

**MICROCOPY**

**976**

**ROLL**

**46**

**NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS**

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS  
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 46

1930-39

793.94/11351-11670  
Nov.-Dec. 1937



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

## INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

1794

PTSM

A

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

GRAY

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated November 29, 1937 11/30

Rec'd 2:50 p. m.

*Telegrams Nanking*  
*see*

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 29 1937  
Department of State

793.94

973, November 29, 3 p. m.

One. The mayor is now here, also Minister of Health who are to remain two days. The police commissioner has been relieved of his post so that military may take over control of the police. The banks closed November 27th with possibility of reopening today but the bankers are now reported as under way up river. Three exchange shops, however, have been ordered to continue temporarily in operation. Postal is preparing to board a ship on which to wait near by until they consider it safe to return and resume the service. British Embassy is beginning today to embark British and some German nationals on a pontoon hulk moored several miles up river. The Secretary of the German Embassy and his German staff are planning to move shortly to the British Embassy and later board the British gunboat. Wounded soldiers at the Hsiakuan railway station, of whom some 2,000 are still here, are reported as causing new difficulties but there has been no (repeat no) serious development. Most food and other shops have closed.

Two.

793.94/1351

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- No. 973, November 29, 3 p. m. from Nanking via N. R.

Two. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

HTM:CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM YANGPAT

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

November 29, 1937

Rec'd 7:30 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: 2nd BRIGADE USMC  
YANGPAT  
COMDESRON 5  
COMSUBRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMSOPAT  
AMEMBASSY CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING



793.94

0029 Yangtze River ports quiet 2350

SMS

793.94/11352

FILED  
NOV 1 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1937  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MR. WILSON  
December 1, 1937.

A-W.

Mr. Wilson: *Sigbee How*

B.

Mr. Secretary: *O'Neill*

I call your attention to the fact that both the American Commander-in-Chief and the British Commander-in-Chief at Shanghai plan to leave there in about two weeks. It seems to me that the question of the movements of the American Commander-in-Chief is one which we may appropriately leave to his discretion.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 2 - 1937  
FE:MMH:ZMK  
Department of State

*mmh*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



LMS  
This telegram is in Navy Code and must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

NOV 29, 1937

REC'D 4:40 p. m.

TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT

0029 Departing with AUGUSTA to Manila about 14 December. HARBLEHEAD will be station ship Shanghai. British Commander-in-Chief leaving for Hong Kong around same time 2032

SMS:EMB

*793.94  
note  
811.30 minute Fleet*



793.94/11353

NOV 29 1937  
F/FG

*v*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS  
FROM

PLAIN and GRAY

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

ER

Canton via N. R.

Dated November 29, 1937

Rec'd 7:45 p. m.

AMEMBASSY PEIPING  
AMCONSUL HANKOW  
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 30 1937  
Department of State

793.94

November 29, 4 p. m.

Yesterday raiding resulted in damage of Wanglik  
bridge of Canton Hong Kong Railway repaired this morning  
and further damage to Canton-Hankow line at point thirty  
miles north of Canton. Railway authorities state that  
latter line will resume service tomorrow.

Today twelve planes dropped more than twenty bombs  
at Canton-Hong Kong Railway below Cheungmuktou cutting  
telegraph line but not doing important damage to tracks.

Mailed Hong Kong, Swatow.

LINNELL

SMS:RGC

793.94/11354

F/FG

DEC 19 1937

63-1

~~FE~~

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS ...  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (A)

FROM ~~Shanghai~~  
Shanghai via N. R.  
Dated November 29, 1937  
Rec'd 3 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 30 1937  
Department of State

793.94  
note  
793.102 S

1058, November 29, 8 p. m.  
Reference my No. 998, November 22, noon. THESE

matters were discussed yesterday afternoon between the  
foreign commandants and the Japanese military. While  
the Japanese reserved their rights, it is believed that  
they will not take precipitate action. I discussed these  
matters in a friendly spirit yesterday morning with the  
Japanese Consul General. He telephoned me last evening  
that the foreign commandants had had a conference with  
the Japanese military and he believed that both sides  
were satisfied with the result. Repeated to Tokyo.

FILED  
JUL 1 1938

GAUSS

CSB  
Anti-Japanese activities in settlement.

793.94/11355

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

64-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

Gray

TSINGTAO Via N.R.  
FROM  
Dated November 29, 1937

Rec'd 8:48 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

AMEMBASSY HANKOW  
AMEMBASSY PEIPIN  
AMCONSUL CHEFOO

COPIES SENT TO  
Spain AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 30 1937  
Department of State

793.94

November 29,

The state of excitement among Chinese officials and residents has greatly increased today due to a rumor of an alleged presentation of an ultimatum to the local municipal government by the Japanese to surrender the city within twenty-four hours. Whatever the cause may be, the extraordinary activity which has taken place today points to a belief among the high Chinese authorities that events are impending which will require them to leave Tsingtao at very short notice. The railway stations within the city, particularly those in the cotton mill district are very heavily guarded and Chinese residents in the vicinity of the mills have been instructed by the municipal authorities to remove themselves forthwith.

Also there were dismissed from municipal employment today the greater part of the few remaining subordinate officials and employees.

It appears to this Consulate that the Chinese authorities are simply losing their nerve.

This morning the Mayor informed the British and French

u

793.94/11356

F/EG  
FILED  
NOV 30 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

64-2

-2-  
From Tsingtao, Nov. 29.

French Consuls who had been instructed by their Ambassadors to make representations to the Mayor in regard to the sparing of destruction of property that first any action he would undertake would be solely in accordance with instructions of the Central Government and without regard to his personal inclinations. Furthermore, he could assure the Consuls <sup>THAT</sup> (A) EVERY measure would be taken to avoid damage to foreign possessions, that is American and European lives and property. Also that the foreign consuls could rest assured that no action in regard to the public utilities was contemplated. The Mayor also gave assurances that the foreign residential district would not be affected.

Sent to the Department, Hankow, Peiping.

SOKOBIN

NPL EMB

WB  
1/26/36

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CA

Gray

TSINGTAO VIA N.R.

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

Dated Nov. 29, 1937

Recd 8:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

FROM

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 30 1937  
Department of State

793.94

November 29, 10 a.m.

The week-end has passed very very quietly in Tsingtao and Tsinanfu. Perhaps the most disturbing element in the situation is the intrigue among the local Chinese politicians and authorities; from a good source the Consulate is informed that the explosion on Friday night reported in my telegram of November 26, 8 p.m. was not accidental but deliberately intended by Mayor to remove violently official to whom arms and munitions of war had been entrusted but who was getting out of hand. The differences in opinion in regard to the Mayor's announced intention of destroying Japanese property are causing great anxiety. There is apprehension not only as to the possibility of a Japanese landing here, but also as to what length the Mayor will go in his announced intention of destruction, particularly in view of the present local disturbances within the municipal administration. In many quarters the crisis is expected to develop within the next forty eight hours.

There is no activity on the north bank of the Yellow River at Tsinanfu and it would seem that the Japanese still desire to abstain from invasion of Shantung south of the Yellow River and more particularly the Tsingtao district, pending outcome of march up Yanailai River.

Sent to the Department, Hankow, Peiping, Chefoo.

RGCE EMB

SOKOBIN

793.94/11357

F/FG

NOV 30 1937

65-1

FE

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM  
MG CORRECTED COPY

Nanking via N.R.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Dated November 29, 1937.

Rec'd 3:37 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.  
*in strict confidence*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 30 1937  
Department of State

972, November 29, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

One. Press reports alleging arrival new Soviet Ambassador may refer to new Soviet Military Attache who, we are authoritatively informed, reached Nanking yesterday accompanied by number of Soviet bombing and pursuit planes with some Soviet pilots and ground men.

Two. Chiang is still here. According to very reliable source he is postponing departure in order to preclude threatened defection of several provincial commanders at the front. One ranking Chinese official came to me today with warning that we should board gunboat when Chiang leaves because trouble among troops would probably result from his departure. Another source has suggested that defenses being prepared at city gates are primarily against incursion of unruly troops.

Three. It is reported that Chinese are destroying nearby airfields including that at Kwangteh whose fall

is:

793.94/11358

REC'D  
NOV 30 1937

F/A



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

65-3

[CONFIDENTIAL]

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

(corrected)

A strictly confidential telegram (no. 972) of November 29, 1937, from the American Embassy at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

General Chiang Kai-shek is still in Nanking and it is very reliably reported that he is delaying departure so as to preclude threatened defection on the part of several provincial commanders at the front. On November 29 a ranking Chinese official warned the Secretary in charge of the American Embassy that when General Chiang leaves Nanking the staff of the Embassy should go aboard a gunboat because Chiang's departure would probably result in trouble among the troops. It has been suggested from another source that the defenses being made ready at the city gates are primarily for the purpose of protection against the incursion of unruly soldiers.

There are reports to the effect that the Chinese are destroying airfields in the vicinity of Nanking, including the one at Kwangteh because its fall is imminent. The Embassy is of the opinion that if the forces in the vicinity of Nanking do not evacuate when Kwangteh falls it is probable that they will be enveloped in the city with the river at their backs, making a  
disastrous

793.94/11358

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-8-

disastrous defense of Nanking from inside the walls  
inevitable.

Newspaper reports asserting that the new Soviet Am-  
bassador has arrived may refer to the new Soviet Military  
Attaché who, according to authoritative information, ar-  
rived in Nanking on November 28. He was accompanied by  
some Soviet ground men and pilots with a number of Soviet  
pursuit and bombing planes.

795,94/11358

*EJC*  
FE:EOC:HES  
11-30

*KICP*  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Hartman NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIVISION OF  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
DEC 4 1937

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

This telegram must be Nanking via N. B.  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (A)

Dated November 29, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 3:37 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 30 1937  
Department of State

972, November 29, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

793.94  
note  
701.6193

One. Press reports alleging arrival new Soviet  
Ambassador may refer to new Soviet Military Attache who,  
we are authoritatively informed, reached Nanking yester-  
day accompanied by number of Soviet bombing and pursuit  
planes with some Soviet pilots and ground men.

Two. Chiang is still here. According to very  
reliable source he is postponing departure events pre-  
clude threatened (?) several provincial commanders at  
the front. One ranking Chinese official came to me today  
with warning that we should board gunboat when Chiang  
leaves because trouble among troops would probably result  
from his departure. Another source has suggested that  
defenses being prepared at city gates are primarily  
against incursion of unruly troops.

Three. It is reported that Chinese are destroying  
nearby airfields including that at Kwangteh because its  
fall is imminent. It seems to us that if troops in this  
area

793.94/11358

F/EG

11

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

LMS 2-No. 972, November 29, noon, from Nanking.

area do not move out when Kwangteh falls they will probably be enveloped here with the river inhabits (inhabitants?) and their friends, making inevitable a disastrous defense of the city from inside the walls.

Four. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

NPL:SMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

[CONFIDENTIAL]

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A strictly confidential telegram (no. 972) of November 29, 1937, from the American Embassy at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

General Chiang Kai-shek is still in Nanking and it is very reliably reported that he is delaying departure events preclude threatened (?) several provincial commanders at the front. On November 29 a ranking Chinese official warned the Secretary in charge of the American Embassy that when General Chiang leaves Nanking the staff of the Embassy should go aboard a gunboat because Chiang's departure would probably result in trouble among the troops. It has been suggested from another source that the defenses being made ready at the city gates are primarily for the purpose of protection against the incursion of unruly soldiers.

There are reports to the effect that the Chinese are destroying airfields in the vicinity of Nanking, including the one at Kwangteh because its fall is imminent. The Embassy is of the opinion that if the forces in the vicinity of Nanking do not evacuate when Kwangteh falls it is probable that they will be enveloped (inhabitants?) in this area with the river inhabits and their friends making a disastrous defense of Nanking from inside the walls inevitable.

Newspaper

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

-8-

Newspaper reports asserting that the new Soviet Ambassador has arrived may refer to the new Soviet Military Attaché who, according to authoritative information, arrived in Nanking on November 28. He was accompanied by some Soviet ground men and pilots with a number of Soviet pursuit and bombing planes.

793,44/11558  
FE:EC:HES  
11-30

*AKH*  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 353.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hankow, China, October 26, 1937

793.94

*Handwritten initials/signature*

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 28 AM 10 53

Subject: Memorandum Concerning Consular Investigation of Chikungshan.

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of Communications and Records  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

For Distribution Check  
To Hold In U.S.A.  
Very good  
J. J. [unclear]  
C. [unclear] FE  
Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 - 1937  
Department of State

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the information of the Department, a copy, in quintuplicate, of my despatch No. 511 of today's date addressed to the Embassy, Nanking, on the above-mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

*P. R. Josselyn*  
P. R. Josselyn  
American Consul General

Enclosure:

- 1. Copy of despatch No. 511 to the Embassy, Nanking, October 26, 1937.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
A-M/C  
JAN 10 1938  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94/11359

In quintuplicate  
123/850.2  
EFD/MYH

FILED  
JAN 10 1938  
F/FG 11359

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 511.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Haikow, China, October 26, 1937

Subject: Memorandum Concerning Consular  
Investigation of Chikungshan.

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Ambassador,  
Nanking.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum prepared by Consul E. F. Drumright concerning a trip made by him to Chikungshan, Hupeh, between July 17 and 19, 1937. Mr. Drumright proceeded to Chikungshan in compliance with my instructions in order to conduct an investigation jointly with a British consular representative of charges made by certain foreign residents of Chikungshan that their privacy was being invaded by Chinese soldiers.

It was ascertained on investigation that the trespasses committed by Chinese soldiers were of an isolated and trivial nature. In consequence, no official protest was made to the Chinese authorities.

In view of the importance of Chikungshan as a summer resort for American missionaries and of the substantial American mission property interests situated there, I have deemed it desirable to transmit a copy of Mr. Drumright's memorandum to the Embassy and Department for possible purposes of reference.

Respectfully yours,

P. R. Josselyn  
American Consul General

Enclosure;

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Enclosure:

Copy of memorandum as stated.

Original to Nanking;  
Copy to Peiping;  
5 copies to Department (despatch No. 355,  
October 26, 1957).

123/380.2

HFD/MTB

A true copy  
of the signed  
original.

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 511, October 26, 1937,  
from Consul General P. R. Josselyn, Hankow, to Embassy,  
Nanking, concerning an inspection of Chikungshan, Hupeh,  
and summary of present conditions.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL  
Hankow, China, July 20, 1937

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Inspection of Chikungshan (鷓公山),  
Hupeh, and Summary of Present Conditions.

Instructions. In compliance with the instructions  
of the Consul General the undersigned, in company with  
Consul Whitmore of the British Consulate General at  
Hankow, proceeded to Chikungshan in order to conduct an  
investigation of existing conditions there, especially  
with reference to alleged charges that Chinese soldiers  
and students were invading the privacy of foreigners  
who are residing on the mountain.

Itinerary. Consul Whitmore and the undersigned  
traveled via the Peiping-Hankow Railway, leaving Hankow  
at 12:30 p.m. July 17th and arriving at Hsintien (新店),  
the railway station at the foot of Chikungshan, at 5:30 p.m.  
of the same day. A journey of one hour by chair up a  
winding pathway brought us to our destination, Consul  
Whitmore going to the so-called "Business Valley" (also  
termed "South Valley") to stay with friends, while the  
undersigned proceeded to "Missionary Valley" to obtain  
lodging at the American School. Sunday July 18th was  
spent in inspecting the mountain and in discussion of  
conditions and problems with various foreign residents of  
Chikungshan. The morning of July 19th was spent in con-  
sultation with the "General Purposes Council", a self-  
governing body for Missionary Valley composed of the  
elected representatives of the missionary societies having  
property in that section of Chikungshan, and in interview-  
ing Mr. Wei Lun (魏倫), Director of the Chikungshan  
Administration Bureau. The impressions gained from these  
consultations and interviews are discussed below. Consul  
Whitmore and the undersigned departed from Chikungshan  
at 1 p.m. on July 19th, boarding the train at Hsintien  
for Hankow at 2:15 p.m., and arriving in Hankow at 7:25 p.m.  
of the same day.

Historical Sketch of Chikungshan. Before launching  
into a description of present day conditions at Chikungshan,  
it may be well to detail, in brief, the history of Chikung-  
shan. Apparently well known in the period of the Manchu  
Dynasty, the first foreigners to visit Chikungshan were two  
American missionaries, Daniel Nelson and Ingvald Daehlin  
in October 1902. Reverend Nelson acquired a tract of land  
in what is now known as "Missionary Valley" in September  
1903. Subsequently, he disposed of portions of his tract  
to missionaries and missionary organizations.

Meanwhile, other missionaries, principally American,  
acquired adjoining tracts of land from the Chinese owners  
between 1903 and 1906. Portions of these latter tracts  
were transferred to foreign merchants residing in Hankow  
and this area eventually came to be known as the "South"  
or "Business Valley." In 1906 the Chinese authorities

objected

-2-

objected to foreign merchants acquiring land at Chikungshan, with the result that the matter was placed in the hands of the Hankow Consular Body which, after conducting lengthy negotiations with the Hupeh Viceroy, succeeded in negotiating the "Chikungshan Treaty" of 1908. Under the terms of this treaty the Chinese Government secured the right to re-acquire by purchase land held by foreigners in the Business Valley. (Land in the Missionary Valley was outside the scope of the Chikungshan Treaty of 1908). Some of the land in the Business Valley, together with improvements, was re-acquired by the Chinese Government, but much of it was not so redeemed and is therefore still the property of foreign property holders, including merchants. Under the terms of the Chikungshan Treaty of 1908, an organization composed of lot holders of the Business Valley called the "Chikungshan Association" was formed in order to move the local Chinese authorities to administer sanitation, lighting, road construction and other municipal functions, and to deal in general with all matters pertaining to the foreign residents of the Business Valley. It is well to point out, however, that policing and other municipal arrangements were and continue to be vested in the Chinese local authorities insofar as the Business Valley is concerned.

Although the Chinese authorities exercise nominal administrative control over "Missionary Valley" in practice, the missionary community maintains its own simple self-government, raises revenue, extends police protection, and builds roads through the agency of an elected body called the "General Purposes Council."

From its inception, Chikungshan developed into a thriving summer resort, being especially popular with missionaries and foreign merchants from Hankow. The Lutheran United Mission, an American missionary organization, erected two large buildings in the Missionary Valley in which are housed the American School. This school is devoted exclusively to the education of the children of missionaries of certain denominations. A large community hall, jointly constructed by the various missionary organizations at Chikungshan, is situated adjacent to the American School. A substantial stone structure housing the Swedish School stands near the American School property. Probably 150 well-constructed residences are scattered throughout the Missionary Valley. The offices of the Chikungshan Administration Bureau and the Military Commander, a middle school, the business section, and more than 100 private residences are to be found in the Business Valley. The great bulk of the American property is located in the Missionary Valley, while British owned property is confined, in the main, to the Business Valley. Chinese property holders are to be found in the Business Valley but not in the Missionary Valley. There is also some German owned property in the Business Valley.

After 1927, conditions at Chikungshan deteriorated owing to chronic civil disturbances and inability of the Chinese authorities to maintain peace and order. Construction activities ceased and the number of foreigners resorting to Chikungshan decreased. In 1932, owing to the threat of banditry, the movement of foreigners to Chikungshan ceased almost entirely. Indeed, in that year two families of

Americans

-3-

Americans who visited the mountain in spite of consular warnings were seized by communist-bandits and held in captivity for several days. However, by 1934, conditions had improved and with the Chinese authorities taking steps to extend protection and improve general living conditions, the movement of foreigners and Chinese to Chikungshan revived. In 1937, practically all the accommodations at Chikungshan have been occupied, the influx of Chinese to the Business Valley being particularly noticeable.

Present Day Conditions at Chikungshan. An effort was made to investigate present day conditions at Chikungshan. The investigation consisted of a personal tour of the area, and discussions with the Director of the Chikungshan Administration Bureau and with missionary and merchant residents of the two valleys. Judging from appearances both the Missionary Valley and the Business Valley are being maintained at present in commendable style. The Missionary Valley, which is maintained through self-imposed levies on the missionary residents through the agency of the General Purposes Council, appeared to be maintained in better condition than the Business Valley. However, more construction and improvements are in evidence in the latter; for example, pathways are being improved and expanded, police boxes installed, pathways illuminated, pavilions constructed, and trees planted. Practically all the residential structures in the Missionary Valley are in good condition and occupied, but some of the residences in the Business Valley have deteriorated and are not occupied. No soldiers or Chinese students were to be observed in the Missionary Valley but were frequently to be seen in the Business Valley. However, this is to be expected since the soldiers' headquarters and the school for ex-Northeastern students are located in the Business Valley. Approximately 30 police were to be seen in the Business Valley but none is stationed in the Missionary Valley. Eight substantial forts constructed of stone stand on strategic elevations around both the Missionary Valley and Business Valley and are constantly manned by troops. All except one of these forts are located at a distance from residences and other structures.

Inquiries addressed to missionary residents elicited the information that Chikungshan is receiving better administration this year than has been the case for a number of years. No complaint was received from American missionaries and, in general, they praised the recent efforts made by the Chinese authorities to improve conditions on Chikungshan. The missionary community enjoys cordial relations with the civil and military authorities at Chikungshan, and has found by experience that informal representations to the authorities are adequate to remedy justifiable complaints. During the present season only one complaint has been made in connection with Chinese soldiers breaking into an unoccupied house, and that complaint was speedily redressed by the Chinese military authorities punishing the guilty persons. None of the residents of the Missionary Valley uttered complaints concerning any invasion of their privacy by Chinese soldiers or students. On the contrary, the statement was made that Chinese soldiers and students seldom intruded in the Missionary Valley.

Discussions

-4-

Discussions held with two British residents of the Business Valley elicited the information that they had during this season constantly experienced invasions of their privacy by curious Chinese soldiers and students of the school maintained for ex-Northeastern boy students. These soldiers and students were said to trespass on the private pathways of the householders and peer into the houses; on occasion they had washed clothing in a private swimming pool but always desisted when requested to do so. They had been guilty of no other objectionable activities, except that of committing nuisances on the mountaintops. No opportunity was afforded to interview the one American merchant family reported to be living in the Business Valley.

Discussion with Members of General Purposes Council.  
On July 19, Consul Whitmore and the undersigned met with the General Purposes Council which, in practice, administers to the simple municipal wants of the Missionary Valley. In reply to an inquiry whether they had any complaints to make regarding the general administration of Chikungshan, various members of the Council stated they had none and, in fact, commented that a noticeable improvement had taken place in the past year or two. The members of the Council appeared vastly more interested in the question of securing assurances that troops would at all times be stationed at Chikungshan for the protection of the mountain from local bandits than in raising protests against alleged nuisances of the soldiers. Stating that communist-bandits were known still to be rampant to the east of Chikungshan, the General Purposes Council deemed it essential that troops be constantly stationed on the mountain; otherwise the situation might be rendered untenable and foreigners would have to consider the possibility of retiring from Chikungshan. This matter was all the more important, they maintained, in view of the threatening situation in North China, the possibility of large scale hostilities, the consequent withdrawal of troops garrisoning Chikungshan to the battlefield, the interruption of rail communications, and a possible dearth of foodstuffs on the mountain. The Council accordingly requested Consul Whitmore and the undersigned to question the Chinese authorities on the possibility of the troops being withdrawn from Chikungshan in the event of hostilities, and to request the latter immediately to notify the General Purposes Council should the troops be withdrawn from Chikungshan so that the missionaries might take prompt steps to evacuate the mountain. Mr. Whitmore and the undersigned agreed to discuss the matter with Mr. Wei Lun, the Chikungshan Administrative Director (鶴公山管理局局長), with whom we had an appointment later in the morning.

Interview with Mr. Wei Lun. Our interview with Mr. Wei, scheduled for 10 a.m., was delayed somewhat owing to the unexpected arrival on Chikungshan of General Sheng Chen (蔣震), Chairman of the Honan Provincial Government, and General Wang Shu-sheng (王樹聲), Vice Director of the Honan and Anhwei Pacification Commissioner's Headquarters, who were searching for quarters for their families for the summer at Chikungshan.

Mr. Wei

-5-

Mr. Wei proved to be a native of Liaoning who was installed as Director at Chikungshan by General Chang Hsueh-liang. As he spoke a limited amount of English the conversation was carried on in Chinese.

After the usual preliminary courtesies, the conversation turned to the garrisoning of Chikungshan. Mr. Wei stated that it was the invariable policy of the authorities to maintain a garrison of about 800 troops on the mountain at all times, and that this policy was backed by the instructions of General Chiang Kai-shek who had expressed the wish to see the mountain developed in the same manner that Kuling has been developed. Eight blockhouses had been built at strategic points around the summer resort and were constantly manned by a guard of 25 soldiers to each blockhouse. Even if general hostilities ensued between China and Japan and it became necessary to withdraw the garrison, Mr. Wei said that the local militia would be called upon to protect the mountain. Mr. Wei said there were communist bandits in the mountains forty or fifty miles east of Chikungshan, but that they had not molested the mountain since 1932 and would not do so as long as a garrison was maintained on Chikungshan. Mr. Wei reiterated that Chikungshan was a safe place for the residence of foreigners and pointed to the expected arrival of the families of the Chairman of the Honan Provincial Government and other prominent Chinese officials as evidence of the safety of Chikungshan. In reply to an inquiry, Mr. Wei gave definite assurances that if by some chance the soldiers were to be withdrawn from Chikungshan, he would take immediate steps to inform the foreign residents of both valleys.

Consul Whitmore then alluded to the matter of certain foreign residents' complaints of the invasion by soldiers of their privacy. He assured Mr. Wei of the gratitude of the foreigners for the protection rendered by the soldiers, and suggested that the so-called invasion of privacy constituted nothing more than the actions of young soldiers who were not used to the presence of foreigners. The foreigners, especially women, looked with dismay and disquiet upon this invasion of their privacy. Mr. Whitmore knew that the authorities were endeavoring to enhance the reputation of Chikungshan as a summer resort, and he therefore hoped that steps would be taken to abate these petty nuisances and thus reassure the foreigners who visited the mountain.

In reply, Mr. Wei said that he was doing everything in his power to enhance the desirability of Chikungshan as a summer resort and that he welcomed any suggestions that would tend to bring about improvements. He welcomed Mr. Whitmore's suggestion concerning the conduct of the soldiers and gave assurances that he would bring it to the attention of the commanding Colonel. He said that the troops complained against had just left the mountain, and that a new garrison composed of men from the 33rd Division was on its way to garrison Chikungshan. He would discuss the matter with the new Colonel immediately on the latter's arrival; he was sure there would be no difficulty. Mr. Wei also suggested that if foreigners on Chikungshan had grievances to ventilate, he would welcome their sending him letters to that effect so that he could take steps to remedy matters.

The

-6-

The undersigned, speaking on behalf of the American residents of Missionary Valley, told Mr. Wei that the assistance and cooperation of the Chikungshan Administration were appreciated in "Missionary Valley" and that the residents of that area had no complaints to voice.

Mr. Wei, who had previously arranged an interview with the Colonel in charge of the garrison on the mountain, apologized and said that owing to a precipitate shift, the Colonel and his troops were on their way down the mountain. He said that the new Colonel had not yet arrived (he had not met the new Colonel) and regretted that our plan of seeing the highest military official on the mountain had miscarried. At our explicit request he assured us that he would speak to the new Colonel (and succeeding officers) regarding the conduct of the soldiers, particularly as regards trespassing on the property of foreigners. We thanked Mr. Wei for his kindness and took our leave.

On the way down the mountain we met with a delegation of missionaries and told them what had transpired at the meeting with Mr. Wei.

American interests at Chikungshan. As has been indicated above, Chikungshan was founded and originally developed by American missionaries, particularly the Lutheran missionaries. It may be well to say a word about American interests on Chikungshan. American interests are predominant in the Missionary Valley, there being little or no American property in the Business Valley. In the Missionary Valley American interests are centered about the American School which was established by and is used almost exclusively for the education of the children of missionaries connected with the Lutheran sects. The American School consists of two commodious buildings constructed of brick and stone, one of which is used as a recitation hall and the other as a hostel. Children are taught from the primary stages through the high school grades. Ordinarily there are about 75 American pupils in attendance and about ten faculty members. Six pupils were graduated from the high school in 1937. In addition to the school property there is a large community hall constructed of stone which is the property of the missionary community of the Missionary Valley. This hall will accommodate about 500 people. In peaceful years about 300 American missionaries resort to Chikungshan for the summer period.

There are probably seventy-five residential structures owned by Americans in "Missionary Valley." These are constructed of stone and are maintained in good condition for occupation during the summer months. Few of these houses are occupied during the winter.

It is estimated that American investments at Chikungshan total approximately \$200,000 local currency (about \$67,000 United States currency). Negotiations are now on foot for the purchase by the Lutheran United Mission of the property of the Swedish School, a large stone building lying adjacent to the American School, which has not been used by the Swedish

missionaries

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

-7-


missionaries in recent years. This property, for which a consideration of \$50,000 local currency is reported to have been offered, would be used as an adjunct to the American School.

So far as could be ascertained American property interests in the Business Valley are insignificant. During the summer of 1937 only one American family was reported to be living in that area.

E. F. Drumright

123/850.2

EFD/MYH



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED  
7  
No. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

1937 NOV 29 PM 4 02

Shanghai, China, November 8, 1937.

793.94  
note  
893.101-8  
note  
893.102-8

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

For Distribution Check			
Grade	For	FOEM In U.S.A.	No.

Subject: Map of the area of the Greater  
Shanghai Municipality.

THE HONORABLE  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 - 1937  
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS  
PUBLICATIONS SECTION  
DEC 1 1937

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose for the files of the Division  
of Far Eastern Affairs a map of the (Chinese) Municipality of  
Greater Shanghai.

I send this map hurriedly, immediately before the closing  
of the pouch, as it is considered desirable to have a copy  
available in the Department for immediate reference in event of  
any discussions or negotiations concerning the future of Shang-  
hai or the Municipality of Greater Shanghai involved in the  
Sino-Japanese hostilities or their settlement.

Respectfully yours,

*C. E. Gauss*  
C. E. Gauss  
American Consul General.

Enclosure:  
One Map  
CEG/ceg

Map in FE  
*La Th*

793.94/11360

F/FG

11360

NOV 7 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Huatler NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 1048

*A-2*

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Shanghai, China, November 1, 1937.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
A-M/C  
JAN 1 1938

For Distribution Check		Y	No
Grade	For	To F II	In U.S.A.
	<i>Good</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<i>Buttrick</i>	ONL - MID	

793.9

SUBJECT: Shanghai Chinese Vernacular Editorial Comment during October on the Sino-Japanese Difficulties and the Attitude of the United States.

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
7  
NOV 29 6 20 AM '37

COPIES SENT TO  
ONL AND MID.  
WASHINGTON.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 1937  
Department of State

1/

I have the honor to refer to my despatch no. 1003, dated October 11, 1937, transmitting Chinese editorial comment on the Sino-Japanese difficulties as it appeared during August and September in the SHUN PAO and the SIN WAN PAO, the two leading independent Chinese vernacular newspapers of Shanghai, and to summarize selected editorial comment which appeared in these two newspapers during October.

At the outset of the month, there was a tendency to criticize the United States for "shirking its responsibility" in regard to Far Eastern matters. While bolstered somewhat by President Roosevelt's Chicago speech and the subsequent statement of the State Department, skepticism still held sway by the middle of the month and one of the editors queried whether the President's "check" and that of the League of Nations would be "honored at their face value". Both newspapers argued for continued resistance against the foe as a means of compelling the United States and Great Britain to assume their responsibility

793.94/11361


JAN 1 1938  
FILED  
F/FG  
//K/

-2-

sibility for the Nine Power Treaty, as one of them stated, "with sincerity". At the end of the month, these Chinese newspapers looked to the Brussels Conference with hope but little assurance, feeling that while China has more foreign friends than Japan the complexity of the international situation must be considered detrimental to the success of the Conference.

Editorial sentiment at the close of the month was that the fate of China depended on her own struggle for existence and that she should not be disheartened by the military and diplomatic setbacks which might occur incident to and during that struggle.

Respectfully yours,



C. E. Gauss  
American Consul General

Enclosure:

- 1/- Summaries of vernacular editorial comment.

RPB:DTM

In quintuplicate to the Department  
Copy to Embassy, Nanking.  
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.  
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

SUMMARY OF CHINESE PRESS EDITORIAL COMMENTS

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE PACIFIC CONFERENCE

The Australian Delegate to the League of Nations has proposed that the Signatories to the Nine Power Treaty and the various countries interested in the Far East be invited to a Pacific International Conference to seek for a solution of the Sino-Japanese dispute. The views of foreign Powers in this regard differ widely. The crux of the matter lies in the attitude of the United States. So far as China is concerned, even if his proposal is passed and the conference is convoked, it is feared that no successful result will be obtained. Should the Signatories be unable promptly to take effective measures to control Japan who is openly and daringly invading China, China will also by no means carry out her treaty obligations unilaterally. With regard to the present attitude of the United States, it can be clearly seen from the reluctance of the Washington authorities again to experience Stimson's embarrassment of 1932 and their failure to enforce the Neutrality Act strictly that they intend to shirk their responsibility. How can we again rely upon this Treaty, which has already become a slip of waste paper, as our effective charm for defense against aggression? In the midst of our painstaking and hard struggle against the enemy, we should actively mobilize "people's diplomacy" and should at the same time engage ourselves in "multilateral economic diplomacy" in order to strengthen the tie binding one nation with another. We can hardly continue to harbor extravagant hopes toward any international conferences.

(SIN WAN PAO, October 1, 1937.)

-----  
SANCTIONS AGAINST THE AGGRESSOR

The sacred war of our entire nation against the brutal and outrageous aggressor has obviously brought about the gradual development of a favorable international situation. From the recent statement made by the American State Department to the League of Nations, it can be seen that the attitude of the United States is still very positive. All the peoples of the world who are lovers of the justice and peace are at present very anxious to see that effective measures will be taken to bring the aggressor under control. Nevertheless, in

view

\*The people should exercise diplomacy in dealing with all other foreigners than Japanese.

\*\*To build up economic relations through diplomatic channels with many countries.

- 2 -

view of the numerous differences among the nations,  
there will still be many difficulties in the future.

(THE SHUN PAO, October 2, 1937.)

-----  
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S SPEECH IS A BLOW TO THE AGGRESSOR

President Roosevelt's speech should not only serve to clear away the grievous misty clouds in the Far East, but should also lay the corner stone of world peace. Not only China who is being attacked should feel encouraged and be grateful, but also all the peoples in the world who love peace, uphold justice, safeguard humanity, respect international morality, and honor international treaties, should be equally thankful. After hearing the ringing of the bell in the midst of a deep night, those who are infected with the epidemic of aggression should wake up. Otherwise, President Roosevelt will conduct quarantine work and will at least "isolate" the patients in order to check the spread of the disease. As to how this "isolation" is to be carried out, President Roosevelt did not disclose definitely. Although it cannot be interpreted to mean the severance of all international relations, President Roosevelt must have planned and be prepared to carry out the severance of economic relations or other measures similar to economic sanctions. Since President Roosevelt has now given such an indication, we cannot but hope that our delegates to the League of Nations and those who have the onerous responsibility of conducting our diplomatic relations with the United States will make more vigorous efforts toward this end. The great weakness has been that the United States, being a strong and great democratic country, has previously remained indifferent to all controversies, and the front line of peace has therefore been without its strong support. This gap has now been filled. It is particularly hoped that the American delegate to the Conference of Signatories to the Nine Power Treaty will exert vigorous efforts in this respect so that President Roosevelt's speech may not become a dishonored check.

(SIN WAN PAO, October 8, 1937.)

-----  
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S ROAR OF JUSTICE

The League Assembly's resolution can sufficiently express the views of an absolute majority of member countries of the League of Nations, while President Roosevelt's speech and the official statement of the State Department can reveal the attitude of the great United States of America. Since international justice has been thereby strengthened, the international situation has also suddenly undergone a change in its appearance. Now since President Roosevelt's speech

and

- 3 -

and the official statement of the State Department have been released to the public, all doubts about the attitude of the United States have been cleared up. Nevertheless, the determination of its attitude by the American Government is naturally not a matter which can be decided upon in one day or in one night. Probably, President Roosevelt was fully aware of the fact that if one kind of comment, even though improper, was firmly believed by a majority of the people, it could not be rectified by empty words alone and would have to wait until it is proved to be erroneous by actual facts. Of late, the outrageous activities of the Japanese troops have been commonly spoken of by the public, and the public opinion in the United States has also been of one accord against such activities. President Roosevelt has therefore availed himself of this opportunity to make a speech to startle the public, bitterly denouncing aggressive activities. Thus his thoughtfulness and farsightedness indicate that he is really competent to be a great statesman of the present generation. The "Open Door" policy has now been violated by outrageous Japan, and the Nine Power Treaty and the Anti-War Pact have also been torn up by her. Can the United States look at such actions carefully without seeing them? Besides, the United States has very substantial interests in China and has a large dominion on the Pacific Ocean. If she sits by and watches Japan do whatever the latter likes at present including annexing China, American interests will then be completely uprooted. Before long the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands will also be taken over by Japan. How can the United States tolerate this? Since the United States has now clarified her attitude, naturally it is of considerable importance to the situation in the Far East. Not only has the strength of the League Assembly's resolution been greatly increased, but also with the earnest cooperation of the United States it will be easier for the forthcoming Pacific Conference to take effective measures to stop Japan's aggressive activities. Even if outrageous Japan acts in accordance only with her own will and in complete disregard of all, judging from the circumstances Britain and the United States will possibly take joint action. However, with outrageous Japan's wild ambition and brutal measures which have caused China to put up armed resistance, the present Far Eastern war is designed for twofold objects on our part, i.e. to fight for the continued existence of our own country and for the protection of world justice. China is willing to employ her own strength to complete these two sacred missions. It will of course be very welcome to China and heartily appreciated by her if the various friendly Powers in the world can uphold justice, bring moral pressure upon outrageous Japan and render China substantial aid, which may put an end to the brutal acts of outrageous Japan at an early date and may shorten the war catastrophe in the Far East.

(TA KUNG PAO, October 8, 1937.)

-----  
LEAGUE

- 4 -

LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES

In view of the complicated relations among the nations and of the necessary solemn and roundabout process of international movement, we feel rather pleased with and are grateful for the League's resolution and Mr. Roosevelt's speech at this time. It is only necessary for our country to make the period of our armed resistance longer than the time to be spent on the roundabout international process; then this painstaking and hard struggle for punishment of the outrageous party will of course be won by us by virtue of aid from the many. A study of the American President's speech reveals the following points which may be worthy of special attention: 1. He said that "Should international anarchy be permitted to grow and remain uncontrolled, the United States will probably not be able to escape from being attacked". Will the United States take action to meet existing facts? 2. Will the United States take some effective action so far as philanthropic love and humanity are concerned? 3. When will the United States make "positive effort" to take "positive action"? 4. How should the United States make the Nine Power Treaty of Washington and the Anti-War Pact of Paris return to life? An examination of the League's resolution also discloses the following points worthy of particular attention: 1. How should the other eight Powers, except Japan, promptly effect restoration of the value of the Treaty? 2. How can the interpretation of "empty words" as "spiritual" be removed by the various countries from dictionaries in every language? 3. While on the one hand China's resistance is explicitly and definitely recognized as legitimate and is clearly pointed out as a beneficial act, on the other hand shouldn't the uninterrupted maintenance of financial, commercial and social intercourse between the member countries of the League of Nations and Japan, which will directly and indirectly strengthen and prolong the extremely condemnable task imposed upon China, be interpreted as action which may weaken China's resisting strength and increase China's difficulties? 4. How should the member countries discharge their obligation to extend help to China and avail themselves of the opportunity to take independent action to help China? We hope that the United States and the member countries of the League of Nations will spontaneously cause their checks to be honored at their face values, in order that they may face China in true friendship and come up to the spirit of worship and belief in justice.

(THE CHINA TIMES, October 8, 1937.)

-----  
ACHIEVEMENT OBTAINED FROM RESISTANCE

The speech made by President Roosevelt together with the statement released by the State Department which definitely maintains that Japan violates her treaties and resorts to acts of aggression, has given

great

- 5 -

great stimulation to the countries which fight for the cause of righteousness. Furthermore, these pronouncements advocate the collaboration with the League of Nations for the purpose of safeguarding peace. It is sincerely hoped that after the opening of a conference of the signatories to the Nine Power Treaty a strong front will be established and effective measures taken to carry out the principle declared in the statement of the American State Department which stated "international treaties must be respected and international morality must be restored". It is indeed very gratifying that we have won the sympathy of all the friendly nations in the world. But meantime we must observe the situation keenly and understand what is the element which has aroused the sense of righteousness among the nations. It is all due to our heroic demonstration at the time of crisis, which has dealt the aggressor a severe blow. To make it plainer, the change in the international situation is a result of our armed resistance and a heavy price has been paid for it by blood and flesh.

(SIN WAN PAO, evening edition, October 8, 1937.)

-----

A TRIFLING COMMENT

The speech delivered by President Roosevelt, the resolution adopted by the League Assembly on the Sino-Japanese case and the official statement issued by the American Government indicate that China has gained unanimous sympathy from the world. Our country which is being attacked naturally is grateful and feels encouraged. However, the price of our gain of unanimous sympathy from the entire world is fully paid by our blood and flesh. Now we should show our gratitude to the various countries by driving the aggressors out of the line of our national defense with our blood and flesh. If we have one drop of blood we should drop it on the body of the enemy. If we have one round of ammunition we should put it in the enemy's head.

(THE SHUN PAO, evening edition, October 8, 1937.)

-----

COMMENT ON INAUGURATION OF THE COSMOPOLITAN CLUB

The causes for recurrence of a world war will be nothing more than the following: (1) The failure of cooperation between Great Britain and the United States will permit Japan to dominate the Far East, thereby compelling Soviet Russia to resort to arms. (2) The radical action to be taken by Soviet Russia will involve western Europe. (3) The conclusion of an agreement between Japan, Germany and Italy will build up two large war barricades in the world. As regards the first point, it is believed that the brain trust in the White House already has the situation well in hand. As regards the second point, China has made strict explanation

regarding

- 6 -

regarding the Sino-Soviet non-aggression treaty. As regards the third point, Germany bitterly hates the destruction of the Far Eastern market and Italy is also unwilling to fall into another's snare recklessly.

(SIN WAN PAO, October 9, 1937.)

-----  
THIS ACCOUNT SHOULD BE LIQUIDATED RIGHT FROM THE BEGINNING

The foreign Powers interested in the Far East, particularly Great Britain and the United States, are able to take effective measures to liquidate this account. The so-called effective measures are (1) economic sanctions and (2) sanctions by armed force. It is needless to talk about the effect of sanctions by armed force. The effect of economic sanctions is very powerful because Japan's war machinery entirely depends upon arms and raw material from Great Britain and the United States. I believe that since the British and American political leaders have resolutely proclaimed their determination to take effective measures to uphold the sanctity of treaties and pacts, they must have made some preparations for such effective measures. What they are considering is how to find the most practicable way in the midst of contradictory and complicated relations among the nations.

(THE SHUN PAO, October 14, 1937.)

-----  
BRITISH AND AMERICAN FAR EASTERN POLICIES

President Roosevelt and Premier Chamberlain have solemnly announced their determination to uphold the sanctity of the Nine Power Treaty. These pronouncements naturally should be powerful. However, we know that the capital investments of Great Britain and the United States are closely spread over the Far East. Although these two countries are deeply impressed with the aggressor's menace, there are many other factors to which they are required to give consideration. The information received from London and Washington during the past few days reveals the fact that the policies of these two countries are limited to mediation in the present situation because both of them are most anxious to see an early termination of the hostilities. Under the present circumstances, mediation is practically impossible. Even if it is possible, such mediation will hardly be favorable to the outlook for China and the future of world peace. We can have no alternative but to adhere firmly to our determination to resist until the soil is scorched and to fight for the freedom of our nation with iron and blood; then Great Britain and the United States can be compelled to assume their responsibility for the Nine Power Treaty with sincerity.

(THE SHUN PAO, October 17, 1937.)

-----  
BRUSSELS

- 7 -

BRUSSELS CONFERENCE AND FATE OF CHINA

The Brussels Conference is about to open. The question which attracts public interest is whether or not such a conference can produce any result favorable to China. Indeed, the Brussels Conference will not be able to produce a satisfactory result, but we cannot deny that China has more international friends than Japan. Moreover, we cannot overlook the fact that Soviet Russia and the United States will act as leaders in the Conference. In short, while we certainly cannot harbor any extravagant hopes toward such a conference prior to its opening, on the other hand we cannot but pay close attention to it. We must realize that international relations are complicated and changeable. If China firmly adheres to her own position and exerts her efforts through diplomatic channels in the midst of this important conference, we feel confident that there will be a success to some extent. Even if diplomatic efforts fail to cause this conference to produce any favorable result, we also should not feel pessimistic or disappointed because the fate of our nation entirely depends upon our own struggle.

(THE SHUN PAO, October 31, 1937.)

Prepared by Cht  
Seen by HHS  
Copied by Tsj



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR

FROM CINCAF  
November 30, 1937

Rec'd 9:05 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC  
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMEMBASSY CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
ALUSMA PEIPIING

793.94

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 30 1937  
Department of State

0030. Japanese front several miles Kiangyin Wutsin  
Shang Szean line, rapid progress continuing. Advance on  
Hongchow reached Wukang. Conditions Settlement unchanged.  
1915.

CSB

793.94/11363

EG 3 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

66-1

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be- **FROM**  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (A)

Tokyo  
Dated November 30, 1937

*telegram to London for  
Hickok.*

Rec'd 7:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
**COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.**

*Telegram to President*  
Division of  
**FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS**  
NOV 30 1937  
Department of State

580, November 30, 5 p.m.  
Our 569, November 27, noon.

793.94

One. Military officers of the Embassy have been told  
in widely separated Japanese military quarters that a  
declaration of war will be issued tomorrow or the day  
after.

Two. There is no reliable basis for evaluating  
such information other than the statement made by the  
Prime Minister and reported in our 571, November 27, 2 p.m.

Repeated to Peiping for Hankow.

793.94/11364

GREW

HTM:WVC

*copy*

FILED  
NOV 30 1937

F/FCG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*b* (CONFIDENTIAL)

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 580) of November 30, 1957, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

According to information received in widely separated Japanese military circles by military officials attached to the American Embassy, war will be declared either the 1st or the 2nd of December.

With the exception of the Prime Minister's statement (reported in the Ambassador's telegram no. 571, of November 27) there is no reliable basis on which such information can be appraised.

Note. Admiral Holmes and Major Mayer (17 1910) informed orally of the reference made in this telegram to Tokyo's confidential telegram No. 569, Nov. 27, 1957.

*rd*

793.94/11364

*ARR*  
FE:ARR:REK  
11/30/37

*ARR*  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Object

Charge Department

Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Charge to *Part a*  
\$ It should be clearly understood  
being communicated to anyone.

Washington.

NOV 30 PM 6 47 NOV 30 PM 6 47 November 30, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON (England).

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

472

Following for 'Hornbeck.' Please inform him promptly.

QUOTE. (Telegraph Section: Please insert here the text  
of Tokyo's 580, <sup>11364</sup> November 30, 5 p. m., excluding reference to  
telegram No. 569, November 27, noon). UNQUOTE.

(Gray) The pertinent paragraphs of Tokyo's 571, <sup>11307</sup> November 27,  
2 p. m.; read as follows:

QUOTE Several American correspondents are cabling  
extended accounts of an interview which the Prime Minister  
gave yesterday to Japanese press representatives. The  
following are summarized excerpts of statements on prin-  
cipal points of interest: \*\*\*\*\*

~~██████~~ Declaration of war: The Government has been  
studying the matter, but no conclusion has been reached; for  
the time being no action will be taken. UNQUOTE. (and gray)

Hull  
(7.2.1.1)

FE:FCV:REK

FE

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

793.94/11364

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

C

66-2

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PARTAIR  
 PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Department of State

Charge to  
\$

Washington,

1937 DEC 3 PM 3 17

December 3, 1937

AMEMBASSY  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS  
TOKYO (Japan)

This cable was sent in Confidential Code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.

793.94/11364

RUSH. 327

Your 580, November/30, 5 p.m.

The Department desires to be informed of any information available since the dispatch of your telegram under reference and of your present estimate in regard to this matter.

W. Hill  
WR

793.94/11364

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

OR

DEC 3 1937.PM

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_\_

F/EG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FWD  
RMT*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

RECEIVED BY STATE  
DEC 11 1937  
VINOUE

Reference Tokyo's 2663, Nov. 11, 1937 -  
"Japan and the Vatican".

The Associated Press report alleging that the Vatican had declared strongly for the Japanese in the present conflict, the voluble and joyous reception of this news in Japan by the press and public leaders, and the Vatican's categorical denial of the story - all these matters are well known, and their description in this despatch merits no particular attention.

The attached pamphlet entitled "Japanese Catholics View the Sino-Japanese Conflict" and the Embassy's comments in that regard are, however, worth noting. The general tenor of the pamphlet is that Japan's actions in China are entirely in consonance with the teaching of the Catholic Church. The document states that three conditions are usually set down by Catholic moralists as essential for the entrance of a State into war, namely, "sovereign authority, a just cause, and a right intention", and that Japan's position in the present hostilities fulfills all of these conditions.

*J.M.J.*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1 copy of the pamphlet  
in Li. 432  
12-10-37  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION  
EUROPEAN A.  
DEC 6 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Tokyo, November 11, 1937.

No. 2663.

SUBJECT: JAPAN AND THE VATICAN.

793.94  
note  
766a.94

*Bureau*

Form with fields for 'To', 'For', and 'In U.S.A.' with checkmarks.

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 29 PM 1 45

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 1937  
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DEC 7 1937  
DIVISION OF  
RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS  
PUBLICATIONS SECTION  
DEC 1 1937  
Copies of accompanying  
documents stamped to be  
forwarded to DCOR

Honorable  
The Secretary of State  
Washington

Sir:

An Associated Press story alleging that the attitude of the Vatican in the present Sino-Japanese hostilities was pro-Japanese was prominently displayed in the Japanese press under large type headlines and a section of the Japanese press played up the report and used it in an attempt to defend Japan's actions in China. However, after the issuance of the emphatic denial of this report by the Holy See on October 16, editorial comment on the matter ceased.

According to a Domei despatch from Rome dated October 14, the Associated Press learned from a Vatican source on that day that the Holy See, keenly alive to the "growing

Red

793.94/11365

F/MR

DEC 13 1937

11365

-2-

Red menace in China" resulting from the Nanking Government's rapprochement with the Chinese Communist Party and from closer relations between China and Soviet Russia, had issued eight specific instructions to the Catholic hierarchy and missions in the Far East, among them the following: to support Japanese action without reserve whenever Bolshevik danger appears active; to preach the necessity of China's comprehending the precepts of Japanese civilization and of divesting itself of Communist influence; to point out that China's vastness will tend to permit gradual absorption by China of Japanese influence, provided the Chinese people discover again the standards of their ancient civilization; and to give the Japanese military authorities the clear impression that on the part of the Catholic Church there is no obstacle to "complete collaboration". In addition, a Domei despatch from Rome dated October 21 stated that in a speech delivered before high Catholic dignitaries and missionaries at the Gregorian University on October 21, Archbishop Celeso Constantini, Secretary of the Catholic Congregation for Propagation of the Faith, had said that Communism had "shown itself" in China and must be resisted by the Church with determined and effective methods, urged a relentless struggle against Bolshevism in China "not limited to prayers of devotion", and stressed the clever propaganda methods used by Russian Communists in that country.

While the adoption by the Vatican of any attitude toward the Sino-Japanese conflict other than that of strict impartiality would strike most observers as somewhat fanciful, to the Japanese mind moral support of Japan by the Catholic Church as against China would not seem out of the way. First of all, the Catholics are bitterly opposed to those enemies of religion, the Communists, and the Japanese in general profess to believe, and are perhaps actually convinced, that

Chinese

-3-

Chinese resistance against Japan is largely inspired by the Communist influence in China. Secondly, the Church's precept of law and order throughout the world would in Japanese psychology bear a close resemblance to Japan's announced principle of the "stabilization of peace in the Far East". Hence, it can be seen that it was not difficult for the Japanese to make a "case for Japan" out of such a far-fetched report as that of the Associated Press.

Apropos of the alleged instructions issued by the Vatican to its hierarchy and missions in the Far East, the YOMIURI of October 16 stated that it was reassuring to learn that the Vatican as well as Italy was sympathetic toward Japan; that the Vatican's early recognition of General Franco's rightist régime in Spain was the direct consequence of the destruction of churches and cultural institutions by the Spanish Government, which was in league with the Soviet Union; that there was nothing remarkable in the present action of the Vatican in declaring itself "behind Japan's action in China"; and that this step on the part of the Holy See would have a far-reaching effect on the situation in China. The Osaka ASAHI of October 17 asserted that the Vatican's action could be considered as the equivalent of one million reinforcements dispatched in Japan's support; that it was more than enough to counteract anti-Japanese arguments and opinions expressed in Great Britain, the United States, and other countries; that a special telegram from New York to the Osaka MAINICHI indicated that in accordance with the papal instructions, all Catholic believers in the United States were about to adopt a policy in support of Japan and in opposition to all anti-Japanese movements; and that the step taken by the Pope had particular significance in that it would counteract the bad effects of the recent anti-Japanese gesture of the

Archbishop

-4-

Archbishop of Canterbury. THE JAPAN TIMES of October 16 argued that the Catholic Church had supported Japan because of the justice of Japanese actions in China; that if Japan's present military activities in China had been considered to be aggressive, the Catholic Church would never have approved those activities; and that, although the Church deplored war, human massacre, and destruction, it considered war as necessary for the preservation of human peace and happiness.

Domei reported on October 16 that the Pope's open support of Japan's stand in its present struggle in China had encouraged the Roman Catholic Church in Japan to plan positive steps to support this country's contention and that Bishop Yoshigoro Taguchi of the Roman Catholic Church had left for North China not only to comfort the Japanese soldiers there on behalf of 270,000 Catholics in Japan, but also to act as the proxy of Japanese Catholics in explaining the position of Japan to Catholic Churches in Peking, Tientsin, and other North China cities.

Furthermore, it was reported that Rear Admiral Shinjiro Yamamoto, retired, a Roman Catholic, would visit Rome and other European cities in December to defend Japan's stand, and that prior to his departure for Europe he would visit Catholic missionaries in Shanghai and North China with a similar intent. THE JAPAN TIMES of October 21 attributed the following statement to Rear Admiral Yamamoto before his departure: "If the 320,000,000 Catholics in the world stand for Japan, it will greatly improve Japan's position abroad. I have been a Catholic for 40 years and am determined to do my utmost in performing this heavy task. The Church of England is anti-Japanese, but there are in that country 4,000,000 Catholics, and I expect that they will understand Japan's cause."

In

-5-

1/ In a further effort to present Japan's case to the world in a favorable light, the National Committee of the Catholics of Japan has published a pamphlet on the Sino-Japanese conflict, a copy of which is enclosed. The general tenor of the pamphlet is that Japan's actions in China are entirely in consonance with the teaching of the Catholic Church. This document states that three conditions are usually set down by Catholic moralists as essential for the entrance of a State into war, namely, "sovereign authority, a just cause, and a right intention," and that Japan's position in the present hostilities fulfills all of these conditions. The pamphlet makes a point of comparing the Vatican's announced attitude on Communism with that of Japan and of stressing the alleged danger of Communism in the Far East.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph C. Grew.

Enclosure:  
Pamphlet of The National Committee of the Catholics of Japan, entitled: "Japanese Catholics View the Sino-Japanese Conflict."

710.  
GDA:mg

Copy to Embassy, Rome.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

**JAPANESE CATHOLICS VIEW  
THE SINO-JAPANESE  
CONFLICT**

**THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE  
CATHOLICS OF JAPAN**

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE  
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

773.94/11365

## Japanese Catholics View the Sino-Japanese Conflict

A Catholic cannot subscribe, without due reserve, to the slogan; "My country, right or wrong." He feels bound in conscience to uphold the proper ideal of patriotism against both extreme bigoted nationalism and vague internationalism, either being opposed to the right order of charity.

Neither can he accept the immoral principle: "Might is Right." In upholding the ideal of justice he is equally opposed to the extremes of militarism and pacifism, the former making the cult of force an end in itself, the latter, usually based on false interpretation of Holy Scripture, standing for the attitude of non-resistance to such a degree as to overlook the right and the duty of self-defence.

No doubt, many Catholics are militarists unconsciously, their national pride urging them to get their nation at the head of the world and finding armed Might the only means of doing so. But, on the other hand, there are also not a few who in their zeal for peace at any costs forget the fact that the State is the trustee for the welfare of its members and must defend their rights or be false to its trust. Moreover, reason and experience teach us, that evil not resisted and justice not vindicated and right not protected would bring a fallen world speedily to ruin. The Catholic Church holds that the right of just self-defence inheres in the State even more than in the individual. What self-defence is for the individual, that war is for society or the State, namely, the act of warding off unjust attacks or of asserting important rights by force of arms.

The present conflict between China and Japan is not a formal war in its strictest sense, which is usually defined as a conflict between the armed forces of two or more Sovereign States, but a war-like measure, termed as "punitive expedition", which means a vio-

lent measure taken generally by one State against another semi-civilized or loosely organized State to obtain redress against violated treaties or rights which cannot be secured through ordinary diplomatic dealings. Moreover, this armed measure is not directed against the masses but against the leaders as often declared by the Japanese Government.

Three conditions are usually set down by Catholic moralists as essential to entrance by a state into war. They are: Sovereign authority, a just cause and a right intention. Obviously neither a private person or group nor a subordinate political division possesses the right to wage war, but only the supreme lawfully constituted authority of the State. Equally obvious is a right intention; even though engaged in justifiable warfare a State should not include wrongful ends and purposes among its objectives.

The second condition, sometimes formulated as "a just and necessary cause" contains the core of the problem, whenever discussion arises as to the lawful nature of a certain war or warlike measures. The two adjectives "just" and "necessary" would seem to be identical, since no cause will justify war unless it is such as to render war necessary.

It is a vital question, all important to Japanese themselves as well as to the world at large, whether the present Sino-Japanese conflict will stand the test of being examined in the light of those principles. If Japan stands justified before the Forum of conscience she need not be afraid of the Press-Campaign waged against her in different countries, favoured by certain invested interests as well as by various occult forces. Has not the same Press, as Pope Pius XI puts it in His Encyclical on Communism, by a "conspiracy of silence" concealed the menace of a world organization as vast and dangerous as Russian Communism, "we say conspiracy, because it is impossible otherwise to explain how a press usually so eager to exploit even the little daily incidents of life has been able to remain silent for so long about the horrors perpetuated in Russia, in Mexico and even in a great part of Spain; and that it should have relatively so little to say concerning a world organization as vast as Russian Communism."

Japanese Catholics have noted with gratitude the reserved and sympathetic treatment of the Sino-Japanese affair by the Catholic

press all over the world and feel all the more the obligation to examine Japan's case in the light of Christian moral principles and to place their findings before their Catholic brethren in East and West.

It would hardly seem necessary to stress the fact that the military operations in China have been authorized by the legitimate supreme authority of the State, commissioned to safeguard the welfare of the community, had not irresponsible rumours been spread that they were started at the initiative of an uncontrolled military group against the real intentions of the Japanese Government. The unanimity with which both Houses of the Parliament and the whole nation supported the policy of the Government towards China and the special message of Japan's Sovereign, His Imperial Majesty, to the Imperial Diet regarding the China-affair should leave no doubt, that the measures taken against China represent the authoritative exercise of Japan's Sovereign power, to which belongs the right of wielding the sword in order to protect the material, moral and spiritual possessions of the Japanese nation.

In his speech on the "China Incident" in the 72nd Session of the Imperial Diet the Premier Prince Konoe emphasized the resolution of the Japanese Government to resort to force in order to bring about a basic readjustment in the relations between Japan and China and solemnly declared that in carrying out this policy the Government feels increasingly the graveness of its responsibility.

Since then support of that policy has been displayed throughout the length and breadth of the Empire.

The second condition determining the just nature of a war (and consistently of war-like actions) may be summed up by the phrase "necessary self-defense," which implies three facts:

- 1) the existence of certain rights and certain just claims of primary importance to the State and its members which must be protected,
- 2) these rights must be actually violated or at least in certain and imminent danger of being violated,
- 3) War i.e. the use of armed force must be necessary, i.e. the only available means to secure the lawful end, peaceful means having been exhausted to bring about better conditions.

If we apply those principles to the present Sino-Japanese conflict we must first examine Japanese rights involved and their importance to the nation's existence and welfare.

As a second step, we have to find out to which degree vital rights of Japan have been violated and menaced.

Finally the question must be answered whether the inefficiency of peaceful means attempted in vain justifies the use of armed force as the final and last argument of asserting those fundamental rights.

#### Vital Rights of Japan in Manchuria and North-China.

Few people would question that Japan's special position in Manchuria and North China involves "special interests," mainly economic in character. But may those "special interests" be transformed into "rights" in international relation?

In the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902, Great Britain recognized Japan's claim to "special interest in China, which she will not concede to any European or American power." The Franco-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese treaties of 1907 gave similar recognition of Japan's "special interests in China." The Lansing-Ishii Agreement 1917 enlisted America's recognition of Japan's "special interests" in China (rendered in Japanese by "tokushu riyeki"). According to Viscount Ishii's notes this phrase was chosen to describe his statement of the conversation between Lansing and himself that "Japan possesses interests superior to other powers in China as a whole, especially in the regions which are contiguous." In the terms of the Nine-Power Pact of February 6, 1922, formal renunciation was made by the powers, including Japan, of all claims to either "spheres of interest" or "spheres of influence" in China. Both expressions are rather vague of meaning but according to the prevailing spirit of the Conference those general renunciations should preclude the "enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory" (article IV) and prevent monopolistic claims, thus paving the way to the adoption of the "open-door policy" to which all signatories of the Treaty should be committed.

By putting her signature under the Pact, Japan renounced any

future monopolistic claim—but could and did not relinquish such special vital rights as flow from the close neighbourhood and unique historical relations between China and Japan. Moreover, Japan made explicit and formal reservation reasserting her claim to “vital interests in Manchuria generally, a region where, by reason of its close propinquity to Japan’s territory more than anything else, she has vital interests in that which relates to her economic life and national safety.” Although not expressly stated, the same reservation and claim hold good to contiguous regions, as Eastern Inner Mongolia, which stand in very close and special relation to Japan’s national defense and her economic existence. Questions vital to the economic and political safety of Japan are at stake. Japan explicitly reserved the right to take such steps as were necessary to guarantee “the economic existence and national defense of Japan;” Japan asserted a special claim to take measures necessary to prevent “direful influences” from Russian territory from spreading beyond Manchuria.

But whatever may be the purely “legal” position concerning more or less defined formal international rights, the realities either in international relations or law are as often to be found outside the actual texts of treaties, agreements and diplomatic correspondences as in them.

To put it quite plainly and definitely:

1) Japan has a strict right to ward off the sinister forces of Communism from spreading further in the Far-East. This is not a purely internal matter for China. The very structure of Japanese society and State-life is menaced by any further advance of Russian communism into the Far East, the outlying province of Korea being particularly susceptible of communistic influences.

Pope Pius XI rightly speaks of “a propaganda so truly diabolical that the world has perhaps never witnessed its like before—directed from one common centre—shrewdly adapted to the varying condition of diverse peoples.” (Encyclical on Communism)

2) Japan has a right to commercial intercourse with her neighbours, especially when national prosperity as a whole, nay, even the economic basis for the livelihood of a large section of the population is at stake. Grotius, Vittoria and others hold that a State has a right to intercourse with its neighbours. Cathrein,

following the common teaching of Catholic Ethics, counts among causes of a just war the maintenance of trade in such cases, where national welfare as a whole is gravely injured and endangered by unfair exclusion from markets open to others.

3) Japan has a right to intervention against anti-Japanese movements assuming proportions which threaten the political security and peaceful relations in the Far East. This intervention may consist in armed force if other means are of no avail, especially if such boycotts and anti-Japanese demonstrations are the outcome of a consistent policy of hatred against Japan, carried out and promoted by the leaders and with the (at least) silent agreement of the authorities of China, and result in ever increasing heavy losses of life and property of Japanese citizens.

4) Finally Japan has a right to defend Japanese property and invested rights in Manchuria and North China lawfully acquired in the course of many years of peaceful work and trade, especially if a substantial part of the national wealth is involved.

#### Are those vital rights and interests menaced and violated?

##### *1. The menace of Communism.*

The menace of Communism in the Far East cannot be better illustrated than by the increasing number of missionaries killed or held in captivity by lawless bands of a communistic wild soldiery and by the fratricidal wars perpetuating murder and disorder in a country, once highly civilized and blessed with singular resources and potentialities to support a prosperous and peaceful population. Bolshevistic under-hand machinations, thriving on turmoil and agitation, had assumed proportions that Japan could no longer afford to remain an impartial and disinterested spectator. Fire in the neighbour's house and epidemics next door must be fought, cannot be "left alone" to look after themselves. Since the main forces of the communists pushed north into Shensi and Kansu, hoping to establish communication—after Outer Mongolia had already fallen a prey to Soviet Power—with Soviet Russia through Sinkiang, Japan's right to self-defense and protection against the wily world-bolshevization policy of the Third International became

3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
August 10, 1972  
IS, Date 12-18-75

actual—especially in view of the inner weakness exhibited by the neighbouring country in combatting such a formidable menace to peace and order in the Far East. When finally increasing signs of evidence left no more doubt of a secret pact and understanding between China and Moscow—in the meantime openly manifested by the so-called “Non-aggression agreement” between the two Powers—the right of intervention had to be used by the Japanese Government as a matter of plain duty to preserve the existence of the social structure and order of this Empire. No fear of being stigmatized as “aggressor” by hypocritical outcries could be allowed to interfere with that sacred duty of a Government, conscious of its responsibility. Had not the same Powers, protesting now against our country, maintained an ominous “conspiracy of silence”—to use the words of Pope Pius XI—vis-à-vis the under-world-activities of Communism in the Far East as well as in Mexico, Spain and other parts of Europe.

Japan can not tolerate to be encircled by bolshevist Neighbours—Russia on the one hand and a bolshevized China on the other. There is Russia with her self-sufficient Far Eastern Army, with a steel and concrete fortified line, with fifteen completely mechanized divisions, over 1000 tanks and well over 1000 aeroplanes which can menace Tokyo and Osaka and carry hostilities to Japanese soil. This is only the statement of a fact. There is China with ever multiplying cases of systematic agitation and provocation against Japan, not sporadic in nature, but organized and proceeding from a common centre under the sway of occult forces. This, again, is but the statement of a fact. Although China has no open military alliance with Russia—the alignment of forces is perfectly evident and Japan has to take notice thereof, all the more as the outbreaks of anti-Japanese agitations manifested the sway held by communistic influences over the vast extents of the neighbouring China.

We Japanese Catholics feel confident that our brethren in the East and West will show understanding of the regrettable plight into which our country has been plunged by communistic manoeuvres.

We know, our country has no territorial ambitions in China. Perhaps we cannot persuade our fellow-Catholics of other countries

to share our conviction. But they should, and we entertain the hope, they will understand the special position of Japan in Asia as the sole Power called upon and capable to stem the tides of communistic forces which threaten to engulf the immensities of Asia inhabited by almost the half of mankind.

Japan has a unique structure of Family and State, which we proudly call "Kokutai," the "mystical political body of our Family-State." We are determined to defend this sacred trust of order, bequeathed to us by our ancestors from immemorial times. Every Japanese is ready to give his life for this great good, ranking high in our scale of values.

Catholic teaching not only approves of our attitude, but inculcates the religious duty to make sacrifices for the preservation and promotion of the common good of Family and State and the maintenance of peace and order.

Communistic advances and penetration in the neighbouring country have created an imminent and immediate danger to Japan.

Communism and Bolshevization must and will be banished from the borders of the our Empire, Japan will and must live up to her position and mission as custodian of peace and order in the Far East.

Japan at heart sympathizes with China's cardinal national policy of internal unification and reconstruction of the country on a unified basis. However, Japan must be opposed to a policy of cooperation with the Comintern or a People's Front swayed by Moscow, as its only and natural result is to disturb the peace of the Far East and the international relations of this part of the world, which are of such immediate concern to Japan.

*2. Grave Menace to the economic foundation of the Japanese population.*

The population of Japan has risen from 45 million in 1900 to over 70 million at present, the annual increase being over one million. Japan cannot support herself. Only about 16 percent of Japanese territory is productive soil, the rest is rock and quaking volcanic slag. Some stretches of land are still capable of development, but at unbearable costs.

There are not even 100 (one hundred) square feet of tillable earth per Japanese individual, one square mile of productive Japanese earth for 2774 human beings! Manchuria has—by way of comparison—only 65 persons per square mile of fertile soil.

If all the United States were populated as Japan is, they would be supporting one billion five hundred million persons. Would then, we venture to ask, Mexico and Canada be left undisturbed?

But Japan does not look to China's soil for colonization. Even to Manchoukuo, Japanese migration has been negligible. Japan wants badly raw materials, industrial and comestible; Japan wants markets which must support its population; and Japan must live on her trade or let perish a large proportion of her population. Attempts to shut her off from such a vital basis of her trade and commerce as is offered by her vast neighbour country must be met by forceful resistance, other means remaining ineffective.

Doors have been locked to Japanese immigrants in almost all the countries bordering upon the Pacific Ocean. High tariff walls, discriminations against the embargos on Japanese exports put ever graver obstacles in the way of Japanese trade and commerce and threaten the very life-line of our economic existence.

With every possible vigour we must therefore maintain our right to lawful trade and intercourse with a neighbour country whose commercial relations are of vital importance and necessity to this country. Organized boycotts are a direct menace to our national life and welfare and must be fought with arms, if means of peaceful persuasion are of no avail. Misconstructions of our real intentions must be ignored, though regretted.

On July 27th in the 71st special Diet session, Premier Konoye declared once more that what Japan wanted of China was not her territory but her cooperation. Not even a single voice urging anything resembling the conquest of North China has ever been heard in Japan.

Access to raw materials, essential to Japan's industry, is another vital need of our country. About 90 per cent of the world's fundamental industrial resources, such as iron, coal, oil, are controlled by a few Powers while the so-called "have-nots" are hemmed in and handicapped in their economic struggle. We do not advocate a solution by force of the crucial problem created by the dis-

proportionate distribution of the world's resources, but must combat attempts to undermine our economic position in the neighbour country and to preclude our peaceful access to its vast resources while giving a free and even privileged opening to other Powers.

Owing to her position, history and tradition, needs and neighbourly relations, Japan might claim special rights of access, but certainly must secure her fundamental rights of at least equal opportunities with other Powers and suppress a policy of frustrating them.

To our conviction, it is in accordance with Catholic morality to protect those rights, even by force of arms, if the Nation's livelihood is at stake.

### *3. Need of intervention against anti-Japanese agitation.*

The anti-Japanese campaign in our neighbour country has assumed dimensions which constitute a most serious menace not only to Japanese residents in North China but to the Japanese nation as a whole. The seed of hatred has produced a crop of hostilities which can no longer be tolerated.

Already before the outbreak of the Manchurian troubles seven boycotts were declared against Japan. Anti-Japanese policy was one of the cheap means for Generals, fighting against one another, to win popularity.

It is more understandable that since the establishment of an independent Manchoukuo, aided by Japan, anti-Japanese sentiments ran higher and higher. But whether those sentiments are justified or not, a systematic policy of hatred against a neighbour nation, creating an ever widening abyss between two neighbours dependent on one another and killing all friendly relations and approaches, must have disastrous results and cannot be allowed to continue. When finally that anti-Japanese agitation became the rallying-point of the new Kuomintang-Comintern alliance to build up a people's front under cover of an anti-Japanese movement, the menace to Japan became so urgent that it called for action and intervention.

At the seventh World Congress, held at Moscow 1935, the Comintern had singled out Poland and Japan as countries against

which efforts were to be concentrated. As Japan has immunized herself to a large extent against the poison of Communism, the attack had to be directed at the flank. The slogan "Fight Japan" was very handy to unite Blue Shirts and Communists in China into the "People's Front"—a policy which had already proved to yield the desired results in Spain and other countries.

The anti-Japanese movement developed into a conflagration of hatred destroying the last hopes of friendly relations and reconciliation. Armed intervention has become the only means to assert the right of self-defence, other peaceful ways having been tried in vain.

### *4. Need of effective protection of life and property in North China.*

Almost 60,000 Japanese residents in North China engaged in lawful trade and business had to face increasing difficulties in pursuing their occupation and were exposed to acts of violence occurring with multiplying frequency. Approximately 2800 Japanese nationals had to be evacuated from the more outlying centers of trade, such as Hankow and the upper Yangtze area where Japanese commerce amounted to about 60,000,000 yuan annually and where Japanese capital was invested to the extent of some 40,000,000 yuan.

Before the outbreak of the present hostilities, between November 1935 and October 1936, 13 major cases of terroristic acts have occurred, of which Japanese nationals were the victims, suffering loss of life (11 killed, other badly injured) and property.

The massacre at Tungchow, where the toll of civilian men, women and children tortured and killed exceeded 200, is but a sad confirmation of Japan's right and duty to protect peaceful citizens against the outlawry and outbursts of hatred—the offshoot of an anti-Japanese campaign which poisons already the hearts of children by using textbooks abounding with abuse against the Japanese nation.

Life, property and the honour and good name of our nation have to be equally defended against provocations openly encouraged by Chinese authorities and partly grown beyond their control.

Any one of the above mentioned causes is sufficient to meet the

demands of a just self-defence, but cumulatively they form strong evidence that Japan's armed intervention stands justified before the tribunal of justice and Catholic moral principles.

There remains one question to be answered:

**Is the use of armed force necessary and unavoidable?**

Our government has repeatedly proclaimed its policy of non-aggravation and of local amicable settlement of the various issues which had arisen from a feverish anti-Japanese agitation.

The complicated relations between Japanese and Chinese in North-China look most bewildering to the outsider, but neutral observers must admit (and have voiced their opinion) that Japan was in no way prepared for war in North-China, when the clashes occurred and rapidly developed into an undeclared war.

A careful study of the events according to their chronological order will convey the conviction that the Japanese authorities exerted the greatest forbearance and made earnest endeavour to localize the affair and to reach an amicable settlement by peaceful negotiations—but when a peaceful solution was near at one spot, armed clashes broke out at another one, as if openly aiming at warlike measures against Japan. When finally both sides decided to concentrate heavy military forces against one another and war could no longer be stopped, the sword had become the final and inevitable arbiter.

The slogan "Down with Japan" (Ta-tao Jihpen) proved stronger than reason and extremist policy has won the day at a time, when China's internal unification and the establishment of a strong central authority gave reasonable hope of a closer approach between Japan and China and of final co-operation on a basis of equality between the two neighbour States.

Both suffer greatly by this war. But there is only one way to stop the acts of war now going on: to stop its fundamental cause, China's co-operation with the Comintern, which is the main obstacle to the peace of the Far East.

All the petty questions as to who fired the first shot or who is responsible for the outbreak of this or that local incident are irrelevant, compared with that dominant issue. The justice of a war

does not depend upon its physical but upon its moral authorship.

According to Catholic standards of morality, a State, unjustly menaced in its vital interests—be they material, moral or spiritual—is even permitted to make use of its right to self-defense per modum praeventionis i.e. to forestall a threatening attack upon its rights and interests. Such a war, though seemingly offensive, would in reality be defensive. But Japan did not engage on such a war, because she wanted no war at all. With patience she pursued the policy of non-aggravation and localization of existing conflicts, hoping to the last that the Chinese authorities would collaborate in creating a better atmosphere.

There can be no peace nor reconciliation between China and Japan, as long as China does not dissociate herself from Comintern influences and dissolve that dynamic plotting alliance between Blue Shirts and Communists. "Communism is intrinsically wrong and no one who would save Christian civilization may collaborate with it in any undertaking whatever," declares Pope Pius XI in his Encyclical on Communism and vigorously rejects the belief "that communism in countries where faith and culture are more strongly entrenched will assume another and much milder form." In the West a block of some 120 million men, the alliance Italy-Germany, has been formed to ward off the danger of a bolshevized Europe. In the East, Japan stands alone to check the Bolshevization of Asia. We have to defend peace, order, authority, the very foundations of human society and, therefore, give our wholehearted support to our Government taking these warlike measures to establish lasting peace in the Far-East and to safeguard our country from the Communistic menace hanging over East Asia.

We hope and pray that China may awaken to the danger involved in her co-operation with the Comintern. "Those who permit themselves to be deceived into lending their aid towards the triumph of communism in their own country", warns Pius XI, "will be the first to fall victims of their error."

We earnestly beg our Catholic brethren all over the world not to take part in demonstrations, instigated by yellow journalism and irresponsible propagandists thriving on sensational exaggerations and distortion of facts.

Japan has been stigmatized as being "aggressive" and "bent

on making conquests in North-China." In the course of a history of well-nigh 3000 years the Japanese nation manifested a keen sense of self-defense, but remained a "stay at home" people. Korea could not be allowed to fall into the hands of any foreign Power, if Japan's safety was to be secured. Every Japanese knows that we have no territorial ambition whatever in North China. But the whole nation is convinced that Communism, supported by interested groups, is the gravest menace to the Japanese Empire. The whole nation is prepared to make every sacrifice in combatting that danger, just as once the people of Europe bravely stopped the Mongolian invasion.

We hope and trust that our Catholic Brethren abroad will sympathize with Japan's gigantic struggle to stem the floods of Bolshevism in East Asia and will join us in our prayers for peace and friendship between the two neighbour nations, Japan and China, and for final establishment of peace and order in this part of the world.

The National Committee of the  
Catholics of Japan.

Tokyo, October 1937.

昭和十二年十一月五日 印刷  
昭和十二年十一月十日 發行  
著者 東京市麹町區紀尾井町 上智大學内 カトリック大辭典編輯所  
東京市麹町區紀尾井町  
發行者 右代善 小 林 珍 雄  
東京市麹町區内幸町一丁目五番地  
印刷所 株式會社 ニッポン・プレス  
東京市麹町區内幸町一丁目五番地  
印刷者 黒 宮 慎 造

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quatefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

For Distribution-Check			
Grade	M	To file	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
For	<i>Deumright</i>	In U.S.A.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

No. 351.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hankow, China, October 22, 1937

793.94

Subject: Address by Chen Tu-hsiu  
on Sino-Japanese Problem.

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 29 AM 10 52

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

The Honorable  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 - 1937  
Department of State

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, as of possible interest, a copy, in quintuplicate, of my despatch No. 508 of today's date addressed to the Embassy, Nanking, on the above-mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

*P. R. Josselyn*  
P. R. Josselyn  
American Consul General

Enclosure:

1. Despatch No. 508 to the Embassy, Nanking, October 22, 1937.

In quintuplicate.

800

EFD/CFS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
A-M/C  
JAN 5 - 1938  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE

793.94/11366

F/MR

AN 6 - 1938

FILED

11366

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY FOR  
Department

No. 508.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hankow, China, October 22, 1937

Subject: Address by Ch'en Tu-hsiu  
on Sino-Japanese Problem.

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Ambassador,  
Nanking.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, as of possible interest to the Embassy, a copy in translation of an address delivered by Mr. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, a noted Chinese Communist leader and scholar, at Hankow on October 15, 1937, on the subject "Meaning of the War of Resistance against Japan." Mr. Ch'en, it will be recalled, was once a professor of literature at Peita University at Peiping where he was an ardent exponent of leftist ideals. In 1924 he joined the Kuomintang, but soon became a Communist. Following the eclipse of the Communist clique in the Kuomintang, Ch'en fell from favor and was expelled from the Party. In 1932 he was arrested and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment apparently on charges of fostering Communism to the detriment of the National Government. He was released from prison following the commencement of the present Sino-Japanese conflict and has been living quietly in Wuchang for the past month.

It will be noted that Ch'en traces the recent historical development of China and Japan and deduces therefrom

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

therefrom that the present conflict was inevitable owing to the capitalistic development of Japan while China, steeped in conservatism, lagged in the promotion of science and industry. He emphasizes over and over that the present struggle is a war of resistance against imperialistic oppression to determine whether China will become a free nation or a colonial appendage. He calls on the whole Chinese nation to rise up and resolutely oppose the invaders and thus bring about the final emancipation of the Chinese people and nation from outside oppression.

Respectfully yours,

P. R. Josselyn  
American Consul General


Enclosure:

Text of address delivered by Ch'ea Tu-hsiu  
at Hankow on October 15, 1937.

Original to Nanking.  
Copy to Peiping.  
In quintuplicate to Department.

800

EFD/CFS



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 508, October 22, 1937,  
from Consul General P. R. Josselyn, Hankow, China, to  
the Embassy, Nanking, China, in regard to the address  
by Ch'en Tu-hsiu on Sino-Japanese problem.

Translation of a news article appearing in the SAO TANG  
PAO, Hankow, October 17, 1937.

Meaning of the War of Resistance against Japan.

By Ch'en Tu-hsiu.

The Anti-Japanese war of resistance demanded by the whole nation has commenced. Why should we demand a defensive war? In general it is said because Japan has oppressed us excessively harshly. Of course this statement is not in error, but this is skin-deep. All the people, especially the intelligentsia, should acquire a deeper cognizance. A defensive war is not based on a timely emotion, but has a long history.

At the end of the 19th century, capitalism in western Europe developed into its highest stage - imperialism. The various advanced capitalistic countries, with their industries and science, plotted to plunder and conquer the whole world and to turn other countries into their colonies. During that period those nations in the world which could develop their own industries and sciences to cope with the situation became prosperous. Otherwise, they inevitably declined and fell. This is the role of modern history.

Capitalism in the Orient was late in development. Consequently production, life, and culture were left comparatively behind. Most of the Orient was turned into colonies of the imperialists. The people served as their slaves. Capitalism in the Orient, on account of unequal development of the various countries, is not the same in different countries. Now let us discuss capitalism in China and Japan. During the period of Teh Chuan in Japan, there was a great movement of conservatism and anti-foreignism. When the movement for conservatism and anti-foreignism was in progress, strong elements in the community, who had returned from Europe and America, appealed to the country, and the nation gradually became aware of the futility of conservatism and anti-foreignism. The movement turned into a reform movement through the Mikado. All the nation - high and low - became mad for industry and science. Ever since to the present, 60 or 70 years have passed, during which industries and sciences have successfully developed. They have never once met with any reactionary obstruction. Hence, Japan is so strong and prosperous as she is today. What of China? China began to promote industry and science at about the same time as Japan. The first attempt was made when Li Hung-chang adopted western methods to enrich the country and to strengthen its army. Unfortunately at the time no assistance was received from the people. Those students who had studied in Europe and America did not put forth any efforts. All Li Hung-chang's reforms, and plans failed on account of the obstacles put before him by the conservative Manchu regime. Hence the first shot in China's reform did not explode. Consequently in 1894-95 China was defeated by Japan. The stimulus of

the

-2-

the defeat gave rise to the reform movement of 1898. The reform movement led by Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chichao was motivated by the intelligentsia among the people. Their object was to introduce western learning in developing industries and to reform the administrative system. In a short time the whole nation was aroused. Its meaning was greater than that of Li Hungchang's reform. If this movement had been successfully developed to the present time, even if it were a constitutional monarchy, the development of industries and sciences and the strength and prosperity of the country would not be inferior to that of Japan. Unfortunately, this reform failed under the blow of the conservative Empress Dowager of the Manchu regime. The failure of the second reform created the Boxer Incident of 1900, and the occupation of the national capital by the allied forces of the eight powers.

After the defeat in 1900, China fell deeper in the chasm of the imperialist butchers. The indemnity with interest amounted to \$950,000,000. This sum even today is astonishing. At that time it was an unbearable blow on both the government and the people. This is of insignificant importance, but the fatal blow to China is: in addition to the customs duty agreement and consular jurisdiction, important rights of national railways and mines, of inland waterway navigation, of opening factories in China, of stationing troops at Peiping, Tientsin, Hankow and Shanghai were granted. These special rights enjoyed by the imperialists in China, without exception, impair the sovereign rights of China. The treaty of 1901 may be described as the most unequal treaty of the unequal treaties. Thereafter China was placed in the tragic position of a semi-independent country, more plainly so than before 1900. As a consequence both the government and the people became more miserable day by day. The imbecility and cruelty of the Manchu dynasty was placed before the people very plainly. Anti-Manchuism and Revolution gradually raised their heads, and the Constitutional Monarchy movement gradually lost its influence. Hence Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsin started the 1911 revolution. With the uprising spirit of the 1911 revolution, it was hoped to reclaim all sovereign rights, to complete national independence and unification and to develop industries and sciences, but there arose the reactionary movement of the Peiyang militarist clique under the leadership of Yuan Shih-kai. Every step was directed towards antiquarianism. The object of the revolution - to overthrow the Manchu monarchy - was attained, but the great reform to secure national independence and national consolidation and prosperity failed again, and in consequence came Japan's 21 demands, followed by Yuan Shih-kai's usurpation of the emperor's crown, the restoration of the Manchu regime, and the civil war between North and South China - one disaster after another.

The Chinese people's industry experienced a little development during the European War. With the stimulation of the Russian revolution, the efforts of the revolutionists and the uprising of the laborers and farmers, the northern expedition, which startled the whole country, began. With

the

-3-

the success of this expedition, the work left by the 1911 revolution might easily be accomplished, but it failed because of the imperialists's threat and intrigue. Consequently the after result of the September 18th incident was brought about.

During these 60 to 70 years Japan's industry and sciences have developed successfully, and capitalism has developed to the highest point. Every reform of China was frustrated by reactionary force. Capitalism up to the present is still in its infancy. This is the basic cause of the backwardness of China's economy, politics and culture. During the 1898 reform period there was the reactionary doctrine of Cheng Chih-tung to carry out Chinese learning with the instrumentality of western learning.

This doctrine with Liang Chi-chao's exposition during the reactionary period of Yuan Shih-kai is still exercising control over the thought of the intelligentsia today. Even up to date there are people who consider the spiritual culture of the Orient superior to the material culture of the Occident, and conclude that the sword corps can resist the machine guns and cannon of the enemy. This is the point which determines the strength and weakness of China or Japan, and is the factual basis of the reasoning of the "conciliation party" (in fact the "submission clique") of the general public who fear Japan.

The incident of September 18th spread the anti-Japanese atmosphere all over China. The Government has exerted its efforts along military lines for two or three years. Hence the defensive war of today against Japan.

The present defensive war against Japan is not based on momentary feelings or emotions, nor on any racial enmity, but is a revolutionary war of an oppressed race against oppression and bondage of the imperialists. Although the object of the war is to resist Japanese imperialism, yet it is directed against Japanese imperialists, and not the people of Japan, because those who oppress and bind us are not the Japanese people, but the Japanese imperial militarist government. The historical object of the war is to endeavor to throw off the oppression and bondage of imperialism in order to accomplish China's independence and unification, to advance semi-colonial industry to national industry, and to secure an opportunity for the incessant and free development of China's politics and economy.

National independence and unification of a nation can only be obtained when its economic independence and unification have been realized. A country which is backward in economic development must struggle for customs autonomy and adopt a protective tariff, before its infant industry can compete with the industry of the advanced capitalistic countries. The free trade policy is only practical in a country whose industries

are

-4-

are highly developed, whose commercial commodities are exported in large quantities, and whose agricultural products are insufficient. China's national industries, which are in infancy, such as cotton spinning and weaving, rayon, matches, soap, wheat flour, cigarettes, and cement, are located in a semi-independent country. Not only a customs protective tariff for its manufactures cannot be adopted and enforced (Recently the Customs has increased the duty on only a small number of luxuries. Although the revenue receipts of the Government are slightly increased, yet it is not advantageous for no protection to the various industries mentioned above is afforded) to combat dumping, but the various countries possess special rights of establishing factories in China and of navigation. If these conditions are not modified, according to the law of the struggle of capitalism, China's national industries can never be developed. This is the basic reason for the necessity of an anti-imperialistic national revolution in China.

The year before last Hirota of Japan made the following statements to Ambassador Chengting C. T. Wang: "China is an agricultural country, while Japan is an industrial country. If the two countries could exchange their products, and cooperate hand in hand for joint existence and prosperity, would it not be desirable? Why is it necessary for China to oppose Japan?" Our answer to this statement is: The reason why we oppose Japan is simply because we wish to be an industrial country and we do not wish to be serfs of another country, solely for the purpose of producing raw products for it. The Japanese army is today bombing us with cannon and airplanes simply for the purpose of subduing us and making us their serfs.

The present war against Japan is the sequel of the reforms and great revolutions of the past six or seven decades. The first movement was Li Hung-chang's reform; the second movement was the 1898 reform; the third movement was the 1911 revolution; the fourth movement was the northern expedition, and today's defensive war is the fifth movement. The military struggle with the imperialism is the climax of the national emancipation movement.

In a war for the seizure of colonies between two imperialist countries, the socialists in the two countries should oppose their own aggressive war so that it will fail, because these wars only sacrifice the people and bring no progress. War waged by the people of colonies and semi-colonies against imperialist aggression enables the people of the invaded country to raise their heads to overthrow the robbers plundering them. This is a kind of war showing the progress of mankind. Of course the socialists of the invading country should rise up to oppose their government, while the socialists of the invaded country should help their own government in securing victory. Such victories will not only raise their country from the position of a colony or

-5-

a semi-colony, but also will afford an opportunity for the oppressed people of the invaded country to obtain emancipation. Therefore the present defensive war of China against Japan cannot be considered as one between the Nanking Government and the Tokyo Government but one in which the invaded nation of China opposes the invading Japanese imperialists. All the people of China should exert their efforts to assist in the defensive war against Japan, with the exception of the willing traitors.

The present defensive war against Japan has a grave meaning and definitely cannot be regarded lightly. If victory is won, not only the oppression and bondage of the Japanese imperialists can be removed, but the other advanced industrial countries will not continue to compel the people of China to be their serfs. On the basis of historical experience, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Turkey in the past won victories over their foreign enemies, and recovered by diplomatic means the sovereignty required by independent countries and lifted themselves from the position of semi-independent countries. Germany and Russia have abandoned their special rights in China, while the relations between China and France, the United States, Italy, and Belgium are comparatively insignificant. But the influence of Great Britain in China is about the same as that of Japan. The British have always been cautious. Their foreign policy in the recent years, contrary to the past, has become more conservative. The wise Americans understand better than the Japanese the object and power of the demand of the people of China for emancipation. Surely they will not follow the step of Japan who has acted so barbarously that she has failed.

If China is defeated this time, it will perish and be enslaved. Therefore the present war is the key to whether the Chinese will become a free nation or they will become slaves. If a Chinese is idle in the defensive war and does not do his best, he is actually helping the enemy - a passive and imperceptible traitor.

Some assume that China, being so large, will not perish. But it must be understood that the Japanese imperialists are not crushing China through the clumsy way of assuming direct control over the whole of China, but through establishing in North and South China political organizations under various designations and employing the pro-Japanese party as their puppets, so as to indirectly rule China. They will drive those who do not wish to be puppets into Szechuan, Yunnan and Kweichow to live with the Miao people. Is this not the destruction of China? The Japanese imperialists desire to keep the different puppet organizations isolated so that they may be easily maneuvered. They will not be permitted to unite or to become strong. Recently it was rumored that Pu Yi will remove to Peiping. I do not believe that this will become a fact, because it is the Japanese policy not to permit any puppet organization to dominate the whole of China.

If

-6-

If the people do not rise up and if the military power of the Government is constantly isolated, it will be necessary to surrender and abandon North China. The resultant temporary quiet situation in the south will lead eventually to the fall of the whole of China.

The only basic argument of the "submission clique" is that China cannot rival Japan in military prowess and economic strength. They do not know that Japan cannot employ all its forces in a war against China. Moreover, they do not know that China's defensive war against Japan is a revolutionary war of national emancipation. It is impossible to predict final victory on the basis of the military prowess and economic force at the disposal of the two governments. The weak points in the military prowess and finances of the Chinese Government may be made up through the uprising of the whole nation and with the assistance of the revolutionary countries and revolutionary people of the world (including the people of Japan). If we overlook assistance from these two factors, not only will those advocating surrender become eloquent, but the advocates of war will be weakened. Therefore, during the war of resistance against Japan, first of all we must thoroughly understand the true meaning of the war of resistance before we can attain a strong and resolute will, which cannot be perverted.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Huelsman NARS, Date 12-18-75

67-1

*Return to [unclear]*  
*[unclear]*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED **COPIES SENT TO**  
**O.N.I. AND M.I.D.**

EG  
This message must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (B-1)

FROM Hong Kong

Dated November 30, 1937

Rec'd 12:36 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

November 30, 9 a. m.

Following telegram sent at the request of the

Ambassador at Hankow:

"6, November 29, 2 p. m.

ONE. From information gathered from Chinese sources since my arrival at Hankow it would appear that the Chinese Government is preparing for a contest of endurance with Japan and it is believed in Chinese circles that at a suitable juncture the Soviet Government will assist China in a more positive way than by supplying aircraft as at present. Only key officers numbering less than one-fifth of the entire number have been retained in Government departments and the rest dismissed with two months pay. Of the Legislative Yuan for example there remain only the President Sun Fo, Vice President and the heads of five departments. It is reported that Sun Fo and two department heads are now en route by plane via Europe to Moscow. T. V. Soong is reported as having left Shanghai by a British naval vessel for Hong Kong whence he will join the Government.

Two

DIVISION OF  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 30 1937  
Department of State

793.94

793.94/11367

F/FG

67-2

-2- November 30, 9 a. m. from Hong Kong

Two. A Chinese news correspondent believed to be well informed and reliable confirms the earlier forecast that the Government will be located at Hengyang in Hunan and the Foreign Office at Chungking. It is hoped that foreign diplomatic representation will be established at Chungking encouraged by the presence there of suitable foreign buildings and by relative immunity from bombing as compared with Hengyang. Informant states that General is now at Nanking but will proceed to Hengyang when the Japanese capture Kwangteh on their anticipated march on Wuhu to encircle Nanking.

Three. Same informant stated that the Soviet Government would defer active assistance to China until the Japanese capture Hankow which the Chinese think will occur after three months but the Russians predict in two. Reason for selection of this juncture is said to be the Russian belief that by awaiting this event they will be able to force a change in the form of the Chinese Government and that the Chinese can then cooperate more effectively by cutting a long Japanese line of communication. Moreover, the delay until a critical point is reached will enable the Soviet Government to arouse popular opinion in favor of a war of assistance to China.

Four

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

67-3

-3- November 30, 9 a. m. from Hong Kong

Four. Informant stated that during a confidential conference in Nanking recently Chen Li Fu who lately returned from a hurried trip to Moscow asked General Chiang who would replace the latter as the leader of China if Chiang should be forced to retire and that Chiang answered that his successor would have to be a military man and would be either Pai Chung Hsi, the Kuanghsi leader or Mao Tse Tung the foremost Chinese Communist. Informant thought that Chiang himself would be willing to change the form of government somewhat to meet Soviet desires if necessary in order to enlist active Russian support against Japan. This confirms the opinion I have for some time shared that the Japanese war against Communism is likely to drive China at least toward an alliance with the Soviet Union if not into the Third International".

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tokyo. By mail to Peiping.

SOUTHARD

DDM:WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

67-4

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PARTAIR  
 PLAIN

Department of State

This code was sent in confidential code.  
It should be properly paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone. **B-1**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington.

1937 NOV 30 PM 6 41

1937 NOV 30 PM 6 47

November 30, 1937.

*9 pm*

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON (England).

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

✓ 473

Hong Kong's telegram of November 30, 9 a.m., is re-  
peated for the information of Hornbeck. Please inform  
him ~~at once~~ *promptly*.

11367

QUOTE. (Telegraph Section: Please insert here the  
full text of Hong Kong's telegram of November 30, 9 a.m.,  
which transmits Ambassador Johnson's telegram No. 6 of  
November 29, 2 p.m.) UNQUOTE.

793.94/11367

*Hull*  
(M.M.A.)

*JGV*  
FE JGV:NN

*WJ*  
FE

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_\_

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

PARAPHRASE

793.94/11367

A strictly confidential telegram (No. 6) of November 29, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

One. According to a Chinese news correspondent thought to be reliable and well-informed, the Soviet Government will not assist China actively until after the capture of Hankow which, the Russians predict, will be captured in two months, while the Chinese believe it will fall in three months. The reason that this juncture has been selected by the Russians is reported to be their belief that by awaiting this event (1) the Chinese will then be able, through cutting a long Japanese line of communications, to cooperate more effectively, and (2) the Russians will be able to force a change in the form of the Chinese Government. Furthermore, the Soviet Government will be able to arouse popular opinion in favor of a war of assistance to China if action is delayed until a critical point is reached.

Two. According to the above informant, Chen Li-fu, who has only lately returned from a hurried trip to Moscow, during the course of a recent secret conference asked General Chiang Kai-shek who would succeed him as leader of China should he be forced to retire. Chiang is reported

to

-2-

to have replied that he would have to be replaced by a military man who would be either the outstanding Chinese communist Mao Tse-tung, or the Kwangsi leader Pai Chung-hai. The informant felt that, if necessary in order to enlist Russian support against Japan, the Generalissimo himself would be willing to change the form of government to a certain extent to meet the wishes of the Soviets. These views confirm the opinion, for some time shared by the American Ambassador, that the Japanese war against communism is likely to drive China toward an alliance with the Soviet Union if not into the Third International.

Three. Since the arrival of the Ambassador at Hankow, he has obtained from Chinese sources information that (1) Chinese circles believe that the Soviet Government will, at a suitable juncture, assist China in a more positive manner than through the furnishing of aeroplanes as at present, and that (2) the Chinese Government is making preparations for a contest of endurance with Japan. There have been retained in Government departments only key officers numbering less than twenty percent of the total. The remainder have been dismissed with two months salary. For example, there remain of the Legislative Yuan only the president (Sun Fo), the vice president, and the heads of five departments. Sun Fo and two department heads are reported to be flying to Moscow via Europe, and

T. V.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

T. V. Soong is said to have left Shanghai for Hong Kong on a British naval vessel. From Hong Kong T. V. Soong will join the Government.

Four. The Chinese informant mentioned in the first paragraph has confirmed an earlier forecast that the Foreign Office will be established at Chungking and the Government in Hunan Province at Hengyang. It is hoped that, encouraged by the relative immunity from bombing in Chungking as compared with Hengyang and by the presence in Chungking of suitable foreign buildings, foreign diplomatic representation will be established there. The informant states that, on the capture of Kwangteh by the Japanese on their anticipated march on Wuhu to encircle Nanking, the Generalissimo, who is now in Nanking, will proceed to Hengyang.

*ARR*  
FE:ARR:VCI:REK  
11/30/37

*ARR*  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

MM

AMEMBASSY PEIPING  
AMEMBASSY HANKOW  
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

**FROM**

PLAIN, GRAY AND  
SPECIAL GRAY

Canton via N.R.

Dated November 29, 1937

Rec'd. 7am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT  
O.N.I. AND W.H.O.

*EPR*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 30 1937  
Department of State

*793.94*

November 29, noon.

Informed by military headquarters that November twenty-sixth raids were carried out by twenty-eight planes from sea-plane carrier recently arrived southwest of Macao and included bombing of Shiuchow and other points along Canton-Hankow Railway without serious damage of military character.

November twenty-seventh about fourteen planes heavily bombed Canton-Hong Kong Railway near Tongtouha causing damage to bridge and tracks and interruption of service. Meanwhile eighteen planes bombed Canton-Hong Kong Railway at and near Pakong damaging bridge and tracks believed not serious.

Yesterday about thirteen planes flying about Canton an aircraft gun range dropped about twenty bombs at two airfields, arsenals and spur line north of city then continued north and bombed Canton-Hankow Railway at points near Canton. Damage to aerodromes and tracks reported not serious. Civilian property losses considerable, Canton-Hong Kong Railway also bombed yesterday with further damage to bridge at Tongtouha. It is believed damage will require two days to repair.

Alarm

793.94/11368

EC 2 1937

FILED/FG

MM Nov. 29, noon, from Canton. -2-

Alarm given this morning, details not yet obtainable.

Vernacular press is manifesting increasing disappointment over the alleged failure of Brussels Conference to achieve anything towards positive restraint of Japan and assistance to China and over the attitude of foreign powers, particularly American and Britain. The Municipal Government paper states that unwillingness of American and Britain to act is largely responsible for chaotic Far Eastern situation. The Provincial Government paper deplores reported statements of members of Congress contrary to ideas expressed in President's Chicago address and asks when America will cease supplying Japan with materials of war for sake of profit.

Mailed Swatow.

LINNELL

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

68-1 ~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MG \*\*\*

FROM

H  
GRAY

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Tokyo

Dated November 30, 1937.

Rec'd 10:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

582, November 30, 7 p.m.

Shanghai's 1012/November 24, 2 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 30 1937  
Department of State

793.94  
not  
893.1028

One. My British colleague informed me this morning that the Japanese authorities at Shanghai have indicated that on December first Japanese troops are to be sent to occupy Japanese property inside sectors assigned to American and Italian contingents and also that troops will be transported through the International Settlement to Nantao and other points beyond. He stated that the Counselor of the British Embassy would make representations this afternoon.

Two. In view of the urgency of the matter it seemed inexpedient to await instructions and I therefore instructed Dooman to call on the Chief of the East Asia Bureau of the Foreign Office and urge that Japanese troops be directed to abstain from entering the areas concerned at this time. Dooman left with Ishii an aide memoire based substantially on Shanghai's telegram above cited.

Three.

4

793.94/11369

F/FG  
RECORDED  
NOV 1 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

68-2

MG

Page 2,  
#582 from Tokyo

Three. Ishii seemed surprised that any action such as that indicated in paragraph one above would be taken tomorrow. He said that no information to that effect had been received by the Foreign Office and that he would at once communicate with Shanghai. HOWEVER, he made no other commitment.

Repeated to Shanghai.

GREW

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*76*

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

MG ...

**FROM** GRAY ...

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Nanking via N.R.

Dated November 30, 1937.

Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

975, November 30, 9 a.m.

From Roberts for the Secretary of War.

"No material change local situation. Japanese  
in front of Kwangtsh and Chinese source admits loss of  
Wutsin".

Sent to the Department, repeated to Hankow, Peiping  
and Shanghai.

ATCHESON

HTM

WVC

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 30 1937  
Department of State

*793.94*

793.94/11370

F/FG  
FILED  
NOV 3 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

7

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FROM

COMYANGPAT

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

ek

November 30, 1937

Rec'd 1:15 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC  
YANGPAT  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMSOPAT  
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS HARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY HAIKING  
ALUSNA PEIPIG

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 30 1937  
Department of State

793.94

0030. Situation Nanking unchanged. Other river ports  
quiet. 2200.

CSB

793.94/11371

FILED  
NOV 3 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~ASST~~ ~~KE~~

JR

<sup>GRAY</sup>  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

London

*Telegram to London*

Dated November 30, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 1:32 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

745, November 30, 5 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 30 1937  
Department of State

773.96  
note  
393.41

The Foreign Office informs me that the British Consul at Nanking has decided it is necessary to evacuate British subjects from Nanking. He has arranged with the Jardine-Matheson Company to accommodate sixteen British subjects on a hulk moored four miles up the river from Nanking. He has likewise agreed to accommodate German officials and thirteen other Germans, as well as five American ladies and possibly other Americans, none of whose names were given. The Foreign Office has arranged for the Japanese authorities to be advised where the hulk is to be stationed and to be informed that it is being used as a place of refuge for British and other nationals. The British Consul and Military Attache will remain at Nanking for the time being.

In view of interrupted and uncertain communications from Nanking, the Foreign Office felt that the Department might be interested to have the foregoing information.

JOHNSON

WWC:CSB

FILED  
F/FG  
NOV 8 1937

793.94/11372

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

*Gray*

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓  
PART AIR  
PLAIN

Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

NOV 30 PM 56446 November 30, 1937.

*1pm*

AMEMBASSY,  
LONDON (England).

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
RECORDS

471 Your 745, November 30, 5 p. m.

The Department had received the information contained in the telegram under reference. However, the Department desires that you make an appropriate acknowledgment of the courtesy of the Foreign Office in placing the information at our disposal.

*Hull*  
*(m.m.h.)*

*793.94/11372*

793.94/11372

*lulu*  
FE:MSM:REK

*ME*  
*ME*

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_\_

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.93/377 FOR Disp.#1024

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED Oct.20,1937  
*11/1* NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations: Circulars distributed among Chinese employees of an American concern in Tientsin, urging the Chinese to join with the Japanese, and stating American teachings have caused the present hostilities.

fpq

793.94/ 11373

11373.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 741.62/190 ..... FOR Tel. #134, 11 a.m.

FROM Poland ..... ( Biddle ) DATED Nov. 13, 1937  
TO ..... NAME ..... 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Chamberlain's present policy is held to be directed  
towards consulting Germany and Italy in any  
present European negotiations as well as in any  
future Far Eastern negotiations.

mb

793.94 / 11374

11374

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.73/110 FOR Telegram #1036, 6 p.m.

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED Nov. 29, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese situation:  
Japanese censorship over cables and telegraph  
communications: Difficult to protest against-,  
as such practise has hitherto been done by  
Chinese authorities with no protest. Communications  
will likely be cut off.

793.94 / 11375

aa

11375.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
NOV 23 1937  
MR. WILSON

SECRETARY OF STATE  
NOV 23 1937  
NOTED

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

*Teleoff*  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 23 1937  
Department of State

*AW*  
*#*  
*FE*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
NOV 30 1937  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATION

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The following information has been received from the Assistant  
Naval Attache at Nanking:

"A statement has been made from several reliable sources  
that a decision has been made contrary to much expert advice  
to stage a strong dramatic defense of the capital. Recently  
heavy reinforcements passed by here and at present many troops  
from Szechuan Province are in this area. Yesterday seaplanes  
bound Wushi and there is a strong rumor partially confirmed  
that that town has fallen.

~~Dated 21 November, 1937.~~

793.94/11376

793.94

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

*Milton D. Gustafson*  
NOV 19 1973  
DECLASSIFIED

FILED

DEC 3 1937

F/FG  
11376

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
NOV 23 1937  
MR. WILSON  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

*W. A.*  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 23 1937  
Department of State  
*W. A.*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

*AW*  
*S*  
*FE*

Information has been received from the CINCAF that on November 22, General Beaumont, USMC, was told by the Chief of Staff of the Japanese naval landing force that they intended to run trucks over Garden Bridge and through the city to supply their troops in Japanese ~~and~~ properties and mills and to take over the protection of above effective December first. Movement is apparently intended to impress Chinese populace as the properties above are now entirely secure and it appears that due to the crowded condition of the city and recent hostilities that incidents will quite probably result followed by severe reprisals.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
NOV 30 1937  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

793.94/11377

793.94

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SECRETARY OF STATE  
NOV 23 1937  
NOTED

FILED  
DEC 2 1937

*H*

11377

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

F

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

FROM COMSOPAT

793.94

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

egz

November 30, 1937

Rec'd 5:25 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: 2nd BRIGADE USMC  
COMDESRON 5  
COMSUBRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMYANPAT  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSMA PEIPING

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
RECEIVED  
17 1937  
Department of State

0130 South China ports quiet 2000

SMS:RGC

793.94/11378

FILED  
EC 3 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Department of State

This cable was sent in confidential Code.  
It should be classified and processed before  
being communicated to Part A  
AMDELGAT

1937 NOV 19 PM 6 18

Washington,  
November 19, 1937.  
7 pm

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
RECORDS

BRUSSELS (Belgium)

75  
(Gray)

For your information: Excerpt from Shanghai's 984,  
November 18, 7 p.m.:

QUOTE Approximately 220,000 Japanese troops are now  
believed to be engaged in operations from Hangchow Bay to  
the Yangtze River. Additional reinforcements and great  
quantities of munitions and supplies arrive daily. UNQUOTE

793.94

From Naval Attaché at Shanghai, November 18: "Chinese  
state that they will make an attempt to hold a line through  
Kiangyin and Wusih and withdraw when necessary to a final  
defense line running southwest from Chinking through  
Lishui."

(Gray)

793.94/11378A

Assistant Naval Attaché, Nanking, reports on 19th  
that German advisers have had disagreement with Chiang  
and are leaving for Hunan; that Chiang appears determined  
to defend Nanking area despite advice against such action;  
and that Japanese military movements and ineffectiveness  
of Chinese front line increase the possibility of a col-  
lapse of Chinese resistance in the Shanghai-Nanking area.

Telegrams regarding Shantung hostilities indicate that  
Shantung forces may be able to hold the south bank of the

F/FG

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Washington.

-2-

Yellow River for ten to twenty days, and that hostilities ~~may~~ <sup>might</sup> be extended to the Tsingtao area, although Chinese anticipate that the Japanese may attempt to isolate Tsingtao. (End Key)

Shanghai (in its 981, November 17, 6 p.m., refers to strained relations between British and Japanese at Shanghai, particularly following the killing of British soldiers, takes note of decided effort lately on the part of the British to mollify the Japanese, mentioning especially an obvious effort of the British commanding general to be friendly with the Japanese civil officials at a recent luncheon, and states that QUOTE I am informed that this attitude is the result of orders from London END QUOTE.

Hull  
(S)

FE:CV:NN

FE  
m.m.d.

PA/D  
S

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

LMS ... **FROM** GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.  
Dated November 30, 1937  
Rec'd 3:27 p. m.

793.94

**COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.**

592

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1044, November 30, 5 p. m.  
My No. 1034, <sup>11335</sup> November 29, 4 p. m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
REC 11/30/37  
Department of State

793.94/11379

According to unconfirmed reports Japanese troops have captured Kwangteh and are expected to advance toward Wuhu to isolate Nanking. The Kiangyin forts have fallen and Japanese gunboats are reported to have passed through a 50-foot gap in the boom. Japanese columns are reported to have advanced beyond Wutsin and Ihing. On the Nanking-Hangchow motor road they are approaching Liyang.

Japanese troops and supplies continue to arrive almost daily. Sent to (?) repeated to Nanking, Hankow, Peiping.

GAUSS

CSB

NOV 30 1937  
FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FF*

LMS

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

\_\_\_\_\_ Tsingtao via N. R.

**FROM**

Dated November 30, 1937

Rec'd 6:40 p.m.

AMERICAN CONSUL CHEFOO

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 1937  
Department of State

November 30, noon. *egz*

*793.94  
note  
893.10/Tsingtao*

The situation is about the same as it was yesterday, quite confused with many rumors of little significance but I would say that the crux of the situation here is not found in any threat from the Japanese, but in a struggle in which General Han and the Mayor of Tsingtao find themselves increasingly opposed to one another over policy in Shantung and Tsingtao with a few other important political figures ready to take advantage for personal political aggrandizement.

The Consulate has just been informed through a reliable source that (first) the Mayor of Tsingtao has been persuaded by General Yu Hsueh Chung to give up his announced plan of destruction of Japanese property in this city and (second) in the event of Japanese invasion of Tsingtao full responsibility for the defense of the city would be assumed by General Yu.

Local

793.94/11380

DEC 3 1937  
F/EG  
FILED

*u*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LMS 2-From Tsingtao, dated November 30, noon.

Local branches of the Banks of China and Communica-  
tions will operate commencing December 1 a joint office for  
the cashing of their local checks only and no domestic or  
foreign exchange business will be transacted. Sent to  
the Department, Peiping, Hankow.

SOKOBIN

SMS:EMB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R./139 FOR Despatch #590

FROM China (Nanking) (Johnson) DATED Sept. 27, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Report on Sino-Japanese relations for July and August, 1937. Relates course of hostilities and related developments.

aa

793.94/11381

F/MR

11381

I. General Summary:  
See immediately below:

793,94  
II. Foreign Relations:\*

A. Relations with Japan:

1. Outbreak and course of hostilities and related developments:

Apprehension felt in North China in June was amply justified by an outbreak of hostilities between Chinese and Japanese troops early in July near Peiping. Ensuing developments occurred so rapidly that China and Japan soon found themselves engaged in a major struggle of increasing dimensions. Within a few weeks (1) the Tientsin-Peiping area was occupied by the Japanese; (2) Japanese nationals evacuated all of intramural China except the north, Tsingtao and Shanghai; (3) partial evacuation of foreigners was in progress, a large number including approximately 2,000 Americans having left Shanghai; and (4) fighting was being conducted on three fronts in Hopei, in Chahar and at Shanghai. By the end of August approximately 170,000 Japanese and 370,000 Chinese troops were operating on the three fronts, over 60 Japanese naval vessels were also engaged at Shanghai which was becoming a principal theatre of a determined struggle between China and Japan, Japanese bombing planes had raided a wide area in the Yangtze region including Hangehow, Nanchang, the capital at Nanking, Hsushowfu, Kiukiang, Hankow and Wuchang, and the Japanese Navy had declared a blockade of Chinese shipping from Shanghai to Swatow which was later extended to include the coast from Chinwangtao to Pakhoi. Meanwhile a working arrangement

between

---

\*Due to the large number of telegrams received and sent during the months under review it has been found impracticable to make the usual marginal reference notation.

- 2 -

between the National Government and the Chinese Communists was effected, the latter's troops began cooperating with Government forces on a new front that was forming in Suiyuan and Shansi, and a non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia was concluded. Foreign concern over the hostilities caused a series of representations to both sides in the general cause of peace, in connection with the increasingly grave danger and injury to foreign life and property, especially at Shanghai, and in connection with what were apparently deliberate Japanese and inadvertent Chinese attacks upon non-combatants, including foreigners. Among these were foreign casualties resulting from bombs and shells exploding in the Shanghai Settlement area, Japanese bombing of an American mission at Nantungchow, the killing of one American sailor and wounding of several others by a shell which burst on the deck of the U.S.S. AUGUSTA, the serious wounding of the British Ambassador by a Japanese air attack upon the motor car in which he was traveling near Shanghai, the bombing of the S.S. PRESIDENT HOOVER by Chinese planes, Japanese bombing of the capital and other places resulting in destruction of non-combatant life and property.

(NORTH CHINA)

2. The Lukouchiao incident:

a. Beginning of hostilities:

The deadlock in Sino-Japanese relations was rudely broken the night of July 7 when Japanese troops clashed with soldiers of the 37th Division of the 29th Army at Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge), a strategically important point about 10 miles west of Peiping, and casualties were suffered on both sides. Which side fired the first

shot

- 3 -

shot is unknown. The Japanese claimed that Chinese troops opened fire on them while the former were maneuvering near the bridge, that the Japanese troops stopped maneuvering and awaited developments, that the Chinese again opened fire early the next morning, and that the Japanese therefore had to take defense measures. The Chinese claimed that after the first encounter Japanese troops approached the nearby small walled town of Wanping and demanded admission to search for one of their men who was allegedly missing, permission was refused, and subsequently the Japanese opened fire on the town.

b. Responsibility for the clash:

No evidence came to light that the incident was premeditated by either side. The Japanese maneuvers had been announced several weeks previously and had subsequently been postponed but had later begun about two weeks prior to the incident when the Japanese commander, General Tashiro, was ill and subordinate officers were in charge. (Some observers believe that Tashiro was no longer alive although his death was not notified until later.)

The undetermined fact of which side fired first is unimportant, for the reason that responsibility for the outbreak and for the enlargement of the incident from July 10 rests with the Japanese, as evidenced by the facts that (1) the Japanese were unnecessarily holding maneuvers at night in close proximity to a regularly stationed Chinese garrison at a time when a tense political situation existed, (2) the Japanese authorities knew well that the Chinese troops concerned were a part of the

reputedly

- 4 -

reputedly anti-Japanese 37th Division, and (3) the Japanese claim that they had a right to maneuver in that area under the terms of the Protocol of 1901 was doubtful as the area was along the line of <sup>the</sup> Peking-Hankow railway and not on the Peking Tientain line, the road which connected Peking with the sea and therefore the road presumably meant by the terms of the Protocol applicable to the subject. The unestablished claim of the Japanese that they had received permission from the local Chinese authorities to maneuver in that area is scarcely pertinent in view of the dangers known to attend such maneuvers.

c. Legality of Japanese position:

The only legal basis for the maneuvers in the vicinity of Lukoushiao appears to be a note addressed November 15, 1913, by the Chinese Foreign Minister to the Ministers at Peking, which designated four places, including Lukoushiao, as drill grounds for the use of all foreign guards, with two provisos: (1) the four places were designated "temporarily" and (2) "when foreign troops are drilling in these places ball cartridges are not to be used". Putting aside the question whether "temporary designation" could be effective for twenty-four years, the Japanese company drilling July 7 in the vicinity definitely carried ball cartridges. The note is further weakened as a legal basis for Japanese argument by the fact that, between the time of its departure from Feiping and arrival in the area, the Japanese company had been maneuvering at Fengtai, for which there is no legal basis.

Whatever the immediate causes, the background of Sino-Japanese relations in North China was such that almost any incident which the Japanese might wish to

consider

- 5 -

consider serious would probably have entailed the same or similar consequences. Although negotiations for a settlement were initiated at once, and discussions over possible agreements for settlement and over far-reaching Japanese demands continued throughout most of July, there was recurrent fighting in the Peiping area, indications appeared with increasing clearness that the Japanese were enlarging the incident for political purposes (the Chinese claimed that Japanese negotiators protracted the discussions with a view to providing time to bring in reinforcements), additional Japanese troops moved into North China from Manchuria and Chinese forces began moving northward along the Peiping-Hankow Railway, hostilities extended to Tientsin and Kalgan, and the Japanese finally occupied the Peiping-Tientsin-Kalgan region.

d. Early negotiations; intermittent hostilities continue:

The first local negotiations began at Peiping July 8 with most of the city's outer gates closed, railway communications interrupted and 300 Japanese soldiers outside one of the east gates being refused admission to the city. Some time on July 8 an agreement was reached, according to the Chinese Foreign Office, for (a) cessation of military activities, (b) mutual withdrawal of troops, (c) guarding of Lukouchiao by Chinese troops as heretofore. Chinese troops began retiring to the west bank of the Yungting river and subsequently Japanese troops began withdrawing from the east bank toward Peiping, Chinese Peace Preservation Corps units taking over Wanping from the troops of the 57th Division. Firing recurred, however, on the same day, each side accusing the other

of

- 6 -

of not ceasing fire in accordance with the agreement. On the same day in Nanking the Chinese Foreign Office lodged an oral protest against the "attack by Japanese troops on Chinese troops" and on July 9 the Japanese Counselor of Embassy replied orally that Japan reserved the right to make whatever legitimate demands she might think fit in connection with the clash. On that day also General Chiang Kai-shek announced at Kuling that he was despatching 3 divisions to North China. The next day, July 10, Japanese troops were reported coming through a pass of the Great Wall, 1,000 Japanese troops from Fengtai took positions around Wanping, which they claimed had been recaptured by Chinese troops, and again heavy fighting broke out. (The Japanese troops now strategically controlled a part of the Peiping-Hankow Railway as, by increasing their garrison at Fengtai in 1935, they <sup>previously</sup> gained strategic control of a part of the Peiping-Mukden and Peiping-Shanghai Railways and a branch of the Peiping-Hankow line.)

e. Japanese motives in enlarging the incident:

It was apparent by at least July 10 that the Japanese had decided to use the outbreak as pretext for extension of Japanese influence in North China, as (a) some 1,000 Japanese troops proceeded to the Wanping area that day, notwithstanding the prior withdrawal of Chinese troops in accordance with agreement, (b) the Japanese were evidently less interested from that date in a local and non-political settlement than in a political settlement under the guise of Chinese agreement to suppress anti-Japanese activities, and (c) Japanese military strength increased rapidly and in excess of Japanese needs if the incident were to be settled locally and non-politically.

f.

- 7 -

f. Motivation of the Japanese military:

The Japanese military were presumably motivated by various factors, including (a) belief that a reasonable settlement would be interpreted as weakness on their part, (b) belief that force would be necessary sooner or later to achieve their ends in North China, (c) previous frustration of those ends by Sung's regime, although Sung owed his position to Japanese aid, (d) threat to achievement by the growing influence in North China of the National Government, (e) threat from the growing unity, nationalism, and military and economic strength of China and from the growing popularity and power of General Chiang Kai-shek, (f) fear of results of the rapprochement between the National Government and Chinese Communist leaders, (g) the international situation, principally in respect to Soviet Russia, and (h) the political situation at home where the Japanese Government, dominated by the fighting service, needed the united support of the people to accomplish their program of re-organization of the government and the national resources.

g. The Peiping July 11th agreement; Japanese reinforcements from Manchuria; Chinese troops move northward; fighting recurs:

On July 11 an agreement was reached at Peiping between Japanese military officials and General Chang Tzu-chung, Tientsin Mayor and Commander of the 3rd Division of the 29th Army who was pro-Japanese. Chinese and Japanese accounts of the agreement differed, the former stating that it included provision for apology and withdrawal by both sides. According to Japanese official sources it provided for (a) Chinese apology, (b) punishment of Chinese officers responsible; (c) assurances for the future, comprising voluntary retirement of Chinese officials in

North

- 7 -

f. Motivation of the Japanese military:

The Japanese military were presumably motivated by various factors, including (a) belief that a reasonable settlement would be interpreted as weakness on their part, (b) belief that force would be necessary sooner or later to achieve their ends in North China, (c) previous frustration of those ends by Sung's regime, although Sung owed his position to Japanese aid, (d) threat to achievement by the growing influence in North China of the National Government, (e) threat from the growing unity, nationalism, and military and economic strength of China and from the growing popularity and power of General Chiang Kai-shek, (f) fear of results of the rapprochement between the National Government and Chinese Communist leaders, (g) the international situation, principally in respect to Soviet Russia, and (h) the political situation at home where the Japanese Government, dominated by the fighting service, needed the united support of the people to accomplish their program of re-organization of the government and the national resources.

g. The Peiping July 11th agreement; Japanese reinforcements from Manchuria; Chinese troops move northward; fighting recurs:

On July 11 an agreement was reached at Peiping between Japanese military officials and General Chang Tzu-chung, Tientsin Mayor and Commander of the 30th Division of the 29th Army who was pro-Japanese. Chinese and Japanese accounts of the agreement differed, the former stating that it included provision for apology and withdrawal by both sides. According to Japanese official sources it provided for (a) Chinese apology, (b) punishment of Chinese officers responsible; (c) assurances for the future, comprising voluntary retirement of Chinese officials in

North

- 8 -

North China who obstruct Sino-Japanese cooperation, expulsion of Communist elements from that district, control of Blue Shirts and other organizations hostile to Japan, control of education in the schools, cessation of anti-Japanese propaganda, (d) withdrawal of the 37th Division from Peiping. The Japanese version is considered to be correct, the considerable modification of the Chinese version being due to a desire to mislead and allay the belligerence of the anti-Japanese 37th Division and to deceive the National Government as to the far-reaching nature of the terms demanded by the Japanese and accepted by Chang.

General Sung Che-yuan, Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council and Commander of the 29th Army, who had been in temporary retirement in northern Shantung since May, presumably to avoid pressure being exerted upon him both by the Japanese and the National Government, arrived in Tientsin on the day of the agreement as did also General Kozuki, new Japanese commandant. For several days, however, Sung refused to enter into discussions with the Japanese, thereby apparently delaying effectuation of the agreement, and negotiations were continued between Japanese military officers in Tientsin, Cheng Tzu-chung and the half-Japanese Managing Director of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, Chen Chueh-sheng. It began to appear that two widely diverging factions were at work in the 29th Army: (a) one headed by the Hopei Chairman General Feng Chih-an (Commander of the anti-Japanese 37th Division) and Peiping Mayor Chia Teh-chun, who were loyal to the National Government and wanted to fight, and (b) one organized by Chang Tzu-shung

(Commander)

- 9 -

(Commander of the supposedly pro-Japanese 38th Division) which advocated surrendering to Japanese demands and which was strongly, and perhaps successfully, pressing Chung to that end. In Peiping a notice was issued to Japanese residents concerning measures to be taken in case of emergency, 3,000 Japanese troops from Manchuria began entering Tientsin July 12, and fighting west of Peiping broke out again that night. By July 14 practically all the Japanese troops ordinarily stationed in Tientsin had been sent to the Peiping area and, with reinforcements which replaced them at Tientsin, there were approximately 12,000 in North China or about twice the number present July 7.

h. Further discussions in Nanking; Japanese ultimatum

The Foreign Minister returned to Nanking July 9 from the summer capital at Nanking and the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy called on him the next day (the Japanese Ambassador was then in Tsingtao on his way to Tientsin) but no attempt to enter into actual negotiations appeared to have been made either by the Japanese Embassy or the Foreign Office, Mr. Hidaka and Dr. Wang merely expressing the hope that an amicable settlement would be reached and the former expressing the further hope that the Chinese Government would prevent a recrudescence of anti-Japanese feeling as a result of the incident. On the night of July 10 the Foreign Office sent to the Japanese Embassy a written protest which recapitulated the Chinese situation as previously explained to the Japanese. On July 11 Mr. Hidaka held a further conversation with Mr. Chen Chieh, Administrative

Yisa

- 10 -

Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs during which, according to the Foreign Office, Mr. Chen demanded that Mr. Hidaka cable the Japanese Government to order a cessation of Japanese military activities in North China and protested against the reinforcement of Japanese troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area as being contradictory to the professed desire of the Japanese Government to prevent aggravation of the incident. Mr. Hidaka's reply was to the effect that the movement of Central Government troops northward had given rise to apprehension on the part of the Japanese troops. (Throughout the course of the present crisis the mutual suspicions of the Japanese and Chinese soldiers seems to have drawn them inevitably into hostilities. At Lukouchiao fighting broke out because of these suspicions when Japanese troops on maneuver approached Chinese positions. The Japanese reinforcements in the North impelled the Chinese Government to concentrate troops in southern Hopei with the same result on a larger scale. Chinese troops concentrations at Hankow resulted in the evacuation of Japanese nationals and naval vessels, as an alternative, in the Japanese view, to hostilities. The increase in Japanese and Chinese forces in the Shanghai area turned that region into a major fighting zone.) According to a Foreign Office official, Mr. Hidaka went on to advance the view that (1) North China was a special, almost independent, region, (2) whatever occurred there was no proper concern of the National Government, which had been acting "illegally" in attempting to augment and nationalize the 29th Army, (3) the Lukouchiao incident could be settled only by negotiations with regional authorities and the National Government should not interfere.

- 11 -

i. Attitude of the Japanese Ambassador:

During Counselor Hidaka's conversation at the Foreign Office on July 11 it was intimated to him that Ambassador Kawago should come to Nanking to arrange a settlement, but Hidaka replied that this was not necessary because it was his Government's policy to deal locally with North China matters and he himself, recently Chargé d'Affaires, was sufficiently responsible to carry on any essential conversations. The Japanese Ambassador subsequently went to Tientsin from Shanghai and Tsingtao, and in a press interview at Tientsin July 16 stated that the current situation was a local affair between Chinese and Japanese military and did not concern him, as he was accredited to the National Government.

j. China's memorandum to interested Governments:

Under date of July 15 the Chinese Government sent to "various interested Governments" including the United States, a memorandum stating that (1) since the Lukouchiao incident the Chinese authorities had used their best efforts to arrange cessation of hostilities by mutual withdrawal of troops, (2) the sudden attack on Lukouchiao and the invasion of North China by large Japanese military forces (estimated at over 100 airplanes and 200,000 troops) constituted violation of China's sovereignty contrary to the Nine Power Treaty, the Paris Peace Pact and the League Covenant, and (3) while China was obliged to defend herself she was ready to settle her differences with Japan by any of the pacific means known in international law and treaties.

k. Japanese ultimatum at Nanking:

On July 16 Mr. Hidaka informed the Foreign Office that the Japanese Government's impression was that the

Chinese

- 12 -

Chinese Government and particularly General Chiang Kai-shek did not realize the gravity of the situation in North China and that an additional very important element of danger had been injected into the situation by "the Communists". The next day, July 17, the Assistant Japanese Military Attache, Colonel Ikido, handed a written memorandum to the Chinese Vice Minister of War to the effect that, if the Chinese Government in disregard of the Ho-Umezu Agreement of 1938 despatched troops including air contingents into North China, the Japanese military would take whatever measures they considered necessary and any eventualities would be the responsibility of the Chinese Government. This demarche was followed by a memorandum handed by Mr. Hidaka to the Chinese Foreign Minister which pointed out the gravity of the situation and urged that the National Government despatch no more troops northward and refrain from "further provocative acts".

1. The Tientsin July 19th agreement; "unsatisfactory"  
Foreign Office reply to Japanese aide memoire of  
July 17th; threat of general hostilities grows:

General Sung and Japanese military officers at Tientsin on July 19 reportedly came to an agreement which defined the Peiping July 11th agreement, and Sung tendered an apology for the Lukouchiao incident. By this time the Japanese military in Peiping were making an additional request that all troops of the 29th Army withdraw from Peiping, some 6,000 additional Japanese reinforcements arrived in Tientsin from Manchuria within a few days, and Japanese planes on July 18 had fired machine guns on one or more trains on the Peiping-Hankow Railway near Changhouchiao, Honan, resulting in written protest by the Foreign Office. On July 19 a subordinate officer of the Foreign

Office

- 15 -

Office delivered to the Japanese Embassy an aide memoire in reply to the Japanese aide memoire of July 17. This document (1) stated that the Chinese Government had repeatedly declared its readiness to seek a settlement by pacific means, but the Japanese Government, while professing anxiety not to see the situation aggravated, had despatched large numbers of troops into Hopei indicating a clear intention to resort to force, and the Chinese Government had been compelled to take precautionary measures for self-defence, (2) recalled that on July 12 the Foreign Minister had proposed mutual cessation of military movements and withdrawal of troops to the original positions, but no reply to this proposal had been received, (3) reiterated China's desire for a peaceful settlement and its intention not to aggravate the situation and again proposed (a) the fixing of a date on which both sides should simultaneously cease all military movements and withdraw their forces to the original positions, and (b) immediate negotiations through regular diplomatic channels, and (4) concluded with a statement that China was ready to exhaust all pacific means for the maintenance of peace such as direct negotiation, good offices, mediation, arbitration. According to Japanese sources, Hidaka informed the bearer of the Chinese aide memoire that the Chinese document was unsatisfactory, because it did not deal specifically with the Peiping July 11th agreement (of the contents and implications of which the Chinese Foreign Minister was professedly ignorant) and that it would be held until midnight to receive further oral assurances from Dr. Wang, but the latter did not give Hidaka an appointment until

the

- 14 -

the following morning.

m. Discussion between Japanese Military Attache and Chinese War Minister:

Also on July 19 General Kita, Japanese Military Attache who had come to Nanking from Shanghai, held a discussion with the Minister of War. According to the Chinese Foreign Office, General Kita requested the withdrawal of "Central Government" troops from Hopei to prevent aggravating the crisis, which was "rapidly approaching the final stage". General Ho replied that the tension in the north was due to the sending of large <sup>and</sup> Japanese military/air forces into Hopei, Chinese precautionary measures were therefore necessary, these were purely for self-defense and were without intent at provocation, and if Japan would withdraw her newly increased forces, China would consider withdrawing her troops.

n. Chiang Kai-shek's statement of July 19:

The press released on July 20 a lengthy statement of General Chiang Kai-shek dated July 19 in which the Generalissimo (1) reviewed the situation and the Government's policy, (2) accused the Japanese of desiring to (a) expand the Tangku Truce and enlarge the East Hopei region, (b) drive out the 29th Army, (c) force out General Sung Che-yuan, (3) stated that (a) the Lukouchiao incident was premeditated by the Japanese, (b) if China gave up the Marco Polo Bridge (Lukouchiao) Feiping would become a second Mukden and Nanking a second Feiping; and (4) defined China's position by "four points": (a) any settlement must not infringe upon China's territorial integrity and sovereign rights, (b) no illegal alteration would be allowed in the status

- 15 -

the status of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council which was fixed by the Central Government, (c) China would not agree to the removal by outside pressure of local officials, such as the chairman of the Council, who were appointed by the Central Government, and (d) China would not permit any restrictions upon the position held by the 29th Army. General Chiang stated that these constituted the minimum conditions possible as a basis for negotiations and that while China sought peace, it did not seek peace at any cost, and might be forced to defend itself.

c. Chiang Kai-shek's position; the die is cast:

General Chiang's statement of July 19 indicated clearly that out of the dilemma which had faced him since May 1935 he had chosen a definite course: resistance. His dilemma had been that (1) war with Japan would mean ultimate defeat for China after a long drawn-out struggle which at the end might find him in actual control of only the western provinces, and (2) acquiescence in Japan's policy in North China would mean disunity, perhaps civil war, probably the collapse of the present Government and almost certainly his own political suicide. He chose the course which would save his own and the country's self-respect.

d. End of diplomatic negotiations at Nanking:

During Mr. Hidaka's call on Foreign Minister Wang July 20 the former, according to Japanese sources, stated that the Foreign Office's aide memoire of July 19 was unsatisfactory because (1) it did not state whether the Chinese Government would cease provocative acts, by which the Japanese aide memoire meant sending additional troops

into

- 16 -

into Hopei, and (2) did not state that the Chinese Government would cease impeding local negotiations in the North. In reply Dr. Wang referred to the proposal in his side memoire for mutual withdrawal of troops, stated China had committed no provocative acts, and said that any suitable settlement reached locally would be welcomed by China. Mr. Hidaka considered these assurances on the whole satisfactory, but rejoined that they could not improve the present gloomy outlook because of two circumstances: it had been a mistake (1) to send the Japanese Embassy an evasive and generally unsatisfactory reply by the hand of an emissary unable to supplement or elucidate it, and (2) to publish General Chiang's statement. These circumstances, he said, had crystalized the situation beyond possibility of improvement by the Foreign Minister. According to the Chinese Foreign Office. Mr. Hidaka again brought up the question of the increase of Chinese military strength in Hopei and the Central Government's attitude toward the local negotiations, and the Foreign Minister (1) replied that it was necessary for both sides to take prompt measures to avoid the threatened conflict, (2) stated that the presence of a large Japanese army in Hopei was a violation of China's sovereign and territorial rights, (3) renewed the proposal in his side memoire that a definite date be immediately set for mutual cessation of military activities and troop withdrawals as the only practicable course to avoid the conflict, which should be acceptable to the Japanese because both countries were desirous of not aggravating the situation and were merely taking precautionary measures, (4) said that any

issue

- 17 -

issue of a local nature susceptible of adjustment on the spot could be settled locally provided such settlement received the sanction of the National Government, and (5) added that so long as there was the slightest hope for peace China would not abandon efforts toward solution through regular diplomatic channels. This was the last conversation of any consequence between the Japanese Embassy and the Foreign Office.

g. Japanese mail censorship at Tientsin; more Japanese reinforcements; renewed fighting near Peiping; withdrawal of 37th Division:

The Japanese military on July 18 placed military censors in the Central Post Office at Tientsin, and in the few days prior to July 20 some 6,000 Japanese reinforcements arrived in Tientsin from Manchuria, bringing the total to approximately 16,000. News of the Tientsin July 19th agreement did not relieve the increasing tension in Peiping, as a result of which sandbag barricades had been erected in the streets, and fighting recurred near Lukoushiao July 20 and Japanese artillery shelled Nanping. General Chiang Kai-shek returned to Nanking July 20. On July 22 troops of the 37th Division commanded by General Feng Chih-an began to withdraw from their positions between Peiping and the Yungting River and from Peiping itself, and troops of the 132nd Division of the 29th Army entered Peiping to take over from them. This change temporarily relieved the tension in Peiping and the sandbag barricades were removed. On the same day the Japanese military censors withdrew from the Tientsin Post Office.

h. Capture of Langfang; clash at Changyimen:

Events moved rapidly the next few days. According to Chinese official sources, General Sung asked the National

Government

- 18 -

Government to retain in south Hopei the four divisions sent there, but the stopping of their advance (if they intended to advance) did not avert the hostilities which resulted in the occupation of Peiping and Tientsin. Japanese bombing and other military planes began flying over Tientsin July 21. By July 24 the Chinese claimed that all contingents of the 37th Division had withdrawn from the Papsoshan area, but apparently this was not true and two companies of Japanese troops also remained in the Lukouchiao area.

The threat to a peaceful settlement implied in the non-withdrawal of the 37th Division was greatly augmented by an outbreak of fighting at 11 p.m. July 25 at Langfang, midway between Peiping and Tientsin on the railway, and by a severe clash at about 7 p.m. July 26 at Changyi-men (Kwanganmen), a gate in the west wall of Peiping. The fighting at Langfang resulted in the driving away of troops of the 38th Division regularly garrisoned there and the taking over of the railway station by Japanese troops. The fighting at Changyi-men involved Japanese troops which were entering the city, and men of the 132nd Division of the 29th Army. According to a responsible Japanese official, these two clashes convinced the Japanese military that the agreement of July 19 was inadequate, they had been mistaken in their belief that only the 37th Division of the 29th Army was dangerously anti-Japanese, no regime in Hopei Province under officers of the 29th Army could possibly be satisfactory, and the 29th Army and its officers must therefore be forced to leave the Peiping-Tientsin area.

a. The Japanese ultimatum of July 26 at Peiping:

On July 26, the Japanese military presented two

demands

- 19 -

demands to the Chinese authorities at Peiping; (a) troops of the 37th Division within Peiping should withdraw by noon of July 27 to west of the Yungting River and (b) troops of that Division at Hsiyuan and in its vicinity should similarly withdraw by noon of July 28. The demands were allegedly accepted July 26 by Chang Wei-fan, Managing Director of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, on behalf of the 29th Army. Chang's acceptance of the demands did not move the 37th Division, however, and the dangers of the situation increased.

t. Local negotiations continue; foreigners called into Legation Quarter; fighting at Tunghow:

Negotiations over the demands were entered into the night of July 26 and, according to a Japanese official, the Chinese accepted the Japanese demands, but Japanese residents in Peiping began to take refuge in the Quarter, pursuant to orders issued avowedly to prevent difficulties between Japanese and Chinese during the withdrawal of the 37th Division. The next morning, July 27, fighting began at Tunghow, 13 miles from Peiping, where about 500 troops of the 38th Division had been stationed outside the city gate since the inception of the East Hopei regime of which Tunghow had been the "capital", and Japanese bombing planes wrecked the town. The gate of the American School situated outside Tunghow was damaged but two Americans at the school were not injured. The Chinese authorities rejected the Japanese demands on the afternoon of July 27 (according to the Chinese Foreign Minister the demands by this time included one for the retirement of Chinese troops from the Peiping area to Paoting, south Hopei), and that afternoon fighting occurred at Huangtsun and Tuanho

(near

- 20 -

(near and south of Banyuan) and reportedly at one or two other places more distant from Peiping. That night the Foreign Office at Nanking issued another statement reviewing the situation and ending with a pronouncement that China had exhausted efforts for peace, and responsibility for future developments in North China rested solely with Japan. Also that evening the National Government telegraphed instructions to General Sung to resist the Japanese and Sung was reported to have already issued orders to that effect to the 29th Army. The headquarters of the 37th Division at Hsiyuan, from which the troops had already withdrawn, were bombed during the night. Chinese sources gave out false reports of sweeping Chinese victories on July 26 at Langfang and Fengtai, which lead Chinese at Tungchow and Tientsin to believe that General Sung was conducting a successful campaign against the Japanese and precipitated significant conflicts at Tungchow and Tientsin.

u. Revolt at Tungchow:

The Peace Preservation Corps (Chinese) at Tungchow revolted July 28, killing more than 200 Japanese nationals, including women and children and including also most of the Japanese garrison, which numbered about 50. Japanese reinforcements, aided by bombers, attacked the Peace Preservation Corps the following day and drove away those of the Corps who were not killed. Chinese civilians of Tungchow suffered heavily, not only as a result of bombing but also, according to reputable observers, because the Japanese military shot down Chinese who were suspected of being involved in the revolt.

Y.

- 21 -

V. Americans withdraw into Legation Quarter;  
general disruption of normal life; neutrality  
of the Quarter:

Before July 26 Americans in the Western Hills and at Yenching University west of Peiping were warned to come into Peiping. Japanese and German nationals sought refuge in the Legation Quarter July 27. On July 28 Americans in Peiping (approximately 700) began to withdraw into the quarter, many Americans receiving food and shelter from the Embassy Guard, and two American marines who were assisting Americans into the quarter were fired upon through error by Chinese troops, and one marine was wounded slightly. British and French nationals came in on the same day as Americans. Dislocation of ordinary life in the Peiping-Tientsin area had begun shortly after July 7. Martial law had been put into effect in Peiping; ingress and egress became difficult with the closing of the gates except for brief intervals; barricades of sandbags were erected in many streets. Rail service between Peiping and Tientsin was frequently suspended and telegram service out of Peiping and Tientsin was impossible by the close of July. The Japanese military stationed censors in the Tientsin Central Post Office on July 19, removed them July 22 as the result presumably of a protest made by the Tientsin Consular Body, but reestablished censorship from July 28. As the month progressed, fighting between Japanese and Chinese outside the walls of Peiping increased, with firing and bombing by Japanese resulting in the deaths of many Chinese civilians and the destruction of civilian property.

On July 29 the American Embassy, acting on behalf of the American, British, French and Italian diplomatic

representatives

- 22 -

representatives and guard commandants, obtained the assurances of the Japanese Embassy that strict neutrality of the quarter would be maintained and sorties therefrom would not be made.

w. Collapse of Sung's regime; Japanese occupation of Peiping; end of the military phase at Peiping:

The report that General Sung had issued orders to the 29th Army to fight was accompanied in the press by the text of a circular telegram reputedly issued by Sung in which he promised to defend Peiping until death.

On the morning of July 28 the situation became highly critical when Japanese planes heavily bombed Peiyuan and Hsiyuan, north and west of Peiping, where troops of the 37th Division were stationed, and Kanyuen, where troops of the 38th Division were stationed. As a result of this activity, the troops of the 37th Division stationed in Peiping left the city during the night of July 28-29, and, together with troops of that division outside the city, proceeded westward to the railway and thence south. General Sung Che-yuan left Peiping during the same night for Paoing, accompanied by General Chin Teh-chun, Mayor of Peiping, General Feng Chih-an, Chairman of Hopei and Commander of the 37th Division, and other officers and officials of General Sung's regime who were known not to be friendly toward increased Japanese control in Hopei Province. The collapse of Sung's regime and the withdrawal of his troops marked the end of the military phase in the old capital and the beginning of the political phase in which Peiping began to take on the character of a second Mukden.

x. The weakness of Sung Che-yuan and his subordinates:

The elimination of General Sung from Hopei was facilitated

- 23 -

facilitated by (a) the lack of intelligence on the part of the leaders of Sung's regime to cope with the situation, (b) divergent views of Sung's military subordinates, civilian subordinates and advisers, and Japanese associates, (c) defection of General Chang Tzu-chung to the Japanese side, and (d) vacillation of General Sung between such views as (1) that he could perhaps cope with the Japanese in conversation and in military action and (2) that the National Government wished to see him and his army eliminated from the political scene.

y. The attitude of the National Government toward Sung:

The attitude of the National Government was difficult to determine. Certain Chinese claimed that General Sung had been ordered prior to July 7 by General Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw to Peiping, in case of a clash with Japanese forces, and had received a similar order again on July 11. If there were such orders, he may have disobeyed them in the belief that he could deal with the Japanese by himself and that, were he to withdraw, it would mean his elimination by the National Government and his being stigmatized as a national traitor. He may have for the same reason requested the retention in south Hopei of the divisions sent there, if report to that effect is true. On the other hand, he may have expected or hoped that he would receive material aid from the National Government for resistance to the Japanese and been disappointed. The troops (60,000 north of Shihkiachuang) which the National Government sent into Hopei during July remained remote from the Peiping-Tientsin area.

z.

- 24 -

z. Chinese attack on Japanese military at Tientsin:

Chinese Peace Preservation forces in Tientsin attacked the Japanese military contingents in Tientsin July 29, presumably as result of the false reports of Chinese victories at Langfang and Fengtai. Apparently the Chinese did not attack Japanese civilians. They were repulsed by Japanese troops and those who were not killed fled, presumably joining other Chinese forces south and west of Tientsin. Fighting ended by August first.

Japanese bombing operations were carried out over several areas of the native city and outside Tientsin, one object of attack being government buildings. The outstanding instance of destruction caused by Japanese planes was the complete demolition of Nankai University and Nankai Middle School. The Japanese claim that the Chinese military had received assistance from those institutions, but it is probable that the real reason for the Japanese action was the anti-Japanese attitude of those institutions during the past. The immediate military phase in Tientsin was now also ended.

Among questions with foreigners which arose in consequence of the fighting was the desire of the Japanese to transport troops across the French Concession, which is immediately adjacent to the Japanese Concession and lies between the latter and the East Station. The French authorities closed the Concession against Japanese troops and in retaliation the Japanese refused to permit passage of French military en route to their East Arsenal barracks over the International Bridge, the south end of which rests on the French Concession and the northern end of which was held by the Japanese.

Reportedly

- 25 -

Reportedly Japanese soldiers attacked and disarmed the small French contingent regularly on duty at the East Station, wounding a non-commissioned officer. One Italian marine was accidentally killed during Sino-Japanese fighting.

aa. Occupation of Taku:

Two Japanese destroyers bombarded Taku at the mouth of the Hai River on July 29, and on July 30 a Japanese naval detachment occupied the village.

3. The political phase at Peiping and Tientsin begins:

a. The end of General Sung's regime:

Following his departure from Peiping, Sung's political and military organization soon disappeared: the two regiments of the 132nd Division left Peiping August 1 in the direction of Faojing, thereby clearing the vicinity of Chinese regular forces; the 36th Division, which had been stationed between Nanyuan and Tientsin, moved south in disorder; General Chang Tzu-chung, who took over the posts of Acting Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, Acting Mayor of Peiping, and Acting Commissioner of the Hopei-Chahar Pacification Headquarters, shortly resigned these offices; the Hopei-Chahar Pacification Headquarters was abolished August 9; the Hopei-Chahar Political Council suspended activities from August 19; all important officials and officers of Sung's regime either went south or into hiding. Sung was subsequently transferred to Tsangchow, south of Tientsin on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, while his 37th, 38th, and a part of his 132nd Divisions, together with the Peace Preservation Corps of Tientsin, which had fled after the fighting in Tientsin at the close of July, were reorganized

into

- 26 -

into the New First Route Army and stationed on that railway. Some of the Sung's soldiers presumably remained, however, in the vicinity of Peiping to carry on guerilla activities against the Japanese. The other division of the 29th Army (the 145rd) remained in Chahar, where it was assigned to the defense of Kalgan.

b. Japanese intentions as to the administration of Hopei:

The Japanese had not by the end of August reached a decision with regard to the form of administration for that part of Hopei which they had seized. Certain administrative organs of a character similar to those functioning in Manchuria for a short time after the Mukden Incident were, however, inaugurated, composed of Chinese assisted by Japanese advisers.

c. New administrative organs:

For the administration of affairs in Tientsin, a Tientsin Local Maintenance Society was inaugurated August 1. A Peiping Local Maintenance Society was inaugurated August 3. For the administration of the districts of Hopei under Japanese control, including East Hopei, an Association of the District (hsien) Maintenance Societies was inaugurated August 10.

The real power of administration of Peiping and Tientsin lay, however, not with these committees but with certain Japanese and Chinese. In Peiping the most influential figures seemed to be Lieutenant Colonel Gennosuke Matsui, Chief of the Special Military Organ at Peiping, and Fan Yu-kuei, new Peiping Chief of Police, whose record for honesty and loyalty was questionable.

d. The caliber of the members of the new organs:

The Japanese were moderately successful in their

choice

- 27 -

choice of chairmen of the Peiping and Tientsin Local Maintenance Societies. After several refusals, General Chiang Chao-tsung, once an official under Yuan Shih-kai, agreed to head the Peiping society, and to serve as Mayor. Chiang, whose reputation among Chinese was good, was motivated in his acceptance by a seemingly genuine desire to improve the lot of the populace of Peiping and the surrounding area. There was evidence before long that he found his duties difficult because of lack of cooperation on the part of those Japanese behind the scenes who held the actual power. The Chairman of the Tientsin Local Maintenance Committee, Mr. Kao Ling-wei, a former Cabinet Minister under the old Peking Government, also enjoyed good repute among Chinese.

e. The promotion of "good relations" with Japan:

Treatment of important Chinese: arrests and search:

The stated primary objective of the Japanese military in their action which began July 7 was suppression of Communist, blue shirt, and anti-Japanese activities. It was therefore surprising that few prominent Chinese were arrested following Japanese control. Only a few Chinese newspaper men, primarily those with Kuomintang connections or sympathies, were arrested in Peiping. Searching of houses in Peiping appeared to be directed primarily against members of Sung's regime.

Attitude toward the Kuomintang:

It was evident that the Japanese were intent on eliminating Kuomintang influence in the area. Orders were issued that all Kuomintang and anti-Japanese

publications

- 28 -

publications as well as pictures of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and symbols of the New Life Movement should be destroyed and these orders were reportedly thoroughly followed. Measures for the revision of text books were initiated.

Cultural institutions:

On August 29 a committee was appointed for the purpose of "preserving" twenty-two National Government educational institutions. It seemed doubtful that many of the institutions would continue their activities and the indications were that Peiping would in due course cease to be the educational and cultural center of the Far East.

Treatment of the press:

In part as a result of the arrests, a number of Chinese newspapers and news agencies in Peiping closed voluntarily or by order and those which continued active altered their character so as to be acceptable to the Japanese, with the result that the populace could obtain only distorted and incomplete news. A similar situation apparently existed in Tientsin. The Peiping Chronicle, which is English owned and edited, was forced to abandon publication from August 23 to 28.

Treatment of the people: disruption of normal life:

Although it seems for a few days following occupation that the Japanese were making efforts to create a favorable impression upon the people, such efforts were soon nullified by ill-treatment of shopkeepers by Japanese soldiers, including the taking of merchandise without payment; commandeering of motor vehicles and mule carts; impressing of coolies; searching of houses; reported seizures of Chinese girls for the use of Japanese soldiers; disarmament of Chinese police, which resulted in an increase

of

- 29 -

of robberies; flights of Japanese bombing planes over the city; reports of violence against Chinese civilian life and property in areas outside the city. As a result considerable fear existed among the people; many Chinese remained off the streets; shops and places of amusement suffered severely; and improbable rumors became current and increased the uneasiness. This uneasiness was also in part due to the activities of certain Chinese in the new regime, principally the new Chief of Police, initiated without reference to the Japanese, for purposes of graft or of paying off grudges.

f. Commerce and finance after the Japanese occupation:

Trade was practically at a standstill during August in the Peiping-Tientsin area. Freight could not be moved from the interior to Tientsin, in part because of the movement of Japanese troops and military supplies on the railway between Peiping and Shanhaikwan. (Passenger service between Peiping and Tientsin was resumed on a retarded schedule early in August.) A shortage of National Government bank notes became acute. The authorities announced that East Hopei Bank notes should circulate legally, and a branch of that bank was opened in Peiping. Bank of Chosen notes began to circulate freely. Restrictions on withdrawals from Chinese banks were put into force, as was done in Central China. Retail prices rose, in some cases doubling.

Inconvenience was caused by disruption of telegraph and radio, and postal delays due in part to Japanese censorship. At Tientsin numerous incidents occurred as a result of the passage of Japanese troops through the

British

- 30 -

British and French concessions, and the British and French officials there finally closed their concessions to Japanese troops after August 30.

A disturbing factor was the appearance in the Japanese-controlled Chinese press of statements intended apparently to arouse anti-Western feeling among its readers.

g. Aftermath of the fighting in the Peiping area:

Foreign nationals, including Japanese, who had withdrawn during the latter part of July into the Legation Quarter, returned to their houses in the city early in August. A considerable burden was placed on eleemosynary organizations, in caring for Chinese who had been wounded in places close to Peiping. As a result of the driving away of forces of the 29th Army and Peace Preservation Corps men and as a result of the uncertainties attending a political change, the Peiping countryside became increasingly dangerous because of roving groups of armed Chinese. Some of these were said to be a force organized for the purpose of harassing the Japanese, others to be Liu Kuei-tang's semi-bandit troops who entered the area to take advantage of the disturbed conditions. The most serious incident was the kidnapping August 30 of 8 foreigners of 6 nationalities belonging to the Mariste (French Catholic) Seminary twelve miles northwest of the city.

h. The East Hopei regime:

Shortly after the July 28 massacre of Japanese nationals at Tungehow, the "capital" of the East Hopei regime was moved to Tangshan on the Tientsin-Shanhaikwan Railway. A number of new officials were appointed,

including

- 31 -

including that of "Governor", reportedly to replace Yin Ju-keng, head of the regime, and five other high officials who were said to have been arrested by Japanese on August 6 somewhere in the Legation Quarter. Supposedly the arrested officials were suspected of implication in the Tungchow revolt July 26.

With the extension of Japanese control over areas south of East Hopei, the future of that regime was in doubt.

1. Military activities in North China during August:

Japanese and Chinese military strength:

Japanese military strength increased during August in Hopei (and south Chahar) from some 20,000 (July 26) troops with a number of planes to at least 150,000, while artillery, tanks, and other supplies also continued to pour in. Distribution was primarily between the three fronts; namely, the so-called Tientsin-Pukow Railway front, the Peiping-Hankow Railway front, and the Nankou-Kalgan front. Chinese forces also increased on those front, to an estimated more than 250,000 men.

The taking of Nankou Pass and Kalgan:

The only severe fighting which took place during August in North China was in the Nankou-Kalgan area. Bombing Nankou on August 3 and 4, Japanese forces began an attack from the south about August 10. Notwithstanding the despatch of large numbers of Japanese reinforcements, the Japanese progressed with unexpected slowness and by August 20 were only a short distance inside the pass, which is twelve miles long. It became evident that if the pass was to be taken in the immediate future

- 32 -

a Japanese movement from the north would be necessary. This was carried out, and by the close of August Balgan and places between Balgan and Hankou along the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, and the Pass itself, were occupied by Japanese moving from Jehol. The Chinese forces withdrew to the west and southwest.

The Peking-Hankow Railway front:

The southernmost point on the Peiping-Hankow Railway occupied by Japanese forces by the close of August was a little south of Lianghsiang. The expected southward movement of these forces did not take place during August. Among the causes of the delay were presumably the heavy rains during the month and Japanese preoccupation with Chinese forces in the hills along the Japanese western flank as well as with the Hankou Pass operations.

The Tientsin-Pukow Railway front:

Heavy rains and resultant flooding of areas south of Tientsin were apparently one of the causes of the absence of important military action by the Japanese forces stationed in Tientsin and for a short distance along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. Japanese claimed to have taken near the end of August Chinghai, which is on the railway a few miles south of Tientsin.

J. Withdrawal of Japanese from Shantung:

Although only one important incident involving Japanese and Chinese occurred in Shantung, namely, the shooting on August 14 at Tsingtao of two Japanese sailors, and although the incident appeared to be amicably settled, nevertheless all Japanese in Shantung had evacuated by close of August, with the exception of some 300 at Tsingtao. (Japanese evacuation of the Yangtze Valley

begun

- 33 -

begun at the close of July was completed August 16.) The evacuation of these, including the staff of the Japanese Consulate General at Tsingtao, was ordered to take place early in September. Although the official Japanese reason given was the desire to avoid any incident which might aggravate the situation, Chinese feared that the evacuation was a prelude to Japanese military action against Tsingtao, perhaps in conjunction with a Japanese drive southward from Tientsin; that is, seizing Tsingtao, the Japanese would move westward from Tsingtao to obtain control of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway at Tsinan, thereby cutting off Chinese forces massed between that city and Tientsin.

(CENTRAL CHINA AND THE HINTERLAND)

1. Hankow crisis; hostilities averted by Japanese evacuation:

The Lukoushiao incident made little immediate impression in Central China but as the situation in the North developed and the attitude of the National Government stiffened, the tension spread to Hankow where Chinese dispositions around the Japanese Concession and Japanese defense preparations had been made last autumn following the murder of two Japanese at Chengtu (August 24, 1936). As Chinese military works around the Concession were increased, the Japanese felt that they were being isolated and instead of increasing their forces as was done in the autumn of 1936 they evacuated. Presumably this extraordinary move was undertaken to prevent extension of hostilities to this interior point where it would be difficult to conduct successful operations and where any large scale operations would absorb forces needed in the north and for the protection

of Japanese

- 34 -

of Japanese interests at Shanghai.

Before the close of July, the few Japanese nationals at Chengchow, Honan, withdrew from that place. Japanese women and children at Hankow began embarking for down river and on August 1 the Japanese Consulates at Chungking and Ichang were closed and Japanese residents were evacuated to Hankow on Japanese gunboats. While the military phase in the Peiping-Tientsin area seemed over, it was apparent that a front was being formed in south Hopei; Japanese, chiefly women and children, began evacuating Tainan and Tsingtao; and partial evacuation of Americans from South Hopei and the interior of Shantung began. The Japanese Consulate at Changsha was closed August 5 and Japanese nationals left, and the next day, August 6, the Japanese Consul General at Hankow received instructions from Tokyo for the withdrawal of Japanese naval vessels and nationals including the naval force (about 300) ashore. There was, according to the Japanese Embassy at Nanking, no question of surrendering or retroceding the Hankow Concession, administration of which was turned over to the Chinese authorities temporarily when the remaining Japanese, comprising consular officials from Chungking, Ichang, Shasi and Hankow, departed. Meanwhile Japanese were evacuating Kiukiang, Wuhu, Chingkiang, Hangehow and Sooshow and the Chinese

blocked

- 35 -

blocked the river above Woosung August 12 when hostilities broke out at Shanghai August 13 there were no Japanese naval vessels in the Yangtze Valley above Shanghai and no Japanese nationals except for the consular personnel which left Hankow August 11 and Embassy personnel at Nanking which, having been joined by the consular personnel from Hankow, left Nanking for Tsinan and Tsingtao on August 16, the day after the first Japanese air attack upon the capital. Evacuation of Japanese from other places except Shanghai, Tsingtao and the North proceeded rapidly; they evacuated Canton and Tsinan August 17 and subsequently Swatow, Foochow and Chefoo; evacuation of Tsingtao began August 28 and was completed after the close of August (on September 4).

(SHANGHAI)

1. Developments preceding hostilities:

a. Reaction to the developments in the North:

At Shanghai, as at Hankow, the immediate reaction to the Lukouchiao incident was surprisingly mild but as events developed in the North feeling mounted, belief grew that Japan had no intention of localizing the incident and was determined to seize North China, General Chiang Kai-shek's statement of July 19 crystallized Chinese opinion in favor of resistance, and public bodies in Shanghai promoted patriotic activities in support of

the 29th

- 26.-

the 29th Army and the National Government in resisting Japan. Both Chinese and Japanese officials, however, showed a disposition to maintain order and prevent incidents. Following the discovery of a Japanese blue-jacket who disappeared July 24, the Japanese Naval Landing Party Commandant issued an unusually conciliatory and apologetic explanation of the despatch of armed patrols into various districts including Chinese territory on the night the man was found missing. Tension nevertheless did not relax. A few days later the false reports of Chinese victories at Langfang and Fengtai, which were seemingly responsible for the Tungchow massacre of July 28 and the attack by Paocantui on Japanese military at Tientain July 29, caused Chinese excitement to reach a high pitch.

Fusillades of firecrackers were discharged throughout the foreign settlements and while there were no serious disorders the Commander of the Japanese Third Fleet issued a warning against untoward incidents and threatened to take measures for the protection of Japanese life and property if the Chinese did not cooperate. Japanese nationals soon began evacuating the Yangtze Valley to Shanghai where their increasing number added to the responsibility of the Japanese defense forces, a heavy exodus of Chinese from Hongkew and Chapei began August 6, both sides apparently made preparations to increase their local forces, and when the next incident occurred August 9 forces of both sides were increased and the situation was beyond control.

b. The Hungiao Airdrome incident:

On the afternoon of August 9 a Japanese sub-lieutenant, a seaman who was acting as the officer's chauffeur, and a

Peace

- 37 -

Peace Preservation Corps sentry were shot dead on Monument Road near the Hungjao Airdrome. The corpse of the Chinese sentry was about 100 yards distant from the car on the road. It was said that the Japanese officer's body, found on the footboard of the car, showed 18 bullet and bayonet wounds and that his skull had been smashed in. The bluejacket was found about 400 yards away off the road and was said to have suffered several wounds on his head and body. The Chinese claimed that the Japanese officer had tried to force his way into the airdrome, had shot and killed the Chinese sentry who challenged him, and with his naval chauffeur had been shot down by Peace Preservation Corps sentries. The Japanese claimed that the officer was wantonly killed while exercising his right to motor over a municipal outside road, that he had been making daily tours over the road, and that he was unarmed, although the chauffeur carried a pistol.

The inquiry into the matter achieved no result but to hasten the outbreak of hostilities.

c. Insuing developments; increase in Japanese naval forces; Chinese regulars occupy the North Station and Kiangwan; meeting of Joint Commission:

On August 11 a Japanese naval squadron arrived with reinforcements (reportedly 5,000 men) for the Naval Landing Party; Japanese warship strength was increased to 4 cruisers, 12 destroyers and 10 gunboats; and quantities of munitions and supplies were landed. At midnight August 11 the Chinese 87th and 88 Divisions, which must have been approaching or entering the Shanghai area for several days previously, occupied the North Station and Kiangwan. On August 12 at the request of the Japanese Consul General a

meeting

- 38 -

meeting was held of the Joint Commission provided for by the 1932 peace agreement, but it was too late for compromise. The same day the Chinese blocked the Whangpoo by sinking steamers and junks across the river from the junction of Kanto and the French Concession and the Municipal Government moved from the civic center. Sniping broke out August 13 in Chapei in the Wangping-Tientungan-East Paoshan Road area; Chinese and Japanese artillery and Japanese naval guns came into action that afternoon and fighting started in Yangtzepoo. The Chinese started aerial bombing operations next morning, and Shanghai and Woosung and vicinity became a battle ground for continuous and extensive hostilities of the fiercest character involving by the end of August some 80,000 Chinese troops, 40,000 Japanese troops on land, from 60 to 80 Japanese naval vessels and a large number of Japanese and Chinese bombing and combat planes.

d. The question of responsibility and the 1932 Peace Agreement:

Foreign military forces, including Japanese, have been stationed in Shanghai since February 1927 by virtue of the right frequently claimed by Governments to protect their nationals in foreign territory when the authorities of that territory are unable to do so. The immediate background of the recent Japanese and Chinese military positions at Shanghai was the 1932 Peace Agreement which formally terminated the Sino-Japanese hostilities of that year at Shanghai. Under the terms of this agreement the Chinese troops were to remain in the positions held at the date of signing, on a definite line north of Soochow Creek ranging in depth from 20 to 40 miles from Shanghai pending "later arrangements" and the Japanese were to withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in Hongkew, the

effect

- 39 -

effect being to establish a demilitarized zone where only Chinese police could function. In June 1937 the Japanese contended that the Chinese had violated this agreement by increasing the number and armament of Peace Preservation Corps men in the zone, by digging trenches in Kiangwan and by refortifying Woosung. While not specifically denying the truth of these accusations the Chinese claimed that the agreement had been a temporary one for solution of a particular situation and, although the "later arrangements" mentioned in the agreement had never been made, the agreement was no longer operative. The Chinese delegate (Mayor Yui) admitted at the meeting of the Joint Commission August 12 that Chinese forces had been strengthened, but only because the Japanese had increased their naval strength in men and ships. By this time evacuation from the Yangtze Valley had reportedly increased the Japanese civilian population at Shanghai to 27,000, the responsibility for whose protection fell upon the Naval Landing Party. The evacuation of the Yangtze Valley was clear indication that the Japanese did not at that time desire any extension of hostilities from the North. The concentration of their nationals at Shanghai and considerations in respect to their large commercial interests and the loss of all but their physical properties in the Yangtze tended to support the view that they did not desire hostilities at Shanghai. The conciliatory pronouncement of the landing party commander after the discovery of the missing bluejacket further supports this view. As regards the August 9 incident, it was admittedly reckless for <sup>Japanese</sup> naval personnel to tour roads in the vicinity of the <sup>Chinese military</sup> airbase at a time of tension, but such tours had been made previously from

day

- 40 -

day to day and it could not reasonably be supposed, without evidence, that the victims deliberately precipitated their death by firing on a Chinese sentry. The peculiar location of the corpses and the failure of the Chinese authorities to produce any witnesses or Chinese participants raised obvious doubts as to the accuracy of the Chinese version, as did also the apparent fact that the 87th and 88th Divisions must have been already en route toward their Shanghai positions at the time. The immediate blame would accordingly appear to rest upon the Chinese; fundamentally the blame for any Sino-Japanese hostilities could logically and rightly be considered as having been due to Japan's policy toward China and the aggressive acts of the Japanese military in North China following the occupation of Manchuria and Jehol. These acts, exemplified in the Japanese military demarche of May and June 1935, created the particular situation in Hopei which resulted in the Lukouchiao incident of July 7 and led indirectly to subsequent developments there and at Shanghai.

2. The course of hostilities:

Space is lacking for a detailed account of the hostilities which began August 13, the danger to life and property in the Settlements, the great loss of life among non-combatants (chiefly Chinese but including some Americans and other foreigners), the destruction of property and disruption of trade and shipping, the evacuation of foreigners from Shanghai in large numbers, and the attempts of interested governments to alleviate the situation.

The principal fighting in the beginning was on a

front

- 41 -

front which extended along the northeastern boundary of Hongkew, with the Japanese in Hongkew and the Chinese forces in Chapai, and thence toward Hongkew Park where the Japanese fortress-like barracks are situated, the Chinese pushing toward the Shanghai Woosung Railway. Japanese naval vessels in the Whangpoo shelled Chapai, the Naval Landing Party took up positions in Yangtsepoo, fighting gradually spread east and north toward Woosung, and Chinese forces came into Pootung. Following the beginning of Chinese bombing operations August 14, Japanese planes carried the warfare into the hinterland in an effort to destroy Chinese air fields and other military establishments and equipment and on August 15 Japanese bombers attacked Hangchow, Nanking and other inland places.

By August 18th the Chinese were occupying a line with their right resting at the Settlement and running through the North Station along the Hongkew western boundary, but they did not seriously attack from the east, north of the Yangtsepoo area, which would have enabled them to bring Hongkew under fire from both front and rear. Delay also apparently caused them to lose a further opportunity of breaking the Japanese resistance before reinforcements could arrive (there were reportedly now 6 Chinese divisions in the area against less than 8,000 Japanese) and although the Chinese made headway to a point about a mile east of Hongkew Creek and made small gains on the Yangtsepoo front, the Japanese counter-attacked on the next day with sufficient success to remove the threat of the Chinese breaking through to the river; and on the 20th the Japanese began to land reinforcements in Yangtsepoo and also Pootung. The next day, with

little

- 42 -

little change in lines, Japanese landings were threatened at Woosung, at Liuho further up the Yangtze (where successful landing to attack the Chinese flank had turned the 1938 hostilities in favor of the Japanese) and at Chapu on Hangchow Bay. Actual landing at Woosung began the night of the 28nd and probably 5,000 men got ashore by morning covered by the fire of the Japanese fleet. (Up to this time Vice Admiral Hasegawa had been in command; command of the combined naval and military forces was now given to General Matsui.) Stiff Chinese opposition made subsequent landings and a Japanese advance from Liuho and Woosung a slow process. But the Japanese occupied Lotien August 26, out flanking and creating a serious threat to the Chinese. Meanwhile tension in Shanghai had lessened when the Japanese landings began and by August 29 some return toward normal conditions had been made. Artillery and naval gun fire continued as well as some aerial bombing but with heavy Japanese reinforcements on the way it appeared that action around the city would shortly cease. By August 30 some 20,000 Japanese troops had been brought ashore, occupied the Liuho-Lotien-Woosung triangle and begun a push near the Shanghai to effect junction with the naval garrison in the city. This junction was not then effected, but the Chinese had already begun to withdraw from the Yangtzepoo front. Stiff resistance was continued by the Chinese to a Japanese advance southward, but indications at the close of the month, borne out by subsequent events, were that the Chinese would withdraw to their next line, Lotien-Liuhong-Tachang-North Station.

It was generally considered that the Chinese troops made an excellent defense, their stubbornness and capacity

for

- 43 -

for punishment enabling them to hold their lines much longer than was anticipated. They greatly outnumbered the Japanese in men but were at a disadvantage as regards artillery, the Japanese naval guns giving the latter tremendous superiority in metal. Some observers considered that the Japanese early gained command of the air, but this opinion was not universal and may have been based partially upon the failure of Chinese bombing planes after continuous attempts to destroy the Idzumi, Japanese flagship, and other Japanese naval vessels in the river. Estimates as to casualties varied greatly. According to one competent source 15,000 Chinese wounded were in hospitals between Shanghai and Hanking at the end of August and one foreign military observer estimated that total Chinese casualties were 30,000 with at least 10,000 killed. The Japanese were said to have admitted 2,000 killed and the observer in question believed that the actual total reached at least 6,000 with probably 18,000 wounded. Except for several Japanese air service personnel (including one woman radio operator) from planes brought down near Hanking, no reliable reports concerning prisoners were received and according to several sources neither side gave quarter to prisoners in the ground fighting.

3. Effect of the hostilities upon foreign interests:

The foreign Powers having interests in Shanghai and their nationals were faced with numerous problems arising from hostilities in close proximity to the Settlements and along the Whangpoo. Both life and property were jeopardized in the foreign areas and in the river by

the aerial

- 44 -

the aerial warfare, including bombing, and by machine and anti-aircraft gun fire and land and naval artillery operations, and several major disasters occurred. There were in addition problems connected with the protection of the Settlements from the area of fighting (except Hongkew which could not be excluded), protection of shipping including naval vessels, evacuation of foreign nationals, care of Chinese non-combatant refugees and casualties, maintenance of order. The greatest danger to life in the Settlements resulted from aerial bombs dropped in the areas, for the most part by accident. There were a number of incidents between the opening of hostilities and the close of August:

Palace and Cathay Hotels, August 14: A Chinese plane dropped 2 bombs, 1 of which wrecked the top floor of the Palace and the other fell immediately in front of the Cathay Hotel; casualties reportedly numbered over 200, with at least 145 killed among them several foreigners including 1 American.

Great World, Avenue Edward VII and Yu Ya Ching Road, August 14: Another Chinese plane dropped two bombs one of which fell at the traffic circus at the junction of the two roads with Boulevard de Montigny, the other being detonated in mid air. The traffic circus was crowded with refugees and casualties reportedly numbered 1047 killed, including 3 Americans, and 203 wounded.

U.S.S. AUGUSTA and H.B.M.S. CUMBERLAND, August 14: Bombs from Chinese planes, presumably directed at Japanese naval vessels, narrowly missed the American and British flagships.

U.S.S. AUGUSTA, August 20: An anti-aircraft shell fell and exploded on the deck of the U.S.S. AUGUSTA, killing one seaman and injuring 18 others.

U.S. Naval Godown, August 25: A heavy bomb about 250 kilos in weight, believe to have been dropped by a Chinese plane, struck the roof of the U.S. Naval Godown, about 50 yards from the temporary offices of the British Consulate General at Hamilton House, fell through three stories and broke up on the ground floor without exploding.

Sincere and Wing On Stores, August 25: A bomb dropped by the plane which bombed the U.S. Naval Godown fell a few seconds later on the balustrade of the second and third stories of the Sincere

Company's

- 45 -

Company's store at the corner of Hanking and Chekiang Roads, blew in part of the front and corner of the building and damaged the Wing On store opposite. Casualties reportedly numbered 173 killed and 349 wounded, among the latter being 2 Americans.

South Railway Station, August 28: Japanese planes bombed the South Railway Station reportedly killing 300 Chinese refugees.

U.S. PRESIDENT HOOVER, August 30: Chinese planes from Hanking despatched to bomb Japanese transports, bombed the American S. S. PRESIDENT HOOVER lying about 50 miles at sea from Woosung, working considerable damage and injuring several members of the crew, one of whom died.

These and other incidents, the general danger to the Settlements and foreign shipping, and interest in the cause of peace as such resulted in diplomatic action by various Governments which is discussed under appropriate heading below.

4. Measures for the protection of the Settlements; evacuation of foreigners:

On August 12 the American and British Consuls General advised their nationals to evacuate the northern area and the area west of the railway, and the Shanghai Volunteer Corps was mobilized. American and British troops took up positions August 13 on the Settlement boundary to cooperate with police and prevent the incursion of armed retreating Chinese and Japanese troops into the Settlement (foreign forces ashore included 1100 American marines, 1000 British troops, and 700 French colonials). Subsequently foreign naval forces were augmented, the American and British flagships arriving August 14; two battalions of British troops from Hongkong reached Shanghai August 17 and 18; 100 United States Marines from Manila arrived August 18; 1252 French and Annamite troops arrived August 25 and 29; and a regiment of United States Marines sailed from San Diego for Shanghai August 27 (they arrived September 19).

Evacuation

- 46 -

Evacuation of Americans and British began August 17 when over 1300, including American consular families, departed for Hongkong and Manila. By the end of the month there had been evacuated over 6,300 foreigners including some 1600 Americans, 3000 British, 450 Germans, 150 French and 150 Dutch. There were in addition a large number of Chinese and Russians who departed. Americans were evacuated chiefly on vessels of the Dollar Line commandeered for the purpose by the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet. The bombing of the S.S. PRESIDENT HOOVER August 30 resulted in the issuance by Admiral Yarnell of orders that American vessels cease making Shanghai a port of call and later evacuation of Americans who could not get commercial passage on foreign vessels was effected by American naval vessels.

(NANKING AND LOWER YANGTZE VALLEY)

1. Aerial warfare in the Yangtze Valley:

The Chinese inaugurated aerial warfare in Shanghai August 14. The next day Japanese bombing planes, in addition to operations at Shanghai, began a series of raids upon places in the lower Yangtze Valley including the capital at Nanking, and even as far inland as Hankow and Wuchang. Among the places reportedly attacked, during August in addition to those in the Shanghai-Woosung area, were:

Hangehow (August 14, 15); Shangno, Chekiang (August 14); Nanchang (August 15); Nanking (August 15, 16, 19, 22, 24, 27); Puchen, Chekiang (August 15); Soochow where an American mission was sprayed with machine gun fire (August 16); Kiangyin and Yangchow, Kiangsu (August 16, 21); Chuyung, Kiangsu (August 16); Nantungchow, Kiangsu, where an American mission hospital was demolished (August 17); Kaching, Kiangsu (August 18); Kwangteh, Anhwei (August 19, 20); Kiekiang (August 20); Chinkiang where the Secony-Vacuum Company's installation was shot at with machine guns,

a Chinese

- 47 -

a Chinese chemical works near Hanking, Hankow-Wuchang, and Shaokan, Hupeh (August 21); Yoehow, Hunan (August 21, 24); Tingzekiao, Hupeh, on the Hankow-Canton Railway (August 23); a point on the Hanking-Shanghai motor highway about 40 miles from Shanghai where the British Ambassador was wounded (August 26); Fenghua (August 26); Canton, Chenyang, north Kwangtung, Chengchow, Fukien, and Fienow, north Fukien (August 31).

The earlier raids on more distant places such as Hanking and Hankow were conducted by heavy bombers based on Formosa (Hankow is but some 50 miles further from Formosa than Hanking) and subsequently naval planes from carriers near Shanghai or along the Chekiang coast were employed. By the end of August it was estimated that the Japanese had lost 60 planes and that 30 Chinese planes had been damaged, about 20 of them irreparably. In the first three days of the aerial warfare (including aerial operations at Shanghai) the Chinese claimed to have brought down 34 Japanese planes, including 26 of 52 heavy bombers based on Formosa, and to have lost 9, and partial investigation indicated that the Chinese claims were not greatly exaggerated. In general it appeared by the end of August that the results of the Japanese air attacks could not be considered as commensurate with the great cost in planes, bombs and personnel (the heavy bombers, for example, carried crews of seven or eight including in some instances women radio operators). The raids failed (1) to achieve any but negligible military results, (2) to demoralize or disorganize the Government, (3) to disorganize communications or interrupt them except temporarily, or (4) to demoralize Chinese troops or population. Damage to airfields, railway tracks, roads was quickly repaired. It also appeared that on the whole the Chinese defense in the air

was

- 48 -

was admirable considering the great disparity between the number of Chinese and Japanese planes (the total Japanese air force in Japan, Korea, Manchuria and China reportedly consisted of some 1800 combat planes in flying condition as against perhaps 580 Chinese combat planes that could be used, and assuming that two-thirds of the Japanese force could be available for China the ratio would be 2 to 1). Chinese defence was restricted by the necessity of conserving planes, because even at the ratio of 34 Japanese losses to 9 Chinese losses in the early attacks the Japanese could in time completely eliminate the Chinese force. The result was that bombing could not in most cases be prevented and while most of the Japanese planes lost were brought down by Chinese pursuits, either before or after raids, the Chinese relied chiefly on anti-aircraft which was generally ineffective except to keep the raiders at high altitudes and thereby lessen their marksmanship which in any case was poor. At the end of August the Chinese force was facing a serious problem in obtaining new planes and necessary replacement parts, and lacking the latter it was anticipated that its effectiveness would diminish greatly within a few weeks.

2. Bombing of Nanking:

The official count of air attacks upon Nanking during August beginning with August 15 was 40, including raids which were frustrated. The early raids, conducted by heavy bombers which reportedly came from Formosa, some 800 miles distant, were apparently directed at air fields and other strictly military establishments but Japanese bombing activities gradually extended with

the

- 49 -

the introduction of planes from carriers near Shanghai until civil government buildings and later hospitals and universities were included among the targets. By the end of August places bombed included the military airfield outside Kwanghua Gate, the arsenal and barracks outside the South Gate, the King Palace commercial airfield, Central University, the Aviation Commission, the Examination Yuan, the Aerial Survey, the Central Military Academy, Legislative Yuan, places near the Ministry of Education, Meteorological Hill, and the National Reconstruction Commission. Maps found on Japanese pilots whose planes were brought down indicated that purely civilian institutions such as Central Party Headquarters, the National Government and the Executive Yuan were also targets and this proved to be the case after the close of the months under review.

Except for bombs apparently directed at Meteorological Hill, which fell near the Soviet Embassy, no bombs were dropped during August in the general area occupied by the foreign diplomatic missions and consulates and the waterfront where foreign merchant and naval vessels were moored, presumably because of (1) Japanese desire to avoid incidents with western Powers and (2) representations to the Japanese initiated August 21 by the German, British, French, Italian and American Ambassadors at Nanking that Japanese bombing planes avoid operations in an area within a line from Hansi Gate to the Circle (Hsin Chieh Kou), thence to Peichiko (Meteorological Hill), thence to the city wall and along the wall northward to a point on the Yangtze located at the railway ferry.

For the most part, Chinese casualties from bombing operations were few, except in the south city (where the

Legislative

- 50 -

Legislative Yuan and a number of other governmental offices are situated) which is a crowded section inhabited chiefly by the poorer classes. On August 27 alone between 100 and 200 civilian residents of this area were killed. Little military purpose was served by any of these numerous raids. Three military planes were destroyed and a small building was damaged on the military air field, an anti-aircraft gun crew was killed, a workshop in the arsenal in the south suburbs was damaged, and a section of the compound wall of the Central Military Academy (if such an institution can be considered as a strictly military objective) was damaged. The Central University, which was not in session, suffered considerable material damage, and since it was bombed a third time after the period under review the assumption was that the bombing was deliberate rather than accidental. The doubtful propriety (under such rules and customs as are supposed to govern hostilities) of bombing the capital of a country with which the attackers' Government continues to maintain diplomatic relations became the subject of comment in the press.

(SOUTH CHINA AND THE COAST)

1. Repercussions; the Southwest supports the Government; Japanese evacuation;

Within a week after the Lukouchiso incident (July 7) Generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, Kwangsi military leaders, sent a telegram to General Chiang Kai-shek pledging their support and urging resistance against Japan and it was apparent throughout the Southwest that opinion in general was in support of the National Government. This sentiment grew as the situation in North China developed; there was some recrudescence of the anti-

Japanese

- 51 -

Japanese boycott movement in Canton and Swatow, preparations for defense were expedited, and Japanese women and children began quietly leaving the coastal ports. On July 30 the Japanese Naval Attaché orally warned the Chinese Navy Minister that "unfortunate incidents" should be avoided in central and south China, otherwise the Japanese fleet would take arbitrary action. Early in August General Pai came to Nanking for his first meeting with the Generalissimo in six years, and by that time most of the Japanese residents and some 50,000 Chinese had left Swatow, Japanese at Canton began moving into Shameen, and the Japanese Consulate at Yunnanfu, where anti-Japanese agitation was being officially organized, was closed (August 5). The Japanese Consulate at Swatow closed and all Japanese except Formosans left that port August 12. By August 13, when hostilities broke out at Shanghai, two-fifths of the Japanese residents of Canton had evacuated and Chinese officials were warning the native population to make preparations for defense, including the storing of foodstuffs. Japanese bombing operations in the Shanghai hinterland began August 14 and were extended August 15 to the capital at Nanking. A few days later saw the completion of Japanese evacuation of Canton (August 17) and Foochow (August 19). Over thirty per cent of the Chinese population had fled from Canton by August 21. On August 23 a Kwangsi division left for central China and the Southwest was definitely involved in the undeclared war.

2. Japanese blockade:

The Commander of the Third Japanese Fleet (at Shanghai) announced August 25 a naval blockade of Chinese shipping

along

- 52 -

along the China coast from Shanghai to Swatow which in September was extended to include the coast from Chinwangtao to Pakhoi. (The international aspects of the blockade are discussed under an appropriate heading.)

3. Japanese air attacks:

Japanese aerial bombing operations were extended to the southern coastal region August 30 when Canton was raided for the first time. On August 31 Canton was raided again and Japanese bombers attacked Cheeping, north Kwangtung, Changchow, south Fukien, and Kienow, north Fukien. The places attacked reportedly suffered little damage. (Naval bombardment of coastal places was not undertaken until September, following the close of the period under review.)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR

This telegram must be Canton via N. R.  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (A)

FROM Dated November 30, 1937

Rec'd 1:05 a.m., December 1.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
ONE AND ONLY  
*in confidence*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
REC-1-1937  
Department of State  
*ch B*

November 30, 4 p.m.

Chinese authorities state they have information that several divisions of Japanese troops have recently landed in Formosa. There are persistent rumors that Japan plans to land troops soon in South China and local military quarters appear increasingly active in preparing for such an eventuality. Huang Tien staff officer Army Headquarters has been placed in command Kwangtung River flotilla.

Yesterday about twenty planes raided Canton-Hankow Railway at Yingtak and several points between there and Canton and reportedly Shiuhing and Samshui on the west river. Damage to tracks reported not serious but station 35 miles north of Canton and other buildings badly damaged. Railway authorities report service from Hankow functioning today.

Through service to Hong Kong still discontinued.

LINNELL

WVC:HTM

793.94/11382

F/LEA  
EC 8 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

[CONFIDENTIAL]

PARAPHRASE

A telegram of November 30, 1937, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

On November 29 approximately twenty airplanes raided the Canton-Hankow Railway at Yingtak and at several places between Yingtak and Canton and according to reports Shiuhing and Samshui on the West River. It is reported that the tracks were not seriously damaged but various buildings, including station thirty-five miles north of Canton, were badly damaged. Service from Hankow was functioning on November 30 according to the railway authorities. Through service to Hong Kong is still discontinued.

The Kwangtung River flotilla has been placed in charge of Huang Tien, staff officer, Army Headquarters. Chinese authorities say that they have been informed that recently several divisions of Japanese soldiers landed in Formosa. Rumors persist to the effect that the Japanese plan to land troops in South China in the near future and it appears that military quarters in Canton are increasingly active in making ready for such an eventuality.

793.94/11382

*EGC*  
FE:EGC:HES  
12-2

*ACR*  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*JG*

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

GRAY

FROM *1038*

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated December 1, 1937

Rec'd 7 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 - 1937  
Department of State  
*WJ*

1050, December 1, 11 a. m.

Reference Tokyo's 582, <sup>11369</sup> November 30, 7 p. m. PLEASE  
SEE my telegram 1038, <sup>11365</sup> November 29, 8 p. m. There is no  
change in the situation as reported therein. These  
matters are in abeyance, It is not believed that any  
precipitate action will be taken. Repeated to Tokyo.

GAUSS

KLP  
Anti-Japanese activities in Settlement

793.94/11383

JUL 14 1938

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Manking via N. R.

Dated December 1, 1937

Rec'd 10:13 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence. egl*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
12-1-37  
Department of State

977, December 1, 2 p.m.

FROM ROBERTS FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

"It is rumored from three different sources that Chinese assertions they will defend Manking to the bitter end are for Japanese and popular consumption and that the real intention is to evacuate the city at the last minute possible.

(GRAY) No change local conditions. No reliable information on situation at the front".

Repeated to Hankow, Peiping.

ATCHESON

KLP:TC

793.94/11384

F/FG

DEC 1 1937

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Huebner NARS, Date 12-18-75

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**PARAPHRASE**

A telegram (No. 977) dated December 1, 1937, has been received from the Secretary in charge of the American Embassy at Nanking. It quotes a message for the Secretary of War from Roberts which reads substantially as follows:

There is no reliable information available on the situation at the front. Local conditions are unchanged. There are three different sources for the rumor that the real intention of the Chinese is to evacuate Nanking at the last possible minute, and that their assertions that they will defend the city to the bitter end are for popular and Japanese consumption.

FE:ARR:SMJ  
EJC.

*AMC*  
FE

12/2/37

69-1

*EE*

*Paraphrase  
of this telegram  
as originally  
rec'd was sent to  
ONI + MID*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CORRECTED COPY

FROM

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Hankow via N. R.

Dated December 1, 1937

Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

9, December 1, 10 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

German Ambassador left Hankow this morning accompanied by the Counsellor of Embassy for Kiukiang and Kuling on customs cruiser loaned by the Chinese Government. No information can be obtained regarding his mission but the natural inference is that he bears to General Chiang some sort of peace proposals from the Japanese.

Repeated to Nanking, Peiping, Shanghai. Peiping repeat to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

WWC:CSB

*793.94  
note  
701.6293*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
YAH LASI...  
DEC 2 1937  
Department of State

793.94/11385

DEC 4 1937  
RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

69-2

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (A)

FROM Hankow via N. R.

Dated December 1, 1937

Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 1937  
Department of State

9, December 1, 10 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

German Ambassador left Hankow this morning accompanied  
by Counsellor of Embassy for (?)kiang Kuling on customs  
cruiser loaned by the Chinese Government. No information  
can be obtained regarding his mission but the natural  
inference is that he bears to General Chiang some sort  
of peace proposals from the Japanese.

Repeated to Nanking, Peiping, Shanghai. Peiping repeat  
to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

TWC:CSB

793.94

793.94/11385

DEC 6 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (No. 9) dated December 1, 1937, received from the American Ambassador at Hankow, reads substantially as follows:

On the morning of December 1, the German Ambassador to China and his Counsellor of Embassy left Hankow for (P)kiang Kuling. They travelled on a customs cruiser loaned by the Chinese Government. While the natural inference is that the Ambassador is the bearer of Japanese peace proposals of some sort to General Chiang Kai-shek, information in regard to his mission is not obtainable.

*ACAP*  
FE:ARR:VCI

*FE*  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton C. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

CINCAF

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM

December 1, 1937

Rec'd 1:35 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV *egz*

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE  
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 1937  
Department of State

0001. Military situation north Lake Taihu unchanged.  
Japanese completing final preparations drive on Nanking  
which they state will be occupied before end December.  
Two Japanese columns approaching Hangchow along grand canal  
and highway. Work removing Whangpoo barrier continued.  
Conditions Settlement unchanged. Japanese army plans  
march three regiments troops through Settlement on three  
December. Detailed report being made by Consul General.  
1955.

CSB

793.94/11386

F/FG

DEC 6 1937

n

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

70-1

72

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated December 1, 1937

REC'D 12:21 p.m.

Secretary of State,

*of paraphrase*

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

*in strict confidence*

978, December 1, 3 p.m.

Division of  
EAS EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 1937  
Department of State

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

793.94  
note  
793.94119

One. We are confidentially informed by reliable competent source that German Ambassador is expected here shortly to discuss Japanese peace proposals which include Chinese (one) declaration of independence Outer Mongolia, (2) participation in anti-Comintern pact, (three) agreement to stop anti-Japanese propaganda, and on Japanese side resumption of status quo in North China as regards Japanese troops. I report this for what it may be worth. Our source states that it is second definite Japanese attempt to initiate peace discussions and that these proposals do not (repeat not) come from the Japanese military.

Two. My German colleague has told me in confidence that Japanese some time ago asked Germany to propose to China that China initiate peace discussions but German Government refused because the Japanese would not reveal what terms would be acceptable to Japan.

Three.

793.94/11387

FILED

DEC 4 1937

F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

70-2

-2- #978, December 1, 3 p.m., from Nanking via N. R.

Three. Repeated to Hankow, Shanghai, Peiping. Peiping  
please repeat to Tokyo.

ATCHESON

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

70-3

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly Confidential

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (No. 978) of December 1, 1937, received from the Secretary in charge of the American Embassy at Nanking, reads substantially as follows:

One. The German colleague of the Secretary of Embassy has confidentially informed him that some time ago Germany had been asked by the Japanese to propose to China that China initiate peace discussions, but, because the Japanese would not divulge what terms would be acceptable to them, the German Government declined.

Two. According to confidential information received from a competent and reliable informant which the Secretary reports for what it may be worth, the Japanese are now making a second definite attempt to initiate peace discussions. The informant states that the German Ambassador is expected to arrive in Nanking shortly to discuss Japanese peace proposals. These proposals, which the informant states do not come from the Japanese military, include, on the part of the Japanese, the resumption of the status quo in North China as regards Japanese troops; and on the part of the Chinese (1) agreement to put a stop to anti-Japanese propaganda, (2) declaration of the Independence of Outer Mongolia, and (3) participation in the anti-Comintern pact.

793.94/11387

*ARR*  
FE:ARR:VGI  
12/2/37

*hds*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Chumley NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Foochow/116 FOR Despatch #7

FROM Foochow (Ward) DATED Oct. 20, 1937  
TO \_\_\_\_\_ NAME \_\_\_\_\_ 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations: Report on-, for  
month of September, 1937.

aa

793.94/1388

F/M/R 11388

**B. Relations with Other Countries.**

**1. Japan.**

a. Min River blocked. Carrying out the intention which they had announced in August when the Japanese naval authorities laid their blockade along the southern coast, and acting under orders from Nanking for which they had been waiting several days, the Provincial Government of Fukien began on September 4 to block the Min River by sinking six steamships and many smaller craft at a point in it below Kwantow (灣頭). These vessels had all been laden with stone, and fishing junks and small launches continued to dump more stone into the river on top of them throughout September.

b. Defense of the coasts of Fukien.

After the laying of the barrier, it became widely rumored and was in fact frequently stated by leading officials of the Province that the coasts of Fukien would be defended if they were attacked, and that various defense works were being constructed along them. A reliable informant states that considerable stretches at least of the coast have been lined with trenches interspersed with gun emplacements.

c.

-5-

c. Patriotic fervor mounts. Although the Japanese blockade of the coast and the Chinese blocking of the river was already beginning to have a seriously adverse effect on the livelihood of local Chinese merchants and of the lower classes generally, the patriotic fervor with which Chinese reacted to the not always encouraging accounts of the progress of the Chinese defense in Shanghai and the North mounted steadily throughout the month, and began in fact to show many of the characteristics which marked the attitude of Americans after the entry of the United States into the World War. Like Americans in that conflict, Fukienese have so far been actually remote from the war itself and most of its effects, but allowing for that handicap they are participating in it as completely as imagination and enthusiasm will allow.

d. Draft enforced. According to reports which have reached this office from interior districts, a light first draft is being enforced in Northern Fukien under which one able-bodied man is being drawn from every hundred families. This apparently very low percentage seems to be yielding a considerable number of troops, and these are being trained at various points in the Province under a well-worked out program which will, according to schedule, land them in the front lines in a year from the day of their entrance into the army. Assuming that these reports are true - the Consulate has not yet been able to verify them - the system is interesting from

several

-7-

several standpoints, not the least striking of which is the assumption which appears to underlay it that the present conflict will last for well over a year.

e. One Ch'ien up and the other out.

While this office was last month describing the Ch'ien triumvirate into whose hands the government of the Province of Fukien had passed, things had already begun to happen to two of the triumviri, as well as to the proconsul whom they had succeeded. On September 14 General Ch'ien I and Mr. T. C. Ch'ien left Foochow for Kienow (建甌). While T. C. Ch'ien continued overland to an unknown destination which rumor said had been determined for him by General Chiang Kai-shek, General Ch'ien I remained in Kienow long enough to select six regiments of troops to despatch to Chekiang and to be sworn in to the post of Pacification Commissioner for Fukien, which he now holds concurrently with that of Chairman of the Provincial Government, whereafter he returned to Foochow to lead some eight hundred local officials in a solemn ceremony in which they all took an oath of allegiance to the National Government and of loyalty to the national cause.

General Ch'ien's promotion, which came while his power in the Province was in almost complete eclipse, coupled with the transfer out of the Province of one of those officials into whose hands a large part of his power had passed, caused widespread speculation among both Chinese and foreigners in Foochow. It was noted that simultaneously with

Ch'ien

-8-

Ch'en I's promotion, another of the group who had in practice taken over the Chairman's power, General Ch'en Ch'i (陳琪), was also promoted, being given the relatively important post of Garrison Commander of Foochow, and it was the consensus of opinion that Ch'en I had simply been given a face-saving promotion to facilitate the actual transfer of power from himself to Ch'en Ch'i and others.

It is equally probable, however, that General Chiang Kai-shek, with whom Ch'en I is said to be on terms of close personal friendship, is as usual looking well into the future and is desirous of retaining Ch'en in a position of sufficient importance to make him immediately available should negotiations with Japan become at any time desirable. General Chiang cannot have forgotten that it was Ch'en I who carried the plans for the Hopei-Chahar Political Council to Tientsin in 1935, where he effected arrangements which in fact postponed for almost two years the conflict in which the nation is now so completely engaged.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Swatow/118 FOR Despatch #68

FROM Swatow (Ketcham) DATED Oct. 23, 1937  
TO \_\_\_\_\_ NAME \_\_\_\_\_ 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations- Evacuation of Japanese  
and departure of Consul; and report of Japanese  
attack on Swatow.

aa

793.94/11389

F/M/R

1937

Japan.

Evacuation of Japanese and Departure of Consul.

The tense situation which had been gradually developing in Swatow since the original Loukouehiao incident resulted in wholesale Chinese evacuations from the city, and the withdrawal also of many Japanese and Formosans in the first part of August, culminating on August 12\*\* with the departure of the Japanese Consul and the remaining Japanese subjects with the exception of a certain number of Formosans, variously estimated at from forty to seventy.

Meanwhile defense preparations in the city and in the Eastern Kwangtung area were being rushed and 8,600 troops belonging to the 155th division were quartered in the city.

The

\*See telegram August 7, 12 noon and despatch No. 49, August 14, 1937.  
\*\*See telegram August 12, 1 P.M. and despatch No. 49, August 14, 1937.

-3-

The Consular Corps\* held a meeting at the American Consulate on the afternoon of August 12, to decide, what, if any, action should be taken to deal with the situation which might arise from the sudden departure of our Japanese colleague. On August 13 the Consular Corps called on the Mayor and the Chief of Police and received assurances that full protection would be given to all Japanese vacated property and that the Formosans remaining in the city would also receive protection and would not be molested so long as they behaved themselves. The Chief of Police stated that the names and addresses of all the Formosans or even the exact number of those remaining were not known, although the Japanese Consul had promised to furnish a list. It might be added that the Chinese authorities have scrupulously observed the promises given the consular corps, and up to the time of writing there have been no encroachments of any kind on Japanese property, nor have any instances of attack on or arrest of Formosans been reported.

On August 13 the two Japanese destroyers, which had been in port since July 9, departed, but one remained for a few days in close proximity outside the harbor.

The local reaction to the Japanese evacuation at first seemed one of relief rather than of alarm, but this soon changed when on August 18\*\* the police advised all women and children to evacuate the city, and many false rumors were again in circulation. By August 20\*\*\* it was estimated that half the population had left Swatow,

including

\*See telegram August 14, 2 P.M.

\*\*See telegram August 18, 12 noon.

\*\*\*See telegram August 21, 2 P.M.

-4-

including many males, and business was virtually at a standstill. To add to the general confusion the three government banks, Bank of China, Bank of Communications and Central Bank, removed their Swatow offices to Chaochowfu on August 20 leaving the city without banking facilities. The banking crisis was allayed by the opening of a branch of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation on August 26.

The blockade announced by the Japanese naval authorities on August 26,\* which included a point just south of Swatow, actually did not affect Chinese shipping interests very much, as Chinese coastal steamers had practically all been laid up in Hongkong and in Canton for about two weeks prior to this time. However, junk traffic and the fishing industry were affected immediately and it was reliably reported that at least three junks were captured and burned just outside the harbor entrance shortly after the blockade came into effect. One or more Japanese destroyers have remained in the vicinity ever since the declaration of the blockade.

On August 31\*\*hostilities were carried into this district by the dropping of one bomb by a Japanese airplane on the town of Chen Ping, a city of Eastern Kwangtung about ninety five miles northwest of Swatow. The unoccupied airfield was probably the Japanese objective and the only casualty was a woman reported badly injured.

On that date Swatow city experienced its first air raid alarm, when two planes were seen in the early morning passing at a high altitude northwards of the town.

On

\*See telegram August 26, 4 P.M.

\*\*See telegram August 31, 3 P.M.

-5-

On the close of August a few of the people began to return to the city, but business was still seriously affected and of those who had left probably not more than 10,000 returned.

Japanese Attacks on Swatow.

On September 5\* in the afternoon a Japanese sea-plane appeared over the city on a reconnaissance flight, flying at a high altitude. The plane was fired at from numerous machine gun nests erected in various parts of the city and on Kakchich island, but was flying too high to be hit, and continued its flight for about one hour. The next morning three seaplanes\*\* attacked the military aviation field, on which no planes were stationed, and the only building on which is a two plane capacity hanger. About ten small bombs were dropped in the course of an hours attack, and no damage to the hanger or casualties resulted. The planes also were undamaged, although vigorously machine gunned from the ground. The planes used a light cruiser stationed off the harbor as their base.

September 8\*\*\* witnessed the next aerial attack on the city, this time three seaplanes were supported by a light cruiser, which was fairly definitely established as the Yubari. The attack commenced at 12.40 P.M. and lasted for slightly over two hours. The cruiser, which fired about twenty salvos, directed its attack against the old fort, which had served as a prison in the last few years and for a long time has had no artillery of

any

\*See telegram September 5, 6 P.M.

\*\*See telegram September 6, 9 A.M.

\*\*\*See telegram September 8, 3 P.M. and 7 P.M.

-6-

any description. At the time of the attack, however, it was serving as a military barracks. The planes, which indulged in dive bombing, aimed at the military headquarters, about one third of a mile up Kialat Road from the Consulate, the Municipal building, and hits were scored on the Police headquarters, and the Swatow General Hospital, and one shell from the cruiser landed inside the old fort. Injuries to but three persons were caused by this bombardment, and it seems remarkable that casualties were so few.

On September 9\* at 12.30 P.M. the third air bombing of Swatow took place. This time the air raid warning was not sounded until one plane was virtually over the city with the result that the first bomb dropped on Kialat Road near the new Kwangtung Provincial Bank caught people unawares and killed six outright, causing injuries to over twenty, of whom six later succumbed to their wounds. The Mayor's office and the Poor People's Institute were also hit, but no casualties were caused at either of these two places. Total casualties from this raid were about 16 killed and thirty injured.

The air bombings resulted in a further exodus from the city, so that in the week ending September 11, the city was reduced to about 50,000 or a quarter of the normal population. Many foreign women and children and some men likewise departed, in most instances to Hong Kong, and several of the foreign residents on the Swatow side removed to Kakshieh across the harbor, which was

felt

\*See telegrams September 9, 2 P.M. and 5 P.M.

-7-

felt to be safer, although there were machine gun emplacements and one anti-aircraft gun erected on Kakchich not far from the foreign residential area.

On September 10, the consular corps held a meeting attended, however, only by the career Consuls, British, French and American. The French and American Consuls, the British Consul dissenting, decided to telegraph\* their respective Embassys and Foreign Offices, suggesting that possibly diplomatic protest be made against the continuance of Japanese attacks against the city, which was of no military importance.

Since September 9 the city itself has not been molested by Japanese air raids or bombardments from ships, although on September 15\*\*, firing was heard and light shellfire was seen to land in the vicinity of the harbor entrance. The firing was from two Japanese destroyers, which were also attacked by three Chinese planes operating from Canton. One of these planes made its appearance flying low over the harbor, and was greeted by machine gun fire, until it was seen that it bore the Chinese insignia. The same day the light station at Good Hope Cape, the second light house outside of the harbor was captured by a small Japanese landing party, who remained for only a few minutes, and took away only a revolver and a telescope.

Due to the attacks on the city the Customs authorities on order of General Li Han-hun in command of the military forces in Eastern Kwangtung, cut off the light stations at Sugar Loaf\*\*\* and Good Hope Cape at night,

and

\*See telegram September 10, 6 P.M.

\*\*See telegrams September 15, 10 A.M. and 7 P.M.

\*\*\*See telegram September 16, 10 A.M.

-8-

and no vessels were permitted to enter or leave Swatow between 7.00 P.M. and 8.00 A.M. This order is still in effect.

On September 16,\* two Japanese naval planes bombed Chaochowfu, military headquarters of Eastern Kwangtung and Kityang, an undefended town about thirty miles from Swatow. No casualties were reported at Chaochowfu but at Kityang, there were over twenty killed and sixty wounded. The objective at Kityang was said to be a shovel factory where trench tools were manufactured, but this was undamaged.

About the middle of the month the Chinese began blocking\*\* the northern entrance to the harbor, which has been used only for junk and fishing traffic but, as it was <sup>a</sup>possible entrance for larger draught vessels, this precaution was considered necessary.

The local authorities, particularly the police, acted commendably during the emergency situation which reached its height during the week of September 5-11. Policemen in most instances stuck to their posts, cleared the streets of all traffic, and it is believed due largely to this and efficient air defense precautions, which included the erection of many sandbag shelters, that casualties were so few. The populace who remained in the city during the aerial bombardments, behaved admirably throughout, there was no sign of panic, and the attack seemed if anything to cement the people together in their anti-Japanese stand.

However,

\*See telegrams September 16, 5 P.M. and September 17, 4 P.M.  
\*\*See telegram September 19, 11 A.M.

-9-

However, as previously stated, approximately three quarters of the population had evacuated the city by the middle of September, and business was at a virtual standstill with most shops closed, ice unobtainable, electricity curtailed, and the amenities of life seriously disrupted. Toward the close of the month General Li Han-hun and the Mayor issued a proclamation ordering the firms to re-open and resume business by September 28, and this together with the cessation of attacks caused a gradual return of evacuees so that, while still far from normal, businesses were gradually being re-opened at the end of the month and people were beginning to return to the city.

Recruiting of soldiers has not been carried on to any extent in Swatow, although it is understood that there has been some drafting for military service in the interior. Compulsory military drills for men from 21 to 30 years of age has been carried on for the past two months on a small scale, drills lasting for two hours each day.

About 15 persons accused of spying and giving military information to the enemy have been executed in the Eastern Kwangtung area, according to reliable reports.

The military authorities have commandeered many junks, with the result that transportation of goods into the interior has been seriously curtailed, and some hardship has resulted.

Large cargoes of food supplies, principally rice, have been coming in on foreign steamers and there is no fear of a food shortage.

National

-10-

National Salvation or "Liberty" Bonds.

Swatow has been given a quota of NC\$1,000,000 of national salvation bonds, to be subscribed to locally and a committee was organized early in September to promote their sale. At the end of the month, subscriptions totalled about NC\$70,000.

Sino-Japanese Relations Involving the United States.

\*In accordance with instructions from the Embassy, Americans were advised to keep well away from fortified positions, places of troop concentrations and airfields, and missionaries both at Kakohieh and in the interior were exhorted to have American flags painted or placed conspicuously on the roofs of their buildings.

On the first of September notices were sent out urging the evacuation of Americans and these notices were followed by others including telegrams to missionaries in the interior, outlining the seriousness of the situation and urging evacuation. A meeting was held on September 11 at the American Baptist Mission at Kakohieh, which was attended by all the missionaries then in Kakohieh, at which I discussed the situation with them and requested that such missionaries as were not urgently needed for their work here evacuate from China. However, only two missionaries had evacuated up to the end of September and the total who have left numbered 18 out of 85 Americans registered in this district.

The linen drawnwork and embroidery industry, which outside of agriculture and fishing is the largest industry in the district and in which Americans have an

important

\*See despatch No. 51 to Embassy, Nanking, dated September 25, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Chasler NARS, Date 12-18-75

-11-

important interest, was completely upset, due to the evacuation of practically 95 per cent of the women and girl employees. At the end of the month some workers had returned, and operations were going on at about 20% of normal, but it is feared that serious losses will be suffered this year, due to the interruption and the inability to fulfill orders in time for the important Christmas trade in the United States.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00111 Armament Control / 1588 FOR Letter

FROM World Peaceways, Inc. (J. Max Weis) DATED Nov. 19, 1937  
New York, N.Y. NAME 1-117 \*\*\*

179

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan.

Copy of current broadcast on subject Congress  
Moves toward Application of Neutrality Law,  
which urges the immediate application of the  
Neutrality Law to the Far East because of-  
Encloses-.

f

793.94/11390

F/MR

11390.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 890.00/70 FOR Memorandum

FROM State Department (Myers) DATED Nov. 27, 1937  
TO Far Eastern Division NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict.

Reports developments in-, for week ending Nov. 27, 1937.

mr

793.94/11391

F/MR

11391

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

COMYANGPAT

FROM

December 1, 1937

Rec'd 7 p. m.

COPIES SENT TO  
~~O.N.I. AND M.I.D.~~

ACTION: OPNAV WASHINGTON  
INFO: 2nd BRIGADE USMC  
YANGTZE PATROL  
COMSUBRON 5  
COMDESRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMSOPAT  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY HANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
REC 27 1937  
Department of State

793.94

0001 Marking situation unchanged. Other Yangtze  
ports quiet 2037

SMS:NPL

793.94/11392

F/FG

REC 4 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

KL

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

FROM COMSOPAT

**COPIES SENT TO**  
**O.N.I. AND M.I.D.**

December 1, 1937

Rec'd 8 p. m.

ACTION:  
OPNAV: WASHINGTON  
INFO: 2nd MARBRID  
COMDESRON 5  
CO. SUBRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 2 1937  
Department of State

793.94

0101 South China ports quiet 2000

SMS:NPL

793.94/11393

F/FG  
RECEIVED  
DEC 4 1937

71-1

FE

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

PLAIN

EG

Nanking via N. R.

FROM

Dated December 1, 1937

Rec'd 3:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

PRIORITY

892

Division of  
Far Eastern Affairs  
DEC 21 1937  
Department of State

793.94

976, December 1, 11 a. m.

One. At the request of the committee named therein

Embassy transmits the following: "An international committee representing the more than 100 foreign nationals now residing in Wuhu desires to suggest to the Chinese and Japanese authorities the establishment of a safety zone for civilian refugees, in the unfortunate event of hostilities at or near Wuhu.

The international committee will undertake to secure from the Chinese authorities specific guarantees, that the proposed safety zone would be made free and keep free from military establishments and offices, including those of military communications; from the presences of armed men other than civil police with pistols; and from the passage of soldiers or military officers in any capacity. The international committee would inspect and observe the safety zone to see that these undertakings are satisfactorily carried out.

The

793.94/11394

DEC 21 1937

RECEIVED

F/FG

71-2

-2- No. 976, December 1, 11 a. m. from Nanking via N. R.

The international committee proposes the designation of the area indicated below, as convenient and suitable for the care of civilian refugees. This area lies between the Wuhu-Suancheng railway and the small river commonly called the Changho. It contains the civilian residential section of the city and is free from all fortifications and defense works. The area is bounded as follows: the north by the Wuhu-Suancheng (Ningkwofu) railway; on the east by the East Gate; on the south by the small river and on the west by the Chungshan road. The international committee would see to it that the boundaries of the area would be clearly marked with white flags or with other indications to be agreed upon, plain to all concerned. The committee proposes that the safety zone become effective from the date of acceptance by the Japanese authorities, the Chinese authorities having already accepted the committee's proposal.

The international committee earnestly hopes that the Japanese authorities may find it possible for humanitarian reasons to respect the civilian character of this safety zone. The committee believes that merciful foresight on behalf of civilians will bring honor to the responsible authorities on both sides. In order that it be necessary negotiation

71-3

-3- No. 976, December 1, 11 a. m. from Nanking via N. R.

negotiation with the Chinese authorities may be completed in the shortest possible time, and also in order that adequate preparations may be made for the care of refugees, the committee would respectfully request a prompt reply from the Japanese authorities to this proposal.

The international committee confidently trusts that there will be favorable consideration of this appeal.

Respectfully submitted: signed Dr. Robert E. Brown, Bishop Zenon Aramburn, Father Justus Perez, Rev. A. Hayuan, Mr. T. F. R. Waters, Mr. Joe Wharton, on behalf of the foreign nationals of Wuhu".

Two. Please communicate as soon as possible to the Japanese Ambassador and give Embassy reply for communication to the committee in question.

Three. Sent to Shanghai, repeated to Department, Hankow, Peiping. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo for the Ambassador.

ATCHESON.

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

72-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NL

Shanghai via N.R.

FROM Dated Dec. 1, 1937

REC'd 2 p. m.

*Telegrams to Tokyo & Shanghai sent Dec. 1*

Secretary of State  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 2 1937  
Department of State

793.94

1057, December 1, 7 p. m.

The Japanese Assistant Military Attache at noon today informed British military headquarters that it is the intention for a column of Japanese troops to march through the American and British sectors on Friday, the third of December.

The British Major General is tonight addressing a communication to Major General Harada, Japanese Military Attache, as follows:

"I am sure you must have realized at the conference held on Sunday that such a <sup>trip</sup> ~~trip~~ is very definitely against the wishes of the national commanders. Further, we were under the impression that you inferred that such action was not contemplated in the near future. If you intend to disregard our wishes we must point out that we cannot accept responsibility for any incident which may occur. We will, however, co-operate if you intend to take this action and make arrangements with the municipal police for the route to be cleared of refugees as far as is possible."

OK.

Brigadier General Beaumont, United States Marine Corps  
has

793.94/11395

DEC 11 1937  
F/EG  
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

72-2

ML -2- Shanghai via N.R. Dec. 1, 1937 2 p. m. #1057

80 A M I 100 178

has added a signed endorsement that he is in complete agreement with the views expressed by the British Major General.

It would be exceedingly desirable that the Japanese be dissuaded from this unwise, unnecessary and possibly provocative demonstration. Sent to Department, repeated to Tokyo.

GAUSS

W/C:DDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

72-3

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

1937 DEC 1 PM 6 27

December 1, 1937.

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

793.94/11395.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO, (JAPAN).

*Push 326*

Shanghai's 1057, December 1, 7 p. m., in regard to  
the proposed march of Japanese troops through the American  
and British sectors.

The Department desires that you confer with your  
British colleague and that thereafter you, unless you  
perceive objection, make an informal approach to the  
Japanese Government pointing out that in the opinion of  
the American Consul General at Shanghai the proposed  
Japanese action is <sup>undecidable</sup> ~~advisable, unnecessary~~ and possibly  
provocative of unfortunate incidents and thus likely to  
produce a result the opposite of what the Japanese have  
in mind.

793.94/11395

*Donee*

FE:MMH:SMJ

*FE*  
*MMH*

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. ... NARS, Date 12-18-75

72-4

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

*Gray*

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL  
PLAIN

Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

1937 DEC 1 PM 6 27

December 1, 1937.

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

*8pm*

AMERICAN CONSUL,

SHANGHAI, (CHINA). *van R*

599

Your 1057, December 1, 7 p. m.

The Department is telegraphing Tokyo as follows:

QUOTE (Telegraph Section: Please insert here the  
text of the attached telegram to Tokyo) UNQUOTE. *326, Dec. 1, 8pm*

The Department assumes that you have taken this matter  
up informally with the Japanese Consul General.

*793.94/11395*

*Hull*  
*(7.7.11.1)*

793.94/11395

FE:MMH:SMJ

*FE*  
*At...*

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 60

1-1482 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P.R./119 FOR #2654

FROM Japan ( Grew ) DATED Nov. 9, 1937  
TO \_\_\_\_\_ NAME \_\_\_\_\_ 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict.

Reports developments in -, for month of Oct., 1937.

BT

795.94 / 11396

11396.

B. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

(a) Representations made by the Embassy in Connection with the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

On September 29 the Foreign Office addressed to the Embassy a memorandum requesting that, "with a view to cooperating" with the Japanese forces in their desire not to cause damage to the property of nationals of third countries, a list be supplied of the hospitals, schools, and other eleemosynary establishments belonging to the United States and to nationals of the United States in China.\* Pursuant to the Department's instructions, the Counselor of the Embassy called at the Foreign Office on October 7 and read to the Chief of the Bureau of American Affairs a telegram from the Department of State, which stated in substance that the American Government did not perceive that there was need for the supplying of a list such as that desired by the Japanese Government.\*\*

The Embassy addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a semi-formal note on October 1, bringing to the Minister's attention the substance of a telegram received from the American Ambassador in Nanking, which stated that non-military establishments in Nanking had apparently been the targets of Japanese bombers in recent air raids.\*\*\*

In reply to the Embassy's oral representations of September 26, the Foreign Office stated orally on October 1 that the Japanese Navy had no intention of interfering with Chinese coastal lights and that it was exercising utmost caution to avoid such interference.\*\*\*\*

Acting under the Department's instructions, the Ambassador called on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on October 4 and left with him an aide-mémoire protesting against the continued use by the Japanese armed forces of the International Settlement

in

\* Embassy's telegram No.435, September 30, 1937.  
\*\* Department's telegram No.250 of October 5, 1937.  
\*\*\* Telegram to the Department from the Embassy at Nanking No.737, September 29; and Embassy's telegram No.438, October 1, 1937.  
\*\*\*\* Embassy's telegram No.440, October 1, 1937.

-2-

in Shanghai as a base for military operations against the Chinese. The Vice Minister's only comment was that the Chinese forces were endangering Japanese lives and property in the International Settlement by firing from Pootung and Chapel and that the Japanese had landed a very small number of troops in the Settlement, their principal forces having been disembarked elsewhere.\* On October 19 the Foreign Office delivered to the Embassy a memorandum to the effect that the Japanese Government was obliged to use part of the International Settlement in the present military operations.\*\* Acting under the Department's instructions and after the Ambassador had consulted with the British Ambassador, on October 28 the Embassy made further representations against the use of the International Settlement at Shanghai as a base for Japanese military operations, informing the Foreign Office that the American Government continued to hold the views set forth in the Ambassador's aide-mémoire of October 4.\*\*\*

In reply to the Embassy's representations of September 27 concerning the bombing of the Catholic Mission at Sienhsien by Japanese planes on September 21, the Foreign Office addressed a note to the Ambassador on October 4 stating that the Japanese Government had received the information of the bombing "with deep concern", that the bombing had regrettably been done by mistake, and that the Japanese Government would be gratified if the American Government saw fit to "extend cooperation" to the efforts which Japan was making to prevent such damage to establishments of third nations, such cooperation to be extended by furnishing maps showing the location of American religious and humanitarian establishments in China.\*\*\*\*

It

\* Department's telegram 245, October 2, 1937; and Embassy's telegram No.444, October 4, 1937.  
\*\* Embassy's telegram No.481, October 20, 1937.  
\*\*\* Department's telegram No.270, October 27, 1937; and Embassy's telegram No.501, October 28, 1937  
\*\*\*\* Embassy's telegram No.450, October 5, 1937.

-3-

It will be recalled that in reply to the Ambassador's representations of September 22 concerning the bombing of Nanking by Japanese planes, the Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed a note to the Ambassador on September 29, which stated in substance that the bombing of the military facilities and equipment located in and around the city of Nanking was a necessary and unavoidable measure for the attainment of the military objectives of the Japanese forces, and it was earnestly hoped that the American Government "would cooperate" with the Japanese Government by having American officials, citizens and vessels take refuge away from Nanking in case of advance warning by the Japanese authorities.\* On October 7 the Counselor of the Embassy called on Mr. Yoshizawa at the Foreign Office and read to him a telegram from the Department to the effect that there had been wide-spread comment in the American press that the reply of the Japanese Government was "unsatisfactory"; that there had been adverse comment both in official and unofficial circles in the United States concerning the Japanese Foreign Office's use of the expression "cooperate"; that what the American Government sought and expected was not "cooperation" between the two countries in relation to any phase of military operations, but that American lives and property should not be endangered by any military operations; and that the American Government appreciated the assurance and the apparently sincere effort of the Japanese Foreign Office to help toward avoiding endangering American lives and property, but that in the opinion of the American Government it would be advisable to avoid the use of the term "cooperate" in any context relating to or bearing upon the military operations.\*

On

\* Department's telegram No.221, September 21, 1937; and Embassy's telegrams No.403, September 21, and 431, September 29, 1937.

\*\* Department's telegram No.251, October 5, 1937.

-4-

On October 18 the Embassy delivered to the Japanese Government a memorandum protesting against the attack on September 4 by Japanese airplanes on the Ida Kahn Women and Children's Hospital at Nanchang on the grounds that it was an unwarrantable attack upon a humanitarian establishment and upon non-combatants and that it exposed to grave danger the lives of Americans and non-combatants.\*

Pursuant to the Department's instructions and after consultation with the British Ambassador, on October 14 the Embassy made representations to the Japanese Government on the subject of the integrity of the Chinese Customs revenues at Tientsin.\*\* The British Embassy informed the American Embassy on October 23 that it had received a telegram from Tientsin which reported that there had taken place a local settlement of the Customs issue in accordance with which funds collected by the Maritime Customs would be deposited in the Yokohama Specie Bank, and jurisdiction and regulations of the Maritime Customs would be respected.\*\*\*

Pursuant to the Department's instructions, the Ambassador called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on October 15 and stated orally that the American Government was proceeding on the assumption that the Japanese Government would attend the conference of the parties to the Nine Power Treaty. Mr. Hirota replied that the Japanese Government had not yet received an invitation to attend such a conference and that therefore no decision had yet been reached, but that according to the present tendency within the Government such an invitation would be declined. In reply

to

- 
- \* Embassy's telegram No.457, October 8, 1937; and Department's telegram No.256, October 7, 1937.
  - \*\* Department's telegram No.259, October 12, 1937, and Embassy's telegram No.473, October 14, 1937.
  - \*\*\* Embassy's despatch 2632, October 18, 1937, and Embassy's telegram No.490, October 23, 1937.

-5-

to subsequent arguments advanced by the Ambassador in favor of Japan's participation, Mr. Hirota asserted that such a conference would be useless, inasmuch as the League of Nations had already formally taken the part of China against Japan; that a discussion of terms of peace would be superfluous, since he (Hirota) had been discussing these terms with General Chiang Kai-shok during the past four years; and that "in general" these terms were embodied in his announced "Three Points".\* On October 27 the Japanese Government's refusal of the invitation of the Belgian Government to the Nine Power Treaty Conference was approved by the Cabinet and by the Emperor, and on the same day the Minister for Foreign Affairs handed a copy of the reply to the Ambassador.\*\*

A telegram to the Department from the Consulate General at Shanghai dated October 24, which was repeated to the Embassy, reported that a party of about ten persons, including three American men and two American women, while horseback riding on on October 24 in the British guarded sector of the International Settlement, had been machine-gunned by an airplane stated definitely to be a Japanese plane; that one British soldier belonging to the British outpost near the conflict had been killed; and that none of the party of riders had been injured. On October 25 the Embassy communicated these facts to the Japanese Foreign Office and protested against such attacks. On the following day the Embassy received a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which expressed regret that a Japanese airplane had fired "in error" upon American nationals in Shanghai and stated

---

that

\* Department's telegram No. 261, October 14, 1937; and Embassy's telegrams No. 475, October 15, and 479, October 18, 1937.

\*\* Embassy's telegram No. 498 and 499, October 27, 1937.

-6-

that necessary measures were being devised to prevent the occurrence of incidents of this character, that after investigation the Japanese Government would appropriately deal with those responsible for the incident, and that the Japanese Government was prepared to make necessary compensation in respect of any injury which might have been incurred by American nationals.\*

On October 27 Mr. Dooman read to Mr. Yoshizawa of the Japanese Foreign Office a report received from Shanghai, and he urged that the commanders of the Japanese naval and military forces at Shanghai be directed to see to it that lives of foreigners and other non-combatants in the foreign protected areas were not endangered by Japanese gun fire and by the flying of Japanese airplanes carrying bombs over such areas. Mr. Yoshizawa expressed regret that the actions of the Japanese forces should have made further representations necessary, and said that he would at once take up the matter with the appropriate authorities.\*\*

In response to the suggestion of the Consul General at Shanghai, on October 30 the Embassy protested to the Japanese Foreign Office against the bombing by Japanese airplanes on October 29 of the Methodist Episcopal Mission at Sungkiang, eighteen miles southwest of Shanghai.\*\*\*

(b) Reaction in Japan to the American Far Eastern Policy.

At the beginning of the month there was in Japan general recognition that American opinion opposed Japanese actions in  

---

China

\* Telegram to the Department from the Consulate General at Shanghai No.888, October 24, 1937, and Embassy's telegrams No.492, October 25, and No.493, October 26, 1937.

\*\* Telegram to the Department from the Consulate General at Shanghai No.887, October 24, 1937; and Embassy's telegram No.495, October 27, 1937.

\*\*\* Telegram to the Department from the Consulate General at Shanghai No.906, October 29, 1937; and Embassy's telegram No.501, October 30, 1937.

-7-

China and common knowledge that the American Government was making firm representations with regard to American damages suffered through Japanese activities in the hostilities in China. Following the President's Chicago speech of October 5 and the Department's declaration of October 6, feeling against the United States mounted sharply. This feeling resulted from resentment at being condemned as the aggressor and from uncertainty as to America's intentions of attempting to coerce Japan.\* Editorials, although not violent in tone, clearly revealed that these announcements of the American attitude had been a shock to Japanese opinion.\*\*

Apropos of the declaration of the League of Nations that Japan had violated the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact and of the Department's statement to the same effect, the Foreign Office issued a lengthy statement on October 9 the substance of which was that the Chinese were entirely responsible for the present hostilities and that the present action of Japan in China did not contravene any of the existing treaties.\*\*\*

By the end of the month the outburst against the United States had become less articulate and adverse criticism of the United States had become overshadowed by the bitter and widely voiced resentment against Great Britain. However, the public conviction had become settled that the United States had prejudged the issues between Japan and China, thereby abandoning any right to influence the terms of settlement.

(c)

---

\* Embassy's despatch No.2626 of October 22, 1937.  
\*\* Embassy's telegram No.459, October 9, 1937.  
\*\*\* Embassy's telegram No.463, October 9, 1937  
\*\*\*\* Embassy's despatch No.2626, October 22, 1937.

-8-

(c) Sending of Good-will Envoys to the United States.

Despite the Embassy's informal efforts to discourage the sending to the United States of so-called good-will envoys, the Japanese authorities decided to send the following four prominent Japanese to undertake an unofficial "good-will mission" to the United States: Mr. Takaishi, editor of the NICHU NICHU; Mr. Ashida, member of the Diet and editor of THE JAPAN TIMES; Mr. Bunjiro Suzuki, prominent labor member of the Diet; and Mr. Kojiro Matsukata, member of a well-known commercial family.\* The four envoys sailed for the United States during the month. It was understood that the primary purpose of the mission would be to explain and to defend Japanese actions in China.

(d) Sending of the Embassy's Military Attaché to Japanese Fronts in China as an Observer.

In response to the Japanese War Office's invitation and in accordance with the Department's instructions, Lieutenant-Colonel Crane, the Embassy's Military Attaché, left Japan with several other Military Attachés on a trip as military observer at various Japanese fronts in North China, including those along the Tientsin-Pukow and Peiping-Hankow railways.\*\*

II. RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

(a) China.

Heavy fighting continued during October in the Shanghai area. Meeting with stubborn resistance, the Japanese were unable to make any substantial headway against the Chinese until

the

\* Embassy's telegram No.448, October 5, 1937.

\*\* Embassy's telegrams No.404, September 22; No.442, October 2, and No.452 October 6, 1937, and Department's telegrams No.241, October 1 and No.248, October 4, 1937.

-9-

the latter part of the month. However, on October 27 the Japanese forces succeeded in outflanking and capturing Tachang, which forced the withdrawal of the Chinese forces from Chapel.\* The intensive drive which resulted in this Japanese victory was perhaps inspired by the desire of the Japanese for a substantial success before the convening of the Nine Power Conference. Reports varied as to whether the Chinese decision to withdraw had been taken for strategic reasons or had been compelled by superior force of arms. The Japanese military authorities announced officially on October 14 that since August 23 Japanese losses in the Shanghai area had been 3,046 killed and 9,617 wounded, while foreign military authorities believed that Japanese casualties had been approximately double the official figures.\*\*

The advance of the Japanese forces on the Peiping-Hankow Railway was rapid. Shihkiachwang fell on October 16, other Chinese positions in southern Hopei were successively captured by the Japanese, and at the close of the month the Japanese had penetrated the Hopei-Honan border.

Likewise, Japanese units were successful in their advance southward on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. Tehchow was occupied on October 3 and at the close of the month the Japanese were within close proximity of Tsinanfu in Shantung Province. Meanwhile, the attitude of General Han Fu-chu, Governor of Shantung Province, remained unknown. However, there were indications that General Han Fu-chu had reached an understanding with the Japanese in regard to Shantung and in regard to a movement in Tsinanfu amounting to separation from Nanking in the political-military sphere.\*\*\*

while

- \* Telegram from the Consul General at Shanghai No.893, October 27, 1937.
- \*\* Telegram to the Department from the Consul General at Shanghai No.852, October 14, 1937.
- \*\*\* Telegram from the Embassy at Nanking dated October 23, 1937 quoting telegram from the Consul at Tsingtao dated October 22, 3 p.m., 1937.

-10-

While the Japanese forces were reported by apparently reliable sources to have met with reverses in Shansi Province, they continued their advance in that Province and also in Suiyuan. Taiyuan, the capital of Shansi Province, was not taken by the Japanese before the end of the month.

Repeated Japanese air raids took place against the principal cities in Central and South China, including Nanking, Hankow, and Canton, and also against other places, including undefended towns. In addition, the Tientsin-Pukow, Nanking-Shanghai, Soochow-Kashing, Hankow-Canton and Canton-Kowloon railways were systematically bombed at various points. The Japanese claimed to have inflicted heavy damages on these railways, although information from other sources indicated that the damages sustained by the Chinese were insignificant.

There were insistent though unconfirmed rumors throughout the month that negotiations were taking place for a settlement of the conflict. The Chinese authorities continued to declare that their armies would fight to a finish and would not permit any infringement of the territorial integrity of China in any settlement that might be reached. Nevertheless, at the close of the month it could only be conjectured what the Chinese position would be in the face of further developments. Furthermore, there appeared to be divergence of opinion among the Japanese military, one element insisting upon the destruction of the Chinese armies and the occupation of Nanking, the other element advocating cessation of the southward advance in North China at the Lunghai Railway and also cessation of the Japanese offensive against the Shanghai forces of the Chinese as soon as these forces should be driven to a sufficient distance from the Shanghai area.

At

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

-11-

At the instigation of the Japanese military the Federated Autonomous Government of Mongolia was organized on October 28 at Kueisui, Suiyuan Province, with Prince Yun as Chairman and Prince Teh as Vice Chairman.\*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 741.00/134 ..... FOR Tel#741 4 p.m. .....

FROM Great Britain ( Johnson ) DATED Nov. 29, 1937  
NAME 1-117 \*\*\*

td

REGARDING:

Latest trend of developments in the Far East has superseded Spain as the chief focus of British anxiety and full discussion to take place with Chautemps and Delbos regarding English and French rights and interests in the Far East.

ML

793.94 / 11397

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EU  
FE

JR

GRAY

London

Dated November 29, 1937

Rec'd 1:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

741, November 29, 4 p.m.

The Foreign Secretary met with the leading British journalists last evening and in the course of his remarks, for their background information but not for attribution, made following points:

One. That difficult as the European situation is, it is less tense than in the recent past and in fact the "threat of war cannot now be said to be immediate". Thus an opportunity is afforded for appeasement negotiations.

Two. That the British Government does not intend either to announce changes in policy or to ask France to make changes in hers. In this connection he specifically mentioned that no request would be made for a modification of the Franco-Soviet Pact.

Three. That an effort will be made to establish better relations between Great Britain and France and Germany and Italy but there could be no question of effecting a rapprochement "at the expense of a fifth party".

Four

~~741.00/134~~  
751.6111

740.60

741.00/134

-2- #741, November 11, 4 p.m., from London.

462.814  
Four. That to this end the problem of colonies about which Germany is insistent becomes a question of practical importance and will therefore be discussed "though not for the first time in Anglo French conversations".

193.94  
Five. That a very serious view is taken by the latest trend of developments in the Far East which has superseded Spain as the chief focus of British anxiety. Therefore the full discussion will take place with Chautemps and Dalbos regarding English and French rights and interests in the Far East.

JOHNSON

WVC:CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 9, 1937.

~~MEMO~~  
~~TO~~  
~~THE~~  
~~SECRETARY~~  
~~OF STATE~~

793.94/11397

Reference two despatches from Moscow both dated November 11, 1937. Subjects: "Conference with Chinese Ambassador; Further Information as to Soviet-Chinese Relations" and "Conference with Dr. F. Tsiang Ting-Fu, Chinese Ambassador in Moscow, with Reference to the Visit of the Soviet Ambassador at Nanking to Moscow; the Relationships Between the Chinese Government and the Soviet Union; and an Analysis of Possible Formulas for Mediation in the Sino-Japanese Conflict."

The Chinese Ambassador to Russia informed Mr. Davies that in August, 1937, the Soviet Government had agreed to extend to the Chinese Government a credit of Yuan \$100,000,000 to be used in the purchase of military supplies; that deliveries had already far exceeded that amount; that 400 of the best bombing and pursuit planes had been shipped overland to China; that at least 40 instructors accompanied these planes; and that a quantity of lighter supplies was being shipped overland; that over 200 trucks were engaging in overland transport; that England, France, Belgium and Czechoslovakia, and until recently Italy and Germany, had been supplying China with large

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-2-

large quantities of supplies on a part cash basis.

According to the Chinese Ambassador, the French Government, out of fear of becoming involved in the Far Eastern situation, had placed onerous restrictions on the shipment of military supplies on the Yunnan Railway. Such shipments were required to be mixed with non-contraband, involving much delay through extra handling and reassembling on arrival.

The Ambassador stated that the French were attempting to block any possible involvement on the part of the Soviet Government in the Far East, as France would prefer Russia to conserve its forces against a possible German attack. He said that the Russian Ambassador to China recently returned to Moscow to urge more direct military cooperation on the part of Russia in the Sino-Japanese conflict, but his mission was unsuccessful due to the Russian desire to maintain formally correct relations with Japan.

FE:ARR:NN

*AMC*

NO RECORD OF PREVIOUS  
PREVIOUS ATTACHED  
PREVIOUS TALLIED .....  
PREVIOUS CHARGED .....  
PREVIOUS INDEXED UNDER  
..... 793.94/10696.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastrom NARS, Date 12-18-75

73-1



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*Handwritten notes and stamps:*  
REC  
1937  
MK  
9/12

No. 723

Moscow, November 11, 1957.

Subject: Conference with Dr. F. Tsiang Ting-Fu, Chinese Ambassador in Moscow, with Reference to the Visit of the Soviet Ambassador at Nanking to Moscow; the Relationships Between the Chinese Government and the Soviet Union; and an Analysis of Possible Formulas for Mediation in the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

*Handwritten:*  
793.94  
note  
761193

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

*Handwritten:*  
Embassy  
Tokyo + Peking

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1957 DEC 1 AM 11 50

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

To Special Office (A-M/C)

*Handwritten:*  
Tokyo  
Peking  
2

Copy in FILE  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 2 - 1937  
Department of State

793.94/11398

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
A-M/C  
696 CF  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE

*Handwritten:*  
793.14

In confirmation of my telegram No. 265, October 14, 10 p.m., I have the honor to report as follows:

There was much speculation and mystery connected with the press report that the Soviet Ambassador, Bogomolov, left Nanking by airplane for Moscow and as to the purpose behind the visit.

The Chinese Ambassador here, who is a graduate of Columbia University and received part of his education in the United States and who to an unusual degree enjoys the confidence of President Chiang Kai-shek and who, prior to his coming here, was private secretary

to

DEC 27 1957

FILED

F/FG

11398

73-2

- 2 -

to the latter, has been most friendly and has given every indication of his complete confidence in the purposes and good will of the United States.

Upon my invitation he came to the Embassy and had lunch alone with me. We had an extended discussion of the entire Far Eastern situation. He was apparently completely frank, but insisted that such information as I transmitted to my Government should not be sent by code cable, except through Paris. In the strictest of confidence he gave me the following information:

The Soviet Government agreed, last August, to extend to the Chinese Government a credit of 100,000,000 Chinese dollars to be used for the purchase of military supplies. Deliveries from the Soviet Union had already far exceeded that amount. He stated that over 400 of the best Soviet bombing and pursuit airplanes have already been shipped overland to China. There are at least 40 Soviet instructors accompanying these airplanes. A great many lighter supplies, including airplanes, have been shipped overland, by air, and by caravans. He stated that at the present time over 200 trucks were in actual operation in caravan transport. Plans are now being worked out for the shipment of heavy supplies, tanks, et cetera, by oversea route, possibly via Indo-China, providing arrangements can be made for cooperation of the French Government. A Chinese military mission has been here about six weeks in connection with the purchase of military supplies and for military training. He advised that many European countries are furnishing military supplies to

China

73-3

- 3 -

China on a part cash basis, and that England, France, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia had been the big suppliers. Up to a short time ago it is understood that both Germany and Italy had been furnishing war supplies on a similar basis. Italian sales were made purely on Italian initiative and provided for 50% credit and payment contingent upon safe delivery of the supplies in China. He added that possibly the German and Italian situation may have changed during the last ten days.

The Soviet Ambassador to China, Bogomolov, arrived in Moscow on October 7, after a nine-day flight from China via Siberia. The Soviet Military Attaché, Lapin, is also expected in Moscow in a few days. It is understood that he is also using the same route.

Their visit has two purposes: (1) to work out a better route for shipment of military supplies, and (2) to attempt to urge more direct action through actual military participation. The Chinese Ambassador has little faith in the outcome of the latter, as the Soviet Government desires apparently to maintain formally correct relations with Japan.

He stated that at the present time the Chinese forces have on hand military supplies sufficient for six months' operations. He then added that if the Japanese successes required it the Chinese forces could withdraw gradually into the interior and thus withstand a long war, if necessary, and would be able to obtain sufficient supplies through French Indo-China for such a siege.

73-4

- 4 -


I then asked him his views regarding a possible settlement to which his reply was as follows:

Japan, he stated, would most likely make a great many demands requiring, first, that China recognize "Manchukuo"; second, agreement to the establishment of autonomous regimes in the five northern Chinese provinces; and, third, would require a considerable reduction in tariffs; that their second choice would be the same as the above except that they would require only two autonomous regimes, namely, Hopei and Chahar. He pointed out that to accede to this would have a disastrous moral effect on the Chinese people because it would entail giving up Peiping, would also involve difficulties with the Soviet Union and would, therefore, be impossible.

He then stated that in his opinion the maximum Chinese concession would be the recognition of "Manchukuo" as a result of a compromise, provided it was recommended by the powers and provided there would be a complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, thus establishing the status quo ante.

I want to add here that in connection with the transmission of these facts the Chinese Ambassador made the specific request that I transmit them from Paris by code and not from here. I acceded to his request and sent my telegram under reference by special courier to Paris for transmission from that point. I sincerely regret the twenty-four hour delay involved.


Respectfully yours,

  
Joseph E. Davies

710 Far East

JED/hla

Original and four copies to the Department.

  
Harrison G. ...  
received



- 2 -

people. During our conversation I brought out the fact that the western world did not believe that these were the real reasons back of the Japanese aggression and that the western peoples believed that Japan was trying to gobble China up by pure military force, and that countries of the western world were shocked by the daring and deliberate violations of sacred obligations, and by the inhuman attacks by air on the civil population and of the violation of established rules of international law. He then replied that that was not the case. In reply I told him that it would be necessary for Japan to do something very vigorous to convince the whole world of the good faith of her professions as to China. He expressed personal regret that the situation in China had developed to such a state, and expressed the hope that Japan might make some sort of a statement or might be able to take some action that would convince the world of its good faith in the near future. I gained the impression that this would come after the Japanese military forces had been successful in the Shanghai district and after the Japanese military face had been saved. He stated that in his opinion if economic sanctions were applied to Japan and should the Soviet Union come into the conflict, there would be nothing left for Japan to do but to fight it out to the last man.


During the conversation I gained two very distinct impressions: (1) that he was extremely worried over the President's Chicago speech and the situation at Geneva, and (2) that the Japanese Government is greatly concerned over the present situation and would welcome a solution, provided

- 3 -

|provided they could still save face.

It should be borne in mind that Ambassador Shigemitsu, who is a very fine man, represents the anti-military section of Japanese officialdom. He is, I am sure, personally opposed to the Japanese aggression in China. He is, however, a career man and is in a very difficult situation and, of course, is doing his utmost to sustain his Government in this situation.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph E. Davies

4  
4 Carbon Copies  
Received A.H.C.

710 Far East

JED/hla

Original and four copies to the Department.  
One copy to the Legation, Riga.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

74-1



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

5  
RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Moscow, November 11, 1937.

A-M/C

No. 793.94/11400  
DEC 1 AM 11 50

Subject: Conference with Chinese Ambassador;  
Further Information as to Soviet-Chinese  
Relations.

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

GPK

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	To field	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
For	In U.S.A.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

*Part 1 + 2 by*

793.94  
761.93

*File*

Copy Transmitted by the  
Commercial Office (A-M/O)

To

*Philip  
Yokoyama  
12/23/37*

*Copy in FIE*  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DEC 2 - 1937

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

793.94/11400

Sir:

*See  
793.94/10027*

In confirmation of my telegram No. 276, October  
24, 10 p.m., I have the honor to report as follows:

As a matter of following up developments in  
connection with the visit to Moscow of Bogomolov, the  
Soviet Ambassador to China, and obtaining information  
with reference to the most recent developments in the  
matter of shipments of military supplies, I found oc-  
casion to have an extended conference again with the  
Chinese Ambassador in Moscow, Dr. Tsiang Ting-Fu.

He stated that the Soviet Government here, despite  
urging

JAN 10 1938

FILED  
F/FG

11400

74-2

- 2 -

urging by strong Soviet officials in the Far East and many of the Army authorities here, had decided not to engage in any definite commitment with reference to a direct military treaty with the Chinese Government at the present time. Bogomolov, he stated, is still in the Soviet Union and in Leningrad, and it is understood that he will not return to China nor will he receive final instructions until the conclusion of the Brussels Conference. He stated also that France was using its position here to deter any project of direct aid by the Soviet Union because France would prefer that its ally should reserve its powers against a possible German attack and should not deplete its energies by a war in the Far East.

Dr. Tsiang Ting-Fu stated further that China was having serious difficulty in connection with shipments of military supplies through French Indo-China. This, he stated, was because of fear on the part of the French Government of becoming involved. Such shipments as were made via this route were required by shipping restrictions to be split up into different cargoes and mixed with non-contraband shipments. This, he stated, involved much delay, extra handling, and re-assembling upon arrival. He stated that these conditions were made necessary to keep down the possible risk of loss of entire shipments through the loss of one cargo and also because of apprehension on the part of the French Government that it might become involved through the shipment of military supplies through French channels. He stated that both France and the Soviet Union were reluctant to become committed in the situation

74-3.

- 3 -

situation without assurances of the support of the Great Powers.

China, he stated, could make an extremely strong defense for an almost indefinite period were it provided with adequate military supplies. The difficulty lies not in the procuring of supplies but in their transport.

Germany, he stated, is not unfavorable to China. Despite formal objections raised by the Japanese Government to the presence of a large number of German military instructors in China, the German Government refused to require their return, on the ground that their employment was a matter of private enterprise.

England's alleged premature statement prior to the Brussels Conference that sanctions would not be invoked aroused deep disappointment in China.

China was also deeply grateful, he stated, for the moral support which it found in President Roosevelt's Chicago speech.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph E. Davies

710 Far East

JED/hla

Original and four copies to the Department.

4 copies to [unclear]  
[unclear] [unclear]



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 91 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Geneva, Switzerland, November 23, 1937

*John A. Hornbeck*  
ADVISER IN POLITICAL RELATIONS  
MR. HORNBECK  
DEC 20 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*793.94  
note  
793.94 conference*

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	For		
		off H	
		In U.S.A.	

*PA/H*

SUBJECT: Transmitting Local Editorial Comment  
on the Sino-Japanese Question.

1-1085

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AIR: 3

HONORABLE  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEC 4 1937  
MR. WILSON

DIVISION OF EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 2 1937  
Department of State

WASHINGTON

have the honor to enclose translations of certain 1/2/3/ editorials from Geneva papers relative to the Sino-Japanese question and the Brussels Conference.

The TRIBUNE DE GENEVE is an independent conservative journal, Paul du Bochet, the writer of the editorial submitted herewith, reflecting this policy.

The editorial, translation of which is enclosed, reports the expected Japanese peace terms and connects them with the Three-Power Pact. It regrets the American delegate's attitude at Brussels and the failure of the Conference there. The question, he expects, will revert to the League where no new step will be taken other than to recall to League members the resolution as to individual aid to China.

The JOURNAL DES NATIONS is a violently anti-fascist and pro-League paper. In the two editorials translated and submitted herewith, the JOURNAL continues its crusade

for

793.94/11401

F/EG

11401

- 2 -

for close adherence to the Covenant under its belief that proceeding outside thereof can mean only war. It regrets the failure at Brussels, which came in spite of President Roosevelt's incentive, and refers to the interest of all nine signatories of the Washington Treaty in any solution. Return to the Committee of 23 still provides some hope.

The editor also opposes the creation of a non-intervention committee or of a committee of ambassadors to carry on the task of the Brussels Conference since he considers a return to the Committee of 23 inevitable. The abstention of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden is in his opinion an intention not to line up with a policy the details of which are not known to them; they have as announced reconsidered their attitude toward Article 16 and the steps it brings into play. The JOURNAL blames the hesitancy of London and Paris for the failure of the system of collective security, for when a powerful aggressor always wins, the small states obviously cannot expect the system to work in their behalf. The JOURNAL further points out that China has already rejected a proposal for a Committee of Ambassadors and can of course at any time summon the Committee of 23; the Chinese request under Article 17 remains. Failure at Brussels definitely imposes a return to League procedure.

The JOURNAL DES NATIONS has devoted considerable attention to the Brussels Conference, reporting in full the speeches of the delegates and publishing the Chinese

memorandum

- 3 -

memorandum with regard to the effect of the application of  
sanctions, which was submitted to the Brussels Conference.

Respectfully yours,

  
Howard Bucknell, Jr.  
American Consul.

3 ✓  
Enclosures:

- No.1: Translation of article  
in TRIBUNE DE GENEVE,  
Nov.15,1937.
- No.2: Translation of article  
in JOURNAL DES NATIONS,  
Nov.14-15,1937.
- No.3: Translation of article  
in JOURNAL DES NATIONS,  
Nov.16,1937.

LVB/EW

Original and two copies to Department of State.  
One copy to American Delegation, Brussels.  
" " " " Embassy, Tokyo.  
" " " " " Nanking.  
" " " " Legation, Bern.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 1  
with No 91  
Nov. 23 1937

TRANSLATION.

(Article in TRIBUNE DE GENEVE, Geneva, Switzerland,  
November 15, 1937.

"TOKYO'S REFUSAL.

The Japanese Government has not accepted the invitation of the Brussels Conference. In order to justify this new refusal, it pretends that its military action in China constitutes a measure of legitimate defense which cannot be termed a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty. But the unanimous resolution voted six weeks ago by the Assembly of the League of Nations - and to which the Swiss Delegation was associated - has already indicated the justice of these arguments. It emphasizes in effect that there is no proportion between the sanctions taken by Japan and the incidents which are the origin of the conflict, although the resolution does not determine officially a case of aggression - such a determination bringing into play, under the terms of the Covenant, the automatic unwinding of the mechanism of mutual assistance in favor of the victim - it actually states that the Empire of the Mikado has knowingly violated its international engagements, among which is included the Nine-Power Treaty.

In declining the new invitation which was addressed to it, the Tokyo Government has let it be known that it will not permit itself to be deprived of the fruits of its victory. It is evidently encouraged in this uncompromising attitude by the success which its armies have again won at Shanghai and by the conclusion of its entente with Germany and Italy. However, it expresses the hope in the note that "the powers may make their contribution to the stability of the Far East in conformity with the actual situation". That is to say, it would agree to undertake individual conversations with the western powers, but on the express condition that the latter would not contest its conquest and would limit themselves to accepting the actual situation.

A Havas despatch dated from Tokyo reveals the understanding which exists in official Japanese circles of a lasting peace with China. This would be in fact the enslavement of the Celestial Republic, which would undertake to recognize of its own accord the freedom of Manchuria and of Inner Mongolia, with their principal provinces demilitarized and the army reduced to the rôle of police under the direct control of the conqueror. China would be forced in addition to renounce its "undesirable" relations with France, England, and Russia, to admit Japanese and German advisers into all of the services of the state, to permit its territory to be transformed into a "strategic base for the anti-communist powers" and to accept the establishment of a "Sino-Nippo-Italo-German economic cooperation".

This program reveals very suggestive indications of the real extent and aims of the three-power pact signed last Saturday at Rome and of the manner in which these signatories understand the battle against the bolshevist peril. But under these conditions any serious negotiation becomes impossible. The Brussels Conference has failed in its object and nothing remains but to close. The only question which remains is whether before adjourning to a more propitious date it will leave Japanese defiance

unanswered

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

unanswered or if it will sum up in a collective declaration its attitude concerning the fate of the so-called Nine-Power Treaty with its guarantee of the political and territorial integrity of China and the maintenance of the 'open door'.

The adoption of such a declaration is admitted to be very difficult, for as should have been foreseen the representative of Italy from the very first day has been entirely on Japan's side. In addition, the evasive tone of the American delegate, Mr. Norman Davis, affords a disappointing contrast with the generous and stirring address in which President Roosevelt at Chicago condemned Japanese aggression and re-affirmed the 'sacred character of treaties'.

In any event, the matter will thereupon return to Geneva to the Advisory Committee created some time ago in order to follow the events in Manchuria and resurrected by the last plenary Assembly. However, all that the League will be able to do after the failure at Brussels will be to recall to its members the resolution by which it invited them to 'consider how far they can individually extend aid to China'. If this appeal remains unanswered, it will be the League again which will be accused.

PAUL DU BOCHET. "

LVB/EW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 2  
with No 91  
Nov. 23 1937

TRANSLATION.

(Editorial in JOURNAL DES NATIONS, November 14-15, 1937)

"OUTSIDE OF THE COVENANT THERE IS ONLY WAR.

AGGRAVATION OF THE SITUATION AND THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE.

A 'Prejudicial Conference', exclaims Pertinax. - A Conference 'very frankly harmful to the cause of peace', writes Gabriel Peri. The two extremes of French journalism express succinctly the opinion of all journalists of all countries, of all sides, summoned to Brussels. The diplomats who are taking part in the Conference confess - indirectly and in private conversations - the same disappointing reality.

Once more the terrible truth in the axiom 'outside of the Covenant there is only war' has made itself felt. Not even the cooperation of the United States of America serves to conceal the starkness of this undeniable truth.

The second week of the 'prejudicial Conference' has closed with a balance clearly in the red for the cause of peace.

Let us review the facts. On October 6, encouraged by the strong statements of Franklin Roosevelt, 51 states members of the League found again the energy which seemed to have disappeared for ever. They created the individual duty of aiding China. They agreed that states signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty should consult together in a frank and cordial exchange of views and that they would report at the latest in one month to the League.

The Brussels Conference rapidly came into being. Washington sent Mr. Norman Davis. England was winning. It foresaw a serious rapprochement with the United States and appointed two of its Ministers, courageously and hopefully. The meeting at Brussels opened. A certain uneasiness ruled in the totalitarian camp, to the extent that Nazi Germany refused to participate and Fascist Italy after having taken orders from Berlin cancelled the trip of Mussolini's son-in-law.

Then, nearly terrified by their own courage and their success, the powers once having met at Brussels stepped outside of the Covenant. They denied it, wiped it out, and automatically provoked the aggravation of the situation.

The totalitarian agreement was signed. The Berlin, Rome and Tokyo triangle was established. Japan took Shanghai. Its trumps in hand, Japan directly slapped those who courteously and submissively had invited it to sit down with them, itself the aggressor outside of the Covenant.

- 2 -

Did the brutal reply of Japan provoke a helpful reaction?

We hardly dare say so, in spite of the draft resolution discussed all Saturday in Brussels. We hardly dare say so, for in all the speeches and in all the discussions at Brussels - with the exception of Mr. Wellington Koo - there have been ignored with a perseverance worthy of a better cause the origins of the Conference, the very existence of the decisions of the League Assembly, and the future usefulness of returning to the framework of the Covenant through the Brussels report to the Committee of 23, which must meet before Christmas.

The draft resolution or declaration, further, from what we can tell, is not so bad as one has been led to fear. Its American origin would assure it a compulsory success. After it had been discussed in the course of the Anglo-Franco-American meeting Friday evening, in the private sitting of Saturday it met with only the opposition of Tokyo's partner: Mussolini's delegate. The only one of his opinion, he was permitted to express his views.

This draft resolution furthermore contains only affirmations of principle; it will be submitted to the governments, and on Monday, even if in the meanwhile new trumps have been obtained by the aggressor, it will doubtless be approved as the end of the first phase of the prejudicial Conference of Brussels.

The proposed declaration begins with an affirmation that there is no judicial or moral justification in the employment of force within the territory of a foreign state. An action of this kind undertaken by Japan not only contravenes the Nine-Power Treaty, but is not even justified under the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. From the lack of justification in this case, it follows that idealistic doctrines cannot be defended or imposed by force. If this principle is admitted, international anarchy would very shortly replace the reign of international law. Further, the Conference cannot admit a solution by direct negotiations between Japan and China. Left to themselves, the two combatants could not attain a result, so much the more since it is a question in which are equally interested at least the seven other signatories of the Treaty of 1922. Finally the proposed draft declaration asks what will be the attitude later taken by the signatories of this treaty before the fact that one of them gives a unilateral interpretation to the stipulations agreed to in harmony.

The word violation, as was formerly done in the case of Spain with the word aggression, was carefully dropped from the text which the Brussels Conference should approve Monday. Evidently without the voice of Italy. The League Covenant and the decisions approved by 51 states on October 6, 1937 are also not mentioned.

If then the text of the draft resolution is less bad than one was led to believe, it is a fact that in substance it is a clear contribution to the aggravation of the situation.

The

- 3 -

The League of Nations is excluded in order that the Conference may not have to contemplate the next step. There is no wish to compromise anything, and the demands for financial assistance or for individual measures which may aid China and which Wellington Koo brought forward Saturday morning are left to the second phase of the Brussels Conference, if ever it takes place.

When will this second phase begin? Some say Friday or Saturday next. Others say after the capture of Nanking!

Alas, when diplomacy works outside of the Covenant, anything may happen. The 'prejudicial Conference' of Brussels should give way to the responsible measures of collective security. If it does not actually wish to collaborate with the aggressor, it should surrender to the Committee of 23.

The situation very closely recalls that of March-April, 1936, when the Chairman of the Committee of 13 for the Ethiopian war assumed the terrible responsibility of not summoning his colleagues, of letting the last defense of the Ethiopians be overcome by a gas war and of not summoning the 13 until after the fall of Addis Ababa.

Mr. Munters will not wish to be another Madariaga. After the closing of the first phase of the Brussels Conference, he will summon the Committee of 23. And Mr. Wellington Koo will be able to repeat his speech made at Brussels, adding at the most to his request for financial assistance and for individual measures the affirmation that according to the experience provided by the Conference of the Pacific, outside of the Covenant, there is actually only war."

LVB/EW

enclosure No 3  
with No 91  
(Rev. 23 37)

TRANSLATION.

(Editorial in JOURNAL DES NATIONS, November 16, 1937).

"FIRST LESSON FROM BRUSSELS.

THE VICTIM OF AGGRESSION IS NOT HELPED BY DECLARATIONS  
WHICH ARE NOT UNANIMOUS.

The first lesson learned from the conclusion of the first phase of the Brussels Conference has a very clear meaning: the victim of aggression is not helped by declarations of principle which are not even accepted unanimously.

The 19 powers, of which 18 are members of the League, have after two weeks of heart-rending palaver, failed in the essential duty imposed by collective security. They failed in the duty of assisting the victim of aggression, they failed in the duty imposed by the Covenant.

14 powers believe they have accomplished a great deed in voting a declaration of principle. Three powers abstained even from that. One 'is clearly opposed'.

No power has done what it should in order to fill its true duty toward the Covenant, toward humanity which wishes peace by the application of this Covenant.

The Government of Rome, which profits from the rule of unanimity in sending its vassals to the League of Nations to vote against the application of the Covenant in the Spanish tragedy, profits from the non-existence of this rule of unanimity in the actions of diplomacy outside of the Covenant in order to impose by a contrary vote the non-application of the Covenant.

For, just as long as the shadow Conference of Brussels continues, the League should not, so to say, take back on its hands the terrible conflict which is ravaging the Far East. The procedure discovered by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee of 23 permits each member of the Committee to request a meeting of the latter. Responsibility will not be disposed of by this artifice.

The Advisory Committee of 23 must be convoked. The Chinese memorandum officially distributed to the delegations meeting at Brussels studies appropriate measures which within the spirit of the Covenant might bring aid and assistance to the victim of aggression. But what can Brussels do in this matter? Nothing.

Certainly the Committee of Ambassadors, the creation of which is contemplated in order to kill definitely all assistance to the victim of aggression, and which would in some way survive the Brussels Conference, will not be able to take over, come what may.

The

- 2 -

The Committee of 23 will be summoned. Before Christmas. It cannot be possible that neither its President nor the states members want it.

\* \* \* \*

But let us return to the prejudicial Brussels Conference.

It is nearly useless in these conditions to comment on the text of the declaration, a text which was weakened even at the last moment (if one compares the first version given by the United Press to the final text).

The insolence of the Japanese reply should have as a result the re-affirmation that the war concerns not alone Japan and China and that 'direct negotiations' are not a solution. Such a declaration of principle is in conformity with law. However, one cannot fail to point out that all reference to the League of Nations is absent from the text, that the Conference leaves the door open to a sudden change of attitude by Japan - an impossible change.

Italy's negative vote and its realistic motives are not a surprise and are not of major importance. No one expected Italian cooperation to safeguard peace.

The abstention of the three Scandinavian states, on the other hand, is a very serious warning to the great democracies. No one will imagine that Sweden, Denmark and Norway are not in agreement with the principles of the resolution of the Conference. No one will believe that these three countries wish to indicate any sympathy whatever for the aggressor country.

If however certain states abstained from voting for the resolution, they did so because they wished to point out thereby very clearly that they do not wish to take part in a comedy, that they do not intend to line up with a policy the particulars of which are not known.

It will be recalled that after the failure of sanctions in the Ethiopian war, the Scandinavian states announced that they were forced to reconsider their attitude toward Article 16 of the Covenant. Mr. Sandler repeated this very recently in a speech which received wide attention. However, one should not forget that at the Committee of 23 the Swedish representative actively collaborated in the preparation of a report which went much further than the Brussels resolution and that the three Scandinavian states voted for this resolution in the Assembly.

Thus, if they abstained at Brussels, the debates of the Conference - and especially what took place in the corridors of the Conference - must have convinced them that the redress which they hoped to see in the Assembly resolution was only a snare. They must be convinced that the great

democracies

- 3 -

democracies do not wish to go beyond a simple verbal affirmation of principles.

London and Paris with their hesitating policy are responsible for the abstention of the three Nordic countries. London and Paris will be responsible if the system of collective security - in which France and England are the most vitally interested - is going to continue to break to pieces due to the loss of interest by the small states which say to themselves that they cannot, no more than Ethiopia or China, count on the fact that this system will ever work in their behalf if the aggressor is powerful enough.

One must make no mistake about it. For the great powers, the affirmation of principle contained in the resolution has closed the matter. Of course the Conference has adjourned for only a few days; but just as is stated above, there has already been sought out the way of escaping the necessity of taking those decisions (prudently called 'common attitude') that the resolution causes to be foreseen.

Now there is again talk of a revival of the Committee of Non-Intervention, this time under the form of a Conference of Ambassadors. There is evidence of a desire to maintain such a Conference in order to be able to avoid returning to the League, under the pretext that the Brussels Conference still sits.

All these calculations are based on a faulty premise. They do not take into account, in effect, a primary consideration. And that consideration is the consent of the Chinese Government.

In the first place, the 'Conference of Ambassadors' has already been rejected by China. The Committee of 23 can be summoned at any minute on the request of the Chinese delegate.

Finally, the Chinese appeal under Article 17 of the Covenant has not been withdrawn. It remains hanging like the sword of Damocles over the heads of the governments which dream of non-intervention.

At any moment China can demand that the Council and Assembly apply the procedure of Article 17 which brings into play automatically the application of sanctions under Article 16.

The failure of Brussels therefore does not in any way signify that the great democracies can wash their hands in declaring that they have accomplished their duty.

The success of the Conference of 19 might have been able to render needless a return to the procedure of the League.

Its

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

Its failure imposes such a return.

This is a useful thesis for reflection by the  
chancelleries for the coming week."

LVB/EW



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


75-2

-2-

something out along a line which China could accept. If they failed, he felt that it would be a long war of the guerrilla type. He stated that short of actual participation in military operations, the Chinese Government has received every possible help overland that they could expect. He also discoursed at some length upon the groundless character of the fears of the Western democracies that China might ultimately come under the domination of the communist type of government. He stated that his Government and his Chief, President Chiang Kai-Shek, were firmly opposed to the imposition of communist principles and that the character of the people and particularly the extensive small holdings of land by the population constituted an insurmountable barrier to that possibility.

He also expressed the belief that ultimately, if a long war would develop, the Soviet Union would come in and stated, in the strictest confidence, that he had reason to believe that particularly the military forces of the Soviet Union were impressed with the fact that there might now be an opportunity to dispose of an enemy on the east at this time when both Germany and Italy might be unable to project military activities on the western front of the Soviet Union.

Respectfully yours,

  
Joseph E. Davies.

File No. 710

In Quintuplicate to the Department.

JED:bpg

4 Carbon copies  
Received FR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Dunlop NARS, Date 12-18-75

Telephone: PLAZA 3-4700

Cable: INFARL, New York

AMERICAN COUNCIL  
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

129 EAST 52D STREET · NEW YORK CITY



*Reply drafted  
Nov 24, 1937  
JMS*

OFFICERS

- CARL L. ALSEBERG, Chairman
- WALLACE M. ALEXANDER, Vice-Chairman
- MISS ADA L. COMSTOCK, Vice-Chairman
- FREDERICK V. FIELD, Secretary
- CHARLES J. RHODES, Treasurer
- MISS HILDA AUSTERN, Assistant Treasurer



November 15, 1937.

Dear Mr. Hamilton,

At Mr. Frederick Field's suggestion, I am sending you herewith a manuscript of a pamphlet on American policy in the Far East which we are shortly to publish.

We should be very grateful if you or someone in the Far Eastern Division would consent to look over this manuscript and send along any criticisms or suggestions which you might care to make. It often happens that outsiders writing upon these subjects make errors of factual statement or interpretation which can readily be pointed out by those to whom these matters are of direct and official concern. Before issuing this pamphlet to the public we would welcome suggestions and comments from someone who speaks with authority in this field. I should add that this pamphlet is not intended to be a review of details of American policy nor an argument for any particular line of policy, but a simple presentation of the general background and of the major issues today.

I shall greatly appreciate any suggestions which you will care to make.

Sincerely yours,

*Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr.*

Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr.

Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton,  
Division of Far Eastern Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D.C.

79394

793-8/1143

1143

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 30 1937

Confidential

Dear Mr. Lockwood:


The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of November 15, 1937, with which you enclosed a manuscript entitled "AMERICA AND THE FAR EASTERN WAR, World in Arms", with the request that I or someone in the Far Eastern Division look over the manuscript and send along any criticisms or suggestions which we might care to make. In accordance with that request the manuscript has been studied in the Division and certain comments thereon as to statements of fact are set forth in a memorandum attached to this letter. You will realize, of course, that neither the Division of Far Eastern Affairs nor the Department of State should be cited as the source of these comments.

Sincerely yours,

*M. M. H.*  
Enclosures:  
Memorandum.  
Secretary Hull's statement of July 16, 1937.  
Manuscript.

NOV 30 1937  
Mr. William W. Lockwood, Jr.,  
American Council, Institute of  
Pacific Relations,  
129 East Fifty-second Street,  
New York, New York.

*JHS*  
FE:JHS:VGI  
11/29/37



793.94/11403

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Chusoff NARS, Date 12-18-75

Comment on the Manuscript entitled "AMERICA  
IN THE FAR EASTERN WAR. World in Arms".

Page 1, paragraph 1, sixth sentence. In that speech the President voiced his "determination to pursue a policy of peace and to adopt every practicable measure to avoid involvement in war". Furthermore, it must be pointed out that in that address the President did not call for "collective efforts to restrain the war makers even to the point of 'quarantine' measures against the aggressor".

Page 2, paragraph 1, second sentence. This is an incorrect statement, inasmuch as there has obviously been no century-long struggle between China and Japan.

Page 2, paragraph 2, last sentence. This is an exaggeration.

Page 3, paragraph 2, last line. "Resistance to any further encroachments on China's integrity" is an incorrect statement of the Open Door policy. It is suggested that such a phrase as "respect for China's integrity" might replace the phrase under consideration.

Page 4, paragraph 2, penultimate sentence. It is highly questionable whether the Four Power Treaty in regard

-2-

regard to insular possessions and dominions in the Pacific can be interpreted as a "non-aggression pact".

Page 8, paragraph 2, last three lines. It is questioned whether this statement is correct. It would be more accurate to state "to educate the American public to the policies of peace".

Page 9, paragraph 2. "8,000" should be changed to "10,000" and "\$200,000,000" should be changed to "\$250,000,000".

Page 9, last line and first paragraph of page 10. It should be pointed out that the reasons here set forth have not been cited "unofficially" by any official of the Department of State. This sentence should be clarified.

Page 11, paragraph 1, fifth from last line. The Secretary's statement of that day cannot be construed as a formal accusation of Japan.

Page 12, line 8. The sentence beginning with the word "consequently" is not a correct statement. Moreover, the words "collective action" are much too broad. (See Secretary's statement of July 16 on principles of policy)

Page 12, line 15. In as much as the word "quarantine" was used only incidentally in the Chicago speech, it is questionable whether the President's speech can accurately be designated as his "quarantine" speech.

Page 13.

-3-

Page 16, paragraph 2, line 3. It might be considered inaccurate to state that the Far Eastern crisis constitutes the first major test of the Neutrality Act; reference is made, naturally, to the Italo-Ethiopian crisis, which was impending at the time of the enactment of such legislation.

Page 28, second paragraph, last sentence. The statement is open to the interpretation that the United States is taking the leadership in forcing Japan to withdraw from China by economic or military measures. Possibly some such phrase as "wary lest America now take" is intended.

It is suggested that the article under examination would appear to be lacking in precision of expression and might, therefore, give rise to miscomprehension on the part of the average reader in regard to the statements interpretative of this Government's foreign policy.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*a*  
Mr. Ford  
I find no card  
for this message  
and this is only a  
copy but for  
historical purposes  
I think it should  
be recorded  
N.E.F.  
See 793.94/12039

793.94/11403-118

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Huatfen NARS, Date 12-18-75



*Rec'd from  
S. File  
M.D.H.*

76-1

His Excellency Franklin D. Roosevelt  
The President of the United States  
Washington, D. C.

Never in her long history has China been confronted with such a grave crisis as she is going through today and never has peace of the Far East been so disastrously disturbed as it is today. In the last five months, China has engaged in a life and death struggle against Japan. Armed with the ultra-modern implements of war and displaying a cruelty characteristic of mediaeval barbarism, the Japanese land, naval and air forces have seized city after city, massacred numberless non-combatants including ~~and a few~~ foreign nationals, and destroyed immense amount of ~~property~~ not even sparing cultural, religious and charitable institutions. In the relentless prosecution of their aggressive campaign, they have disregarded, and even deliberately violated, the rights of third countries with the evident intention of realizing Japan's long cherished ambition to dominate the whole Pacific region. They are now in unlawful occupation of large parts of North China as well as important cities and towns along the Nanking-Shanghai Railway including the Capital of the Republic. A puppet regime purporting to be "The Provisional Government of the Republic of China" has been set up by the Japanese militarists in Peiping. They are yet further extending their invasion in different directions. According to the present indications, attempts are being made to penetrate Northern Kiangsu, Shantung, The Yangtze Valley and

793.94

793.94/11403-1/2

PS/SA B

NOV 6 1944

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

76-2

-2-

Valley and South China.

Marshalling all our available forces, we have combatted the Japanese onslaught to the best of our ability. With the firm determination to preserve our national existence we have made supreme sacrifice --- sacrifice in man-power, in resources, in commerce and industry. We are shedding blood in the hope that the nation may live in peace and with honor. We are not fighting a war in the ordinary sense of the word. But we are resisting the wanton aggression and repelling the fierce attacks on our own territory. We are fighting for the liberty of the Chinese nation and against the common menace to the mankind. We are not only defending ourselves, but also the principle of the sanctity of treaties especially the Nine Power Treaty, under which the sovereignty, independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China should be respected by Japan and other signatory Powers. We will not surrender to Japan's brutal force, but will continue our resistance until the Japanese Government abandons its aggressive policy, until our national administrations are restored to us and until the principle of inviolability of the international covenants is vindicated.

Throughout the conflict, the Chinese people have been conscious of, and felt grateful for, moral support we have received from the United States. We know that under Your Excellency's able leadership, the American

Government with

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

76-3

-3-

Government with its proverbial sense of justice and always guided by its traditional policy in the Far East will do its best to uphold all legal and treaty rights and maintain law and order so necessary for the peaceful conduct of international relations. On behalf of the Chinese people, I therefore take liberty at this critical moment of urgently appealing to Your Excellency and, through you, the American people to render such effective assistance to China as will enable the struggle for the cause of world peace and solidarity to be carried on to a successful conclusion at an early date. I am sure that the Chinese people will be forever grateful to Your Excellency for all your efforts towards that end.

Chiang Kai-shek

December 24, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

CA

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED** Gray

TSINGTAO VIA N.E.

Dated Dec. 1, 1937

FROM

Recd 7:13 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
PAN ASIATIC AFFAIRS  
DEC 2 1937  
Department of State

793.94

December 1, 3 p.m.

EJL

The tension has decreased considerably and it appears that the internal political difficulties which have given rise to the great uneasiness have been composed, at least for the time being. Last night after lengthy conference the mayor ordered the Chinese bank to open today and they are transacting business as usual.

There has been issued a proclamation by the Intelligence Bureau affirming intention of the authorities to preserve peace and order in Tsingtao and "to exert themselves even more so in regard to the protection of lives and property of foreigners."

In view of this proclamation and the general easing of the situation today this Consulate believes that no danger locally may be expected unless the Japanese undertake military operations here, the signs of which are not apparent at present.

Tsingtao is absolutely quiet.

Repeated to Peiping, the Department, Hankow.

SOKOBI

SMS MPL

793.94/11404

11 6 1937  
F/FG  
VICTORY

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Handwritten initials*

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR  
AMEMBASSY PEIPING  
AMEMBASSY HANKOW

SPECIAL GRAY  
FROM Tientsin via N. R.

Dated December 2, 1937

Rec'd 8:35 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
Department of State  
*Handwritten initials and 'B'*

793.94

81, December 2, 5 p.m.

*Handwritten '82'*

It is reported that during daylight hours from  
November 24th to 30th Japanese brought in from Manchuria  
2500 troops; sent out by sea 1500 casualties and sent out  
to Manchuria 2500 troops, 20 field pieces, 150 tanks and  
600 motor trucks.

CALDWELL

CC:CSB

793.94/11405

DEC 6 1937  
FIVEG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

77-1

4

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR

PLAIN

Nanking via N. R.

FROM

Dated December 2, 1937

Rec'd 7:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

882

793.94

note

793.102 Nanking

979, December 2, 9 a.m.

Embassy's 974, November 29, 8 p.m.

Nanking safety zone.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 2 1937  
Department of State

One. International Committee November 30th arranged for civilian associated in Shanghai to inform Japanese Embassy that Chinese authorities here had agreed in detail to the stipulation of the safety zone proposal and were providing rice and other practical assistance.

Two. Following message from Nanking Committee from Shanghai Associated now received by Embassy in Shanghai December 1st "Japanese authorities have duly noted request for safety zone but regret cannot grant it. In the event of Chinese forces misbehavior towards civilians and or property cannot assume responsibility but they themselves will endeavor to respect the district as far as consistent with military necessity. Signed Jacquinet".

Three. Sent Department. Repeated Hankow, Peiping. Peiping kindly repeat to Tokyo.

ATCHESON

DM

793.94/11406

DEC 6 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR

FROM CINCAF 4.122

December 2, 1937

Rec'd 9:05 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: AMCON SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING  
SECOND BRIGADE USMC

COPIES SENT TO  
~~C.N.I. AND M.I.D.~~

DIVISION of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 27 1937  
Department of State

793.94  
note  
393.1115  
393.0015

793.94/11407

0002. Military situation unchanged. Japanese believed advanced six miles west Wutsing and to have occupied Liyang. Chinese reported counter attacking East Kwangteh. Conditions Settlement unchanged. Police state all precautions being taken prevent anti-Japanese demonstrations during parade tomorrow. Total two four four six foreigners including two hundred forty-nine Americans returned Shanghai during November. 1920.

CSB

FILED  
DEC 9 1937  
F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

78-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY  
FROM  
Tokyo

Dated December 2, 1937  
Rec'd 8:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.E. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 24 1937  
Department of State  
RJD

793.9411408

RUSH.

580, December 2, 4 p.m.  
Department's 326, / 11395 December 1, 8 p.m.

One. The Department presumably will have noted our  
582, / 11369 November 30, 7 p.m., (to which reference was made  
in Shanghai's 1050, December 1, 11 a.m.) in which case WE  
reported having taken action in anticipation of the  
Department's instructions.

Two. Today WE informed the Foreign Office of the  
statement made by the Japanese Assistant Military Attache  
at British military headquarters, as reported in Shanghai's  
1057, and again urged against sending of Japanese troops  
into neutral areas. The Foreign Office stated that  
according to a report received from Shanghai the project  
to march Japanese forces into such areas has been  
"abandoned" and "the question does not arise".

Repeated to Shanghai.

GREW

WGC:KLP

FILED  
DEC 11 1937  
F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

79-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (A)

FROM Hankow via N. R. <sup>USA</sup>

Dated December 2, 1937

Rec'd 7:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
**COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.**

*in confidence* 882  
982, December 2, noon.  
Our 978, December 1, 3 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 2 1937  
Department of State

793.94  
note  
793.94119

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

One GERMAN Ambassador arrived here on Chinese customs  
cruiser. We are reliably informed that Chiang will inform  
him that China cannot (repeat not) consider any peace  
proposals which do not give recognition to her full  
sovereignty.

Two. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping. Peiping please  
repeat to Tokyo.

ATCHESON

KLP

FILED  
DEC 6 - 1937

793.94/11409

F/FG

W

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL).

79-2

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 98E) December 2, 1937, received from the Secretary in charge of the American Embassy at Nanking, reads substantially as follows:

The Secretary of Embassy refers to his telegram (no. 978) of December 1, 1937, and reports that the Chinese customs cruiser with the German Ambassador on board has arrived in Nanking. According to reliable information received by the Embassy, he will be informed by General Chiang Kai-shek that no peace proposals can be considered by China unless her full sovereignty is recognized therein.

*ACB*  
FE:ARR:REK  
12/2/37

FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated December 2, 1937

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Divi  
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 2 1937  
Department of State

793.94

1037, December 2, 6 p.m.

My No. 1044, November 30, 5 p.m.

Japanese forces are reported to have advanced on all fronts in the Taihu Lake area. A small Chinese contingent is still in the Kiangyin forts. On the Shanghai-Nanking Railway Japanese troops are reported to be within six miles of Linkow and, further south, to have advanced approximately fifteen miles northwest from Kwangteh.

The Chinese abandoned Haiyen on November 30. Tsungteh northeast of Hangchow and Wukang further west have been taken by the Japanese.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Hanking, Hankow.

GAUS

JLS:WTC

793.94/11410

F/FG

FILED

DEC 7 1937

W

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~FE~~

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR

COMSOPAT

FROM DECEMBER 2, 1937

Rec'd 12:48 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

882

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 27 1937  
Department of State

793.94

0102. Air raids Canton 0900, several bombs vicinity  
air field north of City, other South China ports quiet.  
2000.

CSE

793.94/11411

FILED,  
DEC 8 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

80-1

DIVISION OF  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FE  
EU

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Geneva

Dated December 2, 1937

Rec'd 1:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

793.94  
note  
Act. Comm.

369, December 2, 4 p.m.

Minister's 41, October 8, 3 p.m. 110481

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 2 1937  
Department of State

Opinion in Geneva is that no meeting of Sino-Japanese Advisory Committee will be called at least before January Council meeting. Secretariat officials feel that League did its part adopting the Committee's resolution condemning Japan and the Chinese think no useful purpose would be served by referring the matter back to the Committee when the Brussels Conference itself was unable to take more direct action. Hoo indicates that the present Chinese plan is to endeavor to obtain any possible aid from individual governments as a result of either joint (or?) all individual agreement and in the meantime to wait upon events.

793.94/11412

BUCKNELL

KLP:CSB

DEC 7 1937

WILLARD

F/FG

h

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

81-1

JWB

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

GRAY

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated December 2, 1937

Rec'd 2:10 p. m.

Secretary of State, COPIES SENT TO  
Washington. O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 2 - 1937  
Department of State

1070, December 2, 9 p. m.

Your number 599 / 11395  
DECEMBER 1, 1 p. m.

I have repeatedly discussed the matter with my  
colleague who, HOWEVER, can do nothing in the face of  
the high military decision. The parade is scheduled  
to start at 11 o'clock tomorrow morning from Jessfield  
and to take two hours to pass down Yuyo Road, Avenue  
Haig, Avenue Foch, Thibet Road, Nanking Road and the  
Bund to Hongkew. About three thousand men will be in  
line. Extraordinary police precautions are being taken.

GAUSS

DDM:WVC

793.94/11413

F/EG

82-1

EE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG  
This message must be \_\_\_\_\_ Hankow  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated **FROM** Dated December 2, 1937  
to anyone. (B)

Rec'd 1:44 p. m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

*paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
CONFIDENTIAL

Division of  
WAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 3 - 1937  
Department of State

793.94  
note  
793.94/119

11, December 2, 2 p. m.  
NY 6, /11367  
NOVEMBER 29, 2 p. m.

In private conversation yesterday the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not deny and by evasiveness admitted the truth of the theory that the German Ambassador has gone to General Chiang bearing Japanese proposals for a cessation of hostilities. Asked whether he thought there was any chance of an agreement, he expressed deep pessimism saying that from what he heard the Japanese terms would be unendurably severe and would include a demand to garrison every important city in China. It now appears that the German Ambassador was accompanied by Hsu Mo, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that the vessel transporting him arrived at Nanking this morning at 9 a. m. flying the Swastika flag. The Ambassador immediately disembarked. Conflicting reports are current, one being that the German Ambassador is acting on behalf of the Italian and not the German Government. However that may be, the recent recognition of Manchukuo by the Italian Government and the offer of services

793.94/11414

FILED  
F/FG  
DEC 6 1937

11

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

82-2

-2- 11, December 2, 2 p. m. from Hankow

services of mediation by the German Government indicate a desire on the part of these Governments either in competition or in cooperation to accord early recognition to Japan as the master of the Far East and to share in the spoils of victory. I venture to suggest also that Italy and Germany wish by prompt and "realistic" action to demonstrate that they are more important factors in the Far Eastern world than those nations like Great Britain and the United States which endeavor to support a treaty system based on international promises and not on present actualities. A secretary of the Italian Embassy remarked to me humorously yesterday that the Rome-Berlin axis did not seem to function in the Orient for although he dined with the German Ambassador a few hours before his departure the latter gave him no hint of his projected mission. If the German Ambassador is acting on behalf of the Italian Government and not his own this remark was, of course, intentionally misleading. The attitude of officials of Foreign Office toward the Italian recognition of Manchukuo and German friendliness with Japan is one of profound discouragement and disappointment that the nations supporting the treaty system do not take practical measures to save China from internal ruin at the hands of Japan and the world from international chaos.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

82-3

'-3-"11, December 2, 2 p. m. from Hankow

chaos. I have endeavored to show that the Nine Power Treaty constituted a renunciation on the part of each signatory and entailed no (repeat no) common responsibility for enforcement.

Repeated to Tokyo. By mail to Peiping.

JOHNSON

KLP:AWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

82-4

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 11) of December 2, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

During the course of a private talk on December 1 with the American Ambassador the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs did not deny the truth of the conjecture, and by evasiveness admitted, that the German Ambassador has gone to Chiang Kai-shek with proposals from the Japanese for a discontinuance of hostilities. In reply to an inquiry in regard to the chance of an agreement being reached, the Foreign Minister expressed himself as very pessimistic and said that, according to information which he had received, Japan's terms would include a demand to garrison every important city in China and would be unendurably severe. Current reports are conflicting, one being that the German Ambassador is acting not for the German Government but on behalf of the Italian Government. Whatever may be the truth of the matter, the offer of services of mediation by the German Government and the Italian Government's recent recognition of "Manchukuo" show that these Governments desire, either in cooperation or in competition, to accord to Japan early recognition as the master of the Far East and to share in the spoils of victory. On December 1 a secretary of the Italian Embassy remarked humorously to the American Ambassador that seemingly the Rome-Berlin axis did not operate in the Orient, as the German Ambassador, with whom he had dined a few hours before the Ambassador's departure, gave no hint of his contemplated

793.94/11414

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

contemplated mission. This remark was, of course, intentionally misleading if the German Ambassador is acting not on his own Government's behalf but on behalf of the Italian Government. The American Ambassador suggests that the German and Italian Governments may desire to demonstrate, by "realistic" and prompt action, that they are of more importance in the Far East than governments like the United States and Great Britain which try to support a treaty system based not on present actualities but on international promises. It seems now that the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs (Hsu Mo) accompanied the German Ambassador who arrived at Nanking at 9:00 a.m. on the morning of December 2 aboard a vessel flying the Swastika flag. The Ambassador landed immediately. The attitude of Chinese Foreign Office officials toward German friendliness with Japan and Italian recognition of "Manchukuo" is one of extreme discouragement and disappointment that the nations supporting the treaty system do not take practical measures to save the world from international chaos and China from internal ruin by Japan. The American Ambassador has tried to point out that the Nine Power Treaty constituted a relinquishment on the part of each signatory and that no common responsibility for enforcement was entailed.

793.94/11414

*209.C.*  
FE:EC

*ACR*  
FE

KII-3-37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 741.51/253 FOR Tel. 1685-9pm

FROM France (Bullitt) DATED Dec. 1, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 670

REGARDING: Far Eastern situation. Statement that there had been a great deal of discussion concerning, - during visit to London but that the British had said that while they were quite ready to cooperate in any general movement to stop Japan they could not act individually.

fp

793.94 / 11415

DOCUMENT FILE

11415

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

sms ... FROM PLAIN  
Shanghai via N R  
Dated December 2, 1937  
Rec'd 7:48 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 3 1937  
Department of State

793.94

December 2, 10 a.m.  
Nanking's 976, December 1, 11 a.m.

Request of International Committee for creation  
of safety zone at Wuhu has been communicated to  
Japanese Ambassador with request for an early reply.  
Sent to Department. Repeated to Nanking, Hankow,  
and Peiping.

sms ... GAUSS  
Shanghai via N R  
Dated December 2, 1937  
Rec'd 7:48 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

793.94/11416

F/FG  
FILED  
DEC 6 1937

CA

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (Gray, Special Gray, A).

NANKING VIA N.R.

FROM

Dated Dec. 2, 1937

Recd 945 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
REC 3-4937  
Department of State  
*OK B*  
*WJ*

793.94

983, December 2, 3 p.m.

FROM ROBERTS FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

"During the last three days two Chinese divisions reported to be the 51st and 62nd passed through Nanking from the front and crossed to Pukow and three or four batteries of 75 mm guns, three batteries of mountain guns, several 105 guns, and at least three 150 mm medium guns also crossed the river. It is probable that these guns came from the artillery school at Tangshan since they arrived from that direction and showed no evidence of recent field use.

(SPECIAL GRAY) At the first air raid warning December 1, 5:50 p.m., 19 low wing pursuit monoplanes of Russian make, said to be Waddell Williams type, got off the local field, circled the city and remained in the air for half an hour until the clear signal sounded. They seemed very fast. (SEE SPECIAL GRAY) (For detailed description see Nanking reports to Navy Department)

(GRAY) December 2, 11:50 a.m., ceiling unlimited, weather cool, hazy large cirrus patches, morning's wind

ten

793.94/11417

FOIA  
EX-103  
1987

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

CA --2--983 from Hanking Dec 2...

ten miles on the ground. According to a Chinese report about eleven Japanese planes appeared of which four were said to be light bombers and the rest pursuit but all flew at very high altitude probably above 15,000 so that identification was impossible from the ground. The air field was bombed twice with respectively about eight and ten bombs, probably 500 pounds. Several Chinese planes just got off the field before the bombing. At 1:00 p.m. about six Japanese pursuit appeared and were engaged by the same number of Chinese. The action was obscured by the haze so that when one plane caught fire and crashed and the pilot bailed out it was impossible to determine which side it belonged to, but the Chinese say it was Japanese and that they also shot down at least two light bombers. Chinese bombing planes had another narrow escape from the field, taking off while Japanese were almost overhead. These Russian bombers are midwing twin motor monoplanes somewhat similar to Boeing but further particulars not yet known."

Sent to Department. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai (END GRAY)

ATCRESCH

SMS EFB

[CONFIDENTIAL]

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (no. 983) of December 2, 1937, from the American Embassy at Nanking quotes a telegram for the Secretary of War from Roberts which reads substantially as follows:

Two Chinese divisions from the front passed through Nanking during the last three days. It is said that they were the sixty-first and sixty-second divisions. They crossed the river to Pukow. Three or four batteries of 75 mm guns crossed the river also, together with several 105 guns, three batteries of mountain guns, and at least three 150 mm medium guns. Since these guns showed no signs of recent field use and came from the direction of Tangshan, it is likely that they came from the artillery school at that place.

Nineteen low wing pursuit monoplanes of Russian make, said to be Waddell Williams type, got off the local field at the first air raid warning on December 1 at 3:30 p.m. They seemed very fast and circled the city, remaining in the air for half an hour until the clear signal sounded. (See Hanking's reports to the Navy Department for detailed description.)

December 2, 11:30 a.m., ceiling unlimited, weather cool, hazy large cirrus patches, morning's wind ten miles on the ground. According to a Chinese report about eleven Japanese planes appeared of which four

were

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

were said to be light bombers and the rest pursuit but all flew at very high altitude probably above 15,000 so that identification was impossible from the ground. The air field was bombed twice with respectively about eight and ten bombs, probably 500 pounds. Several Chinese planes just got off the field before the bombing. At 1:00 p.m. about six Japanese pursuit appeared and were engaged by the same number of Chinese. The action was obscured by the haze so that when one plane caught fire and crashed and the pilot bailed out it was impossible to determine which side it belonged to, but the Chinese say it was Japanese and that they also shot down at least two light bombers. Chinese bombing planes had another narrow escape from the field, taking off while Japanese were almost overhead. These Russian bombers are midwing twin motor monoplanes somewhat similar to Boeing but further particulars not yet known.

793.94/11417  
p.g.c.  
FE:EC:HES  
12-3

*ACB*  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

83-1

FE

CA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Plain

NANKING VIA W. R.

FROM: Dated Dec. 2, 1937

Recd 9:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 3 1937  
Department of State

793.94  
note

993.102 Nankeing  
11406  
934, December 2, 6 p.m.  
979, December 2, 9 a.m.

Please transmit to Father Jacquinot following message  
from International Committee for Nanking safety zone:

"Cordial thanks for your services. Committee appreciates Japanese assurance of endeavor to respect the district as far as consistent with military necessity. We have secured full agreement from Chinese military authorities for exact compliance with original proposal. Committee is therefore proceeding with work of organization and administration in safety zone and informs you refugees already entering. At proper time and after adequate inspection Committee will formally notify both Chinese and Japanese authorities that zone is in operation. Committee would ask you kindly to confer again with Japanese authorities pointing out that direct assurances from them to us would go still further to lessen the anxiety of distressed civilians and respectfully requesting them to give us early notification to that effect. Signed Rabe, Chairman."

Sent to Shanghai. Repeated to Department, Hankow,  
Peiping.  
S S E D

ATCHESON

793.94/11418

F/FG

FILED  
DEC 6 1937

FE

1023 Green Avenue

5 Detroit, Michigan

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
September 21, 1937

Mr. C. Hull  
Secretary of State  
Washington D.C.

NOV 23 1937

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS  
Department of State

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 23 1937  
NOV 23 1937

My Dear Mr. Hull:

November 29 1937

During a class discussion in  
Current Events, in a history class,  
the teacher asked the class "Why Japan  
has not declared war on China  
but continued to fight with her?"  
He then asked me to write to you  
and obtain your view point on  
this topic. I would appreciate it  
very much if you would send  
your answer to this letter to the  
above address as soon as possible.

Thank you.

HEF

\* 793.94 (Dist)

Respectfully yours,  
Marian Frahm

019-FRAHM, MARIAN- 793.94/11419

11419

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 29 1937

In reply refer to  
FE 619 Frahm, Marian

My dear Miss Frahm:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of November 21, 1937, in which you inquire why Japan has not declared war on China.

The question raised in your letter is one which the Department is not in position to answer. You will, I believe, understand that it would be inappropriate and unwise for an official of the United States Government to discuss or attempt to interpret the foreign policy of another government.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

*M. M. Hamilton*  
Maxwell M. Hamilton  
Chief  
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Miss Marian Frahm,  
1023 Green Avenue,  
Detroit, Michigan.

*KSP*  
FE:KFP:HES  
11-29

CR *[initials]*  
NOV 29 1937. PW



793.94/11419

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

937 10 2 AM 11 57


DATE: December 1, 1937

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST.  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND INTERESTS

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Witold Wankowicz, Counselor of Polish Embassy,  
Mr. Ballantine.

COPIES TO:

793.94  
note  
693.002



793.94/11420

Mr. Wankowicz said that he had dropped in to inquire regarding developments in the Far Eastern situation. He referred to the report that in North China the customs tariff had been reduced on a large number of items imported from Japan, and asked whether we had any confirmation. Mr. Ballantine said that we are still awaiting confirmation. In regard to the Shanghai Customs situation, Mr. Wankowicz was told that the Japanese had indicated that they would respect foreign material interests in the customs, but that they would not tolerate interference by third parties in the operations of the customs.

Mr. Wankowicz expressed interest in possible future developments such as Japan's ultimate military objectives beyond

F/FG  
11420

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

beyond Nanking, whether Japan would declare war, whether war between the Soviet Union and Japan was likely, and whether Outer Mongolia was about to play the part of a "Trojan horse" for the Soviet Union, but neither Mr. Wankowicz nor Mr. Ballantine ventured any opinion on these matters.

*M. M. H.*

*JWB*  
FE: JWB: SMJ

FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

84-1

K

3  
RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 - 1937  
Department of State

Left at the Department  
of Mr. J.M.K. Vyvyan of the  
British Embassy at 12:00  
noon, Dec. 1, 1937.

1937 NOV 2 11 3 52

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

December 2 1937  
reply drafted Dec 2  
V.

793.94  
793.102 8

His Majesty's Consul-General at Shanghai reported on the 27th November that the Japanese authorities had demanded that the extra-Settlement areas between the Perimeter and the Western Settlement boundary should be policed by them. The presence of Japanese military police inside the defences of the Perimeter seems likely to give rise to incidents both with foreign troops and with the Chinese population, and is, therefore, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, most inadvisable.

Telegram  
to Tokyo  
Dec. 1

Instructions have accordingly been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo to urge upon the Japanese Government the desirability of allowing the Municipal Council to police the area in question.

Meanwhile it has been learnt that the Municipal Council have reason to think that the Japanese authorities might recognise the Council's right to police the extra-Settlement roads in question, and for this they might consider the employment of the former Chinese police under Japanese control. In the opinion of His Majesty's Consul-General, although this makes the position a little less serious, dangers surrounding the scheme still exist. Strictly speaking it would appear that the Municipal Council should only have the right to police the roads since in normal times the Chinese police the areas between  
the/

793.94/11421

DEC 1 1937

F/FG

84-2

-2-

the roads although in practice it used to be found necessary for both forces to operate on the roads. The Japanese authorities therefore have a colourable claim to police the areas between the roads, but if they do so incidents with the Chinese and with foreigners seem almost certain; there will be a risk of other incidents between the Japanese and British troops, and if the Municipal Council's right to police the roads is not denied, as it is obviously undesirable that it should be, there will probably be difficulties between their police and the Japanese police. There will also probably be a great influx of refugees into the Settlement and consequent additional difficulties will arise for the Settlement authorities.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be glad to learn whether in view of the circumstances outlined above the United States Government would be prepared to instruct their Ambassador at Tokyo to support Sir R. Craigie's representations, by urging the Japanese Government to allow the Municipal Council, for the present at any rate, to police the whole area between the Perimeter and the Western boundary of the Settlement. It is understood that American troops are not directly concerned with the area in question, but on broader ground, which involves the position of the Municipal Council, it is felt that the matter

may/

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

84-3

-3-

may be of interest to the United States Government especially since the same considerations are understood to arise in connection with the desire of the Japanese authorities to occupy certain mills in the American sector in the Settlement.

*Plus*

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.,

December 1st, 1937.

84-4

**AIDE-MÉMOIRE**

The receipt is acknowledged of the British Embassy's aide-mémoire of December 1, 1937, in regard to the polling by the Japanese of the extra-Settlement areas. Note is taken of the British Government's statement that the British Ambassador in Tokyo has been instructed to make representations to the Japanese Government in the matter and of the British Government's inquiry whether the American Government would be prepared to instruct the American Ambassador in Tokyo to take similar action.

The American Government, after giving the matter careful consideration, has reached the conclusion that it is advisable at this stage that an approach be made by the American Consul General at Shanghai rather than by the American Ambassador at Tokyo. The American Government feels that its Consul General at Shanghai, in view of the peculiar character of the problem, and of the Consul General's intimate knowledge of the numerous and intricate

793.94/11421

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Glusky NARS, Date 12-18-75

84-5

-2-

intricate factors involved in that problem, is in a better position than is the American Ambassador at Tokyo to present effectively to the Japanese authorities this Government's views. Accordingly, the American Government has authorized the American Consul General to discuss the matter with his British colleague and to make an informal approach to the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai. The American Government has suggested to its Consul General that, without raising any question of the legalities involved in the Japanese plans, he endeavor to impress upon the Japanese Consul General the advisability of having the Municipal Council police the area in question for the present in order that possible disturbances or incidents may be avoided.

A true copy of  
the signed original  
AW

HRW

Department of State,

Washington,

December 2 1937

CR ✓ 509

DEC 2 1937.PM

AW  
FE:JCV:VCI - 12/2/37

AW  
FE  
m.m./d.

AW  
HRW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMYANGPAT

FROM ~~...~~  
December 3, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFC: SECOND BRIGADE USMC  
YANGPAT  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCPAC

SENT TO  
~~...~~  
AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
REC'D  
Department of State  
1037

COMSOPAT  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSMA PEIPING

793.94

0002. Five Jap bombers raided military air field  
Nanking today. Other river ports quiet. 2305.

JS

793.94/11422

F/FG

FILED  
DEC 6 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

85-1

12

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR

GRAY

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated December 3, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 3 1937  
Department of State

793.94

1074, December 3, 2 p.m.

At about one o'clock today when the Japanese forces were carrying out their ill advised military parade through the Settlement a hand grenade was thrown by a Chinese on Nanking Road. It is reported that one Japanese soldier, one Japanese civilian and two Shanghai Municipal policemen were wounded and that the thrower of the hand grenade was shot and killed by the police. The parade continued and has now cleared Nanking Road and the Bund.

Sent to the Department, Tokyo, Nanking, Hankow and Peiping.

GAUSS

EDM

793.94/11423

FILED  
DEC 11 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

85-2

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

*Gray*  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Washington,

1937 DEC 3 PM 3 18 December 3, 1937.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

SHANGHAI (China) DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

RUSH. **607** / 11423  
Your 1074, December 3, 2 p.m.

Press reports from Shanghai carry sensational items to the effect that following the throwing by a Chinese of a hand grenade Japanese troops immediately seized complete control of the area in which the incident occurred; that the Japanese troops aimed pistols at U.S. marines and British soldiers, pushed foreigners about with rifle butts, set up machine guns, extended the area which they seized until it had entered the U.S. Marine defense area; that hot words were exchanged between the U.S. marines and the Japanese; and that later the Japanese officers began giving the command to withdraw. The press reports state also that four U.S. marines, two of them dispatch riders on motorcycles, were threatened with drawn pistols by Japanese officers; that two truck loads of British soldiers were similarly treated; that a number of foreign civilians were pushed about roughly with rifle butts; and that an American and a British subject were beaten.

Please radio Department as soon as possible a report covering the items mentioned above and adding such further

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

793.94/11423

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

85-3

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State

- 2 - Washington,

particulars as will enable the Department to evaluate the stories in the press.

It would be very helpful to the Department if you could arrange with the correspondents there who make the reports to the press in the United States to show you in confidence copies of their stories, and if you would then radio the Department a statement of the essential facts.

KRw

Thill  
KRw

FE:MMH:EJL

RWA  
FE  
M.M.H.

DEC 2 1237 PM

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quatefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 751.6111/202 Confidential File FOR Tel. # 1693, 9 p.m.

FROM France (Bullitt) DATED December 2, 1937.  
TO NAME 1-1127 670

REGARDING: French and British in agreement that no action to restrain  
Japan in the Far East could be envisaged "unless the  
United States takes full part therein".

Mr. Massigli of the French Foreign Office informed Mr. Wilson -

j

793.94 / 11424

Confidential File  
11424

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR  
...  
AMEMBASSY PEIPING  
AMEMBASSY HANKOW  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

FROM PLAIN, GRAY and SPECIAL GRAY

Canton via N. R.

Dated December 2, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m., 3rd.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 4 1937  
Department of State

793.94

December 2, 4 p.m.

No raiding November thirtieth. December first,  
three planes attacked Canton-Hong Kong Railway at Tongtouha  
and south-bound local train near there. Bridge slightly  
damaged, third class coach and two freight cars damaged;  
fireman reported killed and railway official wounded by  
machine gun fire. Line bombed again in afternoon twelve  
miles further south very slight damage.

This morning a small group of planes flying very high  
dropped about ten bombs at aerodrome and spur line north  
of Canton all reportedly landing in open fields. Tracks  
at Tongtouha also bombed by one plane with no damage.

Mailed Shanghai, Swatow.

LINMELL

DDM

793.94/11425

F/FG  
FILED  
DEC 6 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

44

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

A portion of this telegram Nanking via N. R.  
must be closely paraphrased **FROM**  
before being communicated Dated December 3, 1937  
to anyone. (A)

Rec'd 9:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*paraphrase*  
SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*confidence*  
DIVISION OF  
INVESTIGATIVE AFFAIRS  
*etc*  
*file*  
*my*

985, December 3, 9 a.m.

793.94

FROM ROBERTS FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

"Chinese military source says Kiangyin forts still  
holding out and no Japanese warships yet above the boom.  
Also claims that Chinese forces are behind the Japanese  
in the Kwangteh area thus checking advance of that column.  
Loss of Ithing admitted but no information on the report  
of Japanese at Liyang (END GRAY).

793.94/11426

Reliable source states that during air raids of  
December 2 the Chinese lost three planes although their  
official statement claims no losses.

Local defense digging trenches and erecting entanglements  
on ~~(2)~~ <sup>purple mountain</sup> (2) The 36th Division has arrived to reinforce  
the ~~(2)~~ <sup>model</sup> detachment in the defense of the city and military  
sources say these are the only two divisions in Nanking.

Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

KLP:WWC

EC 6 1937  
RIF/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 985) of December 3, 1937, from the American Embassy at Nanking quotes a message for the Secretary of War from Roberts which reads substantially as follows:

According to a Chinese military source, Kiangyin forts are still holding out and no Japanese warships are yet above the boom. It is claimed, also, that Chinese forces are behind the Japanese in the Kwangteh area thus checking advance of that column. The loss of Ibing is admitted but there is no information on the report of Japanese at Liyang.

It has been learned from a reliable source that, although the Chinese official statement claims no losses during the air raids of December 2, the Chinese lost three airplanes.

The 36th Division has come to strengthen the (?) detachment in defending Nanking and, according to military sources, these are the only two divisions in the city. The local defense is digging trenches and preparing entanglements on (?) (?).

793.94/11426

*egc*  
FE:EGC

*ADP*  
FE

XII-3-37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-1

~~FE~~

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

MM

Nanking via N.R.

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A).

Dated December 3, 1937

FROM Rec'd. 6am.

Secretary of State  
Washington, D.C.

*Paraphrase*  
**COPIES SENT TO**  
**O.N.I. AND M.I.D.**  
*attach*  
*confidence*

*2B*  
Division  
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 3 1937  
*W*  
*TA*  
*MS*

*793.94*  
*note*  
*193.94-19*

PRIORITY.

986, December 3, 11am.

Embassy's 982, <sup>11409</sup> December 2, noon and 978, December

1, 3pm.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

One. Hsu Mo, political Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Counsellor of German Embassy accompanied ~~Trautmann~~ here and left with him for Hankow at midnight last night after conferring with Chiang Kai Shek. We are reliably informed that (one) proposals communicated to Chiang by German Ambassador were in general as set forth in our 978; (two) Chiang's reply was substantially as indicated in our 982 and, (three) Chiang has taken the position that (a) any negotiations must be undertaken with the Chinese Foreign Office, (b) he will not recognize any settlement which violates his stipulation concerning sovereignty and, (c) in event of such settlement he will continue with his troops to resist the Japanese.

Two. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo.

CSB

ATCHESON

793.94/11427

DEC 7 - 1937  
FILED

F/FG

86-2

Strictly Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 986) of December 3, 1937, from the Secretary in charge of the American Embassy at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

The Secretary of the Embassy refers to the Embassy's telegrams No. 978 of December 1, 1937, and No. 982 of December 2, 1937, with regard to the German Ambassador's recent visit to Nanking, and reports that, according to reliable information received by the Embassy, the peace proposals communicated by the German Ambassador to General Chiang Kai-shek were substantially as stated in the Embassy's telegram of December 1 referred to above, and the Generalissimo's reply was about as set forth in the Embassy's telegram of December 2 referred to above. The position taken by Chiang Kai-shek is reliably reported to be that negotiations must be taken up with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that any settlement violating his stipulation in regard to sovereignty will not be recognized by him, and that should such a settlement be made he and his armed forces will continue to resist the Japanese.

The Counselor of the German Embassy (Hsu Mo) and the Chinese Political Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, who accompanied the German Ambassador to Nanking, after conferring with the Generalissimo, left for Hankow with the Ambassador at midnight on December 2.

*ARR*  
FE:ARR:NN

*hdy*  
FE

793.94/11427

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

87-1

*JWB*

*K*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

GRAY

FROM

Tokyo

Dated December 3, 1937

Rec'd. 6:55am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

589, December 3, 1pm.

One.

Our 588, December 2, 4pm, was sent after checking with the British Embassy, which also received from the Foreign Office the assurance set forth in last sentence of our telegram under reference.

Two. The papers this morning carry a report from Shanghai to the effect that a demonstration march of Japanese troops will be held at noon today through the International and French Settlements. The Foreign Office, in reply to an inquiry which we immediately made, insists that nothing has been received on this subject from the Consul General at Shanghai subsequent to the report on the basis of which we were assured yesterday that plans to send Japanese troops into the neutral areas had been abandoned.

Three. We urged that instructions be sent countermanding orders for the march, but the Foreign Office expressed doubt whether any effective action could be taken.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 3 1937  
Department of State

793.94

11408

793.94/11428

DEC 14 1937

F/FG

u

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

87-2

mm 589, December 3, 1pm, from Tokyo. -2-

taken. I let the Foreign Office know that, if this demonstration is held, another example would be offered of discrepancies between the statements of the Foreign Office and the actions of the Japanese military. My British colleague is making similar representations.

Repeated to Shanghai.

GREW

KLP  
GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIVISION OF  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 1937  
JMS

file  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 - 1937  
Department of State  
B  
MS

~~FE~~  
~~EC~~  
~~DCR~~

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The following information has been received from the Assistant  
Naval Attache at Nanking under date of 30 November, 1937:

793.94

The raid which was previously postponed because  
of unpreparedness is now planned for the first  
favorable day. Number of planes and personnel  
for proposed missions have not been disclosed.  
Soviet Military Attache has departed for Hankow  
after having a short conference and Soviet sailors  
are now on strictly mercenary basis. New Chinese  
bombing planes are reported to be faster than any  
Japanese class. Total number in this region is  
still small and the large losses previously reported  
to be enroute to Lanchow is now disclaimed.

793.94/11429

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

DEC 8 - 1937  
FILED

11429

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

88-1

~~A-11~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Memorandum of Conversation  
A-W

DATE:  
November 28, 1937.

SUBJECT: The Far Eastern Situation.

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Kojiro Matsukata and Mr. Wilson.

COPIES TO: S, U and FE.



793.94/11430

Mr. Kojiro Matsukata, son of old Prince Matsukata, called on the telephone and asked to come and see me. I had known Mr. Matsukata in Tokyo in connection with the fact that he was a graduate of Yale.

Mr. Matsukata told me that he was not sent by his Government, that he had not, in fact, discussed with Mr. Hirota what he would say when he came to America. On the other hand, he had given Mr. Hirota opportunity to explain his, Mr. Hirota's, views and had given the same opportunity to the Chiefs of the Army and Navy and other high officials in Japan. As a result of this, he felt able to express Japan's general interest although it must be understood that he was speaking only for Mr. Matsukata and not for the Japanese Government. Again he emphasized

FORM 1-1936

FILED

DEC 6 1937

11430

88-2

2

emphasized, however, that the Japanese Government was fully aware of what he was about to say.

The Japanese Government want, by all means, to stop this fighting and it has already gone much further than was expected; almost accidentally the thing got under way, gained momentum and tempo; the Japanese themselves are shocked at the magnitude of the affair; it is fearfully costly to keep up this struggle; at the same time they are injuring their best customer; hence, they hope to be able to get into negotiation with China.

How to bring this about: Mr. Matsukata says that all hands are agreed that the United States is the country to bring it about; this must be done without England and in the form of "good offices"; he insisted again and again on the dislike of England which reigns in Japan at present.

Turning to the form of "good offices", he feels that Mr. Grew and Mr. Johnson should approach the two governments offering good offices to bring representatives of the two governments together so that the talk between China and Japan can be "direct"; this does not exclude the representative of a friendly third power, notably the United States in the person of Mr. Grew, from sitting with the negotiators as observer and using friendly means to get the two parties into harmony; this, according to Mr. Matsukata, would not be "intervention" and  
would

88-3

3

would be "direct negotiations."

I said that he could not expect me to give any more than a personal opinion, both because he was expressing his own opinion only and because I would have to consult my superior officers on a matter of this kind even if it came officially. Here, however, was my personal opinion. I could well understand that Japan wanted now to stop this war; it must be a frightful expense; it must be disagreeable to be carrying on a campaign against the moral judgment of the world; it must give anxiety to thoughtful people in Japan to see a struggle of this sort with Japan's best customer, a struggle which will build up in China a generation of hatred, as well as destroying their purchasing power for years. Furthermore, I felt, and I thought most thoughtful people in the world would agree with me, that the time had gone by when a nation could hold in subjection alien populations; the growth of the newspapers, of the radio, of other forms of communication was such that any attempt to subjugate might well mean the destruction of the nation which attempted it; these were the thoughts that led me to think that it was natural that Japan should want to come to a halt in the proceedings.

There were further considerations - Japan had pushed back the Chinese armies around Shanghai; they had penetrated deeply in north China; there was no longer any question of "face". Here Mr. Matsukata interrupted and said that this was just the  
moment

88-4

4

mement when "face" could be saved for both parties; with the Japanese entering Nanking Chiang would lose face; the Japanese did not want Chiang to lose face; they wanted him to maintain a unified China; he was a reasonable man and they could deal with him. Mr. Matsukata apologized for interrupting and asked me to continue.

I said that I personally had a lot of doubts as to whether we could make an offer of good offices, we were bound by the Nine Power Treaty and it would seem to me difficult for us to suggest that China agree to an armistice for the purpose of entering into negotiations unless we were convinced that Japan was willing to negotiate a peace consistent with the Nine Power Treaty. I said it would be to assume a heavy responsibility for us to urge China to lay down its arms in a truce under conditions in which Japan could dictate an onerous peace.

Mr. Matsukata replied that in the first place he was convinced that Japan had no idea of being unreasonable, but that certainly the longer the war went on, the more chance there was of unreasonable elements getting control; second, he said what was to prevent Mr. Grew suggesting the idea of good offices to Mr. Hirota, on condition that Mr. Hirota could satisfy him that the terms to be offered China were reasonable and generous.

Mr. Matsukata then reemphasized the necessity for urgent  
action

88-5

5

action, if possible, before the fall of Nanking.

During the course of the conversation I asked him what his plans were. He said he was staying in Washington some days and would consider it a great honor if Mr. Hull would receive him. He made no specific request for an interview and I did not encourage him in this respect as I feel that an overture for an interview with the Secretary should be made by Saito.

Hugh R. Wilson.

A-W HRW/AB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 811.5034 China/430 FOR Tel.#1060-9am.

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED Dec.2,1937  
#611 NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: The Possible Closing Down of the CHINA PRESS,  
by Japanese authorities: The Japanese Consul  
General asked Mr. Gauss what position he would  
take if Japanese authorities desired to close  
down this American incorporated, but almost entirely  
Chinese owned, English language newspaper. Mr. Gauss  
stated he would be under the necessity of protesting,  
and suggested such an issue be avoided.

fpg

793.94/11431

11431

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

JR

SPECIAL MAIL

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated December 2, 1937

Rec'd 7:20 a.m.

*note  
793.94*

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1060, December 2, 9 a.m.

In conversation yesterday afternoon the Japanese Consul General asked me what position I would take if the Japanese authorities desired to close down the CHINA PRESS an American incorporated but almost entirely Chinese owned English language newspaper. I replied that as the company is incorporated under the laws of one of the States of the United States I would be under the necessity of protesting. I inquired whether the paper as at present published is objectionable to the Japanese. He did not know. I suggested that in view of the power of the press it would be desirable to avoid a difficult issue by attempting to close down an American incorporated newspaper, particularly if its present attitude is not objectionable.

*811.5034 China/430*

GAUSS

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

89-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Hankow via N. R.

Dated December 3, 1937

Rec'd 1:04 p.m.

793.94  
note  
793.94119  
762.93

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 1937  
Department of State

14, December 3, 4 p.m.

Mr. Tuan of Foreign Office called today under instructions from Minister of Foreign Affairs to inform me that the Chinese Government had accepted in principle an offer by the German Government of good offices in present Sino-Japanese matter. He referred to fact that China from beginning had been ready to accept good offices of third power and anxious to settle outstanding questions with Japan by peaceful means; that Nine Power Conference was itself in the nature of good offices; and that although the Nine Power Conference was legally still in existence it had adjourned and China had therefore accepted German offer. He expressed ignorance as to whether German Ambassador had been advised of Japanese terms. Other missions also informed.

Repeated to Peiping, Nanking. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

793.94/11432

FILED  
F/EG  
DEC 8 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

89-2

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

Department of State

Charge to

Washington,

1937 DEC 3 PM 6 35

December 3, 1937.

793.94/11432

THE PRESIDENT,  
AT SEA.

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

7 pm

4 We have heard nothing further on the question of a  
declaration of war by Japan.

✓ On the contrary, Ambassador Johnson telegraphs that  
an official of the Foreign Office called on him today  
under instruction from the Chinese Minister for Foreign  
Affairs to say that the Chinese Government had accepted  
in principle an offer by the German Government of good  
offices. The caller expressed ignorance as to whether  
the German Ambassador to China had been advised of Japa-  
nese terms. ¶ On December 1 the German Ambassador accom-  
panied by the Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs  
left Hankow for Nanking, where the Ambassador conferred  
with Chiang Kai-shek. The German Ambassador left Nanking  
for Hankow at midnight last night.

344

793.94/11432

~~Cordell Hull~~

F/MR

FE:MMH:NN

FE  
m.m.d

up

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FROM PLAIN AND GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

AMEMBASSY HANKOW

Dated December 3, 1937

Rec'd 1:38 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS

1937

State

793.94  
note  
893 6351

802, December 3, 6 p.m.

Embassy's 789, November 27, 5 p.m.

One. Japanese authorities continue to give no information with regard to the military situation along the Peiping-Hankow Railway and in Shansi. Reliable reports continue to be received which indicate that the Japanese military control only a narrow zone along that railway, that groups of Chinese troops occupy towns and cities outside that zone, and that there are frequent minor clashes in and near the zone. These informed believe the situation in Shansi is even less favorable to the Japanese and their belief is supported by admissions made by Japanese.

Two. According to a Japanese report, a "Shansi Federated Government" was established yesterday at Taiyuanfu.

Three. Reliable information as to progress of plans for regime for North China continues to be lacking.

Four

793.94/11433

DEC 11 1937

F/AFED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #802, December 3, 6 p.m., from Peiping via N. R.

Four. According to a press report from Kalgan, the regime at Kalgan has confiscated the Lungyen iron mines on the grounds that they are the property of the National Government. The report adds that the Mongolian Border Districts Federated Committee (see above mentioned telegram) has asked the Hsingchung (China Development) Company at Tsintsin to operate the mines. Such operation seems improbable at present. According to the report, some sixty thousand tons of iron ore are now in storage and the Hsingchung Company has arranged transportation. This also seems improbable.

Repeated to the Ambassador. By courier to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

WVC:CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

90-1

EE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FROM GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated December 3, 1937

Rec'd 1:15 p.m.

793.94  
note  
893.102

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.L.D.

Division of  
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 31 1937  
Department of State

1073, December 3, midnight.

Your number 598 / 11325 / December 1, 7 p.m.

Your suggestion regarding temporary police arrangements for areas on both sides Extra Settlement roads within the foreign defence lines was made here in the concise form that the foreign forces should receive such municipal police assistance for the time being in protecting and insuring order in their sectors. The Japanese objected, maintaining that the municipal police have no authority whatsoever to function off the roads.

At meeting on November 27th of senior naval, military, consular, and municipal authorities it was agreed that the military commanders should discuss the matter with General Harada while interested Consuls General approached the Japanese Consul General.

The military commanders saw General Harada and learned from him that arrangements are being made by the Japanese for an adequate police force to be sent to Shanghai to police

793.94/11434

DEC 11 1937

FILED

F/FG

90-2

-2- #1073, DECEMBER 3, midnight from Shanghai via N. R.

police areas heretofore policed by the Government of greater Shanghai. It was stated that these police had to be trained and that there was no intention of policing the western extension areas until the outside areas had been opened up and conditions were sufficiently normal for troops to be withdrawn from the perimeter. It was stated that these arrangements would take time and due warning would be given.

In view of the foregoing the Consuls General took no further action but the subject came up in an informal discussion I had with the Japanese Consul General on the morning of November 28th before the military commanders had met and I earnestly urged a friendly arrangement. Please see my number ~~438~~<sup>1138</sup> / <sub>1038</sub> November 29, 8 p.m.

No further action appears to be necessary or desirable at this time. Repeated to Tokyo.

GAUSS

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

91-1

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department

Department of State

Charge to  
\$

Washington.

December 4, 1937.

This cable was sent in confidential Code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone. A

793.94

AMERICAN CONSUL,  
SHANGHAI (China).

1 p.m.

RUSH. 613

(GRAY)

Press reports from Shanghai continue to be of a sensational character. For instance, Hallett Abend's article in today's New York Times under Shanghai date line December 4 states that:

QUOTE Colonel Price made a peremptory demand for the immediate removal of all Japanese soldiers, sentries and barricades from the American defense sector, threatening that if the Japanese did not instantly comply his marines would clear them out. With many apologies, the Japanese commander gave hurried orders and in ten minutes all encroachments into the American sector were withdrawn. UNQUOTE. (END GRAY)

Reports of this character and of the character of the press report that the Japanese threw the American flag into the river (see Department's 593, November 30, 7 p.m.) cause great misapprehension in the United States. It would therefore be very helpful if you could arrange with the correspondents there who make the reports to the press in the United States to show you in confidence copies of their stories, and if you

keep you apprized as far as possible of what they are sending.

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

793.94/11434A

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

91-2

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

would then radio me a statement of the essential and  
official facts in regard to items likely to create  
misapprehension and embarrassment here.

Hull  
WRW

✓  
CRW  
DEC 4 1937

FE:MMH:EJL

FE  
m.m.H.

Ci  
m.g.l.

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Telephone, PLAZA 3-4700

Cable, INFABEL, New York

AMERICAN COUNCIL  
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

*JHS*  

---

*DCR*

OFFICERS

CARL L. ALSBERG, *Chairman*  
WALLACE M. ALEXANDER, *Vice-Chairman*  
MISS ADA L. COMSTOCK, *Vice-Chairman*  
FREDERICK V. FIELD, *Secretary*  
CHARLES J. RHOADS, *Treasurer*  
MISS HILDA AUSTERN, *Assistant Treasurer*

129 EAST 52D STREET · NEW YORK CITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
DEC 5 1937  
Division of  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
2 - 1937  
Department of State  
*file*  
*JHS*  
*103*

December 1, 1937.

Dear Mr. Hamilton,

11403

I am most grateful to you for the suggestions concerning the manuscript America and the Far Eastern War, conveyed with your letter of November 30th. Some of the suggested corrections I am now unfortunately unable to make because the printing of the pamphlet is already far advanced, but I appreciate very much this help which you have very kindly given us.

Sincerely yours,

*Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr.*  
Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr.

Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D.C.

793.94711435

DEC 3 1937

FILED

F/EG 11/35

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY  
ADMINISTERED BY TUFTS COLLEGE WITH THE COOPERATION OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY  
EDWIN GINN LIBRARY

MEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS



*Oct 30 1937*  
*3mc*  
October 28, 1937



793.94

Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton, Chief  
Far Eastern Division  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C.

793.94/11436

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

There are quite a number of people in these parts, some organized, who do not like the trouble that public opinion is giving in connection with the Far Eastern situation. On the initiative of some of them, I have drafted a statement calculated to turn several corners of the present mental set-up.

I enclose a copy of it, simultaneously with sending it to those who will actively sponsor its multiple signing, for your information and with the hope that I have been moderately successful in expressing useful ideas.

Sincerely yours,

*Henry & Myers*

M/  
Enc.

NOV 2 1937

FILED

11436

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The confusion in the American public mind with respect to the situation in the Far East should be a matter of primary concern to all good citizens and should be brought to an end for the good of the country as quickly as may be. In the hope of contributing to this desired clarification, the undersigned address this letter to all of our representatives in Congress and to all other officers of the Federal Government who can now influence the policy of the United States.

In the American mind, two things are as clear as crystal:

1) The Japanese government under the influence of an overweening ambition, fostered by an unfettered military regime, is engaged in an unjustified and irresponsibly ruthless campaign to alienate large territories belonging to the Chinese Republic and to overturn the only Chinese government which has been able to unify the Chinese people in a program of progress and fundamental development.

2) The American people, desiring nothing that does not belong to them of right and more deeply imbued than ever with the determination to maintain friendly international relations, are deeply opposed to war and the war system and are so determined to avoid its consequences for themselves that they are sincerely averse to seeing the United States Government take any action that might seem to defeat those wishes.

We discuss these two conditions in the light of developing events in order to draw constructive conclusions from them as to the true direction of American polity.

No authentic voice in the United States has questioned, or can question, the statement of principles issued by the Secretary of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

State on July 16 and its application to the Far Eastern situation on August 23. In those two pronouncements, made on behalf of the government and people of the United States and formally communicated to the whole civilized world, the United States records that "there can be no serious hostilities anywhere in the world which will not, one way or another, affect interests or rights or obligations of this country". Those principles were derived from and embodied in treaties to which the United States is a party, among which were specifically mentioned the Briand-Kellogg pact and the so-called 9-power treaty with reference to China.

On October 6 the United States government again spoke the evident conviction of the American people and, in a statement confirming the conclusion of most other governments, asserted that "the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relations between nations", and is contrary to the principles of those two treaties. In consequence of that decision, the United States is meeting with the representatives of other governments to consider as a matter of vital interest how to prevent the action of Japan from jeopardizing the "immediate or future security" of each and all of them.

It is apparent that the posture of events in the Far East makes it eminently desirable that Chinese power of resistance should not be weakened, and that this can best be done through the extension of aid to China rather than by intervention in the hostilities. In the presence of force, we all are too prone to assume that a reaction in kind is called for. No such conclusion is justified from the conditions under which the meeting at Brussels is taking place. Sanctions are the last, and not the first, resort of a

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Qualen NARS, Date 12-18-75

single system of international organization and any discussion of the Brussels meeting in those terms is unreal. That meeting is intended to provide the physical opportunity for the "full and frank communication" required by the so-called 9-power treaty. Its mediatory functions are unrestricted by procedure. Its mere convening is an outright denial of the Japanese contention that Sino-Japanese relations are exclusively the concern of Japan. The governments participating at Brussels, including that of the United States, could not in good conscience and sound policy do otherwise than thus assert their right to do what they can to see that the relations between China and Japan are reestablished upon a basis of equity or agreement instead of upon the unilateral will of an untrustworthy militarism.

The only safe predictions or hopes which should be indulged in with respect to that meeting are, first, that it will confirm the existing unity of purpose to restore peace in the Far East on appropriate conditions and, second, that it will uphold the incontestable right of the Chinese people to administer their country under a government of their own selection. Can it be doubted that, if Japan declines to participate, our own and other countries should make it physically possible for the Chinese people to realize this fundamental necessity?

There is nothing in the present situation that is inconsistent with the peace purposes of the American government or people. These purposes are, however, widely misinterpreted and occasionally grossly misunderstood. Peace is not, and never can be, attained by means of abstract assertions or the mere avoidance of consequences. Supineness in the face of unjustifiable conditions does harm rather than service to the cause of peace. The true basis of peace is the intelligent management of international affairs in

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

accordance with the best-attested standards of public action.

The extent, vigor and validity of peace principles all grow out of the interdependence of modern life. It is entirely nugatory to build a conception of international law and order upon a foundation of interdependence and then to declare the system bankrupt in the face of events that jeopardize it. Despite any appearances to the contrary, the American people have not so hamstrung their common sense.

Therefore, believing that we have fairly analysed the current position, we call upon all our fellow citizens and especially those in public life to support every effort that it may prove possible for our government to make to (1) contribute to the restoration of peace in the Far East by mediation or (2) insure that the Chinese people should not be driven to their knees by Japanese militarism for lack of materials with which to maintain their resistance.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*D CR  
file  
mmh.*

October 30, 1937.

My dear Mr. Myers:

I have your letter of October 28 enclosing a copy of a statement which you have drafted in regard to the Far Eastern situation. I have not as yet had time to read the statement but look forward to doing so over the week-end. I thank you for your courtesy in bringing it to my attention.

With all good wishes, I am,

Yours sincerely,

*M. D. Gustafson*

Mr. Denys P. Myers,  
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,  
Medford, Massachusetts.

MMH:ZMK

795.94/11456

F/MR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

JR

CINCAF

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

DECEMBER 5, 1937

Rec'd 1:45 p.m.

FROM

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE  
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARPLEHE AD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

Division of  
FAB EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 4 1937  
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

0003. Military situation unchanged. Japanese claim slow progress on entire line, advance now believed have reached Tanyang Liyang Kwangteh line and within ten miles Hangchow. Japanese planes acting bombing lines Chinkiang Nanking yesterday, today. Flight Chinese planes raided Woosung area yesterday during Japanese march through settlement; Chinese threw hand grenades wounded three Japanese soldiers one Japanese civilian two municipal police. Chinese was shot by municipal police, investigation being conducted. Japanese troops now occupy Nanking Road between Kwangsi Yu Yaching Roads, state troops will be withdrawn upon completion investigation. Said no desire use incident make demands on settlement authorities 1500 Japanese troops extended guards from Nanking Road 500 yards on Bubbling Well Road into American section, withdrew these after protest. 1943.

CSB

*12*

793.94/ 11437

DEC 6 1937  
F/FG  
FILED

92-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

*Paraphrase sent to Peking, Tokyo, London,  
& Paris*

JR  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (A)

FROM Rome

*Dec. 13*

Dated December 3, 1937

Rec'd 2:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*Paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*3mc*

*V. J. [unclear]*  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 4 1937  
Department of State  
*[initials]*

499, December 3, 5 p.m.

Viscount Ishii, who is on his way to London to  
explain the Japanese viewpoint, had a conversation  
yesterday with my British colleague who is an old friend  
of his from Geneva days. I am forwarding by pouch a  
copy of Lord Perth's memorandum of this conversation which  
includes the following points.

(1) While Chiang Kai Shek had been strongly anti-  
Communist and had been successful in ridding the  
provinces near Nanking of red elements a number of  
his advisers were thoroughly sympathetic to the Communist  
theories and unfriendly to the Christian General and the  
Young Marshal Chiang Tso Lin *Hsueh Liang* when Chiang Kai Shek was  
the prisoner of the Young Marshal a part of the agreement  
with regard to the former's release was that there should  
be cooperation with the Communists against Japan. Chiang  
Kai Shek being an honorable man had performed his part of  
the bargain although he himself does not believe in  
communism. Communist theories on the other hand are likely

to

793.94/11438

FILED

DEC 8 1937

F/EG

92-2

-2- #499, December 3, 5 p.m., from Rome.

to attract Chinese peasants because of their eagerness to possess land.

Two. With regard to internal economic and financial difficulties there were two problems: (a) How to provide for the continuing increase in Japan's population, and (b) Where to export Japanese manufactured goods and obtain the needed raw materials. As a result of difficulties in obtaining raw materials abroad Japan had decided that she must secure such material in China and it was therefore essential for Japan to lease territory as well as to cultivate raw materials especially cotton, in North China. If the Japanese needs along these lines could be met there should be no reason why a satisfactory settlement could not be arranged which would give full consideration to foreign interests in China. Japan had no desire for territorial annexations but only needed raw materials produced on lands leased through the medium of companies set up with Chinese and Japanese capital. Chiang Kai Shek knew of the Japanese terms as regards North China but could not meet them because of popular sentiment.

Three. Japan could NEVER be a Fascist state since Fascist theories are entirely opposed to the Imperial nature of the constitution of Japan.

PHILLIPS

KLP:CSB

[CONFIDENTIAL]

92-3

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 499) of December 3, 1937, from the American Embassy at Rome reads substantially as follows:

On December 2 the British Ambassador, who is an old friend of Viscount Ishii from Geneva days, had a conversation with the Viscount who is en route to London to explain the Japanese viewpoint. The American Ambassador is sending to the Department by mail a copy of Lord Perth's memorandum of this conversation. The following points are included in the conversation:

(a) A number of General Chiang Kai-shek's advisers were unfriendly to the Christian general and the young Marshal (Chang Hsueh-liang) and were thoroughly sympathetic to the communist theories, although Chiang Kai-shek had been very anti-communist and had succeeded in driving the red elements out of the provinces near Nanking. A part of the agreement in connection with General Chiang Kai-shek's release at the time he was held prisoner by the young Marshal was that there should be cooperation with the communists against Japan. Although General Chiang did not believe in communism himself he, being an honorable man, carried out his part of the agreement. On the other hand, Chinese peasants, on account of their eagerness to possess land, are likely to be attracted by communist theories.

(b)

793.94/11438

92-4

-2-

(b) It would never be possible for Japan to be a Fascist state as Fascist theories are opposed entirely to the imperial nature of Japan's constitution.

(c) There were two problems in regard to internal financial and economic difficulties: (1) How to provide for Japan's continually increasing population and (2) where to obtain needed raw materials and export Japan's manufactured goods. Because of difficulties in obtaining the necessary raw materials abroad the Japanese had decided that they must secure such material in China. It was essential, therefore, that Japan lease territory as well as cultivate cotton and other raw materials in North China. Japan only needed raw materials raised on lands leased through the medium of companies set up with Japanese and Chinese capital and Japan had no desire for territorial annexations. If Japanese needs along the above-mentioned lines could be met there should be no reason why it would not be possible to arrange a satisfactory settlement which would give full consideration to foreign interests in China. Although the Japanese terms with regard to North China were known to Chiang Kai-shek he was not able to meet them because of popular sentiment.

793.94/11438  
a.j.c.  
FE:EC:HES  
12-6

ACR

93-1

FE

LMS  
This telegram must be **TELEGRAM RECEIVED** Hankow *Shown to Major Mayer Dec. 4*  
closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)  
Dated December 3, 1937  
FROM Rec'd 2:37 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

12, December 3, 2 p. m.  
My 11, <sup>11414</sup> DECEMBER 2, 2 p. m.



NOTE  
793.9419

In confidential conversation this morning H. H. Kung discredited the theory that the German Ambassador has gone to General Chiang as the messenger or at the instigation of Italy. He said that the recognition of Manchukuo has definitely eliminated Italy from among those nations trusted by China. (There is an apparently reliable report that all Italian aviation advisers are to be dismissed) Kung thought that Japan selected Germany and not Italy as its present emissary knowing that Italy would be regarded with distrust. I asked Kung what the reaction of the Chinese leaders would be to the proposals conveyed by the German Ambassador. He replied promptly that this would depend on the attitude of the American Government toward the Sino-Japanese conflict and he asked me in turn whether I would advise China to treat with Japan stressing that he wanted my opinion not (repeat not) as a diplomat but as his friend and a friend of China. I said that I did not know what terms Japan was offering and in general had

no

793.94/11439

F/FG

4

93-2

LMS 2-No. 12, December 3, 2 p. m., from Hankow.

no adequate basis for an opinion. To my relief he did not inform me what terms are being offered. I remarked that Great Britain and France having oriental possessions would naturally be very interested in possible terms of settlement of the present conflict and I inquired what Kung knew concerning their attitude. He admitted that the two nations named would feel a keen interest in the specific terms of settlement but he insisted that the interests of the United States were as closely involved as those of other nations if not more so; he made certain statements which I did not attempt to refute, viz. that the Japanese are by nature and tradition a fighting race, that it is their ambition to utilize the man power and natural resources of China in furtherance of schemes of military expansion, that a Japanese victory would be a victory of military despotism over peace-loving democracy, that China in this sense was fighting the common battle of international security and morality, that further enhancement of Japanese military power would disturb the equilibrium in the Pacific area and would expose even the United States to danger of incursion in the future, that every victory of imperialism like that of Italy over Ethiopia and Japan in Manchukuo further imperiled the peace of the world and that no nation could isolate itself from the consequences

93-3

LMS 3-No. 12, December 3, 2 p. m., from Hankow.

consequences of a rule of predatory militarism. He made the interesting statement that even before the final Japanese victory at Shanghai the Japanese made several tentative approaches to the Chinese for cessation of hostilities and he strongly inferred from the present renewal of these approaches that the Japanese are anxious to terminate their present costly venture. He expressed the conviction that the present moment would be most favorable for some sort of international demonstration of overhauling Japan. He said that a similar favorable moment had occurred during the course of the Nine Power Conference at Brussels ~~at Brussels~~ but that the lack of any concrete result from the Conference had given renewed courage to Japan. I made the remark that from the very beginning it had been beyond the bounds of possibility that the United States would go to war against Japan either alone or in concert with other nations. Kung replied that no Chinese expected the United States to fight their battles but he insisted that it would be sufficient to halt Japan's scheme of conquest if the leading democratic nations of the world would make some gesture such as issuing preliminary mobilization orders to their fleets or affording China assistance in money or war materials and he

urged

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quastrom NARS, Date 12-18-75

93-4

LMS 4-No. 12, Dec. 3, 2 p. m., from Hankow.

urged that such an act at this moment would save the necessity of far greater expenditure at a later date when Japan's military power had been expanded and enhanced. He said that the United States held the key to the situation because Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union had all signified their readiness to take some step on China's behalf but refused to do so until they were positive the United States would take similar action, their reason being that without the cooperation of the United States no measures could possibly be effective. He urged that the United States should not abdicate from its position of leadership in support of international justice and democracy. He said that in expressing these views his position with respect to his colleagues in the Government was delicate because foreign affairs did not fall within his province but he had had the great privilege of becoming acquainted with the President and the Secretary of State and he would be grateful if his views might be communicated to them.

My estimate of the situation is that while the Chinese are being subjected to a terrific strain by the necessity of conducting military operations on a scale for which they were not prepared, nevertheless, they are encouraged to think that the Japanese are doubtful of

reaping

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

93-5

LMS 5-No. 12, December 3, 2 p. m., from Hankow,  
21 3 1939

reaping benefits commensurate with the cost and that this with the possibility, even though it be remote, that the Soviet Union may take advantage of Japan's preoccupation in China may make Japan's terms of settlement milder as the conflict is protracted. It seems probable that the Kuangsi leaders and the Communists would refuse to be a party to a surrender.

Repeated to Tokyo, by mail to Peiping.

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quatefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

**FE**

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

LMS

COMSOPAT

FROM  
DECEMBER 3, 1937

Rec'd 7:30 p. m.

ACTION: OPIAV WASHINGTON  
INFO: 2nd MARIBRID USMC  
COMDESRON 5  
COMSUBRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

COPIES SENT TO  
~~CINLAND M.I.D.~~

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 4 1937  
Department of State

0103 South China ports quiet 2000

SMS:EMB

793.94

793.94/11440

DEC 8 1937

RECEIVED

F/EG

94-1

Fe

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

SMS

GRAY

FROM Nanking via N R

Dated December 3, 1937

Rec'd 7:11 p.m.

793.94  
note nanking  
893.102

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 4 1937  
Department of State

939, December 3, 2 p.m.

One. The Mayor and Minister of Health and former Commissioner of Police have left. Police are now nominally headed by deputy defence commander whose headquarters will be some distance from the city. Arrangements for the administration, policing and provisioning of safety zone are going forward. It is obvious that the Chinese authorities are anxious for the scheme to assume concrete form and they are providing police, funds and large supplies of rice. Daily meetings of foreigners and Chinese officials continue.

Two. A number of police have run away but the city is still orderly and certain troops have been designated to maintain order among passing or other soldiers. Cases of occupation of private property by soldiers have been promptly handled by the defence commander's

793.94/11441

DEC 8 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

94-2

sms 2 - No. 989, December 3, 2 p.m. from Nanking.

commander's headquarters. City gates are being  
barricaded but three remain partially open: Chungshan,  
Yichiang to the Bund and the south gate to Wuhu.

Three. Sent to the Department. Repeated to  
Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON.

sms

emb

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

JS

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

Gray  
NANKING Via N.R.

FROM ~~ed~~ December 3, 1937

Rec'd 3:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*zmc*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 4 1937  
Department of State  
*WWS*

990, December 3, 3 p.m.

FROM ROBERTS FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

"December 3, 10 a.m. On emergency raid signal about 12 Chinese pursuit (#) flew off southwest and had not returned by 1 p.m. At that hour ceiling unlimited, weather cool, very hazy, some cirrus, five mile southwest wind, two Japanese heavy bombers newer type and one plane of similar design but a little smaller which may have been reconnaissance flew from southeast at ten thousand directly over the Embassy northwest to the river then turned southeast and departed without bombing. Anti-aircraft very accurate and somewhat close, it was surprising there were no hits.

At 1:25 p.m. four large bombers at about eight thousand very indistinct in the haze bombarded the airfield and went off south. Almost immediately afterwards approximately six light bombers from the east circled over the city and from west to east dive bombed arsenal airfield area coming down to not lower than six thousand. Only when they dived were they visible even through field glasses. During this raid

795.94/11442

REC'D  
DEC 9 1937

F/E G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

JS

-2-  
From Nanking, #990.

raid there was no antiaircraft fire probably on account of poor visibility. Apparently the Chinese pursued were first drawn away, the objective was then reconnoitred and bombed. Damage unknown."

Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

GW WWC

#-apparent omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

95-1

FE

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

sms

FROM GRAY AND, SPECIAL GRAY

Shanghai via N R

Dated December 3, 1937

Rec'd 7:22 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 4 1937  
Department of State

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.J.D.

1081, December 3, 5 p.m.

Reference to my No. 1074, / 11423 December 3, 2 p.m.

Following the incident this afternoon the Japanese military now controlled approximately 25 city blocks in the crowded Nanking road area of the Settlement and prevented all movement or traffic. Some of their sentries were extended into the American sector but withdrawn after representations by the Commanding Officer, Fourth United States Marines.

The Japanese Embassy spokesman at the press conference this evening is reported to have made the astounding statement that the Japanese authorities are confident the Municipal Council "will not shirk its responsibility".

This incident completely confirms the opinion repeatedly expressed that the Japanese forces should

not

793.94/11443

FE G

95-2

sms 2 - No. 1081, December 3, 5 p.m. from Shanghai

not enter the areas south of the Creek. The most elaborate precautions were taken by the municipal authorities to prevent any incident. Japanese military entry into the foreign protected areas with their heavily congested Chinese districts must serve to provoke incidents which seriously affect peace and order and may seriously prejudice the safety of foreign residents. It cannot be too strongly urged that the Japanese Government issue positive instructions to its military commanders to keep their troops outside the areas protected by the foreign neutral forces until the return of normal conditions.

As this telegram is being prepared a report has been received that the Japanese troops will be withdrawn from the area concerned <sup>tonight</sup> ~~to day~~.

Sent to the Department; repeated to Tokyo.

GAUSS

(\*) Apparent omission.

emb

sms

WB  
12/16/37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FROM COMYANGPAT

December 3, 1937

Rec'd 9:10 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC  
YANGPAT  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMSOPAT  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

COPIES SENT TO  
~~ONE AND M.I.D.~~

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 4 1937  
Department of State  
*MS*

0003. Military airfield Nanking bombed noon today.  
Other river ports quiet. 2355.

SMS:EMB

793.94/11444

FILED  
DEC 9 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FB*

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS  
This message was received ~~in~~ FROM  
Navy Cipher and must be closely  
paraphrased before being made  
public.

ALUSNA PEIPING  
December 3, 1937

Rec'd 8 p. m.

TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT  
INFO: 2nd BRIGADE  
COMSUBRON 5  
COMDESRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AIEMBASSY NANKING



00003 Approximately 2500 Japanese troops moved into  
Manchuria week ending 30 November 600 trucks tractors,  
150 tanks and 20 guns. This continued concentration  
material is important. Political situation here at stand-  
still. Reliable reports of Red Army organization behind  
Japanese lines in Hopei and Shansi continue with informa-  
tion of raid on Nippon airfield at Hantan near Anyang  
destroying eight planes. New railroad between Tungchow  
Kupeikou nearing completion although subjected to sabotage,  
also encounters between road guards and irregulars. These  
local uprisings on increase 2145

SMS:EMB

793.94/11445

DEC 8 1937  
FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Fc*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD

CINCAF

Rec'd. December 4, 1937.

FROM

9:11 a. m.

ACTION OPNAV  
INFL 2ND BRIG USMC  
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON 5  
COMDESRON 5  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARELEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

*2*  
*101 A*  
DEPARTMENT OF  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 4 1937  
Department of State  
*B*

0004. Japanese troops moving westward rapidly,  
reliable reports advance units have reached Kuyuang from  
Tanyang, Liyuang and occupied Langki northwest of Kwansteh.  
Unconfirmed reports Japanese landed forces on north bank  
Yangtze near Tungchow and Tsingkiang, Chinese offering  
little resistance. Japanese planes assisting in all  
operations by extensive bombing scouting. Conditions  
settlement unchanged quiet. Japanese army officials have  
expressed regrets entrance American sector yesterday 1908.

CSB

793.94/11446

DEC 5 1937

F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Sullivan NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR A portion of  
this telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (A)

Canton via N. R.

FROM Dated December 3, 1937

Rec'd 9:22 a.m., 4th.

AMEMBASSY PEI PING  
AMEMBASSY HANKOW  
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence*

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 4 1937  
Department of State  
*W*

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

December 3, 4 p.m.

Canton Kowloon railway today raided twice near  
Tonglouha by small group of planes with unimportant  
damage.

Commenting on press reports of recent Japanese  
landing on Kwangtung coastal Island including Chikkai,  
Saint John's, *Sanycho* (twelve miles southwest of Macao)  
and *Waichow* (thirty miles South of Pakhoi), (GRAY)  
~~influential~~ *military* headquarters spokesman confirms landings  
on Chikkai and St. John's and admits likelihood of  
landings on others, but states that with exception of  
Hopao all landings thus far reported have been only  
for purpose of taking soundings, obtaining fresh water,  
et cetera, and terrorizing and that in each case invaders  
soon withdrew to warships. (END GRAY)

*WBS*  
*5-11-38*

Informed

793.94/11447

DEC 8 1937

RECEIVED  
F/FG

-2- December 5, 4 p.m., from Canton via N. R.

Informed by source believed to be reliable that substantial numbers of new anti-aircraft guns are being set up at Canton and other important points in Kwangtung.

*WB*  
*3-11-36*

(PLAIN) Recent Vernacular press opinion has been characterized by (one) ~~condition~~ *continued* reproach of democratic powers for alleged shortsighted weakness in not acting against Japan and assisting China's struggle for cause of world peace. (two) Editorials in the two local government owned papers denouncing Italy for recognition of Manchukuo but stating conviction that other powers including Germany will not follow example. (three) ~~cautions~~ *cautions* approval of Anglo-German and Anglo-French conversations as presumably contributing to European peace and looking toward action in Far East favorable to China.

*3-11-36*

The dominant note however is that whatever other countries do China must continue her own battle for national existence. (GRAY) Popular morale and war ~~sentiments~~ *spirit* appear to be holding up strongly. Mailed Swatow.

LINNELL

*3-11-36*

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

[CONFIDENTIAL]

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of December 3, 1937, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

On December 3 a small group of airplanes raided the Canton-Kowloon Railway twice near Tonglouha. The damage inflicted was unimportant.

From a source believed to be reliable the Consul General has learned that new anti-aircraft guns in substantial numbers are being set up at important points in Kwangtung Province, including Canton.

Commenting with regard to newspaper reports of Japanese landing on Kwangtung coastal island, including Samycho (twelve miles south of Macao), Chikkai, Wichow (thirty miles south of Pakhoi), and Saint John's, an influential headquarters spokesman confirms landings on Chikkai and Saint John's and admits likelihood of landings on others, but states that with exception of Hopao all landings thus far reported have been only for purpose of taking soundings, obtaining fresh water, et cetera, and terrorizing and that in each case invaders soon withdrew to warships.

Recent vernacular press opinion has been characterized by (1) condition reproach of democratic powers for alleged shortsighted weakness in not acting against Japan and assisting China's struggle for cause of world peace;

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

peace; (2) editorials in the two local government-owned papers denouncing Italy for recognition of Manchukuo but stating conviction that other powers, including Germany, will not follow example; and (3) cautions approval of Anglo-German and Anglo-French conversations as presumably contributing to European peace and looking toward action in Far East favorable to China.

The dominant note, however, is that whatever other countries do China must continue her own battle for national existence. Popular morale and war sentiment appear to be holding up strongly.

*e.g.c.*  
FE:EGC:HES  
12-6

*FE*  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

a  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 6, 1937.

The Ambassador's telegram from Hankow, No. 15, December 4, 9 a.m., would appear to require no action by the Department. The Ambassador has indicated to the Consul at Tsingtao that he should associate himself with his colleagues in oral representations to the Chinese authorities, urging them to accord protection to all foreign property in Tsingtao. Nothing further would seem to be called for at this time.

*M.M.W.*

*JWS*  
FE:JWB:NN

79394/11448

96-1

*JWCB*

*F*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Hankow via N. R.

Dated December 4, 1937

Rec'd 8 a.m.

*793.94*

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

15, December 4, 9 a.m. / *11404*  
Tsingtao's December 1, 3 p.m.

*file Frank B*  
Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 4 1937  
Department of State  
*WAS*

The British Embassy has renewed its inquiry of the various diplomatic missions whether they would be willing to instruct their representatives in Tsingtao to urge upon the Chinese authorities to refrain from carrying out their threat of destroying Japanese property. I replied that our information from Tsingtao was that there now seemed little prospect of such destruction but that I would be willing to instruct the American Consul to associate himself with his colleagues in oral representations to the Chinese authorities urging them to accord protection to all foreign property in Tsingtao.

Sent to Tsingtao, repeated to Peiping.

JOHNSON

KLP

793.94/11448

DEC 8 1937

FILED

F/EG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO  
~~STATE~~ AND M.I.D.  
*3/11/76*

RB

FROM COMSOPAT

Rec'd December 4, 1937

12:40 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC  
COMSUBRON 5  
COMDESRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 5 1937  
Department of State

773.94

0104 South China ports quiet 2000.

793.94/11449

CSB

EO 1.6.1987

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

~~COPIES~~ SENT TO  
~~OSI AND M.I.D.~~

lv

GCHSOPAT

gpo

FROM

December 5, 1937

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

ACT OF: CPHAV  
INFC: 2NDBRIGUSHC  
CONSULRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
SINCAF  
COO YANGPAT  
USS HARBLEHEAD  
AMBASSY NANKING  
AMSM. PEIPING

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 1937  
Department of State

793.94

0105 At 1400 three planes raided airport north-  
east Canton other South China ports quiet 2000.

WIC

793.94/11450

F/EG  
FIELD  
EC 10 1937

*TE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

CINCAF

gpo

FROM

December 5, 1937

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: 2NDRIGUSMC  
COMSUPRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
CONSOPAT  
AMEMBASSADORCHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

793.94

Department of State  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SECY  
B  
793

0005 Military situation on Chinkiang Kuyung Lishui  
Langki front believed unchanged Chinese reported have  
strengthened positions completed preparations defense  
Kuyung Wuhu line many Chinese and foreigners evacuating  
Nanking Wuhu Japanese planes active bombing Nanking and  
refugees crossing to north bank Yangtze reliably reported  
two British river steamers at Wuhu struck by bombs set  
after no information regarding casualties Japanese mili-  
tary consular police placed on guard Japanese mills  
Italian sector since yesterday Japanese state intend take  
independent measures in settlement in case recurrence  
Nanking Road incident 1935.

wwc

793.94/11451

FILED  
DEC 10 1937

F/F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. ... NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~75~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

FROM SPECIAL GRAY

CANTON VIA N. R.

Dated December 4, 1937

Rec'd 12:03 p. m.

AMEMBASSY PEIPING  
AMEMBASSY HANKOW  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

Secretary of State  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
CINL AND M.I.D.

RECEIVED  
FAR EASTERN  
Department  
*[Handwritten initials]*

793.94  
note  
893.77

December 4, 1 p. m.

Yesterday's raiding of Canton-Hong Kong Railway now reported to have included destruction of railway workshop at Sheklung. Canton-Hankow Railway also raided yesterday by eight planes at several points twenty five to forty miles north of Canton and reportedly early this morning, but railway authorities have since reported that through service is still functioning regularly on both railways.

Mailed Shanghai, Swatow.

LINNELL

GV  
WVG

793.94/11452

FILED  
DEC 10 1937  
F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Blumstein NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

lw Sixth Marines

**FROM** December 4, 1937

Rec'd 8:35 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC  
YANGPAT  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMSOPAT  
AMEMBASSY CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

Division of  
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 1937  
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO  
~~UNIT AND M.L.D.~~

793.94

0004 Military airdrome Nanking bombed by eight  
Japanese planes today. Other river ports quiet 2350.

793.94/11453

sms

F/FG  
FILED  
EC 10 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Justaffer NARS, Date 12-18-75

97-1

4

MJD

GRAY  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated December 4, 1937.

FROM

Rec'd. 7:33 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 5 1937  
Department of State

793.94

1085, December 4, 3 p. m.

At 10:30 this morning five Japanese trucks loaded with rice and other foodstuffs and a staff car containing altogether about 35 officers and men armed with rifles or revolvers were stopped by the French at the border of their concession and the bund. After considerable discussion and a delay of about one hour I understand the French authorities granted permits after a French policeman had been placed in each truck and the staff car and the rifles placed on the floors of the trucks.

With reference to my number 1081 dated December 3, 5 p. m. the Japanese cordon around the area were withdrawn by nine o'clock last night. This morning two of General Matsui's staff officers and the Assistant Military Attache called on General Beaumont and apologized for entering the American defense sector yesterday. They said, according to a member of General Beaumont's staff, that the mistake was due to their officer being unfamiliar with Shanghai and consequently unaware of the boundary of the American sector.

Repeated to Tokyo, Hankow, Nanking, Peiping.

CSB

GAUSS

793.94/11454

F/EG  
FILED  
DEC 10 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

98-1

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

GRAY

FROM SHANGHAI VIA N.R.

Dated December 4, 1937

Received 2:35 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 1937  
Department of State

1086, December 4, 4 p.m.

793.94  
note  
793.1028

I learn this afternoon that as the Japanese were preparing to withdraw their military cordon last evening they handed to the Commissioner of Police of the International Settlement the following memorandum which he was asked to sign:

"Memorandum exchanged between Colonel Kusumoto, representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces, and Major Gerrard, Commissioner of Police, in front of the Sun Sun Company, in the International Settlement, on December 3, 1937. One. The Japanese forces will in future freely pass through the International Settlement without notice whenever it is considered necessary. Two. The Shanghai Municipal police authorities promise that in future adequate measures will be taken positively to prevent the recurrence of a similar relegated incident as that of today.

THREE

793.94/11455

DEC 7 1937

F/EG

98-2

EDA - 2 - #1086, DECEMBER 4, 4 p.m. from Shanghai

Three. In case of the occurrence of such a regrettable incident as that of today in future, the Japanese forces will adopt appropriate actions independently assuming that the Shanghai municipal police authorities have no power to maintain peace and order.

Four. The Japanese forces will adopt appropriate measures independently in making searches and arrests should the policing on the part of the Shanghai municipal police be considered unsatisfactory".

The Commissioner of Police stated he could make no agreements but that he could bring the contents of the memorandum to the attention of the Council. He endorsed the memorandum as follows:

"I have read and understood the above and will bring the contents to the notice of the Council. So far as foreign troops are concerned, every effort will be made to prevent a similar incident."

Two. The Municipal Council is preparing a communication to the Senior Consul reporting the events of yesterday and requesting the consideration and action of the interested foreign consuls. The Senior Consul is expected to summon a meeting as soon as the communication is received. Developments will be reported promptly.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tokyo

SMS:KLP

GAUSS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

9.

NR 98-3  
Gray

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect,  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington.

1937 DEC 5 AM 1:32  
December 5, 1937.  
2 PM

793.94/11455  
note  
893.1028

AMERICAN CONSUL,  
SHANGHAI (China).

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

Rush.  
615 Your 1086, December 4, 4 p.m./11455

The Department notes that the senior consul is expected to summon a meeting as soon as a communication is received from the Municipal Council. We feel that the <sup>memorandum</sup> communication of Colonel Kusumoto is of such a nature and above all of such a tone affecting as it does all foreign interests in the Settlement that the occasion calls for a joint statement on the part of the <sup>interested consuls</sup> ~~consular body~~ in Shanghai.

m. m. d.

We believe that such a statement should be dispassionate but firm; that it should recite precedent and regulation in respect to each of the matters dealt with in the Japanese memorandum; that it should point out the effect upon the orderly functioning of the Settlement which the carrying out by the Japanese of the measures proposed would have; that it should emphasize the risk to all concerned of ~~provocative~~ <sup>provocative / of disturbance</sup> action; that it should point out that the Municipal Council has maintained order in the past and presumably can do so in the future unless disorder is <sup>invited</sup> ~~provoked~~ through <sup>unwise</sup> ~~provocation~~.

m. m. d.

In <sup>considering</sup> ~~considering~~ the joint statement you might keep

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94X11455

F / MR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

98-4

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect,  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Department of State

- 2 - Washington.

in mind/the advisability/of a declaration/to the effect that/  
such action/as is/suggested/by the Japanese/memorandum/cannot  
be justified/by local conditions/and gives/rise/to the/  
presumption/that the/Japanese authorities/are acting with the/  
deliberate/intention/of <sup>setting aside</sup> ~~destroying~~ the local administration/  
and setting themselves up/as complete administrators of the/  
Settlement. Obviously/the phraseology/of such a statement  
would have to be carefully scrutinized. *You will of course* ✓  
*feel free to reserve your good judgment as to the*  
*advisability and form of such a joint statement.* ✓  
It is our thought that such a joint statement will be/  
presented at Shanghai/ but that further/ each consul/ should  
transmit it/ to his government/ with the suggestion that it be/  
brought to the attention of the Japanese Government/ at Tokyo /  
with such supporting recommendations/ as each government desires. ✓

In the event that the <sup>interested</sup> ~~consular~~ body should not adopt such  
a statement I desire to have from you a statement covering the  
points mentioned above for my guidance in considering the  
question of representations by this Government to Tokyo.

A-W HRW:EJL *HRW*  
FE:MMH  
*m.m.d.*

*Hree*

Enciphered by .....  
Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

99-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

PLAIN

FROM Shanghai via N. Ry

Dated December 4, 1937

REC'D 2:20 p. m.

DIVISION OF  
EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 6 1937

Department of State

Secretary of State  
Washington.

793.96  
note  
893.102 Nanking

1087, December 4, 6 p. m.

Reference Nanking's telegram 944, November 22,

10 p. m., concerning safety zone at Nanking. Japanese  
Ambassador through his Consul General has requested  
that the following observations be communicated to  
American Ambassador as prepared by Japanese authorities  
concerned after serious consideration of the proposal  
of the international community in Nanking:

"One. In view of the fact that the suggested  
area is located within the well fortified rampart  
of Nanking and is fairly extensive and that there  
exist within its perimeter no natural vantage grounds  
or artificial structures by means of which communica-  
tion can effectively be cut off whenever necessity arise  
it is considered necessary that sufficient powers,  
material or otherwise have to be vested in the hands  
of the supporters of the safety plan zone in order  
to check

793.94/11456

FILED  
DEC 10 1937  
F/EG

99-2

RB -2- No. 1087, December 4, 8 p. m. from Shanghai

to check effectively the entry of Chinese armed troops which may in the event of hostilities breaking out near-by try to take shelter within the zone or utilize it for military purpose.

Two. It must also be pointed out that in and around the said area there exist Chinese military establishments and that there are places in and around the said area that can hardly be considered to be left unused by the Chinese troops in case fighting will breakout in Nanking in future.

Three. Taking the foregoing into consideration the Japanese authorities entertain apprehension that even though the Chinese authorities had accepted the proposal under review sufficient guarantee could hardly be obtained in the event of fighting occurring in the City of Nanking for entirely preventing Chinese troops from entering into the zone or utilizing it for military purposes.

Four. Under these circumstances the Japanese authorities while fully appreciating the lofty motive of the sponsors of the proposal in question are not in a position to give an undertaking that the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

99-3.

RB -3- No.1087, December 4, 6 p.m. from Shanghai  
that the said area will not be either bombed or  
bombarded.

FIVE. It may be taken for granted, however,  
that the Japanese forces have no intentions what-  
ever to attack such places as are not utilized by  
Chinese troops for military purposes or such areas  
where the Chinese troops have not established  
their military works and establishment and where  
there are no Chinese troops stationed."

Repeated to Hankow, Nanking, Peiping, Tokyo.

GAUSS

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quatefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

100-1

MJD

GRAY  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated December 5, 1937.

FROM

Rec'd. 6:50 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington

**COPIES SENT TO**  
**O.N.I. AND M.I.D.**  
Division of  
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 5 1937  
Department of State

1088, December 5, 9 a. m.

Referring to Department's telegram No. 607, /11423

December 3, 4 p. m. and my 1081, /11443 DECEMBER 3, 5 p. m.

I am informed by the intelligence officer of the Second Brigade, United States Marine Corps, that no Japanese troops aimed pistols at either American or British troops and that no marine despatch riders were threatened with drawn pistols although both British and American trucks and at least (#) American despatch riders were diverted by the Japanese forces. He further states that it was necessary to talk forcefully to the Japanese guard placed in the American sector before the Colonel in command of the Fourth marines and the aforementioned intelligence officer accompanying him were permitted through the lines to interview the Japanese Lieutenant Colonel in charge who had established himself on Nanking Road near the corner of Chekiang Road. As a result of the interview the Japanese guards in the

American

FIELD

793.94/11457

F/FG

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

100-2

MJD -2- No. 1088, December 5, 9 a. m. from Shanghai

American sector were shortly thereafter withdrawn at about 5 p. m. The withdrawal of the Japanese forces from the Cordon area to Hongkew was completed about 9 p. m., the third. Yesterday morning General Matsui sent officers to General Beaumont to apologize for the incursion into the American sector.

I understand that an American by the name of Vaughan read currently (?) and a Britisher by the name of Maitland were manhandled either by Japanese soldiers or Japanese civilians Maitland is alleged to have torn a Japanese flag from the hands of a Japanese spectator. I have requested the complete report of the Shanghai Municipal Police but have been informed that it will not be ready until Monday.

While the Japanese spokesman at the press conference yesterday morning is reported to have said that the troop movement was a transfer of troops and not a parade, groups of Japanese civilian men and women waving paper Japanese flags and shouting banzai lined the route of march at various places, especially on Nanking Road. Previously very few Japanese have been seen south of Soochow Creek in the Settlement.

GAUSS

WWC

(#) Apparent omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

101-1

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1w \_\_\_\_\_ PLAIN

FROM Shanghai via N.R.

Dated December 5, 1937

Rec'd 6:50 a.m.,

Secretary of State  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 1937  
Department of State

793.94  
note  
893.102 8

1090, December 5, 11 a.m.

Reference my 1086, December 4, 4 p.m.

Shanghai Municipal Council released statement to the press last evening that no agreement was entered into on night of December third by the commissioner of police and Japanese military representatives, that a document was drawn up by Japanese officers setting out the points made by Japanese military representative in conversation he had with the commissioner, that the commissioner emphasized he had no authority to enter into any agreement and in order to make it clear that the document did not purport to be an agreement he endorsed it to the effect that he had read and understood the document and would bring its contents to the notice of the Council, and that the commissioner of police emphasized that he could make no agreement with

793.94/11458

F/E G  
RECEIVED  
DEC 7 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

101-2

-2- No. 3090, December 5, 11 a.m. from Shanghai

with regard to the passage of Japanese troops through  
the International Settlement.

The press release adds that the Council desires  
it to be known that its representatives had previous  
to the parade stressed to the Japanese authorities  
the inadvisability of holding such a parade at the  
present time.

The statement concludes that the Council has  
made a full report to the senior Consul of the occur-  
rences which took place on December third.

Repeated to Tokyo.

GAUSS

WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Qualifen NARS, Date 12-18-75

102-1

FE

CA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Gray

SHANGHAI VIA N.R.

FROM Dated Dec. 5, 1937

Reed 10:35 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1091, December 5, noon.

Following is text of confidential report dated

December 4th submitted to the Shanghai Municipal Council  
by the Commissioner of Police:

"On the evening of yesterday, 3rd December, at about  
5:45 p.m., I proceeded with Mr. Aiers, <sup>Deputy Commissioner</sup> D. C. (~~Chinese~~  
~~Consul General~~) to a shop on Marking Road near Kwangsi  
Road where the Japanese military had established a tempor-  
ary office, and there I met Colonel Kusumoto, Assistant  
Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy. Colonel Kusu-  
moto having cleared the room of all but Japanese mili-  
tary officers and my own officers including Mr. Young,  
D. C., through Mr. Uyehara D. C. (Japanese) acting inter-  
preter, made following statement: speaking for General  
Matsui, he intimated that the Japanese military authori-  
ties took a serious view of an incident in which a  
foreigner at Szechuan Road had broken a Japanese flag  
and considered that the police were responsible for not  
preventing such incidents. He further stated that Japan-  
ese military, being now in occupation of the territory  
surrounding

793.96  
not  
893.102

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 1937  
Department of State

793.94/11459

FILED  
F/E G

DEC 10 1937

102-2

CA --2--1091 from Shanghai

surrounding Shanghai, had the right to move troops through the Settlement and would do so again without notice.

He then requested a guarantee that such an incident as the bomb throwing would not occur again. I informed him that I could not give such a guarantee, but was prepared to guarantee that the police would do their best to prevent such incidents. He then stated that if such incidents occur again, the Japanese military authorities would consider that the police were not capable of maintaining order and would take such appropriate action as they wished.

Having made this statement, he informed me that the Japanese military troops would be withdrawn, and asked for protection for them on their way out of the Settlement, and requested us to provide means of conveyance. This was arranged.

In the course of the next two hours they prepared some document in Japanese and English which they eventually expressed a desire that I should sign. I read the document, which purported to be a memorandum of the conversation. I made it clear that I would only sign it as such and that I could not sign any agreement that Japanese troops could pass through the Settlement. I was assured that they understood the limit of my authority and that the document was merely a memorandum of our conversation

102-3

CA --3--1091 from Shanghai

conversation which was required for record purposes. To make my position clear, I endorsed on the copy a statement to the effect that I had read and understood what was written, and that I would bring the contents to the notice of the Council, and that as far as the police were concerned, every effort would be made to prevent a similar incident.

This document having been signed, Japanese military withdrew at about 2:40 p.m., and Nanking Road was open for traffic by 9 p.m., normal police duties being established.

I would suggest that the Council take into serious consideration announcement by the Japanese military representatives that the Japanese troops would march through the Settlement in future unannounced and if any incident happened they would take appropriate action they considered necessary.

It is impossible for the police to carry out their normal duties under such circumstances, and it is also not in their power to prevent the Japanese military authorities doing what they announce they intend to do. If it is to be made possible for the police to function satisfactorily, this question must be checkmated by higher authorities immediately, if the interests of the Settlement are not to suffer."

GAUSS

WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Handwritten initials*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

Tsingtao via N.R.

FROM

Dated December 4, 1937

Rec'd 12: 43 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*3 Jan*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 5 1937  
Department of State  
*Handwritten initials*

793-94

Secretary of State

Washington

December 4, 4 p. m.

There has been no alteration in the very quiet situation prevailing for the past three days in Tsingtao and no early change is expected. At Tsinanfu it has been equally quiet for more than a week and today for the first time this week a few shells were sent from the north bank of the Yellow River; otherwise all quiet in Shantung south of the River.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Hankow.

SOKOBIN

SMS:KLP

793.94/11460

F/FG  
FILED  
DEC 10 1937

103-1

JS TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (A)

FROM Dated December 4, 1937

Rec'd 4:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*at a conference*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 1937  
Department of State  
*chw*

793.94

595, December 4, 8 p.m.  
Department's 327, <sup>11364</sup> December 3, 4 p.m.

One. The procedure in Japan with regard to declaration of war is that action is initiated by the Government but the instrument is signed and promulgated by the Emperor only upon the advice of the Privy Council. Probably only a very restricted circle would know of any such decision in the present instance if and when made by the Government but we hope through personal contacts in various quarters to be informed if and when the Privy Council has the matter under consideration.

Two. It is not (repeat not) a Japanese trait to take decisions hastily.

Three. Although Japan is aware that neither the League nor the Nine Power Treaty nations are eager to take coercive measures against Japan, the Japanese Government is reluctant as I have reason to believe to create a further issue with the League without good reason. We believe that unless conditions arise which would materially impede the successful attainment of Japanese objectives in China, such as the continuous flow of arms and munitions

793.94/11461

F/F/G

DEC 6 1937

103-2

Js

-2-

From Tokyo, #595.

munitions to China from abroad in substantially large quantities or the supply of foreign credits to China or some other form of material assistance to China, the Japanese Government will endeavor to avoid placing the League in a position where its member nations would have automatically to apply economic sanctions or overtly proclaim its impotence..

Four. My British colleague has reported to his Government that the decision as to a declaration of war will depend on the amount of arms and munitions brought into China and he tells me that the flow of such arms and munitions from Hong Kong is steadily increasing. We have agreed promptly to exchange such information as may come to us.

Five. Another informant in close touch with Japanese naval officers considers a declaration of war "almost inevitable" and states that those officials who wish to avoid trouble with Great Britain are "fast losing ground." While the navy, in the event of a declaration of war, fully intends to exercise the procedure of visit and search of all vessels entering Hong Kong, naval officers are convinced that England is in no position to do anything about it. The foregoing obviously represents certain naval views.

Six. We have had this matter under close observation from the very beginning (see our 509, November 2, 2 p.m.)

Since

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Glustein NARS, Date 12-18-75

103-3

JS

VI ON MAS-2, 20170  
From Tokyo, 7595.

Since that time rumors have been current that the Japanese Government has reached an affirmative decision on this matter to be effective as of various dates. The report mentioned in the Department's 315, November 24, 6 p.m., is a case in point. These dates have come and gone without a declaration of war. We are continuing to watch for developments and we shall not fail to inform the Department as soon as any significant indication is observed.

GREW

KPE SLS

[CONFIDENTIAL]

103-4

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 595) of December 4, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

With regard to reports to the effect that Japan is soon to declare war, the Ambassador states that it is not a trait of the Japanese to make hasty decisions.

The Japanese procedure with regard to declaration of war is that although action is initiated by the Government the declaration is signed and promulgated by the Emperor only upon the advice of the Privy Council. It is likely that in the present instance such a decision, if and when made by the Government, would be known to only a very restricted circle. If and when the Privy Council has under consideration the matter of a declaration of war the American Ambassador hopes to be informed through personal contacts in certain quarters.

The Ambassador has reason to be of the opinion that the Japanese Government is reluctant to create, without good reason, a further issue with the League of Nations, although the Japanese Government is aware of the fact that neither the Nine Power Treaty nations nor the League is desirous of taking coercive measures against Japan. Unless there should arise conditions--such as the supply of foreign credits to China, the continuous flow of arms and ammunition to China from abroad in considerably large quantities, or some other form of material assistance to China--which would hinder materially Japan's successful attainment of its objectives in China, the American Ambassador is of the opinion that the Japanese Government

793.94/11461

-2-

Government will try to avoid placing the League of Nations in a position where the League members would automatically have to apply economic sanctions or proclaim openly the impotence of the League.

The British Ambassador in Tokyo has reported to the British Government that the amount of arms and ammunition brought into China will be the determining factor in the decision with regard to a declaration of war. The flow of arms and ammunition into China from Hong Kong is increasing steadily, according to the British Ambassador. The British Ambassador and the American Ambassador have agreed to exchange promptly such information as they may receive.

According to another informant who is in close contact with officers of the Japanese navy, the Japanese officials who wish to avoid trouble with Great Britain are "fast losing ground". This informant considers a declaration of war "almost inevitable". Although the Japanese navy fully intends, if war is declared, to exercise the procedure of visit and search of all vessels going into Hong Kong, naval officers feel certain that Great Britain is in no position to do anything about the matter. Obviously, the above represents the views in certain naval quarters.

The American Embassy has had under close observation from the very beginning the matter of a possible declaration of war by the Japanese, is continuing to watch for developments, and will inform the Department as soon as any significant indication

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

tion is noted. There have been rumors current since the first of November to the effect that an affirmative decision, to be effective as of various dates, has been reached by the Japanese Government. These dates have come and gone without war being declared.

793.94/11461

*egc*  
FE:EGC:HES  
12-6

*AM*  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State

*gms*  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

1937 DEC 6 PM 1 14

Washington,

December 6 1937  
*20m*

793.94

AMEMBASSY DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

TOKYO (Japan).

329

Recent American press comment upon the Far Eastern situation has been increasingly critical of Japan particularly in connection with developments at Shanghai. The Chicago Daily News asserts that it is Japan's policy to seize the present moment to bully, bluff and compel us out of Asia ~~and that the Shanghai launch incident is a logical result of American declarations that short of actual armed invasion we will never resort to arms.~~

*note*  
*M. S.*

Kansas City Times says that two disquieting assumptions are imparted in the wording of the Japanese QUOTE request UNQUOTE to the Shanghai Municipal Council. One is that the Japanese will be the sole judge as to whether its provisions are being reasonably carried out and the other is that the Japanese reserve the right to take whatever military measures they deem advisable within the Settlement.

Cleveland Plain Dealer says that every day that passes weakens the Japanese armies physically while it breeds an overconfidence that may be their undoing.

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

793.94/11461A

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Washington.

-2-

Baltimore Sun says that a strong probability is that Japan's increasing power in Shanghai will mean a commensurate decline in the power and influence of the western nations. Having failed China at Geneva and Brussels, the western nations cannot expect the Chinese not to make the best deals they can. The effect of Japanese occupation of the International Settlement which is crowded with desperate Chinese refugees, enraged Chinese patriots, and a few helpless foreigners is not pleasant to imagine.

New York Herald-Tribune, after referring to the menace which every extension of Japanese influence under army leadership constitutes to the security of any other nation's interests in Asia or in the Pacific, observes that there can be no hope of permanent peace by negotiation in the Far East until some kind of civil government is evolved in Tokyo that can hold the army to the nation's signed pledges. Referring to Matsui's statement that Nanking must abandon its policy of depending upon Western nations, this paper believes that if China's sovereignty and independence fall as completely into the custody of Japan as those of Manchuria have fallen the Japanese will be fired to new ambitions and the peace

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

-3-

Washington,

and security of the whole Orient be placed in greater jeopardy.  
Cincinnati Times-Star, speculating on future possibilities, says that Japan, having a large job on its hands in China, has been careful lately not to tread too hard on Russia's toes but if the resistance of China collapses, Outer Mongolia will be the next objective in Japan's westward march of empire. From this distance it looks like an enormous undertaking but imperial conquest is a heady wine.

*Handwritten initials: HLL, MRW*

*Handwritten number: 763865*

(Note: Telegraph Section: Please repeat the foregoing telegram to Tokyo to AMEMBASSY, (Peiping) with request that Peiping repeat to Ambassador at Hankow.)

*JWB*  
FE:JWB:REK-VCI

FE  
*Handwritten initials: MRW*

*Handwritten initials: CR, 10*  
DEC 6 1937.

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

a

104-1

JWB

FA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

OFFICE OF THE ADVISER ON  
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS  
DEC 11 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EDA

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone (b)

FROM TOKYO

Dated December 4, 1937

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State

Washington

*in strict confidence*

596, December 4, 10 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 - 1937  
Department of State

793.94  
note  
894.51

1/4/37  
Webb

One. My British colleague proposes to cable

his Government along the following lines: Japan is  
clearly beginning to feel the need of foreign capital  
for requirements in China, in Manchuria and at home;  
Japanese industrialists are now approaching American  
financial interests, notably through Aikawa ~~(?) (?)~~ awa of Nippon  
Sangyo. The prolongation of hostilities would be  
encouraged by any success in obtaining such credits  
in England, France or the United States while at the  
same time our chances of exercising moderating influ-  
ence in the final settlement would be diminished. On  
the other hand an important factor in keeping respon-  
sible Japanese industrial and financial circles anxious  
for our good will is the hope of obtaining economic  
assistance after the settlement. The cause of a  
favorable settlement would therefore be served if an  
identical line with regard to Japanese requests for

Financial

793.94/11462

FILED

DEC 14 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

104-2

EDA - 2 - #596, December 4, 10 p.m. from Tokyo

financial assistance in any form could be taken by the three governments concerned. The best answer to any such approaches is to reply that everything must depend upon the terms of peace.

Two. Craigie has written me privately and confidentially asking whether I would consider sending a telegram to my Government along similar lines. I have told him orally of the position of our Government concerning foreign loans and the difficulty of legally controlling their issuance. Furthermore, I have pointed out the inherent weakness of his proposal, namely that if we were to make economic assistance conditional upon favorable terms of peace and if favorable terms were then granted, we would, at least by implication, have committed ourselves to rendering such assistance. I indicated my belief that the American Government would not (repeat not) be willing to take such a position. I also expressed my doubt as to whether American financial interests would be disposed to provide capital for Japan under present conditions.

GREW

SMS:KPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

b  
[CONFIDENTIAL]

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A strictly confidential telegram (no. 596) of December 4, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

The British Ambassador contemplates sending to his Government a telegram to the following effect: It is clear that the Japanese Government is beginning to feel the need of foreign capital for requirements in Japan, in Manchuria, and in China. Ayukawa of Nippon Sangyo and other Japanese industrialists are approaching American financial interests at the present time. Any success which the Japanese might have in procuring financial credits in France, Great Britain, or the United States would encourage the prolongation of hostilities. Our chances of exercising moderating influence in the final settlement would at the same time be decreased. The hope of obtaining economic assistance after the settlement is, on the other hand, an important factor in keeping responsible Japanese financial and industrial circles eager for our good will. Therefore, if an identical line in regard to Japanese requests for any form of financial assistance could be followed by Great Britain, France, and the United States, the cause of a favorable settlement would be served. To reply that everything must depend upon the peace terms is the best answer to any such approaches.

793,944/11462

The American Ambassador has received a private and confidential communication from the British Ambassador, Craigie, inquiring whether he (the American Ambassador) would consider sending

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

sending to the American Government a telegram along similar lines. The American Ambassador explained orally to the British Ambassador the position of the American Government in regard to foreign loans and the difficulty of controlling legally the issuance of such loans. The American Ambassador also pointed out the inherent weakness of this proposal, that is, in case we were to condition economic assistance upon favorable terms of peace and favorable terms were then given we would have committed ourselves to giving such assistance, at least by implication. The American Ambassador expressed the belief that this Government would not be willing to take such a position. The Ambassador also expressed doubt as to whether under present conditions American financial interests would look with favor upon a request to provide Japan with capital.

793.94/11408

EGC.  
FE:EGC:HES  
12-6

*Handwritten initials*  
FE

136

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*2*

*104-3*

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Charge to  
\$

Washington, *10*

AMEMBASSY,

1937 DEC 10 PM 5 11

December 6, 1937. *7 P.M.*

TOKYO, (JAPAN).

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

This case  
It should  
be comm.

Conf Code  
ed befo  
*B-1*

*338 793.94/11462*  
Your 598, December 4, 10 p. m.

One. The position of our Government with respect to foreign loans affecting the Far Eastern situation is as follows:

(a) Should there be a declaration of war in the Far East and/or should the Neutrality Act be applied, it would become unlawful to make loans or credits to the belligerent governments or their agencies.

(b) Except for the possible application of the Neutrality Act, the American Government has no legal authority for controlling either loans to Japanese authorities or American investment in Japan.

(c) It is nevertheless probable that banking interests considering any large financing in the Far East, in which there was an intention of offering securities to the public, would inform the Department in advance. Such issues must be registered under the Securities Act of 1933, which brings the facts regarding them before a Federal Commission, which, however, is empowered only to assure disclosure of the material facts for the purpose of protecting investors.

In the event of investment in private enterprises in the Far East, however, there has not usually been any such opportunity afforded for taking into account our policies.

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ....., 19.....

793.94/11462

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

104-4

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department  
OR

Department of State

Charge to  
\$

Washington.

Two. (The following observations on the question raised by Craigie represent the present probabilities:

(a) Even though the Neutrality Act is not applied, it is not to be anticipated that there will be any substantial loans or credits extended to Japanese borrowers during the period of hostilities. Likewise it is not to be anticipated that American enterprise will make new direct investments.

Furthermore, apart from any special considerations which might enter into Far Eastern financing, it is to be observed that the recent and present position and behavior of the American capital market has been such as to make it extremely unlikely that it will be possible to issue any large foreign public security.

(b) Subsequent to the period of hostilities, the possibilities of American investment would be influenced by (1) the nature of the agreements reached by Japan with China and with other governments in relation to China, that is, if these agreements are such as not to be inconsistent with pledges given by the Japanese Government to respect American rights and interests guaranteed by treaty, there would obviously be less hesitation in making loans and credits than otherwise; (2) the prospect of stability in the Far East, judged in the light of the nature of the peace settlement and other circumstances; this would affect not only the risk concerned but also sentiment; (3) the type of economic arrangements, including the treatment accorded foreign investment by the Japanese authorities both within Enciphered by Japan and in any areas of China which they may directly or

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

104-5

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
\$

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

- 3 -

Washington,

indirectly control; (4) the nature of the trade arrangements that would develop; this especially would bear upon the possibilities of private direct investment.

If as a part of the outcome of the present conflict in the Far East the American people and American business interests are left with a sense that the Japanese authorities are likely to continue with plans for further territorial extension of their political authority, it is probable that there would be a more or less automatic abstention from any substantial investment in territories under Japanese control and that this would take place even in the absence of any action whatsoever on the part of the American Government. Official thought would be influenced by the same considerations.

The foregoing bears out what you have already told Craigie.

CRU  
DEC 9 11 37 AM

FE  
JWB:SMJ/EJL

FE  
m.m./d

EA  
HF

Handwritten signatures and initials: "Hill", "LE", "AWW", "A-W", "S", and a large signature.

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD

GRAY

FROM London

Dated December 4, 1937.

Rec'd. 11:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 4 - 1937  
Department of State

753, December 4, 2 p. m.

793.94

The leading editorials in the important London newspapers are today devoted to the Japanese victory march through Shanghai which is unanimously condemned in language that is unusually forceful.

The TIMES, after emphasizing the serious limitations and weakness of the Japanese military mind, states: "The powers with interests in China have put up with a great deal from Japan who stands to two of them in the relation of an ideological brother and to one of them in the relation of an old and once valued friend. But it would be a mistake for Japan to exaggerate the amount of damage she has done them and to base on that exaggerated amount an estimate of how much farther she can go with impunity. It is true that foreign trade with China has suffered severe disabilities in the last five months; but foreign trade with China has in the past repeatedly shown its ability

to

DEC 11 1937

FILED

793.94/11463

F/A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MJD -2- No. 753, December 4, 2 p. m. from London

to survive just such disabilities. It is true that material damage has been done to foreign property without recompense; but this too has happened many times before. Japan has certainly gone very far; but it would be imprudent of her to subject foreign interests in China to more than what they have come to regard as inevitable wear and tear."

The DAILY TELEGRAPH terms the march reckless and provocative and is of the opinion that it is increasingly difficult to disbelieve that Japan is not deliberately intending to arouse anti-Japanese feeling in every country and that "Hong Kong is a desirable acquisition in the eyes of Japan's militarists." It also suggests that it is questionable whether the parade did not take place in the hope that the incident would be bigger.

The MANCHESTER GUARDIAN makes the same point: "So wanton was the Japanese decision that it is hard to avoid the suspicion that they hoped to create an excuse to strengthen their grip on the Settlement and if the reports of Japanese demands are true this may well be so."

The NEWS CHRONICLE concludes its editorial: "Japan is ruthlessly pursuing a policy of conquest and is riding roughshod over Chinese rights, foreign concessions and all considerations of international morality."

The DAILY HERALD editorial entitled "Lesson of  
Shanghai"

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MJD -3- No. 753, December 4, 2 p. m. from London

Shanghai" is directed mainly against the National Govern-  
ment's Far Eastern policy since 1931 and it expresses  
the opinion that "yesterday Simonite foreign policy came  
home to roost."

JOHNSON

GW  
KLP

105-1

4-

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD.. FROM Tokyo

A portion of this telegram Dated DECEMBER 5, 1937.  
must be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated Rec'd. 6:30 a. m.  
to anyone. (A)

Secretary of State  
Washington.

*Paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in strict confidence*

Director of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 1937  
Department of State  
*ewc*  
*ABC*

793-94

598, DECEMBER 5, 2 p. m.  
Our 595, <sup>11461</sup> DECEMBER 4, 8 p. m.

(GRAY) One. The papers this morning state that conferences between the government and imperial headquarters will take place to decide upon a matter of "high national policy" to be made effective upon the capture of Nanking which is expected to occur before the end of the year. Some papers report that the policy under reference is the question of canceling Japan's ~~to~~ <sup>recognition of</sup> the Chinese Government while others say that it is the question of issuing a declaration of war. (END GRAY)

Two. The opinion is generally held among Japanese who have access in varying degrees to official despatches and among Chinese experts that notwithstanding acquiescence by the Chinese Government in the mediatory efforts of Troutmann the Chinese Government is not as yet in any mood to make peace. As they see it the  
Chinese

793.94/11464

F/A

FILED  
DEC 8 1937

105-2

MJD -2- No. 598, December 5, 2 p. m. from Tokyo

Chinese Government has given its assent to German effort at mediation in order first, to stimulate rivalry between the Fascist nations and the democratic nations and eventually to secure positive intervention on the side of China by the latter group. ~~The~~ estimate of these Japanese is that China is relying on a war of endurance but they believe that such strategy will prove illusory unless foreign help in the form of war supplies continues.

Three. There have been persistent suggestions that the removal of the Chinese Government to remote points in the interior has reduced the status of that Government to that of a local regime and that therefore recognition should be ~~be~~ *withdrawn* (?). HOWEVER, arguments of this kind would usually be a prelude to the setting up of some new Chinese regime under Japanese control and would not necessarily go to make a case for a declaration for war.

Four. In our view the capture of Nanking will probably be signalized by promulgation of some new Japanese policy. That policy may take the form of a declaration of war or the setting up of a new Chinese regime or both.

GREW

WVC

[CONFIDENTIAL]

105-3

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 598) of December 5, 1937, from the American Embassy at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

The morning newspapers of December 5 state that conferences between the Government and imperial headquarters will take place to decide upon a matter of "high national policy" to be made effective upon the capture of Nanking which is expected to occur before the end of the year. Some papers report that the policy under reference is the question of canceling Japan's (?) the Chinese Government while others say that it is the question of issuing a declaration of war.

Chinese experts and Japanese who have <sup>in varying degrees</sup> access to official despatches are in general of the opinion that as yet the Chinese Government is not in any mood to make peace in spite of its acquiescence in the mediatory efforts of Trautman. The Chinese Government has, as they see it, acquiesced in the German effort at mediation in order, first, to incite rivalry between the democratic nations and the Fascist nations and to obtain eventually positive intervention by the democratic group on the side of China. These Japanese are of the opinion that China is depending on a war of endurance but it is their belief that, unless foreign help in the way of war supplies continues, such strategy will prove illusory.

Suggestions have persisted that the status of the Chinese Government has been reduced to that of a local régime on account of its removal to remote points in the interior and  
that

793.94/11464.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

that recognition therefore should be (?). This kind of arguments would not go necessarily to make a case for a declaration of war and would be a prelude ordinarily to the establishment under Japanese control of some new Chinese régime.

In the opinion of the American Ambassador it is likely that the capture of Nanking will be marked by the promulgation of some new Japanese policy which may be in the form of the setting up of a new Chinese régime and/or a declaration of war.

793.94/11464  
S.C.  
FE:MC:HES  
12-6

ACR  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

GRAY

FROM Tokyo

Undated

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

DECEMBER 6, 1937

DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 6 1937

Department of State

Embassy's 598, December 5, 2 p.m.

Please add to last paragraph: "Repeated to Peiping  
and relay to Ambassador Johnson."

GREW

CA  
CSB

Re: Conference between Government and Imperial headquarters.

F.W. 793.94/11464

FILED  
DEC 8 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

106-1

*Handwritten mark*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

FROM GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated December 4, 1937

Rec'd 11:55 a. m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 1937  
Department of State

793.94

993, December 4, noon.

Embassy's 989, <sup>11441</sup> December 3, 2 p. m.

One. Number of police on policing duty seems to be diminishing but groups consisting of police gendarmes and soldiers are patrolling streets. Some Chinese civilians in south city have been armed. Trenches are being dug close to the Embassy but military authorities have promised the so-called Safety Zone Committee that this work will cease. Some looting by stray soldiers in Hsiakuan section has been reported. The Yichiang gate to the bund is crowded and today's bombing inside city walls (Embassy's 994, December 4, 3 p.m.) will probably increase the outflow. General and Mrs. Chiang and the Mayor are still here.

Two. Due to reports that Chinese units from the Chinkiang Tanyang Kintan line have retreated to a point not far distant from Kuyung, Embassy has today as ~~pre-~~ <sup>precautionary</sup>

cautionary

793.94/11465

F/A

FILED  
DEC 6 1937

106-2

RB -2- No.993, DECEMBER 4, noon from Nanking

*precautionary*  
~~cautionary~~ measure warned Americans to be prepared to board PANAY at short notice.

Three. British sources report that Chinese troops were looting in (Chingtao?), a development probably arising from reported profiteering of Japanese in that vicinity.

Four. Repeated to Hankow, Paiping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

*See 2 in  
paraphrase in  
Confidence Zone*

Gray  
FROM  
NANKING VIA N R

Dated December 4, 1937

Rec'd 5:38 p.m.

Secretary of State, Amembassy, Peiping; Amembassy,  
Washington, D.C. Hankow; for Amilat Amconsul, Shang  
hai.

994, December 4, 1 p.m.

FROM ROBERTS FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

"At 10:45 a.m. December 4, ceiling unlimited,

weather cold, very hazy, ten mile<sup>north</sup> wind, a flight of  
three Japanese heavy bombers flew over city at about  
6,000 from southeast to northwest passing over Embassy,  
circled to the east and from north to south bombed the  
commercial airfield with high explosive and incendiary  
setting fire to a supply of gas and oil contained in a  
small shed on the field and starting grass fires on the  
field itself. Only one hangar was struck and parts of  
five old planes were damaged. At the same time several  
pursuit of which the observer actually saw only two flew  
at varying altitude over 6,000 to the west of the city.

END SECTION ONE.

ATCHESON

KLP SMS

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 4 1937  
Department of State

793.94

793.94/11466

F/A

FILED  
DEC 7 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

CA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED  
This telegram was closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (A) NANKING VIA N.R.

Dated Dec. 4, 1937

FROM Recd 6:50 a.m. Dec. 5.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

December 4, 1 p.m.

FROM ROBERTS FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR. (Section 2)

"Chinese military source stated last night that sixteen divisions have now been assigned to the defense of the Nanking area; that there was no communications with the Kiangyin forts yesterday the assumption being that they had fallen; and that the Chinese were holding a line east of Tanyang east of Kintan west of Liyang east of Kwangteh and north of Haining. However, later unofficial reports including Chinese local newspaper, state Japanese have taken the forts and Tanyang and their advance units are well on the way to Chinkiang which the Chinese are said to be making strenuous preparations to defend. These later reports are partially confirmed by a semi-official report of <sup>an air</sup> ~~(?) (?)~~ reconnaissance ~~(?)~~ yesterday. This source also says that retreating Chinese units are already in the vicinity of Kuyung. It is likely however units are the additional troops withdrawn to this area for the defense of Nanking. According to information from several sources there are many

Chinese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

CA --2-- **NANKING** for Secwar...

Chinese units still in localities north and south of the railroad and Grand Canal along which the Japanese have pushed their advance but judging from their previous actions there is small chance that these units will unite or cooperate seriously to threaten the advance of the Japanese main column and will probably be isolated.

The local defense continues preparations south and east of the city. Field fortifications are being rushed in the Singyuan Park and vicinity and many trees in the park have been cut down to clear fields of fire. City gates are barricaded with sand bags reinforced with angle iron and all gates except three have been closed. There are evidences of renewed determination to make a strong defense of the capital and the rumors of last minute evacuation have subsided.. Also there seems to be no preparations whatever for ferry facilities for evacuating across the river. The military are rapidly getting out of the proposed safety zone and have stopped work on fortification of certain sections therein.

I was confidentially informed by a reliable and fairly competent source that Chinese intelligence reports definitely indicate Russia is actively preparing for war with Japan but will not start until Japanese are more fully extended in China. While I am unable to evaluate this statement I have heard similar though less definite statements made before and I believe this represents the present belief of the Chinese military.

Repeated to Hankow, Peinping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

[CONFIDENTIAL]

PARAPHRASE

Section 2 of a telegram (no. 894) of December 4, 1937, from the American Embassy at Nanking quotes a message for the Secretary of War from Roberts reading substantially as follows:

On the night of December 3 it was learned from a Chinese military source that it is assumed that the Kiangyin forts have fallen as there was no communication with the forts on December 3; that sixteen divisions have been assigned to defend the area around Nanking; that a line east of Tanyang, east of Kintan, west of Liyang, east of Kwangteh, and north of Haining was being held by the Chinese. A Chinese newspaper in Nanking and other later reports state, however, that the Kiangyin forts and Tanyang have been taken by the Japanese whose advance units are well on their way to Chinkiang. It is said that strenuous preparations are being made by the Chinese to defend Chinkiang. A semi-official report of (?) (?) (?) on December 3 partially confirms these later reports. Retreating Chinese units are in the vicinity of Kuyung already, according to this source. However, these units are probably the additional troops withdrawn to the area of Nanking for the defense of the city. Information coming from various sources is to the effect that there are still in localities north and south of the railroad and Grand Canal, along which the Japanese have pushed their advance, a number of Chinese units. However, judging from the previous actions of the Chinese units, it is not likely that they

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Blustein NARS, Date 12-18-75

-8-

they will cooperate or unite to threaten seriously the advance of the main column of Japanese. It is probable that the Chinese units will be isolated.

South and east of Nanking the local defense continues preparations. All the city gates except three have been closed and the gates are barricaded by sand bags re-enforced with angle iron. Many trees in Singyuan Park have been cut down to clear the fields of fire and field fortifications are being rushed in the park and vicinity. The military are evacuating the proposed safety zone rapidly and have ceased work on fortification of certain sections in the zone. There appear to be no preparations whatever for ferry facilities for evacuating across the river and rumors of last minute evacuation have subsided. There are signs of a renewed determination to make a strong defense of Nanking.

According to information received confidentially from a reliable and fairly competent source, Chinese intelligence reports show definitely that the Soviet Government is making active preparations for war with Japan but will not begin war until the Japanese are extended in China more fully. Captain Roberts has heard similar though less definite statements made before and he is of the opinion that this statement represents the belief held by the Chinese military at present, although he (Roberts) is unable to evaluate the statement.

793,94/11488  
29C.  
FE:EGC:HES

*ACR*  
FE

12-6

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED Plain

NANKING VIA N.R.

FROM Dated Dec. 5, 1937.

Recd 1:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 1937  
Department of State

793.94

997, December 5, 6 p.m.

Following telephones to Embassy by Dr. Robert E. Brown of Wuhu: at ~~eleven~~ <sup>11</sup> a.m. today about ten bombs were dropped at Wuhu by some five Japanese planes. Two British merchant ships Butterfield and Squires' SS TATUNG, and Jardine Mathesons SS TACKWO were struck and caught fire. Superstructure of TACKWO burned away and it drifted against its company's hulk which was set afire and gutted. British captain of TATUNG and wife were injured. There were several casualties on Asiatic Petroleum Company launch, and Captain Barlow of HMS LADYBIRD received flesh wounds in the flank. There were more than one hundred Chinese casualties from the bombing.

Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

WVC

CA

793.94/11467

F/A FILED

DEC 10 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Chasler NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 847.00/269 FOR Despatch #569

FROM Sydney, N. S. W. (Doyle) DATED Nov. 10, 1937  
TO NAME 2-1127

REGARDING: Sino- Japanese conflict. Discussion of latest developments  
in the,--

fp

793.94/1468

F/WR

11468

- 9 -

FOREIGN RELATIONS.

The Sino-Japanese conflict continued to receive a great deal of space in the local press. Public sympathy is very much in favor of China. A boycott on Japanese goods has been urged by various bodies. The Australasian Council of Trades Unions at its Interstate Conference at Melbourne on November 1 decided to institute a boycott as a protest against the Japanese aggression. The New South Wales Labor Council early in October approved a list of Japanese goods to be boycotted. The Housewives' Association of Sydney, stated to have 12,000 members, declared a boycott against Japanese goods on November 1. The idea of a boycott, however, has been denounced both by the Prime Minister and by the Leader of the Federal Labor Party, Mr. Curtin. It has also been opposed by practically the entire press.

Opposition to a boycott was expressed on the grounds that it was useless and dangerous, would lead to loss on the part of local traders, would provoke retaliation by Japan, would arouse bitterness and in any event would not be effective unless it were collectively undertaken by other countries, including the United States. Wool interests are particularly anxious that no serious boycott be undertaken.

It was reported under a Tokyo dateline of November 10 that the Minister of Commerce, Mr. Yoshino, had decided not to sanction the import of wool before the end of  
January,

- 10 -

January, stocks being estimated to be sufficient until that time. Licenses may be granted at the end of November or early in December for February requirements.

The Minister for Trade and Customs (Colonel White) announced on November 9 that for the September quarter just ended Australia's trade with Japan resulted in an adverse balance of £567,000, the balance for the corresponding period of 1956 being an adverse one of £1,237,000. Before the trade dispute with Japan the quarterly balance was generally between £2,000,000 and £3,000,000 in favor of Australia. In the first quarter of this year 14,227 bales of wool were exported to Japan, compared with 979 bales in the corresponding period of 1956. Japan had, however, increased her purchases of metals and wheat from Australia.

A news item from Canberra on November 9 stated that the title of the Australian Trade Commissioner in Japan, Lieut.-Col. Longfield Lloyd, will be altered to either Australian Commissioner or Australian Representative, the reason alleged being that the word "trade" in the title was not advisable. His status, it is stated, will not be changed.

The owners of the Japanese lugger TAKAGIHO MARU, which was captured by the patrol boat, LARRAKIA, on June 10 for having allegedly been within territorial waters, are stated to have taken legal action for the release of the vessel, in addition claiming £80,000 from the Commonwealth Government for damages and detention

of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Blumstein NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 11 -

of the vessel. Similar action was reported taken in respect of the luggers DAI NIPPON MARU and TOKYO MARU, which were also arrested on the same charge. The case, it is stated, will probably not be listed in the Supreme Court before April 1938.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00/744 FOR tel #286 3pm

FROM Germany ( Dodd ) DATED Dec. 2, 1937  
TO NAME 1-117 870

REGARDING: Article in NEW YORK TIMES recommending  
the "starving out" of the powers  
of the powers of the anti-comintern  
triangle.

German reaction to-.

dg

793.94 / 11469

F/MR

11469

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Husted NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 90

Copy for Q-7  
Department of State MC

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL  
CANTON, CHINA

November 4, 1937.

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
Department of State

793.94

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

SUBJECT: Japanese Air Raid on City of Sunwui.

The Honorable

Nelson Trammell Johnson,

American Ambassador,

Canton.

Stamp: Chase, ONI-MID, M, USA, V

Sir,

1/- I have the honor to enclose an account of a Japanese air raid on the city of Sunwui (新會), seat of the Sunwui District Government, situated near the lower delta of the East River, about sixty miles south of Canton, which took place on October 25, 1937. The account is believed worthy of a special report since it provides first hand detailed evidence (including photographs) and was furnished direct to the Consulate General by a very trustworthy American missionary resident of Sunwui. The latter's name is withheld in compliance with his request.

In connection with the account, the following may be noted. Sunwui is an unfortified city and possesses no strategic value aside from the little derived from the circumstance that it lies near the coast and is on the very unimportant Sunning Railway. The attack was not a part of any attempt to effect a landing on the coast. Its main objectives, in so far as they appeared to be specific, were

destruction

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
A-M/C  
RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
NOV 10 1937  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
NOV 4 AM 11  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

SENT TO  
ONI AND M.I.D.

793.94/11470

JAN 12 1938

FILED

F/FG 11470

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

destruction of the railway station and the District Government headquarters. Even admitting the railway to be a justifiable target, there would appear to be no military justification in bombing the station lying in a thickly populated area. The attack on civil government quarters and the indiscriminate machine-gunning of the populace were acts for which there could be no conceivable excuse.

Respectfully yours,

Irving N. Linnell,  
American Consul General.

~~Enclosure:~~


1/- Account of Raid, with photographs attached.

Copies sent:

Original and one copy to Embassy, Nanking.  
1 copy to Embassy, Peiping.  
5 copies to Department.  
1 copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

800

ASC/ecw



4  
Handwritten signature

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 1 TO DESPATCH NO. 90 DATED NOVEMBER 4, 1937,  
FROM IRVING N. LINNELL, AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL, CANTON,  
CHINA, ON THE SUBJECT: "JAPANESE AIR RAID ON THE CITY OF  
SUNWUI".

From Letter of October 28, 1937, from American  
Missionary at Sunwui.

At 8.30 on the morning of October 25, 1937, three Japanese planes appeared coming from the South and immediately the signal was given on the siren for everyone to keep off the street. I was sitting at our breakfast table at the time, just having finished breakfast after making my morning rounds at the leper colony. When the signal was given I went and stood on our back porch to watch the planes. Suddenly one of the planes began to fall, and thinking something had gone wrong with his motor and that he was crashing, I called to Dr. .... who was sitting nearby, "Quick Doc, watch this plane fall". Hardly had I uttered the words than the plane swooped upward, and a few seconds later I heard G-o-o-M, our fair city of Sun Wui was being bombed by the Japanese.

The first six bombs dropped in the vicinity of the Sun Wui Railroad Station at the East Gate. I watched the planes swoop down and drop these six bombs, each one of which was a perfect score. After the first bomb was dropped, men, women and children in this part of the city ran for the fields, palm groves, bamboo hedges, et cetera, anywhere to get away from the city. The Japs evidently saw this because they then started to use their machine guns to mow the poor people down like grass.

The seventh bomb hit the government yamen, and shook our house like a leaf in the wind. I then decided that the house was no place for me, so I went out and hid behind a brick wall and watched them drop five more bombs in the vicinity of the East Gate.

The bombing party lasted about forty five minutes, during which time the Japanese dropped twelve bombs, and no one knows how many machine gun bullets. Eleven of the bombs landed near the East Gate, which wrecked the railway station with surrounding houses, shops and buildings, tore up the rails and bent them as if they were made of wire, killed fourteen poor innocent Chinese, mostly women and children. The bomb that hit the yamen wrecked the Mandarin's room, and the room of his private secretary. Every bit of window glass, etc., was smashed, as were the adjoining rooms of the Mandarin. Evidently the Japs have very fine maps of this section because it is no easy job to pick out the yamen from the surrounding government buildings. Fortunately the mandarin and his staff were neatly tucked away in their dugout, so they suffered no harm.

Here at the asylum, with over 300 lepers under our care, we have the American and Red Cross flags swinging in the breeze, so we have hopes that if the Japs return, which they surely will, they will pass us by. The poor people here are living in fear and trembling because, like myself, it was probably their first experience at being bombed, and, like myself, they don't care for another party.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Chasler NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The enclosed pictures, given to me by Police Inspector  
..... speak louder than words and tell the story of the  
awful massacre of these poor innocent Chinese when they  
were bombed by the Japanese on the morning of October 25,  
1937, in Sun Wui.

-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-


Copied by sew

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copies of Photographs furnished by American Missionary at Sun  
 Wui, Kiangtung, showing results of Japanese air raid on that  
 city described in his account (copy attached).



The Sunwui Railroad Station  
 after the Japanese bombed it.  
 The twisted rails can be  
 seen in the foreground.




houses along Tung Moon  
 Shear after the Japs  
 bombed Sunwui on Oct.  
 25, 1937.



Private homes were wrecked  
 when the Japanese bombed  
 Sunwui on Oct. 25, 1937.  
 These buildings were next  
 to the railroad station.



The Mandarin's room in  
 the Sunwui Yamen after  
 being bombed by the Japs.



The Sunwui Railroad  
 Station after the  
 bombing of October 25,  
 1937.



Six of the Fourteen  
 killed when the Japanese  
 bombed Sunwui on Oct.  
 25, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -



The mandarins private secretary's room after the bombing of October 25, 1937. Mr. .... in the foreground.

-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-

(The descriptive notes under the above pictures were provided by the informant who supplied the pictures).

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Chasler NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 90

Copy for  
Department of State

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL  
CANTON, CHINA

November 4, 1937.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

SUBJECT: JAPANESE AIR RAID ON CITY OF SUNWUI.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Ambassador,  
Peking.

Sir:

1/- I have the honor to enclose an account of a Japanese air raid on the city of Sunwui (新會), seat of the Sunwui District Government, situated near the lower delta of the West River about sixty miles south of Canton, which took place on October 25, 1937. The account is believed worthy of a special report since it provides first hand detailed evidence (including photographs) and was furnished direct to the Consulate General by a very trustworthy American missionary resident of Sunwui. The latter's name is withheld in compliance with his request.

In connection with the account, the following may be noted. Sunwui is an unfortified city and possesses no strategic value aside from the little derived from the circumstance that it lies near the coast and is on the very unimportant Sunning Railway. The attack was not a part of any attempt to effect a landing on the coast. Its main objectives, in so far as they appeared to be specific, were

destruction

- 2 -

destruction of the railway station and the District Govern-  
ment headquarters. Even admitting the railway to be a  
justifiable target, there would appear to be no military  
justification in bombing the station lying in a thickly  
populated area. The attack on civil government quarters and  
the indiscriminate machine-gunning of the populace were acts  
for which there could be no conceivable excuse.

Respectfully yours,

Irving N. Linnell,  
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Account of Raid, with photographs attached.

Copies sent:

Original and one copy to Embassy, Nanking.


1 copy to Embassy, Peiping.

3 copies to Department.

1 copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

600

ABC/ew



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton C. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 1 TO DESPATCH NO. 90 DATED NOVEMBER 4, 1937,  
FROM IRVING N. LINNELL, AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL, CANTON,  
CHINA, ON THE SUBJECT: "JAPANESE AIR RAID ON THE CITY OF  
SUNWUI".

From letter of October 28, 1937, from American  
Missionary at Sunwui.

At 6.30 on the morning of October 25, 1937, three Japanese planes appeared coming from the South and immediately the signal was given on the siren for everyone to keep off the street. I was sitting at our breakfast table at the time, just having finished breakfast after making my morning rounds at the leper colony. When the signal was given I went and stood on our back porch to watch the planes. Suddenly one of the planes began to fall, and thinking something had gone wrong with his motor and that he was crashing, I called to Dr. .... who was sitting nearby, "Quick Doc, watch this plane fall". Hardly had I uttered the words than the plane swooped upward, and a few seconds later I heard G-o-o-M, our fair city of Sun Wui was being bombed by the Japanese.

The first six bombs dropped in the vicinity of the Sun Wui Railroad Station at the East Gate. I watched the planes swoop down and drop these six bombs, each one of which was a perfect score. After the first bomb was dropped, men, women and children in this part of the city ran for the fields, palm groves, bamboo hedges, et cetera, anywhere to get away from the city. The Japs evidently saw this because they then started to use their machine guns to mow the poor people down like grass.

The seventh bomb hit the government yamen, and shook our house like a leaf in the wind. I then decided that the house was no place for me, so I went out and hid behind a brick wall and watched them drop five more bombs in the vicinity of the East Gate.

The bombing party lasted about forty five minutes, during which time the Japanese dropped twelve bombs, and no one knows how many machine gun bullets. Eleven of the bombs landed near the East Gate, which wrecked the railway station with surrounding houses, shops and buildings, tore up the rails and bent them as if they were made of wire, killed fourteen poor innocent Chinese, mostly women and children. The bomb that hit the yamen wrecked the Mandarin's room, and the room of his private secretary. Every bit of window glass, etc., was smashed, as were the adjoining rooms of the Mandarin. Evidently the Japs have very fine maps of this section because it is no easy job to pick out the yamen from the surrounding government buildings. Fortunately the mandarin and his staff were neatly tucked away in their dugout, so they suffered no harm.

Here at the asylum, with over 300 lepers under our care, we have the American and Red Cross flags swinging in the breeze, so we have hopes that if the Japs return, which they surely will, they will pass us by. The poor people here are living in fear and trembling because, like myself, it was probably their first experience at being bombed, and, like myself, they don't care for another party.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The enclosed pictures, given to me by Police Inspector  
..... speak louder than words and tell the story of the  
awful massacre of these poor innocent Chinese when they  
were bombed by the Japanese on the morning of October 25,  
1937, in Sun Wui.

-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-

Copied by cew

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copies of Photographs furnished by American Missionary at Sun Wui, Kwangtung, showing results of Japanese air raid on that city described in his account (copy attached).



The Sunwui Railroad Station after the Japanese bombed it. The twisted rails can be seen in the foreground.



Houses along Tung Moon Shaan after the Japs bombed Sunwui on Oct. 25, 1937.



Private homes were wrecked when the Japanese bombed Sunwui on Oct. 25, 1937. These buildings were next to the railroad station.



The Mandarin room in the Sunwui Yamen after being bombed by the Japs.



The Sunwui Railroad Station after the bombing of October 25, 1937.



Six of the Fourteen killed when the Japanese bombed Sunwui on Oct. 25, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copies of Photographs furnished by American Missionary at Sun Wui, Kwangtung, showing results of Japanese air raid on that city described in his account (copy attached).



The Sunwui Railroad Station after the Japanese bombed it. The twisted rails can be seen in the foreground.



Houses along Tung Moon Shaan after the Japs bombed Sunwui on Oct. 25, 1937.



Private homes were wrecked when the Japanese bombed Sunwui on Oct. 25, 1937. These buildings were next to the railroad station.



The Mandarin's room in the Sunwui Yamen after being bombed by the Japs.



The Sunwui Railroad Station after the bombing of October 25, 1937.



Six of the Fourteen Killed when the Japanese bombed Sunwui on Oct. 25, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -



The mandarin private secretary's room after the bombing of October 25, 1937. Mr. .... in the foreground.

-0-0-0-0-0-0-

(The descriptive notes under the above pictures were provided by the informant who supplied the pictures).

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

a

107-1

P

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR  
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)  
FROM Shanghai via N. R.  
Dated December 5, 1937

Rec'd 6:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*of paraphrases*  
**COPIES SENT TO**  
**O.N.I. AND M.I.D.**  
*in conference*

*cu*  
Division of  
**FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS**  
**DEC 6 1937**  
Department of State

793.94  
with  
793.102 S

1089, December 5, 10 a.m. | 11455  
Reference my number 1086 of December 4, 4 p.m.

Secretary of the Municipal Council informs me by telephone this morning that last evening the Japanese Consul General talked with Commissioner of Police saying that the memorandum had been drawn up by junior officers, that General Matsui and he were considering withdrawing the memorandum and that he hoped if the Commissioner had not reported the memorandum to the Council he would withhold it. Commissioner replied that he had already reported the memorandum to the Council.

Repeated to Tokyo.

GAUSS

WTC

DEC 8 1937

RECEIVED

793.94/11471

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

[CONFIDENTIAL]

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 1089) of December 5, 1937, from the American Consul General at Shanghai reads substantially as follows:

On the morning of December 5 the Consul General was informed by telephone by the Secretary of the Municipal Council that the Japanese Consul General talked with the Commissioner of Police of the International Settlement on the evening of December 4, saying that the memorandum (referred to in telegram no. 1086 of December 4 from Shanghai) had been drawn up by junior officers and that he and General Matsui were thinking of withdrawing the memorandum. The Japanese Consul General expressed the hope that the Commissioner would withhold the memorandum if he had not already reported it to the Council. The Commissioner replied to the Japanese Consul General that the Council had already <sup>been</sup> informed with regard to the memorandum.

793.94/11471

793.94/11471

FE:EGG:HES  
12-6

ACB  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

107-2

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington.

1937 DEC 6 PM 12 55

December 6, 1937.

AMERICAN CONSUL,  
SHANGHAI (China).

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

This cable was sent in Confidential Code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone. *PM*

✓ 617

11471

Your 1089, December 5, 10 a. m., just received.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

If the Japanese are willing to withdraw the memorandum,  
would it not repeat not be practicable for the Commissioner of  
Police to withdraw his report to the Municipal Council.

*Free*

793.94

793.94/11471

F/MR

FE:MMH:REK

*FE*  
*mmh*

*AW*  
*WRW*

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

11471

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Juster NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

GRAY

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

Nanking via N. R.

Dated December 5, 1937

FROM Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

**COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.**

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
1937  
Department of State

996, December 5, 1 p.m.

From Roberts for the Secretary of War.

December 5, 10 a.m.

793.94

Ceiling unlimited weather clear cold hazy variable  
north wind five miles. Three heavy Japanese bombers  
appeared from south circled clock-wise over city and  
from south to north bombed commercial airfield district  
with at least 20 high explosive and incendiary, then  
disappeared northeast. They were accompanied by at least  
six pursuit flying by flights in column. At 10:30 three  
reconnaissance planes about the size of medium bombers,  
and in wide triangular formation appeared from the south  
and circled twice over city. All planes were flying at  
about 6 to 8 thousand. The pursuit also circled twice  
and one flight remaining until 11 o'clock paying  
particular attention to the Hsiakwan area, then two flew  
off down river and one returned south over city. Anti-  
aircraft fire was fairly accurate but there were no direct  
hits. Damage: block of native houses immediately east  
of canal and south of Chungshanlu opposite the power  
company's

793.94/11472

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #996, December 5, 1 p.m., from Nanking via N. R.

company's office was almost totally destroyed by explosions and fire and power company's garage with stock of gas and oil was burned. Objective apparently the adjoining commercial field.

No change local situation. Japanese are reported leaving Chinkiang on their right and pushing toward Kowtow". Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FROM: CI NCAF  
December 6, 1937  
Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECCND BRIGADE USMC  
ANCON SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

793.94

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 1937  
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

0006. Japanese advance units believed within ten miles Nanking having passed South Kuyung other sectors unchanged Embassy reports eighteen Americans including three women still in city. Shanghai quiet. 1925.

WWC

793.94/11473

F/FG FILED  
DEC 7 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw


COMYANGPAT

FROM December 6, 1937

Rec'd 9 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: 2NDBRIG.USMC  
YANGPAT  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMSOPAT  
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MAPLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

793.94



0005 Six heavy Japanese bombers accompanied by five pursuit raided airfield Nanking 1030 today. Jardine Matheson steamer TUCKWO and Butterfield and Squire steamer TATUNG struck by direct hits from Jap bombers at Wuhu at noon. As far as known there were no foreign casualties. Foreigners are now evacuating Nanking and nine Americans will embark on PANAY tomorrow morning 2130.

csb

793.94/ 11474

F/FG

RECEIVED

DEC 7 1937

108-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated December 5, 1937

Rec'd 1:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

793.94

COPIES SENT TO  
ANI AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 1937  
Department of State

1095, December 5, 5 p.m.

Your 613, December 4, 1 p.m.

I have been endeavoring to ascertain and report exact facts. I enjoy cordial relations with the principal press correspondents, find them helpful and cooperative, have given them information and assistance where possible and proper, have carefully avoided crediting sensational reports, and have noted no disposition on their part to do so.

793.94/11475

The incident concerning the Marines and the Japanese was reported in the last sentence of the first paragraph of my number 1081, December 3, 8 p.m., <sup>on the basis</sup> ~~partially~~ of information from the United States Marine intelligence officer who was with Colonel Price and informed me at his request of what had occurred. I have seen Colonel Price since receiving your No. <sup>613</sup> ~~651~~. He tells me there was no peremptory demand and no threat. He informed the Japanese officer that his sentries had extended into the American

WTS  
4/20/38

American

DEC 7 1937

FILED  
F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

108-2

-2- #1095, December 5, 5 p.m., from Shanghai via N. R.

American sector and were blocking traffic with no apparent good reason and inquired why this was done. The Japanese officer apparently became (\*) for the first time that he was extending into the American sector and stated that his men would be withdrawn immediately. This was done.

GAUSS

(\*) Omission.

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00/745 ..... FOR letter .....

FROM President ..... (.....) DATED Dec.2, 1937  
TO ..... NAME ..... 1-1187 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Report on policy of the United States  
respecting the Chinese and Spanish  
conflicts, prepared by National Lawyers  
Guild, N.Y.C. Chapter.

dg

793.94// 11476

F /

11/76

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 6, 1937

Rec'd 8:33 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 1937  
Department of State

793.94

805, December 6, 4 p.m.

Embassy's 756, November 16, 3 p.m.

American military authorities at Tientsin report that the estimated number of effectives withdrawn from North China from October 19 to December 4 was 70,000, and that French estimate for the same period was 112,000, and that 30 airplanes left the Peiping areas November 27 for Manchuria via Tientsin. Repeated to the Ambassador and Tokyo.

793.94/11477

LOCKHART

WWC  
DTM

50  
F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DI

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

*FE*  
*FA*

*in strict confidence*  
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

Hong Kong

This telegram must be closed ~~FROM~~  
paraphrased before being com-  
municated to anyone. (A)

Dated ~~DEC~~ December 6, 1937

Rec'd 5:30 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

*Line Reached 3?  
6 Para 2-7 Follow*  
OFFICE OF THE ADVISER  
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 - 1937  
Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
1937  
Department of State

December 6, 2 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

I have been reliably informed that Hong Kong Manager  
Bank of Canton and "four-five" other Chinese bankers here  
have been ordered by Hong Kong Chief of Police to leave  
the colony because of anti-Japanese activities. It is  
believed order will not be enforced if bankers moderate  
activities which have embarrassed local Government.

SOUTHARD

*793.94  
note  
8469.516*

JLS  
WVC

793.94/11478

DEC 8 - 1937

FILED

F/EG

4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly Confidential

PARAPHRASE

A telegram of December 6, 1937, from the American  
Consul General at Hong Kong reads substantially as  
follows:

According to information received by the Consul  
General from a reliable source, the Chief of Police  
at Hong Kong has ordered the manager of the Hong Kong  
branch of the Bank of Canton and "four-five" other  
Chinese bankers to leave the Crown Colony because of  
anti-Japanese activities embarrassing to the Hong Kong  
Government. It is thought that if these bankers cur-  
tail their anti-Japanese activities the police will  
not enforce the order.

*ARR*  
FE:ARR:VCI

*FE*  
FE


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

December 7, 1937.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments  
to the Honorable the Secretary of the Treasury, and  
encloses six copies of paraphrase of telegram of  
December 6, 1937, from Hong Kong.

793.94/11478

793.94/11478



EA:LWW

FF  
*[Handwritten signature]*

HF

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

109-1

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR

PLAIN

FROM Nanking via N. R.  
Dated December 6, 1937  
Rec'd 10:52 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.P. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 - 1937  
Department of State

1002, December 6, 2 p.m.  
1087 / 793.94/11456  
Your 1007, December 4, 6 p.m.

Nanking safety zone.

On behalf of the Embassy please communicate as soon as possible to Japanese Ambassador following message from International Committee.

"One. The International Committee has received the reply of the Japanese authorities and has duly noted the same. The Chinese authorities are already in process of reducing the number of military establishments and men within the area of the zone, and the committee is therefore proceeding with the demarcation of boundaries, marking them with flags bearing as a symbol a red cross on a white background, the cross being surrounded by a circle to indicate the idea of a zone. The corners of the zone will be marked with the same symbol on a large sheet spread horizontally on the ground or roofs of buildings.

793.94/11479

TWO

FILED

F/FG

109-2

-2- 1002, December 6, 2 p.m., from Nanking via N. R.

Two. In view of the progressive removing of such Chinese military elements as still remain in the area of the safety zone, and in view of the need and anxieties of the thousands of refugees and other civilians pressing into the zone, the International Committee trust that the Japanese authorities will refrain from bombing or otherwise attacking the area during this period of active preparation of the zone, as well as during the latter period of complete fulfillment of the arrangements for the safety zone. The International Committee will press forward with its recognized tasks as rapidly as possible.

Three. The International Committee is pleased to note the assurance contained in the fifth paragraph of the reply of the Japanese authorities, which reads as follows: 'It may be taken for granted however that the Japanese forces have no intention whatever to attack such places as are not utilized by Chinese troops for military purposes or such areas where the Chinese troops have not established their military works and establishments and where there are no Chinese troops stationed'.

Four. The International Committee informs the Japanese authorities that some fifteen or twenty foreign nationals are standing by to aid in the administration of the zone. The continued presence of these foreign nationals <sup>the</sup> within / city is evidence of their confidence in the good faith of both the Chinese and Japanese authorities

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

109-3

-3- #1002, December 6, 2 p.m., from Nanking via N. R.

authorities in regard to the zone, and also of the  
International Committee's firm intention to see that  
arrangements for the zone are fully carried out. Signed  
Rabe, Chairman".

Sent to Shanghai, repeated to Hankow, Peiping.  
Peiping please repeat to Tokyo for the Ambassador.

ATCHESON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

*[Handwritten initials]*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated December 6, 1937

Rec'd 11 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 10 1937  
Department of State

1005, December 6, 3 p.m.

FROM ROBERTS FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

"December 6, 1:35 p.m., ceiling unlimited, weather cold, calm, clear, large cirrus in south. Four Japanese army medium bombing bi-planes flying down river raided the Puleach water front district followed ten minutes later by two more in opposite direction with same objective, all from altitude of more than 8000. First flight power dived from usual column formation, the other flat bombed. At 1:50, nine single engine medium bi-planes in wedge formation by flights of three at about 10,000 appeared from the southwest apparently heading for same target but after close bursts of anti-aircraft shelling they separated and disappeared northwest without bombing. This formation was accompanied by at least two planes flying directly over city. Damage: buildings in the vicinity of the power plant, water tower, and cameroons terminal

793.94/11480

set

F/EG  
FILED  
DEC 7 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #1005, December 6, 3 p.m., from Nanking via N. R.

set on fire including some oil stocks but no damage to  
these three apparent targets".

Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

WVC:KTM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

110-1

*Handwritten mark*

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

lw

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

FROM

Dated December 5, 1937

Rec'd 7:30 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 1937  
Department of State

1092, DECEMBER 5, 1 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Following is substantially full copy of letter from  
Chairman Municipal Council to senior consul. Omissions  
are unessential.

"Although the Council did not receive information  
until the morning of December 2 that the Japanese forces  
proposed to parade through the Settlement, it had been  
made known to the Council for some time past that the  
Japanese military had in contemplation the project of  
marching Japanese troops along the bund. On each  
occasion that this project was discussed with the Japanese  
authorities the Council's representatives stressed the in-  
advisability of Japanese troops entering at the present  
time that part of the Settlement which lies south of the  
Soochow Creek. It was considered that while the Council  
has of course neither the right nor the power to object  
on legal grounds to the passage foreign forces through the  
International

793.94/11481

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

116-2

-2- No.1092, DECEMBER 5, 1 p.m. from Shanghai.

International Settlement, nevertheless, the passage of Japanese armed troops through the Settlement at the present time would cause grave embarrassment to the Settlement authorities and place a grave strain upon the municipal police. It was emphasized that with a large Chinese population having still in their minds the recent local hostilities and with an unprecedented number of destitute persons and refugees in the Settlement it was quite impossible for the municipal police though taking every possible precaution ordinarily feel that a march by Japanese troops was likely to result in an unfortunate incident which would tend to disturb peace and order and the confidence of a peaceful population. I have previously stated that it was only on Thursday December 2 that the Council received information of the course that the Japanese authorities intended to take on Friday. I myself personally again emphasized to the Japanese Consul General the Council's view as to the inadvisability of the march which the Japanese military authorities proposed.

As you are aware the Commissioner of Police immediately upon receiving information as to the proposed march instituted special police measures. (Omission). Nothing

was

110-3

-3- No. 1092, December 5, 1 p.m. from Shanghai.

was left undone which could have been done to prevent the type of incident which the Council feared. (Omission). The Japanese column entered the Settlement at 11 a.m. and continued along the prescribed route without any incident until the second battalion was passing Kwangsi Road. (Omission). At that moment an unknown man dressed in foreign style clothing attempted to pass the police cordon on Kwangsi Road at a point approximately 30 yards south of Nanking Road. He was stopped by a Chinese police constable on duty and told to go back. The man nodded his head but immediately turned to the right and threw a parcel wrapped in a newspaper which he carried in his right hand. Fearing that he had thrown a dangerous missile, the Chinese police constable drew his pistol and loaded. Hearing an explosion he opened fire on the thrower who was attempting to run back through the crowd. The man fell to the ground wounded. (Omission). The missile was a bomb of some sort and exploded on the north side of the marching column. Three Japanese soldiers, one Japanese civilian, one foreign police officer and one Chinese police constable were wounded. As far as is at present known none of the wounds were serious. The marching  
column

110-5

-5- No. 1092, December 5, 1 p.m. from Shanghai

between the Commissioner of Police and the Assistant Military Attache of the Japanese Embassy are set out in the Commissioner's own words in a copy of a report made by him to the (\*\*\*) Council. I have attached to Commissioner's report a copy of the document which we handed to Commissioner and which he endorsed (these have been telegraphed separately in my No. 1091 and No. 1086). While not of course questioning the fact that it was natural for the Japanese military to take immediate precautionary steps on the occurrence of the regrettable incident of the bomb throwing I would stress the fact that there would appear to have been no good reason for continuing presence of Japanese troops for a period of about eight hours in a crowded part of the Settlement. The troops in question hampered the police in performing their legitimate functions and their continued presence caused alarm and lack of confidence among the civilian population of the Settlement. I venture to express the hope that the interested consuls may think fit to remonstrate with the Japanese authorities in regard to this aspect of the matter.

It is the wish of the Council to place the full facts of the occurrence under discussion before ~~the~~

interested

110-6

-6- No. 1092, December 5, 1 p.m. from Shanghai

interested consuls and to request them through you to take such steps as they may think proper in regard thereto.//

The senior consul is asking the interested consuls to meet with him tomorrow afternoon.

GAUSS

KLP

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Hueter NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Shanghai via N. R.  
Dated December 6, 1937  
Rec'd 1:05 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 1937  
Department of State

793.94

1009, December 6, 2 p.m.

WAB  
4/20/38

Japanese forces have taken the Kiangyin forts, Tanyang and Langki and are within five miles of Kuyung and Lishui. They are within 15 miles of Hangchow <sup>on both</sup> ~~and are between~~ the Grand Canal and the Hangchow-Shanghai railway. Japanese bombing planes have continued to be very active on all fronts in this area.

Repeated to Nanking, Hankow, Peiping.

GAUSS

JLS:TC

793.94/11482

FILED  
DEC 7 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Chastain NARS, Date 12-18-75

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
NOV 30 1937  
MR. WILSON

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 30 1937  
Department of State

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
MR. WILSON  
DEC 1 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*AW*  
*A-W*  
*DWP*  
*DCR*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Under date of Nov. 28 , the following has been received from the  
~~XXXX~~ Naval Attache at Peiping . The contents are probably based on  
information he received from the Asst. Naval Attache at Nanking:-  
THE HIGH COMMAND LEFT AT DAYBREAK TODAY HIS PROBABLE DESTINATION BEING  
HANKOW.OUR OBSERVER WILL REMAIN IN CLOSE PERSONAL TOUCH ACCOMPANYING  
THIS SHIFT. IN CASE THERE IS A MILITARY COLLAPSE OF THE PRESENT GOVT  
IT IS VERY LIKELY THAT GENERAL PAI WILL SUCCEED IN COMMAND THE REMAIN-  
ING PORTION OF SOUTH CHINA THAT IS INDEPENDENT , WITH STATUS GENERAL-  
ISSIMO HAZARDOUS. THE SZECHUAN TROOPS AT THE FRONT HAVE DEFAULTED AND  
THE SITUATION IS EXPECTED TO CLOSE IN FAST. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE JAP  
LANDING AT HANGCHOW BAY AND DEFECTION OF THE SZECHUAN TROOPS ARE CLOSELY  
RELATED TO THE USUAL NIPPON CONSPIRACIES. THE SOVIET SITUATION IS CRITICAL  
AS RESULT OF HEAVY CONCENTRATIONS OF BOTH SIDES AND SOVIET ACTION MUST  
DEVELOP RAPIDLY OR EVAPORATE.

793.94/11483

793.94

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEC 8 - 1937  
MR. WILSON

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
DEC 6 - 1937  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLICATIONS

DEC 9 - 1937  
FILED

F/MR

11483

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
NOV 30 1937  
MR. WILSON

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
NOV 30 1937  
OFFICE ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
MR. WILSON

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 30 1937  
Department of State

*AW*  
*S*  
*PAK*  
*DCR*  
*Had*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

The following has been received from the Asst. Naval Attache at  
Nanking under date of November 29:-

A BIG AIR RAID ON THE BASES AT SHANGHAI HAS BEEN PLANNED FOR THE  
MORNING OF THE THIRTIETH. CHIANG HAS POSTPONED HIS DEPARTURE  
INDEFINITELY REASON BEING TO PREVENT DEFECTION OF THE FRONT LINE  
COMMANDERS BUT I BELIEVE THIS IS ONLY TEMPORARY SINCE THE SHORTAGE  
OF GOOD TROOPS HAS BEEN ADMITTED. THE NEW RUSSIAN MILITARY ATTACHE  
REPLACING LEPIN SECRETLY ARRIVED AT NANKING THE TWENTY SEVENTH  
BRINGING MORE PLANES.

793-94

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEC 1 - 1937  
NOTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
DEC 6 - 1937  
CORNS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEC 8 - 1937  
MR. WILSON

793.94/11484

F/MR

FILED  
DEC 9 - 1937

11484

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Will*  
*4EK*  
*DM*  
*7*

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
MR. DWIN  
DEC 2 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEC 3 - 1937  
MR. WILSON

*FRW*  
*AW*  
*DA/S*  
*EW*  
*DCR*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED  
DEC 3 - 1937  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

*793.94*

The following information has been received under date of December, 1937, from the Assistant Naval Attache at Nanking:

All of the best Chinese aircraft pilots are now dead and the remaining ones are indifferent. I have interviewed Tang Seng Chih who has been assigned command of Nanking defense. At Kiukiang I saw men being drafted, this system has been in force for one month. Was able to see two of the Soviet bombers here. They have four Hispano-Suiza engines which are prestone cooled and are modeled on the Boeing bombers. The Russians are operating independently of the other Chinese aviation units, and the American advisers are not permitted to make any observations.

793.94/1485

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 2 - 1937  
Department of State

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEC 2 - 1937  
MR. WILSON

F/MR

FILED  
DEC 10 1937

1485

111-1

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

A portion of this message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Shanghai via N. R.  
Dated December 6, 1937  
Rec'd 2:40 p. m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

*paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence*  
Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 1937  
Department of State  
11453

793.94  
note  
793.102

1097, December 6, 6 p. m.

(GRAY) Reference my number 1086, December 4, 4 p.m. and your 615, December 5, 2 p. m.

One. Interested consuls met this afternoon with the senior consul who stated that immediately upon receipt of the letter from the Municipal Council he saw the Japanese Consul General who assured him that the Japanese wish to consider the whole incident closed and he should "take no notice" of the memorandum of Colonel Kusumoto. Italian Consul General stated he is told by the Japanese Consul General that the latter had succeeded in persuading the military to drop the memorandum and that it may be considered "null and void". (END GRAY)

Two. I pointed out that the memorandum having been reported to us officially must be regarded seriously until we are definitely assured that it is withdrawn with the assent of the military. (GRAY) It was finally agreed that the senior consul should communicate to the Japanese Consul General by memorandum the pertinent portions of the letter from the Chairman of the Municipal

793.94/11486

FILED

F/FG

DEC 15 1937

Municipal

111-2

-2- No. 1097, December 6, 6 p. m. from Shanghai via N.R.

Municipal Council and invite the Japanese Consul General to meet with his interested colleagues to consider the matter when the Japanese Consul General will have an opportunity to make any declaration of withdrawal of the memorandum on behalf of the military and such declaration may be recorded in the minutes. This will leave the interested consuls free to take further action if deemed necessary. The Japanese Consul General has always shown complete willingness to meet with his colleagues and it is anticipated that he will be willing to do so to discuss this matter.

Repeated to Tokyo.

GAUSS

WWC

(CONFIDENTIAL)

111-3

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 1097) of December 6, 1937, from the American Consul General at Shanghai reads substantially as follows:

Reference is made to the Consulate General's telegram no. 1086 of December 4.

On the afternoon of December 6 the interested consuls met with the senior consul who stated that immediately upon receipt of the letter from the Municipal Council he saw the Japanese Consul General who assured him that the Japanese wish to consider the whole incident closed and he should "take no notice" of the memorandum of Colonel Kusumoto. The Italian Consul General stated he is told by the Japanese Consul General that the latter had succeeded in persuading the military to drop the memorandum and that it may be considered "null and void."

The American Consul General pointed out that until definite assurance is received that the memorandum has been withdrawn with the assent of the military it must be regarded seriously since it had been reported officially to the interested consuls. It was finally agreed that the senior consul should communicate to the Japanese Consul General by memorandum the pertinent portions of the letter from the Chairman of the Municipal Council and invite the Japanese Consul General to meet with his interested colleagues to consider the matter when the Japanese Consul General will have an opportunity to make any declaration of withdrawal of the memorandum on behalf of the military and such declaration may be recorded in the minutes. This will

leave

79394/11486

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

leave the interested consuls free to take further action if deemed necessary. The Japanese Consul General has always shown complete willingness to meet with his colleagues and it is anticipated that he will be willing to do so to discuss this matter.

793.94/11486

*qgc.*  
FE:EMC

*MM*  
FE

XII-7-37

112-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Nanking via N. R.

Dated December 6, 1937

Rec'd 10:40 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEC 7  
Department of State

999, December 6, 11 a.m.

Embassy's 986, December 5, 11 a.m., and previous.

Strictly confidential. (SECTION ONE).

One. This morning Chiang Kai Shek's adviser, Donald, gave Mo Hugh and me confidentially as his estimate of present situation <sup>The following</sup> (which, because Donald's position with General and Mrs. Chiang is in the nature of a member of the family, may be considered as closely resembling their personal opinion):

Two. The Chinese now have no means of receiving supplies to recreate their army and air force. American planes purchased cannot reach China; the French will not permit planes and other war materials purchased from Germany to proceed through Indo-China or permit French planes to be set up there and flown into China; planes purchased in England cannot be set up in Hong Kong. With no material help from the powers in the way of necessary military supplies peace negotiations <sup>are</sup> inevitable.

Chiang's

793.94/11487

FILED  
DEC 8 - 1937

F/FG

112-2

-2- #999, December 6, 11 a.m., from Nanking via N. R.

Chiang's position is that he himself will not enter into negotiations but will leave them to the so-called pro Japanese groups in the Government and he resigned the presidency of the executive yuan some time ago to avoid responsibility of negotiations. Among matters mentioned by Trautmann during his visit here December 1-2 were Japanese desires to have Wang Ching Wei and Chang Chun prominent in the Chinese Government and Ho Ying Chin head of the Army. Peace negotiations will begin shortly in Hankow between Japanese and interested Chinese officials and a new Chinese Government along lines desired by the Japanese will emerge. The Japanese want peace because they fear they cannot continue indefinitely to support large scale hostilities. Soviet Russia will not join with China unless attacked by Japan. China is helpless and China as an independent nation is finished. (Section Two follows).

ATCHESON

CSB

112-3

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be \_\_\_\_\_ Nanking via N. R.  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated Dated December 6, 1937  
to anyone. (A) FROM Rec'd 2 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

999, December 6, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

Three. It has been impression of the Embassy here that what hopes have remained to the Chinese were centered in a war of attrition. Up to a week ago we knew from McHugh's daily association with Donald that hopes of recreating the Chinese air force and building up the shattered Chinese armies were still high. The arrival of the Soviet planes with Soviet flying and other personnel perhaps created an overconfidence; those planes failed to fulfill expectations, and hopes of Chinese military success on land and in the air have been dissipated. We have been unable to perceive any indication that definite plans have been adopted for the forming of any real defense line west of Nanking. To us it seems that the Generalissimo has come to realize that what remains of China under his control will be denied the source of supply from the south on which he had confidently counted for continued resistance in the west. There have been numerous indications and assurance from Donald up to now that Chiang (?) expected to build a new China in the west. He now apparently

112-4

-2- #999, December 6, 11 a.m., (SECTION TWO) from Nanking  
via W. R.

apparently concedes that he faces isolation and that  
a Chinese Government administering Szechuen, Yunnan,  
Kwangsi, Kweichow, (Kwangtung is vulnerable to the  
Japanese) perhaps parts of Kiangsi and Fukien and the  
distant wastes of ~~Korea~~ <sup>Tanai</sup> can not successfully pretend to  
be the Government of China and that the situation is  
hopeless for him and his cause.

Four. Sent Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai. Peiping,  
please repeat to Tokyo. END OF MESSAGE.

ATCHESON

GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

[CONFIDENTIAL]

112-5

PARAPHRASE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

A strictly confidential telegram (no. 999) of December 6, 1937, from the American Embassy at Hanking reads substantially as follows:

On the morning of December 6 Mr. Donald (adviser to General Chiang Kai-shek) gave confidentially to the Secretary in charge of the American Embassy and the American Assistant Naval Attaché (McHugh) his estimate of the present situation. On account of Mr. Donald's position with the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang, which is somewhat that of a member of the family, the estimate may be regarded as resembling closely the personal opinion of General and Madame Chiang. Mr. Donald's estimate is as follows:

There is now no way by which the Chinese can receive supplies to recreate their air force and their army. The French will not allow French airplanes to be set up in Indochina and flown into China or allow airplanes and other war materials bought in Germany to proceed through Indochina; airplanes bought in England cannot be set up in Hong Kong; American airplanes purchased cannot reach China. Peace negotiations seem inevitable with no substantial help from the powers in the form of necessary military supplies. The Generalissimo's position is that he himself will not engage in negotiations but will leave the negotiations to be carried on by the so-called pro-Japanese groups in the Government. In order to avoid responsibility of negotiations the Generalissimo some time ago resigned the presidency of the Executive Yuan. Japanese desires to have Ho Ying Chin head of the army and Wang Ching Wei

and

993.94/11487

-2-

and Chang Chun prominent in the Chinese Government were among matters mentioned by the German Ambassador (Trautmann) during his visit to Nanking on December 1 and 2. A new Chinese government along lines desired by the Japanese will emerge from between Japanese and interested Chinese officials. peace negotiations which will soon begin in Hankow/ China is helpless and as an independent nation is finished. Because the Japanese fear they cannot continue to support hostilities on a large scale for an indefinite time the Japanese desire peace. Unless attacked by Japan the Soviet Government will not join with China.

The American Embassy in Nanking has been of the impression that such hopes as the Chinese retained were centered in a war of attrition. As a result of Captain McHugh's daily association with Mr. Donald the Embassy knew up until a week ago that hopes were still high for building up the shattered Chinese armies and recreating the Chinese air force. An overconfidence was perhaps created by the arrival of Soviet airplanes with Soviet flying and other personnel. These airplanes have not fulfilled expectations and the Chinese military's hopes of succeeding in the air and on land have been destroyed. The Embassy has not been able to find any evidence that there have been any definite plans made for forming a real line of defense west of Nanking. It appears that General Chiang Kai-shek now realizes that the portion of China which still remains under his control will be unable to obtain supplies from the south on which he had counted confidently to enable him to carry on resistance

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quale NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

Up to this time  
resistance in the west. /Mr. Donald has given many assurances  
and indications that it was the Generalissimo's plan to build  
in the west a new China. Apparently he concedes now that the  
situation is hopeless for him and his cause, that he faces  
isolation, and that a Chinese government administering the  
provinces of Kwangsi, Kweichow (Kwangtung Province is vul-  
nerable to Japan), Szechuan, Yunnan, the distant wastes of  
Kansu, and perhaps parts of Fukien and Kiangsi cannot pretend  
successfully to be the government of China.

795.94/11487  
E.S.  
FE:EGC:HES  
12-7

*AKA*  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FL*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

CINCAF

FROM Rec'd December 6, 1937

6:41 p.m.

OPNAV: WASHINGTON

INFO: AMCONSUL SHANGHAI COPIES SENT TO  
AMEMBASSY CHINA

**COPIES SENT TO  
GEN AND MLD.**

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 1937  
Department of State

*743.94*

0006. Morning 5 December twenty Japanese soldiers in truck entered British sector Jessfield Park failing stop at signal British sentry, also party Japanese military gendarmes observed in same sector vicinity British headquarters. Major General Telfer Smollet letter addressed Major General Harada requested Japanese military be instructed observe courtesies in entering Settlement, that he be informed purpose Japanese soldiers within perimeter, that he be warned further movements Japanese within Settlement, and stated he believed undesirable Japanese soldiers enter perimeter. Morning sixth three Japanese soldiers, four plain clothes police entered Great Eastern Hotel near Nanking Road, arrested four Chinese took them to Hongkew after questioning them three hours, returned uninjured to same building. No Japanese gendarmes now in Settlement, eight consular police in Japanese mills Italian sector, British sector commander given no notification. Japanese continue confiscating Chinese sampans, boats.

793.94/11488

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB -2- No.0006 December 6, from CINCAF

boats: Many sampans ~~at~~ <sup>at</sup> Soochow Creek adjacent British  
sector confiscated, crews driven ashore today. 2330.

SMS

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*12*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

COMYANGPAT

FROM

Rec'd December 6, 1937

9:53 p. m.

OPNAV: WASHINGTON D. C.  
INFO: 2nd BRIGADE  
YANGPAT  
COMDESRON 5  
CONS BRON 5  
CINCAF  
CONSOPAT  
AMEMBASSY CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

~~SECRET~~

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 1937  
Department of State

793.94

0006 Nanking and Pukow waterfronts bombed today  
by seventeen Japanese planes. Eight American nationals  
have taken refuge on PANAY, thirteen still remain in  
city. Other river ports above Nanking quiet. 1948

SMS

NPI.

793.94/11439

EP 8 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Huelsken NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

FROM COMSOPAT

December 6, 1937

Rec'd 9:54 p. m.

OPNAV: WASHINGTON  
INFO: 2nd BRIGADE  
CONSERON 5  
COMSUBRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIFING

COPIES SENT TO  
~~UNITED STATES~~ N.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 1937  
Department of State

793.94

0105 1250 Air raid north of Canton five separate  
bombers. Other South China ports quiet 200

SMS:NPL

793.94/11490

FILED  
DEC 8 1937

F/F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be- FROM  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (A)

Nanking via N. R.

Dated December 6, 1937

Rec'd 3 p. m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence*

*file*  
DIVISION OF  
EAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 1937  
Department of State  
*ch B*

*793.94*

1000, December 6, noon.

FROM ROBERTS FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

"December 5 from 3:00 to 6:00 p. m. Captain McHugh  
and I visited Kuyung, 26 miles from Nanking. We found  
the platoon stationed in the edge of the village deployed  
in position and they had blown up a small bridge just  
out of town on the Chinkiang road. To the left front  
artillery fire and occasional machine gun bursts were  
clearly audible. The Cantonese of the 106th division  
holding the village told us that it was Japanese artillery  
firing and that enemy cavalry patrols were off to their  
left front. A section in a support position and a company  
commander told the same story. In the relief of support  
lines they had dug fox holes, small trenches and machine  
gun pits on both sides of the highway. Detachments were  
setting fire to farm buildings so that as they said

nothing

793.94/11491

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB -2- No. 1000, December 6, noon from Nanking

nothing will be left for the Japanese. Along the road  
for at least ten miles toward Nanking concrete bridges  
were already mined and wooden bridges prepared for burn-  
ing and in every village there were barricades but only  
a few small detachments were on the Kuyung road until  
after dusk when we passed one battalion moving forward.  
The Nanking local defense zone apparently extends to  
Takushan 22 miles but between that point and the Singyuan  
park we saw few signs of defense preparations. Organiza-  
tion of positions in the park has apparently been completed  
for no activity was observed except at Chungshan gate  
which is being walled up with concrete except one portal  
still open. Beyond the park the area traversed seemed  
too thinly held and too poorly organized for any strong  
defense of the capital."

Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

SMS

NPL

[CONFIDENTIAL]

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (no. 1000) of December 6, 1937, from the American Embassy at Nanking quotes a message for the Secretary of War from Roberts which reads substantially as follows:

Captain McHugh and Captain Roberts visited Kuyung (twenty-six miles from Nanking) from three to six o'clock on the afternoon of December 5. They found that the Chinese had blown up a small bridge on the Chinkiang road just outside of Kuyung and that the platoon stationed in the edge of the village was deployed in position. Artillery fire and occasional machine-gun bursts could be heard clearly to the left front. It was Japanese artillery firing and Japanese cavalry patrols were off to the left front, according to information received from the Cantonese of the 106th division who were holding the village. The same story was told by a company commander and a section in a support position. In order, as they said, that nothing will be left for the Japanese, detachments were setting fire to farm buildings. On both sides of the highway the Chinese had dug small trenches, machine-gun pits, and fox holes in the relief of support lines. Wooden bridges have been prepared for burning and concrete bridges were already mined for at least ten miles along the road toward Nanking. There were barricades in every village but until after dusk when one battalion was met moving forward there were only a few small detachments on the Kuyung road. Although apparently the Nanking local defense zone extends to Takushan (twenty-two miles), between Singyuan Park and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

and Takushan few signs of preparations for defense were seen. The area traversed beyond the park appeared to be too poorly organized and too thinly held to provide any strong defense of Nanking. Apparently organization of positions in the park has been finished as no activity was seen except at the Chungshan gate. With the exception of one portal which is still open this gate is being walled up with concrete.

793.94/11491

*egc.*  
FE:EGC:HES  
12-7

*APR*  
FE  
*Jms*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Glusker NARS, Date 12-18-75

113-1

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (b)

PARIS  
FROM Dated December 6, 1937

Received 5:35 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

*of paraphrase*

*File*  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 - 1937  
Department of State  
*MS* *11A* *B*

793.94  
*note*  
793.94119

*in strict confidence*

1702, December 6, 5 p.m.

We were told this morning by the Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Foreign Office that the French representative at Hankow reported three days ago that he had been informed by the Chinese Foreign Ministry there that the Chinese Government "had accepted the German offer of a kind of mediation". The Foreign Office understands that the Chinese say that the Germans took the initiative in making the offer while the Germans and Japanese say that the Chinese asked that the offer be made. The Foreign Office has no information concerning the terms of any proposals which may have been submitted to the Chinese by the Germans nor concerning the Chinese reaction to any proposals which may have been made. Hopp-  
not expressed the opinion that it would be impossible for Chiang Kai Shek to accept proposals of the nature which the Japanese are certain to make. He believes that about all that the Chinese would find it possible to accept would

793.94/11492

F/FG

RECEIVED

113-2

EDA - 2 - #1702, December 6, 5 p.m. from Paris

would be an armistice and an agreement to withdraw troops from certain areas while the Japanese are certain to insist among other things upon recognition of Manchukuo.

WE WERE shown a memorandum from the Chinese Embassy to the French Government dated November 27 which refers to conversations between the Chinese Delegation at Brussels and other delegations and submits a list of war material (aeroplanes, artillery, tanks, trucks, et cetera) required by the Chinese Government as well as a request for a credit of 100,000,000 pounds to be granted by the United States, England, and France, the credit to be guaranteed by a pledge of customs and salt revenues and by the oil monopoly in China. The Foreign Office has consulted with the British concerning the reply to be made to this request and the British have said that it is simply a question of how to say "no" in the most appropriate and courteous manner. This is also the view of the Foreign Office which assumes that the United States Government will take the same line in its reply.

Hoppenot referred to the visit of Viscount Ishii saying that he arrived in Paris from Rome on December 4, was leaving today for London and would return to Paris in about two weeks or so. Appointments had been arranged for Ishii to call today on President Lebrun and on Premier

Chautemps

ebh/11792

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

113-3

EDA - #1702, December 6, 5 p.m. from Paris

Chateaux but these appointments had been canceled at  
Ishii's request who explained that he wished to visit  
London first. French officials according to Hoppenot  
"will listen courteously" to what Ishii has to say.

BULLITT

SIS:NPL

[CONFIDENTIAL]

113-4

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (no. 1702) of December 6, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Paris reads substantially as follows:

Hoppenot, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the French Foreign Office, informed the American Ambassador on the morning of December 6 that three days before the French representative at Hankow had reported that, according to information received from the Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Hankow, the Chinese Government "had accepted the German offer of a kind of mediation". According to the understanding of the French Foreign Office the Japanese and Germans say the Chinese requested that the offer be made while the Chinese say the Germans took the initiative in making the offer. No information with regard to the terms of such proposals as may have been placed before the Chinese/or with regard to the Chinese reaction to any such proposals has been received by the French Foreign Office. Hoppenot believes that about all that the Chinese could accept would be an armistice and an agreement to withdraw troops from certain areas, whereas the Japanese are sure to insist upon the recognition of Manchukuo among other things. Hoppenot was of the opinion that General Chiang Kai-shek could not accept the kind of proposals which the Japanese are sure to make.

A memorandum dated November 27 from the Chinese Embassy in Paris to the French Government was shown to the American Ambassador. This memorandum refers to conversations at Brussels between the Chinese delegation and other delegations there

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

there and presents a list of war material required by the Chinese Government. This war material includes tanks, trucks, artillery, airplanes, et cetera. The memorandum contains also a request for a credit of 100,000,000 pounds to be granted by France, the United States, and Great Britain. This credit is to be guaranteed by the oil monopoly in China and by a pledge of salt and customs revenues. The French Foreign Office concurs in the view of the British, with whom the matter of reply to be made to this memorandum has been discussed, that the reply is simply a question of how to say "no" in the most courteous and appropriate way. That the United States Government will take the same line in its reply is assumed by the French Foreign Office.

Referring to Viscount Ishii's visit, the Chief of the Far Eastern Section said that the Viscount arrived in Paris on December 4 from Rome, that he was leaving for London on December 8, and that in about two weeks he would return to Paris. According to the Chief of the Far Eastern Section, French officials "will listen courteously" to what Viscount Ishii has to say. Appointments which had been arranged for the Viscount to call on December 8 on Premier Chautemps and President Lebrun were canceled at the request of the Viscount who explained that he desired first to visit London.

793.94/11492  
e.g.c.  
FE:EC:HES  
12-7

*MLP*  
FE  
*JMB*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

114-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB  
A portion of this telegram  
must be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone. (A)

Shanghai via N. R.  
Dated December 6, 1937  
Rec'd 4 p. m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
*in confidence*  
DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
Department of State

1098, December 6, 7 p. m.

793.94

(GRAY) I learn this evening from officials of the Municipal Council and it is also reported in the press, that at about seven o'clock this morning Japanese police or gendarmerie accompanied by Japanese in plain clothes drove in motor cars to the Great Eastern Hotel in the Wing On Building on Nanking Road, entered the hotel and arrested three Chinese men and one Chinese woman, took them by motor car to Kongkew, there questioned them for about an hour, and finally released them and sent them back to the hotel. The Japanese did not communicate with or notify the municipal police.

Two. It would seem that the Japanese are taking action exactly in accordance with the fourth point of the memorandum

793.94/11493

F/FG

114-2

RB -2- No. 1098, December 6, 7 p. m. from Shanghai

the memorandum handed to the commissioner of police  
by Colonel Kusumoto as reported in my number 1086, / 11455  
December 4, 4 p. m.

Three. The Council will report the matter to the  
senior consul. (END GRAY) Council officials have  
inquired of me whether it would be possible to have  
patrols of foreign troops within the settlement to  
prevent such incidents. I have replied that I do  
not believe such use of American troops would be  
approved. Sent to the Department. Repeated to  
Tokyo.

GAUSS

PEG

CSB

(CONFIDENTIAL)

114-3

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 1098) of December 8, 1937, from the American Consul General at Shanghai reads substantially as follows:

On the evening of December 6 the Consul General learns from officials of the Municipal Council and it is reported also in the press, that at about seven o'clock on the morning of December 6 Japanese police or gendarmerie accompanied by Japanese in plain clothes drove in motor cars to the Great Eastern Hotel in the Wing On Building on Nanking Road, entered the hotel and arrested three Chinese men and one Chinese woman, took them by motor car to Kongkew, there questioned them for about an hour, and finally released them and sent them back to the hotel. The Japanese did not communicate with or notify the Municipal Police.

It would seem that the Japanese are taking action exactly in accordance with the fourth point of the memorandum handed to the Commissioner of Police by Colonel Kusumoto as reported in the Consul General's telegram no. 1086 of December 4.

The Council will report the matter to the senior consul. In reply to an inquiry from Council officials whether, in order to prevent such incidents, it would be possible to have patrols of foreign troops within the International Settlement, the American Consul General expressed the belief that approval would not be given for such use of American troops.

793.94/11493

egf.  
FE:EGC  
XII-7-37

FR

793.94/11493

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
Charge to  
\$  
1937 DEC 7 AM 10 14

Department of State

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

December 7, 1937. *11am*

This cable was sent in confidential Code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.

American Consul,  
Shanghai (China)

*619*

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 1098, December 6, 7 p. m.

The Department agrees with the thought contained  
in the reply made by you, as set forth in the last substan-  
tive sentence of your telegram under reference, that such  
a use of American Marines is not repeat not within the  
purview of the mission of those troops.

*793.94/11493*

*note*  
*893.0146*

FE MMH/AB  
MMH

AW  
HRW

*Three*

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

793.94/11493

F/MR

11493

115-1

~~F~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS \_\_\_\_\_ Gray

FROM HANKING Via N/R

Dated December 7, 1937

Rec'd 6th 11:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
REC-1937  
Department of State

PRIORITY

1004, December 7, 7 a.m.

793.94

General and Mrs. Chiang Kai Shek left at 6:00 this morning by plane for the interior.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

EDA SMS

793.94/11494

FILED  
DEC 8 1937

F/EG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75

*ft*

DI

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

Gray

FROM CHEFOO Via N R

Dated December 6, 1937

Rec'd 7th 7 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO  
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 1937  
Department of State

December 6, 4 p.m.

*793.94*

Chinese troops yesterday destroyed bridges in Chefoo-Weihsien motor road approximately 15 miles west of Chefoo and another point west of Penglai. I am reliably informed additional destruction was effected further west.

ALLEN

JS

793.94/11495

DEC 8 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 355.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hankow, China, November 3 1937

Subject: TA KUNG PAO Appeal to American  
and British Governments.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 - 1937  
Department of State

193.94

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 10 33  
DEC 6 1937

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

The Honorable  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.

For Distribution-Check  
M.  
Dunwright

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE  
DEC 7 1937

I have the honor to transmit herewith, for  
the information of the Department, a copy, in  
quintuplicate, of my despatch No. 516 of today's  
date addressed to the Embassy at Nanking on the  
above-mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

*P. R. Josselyn*  
P. R. Josselyn  
American Consul General

Enclosure:

- 1. Despatch No. 516, November 3, 1937,  
to the Embassy, Nanking.

In quintuplicate

800

KFD/MYH

793.94/11496

F/FG  
1937  
11496

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 516.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hankow, China, November 3, 1937

Subject: TA KUNG PAO Appeal to American  
and British Governments.


The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Ambassador,  
Nanking.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy  
in translation of an editorial which appeared in  
the October 22, 1937, edition of the TA KUNG PAO,  
an independent Chinese vernacular newspaper now  
published at Hankow.

It will be observed that an endeavor is made to  
expose Japanese designs in China and to describe the  
determined resistance with which such designs will be  
met. An eloquent plea is made for Anglo-American  
cooperation in checking Japanese aspirations and  
actions in China which, according to this journal,  
would result to the benefit of the world.

Respectfully yours,



P. R. Josselyn  
American Consul General

Enclosure:

Copy in translation of an editorial appearing in  
October 22, 1937, issue of TA KUNG PAO, Hankow.

Original to Embassy, Nanking;  
Copy to Embassy, Peiping;  
5 copies to Department (despatch No. 355,  
November 3, 1937).

800

EFD/MYH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 516, November 3, 1937,  
from Consul General P. R. Josselyn, Hankow, China, to  
the Embassy, Nanking, on the subject of TA KUNG PAO  
Appeal to American and British Governments.

Translation of an editorial appearing in the TA KUNG  
PAO, Hankow, October 22, 1937.

A Special Appeal to the British and American Governments.

At the conference of the signatory countries of the Nine Power Treaty the attitude of Great Britain and the United States, no doubt, will be of the greatest importance. These two countries are good friends of China; therefore, we wish to make a few sincere statements to the two Governments.

Of late the Chinese people have taken the attitude of the United States as being quite sincere. It will not spare any efforts in cooperating with the various countries. But there is one point: Americans in the past did not take matters seriously and thoroughly; therefore they have yet got quite a thorough understanding of the present and future development in the Far East. On the other hand Great Britain is experienced in its plans and discusses matters thoroughly, but in the past it was attacked by the sickness of compromise in regard to Japan. It is its habit to postpone and delay the solution of problems and not to seek a solution. This is of course due to the great and complicated interests of the British Empire all over the world. In fact it has not got a thorough and genuine enough knowledge of universal tendencies.

We wish to describe thoroughly the true aspects of the Far Eastern Problem below, and hope that the British and American Governments will cooperate closely and assume responsibility so that they will not make any mistake in their cognizance to the end that their sympathy for China cannot bring the desired result. In concise terms, China and militarist Japan cannot exist together. In recent years China has suffered enough oppression. Today is the final day of accounting. Being a weak country it is not easy for it to arrive at such a determination, but being compelled to take this step, and having been obliged to make this determination, it is extremely strong and cannot be shaken, because we have come to the conclusion that no yielding and conciliatory peace policy can satisfy the ambition of the militarist clique of Japan, and can save China from the danger of being conquered and lost. Consequently, having been compelled to resort to this bloody sacrifice, we are obliged to fight to the last and to seek life out of death. Throughout the transition period of the defensive war, we will be ever ready to suffer any defeat. We have determined to fight for a road of light for the Orient and for the world; we have determined to secure liberty and emancipation for China, and also for the good people of Japan, in the hope that after the war true peace for China and Japan may appear. The statements given above represent fully, without any discount, the psychology of the Chinese nation. In his repeated speeches our Generalissimo Chiang proclaimed this final determination of the country.

It

-2-

It may be recalled to the British and American Governments that China's defensive war has occurred after the occupation of the Four Eastern Provinces and the semi-occupation of Hopei and Chahar, and also after the occupation of Peiping and Tientsin, even after the local Chinese authorities sought peace through concessions following the Lukouchiao incident. If the Chinese nation today squares all the past accounts and again loses several provinces, it cannot yet safeguard the half-country left. In recent years our leader has really devoted all his efforts to peaceful reconstruction work and has really tried his best to prevent any conflict, but the farther we retreat the more the enemy advances. Japan has decided not to grant peace and not to permit us to reconstruct the country. It has determined to swallow all our natural resources and destroy all our industries, so that economically we can never abandon the position of being an agricultural country, and so that politically we may take its instructions or orders. It desires to attack Soviet Russia and compel us to guard against Communism jointly with it. It desires to expel all the white races from Asia; and it desires, moreover, to eliminate your British and American influence; therefore it declares that China's policy is to oppose Japan and has constantly brought pressure to bear on it. To put it basically, if China does not fight this defensive war, it will lose its independence. We have held our patience for several years. Now we are being attacked and bombed on a large scale. Really the final stage has come. We swear not to exist with the cruel Japanese under the same sky. During the past three months how much of our property has been destroyed, and how many of our troops and people have been killed! This debt of aggression must be squared, and will not be allowed to drag on. If we surrender half way, in a few days it will come again to occupy another several provinces, and its cruel planes will again bomb everywhere. A worthy nation can suffer such tragic conditions only once. How can it be repeated twice or thrice? Therefore the British and American Governments must thoroughly understand that China has resolved not to exist with the cruel Japanese unless and until our lost territory is recovered and our integrity and independence are safeguarded. China's power is not sufficient; therefore we expect our friends to assist. We have great expectations in Great Britain and the United States. In fact Great Britain and the United States truly show sympathy for China. Now the conference of the signatory countries of the Nine Power Treaty will soon be convened. We hope that the two leading countries first ascertain the true aspects of the problem. Furthermore we hope that the British Government will not make any mistake in the situation. We may say that China has only one opinion. Those who were conservative in the past are now more resolute. If Japan instigates Italy to argue on behalf of Japan at the conference, or asks China to surrender to Japan, China will surely give them a strong refusal. No such friendly statements will be heeded. Do not worry on behalf of China concerning the difficulties and hardship of a protracted defensive war. If you are really anxious, extend all possible assistance to us, as Great Britain and the United States are amply able to do. Soviet Russia is only awaiting

the

-3-

the resolution of Great Britain, and France is ready to cooperate with Great Britain and the United States. We venture to say: conditions in the Far East will surely change, and militarist Japan will fall without doubt. But in the change of conditions and in the fall of Japan, those who foresee it early and who put forth more efforts, will affect the tendency of the international arena in the Far East in future and the future political and economic development of China. Public opinion in China today really hopes that both Great Britain and the United States will decide to lead the other countries to assist China and to check cruel Japan through joint movement. In this way success may be most easily achieved and the best result obtained. At the same time we wish to declare, China hopes that the Nine Power Treaty conference will be crowned with good results; but if without results, China will continue to carry out its determination for self protection and existence and will not alter its policy on account of its friends' attitude. In conclusion we wish to enjoin British and American statesmen: 1) to assist China will really prove advantageous to Great Britain and the United States; 2) to express your sympathy to the last; now is the time to extend help; 3) it is well for great statesmen to lead the way according to conditions. The word "conditions" is very important. Conditions in the Far East must be thoroughly settled, so as to uproot future trouble. A stone rolling down from the summit of a mountain cannot stop midway. What is your opinion, statesmen of Great Britain and the United States?

TFV  
#L  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR  
FROM PLAIN, GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY  
AMEMBASSY PEIPING Canton via N. R.  
AMEMBASSY HANKOW Dated December 6, 1937  
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI Rec'd 11:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
zmk

2  
AS  
fil  
B

793.9d

December 6, 4 p.m.

Damage to Canton-Hankow Railway from extensive raiding December 4 was relatively slight. Yesterday Canton-Hong Kong Railway was raided twice at and south of Tongtouha without serious damage and Canton-Hankow line twice at Ying and points south (?) reportedly not serious damage. A Japanese plane destroyed a grounded Chinese plane at Tienho aerodrome. Three raids today both railways bombed, planes passing Canton subjected to heavy anti-aircraft fire indicating presence of new gunboat.

Americans arriving here a week ago and yesterday from Hankow report continuous very heavy northward movement of troops and military supplies.

Canton Government paper denounces peace terms reported presented to Generalissimo by German Ambassador, as sugar coated poison aimed to make China a puppet of Japan and Fascism. Kwantung Government paper declares no negotiations

793.94/11497

DEC 9 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- December 6, 4 p.m., from Canton via N. R.

negotiations possible till Japanese troops leave Chinese soil.

Canton is expected to gain greater importance as financial and economic center as Japanese control in Yangtze Valley increases. Mailed Swatow.

LINNELL

WTC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TK

116-1

*JTB*

*FL*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FROM PLAIN

Hankow via N. R.

Dated December 7, 1937

Rec'd 8:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*James*

*Tokyo*  
*Dec 7, 1937*  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 - 1937  
Department of State

*793.94*  
*not*  
*393.115*  
*393.1115*

19, December 7, 11 a.m.

Japanese planes bombed the waterfront at Wuhu and although the ships and other property damaged were not owned by American citizens the manner in which the raid was conducted made it a menace to the safety of American citizens and property and I suggest that the Embassy at Tokyo may think it advisable to enter a protest to the Japanese authorities. Features affecting American interests were that bombs were dropped on the British passenger steamer TUCKWO setting it on fire and causing it to drift against the hulk belonging to the same company which likewise caught fire. Both craft were completely gutted. Bombs were dropped also on the British freighter steamer TATUNG and badly damaged both the steamer and the hulk to which it was moored. All ships were plainly marked with British flags. These ships were common carriers and were habitually used by American citizens for the transportation

793.94/11498

DEC 11 1937  
OFFICE G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

116-2

-2- #19, December 7, 11 a.m., from Hankow via N. R.

transportation of themselves, their families and their property. So far as known at present no American citizens were injured. Whether there was American property loss has not been definitely ascertained. You will recall that in your telegram of December 3, 5 p.m., you reported that the Japanese Foreign Office itself suggested that the Yangtze route be used for evacuation. The attack on commercial facilities used by American citizens just described is on this account open to still more serious objection.

Sent to Tokyo through Peiping. Repeated to Shanghai. Peiping please transmit to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Tokyo

Dated December 7, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 1937  
Department of State

793.94

600, December 7, 2 p.m.

Department's 529, December 6, 2 p.m.

Giving American press comment is particularly  
helpful to us.

GREY

JS

793.94 / 11499

FILED  
DEC 10 1937

F/F G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TEV 117-1

KL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Telegram must be FROM Tokyo  
paraphrased be-  
ing communicated  
to anyone. (A)

Dated December 7, 1937

Rec'd 7:18 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
ONLAND MLD  
*in strict confidence*  
*Zmc*

193.94  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 - 1937  
Department of State

603, December 7, 5 p.m.

792.97  
A member of the Foreign Office commenting on press reports mentioned in paragraph one of our 598, December 5, 2 p.m., states confidentially that the Foreign Office has no official knowledge of any plan to withdraw recognition of Chinese Government. Our informant says that he understands that the press reports originated either at the War Office or with persons close to the Prime Minister and that, therefore, they have "some significance". His comment was that any such plan would require careful consideration of a number of delicate problems that the Foreign Office has not (repeat not) thus far made any such study.

Repeated to Peiping for relay to Ambassador John

GREW

WWC:KLP

F/F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

[CONFIDENTIAL]

117-2

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 603) of December 7, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

With regard to newspaper reports mentioned in the first paragraph of the Ambassador's telegram no. 596 of December 5, a member of the Japanese Foreign Office states confidentially that the Foreign Office knows nothing officially with regard to any plan to withdraw recognition from the Chinese Government. It is the understanding of this informant that the newspaper reports had their origin either with persons close to the Premier or at the Ministry of War and that for this reason they have "some significance". This informant commented to the effect that a number of delicate problems would have to be carefully considered in connection with any such plan and that up to the present time no such study has been made by the Foreign Office.

793.94/11500

793.94/11500

egc.  
FE:EGC:HES  
12-7

ADP  
FE  
Jus

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

Tokyo

Dated December 7, 1937

Rec'd 7:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
SENT TO  
D.M.D.  
*in strict confidence*

*Del*  
*Ch*  
Div. of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
*W*  
*my*

601, December 7, 3 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Embassy's 596, December 4, 10 p.m., withholding financial assistance to Japan.

My French colleague states that he has cabled his Government along the lines of Craigie's telegram and that in general he agrees with and supports Craigie's suggestions.

GREW

DDM

*793.94*  
*note*  
*894.51*

793:94/11501

DEC 14 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

[CONFIDENTIAL]

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 801) of December 7, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

The American Ambassador has been informed by the French Ambassador that the latter in general agrees with and supports the suggestions made by the British Ambassador as outlined in the American Ambassador's telegram no. 596 of December 4. The French Ambassador states that he has sent to his Government a telegram along the lines of the British Ambassador's telegram.

795.94/11501


295.  
FE:EGC:HES  
12-7

ACR  
FE  
JMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM [REDACTED]  
MBO



CINCAF  
DECEMBER 7, 1937  
Rec'd 10:37 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC  
AMCON SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON 5  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING



793.94

0007 Military situation unchanged. Settlement  
quiet 1915.

KLP:

793.94/11502

DEC 8 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TW

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated FROM  
to anyone.

ALUSNA PEIPING  
December 7, 1937  
Rec'd 10:20 a.m.

ACTION: NAVY DEPARTMENT

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMEMBASSY NANKING

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 1937  
Department of State

793.94

0006. General Kita here negotiating politically but  
Wu Pei Fu still insists on complete withdrawal Japanese  
troops from China and request from Generalissimo to take  
charge. The latter stipulation intended show control this  
area by central government and is intolerable to Japan  
who are considering alternate plan of reviving Hopei  
Chahar Council with remaining old members then install  
Pu Chieh as head North China evident that Nippon desperat-  
ly trying effect some form regime thus weakening Nanking  
also strengthening own hand against much feared activities  
in Manchukuo. Seventy thousand effectives withdrawn  
this area to Manchuria since nineteen October probably  
half sent Shanghai thirty planes went north via Tientsin  
on twenty-seventh November reliable reports received  
growing unrest in puppet state. 2150.

KLP

793.94/11503

FILED

F/EG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

GRAY

FROM Nanking, via N.R.

Dated December 7, 1937

Rec'd 8:22 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

<sup>1008</sup>  
~~1000~~, DECEMBER 7, 11 a.m.

Embassy's 1004, <sup>11494</sup> DECEMBER 7, 7 a.m.

Division of  
EAS-EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 1937  
Department of State

793.94

One. The Mayor was still here last night. His duties now seem chiefly concerned with the so called safety zone. Steady streams of refugees, most of whom were women and children of the poorer classes, were entering the area all day yesterday.

Two. Yesterday a British Embassy clerk en route from (?) (?) in British merchant launch was fired upon by two Chinese soldiers in a sampan when he refused to stop at their hail. Six soldiers were executed yesterday for looting in Hsiakuan section and village near British Embassy. Otherwise the city remained quiet although there was growing confusion outside the walls because the military have been burning villages to clear the terrain for their artillery fire. Some of this confusion may spread inside the walls now that Japanese advance units have taken Kuyung and, as reported by an

American

793.94/11504

FILED

DEC 7 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

2- No. 1009, December 7, from Nanking.

American correspondent last night and announced in the Chinese press this morning, are about twenty-three miles away just beyond Tangshan on Nanking Hangchow highway. Early this morning we heard a battery, no doubt Chinese, and located in that direction nearer the city, fire a few rounds.

Three. Postal delivery ceases today although Hsia-kuan post office is still accepting mail for despatch.

Four. British sources report that Chinese troops at Chinkiang are systematically looting and burning the city. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

KLP:WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 23, 1937.

JAN 3 1938

NOTED

S:  
Mr. Secretary.

Shanghai's despatch No. 1070, November 7, 1937, on the subject "The Future Status of Shanghai".

Mr. Gauss submits, in rough outline, suggestions for a possible solution of the problem of the future status of Shanghai. His suggestions have as their essential basis (1) the merger of present special foreign interests in an international municipal venture which shall admit substantial Japanese participation, but not domination, under a form and structure essentially Chinese and depending from the National Government, and which shall include Chinese representation and participation, and (2) the gradual substitution of Chinese for international control over a fixed term of years, say 25 years, when the whole structure shall pass finally into Chinese form and character.

Mr. Gauss states that in his opinion the French Government may be disposed to pool its interests in Shanghai with those of the other powers. He does not minimize the difficulties to be encountered in obtaining the cooperation of the Japanese military who may demand a dominant position in the Shanghai area.

RLS/REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 23, 1937.

~~A-116.~~  
Shanghai's despatch No. 1070, November 7, 1937, on the subject "The Future Status of Shanghai."

Mr. Gauss has obviously given a great deal of thought and attention to the preparation of this report on the important question of the future status of Shanghai. His suggestions for a solution of this problem are comprehensive and should be of great value to the Department in its consideration of the Shanghai problem on the conclusion of hostilities.

FE recommends that this despatch be given the grade of "Excellent."

*JW*

*RS*  
FE:RLS:VCI

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 1070 <sup>air</sup>

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 - 1937  
Department of State

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Shanghai, China, November 7, 1937.

January 7 1938

793.94  
993.101  
993.102

SUBJECT: The Future Status of Shanghai.

1-148

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 DEC 7 AM 10 29

THE HONORABLE  
SECRETARY OF STATE,  
WASHINGTON.

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

Ey  
Faus

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
MR. HORNBECK  
JAN 21 1938  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
A-M/C  
JAN 8 - 1938  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE

While the ultimate course and final outcome of the present Sino-Japanese hostilities cannot now clearly be foreseen, it appears that at least the first phase of Japan's military operations in China is being completed, with the Japanese in occupation of several of China's northern provinces and of the immediate Shanghai area.

Japan had no desire for a clash of arms at Shanghai at this time; her objectives were in the North. The military occupation of the Shanghai area has been slow and tedious and has exacted an exceedingly heavy toll in men and material. Forced to large scale military operations in this area, it remains to be seen whether Japan will now be content merely to have driven the Chinese armies some few miles inland from the port or whether she will determine to attempt a deeper penetration of the Yangtze Valley toward the national capital in an effort still further to crush China's military strength and perhaps to humble China to a dictated peace. If Japan determines upon that course she must undoubtedly pay a high price for whatever success, if any, she may attain.

Sooner

793.94/11505

F/FG  
11545

-2-

Sooner or later, however, there must come the time for consideration of, and negotiations on the future status of Shanghai, and I wish by this despatch to lay before the Department for what they may be worth my observations on this problem.

Even the more liberal-minded and farseeing amongst those Japanese who are not entirely in accord with the Japanese military policy toward China, express the view that Japan's heavy sacrifices in the Shanghai campaign will lead to extensive and perhaps even extravagant demands in this area. Unless I am entirely wrong in interpreting their guarded remarks and general attitude, it is probable that the Japanese military demands will be for some such broad arrangement as the cession of a leased territory extending from the Yangtze River to Hangchow Bay, or at the very least, a deep demilitarized zone of equal proportions and within that zone an arrangement which will ensure for Japan a dominant position and controlling influence.

Foreign business and other leaders at Shanghai and some of the Chinese of calmer judgment, clearer vision and practical outlook, seeing the trend of events, have lately been giving quiet consideration to the possibility of finding a solution of the Shanghai problem which might be supported by China and the friendly Powers and yet be acceptable to Japan, with promise of a more happy existence and prospect for the future for both foreign and Chinese interests than can be contemplated under any Japanese military dictated arrangement.

I am aware that a small group of Americans and Britons have been studying the problem for some weeks, and

I am

-3-

I am told that in a few days a rough draft outline of the results of their study will probably be available for private and confidential circulation.

Several of the interested Americans have discussed the problem with me unofficially.

As the Department is aware, various schemes have been put forward from time to time for the solution of the Shanghai question. A "free city" plan has several times been mooted; and there have been proposals for the establishment of an international zone extending into the hinterland, protected by foreign garrisons or "neutralized" by the Powers.

In my unofficial conversations with interested Americans I have suggested no solution of the Shanghai problem, but having in mind that we must finally face a situation in which the Japanese will likely demand control and domination of a large area, I have not discouraged a study of the situation with a view to the quiet formulation of proposals which might be put forward through appropriate channels at the proper time.

I have told those who have consulted me:

1. That any scheme for a "free city" which would seriously impinge China's administrative and territorial integrity and deprive the National Government of the large Shanghai customs revenue would not be likely to have official foreign support.
2. That any plan which contemplated the indefinite presence of foreign garrisons at Shanghai or a guarantee by the Powers for the protection of a neutral area would equally fail of official foreign support.
3. That any effort to produce a formula which might be put forward for Chinese and Japanese acceptance must prominently indicate the complete willingness on the part of those Powers now interested in the International Settlement and the French

Concession

-4-

Concession to merge those special areas into a common venture which promises equal benefits to all legitimate interests and eventual complete rendition of the whole area and its administration to China.

The opinion has been expressed in some quarters that the French might not be disposed to include the French Concession in any proposed merger of interests. I do not share that opinion, and believe that with the present trends in France and the realization by the French that some solution must ultimately be found for the "concession" problem in China, there would be a disposition to pool French interests with the interests of other Powers provided due recognition of French interests is secured in any arrangement finally made.

While I have thus limited my expression of personal views to the interested Americans who are studying the problem, I now venture to submit for the information of the Department, in rough outline, suggestions for a possible basis for a solution. In doing so, I am keeping constantly in mind that we are faced with the probability of Japanese demands which if imposed and met would seriously affect both Chinese and foreign interests at China's principal port and commercial, financial, and industrial center; which would in effect establish Shanghai as a Japanese dominated port.

1. Believing that Japan will at the least insist upon a deep demilitarized zone extending between the Yangtze and Hangchow Bay, I would suggest that such a zone be established within the minimum of the Japanese demands, and that China and Japan might perhaps guarantee its neutrality, by treaty or agreement, for a period of say twenty-five years.
2. Within such demilitarized zone there might be set up, within the minimum of the Japanese demands, an area to be known as a Special Chinese Municipality, to embrace at the outside not more than the area of the present Special Municipality of Greater Shanghai (Chinese), together with the

present

-5-

present International Settlement and French Concession areas.

3. Such special municipality should depend from the National Government. Its titular head might be a Chinese, nominated by the governing body of the Municipality and appointed by the Chinese Government, serving principally as a presiding and "representative" officer and as a high ranking liaison with the National Government.
4. The Special Municipality should have the same powers of municipal government as a special municipality of the Chinese Government (except perhaps that it may be necessary to provide for further special authority to carry out the arrangements), and if any veto power is vested in the National Government it should be so restricted and safeguarded as not to permit of undue and unreasonable interference with the legitimate functioning of the municipal governing body.
5. The municipal governing body would perhaps need to be bicameral, with a council representative of all nationalities and interests (including the Chinese), and a committee (with restricted veto power and the executive authority) carefully balanced to be representative of those interests principally concerned in the establishment of the Municipality, including China and Japan and the major Powers interested in the International Settlement (which is a merger of the British and American settlements) and the French Concession.
6. The Special Municipality should absorb, so far as necessary, the major personnel of the present International Settlement and French Concession administrations, to which may be added a substantial Japanese personnel and such trained Chinese personnel of all administrations (including the present Chinese Municipality of Greater Shanghai) as may be necessary.
7. The Special Municipality should also absorb the outstanding legitimate indebtedness and obligations of the three administrations.
8. The trained police forces of the foreign areas, with an added substantial Japanese unit and such personnel of the police of the Chinese Municipal Government as may be necessary, should form the police organization of the Special Municipality.
9. Provision should carefully be made for the functioning within the Special Municipality of the National Government agencies for the collection of the Customs and other national revenues, but a check should be provided against the imposition within the Special Municipality of special taxation

not

-6-

not uniform and uniformly collected throughout the country; and as to special national laws, such as those governing narcotics and opium, factory inspection, "party" organizations, authority should vest in the governing body of the Municipality to prevent the exercise of controlling and supervising authority except through agencies of the Municipality.

10. The Chinese courts should be provided for in a manner similar to that now obtaining in the International Settlement and the French Concession, except that it might be desirable, looking forward, to seek the establishment of these courts on a higher plane than most Chinese courts with a view to the possible later relinquishment of the regime of extraterritoriality and it might for this reason be desirable to establish certain checks and safeguards, as for example the appointment of foreign legal advisers, as contemplated in the draft proposals of 1931 for the abolition of extraterritoriality.
11. Provision should then be made for the gradual replacement both on the governing body and in the personnel of the Municipality, of foreign interest, with an ultimate rendition of the area to complete Chinese administration as a gradual process over a period of say twenty-five years.

These suggestions represent merely a rough outline.

They have as their essential basis (1) the merger of present special foreign interests in an international municipal venture which shall admit substantial Japanese participation (but not domination) under a form and structure essentially Chinese and depending from the National Government, and which shall include Chinese representation and participation, and (2) the gradual substitution of Chinese for international control over a fixed term of years, say twenty-five years, when the whole structure shall pass finally into Chinese form and character.

I admit that the implementing of the proposals would present a number of perplexing and difficult problems; there would be the necessity of meeting the extravagant demands of a momentarily dominant Japanese military; there would be the necessity, particularly on the part

of our

-7-

of our British friends, of sacrificing a substantial portion of their present dominant position; and in order to arrange French participation there might be the necessity of assuring to French representation a greater participation in the governing body and administration than the French commercial and financial position at Shanghai might otherwise justify; but it is my opinion that these suggestions may be found to offer in broad outline a possible and desirable solution of the Shanghai problem which might be made generally acceptable to both China and Japan as the antagonists in the present hostilities, and to foreign and Chinese interests at Shanghai generally.

A difficult task would be the proper checks and balances in the governing body of the Special Municipality. In this regard it would be wise to look forward to the time, perhaps not more than a few years distant, when an Asiatic bloc of Chinese and Japanese might substantially dominate the municipal government. I believe that in the Council of the Municipality the widest possible foreign representation should be permitted and the representation not confined to the nationalities of the "interested Powers" only. All foreign consular control or supervision should be excluded from the administration, and, in order that the Municipality as such may be sued, a special court should be set up for the purpose, perhaps composed of judges of the Chinese Courts along with any judicial advisers of the Chinese Courts (of foreign nationality). Foreign residence and trade, the establishment of factories, et cetera, should be permitted throughout the area of the whole Municipality, a land registry based on the new Chinese land laws might be set up (super-  
seding

-8-

seding the present complex system which includes the consular land offices), and it might reasonably be possible to establish a limited free port area and free port manufacturing zone under Customs control to meet certain ambitions in that direction.

The revenues of the enlarged municipality, if properly collected and administered, should be adequate for the purpose both of the administration and of its consolidated indebtedness. It is certain that both Chinese and foreign capital would find in such a set-up a desirable locale for investment, and the Shanghai eventually handed over to complete Chinese control and administration would probably present a richer, better ordered and better administered area than China might hope to evolve by its own effort over a much longer period of time.


I realize that even if general agreement might otherwise be had to the broad outline of my proposals there would be objection that the twenty-five year period of "international" control (with gradually increasing Chinese influence) which it contemplates would likely not be acceptable to the Japanese, and would not even be pleasing to certain foreign interests which would like to perpetuate foreign influence in China's premier port. A twenty-five year period might of course be stretched to forty years or even fifty years, roughly two generations, but I have sufficient confidence in the Chinese and the progress which they were able to show to the world in the past ten years to believe that a twenty-five year period is reasonable. I do not believe that much could be accomplished in a shorter period and I do not

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-9-

not believe that foreign capital could be courted to invest in the Shanghai area if the period of "international government" of the port were fixed at less than that period.

Respectfully yours,



C. E. Gauss  
American Consul General

CEG:DTM

Original to Department by air mail  
Four copies to Department by pouch  
Copy to Embassy, Nanking (by hand)  
Copy to Embassy, Peiping (by hand)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 7 1938

*[Handwritten signature]*  
*after making*

Clarence E. Gauss, Esquire,  
American Consul General,  
Shanghai, China.

Sir:

In acknowledging the receipt of your despatch  
No. 1070 dated November 7, 1937, entitled "The Future  
Status of Shanghai", it is a pleasure to inform you  
that, in view of its value to the Department, and the  
thought and careful attention which it evidences, the  
Department has accorded to the report the rating of  
EXCELLENT.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

G. S. Messersmith

*note*  
*123 y 231*

793.94/11505

Entered on Efficiency Record

*M.V.D.*

CR  
JAN 6 1938

A-M/C:JJM:EE  
1-4-38  
*[Handwritten initials]*

*[Handwritten initials and marks]*

A true copy of  
the signed original  
*[Handwritten mark]*

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hurler NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Foochow/117 FOR #10

FROM Foochow ( Ward ) DATED Nov. 1, 1937  
TO  NAME  1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict.

Reports developments in-, for month of Oct., 1937.

mr

793.94/11506

F/W/R

793.94  
11506

B. Relations with other countries.

1. Japan.

a. Burge of Japanophiles. Rumors of the arrest and execution of allegedly pro-Japanese Chinese in Foochow and Northern Fukien first gained general circulation about the middle of September with the appearance of well-substantiated reports of the apprehension of several obscure Chinese charged with traffic with Japan. The shooting on September 11 of a shopkeeper for communication with Formosa attracted no particular attention.

It was not known until some days after the event that on September 14 Hwang Ping-ting (黄丙丁), graduate of a Manchurian medical school and Superintendent of the Fukien Government Hospital - famous for his refusal to employ any but Japanese-trained doctors - had been arrested. For over a month there was no word of his whereabouts, whereafter it was variously reported that he had escaped; that on or about October 15 he had died from an overdose of chloroform administered by his captors; that he had been freed.

Early in October it was reported that Li Tse-i (李擇一), long an associate of General Ch'en I (陳儀), to whose Government in Fukien he served as High Advisor, and one-time member of the

Hpei

-4-

Hopei-Chahar Political Council, had been arrested on September 18, and was being held, presumably in Nanking.

On October 9 Lin Pai (林白), well-known scholar and poet, an editor of the Japanese-controlled Min Pao, and until October 6 a secretary in the Reconstruction Bureau, was arrested and shot. He was charged with accepting money to carry on Japanese propaganda, and certainly his connection with the Min Pao - a paper which ceased publication when the Japanese Consul General left Foochow - would lend colour to such an allegation, but of more significance is the fact that the propaganda which he was supposed to be attempting to disseminate was described as being in favor of autonomy for Fukien with General Ch'en I as the head of the new state.

But with his two most recent arrests General Ch'en Ch'i (陳琪) has come even closer to the person of the man whom many Chinese regard as Fukien's First Japanophile: on the night of October 20, J. Y. Liu (劉爰其), prominent local Rotarian and Manager of the Foochow Electric Light Company, and his uncle G. L. Liu (劉崇倫) were taken into custody by plainclothes men of the 80th Division, the former from a party and the latter from a hospital in which he lay ill. Nothing has been heard of them since, although they are both believed to be alive. It has since been reported that they were charged with selling military secrets to Japan, and supplying Japanese ships at Matsau with coal. Their arrest is important, however, not because they

are

-5-

are both well known to the local foreign community, but because they are close friends and supporters of General Ch'en I. Like the Chairman, C. L. Liu was married to a Japanese, and for the last two summers at least General Ch'en I has lived with the Lius in their house on Kuliang (鼓嶺), the mountain resort near here.

In the face of this apparently rapidly developing situation the Chairman still took no part in the various patriotic and anti-Japanese activities in the Province which another person in his position might have been expected to lead: at the regular memorial meeting on Monday morning, October 11, on one of the rare occasions on which he speaks at all, Ch'en I exhorted his subordinates in the best Confucian manner, urging them to do good.

b. Census in search of spies. One of the difficulties which Fukien faces in its effort to take its place in the common front against Japan arises from the fact that Japanese subjects of the nearby island of Formosa - which has been Japanese only since 1895 - are many of them Fukienese by race and language, and can pass easily for Chinese. The rumor that some hundred and forty Formosans had recently arrived in Foochow to serve as Japanese spies caused the Government here to order a special census of the population to track them down. A house-to-house canvass was in

fact

-6-

fact made, but no statement as to whether it attained its object has been published.

c. Japanese planes fly over Foochow.

Six times during October - on the 3d, the 8th, the 9th, the 18th, the 23d, and the 24th - Japanese aeroplanes appeared over Foochow, but only on two occasions did they remain over the city for any length of time, and on neither of those were bombs dropped.

d. Propaganda pamphlets dropped. During

the visitation of October 24 - carried out by three large twin-engined bombing planes, which circled over the city for over half an hour - propaganda pamphlets were scattered over the city. Those dropped on Nantai (南台) were of two kinds, one picturing the destruction of areas which resisted Japanese armies, and the comradery and peace which prevailed where they were welcomed, and the other describing the destruction of the Chinese air and sea fleets by the Japanese bombers. These and four other types of hand-bills were scattered over wide areas south of the Min River (閩江) on the same day. Pamphlets picked up at P'ut'ien (浦田) explained that the Japanese Army did not seek the conquest of territory but was only engaged in a righteous punitive expedition against Chiang K'ai-shek (蔣介石) in which it hoped to revenge the crying wrongs which, according to the pamphleteers, that monstrous person had done to the Chinese people.<sup>5</sup>

e.

---

<sup>5</sup>An effort is being made to secure copies of these handbills for transmission in a separate despatch.

-7-

e. Air defence plans rumored. To Cantonese commanders to the south, and to the military authorities at Nanch'ang (南昌), whose guard areas the planes which crossed Fukien were flying to attack, reports of the unhindered flights of these bombers over Foochow were said to have recalled the rumors which were current in the last week of July of an arrangement between General Ch'en I and the Japanese Consul General whereby Northern Fukien purchased immunity from attack in return for non-participation in anti-Japanese acts. Persistent local political gossip, probably not altogether groundless, had it that these generals carried their charges against General Ch'en to Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek, who in order to disprove them ordered that steps were to be taken to prepare a "first line" of aerial defence at Foochow. It was even said that a flotilla of planes was to be sent here. If there has been any actual development in this direction, no sign of it is as yet evident.

f. Diongloh reported bombed. However, on October 26 the airfield at Diongloh (Ch'ang Le - 長樂), at the mouth of the Min River, the construction of which had been begun allegedly as a part of this air defence scheme, was reported to have been bombed. Two bombs were in fact dropped, but they both fell into the sea, and the Admiral in charge of the defence of that area informed the Consulate that he did not believe that an attempt had been made to

attack

-8-

attack the airfield; in his opinion the bombs were loosed by accident from injured bomb racks.

g. More land defenses constructed.

Whether an attempt is to be made to check the flight of Japanese aeroplanes over Foochow, there is no doubt but that the military authorities now in control here are doing their best to make an actual military invasion of the province - for instance, through Amoy and up the Foochow-Amoy road - a costly undertaking. In one small area some distance from Foochow this writer saw probably not less than three thousand laborers busy on the construction of defence works apparently well calculated to assist a properly organized defence of that particular region.

h. Sah to Shanghai and Singapore.

The "Grand Old Man" of Fukien, Admiral Sah Chen-ping (薩鎮冰), was selected by the Provincial Society to Support Resistance to Japan to head a party of Foochow citizens to proceed to the front lines in the Shanghai area to lend encouragement to the Chinese troops fighting there, and to bear them gifts of clothing and other necessities. He and the group which accompanied him left on October 1 by river launch for Yen'ing (延平), whence they travelled overland to Shanghai. From Shanghai he proceeded by boat to the Straits Settlements and the Philippine Islands, where his mission is the collection of funds from overseas Fukienese, and the sale to them of the so-called "Salvation Bonds".

-9-

i. "Liberty Bond" campaign. In the campaign for the sale of the "Liberty-" or "Salvation Bonds", which opened here in September, the Province of Fukien is expected to subscribe \$12,000,000, \$8,000,000 of which is to be collected from the municipalities and districts (Fochow and Amoy are both expected to contribute \$800,000) and \$4,000,000 from the sale of public property and reductions in the salaries of public servants. Within the three months allowed the province in which to raise the required amount, every school teacher who receives more than \$50 must subscribe one month's pay; every university student must solicit or contribute \$10, and every middle school student \$5. A family worth \$10,000 must contribute 1% of that amount; one worth \$50,000 2%; one worth \$100,000 3%.<sup>4</sup> This levy on wealth in the Province has already caused an audible murmur among those most effected, and the regulations governing the amount of the collection may be changed.

j. Other patriotic activities. While the more well-to-do were being asked to make substantial contributions to the purchase of "Salvation Bonds", a drive was being pushed among the people to secure from them such pittance as they could afford to give. Called the "sent a day" movement, it gathered considerable momentum during the month.

On his way to Hongkong Admiral Seah had informed representatives of the Society to Support Resistance that the Shanghai soldiers stood in need

of

---

<sup>4</sup>Fukien Min Pao, October 12, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-10-

of cotton waistcoats more than anything else, and shortly thereafter school girls in every large town and city in this district were busy making them.

On October 22 the Chamber of Commerce of Foochow - acting in concert, it was said, with that of Amoy - wired the League of Nations, requesting that body to use economic pressure to force Japan to forego her aggressive policy in China.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 890.00/71 FOR Memorandum  
FROM State Dept.  
Far Eastern Division (Hamilton) DATED Dec. 4, 1937.  
/td/ NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: The Situation in the Far East: Resume' of develop-  
ments in Sino-Japanese controversy during week  
ended Dec. 4, 1937.

fpg

793.94/ 11507

11507

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 22, 1937.

~~MSM:~~

~~JCV:~~

~~JWB:~~

~~RCM:~~

MMH:

Shanghai's despatch No. 1077,  
November 22, 1937, on the subject "Japanese  
Plans at Shanghai".

Mr. Gauss feels that the Japanese are too busy with their military activities to give attention for the present to the Shanghai problem, but that the problem will be dealt with by the Japanese military and not consular authorities. He believes it advisable not to make any changes in the disposition of our forces which would give the Japanese an opportunity to introduce Japanese troops south of Soochow Creek on the pretext of protecting Japanese property.

Mr. Gauss states that the temper of the Japanese military, if correctly reported, is one of truculent disregard for all foreign rights and interests and a determination to place Japanese authority in control at Shanghai. He does not believe that the Japanese civil authorities at Shanghai will be able to persuade their military to a moderate or reasonable course.

*MSM*  
RLS/REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 1077

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 - 1937  
Department of State  
*Handwritten initials and marks*

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Shanghai, China, November 22, 1937.

*Handwritten:*  
793.9  
note  
893.1028

SUBJECT: Japanese Plans at Shanghai.

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
NOV 23 11 01 AM '37  
7 DEC 7 1937

OFFICE OF  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
RECORDING DESK  
WASHINGTON

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

A.M/C

RECORDING DESK

FILE -

*Handwritten:* UG  
Saus  
ONI MID  
DI

I am taking advantage of the departure of a naval vessel for Hong Kong tomorrow morning to transmit to the Department copy of:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
A.M/C  
DEC 23 1937  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

1. A memorandum handed to me this morning confidentially by the (American) Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council, recording the representations made to him on Saturday, November 20th, by the Japanese Consul General, and the representations made to the Secretary General of the Council (also an American; Mr. Stirling Fessenden) on the afternoon of the same day, by Major General Harada, the Military Attache of the Japanese Embassy, acting on behalf of General Matsui, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese military forces in this area.
2. Copy of an "aide memoire" handed to me this morning by Admiral Yarnell with the statement that it had been delivered to the commandant of the U. S. Marines, Brigadier General Beaumont, by Captain Fujita, the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Naval Landing Party.

793.94/11503

These documents have been the subject of telegrams despatched by me to the Department today, with copies to the Embassy at Tokyo.

Enclosure No. 2, makes reference to the "Consuls General in Shanghai, who met in a semi-official conference the other day" having "discussed the question of returning the disposition of foreign troops in the Settlement to its pre-trouble status".

In that connection, I enclose (Enclosure No. 3) copy of a signed memorandum from the senior (neutral) naval commanders at Shanghai, dated November 15th, 1937, which they handed to their Consuls General. When this memorandum was received some doubt arose as to the intentions of the naval commanders, and it was ascertained that the memorandum, which had a British origin,

F/F/G

DEC 7 - 1937

-2-

origin, was intended for possible "trading" purposes by the consular representatives.

The French Consul General was of the opinion that the time had not arrived for any negotiations with the Japanese. My British colleague and I felt that we should proceed with the utmost caution. We approached the Senior Consul (the Norwegian Consul General) who convened a meeting of the American, British, Dutch, French, Italian and Japanese Consuls General and himself for an informal discussion of pending problems.

At this meeting we considered the difficult food situation; the necessity of getting food supplies in from the countryside (whence the Japanese have driven most of the Chinese as refugees in the foreign areas), and the desirability of returning all districts to normal as soon as possible so as to relieve the refugee situation and allow business to function again. Reference was made to the desirability of returning the foreign troops to their barracks as soon as possible; this suggestion was made in order to obtain the Japanese reaction.

I made the following memorandum record of my estimate of the result of the meeting, at which no minutes were taken:

"My reaction to the meeting was that the Japanese are not prepared at the moment to disclose their plans; they are too busy following up their military advantage to give attention to the Shanghai problem; that problem however will be dealt with by the Japanese military and not by the consular authorities (except as they may be told later what to do); and that so far as concerns our neutral area it would be well not to make any changes in our disposition of forces which would give the Japanese an opportunity to propose the introduction of Japanese troops south of the Creek on the pretext of protecting Japanese property which the foreign forces had given up protecting."

I am of the opinion that our Italian colleague allowed the Japanese to know exactly what had been proposed in the memorandum handed to us by the senior naval commanders (including the Italian).

Shanghai is full of rumors and reports as to the plans of the Japanese military and it is not possible at this time to reach any conclusion as to what action will probably be taken. One source close to the Japanese Consul General tells me that the latter is so discouraged in his efforts to curb the ambitious Japanese military plan to seize the Customs, the banks, and other government offices, that he threatens to resign. I cannot but feel that some of the reports put out have been designed to intimidate the Chinese, and the foreign authorities to easy acquiescence in whatever the Japanese military may dictate.

It seems to me, examining the memorandum of the conversations with officials of the Municipal Council, that the Council


-3-

Council has taken an exceedingly liberal attitude toward the Japanese "demands". A reasonable basis for a working arrangement might be found in such attitude.

But all suggestions for the introduction of Japanese forces into the area south of Soochow Creek should be opposed. Whatever the legal aspects of the problem, it must be realized that the presence of Japanese troops in the foreign protected "neutral" areas with their huge Chinese resident and refugee population of almost three million persons, is certain to lead to "incidents" and disorders, no matter how strenuously the police and other authorities may guard against them. The Japanese, if they are well disposed toward foreign interests and toward the Chinese civilian population, would be well advised to refrain from any attempt to put their forces south of the Soochow Creek.

The Department will recall that I have from the beginning of the threat of hostilities at Shanghai emphasized the necessity of maintaining the sanctity of the "neutral" areas guarded by the (neutral) foreign forces. In the absence of a declaration of war which might give the Japanese forces the rights of a belligerent army in occupation, every effort should be made, short of a resort to armed force, to exclude the Japanese forces from the so-called "neutral areas" until the cessation of Sino-Japanese hostilities. The Japanese have occupied and shut off the northern and eastern districts of the Settlement. Those districts are after all is said and done, a military base. Only with the greatest difficulty are Americans and other foreign nationals permitted to enter portions of those areas to remove cargo or look after their property. If the Japanese forces enter the area south of the Creek, there can be no question but that they will soon be in complete domination of it. "Incidents" will occur, or be manufactured, and what may have been originally a small armed guard for a Japanese cotton mill would soon become a Japanese military force in complete occupation. The temper of the Japanese military, if it is correctly reported, is one of truculent disregard for all foreign rights and interests and a determination to place Japanese authority in control at Shanghai. I do not believe that the Japanese civilian authorities at Shanghai, if it is true that they favor a moderate course of respect for foreign rights and interests, will be able to persuade the Japanese military to a moderate or reasonable course.

Respectfully yours,

  
C.E. Gauss  
American Consul General.

3 Enclosures.

Original by air mail through Hong Kong  
Copies to follow by first pouch  
CEG/ceg

Enclosure No. 1 in Despatch No. 1077  
dated November 22, 1937, from the  
American Consul General at Shanghai.

Aide Memoire of Interviews with Japanese Officials  
on Saturday, November 20, 1937.

-----

At 11 o'clock on Saturday morning Mr. Okamoto called by appointment on the Chairman of the Council. Mr. Okamoto brought with him Mr. Tajiri. Mr. Fessenden and Mr. Phillips were present.

Mr. Okamoto stated that on receipt of the Council's reply to his first letter with regard to the suppression of anti-Japanese propaganda he had found it necessary to write his further letter dated November 18. That letter had purposely been framed in abstract or general terms and the purpose of the present interview was to discuss with the Council details as to the various measures which the Japanese military authorities desired should be adopted.

Mr. Okamoto then proceeded to go through item by item various points covered by a typed memorandum which he had with him.

The first main heading was:

- (1) Suppression of anti-Japanese and other subversive activities.

This main heading was divided into four sub-headings:-

- (a) Disbandment of all organisations, including Kuomintang Branches.

In regard to this the Council's representatives made it clear that the Council was prepared to co-operate in suppressing any organisations which were indulging in anti-Japanese propaganda. Mr. Franklin pointed out that it would be undesirable to suppress an organisation of a beneficial nature, such as the Red Cross, and stated that he assumed that the Japanese authorities had in mind only organisations indulging in activities which might be described as "helping the enemy". Mr. Fessenden emphasised, in regard to the National Salvation Association which was specifically mentioned by Mr. Tajiri, that the Council had taken steps to suppress this organisation long before they had been requested by the Japanese authorities to suppress anti-Japanese organisations. Mr. Phillips stated that his recollection was that he had read in recent Police reports that Kuomintang branches had been closed down already, but that he would confirm this point with the Commissioner of Police.

In conclusion Mr. Franklin stated that it appeared that there was no difference of opinion between the Japanese authorities and the Council on this sub-heading. He added that it was important to the Council to know what were the organisations which the Japanese regarded as deserving of suppression. Mr. Phillips suggested in this regard that it might be possible for there to be a direct liaison between the Japanese authorities and the Shanghai Municipal Police, Special Branch, who were engaged upon this work. Mr. Franklin emphasised the point that the Council did not wish to be charged

-2-

with a breach of faith, and that unless the Council knew which organisations the Japanese authorities had in mind they could not safely give any undertaking that all organisations of the nature under discussion would be suppressed.

(b) Suppression of posting of bills and dissemination of literature; prohibition of theatricals, etc.

It was explained to the Japanese officials that the Council was already and had been for some time engaged upon this work and that the Municipal Police were in entire accord with the Japanese authorities as to the desirability of suppressing bill posting and the dissemination of literature which would stir up the masses in any way. The Police had always been prepared to suppress and were in fact suppressing theatricals of an anti-Japanese nature.

(c) Suppression of Radio Broadcasts.

In this connection the Japanese Consul-General asked how many broadcasting stations there were in the Settlement. He stated that it was definitely known to the Japanese that there were still being broadcasted matters which were hurtful to the Japanese and helpful to the Chinese Government. He emphasised that the object of the Japanese military was to end the war as soon as possible and that no activities could be tolerated in Shanghai which were helpful to those who were resisting Japan. The Council's representatives stated that without consultation with the Commissioner of Police they were unable to give Mr. Okamoto detailed information as to the number of broadcasting stations and as to the practicability of controlling them rather than suppressing them. They undertook to take the whole matter up with the Commissioner of Police at the earliest opportunity. Mr. Fessenden stated that he had been assured by the proprietor of a leading Chinese broadcasting station that nothing of an anti-Japanese nature was now being broadcasted. Mr. Okamoto, however, stated that he had information to the contrary.

(d) Suppression of Chinese Spy Mania and Traitor Hunting.

At this point Mr. Okamoto raised his voice and almost shouted. He gave the appearance of having reached a point on which he had been specifically instructed by General Matsui to be emphatic.

Mr. Fessenden informed Mr. Okamoto that he agreed that there had been definite instances of traitor hunting, but that the Municipal Police had been paying for some weeks the most special attention to this point and that he, Mr. Fessenden, who received daily Police reports covering such matters, believed there had been no instance for the past three weeks. He considered that on all the points at present mentioned by Mr. Okamoto it might be said that the Municipal Police had already been taking action which had proved most successful.

(2) Eviction of Chinese Government organs and their representatives, both central and local; effective supervision over the activities of Chinese governmental and party leaders.

Mr. Franklin made it clear at once to Mr. Okamoto that a distinction must be drawn between the various types of Chinese governmental organs. Both in theory and in fact, the

-3-

Council had no jurisdiction whatever over the Customs, and in fact, though there might be a slight difference in theory, the Council had no jurisdiction whatever over the Chinese Post Office. In regard to other Chinese Governmental organisations in the Settlement, it might be said that the Council could probably prevent them from functioning. As Mr. Okamoto, tended to pursue the matter about the Customs it was pointed out to him that this was a matter for the Consular Body rather than for the Council. This suggestion did not meet with favour, as Mr. Okamoto stated that everybody knew that the Consular Body could only act when unanimous and that as a result their meetings did not result in decisions but merely in discussion. The Consular Body, he said, had no power to enforce its decisions, if taken, whereas the Council had a Police Force.

The Council's representatives agreed that except in so far as the Customs, the Post Office and possibly the Telegraph offices were concerned, the Council could probably take action to ensure the removal of Chinese Government offices from the Settlement. Mr. Phillips had stated that he had reliable information that very morning that the City Government offices had already ceased to function in Shanghai.

In regard to the supervision of the activities of Chinese Governmental and party leaders, Mr. Okamoto first indicated that the Japanese desired the immediate eviction from the Settlement of Mr. O. K. Yui, Mr. Doo Yet Sung, T. V. Soong and Wang Hsiao Lai: there might also be others. He stated that these persons had been leaders in stirring up the Chinese people to resist the Japanese and that he considered that they should not enjoy the safety of the Settlement. It was pointed out to him that a Domei despatch had reported that Mr. O. K. Yui had already reached Hongkong, and that probably the other two gentlemen were residing in the French Concession rather than in the Settlement. It was in addition pointed out to him that the Council had no power to deport people because in the past they might have indulged in activities which were not desirable. Provided they were at present conducting themselves without prejudice to law and order the Council could not take any measures to deport them. Mr. Okamoto appeared to accept this position, and asked, apparently without great conviction, that the Council should exercise special supervision over these persons. The impression was given that it would undoubtedly make for a better atmosphere if private persuasion could effect the departure of these persons from the Settlement.

(3) Prohibition of Chinese censorship of communications - both postal and telegraphic.

It was pointed out to Mr. Okamoto that the Council's officers could not enter without warrant or every good reason upon the premises of foreign telegraph companies. The Council's representatives, however, agreed that in practice the Council probably could prevent, through the Police, the exercise of any Chinese censorship over these companies. In regard to the Post Office the situation was different, as the postal service had more of an official and international aspect.

-4-

(4) Suppression of Chinese censorship of the Chinese Press and news services.

The Council's representatives indicated that they would take this matter up with the Commissioner of Police and find out from him exactly how the Chinese censorship of the press worked. It was agreed that the Council would be ready to co-operate in this matter as far as it could.

(5) Suppression of unauthorised wireless communications by the Chinese.

It appeared from Mr. Okamoto that the Japanese military authorities desired to prevent any wireless messages being transmitted from Shanghai which might in any way convey useful information or assistance to the Chinese Government or the Chinese forces. Mr. Franklin pointed out the great difficulty of controlling a large number of wireless transmission sets and also pointed out that it was important not to interfere with diplomatic and commercial communications or to do anything which would cut Shanghai off from the rest of China. Mr. Okamoto appreciated Mr. Franklin's point and stated that he would be satisfied provided any messages were prevented which were of assistance to the enemy. The Council's representatives agreed to discuss this matter with the Commissioner of Police and decide what steps could reasonably be taken.

Mr. Okamoto and Mr. Tajiri then requested that from time to time a list be sent to them summarising the various activities of the Municipal Police on the lines suggested by the Japanese. They implied that such a list might be of value to them in satisfying their military authorities of the good faith and intentions of the Council.

Just before they left Mr. Okamoto and Mr. Tajiri mentioned the fact that a Japanese Admiral had been prevented from coming into the Settlement because he was in uniform. It was pointed out to them that there was nothing to prevent a Japanese officer coming into the Settlement in uniform but that it might be that hitherto the Police had felt it to be impossible to guarantee the safety of a Japanese officer in uniform who might, especially on foot, be attacked by Chinese. Mr. Okamoto emphasised the desirability of as soon as possible securing a state of affairs where Japanese officers could move freely through the Settlement without fear of attack.

In conclusion Mr. Okamoto stressed the desirability of increasing the number of Japanese police, and also emphasised the strong desire of the Japanese to have a Police officer of a high position in the Police Force. Mr. Phillips pointed out that there was already a Japanese Deputy Commissioner. To this, however, Mr. Tajiri replied that the present Japanese Deputy Commissioner's work lay outside the ordinary central organisation, and what they wanted was a high Japanese officer playing an integral part in the central administration of the Police Force.

Mr. Franklin promised that both these points would be reported upon by the Commissioner of Police.

-----

-5-

At 12 o'clock Mr. E. A. Long, Secretary of the Consular Body, telephoned to Mr. Phillips on behalf of the Senior Consul and stated that it had been brought to his attention that the tone of articles in the Shun Pao and the Ta Kung Pao had recently been growing more bitter, that the Japanese were described as "barbarians" and that the Foreign Powers were accused of standing by and seeing the Chinese slaughtered. The Senior Consul felt that if the tone of these articles was not modified it might provide an excuse for Japanese interference.

-----

At 4 o'clock General Harada, accompanied by Mr. Okazaki, called on Mr. Fessenden by appointment to bring a message from General Matsui. Mr. Phillips was present.

General Matsui's message, which had been prepared in advance, was of a formal nature, and its effect is summarised in this morning's papers in a communique issued by the Japanese themselves. In effect it may be said to have been as follows:-

General Matsui expects the Council to take immediate steps to suppress the subversive actions of the Chinese Government organisations and other groups in the Settlement which are anti-Japanese, and if the Council fails to take these steps General Matsui will reluctantly be compelled to take them himself.

After the message had been translated a discussion took place, and Mr. Okazaki, on behalf of General Harada, asked certain questions which gave an indication of what was passing in the minds of the Japanese military. He was particularly anxious to know whether or not the Council claimed any jurisdiction over the Customs. On Mr. Fessenden stating that the Council claimed no such jurisdiction, and that any dealings with the Customs would be a matter for the Consular Body, Mr. Okazaki showed resentment and pressed for the answer that the Consular Body, as such, had no jurisdiction over the Customs. He made the point that the Customs was in theory a purely Chinese institution and that neither the Council nor the Consular Body had legally any say in the matter. He stated that what was to be done with the Customs was already under consideration by the Japanese authorities.

He then asked what the Council's attitude would be if the Japanese wished to march troops along the Bund with transport and supplies going to Nantao. Mr. Fessenden stated that in theory the Council had no right to protest against Japanese troops marching peacefully along the Bund, but that he very much doubted the wisdom of such a step on the ground that it might alarm the Chinese and disturb the foreign population. To this General Harada replied, through Mr. Okazaki, that a show of force might be of value in regard to the Chinese population as deterring them from anti-Japanese activities, and that the foreign population were mostly educated and accordingly should not be disturbed by the presence of Japanese troops.

Mr. Fessenden in general assured General Harada that

-6-

the Council appreciated the realities of the situation and the fact that the Shanghai area was under Japanese military occupation. He emphasised, however, the size of Shanghai and the complexity caused by its various nationalities' interests, and urged that the Japanese authorities should not be impatient but should rely upon the goodwill and good sense of the Council.

The interview closed in a friendly atmosphere, but it had previously been very conspicuous by the display of the iron hand rather than of the velvet glove.

21st November, 1937.

Copied by DTM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 in despatch No.  
1077 dated November 22, 1937,  
from the American Consul General  
at Shanghai, China.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

A I D E M E M O I R E

It has come to my knowing, that now that the actual scenes of the present hostilities are shifted from the vicinity of Shanghai to the remote interior, and this International Settlement is freed from danger of fighting, Consul-Generals in Shanghai who met in a semi-official conference the other day discussed the question of returning the disposition of foreign troops in the Settlement to its pre-trouble status.

In view of the present situation in the Settlement gradually resuming its normal state of affairs, my Admiral Ohkoti wishes to hold himself responsible for the protection of the lives and properties of his nationals residing in your sector. For this purpose he would like to inform you, as a matter of courtesy, that he will despatch a contingency of his troops to the Naigai Wata Kaisha Club on Gordon Road as he did before the present hostilities broke out. He also wishes to notify you that he will hereafter send his lorries with few of his men on them for the transportation of food-stuffs to his sailors in the area west of the International Defence perimetre and Nangtao through the Settlement south of Soochow Creek, as this route provides us short-cut.

In this connection, will you please remind yourself that American Marines have been despatched to the Yangtzepoo plant of the Shanghai Power Company for the protection of this American property, and also ration lorries have been daily sent there through our "A" sector with your men on them, since the outbreak of the present trouble.

Copied by DTM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 in Despatch No. 1077 of  
November 22, 1937, from the American Consul  
General at Shanghai, China

-----  
UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET  
U.S.S. AUGUSTA, Flagship

Shanghai, China  
15 November 1937

The several senior naval commanders have met in conference to discuss the subject of the future disposition of the troops in the International Settlement and the future relations with the Japanese forces.

The following were agreed upon:

The object of the troops in the international Settlement at present is to maintain law and order and to establish normal conditions in these areas at the earliest possible moment.

American, British, and Italian troops are to be withdrawn from defensive positions to barracks as soon as conditions permit. It is believed that this condition now exists in the above sectors. Patrols will be maintained along the perimeter as necessary.

The policing of the International Settlement is to be carried out by the Municipal police supported by troops if necessary in their respective areas.

On account of the large commercial interests in Hongkew it is most desirable that this section return to its former status as soon as practicable.

Until present hostilities are over it is desirable that Japanese troops not be quartered south of Soochow Creek or in B sector.

H.E. YARNELL  
Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Commander-in-Chief  
U.S. Asiatic Fleet

CHARLES LITTLE  
Admiral  
Commander in Chief  
China Station

LE BIGOT  
Vice Admiral  
Commander in Chief  
French Naval Forces  
in the Far East

ALBERTO DA ZARA  
Capitano di Vascello  
Commandante Superiore in E.O.

J. HOUTSMULLER  
Lieutenant Commander  
Senior Netherlands Naval Officer

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Hague, Netherlands,  
November 24, 1937.

No. 83

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 - 1937  
IN  
Department of State

SUBJECT: POSSIBILITY OF GERMAN MEDIATION OFFER  
SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 DEC 7 PM 1 43

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

*Handwritten initials*

*Handwritten initials*

*Handwritten signature*

793.94  
793.94/19

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that in a conversation with the Foreign Minister today he referred to a letter he had just received from Jhr. A.C.D. de Graeff, First Netherlands Delegate to the Far Eastern Conference at Brussels, in which the latter said, inter alia, that M. Spaak had told him on the eve of the dissolution of the Conference that he really feared that Germany was now going to make a concrete move looking towards mediation in the Sino-Japanese conflict.

The Department has undoubtedly been far more fully informed...

793.94/11509

LEF/FG

1/509

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Huatgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

informed from Brussels, and perhaps elsewhere, of possibilities in this direction, and accordingly I did not deem that this warranted a cable, but feel that for the record it is better to send this brief written despatch.

Respectfully yours,

*George A. Gordon*  
George A. Gordon.

File No. 710

In quintuplicate

GAG:ekd

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

\*\*\*  
MBO

FROM

COMSOPAT

EXP. SENT TO  
~~SECRET~~ M.I.D.  
*zms*

December 7, 1937

Rec'd 1:55 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC  
COMSUBRON 5  
COMDESRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

*[Handwritten signature]*  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 - 1937  
Department of State  
*[Handwritten initials]*

*793.94*

0107 Air raid 1430 on Canton air field, other South  
China ports quiet 2000.

WWC

793.94/11510

F/FG

FILED  
DEC 10 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

*EE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED *MSM*

JR

FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*3000*

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated December 7, 1937

Rec'd 12:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 11 1937  
Department of State  
*MSM*

793.94

1105, December 7, 8 p.m.

Reference my 1097, December 6, <sup>11486</sup> 6 p.m., JAPANESE

Consul General is meeting with his interested colleagues  
at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. Repeated to Tokyo.

GAUSS

JLS:KLP

793.94/11511

FILED  
DEC 11 1937  
F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quateman NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-1

17V JWS

K

JR

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

A portion of this telegram Shanghai via N. R.  
must be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated to anyone. (A) Dated December 7, 1937

FROM Re-ld 1:06 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
S.M. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 1937  
Department of State

1101, December 7, 4 p.m. (GRAY)

Reference my No. 1098, December 6, 7 p.m.

793.94  
net  
893.1028

According to the Japanese Domei news service the Japanese military spokesman at press conference this morning stated that urgent necessity dictated by military requirements had caused the military police to make the arrest of the persons concerned who were suspected of being involved in a plot threatening the security of the Japanese forces and that when questioning revealed they were innocent they were released. The spokesman declared that "We did not intend to challenge or to deny the right of the Shanghai Municipal Police to police the International Settlement" and "we hope that there will be no further need for us to take such action if the Shanghai Municipal Police take the necessary steps". (END GRAY)

793.94/11512

Two. Municipal Council has reported the incident to the Senior Consul who is seeing the Japanese Consul General today. Notwithstanding all assurances, we may expect continuance of such measures so long as the Japanese military remain at Shanghai.

Repeated to Tokyo.

GAUSS

WWC:KLP

FILED  
DEC 12 1937

F/FG

(CONFIDENTIAL)

1-2

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (no. 1101) of December 7, 1937, from the American Consul General at Shanghai reads substantially as follows:

Reference is made to the Consul General's telegram no. 1098 of December 6.

According to the Japanese Domei news service the Japanese military spokesman at a press conference on the morning of December 7 stated that urgent necessity dictated by military requirements had caused the military police to make the arrest of the persons concerned who were suspected of being involved in a plot threatening the security of the Japanese forces and that when questioning revealed they were innocent they were released. The spokesman declared that "We did not intend to challenge or to deny the right of the Shanghai Municipal Police to police the International Settlement" and "we hope that there will be no further need for us to take such action if the Shanghai Municipal Police take the necessary steps."

The incident has been reported by the Municipal Council to the Senior Consul who is seeing the Japanese Consul General on December 7. So long as the Japanese military stay in Shanghai we may expect to see a continuance of such measures, notwithstanding all assurances.

793.94/11512

*EGC*  
FE/EGC  
XII-8-37

*ACB*  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

FROM

Dated December 7, 1937

Rec'd 2:41 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

*File*  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 1937  
Department of State  
*File*

1102, December 7, 5 p.m.

My 1096, <sup>11482</sup> December 6, 2 p.m.

793.94

Japanese advance units are reported to have taken Chalukow and Kaokiaomen about three miles from Nanking to the south and southeast respectively. According to an unconfirmed report they have captured the Purple Mountain and further south are about ten miles from Wuhu. Japanese gunboats have passed through the Kiangyin boom but three new booms are said to have been constructed between Chinkiang and Nanking. Competent observers in Shanghai do not expect prolonged Chinese resistance at Nanking.

Repeated to Nanking, Hankow, Paiping.

GAUSS

KLP:ENC

793.94/11513

FILED  
DEC 1 1937  
F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
1937

December 14, 1937

A. W.  
P. H.  
E.  
Mr. Wilson



*Mr. Hornbeck*  
You may be interested in noting

the kind of propaganda which is being put out in this country by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce of New York. The conclusions of the attached pamphlet are given in the preface.

*m. m. h.*

*See 15*

*JWB*



*793.94 / 11514*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

TPV

F-E

793.94



**The Sino-Japanese Crisis** Division of  
1937 FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 - 1937  
Department of State

First Comprehensive, Authentic, Factual Statement,  
with Official American and Japanese Documents

793.94/1514

JAPANESE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF NEW YORK  
500 FIFTH AVENUE  
NEW YORK CITY

FILED  
AN 10 1938  
F/F 6574

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By *Milton D. Gustafson*, NARS, Date *12-18-75*

Chinese censors struck [certain] facts and opinions from cables and radio messages filed and even changed news cables to make it appear that doubt existed in the minds of foreign officials here that possibly the bombs came from Japanese planes, but this is distinctly not true.

*New York Times Shanghai dispatch filed at Hong Kong,  
September 2, 1937.*

During the world war the French Press Bureau had photo-chemigraphic department whose "principal work consisted in making photographs and cuts of wooden figures with cut-off heads, torn-out tongues, gouged-out eyes, crushed skulls, and brains laid bare. The pictures thus made were sent out as unassailable evidence of enemy atrocities to all parts of the world where they did not fail to produce the desired effect."

*From Behind the Scenes of French Journalism by a French  
Chief Editor.*

## The Sino-Japanese Crisis 1937

First Comprehensive, Authentic, Factual Statement,  
with Official American and Japanese Documents

## CONTENTS

### *Part One*

#### THE CRISIS

PAGE

I. Foreign Troops in North China. . . . .	11
II. Clashes at Peiping. . . . .	15
III. China's Will to War. . . . .	18
IV. Japan Strives for Peace. . . . .	23
V. Enter Shanghai. . . . .	28
VI. A Campaign of Lies. . . . .	34

### *Part Two*

#### LEADING TO THE CRISIS

VII. China's First Opportunity Lost. . . . .	41
VIII. China Scraps Treaties. . . . .	44
IX. Technique of anti-Japanese Agitation. . . . .	55
X. Heading to the Clash. . . . .	58

### *Part Three*

#### OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

I. Secretary Hull's Statement to the Press, July 16, 1937. . . . .	65
II. Japan's Observations on Secretary Hull's Statement. . . . .	66
III. Secretary Hull's Statement on American Policy on the Sino-Japanese Situation, August 23, 1937. . . . .	67
IV. Pacific Blockade of China Coast. . . . .	69
(a) Japanese Foreign Office Announcement, August 26, 1937.	
(b) Japanese Navy's Statement, August 26, 1937.	

	PAGE
V. Statement by Mr. Koki Hirota, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at an Interview with the Foreign Correspondents, September 1, 1937. . . . .	71
VI. Text of Japanese Foreign Minister Koki Hirota's address before Diet, September 5, 1937 . . . . .	74
VII. President Roosevelt's Warning to Americans in China. (Special dispatch to the <i>Baltimore Sun</i> , September 6, 1937) . . . . .	79
VIII. State Department's Warning to American Shipping, September 10, 1937. . . . .	81
IX. State Department's Statement on War Trade, September 14, 1937 . . . . .	82
X. Vice-Admiral Kiyoshi Hasegawa's Communique of September 19, Warning in Advance of Intended Aerial Bombing of Nanking. . . . .	82
XI. Admiral Harry P. Yarnell's Reply to the Foregoing Communique of Vice-Admiral Hasegawa. . . . .	83
XII. Text of the American Protest, dated September 22, 1937, against Japan's Announcement to Bomb Nanking. . . . .	84
XIII. Japan's Note of September 29, 1937, in Reply to America's Note of September 22, regarding Nanking Bombing . . . . .	86
XIV. Admiral Harry P. Yarnell's Statement, Shanghai, September 24, 1937, regarding Protection of American Lives and Property. . . . .	87
XV. State Department's Statement, October 6, 1937. . . . .	88
XVI. Japanese Government's Statement. . . . .	90

## PREFACE

If the facts herein presented are weighed without bias, these conclusions are inevitable:

1. For 16 years Japan strove to befriend China. China replied with anti-Japanese agitation. This agitation was not an outgrowth of Manchukuo's secession under Japanese guardianship—it had been going on for almost ten years while Japan was following a decidedly conciliatory policy in China's interest.
2. The present clashes in the Peiping-Tientsin area and at Shanghai were caused by the aggressive acts of Chinese Armies. For three weeks Japan did all in her power to avoid hostilities and to settle the "incident" in the Peiping-Tientsin region through peaceable negotiations. All such Japanese endeavors were frustrated by the repeated, wilful aggressions of the Chinese forces who wanted to crush the Japanese by superior numbers. For three weeks Japan did not mobilize home troops. China mobilized immediately after the Marco Polo Bridge clash.  
At Shanghai, the official foreign representatives, who participated in the Sino-Japanese negotiations for forestalling hostilities in that area, are agreed that Japan was goaded into taking military action by provocations by the Chinese who evidently wanted to fight.
3. In the above light, Japan can by no stretch of the imagination be called the aggressor. She acted in self-defense. This being so, Japan has violated neither the Nine Power Treaty nor the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Suster NARS, Date 12-18-75

Kellogg Pact, neither of which bars defensive military action. Can any nation be expected to write notes and consult the numerous signatories of the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty while its troops, rightfully stationed in a foreign country, are being repeatedly assaulted, while 200 of its civilian nationals are being massacred (Tungchow), while another 10,000 (Tientsin) and still another 30,000 (Shanghai) of its nationals are in imminent danger of being attacked, all by the regular soldiery of that foreign country?

4. What Japan wants in North China is the establishment of a condition which will not menace Manchukuo, and which will permit her to engage in peaceful pursuits of commerce and industry in cooperation with the Chinese. Japan is convinced that such a condition cannot be established while the Blue Shirts (similar to Soviet Russia's Secret Political Police or G.P.U), Communists, and other anti-Japanese organizations are permitted to operate with the Central Chinese Government's connivance and encouragement.
5. North China will not become a second Manchukuo. The Emperor of Manchukuo will not move to Peiping to occupy the palace which belonged and still belongs to him. The establishment of the above-mentioned peaceful condition is all Japan wants.

Japan, in short, is the aggrieved party in this unfortunate conflict which she did everything to avoid. She is grieved because her endeavors of 16 years for peace and friendship with China have been greeted with taunting rebuff by the other side. She is grieved because her acts and motives have been grossly misconstrued and misjudged abroad, particularly in America for which she has nothing but respect and friendliness.

Just now, the outside world is governed by emotions rather than by reason on this question. Yet this is the time of all times when reason should control passion. America wants peace. Japan wants peace. Japan is grateful to America for all that America has done for her since the historic days of Commodore Perry. No untoward developments should be permitted as between the two nations.

Americans may not unreservedly accept the above five conclusions. But they will at least concede that the case is a complicated one—that it requires a careful study before they commit themselves to any rash conclusion. They will recognize that China's claims are open to debate and call for scrutiny.

If in the face of the clear evidence presented herein America insists upon calling Japan the aggressor, Japan will never reconcile herself to the pained and painful thought that grave injustice has been inflicted upon her. She will be hurt to the quick that a nation whom she has for eighty long years regarded as her best friend has failed her.

Economically, Japan's relations with America have been most satisfactory. America is Japan's best customer. Japan is America's third best customer. Normally, Japan alone buys from America more than China and all the rest of Asia and Oceania combined. We hope this happy condition will not change. The war-emergency measure, restricting Japan's imports, affects only less than one per cent of her normal imports from America, and this only temporarily.

With these thoughts we present this pamphlet to the American public in the interest of Peace and Good Neighborhood, of Justice and Fair Play.

*Japanese Chamber of Commerce of New York.*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By *Milton O. Quate*, NARS, Date 12-18-75

War is, in itself, an atrocity. Cruelty and suffering are inherent in it. Deeds of violence and barbarity occur, as everyone knows. Mankind is goaded by authority to indulge every elemental animal passion. But the exaggeration and invention of atrocities soon becomes the main staple of propaganda.

*Lord Ponsonby in his FALSEHOOD IN WAR-TIME.*

---

It is even possible that a policy of friendly co-operation with Japan would produce a greater measure of peace and prosperity in Asia than our pedantic insistence on the status quo and our attempt to revive the sick man of Asia by maintaining the integrity of China.

*Jay Franklin*  
*in New York Post and other papers.*

## Part I The Crisis

There can be no doubt that the Chinese forced the fighting in the Shanghai areas, while foreign powers took little cognizance of the fighting in North China. It was hoped that by making a last stand at Shanghai, possibly some form of intervention or at least greater notice of China's case would be taken. Furthermore, the terrain north of Shanghai was much more suitable for defensive action than that of North China. The best Chinese troops also were in this area.

*New York Herald Tribune, Shanghai Dispatch, September 16, 1937.*

Qualified foreign army and naval observers and precision instruments aboard American, British and French warships in the Whangpoo River disclose that the Japanese have kept their pledge that their bombers will not fly over the Shanghai refugee area. The Chinese have refused to give a similar pledge.

*New York Times, Hong Kong Dispatch, August 27, 1937.*

## CHAPTER I

### FOREIGN TROOPS IN NORTH CHINA

Any conditions which make comparisons damaging to China's "face" possible are outrageous in the sight of all patriotic Chinese; so the continued existence of foreign communities, persisting in some dignity and prosperity, while China goes to pot under native mismanagement, is in itself intolerable.

RODNEY GILBERT in "*The Unequal Treaties: China and the Foreigners*"

In 1900 North China was shaken with a great anti-foreign uprising known as the Boxer Rebellion, encouraged and fostered by the Chinese Government itself. The extermination of all foreigners was the objective of the Boxers. To attain this objective the Boxers directed their first assault against the Legation quarters in Peking (now Peiping).

For eight weeks from June 19, 1900, hordes of Boxers besieged the British Legation in Peking, in whose compounds all other Legations and foreigners had taken refuge. For eight weeks they were bombarded and subjected to murderous assaults day and night.

Never before in all the history of the whole world had any government attempted, through instigated mob uprising, to massacre an entire diplomatic corps accredited to that government. On July 16, one of the beleaguered Americans, the late Dr. W. A. P. Martin, a sincere friend of the Chinese, penned the following appeal "to the Christian world":

"Since July 19, we have been shut up in the British Legation and others adjacent, and bombarded day and night

with shot and shell. The defence has been magnificent. About 1,000 foreigners (of both sexes) have held their ground against the forces of the Empire. Some thousands of Chinese converts are dependent on us for protection. The City Wall near the legation is held by our men, but the Chinese are forcing them back and driving in our outposts. The mortality in our ranks is very great; and unless relief comes soon we must all perish. Our men have fought bravely, and our women have shown sublime courage. May this terrible sacrifice prove not to be in vain! We are the victims of pagan fanaticism. Let this pagan empire be partitioned among Christian powers, and may a new order of things open on China with a new century."

At the beginning of the ninth week of the murderous siege a combined British, French, American, Japanese, Italian, German, Russian, and Belgian force carried the walls by storm, and entered the Legation quarters just in time to save the 1000 foreigners from a wholesale destruction.

In the wake of this tragedy, the Boxer Protocol was signed between the foreign powers and the Chinese Government. By virtue of the Protocol foreign troops were stationed along the railway between Peking and Tientsin so that the foreigners in the Capital could at least keep a line of escape open to the sea coast in case of emergency.

Today, 37 years after the Boxer uprising, the foreign powers do not as yet feel safe in relinquishing the right of stationing garrisons. The anti-British uprising of 1926-7, the Nanking and Shanghai outrages of 1927, and the Tsinan outrages of 1928 are still fresh in their minds.

The Nanking outrages included the looting of the British, American, Japanese and other consulates; assaults upon foreign

[ 12 ]

women; murder of the American vice-president of Nanking University, two Englishmen, a French and an Italian priest; the wounding of the British Consul General and a number of others, all by Nationalist troops. Soon thereafter, these troops attempted to seize the International Settlement in Shanghai.

The Tsinan outrages of 1928 were directed mostly against the Japanese residents in that city in Shangtung Province, resulting in the looting of hundreds of Japanese establishments, and in the killing of tens of Japanese.

The foreign troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area are accustomed to hold periodic maneuvers. At Peiping, the American soldiers usually hold maneuvers in a place known as Happy Valley, while the British and other European soldiers use an area north of the American grounds. The Japanese use a flat area near the Marco Polo Bridge some two miles from Peiping.

The notes exchanged in 1902 between Japan and China provide that, except in the case of gun practice with live ammunition, no advance notice need be given the Chinese authorities.

But the Japanese military authorities in North China, out of courtesy and a desire to forestall any untoward incident, always informed the local authorities in advance whenever maneuvers were to be held.

In July, 1937 the foreign garrisons in North China consisted of the following:

	Soldiers	Machine Guns	Cannon	Tanks and Armored Cars
Japanese .....	4,080	173	38	9
American .....	1,227	121	13	2
British .....	999	64	10	0
French .....	1,839	135	26	10
Italian .....	384	62	4	4

[ 13 ]

The Japanese residents engaged in business in this area total 17,000, whom 4,080 Japanese soldiers are expected to protect. All Americans and Europeans combined total 10,338 for whose protection 4,449 soldiers are stationed.

[ 14 ]

## CHAPTER II

### CLASHES AT PEIPING

What needs most to be said about China now is that the Chinese are very close to losing their balance. If they do not pull themselves up, they will repeat the mistake they made almost ten years ago, with the same disastrous consequences.

NATHANIEL PEPPER *in Asia, New York.*  
(Written in Shanghai, April, 1937)

On the evening of July 7, 1937, some 150 Japanese soldiers were engaged in the usual maneuvers on their usual grounds near the Marco Polo Bridge. As always, the Chinese authorities had been advised in advance. The Japanese soldiers carried no live ammunition. They used blanks.

Unexpectedly, at 11:40 of the same evening, these Japanese soldiers were fired upon by Chinese troops of the 37th division of the 29th Army from the direction of the Marco Polo Bridge and the village of Lung-wang-miao.

The Japanese did not and could not return the fire because they had no real shots. They halted their maneuvers, retreated some distance, and notified their headquarters in the former British barracks at Fengtai some two miles away. Reinforcements arrived a little after midnight. Then the Japanese replied to the Chinese fire. ✓

Meanwhile, the local Chinese and Japanese military authorities in Peiping were advised of the incident. Immediately they formed a joint Sino-Japanese mediation party and dispatched it to the scene. As a result, at 6 A.M., July 8, the fighting stopped. ✓

[ 15 ]

But at 3 P.M. and again at 6 P.M. of the same day, the Chinese soldiers resumed firing upon the Japanese.

Next morning, July 9, a truce was arranged between a responsible representative of the 29th Army and Colonel Matsui of the Japanese force.

On July 10, between 5 P.M. and 8 P.M. more than 200 Chinese soldiers brought forth trench mortars and launched a new attack, thus utterly disregarding the truce agreement. The Japanese, naturally, opened fire. However, a truce was again arranged, as the Japanese were anxious to localize the incident and to liquidate it at once.

On July 11, the Japanese Government sent instructions to the Japanese military authorities on the spot and urged them to bend their endeavors for an early settlement.

At 4 P.M. on the same day an agreement was reached between Colonel Matsui on the Japanese side and General Chang Tsujung (Mayor of Tientsin) and Ying Yung (Chief of the Public Peace Bureau of Hopei Province, in which Peiping is located) on the Chinese side.

The terms of this agreement were:

- (1) Apology by the representatives of the 29th Army, and the punishment of those directly responsible.
- (2) The Chinese troops to evacuate Lukouchiao village (at Marco Polo Bridge) from which they fired upon the Japanese, and to be replaced by the Peace Preservation Corps for the purpose of keeping the Chinese troops sufficiently separated from the Japanese.
- (3) Adequate measures to be taken for curbing the activities of the anti-Japanese Blue Shirts and Communists.

[ 16 ]

There was nothing extraordinary in these terms. They were of a nature to be easily complied with. Item 3 for the curbing of the Blue Shirts and Communists had already been agreed upon long before this incident. Both the Blue Shirts and the Communists were the most dangerous and disturbing elements conducting nefarious yet violent anti-Japanese campaigns both among the civilian Chinese and the Chinese soldiers. To restore normal intercourse between Japan and China, the curbing of their activities was imperative.

On July 13, General Sung Cheh-yuan, Commander of the 29th Army and Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council (which had ample power to deal with such matters as the above) went to Tientsin and took up the negotiations with Lieutenant-General Katsuki, Commander of the Japanese garrison.

General Sung virtually accepted the above terms and on July 18, expressed to General Katsuki his regrets over the Marco Polo Bridge incident. Thus the first step was taken toward a speedy settlement.

[ 17 ]

### CHAPTER III

#### CHINA'S WILL TO WAR

At a time when Japanese statesmen have clearly shown their desire to view Chinese affairs by a "new concept," it is unfortunate that certain asperities in argument have lately manifested themselves in Chinese comment on Sino-Japanese relationships. . . . The man who cries before he is out of the wood is apt to receive a nasty shock. So also is he who banks too much on a forbearance which emanates from a sense of strength mistaken by him for weakness.

*North China Daily News (British)*  
*Shanghai, May 22, 1937*

We have seen that by July 18 the competent Chinese authorities in North China had practically agreed to settle the incident locally and peaceably.

But Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek's Government at Nanking had been bent upon provoking war. It had decided to strike at Japan while Japan's military preparations were not completed. It had exaggerated the significance of such events as the short-lived revolt of a small body of Japanese soldiers in Tokyo in February, 1936, and it hastened to the conclusion that the Japanese Army had but feet of clay. It believed that China had at least an even chance of winning a war with Japan and of regaining the lost territory of Manchukuo.

Nor was this Chinese belief unnatural. China had 198 divisions comprising 2,250,000 officers and men. This gigantic army has further been reenforced by 200,000 Communist soldiers whom Nanking worked hard to set against Japan.

In comparison the Japanese Army is a puny affair, consisting of 17 divisions of 250,000 officers and men.

[ 18 ]

China, moreover, had acquired in large numbers modern implements of war such as airplanes, machine guns, tanks, etc., with foreign instructors to teach Chinese in their use. Many of her numerous divisions have been trained by foreign officers.

Small wonder that Chinese military leaders had decided to strike.

Following the Marco Polo Bridge incident of July 7, the Nanking Government lost no time in sending troops to the North. On July 9 it mobilized 4 divisions. It also mobilized air forces. These, of course, were in addition to the large forces already in North China.

By July 19, no less than 30 divisions (about 200,000 men) of the Chinese Army had been concentrated in North China. Of these about 80,000 were in the neighborhood of Peiping.

By July 22 Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek's own divisions had entered Hopei province. This was in violation of an agreement of 1935 under which Nanking pledged itself not to advance any of its troops into this province. The agreement was signed by General Ho Ying-chin, Nanking's War Minister and Chairman of the Peiping branch of Nanking's Military Council, and by General Umedzu, Commander of the Japanese Garrison at Tientsin.

By July 23 there were at least 250,000 Chinese soldiers in North China. Such a great military concentration, such a feverish mobilization can be understood only in the light of Nanking's thirst for war.

That China was bent upon war was fully recognized by competent American and European observers. On May 22 the North China Daily News, authoritative British newspaper in Shanghai, sounded this warning to Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek:

[ 19 ]

"At a time when Japanese statesmen have clearly shown their desire to view Chinese affairs by a 'New Concept,' it is unfortunate that certain asperities in argument have lately manifested themselves in Chinese comment on Sino-Japanese relationships. . . . The danger of overcalling a hand is well-known to diplomatists as well as to bridge players. The success of General Chiang Kai-shek in obtaining the recognition of China's equality of status as the result of his unification of the country, will only be prejudiced if the occasion is taken to claim for China a measure of military or political strength unwarranted by the facts. The man who cries before he is out of the woods is apt to receive a nasty shock. So also is he who banks too much on a forbearance which emanates from a sense of strength mistaken by him for weakness."

Mr. Nathaniel Peffer, a keen critic of Far Eastern affairs and a sincere friend of China, writing from Shanghai last April in *Asia* (New York) for June, struck much the same note of warning against China's "will to war." Said he:

"What needs most to be said about China now is that the Chinese are very close to losing their balance. If they do not pull themselves up, they will repeat the mistake they made almost ten years ago, with the same disastrous consequences. In fact, it is difficult just now to say which China has more to fear: Japan or China, the ambitions of the Japanese Army or the state of mind of the Chinese people. The latter, I am inclined to think. For it may succeed in bringing on a war that is not easy to prevent in any case but that could still be prevented. . . ."

"China won a great moral victory last autumn. It stood off Japan by sheer force of will. But the victory has borne

[ 20 ]

an over-confidence, a recklessness and an impatience to exploit the victory that may very well bring on that which the Chinese have had most reason to dread till now — a formal attempt by Japan to conquer the country by force. What began as a resignation to war if necessary, as a last resort, in self-preservation, is now in a fair way to becoming a will to war. One has only to be here in China for forty-eight hours to be shocked by the recklessness with which not only students but mature and influential Chinese talk and think of war."

It was this *Will to War* on the part of China which defeated Japan's *Will to Peace* this year.

By July 11 the Japanese Government, while ordering the Japanese military authorities on the spot to endeavor for peaceful settlement, had been forced to take cognizance of China's feverish war activities which had immediately followed the Marco Polo Bridge incident.

On July 19, the Nanking Government flatly notified Japan that it would recognize no local settlement of the incident, and that Tokyo must negotiate directly with Nanking. This, of course, meant that Nanking would reject the terms which had been agreed upon between the Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council and the Commander of the Japanese Garrison.

The Hopei-Chahar Political Council was organized in 1935 with the explicit agreement of the Nanking Government. It had settled many important local questions such as restoration of mail and railway communications between Manchukuo and North China, and the establishment of customs offices along the Manchukuo-Chinese border. It had also amicably settled delicate questions arising from the murder by anti-Japanese Blue Shirts of three Chinese newspaper publishers friendly to Japan, and the

[ 21 ]

assassination of a pro-Japanese Commander of the Peace Preservation Corps at Luan-chow.

All this while, the Nanking Government never raised any objection to such local settlements of such local matters.

Now, however, China's military leaders are evidently convinced that they are prepared to confront Japan in the arena.

Hence their flat rejection of the Japanese proposal for a peaceable local settlement.

Japan insists upon peaceable local settlement of this matter (1) because preservation of the local autonomy enunciated by the Hopei-Chahar Political Council was deemed essential to peaceful, normal relations between North China, Manchukuo and Japan, (2) because the increasing extension of Nationalist influence in North China also meant Communist and Blue Shirt inroads, (3) because such a condition will lead to the joining of forces between these disturbing elements and the red regime of Outer Mongolia.

#### CHAPTER IV

##### JAPAN STRIVES FOR PEACE

The central authority has grown weaker and weaker until at present its mandates are practically without effect. In the meantime the military leaders in the various provinces, realizing their power and subject to no restraining influence, have worked each for himself, rising and falling like the tide. Temporary combinations are effected for the purpose of eliminating anyone who appears to be gaining the ascendancy; but when this is accomplished, the allies split up to fight among themselves, until the time is ripe for another effort at military consolidation.

Walter H. Mallory in his *China: Land of Famine*.

We have noted that by July 19 the semi-autonomous North China authorities (the Hopei-Chahar Political Council) had taken a definite step toward the speedy liquidation of the incident started at the Marco Polo Bridge on July 7.

But with the Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek's Nanking Government bent upon war, mobilizing 250,000 soldiers in North China alone, urging the local war lords to fight the Japanese, using Blue Shirts and Communists to stir up anti-Japanese agitation among the soldiers and populace, and vetoing in advance any local settlement of the question, Japan's hope for a peaceable liquidation was doomed.

Small wonder the officers and men of the 37th division, which provoked the Marco Polo Bridge incident, continued defiant and recalcitrant—this in spite of the fact that this division belonged to the 29th Army whose Commander in Chief was General Sung Cheh-yuan himself who had agreed upon a peaceable local settlement. Other divisions were equally defiant.

On July 20, despite Sung Cheh-yuan's pledge, the troops of the 37th division renewed attack upon the Japanese, again in the neighborhood of the Marco Polo Bridge.

Again General Sung Cheh-yuan assured General Katsuki, the Japanese Commander, that he would cause the withdrawal of the 37th division by noon of July 21.

On the same day, July 21, at 11 A.M., at Nanking, Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek held a war Council, and formulated warlike measures against Japan.

On July 23 General Hsiung Pin, assistant chief of Nanking's General Staff, a right-hand man of Chiang Kaishek, flew to Peiping and Paotingfu (Capital of Hopei Province, 90 miles south of Peiping) and admonished the local armies to fight the Japanese, and promised a generous aid with money, men, and arms from Nanking.

No wonder that, notwithstanding General Sung Cheh-yuan's pledge for the withdrawal of the 37th division, this same army continued to remain practically in the same position facing the Japanese.

Still, on July 25, the Japanese Commander expressed the opinion that the incident would be peaceably settled.

Even as he was speaking those optimistic words, the Chinese army cut the Japanese military telephone line between Peiping and Tientsin. It was found that the line was cut at Langfang, half way between those two cities.

On July 25, at 4:20 P.M., a corps of Japanese engineers accompanied by a company of soldiers, went to Langfang under an explicit understanding with General Chang Tsu-chung, Commander of the 38th division which occupied that area.

By 11 P.M. on the same day the repair work had been done. The Japanese engineers and soldiers were eating supper at the railway station. Suddenly these Japanese, while still eating, were

3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
1st 10, 1972  
i, Date 12-18-75

attacked by Chinese soldiers using rifles, hand grenades, machine guns, even trench mortars.

The Japanese, under cover of darkness, stood the ground in the face of the enormously superior numbers. Using the field telephone line they had just repaired, they notified their headquarters at Tientsin.

Langfang is some 40 miles from Tientsin — too far to send a rescue force by ordinary means when the besieged party was in an imminent danger of annihilation.

So at 7 A.M. the next day (July 26) several Japanese planes were sent to Langfang, bombed the Chinese position, and rescued the Japanese.

It was the old Chinese story — the Commander of this Chinese division had agreed to let the Japanese repair the wire, but his subordinates, whether with the connivance of their commander or not, attempted to massacre the Japanese.

By then General Katsuki, the Japanese Commander, had reluctantly come to the conclusion that the Chinese Commanders could not be trusted, either because their orders were disregarded by their subordinates, or because they were themselves treacherous, or because they were forced to eat their own words under Nanking's promptings.

Consequently, on July 25, the Japanese Commander sent to General Sung Cheh-yuan a note which proved to be the ultimatum. The note voiced regret at the occurrence of new clashes and blamed them entirely on the failure of the 29th Army to carry out the terms of the agreement concluded with the Japanese authorities, and also on that army's maintenance of a provocative attitude.

If the 29th Army authorities still intended to prevent aggravation of the situation, the note demanded that they demonstrate

their sincerity by promptly effecting a complete evacuation of the entire Peiping area by the 37th Division.

The note specified that the troops of the 37th Division near Lukouchiao and Papaoshan be withdrawn "by noon tomorrow," July 26, to Changsintien, south of Lukouchiao; that all troops of the same division immediately leave Peiping; and that these troops, together with those of the 37th division stationed at Hsiyuan, a short distance northwest of Peiping, be moved from the area north of the Peiping-Hankow Railway to the west bank of the Yungting River by Wednesday noon, July 28th.

Specifying further that all these troops must be withdrawn promptly to the Paoting area, 90 miles south of Peiping on the Peiping-Hankow Railway, Lieutenant-General Katsuki warned that, should the Chinese fail to carry out the demand, the Japanese Army would be "compelled to conclude that the 29th Army's authorities lack sincerity, and to take any action it may deem appropriate." In that event the 29th Army must take full responsibility for anything that might happen.

Needless to say these terms were not complied with. So, on July 28, at 5 A.M., the Japanese troops began to march toward the Chinese lines.

On July 27 the Japanese Cabinet abandoned the hope for peaceable settlement, and ordered the mobilization of reinforcements to China. Note the date. Three weeks had elapsed before Japan ordered home troops to the scene of trouble, while Nanking had mobilized on July 9. For 21 days Japan strove to minimize and localize the clash and to arrive at an amicable solution. But China was bent upon war.

Strangely, on July 27, at 11 P.M., the Nanking Government came forth with a vaguely couched overture that it would negotiate on the basis of the terms which had been agreed upon between the North China authorities and the Japanese garrison

[ 26 ]

commander. It was too late. Nanking itself had cast the die. It had virtually said to the Japanese, "Come on and fight if you dare." It was evident that this eleventh hour overture was made merely for foreign consumption—to clothe with plausibility the pretense that China wanted peace. It was made with full knowledge that it was all too late to be practicable.

Furthermore, events in North China during the preceding three weeks had conclusively proved, as we have noted, that China's words could not be trusted. Had Nanking really wanted to negotiate it should have cancelled its warlike preparation and withdrawn the troops from certain areas in North China. This Nanking dared not to do. It had overcalled its hand, fanning anti-Japanese feeling among the soldiers as well as among the masses. It had sowed the wind. It was destined to reap the whirlwind.

On July 29, 3,000 soldiers of the 29th Army massacred more than 200 Japanese civilians in Tungchow, north of Peiping.

Almost simultaneously, on the same day, soldiers of the 29th Army launched attack upon the Japanese concession at Tientsin with more than 10,000 Japanese civilians.

[ 27 ]

## CHAPTER V

### ENTER SHANGHAI

The Japanese did not want a repetition of the fighting here and exhibited forbearance and patience and did everything possible to avoid aggravating the situation. But they were literally pushed into the clash by the Chinese, who seemed intent on involving the foreign area and foreign interests in this clash.

*New York Times Shanghai Dispatch, August 30, 1937*

When China is involved in trouble with Japan in the North, there is always trouble in the South, particularly the Shanghai sector. It was so in 1932. So it is on the present occasion.

The reason is obvious. In order to divide and weaken the Japanese Army in North China, the Chinese strategists think it a good move to "start something" in the South.

In the Shanghai sector Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek's crack divisions are firmly entrenched. They are provided with all the paraphernalia of modern warfare. Their underground and surface fortifications are supposed to be impregnable. Here they fight in a terrain familiar to them but strange to the Japanese. Everything is to their own advantage. The temptation is too great for them not to draw the Japanese to this vantage ground.

As the *New York Herald Tribune*, on September 19, editorially observed, the Shanghai part of the present conflict

"was precipitated by hot-heads in Nanking who seem to have thought that it would be a great moral victory and would give China's cause much advertising abroad, if the Japanese Navy's six or eight thousand marines could be

driven out of Shanghai before the army could come to their support."

At Shanghai, even more than at Peiping, the Japanese were eager for peace. Obviously, it was to their advantage not to divide their forces while the North China situation was so serious. But here, as in the North, China precipitated an "incident."

On August 9, at 6 P.M., a Japanese naval officer, Lieutenant Oyama and his seaman chauffeur, while driving along Monument Road, an extension of the International Settlement, were suddenly pounced upon by a large body of Chinese soldiers of the so-called Peace Preservation Corps.

Oyama was instantly killed, with more than thirty bullets riddling his body. His seaman aide was seriously wounded and died shortly afterward. Both Oyama and the sailor belonged to the Japanese naval headquarters in the International Settlement.

The Monument Road is under the jurisdiction of the International Settlement and is open to the passage and residence of all foreigners. There was absolutely no reason why the two Japanese should be attacked. Lieutenant Oyama was not armed, nor was his seaman-aide. Yet they were murdered in cold blood.

Furthermore, the above road is in the demilitarized zone established by the truce agreement of May, 1932, concluded between the Japanese and the Chinese military authorities after a brief fighting at Shanghai in that Spring. This zone extended for some 15 miles to the North, West, and South of the foreign area. The agreement was witnessed and thus virtually approved by British, American, French, and Italian representatives. In order to supervise the execution and operation of that agreement a permanent International Committee, consisting of Japanese,

Chinese, British, American, French, and Italian representatives, was organized.

Within the demilitarized zone no regular Chinese soldiers were to be stationed, but only a Chinese police force known as the Peace Preservation Corps, over whose organization, equipment, and distribution there was no foreign supervision. At the time the above murder took place, this police force was known to comprise some 20,000 men who were in reality soldiers.

The men on the staff of the Peace Preservation Corps were not to carry rifles, but only pistols. But an autopsy of the murdered Japanese Navy men showed that the bullets lodged in their bodies were from rifles.

For some time before the murder incident, the foreigners in Shanghai had reason for believing that the Chinese, in violation of the 1932 truce agreement, had smuggled rifles, machine guns, and even cannon into the demilitarized zone. This could be easily done, as the International Committee had no authority to supervise the military equipment of the Peace Preservation Corps in that zone.

On August 10, the morning following the murder, the Japanese Consul General in Shanghai requested a meeting of the aforesaid International Committee of which the foreign consuls concerned and the Chinese Mayor of Shanghai, Mr. O. K. Yui, were members.

At this meeting the Japanese made a full report on the murder incident, and proposed that the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps be temporarily withdrawn from the section adjacent to the International Settlement and the French Concession.

The foreign members of the Committee approved this plan, while Mayor Yui promised he would do all in his power to carry it out. Meanwhile Vice-Admiral Kiyoshi Hasegawa instructed the Japanese Naval headquarters in the International

[ 30 ]

Settlement to keep cool and do nothing to complicate the situation. He landed no marines.

On August 11, Mayor Yui, evidently under pressure from Nanking's military authorities, abruptly notified the Japanese Consul that he was "powerless" and "could do nothing." Consequently, on that evening, a contingent of Japanese marines were landed for precaution.

By the morning of August 12, it had become clear that Chinese regulars, in addition to the Peace Preservation Corps, had poured into the demilitarized zone and even occupied Chapei, contiguous to the Japanese section of the International Settlement.

Alarmed by this, the International Committee held another meeting at 4 P.M. on the same day, August 12. The Japanese again proposed the withdrawal of the Chinese troops from the demilitarized zone, but the proposal was futile as the Chinese militarist temper had become such as to defy any foreign mediation or good offices.

The next morning, August 13, skirmishes were fought between Chinese regulars and Japanese marines.

On August 14 the British Chargé d'Affaires at Tokyo suggested to the Japanese Government (1) that the Chinese troops be withdrawn from the area adjacent to the International Settlement and the French Concession, (2) that the Japanese marines, who had been newly landed, be withdrawn from the International Settlement, (3) that the area evacuated by the Chinese troops be policed by an international force.

Japan was favorably inclined toward this suggestion. Just then news reached Tokyo that Chinese planes had launched aerial bombing aimed at the Japanese flagship "Idzumo," the Japanese Consulate buildings, Japanese naval headquarters, and Japanese cotton mills in the International Settlement. This rendered the consideration of the British proposal impracticable. Japan had to

[ 31 ]

conclude that China was bent upon war. Since then Japan declined to consider any foreign mediation similar to the above British proposal.

The authoritative New York *Times* correspondent at Shanghai, on August 30, reported:

"Official foreign observers and officials of various foreign governments who participated in various conferences here in seeking to avoid the outbreak of local hostilities, agree that the Japanese exhibited the utmost restraint under provocation, even for several days keeping all of the Japanese landing force off the streets and strictly within their own barracks, although the move somewhat endangered Japanese lives and properties.

"Opinions may differ regarding the responsibility for opening of hostilities in the vicinity of Peiping early in July', said one foreign official who was a participant in the conferences held here before August 13, 'but concerning the Shanghai hostilities the records will justify only one decision. The Japanese did not want a repetition of the fighting here and exhibited forbearance and patience and did everything possible to avoid aggravating the situation. But they were literally pushed into the clash by the Chinese, who seemed intent on involving the foreign area and foreign interests in this clash.'"

Mr. Victor Keen, the New York *Herald Tribune* correspondent in Shanghai, under date of September 16, expresses the same view:

"There can be no doubt that the Chinese forced fighting in the Shanghai areas, while foreign powers took little cognizance of the fighting in north China. It was hoped that by making a last stand at Shanghai, possibly

[ 32 ]

some form of intervention or at least greater notice of China's case would be taken. Furthermore, the terrain north of Shanghai was much more suitable for defensive action than that of North China. The best Chinese troops also were in this area."

[ 33 ]

## CHAPTER VI

### A CAMPAIGN OF LIES

The paramount desire in the minds of a vast majority of American citizens at present is neutrality and peace at almost any price. How to cause that public sentiment in America to change, London and Paris diplomats ask. Build up a villain, is their answer, produce an undiluted criminal, replete with surrounding stories of brutalities and cruelties.

BOAKE CARTER, in the *New York Mirror* and other papers.

When a Chinese airplane bombed the Cathay and Palace Hotels, the best foreign hostelry in the International Settlement, China's official propaganda bureau spread news that the bomber was Japanese.

"Within 24 hours," writes Mr. Mark J. Ginsbourg, Shanghai correspondent of the Washington, D. C. *Post*, the propaganda bureau "issued an essential correction informing one and all that as a result of a thorough investigation by our staff members, it was learned that the bomber in question was Chinese, not Japanese."

Again, on August 22, Chinese planes bombed the International Settlement, this time hitting the Sincere and Wing-on department stores. Again the Chinese propaganda bureau declared that the missiles were from Japanese planes.

The *New York Times* Shanghai correspondent, to avoid Chinese censorship, filed his dispatches on this bombing at Hongkong, instead at Shanghai, so that he could tell the truth.

His dispatch dated Hongkong, August 27 (five days after the bombing), said in part:

[ 34 ]

"That some International action should be agreed upon providing for armed measures or other restraints to prevent irresponsible Chinese aerial bombing and the killing of helpless civilians in Shanghai's International Settlement and the French Concession is the consensus of foreign consular, naval and military officials in Shanghai."

That same dispatch complained of Chinese censorship, saying:

"Chinese censors struck the foregoing facts and opinions from cables and radio messages filed and even changed news cables to make it appear that doubt existed in the minds of foreign officials here that possibly the bombs came from Japanese planes, but this is distinctly not true."

Further, the *New York Times* dispatch, dated Hongkong, September 6, says about the same bombing:

"The Chinese disavowed responsibility, declaring that the missiles were from Japanese planes. Now, however, it has been definitely determined that these bombs were both of Italian manufacture bought by China from Italy. American and British naval investigators here concur in this finding and Italian officials admit the origin of the bombs. This seems conclusive proof, since the Italians say Japan never bought any such war supplies from Italy."

Remember that all these American correspondents at Shanghai are genuine friends of China. Their sympathies are for the Chinese. Yet they could not stand China's campaign of lies—such flagrant lies as have seldom been indulged in by any responsible agency of any responsible government.

If, as the *New York Times* Shanghai correspondent says, the Chinese censors are so bold as to strike out words written by foreign correspondents and write in entirely different words,

[ 35 ]

the world must be wary of news emanating from Nanking, Shanghai, or Canton about allegedly indiscriminate bombings by Japanese planes over Chinese cities.

These dispatches always give prominence to civilian casualties from Japanese bombings, but omit damages suffered by Chinese military establishments or Government buildings, of which the Japanese authorities have records as accurate as such records could be.

The Nanking correspondent of an Occidental news agency with world-wide ramifications has been an American educated Chinese who is connected with the publicity bureau of the Nanking Foreign Office.

This campaign of lies extends to press wirephotos and newsreels from China. For the sake of convenience foreign news agencies in China employ Chinese photographers along with their own countrymen. That, perhaps, accounts for the pollution of Chinese wire photos and newsreels. What guarantee is there against such pollution, if even news dispatches are changed to suit the Chinese censors?

Certain American theatres have been displaying newsreels, showing two Chinese, blindfolded and kneeling, being shot. Investigation proved that the films were made in 1931, and that the victims were Chinese looters shot by Chinese. When this was proved, the films were withdrawn.

Recently, many American newspapers printed a photograph, showing a Chinese woman, blindfolded and tied, being used as target for bayonet practice by a Japanese soldier! The face of this soldier is not Japanese, but distinctly Chinese. The blindfolded figure appeared like a dummy rather than a human being. The picture showed the soldier sticking his bayonet into the body, but no blood flows out of it!

[ 36 ]

When Colonel T. Tokahashi, of the Japanese army, was confronted by New York reporters with this photograph, he said: "The technique of the Japanese soldier as we are trained is entirely different than that displayed in the photographs. We do bayonet charges from the hips up. The soldiers do not use their weapons in the manner shown in the photographs. If a Japanese soldier affect the poses shown by the persons practicing in the pictures he would be punished."

Finally, a few of the typical specimens of the way the American press misconstrued, unintentionally of course, Admiral Hasegawa's chivalrous forewarning (Official Document No. X) of his intention of bombing "the Chinese forces as well as all establishments pertaining to military operations in and around Nanking":

1. "To blow Nanking off the Map" (New York Daily News based upon a United Press dispatch, Sept. 20).
2. "Concentrated air attacks on all sections of Nanking" (New York Times, Sept. 20).
3. "Unrestricted aerial bombing of Nanking" (New York Journal of Commerce, Sept. 20).
4. "Japan massed a gigantic warplane fleet today to destroy Nanking, capital of China and home of more than 1,000,000 people" (New York World Telegram, Sept. 20).
5. "Japanese hope to raze Nanking to the ground" (New York Journal-American, Sept. 20, based upon an International News Service dispatch).
6. "Japanese determination to raze China's modern capital" (Brooklyn Daily Eagle, Sept. 20, based upon Associated Press dispatch).

[ 37 ]

7. "Apparent determination to raze China's modern capital"  
(*New York Post*, ditto).
8. "That Japan intends to attempt to demolish Nanking as a city and as a seat of government and reduce all the fine new buildings in China's ten-year-old capital to blackened rubbish heaps was clearly indicated by Admiral Hasegawa's declaration that he means to strike a paralyzing blow, hoping thereby to hasten the end of the conflict" (*New York Times* special dispatch from Shanghai, Sept. 21).

Only the *New York Herald Tribune's* special Shanghai dispatch by Mr. Victor Keen gave the full text of Admiral Hasegawa's warning, and reported judiciously.

## Part II

### Leading to the Crisis

the world must be wary of news emanating from Nanking, Shanghai, or Canton about allegedly indiscriminate bombings by Japanese planes over Chinese cities.

These dispatches always give prominence to civilian casualties from Japanese bombings, but omit damages suffered by Chinese military establishments or Government buildings, of which the Japanese authorities have records as accurate as such records could be.

The Nanking correspondent of an Occidental news agency with world-wide ramifications has been an American educated Chinese who is connected with the publicity bureau of the Nanking Foreign Office.

This campaign of lies extends to press wirephotos and newsreels from China. For the sake of convenience foreign news agencies in China employ Chinese photographers along with their own countrymen. That, perhaps, accounts for the pollution of Chinese wire photos and newsreels. What guarantee is there against such pollution, if even news dispatches are changed to suit the Chinese censors?

Certain American theatres have been displaying newsreels, showing two Chinese, blindfolded and kneeling, being shot. Investigation proved that the films were made in 1931, and that the victims were Chinese looters shot by Chinese. When this was proved, the films were withdrawn.

Recently, many American newspapers printed a photograph, showing a Chinese woman, blindfolded and tied, being used as target for bayonet practice by a Japanese soldier! The face of this soldier is not Japanese, but distinctly Chinese. The blindfolded figure appeared like a dummy rather than a human being. The picture showed the soldier sticking his bayonet into the body, but no blood flows out of it!

[ 36 ]

When Colonel T. Tokahashi, of the Japanese army, was confronted by New York reporters with this photograph, he said: "The technique of the Japanese soldier as we are trained is entirely different than that displayed in the photographs. We do bayonet charges from the hips up. The soldiers do not use their weapons in the manner shown in the photographs. If a Japanese soldier affect the poses shown by the persons practicing in the pictures he would be punished."

Finally, a few of the typical specimens of the way the American press misconstrued, unintentionally of course, Admiral Hasegawa's chivalrous forewarning (Official Document No. X) of his intention of bombing "the Chinese forces as well as all establishments pertaining to military operations in and around Nanking":

1. "To blow Nanking off the Map" (New York Daily News based upon a United Press dispatch, Sept. 20).
2. "Concentrated air attacks on all sections of Nanking" (New York Times, Sept. 20).
3. "Unrestricted aerial bombing of Nanking" (New York Journal of Commerce, Sept. 20).
4. "Japan massed a gigantic warplane fleet today to destroy Nanking, capital of China and home of more than 1,000,000 people" (New York World Telegram, Sept. 20).
5. "Japanese hope to raze Nanking to the ground" (New York Journal-American, Sept. 20, based upon an International News Service dispatch).
6. "Japanese determination to raze China's modern capital" (Brooklyn Daily Eagle, Sept. 20, based upon Associated Press dispatch).

[ 37 ]

7. "Apparent determination to raze China's modern capital" (New York Post, ditto).
8. "That Japan intends to attempt to demolish Nanking as a city and as a seat of government and reduce all the fine new buildings in China's ten-year-old capital to blackened rubbish heaps was clearly indicated by Admiral Hasegawa's declaration that he means to strike a paralyzing blow, hoping thereby to hasten the end of the conflict" (New York Times special dispatch from Shanghai, Sept. 21).

Only the New York *Herald Tribune's* special Shanghai dispatch by Mr. Victor Keen gave the full text of Admiral Hasegawa's warning, and reported judiciously.

## Part II

### Leading to the Crisis

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Japan was once our best and most faithful friend, among the nations. We lost her confidence and friendship when we began to base our foreign policies on the subtle advice of Europe's diplomats and statesmen, playing their own games of empire.

*Dr. Albert Shaw, in The Digest.*

Participation in an advisory committee aiming at the condemnation of one of the belligerents in a foreign war, risks the abandonment of neutrality by becoming a party to a common front, and in the present case, an anti-Japanese front, and might lead to acts which Japan will construe as hostile. If this happens, it would be done, I venture to believe, not in the interests of the United States, but of other nations.

*Professor Edwin M. Borchard, Yale University.*

## CHAPTER VII

### CHINA'S FIRST OPPORTUNITY LOST

In private conversations with the members of the Yamen (Imperial Chinese Government) I have tried to turn their views from the spectre of intervention to what I conceive to be China's true policy, and that is a sincere, friendly, rapprochement with Japan.

HON. CHARLES DENBY, American Minister to China, 1895.

Back in 1904-5 Japan, a little David, fought Czarist Russia, a colossal Goliath, upon Chinese soil. She fought first to save China, and secondly to save herself. The two were the same thing, because Russian absorption of China meant Japan's own eventual doom.

While Japan was fighting to save China, what was China doing? China, instead of cooperating with Japan, secretly helped Russia. Secretly, she had entered into an alliance with Russia against Japan.

Yet, despite all Chinese obstructions, puny Japan defeated the Russian colossus, and gave back to China the vast territory of Manchuria which Russia had planned to annex. In this titanic struggle Japan sacrificed unnumbered lives and untold treasure.

At the end of the struggle all that Japan asked for and obtained was a speck of territory around Port Arthur (the Russian Gibraltar of yesteryears), a few hundred miles of railways, and a few mines along them. These she took, not from China, but from Russia. Their retention by Japan was a measure of safeguard against Russia's renewed advance.

Japan, acting so magnanimously, hoped that China might reciprocate. She hoped China would cooperate with her in the

development of Manchuria's resources, and in the strengthening of its defense against Russia's possible, even probable, "come-back."

Here was China's opportunity. She could have made Japan her true friend, ready to stand by her through thick and thin. With Japanese help, China could have developed Manchuria, and made it a bulwark against further Russian aggression.

Instead, China flirted with the bigger powers of the Occident, not excepting even Russia, which had only yesterday schemed China's destruction.

China reasoned: "Japan is small and poor. She was admitted into the family of powers only recently. In Europe and America there are nations, rich and powerful. These we must befriend, and by so doing we could perhaps drive Japan out of Manchuria."

So reasoning, China invited this, that and the other powers into Manchuria, all for the purpose of undermining the Japanese foothold—the foothold which Japan had considered essential to preserve herself and China against a possible Russian revenge.

Thus did China throw away her first opportunity—a pitiable case of shortsightedness.

The record of the events which followed is a record of Japan's struggle to secure her position in the face of China's constant obstruction, and China's never-ceasing intrigue with Western powers behind Japan's back. The so-called "Twenty-One Japanese Demands" upon China in 1915, is an outstanding example of that struggle. Japan, unable to persuade China to cooperate with her, was sometimes forced to take drastic measures, much to her own distaste and regret.

History repeats itself. Thirty-two years ago Japan saved China and herself from "White" domination of Czarist Russia. Today she is again striving to save China and herself from much the

same danger—this time "Red" domination of Communist Imperialism which has already appropriated Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan).

development of Manchuria's resources, and in the strengthening of its defense against Russia's possible, even probable, "come-back."

Here was China's opportunity. She could have made Japan her true friend, ready to stand by her through thick and thin. With Japanese help, China could have developed Manchuria, and made it a bulwark against further Russian aggression.

Instead, China flirted with the bigger powers of the Occident, not excepting even Russia, which had only yesterday schemed China's destruction.

China reasoned: "Japan is small and poor. She was admitted into the family of powers only recently. In Europe and America there are nations, rich and powerful. These we must befriend, and by so doing we could perhaps drive Japan out of Manchuria."

So reasoning, China invited this, that and the other powers into Manchuria, all for the purpose of undermining the Japanese foothold—the foothold which Japan had considered essential to preserve herself and China against a possible Russian revenge.

Thus did China throw away her first opportunity—a pitiable case of shortsightedness.

The record of the events which followed is a record of Japan's struggle to secure her position in the face of China's constant obstruction, and China's never-ceasing intrigue with Western powers behind Japan's back. The so-called "Twenty-One Japanese Demands" upon China in 1915, is an outstanding example of that struggle. Japan, unable to persuade China to cooperate with her, was sometimes forced to take drastic measures, much to her own distaste and regret.

History repeats itself. Thirty-two years ago Japan saved China and herself from "White" domination of Czarist Russia. Today she is again striving to save China and herself from much the

same danger—this time "Red" domination of Communist Imperialism which has already appropriated Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan).

## CHAPTER VIII

### CHINA SCRAPS TREATIES

No nation which refuses to exercise forbearance and to respect the freedom and rights of others can long remain strong and retain the confidence and respect of other nations. No nation ever loses its dignity or good standing by conciliating its differences, and by exercising great patience with, and consideration for, the rights of other nations.

—PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

The Washington Conference of 1921-2 furnished China with another opportunity for befriending Japan. China cast it to the wind, as she did her first opportunity. Blindly, she continued to follow the old policy of wilful antagonism toward Japan.

At the Washington Conference Japan made considerable concessions to China—concessions no other power similarly situated would have made.

In Shantung she gave back to China all the important rights which she had obtained, not from China, but from Germany.

In Manchuria itself Japan gave up certain important concessions which she had obtained from the Chinese government.

Japan withdrew troops which she had placed in certain interior points in China for the necessary protection of her nationals.

She formally and definitely renounced her proposals which constituted group V of the so-called twenty-one demands of 1915—proposals which had been on the tapis.

These Japanese sacrifices were not entirely disinterested. Japan made them in the hope that henceforth China would change her policy of antagonism towards her and that the two nations might enter into a new era of cooperation for the good of both.

At the final session of the Washington Conference, Baron

Shidehara, on behalf of the Japanese delegation, made this statement:

"Japan believes that she has made to China every possible concession, consistent with the sense of reason, fairness and honor. She does not regret it. She rejoices in the thought that the sacrifice which she has offered will not be in vain, in the greater cause of international friendship and good will.

"We are vitally interested in a speedy establishment of peace and unity in China, and in the economic development of her vast natural resources. It is indeed to the Asiatic mainland that we must look primarily for raw materials and for the markets where our manufactured articles may be sold. Neither raw materials nor the markets can be had, unless order, happiness, and prosperity reign in China under good and stable government. With hundreds of thousands of our nationals resident in China, with enormous amounts of our capital invested there, and with our own national existence largely dependent on that of our neighbor, we are naturally interested in that country to a greater extent than any of the countries remotely situated."

Here was an unmistakable intimation that Japan was anxious to cooperate with China on the broad principle of live and let live.

Following the Washington Conference, Japan faithfully adhered to the spirit which she had expressed at that conference. Take, for instance, her attitude relative to the Lincheng incident.

In May, 1923, the so-called "Blue Express" on the Nanking-Tientsen railway was carrying thirty-five European and American tourists, including several women, from Nanking to Peking. They were all captured by bandits at Lincheng, in Shantung province, and were held for ransom for several weeks. For several weeks the captives were subjected to indescribable privation—cold, hunger, thirst, sleepless nights.

The foreign powers were so shocked that some of them informally proposed that all of the main railways in China be guarded by an international police force under foreign control. A certain European power or powers approached Japan with this suggestion. Had Japan endorsed it, China might have lost control of her own railways.

Japan, remembering the idealism professed by the powers at the Washington Conference, objected to the suggestion—which, of course, nipped the plan in the bud.

Even at the Opium Conference at Geneva in 1925, Japan cooperated with China with a view to the abolition of opium traffic in China.

In 1925, Baron Shidehara became Foreign Minister, which further strengthened Japan's liberal policy toward China. At the International Tariff Conference, held at Peking in 1925 for the purpose of readjusting the powers' tariff relations with China in accordance with the Washington Conference treaty, Japan expressed her hope for "the inauguration of a regime of tariff autonomy (for China) backed by an adequately strong and unified government, and a complete removal of all restrictions which might impede the freedom of intercourse and trade between China and other powers."

In 1926, Baron Shidehara, speaking before the Legislature, laid down these four principles of Japan's Chinese policy:

1. "Respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and scrupulously avoid all interference in her domestic strife.
2. "Promote the solidarity and economic rapprochement between the two nations.
3. "Entertain sympathetically and helpfully the just aspirations of the Chinese people, and cooperate in their efforts for the realization of such aspirations.

[ 46 ]

4. "Maintain an attitude of patience and toleration in the present situation in China, and at the same time protect Japan's legitimate and essential rights and interests by all reasonable means at the disposal of the Government."

The above announcement was in reply to China's demand for the abolition of extraterritoriality. Meanwhile, the International Commission organized by the powers, which participated in the Washington Conference, had been in China, studying the Chinese judiciary with a view to determine whether or not extraterritoriality should be abolished.

The commission's report, written mostly by Mr. Silas H. Strawn, representing the American Government, disclosed a most arbitrary militarist domination of the Chinese judiciary and a universal miscarriage of justice. It was emphatic that the termination of extraterritoriality was out of the question.

And yet Baron Shidehara was willing to negotiate with whatever government existed in China for gradual abolition of extraterritoriality. It was understood that as a general principle he would agree to the termination of extraterritoriality, but that in the railway zone in Manchuria the Japanese judiciary must be maintained at least for some years to come.

That was a great concession. Yet to this conciliatory policy, China's reply was the *arbitrary, unilateral abrogation of the treaty with Japan!* China never showed a desire to meet Japan half way.

From 1925 to 1927 a violent anti-foreign, particularly anti-British, agitation swept through the provinces south of the Yangtse River. This culminated in the horrible Nanking outrage of March 24, 1927, when all the foreign consulates and many of the foreign firms and residences and the missionary institutions were looted. The foreigners murdered included the American vice-president of Nanking University, two Englishmen, a French

[ 47 ]

and an Italian priest. A number of foreign women were indescribably outraged.

Throughout that period Japan continued to be conciliatory. When the British and American warships at Nanking trained their guns at certain sections of the city to shield the fleeing foreigners before the nationalist hordes, the guns of the Japanese ships were silent—this in spite of the fact that the Japanese consulate, along with other consulates, had been sacked and that the consular staff, including the women, had been unspeakably abused.

In the wake of the Nanking outrage a certain power approached Japan with the suggestion that an international force occupy certain strategic points on the Yangtse as a guarantee of security of foreign lives and property. The suggestion received no encouragement from Japan, and was dropped.

In May, 1929, Baron Shidehara appointed Mr. Sadao Saburi, one of his trusted lieutenants, as Minister to China. Mr. Saburi was instructed to carry out a certain conciliatory programme formulated by Baron Shidehara.

Mr. Saburi, after a brief stay in Nanking, returned to Japan, and killed himself! He left no explanation. But many presumed, and the presumption persists, that the new Japanese Minister had been so viciously rebuffed by the Nationalist politicians at Nanking that self-annihilation seemed to him the only honorable way to wipe out the personal disgrace. He followed the code and practice of the *Samurai* of old.

Then Baron Shidehara appointed Mr. Torikichi Obata as successor to the ill-fated Mr. Saburi. To his amazement, China rejected Mr. Obata as *persona non grata* simply because he had happened to serve as a secretary at the Japanese Legation at Peking when Japan presented to China the so-called "Twenty-One Demands" in 1915. Not only did Obata have no part in

the formulation of those demands, but he was known to have objected to some of them and to have gone to Tokyo to present before the Foreign Office his views for the modification of the terms.

Yet China, turning a deaf ear to all Japanese explanations, rejected Mr. Obata. This taunting attitude, so luridly revealed in Mr. Saburi's suicide, and again brought to bold relief in Mr. Obata's rejection, caused a furor in Japan. Some of the metropolitan newspapers published editorials under the ominous title: "We Shall Never Forget!"

Even then Baron Shidehara did not lose hope. On January 21, 1930, he, speaking before the Legislature, said:

"If one takes a broader view of the future well-being of both Japan and China, one will be satisfied that there is no other course open than to pursue the path of mutual accord and cooperation in all their relations, political and economic. Their real and lasting interests, which in no way conflict but have much in common with each other, ought to be a sufficient assurance of their growing *rapprochement*. If the Chinese people awaken to these facts and show themselves responsive to the policy so outlined, nothing will more conduce to the mutual welfare of both nations. . . .

"It ought not to be difficult for the Chinese people to realize what we have in mind, if they only recall the whole-hearted cooperation which the Japanese representatives extended to the Chinese throughout the whole course of the Peking Tariff Conference and of the sittings of the International Commission on Extraterritoriality in 1925-1926. The attitude which was then taken by Japan is the attitude she is now taking in handling the question of unequal treaties. In that spirit we gladly accepted, as early as 1926, the Chinese proposal to open negotiations for the revision of the Sino-Japanese Commercial Treaty."

All this was of no avail. As Mr. Rodney Gilbert, author of two penetrating books, "What Is Wrong With China," and "China's Unequal Treaties," observes, any conciliatory policy towards China by any foreign power serves only to "confirm the Chinese in his self-esteem; it convinces him that he is above the law and rightly so, and that any attempt to call him to account is imperialistic aggression."

Between 1923 and 1927 this Chinese characteristic has been made worse by the "Red" counsels given by the Soviet agents whom Nationalist China invited as advisers. These Red advisers put to the mouths of the Chinese such slogans as "Down With Foreign Imperialism," "Down With Foreign Militarism," "Down With Unequal Treaties," "Down With Great Britain," and "Down With the Japanese."

Against the stone-wall of wilful anti-foreignism, Japan's liberal policy made no impression, making Baron Shidehara appear to be a blind optimist.

Even as Shidehara was speaking such sensible, conciliatory words as we have quoted, Nationalist China was pushing a scheme to rid Manchuria of Japanese enterprises.

The upshot of it all was the Manchurian upheaval of the fall of 1931, resulting in the appearance of the new state of Manchukuo—another example of China's shortsightedness. China, begrudging Japan the few rights and privileges that the latter had legitimately acquired in Manchuria, lost the whole of Manchuria. For that China has nobody to thank but herself. Had China responded to Baron Shidehara's repeated overtures of friendliness in like spirit, the Manchurian incident would never have happened.

Must we agree with Mr. Humphrey Marshall, American High Commissioner to China in 1852-1854, that "the Chinese Govern-

ment concedes justice only in the presence of a force able and willing to exact it"?

Must we agree with Robert M. McLean who succeeded Mr. Marshall, that "diplomatic intercourse can only be had with this Government at the cannon's mouth"?

Must we agree with Lord Engin who said in 1858 that the Chinese are "a people that yield always to force, but never to reason"?

As recently as 1925 Mr. Silas H. Strawn, a distinguished American lawyer, went to China full of sympathy for China. It took him only a few months to be utterly disillusioned. Speaking in Shanghai, he said:

"It is a primal instinct of human nature to attempt to blame someone else for one's misfortunes or shortcomings. . . . I believe I can confidently state that I have thus far seen no convincing evidence that China's present-day troubles are in any degree attributable to the so-called unequal treaties, or to the imperialistic attitude of the foreign Powers. On the contrary, the evidence seems to be overwhelming that the troubles of China today are internal rather than external, and that unequal treaties, extra-territoriality, tariff autonomy, and imperialism are political slogans which are availed of by the agitators to excite the people of China into a frenzy of unrest. . . . By telling the truth about the situation I may be able to help the Chinese people. . . . In the solution of this problem, as in that of any other different question, we must commence with a knowledge of the facts and not rely upon false premises if we hope to arrive at an accurate conclusion."

The same condition as was described by Mr. Marshall, Mr. McLean, Lord Elgin, and Mr. Strawn defeated Japan's conciliatory policy, caused one of her ministers to China to kill himself

in despair, and to send the enlightened, liberal Baron Shidehara to oblivion in disgrace, at least for the moment.

During this period of Japan's conciliatory policy China resorted to a wholesale scrapping or violation of her agreements with Japan. The following are the more important of the agreements so violated:

1. Refusal to honor Articles 2 and 4 of the 1915 "*Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia*" granting the Japanese the right to lease land for commercial and agricultural purposes.
2. Arbitrary increase of export customs duty on coal from the Japanese-operated Fushun and Yentai mines from one-tenth to four-tenths of a Haikwan tale per ton. This violates Article 2 of the "*Detailed Regulations for Fushun and Yentai Mines*," May, 1911.
3. The building of parallel lines to the South Manchuria Railway in violation of a protocol to the 1905 Peking treaty.
4. Failure to carry into effect the provisions of the "*Agreement Relating to the Chientao Region*," September, 1909, whereby China agreed to extend the Changchun-Kirin Railway to the Korean border. This agreement was supplemented by new agreements in 1918 and 1927.
5. Discrimination against Japanese goods on the Chinese railways in Manchuria in violation of the Washington Nine Power Treaty, February, 1922.
6. Disregard of the 1915 treaty respecting Manchuria by demanding the return of Port Arthur and Dairen.
7. Demand that the Japanese guards be withdrawn from the railway zone in disregard of the 1905 agreement.

[ 52 ]

8. Refusal to negotiate detailed regulations concerning Sino-Japanese joint mining enterprise along the South Manchuria Railway, although Article 4 of the "*Agreement Concerning Mines and Railways in Manchuria*," September, 1909, provides for the adoption of such regulations.

9. Imposition of discriminatory high import duty on tobacco by the Chinese maritime customs at Dairen, Manchuria. This violates Article 12 of the "*Agreement Regarding Establishment of Maritime Customs Office at Dairen*," May, 1907.

10. Refusal to sell the necessary land for railway construction to the South Manchuria Railway, thus making it impossible for the railway to obtain, from lands along its lines, the stones, sands, etc., necessary for their repair and maintenance. This violates Article 6 of the Sino-Russian agreement of September, 1896, the provisions of which are applicable to the South Manchuria Railway under the Portsmouth Treaty between Japan and Russia, September, 1905, and the Peking Treaty between Japan and China, December, 1905.

11. Issuance of a secret order making it impossible for the Japanese to reside and travel outside the railway zone in South Manchuria. This violates Article 3 of the "*Treaty Respecting South Manchuria*," May, 1915.

12. Persecution of the Koreans in violation of Article 3 of the "*Agreement Relating to Chientao*," September, 1909, which provides that "China recognizes the residence of Korean subjects, as heretofore, on agricultural lands lying north of the River Tumen."

13. Illegal levy of taxes within the railway zone along the lines of the South Manchuria Railway. This contravenes Article

[ 53 ]

6 of the Sino-Russian agreement of September, 1896, which provides that the "company (the South Manchuria Railway in the case of Japan, the Chinese Eastern Railway in the case of Russia) shall have the absolute and exclusive right of administration of its lands."

14. Refusal to appoint a Japanese traffic manager or an adviser on the management of the Taonan-Anganchi railway financed by the South Manchuria Railway, though the loan agreement provides for such appointment to ensure its efficient operation.

15. Making it impossible for the Japanese traffic managers and accountants on other Japanese-financed but Chinese-operated lines to exercise the authority of supervision provided in the loan agreements.

16. Protests against the manufacture of shale oil from Fushun coal by the South Manchuria Railway.

17. Misappropriation of the receipts of the railways financed by Japanese concerns, resulting in non-payment to the service of Japanese loans.

## CHAPTER IX

### TECHNIQUE OF ANTI-JAPANESE AGITATION

I have seen no convincing evidence that China's present-day troubles are in any degree attributable to the so-called unequal treaties or to the imperialistic attitude of foreign Powers.

HON. SILAS STRAWN, *Speaking in Shanghai*, 1925.

We have seen that for almost a decade following the Washington Conference, Japan did every possible thing to befriend China, and that China's response was a studied effrontery.

During this period China developed a technique of anti-Japanese agitation, and used it with deadly effect. In June, 1928, the National Convention of anti-Japanese Societies, which were subsidized by the Nanking Government issued this declaration:

"The objective of our anti-Japanese movement is to ruin the Japanese by causing our economic rupture with them. The pressure will next be brought to bear upon all the rest of the Imperialist nations with the ultimate object of nullifying all unequal treaties."

Until August, 1929, the government-subsidized "Societies for the Revocation of Unequal Treaties" openly enforced anti-Japanese boycott by meting out direct punishment to Chinese merchants handling Japanese goods.

This caused diplomatic complications with Japan. To circumvent Japanese protest the Nationalist Government, in August, 1929, stopped such open and direct actions. Instead it ordered that the "Merchants' associations (not political societies) of every district shall hold themselves responsible for rescuing the nation

from foreign economic aggression." The government held "such associations liable to punishment in the event of their failure to inquire into and deal adequately with every case of transactions in Japanese goods by individual merchants." This order was, of course, secretly distributed.

School text-books are another means of anti-Japanese propaganda. Many of these denounce foreigners generally, but emphasis is laid upon the condemnation of the Japanese.

The *National Humiliation Reader* contains dramas showing the wickedness of all foreigners and exhorting the rising generation to repel foreign aggression at all costs.

The *New Age Reader*, says: "China's burning question is foreign encroachment. The foreigners compel us to lease lands. They commit crime on our soil, yet they do not submit to our law and our jurisdiction. Our maritime customs were forcibly usurped and have been administered by foreign imperialist."

The Nationalist China ignores that neither the foreign settlements nor the foreign administration of maritime customs were imposed upon China by alien overlords, but that both were initiated by the Chinese Government itself for its own convenience.

Many text-books on Ethics teach children to despise and hate the Japanese. In many schools pupils are asked such questions as: "Who is China's greatest enemy?" The answer expected is, of course, "the Japanese."

In the army clever catechisms are used to exhort the soldiers to look upon Japan as China's avowed enemy who must be crushed. This method is further reenforced with anti-Japanese war songs to the cadence of which the soldiers are drilled to march. Here is an example in rough English translation:

"We will knock you down and make you impotent.

[ 56 ]

"We will throw your rifles away.

"We will destroy your cannon.

"We will destroy your hegemony.

"We will brace our spirits in firm unity.

"That we may overthrow Imperialism.

"Overthrow! Overthrow!"

Remember, all this was going on while Japan was pursuing a policy of conciliation. To Japan it was a tragic case of one-sided endeavor to be friendly with her neighbor. There can be no normal intercourse between any two nations, as long as the ideology and national policy of one is uncompromising antagonism towards the other.

[ 57 ]

from foreign economic aggression." The government held "such associations liable to punishment in the event of their failure to inquire into and deal adequately with every case of transactions in Japanese goods by individual merchants." This order was, of course, secretly distributed.

School text-books are another means of anti-Japanese propaganda. Many of these denounce foreigners generally, but emphasis is laid upon the condemnation of the Japanese.

The *National Humiliation Reader* contains dramas showing the wickedness of all foreigners and exhorting the rising generation to repel foreign aggression at all costs.

The *New Age Reader*, says: "China's burning question is foreign encroachment. The foreigners compel us to lease lands. They commit crime on our soil, yet they do not submit to our law and our jurisdiction. Our maritime customs were forcibly usurped and have been administered by foreign imperialist."

The Nationalist China ignores that neither the foreign settlements nor the foreign administration of maritime customs were imposed upon China by alien overlords, but that both were initiated by the Chinese Government itself for its own convenience.

Many text-books on Ethics teach children to despise and hate the Japanese. In many schools pupils are asked such questions as: "Who is China's greatest enemy?" The answer expected is, of course, "the Japanese."

In the army clever catechisms are used to exhort the soldiers to look upon Japan as China's avowed enemy who must be crushed. This method is further reenforced with anti-Japanese war songs to the cadence of which the soldiers are drilled to march. Here is an example in rough English translation:

"We will knock you down and make you impotent.

[ 56 ]

"We will throw your rifles away.

"We will destroy your cannon.

"We will destroy your hegemony.

"We will brace our spirits in firm unity.

"That we may overthrow Imperialism.

"Overthrow! Overthrow!"

Remember, all this was going on while Japan was pursuing a policy of conciliation. To Japan it was a tragic case of one-sided endeavor to be friendly with her neighbor. There can be no normal intercourse between any two nations, as long as the ideology and national policy of one is uncompromising antagonism towards the other.

[ 57 ]

## CHAPTER X

### HEADING TO THE CLASH

The Chinese Government concedes justice only in the presence of a force able and willing to exact it.

HUMPHREY MARSHALL, American High Commissioner to China 1852-54

We have seen that for ten years before 1931 China had pitted artificially fostered Japanophobia against Japan's conciliatory policy, and that her design to drive Japan out of Manchuria resulted in the appearance of Manchukuo as a new state.

The Chinese nationalists would not admit that the secession of Manchuria was due to her own fault. They blame it entirely on Japan, and use it to further anti-Japanese agitation as a means of uniting their divided country.

Their new slogan is "Regain lost Manchuria." They have instigated the rabble armies, which were driven out of Manchuria, to stir up trouble along the border. For much the same purpose, they have sent to the North Nationalist soldiers disguised in plain clothes. They have sent "Blue Shirt" agitators to the same region to intimidate, even assassinate pro-Japanese Chinese of influence. The so-called "volunteers" and even bandits have been secretly encouraged to harass Manchukuo borders.

For a long time after the secession of Manchukuo, Nationalist China cut off all means of communication with that new state. Even today, after long, tortuous negotiations, only one through train a day is permitted to run between Manchukuo and Peiping. Even this is operated under a constant fear of obstruction. Mails

[ 58 ]

to and from Manchukuo are tampered with on the Chinese side. Prizes have been offered for the heads of Manchukuo officials.

Naturally, in the early stages of Manchukuo, there were numerous border troubles and incidents. That necessitated at times a show of force on the part of Japan as the guardian of Manchukuo. The result was the setting up of a narrow strip of buffer territory known as the East Hopei Autonomous Region, and a conclusion of various agreements between the Japanese military authorities and the responsible military representatives of the Nanking Government.

Under one of these compacts the Nanking Government agreed not to send Nationalist troops and Blue Shirts into Hopei Province. This arrangement was necessary for peace in North China and the security of Manchukuo. The agreement, however, has never been strictly observed by Nanking.

During the last few years the Communist agitators filtering into Hopei Province and Communist armies advancing in the same direction became a new source of Japan's worry. The alliance between the Blue Shirts and the Communists under the banner of "Down with Japan" and "Regain Lost Manchuria," boded ill for peace in the north.

Nor was that all. Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek himself struck a bargain with the Communist forces. Last December he was captured at Sianfu by two pro-communist war-lords. He was released by paying a huge ransom as well as by agreeing to liquidate his eight-year-old campaign against the Communists and to effect an alliance between the Nationalists and the Communists.

To save his life and his face the shrewd Chiang Kaishek did some clever anti-Japanese "sales talk" to the Communists. The

[ 59 ]

Communists had no love for Chiang Kaishek, but wanted some of his money and arms. Thus was the bargain made.

As a consequence 200,000 Communist soldiers became a part of the Nationalist army. Last January the Nationalist Party, which had been an avowed enemy of the Communists, changed its front, and adopted a resolution to work with them against Manchukuo and Japan. Thus did the Communization of North China become a real menace.

The Blue Shirts are a reactionary body, organized to strengthen Chiang Kaishek's autocratic rule. They are also the "G.P.U." of China, feared and dreaded by all outsiders. They are ruthless, unscrupulous. They intimidate, assassinate, blackmail. They do away with politicians or militarists who stand in Chiang Kaishek's way.

At first the Blue Shirts were not particularly anti-Japanese. But as Chiang Kaishek decided to exploit the Japanese menace as a means of uniting the country, the Blue Shirts, too, became anti-Japanese. Their alliance with the equally ruthless Communist agitators would have stirred up no end of trouble in North China had they not encountered Japan's restraining influence there.

Following the secession of Manchuria, Japan tried hard to mollify China. But China, ignoring that the secession was due to her own shortsightedness, continued to scheme the eventual rendition of Manchuria. Whenever Japan sought rapprochement, China was sure to intimate, if she did not actually insist upon, the rendition of Manchukuo. That, of course, was impossible.

In 1934, when the Nationalists and the Blue Shirts had still been fighting the Communists, Japan made these three proposals to China:

1. Stop anti-Japanese agitation under Nanking's encouragement or connivance.

[ 60 ]

2. Cooperation between Japan and China for the development of the still dormant natural resources in North China.
3. Cooperation to check the spread of Communism.

Since 1934 Japan repeated the same overture over and over again. These proposals were reasonable and sensible. Had they been adopted, they would have benefited both countries. And Nanking knew it.

And yet Nanking chose to cut off its nose to spite its face. Instead of cooperating with Japan, Nanking allied itself with the Communists, which would in the end prove the height of shortsightedness. Is it any wonder Japan favors some sort of local autonomy for North China, whose freedom from Communist and Blue Shirt agitation is vital to her and to Manchukuo? Had Nanking acted upon the Japanese proposal, there would have been no need for Japan's manifest solicitude for such autonomy.

This Chinese shortsightedness is all the more deplorable, as we look back over the political developments at Tokyo since last March. Last March Mr. Naotake Sato became Japan's Foreign Minister. Before accepting the office, Mr. Sato conferred with military leaders, and arrived at the conclusion that he would meet with no opposition from them if he launched a liberal China policy.

Mr. Sato, speaking before the Legislature, clearly intimated that Japan must somewhat recede from North China in order to affect a rapprochement with Nanking. He intimated that North China autonomy would not be essential to Japan, if Nanking and Tokyo cooperated upon equal footing.

Mr. Yuki, Finance Minister, echoed Mr. Sato by saying: "Japan's economic policy cannot stand without regard to China."

[ 61 ]

The Army understands this now, and agrees that economic co-operation in China is essential."

Yet Nanking was uncompromising. Manchukuo still rankled in its mind. It was then that the authoritative British journal in Shanghai, the North China Daily News, issued this warning to Nanking:

"At a time when Japanese statesmen have clearly shown their desire to view Chinese affairs by a 'new concept' it is unfortunate that certain asperities in argument have lately manifested themselves in Chinese Comment on Sino-Japanese relations. . . . The man who cries before he is out of the wood is apt to receive a nasty shock. So also is he who banks too much on a forbearance which emanates from a sense of strength mistaken by him for weakness."

The final sentence is most significant—to "mistake forbearance for weakness." Lord Elgin once said that "I have been China's friend," and that he had nevertheless to resort to "bullying" to make any reasonable point of view acceptable to the Chinese. So has it always been in China. Times change, but the leopard never changes its spots.

### Part III Official Documents

The faking of pictures in the World War became a vast industry.

A picture taken by Karl Delius, of Berlin, showed delivery of mail bags in front of the Field Post-office of the German army in Kavevara. This was reproduced in the London Daily Mirror of December 3, 1915, with this caption: "Made to Wash Huns' Dirty Linen."

An official photograph of German officers inspecting munition cases behind their lines was reproduced in London's War Illustrated, January 30, 1916, as "German Officers Pillaging Chests in a French Chateau."

So when you see atrocity pictures again nowadays—try and be a little skeptical about their supposed "truth." You'll be helping to keep down mass emotionalism and your country out of other people's wars.

*Boake Carter, in the New York Daily Mirror, October 5, 1937.*

No. 1

SECRETARY HULL'S STATEMENT TO THE PRESS, JULY 16, 1937

I have been receiving from many sources inquiries and suggestions arising out of disturbed situations in various parts of the world.

Unquestionably there are in a number of regions tensions and strains which on their face involve only countries that are near neighbors but which in ultimate analysis are of inevitable concern to the whole world. Any situation in which armed hostilities are in progress or are threatened is a situation wherein rights and interest of all nations either are or may be seriously affected.

There can be no serious hostilities anywhere in the world which will not one way or another affect interests or rights or obligations of this country.

I therefore feel warranted in making—in fact, I feel it a duty to make—a statement of this government's position in regard to international problems and situations with respect to which this country feels deep concern.

This country constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of peace. We advocate national and international self-respect. We advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the national affairs of other nations.

We advocate adjustment of problems in international relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement. We advocate faithful observance of international agreements.

[ 65 ]

Upholding the principle of the sanctity of treaties, we believe in modification of provisions of treaties, when need therefor arises, by orderly processes carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation.

We believe in respect by all nations for the rights of others and performance by all nations of established obligations. We stand for revitalizing and strengthening of international law. We advocate steps toward promotion of economic security and stability the world over.

We advocate lowering or removing of excessive barriers in international trade. We seek effective equality of commercial opportunity, and we urge upon all nations application of the principle of equality of treatment.

We believe in limitation and reduction of armaments. Realizing the necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for national security. We are prepared to reduce or to increase our own armed forces in proportion to reductions or increases by other countries.

We avoid entering into alliances or entangling commitments, but we believe in co-operative effort by peaceful and practicable means in support of the principles hereinbefore stated.

---

No. 2

JAPAN'S OBSERVATIONS ON SECRETARY HULL'S STATEMENT

The Japanese Government wishes to express its concurrence with the principles contained in the statement made by Secretary of State Hull on the 16th instant concerning the maintenance of world peace. It is the belief of the Japanese Government that the objectives of those principles will only be attained, in their ap-

[ 66 ]

plication to the Far Eastern situation, by a full recognition and practical consideration of the actual particular circumstances of that region.

---

No. 3

SECRETARY HULL'S STATEMENT ON AMERICAN POLICY ON THE  
SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION, AUGUST 23, 1937

At his press conference on Aug. 17, the Secretary of State announced that (1), legislative action to make available funds for purposes of emergency relief necessitated by the situation in the Far East had been asked and that (2), this Government had given orders for a regiment of marines to prepare to proceed to Shanghai. The Secretary then discussed at some length the principles of policy on which this Government was proceeding.

The situation at Shanghai is in many respects unique. Shanghai is a great cosmopolitan center, with a population of over 3,000,000, a part of which has been developed by the nationals of many countries, at which there have prevailed mutually advantageous contacts of all types and varieties between and among the Chinese and people of almost all other countries of the world. At Shanghai, there exists a multiplicity of rights and interests which are of inevitable concern to many countries, including the United States.

In the present situation, the American Government is engaged in facilitating in every way possible an orderly and safe removal of American citizens from areas where there is special danger. Further, it is the policy of the American Government to afford its nationals appropriate protection primarily against mobs or other uncontrolled elements. For that purpose it has for many

[ 67 ]

years maintained small detachments of armed forces in China, and for that purpose it is sending the present small re-enforcement. These armed forces there have no mission of aggression. It is their function to be of assistance toward maintenance of order and security. It has been the desire and the intention of the American Government to remove these forces when performances of their function of protection is no longer called for, and such remains its desire and expectation.

The issues and problems which are of concern to this government in the present situation in the Pacific area go far beyond merely the immediate question of protection of the nationals and interests of the United States. The conditions which prevail in that area are intimately connected with and have a direct and fundamental relationship to the general principles of policy to which attention was called in the statement of July 16, which statement has evoked expressions of approval from more than fifty governments. This government is firmly of the opinion that the principles summarized in that statement should effectively govern international relationships.

When there unfortunately arises in any part of the world the threat or existence of serious hostilities, the matter is of concern to all nations. Without attempting to pass judgment regarding the merits of the controversy, we appeal to the parties to refrain from resort to war. We urge that they settle their differences in accordance with principles which in the opinion not alone of our people, but of most peoples of the world should govern in international relationships. We consider applicable throughout the world, in the Pacific area as elsewhere, the principles set forth in the statement of July 16. That statement of principles is comprehensive and basic. It embraces the principles embodied in many treaties, including the Washington conference treaties and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris.

[ 68 ]

From the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East we have been urging upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments the importance of refraining from hostilities and of maintaining peace. We have been participating constantly in consultation with interested governments directed toward peaceful adjustment. This Government does not believe in political alliances or entanglements, nor does it believe in extreme isolation. It does believe in international cooperation for the purpose of seeking through pacific methods the achievement of those objectives set forth in the statement of July 16. In the light of our well-defined attitude and policies and within the range thereof, this Government is giving most solicitous attention to every phase of the Far Eastern situation, toward safeguarding the lives and welfare of our people and making effective the policies—especially the policy of peace—in which this country believes and to which it is committed.

This Government is endeavoring to see kept alive, strengthened and revitalized, in reference to the Pacific area and to all the world, these fundamental principles.

---

No. 4

#### PACIFIC BLOCKADE OF CHINA COAST

A. *Japanese Foreign Office Announcement, August 26, 1937*

Although Japan has been forced to adopt measures of self-defense in the face of lawless attacks upon her forces by Chinese armies and their wanton disregard of Japanese lives and property and violations of Japan's rights and interests in China, it has always been the desire of the Japanese government to minimize the scope of the present affair. However, the Chinese armies, by

[ 69 ]

their repeated outrages and provocations, have intensified still further gravity of the situation.

In these circumstances, with a view to prompting China's reconsideration and to effecting a speedy settlement, the Japanese naval authorities found it necessary to close traffic of Chinese vessels on the Chinese sea coast from 32° 4' north latitude and 121° 44' east longitude, to 23° 14' north latitude and 116° 48' east longitude, beginning at 6 p.m., August 25, 1937.

The above measure is solely one of self-defense against the lawless acts of the Chinese, and applies only to Chinese vessels. It may be added that peaceful commerce carried on by third powers will be fully respected, the Japanese navy having no intention of interfering with it.

*B. Japanese Navy's Statement, August 26, 1937*

The Imperial navy has decided to block the navigation of all Chinese ships along the Chinese coast from the Yangtsekiang to Foochow, Amoy, and Swatow, commencing August 25 at 6 p.m. While Japan has been obliged to take self-defensive measures for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese residents in China, the Japanese government from the first has desired to confine the trouble to a minimum area.

Nevertheless, the situation has been aggravated through the challenges by Chinese forces and accordingly the Imperial navy has decided to blockade the Chinese coast so that China will reflect and the situation improve.

The blockade of the Chinese coast is intended chiefly for weakening China's fighting strength and the Imperial navy has no intention of unnecessarily seizing Chinese ships and their

[ 70 ]

cargoes. It will confine its action to self-defensive measures in accordance with international justice.

The Imperial navy will respect the peaceful trade of other countries and has no intention of interfering with it.

No. 5

STATEMENT BY MR. KOKI HIROTA, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, AT AN INTERVIEW WITH THE FOREIGN  
CORRESPONDENTS, SEPTEMBER 1, 1937

There has developed between Japan and China a situation which is indeed very regrettable. I shall not touch upon the origin and development of the present incident, which you all know so well. I wish only to emphasize here the high degree of patience and forbearance with which the Japanese Government have consistently been striving to bring about a peaceful settlement. At the time of the Lukouchiao Affair, our Government, hoping to the last to reach a pacific solution through a local settlement, did everything possible to prevent aggravation of the situation, in spite of repeated bad faith of the Chinese Nanking Government which manifested a complete lack of sincerity and not only rejected the agreement arrived on but also moved vast armies northward, challenging Japan directly. Moreover, they incited and instigated popular feeling against this country to such an extent that the lives and property of our nationals throughout China were suddenly jeopardized. As the conflict began to spread, we lost no time in ordering the evacuation of Japanese residents from Hankow and other points on the Yangtze as well as from various places in Shantung and South China. This measure was taken with a view to forestalling the

[ 71 ]

occurrence of any untoward incidents, and this, more than anything else, demonstrated powerfully our sincerity in observing our avowed policy of non-aggravation. Of course this measure involved untold sacrifices on our part as it amounted to a complete abandonment of business interests acquired after many years of arduous toil by our nationals. However, we decided to bear even those for the purpose of avoiding aggravation of the situation. Again, when on July 11 the Cabinet decided despatching contingents in view of the North China situation which was growing worse every moment, we still clung to the anticipation of bringing about an amicable solution and continued to nourish the hope that the Nanking Government would reconsider their attitude. Thus to the last moment we sought and strove for pacific settlement, firmly determined as we were to prevent an armed clash and we took exactly the same attitude in regard to the Shanghai Affair.

In some quarters abroad people seem to be under the erroneous impression that at Shanghai Japan was retaliating for the murder of an officer and a sailor of her naval landing party by the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps. Nothing could be further from the truth. Of course China was entirely to blame for the shooting of our marines, but our Government with the greatest self-restraint endeavored to reach an amicable local settlement through diplomatic channels. Hostilities broke out in Shanghai because China, in violation of her agreement for the cessation of hostilities around Shanghai concluded in 1932, rushed her regular troops into the forbidden area and strengthened her forces both as to number and equipment and then deliberately provoked the Japanese. Our Government firmly believe that as a first prerequisite these Chinese forces should be made to withdraw from the fighting area and the Chinese military works in the vicinity of the International Settlement should be removed if the city is

[ 72 ]

to be spared the disastrous effects of armed conflict. In other words, foreign lives and property in Shanghai are menaced not by the small Japanese forces defending the settlement but rather by the Chinese armies which, relying upon their vastly superior numbers, undertake an offensive against the Japanese. In fact, in our desire to maintain peace and security in and around Shanghai, we were giving favourable consideration to the proposal of the Powers to preserve these regions from the danger of hostilities when the Chinese launched a sudden attack upon the International Settlement, our Consulate General, and our warships on the Whampoo, bombing then indiscriminately from the air, and our forces were compelled to return fire for the defense of our nationals numbering more than 30,000 in the city. Both in North China and at Shanghai it was without question unwarranted Chinese provocations that precipitated hostilities. The fundamental causes lay in the fact that the leaders of Present-day China have long fostered anti-Japanism as a tool for political purposes, exploiting diplomatic issues to enhance their prestige and to that end they have, through collusion with communists, openly and energetically prepared for war with Japan. The Sino-Soviet non-aggression pact, concluded a few days ago, is of especial significance in this regard. To this, Japan as a bulwark against communist encroachment upon East Asia, cannot afford to remain indifferent. A major conflict is now in progress between Japan and China despite our earnest efforts to avert it. However, striving as our armies are for the protection of our legitimate rights and interest and for the attainment of enduring peace in East Asia, the Japanese Government are prepared as ever to recall their expeditionary forces and join hands with China in friendship the moment the Chinese Government demonstrate their sincerity in reconsidering and rectifying their attitude toward Japan. But, in view of the fact that the Japanese

[ 73 ]

people cannot tolerate the recurrence of such deplorable affairs and with the situation already assuming the serious proportions it has, we are firmly determined to pursue our declared policy until the possibility becomes ripe for a fundamental settlement. Japan and China are, after all, neighbors and old friends. It should not be such a difficult task to realize the ideal of mutual prosperity and well-being in the interests of the peace of East Asia and of the world. I cannot conceal my fervent hope that the Chinese Government will reconsider the policy they have pursued up till now vis-a-vis Japan. As regards the rights and interests of third Powers, I can assure you that they will be fully respected by Japan. Our Government are giving careful consideration to the matter of safeguarding them. At the same time, in order that peace may be restored as soon as possible, the Powers are invited to cooperate with Japan by refraining from any action which would be likely to prolong the present hostilities. I deeply regret to hear that the victims of the conflict included many foreign residents. Since the press has an important role to play in the promotion of international understanding and good will, especially in such a critical situation as is now prevailing, I wish, Ladies and Gentlemen of the press, to appeal to you for your wholehearted cooperation.

No. 6

TEXT OF JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER KOKI HIROTA'S ADDRESS  
BEFORE DIET, SEPTEMBER 5, 1937

Ever since the beginning of the present China affair, the Japanese government, in pursuance of the policy of local settlement and non-aggravation, exerted every effort to effect speedy

[ 74 ]

solution. The Nanking government, whose prompt reconsideration was invited, failed to manifest a grain of sincerity but concentrated armies in North China to challenge Japan, while in Yantze Valley and elsewhere in South and Central China they embarked on an anti-Japanese campaign of the most vicious kind, which not only prevented our nationals in that region from engaging in peaceful pursuits but also jeopardized their very existence.

In these circumstances the Japanese government, still desiring to avoid disturbance of peace as far as possible, ordered the evacuation of all Japanese residents in Hankow and other points along the Yangtze River. Shortly after that, on August 9, at Shanghai, Sub-Lieut. Oyama and Seaman Saito of a Japanese landing party were murdered by the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps.

Even then Japan, adhering to a peaceful course, sought to settle the affair through the withdrawal of the Peace Preservation Corps and removal of all military works that had been erected in violation of the 1932 truce agreement. China refused to comply with our demands under one pretext or another and proceeded instead to increase her troops and to multiply military works in the prohibited zone and finally launched an unwarranted attack upon the Japanese. Thereupon, as a matter of duty, our government dispatched small naval reinforcements to Shanghai as an emergency measure to insure protection of our nationals in that city.

In view of these disquieting developments in Shanghai, Ambassadors at Nanking of five powers, Great Britain, America, France, Germany and Italy, sent a joint request on August 11 to both Japan and China that the two countries do all in their power to carry out effectively a plan to exclude Shanghai from the scope of any possible hostilities so as to safeguard lives and property of foreigners therein.

[ 75 ]

Our government replied through Ambassador Kawagoe to the effect that, while Japan was most solicitously concerned over the safety of lives and property of all foreigners as well as Japanese in Shanghai, China should as the first prerequisite withdraw outside striking distance her regular troops and peace preservation corps that were advancing on the Settlement and menacing Japanese and to remove military works in the vicinity of the International Settlement and that Japan be prepared to restore her forces to their original positions provided China agreed to take the above steps.

The Ambassador was also instructed to request the powers concerned to exert their influence toward inducing China to execute those urgent and appropriate measures which, however, were flatly rejected by China. On August 11 the Consul Generals at Shanghai of Great Britain, America and France submitted a certain concrete plan proposing that Japan and China enter into direct negotiations for the purpose of averting the impending crisis.

The text of the proposal was received in Tokyo at midnight on August 13. But in the afternoon of that very day the Chinese armies that had been pouring into the Shanghai area took the offensive and on August 8 their war planes dropped bombs not only on the headquarters of our landing party, our warship and our Consulate General but also all over the International Settlement. No longer could we do anything but abandon all hopes of peaceful settlement and fight for the protection of our 30,000 nationals in Shanghai. I regret to say that the earnest efforts of the powers concerned were thus nullified by Chinese outrages.

Shanghai having been converted into a theater of hostilities, grave concern was naturally shown by powers who have vast amounts of capital invested and large numbers of their nationals residing in the city. Great Britain notified both Japan

[ 76 ]

and China on August 18 that if governments of the two countries agreed to withdraw their forces mutually and to entrust to foreign authorities the protection of Japanese subjects residing in the International Settlement and on extrasettlement roads the British government was prepared to undertake the responsibility provided other powers co-operate.

The next day, August 19, we were informed by the French government of their readiness to support the British proposal. The American Government also previously expressed hope for the suspension of hostilities in the Shanghai area. Japan, having as great interests in Shanghai as these powers, is equally solicitous for peace in the city. But, as has been stated above, actions taken by the Chinese in and around Shanghai are plainly in violation of the truce agreement in 1932 in that they illegitimately moved their regular troops into the zone prescribed by that agreement and increased both the number of armaments and the Peace Preservations Corps and in that relying on their numerical superiority they challenged the landing party and the civilian population of our country.

Therefore, in their reply to the British proposal our government explained in detail Japan's successive efforts toward peaceful solution as well as the truth regarding the lawless Chinese attacks and stated that the hostilities in Shanghai could not be brought to an end save through the withdrawal of Chinese regular troops from the prohibited zone and of Peace Preservation Corps from front lines. At the same time, our sincere hope was expressed that Great Britain, as one of the parties to the truce agreement, use her good offices to bring about the withdrawal of the Chinese troops outside of the prescribed zone. Similar replies were sent to France and America.

As for North China, in willful disregard of various pledges and agreements, the Chinese central armies moved northward to in-

[ 77 ]

dulge in a series of provocative actions, and large forces began to pour into the Province of Chahar. Our government, therefore, has had to take determined steps.

Thus hostilities now spread from North to Central China, and Japan finds herself engaged in major conflict with China on extended fields. I am deeply pained to say that some 50,000 Japanese residents in various parts of China have been forced to evacuate, leaving behind them their huge investments and their business interests, acquired through years of arduous toil and other interests, while not a few of them have been made victims of hostilities. It is also to be regretted that the nationals of other countries in China are being subjected to similar trials and tribulations.

All this is due to no other cause than that the Nanking government and also local militarist regimes in China have for many years in the past deliberately undertaken to incite the public opinion against Japan as a means of strengthening their own political powers and, in conclusion, with Communist elements, they still further impaired Sino-Japanese relations. Now our loyal and valiant soldiers, with the united support of the nation behind them, are engaged in strenuous campaigns night and day amid indescribable hardships and privations. We cannot but be moved to hear their heroic sacrifices as well as their brilliant achievements.

It is hardly necessary to say that the basic policy of the Japanese government aims for the stabilization of East Asia through conciliation and co-operation between Japan, Manchukuo and China for the common prosperity and well-being. Since China, ignoring our true motive, mobilized her vast armies against us, we can do no other than to counter it by force of arms.

The urgent need at this moment is that we take a resolute attitude and compel China to mend her way. Japan has no other objective than to see a happy and tranquil North China and all

[ 78 ]

China freed from danger of recurrence of such calamitous hostilities as at present, and Sino-Japanese relations so adjusted as to enable us to put into practice our above-mentioned policy. Let us hope that the statesmen of China be brought to take a broad view of East Asia, that they speedily realize their mistakes and that, turning a new leaf, they will act in unison with the high aim and aspirations of Japan.

No. 7

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S WARNING TO AMERICANS IN CHINA  
(Special Dispatch to the *Baltimore Sun*, September 6, 1937)

Great Salt Pond, Block Island, R. I., Sept. 5—President Roosevelt gave notice today that American citizens who decline to come out of China will remain there at their own risk.

The President said that the policy with respect to evacuation of American citizens in China is the same as that applied to American citizens in Ethiopia in 1935 and in Spain in 1936.

In each instance they were urged by American diplomatic and consular officials to evacuate and were aided in doing so, the United States Government making it clear that it would take no responsibility for the protection of those who chose to remain.

The President has set no deadline after which the Government will formally renounce the obligation of protecting, as best it can, American citizens in China. There are still 7,780 American citizens in China, the President said. Some of them are, or were, at distant inland points and so require time to arrange their affairs and reach points of evacuation on the coast. But diplomatic

[ 79 ]

and consular officials have endeavored to reach every American citizen in China with an urgent recommendation that he leave the country. Those who fail to heed this recommendation will remain in China at their own risk, the President warned today.

The "stay-at-your-own risk" warning that the President issued today to American citizens in China, struck a stronger note than has been sounded up to now by either him or the State Department. While backing up the evacuation recommendations issued to American citizens in China by diplomatic and consular officials on the ground, State Department officials have emphasized that there would be no precipitate withdrawal and indicated that those who remained at such points as Shanghai, would be given as much protection as possible.

The President volunteered no exception today for the 2,000 or more American citizens who remain in the International Settlement at Shanghai or for those who remain at Peiping and Tientsin, the other points where American armed forces are stationed. At the same time, he gave no intimation that withdrawal is imminent for the marine guard from Peiping or the regular army detail from Tientsin, both of which forces are authorized by the Boxer protocol, or the marine guard in the International Settlement, which soon would be reinforced by another marine regiment from San Diego.

Likewise, the vessels of the Asiatic fleet will remain along the China coast, although their location from time to time will depend on where new pressure areas development requiring their aid in evacuating American citizens. By implication the President's comments today emphasized the large and complex dimensions of the evacuation problem quite as much as it did the warning to American citizens that the United States will take no responsibility for them if they choose to remain in China.

[ 80 ]

No. 8

STATE DEPARTMENT'S WARNING TO AMERICAN SHIPPING  
SEPTEMBER 10, 1937

The conflict in the Far East has resulted in the creation of a danger zone along the coast of China which makes it dangerous for American merchant vessels to operate in the adjacent waters.

The Japanese authorities have announced a blockade of the entire coast from Chinwangtao to Pakhoi against the entrance or egress of Chinese shipping.

The Chinese authorities have announced their intention, in view of the blockade, to take apparent action against all Japanese naval vessels along the Chinese coast and have requested that naval and merchant vessels of third powers avoid proximity to Japanese naval vessels and military transports and have their respective national colors painted on their top decks in a conspicuous manner.

The Chinese authorities have also announced the following:

(A) The mouth of Min River in Fukien Province has been closed to navigation and all shipping through that place has been suspended as of Sept. 4.

(B) Beginning Sept. 9 no foreign merchant vessels will be permitted to navigate at night in waters between Bocca Tigris Forts and Canton.

The State Department was informed that the hydrographic office of the Navy Department included the announcement in the hydrographic radio bulletin issued today and in the daily memorandum for the information of mariners issued by the hydrographic office, under the heading: "Caution regarding dangers to merchant ships in Far Eastern waters."

[ 81 ]

No. 9

STATE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT ON WAR TRADE,  
SEPTEMBER 14, 1937

Merchant vessels owned by the Government of the United States will not hereafter, until further notice, be permitted to transport to China or Japan any of the arms, ammunition or implements of war which were listed in the President's proclamation of May 1, 1937.

Any other merchant vessels flying the American flag which attempt to transport any of the listed articles to China or Japan will, until further notice, do so at their own risk.

The question of applying the Neutrality Act remains in *status quo*, the Government policy remaining on a twenty-four-hour basis.

No. 10

VICE-ADMIRAL KIYOSHI HASEGAWA'S COMMUNIQUE OF  
SEPTEMBER 19, 1937

*Warning in Advance of Intended Aerial Bombing of Nanking*

(For Press Reports on this warning, see Chapter VI of this Pamphlet)

It being the objective of the Japanese operations to bring the present state of hostilities to an early conclusion terminating the hostile actions of the Chinese forces, and Nanking being the principal base of Chinese military operations, the Japanese naval air force may, on the afternoon of the 21st, resort to such offensive measures as bombing and otherwise upon the Chinese

[ 82 ]

forces, as well as upon all establishments pertaining to military operations and activities in and around Nanking.

It needs no reiteration that the safety of lives and property of nationals of friendly powers will be taken into full consideration during the projected offensive. However, in view of the possibility of such nationals becoming dangerously involved in the Chino-Japanese hostilities despite such precautions, the commander in chief of the 3d Fleet is constrained earnestly to advise such officials and residents living in and around Nanking to take adequate measures of voluntary moving to areas of greater safety. Foreign warships as well as others proposing to avoid danger in the Yangtse River are advised to moor upstream from Hsiasanshan.

No. 11

ADMIRAL HARRY P. YARNELL'S REPLY TO THE FOREGOING  
COMMUNIQUE OF VICE-ADMIRAL HASEGAWA

My Dear Admiral Hasegawa:

I have received a notice issued through the Japanese Consul General in reference to proposed bombing of Nanking by the Japanese naval air force, operations to begin afternoon of September 21. This notice contained advice to foreign ships to move upstream from Hsiasanshan.

The United States Navy has at Nanking two river gunboats, the Luzon and the Guam. These two ships are anchored abreast the Butterfield & Swire pontoon. So long as the United States Embassy and other American nationals remain in Nanking, it is necessary that these two vessels remain also.

[ 83 ]

These two vessels are distinguished by the United States flag spread horizontally on their upper works. It is requested that you issue the necessary instructions to the Japanese naval air force to avoid dropping bombs in the vicinity of these vessels. In the case of Japanese Army planes bombing this vicinity, it is requested that similar instructions be issued.

No. 12

TEXT OF THE AMERICAN PROTEST, DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1937,  
AGAINST JAPAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT TO BOMB NANKING

The American Government refers to the statement by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Third Fleet which was handed to the American Consul General at Shanghai on Sept. 19, announcing the project of the Japanese Naval Air Force, after 12 o'clock noon of Sept. 21, 1937, to resort to bombing and other measures of offensive in and around the city of Nanking, and warning the officials and nationals of third powers living there "to take adequate measures for voluntary moving into areas of greater safety."

The American Government objects both to such jeopardizing of the lives of its nationals and of non-combatants generally and to the suggestion that its officials and nationals now residing in and around Nanking should withdraw from the areas in which they are lawfully carrying on their legitimate activities.

Immediately upon being informed of the announcement under reference, the American Government gave instruction to the American Ambassador at Tokyo to express to the Japanese Government this government's concern; and that instruction was carried out. On the same day, the concern of this government

was expressed by the Acting Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington.

This government holds the view that any general bombing of an extensive area wherein there resides a large populace engaged in peaceful pursuits is unwarranted and contrary to principles of law and of humanity. Moreover, in the present instance the period allowed for withdrawal is inadequate, and, in view of the wide area over which Japanese bombing operations have prevailed, there can be no assurance that even in areas to which American nationals and non-combatants might withdraw they would be secure.

Notwithstanding the reiterated assurance that "the safety of the lives and property of nationals of friendly powers will be taken into full consideration during the projected offensive," this Government is constrained to observe that experience has shown that, when and where aerial bombing operations are engaged in, no amount of solicitude on the part of the authorities responsible therefor is effective toward ensuring the safety of any persons or any property within the area of such operations.

Reports of bombing operations by Japanese planes at and around Nanking both before and since the issuance of the announcement under reference indicate that these operations almost invariably result in extensive destruction of noncombatant life and non-military establishments.

In view of the fact that Nanking is the seat of government in China and that there the American Ambassador and other agencies of the American Government carry on their essential functions, the American Government strongly objects to the creation of a situation in consequence of which the American Ambassador and other agencies of this Government are confronted with the alternative of abandoning their establishments or being exposed to grave hazards.

In the light of the assurances repeatedly given by the Japanese Government that the objectives of Japanese military operations are limited strictly to Chinese military agencies and establishments and that the Japanese Government has no intention of making non-military property and noncombatants the direct objects of attack, and of the Japanese Government's expression of its desire to respect the embassies, warships and merchant vessels of the powers at Nanking, the American Government cannot believe that the intimation that the whole Nanking area may be subjected to bombing operations represents the considered intent of the Japanese Government.

The American Government, therefore, reserving all rights on its own behalf and on behalf of American nationals in respect to damages which might result from Japanese military operations in the Nanking area, expresses the earnest hope that further bombing in and around the city of Nanking will be avoided.

---

No. 13

JAPAN'S NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 29, 1937, IN REPLY TO AMERICA'S  
NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 22, REGARDING NANKING BOMBING

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have duly noted the contents of Your Excellency's note No. 780 of September 22 regarding the bombing of Nanking by Japanese forces.

As Your Excellency's government is well aware, Nanking is exceptionally strongly fortified and it is the most important strategic base of military operations for the Chinese forces.

The bombing of the military facilities and equipment located in and around the said city is a necessary and unavoidable measure for the attainment of the military objectives of the Japanese forces. It goes without saying that bombing operations by Japa-

[ 86 ]

nese forces will be strictly confined to such scope and will not be aimed at non-combatants, as evidenced by the fact that warning was given even to Chinese non-combatants.

The frequently stated policy of the imperial Japanese government to respect, as far as possible, the rights and interests of third countries and the safety of the lives and property of the nationals thereof remains unaltered in the present bombing operations.

The recent proposal of the imperial Japanese government that the officials, citizens and vessels of your excellency's country take refuge was the result of the desire to avoid, if possible, the occurrence of injury to nationals of third countries, which might be unavoidable, notwithstanding the greatest precautions which may be taken by the Japanese forces.

It is hoped that your excellency's government will understand that the imperial Japanese government has desired the safety of the nationals of third countries, in spite of the fact that the Japanese forces are restricted in their strategic movements by reason of the giving of advance warnings, and it is earnestly hoped that your excellency's government, with full appreciation of the circumstances, will cooperate with the measures taken by the imperial Japanese government.

Furthermore, the view of the Imperial Japanese government with regard to damages sustained by nationals of third countries as a result of the present hostilities in China is as stated in my note of August 31.

---

No. 14

ADMIRAL HARRY P. YARNELL'S STATEMENT, SHANGHAI, SEPTEMBER  
24, 1937, REGARDING PROTECTION OF AMERICAN LIVES AND PROPERTY

Naval vessels will be stationed in ports where American citizens are concentrated, and will remain there until it is no longer

[ 87 ]

possible or necessary to protect them or until they have been evacuated. This policy, based on our duties and obligations, will be continued as long as the present controversy between China and Japan exists, and will continue in full force even after our nationals have been warned to leave China and after an opportunity to leave has been given.

Most American citizens now in China are engaged in businesses or professions which are their only means of livelihood. These persons are unwilling to leave until their businesses have been destroyed or they are forced to leave due to actual physical danger.

Until such time comes our naval forces cannot be withdrawn without failure in our duty and without bringing great discredit on the United States Navy.

In giving assistance and protection our naval forces may at times be exposed to dangers which will in most cases be slight but in any case these risks must be accepted.

---

No. 15

STATE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT, OCTOBER 6, 1937

The Department of State has been informed by the American Minister to Switzerland of the text of the report adopted by the advisory committee of the League of Nations setting forth the advisory committee's examination of the facts of the present situation in China and the treaty obligations of Japan. The Minister has further informed the department that this report was adopted and approved by the assembly of the League of Nations today, October 6.

[ 88 ]

Since the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East, the Government of the United States has urged upon both the Chinese and the Japanese governments that they refrain from hostilities, and has offered to be of assistance in an effort to find some means, acceptable to both parties to the conflict, of composing by pacific methods the situation in the Far East.

The Secretary of State in statements made public on July 16 and August 23 made clear the position of the Government of the United States in regard to international problems throughout the world and as applied specifically to the hostilities which are at present unfortunately going on between China and Japan.

Among the principles which in the opinion of the Government of the United States should govern international relationships, if peace is to be maintained, are abstinence by all nations from the use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations; adjustment of problems in international relations by process of peaceful negotiation and agreement; respect by all nations for the rights of others and observance by all nations of established obligations, and the upholding of the principle of the sanctity of treaties.

On October 5 at Chicago the President elaborated these principles, emphasizing their importance, and in a discussion of the world situation pointed out that there can be no stability for peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all; that international anarchy destroys every foundation for peace; that it jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small; and that it is therefore of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that respect for treaties and international morality be restored.

In the light of the unfolding developments in the Far East the Government of the United States has been forced to the conclu-

[ 89 ]

sion that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power treaty of February 6, 1922, regarding principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, and to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928. Thus the conclusions of this Government with respect to the foregoing are in general accord with those of the Assembly of the League of Nations.

No. 16

JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT

The League of Nations regards Japan's action in China as violation of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Antiwar Pact. The United States published a statement to the same effect.

This was due to misunderstanding Japan's true intentions. The Japanese government extremely regrets this misunderstanding.

The present conflict was caused by Chinese troops' irregular attacks on Japanese troops which were stationed in North China according to treaty stipulations. Japanese were maneuvering at Lukouchiao with a small number of troops, as Japanese garrisons were widely scattered during peace time.

After the outbreak of the trouble, Japan tried to settle locally and the action of the Japanese troops was nothing more than a measure of self-defense. Japan had no other intention whatever.

Aggravation of the conflict in Shanghai and North China was due to the attitude of the Chinese, who, violating the Shanghai truce agreement signed in 1932, stationed 40,000 troops in the de-

[ 90 ]

militarized zone and were planning to murder 30,000 Japanese residents, including women and children.

At that time the Japanese forces were only 3,000 strong. Thus, China is responsible for the aggravation of the situation because she disregarded Japan's nonaggression policy and mobilized a huge number of troops against Japan.

This forced Japan to take military action. Japan's military operations in China today have been entirely caused by China's provocative attitude. Japan's action is entirely in self-defense.

What Japan wants in taking the present action is to eradicate China's anti-Japanese policy and maintain peace in the Far East cooperating with China.

Japan has no territorial ambitions.

Accordingly, Japan's action in China violates no existing treaties in any way whatever. On the contrary, China in carrying out her stubborn anti-Japanese policy, incited by Red influence, is planning to drive out Japanese rights and interests from China by force of arms.

It is China's government that is violating the spirit of the pact against war, menacing the peace of the world.

[ 91 ]

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By *Milton D. Hunter*, NARS, Date *12-18-75*

What the democracies would like is to remain undisturbed in the enjoyment of all their possessions. They would like to keep what they have, not only their colonies and their dependencies, but also their monopolies and their preferences, and they would like never to have to defend what they have. Thus they can barely persuade themselves to make the relatively small concessions embodied in Secretary Hull's policies, and for the rest they would like to keep the world in order by reminding it that it would be as noble as it would be convenient for them if all treaties were habitually respected.

*Walter Lippmann, in the New York Herald Tribune,  
October 16, 1937.*

According to the Department of Commerce at Washington the emergency ordinance just put into effect by the Japanese Government affects only less than one per cent of the total value of American exports to Japan.

In the first seven months of 1937 Japan bought \$192,000,000 worth of goods from the United States. In July alone American exports to Japan totalled \$27,000,000.

With the Compliments of  
THE JAPANESE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE  
OF NEW YORK  
500 FIFTH AVENUE  
NEW YORK CITY

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Glusberg NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICA'S ORIENTAL TRADE

(Value in dollars)

1935

	<i>Exports To</i>	<i>Imports From</i>
JAPAN .....	203,155,000	151,142,000
CHINA .....	38,984,000	63,783,000

1936

JAPAN .....	204,186,000	172,395,000
CHINA .....	46,535,000	73,252,000

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 1937  
Department of State

FROM

RB

CINCAF

Rec'd December 7, 1937

8:25 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: AMEMBASSY CHINA

COPIES SENT TO  
~~UNIT AND M.L.D.~~

793.94

0007 Japanese army reported at Purple Mountain vicinity Nanking. Chinese troops withdrawing from Chinkiang-Nanking-Wuhu area to North Bank River offering little resistance. Morale poor. Situation in valley may become bad due to large number disorganized troops. 2327

793.94/11515

NPL

DEC 11 1937

92/END

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

FROM CINCAF

December 8, 1937

Rec'd 6:20 a.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 8 1937

Department of State

ACTION: NAVY DEPARTMENT

INFO: COINYANGPAT  
COHSOPAT

793.94

0007. Forty Japanese transports accompanied by many  
naval vessels reported off Chikai near Towshan, Kwangtung  
this morning. 1930.

DDM

793.94 / 11516

F/EG  
FILED

DEC 11 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Chastain NARS, Date 12-18-75

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated FROM  
to anyone.

CINCAF

December 8, 1937

6:20 a.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 1937  
Department of State

ACTION: NAVY DEPARTMENT

INFO: AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO CHINA

793.94

0007. March Japanese troops through Settlement done  
on insistence younger army officers who also drew up  
demands after bomb incident and refused return Hongkew  
until police commissioner had agreed submit them to  
Municipal Council. This radical element probably attempt  
exact rigorous terms in any peace agreement affecting  
Shanghai or general situation. Understood action above  
group feared by high army navy commanders. 2325.

DDM

793.94/11517

F/FG  
(11517)  
DEC 11 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DI

JR

PLAIN

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated December 7, 1937

Rec'd 6:20 a.m., 8th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1013, December 7, 9 p.m.


Our 997, December 5, 6 p.m., Wuhu bombing. Reliably

reported that further bombing at Wuhu occurred yesterday  
and that during eleven air raids upon the city some of  
which were directed at railway station a waterfront  
godown of British firm Butterfield and Swire was bombed.

Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai. Peiping please.  
repeat to Tokyo.

ATCHESON

DDM



793.74

793.94/1518

F/F G

FILED

DEC 11 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMYANGPAT

FROM December 8, 1937

Rec'd 8:32 a.m.

ACTION: CPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE YANGPAT  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMSOPAT  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEI PING

793.94

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 1937  
Department of State

0007. Railway yard Fukow bombed 14:30 today.

Situation Nanking unchanged but preparations for defense  
of city continues. Other ports quiet. 2360.

KLP

793.94/11519

DEC 11 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

4

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

CINCAF

FROM

DECEMBER 8, 1937

Rec'd 8:27 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: 2ND BRIG USMC  
AMCON SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON 5  
COMDESRON 5  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMN AMBASS CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMBEM NANKING  
ALUSNA  
PEIPING

793.94

SENT TO  
M.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
REC 8 1937  
Department of State

0008 Japanese advance reached points approximately five miles southeast Nanking, ten miles East Wuhu. No fighting immediate vicinity city Nanking which reported quiet with Chinese continuing defense preparations. Japanese vessels now about Kiangyin removing mines, sounding channels. Thirty Japanese transports off Woosung. Settlement quiet 1930.

KLP:

793.94/1 1520

F/FG

FILED  
DEC 11 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Handwritten mark*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Tokyo

Dated December 8, 1937

Rec'd 9:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
S.W. AND M.L.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 1937  
Department of State

606, December 8, 6 p.m.

This morning the Foreign Office spokesman told foreign press correspondents that Germany, Great Britain, Italy and the United States, those powers who feel they have large interests in the Far East, were active in leading China to come to direct negotiation and that the Japanese Government was waiting to hear the good results of their activities.

So far as the United States is concerned this appears to be another case of wishful thinking on the part of the Japanese.

GREW

WWC

793.94/11521

793.94  
-  
new  
793.94/119

F/FG  
FILED  
DEC 11 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FORM DS-515  
3-19-47

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Memo of conversation between the Under Secretary  
and the British Ambassador regarding the situation  
in the Far East.

FOR THE ORIGINAL PAPER FROM WHICH REFERENCE IS TAKEN

SEE Memo  
(DESPATCH, TELEGRAM, INSTRUCTION, LETTER, ETC.)

DATED Dec. 8, 1937 FROM Under Secretary-Welles  
~~XXXX~~

FILE NO. 740.00/238

793.94/11521 1/2

Confidential File

793.94/11521/2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

PLAIN

FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated December 7, 1937

Rec'd 6:20 a.m. 8th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
SENIOR STAFF  
*JMS*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 1937  
Department of State  
*[Handwritten initials]*

*793.94  
note  
793.94119*

1104, December 7, 7 p.m.

On December fourth, using as a topic the reported  
peace moves of the German Ambassador to China, the NORTH  
CHINA DAILY NEWS editorially urged the consideration by  
the Chinese of peace with Japan. "It is significant that  
to General Chiang Kai Shek public opinion looks as the  
leader who, having so clearly defined the actualities  
of resistance, is best fitted to display the courage  
which is prepared to lead in calling a halt to that  
resistance". Omission. "In the light of the desperate  
predicament of the Chinese Government, its armies and  
the whole fabric of its civil administration, nothing  
but commendation could be forthcoming for the leader who  
would stand forth to accept responsibility for peace".  
This morning in editorial plea is made for understanding  
on the part of Japan. Japan should realize that the  
nations of the world are not all against her as the  
Japanese people are led to believe. She should realize  
on

793.94/11522

DEC 11 1937

FILED  
RRG

-2- #1104, December 7, 7 p.m., from Shanghai via N. R.

on the other hand that forbearance does not derive entirely from lack of resolution or stamina. "Japanese announcements have repudiated the idea that mediation can be effectively offered in the present conflict by any third party. That may or may not be right. Yet, in the long run, no one can imagine any Far Eastern settlement to which the views of such third parties will not have relevance. Are Japanese military designs to be permitted destructively to develop their piecemeal and improvisatory influences on the destiny of Chinese while the economic and political interests of the Japanese people are exposed to further neglect and impairment, owing to the inhibitions which render contacts with other nations increasingly embarrassing? Is it not possible to bring Tokyo to realize that when a military machine has succeeded in the primary object for which it has been used it is incapable of operating effectively for creative purposes of restoration and recovery? It is equally helpless in the endeavor to preserve the sympathy and cooperation of neutral nations to say nothing of the people whom it has overcome. The situation seems urgently to require that some recognition of these principals should move the mind of Tokyo".

H. G.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3- #1104, DECEMBER 7, 7 p.m., from Shanghai via N. R.

H. G. Woodhead in this evening's POST AND MERCURY considers that the continued Japanese encroachments upon British interests and outrages on British property are driving Britain to a point when an ultimatum "will constitute the sole alternative to intolerable humiliation". He advocates that Viscount Halifax be sent to the Far East as a special envoy to make a final effort to avoid a breach with Japan. If he is not available "it is imperative that someone of similar rank and prestige should come to the Far East without delay".

The NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS may be considered to be close to British official circles.

GAUSS

DDM:KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIVISION OF  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*file*  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEC 3 - 1937  
MR. WILSON

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 - 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADVISER ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS  
MR. WILSON  
DEC 3 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

FE  
A-W  
PA/B  
E  
BAR

The following information has been received from the  
Assistant Naval Attache at Nanking under date of 2 December, 1937:

There are at present 35 planes from Russia here and  
all have Russian crews. On the second of December  
twenty pursuit planes defending Nanking against a  
Japanese raid brought down three Japanese planes  
with no loss to selves. The rest of the 35 are  
light bombers and six of these 15 light bombers  
assert they successfully bombed Point Island  
yesterday.

793.94

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

793.94/11523

F/MR

FILED  
DEC 9 1937

11523

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIVISION OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
MR. DUNN  
DEC 6 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 6 - 1937  
Department of State

~~PA~~  
E

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The following information has been received from the Assistant  
Naval Attache at Nanking under date of 6 December:

Thirty new Russian bombers were supposed to arrive  
in Nanchang on the third of December.

Our agent states that his friends are staying but  
are prepared for a hasty exodus and in that case he will  
follow on the succeeding day.

The Chinese air force is planning daily raids  
on the Nipponese advance and has shifted bases to  
Hankow, Nanchang, and Nancheng.

793-94

793.94/11524

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

F/MR

FILED  
DEC 9 1937

11524

2-1

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

PLAIN

FROM Shanghai via N.R.

Dated December 8, 1937

Rec'd 9:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 1937  
Department of State

NOTE  
393.1115

1114, December 8, 5 p.m.

The Senior Consul informs me he has received a communication from the Japanese Consul General which in substance states that it is the earnest wish of the Japanese forces that all foreign nationals now remaining Nanking should stay away from the zone of actual fighting by evacuating from that city without delay. Sent to Nanking, repeated to Hankow and Peiping.

GAUSS

CSB:

793.94/11525

DEC 11 1937  
E/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

3-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

*FE*  
DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 9 - 1937  
Department of State

JR

GRAY

FROM Hankow via N. R.

Dated December 8, 1937

Rec'd 9:41 a.m.

NOTE  
893.24  
761.93

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 - 1937  
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

23, December 8, 4 p.m.

A representative of a foreign Embassy stated this morning that a few days ago 42 Soviet planes arrived in Manchong bringing about 100 Soviet flyers and other aviation personnel, also that about 50 Soviet flyers are in Hankow and a number of planes including an efficient pursuit plane. This information has not been confirmed but is regarded as probably reliable. Repeated to Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping.

793.94/11526

JOHNSON

WNC:KLP

111064

DEC 13 1937  
F/F G  
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3-2

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

Washington,

1937 DEC 8 PM 4 53

December 8, 1937.

*No distribution*

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
ATTENTION

This cable was sent in confidential code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone. A-1

AMEMBASSY

HANKOW (CHINA) *van H.P.*

*one*

*793.94/11064*

Referring to the Department's No. 348,  
*SABAY* November 11, 5 p. m. to Nanking suggesting that  
telegrams transmitting military information be  
enciphered in confidential codes, the Department  
is of the opinion that your No. 23, December 8,  
*11526* 4 p. m. should have been enciphered as suggested.

793.94/11526

*Hull.  
(RHS)*

*793.94/11526  
note  
119.25*

*2AB.*  
DCR:DAS:MJP

*See  
FE  
over*

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

F/A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

72

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FROM GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated December 7, 1937

Rec'd 6:20 a.m., 8th.

Secretary of State, **COPIES SENT TO**  
Washington. **O.N.I. AND M.I.D.**

793.94

1012, December 7, 4 p.m.

FROM ROBERTS FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 12 1937  
Department of State

"According to an American who yesterday went to

Tangshan the Japanese were within two miles of that point, having taken Kuyung. No other definite information of Japanese advance but local unconfirmed reports say another column has passed Lishui and is about twenty miles from Nanking. Reference report yesterday's air raid Pukow Railway yards including locomotive shop were damaged and two bombs fell on the Hsiakwan side near the fish market and several people were killed.

Local troops near Kuyung say that the Japanese first shelling their positions with artillery then bombing from low flying planes of which they say there are many. However planes were used only during the morning yesterday and the day before although artillery fire continued until dusk. Observation planes are used for spotting artillery.

Four

793.94/11527

DEC 12 1937

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #1012, December 7, 4 p.m., from Nanking via N. R.

Four Japanese planes raided Pukow at two thirty p.m., today. Weather clear but extremely hazy. Bombs were dropped on railway yards from altitude of about 8000.

The 88th Division garrisons the defence lines outside the main south gate and for two or three miles defence preparations are very thorough. No information available regarding advance of Japanese from that direction". Repeated to Peiping, Hankow, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. H. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

G-2  
GVS


*RCM*  
*JWB*  
*SSM*  
*JCV*

G-2/2657-E-439

DCR

November 20, 1937.

*793.94*  
*W. H. [unclear]*  
*Mar 19,*  
*1973*



MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. Herewith are Situation Maps and Summary covering events in China for the week ending November 20.
2. The outstanding developments for the past week have been:
  - a. The continued Japanese progress west of Shanghai culminating in the capture of Soochow and Kashing. This renders further Chinese defensive action east of Lake Tai impracticable.
  - b. The gradual evacuation of Hanking by Chinese governmental departments.
  - c. Increasing Japanese pressure on International Settlement authorities at Shanghai, indicating a desire for absolute and exclusive control therein.
  - d. The promulgation of an Imperial Ordinance on November 17 authorizing an Imperial Japanese General Headquarters.

NOV 20 1937  
FILMED

encls.  
ml

E. R. W. McCABE,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

*No map attached*

CONFIDENTIAL

11528

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

G-2  
W M

G-2/2657-E-439

*L. G. Hipsman*

*Mar 19,  
1973*

November 20, 1937.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, INTELLIGENCE BRANCH:

Subject: Summary of Events in Sino-Japanese  
Situation, November 13-19, 1937.

GENERAL

The Brussels parley concluded the first phase of its deliberations on November 15 with a light moral rebuke to Japan, pointing out that Japanese action in the Sino-Japanese dispute is not in consonance with the principles of the Nine-Power Pact. The vote on this action was fifteen to one; Italy casting a lone negative vote. Norway, Sweden and Denmark failed to vote for unexplained reasons. The parley recessed until November 22 to await instructions from the home governments as to further lines of action or adjournment. The Japanese spokesman at Brussels was outspoken in his contempt for the action of the delegates. He also stated that Japan would consider any aid to China by a third power as a hostile act.

Emperor Hirohito by Imperial Ordinance November 17 sanctioned the formation of an Imperial General Headquarters to assume supreme authority in war time and at "such other times as events may dictate." The General Headquarters will include the Emperor, two royal Princes, and high Army and Navy staff officers. It is probable that the final authority will be concentrated into the hands of not more than six men. It is stated that the object of the General Headquarters is to coordinate military and naval functions and that it will have no political effect (?). A declaration of war on China appears unlikely at this time.

The tremendous Chinese reverses in the Shanghai Delta area has forced the Chinese Government to evacuate Hanking. The new seat of the government is to be at Chungking, Szechuan, just west of the Yangtze River gorges. The Executive, Legislative, Judicial, and Control Yuan will go there. The Ministries of Finance, Education, and Public Health are being established in Hankow. Some Ministries may go to Changsha. It is reported that Chiang Kai-shek wished to turn over his control of governmental agencies to H. H. Kung, in order to be free for military operations. However, Chiang was persuaded to continue in his present office. Most foreign embassies

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

will probably move to Hankow, leaving some personnel to maintain contact in Hanking. The American Embassy will leave two secretaries and the Acting Assistant Military Attache at Hanking. Tokyo foresees administrative chaos in China as result of the Government's evacuation of Hanking. A Tokyo spokesman pointed out that Japan's air arm can strike the Chinese capitals no matter where located.

Japanese press continues attacks on the British. The heavy flow of munitions destined for China through Hongkong has again been brought out. A group of retired Army and Navy officers, diplomats, and politicians on November 15 decided to convoke a mass demonstration against the British attitude in the Sino-Japanese hostilities. At Shanghai the British authorities are pestered by the Japanese with vexatious Settlement problems, possibly to try out British resistance before taking virtual control of the International Settlement.

The chairman of the French Senate Foreign Affairs Committee revealed that Japan threatened military reprisals including occupation of Hainan Island and blockade of French Indo China, if France continued to send aid to China. This statement was denied emphatically by the French Foreign Office and guardedly by a Japanese spokesman at Tokyo. The French Government some weeks ago stopped further munitions shipments over the Hanoi-Yunnanfu Railway. In this connection, the French-Japanese treaty of 1907 obligates each party to refrain from acts which will disturb the spheres of influence of the other.

The French General Confederation of Labor, containing five million members, proclaimed a boycott of Japanese goods November 15.

It is reported that construction has been stopped on many buildings and in several shipyards in Japan because of the iron shortage. According to Government estimates, postponement of all public and private building would result in a saving of 300,000 tons of iron. The new Finance Ministry Building at Tokyo, costing nearly \$2,000,000, is among the projects affected.

According to Domei, Moscow, the Japanese Government on November 15 lodged a protest with the Soviets against reported action in enforcing the mass deportation of 200,000 Koreans from the Siberian Maritime Provinces to Turkestan.

Marshal Bluscher, commander of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, in an order published November 7 declared that "the Far Eastern Army and Pacific Fleet will not allow the fascist bloc to violate a single inch of the Far Eastern border.

Japanese press states that the Government will soon recognize the Franco regime in Spain.

Coleman De Wetteville, Red Cross representative at Shanghai, states that the Chinese have suffered 800,000 casualties to November 17. He estimates 175,000 killed at Shanghai and 200,000 in North China. On November 18 the Japanese announced their casualties at Shanghai as a total of 51,610 distributed as follows: Army, 9,760 dead, 29,850 wounded; Navy 1,200 dead and wounded. They claim 300,000 Chinese casualties at Shanghai.

Representative Lewis on November 19 introduced a resolution in the House calling for economic sanctions against Japan as an aid in termination of the war in China.

Comment. Despite the Shanghai defeats, there appears to be enough "will to fight" in the Chinese command to carry on for some time. There is a difference of opinion between Chiang and his advisers, both Chinese and foreign, as to the advisability of making a stand at Nanking, but there appears to be no schism on continuing resistance. The Government's evacuation of Nanking will have some effect on China's morale. However, early in the war, Chiang had announced that such evacuation would take place when necessary and that China would fight a retreating action to Tibet if necessary. Unless the Japanese can break down this will to fight, they are in for a long and expensive campaign. The Japanese should be able to take Nanking within four weeks by land, or in a much shorter time if their navy succeeds in breaking through the Yangtze barriers. Unless they can again trap a large Chinese force during the present operation, peace may still be a long way off.

#### NORTH CHINA THEATER

Shansi. The Japanese are continuing a slow advance south. Their west column is approaching Fenyang. Their east column is moving from Hochun, south of Pingting, toward Yushe. Chinese Szechuan units are reported arriving in Fenyang to aid in holding the Japanese.

Ping-Han. No further Japanese advance on this line has been reported. Chinese units at Weihsieh, 45 miles west of Singtai (Shuntai) have been driven out and the city captured. Weihsieh had been used by Chinese troops as a base for operations against Japanese communications.

Japanese control in Hopen is mainly along the railway lines. Large Chinese units are still roving in the areas between.

Tsin-Pu. All Chinese units have been withdrawn south of the Yellow River and the Japanese now control the north bank. Several spans of the Tsin-Pu bridge north of Tsinan have been destroyed by Chinese. The Chinese expect the Japanese to cross at Taiyang, Taitze, and Putai, and are prepared to resist at those points. 3c

far there has been no attempt to cross the river. It is believed the Japanese still hope for a peaceful solution in Shantung in order to safeguard their valuable properties there.

Chinese units at Chefoo and Tsingtao are being withdrawn toward Tainan to aid in the defense.

The civilian exodus from Tainan continues. Sporadic looting of Japanese property, apparently countenanced by local authorities, started November 17. At Tsingtao tension is high and the Chinese Mayor there threatens to destroy the Japanese mills before Japanese occupy the town. It is reliably reported that the Japanese are paying the Tsingtao Municipal Government \$12,000 Mex. monthly for the protection of the Japanese-owned mills.

Han Fu-shu reaffirmed his intention to resist further Japanese encroachment. He has stated that he can hold the Yellow River line for 30 days.

Chinese expect Japanese landings at Jihshao and Lungkou to isolate Tsingtao.

#### CENTRAL CHINA THEATER

Japanese succeeded in inflicting a major defeat on the Chinese forces in the Shanghai area. Pressing north with their newly landed forces on the north shore of Hangchow Bay and west from the Settlement they broke completely Chinese resistance east of the Soochow line. A new landing on the Yangtze north of Chdntang and naval action along the river aided in the debacle. Lunshan (Quinsan), key point on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, fell on the 18th. The Chinese are now holding a line from Fushan south through Changshu - Soochow - Kashing to Chapeu. At Pingyang between Soochow and Kashing the Japanese have broken through this line and held a 10-mile section of the Kashing-Soochow Railway. They are assembling many motorized boats for use on Lake Tai in outflanking the present and succeeding Chinese lines. The Chinese are making desperate efforts to hold the victorious Japanese. General Pai Chung-hai is reported at Kashing directing the organization of the defenses there. Heavy rains beginning November 17 have also slowed the Japanese drive considerably. They are now reported hammering at Changshu, Soochow and Kashing. Kashing is reported to have fallen on the 19th. It is probable the Chinese defense will give way soon. Another defensive line to stem the Japanese advance in case of a break through on the Chinese left is being organized and manned north of Lake Tai from Kiangyin to Hushih. A final line to defend Nanking is being formed running from Chinkiang through Lishui to Taiping. About 160,000 Chinese troops are reported to be holding the Soochow line, 60,000 on the Kiangyin-Hushih line, and about 80,000 more in the Nanking area. More are expected. It is probable that 300,000 Chinese troops, including casualties, have been thoroughly disorganized by the Japanese drive. Some of

these troops may be reorganized into fighting units but a large proportion is probably a military loss.

As long as the Chinese troops hold Kiangyin they can protect the river barrier there and so prevent Japanese naval vessels from going up the Yangtsze to outflank them and to attack Nanking. The Japanese Navy has made preparations to destroy this barrier as soon as it can be attacked. Another barrier protected by fortifications is reported at Chinking.

Until hampered by heavy rains, Japanese aircraft conducted extensive bombing operations throughout the delta area. Retreating Chinese troops and defense and communication lines were strafed heavily. Nanking was bombed November 15 and 16. Soochow was subjected to an intense air bombing during the night of November 13-14. Seven hundred bombs were dropped during this period with 2,000 reported killed and heavy property damage.

At Nanking the Government is moving inland as reported above. A general exodus of the civil population is taking place. Chiang Kai-shek is apparently determined to make a stand in the Nanking area despite the advice of his associates. It is reported that he has disagreed with the German advisory staff on this decision and that they are leaving Nanking for Henyang, Hunan (south of Changsha) via Hankow on November 20. Well equipped Kwangai units are reported moving through Nanking en route to the front, and Szechuan divisions are reported in the city.

Nineteen Russian pursuit and a few bombardment planes have arrived at Nanking. Bomb racks are being remodelled to take available Chinese bombs. It is reported these planes will be ready for action November 20. These planes are stated to be faster than any Japanese planes, and due to their high landing speed will be flown by Soviet pilots. Other Soviet planes are being prepared at Lanchow. Seven hundred Chinese student pilots are reported under training in the interior.

Japanese authorities at Shanghai have handed the Municipal Council and officials of the French Concession a black list of 700 names with a demand that most of the persons named be no longer harbored as residents. Heading the list are T. V. Soong and Mayor O. K. Yui. No foreigners are on the list. There is real apprehension on the part of residents that the Japanese will invade the international zones and provoke international incidents. The British officials at Shanghai are apparently making strong efforts to ease the local Japanese-British tension. These efforts are being made presumably because of instructions from London. Japanese military have seized German-owned tugboats and are using them in the Upper Yangtze against the protest of the German Consul General.

A highly placed Japanese official at Shanghai indicated the following local demands in a peace settlement: (a) A large neutral zone surrounding Shanghai; (b) Extension of the International Settlement to include extra Settlement roads; (c) Greater Japanese participation in municipal affairs; (d) A Japanese concession to include Woosung; and (e) Shanghai to be made into a free port.

With the Settlement area fairly quiet all foreign defense units have reduced their sector guards. The Shanghai Volunteer Corps has demobilized all but the Russian units.

SOUTH CHINA THEATER

Japanese continue to bomb Canton-Kowloon and Canton-Hankow railways in efforts to stop the flow of munitions from Hongkong. The Amy outer forts were bombed November 13. A Japanese plane, the first in almost two months, was sighted at Swatow.

Reliable reports state that Hspao Island, 30 miles southwest of Maone, is being used by the Japanese as a seaplane base only. No airfield has been constructed.

WILLIAM MAYER,  
Major, U. S. A.

td

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

G-2  
GVS

FF  
DR

0-2/2657-2-139

November 27, 1937.



*Mail 1937*

*W. H. P. H. H. H.*



MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. Herewith are Summary and Situation Map covering events in China for the week ending November 27.
2. The outstanding developments for the past week have been:
  - a. Continued Japanese success in the Yangtze Delta area, particularly south of Lake Tai.
  - b. Increased Japanese assertiveness for control of governmental activities in the Shanghai International Settlement.
  - c. Significant reports that the Japanese combined fleet was returning to Japan to rush the landing of supplies and reinforcements of sea power.

700.34/1539

DEC 11 1937

FILED

F/DR

E. R. W. McGUIRE,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

2 encls.  
ml

11529

CONFIDENTIAL

0-2/2657-7-439

0-2  
W 3

OSD 1636  
*L. Philipshman* *Mar 19, 1973*

November 27, 1937

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, INTELLIGENCE BRANCH:

Subject: Summary of Events in Sino-Japanese  
Situation, November 21-27, 1937.

GENERAL

The Brussels parley ended its deliberations on November 24. The lengthy closing declaration again reaffirmed the principle that force by itself cannot provide a lasting solution to international disputes, and urged both China and Japan to avail themselves of mediation. Except by remote inference, there was no censure of Japan. While the declaration stated that the meetings are merely temporarily suspended to allow time for the participating powers to exchange views, to all intents and purposes the parley is finished. The American delegates will sail for home about December 2.

Editorial comment on the conference showed a keen disappointment in the results accomplished. It was pointed out that 19 nations tried for weeks to bring peace in the Far East after the League of Nations had unanimously deemed Japan a treaty breaker, and that they failed. The failure showed that so-called "collective security" backed only by moral censure was a fallacy. From the start the conference was marked with hesitation and indecision on the part of the democratic powers. In this as in previous conferences, these powers apparently assumed that any economic or diplomatic curb on an aggressor nation would ultimately lead to war and that there was no middle ground. Therefore, the question seemed to resolve itself into whether or not they were prepared to "fight" for the principles involved. With such indecision, the determined stand of a single nation, Italy, an avowed supporter of Japan, was able to nullify any attempt at effective concerted action.

Reliable news reports indicate that responsible officials in Tokyo are willing to make a "reasonable peace" with

CONFIDENTIAL

China. They insist that China move first. With reference to "mediation," they differentiate between mediation for an armistice and mediation for peace. They have no objections to mediation for an armistice but insist that final peace negotiations must be direct. They further state that some sign of Chinese submission is an essential prerequisite.

A statement issued by the newly formed Japanese Imperial GHQ on November 20 says that the GHQ will function merely as an instrument to permit the Emperor to exercise supreme command over the Army and Navy, and is not a combination of High Command and Government. No members of the Cabinet are regularly assigned to the headquarters but they may be invited to confer if necessary. The duties of the GHQ are to advise the Emperor, to formulate high strategic plans, and to assure coordination between the Army and Navy. No list of personnel comprising the GHQ has been published.

Tokyo announced that Admiral Osami Nagano's combined fleet was returning to Japan to rush the loading of supplies and manpower "to meet the recent spectacular developments of the land operations at Shanghai." This announcement was interpreted at Shanghai to mean the redoubling of Japanese efforts and that they would not only press up the Yangtze but make landings at Haichow and on the Fukien coast as well. In this connection the China Sea Fleet, a combination of the 2nd and 3rd Fleets, was last reported under command of Admiral Maegawa at Shanghai. Whether Admiral Nagano's command is part of this fleet or a separate entity is not known at this time.

Japanese press states that sentiment among high Japanese officials leading to a declaration of war against China is growing. A reliable source in Shanghai reported that Japan will declare war on December 1. Despite these reports it is believed that such a declaration hinges upon the volume of munitions which finds its way into China, particularly through Hong Kong. If the Japanese succeed in keeping down the flow of munitions by interdicting railways and other lines of communication, it is probable that war will not be declared soon.

It is reported that the Spanish Loyalist regime at Barcelona was informed by Soviet authorities that Russia's role in Spain must be curtailed because of "growing preoccupation" with events in the Far East. Reliable information from Europe states that Russia will ship 20,000 tons of munitions to China, routed from Odessa via Hong Kong. This shipment to be followed by more. More Soviet planes are reported arriving at Lanchow, Sian and in the vicinity of Hanking.

## CONFIDENTIAL

The Soviet Government has protested to Japan against the statement made by General Araki when he declared that Japan must strike at Russia in order to settle the whole Chinese communist situation.

Japanese report that the Russian Consul General at Harbin and his staff are to be withdrawn and the consulate closed about December 15.

The Russian Ambassador to China, now in Moscow, was summarily relieved and replaced on November 22 without explanation. It is reported that General Lepin, the Soviet Military Attache to China, is also being replaced because he advised the Moscow Government that China was capable of long resistance against Japan, and that recent events belie his judgment.

Japanese newspapers publish alarmist reports of Russo-Japanese friction. A dispatch from Tsuruga stated that 1,500 Soviet planes and many submarines were concentrated in Eastern Siberia and 1,000 bombers were being furnished the Chinese Government. A Harbin dispatch stated that the Soviet Government had ordered the Staff of its Harbin Consulate General to withdraw on December 15. Domei announced several Japanese residents in Russia were sentenced to 30 years in prison without cause.

The Japanese Budget for 1938 is in preparation. The regular expenditures are estimated at Y2,800,000,000. The additional War Budget is anticipated as not less than Y2,500,000,000, which equals the amounts expended since last May. The budget apparently anticipates that the Japanese Armies must be maintained in China (or elsewhere) at least until 1939, and probably longer.

It is reported that Japan and Italy are planning a new commercial treaty to be signed about mid-December.

The Japanese 2nd and 3rd fleets have been combined to form the China Sea Fleet. The new fleet is under command of Admiral Hasegawa, now at Shanghai.

Tokyo announced on November 20 that 16,043 Japanese soldiers were killed in action to date. The same source states that Chinese casualties total 554,000 of which 154,470 are dead.

Dutch sources on November 20 reported sighting unidentified submarines off Ternate, in the Netherland Indies (127°E. -- 0° to 2°S.). The submarines submerged upon the approach of surface vessels.

## CONFIDENTIAL

War risk insurance rates in Europe and the Orient were reduced to one-quarter of one per cent on November 19.

### NORTH CHINA THEATER

There was comparatively little military action in North China during the past week. The Japanese are engaged in mopping up their rear areas and no advances have been reported.

Chinese report that eight foreign Catholic missionaries and one other foreigner were slaughtered and cremated by uniformed soldiers, presumably Japanese, at Chenting, on the Ping-Pan Railway north of SMihshichuang. None were Americans.

The mole at Chafoo was damaged on November 21, by Chinese attempts to destroy it.

Tokyo press reports a "burning desire" among northern Chinese leaders to form a federation of local autonomous States. Premier Koyama at Tokyo on November 26 stated that the Japanese Government had been asked to send political and economic advisers to North China for a new regime which would come into being during January. The advisers are now being selected.

### CENTRAL CHINA THEATER

After the occupation of Changsha, Hoochow and Kashing on November 20, Japanese advances continued. North of Lake Tai they are attacking the Chinese line running from Kiangyin to Wushih. It is reported that this line has been penetrated north of Wushih and that town is now being attacked from the north and east. At Kiangyin, Japanese naval, air and land attacks continue. Using a motor boat flotilla and scows on Lake Tai, the Japanese succeeded in landing forces near Iking and at Chiapu, on the west side of the lake. South of Lake Tai, a strong Japanese force driving from the vicinity of Pingwang and Shingtsch, captured a Chinese strong point at Wuhing (Wuchow) and has pushed on to Changhing where contact was established with the Japanese units landed at Chiapu. The drive south of the lake appears to be developing into a strong threat to the Chinese defense. A continued advance along this line will cut communications between Hangchow and Hanking and outflank the Chinese north of the lake. Northeast of Hangchow the Chinese are still holding a line from Haiyun on Hangchow Bay through Wangten, Puyuan and Wochan. Haiyun is being subjected to naval and air bombardment. Late dispatches state that Chinese resistance is stiffening on all fronts.

Japanese aircraft continue extensive bombing operations throughout the delta area and the hinterland. Hanking was bombed

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

on the 22nd, 24th and 25th. During the attack on Hanking on the 24th, bombs were dropped inside the city wall for the first time since September 25. Air raids were also reported on November 24, at Changsha and at Loyang. The Chinese appear to have difficulty in handling the new speedy Soviet planes. Several have been damaged in landing, others are reported to have been destroyed by the Japanese in a surprise air raid. A few foreign pilots are reported with the Chinese forces.

Chiang Kai-shek is still at Hanking. He is reported still determined to defend the capital to the last. General Tang Sheng-chih, Director of Military Training, has been appointed defense commander of the Metropolitan area. Large numbers of Chinese wounded are reported in Hanking. Some of these are becoming unruly and steps have been taken to get them under control.

The Chinese General Staff is now in Hankow but may move to Changsha. The Ministry of War is reported moving to Changsha and Nanyang. The German advisers were reported last week leaving for Nanyang (south of Changsha). Since the Ministry of War is also going there, it is probable that the advisers are still aiding the Chinese War Office.

Foreign ambassadors at Hanking left the city for Hankow on November 22, to keep contact with the Chinese Foreign Office established there. Most of the embassies left representatives at Hanking to keep in touch with the local situation. An international committee at Hanking is endeavoring to establish a safety zone there for civilian refugees. Requests were forwarded to the Japanese and Chinese authorities on November 22. While no reply has been received so far, favorable action is unlikely.

Japanese military leaders at Shanghai are exerting increasing pressure on the Settlement authorities. They have submitted a list of "requests" covering the suppression of anti-Japanese and Chinese Government activities. They have asked for the expulsion of some Chinese and for the surveillance of others. The military authorities have announced that they propose to place their own guards on Japanese property located in the defense sectors of other foreign powers, and to supply these units by armed trucks. The military also wish to march troops along the bund through the Settlement to Mantao. Local foreign authorities fear that these Japanese movements through a city congested with Chinese, (many of whom are almost hysterical with Japanese hatred) might lead to "incidents," and these in turn to severe Japanese reprisals. It is probable that the Japanese would consider an "incident" proof that the Settlement authorities cannot maintain order and so give the Japanese an excuse to take over the control of the International Zone. Altogether the situation is not a very happy one for the Shanghai authorities. They are conceding most of the Japanese "requests," but an international incident

## CONFIDENTIAL

may arise at any moment. The Japanese Consul General has asked the Commissioner of Customs for "cooperation" in arranging for Japanese supervision of the customs, stating that foreign loan and indemnity quotas and foreign customs' personnel would be protected. One Japanese customs official from Tientsin has been transferred to Shanghai to serve as Administrative Commissioner, which makes him the second ranking official in the Customs Service. Steps to take complete Japanese control of the Chinese postal, customs and communication organizations in Shanghai were started November 27.

The Bureau of Social Affairs of Greater Shanghai has estimated the damage to Chinese industrial plants in the area as over \$2500,000,000. The percentage of plants damaged or destroyed in each district is as follows: Chapel 100%; Hongkew and Yangtszepoo, 70%; Kantao, 50%; other districts, 50%.

### SOUTH CHINA THEATRE

Intensive bombing of the Kwangtung railways continues. Through traffic on the Canton-Hankow railway is now temporarily suspended due to bombing damage. Twenty Japanese airplanes raided Canton and vicinity on November 20.

The Japanese steamer Daian Maru, en route from Hiroshima to Takao, Formosa, with 2,000 tons of aviation gasoline, was destroyed by fire near Taihoku, Formosa, November 26.

### COMMENT

As yet there appears to be no decided break in Chinese national morale as a result of the Shanghai delta reverses. These defeats were a serious blow to Chinese military power. The flower of the Chinese Army and some of the best trained younger officers were shattered at Shanghai. Despite the rapid Japanese advances they have not been able to effect a second "Rannenberg" so far. However, many effective large Chinese units have been completely disorganized and casualties have been most heavy. Whether any of these units can be salvaged and reorganized is problematical. China still has plenty of manpower, courageous but with little training. The most serious shortage is in trained staff officers, particularly in supply matters. It was this lack that contributed greatly to the Shanghai debacle. A serious shortage of munitions is also likely to develop soon. From now on the efficiency of the Chinese Army will probably drop progressively. The Japanese should have little difficulty in pushing on to Hankow and beyond. However, the Japanese must do more than merely occupy territory. It is essential that Chinese will be

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Husted NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

fight be crushed, and that soon, for Japan to have a satisfactory solution to the situation. The war efforts are draining Japanese economic and financial resources, and while she can carry the load for a long period yet, the effects of the economic strain will have to be met sooner or later. A prolonged war may do Japan irreparable damage. We may yet have the spectacle of China, weak in military power, but strong in unified will to resist an aggressor, almost a match for the strong Japanese military machine.

mob

WILLIAM HAYER,  
Major, C. W. S.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
DEC 8 1937  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

PARAPHRASE OF CABLE

From: Treasury Attache  
Shanghai, China

Date: December 7, 1937

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 - 1937  
Department of State

793.94

Re: Message from Professor Buck at Hankow

In interview with Chang Chun, Chief of Political Council in Charge of Foreign Affairs, he inquired as to America and England's attitude if Russia should enter the conflict and expressed opinion that Russia, cooperating with China in armed conflict against Japan, does not mean a coalition in political faith and that fundamentally China is not communistically inclined. Chun expressed appreciation of all your assistance.

793.94/11530

F/ARR

DEC 8 1937

FILED

11530

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TREASURY DEPARTMENT

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

RETURN AFTER FIVE DAYS

*Dr. Feis*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**FE**

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Nanking via N. R.

FROM Dated December 8, 1937

Rec'd 1:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 4 1937  
Department of State  
*of paraphrase*  
**COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.**  
*conference*

1016, December 8, noon.  
*1004 793.94 / 11494*  
My 1014, December 7, 7 p.m.

Strictly Confidential. I understand that General and Mrs. Chiang and Donald are at Haiweissu near Kuling. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

KLP

793.94/11531

DEC 13 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

PARAPHRASE

A strictly confidential telegram (no. 1016) of December 8, 1937, from the American Embassy at Hanking reads substantially as follows:

It is the understanding of the Embassy that Mr. Donald, the Generalissimo, and Mme. Chiang are near Kuling at a place called Haiweissu.

793.94/11531

FE:EGC

XII-8-37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*F*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB \*\*\*

FROM COMSOPAT

Rec'd December 8, 1937

6:53 p. m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: 2ND BRIGADE  
COMESRON 5  
COMSUBRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING.

793.94

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 9 1937  
Department of State

0108 South China ports quiet 2000.

NPL

793.94/11532

FC 11 1937  
F/A/F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D. 4-1

*in strict confidence. 8/2*  
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (A)

FROM HANKOW Via N R

Dated December 8, 1937

Rec'd 5:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

AmEmbassy, Nanking.  
AmEmbassy, Peiping.  
AmConsul, Shanghai.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 9 - 1937  
Department of State

793.9  
793.94/119

22, December 8, 11 a.m.

I saw Wang Ching Hui last evening. He stated that the Chinese Government was now awaiting information through official channels concerning Japanese reaction to German offer of good offices. He referred to the fact that he had seen a press report purporting to be a statement from the Japanese Foreign Office to the effect that Japan was prepared to accept mediation by a third power.

Dr. Wang again referred to the fact that the Chinese felt that by accepting German offer of good offices they were not being *unfaithful to* ~~the~~ ~~Nine~~ ~~Power~~ Conference at Brussels which as he pointed out had adjourned without bringing about the negotiations which it had hoped to accomplish. He emphasized the fact that the Chinese would be glad to accept the good offices of any friendly power.

Dr. Wang then put the following hypothetical question to me; "Suppose China negotiates with Japan and discovers that the terms which Japan seeks to impose are in violation of the terms of the Nine Power Treaty. What will the other powers party to the Nine Power Treaty do when China communicated this fact

793.94/11533

RECEIVED

F/FG

4-2

-2-  
From Hankow, #22.

this fact to them (as I infer China intends to do) and asks whether China should accept these terms or not?" I told Dr. Wang that obviously I was in no position to say what reply might be returned to such a query, and I agreed with him that in all likelihood Japanese terms would be such that they would in fact violate the principles of the Nine Power Treaty guaranteeing equality of treatment to the powers in China.

Dr. Wang asked me for my estimate as to what other line the Japanese might follow upon the capture of Nanking. I told him that it was my guess that with the capture of Nanking the Japanese military would attempt to set up a regime amenable to its wishes either in Nanking or in Peiping; that it would enter into negotiations with that regime for a settlement of all outstanding questions along lines favorable to Japanese desires, and accept from that regime a mandate legalizing Japanese activities in Peiping, Tientsin, Shanghai and other areas occupied by Japanese arms; that Japan might withdraw recognition from the National Chinese Government and treat that Government as an outlaw government and its armies as bandits in revolt against the established authority recognized by Japan. Dr. Wang concurs in this estimate. He stated that there was a difference of opinion between the Japanese army and the Japanese navy on the question of a declaration of war. He said that he had just

4-3

-3-  
From Hankow, #22.

just been informed from Tokyo that it was intended to hold a privy council meeting in the presence of the Emperor today to decide whether Japan should declare war on China or not, and to decide the question of whether Japan should negotiate with the Chinese National Government. I stated that it was my belief the Japanese army did not wish a declaration of war, as it felt freer to pursue its political purposes on the mainland without such declaration, and that a procedure such as I outlined above would obviate the necessity for any such declaration of war. Dr. Wang stated that he hoped within two or three days to have some information for me regarding German exercise of good offices.

The Chinese Government is obviously at the end of its power to offer too active and effective resistance to Japan, and is seriously considering the advisability of entering into negotiations immediately. There are, however, obvious difficulties in the way of any negotiations that might be acceptable to Japan. One of the Japanese demands will be cooperation against communism, and the present Chinese Government <sup>by its</sup> ~~is~~ non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia would find it embarrassing to enter into a discussion on the matter.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to <sup>Hankow</sup> ~~Peiping~~ Peiping, Shanghai  
Peiping please repeat to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

RGC NFL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

[CONFIDENTIAL]

4-4

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 22) of December 8, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

On the evening of December 7 the Ambassador talked with Wang Chung Hui. Dr. Wang asked the Ambassador for his estimate with regard to what other course the Japanese might pursue upon the capture of Nanking. The Ambassador stated that it was his guess that the Japanese military would try, with the capture of Nanking, to establish, either in Nanking or in Peiping, a régime amenable to its wishes; that the Japanese military would negotiate with that régime for a settlement, along lines favorable to Japanese desires, of all outstanding questions and accept from that régime a mandate making legal Japanese activities in areas occupied by Japanese armies, including Peiping, Tientsin, and Shanghai; and that the Japanese might withdraw recognition from the National Government of China and treat the National Government's armies as bandits in revolt against the established authority recognized by Japan and the National Government as an outlaw government. Dr. Wang agreed with this estimate. He stated that he had just received from Tokyo information to the effect that it was planned to hold a Privy Council meeting on December 8 in the presence of the Emperor to decide whether or not Japan should declare war on China and to decide whether Japan should negotiate with the National Government of China. He said also that there was a difference of opinion between the Japanese navy and the Japanese army

on

74394/1533

-2-

on the question of a declaration of war. The American Ambassador expressed the belief that as the Japanese army felt freer to follow its political purposes on the mainland without a declaration of war it did not wish such a declaration and that a procedure such as the Ambassador outlined above would do away with the necessity for a declaration of war.

Dr. Wang said that the National Government was awaiting now information through official channels in regard to Japanese reaction to the German offer of good offices. Dr. Wang mentioned that he had seen a press report which purported to be a statement from the Japanese Foreign Office to the effect that Japan was ready to accept mediation by a third power.

Dr. Wang stressed the fact that the Chinese would be glad to accept the good offices of any friendly power, and he referred again to the fact that the Chinese felt that by accepting the German offer of good offices they were not being (?) the Nine Power Conference at Brussels which had adjourned, as he pointed out, without bringing about the negotiations which it had hoped to bring about.

Dr. Wang then put to the American Ambassador a hypothetical question as follows: "Suppose China negotiates with Japan and discovers that the terms which Japan seeks to impose are in violation of the terms of the Nine Power Treaty. What will the other powers party to the Nine Power Treaty do when China communicates this fact to them and asks whether

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Duvall NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

whether China should accept these terms or not?" (The Ambassador infers that China intends to communicate to the Nine Power Treaty powers the terms which Japan seeks to impose.) In reply the Ambassador stated that obviously he was not in position to say what answer might be given to such a query and he agreed with Dr. Wang that it was quite likely that Japanese terms would be of such a nature as to violate in fact the principles of the Nine Power Treaty guaranteeing equality of treatment to the powers in China. Dr. Wang said that he hoped to have for the Ambassador within two or three days some information in regard to the German exercise of good offices.

It is evident that the National Government has reached the end of its power to resist Japan actively and effectively and has under serious consideration the advisability of immediately entering into negotiations. However, obvious difficulties exist in the way of any negotiations which the Japanese might find acceptable. Cooperation against communism will be one of the Japanese demands and in view of the Sino-Russian non-aggression pact the present Chinese government would find it embarrassing to enter into a discussion of this subject.

*EJC*  
FE:EJC:HES  
12-9

*ACK*  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

Plain and Gray

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM  
CANTON Via N-R

Dated December 8, 1937

Rec'd 9th 1:00 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

Amembassy, Hankow.  
Amembassy, Peiping.  
AmConsul, Shanghai.



793.94

December 8, 4 p.m.

Twice yesterday and once this morning small groups of planes raided Canton Hong Kong Railway south of Cheunguktau and Canton Hankow Railway section between Yingtau and Canton, causing only minor damage to the lines. Another raid this afternoon believed on same railway.

Information just received from Chinese military and Catholic Mission sources confirms that Japanese landed small force of marines on Saint John's Island after several days shelling of point on the western side defended by local militia. Military source characterizes fresh reports of fighting there as greatly exaggerated and a letter from members of the Catholic Mission on eastern side of the island dated November 29th stated that the Japanese had assured them they had nothing to fear. Military source also states that Japanese simultaneously bombarded and landed on nearby Wsiachuan Island.

United States.

LINCOLN

JS

793.94/11534

F/FG

REC'D  
DEC 14 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB  
...

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated December 8, 1937

Rec'd 4 p. m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 9 1937  
Department of State

1014, December 8, 9 a. m.

FROM ROBERTS FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

WBS  
12-16-37

*According*

American eye witness the Japanese yesterday afternoon were occupying the artillery range at Tangshan and at 5 o'clock were shelling Chinese positions this side of the town. An observation plane was spotting artillery fire but two Chinese mountain guns were still effectively checking advance through the village.

There are no apparent facilities for evacuating wounded from the front and there are no adequate hospital facilities remaining in Nanking with the sole exception of Nanking University Hospital which now has only two American doctors, two American nurses and some Chinese orderlies.

The mining of bridges and culverts along the Hangchow Road is being continued right up to the bridge over the moat outside Chungshan gate. Burning of native villages and houses

793.94/11535

COPIED

DEC 11 1937

F/E G

5-2

RB -2- No. 1014, DECEMBER 8, 9 a. m. from Nanking

and houses now extends to the park area but I could  
elicit no adequate reason for this action.

Organization of positions on the hills along the  
Wuhu Road is fairly thorough with fire and communica-  
tion trenches, wire entanglements, machine gun pits  
and telephone lines; and appeared to be better than  
was the Hangchow Road.

City is orderly but thousands of refugees came  
in to the safety zone yesterday. Embassy officers  
will not leave Nanking but will start sleeping aboard  
the PANAY tonight. I shall conform to their action."

Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping,  
Hankow, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

RGC

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



RB ...

FROM GRAY

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Nanking via N. R.

Dated December 8, 1937

Rec'd 3:11 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

1015 December 8, 10 a. m.

One. The Mayor is believed to have left and two minor Foreign Office officials who arrived several days ago, purportedly to assist us with the local authorities, seem now to have disappeared. Although egress to the bund through Yichiang gate is still easy, Chinese are not permitted to enter the city walls there and last night police went from house to house in the Hsiakuan section outside the wall warning the people to go across river to Pukow.

Two. The sky over Nanking and surrounding terrain is hazy with smoke from burning houses in the countryside. Yesterday afternoon Roberts and I went past Shaolingwei on the Tangshan Road and all poorer dwellings were being fired. Shaolingwei was entirely in flames with barely passage for the motorcar through the main street. Nearer Nanking in the Lingyuan district houses with thatched roofs were burning but residences such as

793.94/11536

FILED  
DEC 14 1937

F/EG

793.94

88K

RB -2- No.1015, December 8, 10<sup>51 A</sup> a. m. from Nanking

such as Kung's and Sun Fo's were apparently being exempted from destruction. Preparations along the Wuhu Road outside the south gate had not reached this stage when we drove out a few miles last evening.

Three. Chinese reports that artillery firing has been audible this morning are confirmed by the PANAX from which battery fire to the east could be heard. Occasional explosions which we hear from the Embassy are probably bridges and structures being blown up in the defense sector outside the city. Yesterday on the Hangchow Road we heard no (repeat no) artillery fire although the Japanese had reached Tangshan not far distant and some 18 miles from the wall. At the most rapid rate at which the Japanese have been advancing they could not (repeat not) yet be much less than ten miles from Nanking at this time.

Four. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

KLP

WVC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6-1  
(Mr. Becker of Tel. Room  
says this message all came  
in Gray. E.g.C.)

Gray

Ch B  
Division of  
Far Eastern Affairs  
DEC 9 1937  
Department of State

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

~~A portion of this telegram  
must be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone. (A)~~

Shanghai via NR

Dated December 8, 1937

Rec'd 3:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I. D

793.94

1111, December 8, 2 p.m. (GRAY) Department's No.  
623, December 7, 7 p.m.

One. No material changes have occurred since November 18. American forces have been occupying a reduced number of posts along the American perimeter with materially reduced personnel. Because of the adequacy of the Settlement police, patrols have been maintained only along the northern section of the perimeter and in the vicinity of the Japanese mills. Greatly reduced patrols have been maintained along the marine reserve line.

Two. Two British forces have been maintaining all posts along their perimeter but withdrew from their reserve line. Patrols have been maintained throughout the sector because much of it is in the Extra Settlement roads area in which the Settlement police are not yet functioning.

Three. French forces have been occupying all posts along their perimeter but with greatly reduced personnel, troops

793.94/11537

RECORDED F/EG  
DEC 11 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quatman NARS, Date 12-18-75

6-2

2- No. 1111, December 8, from Shanghai.

troops were withdrawn from the reserve line. French  
police have been maintaining patrols throughout the  
entire French sector.

GAUSS

CSB:

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

7-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

*HR*  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 9 1937  
Department of State

RB  
A portion of this telegram **FROM**  
must be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated to  
anyone. (A)

*Tels drafted Tokyo and Shanghai*  
Shanghai via N. R. 9-12-37

Dated December 8, 1937

Rec'd 3:30 p. m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
1  
*in confidence. 872*

1112, December 8, 3 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(GRAY) Reference my 1105 / *11511* December 7, 8 p. m.

One. At the meeting of the interested consular representatives this morning the Japanese Consul General stated in reference to the memorandum quoted in my 1086 December 4, 4 p. m. that when he learned of this document he had called on his military authorities and succeeded in having them say that the matter was settled. He added "We will not take any advantage of the incident which occurred that afternoon. We can treat it just as the senior Consul has said, that is, just as if the conditions or demands were not presented at all." (END GRAY)

Two. I endeavored to obtain a more satisfactory statement to the effect that the Japanese military acquiesced in or agreed to the declaration that the conditions or demands might be considered as not having been presented

793.94

793.94 / 11538

F / FG

7-2

RB -2- No.1112, December 8, 3 p. m. from Shanghai

presented at all, but could get nothing further than the statement of the Japanese Consul General that he would take the responsibility for what he had said.

(GRAY) Three. In the matter of the arrest of certain Chinese by Japanese gendarmes as reported in my 1098, December 6, 7 p. m. the Japanese Consul General stated that the Japanese gendarmes took action without consulting him, that there was some urgency as certain dangerous spies were reported to be plotting against the military authorities, and that he has been assured that this sort of thing will not occur again "so long as the municipal police will cooperate". (END GRAY)

Four. The Japanese Consul General agreed at the meeting to a rough draft of release to the press but he has since indicated after consulting his military authorities that he cannot agree to any press release.

Five. I do not regard the outcome of our efforts as entirely satisfactory but believe the Japanese Consul General is well disposed and that he has done all he can in the circumstances. The Japanese military of course will not publicly recede from any position they have taken.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tokyo.

GAUSS

NPL

[CONFIDENTIAL]

PARAPHRASE

A confidential telegram (no. 1112) of December 8, 1937, from the American Consul General at Shanghai reads substantially as follows:

Reference is made to the Consul General's telegram no. 1108 of December 7.

At a meeting of the interested consular representatives on the morning of December 8 the Japanese Consul General stated in reference to the memorandum quoted in the American Consul General's telegram no. 1086 of December 4 that when he learned of this document he had called on his military authorities and had succeeded in having them say that the matter was settled. He added, "We will not take any advantage of the incident which occurred that afternoon. We can treat it just as the senior Consul has said, that is, just as if the conditions or demands were not presented at all."

Although the American Consul General tried to obtain a more satisfactory statement to the effect that the Japanese military agreed to or acquiesced in the declaration that the demands or conditions might be regarded as not having been presented at all, he was unable to obtain anything further than the Japanese Consul General's statement that he would assume responsibility for what he had said.

With regard to the matter of the arrest of certain Chinese by Japanese gendarmes as reported in the Consul General's telegram no. 1098 of December 6, the Japanese  
Consul

793.94/11538

-2-

Consul General stated that the Japanese gendarmes took action without consulting him, that there was some urgency as certain dangerous spies were reported to be plotting against the military authorities, and that he has been assured that this sort of thing will not occur again "so long as the municipal police will cooperate".

At the meeting the Japanese Consul General assented to a rough draft of a statement to the press, but since the meeting he has made it known after conferring with Japanese military authorities that he is unable to agree to any statement to the press.

Of course, the Japanese military will not recede publicly from any position which they have taken. The American Consul General is of the opinion that the Japanese Consul General is well disposed and under the circumstances has done all he can, but he (the American Consul General) does not consider as entirely satisfactory the result of the efforts of the interested consular representatives.

29C-  
FE:EGC:HES  
12-9

*ACR*  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton C. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 10, 1937.

4-W  
Mr. Wilson:

S  
Mr. Secretary:

FE is of the opinion that it will be impossible to obtain an adjustment of the Japanese "victory march" through the International Settlement at Shanghai any more satisfactory than that indicated in Shanghai's telegram No. 1112, December 8, 3 p.m. At the same time we feel that we might emphasize to the Japanese Government at Tokyo our definite interest in the matter. We therefore suggest a telegram to Tokyo as per the attached draft.

MMH:EJL

*m. m. d.*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7-3

TELEGRAM SENT

*Gray*

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,  
December 10, 1937.  
6 P. M.

AMEMBASSY,

DIVISION OF  
TOKYO (Japan).

337

11538

Shanghai's No, 1112, December 8, 3 p.m.

*793.94  
note ✓  
893.102 S*

Unless you perceive objection, the Department desires

that the Embassy approach the Foreign Office and with reference to previous representations made in connection with the march of Japanese troops through the International Settlement at Shanghai inform the Foreign Office that this Government has taken note of the statements made by the Japanese Consul General on December 8 at the meeting of the interested consular representatives and express the confidence of this Government that these statements and the attitude of the Japanese authorities as indicated in Shanghai's telegram under reference would put an end to apprehensions regarding future occurrences of a nature likely to lead to consequences disturbing to the preservation of order in the International Settlement.

793.94/11538

*Hee*

*JWB*  
FE JWB:EJL

FE

A-W

S

*CR*  
CR

*7.24.4.*

*ARW*

DEC 10 1937. PM

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

F/F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Gray*  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

1937 DEC 10 PM 5 11

Washington, D.C.  
December 8, 1937.  
7 P.M.

AMERICAN CONSUL, DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS  
SHANGHAI (China), *via N.R.*

636

Your 1112, December 8, 3 p.m.

Department has telegraphed Tokyo as follows:

QUOTE (Telegraph Section: Please insert here the text of Department's telegram to Tokyo hereto attached.) UNQUOTE.

337 Dec. 10, 6 P.M.

*Hull*  
*HRW*

793.94/11538

*JWB*  
FE:JWB:EJL

FE

*m/d.*

*CR/A*  
DEC 10 1937.PM

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_ 19 \_\_\_\_\_

F/EG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMYANGPAT

FROM December 9, 1937

Rec'd 8:40 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC  
YANGPAT  
CCISUBRON FIVE  
COCDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
CONSOPAT  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEI PING

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 9 1937  
Department of State

793.94

0008. Conditions Nanking unchanged, other river ports  
quiet. 2355.

CSB

793.94/11539

FA/EG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Huels NARS, Date 12-18-75

**FE**

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

FROM

COMSOPAT

**COPIES SENT TO  
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.**

December 9, 1937

Rec'd 9:45 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC  
COMSUBRON 5  
COMDESRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

Division of  
FAR EAST AFFAIRS  
DEC 11 1937  
Department of State

0109 South China ports quiet 2000.

KLP

793.94/11540

DEC 11 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastrom NARS, Date 12-18-75

*EE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

3:00  
FROM GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated December 9, 1937

Rec'd 8:00 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
AN EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 21 1937  
Department of State

1020, December 9, 9 a.m.

FROM ROBERTS FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

"According to reliable foreign sources the Japanese were yesterday two or three miles this side of Tangshan on the Hangchow road and soldiers of the 154th and 156th Kwantung divisions were in support positions near the infantry school; Japanese were about 5 miles north of Molingkuan engaged by the 88th division; and Kwangsi troops were reported holding the northeast approaches near Chishashan on the railway. The road to Wuhu has been torn up about 4 miles outside the Chunghua.

Four Japanese medium bi-planes flew over the city about 10 o'clock this morning apparently on reconnaissance at about 6000, lower than usual probably on account of the thick haze but were driven off by anti-aircraft fire."

Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

KLP:CSB

793.94/11541

DEC 11 1937

WILLIAMS

F/F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

8-1

*FE*

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

GRAY

FROM

Nanking via N.R.

Dated December 9, 1937

Rec'd 8:00 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
Far Eastern Affairs  
DEC 9 - 1937  
Department of State  
*692*

793.94

1021, December 9, 10 a.m.

One. I received a message on the PANAY this morning from an officer of the defense commander's headquarters stating that the situation was serious and advising us not to go ashore. Since there were no other indications from the city of trouble within or fighting nearby, Paxton, Roberts and I proceeded to the Embassy where we learned from the officer by telephone that artillery and machine gun fire had been audible and he assumes that Japanese units yesterday reported in the area of Molingkuan, which town is some 17 miles southeast of Nanking, were now very near the capital.

Two. At present Japanese planes are flying over Nanking presumably on reconnaissance; except for heavy antiaircraft fire the city is (\*); and no sounds of field artillery are audible from the Embassy.

Three. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

GW:WWC

(\*) Apparent omission.

793.94/11542

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR ...

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated December 9, 1937

Rec'd 8 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington,

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
Far Eastern Affairs  
AEC 9-1937  
Department of State

1023, December 9, 1 p.m.

One. We are reliably informed that Japanese troops are just outside Kwanghuamen exchanging machinegun fire with Chinese on the wall and that there is cross artillery fire between the area outside that gate and Chinese batteries on Purple Mountain. Shortly after eleven a column of Chinese soldiers passing along Kuo Fu Road near National Government headquarters was bombed. Artillery fire to the south was audible after 11 o'clock this morning. Air raid warning apparatus has ceased to function.

Two. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai. Requests War Department be informed.

ATCHE SON

KLP

793.94/11543

RECEIVED  
DEC 14 1937

F/F G

9-1

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be Tokyo  
closely paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM Dated December 9, 1937

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

*in confidence. GJR*

Rec'd 7:35 a.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 9 1937  
Department of State

793.94

608, December 9, 4 p.m.

The Military Attache was informed at the War Office  
yesterday that there is to be no change in the mission of  
the Japanese army which is the destruction of Communistic  
and anti-Japanese forces in China and that no Chinese  
offer of capitulation which does not include the  
elimination of such forces and elements would be  
entertained. It is the belief of the Military Attache  
that the Japanese army opinion calls for continued  
military operations until this objective is reached and  
would not approve any settlement based on considerations  
of a purely political nature.

793.94 / 11544

Repeated to Peiping for relay to Ambassador Johnson.

GREW

WVC:GVJ

DEC 11 1937  
FILED  
F/EG

[CONFIDENTIAL]

9-2

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 608) of December 9, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

According to information received at the Japanese Foreign Office on December 8 by the American Military Attaché, there is to be no change in the Japanese army's mission, which is the destruction of anti-Japanese and communistic forces in China, and the Japanese would entertain no offer of capitulation from the Chinese which does not include the elimination of such elements and forces. The American Military Attaché believes that Japanese army opinion would not approve any settlement based entirely on considerations of a political nature and that until the above-described objective is reached this opinion calls for continued military operations.

793.94/11544

793.94/11544

EJC.  
FE:EDU:HES  
12-9

ADP  
FE

10-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Tokyo

Dated December 9, 1937

Rec'd 7:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
REC'D 9/11/37  
Department of State

793.94

609, December 9, 5 p.m.

Johnson's 19, December 7, 11 a.m., from Hankow.

Japanese bombing at Wuhu.

One. Yesterday the British Ambassador called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and "speaking informally in advance of instructions from London" expressed confidence that the British Government would take a serious view of the reported attack on two British merchant ships if the facts are as reported. Craigie referred also to the complete disregard of Japanese assurances with regard to safeguarding the lives and property of noncombatants. Today a telegram was received from London approving his representations and he will send a note to the Foreign Office stating his protest has been approved by the British Government and that he reserves the right to claim compensation.

Two. As British interests are specifically and directly involved it was not my intention to make representations until my British colleague had acted. As, according

793.94/11545

F/E/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

10-2

-2- #600, December 9, 5 p.m., from Tokyo.

according to Johnson, "the manner in which the raid was conducted made it a menace to the safety of American citizens and property", we will tomorrow remind the Foreign Office of the assurances repeatedly given with regard to safeguarding lives and property of noncombatants, request that an investigation be made of the bombing of the Wuhu water front and urge that those responsible be severely dealt with.

Repeated to Peiping for relay to Johnson.

GREW

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Justafin NARS, Date 12-18-75

10-3

*Gray*

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State

Washington.

1937 DEC 9 PM 4 28

December 9, 1937.

*Span*

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO, (JAPAN).

*m.m./d. Push. 335*

Your 609, December 9, 5 p. m.

(While no repeat no objection is perceived to your reminding the Foreign Office of the assurances repeatedly given with regard to safeguarding lives and property of non-combatants, the Department considers it inadvisable as no Americans are known to have been injured for you to request that an investigation be made or to urge that those responsible be severely dealt with.)

793.94/11545

*d. true*

*793.94/11545*

DEC 9 1937 PM

*Ken*  
FE:JWB:SMJ

FE  
*m.m./d.*

A-W  
*HRW*

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

D. O. R.—No. 50

1-1482 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F/F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

10-4  
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN  
By Naval Radio

Washington.

1937 DEC 9 PM 4 28

December 9, 1937.

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

AMEMBASSY,

PEIPING, (CHINA). *man R.*

391

Dec. 9, 5 p.m.

Ambassador's 19, December 7, 11 a. m. and Tokyo's 609, *111498*

The following telegram to the American Embassy at Tokyo is repeated for transmission to the Ambassador at Hankow:

QUOTE While no repeat no objection is perceived to your reminding the Foreign Office of the assurances repeatedly given with regard to safeguarding lives and property of non-combatants, the Department considers it inadvisable as no Americans are known to have been injured for you to request that an investigation be made or to urge that those responsible be severely dealt with. UNQUOTE.

*Free*

*CR/AS*  
DEC 9 1937. PM

*JWB*  
FE:JWB:SMJ

FE

*A-W*  
*W.A.*

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_ 19 \_\_\_\_\_

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/11545

F/A

11545

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

//-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

FROM GRAY AND PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 9, 1937

Rec'd 8:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division  
FAR EASTERN  
DEC 9-1937  
Department of State

811, December 9, 6 p.m.

Embassy's 802, December 3, 6 p.m.

7019493  
693.002

One. Military situation in North China has not

(repeat not) altered appreciably during the past week.

The Embassy is reliably informed that the Japanese military leaders have received report that the Shantung authorities intend to destroy Japanese property at Tsingtao by December 31, regardless of whether or not Japanese military attack, and that the Japanese are therefore inclined to attack in Shantung soon as Japanese property will be destroyed anyway and as an early attack is regarded as strategically advantageous (SEE Ambassador's telegram No. 15, December 4, 9 a.m.).

Two. According to the Japanese press Tungkuang on the western part of the Lunghai Railway was bombed December 7th by Japanese naval planes.

Three. The only new known political development is the recent arrival at Peiping of Wang Keh Min and other

Chinese

793.94/11546

FILED  
DEC 11 1937

F/F G

11-2

2- No. 811, December 9, from Peiping.

Chinese of his type (see confidential biographic data August 31, 1935). They are now conversing with local Chinese leaders.

Four. The local Japanese Embassy is being augmented by the two second secretaries, one third secretary and one attache. It is also understood that there will be an additional counselor. The attache is acting as Major General Kita's legal adviser. The strengthening of the Embassy is presumably in preparation for increased political importance of Peiping.

Five. There is a large daily influx of Japanese and Koreans into Peiping. According to a police estimate published in the press a hundred and ten Japanese and forty Koreans have entered Peiping daily during the past month of whom fifty per cent were visitors, twenty-five per cent were bound for other places and twenty-five per cent are remaining in Peiping.

Six. The Embassy is reliably informed that the Japanese authorities in Tientsin desire a reduction of tariff on foodstuffs, especially wheat, in order to relieve the desperate condition of the North China population, that the customs authorities in Tientsin have been approached more than once in this respect, that the  
customs

11-3

3- No. 811, DECEMBER 9, from PEIPING.

customs authorities have replied that the matter has been referred to the National Government which has refused to authorize a reduction and that, although the Japanese can get around the difficulty to some extent by importing foodstuffs free of duty as military supplies, the situation may cause the Japanese authorities to take steps to effect a reduction without the consent of the Chinese authorities concerned.

Repeated to Ambassador, code text to Tokyo by mail.

LOCKHART

KLP:

12-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

CINCAF

FROM: December 9, 1937

COPIES SENT TO  
~~O.N.I. AND M.I.D.~~

Rec'd 11:40 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC  
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 9 1937  
Department of State

793.94

0009. Japanese have occupied Chinkiang, surrounded Nanking, advanced within two miles Wuhu. State will capture Nanking within twenty-four hours. In order avoid responsibility future damage foreign ships in Yangtze Japanese issued warning keep clear vicinity Chinese military establishments, if possible leave zone hostilities. IOZUMO fired several rounds at 1747. No Chinese planes sighted. Conditions Settlement unchanged. 1937.

CSB

793.94/11547

FILED  
DEC 11 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

13-1



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE:

December 7, 1937.

SUBJECT: FAR EASTERN SITUATION.

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR,  
DR. CHENGTING T. WANG.

COPIES TO: U, A-W, FE, PAID, C

793.94

700.04/11543

F /

DEC 13 1937

FILED

11548

The Ambassador of China came in upon his own request. I inquired about conditions and developments in China, and he replied that they were quite bad and that the Chinese Army, after leaving Shanghai, had not been able to rally and make a firm stand, even when it got back in front of Nanking; that it was probably not the purpose to defend Nanking seriously on account of the disadvantageous surroundings.

The Ambassador then said that China was somewhat like Belgium in the World War, insofar as the friendly interest and cooperative attitude of the other nations were concerned, and that his Government, being desirous of fighting on for an indefinite time, was extremely interested

13-2

-2-

terested to ascertain what is the general attitude of the nations towards helping China in the event she undertakes to fight on and to resist to the last. I replied that, frankly, I had nothing new on that subject, and added that the Ambassador, of course, knew the state of mind of the people of this country towards the situation in China, but that I could not say anything new on the other subject to which his chief inquiry related. He said that the Generalissimo was not disposed to make peace for one reason that it would simply be giving that much away instead of having it taken by force, and that on the other hand the Japanese were very desirous of peace. I asked him whether the German Ambassador, who visited the Generalissimo on this mission, knew or conveyed any terms for the Japanese, and he replied that the Ambassador did not know nor convey the Japanese terms to the Generalissimo; that he was simply seeking a preliminary step on the part of China which would lead to negotiations.

The Ambassador said that the Generalissimo had left Nanking and would probably go some three hundred miles to a place not in the direction of Hankow, somewhere on a branch of the Yangtze River. He stated that the Chinese troops were in better shape than the present

surface

13-3

-3-

surface appearance of the situation in front of or about Nanking would indicate, and that they could and probably would make a better showing beyond Nanking.

The Ambassador again came back to the question of supplies and armaments, stating and reemphasizing that it was a matter of great difficulty for resistance of the guerilla type without reasonable supplies. He stated that, officially, the French Road through Indo-China prohibited transportation of supplies, but that, unofficially, they were permitting some things to go over the road. He said that the British had done fairly well in facilitating the purchase and transportation of military supplies to China.

The Ambassador frequently came back to the question of aid if the fighting were to go on as the Generalissimo desired it to go on. I again said to him that there had been no new developments on that subject since our previous conversations.

C.H.

S CH:MA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

13-4

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
~~CONFIDENTIAL CODE~~  
PLAIN

Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 DEC 15 PM 6 16

Washington, <sup>15</sup>  
December <sup>14</sup>, 1937.  
8 P.M.

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

✓ 617 / 11492  
Your / 1702 / December 6 / 5 p. m. /

This cable was sent in confidential Code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone. B-1

The Chinese Ambassador in a conversation with me on  
December 7 brought up the question of aid to China. He  
stated that it was a matter of great difficulty for China  
to continue resistance ~~[by guerrilla tactics]~~ without supplies.  
He did not, however, make any specific request in regard  
to financial assistance. I told the Ambassador that I could not  
say anything new on the subject to which his inquiry related.

793.94/11548

*Handwritten signatures and initials*

793.94/11548

DEC 15 1937 PM

FE:JWB:REK

FE  
m.m/d.

PA/H  
SKW

EU  
PM

F/  
A-W

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

11548

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PLAIN

1937 DEC 15 PM 6 16

Washington, DC  
December 14, 1937.  
7 P.M.

AMEMBASSY,  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
LONDON (England).

493  
Your 764, December 10, 6 p. m.

893.24/330

This cable was sent in confidential Code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone. B-1

The Chinese Ambassador in a conversation with me on  
December 7 brought up the question of aid to China. He  
stated that it was a matter of great difficulty for China  
to continue resistance ~~to the Japanese~~ without supplies.  
He did not, however, make any specific request in regard to  
financial assistance. I told the Ambassador that I could not  
say anything new on the subject to which his inquiry related.

793.94/11543

793.94/11548  
note  
993.51

*Free*

CR  
DEC 15 1937. PM

FE:JWB:REK

PA/H  
GAT

FE  
m.m.H.

EA  
H.F.

F/A  
EU/PM  
A-W

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_  
Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
✓ CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State

1937 DEC 20 PM 6 39

Washington,  
December 20, 1937.  
8 P.M.

AMEMBASSY, DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
LONDON (England) : US

This cable was sent in confidential Code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone. C-1

✓ 501  
Your 785 / December 18 / 3 p. m. /

There have been ~~no~~ new developments on this matter  
subsequent to those indicated in the Department's 493,  
December 15, 7 p. m.

793.94/11548

Hull  
P.H.

793.94/11548

F/M/R

*JWB*  
FE: JWB: REK

FE  
*m.w./d.*

PA/H

EA

Eu

A-W

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator M., 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 20, 1937.

It may be deemed desirable by the Department to add to the attached draft telegram a paragraph reading as follows:

"Somewhat the same considerations as those outlined in your 764, December 10, 6 p. m., which in the opinion of the British Foreign Office would render it difficult for the British Government to act favorably upon the request of the Chinese Government would be applicable also to favorable action by this Government."

Or an alternative paragraph reading as follows:

"The Executive branch of the Government has no authority to extend financial aid to China and Congress would probably be unlikely to authorize such financial aid."

FE is inclined to the opinion that it would be preferable not to include in the telegram either of the foregoing paragraphs in order to avoid giving the British Government a possible basis for placing on this Government the responsibility for British unwillingness or inability to accede to the Chinese Government's request.

*concur*  
*S.H.*

*m. m. H.*

*JWB*  
FE:JWB:REK

14-1

EE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

PLAIN

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated December 9, 1937

Rec'd 1:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

PRIORITY.

1026, December 9, 6 p.m.

FOR AMERICAN AMBASSADOR.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 9 - 1937  
Department of State

"The International Committee has secured agreement of  
Defense Commissioner Tang Sheng Chih to the propositions  
embodied in the following telegrams --

Telegram number one 'The International Committee  
which has organized a safety zone in Nanking would  
respectfully make this further humanitarian proposal to  
the Chinese authorities, namely, that they should undertake  
not to carry on military operations within the walled city  
of Nanking, provided the International Committee can  
secure the agreement of the Japanese authorities not to  
attack the walled city. As practicable means of procedure,  
the International Committee proposes for the forces in the  
vicinity of Nanking a truce of three days, during which  
time the Japanese troops would maintain their present  
positions and the Chinese troops would withdraw from the  
walled city. International Committee would request,  
for the sake of the great number of civilians now  
endangered

11074  
893.102  
Nanking

793.94/11549

EP 11 1937  
P/EG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

14-2

-2- #1026, December 9, 6 p.m., from Nanking via N. R.

endangered, the earliest possible reply to this proposal.

Signed Rabe, Chairman';

Telegram number two 'The International Committee which has organized a safety zone in Nanking would respectfully make this further humanitarian proposal to the Japanese authorities, namely, that they should undertake not to attack the walled city of Nanking provided the International Committee can secure the agreement of the Chinese authorities not to carry on military operations therein. As a practical means of procedure, the International Committee proposes for the forces in the vicinity of Nanking a truce of three days, during which time the Japanese troops would maintain their present positions and the Chinese troops would withdraw from the walled city. The International Committee would request, for the sake of the welfare of the great number of civilians now endangered, the earliest possible reply to this proposal. Signed Rabe, Chairman'.

General Tang wishes us through you to communicate the first telegram to General Chiang Kai Shek. We are transmitting the second through attache of the Japanese authorities in Tokyo and Shanghai.

PLEASE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. H. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

14-3

-3- 1026, December 9, 6 p.m., from Nanking via N. R.

Please inform the other embassies of these proposals. The International Committee hopes the proposals may also have their endorsement. Speed essential. Signed, Rabe, Chairman".

Sent to Hankow. Repeated to Shanghai, Peiping. Shanghai please communicate to Japanese Embassy and repeat to Tokyo.

ATCHESON

CSE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

15-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

PLAIN

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated December 9, 1937

Rec'd 2:19 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
REC 14 1937  
Department of State

793.94  
793.94/11525  
393.1115

1024, December 9, 4 p.m.  
Shanghai's 1114, December 8, 5 p.m., and my 1019,  
December 9, 9 a.m., and 1021, December 9, 10 a.m.

393.1115/2135

One. Contents of Shanghai's 1114 were communicated to all Americans in Nanking this morning who were also informed that list of their names and addresses was being furnished Japanese authorities with request that in case of need these Americans be given appropriate protection and facilities.

Two. Shortly after noon there was considerable bombing in the Kwanghua gate area, some bombs apparently falling inside city, and earlier two bombs were dropped in Hsiakuan section.

Three. At urgent request of Chinese military authorities who stated Yi Chiang gate to the Bund might close at any time, we returned to PANAY at 3 p.m., after giving remaining Americans opportunity to accompany us. Prideaux Brune of the British Embassy and London TIMES correspondent MacDonald accompanied us and later transferred

to

793.94/11530

FAFG

DEC 11 1937

15-2

-2- #1024, December 9, 4 p.m., from Nanking via N. R.

to H.M.S. SCARAB where British Embassy staff is quartered. Preparations to barricade the gate were being made as we passed through and a wide section of Hsiakuan outside and near the wall was being fired. Just after we arrived on PANAY the Pukow water front was heavily bombed, one of the smaller station buildings was hit and set afire, and three bombs fell in water opposite us. An anti aircraft shell struck the water about two hundred feet from PANAY and this vessel subsequently proceeded up river about two miles to Sanchiaho off Asiatic Petroleum Company installation where American refugees from inside the city will proceed if they decide to leave and can do so. H.M.S. SCARAB and CRICKET now at Sanchiaho will move at five p.m., up river about one-half mile where JARDINE hulk is lying.

Four. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai. Shanghai please inform Japanese authorities of position of PANAY. Peiping repeat to Tokyo.

ATCHESON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

16-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB FROM COMYANGPAT

Rec'd December 9, 1937

7:30 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV

COPIES SENT TO  
~~SECRET AND M.I.D.~~

INFO: 2ND BRIGADE  
YANPAT  
COMDESRON 5  
COMSUBRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMSOPAT  
AMEMBASSY CHINA  
USS MANBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

793.9d

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 14 1937  
Department of State

0009 Nanking city gates closed, many fires  
burning both sides of river, waterfront area outside  
city walls practically deserted, intensive bombing by  
Japanese through day. PANAY moved two miles up river  
from present anchorage to facilitate evacuation re-  
maining nationals. USS GUAM standing by Wuhu where  
sixteen United States nationals remain. 2030

SMS  
NPL

DEC 14 1937  
FILED

793.94/11551

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

GRAY

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated December 9, 1937

Rec'd 5:05 p. m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 10 1937  
Department of State

793.94

1122, December 9, 5 p. m.

My No. 1102, December 7, 5 p. m.

According to unconfirmed Japanese reports their  
troops have captured the Tachiachiao aerodrome outside  
Nanking and have reached the Yangtze on both sides of  
Nanking. They also state that another column is within  
a few miles of Wuhu.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Nanking, Hankow,  
Peiping.

GAUSS

793.94/11552

SMS

NPL

REC'D  
DEC 14 1937

F/FG

17-1

*Fi*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

FROM PLAIN

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated December 9, 1937

Rec'd 6:53 p. m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

*Handwritten initials*  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 10 1937  
Department of State

*793.94  
not  
393.0015*

1123, December 9, 6 p. m.

I have now received from Senior Consul full text  
of notification mentioned in my 1114/11525, December 8, 5 p.m.  
It follows: "In view of the imminent danger of the area  
in and around Nanking becoming directly involved in very  
SEVERE and extensive fighting between the Japanese and  
the Chinese forces, I have the honor to inform you, for  
transmission to the interested colleagues, that it is  
the earnest wish on the part of the Japanese forces  
that all the foreign nationals now remaining in Nanking  
will stay away, as much as possible, from the zone of  
actual fighting by evacuation from that city without delay.  
This request is urgently made with a view to preventing  
any foreigner from becoming involved in the dangers of  
hostilities which may extend to that city at any moment,  
and I shall be grateful if you will kindly transmit, at  
your earliest convenience, the present information to  
the interested

793.94/11553

DEC 13 1937

FILED

F/F G

17-2

RB -2- No. 1123, DECEMBER 9, 6 p. m. from Shanghai<sup>4</sup>

the interested colleagues in order that necessary steps may be taken by them.

The Senior Consul has today circulated the following letter of today's date received by him: "I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of the writing stating the intention of the Imperial Japanese forces regarding the security of foreign ships and vehicles to be found in and around the zone of fighting in the Yangtze valley and shall be grateful if you will kindly take immediate steps to bring it to the notice of the interested parties through our honorable colleagues. I have the honor to be, etc., signed Suemasa Okamoto, Japanese Consul General. (One) The Imperial Japanese forces, firmly subscribing to the principle of respecting the rights and interests of the third powers, have so often found themselves during the present conflict in a trying predicament when carrying out military operations against Chinese troops, who had deliberately established military works and structures in the close vicinity of the interests of the third powers or tried to engage Japanese troops in such a way or in such a district as might easily involve the interests of the third powers in the hostilities.

(Two)

17-3

RB -3- No.1123, December 9, 6 p. m. from Shanghai.

(Two) In view of the hostilities spreading all over the Yangtze valley, the Imperial Japanese forces sincerely hope that the third powers will ungrudgingly cooperate in the efforts of the Imperial Japanese forces, not to cause molestation to the interests of the third powers, by keeping or removing their ships and vehicles, government owned or otherwise, as far away as possible from Chinese troops, either stationary or moving, and Chinese military establishments or, if possible, by taking them entirely out of the zone of fighting. (Three) It goes without saying that under any circumstances the Imperial Japanese forces will do their utmost to respect foreign ships and vehicles to be found in and around the zone of fighting but in case no cooperation is forthcoming from the third powers, or their nationals in such a way as is suggested in the preceding paragraphs, the Japanese forces are not in a position to ensure the security of such ships and vehicles and cannot be held responsible for whatever consequences that may involve them."

FOR THE AMBASSADOR. I have this evening received a letter direct from the Japanese Consul General enclosing a copy of the statement issued by the Imperial Japanese forces

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

17-4

RB -4- No. 1123, December 9, 6 p.m. from Shanghai

forces as given above and requesting on behalf of the Japanese Ambassador that it be conveyed to the American Ambassador and adding that Mr. Kawagoe would very much appreciate it if the American Ambassador would circulate the statement among the interested heads of missions.

Sent to Department. Repeated to Hankow, Nanking, and Peiping.

GAUSS

SMS

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

a

18-1

~~FA SIAA~~

*[Handwritten signature]*

CA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Gray

SHANGHAI VIA N.R. DEC 11 1937

Dated Dec. 9, 1937

FROM

Recd 7:20 p.m.

*Telegram to Shanghai and Tsingtao*

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 11 1937  
DEC 10 1937  
Department of State  
*[Handwritten initials]*

1125, December 9, 8 p.m.

793.94  
with  
373.745

Japanese Consul General at Shanghai has addressed me

informally as follows:

"I am writing to you to solicit your good offices in regard to the matter of Japanese property in Tsingtao. As you may be probably aware there are in Tsingtao particularly extensive Japanese interests in the form of investments in cotton mills and other property including public utility works and when Japanese residents in that port city were compelled to evacuate in August last as the result of the Sino-Japanese hostilities these interests were entrusted in the hands of the local Chinese authorities for safe custody.

According to reliable authority emanating from Tsingtao recently, however, it is allegedly reported that the Chinese military authorities stationed there have made it known that in accordance with instructions from the higher command they intend to carry out a wholesale destruction of all the Japanese interests by systematically blowing up the Japanese cotton mills and other establishments. The report is naturally causing great anxiety as well as resentment among all the

Japanese

793.94/11554

F/F G

18-2

CA --2--1125 from Shanghai Dec 9...

Japanese concerned and such action on the part of the Chinese authorities if actually resorted to will doubtless constitute a most unwarranted act of vandalism to civilian property which must be respected in all circumstances.

Acting under instructions from my Government I wish to ask you to be so kind as to use your good influence to persuade through appropriate channels the Chinese authorities concerned to refrain from putting into effect their alleged intention. I shall deeply appreciate whatever step that you may be able to take in this matter and I am sure that any such action on your part may be had without prejudice to the policy maintained by your Government throughout the present hostilities."

I request that the Department issue any desired instructions to the Consul at Tsingtao to whom I am repeating this message and that I be informed what reply to return to the Japanese Consul General here.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tsingtao.

GAUSS

SMS NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*May*  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

1937 DEC 11 PM 12 45

Washington, *via Naval Radio.*

December 11, 1937. *10*

*793.94/11554*  
*note*  
*393.94*

AMERICAN CONSUL  
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

SHANGHAI (China).

*637*

Reference your 1125, December 9, 8 p.m.

The Department has instructed Tsingtao as follows:

QUOTE Reference Shanghai's 1125, December 9, 8 p.m.,  
and Ambassador's 15, December 4, 9 a.m.

If you have not repeat not already approached the local Chinese authorities on the basis of the Ambassador's instruction under reference, you should do so now. You should not repeat not make any reference to the contents of Shanghai's telegram above-mentioned.

You should promptly inform <sup>and the Department</sup> Shanghai of the action you have taken in regard to this matter. END QUOTE

The Ambassador's telegram under reference reads as follows:

QUOTE/The British Embassy has renewed its inquiry of the various diplomatic missions whether they would be willing to instruct their representatives in Tsingtao to urge upon the Chinese authorities to refrain from carrying out

793.94/11554

F/A

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Washington,

-2-

their threat of destroying Japanese property. I replied that our information from Tsingtao was that there now seemed little prospect of such destruction but that I would be willing to instruct the American Consul to associate himself with his colleagues in oral representations to the Chinese authorities urging them to accord protection to all foreign property in Tsingtao. END QUOTE /

You may inform your Japanese colleague of the general nature of the instructions given to the Consul at Tsingtao.

*Hubb*

*HRW*

*GR*  
DEC 21 1937.

793.94/11854

*tdm*  
FE:MSM:VCI

*James R. J.*  
FE  
12.21.37

*A-W*

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19 .....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

166

18-3

TELEGRAM SENT

*Man*  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE   
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State

*Washington, via Naval Radio*

1937 DEC 11 PM 12 40

December 11, 1937.

AMERICAN CONSUL <sup>DIVISION OF</sup> COMMUNICATIONS <sup>AND RECORDS</sup>  
TSINGTAO (China).

*1 Pm*

Reference Shanghai's 1125, December 9, 8 p.m., and  
Ambassador's 15, December 4, 9 a.m.

*11554*

*11448*

If you have not repeat not already approached the local Chinese authorities on the basis of the Ambassador's instruction under reference, you should do so now. You should not repeat not make any reference to the contents of Shanghai's telegram above-mentioned.

You should promptly inform Shanghai <sup>and the Department</sup> of the action you have taken in regard to this matter.

793.94/11554

*J. Free*

*DEC 11 1937*

793.94/11554

FE:MSM:VCI

*FE*  
*W. Paul*  
*A-W*

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

*JWB*

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR ...

FROM GRAY, ...

Tokyo

Dated December 10, 1937

Rec'd 1:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

610, December 10, 11 a.m.  
Department's 335, Wuhu bombing.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 10 1937  
Department of State

We have taken no (repeat no) action, but we will look for an early opportunity to remind the Foreign Office of assurances given regarding safety of lives and property.

Repeated to Peiping for relay to Ambassador Johnson.

GREW

JS

793.94/11555

FILED  
DEC 14 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quigley NARS, Date 12-18-75

19-1

*FE*

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR

PLAIN

FROM Hankow via N. R.

Dated December 10, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 10 1937  
Department of State

PRIORITY.

25, December 10, 3 p.m.

My 24, <sup>N.C.</sup> December 10, 11 a.m.

793.94  
note  
793.94119

I have been informed orally but officially by the Foreign Office that the International Committee was mistaken in thinking that General Tang Sheng Chih had expressed approval of plan for three days truce and withdrawal of Chinese forces from the walled city of Nanking and I was further informed that General Chiang Kai Shek had stated he was not (repeat not) in position to accept that proposal.

Sent to Nanking, repeated to Department, Peiping, Shanghai. Peiping repeat to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

JS

793.94/11556

DEC 11 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

MBo ...

FROM PLAIN

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated December 2, 1937

Rec'd 7:00 a.m., Dec. 10.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 10 1937  
Department of State

793.94

1061, December 2, 10 a.m.

Nanking's 976, <sup>11394</sup> DECEMBER 1, 11 a.m.

Request of International Committee for creation of  
safety zone at Wuhu has been communicated to Japanese  
Ambassador with request for an early reply. Sent to the  
Department. Repeated to Nanking, Hankow and Peiping.

GAUSS

OSB: Note: Above cable received after request  
for missing number. Telegraph Room.

793.94/11557

FILED  
DEC 14 1937

F/FG

20-1

MBo

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Tokyo

FROM Dated December 10, 1937

Rec'd 8:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND ...

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 10 1937  
Department of State

793.94

615, December 10, 7 p.m.

Reference my 589, / 11428 December 3, 1 p.m., march of Japanese  
troops through International Settlement.

I have received from my British colleague the follow-  
ing ~~pro~~ memoria which he left at the Japanese Foreign Of-  
fice yesterday.

"It is clear that the municipal police took all the  
precautions humanly possible during the march of Japanese  
troops through the Settlement on 3rd December and consi-  
dering the provocation offered by this march it is sur-  
prising that there were no further incidents.

The unrestrained interference of the Japanese military  
authorities is likely to destroy the municipal administra-  
tion and the authority which it exerts for the preservation  
of law and order in the Settlement. By such action the  
Japanese military authorities will gain nothing and will  
only succeed in producing chaos in this thickly populated  
area to the great danger of the many valuable foreign in-  
terests including Japanese interests."

GREW

KLP:

793.94/11558

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

21-1

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

PLAIN

FROM Hankow via N.R.

Dated December 10, 1937

Rec'd 6:00 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO

11549

282

Twenty-four, December ten, eleven a.m.

Nanking's 1026, December nine, six p.m.



The following communication was sent to diplomatic missions represented in Hankow December ten, eleven a.m.

"The American Ambassador at about twelve p.m. December nine received a radio message from Mr. Atcheson, in charge of the Embassy at Nanking which was despatched at six o'clock and transmitted the text of two telegrams addressed by the International Committee in charge of the 'safety zone' at Nanking to the Japanese and Chinese authorities, respectively, making a proposal whereby fighting inside the walled city may be obviated and the probable death of many civilians avoided; the Committee asked that these messages be communicated through the agency of the American Embassies in Tokyo and Hankow to the authorities concerned. A copy of the radio message received from Mr. Atcheson is attached hereto for the information of the diplomatic

793.94/11559

DEC 11 1937

F/EG

21-2

2- No. 24, December 10, from Hankow.

diplomatic missions represented in Hankow.

Immediately on receipt of this message the American Embassy in Hankow delivered a copy of it to the appropriate Chinese authorities in Hankow and word was received from them this morning that the proposal has been laid before the highest military command and that when a reply should be received from them, it would be communicated immediately. Presumably the message to the Japanese authorities in Shanghai and Tokyo was similarly transmitted during the evening of December 9, 1937.

It is to be noted that the International Committee solicits from the Embassies their support of the proposal in question. The American Ambassador, for his own part, has informed the Chinese authorities that the humanitarian proposal of the International Committee at Nanking meets with his approval and that he would be glad to see it put into force to the fullest extent consistent with plans adopted by the Chinese military command."

Sent to Nanking, repeated to Department, Peiping, Shanghai, Peiping repeat to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

JS:

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

41

DI

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBO

SPECIAL GRAY  
FROM Tientsin via N.R.

Dated December 10, 1937

Rec'd 12:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
C.N.I. AND A.I.D.

DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 14 1937  
Department of State

793.94

87, December 10, 5 p.m.

It is reported that during daylight hours from  
December 1st to 7th no Japanese came in from Manchuria  
but 5000 went out and 1000 casualties were sent out by  
sea.

CALDWELL

KLP:

793.94/11560

DEC 14 1937

F/FG

7

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR

FROM GINCAF

December 10, 1937

Rec'd 1:30 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: SECOND BRIGADE  
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING



0010. Unconfirmed reports Japanese began general attack Nanking about 13:30. Have entered city one place. Fighting in progress outskirts Wuhu. Settlement and area quiet. 1905.

KLP:WWC

793.94/11561

DEC 14 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Mr. Secretary of State

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sir:

Please inform me immediately as to all  
the treaties Japan would be breaking if she  
openly declared war on China

1957 DEC 2 PM 3 21  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS  
Thank you

Elaine Mitchell  
2259 So. Bedford Dr.  
Beverly Hills,  
California

793.94

December 18 1937

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 10 1937  
Department of State  
Cand

793.94/11562

DEC 9 1937

RECEIVED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

*W*  
Mr. Secretary of State  
RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sir:

1937 DEC 9 PM 3 49  
Please inform me immediately as to whether  
if we openly recognized in the Orient would this  
give the Japanese the right to search our ships. If  
so, has the <sup>COMMUNICATIONS</sup> ~~recording~~ of ships ever provoked an  
incident before that might have led to war.

Thankyou—

Elaine Mitchell  
259 So. Bedford Dr.  
Beverly Hills  
California

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gutzler NARS, Date 12-18-75

*rw*

Dear Sir:

5  
RECEIVED  
DEC 20 1972

I would appreciate it greatly if you would  
me a complete and accurate document or chart of  
statistics showing the amount of money and muni-  
tions Japan has received in the recent conflict from  
the United States, by sending ships here here. Also  
China. Thank you

COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

Laine Mitchell  
259 So. Bedford Dr.  
Beverly Hills,  
California

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

December 18 1937

In reply refer to  
FE 793.94/11562

Miss Elaine Mitchell,  
259 South Bedford Drive,  
Beverly Hills, California.

Madam:

The receipt is acknowledged of the three undated letters in which you ask certain hypothetical questions with regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation and request that you be supplied with statistics with regard to the amount of money and munitions which Japan and China have received from the United States during recent months.

The Department is not aware of any loans which have in recent years been made or are now being made to Japan by American banking or commercial interests. With regard to your inquiry concerning the shipment of munitions there are enclosed copies, as given to the press, of tables giving information in regard to the exportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war from the United States for the period July 1, 1937, to November 30, 1937, inclusive.

As

793.94/11562

F/A

1/5/2


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

As to your other questions, you will, I believe, appreciate that it would be inappropriate and unwise for any person in a position of responsibility to answer hypothetical questions on matters of international importance. It is suggested, however, that you consult the librarian of your public library with regard to a list of standard publications from which you might obtain information that would enable you to answer the questions contained in your letter.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

  
Maxwell M. Hamilton  
Chief  
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Enclosures:

CR ✓  
DEC 18 1937

Press releases of  
August 6, September  
4, October 6,  
November 4, and  
December 6, 1937.

892.  
FE:EC:HES  
12-15, 16

FE 



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FROM GRAY  
Shanghai via N. R.

Dated December 10, 1937

Rec'd 2:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

1133, December 10, 4 p.m.

My No. 1122, <sup>1155-2</sup> December 9, 5 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 11 1937  
Department of State

According to Japanese sources a reply has not been received to the letter General Matsui is reported to have sent General Tang Sheng Chih demanding the surrender of Nanking by one today and consequently a general attack on the city was launched this afternoon. The fall of Nanking is expected very soon. There are no reports of developments on the Hongchow front. In Shanghai there are persistent rumors that peace negotiations are being carried on, along the lines mentioned in Nanking's number 999, December 6, 11 a.m.

Repeated to Nanking, Hankow, Peiping.

GAUSS

RR:WWC

793.94/11563

DEC 11 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

22-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

PLAIN  
FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated December 10, 1937

Rec'd 3:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 14 1937  
Department of State

1032, December 10, midnight.

International Committee requests that following be  
communicated as soon as possible to Japanese Embassy:

"International Committee, Nanking, for sake of two  
hundred thousand civilians, seeks prompt and favorable  
reply to yesterday's telegram regarding armistice and  
withdrawal of Chinese troops from walled City of Nanking.  
Signed Rabe, Chairman".

Two. Sent to Shanghai, repeated to Peiping, Hankow.  
Nanking please repeat to Tokyo with request that Embassy  
there communicate to Foreign Office.

ATCHESON

WSB

793.94/ 11564

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 811.515-Silver/121 FOR Memo.  
Department File

FROM State Department (Feis) DATED Dec. 1, 1937.  
TO Adviser on Int. Economic Affairs. NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Rumors from Far East regarding the possibility that Japan might declare war on China; steps preparatory to the issuance of a neutrality proclamation were being studied. Question is what should U.S. do about buying silver from China.

th


793.94/11565

11565

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

GENERAL OFFICES  
58 E. WASHINGTON ST.  
CHICAGO ILL.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT  
MUNSEY BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D. C.



RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

37 DEC 10 AM 9 51

NOVEMBER 17 1937  
*ack'd*

TELEPHONE NATIONAL 3342

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
WASHINGTON, AND RECORDS

December 8, 1937

*793.94*

Hon. Cordell Hull  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

*File*  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 11 1937  
Department of State  
*Ch*

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I take the privilege of enclosing herewith  
a letter from a very dear friend of mine, who has been in China  
since the days, forty years ago, when we were schoolmates together.

His message comes from the bottom of his  
heart and I know you will be interested in what he has to say.

Assuring you of my highest personal regards,  
I am

Very sincerely,

AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION

*Edw. A. O'Neal*

Edw. A. O'Neal - President.

*Ed*

793.94/11566

DEC 18 1937

F/F G

11566

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

[COPY:HES]

CHEELOO UNIVERSITY  
Tsinan, Shantung  
China

Telegraphic Address:  
"Cheeloo, Tsinan"

School of Medicine  
Office of the Dean

Ch'ung Te School,  
TSINGTAO.  
October 25th, 1937.

Mr. E. A. O'Neal,  
American Farm Bureau Federation,  
58 East Washington Street,  
CHICAGO.

Dear Ed,

I am writing to you at this time because I thought you personally would be interested in getting a letter direct from Shantung province, and also because I know that you are very close to the administration, and you might think it worth while to pass this letter on to someone else.

Our University in Tsinan was closed about three weeks ago, owing to the near approach of the Japanese army, and Chinese students and teachers are, naturally, afraid of this army. We have set up a temporary office in Tsingtao.

All the world knows the general war situation out here and, apparently, the sympathy of the world is with China. The Japanese militarists have the bit between their teeth and are running away. Evidently censorship and war propoganda are preventing the Japanese people from knowing the real situation in China, but it is to be hoped that the return to Japan of tens of thousands of Japanese merchants who have lived in China for many years and built up Japan's most important trade, and also the numbers of wounded that are now being sent back will enable the people gradually to know what the real situation here is, even if no outside news is allowed to enter the country. However, the fact is that the militarists are carrying out their policy of force and terrorism. They care nothing for world public opinion, and are continuing indiscriminate bombings, on the plea of self defence. Japan had the opportunity, years ago, of

getting

-2-

getting all she wanted, economically, from China, through friendliness, but she has chosen the opposite policy of force, and is throwing the full strength of her war machine against China. On the other hand, we see China, considered a weak, disunited and unprepared people, putting up a remarkable fight and surprising the world, especially the Japanese. The Chinese have many weaknesses which could be easily pointed out. They are handicapped by a number of inefficient and possibly some traitorous leaders, but, compared with a few years ago, the change in the attitude of the government and the people is remarkable. Weak leaders are gradually being replaced by others: their aviators are learning to fight, as well as to fly, and their gunners to shoot straighter. The work of preparation of the army and the people, as well as of war materials, which Chiang Kai Shek has carried on in the last few years is now being appreciated. War propaganda is being carried on and the Japanese are helping, through their constant bombings of non-military areas, to unite the people in their resistance. The Chinese are a patient people and used to suffering. They are uniting now as never before in their history, and they are desparate. Japan may win, temporarily, (though there is some doubt about that now) but she is bound to lose in the long run. In the end she will suffer more from this war than China.

The question which ought to interest you and the American government is what relation has the United States to all this? Our government and people have always been friendly and helpful to China. The blunder of Congress in passing the Oriental Exclusion Act thirty years ago stirred up a great deal of feeling out here at the time, but more important issues have pushed the remembrance of this into the background. Mr. Stimson tried to stop Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931, but Sir John Simon would not agree to a stiffened attitude on the part of England and America, so nothing was done; and Japan ignored the Nine Power Treaty, and set a good precedent for Italy, by taking Manchuria.

You have, no doubt, seen in your papers the strong reaction produced in China amongst Americans and British, as well as Chinese, by the State Department's advice to Americans to leave this country. I see that General Smedley Butler has also said that they all "ought to get to hell out of here". Fortunately, the State Department does not have the power to order us out, unless we are guilty of a crime. Mr. Roosevelt has shown that his policy is one of goodwill and friendliness towards all. This has been well shown by the relation of the administration to the republics of South America, and I am sure that Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hull appreciate the moral and spiritual influence introduced into China by missionaries, through preaching, teaching and medicine. But the aspect of

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

the situation that appeals to the average politician is, of course, the financial one. The protest from the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai you may have seen. Certainly, the withdrawal of all Americans from China at this time would have been a serious mistake from which American philanthropy and business would never have recovered. The action of ambassador Johnson in leaving his post, to go on a battleship at Nanking, at the request of the Japanese, created a great deal of adverse comment. In fact, the policy of the administration up to the present, as a Shanghai American paper points out, has tended to arouse the contempt of Japan and the animosity of China. We took the lead in the drawing up of the Nine Power Treaty, but when Japan breaks this and sets up a puppet government in Manchuria, we only write notes. Therefore Japan proceeds to take the next step in the conquest of Asia, by attempting to take the north, if not the whole of China. If you have any doubt as to the aim of Japan, read the memorial of Premier Tanaka to the Emperor, which leaked out and was published in 1927. I hate war, but if we have to tackle Japan, I think it would be better to do so now than after she has conquered a good part of Asia, with its material resources.

Up to the present, America has done nothing, but I am glad to see that, finally, a conference of the Nine Powers, and others, is being called in Brussels. I see that Senator Pittman is strongly in favour of something definite being done. If the British and American governments had taken some action in 1931, Manchukuo would probably not have come into existence. Even now, it may not be too late to do something in China. An embargo on exports to Japan would stop the war before long, but I do not expect that this can be put into effect by the governments. However, the British and American labour parties may be able to start a world-wide boycott, which would have the desired effect, and not be official. I do not have a copy of the Neutrality Law, but I remember that the President disapproved of certain clauses in this, and I am glad to see that he has not invoked it. To do so would obviously be to play into the hands of Japan, and we should be accused of practically being allies of Japan against China. As I see it, China is going to survive, and revive, in the course of time. I hope she is not going to copy western civilisation to the extent of going in for militarism, as all of our nations are doing. She will be a tremendous market in the future, besides being a power on the Pacific, and when she recovers, her people will remember the nations that were friendly and helpful in her time of suffering. Of course, I am partial and prejudiced, but I hope I can still look at the situation in a realistic way. As a missionary medical teacher, I feel that, even now, we have a great field of usefulness out here, and, in the future, our opportunities for service to China will be greater than ever.

Yours sincerely,  
R. T. SHIELDS

RTS:MMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply refer to  
FE 793.94/11566

December 17 1937

My dear Mr. O'Neal:

Thank you very much for your letter of December 8, 1937, enclosing a letter of October 25 received by you from Dr. R. T. Shields, Tsingtao, China, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation. Dr. Shields' letter has been read with interest and I assure you that your thoughtfulness and courtesy in bringing it to my attention are greatly appreciated.

I have taken the liberty of having a copy of Dr. Shields' letter made for our files and am returning the original to you herewith.

Sincerely yours,

Gordell Hull

Enclosure:  
From Dr. Shields,  
October 25, 1937.

Mr. Edward A. O'Neal,  
President, American Farm Bureau Federation,  
58 East Washington Street,  
Chicago, Illinois.

Monte

DEC 15 1937. PL

egc.  
FE:EGC:HES  
12-14

DR  
FE  
M.W.



CRF

F/A

793.94/11566

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

PLAIN  
FROM COMSOPAT

COPIES SENT TO  
~~O.S.I. AND M.I.D.~~

December 10, 1937

Received 9:20 p.m.

OPNAV WASHINGTON  
INFORMATION 2ND MARINE BRIGADE USMC  
COMDESRON 5  
COMSUBRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

793.94

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 10 1937  
Department of State

0110 South China ports quiet 2000.

SMS:RGC

793.94/ 11567

DEC 13 1937  
F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1914

~~FE~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

PLAIN

FROM SHANGHAI VIA N.R.

Dated December 10, 1937

Received 5:05 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 14 1937  
Department of State

1129, December 10, noon.

Nanking's 1026, <sup>11549</sup> December 9, 6 p.m.

This morning was repeated to Tokyo and pertinent  
portion communicated to the Japanese Consul General for  
transmission to Japanese Embassy.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Hankow, Nanking  
and Peiping.

GAUSS

NPL

793.94/11568

DEC 14 1937

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

PLAIN

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM SHANGHAI VIA N.R.

Dated December 10, 1937

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED 5:01 p.m.

Secretary of State *egz*

Washington

1130, December 10, 1 p.m.

Nanking's 1024, December 9, 4 p.m. / 11550

Position of PANAY was communicated to Japanese

Consul General this morning with request that he notify Japanese forces so that ship might not be endangered by their military activities.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Hankow, Nanking and Peiping.

GAUSS

NPL

*egz*  
JAN 7 1938  
DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE ADMINISTRATION  
Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 14 1937  
Department of State

793.94

793.94/11569

F/EG  
FILED  
DEC 17 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

EDA

GRAY

FROM NANKING VIA N.R.

Dated December 10, 1937

Received 3:03 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

COMMUNICATION TO  
ONE AND ALL  
EJF

DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 11 1937  
Department of State  
B

1029, December 10, 3 p.m.

FROM ROBERTS FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

793.94

"The Japanese attack on the Kuanghua gate was beaten off by the Chinese yesterday afternoon, the two northern columns were still some ten miles from the city, and the southern column was being held up by the 89th division whose artillery firing was audible long after dark. From the change in direction of this firing apparently the Japanese were expelled by the left toward the river.

Weather conditions, no change yesterday. Japanese bombing bi-planes; light, medium, and one flight of heavy, the last observed for the first time, concentrated on Chinese defences near the Kuanghua and Chunghua gates and the south city but also bombed other localities including a column of troops on Kuofu Road, and in the afternoon, the Pukow water front and railway station where

700.64/11570

RECD  
DEC 11 1937

R/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EDA - 2 - #1029, December 10, 3 p.m. from Nanking

where incendiary and 5000 pounds high explosives were dropped with no great damage. Usual bombing tactics but light planes dived to about 2000 in spite of anti-aircraft fire which in general was wide and ineffective. Most all of heavy planes flew at about 6000 but haze prevented good observation.

Buildings in Hsiakuan were fired yesterday afternoon beginning just outside main gate frontal although far from field of firing and Chinese said they would continue the burning today to at least 600 yards from the walls.

In agreeing to the proposal of the International Committee for a truce Tang Sheng Chih obviously realizes the futility of continuing defense of the city in the face of Japanese preparations to bring up heavy artillery and their undisputed command of the air.

At noon today two captive balloons were put up by the Japanese and the sound of large shell explosions in the direction of the park and of the Kuanghua Gate can be plainly heard on the ship".

Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai

ATCHESON

KLP:WWC

23-1

*MSM*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

GRAY

FROM TSINGTAO VIA NARS

Dated December 10, 1937

Received 5 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DIVISION OF  
EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS  
RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793-94

December 10, 5 p.m.

I accompanied this morning the two naval officers commanding two American destroyers now in port on their first call on Mayor of this city. These destroyers are going into drydock here. In response to the hope expressed by the senior officer that the Mayor would give him ample notice in case of trouble so that the men-of-war could be removed (referring to but not mentioning explicitly the alleged intention to destroy Japanese property), the Mayor replied "fundamentally whether or not there will be trouble depends on the Japanese. We need not expect anything to happen here for some days in any case".

This Consulate concurs with the Mayor that no hostilities are likely to occur here for the present, and it continues to believe Chinese will not destroy property unless Japanese undertake military operations against or near Tsingtao.

Sent to the Department, Hankow, Peking, Shanghai.

NPL:RGC

793.94/11571

RECEIVED

SOKOBIN

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

GRAY

FROM NANKING VIA N.R.

Dated December 10, 1937

Received 4:52 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 11 1937  
Department of State

793.94  
WB-16-37

1028, December 10, 9 a.m.

One. Several days ago the servants of (?)

Secretary Okumura came to me and stated that Chinese soldiers had entered Mr. Okumura's residence at 2 Hsichiao and had removed all articles of furniture therefrom. I orally informed both the Mayor and the Secretary General of the Defense Commander's headquarters who (?) to do what was possible to recover the articles taken. Mr. Okumura's servants, who have recently been living in our embassy compound informed me today that the articles had not (repeat not) been returned. Please inform Mr. Okumura.

Two. Sent to Shanghai. Repeated to Department, Hankow, Peiping For the Ambassador.

ATCHESON

NPL:RGC

793.94/11572

FILED  
DEC 11 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMYANGPAT

FROM December 11, 1937

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE  
YANGPAT  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMSOPAT  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

892  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 11 1937  
Department of State

793.94

0010. Continucus bombing east and south gates  
Nanking by Japanese planes throughout day. Chinese troops  
moving into city. River ports above Wuhu quiet. 2132.

RR

793.94/11573

DEC 11 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*JWS* *PC*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo <sup>470</sup>

FROM **GRAY** **SECRET**  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

Tokyo

Dated December 11, 1937

Rec'd 7:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECRET~~

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
REC 11 1937  
Department of State

793.94

616, December 11, 3 p.m.

Department's 337, December 10, 6 p.m., march of  
Japanese troops through the International Settlement at  
Shanghai.

Action taken.

GREW

RR:

793.94/11574

FILED  
DEC 14 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 11 1937  
Department of State

MBO-

FROM  
PLAIN

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated December 11, 1937

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

793.94

1134, December 11, 9 a.m.

/11564

Pertinent portion of Nanking's 1032, December 10,  
midnight, was this morning forwarded to the Japanese  
Consulate for transmission to the Japanese Embassy.

GAUSS

RR:

Withdrawal of Chinese troops from Nanking.

793.94/11575

FILED  
DEC 11 1937

F/F G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Dunne NARS, Date 12-18-75

24-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

GRAY AND PLAIN

FROM  
Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 11, 1937

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
REC'D 12 11 1937  
Department of State

793.94

812, December 11, 3 p.m.  
Embassy's 811, December 9, 6 p.m.

One. In preparation for celebration of the fall of Nanking, the local authorities have ordered all pupils of elementary schools above the age of ten and all pupils of middle schools to prepare to participate in a parade. The preparations include the making of paper banners with the inscription "the fall of Nanking is the first step in the awakening and birth of a newly rising China" and the placing of a red lantern in front of each pupil's house with the inscription "celebrating the fall of Nanking." It is understood the parade will take place December twelve. Guns and firecrackers have been fired today in anticipation. The forcing of school children to participate in a victory parade has created ill feeling and bitterness among local Chinese and is an inept measure on the part of the Japanese military.

Repeated to the Ambassador and to Tokyo.

RR:A

LOCKHART

793.94/11576

DEC 14 1937

F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR epo

**FROM CINCAF**

December 11, 1937

Rec'd 10:15 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC  
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMSOPAT  
COMYANGPAT  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



0011. Japanese assault Nanking continues. Believed have made breach in walls in vicinity Kwanghwa gate. Small detachments troops now in city. Unconfirmed report Wuhu occupied. Settlement situation unchanged. -Seventeen armed Japanese soldiers entered Japanese mill American sector night tenth, withdrew upon request. 1932.

RR

793.94/11577

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. ... NARS, Date 12-18-75

25-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 11 1937  
Department of State

JR

FROM

GRAY

Hankow via N. E.

Dated December 11, 1937

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND R.I.D.  
892

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

793.94  
Nov 3  
3-25-38

28, December 11, noon.

Your 1031, / 11579 DECEMBER 10, 11 P.M.

Copy of message of International Committee has been handed to General Chang Chun and to Minister of Foreign Affairs with a statement that I am transmitting this without commitment in any sense. For your confidential information this message I feel has arrived too late to accomplish any good. It is doubtful whether Chinese here would have accepted it in any case because it meant surrender of city. Humanitarian interests involved, however, are I think appreciated and highly commended.

Sent to Nanking, Peiping, Shanghai. Peiping repeat to Tokyo.

CSB

JOHNSON

793.94/11578

DEC 14 1937

FILED

F/E/G

26-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 11 1937  
Department of State

JR \*\*\*

FROM GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated December 10, 1937

Rec'd 9:23 a.m., 11th.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94  
with  
793.94119

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1031, December 10, 11 p.m.

International Committee requests following be  
communicated to Chiang Kai Shek as soon as possible:

"The International Committee wishes respectfully  
to inform General Chiang Kai Shek through the proper  
channels that Defence Commander Tang Sheng Chih considers  
the committee's truce proposal right and proper for  
humanitarian reasons. But he must refer to the highest  
authority the question of withdrawal, since he is under  
orders to defend Nanking. The International Committee  
therefore urgently renews its proposal at this critical  
moment when several thousand civilians in Nanking have  
already lost their homes from military causes, and  
when 200,000 are endangered. Signed Rabe, Chairman".

Two. Confidential for the Ambassador from the  
Committee:

"The International Committee upon authoritative  
assurances confirms its statement of Tang's attitude,  
Headquarters

793.02/11579

DEC 14 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Dunlop NARS, Date 12-18-75

26-2

-2- #1031, December 10, 11 p.m., from Nanking via N. R.

Headquarters is convinced Chiang would agree if he knew  
the military situation. Signed Rabe, Chairman".

Three, Sent to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai. Peiping  
please repeat to Tokyo.

ATCHESON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 9, 1937.

S

Mr. Secretary:

Lieutenant General Fujii in his letter observes that purely aggressive wars are unknown in Japan's long history and enumerates various alleged examples of China's hostile acts against Japan. The letter follows the usual line adopted by Japanese apologists and need not be read.

*M.M.H.*

*J.W.B.*  
FE: JWB: SMJ

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

FE

*Mr. Hamilton*

*for your  
perusal and drafting  
of acknowledgment for  
the Secy's signature.*

December 10 1937

*Hks -*

*GUR*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 - 1937  
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*File*  
Division of  
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 14 1937  
Department of State

JOHN J. PERSHING  
WASHINGTON

December 8, 1937.

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
3  
793.94/115802.F  
1937 DEC 11 AM 9 35

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RELATIONS

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have just received a letter from  
General Fujii, who was Chief of Staff of Kuroki's  
Army during the Russo-Japanese War. It was while  
acting as American observer with that Army that  
I became acquainted with him. I do not know what  
position he occupies now, nor whether he is still  
in active service.

793.94

Thinking that this letter might have  
some bearing upon the relations of our Government  
with the Japanese, I am enclosing a copy for your  
information. It is so palpably propoganda as to  
be somewhat amusing, and I doubt its value to you  
except possibly that it may indicate a general  
plan on the part of the Japanese Government to  
influence opinion in the United States.

With high esteem and great respect,  
believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

*John J. Pershing*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED

DEC 8 - 1937

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
Enclosure

F/A  
11580

FILED  
DEC 17 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

81 Obanmachi, Yotsuya,  
Tokyo, Japan,  
Nov. 14th, 1937.

General John J. Pershing,

My dear general,

It is 33 years since your excellency was as military attache of Japan's most esteemed America with us in Kuroki's hdqrs in Manchuria. It was my great pleasure to hear of your excellencie's great exploits as Commander-in-Chief of American forces in the great War and to think you are still enjoying your good health. Of our comrades in Manchuria, Gen. Sir Ian Hamilton once sent me his work, "A Staff Officer's Scrap Book" and recently gave me his letter and photograph. Maj.-General Hoffman of Germany also gave me his works ("Der Krieg der versäumten Gelegenheiten" and "Tannenberg, wie es wirklich war") but I am sorry he is no more. Mr. Frederick Palmer of Collier's Weekly called on me a few years ago and told me how he had served in the World War.

As to the present hostilities between China and Japan, I wish to lay before you a few remarks of mine on the affair and humbly ask you to pay your attention to them. Looking backward, first, why did the China and Japan War of 1894-5 happen? Because China, violating treaties about Korea, suddenly despatched her armed force about one brigade strong to Chemulpo, without giving any notice to us. This compelled us to send our troops to confront them. If we had taken no steps then, China would have swalled up Korea completely. Then in 1904 we did our best to avoid war against Russia by proposing even

793.94/11580

DEC 17 1937

FILED

-2-

concessive measures. But Russia looked on us with contempt and considered us easy to deal with and paid no attention to what we proposed. So we were compelled to stand against her even at the eleventh hour. If we had remained still, all Manchuria and Korea must have fallen to her hand. In the World War we most faithfully performed our duties in accordance with Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty. Then we returned our blood-bought Tsingtao ungrudgingly to China. Such instance we feel is not very often the case in the world history. As you witnessed in the Manchurian field, we treated as well the Russian wounded as our own men. I myself was criticized by my fellow soldiers as treating the enemy even better than our own men. How well we protected the local inhabitants, how our discipline was perfectly kept, I think the 17 military attaches and 18 press correspondents of the powers must own by their witness gained while they were in our First Army.

Manchuria, where our blood was often shed, now at present by our humane and philanthropic help has become an independent power and the facts testify how that nation are free and happy to enjoy their lives and are advancing daily toward civilisation, much in contrast to the vast inhabitants of China Proper.

Purely aggressive wars are unknown in our long history. For several years before the present affair, we acted with utmost perseverance in the Far East, while the instances of China's hostile acts may be enumerated as follows:

1. In the Chinese primary school text books, the antagonizing and showing contempt of Japan has been mentioned for years to implant such

-3-

thought in young minds.

2. China propagated publicly by newspapers, posters, or addressed the same thought as above.
3. In every China's open ports, all possible impediments were laid in the ways of our merchants and their business was almost stopped.
4. Violating the Peace Treaty of 1932, China constructed strong defence works around Shanghai. In North China also such works were constructed, thus eagerly preparing for the war against Japan. When such works were complete, China began challenging us in every way.

Under such circumstances, we were still patient and endeavoured to continue friendly relation with China, who mistook this peaceful attitude of ours for our weakness and began at last firing at our garrison at Lukouchiao in North China. Then in Shanghai they murdered a naval officer and a seaman of ours. There still we tried to localize the affair and even facing a big force we with less than 3000 seamen forming our landing party on the spot tried to protect our civil inhabitants. But China augmented her forces to several ten-thousands and opened attack on our seamen and civilians, thus exposing them to utmost danger. This compelled us to land our army forces in Shanghai.

After the opening of hostilities, China did not hesitate to resort to such inhuman ways as follows:

1. On their retreat, their soldiers threw poisons into the wells. They did that by orders. Some of our men and horses fell sick by drinking from such wells.
2. In the northern front they used women in the first line.
3. Numberless were the cases of their misusing our flags.

-4-

4. They mixed civil-dress-soldiers among their troops and if they were killed, they proclaimed that the Japanese had killed the civilians.
5. They did cruel deeds to our sanitary corps and our wounded.
6. At Tungchow, east of Peking, they cruelly murdered nearly a hundred Japanese inhabitants including women and children.
7. They often made use of dum dum bullets. These bullets were also found left in their positions.
8. They made uses of poison gasses in the front line.
9. They fired at our hospital ships and field hospitals and wounded several.
10. They disguised their air-planes into Japanese planes.
11. Several of them fought under the cover of the flags of third powers.

We Japanese have never bombed at men and materials that have no connection with warfare. We paid utmost attention not to put civilians into danger. Some of our planes, when they could not locate their objectives, returned empty handed. The rumour that our Navy sunk Chinese junks is a pure falsehood. Many radio news from China are always full of such falsehood. Our bushido never can dream to massacre noncombattants. It is plain enough that we in accordance to its time-honoured principles are fighting most humanely and gentlemanly.

By what I have written above it may be plain that because of China's unbearable antagonism and contempt of us, massacres, and commercial hindrances we have taken up the ways of self-defence, and that they often resorted to inhuman ways while we are entirely free from such censure. So the entire responsibility of the present affair rests on China. People

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

of nations who hope for the early cessation of hostilities must render no help to China. If not the affair will only be lengthened.

We flatly and absolutely deny communism. China has already been greatly communistic. If communism pervades China, other powers too will not be put in very advantageous position. And Chiang Kai-shek's government has firmly grasped the communists' hands, who are violently anti-Japanese. Moreover Japan has no desire for territory. We always highly esteem the interests of a third power. Also we want to become the best friend of China. If she wishes to live in prosperity and peace in the East, she must put end to her anti-Japanese attitude and give up all mean ways of trying to weaken us by courting the help of a third power. However let the dead past bury its dead and let sincerity and mutual trust come back. Then hostilities will soon cease.

We shall never forget that Japan for decades has enjoyed hearty good will of America and trust that we are still in most friendly relation. I sincerely hope that the ladies and gentlemen of your country will come at most correct recognition of the causes of the present affair.

I have the honour to remain

your excellencie's most faithful friend.

(Signed) S. Fujii Lt.-Gen.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

December 10 1937

My dear General Pershing:

I appreciate very much your courtesy in sending me enclosed with your letter of December 8, 1937, a copy of a letter addressed to you by Lieutenant General S. Fujii in regard to the present situation in the Far East.

Although the Department's information indicates that Lieutenant General Fujii is no longer on the active list of the Japanese Army, his letter to you is of interest because of the similarity of its tenor to other Japanese statements, official and otherwise, on the subject of the present conflict between Japan and China and because it bears out the desire manifest in many circles in Japan for American sympathy and good will.

With warm personal regards, I remain,

Sincerely yours,


Cordell Hull

John J. Pershing, U. S. A.,  
General of the Armies,  
War Department.

CR  
DEC 10 1937. PM

FE:JWB:SMJ:REK  
12/10/37

FE  
*m.m.f.*



793.94/11530

F/A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE GENERAL CONFERENCE COMMISSION ON WORLD PEACE  
OF THE

REV. RALPH W. SOCKMAN, CHAIRMAN  
REV. ERNEST FREMONT TITTLE, RECORDING SECRETARY  
5  
RECEIVED  
METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
140 RUSH STREET, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

MR. HAROLD K. WRIGHT  
TREASURER

1937 DEC 11 AM 9 20

REV. CHARLES F. BOSS, JR.  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 13 1937  
Department of State  
Reply drafted Dec 16 KAO

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

793.94

December 16 1937  
December 9, 1937

- Members of the Commission
- REV. WALTER AITKEN  
Lincoln, Nebraska
  - REV. WILLIAM H. ALDERSON  
Hempstead, N. Y.
  - REV. ROBERT M. ATKINS  
Flint, Michigan
  - REV. HAROLD C. CASE  
Topeka, Kansas
  - REV. RALPH E. DIFFENDORFER  
New York, N. Y.
  - MR. ANSON C. FRY  
Cincinnati, Ohio
  - MR. GEORGE E. KEITH  
Manchester, Conn.
  - PROFESSOR WILEY W. MATHER  
Upland, Calif.
  - BISHOP G. BROMLEY OXNAM  
Omaha, Neb.
  - REV. DAVID J. SHENTON  
Council Bluffs, Iowa
  - REV. RALPH W. SOCKMAN  
New York, N. Y.
  - REV. ERNEST F. TITTLE  
Evanston, Ill.
  - MRS. GEORGE H. TOMLINSON  
Evanston, Ill.
  - MISS ADA TOWNSEND  
Evanston, Ill.
  - REV. BRUCE S. WRIGHT  
Erie, Pa.

The Honorable Cordell Hull,  
Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Secretary Hull:

I am enclosing the statement officially adopted by the General Conference Commission on World Peace of the Methodist Episcopal Church in its annual meeting November 16 and 17. The document approaches the proposals from the point of view of the Christian religion. Nevertheless it also approves economic and political proposals consistent, we believe, with our point of view.

- Executive Committee
- BISHOP G. BROMLEY OXNAM  
Chairman
  - REV. ERNEST F. TITTLE  
Recording Secretary
  - MR. ANSON C. FRY
  - REV. MERLE N. ENGLISH  
Co-operating member  
representing Board of  
Education
  - REV. CHARLES F. BOSS, JR.

The Commission instructed me to send this statement to you and to request that it be brought to the attention of Mr. Roosevelt, because of its bearing on our foreign policy with reference to the Far East and our great desire to see an easing of tensions at the point of international economic conflict.

- Board of Education  
Committee on  
World Peace Education
- REV. LUCIUS H. BUGBEE
  - DEAN W. C. COFFEY
  - REV. W. E. J. GRATZ
  - DEAN THOMAS F. HOLGATE
  - PRES. DANIEL L. MARSH
- Ex Officio
- REV. MERLE N. ENGLISH
  - REV. HARRY W. MCPHERSON

Our Commission took cognizance of the constructive efforts being put forth by our State Department and have consistently urged support for your efforts to relieve international economic tensions through favorable trade agreements, efforts at conciliation, and a willingness to cooperate with other nations in the interest of a peaceful solution to our problems.

Assuring you of our cooperation wherever possible in the effort to maintain peace in the world, I am,

Sincerely yours,

*Charles F. Boss, Jr.*  
Executive Secretary

cfb-w

FILED  
DEC 17 1937

793.94/11581

F/F/G  
11581

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

STATEMENT ADOPTED BY  
GENERAL CONFERENCE COMMISSION ON WORLD PEACE OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH  
AT ITS ANNUAL MEETING, NOVEMBER 16 AND 17, 1937

The World Peace Commission approaches the extremely difficult problems of the present international situation from the standpoint of Christian faith in the revelation of God in Christ. As revealed in Christ, God is a God of love who condemns sin which is a denial and betrayal of the claims of fellowship, and who redeems sinners by way of the cross, - that is, by sacrificial effort in their behalf. The nature of God as thus revealed is the persistent ground of human existence and the true standard of human conduct. Mankind can prosper only insofar as it recognizes and obeys the law of love. The wages of sin is death. The reward of selfishness is war, economic disaster, and a growing eclipse of the cultural values of civilization. Moreover, a world tormented by war and preparations for war can be redeemed only insofar as it chooses the way of the cross. It cannot overcome evil with evil; it can only overcome evil with good. This conclusion must be our guide if we are determined to approach the problems of the present world situation from the standpoint of Christian faith in the revelation of God in Christ.

I.

We cannot, therefore, suppose that war is an effective means of achieving any good end, even though it should be waged under the auspices of the League of Nations in the name of "collective security," or under the auspices of united democracies in order to oppose the advance of fascism and to make the world safe for democratic processes and ways of life. War, which "involves compulsory enmity, diabolical outrage against human personality, and a wanton distortion of the truth", as was said by the World Conference held last summer at Oxford - war is itself an evil; and you cannot overcome evil with evil. At this point, accordingly, we desire to reaffirm the statement made by our Commission two years ago:

"We yield to no one in our admiration of men who hitherto, in full accord with public sentiment and the dictates of their own conscience, have given up their lives in war. But war, whatever may have been true of it in the past, is now productive only of evil. It involves (a) the slaughter of human beings, including women and children; (b) violation of personality; (c) lying propaganda; (d) deliberate breeding of the spirit of hate; (e) vast destruction of property; (f) unsettling of the economic structure of society, threatening the collapse of credit, the curtailment of commerce, widespread unemployment, world-wide reduction of the standard of living, with here and there actual starvation; and furthermore,

(g) it threatens the destruction of democracy and encourages the spread of fascism; (h) it puts in the place of moral law the doctrine of military necessity; and (i) it distorts the religion of Jesus into the religion of a war god. Therefore, we feel bound to conclude that war is sin, a word which we use deliberately because of its religious connotations, signifying as it does an offense not only against man but also against God."

Also, we would call renewed attention to the position officially taken by the Methodist Episcopal Church at its last General Conference:

"War is social sin. War as we now know it is utterly destructive. It is the greatest social sin of modern times, a denial of the ideals of Christ; a violation of human personality; and a threat to civilization. Therefore we declare that the Methodist Episcopal Church as an institution does not endorse, support or purpose to participate in war."

## II.

Nor can we suppose that an economic boycott, whether governmental or individual, is an effective means of defending the rights of the weak and opposing the aggression of the strong. Today, the employment of economic force is favored by many persons who, feeling compelled to disavow the use of military force, none-the-less feel constrained to find and use some means of putting an end to outrageous wrong. But this means - an economic boycott - we feel obliged to reject for the following reasons:

1. An economic boycott, if effective, may kill people just as certainly, although not as quickly, as bombs or machine guns. It may kill them by the slow, agonizing process of malnutrition. It may kill not only the guilty but also (and more likely) the innocent, including women and children. Moreover, it is bound to stimulate the spirit of ill-will and hate both in those who use it and in those against whom it is used. Also, it is bound to provoke reprisals, as does the use of poison gas or any other instrument by which men undertake to reform their fellows by killing or injuring them and causing them to suffer. Like war, of whose psychology it undoubtedly partakes, an economic boycott is itself an evil; and you cannot overcome evil with evil.

2. An economic boycott, if it should threaten (from the standpoint of the aggressor) to become effective, will almost certainly lead to armed resistance - war. In the present situation a desperate Japan, finding willing allies in other "have-not" nations, might precipitate another world war rather than submit to utter defeat and downfall.

3. An economic boycott, by fixing attention upon the sins of others and diverting it from one's own sins, would not serve to eliminate those economic maladjustments which today are a primary cause of world unrest. On the contrary, it would only serve to obscure them and thus to leave basic problems unsolved.

III.

Believing that evil can only be overcome with good, we advocate:

1. Repentance; We, too, have sinned against China, we of the West who have compelled her under military threat to grant "concessions," involving ninety-nine year leases of ports serving as bases for our trade and also for our navies; options to exploit her mineral resources in our own interest; control of her banking, credit, finance, and tariff regulation; permission to build railroads through public lands, exempt from taxation, et cetera. Unless and until we repent of our own sins, we can hardly expect Japan to be greatly affected by our "moral" condemnation.

2. Works meet for repentance.

a. Withdrawal of all foreign military and naval forces from Chinese territory and waters. (The presence of our own gunboats and marines leaves us no moral right to protest against the presence of an armed Japan in China.)

b. Surrender all "concessions" by which we are able to exploit the resources of China in our own interest and to the loss of the Chinese people. For a limited but adequate period we believe that the United States, in the case of its own nationals, should provide for the indemnification of business losses thus incurred. Any temporary increase in taxation resulting from this measure would be as nothing compared to the economic loss incurred through war.

c. Surrender of all claim to the special privileges of "extraterritoriality." Americans who take up residence in China, whether as industrialists, bankers, merchants, or missionaries, should do so at their own risk, seeking from their own government only such protection of property and life as may be secured through peaceful negotiation.

3. Refusal to supply any belligerent with the means of making war. This, of course, follows from any thorough-going repudiation of war as a means of seeking any good end. We urge the application of our present neutrality legislation to the Far Eastern situation, and the passage of mandatory legislation which in the event of war, declared or undeclared, would make it illegal to assist either

belligerent to carry on the war, whether (a) by loans of money; or (b) by sales on any terms, of such war-making materials as guns, shells, lethal gas, bombing planes, armored tanks, gasoline, oil, scrap iron, et cetera; or (c) by sales of any article of commerce in excess of its normal export during a five-year period preceding the war. The enforcement of such legislation should, of course, be accompanied by a public and persistent offer to act as mediator in the dispute.

4. Renunciation of economic warfare by

- a. Providing access to raw materials on equal terms for all peoples;
- b. Providing freer access to essential markets. If and when necessary, tariffs and quotas should be fixed under conditions of international conference and agreement;
- c. Stabilizing currency;
- d. Improving the standard of labor and living by international agreement as is being done by the International Labor Office.

We urge American business men, especially those who have membership in Christian churches, to give full and persistent support to this approach to the economic problem, which is called for alike by Christian faith and by the demands of a sane and far-seeing statesmanship.

5. Renunciation of economic imperialism by "the abolition of the whole conception of individual ownership of undeveloped territories." (A recent recommendation of Lord Robert Cecil). Undeveloped territories should be placed under international control with the understanding that their resources are to be developed and used primarily for the benefit of the native population, and secondarily for the benefit of all the rest of the world.

6. Military disarmament. This, we are convinced, can be made to accompany economic disarmament. If peoples are delivered from economic fear, they will be glad to be rid of the mounting burden of taxation created by a race in armaments. Future disarmament conferences should include representatives of business, the professions, labor, and youth, not merely representatives of government, the army, and the navy.

7. A permanent international economics office corresponding to the now existing International Labor Office. A recommendation of this character, recently made by the King of the Belgians, has received favorable editorial comment both in Europe and the United States.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

8. A persistent attempt in every nation to solve the problem of distribution to the end that

- a. Enforced unemployment may be ended;
- b. Peoples may be able themselves to consume most, if not all, of the goods they produce; and
- c. International trade may become a friendly interchange of goods and services.

This, we believe, is utterly essential. Unless it is undertaken and pushed to a successful issue, war and rumors of war will continue; for industrialized nations will continue to engage and compete in imperialist adventures in hope of finding release for capital accumulations and surplus products.

9. A persistent attempt to educate the minds and hearts of men to the end that there may be an intelligent will to peace. Here the school and the church must work together. We earnestly recommend the creation in every local church of a standing Committee on Peace whose function is to promote knowledge of world conditions and such mental and moral attitudes as make for peace.

10. Immediately, we urge financial support of efforts to relieve the vast war-bred suffering in China, Japan, Spain and Ethiopia. We recommend full use of channels of relief already in existence. These include the China Emergency Relief Fund of the Board of Foreign Missions and the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York City, N.Y.; and the Friends Service Committee, 20 South 12th Street, Philadelphia, Penna.

Ralph W. Sockman, Chairman

Ernest F. Tittle, Recording Secretary,

Charles F. Boss, Jr., Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Chute NARS, Date 12-18-75

December 13, 1937.

My dear Mr. Boss:

Thank you for your letter of December ninth enclosing a copy of the statement adopted by the General Conference Commission on World Peace of the Methodist Episcopal Church at its annual meeting held on November sixteenth and seventeenth. I appreciate your sending this to me and am glad to have it. I feel happy that the great objective of world peace is receiving such careful, thoughtful and understanding study as the statement which you sent me shows. I think all of us are coming to understand that lasting peace can be made secure only as the result of toilfully building the kind of foundations upon which alone it can rest. The whole problem of peace goes close to the heart of Christianity.

With appreciation for your statement, believe me,

Sincerely yours,

FRANCIS B. SAYRE

Reverend Charles F. Boss, Jr.,  
740 Rush Street,  
Chicago, Illinois.

Approved for  
release by  
Date 8-2-81

FBS:ABN

793.94 / 11581

F/FG 11-28

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

December 18 1937

In reply refer to  
FE 793.94/11581

My dear Mr. Boss:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of  
December 9, 1937, with which you enclose a statement  
officially adopted by the General Conference Commission  
on World Peace of the Methodist Episcopal Church at its  
annual meeting on November 16 and 17.

The contents of your letter and its enclosed  
statement setting forth the views of your organization  
in regard to the situation in the Far East have re-  
ceived careful consideration, and your courtesy in  
making these views known to the Department is greatly  
appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

*M. M. H.*

Maxwell M. Hamilton  
Chief  
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

The Reverend  
Charles F. Boss, Jr.,  
Executive Secretary,  
The General Conference Commission  
on World Peace of the Methodist  
Episcopal Church,  
740 Rush Street,  
Chicago, Illinois.

GR ✓  
DEC 16 1937.PM

*KFP*  
FE:KFP:HES  
12-16

*AL*  
FE

A true copy of  
this signed original  
*[Signature]*

793.94/11581

F/A

11581

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo DEPARTMENT OF STATE FROM GRAY

File  
DEC 15 1937  
DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

Nanking via N.R.  
Dated December 11, 1937

REC'D 7:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 11 1937  
Department of State

193.94  
-16  
393.1115

1033, December 11, 1 p.m.

One. All Americans within Nanking were reported safe at 1 o'clock last night.

Two. Air raids yesterday were directed chiefly against Kwanghua and south gates but one bomb was dropped in Wutaishan area of city's western section at edge of so-called safety zone, causing number of casualties. Shells were reported to have fallen near the main circle in Chungshan road east and Kuofu and two in the neighborhood of the Hsiakuan railway station. The former were from Japanese batteries outside Kuanghua gate in the military airfield area which was in Japanese hands, the latter from batteries belonging to the Japanese right column approaching the city from Chihsiashan area north side of Purple Mountain and in the direction of one of the two Japanese captive balloons visible. Advance of these batteries and deviation of their fire to the left may compel the PANAY to move further up river and

703.94/11332

DEC 11 1937

F/FG

2. No. 1033, December 11, from Nanking.

and Americans in the city were last night so informed.

Three. Japanese bombing planes passed over the PANAY yesterday afternoon but did not drop any bombs within hearing distance.

Four. Burning of Hsiakuan continues. British "Bridge House" Hotel was burned yesterday afternoon after being looted. American Church Mission property in Hsiakuan was at that time reported as still safe. There were two large fires on the Pukow water front last night, one of which is believed to have been the burning of the passenger ferry pontoon and shed near the railway station.

Four. Telephone communication with the city still being maintained through Asiatic Petroleum Company installation but presence nearby of machine gun nests and occasional rifle fire along the shore last evening makes after dark telephoning inadvisable.

Five. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

RR:CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

27-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

PLAIN

FROM Nanking via N.R.

Dated December 11, 1937

Rec'd 11:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*File*  
JAN 17 1938  
PRIORITY.  
DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 11 1937  
Department of State

1035, December 11, 5 p.m.

(PART ONE). At 2:45 p.m. today shells began falling on the near shore not far upriver from the PANAY. Reluctant to leave Sanchao and possibility of further contact with Americans PANAY delayed moving until shells were falling in the water ahead and on the opposite bank and then proceeded upriver about twelve miles from Nanking to mileage two hundred eight above Woosung where vessel is now anchored. As from this Embassy, please communicate our positions to Japanese Embassy with request that appropriate instructions be issued to Japanese forces including air force since Japanese bombing planes have flown daily over the PANAY at the San Chiaho as well as former Hsiakuan anchorage.

Two. British vessels also proceeded upriver.

Three. Sent to Shanghai, repeated to Department, Hankow Peiping. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo with

793.94/11583

FILED  
AM 17 1938  
F/E/G  
request

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

27-2

2. No. 1035, December 11, from Nanking.

request that Embassy Tokyo kindly take appropriate action  
with respect to last sentence first paragraph above.

For the Ambassador.

ATCHESON

CSB:

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

*Y*  
COPIES SENT TO  
~~ONLINE AND OLD.~~

LMS  
..

FROM

COMSOPAT

*882*

December 11, 1937

Rec'd 3 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: 2nd BRIGADE USMC  
COMSUBRON 5  
COMDESRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMPAT  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

*793.94*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 15 1937  
Department of State

0111 South China ports quiet 2000

CSB

793.94/11584


F/A

FILED

DEC 14 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



sms ... FROM ALUSNA, PEIPING  
This telegram was received in navy cipher and must be closely paraphrased before being released for publication. December 12, 1937  
Rec'd 4:20 p.m.

ACTION: NAVY DEPARTMENT

INFO: CINCAF

793.94

0012 Estimates Japanese troops in North China as on 9 December in thousands. Highest 350, lowest 225 including Kwantung army. Observer on spot reports war spirit strong in Hankow with new levies straining. Expect something definite local political situation possible tomorrow or Tuesday. Likely Tsao Kun Wupai Fu Hsieh Yuan setup. 2030

emb

DEC 13 1937

FILED

793.94/11585

F/A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo COMSOPAT  
FROM December 12, 1937  
Rec'd 11:40 a.m.

ACTION: OFNAV  
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC  
COMSUBRON 5  
COMDESRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 14 1937  
Department of State

793-94

0112 South China ports quiet 2000.

RR:

793.94/11586

F/A

FILED  
DEC 14 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB

CINCAF

FROM December 12, 1937

Rec'd 11:47 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC  
AMCON SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON 5  
COMSUBRON 5  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMN AMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

89 X

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 14 1937  
Department of State

793.94

0012 Japanese have entered Walls Nanking two places  
advancing slowly aided heavy artillery fire from Purple  
Mountain. Chinese resistance strong although some troops  
have withdrawn across river to Pukow. Large sections  
city burning. Wuhu occupied yesterday. Japanese troops  
estimated one division returned Shanghai from Soochow.  
Seven transports off Woosung. Shanghai, Nanking,  
Hangchow railroads being repaired. Japanese rolling  
stock now in use between Woosung. Shanghai Settlement  
quiet 1940.

RR:

RECEIVED  
DEC 14 1937

793.94/11587

F/X

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

CA

Y

**FROM** incaf

Dated Dec. 13, 1937

Recd 4 a.m.

*882*

Action: USS AUGUSTA USS MARBLEHEAD  
Info: 2nd Brigade (USMC) Amcon Shanghai,  
Comsubron Five, All ships at Shanghai,  
Comdesron Five, Comyangpat, Comsopat,  
Opnav, USS EDSALL, Comsixteen, Navpur,  
Shanghai,  
Priority to USS MARBLEHEAD

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
REC 13 1937  
Department of State  
*W*

1113. AUGUSTA will not depart Shanghai until  
further notice 1102.

SMS

*793.94*

FILED  
DEC 14 1937

793.94/11533

F/A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75

28-1

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

CINCAF  
FROM

Rec'd. 9:10am. DECEMBER 13, 1937

ACTION: OPNAV

COPIES SENT TO  
~~O.N.I. AND M.I.D.~~

INFO: COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMBASSADOR CHINA  
ALUSNA PEIPING

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 13 1937  
Department of State

0013 General Matsui's headquarters announced capture  
Nanking Chinese troops surrendering unconditionally 2140.

793.94

793.94/11539

F/A

DEC 13 1937

RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 13 1937  
Department of State  
lab  
NA  
B

sms \*\*\*  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

FROM  
COMYANGPAT

December 12, 1937

Rec'd 5:54 p.m.

ACTION: CINCAF

INFO: NAVY DEPARTMENT FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION

793.94

0012 Three air attacks made on British gunboats  
CRICKET and SCARAB with convoy twelve miles above  
Nanking during afternoon. Eighteen bombs dropped. No  
direct hits except on one merchant vessel. Both gun-  
boats opened fire on attacking planes. 2112

sms

793.94/11590

F/A

RECEIVED  
DEC 13 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

29-1

~~FC~~

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

CA

~~DEPARTMENT OF STATE~~

*J. L. ...*

COMYANGPAT

JAN 17 1938 FROM

Dated Dec. 13, 1937

DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

Recd 4 a.m.

Action: Cincaf,

COPIES SENT TO  
~~O.N.I. AND M.I.D.~~

Info: USS OAHU

*802*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 13 1937  
Department of State  
*File*

793.94

Passed by Cincaf to Opnav for Information.

0013. Have urged Hashimoto through British at Wuhu  
not attack Hoshien until American and other foreign refug-  
ees have been embarked. Expect OAHU arrive Wuhu early  
tomorrow morning and have requested British convey this  
information to local Jap authorities 1247.

SMS

793.94/11591

F/A

FILED

AN 17 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

FROM GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated December 11, 1937

Rec'd 12:45 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
ONE AND FILED.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 13 1937  
Department of State

793.94

1034, December 11, 2 p. m.

FROM ROBERTS FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

"According to the best available information from several foreign observers ashore the Chinese still hold slopes of Purple Mountain in the park area but Cantonese troops from the Tangshan Road now are found inside the city; the Japanese are just outside the Kuanghua gate; and the South City and especially the positions held by 88th division outside the south gate are being heavily shelled with 75's, at least some 105's and possibly larger calibre. Aerial bombardment of these two gate areas continues and Pukow was raided yesterday afternoon and again at 1:15 p. m. today. The gate to Hsiakuan is still open. Reliable sources insist that General Tang would welcome a truce to arrange evacuation of his troops from Nanking".

Repeated to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai.

ATCHESON

RR

793.94/11592

F/A

FILED

DEC 15 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

CA

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

Gray

*JAN 17 1938*

NANKING VIA N.R.

**DIVISION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
NAVY AND MARINE ADMINISTRATION**

Dated Dec. 11, 1937

Recd 8:09 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

**COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.**

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 13 1937  
Department of State  
*file*

1036, December 11, 6 p.m. *EJL*

*793.94*

One. Shelling which was heavy this morning in south of city and inside Kwanghua gate was extended further into town this afternoon. Shells fell; (one) on Chungshan road in front of the Fuchang Hotel, killing about fifty persons (two) in back of the hotel, (three) at American Bible Teachers Training School in Wutaishan area *With some* property damage. Attempts were made to bomb and shell anti-aircraft battery near the Embassy and Embassy compounds were said to have filled with Chinese refugees. One foreign observer predicted that Japanese units would probably force their way through Kwanghua gate by this evening.

*wfb  
1-22-38*

Two. New firing appeared this afternoon in Hsiakwan section, notably northern. Pukow passenger ferry pontoon looked intact today, last night's fire having been down river from it, and the principal railway station buildings did not appear to be damaged by heavy bombing today.

Three. Shore telephone connection with the city was broken this afternoon and it was reported that light and water services were ceasing to function. Before the

PANAY

793.94/11593

F/A

DEC 17 1937

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

CA --2--1036 from Hanking...

PANAM moved this afternoon we saw police on shore pre-  
paring to embark across the river, later several hundred  
issued into ~~Hskwan~~ <sup>HSIAKUAN SECTION</sup> (?) for the same purpose, and the city  
is now presumably without police.

Four. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Hankow,  
Peiping, Shanghai. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo.

ATCHESON

RGC MPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED *ejz*

MB5

PLAIN, GRAY and SPECIAL GRAY

AMEMBASSY PEIPING  
AMEMBASSY HANKOW  
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI

FROM ~~London~~ via N.R.

Dated DECEMBER 11, 1937

Rec'd 4:26 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

~~COPIES SENT TO~~

Division  
FAR EASTERN  
DEC 15 1937  
Department of State  
*ny*

December 11, 4 p.m.

*792.94*

December ninth three raids on Canton Hong Kong railway Tengtouha and Cheungmuktou sections and two raids on Canton Hankow railway between Yingtak and Canton. Damage to tracks not serious. Bombs barely missed two trains on Canton Hong Kong line one an express. Authorities now expect regular attacks on trains and have reduced service to Hong Kong to one evening train daily.

*WDS  
3-2-38*

December 10th seven planes dropped about twenty-five bombs at Shiuchow aviation ~~plant~~ establishments with considerable reported damage and according to government officials used machine guns on Shiuchow populace.

This morning planes raided Canton Hong Kong railway demolishing Tintengwai station and slightly damaging tracks. Canton Hankow line also raided. Damage not important. One Japanese bomber shot down near Yingtak. Another alarm this afternoon.

A

795.94/11594

F/A

DEC 15 1937

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2- December 11, from Canton.

A second highway from Canton to Hong Kong border via Tongkun and Cheungmuktoy has been opened. British authorities have finally complied with Chinese request to complete short unfinished link between Chinese roads and Hong Kong highway. Bridge will shortly be constructed at Shunchun which will complete unbroken highway to Hong Kong. Local Chinese circles manifesting great relief over Central Government's determination to continue war. Patriotic student parade held on ninth at Canton. Popular Front leaders arriving here from Shanghai are reported to have been warmly welcomed and to be energetically urging increased popular resistance.

Missionaries report that Japanese naval forces continue to make landings on Islands near entrance to west river delta and to take soundings, but these landings appear to be only exploratory and temporary. Food and water seem to be main objectives. Mailed Hong Kong, Swatow.

LINNELL

RGC:NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

30-1

*FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*See Dept 340  
Dec. 12: 11:45 PM  
to Tokyo*

PLAIN

*John*  
JAN 17 1938

Hankow via N.R.

DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

Dated December 12, 1937

Rec'd 2:00 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 13 1937  
Department of State  
*MS*

Secretary of State,  
Washington,

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

*efL*

29, December 12, 10 p.m.

British gunboats SCARAB and CRICKET with JARDINE  
hulk and merchant ship WHANGPOO loaded with foreign  
refugees were deliberately bombed this afternoon. No  
casualties reported but as there are American refugees  
from Nanking on hulk I hope Department will urgently in-  
struct Tokyo to press the Japanese Government to issue  
instructions which will prevent this in future. Japanese  
informed British at Wuhu today that Japanese military  
forces have orders to fire on all ships on Yangtze.  
Unless Japanese can be made to realize that these ships  
are friendly and are only refuge available to Americans  
and other foreigners a terrible disaster is likely to  
happen.

Repeated to Peiping, Shanghai, information of GINCAF.

JOHNSON

RR:

793.94/11595

F/A  
FILED

AM 17 1938

31-1

FE

CA

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (A)

Dated Dec. 12, 1937

FROM

Recd 5:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 13 1937  
Department of State

1137, December 12, 4 p.m.

*in confidence. E.J.L.*

793.94

(GRUY) The Japanese naval landing party have informed the American, British and Italian forces "as a matter of courtesy" that beginning December 15 they intend to send detachments of sailors to certain Japanese mill and other property in the American and Italian sectors for the protection of Japanese nationals.

Two. Commander in Chief made representations in the matter to the Japanese Admiral while the Commanding Officer United States Marines has made like representations to the Japanese naval landing party pointing out that the proposed action is unnecessary as Japanese nationals and their property in the American sector are already well protected and the introduction of Japanese sailors may lead to complications which should be avoided.

Three. I have made like representations to the Japanese Consul General leaving with him a brief memorandum which I have supplemented by a frank and friendly conversation in which I pointed out that by introducing Japanese armed forces into sectors guarded by other foreign troops those sectors may

793.94/11596

F/A  
EO 1.3.1937

31-2

sms 2 - No. 1137, December 12, 1 p.m. from Shanghai.

sectors may become the legitimate object of Chinese air raid attacks (we have had one or two small Chinese raids over Hongkew recently and there are reports that the Chinese intend to make a last desperate air raid over Shanghai), that until the serious refugee problem is solved by Japanese action to permit Chinese to return to the countryside it is necessary to continue special military measures in support of the police in the foreign sectors, and that it is advisable to postpone the sending of any Japanese armed forces to the Japanese mills in the foreign sectors until the situation has so improved as to permit the foreign forces to suspend their special protection measures.  
(END GRAY)

Four. It is anticipated that the Italians will not interpose objection to the entry of the Japanese forces into the mills in their sector since they recently permitted Japanese military gendarmes to station in those mills without objection and without notifying the foreign forces. There are no mills in the British sector involved in the present matter. The British appear lately to be inclined to interpose little or

no

21-3

sms 3 - No. 1137, December 12, 1 p.m. from Shanghai

no objection to whatever the Japanese may do.

FIVE. (GRAY) At the same interview with the Japanese Consul General I made urgent representations in ~~connection~~ with reports that American and other foreign property in the Japanese occupied areas north of Soochow Creek, in the Hungjao district and in areas elsewhere adjacent to the Settlement and Concession is being molested, looted and pilfered. I asked that the Japanese forces in such areas take immediate steps for full and effective protection of American property, and in my conversation I suggested in a friendly spirit that the whole situation here might be greatly eased if instead of advancing plans for the introduction of Japanese armed forces into areas guarded by other foreign forces some effort WERE made to extend to foreign property in the Japanese occupied areas the same effective protection which is being extended to Japanese property in the foreign sectors.

Six, I do not know whether the action here will be effective in postponing the introduction of Japanese armed forces into the area south of the Creek. Our objections

31-4

sms 4 - No. 1137, December 12, 1 p.m. from Shanghai  
jections stand of record, however, and the Japanese  
must assume any responsibility for the consequences  
of any unwise action they may take. (END GRAY) There  
will, of course, be no (repeat no) attempt forcibly  
to prevent the Japanese from carrying out their plan.

Sent to the Department, Repeated to Tokyo.

GAUSS

klp

sms

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Chas. Jensen NARS, Date 12-18-75

[CONFIDENTIAL]

31-5

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 1137) of December 12, 1937, from the American Consul General at Shanghai reads substantially as follows:

The Japanese naval landing party have informed the American, British and Italian forces "as a matter of courtesy" that beginning December 15 they intend to send detachments of sailors to certain Japanese mill and other property in the American and Italian sectors for the protection of Japanese nationals.

Commander in Chief made representations in the matter to the Japanese Admiral while the Commanding Officer of the United States Marines has made like representations to the Japanese naval landing party pointing out that the proposed action is unnecessary as Japanese nationals and their property in the American sector are already well protected and the introduction of Japanese sailors may lead to complications which should be avoided.

The American Consul General made like representations to the Japanese Consul General, leaving with him a brief memorandum which the American Consul General supplemented by a frank and friendly conversation in which he pointed out that by introducing Japanese armed forces into sectors guarded by other foreign troops those sectors may become the legitimate object of Chinese air raid attacks (there have been one or two small Chinese raids over Hongkew recently and there are reports that the Chinese intend to make a last desperate air raid

793.94/11516.

1 / 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

raid over Shanghai), that until the serious refugee problem is solved by Japanese action to permit Chinese to return to the countryside it is necessary to continue special military measures in support of the police in the foreign sectors, and that it is advisable to postpone the sending of any Japanese armed forces to the Japanese mills in the foreign sectors until the situation has so improved as to permit the foreign forces to suspend their special protection measures.

Since the Italians recently allowed the stationing of Japanese military gendarmes in the mills in the Italian sector without objection and without notifying the foreign forces, it is expected that they (the Italians) will not interpose objection to the Japanese forces entering those mills. No mills in the British sector are involved in the present case. Of late it seems that the British are inclined to accept with little or no objection anything which may be done by the Japanese.

At the same interview with the Japanese Consul General the American Consul General made urgent representations in connection with reports that American and other foreign property in the Japanese occupied areas north of Soochow Creek, in the Hungjao district and in areas elsewhere adjacent to the Settlement and Concession is being molested, looted, and pilfered. He asked that the Japanese forces in such areas take immediate steps for full and effective protection of American property, and in his conversation he suggested in a friendly

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

friendly spirit that the whole situation in Shanghai might be greatly eased if instead of advancing plans for the introduction of Japanese armed forces into areas guarded by other foreign forces some effort were made to extend to foreign property in the Japanese occupied areas the same effective protection which is being extended to Japanese property in the foreign sectors.

The American Consul General does not know whether the action in Shanghai will be effective in postponing the introduction of Japanese armed forces into the area south of the Creek. The objections made stand of record, however, and the Japanese must assume any responsibility for the consequences of any unwise action they may take. No attempt will be made by force to keep the Japanese from carrying out their plan, of course.

793.94/11596  
FRC  
FE:EGC:HES  
12-13

  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

32-1

~~SECRET~~

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

SMS

FROM PLAIN

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated December 13, 1937.

Rec'd. 1:28 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*File*  
*JAN 17 1938*  
DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATION  
Secretary of State,

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

*egz*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 13 1937  
Department of State  
*File*

Washington.

1140, December 13, 1 p.m.

Japanese Consulate General informs me that orders have been issued by Japanese military and naval authorities to stop operations against Hosien, Anhui. Similar instructions are being conveyed to the Hosien front by special Japanese plane.

793.9d

GAUSS

klp

793.94/11597

F/A

AM 17 1938

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 867n.9111/178 ..... FOR #315 .....

FROM Jerusalem ..... ( Wadsworth ) DATED Oct.1, 1937 .....

TO ..... NAME ..... I-1127 ..... 870

REGARDING: Far East Committee of the League.

Press comment on decision to send an American representative to  
the -.

Wi

793.94/11598

F /

115-98

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 845.00 P.R./5 ..... FOR #461

FROM Calcutta ..... ( White ) DATED Nov.4, 1937  
TO ..... NAME ..... 1-1127 670

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict.

Resolution of the All India Congress Committee urging boycott of  
Japanese goods as a result of -.

W1

793.94/11599

F/

11599

Attitude Towards Japan

79280  
The appropriate resolution of the All India Congress Committee views with great alarm and horror the imperialist aggression

-18-

aggression of Japan in China which is attended with wanton cruelty and the bombing of the civil population. Sympathy is offered to the Chinese people, and as a mark of its sympathy the people of India are called upon to "refrain from the use of" Japanese goods.

Supporting this resolution, the speaker, Mr. Bose, said that the state of Indian opinion was such that it hardly required any recommendation. The struggle of China was against Japanese Imperialism and that of India against British Imperialism, so the two were a part of one great struggle. India must do what she could to make Japan curb her imperialistic pride. He did not believe it possible that Japan would boycott all Indian raw products, and even so, India should not flinch from this sacrifice. Another speaker, Professor Ranga, called upon Indian mills to buy the cotton which Japan did not take, otherwise Japan might buy American instead of Indian cotton. If the boycott of Japanese goods was successful, Indian mills and also the British would profit at the expense of the Indian cotton grower. Rabindranath Tagore also made a public statement condemning Japanese activities.

Comment: So far no data have appeared as to the effects, if any, of the movement to "refrain from purchasing" - the word boycott was avoided in the All India Congress Committee's resolution. It was reported that the Government of India was worried as to the possibility of loss in Customs revenue as a result of the Sino-Japanese conflict.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.0146/598 FOR Memorandum

FROM State Department  
Far Eastern Div. (Hamilton) DATED Dec 10, 1937  
TO \_\_\_\_\_ NAME \_\_\_\_\_ 1-1137 870

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict: Question of withdrawal from  
Shanghai of San Diego Marines: Telephone conversation  
between Mr Hamilton and Admiral Leahy, regarding-

aa

793.94/11600

F /  
//606

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

G-2  
W L

CONFIDENTIAL

G-2/2667-4-439

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEC 11 1937  
MR. MALANSON

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RELATIONS  
NOV 11 1937  
Department of State

December 3, 1937.

EE  
A-11  
304  
/

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, INTELLIGENCE BRANCH:

Subject: Summary of Events in Sino-Japanese  
Situation, November 28 - December 3, 1937.

793.94

GENERAL *Al Gustafson* *Mar 18 1973*

Persistent reports from Tokyo, Shanghai, and other reliable sources indicate that Japanese higher authorities, under pressure from divergent political and military groups, are weighing two immediate courses of action in settling the Sino-Japanese situation. One is to seek a peace on the basis of the present military advances, the other is to make a formal declaration of war against China.

The considerations for an immediate peace are that Japan has now achieved practically all immediate tactical objectives in China. To prolong the war would mean a continuing heavy drain on Japanese resources. It might tend to weaken Japan for further operations in her ambitious Pan Asia program. The fact that the United States neutrality act will probably not be applied unless a formal declaration of war is announced, is also a consideration.

A declaration of war on China would legalize an effective blockade and shut off practically all flow of munitions into China. It would immediately legalize all Japanese belligerent rights in occupied territory and open the way for a much wider penetration. From the Japanese extremist point of view it would settle such questions as seizure of customs, the "open door" and other similar questions now open to international diplomatic discussion.

Dr. Eric P. Troutman, the German Ambassador to China, arrived in Nanking from Hankow on December 2 on board a Chinese customs cruiser. His announced mission is to arrange for a Nanking neutral zone to safeguard noncombatants and foreigners. It is probable, however, that his real mission is to discuss peace terms with Chiang Kai-shek. This effort is apparently a second Japanese attempt to offer peace via Germany. Proposals are rumored to include: (a) the withdrawal of Japanese troops to pre-incident strength in North China; (b) agreement by Chinese to stop anti-Japanese activities;

793.94/11601

DEC 15 1937

FILED

F/LR

11601

## CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Chinese recognition of independence of Inner Mongolia (and probably of Manchoukuo); (d) China's participation in the anti-Comintern pact. These moderate terms are reported to originate in the Japanese Foreign Office and not in the Imperial GHQ. Nanking reports state that Chiang is determined not to accept any proposals that fail to recognize full Chinese sovereignty on present occupied territories.

The German Foreign Office on December 2 denied that Ambassador Troutman was mediating between Japan and China. They state that while Troutman was watching every possible opportunity for mediation it was not likely that the Japanese would be willing to talk peace until after the capture of Nanking.

Press reports from Tokyo state that negotiations between Japan and Germany are now being carried on on the following points:

1. Final disposition of the former German islands now under Japanese mandate;
2. Recall of German military advisers in China;
3. Recognition of Manchoukuo and her entrance into the anti-Comintern pact;
4. Trade pacts covering Japan, Manchoukuo and Germany;
5. German foothold in Shantung after Sino-Japanese peace is effected.

Chinese sources close to Japanese military headquarters in North China state that high authorities there are considering three steps to settle the Sino-Japanese situation as follows:

1. A strong effort to induce Chiang Kai-shek to make a direct settlement with Japan on liberal but unrevealed terms;
2. An effort to wean former recalcitrant Chinese generals away from Chiang, split the Chinese strength, and thus force a collapse. These generals include Li Tsung-jen, and Pai Chung-hsi from Kwangai;
3. If the above schemes fail, to "revive" the Chinese Republic of 1924 with Tso Kuo as President in Peking. The new "republic" would then announce that the Kuomintang had forcibly overthrown the legal republic in 1924 and were therefore "rebels." The new "republic" would then come to terms with Japan.

CONFIDENTIAL

More Japanese-Soviet friction is reported. The Japanese Foreign Office announced a strong protest against a series of offensive acts committed against the Japanese consular authorities at Vladivostok. Japanese press scores the Soviet authorities for blocking the renewal of the fisheries agreement. They also cite increasing trouble between Russian authorities and Japanese merchants in North Sakhalien, and report that many members of the Soviet Embassy staff have been recalled from Tokyo.

Japanese press states that I. Luganets-Orlesky, the new Soviet Ambassador to China, is really named Shirnoff and was formerly Vice Commissar of Defense. He is reported bringing to China Soviet planes, pilots, and munitions. Some sources state that Russia has already furnished 300 planes to China since the start of the war and that negotiations for 200 more are in progress.

It is reliably reported that the new Russian Military Attache arrived at Hankow November 28, accompanied by Russian planes, pilots, and mechanics.

Chinese sources indicate a belief that the Soviet Government will take a much more active part in the war when a "real" crisis comes. Such a crisis would be Japanese penetration to Hankow. With the Chinese actively harassing the long Japanese lines of communication, Soviet action would be much more effective. To that end the Chinese Government is preparing for a long war, and are even willing to make changes in the Government that would be acceptable to Russia. They expect that the Japanese will take three months to reach Hankow.

According to Japanese reports, the Japanese Government on December 1 warned the British authorities at Hongkong against permitting Chinese Government leaders there to engage in political activities. T. V. Soong and Sun Fo are reported in Hongkong. Japanese press published a long list of British supplies furnished China. The list included 112 airplanes; 233 tanks, armored cars, and trucks; several hundred field pieces, machine guns, and AA guns; and several million rounds of ammunition of various calibers.

An uprising at Lhasa is reported to have been instigated by Japanese spies, disguised as Buddhist monks, sent out by General Doihara.

The British Charge d'Affaires is moving from Hankow to Shanghai via Canton and Hongkong. His presence at Shanghai is required by conditions affecting British interests there.

Japanese press asserts that United States, British, and French delegates to the Brussels conference agreed to aid China with a five hundred million dollar loan for 25 to 30 years at 3 per cent.

CONFIDENTIAL

The loan is to be secured by a lien on maritime customs, Salt Duties, and oil revenues. Half of the loan is to come from England and the balance equally divided between the United States and France.

The Italian Government formally recognized Manchoukuo on November 29 and plans to establish a legation at Hsinking. Tokyo believes both Germany and France will soon follow suit. It is stated that Italy and Germany may be given certain economic advantages as a reward. There appears to be a hitch in German recognition at present, possibly due to present negotiations with Britain. Japan recognized the Franco regime in Spain on December 1.

The Chinese Ambassador to Italy on December 1 protested against Italian recognition of Manchoukuo.

As previously reported, Japan renounced extraterritoriality rights in Manchoukuo on December 1. All other foreign nationals will be accorded the same treatment as the Japanese. It is probable that the United States and other foreign nations will "protest" when an appropriate occasion arises.

The Japanese Cabinet on November 30 approved the draft of the proposed budget of ¥2,848,299,000, an increase of 54 million yen over the first budget for the current fiscal year. The second budget includes extraordinary war allotments of 400 million yen each for the Army and Navy. Combined ordinary and extraordinary allotments for both services total approximately ¥3,469,200,000. Further war allocations will probably be decided early next year.

The "Oriental Economist," Japanese magazine, stated that only 500 million yen worth of Government bonds have been issued out of the 2.4 billion authorized last August. The article points to this as an indication the war expenses are light despite the extent and intensity of the operations.

Tokyo press reports that the Government will introduce a General Mobilization Bill when the Diet opens in January.

Tokyo press on December 1 reports that the Japanese Foreign Minister has informed the Privy Council that the Government is considering taking over the Chinese Maritime Customs administration. Japanese actions in Tientsin and Shanghai indicate that this action is a strong probability. Customs collections for the last five years have averaged 325 million dollars (Max.) per year. The external debt requirements for 1938 are about 28 million, and the cost of maintaining the customs is about 40 million annually. Repudiation of the internal obligations would result in a good sized plum for the Japanese. The effect of such action on the Chinese monetary structure would be ruinous.

## CONFIDENTIAL

The Chinese National Aviation Corporation is now operating lines between Hankow and Hongkong and between Hankow and Nanking. The Eurasia Aviation Company is operating a line from Hankow to Hongkong. Both concerns use Hankow as their headquarters.

France has dispatched a division of her most modern cruisers to French Indo-China December 1, on an "endurance cruise." The French Minister of Colonies has announced that the Cabinet has appropriated "large sums" to reinforce France's Far Eastern defenses.

### NORTH CHINA

A definite lull in large scale military operations on all fronts in North China is indicated by the scarcity of reports. Bodies of Chinese troops of irregulars, and bandits are operating in the areas in rear of the Japanese front lines. While some of this activity is directed against Japanese lines of communications, much of it is pure banditry and the plight of the Chinese peasants is pitiable.

Increasing tension is reported at Tsingtao where fear of a Japanese landing is causing business offices and banks to close. Members of the Municipal Government and civilians are evacuating. Shipping companies have been warned to keep their vessels ready to move on an hour's notice, indicating local authorities intend to block the harbor.

Japanese army officials in North China state that order is returning, highways are being rebuilt, railways repaired, and steps for the restoration of Chinese currency have proved successful. They state an understanding has been reached between Japanese and Chinese interests for industrial development.

Tokyo reports indicate plans for large scale exploitation of North China's resources are under way. The Japanese Government intends to establish an independent centralized organ in which War, Navy, Foreign and Finance Ministries will be represented. A company to control the exploitation headed by Shinji Bogoh, prominent industrialist and politician, has been suggested. Mr. Matsukata, President of the South Manchuria Railway is also urging that his company be permitted to take charge.

### GENERAL CHINA

In the northern sector of the Shanghai delta, the Japanese broke through the Kiangyin-Washih defense and are now pushing west against the Kiangyin-Tanyang-Kintan line. A small Chinese detachment still holds some of the Kiangyin forts, despite naval, air and land attacks. The Kiangyin barrier is apparently broken through for shallow draft vessels only. Japanese gunboats are reported working on the barrier. In the center sector the Japanese column from Iking has advanced to Liyang. South and west of Lake Tai Japanese and Chinese forces are battling in the vicinity of Kwangteh while another

CONFIDENTIAL

Japanese column is reported advancing on Langki, northwest of Kwangteh. North and east of Hangchow the Chinese have evacuated Haiyen on Hangchow Bay, and Japanese have occupied Wukang, 25 miles north of Hangchow. Chinese resistance is again reported to be stiffening on all fronts.

Chiang Kai-shek is still at Nanking. His reasons for staying are reported to be fear of the defection of some front line commanders. Lui Hsiang, the Chairman of Szechuan, who, with several divisions of Szechuanese troops, was reported in the Nanking area, has gone to Hankow, seriously ill. While Lui has been reported ailing for years, his serious sickness at this time may be significant. The Szechuan troops are also reported to be withdrawing via Wuhu. Two Central Government divisions, withdrawn from the front, and some artillery have crossed the Yangtze to Fengpu. The Chinese admit a shortage of good troops.

Some Chinese sources state that the announced Chinese determination to hold Nanking at all cost is for Japanese and home front effect, and that at the last possible moment a withdrawal will be effected.

The rapid and powerful Japanese thrust southwest of Lake Tai is endangering Chinese at Nanking. Their only effective avenue of retreat lies via Wuhu, and the Japanese drive is aimed at that point. It would be extremely difficult for the Chinese to cross the Yangtze in force. Sufficient boats are not available, and those available would be subjected to serious strafing from the air.

Japanese aircraft continue daily raids on Chinese lines and installations. During an air raid on Nanking December 1, 19 Russian airplanes took off and prevented Japanese bombing. On December 2 Nanking was again visited by bombers flying above 15,000 feet and bombed the air field. Another attack by pursuit was met by Chinese and a ship, not clearly identified, was destroyed. Chinese claim this was Japanese and that they shot at least two more bombers. Hsiao-Shan, southeast of Hangchow, was bombed December 2 with heavy casualties reported. Two Chinese bombers raided Shanghai December 2 with little damage reported. Nanking was again bombed December 3 with little damage. The outskirts of Sianfu were bombed on November 27 and 28.

Three divisions of former Chang Ksueh-liang's Manchurian troops are reported to have mutinied on the Shanghai front late in November. Eight hundred of the mutineers were executed according to unconfirmed reports.

Nanking local authorities announced that the Yangtze will be blocked in the vicinity of Nanking soon and advised that vessels in the lower reaches move up river before November 30.

## CONFIDENTIAL

Despite emphatic representations and warnings from Shanghai municipal and foreign military authorities, the Japanese forces paraded about 8,000 troops through the International Settlement the morning of December 3. As predicted, several "incidents" occurred, the most serious being the throwing of a grenade on the procession by a Chinese. The grenade explosion resulted in the wounding of three Japanese, a Chinese policeman, and a British municipal police officer. The Chinese who threw the bomb was killed by police. The Japanese troops immediately seized control of the vicinity of the bombing, in their alleged search for accomplices. Several clashes with foreign civilians resulted, and as the Japanese extended their lines they also ran afoul of the United States Marine sector. After strong representations by the United States Marine commander, the Japanese finally withdrew. Shanghai authorities fear that the Japanese will seize this incident as a pretext for more positive action in the Settlement. A similar parade scheduled for the French Concession was postponed. It is reported that the French authorities flatly refused to permit armed Japanese troops to march through the concession.

The Japanese naval forces at Shanghai on November 30 seized the American-owned tug FRITING and two Italian-owned tugs. Protests by consular and naval authorities resulted in the return of all three tugs with apologies from the Japanese. The State Department announced the incident is closed.

The Japanese have insisted on taking over Chinese Government interests on both cable and radio since in Shanghai. Japanese censorship has been substituted for Chinese and the revenues due the Chinese administration are being impounded in Japanese banks. Foreign cable companies have not been interfered with so far.

General Matsui on November 30 issued a statement reassuring foreign holders of bonds secured by Chinese Maritime Customs that Japan would not endanger their holdings. He also stated that Shanghai foreign residents and investors had no reason to fear that their properties would be interfered with.

### SOUTH CHINA

Japanese air raids on Kwangtung railways continue daily.

Japanese forces totaling not more than 300 have landed on Chekai Island, 70 miles southwest of Hongkong. It is reported that an additional air base, for operations against South China, is being constructed there.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL.

Mail reports state that the Central Aviation Academy has been moved to Yunnanfu. No reports on the effects of the embargo on munitions shipments via the French railway are available as yet.

WILLIAM MAYER,  
Major, C. A. S.

td

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR

FROM CINCAF

December 13, 1937

Rec'd 9 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC  
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
ALUSNA PEIPING  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division  
FAR EASTERN  
DEC 14 1937  
Department

793.94

0013. Situation Nanking uncertain Japanese state now  
occupy large part city Chinese withdrawing to Pukow.  
Japanese patrols operating north bank Yangtze above  
below Pukow gunboats have reached Nanking, no change  
conditions settlement. 1925.

HPD

793.94/11602

50 14 1937

CHIEF

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 124.93/401 FOR Tel.#1040 7am

FROM China (Nanking) (Atcheson) DATED Dec.12,1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: USS PANAY driven further upstream between Nanking and  
Wobsung by shell fire, also certain American merchant  
vessels; will return to Nanking as soon as feasible.

emc

793.94/11603

F/

79394  
11603

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

MBO

PLAIN

Nanking via N.R.

Dated December 12, 1937

Rec'd 4:00 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1040, December 12, 7 a.m.

Embassy's 1035, December 11, 5 p.m.

One. Shell fire at nine o'clock this morning caused the PANAY to move farther upstream and vessel is now anchored twenty seven miles above Nanking at mileage two twenty one above Woosung. Standard Oil Company's steamers MEIPING, MEIAN and MEISIAN are anchored nearby.

Two. As from this Embassy please inform Japanese Embassy of present position of PANAY and American merchant vessels named and request that appropriate instructions be issued to Japanese forces. Planes and that circumstances may again cause PANAY to move further up and that PANAY expects to return down river or down river/to Nanking as soon as feasible in order to reestablish communications with Americans who remained in Nanking and in order that this Embassy may as soon as practicable resume its functions ashore. Please state that the American Embassy hopes that appropriate steps to facilitate this plan will be taken by all authorities who

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

2- No. 1040, December 12, from Nanking.

who may be concerned.

Three. Sent to Shanghai, repeated to Hankow,  
Peiping. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo with request  
that Embassy Tokyo communicate to Japanese Foreign  
Office.

For the Ambassador.

ATCHESON

RR:

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated December 13, 1937

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.S.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 13 1937  
Department of State

682

1143, December 13, 4 p.m.

My No. 1122, <sup>11552</sup> December 9, 5 p.m. The Japanese have taken Wuhu and claim to have captured Pukow thus cutting off Nanking except for the river. According to Japanese reports they have captured the wall south and west of Chungshan gate at Nanking and are fighting their way along the wall. They also claim that Nanking was intensively bombarded from the air last night with the aid of very lights, and that Chinese troops are retreating upon the river in small steamers and junks. Repeated to Hankow and Peiping.

793.94/11604

GAUSS

CSB

7

FILED  
DEC 15 1937  
F/EG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG \*\*\*

FROM GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated December 13, 1937

Rec'd 10:20 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 14 1937  
Department of State

1144, December 13, 5 p. m.

Reference my 1137, <sup>11576</sup> December 12, 4 p. m.

Japanese naval authorities have informed  
American and other forces that the despatch of de-  
tachments of sailors to Japanese mill and other  
properties in the American and other sectors will  
be postponed. Repeated to Tokyo.

GAUSS

HTM:CSB

793.94/11605

F/EG

FILED  
DEC 21 1937

7

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Glustein NARS, Date 12-18-75

33-1

*Return to FE/EE  
WAA*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

IC

PLAIN

FROM

Hankow via N. R.

Dated December 13, 1937

Rec'd 11:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

*del to*  
*Hankow*  
*6\**  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 13 1937  
Department of State

*NOTE  
893.102 Hankow*

33, December 13, 4 p. m.

Please consult Commander-in-Chief and give

him this message:

"Area covered by former British, Russian and German concessions and present French concession at Hankow and including Butterfield and Swire's property adjoining custom house including bulk of foreign owned and occupied property here. In this area consulates and embassy staffs are now located. In river off this area are concentrated foreign naval vessels of British, American, French and Italian nationality and foreign flag river shipping. Recent events at Wuhu and Nanking have caused considerable apprehension as no safety of this area where are concentrated not only most of permanently residents but many foreign refugees from other parts of China. It would be difficult to shift population or shipping elsewhere. It would relieve present apprehension if assurance could be obtained from

793.94/11606

RECEIVED  
F/EG

7

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

33-2

-2- No. 33, DECEMBER 13, 4 p.m. from Hankow via N. R.

from Japanese that area in question including river front immediately adjoining would be free of attacks. Could you consult with interested British, French and Italian colleagues with a view to exploring possibility of obtaining some assurance from Japanese military and naval commands at Shanghai controlling operations in this area".

Sent to Shanghai, repeated to Department and Peiping. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Handwritten mark*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FROM GRAY  
Hankow via N. R.  
Dated December 13, 1937  
Rec'd 10:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

RECEIVED M.I.D.  
*292*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 14 1937  
Department of State  
*Handwritten initials*

*793.94*  
*no 3*  
*394.115 Panay*

34, December 13, 5 p.m.

Following from Stillwell for War Department.

"War Ministry refuses me permission visit front but indicates possible later. Present address American Embassy Hankow and will exhaust possibilities before further move. Situation Yangtze Valley too serious to warrant shift to Canton. No items of military significance during trip to Hankow not already reported through Peiping. Situation Nanking obscure, but Japanese have complete (\*). Wuhu in Japanese hands. Captain Roberts on board PANAY when bombed yesterday. No news his presence except survivors are ashore in Hohsien. British ship BEE proceeding there to assist".

793.94/11607

JOHNSON

CSB

F/F G  
FILED  
DEC 15 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



793.94  
note  
793.94118

RADIOGRAM IN CODE TO AMERICAN EMBASSY, HANKOW, CHINA.

Left with me  
by Major Mayer of  
War Dept. with  
request that it be  
sent by this Dept.  
Dec. 11, 1937  
774

For Stilwell.

1. War Department desires first that it be kept informed of your whereabouts, second a report without delay as to observations and conditions en route from Peiping to Hankow, third compliance with instructions for reports of operations, daily if practicable.
2. Information here indicates probable early action in South China. It is therefore suggested that you proceed to Canton before railway communications are seriously hampered.
3. The paucity of military information received from China is somewhat embarrassing to the War Department.

793.94/11608

*Let. to Hankow* DEC 11 1937



F/A 1/608

DEC 22 1937

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department **Department of State**

Charge to

\$

1937 DEC 11 PM 1 27

Washington, "A-1"  
December 11, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
HANKOW (China)

3  
ALSO DS

This cable was sent in confidential Code  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.

20m

Read and furnish paraphrase to Stilwell of message for him from War Department as follows:

QUOTE 1. War Department desires first that it be kept informed of your whereabouts, second a report without delay as to observations and conditions en route from Peiping to Hankow, third compliance with instructions for reports of operations, daily if practicable.

2. Information here indicates probable early action in South China. It is therefore suggested that you proceed to Canton before railway communications are seriously hampered.

3. The paucity of military information received from China is somewhat embarrassing to the War Department. UNQUOTE.

Hull  
(m.m.H.)

793.94/11603

F/A

FE:RCM:EJL

FE

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
DEC 13 1937  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS

NEW LIFE MOVEMENT HEADQUARTERS  
NANKING

*Ed. Dratten*

December 9, 1937  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 13 1937  
Department of State

*FE files  
m.m.A*

Ms. Maxwell M. Hamilton  
State Department  
Washington, D.C.

Dear *✓* Mr. Hamilton,

I find that I shall be in Washington on Thursday December 9th., and will call up to see if you are interested in discussing recent developments in the FarEast. Some of the military and naval men that I met on the previous visit asked me to be sure and call again. You might find out if they are interested in further conversation.

*793-94*

It is possible that I shall also have Friday morning in Washington. I usually stay at the Powatan Hotel.

Most sincerely,

*George W. Shepherd*

793.94/11609

DEC 13 1937

FILED F/A

11609

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Mikem D. Qualefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

3 DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

File # FE/H  
Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 10 1937  
Department of State

957 570 12 PM 1 25 December 8, 1937.

DIVISION OF  
Mr. ~~Communications~~ AND RECORDS  
DEC 10 1937

You will have noted the telegram from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet of December 8 stating that forty Japanese transports accompanied by many naval vessels were on the morning of December 7 reported off Chikai (Chikkai) near Towshan, Kwangtung.

It would appear that the Japanese move reported in the telegram under reference is directed against Canton and is designed to bring pressure upon the Cantonese, who are strongly anti-Japanese and in favor of continued armed resistance. By the occupation of Canton, Japan would not only gain control over that important port of entry but would also gain access to the territory served by the Canton-Hankow Railway, the only important overland route of communication between southern and central China. At the same time Japan would put an effective stop to further importations of war materials into China (which are now coming through Hong Kong) except such as might be imported from Soviet Russia.

Chikkai or Chikai is an island on the coast of Kwangtung Province about eighty miles southwest of Hong Kong. The district city of Towshan on the mainland opposite the island is the southern terminus of the Sunning Railway which extends northward to the port of Kongmoon, on the

West

793.94/11610

FILED

F/A

11/6/37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Justesen NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

West River, some forty miles south of Canton. Water transportation for very shallow draft craft only exists between Kongmoon and Canton.

Canton, on the Pearl River, is ninety miles from Hong Kong. The Pearl River is navigable up to Canton for vessels drawing not over ten feet. (There is also rail communication between Hong Kong and Canton - the Canton-Kowloon Railway.) Canton is the most important Chinese port in South China. Its importance as a distributing center for foreign goods, including American, and as an outlet for native goods has been greatly enhanced by the completion last autumn of the Canton-Hankow Railway and by the more recent closing, owing to military operations, of the Yangtze River route, the principal commercial artery in China.

According to the most recent report (under date October 29, 1937) from Canton, there are in the Canton consular district about 280 American citizens (number of persons registered), about half of whom are at Canton. Approximately 430 Americans have been evacuated from this district. At the beginning of 1937 only one American citizen (a Catholic priest) resided on Chikkai Island.

The U.S.S. Mindanao, a light draft river gunboat, is the only American naval vessel in Canton waters. It is stationed at Canton.

*m.m.H.*

*WJ*  
FE:MSM:NN

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Blumstein NARS, Date 12-18-75

76

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR      ops

FROM COMSOPAT

December 13, 1937

Rec'd 1:09 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
ALUSNA PEIPING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 24 1937  
Department of State

793.94

0113. South China ports quiet. 2000.

HPD

793.94/11611

F/EG  
FILED  
DEC 16 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR  
AMEMBASSY HANKOW  
AMEMBASSY PEIPING  
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI

PLAIN AND GRAY  
FROM  
Canton via N. R.

Dated December 13, 1937

Rec'd 3 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

December 13, 5 p.m.

December 12th, two raids on Canton Hong Kong Railway at Sheklung and several points south. Considerable damage to railway <sup>buildings</sup> ~~there~~ but through service continues. Canton Hankow line also raided yesterday by about twenty planes at Shiuchow Yingtak and points south with unimportant damage to tracks.

Refugee party leaving Hankow tenth arrived safely this morning, many are proceeding to Hong Kong this afternoon.

British consular authorities understand that reports of Japanese seizing Chinese customs cruiser and junks in British waters in lower Pearl River delta on December eleventh are correct. Mailed Hong Kong, Swatow.

LINNELL

CSB

O.N.I. AND M.I.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 13 1937  
Department of State

793.94

793.94/11612

DEC 13 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Provisional/1 FOR Tel #818, 5pm

FROM China (Lockhart) DATED Dec. 13, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Formation of new regime in North China being planned by  
Japanese and Chinese authorities. Reports concerning same.

793.94/11613

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FROM GRAY

Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated December 13, 1937

Rec'd 1:18 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 13 1937  
Department of State

793.94

December 13, 9 a.m.

I have just had a telephone conversation with an American resident in Tsinanfu who stated that everything is quiet in Tsinanfu as it has been for many days past.

Two. In the City of Tsingtao the same quiet situation obtains. In an interview which the Mayor of Tsingtao had with Reuter's agent on December 8th he is reported to have said "that he would defend Tsingtao to the last. Furthermore any Japanese attempt is to be made as expensive as possible. He added that situation here is fast approaching a crisis as the Japanese enveloping movements proceed".

Sent to Hankow, Peiping.

SOKOBIN

HPD

793.94/11614

DEC 16 1937

F/FG  
FILED

U



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 811.43 Institute of Pacific Relations/123 FOR Letter

FROM Institute of Pacific Relations-New York, N.Y. (Edward G. Carter) DATED Dec. 8, 1937  
TO Relations-New York, N.Y. NAME

REGARDING:

Hostilities in Far East; proposed study of issues to be faced at conclusion of --

Suggestions regarding issues to be confronted, and method of approach.

793.94/11616

r /

11616

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Huatjen NARS, Date 12-18-75

*MSA* *FE*

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR

GRAY

FROM Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated December 13, 1937

Rec'd 3:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 14 1937  
Department of State

December 13, 11 a.m.

With reference to the Department's telegram of December  
11, 1 p.m. Referring to Shanghai's telegram of December 9,  
8 p.m., and Ambassador's of December 4, 9 a.m., I have  
arranged an interview with the mayor for December 14, 11 a.m.,  
the earliest hour that he will be free to see me,

Sent to Peiping, Hankow, Shanghai.

SOKOBIN

WVC:HPD

793.94/11617

1937

DEC 15 1937

F/FG  
RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TPV  
34-1

X

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR  
A portion of this telegram Hankow via N. R.  
must be closely paraphrased ~~FROM~~  
before being communicated Dated December 14, 1937  
to anyone. (A)

Rec'd 8:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
ONE SOURCE  
*in confidence*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 14 1937  
Department of State

793.94

41, December 14, 9 a.m.

Following for War Department from Stillwell.

WB 1/4/38

"Unconfirmed report Japanese may <sup>turn up</sup> ~~near~~ Tsinpu railroad  
from Fukow towards <sup>Hanchowfu</sup> Hsu(?)fu. No indications of Chinese  
preparation for defense west of Nanking. No reliable  
troops between Fukow and Hankow on north bank; only  
provincial troops. Agents of Hanfuchu reported preparing  
base at Yencheng, Honan, in case Han moves out of  
Shantung.

793.94/11618

WB  
1-7-38

Pai Chung Hsi, Feng Yu Hsiang, Ho Ying Chen and  
Lih Siang at Hankow. Conferences going <sup>ON</sup> (X). Reported  
reorganization of Government being considered to admit  
communistic element on equal terms. It is expected that  
Russia will join China in war on Japan.

WB  
1-7-38

(GRAY) I assume War Department gets copies Embassy  
reports; to avoid duplication <sup>WILL NOT</sup> (X) repeat facts reported  
therein".

F/MR

JOHNSON

FILED  
DEC 18 1937

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

34-2

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 41) of December 14, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Hankow quotes a message from Stilwell for the War Department which reads substantially as follows:

There are no signs of preparation by the Chinese for defense west of Nanking. The Japanese may rout Tsingpu railway from Pukow toward Hsuechowfu, according to an unconfirmed report. Between Pukow and Hankow on the north bank there are provincial troops only; no reliable troops. There is a report to the effect that agents of Hanfuchu are making ready a base at Yencheng, Honan Province, in the event that Han moves out of Shantung Province.

It is expected that the Soviet Government will join the Chinese in war on Japan. Feng Yu Hsiang, Liu Hsiang, Pai Chung Hsi, and Ho Ying Chen are at Hankow and there are conferences going (?). According to reports a reorganization of the Government to admit communistic element on equal terms is being considered.

Colonel Stilwell assumes that War Department gets copies of Embassy reports; to avoid duplication (?) repeat facts reported therein.

793.94/11618

*E.G.C.*  
FE:EGG

*AKR*  
FE

XII-14-37

793.94/11618

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Provisional/2 FOR Tel #1614-1440

FROM Navy Department (.....) DATED Dec. 14, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*

REGARDING: New Government formed this morning. Headquarters  
established in old Foreign Office. Outlines  
present organization.

793.94/11619

wb

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Provisional/3 FOR Tel #1614-1635

FROM Navy Department ( ) DATED Dec. 14, 1937  
TO \_\_\_\_\_ NAME \_\_\_\_\_ 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Three commissions formed under new government; executive, legislative and judicial. Japan says new government is legal government of China and hopes to secure recognition by all nations. Foreign capital welcomed.

wb

793.94/11620

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Provisional/4 FOR Tel #820, 11am

FROM China ( Lockhart ) DATED Dec. 14, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*

REGARDING: A committee of nine, which claims to be the "Government of China", was formed this morning. This committee is the nucleus around which a more elaborate government will be built up.

793.94/11621

wb

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Provisional/5 FOR Tel #822, 4pm

FROM China (Lockhart) DATED Dec. 14, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Provisional Government of China: outlines present organization of same.

793.94/11622

wb

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

35-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

GRAY

FROM Tokyo

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND R.I.D.

Dated December 14, 1937

Rec'd 7:34 a.m.

*in confidence* *ejr*  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.

DIVISION OF  
ANALYSIS AND  
RECORDS  
DEC 14 1937  
Department of State

793.94  
005

april 1962, December 14 noon.

The British Ambassador called upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday morning to protest most emphatically against attacks by Japanese machine guns and field pieces upon British naval vessels LADYBIRD and BEE as well as British merchant vessels, all in the vicinity of Wuhu on the Yangtze. Facts as reported to the British Embassy here are that LADYBIRD suffered four direct hits, one rating killed, one seriously wounded and several minor injuries including flag captain. BEE fired upon but no damage. Chief of Staff on BEE protested strongly to Colonel Hashimoto, temporarily senior Japanese military officer at Wuhu, who "made futile excuses but admitted that firing at warships was his mistake and that Japanese had orders to fire at every ship on the river."

In protesting to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the British Ambassador, after explaining what had happened, suggested that a probable explanation was contained

in

~~FE~~  
FE

700.24/11825

DEC 19 1937

FILED

F/MR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

35-2

2- No. 626, December 14, from Tokyo.

in the admission of the Japanese commanding officer at Wuhu that he had received instructions to fire at every ship on the Yangtze, which meant either that the assurances of the Japanese Government that they would protect noncombatants could not be relied upon, or else that the Japanese military authorities in China were disregarding their instructions.

Craigie added that "British public opinion was bound to take a most serious view of this incident" and urged that the Japanese Government should make a suitable apology as soon as possible.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs called in person on the Ambassador the same afternoon and expressed apology and regrets on behalf of the Japanese Government.

Repeated to Peiping for Hankow.

GREW

HPD:

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

CINCAF

FROM December 14, 1937

Rec'd 8:52 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO

2ND BRIGADE USMC  
AMCON SHANGHAI Y  
COMSUBRON 5  
COMDESRON 5  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMBASSADOR CHINA  
USC MARBLEHEAD  
ALUSNA PEI PING

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 14 1937  
Department of State

793.94

793.94/11624

0014 Japanese occupy Nanking, Pukow, and both banks  
Yangtze to Wuhu. Fighting reported vicinity Kiangpu.  
Japanese believed not advanced South Wuhu, bombing raids  
made on Nanchang, Sian, Loyang, other inland cities.  
Censorship Chinese newspapers will begin tomorrow 1824.

CS B

F/MR

FILED  
DEC 13 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Provisional/6 FOR Tel #835, 6pm

FROM China ( Lockhart ) DATED Dec. 14, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 \* \* \*

REGARDING: Provisional Government - China: requests instructions as to  
policy to be followed regarding same.

793.94/11625

wb

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Provisional/6 FOR Tel #400, 7pm

FROM \_\_\_\_\_ (\_\_\_\_\_) DATED Dec. 15, 1937  
TO China NAME \_\_\_\_\_ 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Provisional Government - China: instructions regarding  
policy to be followed in dealings with officials thereof.

793.94/11625

wb

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EG

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND ALLIED

GRAY 36-1  
Tokyo

42

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated December 14, 1937

Rec'd 12:25 p. m.

Secretary of State, FROM  
Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 14 1937  
Department of State

629, December 14, 5 p. m.

Shanghai's 1137, December 12, 4 p. m. / 11596

793.94  
note  
893.1028

On the basis of the foregoing telegram we

approached the Foreign Office orally today and referred to Consul General Gauss' representations to his Japanese colleague regarding the inadvisability of sending detachments of Japanese troops into the International Settlement and neutral areas to guard Japanese property and reaffirmed the statement made by Gauss to Okamoto.

We also called attention to the conditions of disorder prevailing in the areas of the International Settlement which are being guarded by the Japanese forces and to the fact that houses owned by Americans and others were being looted. It was argued that if there were available Japanese troops to guard Japanese property in the neutral areas where orderly conditions prevailed they might be used to better advantage in the guarding

793.94/11526

F/MR

FILED  
DEC 17 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

36-2

-2- No. 629, December 14, 5 p. m. from Tokyo

guarding of the Japanese areas.

The Foreign Office replied that our statements would be taken into consideration in formulating the instructions sent by the Foreign Office to Okamoto.

Repeated to Shanghai.

GREW

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hunsicker NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD ..

FROM GRAY

London

Dated December 14, 1937.

Rec'd. 12:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND A.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 14 1937  
Department of State

793.94

774, December 14, 5 p. m.

Mr. Eden stated in the House of Commons this afternoon that the Government had under urgent examination the attack on British ships by Japanese forces in the Yangtze River. He said that he was not in a position to make any further statement today but that if the question were asked tomorrow he expected then to be in a position to make a full reply.

JOHNSON

RR  
HFD

793.94/11627

F/MR

DEC 17 1937

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
DEC 18 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~FE~~  
EU  
HJ  
(w)

FJD

GRAY

FROM Tokyo

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Dated December 14, 1937.

Reg'd. 12:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

628, December 14, 4 p. m.

Embassy's 626, December 14, noon.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 14 1937  
Department of State

793.94

733.04/11528

My British colleague today addressed the following letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding British vessels in the Yangtze.

"My dear Minister, I sent you urgently this morning copies of further telegrams I had received in regard to the position at Wuhu where British war ships were fired upon on the 12th instant. From these telegrams I draw two deductions:

(One) The order to fire on all ships moving on the Yangtze appears still to be in force notwithstanding the deplorable incidents which occurred on the 12th instant.

(Two) The guns of the Japanese batteries are still trained pointblank on His Majesty's Ship LADYBIRD and His Majesty's Ship BEE.

As regards the first point I can only say that this appears

DEC 17 1937  
FILED

F/AR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

MJD -2- No. 628, December 14, 4 p. m. from Tokyo.

appears to me to disclose on the part of the responsible Japanese military authorities in China a regrettable disregard for the consequence of their action on the 12th instant.

In regard to point (2) I desire to enter an emphatic protest and to request that immediate instructions may be sent to the Japanese commander at Wuhu to desist from this threatening and wholly unnecessary action.

As Your Excellency will be aware there are women and children on the ships concentrated above Nanking and this makes it all the more imperative that the most explicit instructions should be given to all the Japanese fighting services to respect foreign shipping on the River Yangtze.

I should be grateful if I might be informed at the earliest possible moment whether this has been done.

Believe me et cetera, signed R. L. Craigie."

GREW

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Stateman NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FD*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.S. *SA*

MJD

FROM GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated December 14, 1937.

Rec'd, 12:55 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1150, December 14, 2 p. m.

My 1143, December 13, 4 p. m.

General Matsue's headquarters announced last night that Nanking was taken at sunset. Japanese reports state that mopping up activities are now being carried on. The Japanese military spokesman is reported to have announced this morning that hostilities will be continued until anti-Japanese activities are eliminated.

Japanese transports carrying troops and military supplies continue to arrive at Shanghai almost daily.

Sent only to Hankow and Peiping.

GAUSS

HPD

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 14 1937  
Department of State

*793.94*

793.94/11629

F/NR

FILED  
DEC 15 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.1115/2184 FOR Letter

FROM William H. Sneathers, USS ( ) DATED Dec 13, 1937  
TO NAME 1-117 670

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese conflict: Destruction of American gunboat  
commented upon; urging strongly that all American  
citizens and American boats be removed from danger  
zones, so as not to involve us in the struggle.

793.94/11630

F / MR

11630

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

IN 37-1

8  
U

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (C)

FROM Berlin

Dated December 14, 1937

Rec'd 12:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEC 14 1937  
NOTED

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEC 14 1937  
MR. WELLES

294, December 14, 3 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT.

The Russian representative here said to me yes-  
terday that all democratic countries wished his country  
to save China. He added that his Government would do  
nothing except in cooperation with the United States and  
England.

Today the news from the Far East is worse than  
ever and I have read your and Secretary Hull's state-  
ments as to Japanese brutality. The Japanese Ambassador  
here boasted a day or two ago of his country's having  
killed 500,000 Chinese people. The facts of today and  
the statements that have been made show that no positive  
action is expected on the part of the United States and  
England. This simply means that the policy of Musso-  
lini and Hitler is expected to be applied to the world  
and what a sad result that would be.

If an opinion may be offered I simply say that the  
United

793.94/11631

DEC 2 1937

FILED 1937

F/MR  
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

37-2

2- No. 294, December 14, from Berlin.

United States needs to apply a boycott to Japan. England should cooperate to save herself. If that did not produce prompt effects the American Navy should move toward the Far East with a few British war vessels. If either of these moves were made Mussolini would threaten England, but I believe the Italian people would refuse to fight with America. Germany might threaten moves for Japan but the German people are so much opposed that war would not be made. I think, therefore, that you and Congress can save modern civilization again. This time even without a great war. But continued delay means the loss of democratic civilization.

DODD

GW:WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LFS

COMES SENT TO FROM  
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.

COMSOPAT

December 14, 1937

Rec'd 6:45 p. m.

ACTEON: OPNAV  
INTEC: 2nd BRIGADE USAC  
COMSUBRON 5  
COMDESRON 5  
CINCPAC  
COMYANGPAT  
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA  
US3 MARBLEHEAD  
ALUSNA PEIPING

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 16 1937  
Department of State

793.94

0114 South China ports quiet 2000

SFS:NNL

793.94/11632

FILED F/FG  
DEC 19 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

*7*

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JS

U.S.S.OAHU

**FROM** Rec'd December 15, 1937  
3:05 a.m.

**ACTION:** CINCAF, COMYANGPAT.

Passed by CINCAF to OPNAV for information.

1015. Departing 1300 today in company HODZU and LADYBIRD  
1059.

JS

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

*582*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 17 1937  
Department of State

*793.9d*  
*no h.*  
*811.30 American Fleet*

793.94/11633

FILED  
F/E G  
DEC 18 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

38-1

~~T~~

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JS Plain

FROM NANKING Via N R

Dated December 15, 1937

Rec'd 6:30 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 15 1937  
Department of State

793.94  
note  
373.1115  
121.93

December 15, 6 p.m.

American news correspondent from Nanking reports  
all Americans other foreigners in city uninjured except  
German named Sperling whose injury we previously  
reported. Embassy employees safe and only damage  
to property suffered by Counselor Peck's residence  
which was struck by shrapnel.

Sent Department, repeated Hankow, Peiping.

ATCHESON

JS

793.94/11634

F/FILED  
DEC 18 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

39-1

*ASTM*

*FE*

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JS

Gray

TSINGTAO Via N.R.

FROM Dated December 14, 1937

Rec'd 15th 1:00 a.m.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEC 21 1937  
MR. WILSON

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 15 1937  
Department of State  
*file*

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DECEMBER 14, 3 P.M.

One. With reference to the Department's telegram of December 11, 1 p.m., I called on the Mayor this morning. I opened the discussion with reference to an article by the Mayor which appeared in a local Chinese newspaper on December 10th, dealing with the control of the retrocession of Tsingtau and its defense. I remarked the spirited nature of the article in which there appears the statement "under no circumstances would a drastic (#) be made of Tsingtau to anybody." I emphasized that as he doubtless knew there have been many rumors and reports of the proposed destruction of foreign property, and I desired to be reassured that due protection would be given to such property. I used the term foreign, repeat foreign, property throughout the discussion. I referred to (?) to calls with a similar purpose made by my British and French colleagues.

Two. The Mayor replied emphatically "there is no question at all as to the protection of foreign lives and property." He then added "so far as the Chinese are

793.94/11635

DEC 22 1937

FILED

F/EG

39-2

-2-

From Tsingtao, Dec. 14.

are concerned." He assured me that shall there be any hostilities every precaution would be taken by the Chinese to avoid danger to American lives and property and he went so far as to state that where American property was contiguous to Japanese property, both would be spared in order to avoid danger to or destruction of American property. This statement would imply that the possible destruction of Japanese property is contemplated under certain circumstances.

Three. The Mayor while reiterating his intention to avoid any danger to foreign lives and property, stated that naturally if the Japanese attacked Tsingtau, in view of their indiscriminate destruction of property in the Yangtze Valley, it might be assumed that foreign property in Tsingtau would likely be subject to destruction from Japanese shelling and bombardment.

Four. His whole tone was the understanding so far as the situation could be controlled by the Chinese, there would be no danger to foreign property and certainly he gave the impression that he would take one which would threaten any property in Tsingtau so long as Japanese take no steps to force the issue in this region.

Sent to the Department, Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai.

"-apparent omission

SOKOBIN

JS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 846d.00 P. R./65 FOR Despatch #303

FROM Singapore (Davis) DATED Nov. 1, 1937

TO NAME 1-117 670

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese hostilities- Reaction in Singapore to  
the,- and to American Far Eastern policy.

fp

793.94/11636

11636

**Reaction to American Far Eastern Policy**

One local writer accused the United States of vacillating between its traditional attitude of supporting the "open door" in China and one of isolation as expressed in the Neutrality Act, and termed the temporary withdrawal of the Embassy staff from Hanking a serious break in the Anglo-American diplomatic front.\*\* Although some oral criticism of the United States followed the publication of news despatches regarding the withdrawal and the less responsible elements in the Chinese community talked of boycotting American goods, editorial comment on the whole was restrained and the local attitude improved as the result of subsequent developments in Hanking and Washington.

- 5 -

Reaction to Sino-Japanese Hostilities

Shortly after attacks on neutral shipping in the western Mediterranean were intensified, the press of Malaya moderated its outspoken criticism of Japan and while continuing to deplore the situation in China began to stress the importance of keeping the British Empire out of the hostilities in the Far East.\* Japanese bombing activities however occasioned much resentment, which official denials from Japan only tended to intensify. Local writers found it difficult "to understand the mentality of people who will ignore facts in this blatant manner", surmised that "Japan is beginning to get extremely worried at the extent of the revulsion of feeling which her attack has caused", expressed the view that by "futile and clumsy" propaganda she is trying to assuage the storm of indignation her savage methods have raised, and said that her protestations "would not deceive a child". One\*\* said success by Japan in China would mean that the trade of all other nations would be killed just as it has been in Manchukuo and that "China's open door would be locked, barred, and bolted" by the Japanese. Asking whether Britain and other nations with interests in the Far East can afford to permit this to happen he expressed the view that the cause of humanity demands that there should be intervention to stop Japan in her mad career and that if the cause of humanity is not sufficient perhaps an appeal to self-interest will meet with a readier response, seeing that the Japanese commit outrages with cynical indifference feeling that they can

\* Despatch 281 of Sept. 27, 1937.

\*\* The Malaya Tribune (afternoon daily controlled by Malayan Chinese capital) of Oct. 23, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

can "shoot first and apologize afterwards."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 751.60g/5 FOR #1307

FROM France (Bullitt) DATED Nov. 30, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 470

REGARDING: Visit of Foreign Minister of Latvia, Dr. Munters, to Paris.

As regards possibility of a convocation of the League's Consultative Committee on Far Eastern Affairs, of which Dr. Munters is Chairman, Mr. Grosvald, the Latvian Minister, stated that, as he understood Dr. Munters' views, there was nothing to be gained by having an early meeting of the Committee.

mb

793.94 / 11637

11637

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 394.115 PANAY/2 ..... FOR Telegram #622, 3 pm.

FROM Japan ..... ( Grew ..... ) DATED December 13, 1937.  
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Sinking of the USS PANAY by Japanese planes near Nanking.  
Apologies of the Foreign Minister for- who said that Admiral  
Hasegawa had accepted full responsibility for the accident.

wth

793.94 / 11638

11638

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
DEC 14 1937  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

6-1

SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEC 9 - 1937  
NOTED

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 - 1937  
Department of State

*[Handwritten initials and marks]*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The following information has been received from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet as of 11:35 p.m., under date of 7 December, 1937, and was also sent for information to the American Ambassadors to Japan and China:

793.94  
not  
793.94119

Because of fairness and neutrality shown, high Japanese officials have suggested suitability of the United States as mediator in present conflict consider it inadvisable for the United States to accept this position because of the lack of basis for any settlement.

The Generalissimo and Madame Chiang left Nanking by plane today. The Japanese are concerned over future developments since there is no organized government at Nanking with which to deal. It is believed that no Chinese of any standing or ability will treat with the Japanese because of the nation wide feeling against them.

793.94/11639

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

1896 2

FILED  
DEC 20 1937

Confidential File

11639

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEC 14 1937  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEC 9 - 1937  
NOTED

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 - 1937  
Department of State

*Handwritten initials and marks:*  
S  
U  
FE  
DPR

The following information has been received from the  
Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet as of 9:25 p.m., under  
date of 7 December, 1937, and was also sent for information to  
the American Ambassadors to Japan and China:

The major operations in South China in the near  
future will probably aggravate the British - Japanese  
situation. The Japanese attitude towards Americans has  
continued to be very conciliatory and there is no indication  
of any change in it. After the capture of Nanking the  
Japanese will most likely await political developments before  
advancing inland. It is believed that they have no definite  
plans other than first, destroy Chinese industrial and  
military organizations in the Yangtze area and second, injure  
to the greatest possible extent British interests. It is  
considered that the anti-British attitude will lead to  
instigation of incidents within the settlement.

*Handwritten:*  
793.94  
with  
741.94

793.94/11640

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

DEC 20 1937  
FILED

CONFIDENTIAL FILES  
F/A 11640

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



FE  
DCK

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The Navy Department has received the following information from the Naval Attache at Peiping as of 10:55 p.m., 10 December, 1937:

793.94

Political situation north China summarized tonight by exceptionally well informed source as follows representatives three distinct groups in Peiping attempting to push their plans organize new government. First Shih Sieh Yuan former Yuan Shih Kai follower now broke has been treating with Jap army extremist group advocating revival old national republican govt thrown out by Fing Yuh Sinng with Tsaokun as president to serve unexpired term, hence being able to say new set up legitimate child nineteen twenty four affair, believe Terauchi backing this group who at present seem have control; second, Wang Kemin arrived city secretly on eighth, having constant conversations Kita latter desires establish temporary commission including former members Peiping Political Council pending possible peace terms after fall Nanking or new government at that place, Wang financeer of note will hold economic control is willing cooperate with Japs providing Chinese face can be saved. General K. desires follow this moderate course but Terauchi and radicals thought opposed; third, Chiang Yen Ching ex-premier representing the Monarchist restoration group advocates either Pu Yi or another Chieh ascend Chinese throne preferably Empoferyed acting more or less on own, Opine Kwantung army not supporting him as he lost Hsin Ching Job account disagreeing with Jap advisers, do not think he draws much water, plans will probably not materialize. Everything awaits return Nemo to head local military mission who took his chiefs plan number two above to Kio this messenger expected back in next few days.

793.94/11641

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

DEC 10 1937

F/A

11641

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 17, 1937.

~~MEM:~~  
~~JCV:~~  
~~FNB:~~  
~~ROSE:~~  
~~MMH:~~

Reference despatch No. 685 from Rome, dated December 3, 1937. Subject: "Viscount Ishii's Conversation with the British Ambassador".

Viscount Ishii stated that he was seriously alarmed at the present relations between Japan and England. He feared that if things did not get better they must inevitably get worse, with possibly grave results.

Viscount Ishii explained at length the internal economic and financial difficulties of Japan due to the rapidly increasing population. Japanese were refused as immigrants abroad and some scheme had to be provided to meet their needs; Japanese policy had therefore turned to augmenting industrialization. This policy had for a time given satisfactory results, but many markets were now closed to Japan. Two problems had therefore arisen, the excess population, and raw materials and disposition of Japanese manufactured goods. It was hoped to solve the first by settling the surplus population in Manchuria, and the second by

obtaining

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

obtaining raw materials in North China. He thought this might be done without affecting foreign interests in China; he stated that Japan would respect those interests and that Japanese and British interests in China could be reconciled.

Viscount Ishii referred to the misery existing in Japan, which was the factor underlying the Young Officers' movement; the blame for Japanese exclusion abroad and failure to obtain markets for Japanese goods was always attributed to a weak foreign policy.

He inquired why Great Britain did not adhere to the anti-Communist Pact. The British Ambassador replied that Great Britain did not wish to take sides in ideological questions and thus divide the world into two opposing camps.

RLS/REK  
RDS

*Just*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
MR. HORNBECK  
DEC 27 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AMERICAN EMBASSY

ROME, December 3, 1937.

No. 685

Subject: Viscount Ischii's Conversation with the  
British Ambassador.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

For Distribution Check		Y.	N.
CLASS.	EXT.		
FOR	IN U.S.A.		

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
1937 DEC 14 PM 4 08  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
MR. HORNBECK  
DEC 26 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 15 1937  
Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

Supplementing my telegram No. 499 of December 3, 5 p.m.,

I have the honor to inform the Department that in a conversation today with the British Ambassador I stated that I understood that he had recently received a call from Viscount Ischii, who was passing through Rome on his way to England. In reply, Lord Perth handed me a copy of the memorandum of his conversation with Ischii and stated that he would have no objection to my sending a copy confidentially to the Department. Copies of the record of this conversation are enclosed herewith.

Respectfully yours,

William Phillips

Enclosure:

1. Copy of Memorandum  
SR/wrm  
710

793.94/11642

FILED/FG 11642

1937.94/11438  
no  
741.96  
893.00

4-  
Milton D. Gustafson

11438  
William Phillips

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch No. 685 of December 3, 1937, from the Embassy in Rome.

C O P Y

Record of conversation between Lord Perth and Viscount Ishii  
2nd December, 1937.

Viscount Ishii, whom I knew extremely well in the early days of the League of Nations since for the first years he was the regular Japanese representative at meetings of the Council at Geneva and elsewhere and played a prominent part in various League affairs, came to see me this morning.

He was passing through Rome on his way ultimately to England, where he expects to spend some time. He gave out to journalists before he left, however, that his destination was simply Europe in general.

Viscount Ishii talked to me very frankly, and said that he was seriously alarmed at the present state of relationship between our two countries. If things did not get better he feared they must inevitably get worse, with possible grave results. He hoped to have the opportunity of talking to various prominent personalities in England about Japanese policy. He had had letters from Sir Robert Craigie explaining the object of his journey, which was not, however, an official mission. Our conversation lasted for an hour, and naturally we touched on a large number of points. Among these was Communism in China. I said to Viscount Ishii that the newspapers seemed to be making great play with the theory that Japan's action against China was directed against the spread of Communism in that country. This seemed to me to be a very difficult theory to adopt, since Chang Kai Shek had fought against the Communists and certainly had not adopted their creed.

Viscount Ishii replied that this was true. Chang Kai Shek had been strongly anti-Communist and had managed to

oust

- 2 -

oust the Communist element from all the provinces near Nanking. He further believed that Chang Kai Shek did not approve of Communistic theories. But some of his helpers and advisers were certainly Communistic. He instanced among others Feng, the Christian general, who, he said, had associated his forces with those of Chang Kai Shek. Another Communist was the Young Marshal, Chang Tso Lin. His Communistic tendencies were largely the fault of the Japanese. They had turned him out of Manchuria and his reception in Nanking had not been favorable. He had therefore turned to Russia.

Viscount Ishii stated that when the Young Marshal had taken Chang Kei Shek prisoner, part of the arrangements for the latter's release was that he should co-operate with the Communists against Japan. This arrangement had been kept secret, but Chang Kai Shek, who was a very honest and honourable man, had carried out his promise fully, although, as he already had said, he did not believe that he was at heart a Communist. I must remember too that Communistic tenets were likely to find a fertile soil among the Chinese peasants.

Viscount Ishii then explained at considerable length the internal economic and financial difficulties of Japan. He said that some twenty years ago the quickly increasing population of Japan had become a great problem. Japanese were refused as immigrants, and some scheme had to be provided to meet their needs. Japanese policy had therefore turned to augmenting industrialisation and for a period this had given satisfactory results, but many markets were now closed to Japanese goods. Two problems had therefore arisen; the first, where to settle the continuing overflow of Japanese, and the second, how to obtain raw material and dispose of Japanese manufactured goods.

As

- 3 -

As to the first of these, Viscount Ishii said that a definite and vast scheme of emigration to Manchuria had been adopted. A large company had been founded with capital coming equally from the State and from private enterprise. He believed that with this new organization the surplus population of Japan would be absorbed for some twenty to thirty years. Up to now emigration to Manchuria had been hap-hazard now it would be properly organized.

There remained the second problem, namely raw material and disposal of goods. He said that this had become more and more serious through the trend of world economic events and the tendency to discriminate against Japan. For instance, Japan was the principal buyer of Australian wool, but Australia would not take any large amount of Japanese goods in return. Japan had not the financial resources to continue to buy on such a scale as previously. Again, Japan obtained much raw cotton from India, but Indian duties on Japanese goods were most severe. As a result, Japan had come to the conclusion that she must be enabled to secure raw material in the provinces of China which offered possibilities for its production. It was essential for Japan to be able to lease territory and cultivate cotton and other raw materials in North China. This was the essence of the Japanese demand on China. If Japanese desires in this respect could be met he did not see why a satisfactory settlement taking into full account foreign interests in China should not be reached. Japan did not wish any territorial annexations, but to obtain raw material on land leased by China to Japan by means of companies constituted by Japanese and Chinese capital was essential.

I said that I was very interested to hear what

Viscount

- 4 -

Viscount Ishii had to say on this point, but I could not help remembering the conversation which I had had some five years ago at Geneva with Monsieur Matsuoka, who was the Japanese representative chosen to defend the Japanese case about the Manchurian incident. Monsieur Matsuoka had told me that Japanese policy was to arrange an alliance between Japan, China and Manchukuo for the purpose of ousting all foreign interests in China. Viscount Ishii replied that he knew Monsieur Matsuoka very well, but that he was not and had not been in any way the mouth-piece of the Japanese Government and was inclined to take exuberant and hyper-nationalistic views. He could assure me that the policy of the Japanese Government was to respect foreign interests in China. He himself did not consider that it was in any way impossible to reconcile Japanese and British interests in the Far East.

He stated that I could have no idea of the misery existing in Japan. Daily suicides were frequent, life was by no means secure, beggars entered all houses in various guises, burglaries and thefts were rampant. It was this misery that aroused so much feeling and necessitated some remedy. Social reform had been undertaken, but there were limits to its possibilities. This state of affairs was the factor underlying the Young Officers' Movement. The blame for the exclusion of Japanese emigration from different countries, and for the failure to obtain markets for Japanese products was all laid at the door of a weak foreign policy. The fault was always attributed to the Prime Minister in power. Further, the contrast between extreme poverty and the riches of a few large industrialists was another cause of the influence of the Young Officers' Movement. The Movement, which was of considerable strength, was not due to any personal ambitions, but solely

- 5 -

solely to a desire to remedy what was considered an intolerable situation for the Japanese people as a whole. It was for these reasons that assassinations of prominent politicians and rich industrialists had taken place; they were mainly symbolical outbursts and in no way changed the problem. I would therefore see that the desire of Japan to obtain outlets both for her population and for her industry was not simply a wish but an absolute necessity.

I enquired whether Chang Kai Shek knew of this desire of the Japanese Government as regards North China. Viscount Ishii replied that he did, but that he could not meet Japanese wishes because of the state of popular feeling. Viscount Ishii still hoped, however, that some solution might be found on such a basis.

Incidentally, he enquired why Great Britain did not adhere to the anti-Communist Pact. He remarked that this Pact was not in any way an alliance, but simply an arrangement of self-protection against Communism. I replied that we did not wish to take sides in these ideological questions and thus divide the world into two opposing camps. We felt it better for each nation to settle its own form of Government for itself. Viscount Ishii said that this was all very well, but Communism should be regarded as a dangerous microbe. I remarked that as far as England was concerned, and I was speaking of my own country only, we thought there were two microbes, - one of Fascism and one of Communism, and we did not think that either of them were dangerous to our form of Government, but they were both equally detestable to English public opinion generally. Viscount Ishii observed in this connection that Japan was not and could not be a Fascist State. The adoption of Fascist theories would run contrary to the Imperial nature of Japan's constitution

- 6 -

constitution on which the whole of Japanese ideology was based.

As Viscount Ishii seemed rather nervous about the reception he would meet with in London, I said to him that I felt sure that anything he cared to say would be listened to with great courtesy and attention. He repeated his desire to do something even in the smallest way to promote relationship between our two countries which he again described in somewhat alarmist terms.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG PLAIN  
... FROM  
Hankow via N. R.

Dated December 15, 1937

Rec'd 7 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DEC 15 1937  
Department of State

793.94

61, December fifteenth, 4 p. m.

I find that following message from British Senior  
Naval Officer Wuhu December thirteen to Admiral Crabbe  
has not been reported to Department.

"Prideaux -- Brune and I saw Hashimoto 1:40 today  
and he promised to make every effort to ensure that  
Hohsien is not attacked until refugees have been  
evacuated".

JOHNSON

793.94/11643

DEC 13 1937

FILED

F F G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

"gray"

Radio to the American Ambassador, Hankow:

For Military Attache from the War Department. Barrett has been instructed to issue necessary travel orders for Captain Roberts to proceed via Hongkong to Canton. He will continue on to Hankow on or about January first.

793.94/11644

793.94  
note  
793.94/118

Handed to Mr Mackay  
by Major Mayer of M.I.D.  
3:15 PM, Dec. 17, '37

RMW

11644

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. ... NARS

TELEGRAM SENT *Gray*

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
\$

Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Washington,

1937 DEC 14 PM 4 17

December 14, 1937.

*4P*

AMEMBASSY,

HANKOW (China).

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS

*W. M. R.*

*7* FOR MILITARY ATTACHE FROM WAR DEPARTMENT.

QUOTE Barrett has been instructed to issue necessary travel orders for Captain Roberts to proceed via Hongkong to Canton. He will continue on to Hankow on or about January first UNQUOTE.

*Hull  
WRW*

*793.94/11644*

793.94/11644

F/A

*RM*  
FE:RCM:REK

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_\_

D. C. R.—No. 89

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

*1184*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JOHN M. HOUSTON  
5TH DIST. KANSAS

FE  
COMMITTEE ON  
APPROPRIATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEES:  
INDEPENDENT OFFICES  
LEGISLATIVE

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**

1937 DEC 15 AM 9 11

Washington, D. C.

December 14, 1937

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

*[Signature]*  
December 18 1937

The Honorable Cordell Hull  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 15 1937  
Department of State  
*Reply drafted  
Dec 16  
1937*

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The enclosed telegram, relative to the withdrawal of American vessels from Chinese waters, from UNIVERSITY LIFE, the official student publication of Friends University, Wichita, Kansas, is respectfully submitted to you as an indication of the wishes of the student body of that institution.

Should you have any comment to offer for transmittal to the editor of the publication as to the policy of the State Department during the present crisis, I shall be pleased to receive it.

With expressions of high esteem and kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

*[Signature]*  
John M. Houston

FILED  
DEC 20 1937

793.94/11645

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

[COPY:HES]

WESTERN UNION

1937 DEC 14 AM 4 08

KA 16 50 NL=WICHITA KANS 13

HONORABLE JOHN M HUSTON, REPRESENTATIVE KANSAS=

6TH DISTRICT HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WASHDC=

WE STRONGLY PROTEST ACTION TAKEN IN THE PRESENT  
SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION. WE DEMAND THAT OUR SHIPS BE  
REMOVED FROM EASTERN WATERS IMMEDIATELY. YOU ARE REP-  
RESENTING THE PEOPLE OF KANSAS, NOT THE STANDARD OIL  
COMPANY INC. WE DEPEND UPON YOUR SUPPORT NOW TO AVOID  
OUR BEING DRAGGED INTO THIS FOREIGN WAR=

UNIVERSITY LIFE OFFICIAL STUDENT PUBLICATION  
FRIENDS UNIVERSITY.

December 18 1937

In reply refer to  
FE 793.94/11645

My dear Mr. Houston:

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of December 14, 1937, with which you enclose a telegram received by you from University Life of Friends University, Wichita, Kansas, in regard to the withdrawal of American vessels from Chinese waters. I hope that the following comment on this matter may be of assistance to you in replying to the telegram from University Life.

The question of the types and degrees of protection which this Government should afford to its citizens abroad presents many difficulties and is one in regard to which opinions may very readily differ. In a situation such as has prevailed in the Far East there have been developed during more than a century certain rights, certain interests, certain obligations and certain practices. In the light of peculiar features inherent  
in

The Honorable

John M. Houston,  
House of Representatives.

793.94/11645

F/A

- 2 -

in the situation, all of the major powers have developed and employed, with authorization by the Chinese Government, methods for safeguarding the lives and interests and property of their nationals believed to be appropriate to the situation and warranted by the peculiarities thereof. Thus, for instance, there came about and there is still in existence the system of extraterritorial jurisdiction and various of its concomitants. Concurrently, many nationals of this and other countries have, during several generations, gone to China, established themselves there in various occupations and activities, and subjected themselves both to the advantages and to the disadvantages of the conditions prevailing there; and the American Government has, along with other governments, accepted various rights and incurred various obligations. In a situation such as now prevails, many of our nationals cannot suddenly disavow or cut themselves off from the past nor can the American Government suddenly disavow its obligations and responsibilities. The American naval vessels and the small contingents of American landed forces which have been maintained in China were placed and have been kept there solely for the purpose of assisting in the maintenance of order and security as affecting the lives, the property and the legitimate activities of American nationals, especially in regard to conditions of local disorder and unauthorized violence. These vessels and  
troops

- 3 -

troops have never had in any sense any mission of aggression. It has long been the desire and expectation of the American Government that they shall be withdrawn when their appropriate function is no longer called for. We had thought a few months ago that the opportune moment for such a withdrawal was near at hand. The present, however, does not seem an opportune moment for effecting that withdrawal.

Officers of the American Government have repeatedly and earnestly advised American citizens, in face of dangers incident to residence in China, to withdraw and are making every effort to provide safe means whereby they may depart. During the current situation in China the American military and naval forces have rendered important service in protecting the lives of American nationals, in assisting in evacuating Americans from areas of special danger, and in making possible the maintenance of uninterrupted communications with our nationals and our diplomatic and consular establishments in the areas involved.

There is enclosed for possible transmission to University Life a press release issued by the Department on August 23 outlining the policy on which this Government is proceeding with reference to the situation in the Far East.

AS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

As you may wish to retain the telegram from University Life for your files I return it herewith.

Sincerely yours,

Sordell Hull

A true copy of  
the original  
*[Signature]*

OR

DEC 10 1937 PM

DEC 18 1937

Enclosures:

1. Press release of August 23, 1937.
2. From University Life, telegram of December 14, 1937.

*[Signature]*  
FE:KFP:HES  
12-16

*[Signature]*  
FE  
*[Signature]*

\*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~RE~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM

Hankow via N. R.

Dated December 15, 1937

Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 16 1937  
Department of State

December 15, 10 a.m.

NO. 56  
Following from Colonel Stillwell for the War

Department:

"Chinese in doubt about probable Japanese moves but believe they may operate from Pukow north along Tsinpu, or attempt landing at Canton. Bulk of Chinese troops probably in eastern Anhui, with likely retreat toward Nanchang. Chinese expect build up line of defense in southern Anhui, exact location undecided.

Situation Kwangteh area obscure. Chang Fa Kwei still there, but believe only because opposed by small Japanese force. German advisers still in close liaison with Chinese military, holding frequent conferences here with <sup>who</sup> Fai Chung Hsi/seems to be in charge of operations".

JOHNSON

RE:KLP

793.94  
1-7-38

793.94/11646

DEC 18 1937  
F/E/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

*DCR*  
*[Handwritten mark]*

COLLEGE OF PUGET SOUND  
RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

December 21 1937

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY  
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE  
Frank G. Williston

1937 DEC 15 AM 9 41

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

December 11, 1937

*Quo'd filia*  
*ch*

Far Eastern Division  
State Department  
Washington, D.C.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 16 1937  
Department of State

793.94

Dear Sirs:

The statement was made publicly in this city this past week by an acknowledged authority on Far Eastern affairs that the Twenty-one Demands had been presented to our State Department and approved by it prior to its submission to the Chinese government. I was under the impression that there was a difference in opinion at the time between Mr. Reinsch and the State department, but I did not know that the whole series of Demands had been presented to the State Department. In view of the later protests by this government, such a statement seems incomprehensible. Is it possible to secure some information of official character concerning this charge?

793.9444647

Sincerely,

*Frank G. Williston*

FILED  
DEC 22 1937

F7FG  
11647

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBO ...

FROM COMSOPAT

December 15, 1937

Rec'd 9:24 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: 2ND BRIG USMC  
COMSUBRON 5  
COMDESRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
ALUSNA PEIPING

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 17 1937  
Department of State  
COPIES SENT TO  
~~CINCPAC~~ AND M.I.D.

0015 South China ports quiet 2000.

HPD:

793.94/11648

F/FG  
FILED  
DEC 17 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~14~~

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

OINCAF

FROM

December 15, 1937

Rec'd 9:35 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: 2ND BRIG USMC  
AMCON AT SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON 5  
COMDESRON 5  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
ALUSNA PEIPING

COPIES SENT TO  
~~ONT AND M.I.D.~~

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 15 1937  
Department of State

0015 Japanese troops on north bank Yangtze occupy Yangchow Pukow patrols operating south to positions opposite Wuhu. South of Yangtze Japanese engaged clearing Nanking-Wuhu area of small Chinese units reported making preparations advance on Hangchow. Chinese state preparing new defense line west Wuhu through Ninowo to Hangchow, Central Government divisions being reorganized will continue fight. Hong Kong district reopened foreign residents subject various restrictions, foreign ships in are not yet permitted reopen 1935.

HPD:

793.94/11649

DEC 19 1937

FILED

F/F G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

40-1

✓  
H

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED** DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
DEC 18 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MBO  
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM Paris  
Dated December 15, 1937  
Rec'd 9:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1732, December 15, 11 a.m.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 15 1937  
Department of State

793.94

A number of French statesmen have approached me during the past two days with questions regarding our policy in the Far East. Behind their questioning lies a hope that the United States may take action against Japan; but there is also complete recognition that France cannot apply force in the Far East and that it might be injurious to the interests of France in Europe if Great Britain should become heavily engaged in the Far East.

This opinion was expressed publicly this morning the 15th by Pertinax in the ECHO DE PARIS as follows:

"The worst would be that Great Britain, under the pretext of supporting the United States and of gaining the United States for a permanent cooperation, should let herself go in a dangerous counter stroke in the China Sea. In the condition of Europe today British forces should not be withdrawn from the principal task, which consists of holding in check the two totalitarian states which are our neighbors

793.94/11650

DEC 23 1937

FILED

F/A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Butler NARS, Date 12-18-75

40-2

2\* No. 1732, December 15, from Paris.

neighbors. It is not by action in the Far East but by  
action in Europe that British prestige may be reestab-  
lished."

BULLITT

KLP:

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 20, 1937.

~~JWB~~  
~~MB~~  
~~MD~~

*copy to Tokyo!*

London's 3648, December 8, 1937, contains a memorandum of a further conversation between the Japanese Ambassador and Professor Gerothwohl. The Ambassador stated that the Japanese military were "mad, quite mad" and stated that what General Matsui had done at Shanghai had been not only without the sanction of his government but actually against its orders. He assured the Professor, however, that the government had since re-asserted itself and that he was confident there would be no further grave trouble.

The Ambassador is of the opinion that the war must be stopped and that the time for Anglo-American mediation had arrived. In a conversation with the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, Mr. Eden had replied that it was impossible for Great Britain to act except in unison and conjunction with the United States. The Ambassador confided to his listener that he had rushed over to the continent to see Mr. Norman Davis in regard to the making of a peace move by the United States but that Mr. Davis had been ill and he had been unable to see him.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-2-

The Ambassador related that in a conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister on the subject of mediation, Ambassador Craigie had asked Mr. Hirota for a statement of Japan's peace terms. Mr. Hirota was unable to give these terms but stated that popular sentiment would probably require that Japan's demands be pitched much higher than the government really intended to obtain but that once negotiations had been started, the demands could be moderated.

*SMJ*  
FE: JMJ: SMJ

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*[Handwritten initials]*

No. 3648 London, December 8, 1937.

SUBJECT: Secret Memorandum of Conversation  
between the Japanese Ambassador and  
Professor Gerothwohl

*[Handwritten initials]*  
*[Handwritten initials]*

*[Handwritten: ON MID Embassy, Tokyo]*  
*[Handwritten: Copy in FK]*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

937 DEC 15 PM 12 07

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND TRANSPORTATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE  
DEC 27 1937  
*[Handwritten: AM/C]*

*[Handwritten: Tokyo]*  
*[Handwritten: 12/29/37]*  
*[Handwritten: CR]*

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 16 1937  
Department of State

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
MR. HORNBECK  
DEC 23 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94/11651

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's  
strictly confidential despatch No.3521 of November 3,  
1937, forwarding copies of a secret memorandum fur-  
nished the Embassy by Professor Gerothwohl. I now  
1/ have the honor to enclose a copy of another confidential  
memorandum, dated December 6, of a conversation between  
the Japanese Ambassador and Professor Gerothwohl, a

copy

FILED  
DEC 31 1937  
F F G  
11651

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

copy of which was furnished the Embassy through the  
courtesy of the latter.

Respectfully yours,

*Herschel V. Johnson*

Herschel V. Johnson  
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

✓  
Enclosure:

1. Copy of secret memorandum  
dated December 6, 1937.

HVJ/MW

4 Carbon Copy  
Received ..... *[Signature]*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure 1 in despatch No. <sup>3648</sup> of December 8, 1937,  
from the Embassy in London.

(COPY)

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM DATED 6th DECEMBER 1937.

On Saturday I called once more on the Japanese Ambassador at his urgent request. I remarked on entering his study that the situation in Shanghai was really dreadful. To what complications might it not lead? He rejoined that the Japanese military were "mad, quite mad", and assured me that what General Matsui had done, he had done not only without the sanction of his Government, but actually against its orders. The Government had since reasserted itself, and he felt fairly confident that there would be no further grave trouble. He then remarked that, more than ever, the war must be stopped, and that the time for British or American or Anglo-American mediation had arrived. I asked him how we could be expected to offer our good offices, at a time when anti-British propaganda was simply raging in Japan. We could hardly avoid a snub, and we could hardly desire to court one. He answered that a little while back he had had the pleasure of a talk with our Prime Minister, to whom he had introduced a former Conservative Japanese Minister, a Mr. Hatoyama I believe, who is now the Proprietor-Editor of a leading Japanese newspaper. Chamberlain on this occasion had directly raised the question of that anti-British propaganda and he (the Ambassador) had explained it in this way. The agitation was really superficial and artificial. It had been fanned by irresponsible and second-rate politicians, who were anxious to improve their position and supplant the leaders of the Conservative and Liberal Parties,

by /

-2-

by beating the big Chauvinistic drum, in order to curry favor with the mob on the one hand, and the militarists on the other. They had even held a public meeting at which they had attacked this country. But not a single responsible Japanese statesman of any party had been present; in fact, the responsible leaders on both sides had approached the Government, and urged it to check this agitation. The latter was largely the product of ignorance, to such an extent that when Hatoyama was about to leave Tokio for London, his friends had begged him not to go, lest he should be beaten or stoned in the streets of London. Mr. Hatoyama did not believe this. Nevertheless he had been a little nervous about his reception here, and was greatly relieved and gratified to find that nowhere had he encountered any discourtesy. The Ambassador added that, in his opinion, the violence of the Japanese press and mob and of the irresponsible politicians he had referred to might be likened to our Hyde Park orators, or to the spokesmen of our Socialist opposition, who, when out of office, talked a language which he was sure they would never employ when in office. At the same time I must confess that this picture of the anti-British agitation in Japan by the Ambassador struck me as a good deal more serious than he considered it to be. He wound up with the observation that Chamberlain, after listening to his account, and Hatoyama's, had wisely exclaimed: "Well I suppose we must allow this thing to burn itself out!" The Ambassador, more recently, had spoken with Eden, and broached the question, not exactly of British mediation (for mediation might sound to Japanese ears too much like interference), but of an offer by Great Britain of her good offices as an honest broker to bring Japan and China into contact for the purpose of peace negotiations. You could not expect two countries which were fighting

at /

-3-

at the moment so bloody and desperate a battle to meet in peaceful conclave, except with the assistance of an intermediary. He (the Ambassador) had been a little disappointed by Eden's attitude. For Eden had replied that it was impossible for Great Britain at the present juncture to take any steps except in unison and conjunction with America. The Ambassador seemed at a loss to understand this attitude. It was, of course, only natural, that, in regard to any nation which might lead to a serious clash with Japan, we should decline to go forward except in company with the United States. But when it was question of a peace move, he could not comprehend this reserve. I remarked that our attitude was possibly dictated by the thought that, if we proposed joint mediation with America, Washington, owing to the fear that such a proposal might arouse among the American public the suspicion that we were trying to entangle America, would probably hold back. If America on the other hand came forward herself with a similar proposal, that difficulty might be circumvented, and we would willingly follow the American lead. This consideration had evidently also been present in the Ambassador's mind. Indeed, he confided to me that he had rushed over to the Continent to see Norman Davis about it, but had found him in bed with influenza, and pneumonia threatening; so that the doctors in attendance had refused to allow their patient to discuss business with the Ambassador, who had therefore come back to London empty-handed. Meanwhile the subject of mediation (in the sense explained above) had been touched upon by Craigie, in a conversation with Hirota. Unfortunately Craigie had asked the Japanese Foreign Minister for a full statement of  
Japan's /

-4-

Japan's peace terms to China, and this Hirota had declared his inability to give. The Ambassador added that when a country was at war and in a war fever, it was extremely difficult for its Foreign Minister to frame peace terms in advance. He would probably have to pitch them much higher than he really intended, in view of the excitement and demands of popular sentiment. Whereas, once negotiations had been started, he could moderate his terms. It was also much easier for him (the Ambassador), in the quiet and detached atmosphere of London, to discuss matters more frankly than for anyone in Tokio. He wondered whether Craigie or our Ministers here had realised this. Anyhow, for the moment the vital thing was to stop hostilities, and conclude an armistice, before Nanking had fallen to the Japanese Army, whose entry into Nanking would make their Chiefs even more difficult to deal with than before. It was imperative that the ice between Tokio and Nanking should be broken by some honest broker like Great Britain. Peace terms could wait for full formulation until the two parties were in touch, in the first instance through the intermediary, who could bring pressure on both to show themselves conciliatory and reasonable. After all, it was in the interest of all the Foreign Powers, and of none more so than Great Britain, even from the standpoint of their own interests in China, to stop the war at the earliest possible moment, and that moment, he reaffirmed was now. I enquired of the Ambassador whether, failing America, Anglo-German mediation would not be acceptable, although personally I should like to see Anglo-American-German mediation. He was far from enthusiastic, strangely enough, about my suggestion about Germany, which he dismissed /

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

dismissed with the comment: "Germany would not be a good mediator. Her political sympathies and her commercial interests in Japan are difficult to reconcile." In conclusion the Ambassador begged me to lose no opportunity of advocating the cause of British mediation.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR \_\_\_\_\_ PLAIN, GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

AMEMBASSY PEIPING Canton via N. R.  
AMEMBASSY HANKOW FROM  
ATCONSUL SHANGHAI Dated December 15, 1937

Rec'd 9:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.S. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 17 1937  
Department of State

December 15, 11 a.m.

December 13th.

Six planes raided Canton-Hankow Railway southern section, unimportant damage. December 14th two planes bombed Cheungmuktou section Canton-HongKong Railway, no damage.

Loss of Nanking apparently has not weakened South China war spirit. Military training, sale of bonds, anti-Japanese boycott and campaigns for greater popular resistance are being pushed with renewed energy.

A growing movement for Chinese closer association with democratic countries and Russia in clear cut opposition to Fascist bloc is evidenced by (1) Speeches by popular front leader Cheng Nai Hsi urging repudiation of "doubtful" countries and collaboration with democracies and Russia, (2) Press statement by the Chief of the Kwangtung Civil Military and Kuomintang Propaganda Committee stressing necessity of friendship with the

letter

DEC 18 1937

WHE/F G

793.94/11652

793.94  
note  
793.00

-2- December 15, 11 p.m., from Canton via N. R.

latter powers, (3) Editorials pronouncing Italy's withdrawal from League "the final proof of Fascist bloc's challenge of international justice and peace".

Four. CONFIDENTIAL. <sup>ADMISSION OF GERMAN CONSUL</sup> (2) (2) that he views such developments with concern and that he plans a trip to Kwangsi to correct "misunderstandings regarding Germany's position" which are also prevalent there.

Mailed Hong Kong, Swatow.

LINNELL

CSB

LWS  
1-8-38

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Provisional/7000 FOR Tel #826, 6pm

FROM China (Lockhart) DATED Dec. 15, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Leading figures of new Provisional Government: information concerning same. The new regime will have strict Japanese supervision. A parade was held this noon the occasion of the fall of Nanking and the establishment of the new regime.

wb

793.94/11653

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

41-1

~~FE~~  
EU

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
DEC 21 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LMS

FROM GRAY

London

Dated December 15, 1937

Rec'd 3:40 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 16 1937  
Department of State

793.94  
note  
141.94

779, December 15, 7 p. m.

I understand from a conversation this afternoon at the Foreign Office that the British note to Japan, which was already on the cable last night, was canceled because of the simultaneous receipt by the British Ambassador in Tokyo of a note of apology from the Japanese. A new note has accordingly been drafted and was approved by the Cabinet today. It will be despatched to Tokyo today and the text cabled to Washington for communication to the Department. The Foreign Secretary announced in the House of Commons this afternoon that the government was sending this communication defining the British attitude towards recent incidents and emphasizing the seriousness of the situation which had been created. He likewise announced that the text of the note would be published here tomorrow morning and informed the House of the receipt by the British

Ambassador

793.94/11654

DEC 21 1937

RECEIVED

F/F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Chertoff NARS, Date 12-18-75

41-2

LMS 2-No. 779, December 15, 7 p. m., from London.

Ambassador in Tokyo of the Japanese Government's note regarding the occurrences and offering apology. He explained that the Japanese also undertook to take the necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of such incidents, to deal suitably with those responsible for the accident, and to pay compensation for damages.

The full text of the American note to Japan was published in the newspapers this morning with numerous excerpts from American press comment indicating that the President's demands to Japan have received general approval and calling for a strong attitude for the protection of American interests.

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*[Handwritten initials]*

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom  
Maryland Branch

*Cons'd*  
RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 23 1937  
*[Handwritten initials]*

MRS. DOROTHY MEDDERS ROBINSON  
President Maryland Branch  
Westminster, Maryland

DR. ELIZABETH NITOHIE  
First Vice-President  
2436 St. Paul Street  
Baltimore, Maryland

DR. ESTHER M. DOLE  
Second Vice-President  
Chestertown, Maryland

MRS. LAURA S. ALEXANDER  
Third Vice-President  
9 Taney Ave.,  
Annapolis, Maryland

MISS ALICE MAGINNIS  
Recording Secretary  
700 E. 21st Street  
Baltimore, Maryland

MISS MARY WEAGLY  
Corresponding Secretary  
Westminster, Maryland

DR. OLIVE REDDICK  
Treasurer  
104 E. Second Street  
Frederick, Maryland

COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN

DR. ESTHER J. CROOKS  
Education

MRS. HENRY E. CORNER  
Finance

MRS. ASBURY SMITH  
Inter-Racial

MRS. MORGAN BUCHNER  
Legislative

MRS. GEORGE DOUGLAS  
International Memberships

PRESIDENTS OF LOCAL BRANCHES

MRS. F. E. ISAAC  
Allegany County

MRS. LEON J. GREENBAUM  
Baltimore City and County

MISS CARRIE MOUREE  
Carroll County

MISS ESTELLE LEONARD  
Dorchester County

DR. LOUISE R. HEATH  
Frederick County

MRS. DOROTHY NOLL  
Howard County

DR. ESTHER M. DOLE  
Kent County

MRS. HOMER V. HART  
Washington County

MRS. ANITA D. WEAVER  
Wicomico County

UNPROFITABLY REFERRED  
FOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT  
AND CONSIDERATION



*[Handwritten signature]*  
DIRECTOR IN CHARGE

JANUARY 6 1938

RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

EMILY GREENE BALOH  
Honorary Internat. Sec.

HANNAH CLOTHIER HULL  
National President

GERTRUDE CARMAN BUSSEY  
Vice-President

2132 N. Calvert St.  
Baltimore, Maryland.  
December 13, 1937.

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to protest vigorously against the present foreign policy of the United States. The headlines in the papers today and the further outline of the actions of our government can only cause alarm among the people of this country who want peace more than anything else in the world and who can see these steps leading but to war. Why should our nationals in China not be notified that by a certain date they must withdraw or remain at their own risk? Why should all of our armed vessels not then be withdrawn? Their presence there can only be a source of constant and imminent danger, providing occasions for such stirring up of the people as practiced by our newspapers during these past days? Is our foreign policy to be determined by a series of "incidents"? We travelled this same road such a short time ago that it would seem that the lesson should be still fresh in our minds. What is Congress going to do to protect our 130,000,000 inhabitants from being involved in a war to protect a few thousand who insist on remaining in the war zone?

What has become of our neutrality policy as expressed in the legislation passed by Congress? The people of this country are looking to you for a policy which shall keep us out of war.

Yours very truly,

*Louise Buchner (Mrs. Morgan M.)*

State Legislative Chairman

FILED  
JAN - 7 1938

793.94/11654 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 6 1938

In reply refer to  
FE 793.94 Buchner, Louise

My dear Mrs. Buchner:

The receipt is acknowledged, by reference from the White House, of your letter of December 13, 1937, addressed to the President, in regard to the Far Eastern situation.

With regard to the question of the withdrawal of American forces from China, it may be stated that the question of the types and degrees of protection which this Government should afford to its citizens abroad presents many difficulties and is one in regard to which opinions may very readily differ. In a situation such as has prevailed in the Far East there have been developed during more than a century certain rights, certain interests, certain obligations, and certain practices. In the light of peculiar features inherent in the situation, all of the major powers have developed and employed, with authorization by the Chinese Government, methods

Mrs. Morgan M. Buchner,  
State Legislative Chairman,  
Maryland Branch,  
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom,  
2132 North Calvert Street,  
Baltimore, Maryland.

793.94/11654  
- 1

F/FG

-2-

methods for safeguarding the lives and interests and property of their nationals believed to be appropriate to the situation and warranted by the peculiarities thereof. Thus, for instance, there came about and there is still in existence the system of extraterritorial jurisdiction and various of its concomitants. Concurrently, many nationals of this and other countries have, during several generations, gone to China, established themselves there in various occupations and activities, and subjected themselves both to the advantages and to the disadvantages of the conditions prevailing there; and the American Government has, along with other governments, accepted various rights and incurred various obligations. In a situation such as now prevails, many of our nationals cannot suddenly cut themselves off from the past nor can the American Government suddenly disavow its obligations and responsibilities. The American naval vessels and the small contingents of American landed forces which have been maintained in China were placed and have been kept there solely for the purpose of assisting in the maintenance of order and security as affecting the lives, the property, and the legitimate activities of American nationals, especially in regard to conditions of local disorder and unauthorized violence. These vessels and troops have never had in any sense any mission of aggression. It has long been the desire and expectation

-3-

expectation of the American Government that they shall be withdrawn when their appropriate function is no longer called for.

Officers of the American Government have repeatedly and earnestly advised American citizens, in face of dangers incident to residence in China, to withdraw and are making every effort to provide safe means whereby they may depart. During the current situation in China the American military and naval forces have rendered important service in protecting the lives of American nationals, in assisting in evacuating Americans from areas of special danger, and in making possible the maintenance of uninterrupted communications with our nationals and our diplomatic and consular establishments in the areas involved.

In connection with your inquiry concerning the application of the Neutrality Act to the situation now obtaining in the Far East, your attention is invited to the remarks of the Honorable Sam D. McReynolds, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, as set forth on pages 151, 152, and 153 of the Congressional Record of November 17, 1937. It is believed that you will find a satisfactory answer to the question raised in your letter from a perusal of Mr. McReynolds' statements. Copies of the Congressional Record may be obtained from  
the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.

It may be stated also that a cardinal principle of our foreign relations and one which is never lost sight of is to avoid being entangled in hostilities and that the Administration is endeavoring to follow an unbiased course in connection with the Far Eastern situation and is giving close attention to every phase of that situation toward making effective the policies, especially the policy of peace, in which this country believes and to which it is committed.

As of interest in this connection, there is enclosed a copy of a statement given to the press by the Department of State on August 23 outlining the policy on which this Government is proceeding with reference to the situation in the Far East.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

*RM*  
Raymond C. Mackay  
Assistant Chief  
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Enclosure:

*copy*  
Press release of  
August 23, 1937.

*egc*  
FE:EGC:HES  
1-5

FE

CA  
CUG



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FW*

CA TELEGRAM RECEIVED Gray

TSINGTAO VIA N.R.

FROM Dated Dec. 15, 1937  
Recd 10:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.  
(Amembassy Hankow and Peiping)

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 16 1937  
Department of State

793.94

December 15, 6 p.m.

The fall of Nanking has not ostensibly had effect locally, although of course it is realized by the Chinese that the situation is serious from a national viewpoint. On the other hand the continuance of the questionable attitude of General Han is giving rise to even more pessimism and there are reports that stubborn Central Government troops now in Shantung are being asked by General Han to leave the province.

793.94/11655

The future reestablishment of the Japanese in Tsingtao appears with the flight of time to have become a problem not easy of solution for the Japanese Government. In an interview with the Premier of Japan published on November 27<sup>th</sup> (1) in the JAPANESE TIMES appears the following: "In North China, the only question now awaiting solution is how to deal with Shantung Province. I am sure Tsingtao will in the years to come become a point very important in connection with the Sino-Japanese rapprochement."

WOB  
1/24/38

As far as the Chinese in Tsingtao give any thought to the future

F/HG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CA --2--Dec 15, 6 p.m. from Tsingtao via NR..

the future restoration of normal Sino-Japanese relations in this city I gather the Chinese feel that since the Japanese residents chose to evacuate from Tsingtao, the Japanese cannot expect to return to the status quo ante in Tsingtao in any simple manner, so long as the present Chinese authorities remain in Tsingtao.

SOKOBIN

SMS RGC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Auslofer NARS, Date 12-18-75

2 42-1  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
DEC 15 1937  
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS  
CONFIDENTIAL

ADVISOR OR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE  
MR. WILSON  
DEC 10 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~A-1~~  
~~P-1~~  
~~E-1~~

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 8, 1937.

SUBJECT: Situation in the Far East.

*Copies sent to Tokyo, Peking  
London, Paris & Rome  
Dec. 27*

PARTICIPANTS: The British Ambassador;  
the Under Secretary.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEC 9 - 1937  
MR. WILSON

COPIES TO:

793  
1937  
9

*W  
H  
B  
J*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
JAN 1 1938  
Department of State

1-1400

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning and left with me a memorandum which his Government had instructed him to communicate, covering the conversations between Hitler and Lord Halifax and the recent conversations held in London between the British Government and the French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. I expressed to the Ambassador my appreciation of the information so given me which I assured him would be very helpful to this Government.

The Ambassador then said that he had two matters he would like to take up with me. The first was the continued insistence on the part of the British Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, that the Japanese

790.94/11000

F/A  
FILED  
DEC 20 1937

1156

42-2

-3-

Government was in a receptive frame of mind towards the utilization of good offices of the United States and Great Britain between China and Japan. The Ambassador said that in the opinion of his Government this possibility had died down and there was nothing immediate, but that he would like to have an expression of opinion from the Department with regard to Sir Robert Craigie's insistence that if and when good offices might be considered, the two Governments should not at the outset state to the Japanese Government that they would refuse to transmit to the Chinese Government any peace proposals other than proposals strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty. According to Sir Ronald Lindsay, Mr. Grew had indicated to Sir Robert Craigie that he himself believed that, for reasons of expediency, a preliminary flat statement that the two Governments would refuse to transmit any proposals other than those in accordance with the Nine Power Treaty might not be necessary.

In reply I said to Sir Ronald Lindsay that my recollection was very clear that, in reporting upon conversations of this character which he had had with Sir Robert Craigie, Mr. Grew had indicated plainly that he felt it would be inadmissible for the two Governments to transmit peace proposals which were in any way counter to

the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and that he had felt that it would be essential for this position to be made clear to the Japanese Government. I said that I felt that the position of this Government in that regard had already been made clear to the British Government, and that I considered it inconceivable that either the British Government or the United States Government would be willing to act as intermediaries in the reaching of a peace between China and Japan of a character contrary to the principles embodied in the Nine Power Treaty. The British Ambassador reaffirmed my prior understanding that the position of his Government was entirely that of the Government of the United States in this matter, but that, as a practical matter and for reasons of expediency, it might be difficult for the Japanese Foreign Office to procure the assent of the Japanese Army and Navy to the good offices of the United States and Great Britain if at the outset the two Governments came out with a flat and public statement to the effect that they would not transmit any proposals other than those consistent with the Nine Power Treaty provisions. I said to the Ambassador that, in a negotiation of that character, the precise position to be taken by the Governments concerned would, of course, depend upon conditions as they existed at that particular moment,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

42-4

-4-

but that it seemed to me that the only sound position for Great Britain and the United States to take in such eventuality was to make their position morally secure and perfectly plain to the two parties to the conflict from the outset.

The Ambassador said that the second point which he wished to take up with me was another suggestion made by Sir Robert Craigie with regard to an agreement on the part of the British, French and United States Governments that they would prohibit any financing of Japan by their respective financial interests.

I said to the Ambassador that I was already familiar with this suggestion which had been proffered, and that I felt sure it was not necessary for me to make it clear to him that the United States Government in this question had no such power as that held by the British Government. I said that the British Government already had in force an embargo on loans by British interests outside of the Empire unless such loans had received the approval of the British Government. I stated that the United States Government had no such power and that, furthermore, he knew that it was the policy of this Administration in Washington to refuse either to approve or disapprove financing by private interests. For these reasons, it was impossible for us to make any commitment in this

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Chastain NARS, Date 12-18-75

42-5

-5-

regard. I said, however, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, private financial interests in the United States were not at present receptive to any financing of Japan and that, purely as a private opinion, it seemed to me very doubtful whether under present conditions that attitude would be modified.

The Ambassador talked at some length with respect to the general situation in the Far East and the increasing difficulties of the British Government with regard thereto. He had no precise information to communicate and volunteered the information that he was without recent advice as to the situation in Spain. He said, however, that his own Military Attaché had received word that the anticipated Rebel offensive in Spain would definitely not materialize this winter but would be postponed until the spring.

U:SW:MW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*University  
Life*

APPROVED ALUMNAE AND STUDENT PUBLICATION OF  
FRIENDS UNIVERSITY  
WICHITA :: KANSAS

DIAL 3-7236

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
1937 DEC 20 AM 9

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 20 1937  
Department of State

*B. Beck*  
December 31 1937

December 17, 1937

The Honorable Cordell Hull  
Secretary of State of the United States  
Washington D. C.

*793.94/11656 1/2*

Honorable Sir:

The thin-skinned attitude of the State Department toward the recent Japanese incident and the adequate apologies tendered by the Japanese strikes deeply into our national pride. This apology was ignored until such time as the statesmen felt it necessary to answer them. In light of this incident, we feel our demand may also be ignored, but nevertheless we insist the withdrawal of American ships from foreign waters.

We who live in small houses do not patriotically anticipate being drawn into a foreign war, because the ships of big business furnish the occasion for an irresponsible State Department to further aggravate a precarious situation. We do not want to be drawn into a foreign war--we want your influence to keep us out.

We can see no need in keeping an American war-ship at the scene of another country's war and surely all commercial interests should know by now that if they remain they should do so at their own risks.

We depend upon you, as a statesman, to keep America out of other people's war. We want definite assurance that these statements are being considered and that the state department is not working hand in hand with the commercial interests in the Far East. Awaiting this assurance, we remain,

(Miss) *E. B. Miller* Editor  
Friends University Life  
Official Student Publication  
Friends University  
Wichita Kansas

793.94/ 11656 1/2

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*F*  
Division of *acknowledged*  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS Form *3*  
JAN 7 - 1938  
Department of State  
*FEB 8 1938*

*University*  
*Life*  
*Approved*

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
1938 JAN 5 5 PM  
APPROVED ALUMNAE AND STUDENT PUBLICATION OF  
FRIENDS UNIVERSITY  
WICHITA :: KANSAS

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
FOR AKNOWLEDGEMENT  
AND CONSIDERATION

DIAL 3-7236

December 17, 1937

Franklin Delano Roosevelt  
President of the United States of America  
Washington D. C.

Honorable Sir:

We sincerely urge you to seek the withdrawal of American ships from the scene of the Sino-Japanese war. American commercial interests have been sufficiently warned of their danger in remaining in the war zone, now, definite action must be taken to compel those who persistently remain to do so at their own risk.

We of the humbler classes of America do not feel either morally or patriotically responsible for fighting a foreign war not in the name, of course, certainly in the cause of the concentrated money interests. We know these commercial groups would finally involve us by their own determined interference in foreign waters.

We depend on you to keep our ships out of foreign waters and our country out of foreign wars.

When you align against us for the protection of these commercialized interests you demolish all of the confidence which your earlier administration inspired in us.

Feeling the utmost dissatisfaction in your "forceful diplomatic policy" as evidenced by your recent actions, we remain,

(Miss) *E. B. Miller* editor

The University Life  
Student Publication of  
Friends University  
Wichita, Kansas

U  
A  
R  
E  
R  
S

FILED  
FEB 7 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Austin NARS, Date 12-18-75

December 31 1937

In reply refer to  
FE 793.94 Miller, E. B.

My dear Miss Miller:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of December 17, 1937, in regard to the situation in the Far East.

The Department has also received from the Honorable John M. Houston a letter under date December 14, to which was attached a copy of a telegram, also under date December 14, addressed to him by University Life.

As your letter addressed to the Department and the aforementioned telegram addressed to Mr. Houston relate to the same subject, you may find of interest the substantive portion of the Department's reply to Mr. Houston, which reads as follows:

"The question of the types and degrees of protection which this Government should afford to its citizens abroad presents many difficulties and is one in regard to which opinions may very readily differ. In a situation such as has prevailed in the Far East there have been developed during more than a century certain rights, certain interests,

certain

Miss E. B. Miller,  
Editor, Friends University Life,  
Friends University,  
Wichita, Kansas.

793.94/11656 L  
2

F/F/G

-2-

certain obligations and certain practices. In the light of peculiar features inherent in the situation, all of the major powers have developed and employed, with authorization by the Chinese Government, methods for safeguarding the lives and interests and property of their nationals believed to be appropriate to the situation and warranted by the peculiarities thereof. Thus, for instance, there came about and there is still in existence the system of extraterritorial jurisdiction and various of its concomitants. Concurrently, many nationals of this and other countries have, during several generations, gone to China, established themselves there in various occupations and activities, and subjected themselves both to the advantages and to the disadvantages of the conditions prevailing there; and the American Government has, along with other governments, accepted various rights and incurred various obligations. In a situation such as now prevails, many of our nationals cannot suddenly cut themselves off from the past nor can the American Government suddenly disavow its obligations and responsibilities. The American naval vessels and the small contingents of American landed forces which have been maintained in China were placed and have been kept there solely for the purpose of assisting in the maintenance of order and security as affecting the lives, the property and the legitimate activities of American nationals, especially in regard to conditions of local disorder and unauthorized violence. These vessels and troops have never had in any sense any mission of aggression. It has long been the desire and expectation of the American Government that they shall be withdrawn when their appropriate function is no longer called for. We had thought a few months ago that the opportune moment for such a withdrawal was near at hand. The present, however, does not seem an opportune moment for effecting that withdrawal.

"Officers of the American Government have repeatedly and earnestly advised American citizens, in face of dangers incident to residence in China, to withdraw and are making every effort to provide safe means whereby they may depart. During the current situation in China the American military and naval forces have rendered important service

in

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

in protecting the lives of American nationals, in assisting in evacuating Americans from areas of special danger, and in making possible the maintenance of uninterrupted communications with our nationals and our diplomatic and consular establishments in the areas involved."

As of possible interest there is enclosed a copy of a press release issued by the Department on August 23, 1937, in which is outlined the policy on which this Government is proceeding with reference to the situation in the Far East.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:



Raymond C. Mackay  
Assistant Chief  
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Enclosure:

Press release of  
August 23, 1937.

CR

DEC 30 1937

FE:RCM:NN

FE



A true copy of  
the signed original.

12/29/37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

43-1

JWB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

GRAY

FROM Tokyo

Dated December 16, 1937

Rec'd 8:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

642, December 16, 11 a.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 16 1937  
Department of State

793.94  
note  
741.44

JWB  
1-8-38

My British colleague has today presented the following note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs: "British <sup>Embassy</sup> ~~Empire~~, Tokyo, 16th December, 1937.

793.94/11657

Your Excellency, I have the honor on instructions from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to address Your Excellency on the subject of attacks made by Japanese aircraft and land forces on British warships and merchant shipping at Wuhu and near Nanking on 12th December. These incidents clearly raise grave issues.

Two. At Wuhu a British tug which had conveyed from Nanking His Majesty's Consul, the British Military Attache and the flag-captain to the British Rear Admiral, Yangtze, was attacked by Japanese machine gun fire after transferring these officers to HMS LADYBIRD. The latter proceeded to the tugboat in order to protect her, when she observed a Japanese field gun battery firing on merchant ships concentrated above the Asiatic Petroleum

Company's

F/FG  
FILED  
DEC 18 1937

43-2

2- No. 642, December 16, from Tokyo.

Company's installation. Firing continued and was directed at HMS LADYBIRD herself.

Three. There were four direct hits on this vessel: one naval rating was killed, another was seriously wounded and there were several minor casualties including flag captain. A direct hit was also seen to be sustained by the British merchant ship SUIWO. HMS BEE then arrived on the scene and was also fired on by the shore battery. The Commander of HMS BEE landed to protest and was informed by Colonel Hashimoto, the senior Japanese military officer then at Wuhu, that firing on warships was due to a mistake but that he had orders to fire on every ship on the river. At a later interview the same officer stated categorically that if any ships moved on the river they would be fired on and, despite protests, HMS BEE and LADYBIRD after berthing remained covered by guns at pointblank range.

Four. Near Hsiasan-Shan above Nanking where British merchant ships were concentrated in a part of the river previously designated by the Japanese Commander in Chief as a safety-zone, three separate bombing attacks were made by Japanese aircraft on them and on HM SHIPS CRICKET and SCARAB which were with them.

Five.

43-3

3- No. 642, December 16, from Tokyo.

Five. His Majesty's Government have now been glad to receive Your Excellency's note of the 14th offering the apology of the Imperial Japanese Government for the attacks on His Majesty's Ships, stating that measures were immediately taken to prevent the recurrence of such incidents and adding that they will deal suitably with those responsible and pay the necessary compensation.

Six. His Majesty's Government observe that Your Excellency's note makes no mention of the attacks on British merchant vessels and I am instructed to request that an assurance may be given that all that is said in that note applies equally to these attacks.

Seven. His Majesty's Government take particular note of the statement that those responsible will be suitably dealt with. Adequate punishment of those responsible for the particular attacks under discussion seems indeed to His Majesty's Government to be the only method by which further outrages can be prevented.

Eight. His Majesty's Government cannot but recall the previous incidents in which the Japanese Government have expressed regret for attacks made on British nationals and property and have given assurances that adequate steps had been taken to prevent any repetitions. They

call

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

43-4

4- No. 642, December 16, from Tokyo.

call to mind the attack made on His Majesty's Ambassador to China while travelling by road from Nanking to Shanghai, the subsequent attack on motor cars conveying British officials on a similar journey, the attacks on British civilian and military posts on the defense perimeter at Shanghai, as well as other incidents, and the repeated assurances of the Japanese Government of their intention fully to respect the interests of third powers in the present conflict with China. It is clear that the steps hitherto taken by the Japanese Government to prevent such attacks have so far failed in the purpose and His Majesty's Government must now ask to be informed that measures have actually been taken of a character which will put a definite stop to the incidents of which they complain.

I avail myself et cetera.

Signed R. L. Craigie."

GREW

HPD:

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 DEC 15 AM 9 48

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

December 23, 1937

December 22 1937

*Ans'd*  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 16 1937  
Department of State  
*File*

Department Of State  
Washington D. C.

Gentlemen:

In school we have done a great deal of discussion on the Chinese Japanese War. Our Social Studies teacher has told us that when a country calls all its foreign ambassadors home from a country it automatically declares war. What we want to know is, has China's ambassadors been called home to its capital from Japan and has Japan's ambassadors to China been called home to its capital.

We also have been discussing an ambassadors duties in time of war in their particular zone.

Would please send this information as soon as you find it possible.

Truly yours,

*Robert Parsons*

Robert Parsons

P. S. Send this information to Robert Parsons  
7 1/2 Donlon St. Rochester, N. Y.

*A*  
*79392*

793.94/1653

DEC 23 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastrom NARS, Date 12-18-75

December 22 1937

In reply refer to  
FE 793.94/11658

Mr. Robert Parsons,  
7 1/2 Donlon Street,  
Rochester, New York.

Sir:

In reply to your letter of December 13, 1937, it may be stated that the Chinese Ambassador to Japan and the Japanese Ambassador to China have not been recalled by their respective governments.

In connection with your inquiry concerning the duties of ambassadors in time of war, it is suggested that you consult the librarian of your public library with regard to a list of standard publications on diplomatic practice and international law in which you may find information helpful in your study.


Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

*M. M. Hamilton*  
Maxwell M. Hamilton  
Chief  
Division of Far Eastern Affairs  
FE

OR ✓  
DEC 22 1937.

egs.  
FE:ECC:HES  
12-21



793.94/11658

F/A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED  
CINCPAC

MB o

December 16, 1937

FROM  
Rec'd 9:15 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE  
AMCON SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON 5  
COMDESRON 5  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARBLE HEAD  
ALUSNA PEIPING

RECEIVED  
NOV 17 1937

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 16 1937  
Department of State

0016 Military situation unchanged. Settlement

quiet 1925.

RR:WWC

793.94

793.94/11659

F/FG  
FILED  
DEC 18 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated December 15, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m., 16th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND R.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 16 1937  
Department of State

793.94  
nil.  
711.30

December 15, 10 a.m.

Yesterday at 3:50 p.m., the air raid signal was given when two airplanes believed to be Japanese flying westward over Tsingtao from the sea. About the same time two American destroyers now in port returned from a drill held at sea. It is reported that no little alarm among Chinese was caused by the coincidental appearance of the two foreign men of war approaching Tsingtao at the identical time the air raid signal was in effect.

On October 14th an air raid signal was given by the Chinese in Tsingtao on the appearance of two airplanes near Tsingtao which I personally saw. At the time there was some comment because the USS MARBLEHEAD was at sea near Tsingtao and was actually having its own airplane drill when these two unknown airplanes appeared near Tsingtao. Because these two airplanes were not identified, this Consulate chose to ignore the rumors that the airplanes were those attached to MARBLEHEAD but it

does

793.94/11660

F/E G  
FILED

DEC 21 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- December 15, 10 a.m., from Tsingtao via N. R.

does now seem to this Consulate that some consideration might be had for the feelings of all residents of this city at a moment when there is enough uneasiness as to whether Tsingtao will continue to escape hostilities and when there is so much talk about threats of destruction of Japanese property which exists in all parts of the city. All Americans and many other residents take such matters in a condensed manner but I can testify to the excitability of Chinese when the air raid alarms are sounded. If these drills of American men of war are routine, another time and place might be arranged therefor and in the meantime the Consulate is asking the commanders to notify it for communication to the local authorities of their intended routine movements and drills.

Sent to Hankow, Peiping, Shanghai. Shanghai please advise Commander-in-Chief.

SOKOBIN

RR:CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Justafan NARS, Date 12-18-75

*IJ*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 15, 1937

SUBJECT: Far Eastern situation.

PARTICIPANTS: The German Ambassador, Herr Dieckhoff, and the Under Secretary.

COPIES TO: No distribution except to S.

*File  
DC/R:HW  
5-7-48*



793.94/11660 1/2

The German Ambassador called to see me this morning. He said he came primarily to inquire with regard to the grave situation which had developed in the Far East and as to whether we had any word as yet as to the attitude which would be taken by the Japanese Government.

I told the Ambassador that all of the communications between the two Governments had already appeared in the press and that I was not yet advised of the reply which would be made by the Japanese Government to the formal communications made by the United States. The Ambassador seemed decidedly concerned about the situation and I made no attempt to relieve his anxiety.

U SW:IJ

EXHIBIT	
Anal.	<i>HW</i>
Gen.	<i>HW</i>
Dist.	

*[Handwritten signature]*

793.94/11660 1/2

44-1

FE  
EU

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Fill  
AP

MBo  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (B)

Berlin  
FROM  
Dated December 16, 1937

Rec'd 8:45 a.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
REC 16 1937  
Department of State

193-9-119

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

295, December 16, noon.

In a talk today with the Chief of the Far Eastern  
Section of the Foreign Office it appeared that the German  
position respecting China and Japan and indeed her atti-  
tude toward various phases of the Far Eastern situation,  
which was described in detail in Embassy's 202 August  
26, 8 p.m. had undergone no substantial change.

He states that while Germany's general interests in  
China were of the same character as those of the other  
Western Powers and while she was greatly concerned re-  
garding them, Germany nevertheless possessing no extra-  
territorial rights and not being parties to the Boxer  
protocols she was naturally not brought into the exchanges  
of views taking place between the powers which presumably  
were based on common special rights and privileges in  
China.

He denied press report (Embassy's 266, November 5,  
8 p.m.) concerning German mediation moves by stating that  
Germany had not made any move whatsoever in respect of  
mediation

10999

793.94/11661

F/FG

RECEIVED  
DEC 16 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Huse NARS, Date 12-18-75

44-2

2- No. 295, December 16, from Berlin.

mediation between the two parties. He believed that such rumors had originated because of a conversation which had taken place between the German Ambassador to China and Chiang Kai Shek which had to do, as he understood it, solely with the situation at that time respecting Nanking, the Marshal having suggested to the Ambassador that he take steps with the Japanese to "save the city".

With reference to other accounts that Russia had entered into a "pact of assistance" with China he stated that according to his information this was not true. He felt in any event that such an arrangement would have but little practical value in respect of the furnishing of munitions as due to the physical difficulties involved Russian aid to China in that regard could be but negligible.

DODD

HPD:

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*7*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMSOPAT

FROM December 16, 1937

Rec'd 12:28 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
ALUSNA PEIPING

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 16 1937  
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO  
~~ONI AND M.I.D.~~  
REK

*793.94*

0116.. South China ports quiet. 2000.

KLP

793.94/11662

F/EG FILED  
DEC 13 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG \_\_\_\_\_ GRAY

FROM Shanghai via N. R.  
Dated December 16, 1937  
Rec'd 12:25 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 17 1937  
Department of State

793.94

1163, DECEMBER 16, 4 p. m.  
My No. 1150, <sup>11629</sup> DECEMBER 14, 2 p. m.

According to Japanese reports General Matsui and  
Admiral Hasegawa will make formal entries into Nanking  
at 1:30 p.m. tomorrow.

There are persistent rumors that the Japanese are  
preparing to send troops from Shanghai by sea to either  
the Hangchow or Canton areas. According to reliable  
information there are 40 Japanese transports off Woosung  
30 of which are said to be empty and intended for trans-  
porting troops and munitions to the south.

The Japanese are reported to have captured Yang-  
chow 11 miles north of the Yangtze across from  
Chingkiang and to be mopping up in the Nanking-Wuhu  
area.

Repeated to Hankow, Peiping and Canton.

GAUSS

RR:CCB

FILED  
DEC 18 1937  
F/FG

793.94/11663

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

45-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

A portion of this tele- Tokyo  
gram must be closely  
paraphrased before being  
communicated to anyone.  
(B)

FROM Dated December 16, 1937

Rec'd 10:23 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
U.S. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 16 1937  
Department of State

644, December 16, 6 p.m.

(GRAY) Our 595, December 4, 8 p.m.

793.94  
note  
794.00

A conference between the Government and Imperial  
Headquarters which began on the 14th and was continued  
yesterday and today is reported to be discussing matters  
of high national policy. It is generally understood  
that if a concensus of opinion can be reached the Cabinet  
will tomorrow consider requesting that the Emperor call  
a conference in the near future. (END GRAY)

793.94/11664

In view of the trend of discussion in the press  
which is speculative and of certain information brought  
to me, I am inclined to think that a declaration of war  
is not (repeat not) imminent.

DDM:HPD

GREW

FILED  
DEC 13 1937  
E/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

45-2

PARAPHRASE

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram (No. 844) of December 16, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

A conference between the Government and Imperial Headquarters which began on the 14th and was continued on the 15th and 16th is reported to be discussing matters of high national policy. It is generally understood that if a consensus of opinion can be reached the Cabinet will on December 17 consider requesting that the Emperor call a conference in the near future.

On account of certain information which the Ambassador has received and on account of the trend of discussion in the newspapers which is speculative, the Ambassador inclines to the opinion that a declaration of war is not near at hand.

793.94/11664

793.94/  
E.G.C.  
FE:EC

FE

XII-16-37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 394.115 PANAY/38 FOR Tel #769, 5pm

FROM Great Britain (Johnson) DATED Dec. 13, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Far Eastern Conflict.

Attacks on British ships on the Yangtze River. Eden stated in House of Commons that he regretted to report-. Action taken by British Ambassador at Tokyo.

mr

793.94/11665

F/A

11665

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

GRAY

London

Dated December 13, 1937

Rec'd 12:32 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

769, December 13, 5 p.m.

My 767, December 13, 1 p.m.

*note  
795.9K*

Mr. Eden stated in the House of Commons this afternoon that he regretted to inform the House that several attacks were made yesterday by Japanese forces on foreign shipping including His Majesty's Ships on the Yangtze River. The British Ambassador in Tokyo had made the strongest protest to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs who has promised to make immediate inquiries. The seriousness of these incidents, said Mr. Eden, needed no emphasis.

JOHNSON

RR:WTC


38

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS



*FA*  
*File*



*793.94*

MEMORANDUM

December 13, 1937.

---Mr. Gray:

Mr. Millard W. Rice, Legislative Representative of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Tower Building, Washington, D. C., in a recent conversation made reference to a telephone call which he had received from Mr. Hara, Secretary to the Military Attaché of the Japanese Embassy. Mr. Rice stated that Mr. Hara telephoned him in regard to a petition which the Veterans of Foreign Wars was placing in circulation for the purpose of obtaining extensive signatures to sentiments against the United States being drawn into war. Mr. Rice stated that the conversation was approximately as follows:

793.94/11666

Mr. Hara: Is it true that the VFW organization is circulating a petition to keep the United States out of war?

Mr. Rice replied in the affirmative.

Mr. Hara: May I have a copy of your petition?

Mr. Rice replied in the affirmative.

Mr. Hara: Does your petition name specific steps to be taken to keep the United States out of war?

Mr.

F/A

DEC 11 1937

DEC 16 1937

RECORDED

11666

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Mr. Rice: No, the petition does not contain specific steps as to the methods by which the United States may be kept out of war.

Mr. Hara then expressed what Mr. Rice believed to be approval of the VFW method of approaching the problem. Mr. Hara then queried, "Does your organization propose specific steps as to how to keep the United States out of war?"

To this Mr. Rice replied that in a number of resolutions adopted by his organization at its national convention at Buffalo some such specific steps had been included. Mr. Rice thereupon enumerated a number of the steps indicated and promised to send a copy of the organization's plans for this year, including the steps enumerated, to Mr. Hara.

Mr. Hara then asked Mr. Rice's opinion on the American Federation of Labor and on the Committee on Industrial Organization. To this Mr. Rice replied that he had no particular opinion to express upon those organizations except that he believed it would eventually be to their own interests to get together.

Mr. Hara then asked Mr. Rice what the Veterans of Foreign Wars thought of the alleged policy of the American Federation of Labor to boycott foreign-made goods, and

continued

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

continued the question to ask if Mr. Rice did not think that such a policy, if adopted, might lead to war.

Mr. Rice said he saw no reason why an isolationist policy might lead to war and pointed out to Mr. Hara that Japan for a very long time adopted an isolationist policy, during which time it kept out of war.

To this Mr. Hara replied that conditions then and now are quite different, and continued with what Mr. Rice considered as a rather pointed question: "Do you not believe that if all exports to Japan and all imports from Japan were stopped it would lead to war?"

To this Mr. Rice replied, "Not necessarily", and shortly thereafter ended the conversation in a number of generalities.

Mr. Rice later telephoned to repeat this conversation, of which I took no notice at the time. Since officers of the Veterans of Foreign Wars had not called upon the Secretary it did not seem appropriate to introduce them as harboring alarmist sentiments.

I have checked these statements with Mr. Rice and he agrees that they are substantially the conversation which took place between him and Mr. Hara on December 3. He makes no comments upon them except to repeat them.

J. E. Saugstad.

TA/ES:DMZ:SS WX

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# CATCH

DCR---

---SLIP

IMPORTANT: ENTER ONLY ONE ENCLOSURE NUMBER ON SHEET

FILE NUMBER

793.94/11667

(THE MORE LEGIBLY YOU WRITE, THE MORE ACCURATE IS THE CATCH)

DIVISION AND PERSON REQUESTING PAPER	ROOM NO. AND BLDG.	SPECIFIC PAPER DESIRED	ENTER DATE AND NAME OF PERSON MAKING CATCH
RE - Reid		Tel 827 from China 12-16-37	3-25-48 Holmes
	PHONE NO.	Tel 3 from Munkler 12-15-37	

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILE CLERK (READ CAREFULLY)

When file specified above is returned to file, make a charge as indicated above, marking thru catch-sheet thus: ( ). Send this catch sheet with the papers to the office of person requesting same, before removing any papers from file. ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT THE PAPER YOU HAVE ENTERED ABOVE HAS DESCRIPTION AS GIVEN ABOVE. FOR INSTANCE, DO NOT PLACE OUT A BLUE OR GREEN WHEN THE ORIGINAL OR INVOICE IS REQUESTED.

INFORMATION DATA FOR USE OF DCR PERSONNEL REQUESTING FILE:  
REASON FOR CATCH BEING MADE

FE



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94 / 13,100 T 93,199

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

EG  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

FR886 OAHU

December 16, 1937

Rec'd 3:35 p. m.

TO: CINCAF  
INFO: COMYANGPAT  
PASSED BY CINCAF TO NAVY DEPARTMENT FOR INFORMATION

0016. Attacking force consisted three heavy bombers,  
six light bombers. Heavy bombers dropped three bombs from  
altitudes undetermined then proceeded down river. Light  
bombers dived bombing and machine gunning ships. First  
heavy bomb fell fifteen feet off port bow HOLLING bow and  
wrecking bridge wounding Lt. Comdr. Hughes, second hit  
demolished radio room and surrounding spaces. Crew  
manned machine guns returned fire but projectiles passed  
through non-vital parts planes after attack on PANAY.  
Bombs were dropped on Socony vessels. Planes apparently  
concentrating on armed vessel before destroying others.  
2312.

k1p

*FE*  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
JAN 17 1938  
DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
RELATIONS ADMINISTRATION

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 17 1937  
Department of State

795.94/11669

FILED  
JAN 17 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Auslofer NARS, Date 12-18-75

EE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO  
C.N.I. AND M.I.D. FROM

London

Dated DECEMBER 16, 1937

Rec'd 1:25 p.m.

*Telegram to Tokyo, Dec. 17.*

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 17 1937  
Department of State

780, December 16, 1 p.m.

All of the principal newspapers carried editorials approving the tone of the British note to Japan which was published this morning.

THE TIMES is particularly sharp in its criticism of the Japanese conduct and says that the note with studied moderation sets forth the circumstances in which the attacks were made, the mere recital of which is "a damning indictment of Japanese irresponsibility". The editorial continues "Tokyo will not be far wrong if it detects scathing implications in this document, nor misled if it attaches importance to the close Anglo-American cooperation surrounding the despatch of both the British and American protests. The Japanese official explanation of the sinking of the PANAY and of the other incidents of last Sunday gives an unconvincing and discreditable account of the activities of the air men concerned (\*\*\*)". There are only two possible deductions

793.94/11670

to  
F/FG

^

-2- #780, DECEMBER 16, 1 p.m., from London.

to be drawn from all this hooliganism. It may have BEEN the result of a deliberate attempt by responsible military and naval officers to destroy neutral shipping on the Yangtze -- possibly by way of testing the reactions of the powers concerned, as they tested Russia's on the Amur before launching the North China campaign. If, on the other hand the incidents were not deliberate, then it must be concluded that save for a small civilized upper class no Japanese can be trusted to carry firearms even in the Emperor's service because he is too ignorant and too irresponsible not to run amok without provocation (\*\*\*) . Some doubt about the existence of responsible statesmanship even in Tokyo was perhaps in Mr. Roosevelt's mind when he addressed himself to the Emperor, presumably in an endeavor to establish contact with some source of authority which could not be ignored, disowned, or flouted with impunity (\*\*\*) the prospects of peace dimly discernible a short time ago are today more remote than at any previous stage of the war. (\*\*\*) the exponents of relentlessness in Tokyo were reinforced by appointment to the Home Ministry of Admiral Suetsugu an extreme Nationalist of the new  
crusading

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3- #780, December 16, 1 p.m., from London.

crusading type. There have been other indications that the fighting services with their policy 'war at any price' have lately gained a supremacy even more effective than hitherto in the councils of the nations. (\*\*\*) about a fortnight ago Japan intimated that she no longer welcomed attempts at mediation. There is no reason to suppose that the fire-eating in Tokyo is bluff. The army has the bit between its teeth. Japan aims at the rate not of a mere five provinces in the north but of the whole of China. It is likely that the next step towards this objective will be an invasion of South China and an attack on Canton".

The editorial entitled "Concerted Action" appearing in the Yorkshire POST is also worthy of note since this important provincial journal is owned by Mrs. Eden's family, circulates in his constituency and is used by him on occasion as a personal organ. It points out that "the immediate efficacy of the Nyon agreement suggests that a similar agreement of all powers affected by the real or alleged uncontrollability of Japanese units in China would have an equally desirable effect. There are two common suggestions as to the reasons why Japan has hitherto displayed so contemptuous an indifference to the protests

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4- #780, December 16, 1 p.m., from London.

protests of the foreign governments. The first is that she has or believes herself to have something like a blank check for China from her partners in the anti-Comintern agreement (\*\*). The other reason given for Japan's indifference to foreign protests is a presumed inability even of the three naval democracies, -- France, Britain, and the United States -- to act together. The comparative difficulty of ensuring an overwhelming support of American public opinion for action at a great distance is well understood here. It is intelligible also that in view of the extreme gravity of the actual attack on American ships, President Roosevelt should have considered it necessary to act with the minimum of delay. But if it is common ground that there is lacking in Tokyo not the will but the present ability to put a brake on the activities of politically irresponsible militarists, a concerted protest by all powers with interests in China may be the very step necessary to restore to saner Japanese opinion the control which it has lost. Such action could hardly be misrepresented as advantaging any one power interested over the others." The TELEGRAPH editorial concludes "the British Government has been very patient. No one can pretend

-5- #780, December 16, 1 p.m., from London.

pretend that the requisitions which it has now made are excessive. Indeed, they are more moderate than the circumstances would well justify.

Excerpts from the editorial in the usually pro-Japanese DAILY MAIL follow: "The note sent by the British Government to Japan yesterday speaks wholly in the name of the British people. Happily, in carrying out this policy close cooperation is being maintained with the United States" (\*\*\*) "Prompt reparation and careful avoidance of any further episodes are Japan's obvious ways to preserve good mutual relations".

The Liberal MANCHESTER GUARDIAN thinks that the British Government's note though almost identical in matter is milder in tone than the American note. It says "one may regret that Mr. Eden did not borrow a little of the American bluntness of language, but it is difficult to see what more could have been said after the receipt of the Japanese note. There is however good reason to believe that the Japanese Government is at last genuinely perturbed over the situation though only time can show whether its perturbation is shared by the army and navy in China".

The Socialist DAILY HERALD states "the plain truth is that ever since the Government rejected the League policy in the Far East in 1931 British efforts to stem  
the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-6- #780, December 16, 1 p.m., from London.

the tide of lawlessness have been unreal and ineffective.

(\*\*\*) It is late to start now. But it had better be faced that the situation in the Far East is going to grow worse, not better, unless Britain and France, the United States and the Soviet Union and such powers as will join them are prepared to stand side by side".

JOHNSON

CSB

**MICROCOPY**

**976**

**ROLL**

**46**

**END**

