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NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 50

1930-39

793.94/12327-12480
Jan.-Feb. 1938



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 9, 1938.

~~WAS~~
PA/H
Mr. Hornbeck

London's despatch No. 3833, January 25, 1938, contains an interesting summary and interpretation of British views (official and press) regarding ~~the~~ American policy in the Far East. Although public statements in the United States have given great satisfaction in Great Britain, the fear that a show of enthusiasm might turn American public opinion strongly toward isolation has prompted restraint.

The press gives the impression that America and Great Britain are on an equal footing in the matter of material interests in the Far East, and it reflects the ever present hope that the United States will assume the role of "white hope" in the Far East. "It is ships and not sanctions which are wanted - - -", the Embassy comments.

The despatch quotes extensively from an article by Mr. Winston Churchill, of which the following two paragraphs are of especial interest:

"It is certain that no American Government is going 'to pull the chestnuts out of the fire' for the sake of British or European

interest

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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interest in China. It is not certain that they may not feel an interest and duty of their own.

"The British Government is, however, entitled to say that if the United States for their own purposes choose to take a lead in preserving peace and civilization in and around the China Seas, they would be supported by Great Britain and the British Empire to the full limit of their strength."

The Embassy states that Mr. Churchill's article undoubtedly reflects views widely held in official circles.

Following a quotation from the Sunday Times to the effect that nothing would be so likely to prevent America from doing anything effectual in the Far East as the "suspicion that she has taken sides in a quarrel that was even indirectly European in its motives", the Embassy comments that Anglo-American interchanges respecting the Far East are evaluated by British officials not only in relation to the East but in terms of their application to the European scene.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LONDON, January 25, 1938.

No. 3833

SUBJECT: British Hopes concerning the United States
in the Far East



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



793.94/12327

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to inform the Department that while it is naturally difficult to define with precision the views of British officials regarding the Far Eastern policy of the United States, a great deal of hopeful thinking is revealed by remarks they make in conversation, and the views expressed in the press. Though public statements in the United States regarding the Far East have given enormous satisfaction in Great Britain, the press displays at times a studied restraint, which seems to reflect the fear that the faintest suspicion of

propaganda

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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propaganda, an unguarded speech, or even a burst of enthusiasm might break the spell and suddenly turn American public opinion strongly towards isolation. First the neutrality legislation, and then the Ludlow Bill, frightened England and they are walking carefully. Thus, one reads and hears in London a repetition of the phrases used in Washington, such as the United States and Great Britain, while not taking joint action in the Far East, are proceeding "along parallel lines," and that Great Britain does not want the United States "to pull her chestnuts out of the fire."

As regards material interests in the Far East, there are not infrequent references to the enormous financial and trading losses to Great Britain arising out of the war in China, but precise information regarding the United States is rarely given. The press does not suggest, for example, that American commercial interests in Japan are something like three times as large as those in China, while the British position is roughly the reverse; nor are the provisions of the Philippines Independence Act mentioned. The reader is, rather, left with the impression that the United States and Great Britain are in a practically identical situation in the Far East. The approach in the press to the subject of the use of the American Navy varies from the greatest reserve to mild hints; but the hope that the United States will assume the role of white hope in the Far East is never absent. With exception of some opposition opinion the thought of sanctions in peace time is definitely unpopular. It is ships not sanctions which are wanted; the Government remembers the Mediterranean fiasco.

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fiasco.

A somewhat refreshing example of a straight invitation is afforded by an article by Mr. Winston Churchill, published in the Evening Standard, the full text of which may be found among the press clippings. The title, "What Japan Thinks of Us", is appropriate enough for the first part of the article which refers to the recent incidents on the Yangtze, Japanese "deep-seated hatred towards the white people", Admiral Suetsugu's views on "driving the white race out of the Far East" and the suggestion that the Japanese Army and Navy are running amok; all of these despite the friendly attitude of the white races "who have been good purchasers of Japanese merchandise."

The interesting part of the article is, however, contained in the latter paragraphs, which might appropriately have been entitled "What We Think the United States Should Do About It." After referring to the "bloody decks of the Panay" and to the disappointment which "the great democracies of the western world" feel about Japan, Mr. Churchill urges them not to lose heart but on the contrary to persevere "but we may have to persevere along a somewhat different path." He then mentions the naval ratios of the Washington Conference and the report that Japan is constructing ships exceeding the Treaty categories, and suggests that the United States will, "of course, be compelled to review its programmes and types very searchingly." The article concludes:

"President Roosevelt's declarations seem to show that the Government of the United

States

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States would not be willing to see their naval power seriously rivalled in the Pacific Ocean at the present time. They have an ample superiority, but this might pass in a few years unless timely measures are taken.

It seems probable that a large programme of naval expansion will be undertaken in the United States, and that the American Navy will keep good pace with the British Navy in accordance with the principles of parity which govern our relations.

Neither Government need be afraid of what is called starting a naval race with Japan. It is quite certain that Japan cannot possibly compete with the productive energies of either branch of the English-speaking peoples.

* * *

The immediate problem is of a different character. Its solution depends entirely upon the view--moral, political, economic--which the people of the United States take of their responsibilities in the Pacific.

It is certain that no American Government is going "to pull the chestnuts out of the fire" for the sake of British or European interest in China. It is not certain that they may not feel an interest and duty of their own.

The absorption and organization of a great part of China by Japan into a vast Asiatic naval and military power, with hundreds of millions of subjects under its sway, and animated by the principles which Admiral Suetsugu has so frankly expressed, might not upon a long view be in accordance with the safety and freedom of the people of the United States.

The issue is one entirely for the decision of the American Government and people, and none of us in Europe should presume to intervene in that tremendous cogitation. No one in Great Britain would venture to ask or urge any particular course upon the Washington Government.

The British Government is, however, entitled to say that if the United States for their own purposes choose to take a lead in preserving peace and civilization in and around the China Seas, they would be supported by Great Britain and the British Empire to the full limit of their strength.

There were Anglo-American misunderstandings in 1931, but there should be no misunderstandings now. If President Roosevelt's Government feel it their duty for purely American or world purposes, to make their weight felt in the cause of peace and order in the Far East, the British Empire would associate itself with them heart and hand."

The

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The argument is cleverly developed and, as articles in the press go, exceptionally direct. Like most of them it carefully avoids reference to the inter-relation between the rivalries in the Orient and those in Europe. Perhaps Mr. Churchill shares the view of the Sunday Times, which says:

"As for America, nothing would be so likely to prevent her from doing anything effectual in China as the suspicion that she has taken sides in a quarrel that was even indirectly European in its motives."

In any event, Mr. Churchill's article undoubtedly reflects views widely held in official circles. How far such opinion would be glad to see the United States Navy go, in policing the Far East, is more difficult to judge but the hope is almost universal in England to-day that we will in some measure undertake this dangerous task. And Anglo-American interchanges respecting the Far East are always evaluated by British officials not only in their relation to the immediate or eventual problems in that area but equally in terms of their application to the European scene, which constitutes the over-riding preoccupation of this country.

Incidentally, in contrast to the wider aspects of the Japanese problem touched upon in Mr. Churchill's article, it may be of interest to recall the view which an official of the Foreign Office, who is a Far Eastern specialist, expressed to the Chinese Ambassador (Despatch No. 3597 of November 19, 1937) that even if outside intervention were successful, which was most unlikely, it would merely make Japan more determined to get back at China and therefore,

cruel

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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cruel as it might seem, he feared that until China herself could bring Japan to her senses there could be no lasting settlement. Whether this view is a wise one only events can determine, but in any case it suggests a solution of the Far Eastern problem by purely oriental means.

Respectfully yours,

Herschel V. Johnson
Herschel V. Johnson
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

HM/WMC

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY TROOP 1 IN CHINA
Office of the Intelligence Officer

DIARY OF EVENTS IN SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

"The China Incident of 1937" is a compilation in diary form of reports of military activities in the present Sino-Japanese conflict, made in this office from information from Japanese and Chinese sources as well as from American official reports. The diary was prepared primarily for the use of officers of this command. While incomplete and otherwise unsatisfactory in some respects, it may prove useful for the time being.

THOMAS M. MARTIN,
Major, 15th Infantry.
J-2.

1st Ind.

Headquarters U. S. Army Troop 1 in China, Tientsin, China, December 9, 1937. For: Commanding General, Philippine Department, Manila, P.I.

Approved.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By 289 NARS Date 3/9/73

J. J. Mc KENZIE,
Colonel, 15th Infantry,
Commanding.

FILED

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F/FG

J-2, US 73.

Report No. 19

December 9, 1937

12328

793.94/12328

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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INTEL DIV.
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THE CHINA INCIDENT

OF

1937

July 7th to November 12th
inclusive

(RESTRICTED)

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NOTES

1. For brevity, J will stand for Japanese and C for Chinese throughout these notes.
2. For clarity, operations in each area are treated separately, and any connection between two areas will be noted under the same date in each.
3. At the end of these notes will be found maps which show every locality mentioned in these notes.
4. There are two maps at the end of this report, one for Shanghai, and one for all of North China, which give the weekly progress on all fronts.

CHINESE AND JAPANESE TROOP DISPOSITIONS PREVIOUS TO THE INCIDENT

JAPANESE: About 1,800 Marines of the Japanese Navy stationed in Shanghai.
One battalion at each of the following points in North China:

Peiping
Fengtai
Tungchow
Marco Polo Bridge (night maneuvers)

One regiment at Tientsin.

(The above units listed for North China total about 5,000 men.
There was another 1,000 men in their regular garrisons along the Peiping Railroad from Tangku to Shanhaikuan.)

CHINESE: The 37th Division of the 29th Army at Paoting and Peiping.
The 38th Division of the 29th Army stationed from Taku to Langfang.
(The above units, plus troops stationed at Tsangchow, Kaopeitien, Hochien, and Chochow totalled 43,000 men, under the command of General Sung Che-yuan.)

PEIPING-TIENTSIN OPERATIONS

- July 7: Firing starts at Wanping (near Lukouch'iao--"Marco Polo Bridge") at 11:40 p.m. J report 1 man missing, demand permission search Wanping for the man. Units: C, 1 bn of 29th Army; J, 1 bn on night maneuvers.
- July 8: C refuse permission search for missing soldier. J fire on Wanping north gate 3 to 5 a.m. Joint C & J group attempt localize incident --no agreement reached because J demand C evacuate Wanping. J reinforcements sent from Tientsin by road. J again attack north gate of Wanping at 7:30 p.m. using two 75 mm mountain guns and 4 mortars--damage negligible. Peiping city gates closed--no trains to Tientsin. Missing soldier located in J lines.
- July 9: C agree withdraw west bank of Yungting River by 5 a.m. Do not do so and J attack east gate of Wanping about 8 a.m. Sporadic firing goes on. Upon intervention of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, C & J agree to withdraw. C to west bank of Yungting River and J to Fengtai. Wanping to be garrisoned by Pao An Tui (police trained and armed as soldiers.) J clash with Pao An Tui, who were moving in to garrison the town. Soon settled.
- July 10: Skirmish at Lungwangmiao. J send 4 tanks and some guns toward Wanping from Fengtai, then withdraw. C hold west end Marco Polo Bridge, J hold railroad bank just east of Wanping. 10 trainloads troops reported enroute from Mukden.
- July 11: Skirmish at Papassan, and Lungwangmiao. J claim capture of both. Two troop trains pass through Tientsin towards Fengtai. 12 bombers arrive at Tientsin's East Arsenal from Mukden. New Japanese North China Garrison Commander, Lt. Gen. Katsuki, arrives. He replaces Tashiro who is ill. J troops astride Pinghan railroad line. J claim C agree to following demands: punishment of Chinese officers responsible for the outbreak; prevention of a future occurrence of the same nature; withdrawal of C troops from Wanping and Marco Polo Bridge area; and control of anti-J organizations. 47 wounded J soldiers arrive Tientsin from Fengtai. Gen. Sung Che-yuan arrives in Tientsin from Loiling, northern Shantung.
- July 12: J civilians withdrawn to Embassy in Peiping. Martial law in force in Peiping. J sentries fired on by C from bluffs on west bank of Yungting River. 2000 J troops and 12-75 mm guns arrive in Tientsin through Shanhaikuan.
- July 13: Small Skirmish near Nanyuan south of Peiping. C unit defeated. J erect barricades in Peiping Embassy. Tientsin police reinforced in Native Area. 600 J troops and 7 75 mm guns arrive Peiping from Kupeikou. 2000 J troops and 11 75s arrive Tientsin through Shanhaikuan. Heavy traffic on railroad.
- July 14: 2000 men and 12 guns (J) moved toward Fengtai from Tientsin by road. Two trains American Army people on leave arrive Tientsin from Peiping, to sail on July "Grant" for U.S. Gen. Sung and Gen. Katsuki said to be arranging for opening of formal settlement. Men and supplies still arriving Tientsin through Shanhaikuan.
- July 15: Tokyo War Office announces that troops from Japan proper will be sent to North China. (So far the arrivals have been from Manchoukuo or Korea.) Minor clashes at Lofa and Huangtsun, between Tientsin and Fengtai. More men and supplies arrive Tientsin. Included are 800-500 lb and 500-50 lb aerial bombs. Train service irregular--J more or less in control of East Station.
- July 16: J reservists doing picket duty at J Concession and East Station. 100 C troops disarmed by J at Anping, southeast of Tungchow. Lt. Gen. Tashiro dies in Tientsin, reportedly of heart-failure. South Manchurian Railway guards, clerks, watchmen, signalmen, etc., now operating (in part) movement of trains at Tientsin. More supplies arrive Tientsin.

- July 17: J protests to Nanking Government re sending of Central Troops to North China as violation of Ho-Umetzu Agreement, asserting that according to provisions of this agreement Central troops were not to be allowed to enter Hopei Province. J claim Central troops now en route north on Pinghan Line. More supplies arrive Tientsin. J send troops to garrison Kung Ta Cotton Mill (J-owned) in Tientsin's Hopei District. New J airfields established at Fengtai and Peitsang. The 27th and 31st Central Army Divisions arrived in Paoting today. They came from Honan, and are part of the 26th Army Corps.
- July 18: J report that Gen. Sung, and Tientsin's Mayor, Gen. Chang Tze-chung, made a verbal apology to Gen. Katsuki in Tientsin for the Lukouchiao Incident. J take over Tsinpu freight godown at Central Station. British check up on their Tientsin Emergency Volunteers. 3500 J troops and 12-75s arrived Tientsin through Shanhaikuan. J start censoring mails at Tientsin's Head Post Office.
- July 19: Desultory firing at Marco Polo Bridge. 29th Army unit returns to Wanping. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek publishes his "four points" to be observed in any negotiation with Japan: Any settlement must not infringe on China's sovereign rights or territorial integrity; status of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council must not be changed; removal of local officials by outside pressure will not be agreed to; and no restriction will be placed on the positions held by the 29th Army. On the evening of this day, the J claim that agreement was reached with the Hopei-Chahar Political Council that: officials whose actions are injurious to Sino-Japanese relations must be dismissed; Communists be drastically suppressed; and rigid control of all anti-J organizations, agitations, and education be exercised. 2700 men (J) and 12-75s arrived Tientsin thru Shanhaikuan.
- July 20: Clashes (minor) at Papaoshan, Wanping, and Fengtai. J erect barricades on C side of their Tientsin Concession. J take over International Race Track near East Arsenal (near Tientsin) after ninth race. Very few men and supplies arrived through Shanhaikuan.
- July 21: Report states J plane bombed Shuntou and then machine gunned Peiping-Hankow train. Also, another J plane machine gunned C troop train on Pinghan Line, with few casualties. It is understood that the 37th Division garrison will be withdrawn from Peiping tomorrow, and that the 132nd Division (also of the 29th Army) will replace it. A few J troops and some supplies arrived Tientsin from Shanhaikuan.
- July 22: One regiment of the 37th Division leaves Peiping and two regiments of the 132nd Division arrives there. J supplies arriving in Tientsin almost ceased. J censors at Tientsin's Head Postoffice withdrawn.
- July 23: Peiping-Hankow (Pinghan) Railroad open to traffic first time since July 7th. Peiping and Tientsin train running on fair schedule but in daylight only. Evacuation of Peiping by C still going on. J supplies arriving in Tientsin practically ceased.
- July 24: Evacuation of Peiping by 37th Division ceases. Martial law in Peiping somewhat relaxed. J supplies arriving in Tientsin practically ceased.
- July 25: 7000 tons supplies landed at Tangku by J. At about 11:10 p.m. a J repair crew and supporting infantry unit repairing telegraph wires at Langfang were attacked by the Chinese garrison there. This was the 226th Regiment of the 36th Division of the 29th Army. J sent for reinforcements.
- July 26: J reinforcements arrived from Tientsin about 6:30 a.m. and, with the help of air bombardment, soon drove the C out. No trains and no telephone to Peiping. Gen. Katsuki sends following demands to Gen. Sung: C to evacuate Marco Polo Bridge, Nanyuan, and Papaoshan by noon on the 27th; and the Peiping 37th Division garrison, and Hsiyuan by noon on the 28th. Late this day a J column, when about halfway inside Peiping's Kuangannan (gate), was fired on by C. Finally extricated. All J civilians ordered into J Embassy. 4000 J troops and 16-75s arrived Tientsin through Shanhaikuan.

July 27: All J civilians inside their Peiping Embassy by noon. Early this morning a Japanese unit, aided by air bombardment, disperses the C regiment of the 29th Army, at Tungchow, when the C refuse to surrender their arms. Heavy C casualties. 450 J troops arrive Tientsin through Shanhaikuan. State of emergency declared Tientsin J Concession when bomb explodes there, killing 7.

July 28: Starting at dawn, and intermittently throughout this day the J bombed Hsiyuan, Nanyuan, Peiyuan, and Marco Polo Bridge. The J Fengtai unit left a holding force at Wanping, and attacked Nanyuan from the south. The C there started to retreat in a dense column along the road to Peiping and were suddenly attacked from the air by J planes, using machine guns and small bombs. C suffered about 70 percent casualties here. The J Tungchow garrison marched on Peiyuan, leaving 50 men to hold Tungchow. This column joined one which had come down from Kopeikou and, attacking Peiyuan, found it deserted. All foreigners in Peiping ordered into their respective diplomatic quarters. One marine wounded. Fantastic reports in circulation about Chinese victories at Fengtai and at Langfang. Gen. Sung, Gen. Ch'in, Mayor of Peiping, and their staffs, departed for Changhsintien in automobiles this evening. This afternoon a unit of the C 29th Army, stationed at Taku, fired a trench-mortar at a small J launch there. No hits but J notify all foreigners to clear the river by morning of the 29th because Taku would be shelled. Some supplies arrived in Tientsin thru Shanhaikuan. In Tientsin: J erect barricades around their Concession; control of all railroad stations virtually in J hands; 62 J airplanes based in Tientsin; J censors resume work in Head Postoffice.

July 29: All C units retreat across Yangtze River by nightfall. Early this morning the Tungchow Pao An Tui revolted and attacked the J nationals there. Approximately 200 J killed, including women and children. J shelled Taku three times, total of about 5 hours, and did little damage. Firing was conducted by 3 J destroyers, firing about 600 rounds. C driven out of Taku by landing force of East Hopei troops under J officers. At 2:00 a.m., Pao An Tui in Tientsin, reportedly reinforced by some 29th Army troops, attacked J at Haikuanssu (Barracks in J concession), East Station, and East Arsenal. J finally force back the C at Haikuanssu and at East Arsenal after daylight, but fighting continues for possession of East Station. J also report building housing their consulate-general shelled by trench mortars, and that C also attacked 300 armed mill-hands at a J mill east of Central Station. French deny use of the International Bridge to J so they construct Ponton bridge across Hai Ho from their concession to edge of 3rd Special Area and send reinforcements to East Station. At time of attack there, J trainload of perhaps 600 men had just arrived from Shanhaikuan. These helped hold off attack. J air units bomb following points in Tientsin, starting at 2:00 p.m.: Nankai College, Pa Li Tai, Customs Building and block of houses near East Station in connection with J defense there, Nankai Middle School, Municipal Government Buildings, Pao An Tui Headquarters, Nankai Girls Middle School, Nankai Primary School, Bureau of Public Safety, Tientsin District Court and Jail, Min Tah Middle School, and the Tsingpu and Peking Railway Administration Offices near the Central Station. Train from Shanhaikuan wrecked at Chunliangchong. 1 French Annamite and 1 Italian Marine killed and two French soldiers wounded in Tientsin today. All concessions and American Compound area barricaded. No commercial communication with Peiping.

July 30: Tungchow garrison relieved today and J started rounding up Pao An Tui there. C attackers at East Station finally forced out and J start house to house search for snipers in Tientsin. J bomb following in Tientsin: shops along road to Central Station, Government Mint, Hopei and Chalkow district telephone exchanges, and Hui Wen Academy. No commercial communication with Peiping.

- July 31: With poor flying weather, J artillery shells Nankai University. Also, Hopei Industrial Experimental Station near Central Station, and the so-called "Boxer Village", 1000 yards east of East Station, were shelled. Refugees start pouring into 3rd Special Area, across Hai Ho and into 1st Special Area. 15th Inf. ^{yesterday} soldiers in American industrial plants in 3rd Special Area, in homes of Americans in 1st Special Area, and offers protection of Barracks to Americans. Only 7 accept. Day and night patrols through 1st Special Area also established. 2nd and 4th Special Area police rounded up by J and disarmed and put in black uniforms to differentiate them from Pao An Tui. Police in 3rd S.A. fled—this area seems to be guarded by armed White Russians. German Consul-General calls to thank C.O., 15th Inf. for presence of American patrols and guards in 1st S.A. saying that they were of much help as a symbol of law and order in Tientsin. Much rain today.
- August 1: Claiming that remnants of Pao An Tui were in 1st Special Area, J in Tientsin stated they would send punitive force there this afternoon and perhaps bomb the area. Plans changed due to intervention of many foreign consuls—many of whom live in or near this area. Peiping's Chinese garrison (part of 132nd Div.) leaves for Nankow at 10:00 p.m. In Tientsin, at 10:00 p.m. U.S.S.R. Consulate in 3rd S.A. is raided by White Russians. Furniture broken, clothing and furnishings ripped, records stolen. Consulate staff living in Talati House Hotel during this incident. No commercial communication with Peiping.
- August 2: 4th S.A. police back on duty in black uniforms. J Kawabe and Suzuki brigades halt pursuit of C troops on Pinghan line at Lianghsiang and outpost Lin Li Ho. J reservists in Tokyo being called up. J report 38th Division of 29th Army concentrating at Tsangchow on Tsinpu line. J report Central troops in Tsangchow. U.S. Army in Tientsin maintain patrols and pickets as usual. At 5:30 p.m. J take over 1st S.A. Bureau and at 6 p.m. 58 police of this area are disarmed (voluntarily) as they leave the U.S. barricade after being ejected from cul-de-sac behind Chantecaille Villas. No police on duty in this area this night. International Bridge incident (J vs French) settled amicably when French again permit armed bodies J troops to use bridge. (See notes, July 29)
- August 3: 1 regt. of C 89 Division arrives Nankow from Kalgan and intrenches. Police now on duty in Tientsin's 1st S.A. Today and last two days 14,000 men (J) and 24-75s arrive Tientsin thru Shanhaikuan. Most of Tientsin's native offices now occupied by J. Mopping-up by J in Tientsin virtually completed. C units between Tehchow and Tsangchow reported to be 10th, 25th, 39th, 85th, 91st Divisions, total of 45,000 men, showing no signs of attacking J. Still no communications with Peiping (except Army radio)
- August 4: 1000 men (J) and 20-150 mm howitzers arrive Tientsin from Shanhaikuan. This number, and those reported on the 3rd, might be the 20th J Div. from Korea. No commercial communication with Peiping.
- August 5: J arrivals in Tientsin to date: 45,000 men, 80-75mm guns, 30-10cm howitzers, 20-15cm howitzers, 600 boxcars supplies, 16 tanks, 150 airplanes (all types), 450 trucks. Casualties (J) reported to date: 363 officers and men killed, 875 officers and men wounded. J in Tientsin putting out security outposts all around city. J estimate C troops Hopei & Chahar 207,000. Gen. Sung resigns as C.O. of C 29th Army and appoints Gen. Feng, Governor of Hopei, as commander.
- August 6: Gen. Chang Tze-chung, Mayor of Tientsin, who took over the Peiping-Tientsin Area when Gen. Sung Cho-yuan fled to Paoting, resigned from all his posts today. Heavy rains today, quiet in this area. Tsinghua Univ. in Peiping raided by J who find rifles and ammunition. J troops still arriving Tientsin. Refugees start returning to homes. Rail & mail communication with Peiping opened.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- August 7: Heavy rains today, J troop arrivals Tientsin continues, J are preparing for attack on Nankow Pass. J Volunteer Unit in Tientsin partly disbanded. Two trains, each way, leave Tientsin & Peiping today.
- August 8: J garrison Peiping with about 2000 men, tanks, guns. A few trains running between Peiping & Tientsin but schedules not dependable.
- August 9: U.S. Army barricades in Tientsin removed.
- August 10: Tientsin mails now going to Shanghai by boat from Taku. J troops move on Nankow. J troops quartered in many Chinese Government buildings in Tientsin.
- August 11: Firing to south and west audible in Tientsin. Tientsin American Chamber of Commerce radios resolution to U.S. State Department opposing proposals that 15th Inf. should be withdrawn from China.
- August 12: Tientsin: during past few days British authorities here have had large Union Jacks displayed on ground in open lots, and some painted on streets. Rifle fire heard from direction of 3rd & 4th S.A.s in Tientsin. About 4000 J men arrived Tientsin thru Shanhaikuan in double-decked boxcars, 50 men per car.
- August 13: Heavy rain today. Firing to south and west of Tientsin and in 3rd Special Area audible--probably bandit operations on small scale.
- August 14: Passenger train from Chinwangtao arrives Tientsin in 21 hours, due J troop movements. Tientsin's British Concession state of emergency ends, some barricades removed.
- August 15: J troop arrivals in Tientsin gain momentum.
- August 16: 15,000 J troops reported arrived Tangku by sea & rail past 3 days.
- August 17: Chinese troops in Hopei & Chahar total 180,000. J troops on foot march north through British Concession to their barracks. probably from Tangku.
- August 18: Last large Chinese vernacular newspaper, "Social Welfare", suspends publication in Tientsin. J publish "Yung Pao", only large vernacular paper left. More J troops, tired and muddy, pass through British Concession headed north. Small clash at Tangku, J vs (probably) plainclothesmen.
- August 19: J anti-aircraft guns in position all around Tientsin. Report of 4,000 J troops land Tangku.
- August 20: Firing audible in Tientsin from direction of 3rd Special Area. Trains to Peiping take at least 12 hours. Train from Chinwangtao to Tientsin took 36 hours today. 3000 J troops pass thru British Concession headed north, also from Tangku. Heavy rain today.
- August 21: U.S. Army Barricades put up at 4 a.m. and removed at 9 a.m.-- this due to report that J would hold anti-aircraft fire & so cause stampede to concessions. J have horse depot in 3rd S.A. J conduct some a.m. fire north of Central Station.
- August 22: J troops still arrive Tientsin large numbers.
- August 23: C troops in North China estimated at over 300,000 men. U.S. Army motorcycle patrols stopped this date.
- August 31: J troop movements through British Concession ceases.

Note: Aside from daily Japanese troop movements, there is nothing further of particular military interest in connection with the operations in the Peiping-Tientsin Area.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NANKOW-TATUNG OPERATIONS

- August 3: 1 Regt. of C 89th Div. arrives Nankow and entrenches.
- August 7: J preparing for attack on Nankow Pass.
- August 10: J troops moving on Nankow with 3,000 men, 25 tanks, 3 batteries 105 mm guns, 2 batteries 75 mm guns.
- August 11: J use artillery in preparation for attack on Nankow.
- August 12: C still hold Nankow and Nankow Pass in face of J artillery fire.
- August 13: J Migikura and Nara units take town of Nankow. Each unit probably is a reinforced regiment.
- August 14: Attack slows down. (Rain in this area since August 11th, continued off and on until after Nankow Pass was captured.)
- August 16: J admit 1000 casualties at Nankow to date. Send for reinforcement.
- August 17: J have 10,000 men at Nankow now.
- August 19: J have about 15,000 men at Nankow. Flanks extend 10 miles on each side. C have the 89th Div. involved, and in support: 4th, 21st, 84th, 94th, 143rd Divs. Last two are at Kalgan. Total C strength is 67,000, counting these reserves.
- August 20: J unit starts around southern flank at Nankow. J 5th Division being used here, consists of the 11th, 21st, 41st, and 42nd Regiments. C.G. is Itagaki. J bomb Huailai.
- August 22: J bomb Kalgan. J force from Jehol operating south towards Kalgan. C units start counter-flanking move to north of Nankow.
- August 23: J force from Jehol appears at Kalgan. Probably this is the 1st Division commanded by Lt.-Gen. Kawamura. J bomb Huailai.
- August 24: Nankow flanking force reaches Great Wall to south of Nankow. Chu Yung Kuan in Nankow Pass captured by J. C troops which on Aug. 22nd started counter-flanking move to the northeast, start moving southwest to keep from being cut off. Kalgan taken today by (probably) 1st Division J troops. J bomb Huailai and Tatung.
- August 25: J troops, after flank march, attack C rear and C start retirement, heading en masse for Yuh sien. J bomb Tatung.
- August 27: J take Huailai.
- August 28: J 21st Regt. of 5th Div. takes Hsinpaoan. Occupation of Kalgan completed.
- August 29: J units from Nankow and from Kalgan meet, thus clearing Pingsui Railroad as far as Kalgan.
- August 30: J report 2000 C dead and state they lost 200 killed and 400 wounded from Aug. 16-30. J estimates of their own casualties are probably low.
- Sept. 2: Lt. Gen. Itagaki said J would advance either to Paotou or to Tungkuan via Taiyuan in Shansi.
- Sept. 3-10: J consolidating and bringing supplies up to Kalgan, also repairing long tunnel at top of grade in Nankow Pass where C derailed 8 locomotives.
- Sept. 10: Tienchen captured by J Tsutsumi unit with little opposition.
- Sept. 11: Long tunnel cleared and line open to Kalgan from Peiping. Yangkar taken by J Hasegawa unit.

- Sept. 13: J units, one of which was the Goto Unit, (16th Inf., 2nd Div.) occupy Tatung without a fight. Yuchow taken by 3 J columns which had moved south from Huailai. One column was the Yamada unit (41st Inf., 5th Div.)
- Sept. 14: Kuangling taken by J unit which took Yuchow yesterday.
- Sept. 16: Huaijen, south of Tatung, taken.
- Sept. 17: Hunyuan taken by 41st Regt., 5th Div. and Laiyuan taken by Aihara Unit (21st Inf. Regt. of 5th Div.)
- Sept. 18: J units moving south from Tatung, and those moving west from Hunyuan, met at Yingchow, which was taken. Fengchen, on the Pingsui line north of Tatung, and in Suiyuan, captured today by the J Senda unit.

CHAHAR-SUIYUAN OPERATIONS

- August 19: Reports indicate that Shangtu and Chapsur (Chiapussu) have been captured by Mongol troops in Chahar which advanced from the Changpei area. (These Mongol troops were commanded by Teh Wang, also called Prince Teh.)
- August 21: Mongols aided by J airplanes repulse C attack at Kunghui, 12 miles north of Changpei. J report that 7th Div. of C cavalry involved.
- Sept. 8: Mongol troops commanded by Li Shou-hsin take Shangyi, 30 miles west of Changpei. Mongols pushing C troops back to Shangtu from Tehua.
- Sept. 14: C troops in Suiyuan are probably General Fu Tso-yi's 70th, 72d, & 73d Divisions of perhaps 24,000 men plus perhaps another 24,000 who retreated north from Tatung.
- Sept. 17: Shangtu taken by Mongol unit with J air help. (Mongol units not strong enough to take Pingtichuan unaided. J 1st Div. ordered north from Shansi to help. In this connection, a Mongol source has stated that the original plan was for the Mongols to clear Suiyuan of C troops unaided, while units of the 1st Div. were to be used in Shan.)
- Sept. 18: J Senda unit, part of 1st Div., moving north from Tatung, takes Fengchen in Suiyuan.
- Sept. 20: J Tanaka unit, advancing north from Yuyu, 50 miles west of Tatung, takes Shahukou, a pass in the Great Wall to Suiyuan. A second column takes Hsinhe, east of Pingtichuan, while the Senda unit moves north on the railroad. Mongol unit (fourth column) pursuing C unit west from Shangtu towards Taolin.
- Sept. 24: Pingtichuan taken by J today. Senda unit entered from south, Ichinomiya unit from the east, Tanaka unit from the southwest, and Itakura unit plus some Mongol auxiliaries from Tehua entered from north. (Following the success J 1st Div. ordered back to Shansi.)
- Sept. 27: Tamiao taken by Mongols under Prince Teh. They then move on Pailingmiao.
- Sept. 28: Taolin taken by Mongols under Li Shou-hsin with J air help.
- Sept. 29: Mongol unit under Li Shou-hsin, moving west from Taolin, takes Wulanhua.
- Oct. 2: Mongols under Prince Teh from Tamiao take Pailingmiao, C capital of Inner Mongolia.
- Oct. 7: Mongols under Li Shou-hsin, from Wulanhua, take Wu-ch'uan. (Mongol units not considered strong enough to take Suiyuan City unaided. J 1st Div. units again ordered north from Shansi to help the Mongols.)

- October 10: J Tanaka and Hasegawa units of 1st Div. again pass through Shahukou, encountering little resistance. Other units (unknown) from 1st Div. move north along the railroad.
- October 12: Mongols under Prince Teh, from Paolingmiao, take Erchiaying and then move on Suiyuan City.
- October 13: J Michimori unit, part of 1st Div., takes small town just south-east of Suiyuan City. Four columns converging on Kueihua and Suiyuan City. Kueihua, suburb of Suiyuan City, taken today. Press reports state it is 10 degrees below zero in this region.
- October 14: Suiyuan City taken by four columns. Two columns were the Mongol units under Prince Teh attacking from the northwest, and the Mongols under Li Shou-hsin attacking from the northeast. Another column, part of 1st Div., attacked from the east astride the railroad. The fourth column, consisting of the Tanaka, Hasegawa, and Michimori units of the 1st Div., attacked from the south. (Units of 1st Div. this time are kept in Suiyuan and not sent back to Shansi as the J believe that the Mongols will need further help in these operations.)
- October 16: J units of 1st Div. take Salachi and move on Paotou.
- October 17: J units of 1st Div. take Paotou, and push on to Paohu, 20 miles further which is captured this evening. Railroad now clear of C troops from Tatung to end of line.
- October 22: Defeated C troops moving towards Ninghsia province via Wuyuan and Linho. (Both about 120 miles west of Paotou.)
- November 1: J troops, pursuing defeated C troops, approach Wuyuan.

SHANSI OPERATIONS

- September 13: J units, one of which was the Goto unit (16th Inf., 2nd Div.), occupy Tatung without a fight.
- September 14: Kuangling taken by J units from Yuchow. (One is 41st Inf., 5th Di .
- September 16: Huaijen, south of Tatung, taken. Taiyuan bombed.
- September 17: Hunyuan taken by 41st Regt., 5th Division. Taiyuan bombed. 3 C planes attempt bomb Tatung--driven off. Laiyuan taken by 21st Regt., 5th Division.
- September 19: 11th & 41st Regts., 5th Div., move to Laiyuan. Taiyuan bombed.
- September 20: 21st & 42nd Regts., 5th Div., take Lingchiu.
- September 24: Yinghsien taken by 16th Inf., 2nd Div. The 21st & 42nd Regts., 5th Div., started drive on Taying.
- September 27: J troops, 16th Inf., 2nd Div., arrive at Great Wall.
- September 28: Shohsien taken by J unit. Ju Yueh Kow Pass on Great Wall taken by 16th Inf., 2nd Div.
- September 29: 16th Inf., 2nd Div., takes Fanchih. J report bombing C Red troops at Taihsien.
- September 30: Taying taken by 21st & 42nd Regts., 5th Div., after very severe fighting against units of 8th Red Army. Ningwu taken by J unit which captured Shohsien on Sept. 28th. Taichow taken by 16th Regt., 2nd Div., with the Ishikura unit, which caused the fall of the strong Yenmenkuan Pass. (Taichow taken after 5-hour fight.)

- October 1: J report that 10 C divisions are in retreat to the south. (Probably a total of about 60,000 men.) C units in this area are believed to be: 143rd, 86th, 101st divisions, possibly 4 Red Army divisions under Chu Teh, and perhaps one or two of the 4th, 21st, 64th, and 89th divisions. (All the above under the command of Gen. Yen Hsi-shan, Governor of Shansi Province.)
- October 3: J troops prepare for march on Taiyuan. Taiyuan bombed.
- October 4: Taiyuan bombed. Units of 2nd Div. move on Kwohsien and capture airfield just south of Taichow.
- October 5: Kwohsien taken by Ishikura unit & 16th Inf., 2nd Div., assisted by the 1st and 3rd Regts., 1st Div., which were then ordered to Suiyuan to help the Mongols. (See "Suiyuan operations," Oct. 7th.)
- October 7: Hsienkang taken by column moving southeast from Ningwu. (See notes on Sept. 30th)
- October 11: Yuanping taken by units of 2nd Div., moving south from Kwansien after lapse of some days spent in reorganizing.
- October 12: J units reported reaching Hsinkou, 10 miles south of Yuanping.
- October 13: C report they made counteroffensive in three columns on Wutai, Yuanping, and Ningwu. C report J retreating in disorder. C probably have 150,000 men on these three fronts.
- October 17: C report 40 to 50 thousand J troops surrounded in Wutai, Yuanping, Ningwu area. J in Pichsin have no information on this situation but admit that perhaps some J units are now out of touch with their main body.
- October 18: Situation still in state of flux with both C & J out of touch with many of their smaller units. J report C troops in this area total 80,000 men.
- October 19: J report small advance in mountains north of Hsinkou. J troops in Shansi area believed to be 2nd and 5th Divs. and part, at least of 3rd Div.
- October 21: C report successful air raid on J field at Yuanping.
- October 24: J reports claim that C are using gas shells against them in the Hsinkou region. C counterattack repulsed in heights west of Hsinkou.
- October 27: Taiyuan bombed by Sonoda air unit which reported 3 C planes and some hangars damaged. J 16th and 30th Regts, 2nd Div., capture height west of Hsinkou.
- October 30: J units open fresh attack on Hsinkou. Taiyuan bombed.
- October 31: Taiyuan bombed. Hsinkou deadlock unbroken.
- November 1: Taiyuan bombed. J report C troops in Shansi (front and rear areas) are composed of Central troops, Eads, Szechuan troops, and Shansi troops. J identify them as follows: 18th, 45th, 64th, 65th, 66th, 68th, 69th, 71st, 72nd, 84th, 90th, 101st, 123rd, 124th, and 2 divisions of Red troops. (Estimated total is 120,000 men.)
- November 2: Taiyuan bombed by Shimada and Nakazono air units. J units of 5th Div. take Hsinkou and push south. Hida unit takes Hsinhsien. C resistance broken in this region.
- November 3: C flee in confusion. J units advance without opposition to point 10 miles north of Taiyuan.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- November 4: J units of 20th Div., occupy Yutze, junction of Chengtai & Tatung-Puchow RRs.
- November 5: J units reach Hsintien, 4 miles north of Taiyuan. Taiyuan, and other C positions bombed by Sonoda, Nakatomi, Shibata, Ueda, and Torita air units.
- November 6: Taiyuan north gate attacked as other units attack from the northeast and west. Meanwhile, the 16th and 30th Regts. of 2nd Div., are mopping up in the northern outskirts of Taiyuan.
- November 7: Small C garrison still holds Taiyuan. 28th Cav. Regt. of 20th Div. reaches Taiku. J air unit reports bombing 7 C troop trains fleeing south between Pingyao and Chiehshui.
- November 8: Kayashima unit take Taiyuan east gate, Obata unit takes northwestern gate. Kurihara artillery unit fires on North Gate, with 21st and 42nd Regts. of 5th Div. also involved here. J claim capture of northwest third of Taiyuan. J bomb C defenses.
- November 9: C defenders of Taiyuan, (84th Division), defeated in hand-to-hand street fighting after 16th & 30th Regts., 2nd Div., forced the north gate and the Kayashima unit the northeastern gate. The 21st & 42nd Regts., 5th Division now mopping up in the city. 78th Regt. of 20th Div. pursuing defeated C units south from Taiku. Chingyuan taken by J unit, Chihhsion taken by 79th Regt. of 20th Div., and Pingyao taken by 28th Cav. Regt. of 20th Division.
- November 10-12: No reports received.

PINGHAN LINE OPERATIONS

- August 2: After their pursuit of C troops fleeing from Peiping area, J Kawabe and Suzuki brigades halt at Lianghsiang and outpost Liu Li Ho.
- August 5: C troops along Pinghan line: at Kaopeitien, 9th Cav. Div. & 13th Ind. Brig.; at Paoting-Shihchiachuang area, 10th, 30th, 31st, 116th, 119th, 130th, 141st, 142nd Divs; at Hantan, 139th Div.; at Chochow 37th, 132nd Divs. Total on this line about 80,000 men.
- August 6: No action--heavy rains.
- August 7: No action--heavy rains.
- August 10: J planes bomb Paoting.
- August 12: Small skirmish at Lianghsiang--C repulsed by J.
- August 15: Unconfirmed report states street fighting in Lianghsiang with J repulsing C attackers.
- August 19: C start moving around J west flank at Lianghsiang.
- August 20: C flankers reach point near Changhsintien, where they threaten J line of communications.
- August 21: J troops attack west from Lianghsiang and drive C troops back. J take Toli.
- August 22: J take Liu Li Ho and C troops, which had moved up to Fangshan from Chochow, went back again.
- August 23-29: Minor engagements in hills west of Lianghsiang. J successful. Hadori unit involved.
- August 30: Following C units believed on Pinghan line: (See data under Aug. 5th) Add thereto the 2nd Div. north of Paoting (perhaps at Chochow). Also change 37th Div. from Chochow to Hokien and add the 38th Div. at Hokien. J units on this front probably all or parts of the 6th, 14th, and 20th Divs.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- September 1-4: Sporadic firing and skirmishes in this area. J planes bombing C irregulars.
- September 5: A J cavalry unit ambushed at Chienchuntai, 30 miles west of Peiping. Suffered heavy casualties. J Kanda and Okamoto units (23rd and 45th Regts. of the 6th Division) sent in.
- September 11: J Suzuki unit (80th Regt. of 20th Div.) repulsed C counter-attack south of Lianghsiang and then moved on Fangshan.
- September 13: Chienchuntai finally captured by J 23rd and 45th Regts. after 8 days hard fighting. C units (part of a division) retired to the southwest. This success removed threat to Peiping area from the west and left J free to move south. J moving on Kuan. C defending south bank Yungting River. J move up guns and pentons.
- September 14: J attack on wide front. West of Pinghan line C defend with Gen. Sun Lien-chung's 27th, 30th, and 31st Divisions. East of the line with Gen. Wan Fu-lin's 116th 119th, 130th Divs. Chochow possibly garrisoned by 132nd Division. C has total of 45,000 men. Kuan garrisoned by 91st Division. J have (probably) 20th Div. west of railroad, 6th Div. from the railroad east to Kuan, and parts of the 14th Div. between Kuan and Yungching, farther east. J start move outflanking Kuan to east and west.
- September 15: Suzuki unit (80th Regt. of 20th Div.) takes Fangshan. (See data, Sept. 14, for C units). J units (2nd and 15th Regts. of 14th Div. and the Sakamishi unit) break through between Kuan and Yungching. Kuan taken. (See data, Sept. 14 for C units involved.) J use tanks, heavy artillery, aircraft in this advance.
- September 16: Most of C 91st Div. retreats from Kuan. One regiment refuses to run and holds out until midnight of this day. J air units active all along this 50-mile front today.
- September 17: 3 J columns trying to cut Chochow off. One started from Yungching, one from Kuan, and one west thereof. C still hold Chochow. (The unit from Yungching, part of 14th Div., had a bad time in deep mud in that area.)
- September 18: Column from Kuan (part of 14th Div.) now astride Pinghan line just above Kaopitien. Column from Yungching reaches Hsincheng. Column west of the Kuan column crosses railroad below Chochow and moves on Laishui. (This is a part of the 6th Div. Units of the 20th Div. (Koito and Kobayashi units--77th and 78th Regts) also moving along west side of railroad on Laishui. However, C troops pulled out of Chochow on the night of the 17th and so were not trapped. They then took up positions on Ihsien-Laishui Kaopitien line today.
- September 19: Units of 14th Division take Hsincheng thus flanking the C line as established yesterday. C fall back towards Paoting. J 7th Air Regt. bombed Shihchiachuang today. Planes of the J 1st Air Regt. bombed C troops in the area south of Kaopitien.
- September 20: Units of 14th Div. which took Hsincheng yesterday now at Kucheng on the railroad. Retreating C units reach and take positions on the line Mancheng-Hsian. 28th Cav. of 20th Div. takes Ihsien.
- September 21: J units reach Hsushui. J do not expect C to put up a fight for Paoting.
- September 22: Units of 20th Div. break the C lines at Mancheng and move down to the west of Paoting. Units of the 6th Div., after a hard fight, break through to the north of Paoting. Units of the 14th Div. break through the C lines to the east and move down to the east side of Paoting. C units were reported to be the 17th, 25th, and 27th Divisions. The 16th Div., leaving the Tsingpu line, moves southwest along Tzuya (or Huto) River and takes Tachang.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- September 23: J units move on Paoting from west, north, east, and southeast. Most of C troops retreat to the south. A few stay in the city. J artillery moves up.
- September 24: J units breach northwest corner of Paoting's wall and in three hours clear the city of Chinese troops. Part of J 14th Div. today also cuts the railroad below Paoting but the south gate is not besieged. As the defenders attempt to retreat via this opening, J units ambush and practically destroy them. Main body of C units continue southerly withdrawal.
- September 26: J armored train (Kimura unit) takes Hsinle station.
- September 29: Hsienhsien taken by 16th J Division after moving south along Tzuva (or Huto) River from Tacheng.
- September 30: Paoting station bombed by lone C plane. Driven off by J A.A. fire.
- October 1-3: J units in this area engaged in strengthening lines of communications by clearing out C remnants, a task for which they had no time in their rapid advance.
- October 4: J main body reaches Hsinle without opposition. The 16th Division captures Hengshui after march south from Hsienhsien which fell Sept 29th. Fighting in flooded terrain, the 16th Div. disperses the 8th and 107th C Divs. at Hengshui.
- October 8: J units, (23rd & 45th Regts. of 6th Div.), moving on Shihchiachuang take Chengting after advancing from Hsinle against little opposition.
- October 9: C troops, probably 27th, 30th, 31st 56th, 2nd, 130th, 10th, 83rd, 116th, 132nd Divisions, defending along south bank of Huto River, from west of Pingshan to east of Chinchow. Also probably 139th, 141st, and 142nd Divisions at Chaochow. J units are the 6th, 14th, 20th, and at least a part of the 103rd Division. (Note: This last named unit is composed of J reservists from the 8th Division area in Japan.) Today J troops advance to north bank of River under artillery barrage.
- October 10: On the extreme west flank, the 78th Regt, 20th Div., attacked west of Tienhsing. The 77th Regt, 20th Div., attacked at Tienhsien. The 79th and 80th Regts, 20th Div., attacked just west of Pingshan. The success of these units secured, against possible C attack, the west flank of the 27th Brig. (2nd & 59th Regts) of the 14th Division which broke the C lines between Chengting and Pingshan. The 27th Brig. was followed by the 28th Brig. (15th & 50th Regts) also of the 14th Division. (The 14th Div. is commanded by Lt. Gen. Deihara.) The 14th Div. then closed in on Shihchiachuang from the northwest, aided by the 6th and 103th Divs. which had attacked on the east of the line. Meanwhile, J 7th Air Regt. bombed C positions along the front, their rear areas, and also points along the railroad south of Shihchiachuang.
- October 11: C units in full retreat. J 20th Div. on the west flank moves west on the Chongtai Railroad and the 77th Regt. of this division captures Chinghsing. The 14th Division moves south along the Pinghan line and takes Yintsun. The 45th Regt., 6th Division, takes Luancheng. Inoki unit advances on Chaochow.
- October 12: J 2nd and 53th Regt, 14th Div., takes Yuanshin which was held by Gen. Shang Shen's 32nd Army, and the 14th Div. moves on Kanyi. Inoki unit (part of 6th Div.) takes Chaochow. The J 16th Div. after a march west from Hengshui takes part in capture of Chaochow. (The 16th Div. took Hengshui on Oct. 4th. See these notes on that date.) C retreat to the southwest, 6th and 103th Divs. mop up. Kanyi taken by 14th Div. after preliminary air bombardment.

- October 13: Pihsiang taken by Inoki unit and 45th Regt. (both of 6th Div.)
- October 14: Neichiu taken by J Inoki and 45th Regt. (both of 6th Div.)
 Hantan bombed.
- October 15: Shunteh bombed by J. J report 10,000 C troops killed and 20,000 wounded in Shihchiachung area battles.
- October 16: 2nd and 50th Regts of 14th Div. capture Shunteh. Move on Hantan. 14th Div. capture Shunteh. Move on Hantan, 14th Div. on railroad 16th on the east, and probably the 6th and 106th in rear.
- October 17: Hantan station occupied by armored train. Nanto, east of Shunteh taken by (probably) units of 16th Division. Kuangding, 46 miles northeast of Hantan, also occupied. (Probably by units of 16th Division).
- October 18: C retreating to Chang River on Hopei-Honan border. J enter Tzechow without resistance.
- October 19: C defending along south bank of Chang River on line Kuantai-Fenglochen-Linchang. C troops also holding Taming.
- October 20: J unit (unknown) crossed Chang River near Kuantai and was immediately attacked by a C unit much larger. The Tanishima unit, sent forward as a reinforcement, was also almost immediately in difficulty. Moving due west, the 50th Regt., 14th Division, attacked the C units in flank at Kuantai.
- October 21: J move on C flank at Kuantai successful. C retreat from this point. 2nd Regt., 14th Div., crossed Chang River east of Fenglochen.
- October 22: J 50th Regt., 14th Division, captures railway bridge over Chang River. J Shibata Air Regt. bombs C lines in this area, also bombs Changteh. C troops at Fenglochen, flanked by 2nd Regt. from east, retires on Changteh.
- October 23: Fenglochen taken by 2nd and 40th Regts., 14th Division. To date J estimate they have suffered 4,467 killed. According to another report the estimate of 4,467 included both killed and wounded in North China. Japanese estimate C have suffered 175,000 killed and wounded in North China. On Pingnan line to date, J report C have 25,000 dead. (This figure, 175,000 is admittedly an estimate. J report they have actually noted only 44,000 dead C troops in North China.
- October 24: Unknown J unit crosses Chang River and captures Linchang.
- October 26: C planes attempt bomb Chang River railroad bridge--J report shooting down two.
- November 1: C counterattack (possibly by 47th and 89th Divisions) repulsed by J units.
- November 3: C retreating on Changteh. J pursue.
- November 4: J report capture of Changteh.
- November 11: C unit (unknown, but reported to be part of 20th Army) met by large J force at Pihsiang, 25 miles east of Shunteh, and defeated. C troops retired toward Taming. (This C unit is from Linching in Shantung Province and was evidently making an attempt to cut the railway at Shunteh behind the J front lines.) Taming taken by 59th Regt. of 14th Division, probably attacking before the defeated units from Pihsiang could get there and reinforce the garrison. Attack aided by preliminary artillery bombardment by Torita unit. (J report 3 C divisions defeated at Taming.

November 12: Early this morning small groups of C troops raided Tzechow, Shunteh, and RR bridges on Chang River, with the hope of cutting the J lines of communication to the rear. J report C defeated in all attempts and that they withdrew towards Shantung.

CHENGTAI LINE OPERATIONS

October 11: J 20th Div. on west flank of J advance turns west on the Chengtai railroad and the 77th Regt. of this division takes Cairghaing.

October 12: J 20th Div. reaches C positions at Niangtzekuan. J air units bomb strategic points along Chengtai line as far west as Yutze.

October 13: Units of 20th Div. take town of Niangtzekuan but are driven out by successful C counterattack.

October 25: J admit C defenses at Niangtzekuan still holding. J report C troops in this area to be 5th, 7th, 12th, 27th, 30th, 31st, 47th, and 89th Divisions, total of about 55,000 men. J places bomb all C positions in this area.

October 26: J 79th Regt. of 20th Div., after a march around C south flank, attacks C rear at Paiching. C flee. 77th Regt. captures Chinkuan, and then Hsinankuan, both by frontal assaults. After success of 79th Regt., the 78th Regt. attacks Niangtzekuan, and C troops, fearing that they will be cut off, retire. Then 79th Regt. advances to Hsinankuan and captures the town. J reports 10,000 C troops killed in these actions.

October 27: J units clear remnants from area and reach line 10 miles west of Niangtzekuan.

October 28: Yangchuan attacked by (probably) 77th & 78th Regts. and Pingtan attacked by (probably) 79th & 80th Regts. of 20th Division.

October 30: Pingting and Yangchuan taken after hard fighting. Advance continued to Pingtan on Chengtai railroad. Yutze bombed by J air unit.

October 31: J unit takes Tseshih. Yutze bombed.

November 1: J cavalry unit (probably 28th Cavalry Regt.) takes Chinkuan.

November 2: Shouyang taken by 28th Cavalry Regt. of 20th Division.

November 3: Tsan taken by 23th Cavalry Regt. of 20th Division. Infantry following close behind, with 73th Regt. north of the railroad and the 80th Regt. on the south.

November 4: J units occupy Yutze, junction of Chengtai and Tatung-Puchow Railroads.

(With the capture of Yutze, the Chengtai operations, as such, are considered complete. Further information on the action of the 20th Division will be found under "Shansi Operations", starting with Nov. 4th.)

TSINGTAI LINE OPERATIONS

August 3: J mopping-up operations in Shantung virtually completed. Reports state C troops between Tzechow and Tsangchow are the 10th, 25th, 39th, 85th, and 91st Divs.

August 5: J in Shantung putting out security detachments around city--one detachment believed at Tsangliashing, another at Hsiao Hsi.

August 6 & 7: Quiet on this front--heavy rains. Area west and south of Tientsin flooded.

August 12: Clash at Tulinan between C and J outposts.

- August 13: Tokyo reports that 10th and 16th J Divisions are en route to China from Kobe.
- August 18: J units meet and disperse C plainclothes groups at Taku and Hsiaoan.
- August 20: J 10th Div. located on Tsinpu line. (16th Div. probably in this area also.)
- August 22: J units move south from Tuliuchen towards Chinghai. Mud, knee deep, hampers both sides.
- August 23: J attacking Chinghai in force, using artillery, defenders reported to be 38th C Division.
- August 24: J units take Chinghai. C reinforcements arrive and they counter-attack, driving J troops back out of Chinghai.
- August 25: J 10th Regt., 10th Div., again attacks Chinghai, captures it, and holds it against C counterattacks. Small C group routed when they try counterattack west of Tuliuchen.
- August 26: Machang bombed. J admit heavy casualties at Chinghai.
- August 29: Chonkuantun taken by 10th Regt., 10th Division, after preliminary air bombardment.
- ~~August 30:~~ Advance of J 39th Regt. of 10th Div. (east of the railroad) impeded by flooded terrain due to C having cut dike of Grand Canal above Machang.
- August 31: Wangkouchen, 10 miles west of Chinghai, taken (probably) by units of the 16th Division.
- September 1: C units in this area between Tehchow and Machang are reported to be: 23rd, 25th, 39th, 85th, 91st, 107th, 106th, 113th, and 114th Divisions, totalling about 60,000 men. Defending north of Machang are the 37th and 38th Divisions, according to J reports. Indications are that these positions north of Machang are being attacked by the 10th and 39th Regts. of the 10th J Division.
- September 2: J units approaching Tangkiantun.
- September 5: J 10th Regt., 10th Div., occupies Tangkiantun after it had been subjected to air and artillery bombardment.
- September 9: Machang and Liuho defended by remnants of C 37th, 38th, & 132nd Divisions.
- September 10: 39th & 40th Regts. of 10th Div., take Liuho (on west bank of Grand Canal) after heavy artillery bombardment of the town at a range of 1000 meters. Heavy J air bombardment of Machang soon has the town on fire. 10th Regt. of 10th Div. starts front assault on Machang.
- September 11: Machang taken by J 10th Regt. 10th Div. and pushes on south. Advance elements of the 39th & 40th Regts. of 10th Division reaches Chinghsien.
- September 13: Chinghsien occupied by 39th & 40th Regts. of 10th Div.
- September 15: 33rd Regt. of 16th Division aided by the Nagai unit (also probably part of the 16th Division) takes Rancher, 10 miles west of Machang.
- September 17: Hsiangchi occupied by 39th & 40th Regts. of 10th Division.
- September 18: J units moving on Tsangchow. Tsangchow bombed by J air units.

- September 19: Units of the 16th Division start attack on Tacheng. Tsangchow and Tacheng bombed by J air units.
- September 21: J units reach a point 5 miles north of Tsangchow. Tsangchow bombed by J air units.
- September 22: Tacheng taken by units of the 16th Division, one of which was the Aoki unit. 10th, 39th, & 40th Regts. of 10th Div. occupy towns just north and east of Tsangchow. C troops at Tsangchow are two divisions of the 57th Army, one of the 49th Army, the 39th Div., and the 11th Cavalry Div. They were in positions which had been worked on for months.
- September 23: 33rd & 38th Regts. of 16th Division pursuing defeated C units south from Tacheng. C troops falling back from Tsangchow.
- September 24: J 10th, 39th, & 40th Regts. of 10th Div. occupy Tsangchow. J report 2000 C killed in this fight.
- September 26: J 16th Div. units attacking Shahochiao.
- September 27: J 16th Div. captures Shahochiao, J air units bomb Potochen and Tachow.
- September 28: J 10th Div. takes Potochen.
- September 29: J 16th Div. takes Hsienhsien, 35 miles west of the railroad, and the 10th Div. takes Tungkuang. Very little resistance encountered at either place.
- September 30: J 10th Div. takes Hsienchen. Start attack on Tachow. Tachow and Tacheng bombed by J air units.
- October 1: C opposition demoralized by refusal of 50,000 men of old Northeastern Army units to fight. C begin general retreat to Tehchow, and J take Sangyuan and push on to within 3 miles of Tehchow without opposition.
- October 2: Tacheng taken by units of the 16th Division, one of which was the Aoki unit.
- October 2: Mutinous Northeastern Army units looting at Yucheng, 20 miles north of Tsinan. C send 74th and 81st Divisions to Yucheng to bring the mutineers under control.
- October 3: Tehchow taken by J units of 10th Div. The 39th Regt. attacked the northeast corner of the city wall, and the main body of the Division executed a flank march and attacked the town from the east. The C troops retreated to keep from being cut off. J air units bomb retreating C units.
- October 4: The 16th Div. captures Hengshui, 38 miles northwest of Tehchow, after march south from Hsienhsien, which fell on Sept. 29th. Fighting in flooded terrain the 16th Div. disperses the 8th and 107th C Divs. at Hengshui. (Note: see Pinghan Line Operations, also Oct. 4th.)
- October 5: J units take small town 7 miles south of Tehchow, and J units also appear at Kuching.
- October 6: C mutineers (units of Northeastern Army) at Yucheng finally brought under control with serious disaster to C averted.
- October 7: J armored train advancing from Tehchow, occupies Pingyuan. Gen. Fan Fu-chu, Governor of Shantung, now commanding his units (22nd, 74th, and 81st Divs.) at the front.
- October 13: After a week's inactivity, J units once more start moving south and attack Pingyuan. It is considered probable that the C units were awaiting supplies and also clearing their lines of communication during this period. (Caution is added this last item with the unconfirmed report that between Oct. 6th and Oct. 10th C units had cut the railroad behind the J units-notably at Potochen and Tungkuang.)

- October 14: Pingyuan taken by infantry units of the 10th Division supported by the fire of the 10th Field Artillery. Ehsien, 8 miles west of Pingyuan, and Changchuang, 10 miles south of Pingyuan also taken.
- October 17: J advance units reach north bank of Tuhai River opposite Yucheng which is defended by one Szechuan division and two divisions of Shantung troops.
- October 20: Unconfirmed report from Tsinan states J troops withdrawing northwards from Tuhai River. J spokesman in Tientsin believes this report but admits J troops have encountered strong opposition at Tuhai River. Rumors of activity of small groups of J troops in J rear areas give credence to report that J troops are held up.
- October 21: Situation confused. It may be that the J have halted their advance to clear rear areas of C remnants. Possibility of C advance north towards Tehchow considered improbable considering their unstable position following mutiny of Northeastern Army troops at Yucheng on Oct. 2nd. Hada unit (attached to 10th Div.) captures, without opposition, a small town just west of Yucheng.
- October 22: C troops breach Tuhai River dike and flood area between Yucheng and Changchuang. Linhsien, 16 miles southeast of Tehchow, taken by 10th Regt., 10th Div. The C defenders (29th Division) retreat towards Linyi.
- October 23: Assisted by air bombardment, 10th Regt., 10th Div., takes Fengwangtze and then moves south and takes Kayaowu, 11 miles east of Pingyuan.
- October 24: C troops which had crossed the Tuhai River east of Yucheng, and had advanced to Linyi, were bombed there by J Nakahira air unit today. J admit C shot down one J bombing plane here.
- October 25: J Kawada unit (probably a unit attached to 10th Div.) repulse C counterattack to west of Ehsien.
- October 28: C units, crossing Yellow River at Chiyang en route to reinforce Linyi, bombed by J air units.
- October 29: J Naval air units bomb bridge on Tsinpu line at Tsunhsien, about 35 miles south of Tsinan.
- October 30: C units of 29th Div. move north from Linyi, counterattack at Fengwangtze, and are beaten off by J Suozaga unit with the aid of the Naval unit which was sent to reinforce the Suozaga unit.

(Up to Nov. 12, when this report closes, there were no further reports on the operation on the Tsinan front.)

CHANGHAI SITUATION

- July 24: Seaman Miyazaki reported missing. Alleged to have been kidnapped, but later found and admitted he deserted.
- August 9: Foster agent and Seaman Sakai killed by Chinese soldiers near Tungiao Station.
- August 11: Both sides trying to settle Hunziao incident by means of diplomacy.
- August 12: C 34th Div. moved to Changhai North Station on Kiangsu Rice Course. State of emergency declared. Barricades erected in Trench Concessions.

- August 13: War in Shanghai starts. C troops mass in Hongkow area and on Shanghai-Woosung Railroad, fighting breaking out in Chapel sector. J and C artillery exchange fire. In Shanghai C have between 30,000 and 40,000 including two Central Government Divisions, the 8th and 88th. In the vicinity of Sungkiang and Kiating there are the 36th, 55th, 56th, and 57th Divisions. J landing force, normally 1,800 sailors, reinforced by 2,200 landed from J destroyers.
- August 14: C bombers, while attempting to bomb the "Izumo" (J flagship) missed their mark and hit the International Settlement. 1,047 civilians killed and 1,000 wounded.
- August 18: Foreign observers estimate 800,000 C troops in the Nanking area, and about 150,000 in the Shanghai area.
- August 19: Units of J 3d, 9th, and 11th Divisions are in the Shanghai area. To date J report a loss of 96 killed and 200 wounded.
- August 20: J control most of Hongkow. One shell strikes U.S.S. "Augusta" One killed and 18 wounded on "Augusta".
- August 21: C 61st and 62d Divisions are in Chapel and Kiangwan sectors.
- August 22: 5,000 J troops land at Shanghai. C 45th, 19th, and 63d Division in vicinity of Chapel and Pootung.
- August 23: 3,000 civilians killed and wounded when shell of unknown origin lands in Sincere's Department Store, International Settlement. J land reinforcements in vicinity of Woosung, suffering 350 casualties including 63 dead. Prior to landing J fleet bombard C forces in area between Woosung and Lion Forest Fort. C have between 70,000 and 80,000 troops in Shanghai area. C casualties from the 19th to date is reported to be approximately 15,000. J casualties reported to be about 2,000. J reinforcements estimated over 50,000 under command of General Matsui arrive off Woosung Ports. General Matsui assumes command in Shanghai.
- August 25: J land troops in Woosung. Commander of Japanese Third Fleet, Vice Admiral Hasegawa, issues order declaring a blockade of C shipping along China coasts extending from Shanhaikuan south to Swatow in Kwangtung Province, with the exception of Tsingtao.
- August 26: Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador to China, seriously wounded by firing of J plane along Shanghai-Nanking Highway 50 miles from Shanghai. Heavy fighting continues in Woosung-Liuho sector.
- August 27: J officially announce capture of Lotien, southeast of Liuho. J announce that between Aug. 14th and 25th C lost 176 planes and J lost 16.
- August 28: J report the capture of Yanghang. Cable communication between Shanghai and outside world interrupted.
- August 29: 5,000 C troops crossed Whangpoo from Pootung, some towards Chapel and others in direction of Nantao.
- August 30: J preparing offensive. J lines extend from Liuho to Lotien to Woosung. C lines extend from Lotien to Tachang to Kiangwan to North Station. American ship "President Hoover" attacked by four C airplanes, 1 civilian killed and 7 wounded. J are sending reinforcements to Shanghai front.
- August 31: 68th Inf. Regt. of 3d Division capture Woosung Forts.
- September 1: Woosung village still in Chinese hands. J troops were landed at the Yangtze area. 80 J warships and transports were concentrated off Woosung coast, and in Whangpoo. J announce capture of Paoshan City. J casualties to date reported to be 1008 killed.

- September 2: Heavy fighting in Liuhao and Woosung sectors. C troops counter-attack Lotien. Asama unit captures Lion Forest Fort.
- September 3: Units of J 3d and 11th Divisions in Shanghai.
- September 5: More J troops were reported to have landed in Woosung and Yangtzepoo areas. J extend blockade to include coast from Shenhakuan to Pakhoi, with the exception of Tsingtao and Hongkong.
- September 6: J capture Jukong wharf.
- September 8: C report capture of Yuehpu.
- September 10: To date 70,000 J ashore. C divisions as follows: 10th, 11th, 14th, 36th, 55th, 56th, 57th, 58th, 63d, 56th, 67th, 88th, and 98th. Total of 110,000 men.
- September 11: J report capture of Yanghang.
- September 12: C troops at Yuehpu withdrew westward, to prevent being exposed to J bombardment. Cable communications of Shanghai with outside world resumed.
- September 13: C troops along Yangtze withdrew further inland to 1st line: Chapai, Kiangwan, and Liuhao. J report capture of Civic Center.
- September 15: J report capture of Lotien.
- September 16: Cholera epidemic in Shanghai: 1,018 cases reported since Sept. 1st. There have been heavy rains in Shanghai during the past few days. It is reported that units of the J 1st Div. are operating just east of Yanghang, elements of the 3d Div. just south of Woosung City, and units of the 11th Division between Woosung City and Kiangwan. C recapture Lotien.
- September 17: J report that the Matsumoto unit took Wuchiahang, just north of Kiangwan, today.
- September 18: It is reported that J to date have 80,000 men in the Shanghai area. J recapture Lotien. C units are reported as follows: at Pootung, 55th, 56th, 170th, 173rd, 175th, 176th Divisions; between North Station and Liuhao, 1st, 2nd, 10th, 11th, 14th, 16th, 36th, 57th, 58th, 51st, 63rd, 67th, 87th, 88th, and 99th Divs., and 11th Independent Brigade; at a point 40 miles south of Shanghai, 37th Div., two brigades, and 4 divisions of Kuangsi troops.
- September 19: J report states that the 18th & 34th Regts. of 3rd Div. clash with C units in front of Liuhang. Rains in Shanghai continue.
- September 20: C & J units clash on Liuhao-Lotien front without results.
- September 21: J Asama and other units (some artillery) attack at Lotien with small gains. J report their losses in Shanghai to date as 1,412 killed and 4,169 wounded.
- September 22: J reports state that units of the 3rd Div. attacked at Liuhang and east of that point and registered small gains.
- September 23: J again attack at Lotien without success but make small gains near Kiangwan. One division of J reinforcements arrive in Shanghai.
- September 24: Foreign observers state that there are now 120,000 J troops in the Shanghai area.
- September 25: J 43rd & 14th Regts. of 11th Div. reopen attack on Lotien.

- September 27: J 3rd Div. units, on the east of Liuhang, and the 11th Div. units on the west of Liuhang, make small gains.
- September 28: Following J units are involved between Liuhang and Yanghang, and all have been reported as making small gains: 1st Tank Regt., 149th & 157th Regts. (probably reserve units from home district of 1st Div.), and 16th, 34th, & 68th Regts. of 3rd Div.
- September 29: Units of 11th Div., west of Liuhang, make small gains with the help of tanks. 34th Regt. of 3rd Div. gains foothold in Liuhang.
- September 30: J Naval Landing Force in Chapoi sector makes the main J effort today. J again attack in Lotien-Liuhang sector.
- October 1: Rains in Shanghai continue. J report their losses in Shanghai to date as 1,393 killed and 5,637 wounded, and state the C have lost 20,000 killed and 35,000 wounded. J 9th Div. now reported holding the Lotien-Liuhang sector and the 3rd Div. holding the sector east of Liuhang. At Lotien are reported to be the 11th Div. units and the Taiwan Brigade.
- October 2: Fighting continues in Lotien-Liuhang sector and in Chapoi.
- October 3: J continue attacks along whole front and register slight gains.
- October 4: J use observation balloon for first time in Shanghai.
- October 5: J, having sent 3,000 men to Chapoi from the Kiangwan sector, attack in force but are repulsed. J make gains west from Lotien towards Kiating. J report that so far 56,757 C troops have been killed in the Shanghai fighting. J hold at Lotien in the face of 8 C counterattacks.
- October 6: Heavy rains still falling in this area.
- October 7: J land and sea forces bombard C lines. J attempt to break through C lines between Kiangwan and Liuhang repulsed.
- October 8: Heavy fighting continues. J make small gains toward Kaiting and Fachang.
- October 9: Heavy rains continue with little fighting going on. J Gen. Matsui states a J general offensive will soon be under way.
- October 10: Generally quiet in all sectors; rains continue.
- October 11: C report that they have driven J in Miaohang sector back to Woosung Creek. C report J losses to date as 15,000 killed. J report C casualties to be 150,000 killed and wounded to date.
- October 12: Rains continue and C report J attempt to land troops at Liuhang not successful. Total C casualties to date are estimated by foreign observer to be 50,000 killed and wounded.
- October 14: J resume attacks in all sectors without gains.
- October 15: To date, 2,057 noncombatants killed and 2,955 injured in International Settlement probably as result of misdirected missiles.
- October 16: J units, driven back to Woosung Creek on Oct. 11th, report advancing in face of determined C resistance.
- October 18: J take Kiating but suffer heavily in the fight. J repulsed at Kiating. It is estimated by a foreign observer that the J now have 225,000 men in Shanghai area.

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- October 19: J drive south from Woosung Creek towards Tachang.
- October 20: Heavy fighting northwest of Tachang. J thrust has penetrated between Koshia and Tachang.
- October 21: C reinforces their lines at Tachang and launch counterattacks there.
- October 22: C reinforcements pour into Tachang as C attack in all sectors. J report capture of Kwanglu.
- October 23: C counterattacks at Kwanglu repulsed.
- October 24: British outpost fired on by J plane and one man killed. British issue orders to fire on any plane which attacks their units. J offensive in progress at Tachang and Kiangwan. J report C troops starting retreat.
- October 25: C still hold Tachang and Kiangwan, but J report that C are retreating towards Nansiang and Lunghua, destroying bridges as they go.
- October 26: J capture Miaohang, Tachang, and then follow through to Chonju Railroad Station.
- October 27: J report capture of Kiangwan, Chapei, and Shanghai North Station. C troops reportedly withdrew in good order to line Jessfield Park (on border of British and Italian defense sectors)-Chonju-Nansiang-Kiating-Hiaho. J report C losses to date as 250,000 men killed and wounded.
- October 28: J start drive towards Kiangchao, north of Soochow Creek. C holding Nansiang in face of strong J attack. C report J have suffered 73,000 men killed and wounded in Shanghai area to date.
- October 29: J units drive west along railroad towards Nansiang and clear out C remnants in that area. C, in retreat from Chapei, leave behind a battalion of 500 men as rear guard which is bottled up by the J on the edge of the British defense sector.
- October 30: J mopping up in Chapei and start attacking "doomed" battalion.
- October 31: C "doomed" battalion surrenders arms to British and is interned in the Settlement. J cross Soochow Creek in two places west of International Settlement.
- November 1: C still hold Nantao but J start moving towards those positions from the southwest.
- November 2: Friction between American and J troops in Shanghai when J attempt to enter American defense sector.
- November 3: Heavy rain in Shanghai area. J take Chuyuan, just east of Nansiang. C units in Pootung start crossing Whangpoo River to the Nantao and Lunghua areas.
- November 4: Clash in Nantao area results in heavy casualties for both sides.
- November 6: J troops of 6th Div. from North China land at Chapei, on Hangchow Bay about 40 miles south of Shanghai. Foreign observers estimate that there are 150,000 J troops in the Shanghai area now. Paohsing, south of Soochow Creek, taken by J Sagami unit which crossed on Porter bridges.
- November 7: Chanchiachiao, about 3 miles west of the International Settlement, taken by the J. Observers estimate 20,000 J troops landed at Chapei yesterday. C baggage units south of Sungkian as they move northward from Hangchow Bay.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- November 8: J, having crossed the Whangpoo River south of Sungkiang with little opposition, are now attacking that town. J report cutting Shanghai-Hangchow R.R. west of Sungkiang. J Wachi and Asama units take Kangchiao and cross Soochow Creek with the aid of ponton bridges.
- November 9: C send 20,000 men to Chiahhsing Area. C have completely evacuated Pootung with the exception of a few snipers which the J are now clearing out. J units take Hungjao. (C units which evacuated Pootung crossed the Whangpoo River to Nantao. Many have moved on south to escape being cut off by J units moving east towards the Whangpoo River from Jessfield Park.) J report that the 13th, 23rd, and 47th Regts. of 6th Division take Sungkiang.
- November 10: J units take Lunghua and bottle up the remaining few thousand C defenders of Nantao. J shell Nantao all this day. J report capture of one corner of Nanhhsiang.
- November 11: J now control Pootung and Nantao, most of the C troops trapped in Nantao having surrendered their arms to the French and having been interned in the French Concession.
- November 12: J report capture of Nanhhsiang and C evacuate Kwangfu to escape being cut off. C troops withdraw towards Anting, being subjected to the usual J bombing en route. Foreign observers report J are about to land another 30,000 men in Shanghai. C sending 100,000 troops as reinforcements to the Kunshan-Taitsang area. Reports state that C will hold along the Chiahhsing-Sungkiang-Kunshan-Taitsang-Liuho line.

(Note: Practically every day, during the Shanghai Operations, J and C exchanged artillery fire and, except on rainy days, bombing by aircraft was carried out by both sides.)

JAPANESE TROOPS

- July 29: Tokyo reports 20th Division from Korea now in North China.
- July 31: J arrivals in Tientsin by sea and rail since July 7th: 22,000 men, 88 75-mm guns, 13 10-cm howitzers, 20 tanks, 183 trucks.
- August 3: Tokyo reports advance J unit at Lianghsiang (Pinghan line) is 20th Div.
- August 5: 45,000 men arrived in Tientsin to date. (Also 80 75-mm guns, 30 10-cm guns, and 20 15-cm guns.)
- August 7: Tokyo reports J troop train left Tokyo Station with 3d Regiment, Imperial Guard Division, on board.
- August 9: Tokyo reports 5th and 6th Divisions have gone to North China or Manchoukuo.
- August 11: Tokyo reports 10th Division leaving Kobe tonight for (probably) destination in Korea. 150 merchantmen commandeered in Kobe.
- August 14: About 20,000 J troops land at Dairen en route to Jehol. Mostly artillery.
- August 16: Tokyo reports Japanese mobilization resumed. (Had slackened considerably.)
- August 17: Tokyo reports 5th, 6th, 10th, 20th Divisions in North China plus about 10 squadrons of airplanes (pursuit, bombardment, and observation), and also some heavy artillery and communications troops. Possibly the 11th and 14th Divisions will go to Shanghai.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

August 22: Tokyo reports 8th & 16th Divisions preparing for war service. 7th & Imperial Guards Divisions not to be used yet. 11th Div. lands in Shanghai, also part of 3d and 6th Divs.

August 28: Tokyo reports that it is probable that the 1st Division is in North China.

August 31: J troops North China estimated at 95,000 men.

October 23: J report that to date they have had 4,467 men killed on all North China fronts.

November 5: The following is a list of estimates (by a competent foreign observer) of J troops in North China with corresponding dates:

August 20:	70,000
August 31:	95,000
September 10:	170,000
September 17:	175,000
October 1:	225,000
October 5:	275,000
October 15:	275,000
October 22:	300,000
October 29:	300,000
November 5:	275,000

Note: Decrease on Nov. 5 covered by withdrawal of 6th Division and other units from North China. (6th Division was sent to Shanghai.)

JAPANESE BOMBING


The following is a partial list of important cities and their adjacent regions bombed by the Japanese during the period covered by these notes. The approximate number of times each point was bombed is included:

Chahar Province:	Kalgan.....3
Shansi Province:	Tatung.....3
	Taiyuan.....17
Hopei Province:	Tientsin.....2
	Paoting.....4
	Tchchow.....2
	Taming.....3
Kiangsu Province:	Haichow.....7
	Hsuechow.....12
	Pukow.....2
	Nanking.....27
	Shanghai.....75
	Soochow.....8
Chekiang Province:	Hangchow.....10
Fukien Province:	Amoy.....3
Kwangtung Province:	Canton.....22
	Swatow.....3


MISCELLANEOUS

August 8: All J civilians and consular staffs evacuated from Wuhu, Changsha, Ichang, and other Yangtze River towns today. General Ho Ying-chin, C Minister of War and identified with Ho-Umetzu Agreement, resigns, succeeded by General Ch'en Ch'eng, vice Minister of War.

- August 9: All J civilians and consular staffs evacuated from Hankow today. J Concession there to be administered by C authorities during J absence.
- August 14: 2 J sailors shot in Tsingtao by C. Situation tense.
- August 16: Joint C-J committee investigating incident. J women and children being evacuated.
- August 17: J report Salt Division of C troops marching on Tsingtao from Haichow. J women and children still being evacuated.
- September 2: General Terauchi arrives in Tientsin.
- September 7: General Terauchi assumes command of J troops in North China, but Kwantung Army units and attached Manchoukuoan troops remain under General Ueda, Commander of the Kwantung Army. (Kwantung Army is the name applied to Japanese units stationed in Manchoukuo).
- September 15: General Terauchi's appointment to North China Command announced in Tokyo. J residents have completely evacuated Tsingtao.
- October 1: J conduct A.A. searchlight practice in Tientsin tonight and for 3 or 4 days following.
- October 12: 5 C planes (said to be Northrops) make surprise raid on Tangku. Probably came from airfield in Shantung-dropped 10 small bombs. Damage negligible - windows in British tugboat broken and three Chinese at Tangku killed.
- October 23: J report that a unit of Manchoukuoan troops defeated a band of irregulars at Tongshan, about 25 miles north of Peiping.
- October 31: J report C irregulars attack convoy of J wounded in canal boats on Taching River just south of Hsinan, which is 30 miles west of Tientsin. J beat off attack after sending for reinforcements.




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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



FRONT LINES SHOWN THUS: Date
 SCALE, 1:250,000 OR ONE INCH EQUALS 3.95 MILES. 5 4 3 2 1 0 5 MILES

PEIPING - TIENTSIN AREA





SCALE: 1 INCH EQUALS 15.78 MILES

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Silverstein NARS, Date 12-18-75

0037

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS


February 8, 1938.

F/E:
In connection with the question of practice in regard to the handling of a matter of this sort, I feel that in principle it is better to make replies than to leave questions open.

In regard to the last sentence of Mr. Vincent's memorandum, I have doubt whether the subject matter under reference "is clearly a matter for decision by the commandants concerned." I think it would be dangerous for us to adopt the view that the commandants are the highest authority with regard to anything affecting the Legation Quarter or in the Legation other than matters strictly within the military field.

In this particular case, I do not feel strongly that the Department need reply.

SKH
SKH



PA/H:SKH:ZMK

704
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS


February 7, 1938.

~~ROM~~
~~1001~~

Peiping's 89, February 5, 5 p. m.,
in regard to the question of extinguish-
ing the lights in the Legation Quarter
in Peiping if and when there is a threat
of an air raid.

Mr. Lockhart states that "If the
Department has any objection to leaving
a question of this kind to the decision
of the commandants I should like to be
informed together with a recommendation".

It is felt that, inasmuch as this
is clearly a matter for decision by the
commandants concerned, a reply to the
telegram under reference is not called
for.



[Signature]
FE JCV:SMJ

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
 MR. HONABECK
 FEB 8 - 1938
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEBo

GRAY

FROM Peiping via N.R.

COPIES
 ONI AND

Dated February 5, 1938

Rec'd 10:56 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

89, February 5, 5 p.m.
 793.94 / 12270
 My 79, February 1, 4 p.m.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 FEB 5 1938
 Department of State

793.94
 Note to
 701.0093

At an informal meeting at office yesterday afternoon of representatives of diplomatic missions now in Peiping a discussion was held on the question of whether the lights would be extinguished in the diplomatic quarter of Peiping in case of a notice being henceforth received of an impending air raid. The sense of the meeting was that while it was not expected that a situation would arise in the near future requiring such action, the matter of extinguishing the lights in the diplomatic quarter would be left to the decision of the commandants on receiving notice of an impending (*), together with information that the lights extinguished in all other parts of the city of Peiping, such decision to be on the basis of whether such action afforded better protection to the lives and property of residents of the quarter than would be the case if the lights were kept burning. It was felt by the representatives

793.94/12329

FILED
 F/FG
 FEB 11 1938

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2- No. 89, February 5, from Peiping.

tives present, namely British, French, Italian, Japanese, American, German, Belgian, Dutch, and Brazilian, that a decision of this character should be left to the military commandants as their duty was primarily that of protecting the lives and property of the residents of the quarter. The French representative informs me that his Ambassador, who is in Shanghai, holds the view that the lights should not be extinguished. The commandants of the various guards held a meeting yesterday and decided, the ~~French~~ ^{French} commandant dissenting, that the extinguishing of the lights in the diplomatic quarter would provide better protection than keeping the quarter well lighted when the rest of the city is in darkness. There is of course something to be said on both sides of this question.

If the Department has any objection to leaving a question of this kind to the decision of the commandants I should like to be informed together with a recommendation.

Repeated to the Ambassador. Copy to Tientsin by mail.

LOCKHART

RR:CSB

(*) Apparent omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 842.20/71 FOR Despatch #1885

FROM Canada (Palmer) DATED Feb. 1, 1938
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict. Statement of Lord Marly, Labor
Peer and Deputy Speaker in the House of Lords, that Canada
had little to fear from a threat of Japanese invasion, since
the U. S. was vitally concerned that there should be no foreign
foothold in Canada that the Seattle Naval Base would protect
Canada coast.

fp

733.94/ 12330

/ 12330

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



January 11, 1938.

PA/H
Mr. Hornbeck

S
Mr. ~~Secretary~~

file
DJ

The attached pamphlet, entitled "Why? Who? How?", issued by the Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, is propaganda which has probably been prepared with a view to appealing to the large group of persons in the United States and perhaps other countries who are not well informed in regard to conditions in the Far East. It abounds with inaccuracies and distortions of facts but, while these are obvious to any one familiar with the situation in the Orient, they might easily mislead uninformed readers by the apparently frank and direct manner in which controversial subjects are discussed. The fact that propaganda of this crude nature is issued by the Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, which includes in its membership many distinguished and influential Japanese, is indicative of the present state of opinion among the supposedly well educated and thinking classes in Japan.

my/h

FE:RLS:SMJ

FE

704

Jan. 4, '39

Wm. Hamilton

Dear Max

This letter from
my brother, Donald in Gainesville,
may be of interest. I do
not want the letter back.

9.40

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
VISA DIVISION

Jan. 4, '37

FF
my Hamilton
Dear Max
File
DT

This letter from
my brother Donald in Seaside,
may be of interest. I do
not want the letter back

9.70

1) *Why are Japan and China fighting each other?*

On the Chinese side, in order to drive out the Japanese from China and, if possible, to bring Manchoukuo back under her yoke.

On the Japanese side, in order to protect her legitimate rights in China and further to eradicate the evil elements which have been and still are trying to destroy friendly relations between Japan and China.

2) *Who began the fighting?*

China did. The Chinese troops in Wanping near Peiping were deeply hostile to the Japanese garrison forces carrying on maneuvers around Peiping. They frequently interfered with Japanese troops. On the night of July 7 this year, some of them went to the length of firing at a section of Japanese soldiers on field exercise. Then the trouble started, in spite of repeated efforts on the part of Japan at settling the matter locally.

3) *Has Japan any right to station troops and carry out maneuvers in China?*

The right of Japan to station troops in the Tientsin-Peiping area is clearly recognized in treaties and enjoyed in common with America, Britain, France and Italy.

China herself recognized these rights, and the necessity to exercise the right was recognized by all these Powers who still maintain their forces there. The reason is that China is not a safe country to leave their countrymen unprotected by armed forces on the spot. Recall the many cases of bandits and pirates looting foreign property,

kidnapping and murdering innocent people.

4) *Why did the attempts to settle the incident locally at its early stage fail?*

Because the Chinese never meant to do so. Their leaders were waiting for a chance to fight with Japan, and the rank and file entertained uncontrollable antagonism, the fruit of years of anti-Japanese education and propaganda.

5) *If Japan is on the defensive, how can the dispatch of large military and naval forces be accounted for?*

The Chinese Government mobilized forces numbering 500,000 in the North, and massed 200,000 troops in the Shanghai area. Japanese troops were dispatched to cope with this situation and safeguard the lives and property of Japanese nationals which were in actual danger of being wiped out. Her action is not aggressive but defensive.

6) *Japan may be justified in principle in fighting Chinese troops, but what about the reports of noncombatants being attacked from the air?*

According to International Law, a garrisoned town is subject to any form of bombardment. Nanking and Canton are heavily garrisoned and fortified. In its surrounding district each forms the actual center of military operations for the Chinese troops. Japanese aviation authorities have consistently issued warnings of impending attacks on military positions so that civilians may avoid injury from bombs hitting garrison headquarters, airdromes, arsenals, railway stations facilitating

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

VISA DIVISION

Jan. 4, '37

FF

Wm Hamilton

Dear Max.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

File
DT

This letter from
my brother, Donald M. Seemans,
may be of interest. I do
not want the letter back

9.40

movement of Chinese troops, and artillery and anti-aircraft locations. Japanese planes have also made a point of flying at low altitudes to insure accuracy in dropping bombs, although thereby they have greatly jeopardized their own safety inasmuch as both Nanking and Canton are strongly defended by powerful anti-aircraft batteries. Japanese war planes have never wilfully attacked noncombatants.

7) What are the facts concerning the reported attacks upon schools and hospitals?

In all such cases, these institutions of learning and humanity were desecrated by Chinese troops who had occupied and fortified the buildings as shields for attack or as refuges for defense. In this manner, to cite a few out of many examples, were the Patriotic Girls' School and the Sungteh Girls' School of Shanghai, and the Nankai University of Tientsin converted into military establishments.

As regards hospitals, it is the Chinese and not the Japanese who have been making attacks on them. This is clearly substantiated by the example of the Japanese hospital ship, *Asahi Maru*, which was made the direct target of Chinese bombardments.

8) Is it true that the Chinese fishing fleet off Hongkong was attacked by Japanese submarines?

This story is unfounded and unsupported by fact as proved both by a statement made by a neutral citizen and by the flat denial of the captain of the German steamship, *Scharnhorst*, who was

alleged by the Chinese as being the rescuer of the fishermen.

9) Brutal pictures of Japanese soldiers bayonetting helplessly bound Chinese were circulated in America. Are they actual?

Investigations in Tientsin have revealed the existence of numerous Chinese tradesmen dealing in all kinds of faked photographs. The pictures in question come from such stocks. A Japanese naval officer who saw a newspaper reproduction of one of such photographs ascertained that the uniform of the soldiers and the method of handling the rifle were definitely Chinese.

10) Was not the action of Japan contrary to the provisions of the Washington Treaty and the Anti-war Pact?

As stated in the pronouncements of the Japanese Government, Japan's aim is "not territory, but co-operation;" and there is no question of infringing the provision of the Nine Power Treaty. As to the Kellogg Pact, the right of self-defense is clearly reserved by the Signatory Powers to these treaties. In the present affair, Japan has acted solely to defend herself; the fighting was not of her seeking. If these treaties are to be brought into question in conjunction with the present conflict, the blame must be laid at the door of China who took the offensive from the outset. Even before actually resorting to warlike acts, she had, for years, waged a persistent and insidious campaign, under the guise of peace, against the legitimate and vital interests of Japan in China.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

VISA DIVISION

Jan. 4, '37

FF

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Mr. Hamilton H. File
DT

Dear Max.

This letter from
my brother Donald in Sumatra
may be of interest. I do
not want the letter back

9.70

- 11) Are not the rights and interests of nationals of third Powers being damaged and actually sacrificed in the conflict?

The Japanese commanders have issued statements that the rights and interests of the nationals of third Powers would be fully protected, and have ordered their forces to exert every possible care in this regard. It is inevitable, however, that when such property is occupied by or otherwise used to the advantage of Chinese troops, it becomes subjected to direct attack.

- 12) Will not the stoppage of coastal traffic being enforced by the Japanese Navy hamper the rightful navigation of the vessels of third Powers?

It will not. Vessels of third Powers engaged in peaceful trading are totally exempt from the restrictions and are free to approach the Chinese ports.

- 13) What are the aims of the Japanese, and when can we expect the conflict to end?

Japan is now determined to fight it out to the finish. Peace will return only when China brings herself to realize the error of her ways—particularly of her belief that Japan can be driven out of the Asiatic continent by force.

- 14) What are Japan's conditions in reaching a settlement with the Chinese?

Japan wants the complete abandonment by the Chinese of the notion that Japan is their enemy and the severance of all ties between China and the Communists, either native or foreign, who are working toward the undermining of the traditions and culture of Oriental civilization.

- 15) Is Communism so powerful in China as to be a menace to Japan?

The Nanking Government has formed a close alliance with the Chinese Red Army, which is now incorporated into the Central Army. Today, about forty to fifty per cent. of the power and authority of the Chinese Government is in the hands of the Communists. Japan regards a sovietized China as a grave menace to the welfare of the country, whose national structure and sentiment are incompatible with the doctrines and practices of Communism.

- 16) Will Communism be a boon to China?

The answer is emphatically "No!"

China is still in the course of developing her natural resources, and of unifying and reconstructing her vast nation. Ninety per cent. of China's 400 millions are unbelievably poor and are suffering great want. Communism applied and practiced in China will bring about a state of affairs more serious than can be imagined. It will bring about chaos and tragic disaster.

- 17) What will be the effect of the sovietization of China upon the interests of foreign Powers in that country?

Every democratic country having anything at all to do with China will suffer greatly. Debts may be cancelled; vested rights and interests nullified; extant safeguards of personal liberty and justice prematurely abolished; trade opportunities circumscribed; and even entry and travel in the country restricted, as is the case in Russia.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

VISA DIVISION

Jan. 4, '37

FF

Mr. Hamilton

Dear Max.

This letter from
my brother, Donald in Sumner,
may be of interest. I do
not want the letter back

9.70

18) What will be its effect on East Asia and the world in general?

A China sovietized is a China completely within the grasp of Moscow revolutionaries. The resultant shift in the balance of power will undermine the peace and stability of the Pacific countries. It may prove the first step toward Red revolution in the entire Far East, toward a new war involving the principal countries of America and Europe.

19) Will not the present conflict cause the loss of a good market for Japan?

Japan is well aware that the present conflict will hamper trade relations with China.

She is further aware that the profit from trade after the present conflict is over will fall far short of the interest of the capital corresponding to the expenditure of expeditionary forces. This means that Japan is not fighting for profit or gains. She is fighting to bring about a better future, not only for the Japanese but also the Chinese themselves.

20) What cost Japan can bear in the conflict?

Japan bore without difficulty the reconstruction expenditure after the great earthquake of 1923 amounting to ¥ 10,000,000,000. The present rate of taxes to total national income is remarkably low; the country is in no need of securing loans from abroad; in arms and ammunition Japan is well supplied; new production of gold is increasing annually; and the country still holds fairly large amounts of reserves in foreign currency.



She is richer today. The expeditionary appropriation of ¥ 2,600,000,000 is no great burden to the Japanese people of today.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





GENERAL CABLE CORPORATION

420 LEXINGTON AVENUE



January 3rd, 1938.

Mr. J.F. Simmons, Chief,
 Visa Department,
 Department of State,
 Washington, D. C.



Dear Jack:-

I recently received a Christmas card from a Japanese engineer, a very fine chap who has been here a number of times and with whom I have interchanged cards for the past few years.

With his Christmas card, however, came a little booklet of propaganda entitled "Why? Who? How?" which consists of questions and answers on the Sino-Japanese conflict, the rankest kind of propaganda. I presume that your Department has seen this, or many others like it, but I thought in any case I would send it to you for what it was worth because it is good.

It seems to me that what they have done is instead of giving perfectly innocuous questions and answers, they have picked out the most embarrassing questions to the Japanese side and then given unimportant and misleading answers. The average moron reading it therefore might get the impression that here is a book that answers all these very embarrassing questions from the Japanese point of view and that they have a very strong case merely because an answer has been given to every question.

Sincerely,

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1937
 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE


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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY TROOPS IN CHINA
Office of the Intelligence Officer

From November 15, 1937.
 To November 30, 1937.

MILITARY

North China Theatre



There have been comparatively few reports of military activity in North China during the period under review. Winter has arrived and this has tended to reduce operations in this area.

Suiyuan - Chahar - Shansi Sector. With the capture on November 9th of Taiyuan, the capital of Shansi, the Japanese apparently reached their immediate objectives in this sector. It is believed they have spread out somewhat from the city of Taiyuan into southern Shansi, whence have come only a few reports of engagements and all very minor ones. Suiyuan and Chahar are now apparently completely dominated by the Japanese. It does not appear probable that the Japanese will start any extended drive south through southern Shansi and on into northern Shansi to Jianfu, if such be their intentions, until after the Cheng-tai railroad, which runs from Shihchiachuang to Taiyan, is fully repaired and operating at full capacity, as any large force operating south from Taiyuan would have to depend upon this railway as their main line of supply. Many observers are of the opinion that the Japanese are holding up their advance only until after the capture of Nanking. After such a demoralizing blow a general advance should encounter much less resistance in the North than is now offered by the Chinese.

Hopei-Shantung-and-Northern-Honan Sector. The anticipated Japanese drive from southern Hopei into Shantung has failed to develop during the period covered by this report. Reports indicate that the Japanese have been satisfied to consolidate their positions on the Peiping-Bankow and Tientsin-Tow Railroads by driving most of the Chinese remnants out of southern Hopei, northern Shantung, and northern Honan. Guerrilla warfare with minor engagements at important centers on the north bank of the Yellow River and at important towns

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between the two railroads has been reported and, it is believed, has resulted in driving south of the Yellow River most of the remaining organized Chinese resistance, except along the Inghan line. Engagements have been reported at Tsiyang, Tsiho, Kwanshian, Khotang, Yucheng, Liagyi and Shangho, in northern Shantung, in the Taming, Nanlo, Tsing-feng, and Kaichow area in southern Hopei, and at Chikhsien, Leihuei, and Sinsiang in Northern Honan.

When the Chinese forces withdrew across the Yellow River on November 15th, they dynamited the Tientsin-Tukow Railroad bridge, breaking it in two places. This has been instrumental in delaying further Japanese advance into Shantung. Recent reports indicate that the Japanese may attempt to land a force on the northern Shantung peninsula in the vicinity of Yangel'iaokou, Liutuan, or Lungkow to advance south and cut the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railroad, and thus cut off eastern Shantung peninsula from the remainder of the province. Such an effort would probably cause the rapid withdrawal of Chinese troops from eastern Shantung and might save the Japanese investments at Tsingtao from any great amount of destruction.

Withdrawal of Japanese Troops from the North China area. There has been a further withdrawal of Japanese troops from the North China area during the period covered by this report. Since October 19th, the 6th and 16th Divisions have been withdrawn from North China and sent to Shanghai, and it is not unlikely that a third division has been moved out of North China. It is believed that approximately 70,000 Japanese effectives were withdrawn from North China between October 10th and the end of November. A French observer places the number at 110,000. Estimates of foreign observers as to the number of Japanese troops, including 5,000 to 10,000 Manchoukuean troops, remaining in North China at the end of November vary from 240,000 to 350,000 men.

Central China.

Following the fall of Shanghai the Japanese have conducted a dramatic drive towards Nanking. The most recent reports are that the Japanese, following the occupation of Kiangyin on November 29th, attacked the Kiangyin Forts, which are still in the possession of the

Chinese. The fall of the forts at Kiangyin will give the Japanese a free hand to breach the boom, sweep the mine fields and steam up the Yangtze River, and bombard Chenkiang, where another boom blocks the river. The Japanese force which captured Changchow on the 29th is reported to be advancing up the Shanghai-Nanking Railway with Tangyang, twenty-eight miles distant, the next objective. The Japanese unit which captured Ihsing on the 29th is reported to be driving forward on Liyang. Another Japanese column which captured Kuangte in Anhui Province on the 29th is reported to be advancing along the Hangchow-Wuhu highway towards Wuhu with the objective of cutting off the Chinese troops in the Nanking Area. Wuhu is a city located on the south bank of the Yangtze River in Anhui Province about seventy miles above Nanking. According to Chinese reports, Hangchow is still held by the Chinese and two Japanese columns are attempting to break the Chinese defenses about twenty miles northeast of the city along the Shanghai-Hangchow Railway.

On November 15th the Japanese forces, which landed at Hangchow Bay, were driving up across the railway towards Soochow and at Khsing had turned northeast along the railway towards Shanghai and Sungkiang. By this maneuver they forced the retreating Chinese from Shanghai to fall back on Soochow, thus narrowing the front against which they intended to proceed and undoubtedly cutting off some of the retreating forces. On November 20th, the Japanese claimed they had smashed the line from Changshu to the Yangtze River, outflanking Soochow which was the Chinese supply base during the Shanghai operations. Naval units at the same time were working up the Yangtze River towards the Kiangyin Forts. This envelopment took place so rapidly that the Chinese retreat became almost a rout and rear guard resistance weakened with the uncertainty as to whether the retreating army could break clear. Japanese planes were daily bombing the retreating forces with great intensity and this increased the disorganization of the Chinese units. Soochow fell on November 20th with apparently only slight resistance and at the same time the Chinese were reported with-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

drawing from Wusih on the Shanghai-Nanking railway. The Chinese were reported to have been badly hampered in their retreat by lack of transport. The Japanese, using junks to support their mechanized land forces, sent troops around Taihu Lake and made rapid progress against Wusih, which fell into their hands on November 22d. With the capture of this city a junction was made between the Japanese forces advancing from Shanghai and those that landed in Hangchow Bay, and the Japanese claimed contact along a continuous line extending from Kiangyin on the Yangtze to Haiyen on Hangchow Bay. The Japanese apparently rested on this line for a few days before starting their next drive which is still in progress and has results in the capture on the 29th of the places mentioned above.

Once the Chinese were dislodged from their defensive positions in Shanghai, the Japanese have not permitted them to gain a new foothold. During the swift thrust to the west, the Japanese have had an opportunity to display their characteristic offensive spirit and to bring out the lack of central staff control on the part of the Chinese. This lack of control is so marked that the Chinese appear to be fighting independent group action rather than a coordinated defensive action.

Chinese Resistance not Broken. According to a Berlin report dated November 28th, Major General Harada, the Japanese Military Attache to China, when interviewed by a correspondent of the Berliner Tageblatt on that date, stated that the resistance of the Chinese, although weakened, was not broken and that the continuation of the hostilities after the eventual occupation of Nanking by the Japanese troops is highly probable.

South China.

The naval blockade against Chinese vessels has continued along the China coast. Japanese planes have continued to bomb important centers in South China and it is reported that as a result of these air raids traffic on the Canton-Hankow railway has been suspended and long distance telephone service between Canton and Hongkong interrupted since November 27.

POLITICAL

Szechouanuo, recognition. A November 29th a ter dispatch from Rome states that Italy has decided to accord de jure recognition to Szechouanuo. A report of November 20th states that as a result of this decision the Italian Consulate General at Hankow will be changed into a Legation. Chinese in Tientsin consider this act as unfriendly to China and merely an effort on the part of Italy to secure commercial privilege in Szechouanuo similar to those recently granted to Germany.

Chinese National Government. On November 18th, China decided to move the seat of the National Government to Chungking in Szechuan. On November 20th the Government made a formal announcement that Hankow was completely evacuated by the National Government and the following changes were reported.

(1) To Chungking, Szechuan:

- a. The office of the President of the National Government, and the Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Control and Examination Yuan.
- b. The Ministries of Industries, Education, and Railways.

(2) To Hankow, Hubei:

The Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Interior.

(3) To Changsha, Hunan:

The Ministry of Communications.

(4) To remain in Hankow:

The Generalissimo's Headquarters and other military institutions.

General Chiang Kai-shek resigned as President of the Executive Yuan prior to the removal of the seat of the government in order that he might devote all his time to the defense of China. Mr. H. H. Kung, vice president of the Executive Yuan, succeeded him.

Provincial Capitals. It is reported that the provincial capitals of the following provinces have been moved as indicated:

Kiangsu: from CHENKIANG to HUAIYIN;

Chekiang: from HANGCHOW to CHINHUA;

Shantung: from TSINAN to TAIAN.

Foreign Evacuation from Nanking. It is reported that all foreign embassies are either preparing to evacuate or are evacuating Nanking. The American Ambassador, with all but three or four members of his staff, has moved to Hankow where he is in contact with the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs. Britain is reported to be making arrangements for the evacuation of all her nationals from this city.

North China. The areas of North China cleared of Nationalist troops and Kuomintang political administrators continue to be governed by the district peace preservation commissions with their Japanese advisers. Whether the North will be independent of the rest of China, if determined, has not yet been announced although Northern Honan is reported by Japanese sources to have declared for autonomy during the latter part of this period. This is understood to mean that part of Honan north of the Yellow River. For that matter the whole of North China under Japanese military occupation obviously is independent of Nanking in that the Nationalist Government exercises no authority in the area. Some well informed foreign observers believe that North China will remain within the framework of the reconstructed Chinese National Government. Peking is regarded as the most likely place for the new capital, restored to much or all its former glory. There have been the usual reports of a monarchical restoration. While there are members of the Emperor Pu Yi's family now in Peking, it is reported by the press that they do not admit he will return and it is further reported that Japanese in Peking deny he has any intentions of returning. A Japanese source states that several states under a central federation may be established, each state to have Japanese military support and Japanese economic co-operation. A China thus divided and parcelled out would be one that no nation need fear and might be easier to control and administer by a foreign power.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Shansi. On November 16th Yen Hsi-shan, governor of Shansi and a group of sixteen other provincial military leaders issued a circular telegram in which they blamed hot-headed subordinates of the 29th Army and communists for the spread of hostilities in China, and urged China's military leaders to adopt concrete measures to end hostilities, according to a Domei (Japanese) report.

Bandit Suppression Activities in Tientsin. At an emergency conference convened on November 25th by the Chief of Police of the Tientsin Municipality it was decided that a general house-to-house search would be conducted for bandits and men of dubious character. The search started on November 26th and continued throughout the 27th. The police attempted in two days to search the entire municipality, except the foreign concessions which were exempted. As each district was being searched traffic was suspended in and out of the district except by specified exits, and Chinese going in and out through these exits were subject to search. Reports from Chinese indicate that the search was most thorough but that only two or three bandits were found and arrested.

Last Hopei Pao An Tui. (Peace Preservation Corps).

Mr. Chia Tsung-mo, the new governor of Last Hopei, has caused the Pao An Tui to be reorganized into the "Last Hopei Garrison Corps". This Corps is divided into four detachments and a bodyguard detachment and is reported to total about eight hundred men.

Rural Conditions. Conditions in the rural sections of the province of Hopei continue to be very bad. Many villages are still surrounded by water. The complete withdrawal of the Chinese troops has given the professional bandits a free hand and in some villages the only control exercised is that of bandit leaders. So called red or communist bandits are reported to be operating in several of the hsien (districts) in the interior of the province and these bandits are harassing the Japanese at every opportunity. A recent survey made by a foreigner and a Chinese in fifteen villages surrounding

a city in western Hopei which suffered from the war shows that the average loss per family because of the war is \$124 in round figures. These figures include losses from military assessments, looting, damage to crops, commandeered grain, drop in cotton prices, wrecked and burned property, and miscellaneous causes. The figures are estimated but believed to be fairly accurate. The average total annual income of farmers in this section is \$156 to \$180 so that the average loss per family amounts to approximately two-thirds of the annual income. Generous relief measures will be necessary throughout the winter to alleviate suffering.

Federation of North China Autonomous Governments. On November 26th the three autonomous governments (Inner) Mongolia, South Chahar, and North Shansi announced that a Federated Commission of the Mongolian Frontier was established. The purpose of the federation is to assure the close co-operation of the three autonomous governments in the development of industries, communication, and finance. The seat of the federation is at Kalgan.

The personnel of the Commission consists of a Mongolian Prince, Prince Tao, as Chief of the Commission, six members selected from the three autonomous governments, a Japanese Chief Adviser, a Japanese counselor, and a number of technical experts. The agreement under which the Commission was formed is dated the 732d year after the birth of Genghis Khan, and is published in the Chinese, Japanese, and Mongolian languages. In case of dispute the Japanese text will govern. According to the agreement, all matters taken up by the Commission must be referred to the Japanese Adviser and technical experts concerned and to all members of the Commission for discussion before decisions are made.

The first act of this Federated Commission was to announce the establishment of the Mongolian Frontier Bank at Kalgan. The bank is to have a capital of twelve million yuan (Chinese dollars) with one-fourth of the capital paid up. The capital will be paid in proportionally by each of the three autonomous governments, and the bank

will absorb the South Chahar Bank (the former Provincial Bank of Chahar), the Feng Yeh Bank at Kalgan and at Xieihua, and other small local banks. Banknotes will be placed in circulation in the near future with a par value equal to that of the Japanese and Manchoukuoan currency.

Press Activities. During November the representatives of the Domei News Agency, Tientsin, China, forwarded a questionnaire to all foreign reporters of the foreign-language newspapers and the correspondents of the foreign news agencies in Tientsin. The questionnaire solicited the frank opinion of the foreign correspondents and news agencies on the autonomous regimes already established or about to be established in Southern Chahar, Northern Shansi and other parts of North China, including the future prospects of these regimes; the independence of Inner Mongolia; the extent Japan will be able to influence economic development in North China and the effect of such influence upon the interests of other nationals; the necessity for the presence of Japanese troops in North China in order to maintain peace and order; the result of the severance of the Shanghai area from the control of the Nanking Government and the effect of such severance upon Nanking, Shanghai, and the foreign powers; the future of the Chinese National Government; the interpretation of the significance of the tri-partite anti-communist pact concluded between Japan, Germany, and Italy; the claim that Japan is a stabilizing influence in East Asia; and the way that present hostilities would be settled. The representative of the Domei News Agency stated that the questionnaire was forwarded in compliance with a request of the North China Economic News, a Japanese agency, and that the news agency had pledged that it would under no circumstances quote the source of any of the replies to the questions asked.

ECONOMIC

General.

Business conditions in Tientsin remain depressed. Soup kitchens are to be established in the city by the Bureau of Social Affairs on

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

December 1st and it is anticipated that over forty thousand destitute people will be dependent upon these Kitchens for their food during the winter months. Chinese travellers report that the Japanese who are in control in Kalgan are insisting that all furs be sent out through Manchoukuo via Dairen, so there will probably be little or no fur export trade from Mentsin this year. Business men report that goods shipped from Shanghai are coming via Dairen and that Manchoukuo is insisting on collecting a tax on them. In spite of these adverse conditions foreign business men are optimistic and believe that as soon as the present Sino-Japanese hostilities are ended and an agreement is reached between the two countries, Mentsin will boom with trade.

Plan for the development of North China. Reports from Japan state that the opinion of Japanese government leaders and industrialists regarding the economic development of North China is becoming crystallized as the time for a formal decision approaches. The fundamental policy for the reconstruction of North China will be formulated by the Planning Board on the basis of advice received from the North China Policy Commission. The opinions of the various leaders have been summarized in the press as follows:

- (1) Capital of third countries should be welcomed under the principle of the open door and equal opportunity.
- (2) North China industrial construction should be incorporated into a Japan-Manchoukuo-North China industrial program.
- (3) General industries should be developed on a free basis, but fundamental defense industries such as communications and transportation should be controlled.
- (4) It is hoped that Japan's leading industrial companies will participate in the main industries.
- (5) Development of each industry should be left entirely to a responsible company so that the industry may be developed to the fullest extent.
- (6) A controlling institution should be established to keep the wide sphere of enterprises in adjustment.

(7) The Japanese government should guarantee the business and financing of the control company, thereby rendering it capable of fully controlling the great task of economic development of North China.

(8) A high-type person having full knowledge of the importance of the situation should be made president of the controlling institution and the staff of the institution should consist of representatives of the companies participating in the economic development of North China.

The plan to be presented on behalf of the South Manchuria Railway by Mr. Matsuoka attaches most importance to the railway, port, harbor, and coal enterprises, which are to be developed on a five-year plan. About ¥800,000,000 is needed for the carrying out of the Matsuoka plan. Of this amount it is proposed that ¥500,000,000 be invested by Japan and ¥300,000,000 by Manchukuo and North China combined. The plan proposes the investment of ¥10,000,000 in railway improvement and more than ¥57,000,000 in railway construction in North China. This includes the completion and widening of the Taiyuan-Tatung Railway; the widening of the Chengtai (Shihchiachuang-Taiyuan) narrow gauge; and the construction of the Tientsin-Shihchiachuang (or Tsangchow-Shihchiachuang) Railway, the Tsinan-Tackowchen Railway, and the Kupeikow-Tungchow (Jehol-Peking) Railway. The plan also calls for the reconstruction of the harbors at Tientsin and Tangku, at a cost of ¥68,000,000, as the two main ports of North China and the improvement of Chinwangtao and Tsingtao, at a cost of ¥8,000,000 each, to make them auxiliary ports. The railway company will undertake coal mining at Ching-hsing in western Hopei on the Chengtai railway, at the mines near Tzechuan in Shantung, and at the mines at Poshan. Both Tzechuan and Poshan are about sixty miles east of Tsinan on a narrow gauge railway extending southwest from the Chiaotsi (Tsingtao-Tsinan) line. The plan also calls for the development of electric power, salt, cotton, and the wool industries in North China by the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Kochu Kushi Company, a subsidiary of the South Manchuria Railway Company in which the railway company owns all the capital.

New Trade Control Act for Manchoukuo. A Domei (Japanese news agency) report from Hsinking dated November 29th states that a new Trade Control Act will be enacted shortly by the Manchoukuo Government which will prohibit the importation of rice, except Japanese and Siamese rice; flour, except that of Japanese origin; caustic soda; sugar, except Japanese sugar; and will limit the importation of leaf tobacco from North America and Szechuan. This act will also prohibit the exportation of maize and castor beans except to Japan.

THOMAS M. MARTIN,
Major, 15th Infantry,
S-2.

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. Army Troops in China, Pientsin, China, December 9, 1937. To: Commanding General, Philippine Department, Manila, P.I.

Approved.

J. A. McANDREW,
Colonel, 15th Infantry
Commanding.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR


FROM SECOND BRIGADE USMC

February 7, 1938

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF (ADM)
CINCAF
OPNAV

INFO: AMCON SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING



8607. Chinese continue deny Nipponese capture
Hwaiyuan, Japanese claim occupation that city and of
Famgshan 11 miles to northeast. Six Chinese divisions
ordered from central Shansi to southern Tsinpu defense.
Japanese recaptured Mingyun southern Shantung. Indications
early resumption Japanese southward offensive Pinghan
railway. 1734.

KLP:RR

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
MIL. INTELL. DIV.
2657-H-437
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY TROOPS IN CHINA
Office of the Intelligence Officer.

INTelligence Summary

From: December 1, 1937.
To : December 15, 1937.

MILITARY

The North China Theatre.

Japanese military activity in North China has been limited to mopping up operations directed mainly against units of the 8th Route Army (the former Communist Army), totalling between 50,000 and 60,000 men scattered among the Tai Hang Mountains on the Hopei-Honan-Shansi border and in the vicinity of the Miangtsekuan and Pingtingkuan passes; and to operations against the remnants of General Jung's 29th Army, the former garrison of the Tientsin-Beiping area reported now to total about 15,000 men and to be scattered along the north and south banks of the Huto River, and in the vicinity of Shihchiachuang and Shunte on the Peiping-Hankow Railroad, and in Haintang, Mingshow, Taming, and other villages between the Peiping-Hankow and Tientsin-Pukow Railroads. The Japanese advance along the railroads was very rapid but did not extend far from the main lines of communications and it is believed these mopping up operations will continue for some time before all of the resistance from these forces is overcome or they are annihilated. The land operations have been accompanied by air raids by both Navy and Army planes. A Domei report states that the naval spokesman of the Japanese Imperial Headquarters announced that naval aircraft visited Chouchiakou, Loyang, Kuanhsien, all in Honan Province; Sian, Shensi Province; and Lanchow, Kansu Province, during the period December 1st to 6th and destroyed fifty Chinese aircraft and demolished fourteen hangars and buildings housing troops. The Japanese spokesman has stated that the Japanese bombed and destroyed the Ping-Han Yellow River Bridge on December 4th and 7th so as to cut off the line of retreat of the Chinese forces, that on December 6th Japanese air units bombed Kaifeng, Honan, the headquarters of the Chinese defense forces on the Ping-Han Railroad, and on December 7th bombed the Chinese troops at Tungoheng, seventy kilometers east of Taming.

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The Japanese report that on December 4th, seven thousand Chinese troops in the Lungping-Jhulu area northeast of Shunte surrendered and agreed to assist in the establishment of a new government.

Two thousand of the North China Self Government Army (Hua Pei Tzu Chin Chun), organized with the permission of the Japanese authorities and presumably recruited in North Eastern Hopei, were sent to the vicinity of Yenshan in southeastern Hopei for the suppression of bandits. As soon as they got out of sight of their masters they began to act like bandits themselves. The "Brave Volunteer Army" (I Yung Chun), a more or less spontaneous organization whose principal leaders were genuinely desirous of using it for the restoration of order, contained many men who were bandits and they appear to have corrupted the entire body. Thus, in the area under Japanese occupation in North China the Japanese have not succeeded in destroying all armed resistance or in wiping out banditry, a certain amount of which is the usual concomitant of winter even in ordinary times.

The Central China Theatre.

During the period December 1st to 15th the Japanese completed the reduction of the Kiangyin Forts on both sides of the Yangtze river and pushed rapidly westward toward Nanking in three columns, one column advancing up the south bank of the Yangtze river, one column advancing along the Nanking-Shanghai Railroad, and a double column advancing from Kuangte, Anhui Province, west along the Hanchow-Wuhu Highway towards Wuhu. From the information available in Tientsin, it has not been possible to determine the composition or the identity of the various Japanese units. It is reported that the Ono, Sukigawa, Soda, Katagiri, Kurini, and Imakana units comprised the column that captured Changchow on December 29th and proceeded along the railroad. West of Lake Taihu the Yamada and Chiba contingents were engaged and the Kataoka and Kozakaki units were reported to have captured Kuangte. The Tashito, Morosumi, Soeda, and Kurubayashi units were named as having been engaged at the Kiangyin Forts. The Senda and Komato air units were reported to have assisted in reducing the Kiangyin Forts and the Kakamura, Kozaki, Taki, and Konaka air units were reported to have assisted in the advance on Nanking.

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On December 7th reconnoitering parties reached Purple Mountain, which dominates the capital. Whankiang was captured on the 8th and Nuhu on the 9th, and by the 10th some 7000 Japanese troops were in position some eight miles up the river from Hanking, so there was little chance for the defenders to escape. On December 9th General Matsui, Commander-in-Chief in the Central China Area, issued an ultimatum notifying the garrison commander, General Tang Sheng-chih, that Hanking was completely surrounded and calling for the surrender of the city by noon December 10th. Thirty minutes after the expiration of the time limit set in the ultimatum, an attack was launched which resulted in the capture and occupation of the capital on the 13th, one of the severest blows China has suffered during the present hostilities. Casualties on both sides are reported to have been heavy, the Japanese claiming the Chinese lost between sixty and seventy thousand men. This figure is believed to be high, particularly as the Chinese claim the main force of the Chinese Army was withdrawn before the battle of Hanking started and Japanese reports confirm this statement.

Since the fall of Hanking the Japanese claim the occupation of Kiangpei and Yangchow on the North bank of the Yangtze River, but it is not believed any serious attempt to advance up the river toward Hankow has started to date.

It is believed the next large scale campaign of the Japanese in this sector will be toward Hangchow, which is the last important city in Kiangsu-Chekiang area under the control of the Chinese.

An unconfirmed Chinese report in Shanghai states that 50,000 Japanese troops are being taken out of the Central China area for transportation to South China in preparation for a drive towards Canton.

Thirty Soviet Russian aviators are reported to be in Hankow ready to participate in the Sino-Japanese hostilities and Japanese reports claim China is receiving airplanes from Soviet Russia.

During the recent hostilities in Central China the American gunboat "Panay" was bombed by the Japanese and sunk, together with three Standard Oil vessels, the "Meiping", the "Meihai", and the "Meian", and the British gunboats "Ladybird" and "Zee", and several commercial vessels flying the British flag were fired upon.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The South China Theatre.

Aerial attacks on important cities, particularly along the Hankow-Canton Railroad, have continued during the period covered by this report. Chinese reports indicate that the people of Kwangtung and Kiangsi Provinces are extremely nervous and expect an attack by a Japanese landing force, possibly from the direction of Hainan Island. Many foreign observers believe there are indications that the next Japanese advance will be made in South China.

POLITICAL

The Provisional Government of the Chinese Republic.

Immediately following the capture of Nanking by the Japanese military forces, there was on December 14, 1937, established in Peking a new government called "The Provisional Government of the Republic of China." This new government was ostensibly established by the people of North China, but in reality all observers know it was established at the direction of the Japanese Army.

The old five-color flag was selected as the national emblem and Peking as the capital.

The new government claims jurisdiction over all the territory of China Proper from which the Kuomintang forces have been evicted, including the lower Yangtze Valley. At the present time it is believed to exercise jurisdiction over all of Hopei Province, including that part formerly controlled by the East Hopei Anti-Communist Government, but exclusive of a few unimportant inland towns to which Japanese military occupation has not been extended to date. In the near future it is probable that jurisdiction of the new government will extend throughout all of Hopei, northern Shantung, northern Honan, and Northern and Central Shansi, and possibly southern Chahar, inasmuch as all the parts of these provinces named are already under Japanese military occupation, with the exception of areas distant from the main arteries of communication. The new Government has been congratulated by the Mongolian Frontier Federated Commission, organized at Kalgan on November 26th by the South Chahar Autonomous Government (established at Kalgan on August 26th-28th), the North Shansi Autonomous Government (a development of the Peace Maintenance Commission established at

Tatung on September 20th), and the Mongolian Federated Autonomous Government (established at Kueihua-Suiyuan City on October 27th.) Inasmuch as the Mongolian Frontier Federated Commission has promised to co-operate with the new Government, it seems likely that for the time being at least Peking will not exercise jurisdiction over the territory now controlled by the three members of Mongolian Frontier Federated Commission. Later the new government will probably exercise jurisdiction over all parts of China which come under Japanese military control, except possibly the territory under the control of the Mongolian Federated Autonomous Government established on October 27th at Kueihua in Suiyuan. This government may prefer to remain independent from China though closely allied with both Manchoukuo and China for purposes of trade and industrial development.

The new government consists of a chairman or president, who has not been selected to date; a legislative committee; an executive committee; and a judicial committee. General Pu Pei-fu, the first choice of the Japanese for the head of the new government, is reported to have refused to serve unless he could have his own army and govern without being subject to Japanese dictation. The spokesman of the Japanese Consulate General in Tientsin has given it as his personal opinion that Pu Yi, the emperor of Manchuckuo, will not return to Peking to be the head of the new Government. There are still local reports that Wang Ching-wei in spite of his anti-Japanese statements will finally become the chairman of the new government but this report is doubted by many foreign observers and it is believed the chairman of the new government has not as yet been selected.

The personnel of the new administration at present consists of Mr. Wang Ke-min, Dr. Tung Kang, Mr. Wang Yi-tang, General Chi Hsieh-yuan, Mr. Chu Sen, Mr. Chiang Chao-tsung, Mr. Kao Ling-wei, and Dr. Tang Erh-ho. Of these eight, the first five compose the standing committee of the legislative committee. The chairmen of the three committees are: Executive Committee, Mr. Wang Ke-min; Legislative Committee, Mr. Tang Erh-ho; and Judicial Committee, Dr. Tung Kang. The three committee chairmen and a total of five of the eight members of the new administration are southern

3076

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Chinese. Most of the eight members of the new government have held high offices in Peking before and their names are familiar in China. Wang Ke-min is a former Minister of Finance. He has long been known as a friend of Japan. He sought refuge in Dairen in 1927 when the Nanking Government ordered his arrest. Dr. Tang Erh-ho is a graduate of a medical school in Japan and has a Japanese wife. General Chi Hsieh-yuan is a former ~~gubun~~ (military governor) of Kiangsu Province. Wang Yi-tang was a prominent leader of the old Anfu Party and received a part of his education in Japan. Chu Shen was Minister of the Interior and another strong supporter of the Anfu Party, and is a graduate of the Tokyo Imperial University. Kao Ling-wei was a premier under the Chihli regime.

The Executive Committee consists of the following departments:

Administrative Department, Wang Ke-min, Chairman;
Public Safety Department, General Chi Hsieh-yuan, Chairman;
Education Department, Dr. Tang Erh-ho, Chairman;
Legislative Department, Chu Shen, Chairman;
Relief Department, Mr. Wang Yi-tang, Chairman.

The similarity of the Provisional Government of the Republic of China to the Kuomintang Government of China is worthy of note. The former has its three committees and General Kita is undoubtedly policy dictator, and the latter has its five committees (Yuan) and General Chiang Kai-shek as party dictator.

Domei (a Japanese News Agency) reported that Dr. Tang Erh-ho, Chairman of the Legislative Committee, had, on December 14th in Peking at a ceremony marking the establishment of the new Government, read a proclamation in which it was stated that in order to remove the arbitrary administration of the Kuomintang, the Provisional Government would

1. Revive administration based on the wishes of the people;
2. Oppose Communism;
3. Enhance Oriental morality and friendly relations with neighboring countries;
4. Promote industries for the improvement of the people's living;
5. Invite participation of executive and administrative talent.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The new government has been publicly congratulated by and promised the full support of the Japanese Army in North China, and in the present circumstances this amounts to de facto recognition by Japan. There are reports that Japan will withdraw her recognition of the present Kuomintang Government of China before the end of the year.

Mr. Mao Ling-wei will be governor of Hopei Province and concurrently Mayor of Tientsin.

The Federation of Tientsin-Peking Peace Maintenance Commissions was abolished on December 15th as a result of the establishment of the new government and the Peking Peace Maintenance Commission announced it would cease conducting business with outside activities on December 17th and would cease to exist as soon as it could complete its unfinished business.

Tientsin Maritime Customs.

Mr. Wang Ke-min, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Provisional Government of China, announced on December 16th that his government had taken over control of the Chinese Maritime Customs in North China on December 15th. The change was made without incident. Mr. W. R. Myers, the Commissioner of Customs in North China, was confined to his home in Tientsin by illness at the time the new government asserted its jurisdiction over the Customs, and the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. A. J. Hope, denied to the Tientsin representative of the United Press any knowledge of the passing of jurisdiction over the Customs to the Provisional Government even though the flag of the new government had been raised over the Customs building.

Reports indicate that normal tariff rates have been enforced on all goods imported since the beginning in July of the present military operations, with the important exceptions that all Japanese military supplies and all relief supplies, chiefly if not entirely foodstuffs, for refugees have been admitted duty free. The spokesman of the Japanese Consulate General in Tientsin said last month that it was possible that some dishonest merchants had taken advantage of the arrangement for relief supplies duty free and had thus evaded the payment of duty on a limited amount of foodstuffs.

News Association.

The Tientsin News Reporters Association was established on December 1st, with 67 members representing all the Tientsin Japanese and Chinese newspapers except the Manching Newspaper and the Ta-lu News Agency. These

0072

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

two newspapers were censured for their apparent lack of co-operation and an order was issued depriving them of their right of publication December 1st.

Shansi.

The province of Shansi announced autonomy and severance from the Nanking Government during the period. This Province, or at least so much of it as is under Japanese occupation, will probably be governed by the new Provisional Government of the Republic of China in the immediate future.

Death of Panchen Lama.

The Panchen Lama, spiritual head of Tibet and well known in Tientsin, and for a long time a political exile in China and India, died on December 3d while enroute to his home.

Universities in Peking.

The Peking Peace Maintenance Commission in order to regularize the status of the universities in that area which have lost their contact with the National Government assumed temporary control of these institutions and issued instructions that Japanese should be rated the first foreign language in the curricula; that improvement should be made in the method of teaching Chinese Classics; and that students should not interfere with school administration or engage in political activities of any kind.

Peking-Mukden Railway.

One hundred and twenty employees of the South Manchuria Railway have been assigned to serve in various capacities with the Peking-Mukden Railroad. British employees state that they are used by the railway at the present time in an advisory capacity only, and that such employment will probably cease in the immediate future.

Russian Emigrant House in Tientsin.

The Russian Emigrant House in the First Special Area (ex-German Concession) in Tientsin is causing a good deal of hard feeling among local Russians. Russians who are employed claim that this organization is used as a means of obtaining money from those who have positions and that if any Russian fails to pay the amount assessed against him, he is immediately arrested on false charges and placed in confinement for an indefinite period.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TRUMAN M. MARTIN,
 Major, 15th Infantry,
 S-2.

1st Ind.

Headquarters U. S. Army Troops in China, Tientsin, China, December 22, 1937.
 To: Commanding General, Philippine Department, Manila, P.I.

Approved.

J. A. McANDREW,
 Colonel, 15th Infantry,
 Commanding.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MG ***


FROM PLAIN

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Rec'd February 7, 1938

1:10 p.m.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

CORRECTED COPY
FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Rec'd 9:58 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

49, February 6, 5 p.m.

Yesterday afternoon Major General Amaya, the new garrison commander, gave a welcoming tea at the Japanese Embassy for the foreign diplomatic representatives in Nanking during the course of which he made a long statement outlining his opinion on the local situation and in which he criticised the attitude of the foreigners who had been sending abroad reports of Japanese atrocities and encouraging the Chinese in their anti-Japanese feeling. The gist of the statement is given below. Because of the importance and length of the statement an opportunity was taken of checking this morning with my British and German colleagues for possible errors or omissions and it is therefore believed that the following summary is substantially complete.

The General regretted the prominence which had been given abroad to reports of atrocities committed in Nanking by Japanese troops and in extenuation pointed out the long

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1074

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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KLP

Page 2, #49 from Nanking

long and strenuous fighting and the unexpected strong resistance of the Chinese. The rapid advance had caused the failure of food supplies and the exhaustion of the troops had led to a lack of discipline and hence looting and violence. However, he added that the Japanese troops were the best disciplined in the world and that in the Russo-Japanese War and in the Manchurian incident which had been comparatively mild there had been no atrocities. He hoped Europeans and Americans would refrain from criticism and remain onlookers and to respect the great Japanese nation. Endeavors were now being made to restore discipline. The Japanese troops were not hostile to Chinese citizens but they were angry at the existence of snipers and spies among the latter resulting from the anti-Japanese spirit which Chiang Kai Shek had instilled among the people as well as among the Chinese soldiers.

It was stated to be the desire of the Japanese military to restore order and normal conditions in Nanking as soon as possible. In Yangchow, from which place the General has just come, relations between Chinese and Japanese were good but in Nanking interference by foreigners which encouraged continuance of anti-Japanese feeling amongst the local Chinese population had hindered a return to normal and large numbers of Chinese continued to

1611

49 from Nanking page 3

to live in the so-called "safety zone." He referred to particularly reports and activities of nationals of a "certain country" which was damaging relations between Japanese and that country (this obviously refers to the United States.) The General expressed dislike of the attitude of a judge in a law court taken by the foreigners and warned them that their criticisms and interference between the Chinese and Japanese would anger the Japanese troops and might lead to some unpleasant incident. He asked to be trusted and gave assurances that he would do his best to restore order and normal life in the country and that foreign lives and property would be protected. He requested foreign representatives to discuss their difficulties with him as far as they concerned protection against foreign property but to refrain from interference with matters which concerned the Chinese.

After conclusion of the statement he asked for criticisms and comments from the foreigners present but none of them spoke. When asked if it would be possible to have a copy of the remarks Counselor Hidaka of the Japanese Embassy stated that it was not an official announcement.

He denied statement was obviously directed mainly against the International Relief Committee, composed mostly

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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KLP

Page 4, #49 from Nanking

mostly of Americans but with a ~~GERMAN~~ chairman. This commission has been feeding 50,000 Chinese refugees daily and has been extremely active in attempting to prevent and in reporting Japanese atrocities. In view of his strong opposition on the part of the local military authorities to the International Committee, instructions are requested as to how far this office should go in assisting committee in its humanitarian activities.

Sent to Embassy Hankow. Repeated to Peiping and Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo.

ALLISON

WWC

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MG

GRAY
FROM

Nanking via N.R.

Dated February 6, 1938.

Rec'd 9:58 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

49, February 6, 5 p.m.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Page 2, #49 from Nanking

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Page 3, #49 from Nanking

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Page 4, #49 from Nanking

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Sent to Embassy Hankow. Repeated to Peiping and Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo.

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WWC

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS
 ICHISHAN, WUHU
 TELEPHONE 100

山磯式湖燕
 院醫湖
 THE WUHU GENERAL HOSPITAL
 WUHU, CHINA

LEGAL ADVISER
 FEB 21 1937

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 22, 1937

Instruction to Shanghai

File

193.94
 Mr. Cordell S. Hull, 38 FEB 7 PM 1 12
 Secretary of State,
 The Department of State
 Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS

Dear Sir:

As few Americans have remained in any of the places during the time of entry and beginning occupation by the Japanese army, our experience here may be of some value to you. From reports from previously occupied places, I believe the Japanese conduct here has been quite typical, or probably milder than in most places because there was no actual fighting in Wuhu.

Since the arrival of the Japanese troops on December 10th, there has been established a ruthless reign of terror that has far exceeded anything ever achieved by any Chinese soldiers in my 20 years experience in China. From the hospital windows we have seen them stop civilians on the road, search them and, finding nothing, calmly shoot them through the head. We have seen them firing at the civilians fleeing across the fields as a hunter would at rabbits. We have had case after case brought into the hospital slashed with sabres or stabbed with bayonets because they had nothing more to give the robbers having already been robbed many times, or because they did not produce some of their women folk on demand. Physically well developed farmer or workers were in great danger because they were liable to be accused of being soldiers and shot without the least evidence. This morning such a pathetic case was brought to us with his head half severed from his neck at the back, his throat cut through the trachea in the front, and his left cheek slashed through to the mouth because he could not produce any women on their demand. He was also one of those well developed farmers and was accused of being a soldier.

While the Chinese soldiers were retreating through Wuhu, they did some small looting chiefly opening shops for shoes, clothing and food which they needed. They bothered Chinese private homes very little and not once did they enter or disturb foreign property in Wuhu. We expected the Japanese soldiers would be even more orderly and better disciplined. However, it was just the reverse. They have not hesitated to invade and loot foreign property flying the American flag. On December 13th they pulled down the American flag from a junk belonging to this hospital and threw it in the river. About the same day, they broke into our Methodist Mission residence at Green Hill, ransacking the house and taking whatever they wished. On December 15th, they went to the Wuhu Academy, an American Mission school, and, ordering the caretaker to haul down the American flag, entered in spite of the fact that there was a Japanese poster at the gate forbidding them to enter, and looted the buildings, breaking open the school safe. Two of these buildings were the residences of Americans. In the American Church Mission on Lion Hill, they broke through the compound wall and, breaking into Bishop Huntington's house, looted it. They also robbed a number of Chinese residences on the compound. They have treated the British flag and property in a similar way.

F/EG
 1937

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

December 22, 1937

So far there has been no attack or injury to foreign nationals. However, on December 16th a Japanese soldier threatened Sister Constance of the American Church Mission. He had gone to their gate and tried to take away their gateman, an old man. Sister Constance came along and stepped between the soldier and the gateman holding up her hands. The soldier gave her a push and, drawing his sword to a striking position, hissed "American! American!". The Sister faced him calmly with folded arms until he turned and walked away. I am keeping in constant contact with the Japanese military authorities who come to Wuhu and they assure me that they do not allow their soldiers to do these things.

There has been no police or postal service in the city since December 5th and no electric lights since that date. The hospital has had to depend entirely on its own light, water and other service utilities.

A Japanese Consul arrived on a naval plane on December 15th. He called on me and we requested that he do something to help restore order and give protection. He said they would like to take Messrs. Marshall, Vines, and Hodge back to Shanghai in the plane as the men were eager to get there. These three men were brought to this hospital after injury in the bombing of the U.S.S. Panay. The Japanese had plenty of photographers at the plane to "record the rescue of these Americans from the Chinese?"

I have continued to travel about the city in my car when necessary and have made many trips to bring in Chinese women whom we have learned about. They are living in daily dread and horror of being discovered. Many of them I know have already been discovered by the Japanese soldiers. They seem to have gone out of their way to search for and violate these Chinese women. We have something like 1,000 people on the hospital hill at the present time for whom we are trying to provide protection.

These incidents will indicate something of the type of militarism in Japan. In the face of such a threat to democratic ideals and government, our United States policy of isolation and neutrality seems pathetically inadequate and will in no sense give America the security she desires. Entirely aside from any sympathetic desire to help China defend herself against this aggression, the threatened success of Japanese militarism must be seriously faced by every Democratic nation. If she succeeds, it will only be a question of a few years until, with renewed strength and the increased resources of China, she will prepare a military machine that will truly be frightful, using Chinese soldiers well trained and equipped than whom, all neutral observers agree, there is no better soldier in the world. Unless we are willing to cooperate with other nations to check this unsatiable spirit of aggression by some form of control, economic sanctions applied completely and quickly, or if necessary even by force, we may find ourselves facing Japan alone in some major incident. I agree that there are good arguments that China's past conduct is in part responsible for this punishment. She is getting punishment. However, China's progress of the last five years is all that could be expected of any country and makes Japan's aggression all the more outrageous at this time. As a close student of Sino-Japanese affairs for 20 years, I am strongly convinced that it is absolutely necessary for the peace and security of the world that Japan shall not succeed in this program of aggression. I am sure most Americans either in China or elsewhere who understand the situation hold this view.

Sincerely yours,

Please keep the source of this information secret; otherwise several lives & large interests will be endangered. Rob't E. Brown
 Rob't. E. Brown, M.D., Sup't.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 19 1938.

To the

American Consular Officer in charge,
 Shanghai, Kiangsu, China.

The Department has received from Robert E. Brown,
 M.D., Superintendent of the Wuhu General Hospital,
 Wuhu, a letter of December 22, 1937, with regard to
 certain aspects of the Sino-Japanese hostilities.

The Secretary of State requests that the Consular
 Officer, unless he perceives objection thereto, make
 appropriate acknowledgment of Dr. Brown's letter and
 inform him that the information contained in his letter
 and the views expressed therein have been given careful
 consideration and that the spirit which prompted him to
 write is appreciated.

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
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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 1137

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,


Shanghai, China, January 5, 1938.



SUBJECT:

Intelligence Summaries for the
Period from December 1 to 31,
1937.

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THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.
1938 FEB 7
COMM AND RECORDS




WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 1108 of December 11, 1937, transmitting the intelligence summaries prepared by Captain R. A. Boone, Intelligence Officer of the United States Fourth Marines, for the period from November 8 to 30, 1937. Captain Boone's reports for the period 1/ from December 1 to 31, 1937, are enclosed as of possible interest to the Department.

Respectfully yours,


C. E. Gauss
American Consul General

Enclosure:

1- Intelligence Summaries from
December 1 to 31, 1937.

800
EFS MB

In Duplicate

Copy to Embassy, Hankow.

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FEB 25 1938
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
 HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE BRIGADE
 SHANGHAI, CHINA

1 December, 1937

RESTRICTED

B-2 REPORT

PERIOD 0800, 30 NOVEMBER, TO 0800, 1 DECEMBER, 1937

1. Operations

The Kiangyin Forts,--last stronghold of the Wusih-Kiangyin line were completely occupied by the Japanese yesterday. Although the left flank region has been vigorously defended, the actual capture of Kiangyin was effected with little difficulty.

Opening a renewed drive westward south of Tai Hu Lake, Japanese units have taken Kwangteh, Anhwei. Farther south forces operating on the Grand Canal yesterday occupied Tsungteh (25 miles northeast of Hangchow), while another column took Wukang (21 miles northwest of Hangchow). The activities southwest of the lake presage the Japanese intention to advance on Wuhu, to outflank Nanking, and at the same time cut off the means of retreat to Hankow.

Interviewed yesterday General Matsui intimated that he expected to be in Nanking by Christmas. He also stated that one of his best divisions had been ordered to Shanghai to police the outside areas.

2. Miscellaneous

Seven Japanese transports arrived in Shanghai on the 29th, carrying mules, horses, munitions, and about 20 heavy artillery pieces.

It is reported that the 75th and 76th Chinese Divisions have been transferred from the Nanking area to Chengchow, at the intersection of the Lunghai and Pinghan Railroads.


Restricted entry of foreign residents and their household servants into the Hongkew, Wayside, and Yangtzepoo districts from 15 December is announced by the Japanese Embassy.

Since the outbreak of fighting, 374,235 refugees have been repatriated from the International Settlement. Complete French Concession figures are not available, but it is believed that about 150,000 have been repatriated from that area.

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, May 3, 1973
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS Date Mar 19 1973

R. A. BOONE
 R. A. BOONE,
 Captain, U.S. Marine Corps,
 Brigade Intelligence Officer.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE BRIGADE
SHANGHAI, CHINA

2 December 1937

RESTRICTED

B-2 REPORT

PERIOD 0800, 1 DECEMBER, TO 0800, 2 DECEMBER, 1937

1. Operations

Haiyen has fallen to the Japanese advance. This right flank terminal point on Hangchow Bay succumbed yesterday to a continued naval bombardment, coupled with frontal and flanking infantry attacks. The Chinese line has fallen back along the coast toward Haining. Another Japanese column, pressing toward Hangchow on the Grand Canal was about 15 miles from the city yesterday.

Units from Kwangteh have progressed rapidly westward covering about 20 miles in two days. It is this thrust toward Wuhu which is worrying Chinese military circles in Nanking. The opinion is being expressed in these circles that any contemplated retreat from Nanking should be executed very soon, to prevent encirclement from the rear.

The advance on the Nanking Railroad has moved swiftly northward experiencing little serious opposition. Advance units are nearing Tanyang, 17 miles from Chinkiang.

2. Miscellaneous

Establishment of pro-Nippon police and political organs in the Chinese Territory surrounding the city continues. General Chi Hsieh-yuan, ex-Governor of Kiangsu Province, whose arrival was anticipated in a previous report, is now in Shanghai, residing at a Japanese hotel in Hongkew. He will undoubtedly be given a position of responsibility by the Japanese. It is reported that a Chapei branch of the "Shanghai Peace Maintenance Association" is being formed under Japanese auspices. It will be headed by Wong Ping-yien, former Chairman of the Chapei Citizens Association.

The American-owned launch, which was seized on the 30th by a Japanese naval detail, was returned yesterday with attendant apologies for the seizure and the indignity done the American flag.

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

An interesting note on conditions in southern Hopei comes with a reliable report stating that, in general, the Japanese influence extends only a few miles on either side of the railways. Beyond this, mixed bands of soldiers and bandits roam; infrequently attacking a Japanese outpost, more frequently sacking rural villages and holding wealthy Chinese for ransom.

From the 26th to the 30th of November, 11,187 Chinese refugees left the city by steamship.

R.A. Boone
R.A. BOONE,
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps,
Brigade Intelligence Officer.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE BRIGADE
SHANGHAI, CHINA

4 December 1937

RESTRICTED

B-2 REPORT

PERIOD 0800, 2 DECEMBER, TO 0800, 4 DECEMBER, 1937

1. Operations

Reports from Chinese sources declare that the Japanese forces in occupation of Kwangteh were driven out to the eastward on the 2nd. In direct contradiction, the Japanese military last night announced a concerted advance over the front between the Nanking Railroad and Hangchow Bay, with Nipponese forces in complete occupation of Liyang, and at the outskirts of Tanyang. Advancing southward from Wukang and Tsungteh, Japanese advance units are reported within 15 miles of Hangchow.

The breach in the Yangtze boom at Kiangyin has been further widened, permitting the passage of small gunboats. Yesterday, the completion of a new boom stopped river communication between Chinkiang and Nanking.

2. "Victory Parade"

The announced movement of about 6,000 Japanese infantry, artillery, and auxiliary troops from Jessfield to Hongkew through the Settlement began at shortly after 1100 yesterday. The column consisted of three battalions of infantry, two battalions (6 batteries, 24 guns) of light artillery (75 mm), a company of engineers and miscellaneous auxiliaries including a few cavalry. The units were of a reservist division. The men appeared in excellent physical condition, guns and equipment in fair shape, although obviously having seen hard service. Animals were in very poor condition apparently underfed and not well cared for. The march proceeded without serious incident until about 1245 when the rear portion of the column was passing Nanking and Kwangsi Roads. At this point a grenade-bomb (described as similar to the Mills grenade) was thrown over the column. Upon bursting, it injured three Japanese soldiers, a Japanese Consular Policeman, and three members of the Shanghai Municipal Police. The assassin was shot on the spot by a Chinese constable of the S.M.P., and died about two hours later. The section of the parade, which was disrupted by the explosion, was promptly reassembled, and marched on, leaving a detail behind to clear and patrol the area. Patrols spread out on Nanking and adjacent roads, reaching as far east as Shansi Road, and as far as

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Tientsin, Kiukiang and Yu Ya Ching Roads on the north, south, and west. At about 1525 the Japanese troops extended their patrols into the American sector west of Yu Ya Ching Road. They placed portable barbed-wire barricades across Bukling Well Road just to the west of the Grand Theater and stationed an officer and two sentries at this point, stopping all traffic. Upon being informed of the violation of the American sector by Colonel Price, the Japanese officer in command of the detail caused it to be withdrawn east of Yu Ya Ching Road.

A joint investigation of the bombing was held by the Municipal Police and the Japanese. At about 2000, the investigation completed, the Japanese patrols began to withdraw, and at 2030, the area was entirely open.

3. Miscellaneous


Six Japanese transports arrived in Shanghai on the 2nd. They carried 2,000 troops, six tanks, munitions and miscellaneous supplies.

It is reported that three additional divisions of Szechuenese troops, the 145th, 146th, and 162nd, have been moved into the area of Wuhu.

At about 1200 yesterday the Nanking Military Airdrome was raided. The extent of the damage is not known.

R. A. Boone
 R. A. BOONE,
 Captain, U.S. Marine Corps,
 Brigade Intelligence Officer.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE BRIGADE
SHANGHAI, CHINA

6 December 1937

RESTRICTED

B-2 REPORT

PERIOD 0600, 4 DECEMBER, TO 0800, 6 DECEMBER 1937

1. Operations

The Japanese drive, following a rapid advance, has arrived at the beginning of the prepared Nanking defense system which extends from Chinkiang to Wuhu. The military situation is stationary, with the Japanese bringing additional troops to the front while Chinese forces continue to consolidate. As the line rests now, Japanese forces are in Tanyang, near Kuyung, past Liyang, and in occupation of Langki. Little attention appears to be given the Hangchow area, with most of the Japanese reinforcements and Chinese defenses concentrating on the Nanking Railroad and the Hangchow-Nanking motor road.

Yesterday Japanese aircraft carried out extensive bombing operations over the Nanking-Wuhu area. During the attacks on Wuhu, where troop convoys are said to have been bombed, two British vessels were struck at about 1100. Two commercial vessels, the Butterfield and Swire "Tatung" and the Jardine-Matheson "Tuckwo" were set on fire by the bombs. Splinters struck the British gunboat H.M.S. "Ladybird" resulting, it is said, in the injury of the Commanding Officer.

Japanese aviators reported that they had observed large numbers of Chinese troops (30000 to 50000) crossing the river at Wuhu, and that they bombed some of the junks which were engaged in the crossing.

2. Miscellaneous

Japanese reports declare that the Chinese cruiser "Ninghai" was driven aground by Japanese vessels near Kiangyin on the 4th, and is now in the hands of the Japanese navy.

At about 1030 on the 4th a Japanese supply convoy of four trucks on which were a few armed troops, a staff car, and an empty bus, proceeded south down the bund. Arriving at the border of the French Concession, they were halted by a cordon of French police reinforced by armored cars. After a delay of about 30 minutes, the convoy was permitted to proceed, with a French policeman in each vehicle as escort.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Five Japanese transports arrived on the 3rd carrying munitions, lumber, and about 50 motor sampans.

Beginning 4 December, Japanese mills in the Italian Sector were placed under the guard of Japanese Consular Police and Military Gendarmes.

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R. A. ROONE,
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps,
Brigade Intelligence Officer.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE BRIGADE
SHANGHAI, CHINA

9 December 1937

RESTRICTED

B - 2 REPORT

PERIOD 0800, 6 DECEMBER, TO 0800, 9 DECEMBER, 1937

1. Operations

Abandoning all efforts at a series of delaying actions, the defenders of Nanking have withdrawn to their final positions around the city. Japanese forces, on the 5th and 6th moved rapidly forward in pursuit of the withdrawing Chinese, but despite their anticipatory reports of the capture of Purple Mountain and the Sun Yat Sen Memorial Park, they are no closer than eight miles to Nanking's walls.

For their assault on the capital's defenses the Japanese are using three axes of approach; one unit on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway has passed Tsungtow about 12 miles from the city. Another column advancing northward on the motor road from Lishui is last reported at Mulingkwan, 11 miles from the walls. A third column on the Hangchow-Nanking motor road has taken Tangshui. With these three powerful drives steadily converging, the fall of the city is imminent, although the city's garrison continues its feverish defense preparations.

2. Aircraft

Japanese planes bombed Chinkiang and Wuhu on the 7th, and again yesterday. After vigorous bombing raids on the fortifications at the north extremity of the Kiangyin boom, Japanese troops landed on the north bank of the river and occupied the defenses. The breach in the boom is still large enough only for river gunboats.

3. Miscellaneous

Considering the rapidity of the Japanese advance, it is inevitable that small bodies of Chinese troops must have been enveloped and passed by unnoticed. Numerous reports of small scale guerilla activities have come to hand. One account describes a remnant of the 55th Division which has concealed its arms in the vicinity of Nan Jao, on the Pootung peninsula. The soldiers, in plain clothes, are said to be preparing for concerted action against Japanese outposts.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Pah Dac (Great Way) government in Pootung continues to expand. On the 7th, representatives distributed large quantities of the new red, blue, and yellow flags to residents.

The Japanese military have taken over sub-stations of the Shanghai City Government Police Bureau in the Hungjao area, affixing placards announcing "Japanese Military Police Jurisdiction" on each building.

On the 6th and 7th, 13 Japanese transports arrived at wharves in Yangtzepoo and Wayside. They carried about 1500 men, a number of trucks, lumber, munitions and rice. The Japanese are now employing over 2000 Chinese coolies to unload these vessels as they arrive. The coolies receive \$1.00 per day, and are transported from the Garden Bridge to the wharves each morning by lorry and returned in the evening.

R. A. Boone
R. A. BOONE,
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps,
Brigade Intelligence Officer.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE BRIGADE
SHANGHAI, CHINA

11 December, 1937

RESTRICTED

B-2 REPORT

PERIOD 0800, 9 DECEMBER, TO 0800, 11 DECEMBER, 1937

1. Operations

The Japanese ultimatum delivered to General Tang Sheng-chih on the 9th was not answered, and yesterday at about 1330 a general offensive supported by aerial bombardment was launched on Nanking from the south, east, and north. By evening the column driving from the south had reached the city walls, and heavy fighting was in progress in the vicinity of the Kwanghua gate. A breach was made in the wall at this point, and from latest reports, a small Japanese detachment was within the city last night. On the east and north, units succeeded in securing positions on the eastern slope of Purple Mountain before dark.

On the 9th, the occupation of Chinkiang was completed, while a Japanese detachment advancing up the Sih sien-Nanking highway has reached the outskirts of Wuhu, where heavy fighting was reported last night.

Continued efforts at widening the Kiangyin boom have succeeded in making a breach large enough to permit the passage of a flotilla of twelve 480 ton trawlers, which have moved upstream toward Chinkiang.

2. Miscellaneous

At about 1800 yesterday, 17 Japanese soldiers landed on the south bank of Soochow Creek near Penang Road, and entered the N.J.K. Mill No. 9. No officer accompanied the detail, and it is believed that the soldiers, who had just come downstream from the front, were not aware of their exact location. Representations to the Japanese military authorities secured the withdrawal of the troops.

It is reported that a newly organized 4th Route Army has been transferred from Kwengtung to the Pukow area. This army is composed of about 50,000 old communist troops from Kiangsi, Fukien, and Kwangtung.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Yesterday 35 Japanese transports were noted off Woosung. Of these, 5 carried troops, while the remainder carried supplies, including large quantities of railroad material.

On the 5th, all local Italian news correspondents were escorted to the front by the Japanese. It is interesting to note that these are the first to receive this courtesy.

102 V. H. Krulak
R. A. BOONE,
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps,
Brigade Intelligence Officer.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE BRIGADE
SHANGHAI, CHINA

13 December, 1937

RESTRICTED

B-2 REPORT

PERIOD 0800, 11 DECEMBER, TO 0800, 13 DECEMBER, 1937

1. Operations

Japanese forces have surrounded Nanking on three sides, and are now in contact with the Yangtze on both the northern and eastern sides of the city. Units advancing from the eastward yesterday made their way to the Chungshan Gate, while the troops which captured the Kuanghua Gate on the 9th enlarged their salient in the southern part of the city. Japanese spokesmen claim that yesterday one column driving around the north slope of Purple Mountain reached the banks of Hsuanwu (Lotus) Lake. The populous urban districts of the city underwent a destructive bombardment yesterday, and unless the Chinese abandon the fight very shortly, the Japanese will occupy a city of ruins.

Sizeable numbers of Chinese troops are reported to have made their way across the river in retreat yesterday and the night before. To further harry their movements, a Nipponese force has been ferried across the river below Nanking, and is moving toward Pukow.

Some Chinese remnants remain in the Wuhu area, but the Japanese are in nominal control of the city. Yesterday morning, during the fighting in this region, the British gunboat H.M.S Ladybird was struck by four shells fired from a Japanese battery. One seaman was killed, and several others were wounded.

2. Aircraft

Japanese naval and military aircraft were unusually active yesterday. Raids were carried out over Nanchang and Loyang, two of the largest Chinese air bases. No definite information is available concerning the damage done in these raids, but the Japanese military announced last night that the aircraft factories at both places were damaged, and that three planes were destroyed on the ground at Loyang.

Aircraft supported the operations in the Nanking area on the 11th and 12th, extending their attacks yesterday to the region on the left bank of the river, north of Chinkiang, where retreating Chinese troops are said to be concentrated.

3. Miscellaneous

According to a reliable report, General Chiang Kai-shek, Madame Chiang, and Mr. W.H. Donald have proceeded to Hengshan, a town in eastern Hunan, about 75 miles south of Changsha.

The Italian Ambassador has ordered all Italian citizens in Nanchang (about 90 in number) to evacuate via Hankow and Canton. This apparently terminates the service of the Italian Air Mission.


On the 12th, 118 sampans loaded with Japanese troops passed "C" Sector on their way down Soochow Creek from the front. This convoy is estimated to have numbered 3,000 men. On the same day, a column of approximately 3,000 infantry troops, along with a combat train of 250 carts were noted marching eastward through Chapel.

Manufacturing operations in Shanghai are gradually being resumed. There are now over 30,000 persons employed in factories. The Japanese mills in the western district have not yet begun work, but their early opening is presaged by the re-employment of many of their Chinese workers.

Japanese locomotives and rolling stock are now in use on the Woosung-Shanghai Railway.

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R. A. BOONE,
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps,
Brigade Intelligence Officer.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE BRIGADE
SHANGHAI, CHINA

14 December, 1937

RESTRICTED

B-2 REPORT

PERIOD 0800, 13 DECEMBER, TO 0800, 14 DECEMBER, 1937

1. Operations

The Japanese command has been driven, in the attack on Nanking, to forego its repugnance of infantry assault and hand to hand fighting, and to throw foot troops into frontal attacks on the city. Suffering heavy losses, the Nipponese forces have gained possession of all the gates on the south, east, and north sides of the city, and are inside the walls in large numbers. The investiture of Nanking, although by no means complete, is well on its way to accomplishment. General Matsui's headquarters officially announced, last night, the occupation of the capital.

Japanese units have crossed the Yangtze between Wuhu and Nanking, and are engaged in clearing retreating Chinese soldiers from villages on the left bank.

2. U.S.S. Panay

At about 1330, 12 December, the U.S.S. Panay was bombed and sunk by Japanese naval aircraft engaged in bombing attacks on vessels in the Yangtze above Nanking. In addition to the Panay, three Socony Vacuum motor lighters were destroyed.

Fragmentary reports state that fifty-four persons, of approximately 62 on board, succeeded in reaching the shore at Hohsien, Anhwei, on the left bank of the river. Of these, fifteen were injured, one subsequently dying. Four members of the American Embassy Staff who were on board are all reported safe. The survivors suffered further peril upon reaching shore, as Japanese army forces were machine-gunning the town, preparatory to an infantry attack.

For the succor of the isolated survivors H.M.S. Bee proceeded immediately to the scene of the bombing, and picked up seven persons. At the same time, the U.S.S. Oahu was steaming at best speed downriver from Kuikiang. A Japanese gunboat was expected to arrive at Hohsien by nightfall, while, according to a Third Fleet communique, a flying boat was to leave this morning with medical and relief supplies.

A more detailed report will be included upon the receipt of further information.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


3. Miscellaneous

Seven Japanese transports arrived in Shanghai on the 12th carrying munitions, gasoline, and 50 motor sampans.

Japanese naval vessels have succeeded in making their way through the Chinkiang boom.

R. A. Boone
R. A. BOONE,
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps,
Brigade Intelligence Officer.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huntington NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER,
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE BRIGADE,
SHANGHAI, CHINA.

16 December, 1937.

RESTRICTED

B-2 REPORT

PERIOD 0800, 14 DECEMBER, TO 0800, 16 DECEMBER, 1937.

1. Operations

Following the retreat of Chinese defenders from Nanking and Wuhu, Japanese forces have crossed the Yangtze in considerable numbers and are engaged in expelling snipers, and small bands of soldiers from the villages on the left bank of the river. In Nanking itself there still remain isolated groups of soldiers as was the case in the fighting around Shanghai.

There is now ensuing an interlude of quiet preparation on both sides. The Chinese, although definitely shaken, are proceeding to reorganize their main force, the bulk which escaped from Nanking, into five armies (the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th) under the command of General Chang Chih-chung, who directed the Shanghai defense during August and September. They are preparing new defensive positions west of Wuhu, extending to Hangchow, while new obstructions are being sunk in the Yangtze, in the vicinity of Kiukiang.

The Japanese, meanwhile, are consolidating their rapidly won territory, and give indication of shifting the head of their attack to the left flank of the line, in the Hangchow area. At the same time Japanese troops are noted coming into Shanghai from the front in large numbers. This, coupled with the fact that there are at this time 31 empty transports off Woosung, points to a diversion in some other quarter, probably South China.

2. Miscellaneous

Seventy four survivors of the USS Panay - Standard Oil bombing were taken aboard the USS Oahu and HMS Ladybird yesterday, and started downriver for Shanghai, conveyed by two Japanese vessels. Three of the more seriously wounded arrived here yesterday afternoon in a Nipponese flying boat.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Between the Saddle Islands and Woosung there were noted 40 Japanese transports and 12 warships, on the 15th. Thirty-one of the transports were empty, while the remainder were loaded with railroad material, including small locomotives and rolling stock.

A limited section of the Hongkew-Yangtzepoo area was opened for residence on the 15th. However, the numerous restrictions laid down by the Japanese military, along with curtailed facilities, discouraged any large influx.

R A Boone

R. A. BOONE,
Captain, U. S. Marine Corps,
Brigade Intelligence Officer.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE BRIGADE
SHANGHAI, CHINA

18 December, 1937

RESTRICTED

R-2 REPORT

PERIOD 0800, 16 DECEMBER, TO 0800, 18 DECEMBER, 1937

1. Operations

Japanese units in Nanking are still engaged in mopping up operations, searching out small bands of snipers. Large numbers of Chinese soldiers who shed their uniforms in an effort to be spared, are summarily shot with characteristic ruthlessness.

There still remain on the left bank of the river, sizeable units of Chinese troops. Japanese forces, operating from Pukow and Yukiow (across from Wuhu) are endeavoring to clear the area and solidify the Japanese position between Nanking and Wuhu. Farther downstream, Japanese troops based at Kwachow and Tsinkiang have despatched detachments along the left bank. These activities all appear to be security measures, and, as yet do not indicate any substantial drive northward or westward.

The predicted resumption of the Hangchow offensive materialized on the 16th. The principal effort is concentrated along the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway, supported by a column driving south on the Grand Canal.

2. Aircraft

In conjunction with the land drive on Hangchow, Japanese planes bombed Linping, Siaoho, and Hangchow on the 16th, and Hangchow again on the 17th.

Yesterday eight bombs were dropped on the airfield northeast of Canton.

3. Miscellaneous

The remaining survivors of the Panay disaster, with the remains of four dead, arrived in Shanghai yesterday at about 1645.

On the 15th and 16th, a total of 21 Japanese transports secured to wharves in Yangtzepoo and Wayside. Besides about 3000 troops, they carried large quantities of lumber, gasoline, and munitions.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A belated, and as yet, unconfirmed report states that in the early part of November two Chinese Thornycroft torpedo boats passed through the Kiangyin boom, made their way downriver, and succeeded in sinking a Japanese light cruiser.

During the first 15 days of December, 696 foreigners returned to Shanghai. Of this number, 234 were American and 241 were British.

18 AT 2000
R. A. BOONE,
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps,
Brigade Intelligence Officer.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER,
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE BRIGADE,
SHANGHAI, CHINA

20 December, 1937

RESTRICTED

B-2 REPORT

PERIOD 0800, 18 DECEMBER, TO 0800, 20 DECEMBER, 1937

1. Operations

While groups of Chinese raiders and remnant units continue to harass communications and supply lines between Nanking and Wuhu, Japanese columns are pressing forward on three fronts. Driving close behind retreating Chinese, Nipponese units are moving up the Tsinpu Railway while another force is advancing toward Luchow. A third column, starting from Wuhu is moving southward on the railway toward Sih sien. How far these advances are intended to go is a matter of conjecture, but it is significant to note that almost no reinforcements have been sent to the front through Shanghai during the past week.

Sporadic fighting is reported in the Hangchow area near Changan, where the Shanghai-Hangchow Railway crosses the Grand Canal, about 16 miles from the city.

A new development of the present incident materialized yesterday in the burning of nine Japanese Textile mills at Sze-fang, near Tsingtao. The incendiary activities are laid to the Shantung military, acting under orders of Han Fu-chu. Whether Han is acting under the direction of the Central Government is another question.

2. Miscellaneous

Seaman R. E.F.W.G. Hulsebus, U.S. Navy, died at about 0630, 19 December, as a result of wounds received during the bombing of the USS Panay by Japanese aircraft.

At 0915 on the 18th members of the Japanese Naval Landing Party entered the Chinese Government Radio Administration building on Markham Road ("C" sector) and began dismantling the equipment. Since this entry into the Marine sector came without previous notification, representations were made to the Japanese Naval Attache. The conversations resulted in an apology by Rear-Admiral Honda to General Beaumont. A request to proceed with the work was granted.


Due to the Tsingtao situation, the sailing of the USS Augusta has been indefinitely postponed, while the USS Marblehead and USS Pope have been dispatched to the Shantung port.

011

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

While Japanese transports continue to arrive in Shanghai, it is interesting to note that five empty vessels secured to wharves in Yangtzepoo on the 17th, were loaded with munitions and food supplies, and departed downriver.

R. A. Boone
R. A. BOONE,
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps,
Brigade Intelligence Officer.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER,
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE BRIGADE,
SHANGHAI, CHINA

21 December, 1937

RESTRICTED

B-2 REPORT

PERIOD 0800, 20 DECEMBER, TO 0800, 21 DECEMBER, 1937.

1. Operations

Japanese activities on the left bank of the Yangtze continue. Meeting only mild resistance units have driven northward on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway for a distance of about 20 miles while troops which crossed the river at Chinkiang are now about 22 miles inland. The column advancing on Luchow has penetrated about 12 miles from Wuhu.

Steadily converging on Hangchow, Japanese units have reached Wankiachwang, a village on the Grand Canal 12 miles from the city. While the resistance which the Japanese are encountering in this offensive is not extremely vigorous, they suffer considerably from the activities of small bands which harass their supply and communication lines.

Tsingtao remains tense, with considerable looting of Japanese shops taking place. Nipponese planes are reported to have bombed the railway station.

2. Aircraft

The Kiukiang area was bombed yesterday at 1300 by seventeen Japanese planes. Approximately 65 bombs were dropped. The Nanchang station and airdrome were attacked shortly afterward.

On the 19th extensive bombing raids were carried out over the Canton-Kowloon and Canton-Hankow railways.


3. Miscellaneous

Yesterday at 1500, Major General K. Harada, Japanese Military Attache called on General Beaumont to describe his investigation of the Panay incident, and to express his regrets and apologies for the occurrence.

It is reported that General Tang Shen-chih, who directed the defense of Nanking, has been given command of Chinese forces defending the Tsinpu line.

Empty Japanese transports continue to load cargo at wharves in Yangtzepoo, and depart downriver.

11/11/37
R. A. BOONE,
Captain, U. S. Marine Corps,
Brigade Intelligence Officer.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER,
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE BRIGADE,
SHANGHAI, CHINA

24 December, 1937

RESTRICTED

B-2 REPORT

PERIOD 0600, 21 DECEMBER, TO 0600, 24 DECEMBER, 1937

1. Operations

Meeting vigorous resistance in their drive on Hangchow, Japanese forces have launched a flanking attack on the city from the northwest. This offensive is based on Kwangteh, and is driving southward through Anchi, and Siaofeng, toward Yuhang on the Hangchow-Sih sien motor road. Leading units of this column are reported within 20 miles of Hangchow.

Moving slowly up the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad, troops which captured Hsuh sien on the 21st are nearing Changpaling, 40 miles north of Pukow. Another unit is reported to be about 25 miles north of Chinkiang.

Chinese forces in Kwangtung continue preparations in anticipation of an attack on Canton. We are informed that two Nipponese transports loaded with troops were seen in Bias Bay on the 21st.

Tsingtao continues quiet. The inner harbor mouth has been entirely blocked with sunken vessels and streets are patrolled by Chinese military who have successfully curbed looting.

2. Aircraft

Nanchang station and the airdrome at that city were attacked on the 22nd. Results of the raid are not definitely known, although Japanese Naval spokesman state that 12 Chinese planes were destroyed, while Chinese reports declare that 3 Nipponese planes were shot down.

The Canton-Kowloon Railway was bombed on the 22nd and 23rd.

3. Miscellaneous


We are informed that Mr. Ling Kang-hou, Secretary General of the Chinese Bankers' Association, was approached by the Japanese with the proffer of the Mayorship of Shanghai. Unable to reconcile the position with his Central Government connections, Ling did not accept. The Nipponese then approached Fu Siao-an, Director General of the Commercial Bank of China with the same offer. Fu, it is said, has given tentative acceptance.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Return of residents to the areas north of Soochow Creek is progressing very slowly. At this time there are about 2,000 Chinese and 50 foreigners living in the recently opened section.

Seven Japanese transports arrived in Shanghai on the 21st and 22nd. Yesterday 14 lighter loads of munitions were taken from wharves in Yangtzepoo to vessels at Woosung.

Y. H. H. H. H.
/s/ R. A. BOONE,
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps,
Brigade Intelligence Officer.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE BRIGADE
SHANGHAI, CHINA

27 December, 1937

RESTRICTED

B-2 REPORT

PERIOD 0600, 24 DECEMBER, TO 0600, 27 DECEMBER, 1937

1. Operations

Following their standard practise of maintaining frontal pressure while a flanking movement achieves the objective, Japanese forces have succeeded in capturing Hangchow. Although Japanese reports announced the fall of the city on the 24th, it appears that Nipponese troops were actually not in occupation until the morning of the 26th. The retreat of the Chinese defenders was brought about by the swift advance of a Japanese column moving southward from Kwangteh. Taking Shwaangkitsun on the 23rd, this unit drove rapidly toward Yuhang, on the Hangchow-Nanchang road, thus menacing the Chinese rear. In order to avoid encirclement, the greater part of the Chinese force withdrew during that night. Yuhang was taken on the 24th, and as the Nipponese columns converged on Hangchow on Christmas Day they found themselves opposed only by "sacrifice units".

Mopping up operations are in progress around the city while one detachment is following in pursuit of the Chinese retreat. The Japanese military last night claimed that this unit had occupied Fuyang, 19 miles southwest of Hangchow.

No fighting has yet developed from the tense Tsingtao situation. The Third Fleet Headquarters officially announced yesterday morning that the Tsingtao harbor was under blockade for public and private Chinese vessels. Meanwhile a Japanese force which crossed the Yellow River 50 miles east of Tsinan on the 23rd has advanced southward, and the rupture of the Tsinan-Tsingtao rail line is imminent if not already accomplished, while Tsinan was shelled yesterday from the east.

2. Aircraft

Japanese aircraft attacked Nanchang and the Nanchang-Hangchow Railway on the 25th and 26th. Bombs were also dropped at Haichow, Hsuechow, and along the Lunghai Railroad.

One bomb was dropped at Amoy yesterday.


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3. Miscellaneous

The Japanese military announce the opening to foreigners of all areas north of Soochow Creek as of 27 December. Restrictions against Chinese, other than domestic servants, will continue in force.

V. H. Krulack
for R. A. BOONE
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps
Brigade Intelligence Officer.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE BRIGADE
SHANGHAI, CHINA

29 December, 1937

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B-2 REPORT

PERIOD 0800, 27 DECEMBER, TO 0800, 29 DECEMBER, 1937

1. Operations

Following the rapid crossing of the Yellow River Japanese troops closed in on Tsinanfu, and succeeded in capturing the city on the 27th, after 24 hours of intensive bombardment. Prior to their retreat, Chinese troops set fire to large areas, including many foreign structures. No Japanese troops have yet assaulted Tsingtao, the nearest reported fighting taking place at Jiehhsien, 80 miles west of the city. To protect Tsingtao on the west the Chinese have destroyed a number of bridges on the Kiaochiao-Tsinan Railway.

Nipponese units continue to press west and southwest from Hangchow, north of the Chientang River. On the 26th, Linan, 25 miles west of the city was taken, and on the 27th, Sinteng, a town 28 miles southwest of Hangchow fell to the Japanese. These columns appear to be advancing to form a junction at Jiehhsien with the force coming southward on the railway from Tuhu. The greater portion of the Chinese troops that retreated from Hangchow are reported to have concentrated in the vicinity of Lanchi and Lungyu on the Hangchow-Hanchang Railway 85 miles southwest of Hangchow.

The Japanese give little indication, at present, of pushing their line up the Yangtze Valley, along the river. A greater effort is being expended in the northward drive along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and the Grand Canal. Their advance units are now nearing Kashiin, 50 miles north of Pukow, and are fighting at Maoyu, 42 miles north of Chinkiang on the Grand Canal.

2. Miscellaneous

On the 27th, and again on the 28th, explosives, said to be hand grenades, were thrown from Soochow Creek bridges into Japanese troop sampans below. On the first occasion, one soldier was slightly injured; no casualties are reported from the second. One suspect was arrested by the S.M.P. immediately following the incident of the 28th.


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

These difficulties may be traced, in great part to the number of Chinese soldiers who discarded their uniforms, but not all their weapons, and entered the foreign Settlements after the Chinese retreat. Further back than this, it is recalled that during the first twelve weeks of the war, hundreds of truckloads of Chinese wounded were admitted to the city, accompanied, it is certain, by an occasional concealed gun or grenade.

On the 26th, the Nagasaki Maru brought a number of Japanese Ministry of Communications personnel to Shanghai. It is reported that they will begin the reestablishment of telephone and telegraph facilities on the Yangtze delta.

RC 150-0114
R. A. BOONE,
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps,
Brigade Intelligence Officer.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hurler NARS, Date 12-18-75



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE BRIGADE
SHANGHAI, CHINA

31 December, 1937

RECEIVED

B-2 REPORT

PERIOD 0800, 29 DECEMBER, TO 0800, 31 DECEMBER, 1937

1. Operations

There has been little change in the Yangtze delta military situation in the past 48 hours. The Japanese drive west and southwest of Hangchow is encountering vigorous resistance on the line between Tunglu and Tsacki, and there is no information available on the activities of the unit pressing southward from Wuhu.

Following the occupation of Tsinanfu, the Nipponese immediately took up a movement southward on the Tsingpu Railway, with the apparent objective of ultimately joining with the column advancing northward from Pukow. To thwart this plan, Central Government troops have been strengthening their positions along the railway. Five additional divisions have arrived in the region between Hsuehchow and Yenchow in the last few days.

While an air of resignation to the believed inevitable occupation of the city pervades Tsingtao, Chinese agents continue to destroy Japanese mills and commercial installations. With Japanese warships occasionally in sight off the outer harbor, Chinese residents are leaving the resort city in large numbers.

The obvious interlude which the fighting is passing through at this time points to indecision on the part of the Japanese. Exactly as was the case following the fall of Shanghai, the attackers are awaiting a Chinese move on which to predicate the Nipponese policy.

2. Aircraft

On the 30th, bombs were dropped at Canton, Nanchang, Sian, and several points along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway.

3. Miscellaneous

Ten Japanese transports arrived in Shanghai on the 28th and 29th, carrying 1,000 men, munitions, lumber, forage, and about 20 motor sampans.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


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The assassination of Lo Ka-pang yesterday was a severe blow to local Japanese plans since this man had promised to head the Shanghai puppet government, which is now in process of formation. It will be extremely difficult for the Japanese to induce any respectable Chinese of good standing to replace him.

While refugees are being sent out of Shanghai in a steady stream, the actual number of persons living at the expense of the two municipalities has not reduced materially in the past month. There are now something over 90,000 in the International Settlement, and about 24,000 in the French Concession. Many of these individuals are not truly "refugees", but are destitutes who would receive little aid on an ordinary winter, but who have seized this opportunity to "go on relief".

7-1/5-11
 R. A. BOCKE,
 Captain, U.S. Marine Corps,
 Brigade Intelligence Officer.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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A FEW MAJOR EVENTS OF THE 1937 INCIDENT
WHICH ARE REPORTED TO HAVE HAPPENED IN AND
NEAR SHANGHAI DURING THE PERIOD DECEMBER
11, 1937 TO JANUARY 10, 1938 INCLUSIVE AS
CULLED FROM THE NEWSPAPERS AND ARRANGED
IN A DAY TO DAY CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER.

Handwritten initials

793.94/12339

From:

Signature of Clarke Vyse
Clarke Vyse, American Consul

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China.

Date completed: January 15, 1938.

Date mailed: JAN 16 1938

APPROVED:

Signature of C. E. Gauss
C. E. Gauss,
American Consul General.

F/FG 12339

0125

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A FEW MAJOR EVENTS OF THE 1937 INCIDENT WHICH ARE REPORTED TO HAVE HAPPENED IN AND NEAR SHANGHAI DURING THE PERIOD DECEMBER 11, 1937 TO JANUARY 10, 1938 INCLUSIVE AS CULLED FROM THE NEWSPAPERS AND ARRANGED IN A DAY TO DAY CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER.

December 11, Saturday

The jurisdiction of the Shanghai Municipal Council in the extra-Settlement road areas, which has been for many years the most lively and controversial political question of the city, looms once again as one of the major issues of Shanghai as a result of the recent activities in those districts of the Japanese authorities, THE CHINA PRESS states. The Council's position with regard to the problem was stated clearly by one of its high officials who said that the Council has never claimed any jurisdiction over areas abutting the extra-Settlement roads. While the roads themselves are within the jurisdiction of the Council, the territory off the streets, he said, has always remained under Chinese jurisdiction, and is therefore today in effect under Japanese control by virtue of military occupation.

With approximately 450 officers and men aboard, the U.S.S. MARBLEHEAD, light cruiser, came up the Whangpoo River for the first time yesterday afternoon and tied up at the U. S. Naval Buoys opposite the French Bund. The MARBLEHEAD will relieve the U.S.S. AUGUSTA, flagship of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet, which is scheduled to sail from Shanghai for Manila on December 14th.

The fate of Nanking hung in the balance last night as Chinese soldiers, running the gauntlet of a vigorous Japanese offensive from three sides of the city, made a last

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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last desperate stand to defend their nation's capital against alien capture.

December 12, Sunday

Japanese military police forces in Nantao extended their lines of patrol to include Father Jacquinet's refugee zone yesterday afternoon. This action occurred suddenly shortly after 3 p.m. yesterday following the firing of a pistol at a Japanese sentry standing outside the zone by some one alleged to have been inside the refugee area. Father Jacquinet, however, denied that shot was fired from inside of the zone. Majority of Japanese troops were said to have withdrawn later.

Between 8 and 9 a.m. today, Japanese at Wuhu opened machine-gun fire from the shore on the British H.M.S. LADYBIRD, S.S. SUIWO and Tug TSINGTAH, which were in the river off the port. Passengers on board the SUIWO at the time included Mr. H. I. Prideaux-Brune, British Consul in Nanking, and the British Military Attache, who were on their way upriver.

Again in the afternoon, British vessels were the targets of Japanese weapons, when aeroplanes thrice bombed a concentration of British ships at Hsiasanshan, twelve miles up river from Nanking, where they had gone to avoid being involved in the hostilities around the capital. H.M.S. SCARAB and CRICKET were with the mercantile fleet as guard ships, and they opened fire with their three-inch pompoms and machine-guns in reply to the planes' attack. According to the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS, none of the bombs dropped hit their marks and the British fire also did not hit the planes.

China

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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"China is firmly determined to continue the war against Japan without wavering even in the event of the fall of Nanking," according to a statement made at Hankow to a newspaper representative by General Chang Chun, former Chinese Foreign Minister and at present Secretary General of the Central Political Council. The general stated that ever since the outbreak of hostilities the Chinese Government had reckoned for a long duration of hostilities and had made all necessary preparations for organizing resistance stretching over a number of years.

December 13, Monday

The U.S.S. PANAY, American river gun-boat, and three motor lighters belonging to the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company, were sunk at about 1:30 p.m. yesterday by bombs from Japanese planes, as they lay at anchor about 25 miles upriver from Nanking.

54 survivors, one of whom died from wounds later, managed to reach the shore from the PANAY. Of these 15 were reported to be wounded, among them Captain J. J. Hughes, Commander of the gunboat, and Lieutenant A. F. Anders, Executive Officer. Messrs. J. Hall Paxton and George Atcheson, members of the staff of the U. S. Embassy, who had been left in Nanking when the Embassy staff followed the Chinese Foreign Minister to Hankow, were among the survivors. Captain Roberts, U. S. Military Attache, and Mr. Cassie were also reported to be safe. Most survivors reached Hohsien where they were subjected to Japanese machine-gun fire for some time, as the Japanese launched an attack on the town.

No accurate estimate of the casualties was possible as yet. It was believed that the four sunken

vessels

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vessels carried more than 140 persons, including one Briton, three Italians and a number of Chinese. Of the Europeans and Americans - the latter including a number of newspaper correspondents and cameramen - it was thought that all but ten had been traced; and hope for the other ten had by no means been abandoned.

Owing to a variety of causes, however, communications with the district in which the disaster occurred were restricted.

Rescue operations were done by the H.M.S. BEE which was then off Wuhu, having been fired at, but missed, by Japanese gunners earlier in the day. According to the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS, the rescue operations of the BEE began when the American naval authorities in Shanghai had failed to get in touch with the U.S.S. PANAY on Sunday night, and Admiral Yarnell communicated with the Senior British Naval Officer in Shanghai, and asked his cooperation in establishing the whereabouts of the American boat.

The Commander in Chief of the Japanese China Fleet called on Admiral Yarnell aboard the U.S.S. AUGUSTA in Shanghai at noon today and expressed regrets.

Chinese defenders of Nanking, after withstanding intensive Japanese attacks for one week, were today ordered by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw, according to THE CHINA PRESS. The Generalissimo, in a statement issued at his field headquarters, stated that the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Nanking will not materially affect the policy of the National Government to resist the Japanese troops to the bitter end.

December 14, Tuesday

Nearly

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Nearly 1500 United States Marines, constituting the Second U. S. Marine Brigade, paraded before Admiral H. E. Yarnell at the Race Course yesterday morning as a farewell gesture to the commander in chief of the American forces in the Far East, who was to have left on board the flagship U.S.S. AUGUSTA today for Manila. The AUGUSTA's departure, however, has been postponed upon receipt of news regarding the sinking of the U.S.S. PANAY.

About 60 survivors of the U.S.S. PANAY were scheduled to embark on the U.S.S. OAHU, H.M.S. LADYBIRD and H.I.J.M.S. HOZU this evening at Hohsien to proceed down stream to Shanghai. In the bombing incident of the PANAY, three were known to have been dead and 13 believed wounded, according to THE CHINA PRESS.

In a statement issued to the press tonight, Admiral Yarnell declared that "With reference to the reported statement made by the Japanese naval spokesman that American naval vessels would be withdrawn from the Yangtze River at the request of the Japanese authorities, the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, denied that any such request has been made. It would not be approved if received..."

December 15, Wednesday

Two leading local Chinese newspapers, the SHUN PAO and the TA KUNG PAO, have decided to suspend publication following an announcement that the Japanese controlled "Shanghai News Censorship Office" will start operations beginning today.

A Reuter message from Tokyo states that "The action of President Roosevelt in protesting direct to the

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the Emperor in regard to the bombing and sinking of the United States gunboat PANAY has deeply shocked Japanese susceptibilities. In the eyes of the Japanese the emperor is sacrosanct and above politics, although it will be recalled that Emperor Meiji personally took steps to express regret on the occasion of the attack on the Tsarevich in 1894..."

Mr. O. K. Yui, Mayor of Greater Shanghai, and Mr. David Kung, Special Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, have been appointed by the Chinese Government as members of the standing committee of the Board of Directors of the Central Trust of China.

December 16, Thursday

THE CHINA PRESS says the total cargo originally billed for Shanghai but subsequently dumped at other ports because of the hostilities amounts to between 200,000 and 300,000 tons. Since the first bombings in Shanghai, cargoes bound for Shanghai have been let off at more than a dozen different ports ranging all the way from Japan and Dairen to Singapore, and including such places as Iloilo and ports of Java.

Wang Ke-min, chairman of the "administrative commission" of the new "Provisional Government" in Peiping announced today that the Government had taken over the Customs administration in Chinwangtao and Tientsin, stated the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS. "Regarding the loans secured on the Customs," Wang stated, "the Provisional Government will naturally deal with them in a fair and just manner."

A Tokyo dispatch dated December 16th published in the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS states: Collection of funds
 for

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for the construction of a gunboat to replace the U.S.S. PANAY, bombed and sunk above Nanking on December 12th, was proposed this morning by an anonymous reader in an open letter to the Tokyo NICHI NICHI. This action, the letter said, would form a fitting expression of the Japanese nation's sincere and profound regrets..."

December 17, Friday

The wounded and survivors of the PANAY bombing last Sunday arrived at Shanghai aboard the U.S.S. OAHU this afternoon and were immediately transferred to the U.S.S. AUGUSTA, Flagship of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet. Shortly after their arrival, a press interview was given to a large group of journalists aboard the AUGUSTA by Lieutenant John W. Geist, during which graphic details of the bombing and subsequent machine-gunning and boarding of the PANAY were told.

A Havas message from London says, "The recall of Rear Admiral Teizo Mitsunami, Chief of Aerial Operations in Central China for the Japanese forces, who was held responsible for the sinking of the U.S.S. PANAY near Nanking, has caused considerable relief in diplomatic circles here. The gesture by Tokyo is regarded as having much more significance than the numerous (no fewer than thirteen) excuses and apologies tendered heretofore, a long list of which was published in the press here yesterday together with an enumeration of the repeated Japanese attacks against foreign lives and property in China..."

About 30 Soviet airmen, several of whom had been flying for the Spanish Government, are now assembled in Hankow, stated the Reuters. The Russian pilots have already engaged the Japanese. There are also other

foreign

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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foreign pilots fighting in the Chinese Air Force, among whom a Frenchman was killed and an Australian wounded in an aerial battle last week at Nanchang, the provincial capital of Kiangsi, when several Japanese planes were brought down.

"The Japanese made their triumphant entry into Nanking at noon today," a Transocean Kuomin message states.
December 18, Saturday

A full agreement has been reached between the Japanese and Father Jacquinet under which the Nantao Refugee Zone will continue to be administered by the International Committee, the Japanese giving cooperation in policing and assistance in administration, it was announced by the committee today.

The French Concession authorities announced again today that curfew regulations within their jurisdiction will be relaxed on Christmas Eve and New Year's Eve. It is understood that the Shanghai Municipal Council has made the same decision.

Mr. Ivan Luganets-Orelsky, the new Soviet Ambassador to China, arrived in Hankow on December 15th, according to dispatches relayed to Tokyo from New York.

December 19, Sunday

One of the four seriously wounded survivors of the PANAY disaster, Edgar W. Hulsebus, coxswain of the ill-fated gunboat, died at 6:30 a.m. today at the Country Hospital bring ing the death roll up to four foreingers. The body of Mr. Hulsebus will probably be taken aboard the U.S.S. AUGUSTA today ready to be shipped back to the United States, where the burial will take place.

According to a Tokyo telegram, the American

Ambassador

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Joseph C. Grew, yesterday presented a strong written protest over the machine-gunning and boarding of the American gunboat by Japanese armed forces operating from surface craft. This was considered the most serious phase of the incident.

December 20, Monday

The National Government at Chungking issued a statement this evening repudiating the so-called "Provisional Government of the Republic of China" at Peiping. The establishment of this "bogus regime" by the Japanese after their military occupation of territory proves that they violated China's territorial and administrative integrity. It also clearly indicates Japan's intention of conquering the whole of China. Such a regime or any other established in the area at present under Japanese military occupation cannot be recognized, the statement added.

A United Press London message states that Britain, France and the United States have made representations to Japan suggesting the creation of a safety zone at Hankow.

December 21, Tuesday

Following in the lead of the authorities in the French Concession and the Settlement, the Japanese Consular officials here today announced the lifting of the curfew in the Settlement area north of Soochow Creek on December 24th and 31st.

Mr. Cordell Hull, U. S. Secretary of State, in an open letter to Senator William H. Smathers, according to the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS, declared today that American warships, marines and soldiers will remain in

China

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China at least as long as the present conditions prevail. These vessels and troops were never in any sense on a mission of aggression. The present does not seem an opportune moment for effecting their withdrawal, the Secretary of State said.

Sir Archibald John Kerr Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in Baghdad, has been appointed Ambassador to China in succession to Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, according to an announcement today by the British Foreign Office.

According to a London telegram, Mr. Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, stated in the House of Commons today that the British Government recognizes the Central Government as the Government of all China, and there is, therefore, no question of recognizing the new administration installed in Peiping.

December 22, Wednesday

A small bomb apparently "homemade," was exploded on a ledge outside the window of a Soviet office at Love Lane here in the evening. No one was injured and the damage was trivial, involving only the window-frame, which was splintered. The office is one which arranges for the repatriation of destitute Russians to the U.S.S.R.

Reuter states that the urgency of re-opening the Hongkew and Yangtzepoo areas in Shanghai to merchants and residents of third powers is understood to have been pressed upon the Japanese Foreign Minister by the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, in a discussion in Tokyo today.

December 23, Thursday

With the exception of some areas still regarded as dangerous, entire Chapei was thrown open to Japanese nationals today, according to the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS.

Japanese

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Japanese middle schools are prepared to reopen shortly.

The "Christmas Express" carrying foreign evacuees to Hongkong left Hankow today with 294 passengers of all nationalities: 107 Britons, 96 Americans, 41 Germans, 25 Russians, 10 French, 9 Italians, 3 Swedes and three Norwegians. Of the total number, there are 138 women, 85 children and 71 men.

An "Autonomous Commission" was established in Nanking this morning, ten days after the military occupation by the Japanese. Headed by Tao Hsi-shan, since the beginning of the current hostilities the head of the local branch of the Red Swastika Society, the new organ has two vice-chairmen and 8 members.

December 24, Friday

Celebrating the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Sian incident, when General Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Executive Yuan and Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, safely landed in Loyang from Sian, public organizations in Shanghai sent a telegram today to the Generalissimo at Hankow, pledging their full support to the Central Government and to the plan of armed resistance to Japan.

The H.M.S. CAPRETOWN, the British cruiser which has been marooned up river since the "war" began, arrived off Woosung early this morning. The cruiser was manned by a skeleton crew of 130, and carrying on board 50 civilians from Hankow and up river port.

Japanese claim fall of Hangchow today.

December 25, Saturday

Today's NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS publishes an article received from an independent, reliable source, telling

grim

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grim tales of massacre, looting, and rape by the Japanese during Nanking's capture.

The "Christmas Express" which left Hankow on Thursday with about 300 foreigners, arrived safely at Kowloon at 9 o'clock this morning.

Fatal Japanese bombing of the American gunboat PANAY at Nanking was carried out during a period of good visibility and occurred at some times at heights only 100-200 feet above the clearly marked decks of the ship, according to the report made to the Navy Department by the Commander of the PANAY, Lieutenant Commander J. J. Hughes, and authorized to be published by the Secretary of the Navy. Japanese planes also machine-gunned the decks of the PANAY and Japanese river craft fired on the fatally damaged American warship on which a number of Americans and other foreigners were killed or wounded, the report confirmed.

December 26, Sunday

A Reuter message states that the new Soviet Ambassador to China, M. Luganets-Orelsky, reached Hankow yesterday from Lanchow, the capital of Kansu Province, where he arrived by air from Urunchi.

The NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS publishes a Tokyo message stating that the Japanese Cabinet's Planning Board, which is stated to have been considering measures to deal with Shanghai in the future, has worked out a plan to effect a complete change there, says the ASAHI. This, it says, will be done on the basis of redevelopment of Greater Shanghai and the formation of a new city district at Woosung. The plan is expected to materialize with the emergence of a new municipality of Greater Shanghai

friendly

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friendly towards Japan. The president of the Planning Board has reported the scheme to the Cabinet which, according to the newspaper, "decided that the Japanese Government should give its full cooperation for the realization of such a plan."

At a press conference today, the Japanese spokesman announced that all areas north of Soochow Creek would be reopened for residence and business to non-Chinese on December 27th.

December 27, Monday

"Profound gratitude of the Japanese Government for the attitude shown by the Washington administration in bringing the PANAY incident to an amicable conclusion, was expressed by the Japanese Foreign Minister yesterday to the American Ambassador, Mr. Joseph C. Grew, who called at the Gaimusho in the morning to convey the contents of the American Note, accepting the Japanese Government's apologies for the settlement of the affair but rejecting the claim that it was accidental," states a Tokyo dispatch published in the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS.

Shanghai's foreign community had a field day today with the opening of the areas North of Soochow Creek by the Japanese, the necessity of passes having been abolished. However, as a result of the Japanese Army regulations governing the reopening of these areas, the thorny extraterritoriality question looms again. In effect, according to THE CHINA PRESS, the regulations, which went into force today, abrogate the extraterritorial rights of foreign nationals in the re-opened districts whenever their actions are deemed to be contrary and harmful to the interests of the Japanese armed forces.

At

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At approximately 11:20 o'clock this morning, as a Japanese troop transport junk with 12 soldiers moving down river passed under the Honan Road Bridge, a Chinese threw three hand grenades from the bridge onto the junk. One of the grenades exploded and slightly injured one of the soldiers. All of the grenades were of the Chinese potato masher type.

Under the title of "Only U. S. Embassy to re-open in Nanking," THE CHINA PRESS states that "Except for the American, none of the diplomatic bodies has made definite plans to reopen their legation or embassy quarters in Nanking... When called today, both British and German diplomatic officials discredited earlier reports that they intended to send members of their local embassies to re-open their Nanking offices. Italian officials state that they have plan under consideration, but that no definite decision has been reached... Three members of the local American Consulate General will leave tomorrow aboard the U.S.S. OAHU for Nanking to reopen the American Embassy."

December 28, Tuesday

Shortly after 11 a.m. today, another grenade was hurled from Chekiang Road Bridge onto a creek transport occupied by Japanese soldiers passing beneath the bridge. A Japanese private was slightly injured. One Chinese was arrested on the spot by the Shanghai Municipal Police. The Japanese spokesman stated that he was unable to state yet whether or not the Japanese authorities would demand the surrender of the Chinese.

A spokesman of the Shanghai Municipal Council today contested the statement made by the Japanese authorities that the S.M.C. has for a time forfeited its administrative rights

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rights over the eastern areas of the International Settlement because it ordered its police officers to flee. Pointing out that the Council cannot be expected to order its civilian administrative and police officers to function in the midst of a battlefield, the spokesman stated that the S.M.C. has not and does not intend to forfeit any of its rights inside the International Settlement.

THE CHINA PRESS states that "Laying the groundwork for extending its control over a wide area of Greater Shanghai, Su Hsi-wen's 'Great Way City Government' has established police stations in Chapei, Nantao, Woosung, Hungjao, Chenju and Paoshan...The police constables are making their beats in the company of Japanese armed details. The Chinese policemen are armed with batons and in some instances with pistols..."

December 29, Wednesday

The man who was arrested by the police on the Chekiang Road Bridge shortly before noon yesterday after he and two companions had allegedly thrown a hand grenade from the side of the bridge into a boat loaded with Japanese soldiers, was a soldier and former member of the 19th Route Army which fought in the Shanghai area in 1932, and one of the men who fought in the western district and Nantao this year. He was handed over to the Japanese authorities by the Shanghai Municipal Police. In handing him over, the Council held no objection to the procedure on the grounds that the man was from outside the city and had come here for the allegedly avowed purpose of carrying on guerrilla warfare activities against the Japanese. In addition, a Council spokesman declared, the crime had been committed on Soochow Creek which in days prior to the military occupation by the Japanese was presumed to be under Chinese control and
 that

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that since the Japanese are now in occupation the act apparently was committed in their jurisdiction.

A Jerry Morgan, British subject, one-time Shanghai boxing promoter, was held by the Japanese consular police authorities for questioning in connection with the alleged attempted theft of two Japanese owned oil barges from the Pootung side of the Whangpoo River.

An unnamed leading local civil leader, who is associated with the new "Federation," declared that the so-called "Shanghai Citizens' Federation," which is being organized to take part in the administration of the Greater Shanghai area, is purely a "commercial and philanthropic project" and has no political significance. Explaining that no direct negotiations have taken place between the organization and the Japanese military authorities, the sponsor stated that the project was first broached by a certain member of the Shanghai Municipal Council, who aided in placing the project before the Japanese authorities. He said that the plans have now received approval of the Japanese.

December 30, Thursday

Mr. Loh Pa-hong, 64-year old Catholic leader and philanthropist, head of the Chinese Electric Power Company of Nantao, and reported to have been a member of the so-called "Shanghai Citizens' Federation," was shot down in front of his residence in the French Concession at 2 p.m. today. In their efforts to prevent what they believe might possibly develop into another reign of terror in Shanghai with political assassinations as frequent occurrences, detectives of
the

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the French Concession Police were exerting most of their energy in attempting to capture the two men alleged to be responsible for the murder.

There still remain a total of 216,377 refugees in 314 camps in Shanghai, according to Mr. K. Y. Li, secretary of the International Relief Committee.

Effective tomorrow, all evacuees, including both Chinese and foreigners, of the areas west of Shanghai occupied by Japanese forces will be allowed to return to those districts.

The second, and probably last, international refugee train, christened "The Last Train from Madrid," left Hankow for Hongkong at 9 o'clock this morning, carrying in all 313 men, women and children of ten nationalities from Hankow, Kiukiang, Kuling and Changsha.

December 31, Friday

The resignation of Mr. Wang Ching-wei and General Chang Chun from the positions as Chairman and Secretary-General of the Central Political Council respectively have been accepted by the National Government.

Reports received by a British shipping firm today from the Chinese Maritime Customs in Ningpo indicate that the boom erected at the mouth of the Yung River, at Changhai, in the early days of October, but which was up to today navigable, has now been completely filled. The British firm has been requested to suspend all further sailings to Ningpo, some 20 kilometers inland, the information being relayed to all other concerns with ships running to that port, states THE CHINA PRESS.

January

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January 1, Saturday

The U.S.S. OAHU, with Consul J. M. Allison, Vice Consul James Espy and Mr. A. A. McFayden aboard, is expected to arrive at Nanking today following an uneventful trip from Shanghai. The progress of the vessel, which left Shanghai Tuesday, has been slowed down as it lies anchored each night, proceeding only during the daylight hours which are now very short.

THE CHINA PRESS states, "In the presence of Japanese military and naval officers, a group of Chinese residents in Nanking turned out on New Year's afternoon to inaugurate the 'Nanking Autonomous Commission,' Domei reports. On the same day in Hangchow, an inaugural meeting was held for the 'Peace Maintenance Commission.'"

January 2, Sunday

Settlement Police, with their hands strengthened by the emergency powers granted to them by the S.M.C., today continued to push their vigorous drive to rid the city of terrorist bands which on New Year's Day perpetuated a series of bombing attacks, injuring four Japanese soldiers and five Chinese civilians.

The wave of terrorism continued in Shanghai today when phosphorus bombs of almost identical construction were thrown into the gardens of the official residence of the Japanese Consul-General and the home of Mr. Ku Hsin-ih, Chairman of the Shanghai Foodstuff Dealers' Association and reportedly member of the so-called "Shanghai Citizens' Federation." Both missiles failed to explode and did not injure anyone.

January 3, Monday

The

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The U.S. OAHU has arrived at Hohsien, the scene of the PANAY bombing, and is starting diving operations to investigate the sunken vessel. The American consuls, Messrs. Allison and Espy, and Mr. McFayden, who left Shanghai aboard the OAHU, will proceed to Wuhu, as that city is in the Nanking consular area. They will investigate the conditions of American property in the area before returning to Nanking to reopen the American Embassy.

Few Chinese are returning to Jessfield and Western areas of Shanghai. Japanese issue limited number of passes for inspection trips in Chapei and Nantao.

A Reuter message of today stated that the concensus of opinion at Hankow is that the second German attempt at mediation in the Sino-Japanese dispute is very likely to end in failure. No matter how willing the Chinese Government is to conclude peace, the Japanese terms, it is stated, are so stiff that even leading Chinese pacifists are against their acceptance.

January 4, Tuesday

Japanese officials this morning issued a warning to the Shanghai Municipal Council that the Japanese Expeditionary Force may be compelled to take steps, "as occasion requires," to ferret out anti-Japanese elements in the International Settlement. In addition to the warning, conereted proposals for increased Japanese participation in the activities of the S.M.C. were presented to the Chairman of the Council by the Japanese Consul General during a call made by four Japanese officials upon the Council authorities.

Japanese authorities were during the night in
 complete

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complete control of the Chinese Government Radio Administration, Shanghai's only international wireless communications agency, after they had stationed officials on the premises to act as censors on all incoming and outgoing messages.

According to THE CHINA PRESS, a U. S. Naval official stated today that the PANAY does not seem to be very deep in the mud, as quite a bit of equipment has been salvaged in the short time that operations have been carried on by the U.S.S. OAHU at the spot.

January 5, Wednesday

A potent mass educational program, which involves the schooling of nearly 28,000 refugee children, is being pushed by a special committee of the Shanghai International Red Cross, it was revealed today by the Chinese Educational Officer of the Shanghai Municipal Council.

Mr. Stirling Fessenden, Secretary-General of the Shanghai Municipal Council today clarified in an interview the reported part taken by the Council in the formation of the "Shanghai Citizens' Federation." After stating that the Council has taken no part in the formation, he said "As far as I know the main purpose of the new association is rehabilitation work in Nantao and Chapei, which are outside the Council's jurisdiction."

Foreign consuls representing extraterritorial nations in Shanghai were today urgently considering the Japanese memorandum placed before the Shanghai Municipal Council by the Japanese regarding increased Japanese participation. Decisions relating to the requests are

most

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most likely to be made by the various home governments in Washington, London and other capitals, THE CHINA PRESS states.

Admiral Yarnell's yacht, the U.S.S. ISABEL, arrived in Shanghai today from Manila and will remain here for an indefinite period with the Admiral aboard. The Flagship AUGUSTA is leaving Shanghai today and will probably remain in the Philippines for the next two months, undergoing annual repair and taking part in the annual maneuvers in Philippine waters.

January 6, Thursday

Two Japanese censors started cable censorship in each of the three cable companies operating in Shanghai but were confining their work strictly to censorship. No attempts had been made to interfere with the control of the companies or the routine tasks of sending and receiving messages, says THE CHINA PRESS.

It was reported here today that the American Embassy at Nanking has been reopened. Officials in charge of the re-opening of the embassy are Messrs. John M. Allison, James Espy and A. A. McFayden, of the American Consulate-General at Shanghai.

The Shanghai Municipal Police has lodged a protest, it is understood, with the Japanese Naval Landing Party authorities, as a result of the alleged manhandling of two police officers, Inspector G. J. Bennett, and Superintendent J. Sinclair by Japanese officers at the Landing Party Headquarters on Christmas Day.

On Christmas morning, Inspector Bennett was proceeding in a police car, driven by a Chinese chauffeur, along

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along Wayside Road. The chauffeur was forced to pull up when he saw three lorries blocking the road in front, leaving no room whatever for him to pass. A Japanese dispatch rider, travelling at a fast pace, was also forced to pull up owing to the three lorries obstructing the roadway. The dispatch rider, when he arrived at headquarters, reported that he had been held up by a police car, the number of which he produced. Inspector Bennett was summoned to appear at the Landing Party Headquarters to answer to a charge of obstructing a dispatch rider of the Japanese forces. The Inspector decided that his best course would be to go to the headquarters and explain the true state of affairs.

On arrival at the Landing Party Headquarters, Inspector Bennett was insulted and roughly handled, being poked in the ribs and in the stomach with sticks. Officers present also drew their swords, declaring that Inspector Bennett had purposely obstructed a dispatch rider of the Japanese forces. Superintendent Sinclair, when he visited the Headquarters to assist the Inspector in explaining matters, was treated in a similar manner. Both men have excellent records in the Shanghai Municipal Police, and are of senior rank.

January 7, Friday

Shanghai today is practically isolated from the rest of the world, at least as far as communications are concerned. Cables between Shanghai and Hongkong and Manila were still out of order, while direct radio communication with other parts of the world was impossible as result of the walk-out of the Chief staff of the Chinese Government Radio Administration and break of cables belonging to certain of the foreign

cable

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cable companies. One cable line was still intact. It runs from Shanghai to Japan, thereby affording communication with New York and London. Messages sent via this cable were being routed to Vladivostok thence to London and New York. Press messages for Manila, ordinarily transmitted direct from Shanghai, went completely around the world before reaching their destination. Those for Hongkong did the same thing. As a result, the rates between Shanghai, Hongkong and Manila were almost trebled.

Major-General A. P. D. Telfer-Smollett lodged another strong protest with the Japanese military and diplomatic authorities on the grounds that the Japanese soldiers who are alleged to have assaulted Probationary Sergeant A. R. Turner and Inspector F. G. West, S.M.P., crossed over into the British defense area to attack the police officers on Brennan Road.

January 8, Saturday

The work of the Shanghai Municipal Council during the present emergency, and especially the work of the police, receives high praises from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Bankers' Association and other leading Chinese organizations of the International Settlement in a letter just forwarded to the S.M.C.

The new Emergency Children's Hospital was opened by the International Relief Committee today with eight wards and a sum total of 120 beds.

January 9, Sunday

The Japanese Army spokesman, in the press conference today, blamed an insult reflecting upon the "honor of the Commander in Chief His Majesty the

Emperor

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Emperor of Japan" for the altercation between a member of the Shanghai Municipal Police and details of the Japanese forces on Brennan Road last Thursday. He charged that the police officer involved "had interfered with the duties of a Japanese soldier on official duty." Referring to the incident between Japanese forces and the French police on the Nantao and Frenchtown border Saturday morning, he stated that the affair had been amicably settled.

Two Japanese have been named to high positions in the Chinese Post Office in Shanghai, it was revealed today in a Chinese report: Mr. K. Kanazashi, veteran employee of the local Post Office as the Assistant Postal Commissioner, and Y. Fuki, formerly connected with the Post Office in Hankow, as the Chief Postal Inspector.

Prominent Chinese Communist leaders, including Wang Ming and Ching Pang-hsien, participated in a reception this afternoon in Hankow to celebrate the establishment of the local official organ of the Chinese Communist Party, the NEW CHINA DAILY NEWS.
January 10, Monday

A bomb of the cigarette-tin species was thrown on the Brennan Piece from territory now under the control of the Japanese military this morning. The missile exploded within two yards of the Italian sentry posted at the crossing and quite close, also, to a Chinese constable of the Shanghai Municipal Police. No one was injured and there was no damage to property. It is understood that the S.M.C. does not intend to make a protest to the Japanese authorities over the incident.

According

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According to the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS, a circular letter criticising the Shanghai Municipal Council was sent through the post to various Chinese shops in Shanghai by an hitherto unknown society styling itself the "Shanghai Chung Hwa National Salvation Association." Among the startling statements contained in the letter are "Municipal rates should be remitted for the time being; the British who have treated the Settlement as their own should defray all expenses; the work of the various S.M.C. organs is not worth the money paid them; since times are hard, it is not necessary to ask the Chinese residents to pay the rates, et cetera."

A Reuter dispatch from London states that British "government instructions are expected to be forwarded shortly to the British Consul General at Shanghai, concerning the reply to be made to the Shanghai Municipal Council's request for guidance in connection with the demands made by the Japanese in Shanghai. The instructions are likely to indicate that any new and special measures found necessary should be expressly on a temporary basis and without prejudice to permanent arrangements, which would affect other powers with rights in the Settlement. The Japanese demands to the Shanghai Municipal Council include:

1. An increase in the number of Japanese members of the Shanghai Municipal Police and improved treatment for them.
2. The appointment of Japanese to important posts in the Council's Administrative organs.
3. An increase in the Japanese personnel employed by the Council.

APPENDIX

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APPENDIX I

A Summary of Major Events
 Said to have happened in and near Shanghai during
 the 1937 Incident

<u>American Embassy</u>	
Reopening in Nanking	Dec. 27, Jan. 6
<u>Bombing Incidents</u>	
H.M.S. LADYBIRD and other British vessels by Japanese	Dec.12
U.S.S. PANAY and Standard-Vacuum Oil Company vessels by Japanese	Dec.12
<u>Christmas Express</u>	
From Hankow to Hongkong	Dec. 23,30
<u>Extraterritoriality</u>	
In Extra-Settlement Roads	Dec.11
In re-opened districts	Dec. 27,29
<u>Japanese in International Settlement</u>	
Demands to Shanghai Municipal Council	Jan. 4, 10
Control of Chinese Government Radio Administration	Jan. 4
Censorship of press and cables	Dec.15, Jan.6
Manhandling of, and attack on, Police officers of Shanghai Municipal Police	Jan. 6,7
<u>Grenade Incidents</u>	Dec. 27,28, Jan.10
<u>Massacre, Looting, Rape, etc.</u>	
By Japanese during Nanking's Capture	Dec.25
<u>PANAY Incident (December 12, 1937)</u>	
Details of the Incident	Dec.13
Arrival of survivors at Shanghai	Dec.17
Captain Hughes' Report to the U. S. Navy Department	Dec.25
Closing of the Incident	Dec.27
<u>Nanking and Hangchow, Autonomous Commissions in</u>	Jan. 1
<u>"Provisional Government" at Peiping</u>	
Repudiation by General Chiang Kai-shek	Dec.20
<u>Safety Zone at Hankow</u>	Dec.20
<u>"Shanghai Citizens' Federation"</u>	
Proposed formation	Dec.29
S.M.C. has no relation	Jan. 5
<u>Withdrawal of American naval vessels</u>	
Admiral Yarnell's statement	Dec.14
Mr. Hull's statement	Dec.21

APPENDIX

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APPENDIX II

CHANG CHUN, General, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Secretary-General of the Central Political Council.

HUGHES, J. J., Commander of the U.S.S. PANAY.

KERR, ARCHIBALD JOHN KERR CLARK, Sir, newly appointed British Ambassador to China.

LO PA-HONG, Chinese Catholic leader and philanthropist and head of many enterprises in Shanghai who was assassinated on December 30th allegedly in connection with the "Shanghai Citizens' Federation."

LUGANETS-ORELSKY, IVAN, new Soviet Ambassador to China.

MITSUNAMA, T., Rear Admiral, Chief of Aerial operations in Central China for the Japanese forces said to be responsible for the sinking of the U.S.S. PANAY.

SMATHERS, WILLIAM H., U. S. Senator.

WANG KE-MIN, Chairman of the "Administrative Commission" of the "Provisional Government" in Peiping.

WANG CHING-WEI, Chairman of the Central Political Council, former President of the Executive Yuan.

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In quintuplicate to the Department of State;
One copy to American Embassy, Hankow;
One copy to American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan.

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Source of Information

Note: "North China" indicates NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS, and
 "China Press", THE CHINA PRESS.


Date	Item	Newspaper Name	Date	Page	Date	Item	Newspaper Name	Date	Page
1937.					1937				
Dec.			Dec.		Dec.			Dec.	
11	1-3	China Press	11	1	27	1	North China	28	7
						2-4	China Press	28	2
12	1	"	12	1					
	2-4	North China	13	5	28	1-3	"	29	1
13	1-6	"	14	5	29	1-3	"	30	1
	7	China Press	14	1					
14	1-3	China Press	15	1	30	1	"	31	1
						2	"	31	4
15	1	"	15	6		3	"	31	1
	2-3	"	16	1		4	"	31	5
16	1	China Press	17	1	31	1-2	"	Jan.	1
	2-3	North China	17	5					
17	1-2	China Press	18	1	1938				
	3	"	18	2	Jan.	1	China Press	1	3
	4-5	"	18	4		2	"	3	1
18	1-3	North China	19	9					
					2	1-3	"	3	1
19	1-2	"	20	5	3	1	"	4	2
						2-3	"	4	1
20	1-2	"	21	5	4	1-3	"	5	1
21	1	"	22	9	5	1	"	6	2
	2-4	"	22	5		2-4	"	6	1
22	1-2	"	23	5					
					6	1-2	"	7	1
23	1	"	24	8/5		3-5	North China	7	5
	2	"	24	5					
	3	"	24	8	7	1	China Press	8	3
						2	"	8	1
24	1-3	"	25	5					
					8	1	"	9	9
25	1	"	25	5		2	"	9	1
	2-3	"	26	5					
					9	1-3	China Press	10	1
26	1-3	"	27	5					
					10	1-3	North China	11	5

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMYANGPAT



February 7, 1938

Rec'd 3:39 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: CINCAF
SECOND BRIGADE USMC
YANGTZE PATROL
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF
COMSOPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
AMAMBASSADOR SHANGHAI
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING



0007. Yangtze River ports quiet. 2004.

KLP

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~W. W. H.~~

The three marked
 passages in enclosure
 are graphically
 indicate what one
^{expects to find}
 away throughout
 large areas of north
 China now and
 for a long time
 to come
 J. W.

0159

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO 371

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A. J. K.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China December 23, 1937.

793.94

7
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT:

ONI MID
conditions in Southern Hopei.

DEC 27 AM 11 45
OFFICE OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peking.

DT
✓
W

Sir

793
a
As of possible interest, I have the honor to en-
close a copy of a letter from Miss Annie Lok and a
copy of excerpts from a letter from Miss Maxine McNeal
to missionary associates in Tientsin, regarding condi-
tions in Jehnsien and vicinity, Southern Hopei. In
connection with these letters, the Embassy's attention
is drawn to the fact that the writers are missionaries
and might be inclined to minimize rather than magnify
difficulties which they encounter in the interior.

Respectfully yours,

J. K. Caldwell,
American Consul General.

Enclosures

- 1 Copy of letter from Miss Annie Lok to
Miss Brann and others, dated December 8, 1937.
- 2 Copy of excerpts from letter from Miss Maxine
McNeal, dated December 5, 1937.

800
DOB:M

Original

793.94/12341

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DEC 1 1938

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12341

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- E -

Original to Embassy, Peiping.
Copy to Ambassador, Hankow.
Copy to Embassy, Hanking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Five copies to Department, without covering despatch.

..... A true copy of
..... the signed origi-
..... nal M.....

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 571, dated December 23, 1937, from American Consulate General, Pientsin, China, on subject of "Conditions in Southern Szechuan".

Y. F. S. Y.

Dec. 5, 1937. Pientsin. Szechuan.

My dear Mrs. Brown, Pientsin, Szechuan.

I need not tell you how very, very happy we were to receive your letters this afternoon. As a faithful Christian of King's name brought them in for Mr. Siao Fung, with an additional note of him. How will I be able to write all that is in my heart in this short evening, as the sun must go back tomorrow. Oh, glad you had an opportunity at last and I so much hope that this reaches you in safety too. May I then try to give you some news items, which I think you should know first. First of all that we have not heard from any of you since the last letter from you written last. Both we received two or three papers the first few days we were in Pientsin, since. Just two weeks home, we went to Szechuan to get our winter clothes and bedding, in two days back and forth. Last day our city was invaded by a band of some hundred bandits, which had supreme power for twenty days: looted day and night to their wicked heart's content. Had about 170 people in hiding with us but no harm came to them nor us. Twenty days all gates closed but that ended by them being taken into the army and five thousand came to carry those few hundred off and such a relief for the whole city; thousands of dollars they had exacted and stole all they could carry. Five days later things dropped from the sky, and next morning, the 12th of November, we with all the women fled to the place fifty li north as circumstances all around the city clearly indicated that still greater droppings would follow. As indeed was the case three days later. Then the Japanese arrived and we returned to city nine days later. Indescribable! To make it short, let me only say this: Y. F.'s house & horsestable in ruins, our house uninhabitable, filthy, windows out, doors broken: all our boxes absolutely empty, all bedding gone; no sheets or pillow cases. The kitchen empty: all tins and eatables eaten; the four stoves empty: only stove left is a Chinese oil tin stove. Book cases empty, typewriters gone: not a spoon nor fork left. Here and there a cup among the filth & rubbish. For days we scraped among inches deep of rubbish in our rooms to see what we could find, of our Chinese or foreign clothing nothing to be seen but one summer dress of mine and two of Maxine's, very dirty. In Mrs. Siao's yard they found one combination of mine, indescribably filthy, yet glad to have it, if not this, I could not have a change all winter. As we fled we were with ten of us and could only find one cart for all the things to put on and we all walked to "Little Heart Village"; so we did not take much, hoping to soon return after all was occupied and we expected all to be "kwei kwei chu chu ti then" (means in good order). A car-

case

- 2 -

case of a cow in front yard; the church becomes barn
and church used as stable. A dead horse buried
right before our front door. Filth everywhere between
all our books and papers in the rooms. The south yard
fared a little better and we can live in the room which
I had planned to occupy this winter. But certainly I
never dreamed to do this under circumstances as these.
I am still in China town. As for conditions in city.

Your house shall be left you desolate is what comes to
me all the time. Not a copper's worth can be bought of
anything. This is exactly as I say it, shops absolutely
emptied of all wares, whatever kind. Outside city?
It seems as if every one rich & poor have taken an aim
and targets accumulate by the day to thousands, pillaging
their neighboring villages. We have to go forty li to
get some vegetables and do this at danger of life. Can-
not explain details. I only give some facts. The pres-
ent regime advises us strongly to stay in city & enjoy
their protection. People are returning to city from
villages driven up the fearful rule of bandits and then
they return to country again because they find their
houses emptied of everything and have nothing to eat and
no bedding.

We have done much walking as solitary ventures to take
their rules into occupied territory and wherever we go
there always hangs on a crowd, so if we have a cart, we
have to walk a good deal. We have only two pairs of shoes
left, an very old pair and a better, but less comfortable,
pair. We eat simple Chinese food all in one pot with
all the rest of the yard and only two meals a day. We
are the happy possessors of four tins of milk, some bouil-
lon cubes and a few tins of fish, which the Japanese of-
ficer sent us on arrival here, together with some rice
and some of their hard tack. And so much, so much, so
much more which I cannot tell. I only have a few drops
of ink and a stump of a pencil. There all things are
gone we cannot imagine. All stoves of the big house
have run. No wonder! they all had four legs! Today
we went to see the big man about some passes, etc. and
how comfortable and warm the room was in which we were
ushered into their presence. After we got a bit ac-
quainted I could not refrain from inquiring with a smile,
"Do you think your stove burns well?" Yes they an-
swered, and perhaps seeing the smile on my face, one of
them at once guessed right and added, "Is it perhaps
yours?" After which we all laughed heartily. Indeed,
it was your dining room stove, Miss Brown, which we, of
course, saw the first moment we entered the room. Ha, ha!
That was a joke! Miss Loberg's warns the knuckles of
some other "high-ups", we are told.....

Well, my dears, all we possess is what we wear and a
handful besides. But we thank the Lord that none of us
have been hurt nor killed, though dangers have been near
very often. In T.O. Lee (the town they refuged in) we
slept many a night with our clothes on because of fierce
bandits looting only half a li away from us. It was
funny one morning to see Laxine step out of bed, all
dressed, even with her big boots on! When H.S. (one of
our Chinese servants) and I returned to get our things and

to

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to dig up buried valuables, we did not dare to stay there for the night as some delegates of bandits had been that day to see a king's horse and had gone away in a rage. Hundreds of them were hiding in the orchards, and twice we had to go by there that same afternoon. The following night T.C. Mao was robbed and Mao-con King's house was wrecked and ruined and many other houses beside. The people in Hsiao Hsin & Ts'ong yung were so very kind to us; in Ts'ong yung old Mrs. Chang gave us a big sack of potatoes (sweet) and another one with turnips & carrots, and their sympathy was heart-touching: "as long as we have to eat, you just come and say what you want" they assured us. They dare not bring it to the city, though, as animals are taken, eaten or never returned. Food will be a problem after a while. We drink real mud-water and for "tien hsin" (dessert) we have a pair of Chinese white stockings of Y & L where our occupants were so kind as to pour all the vanilla extract over and when we get real hungry for something sweet, we eat where her stocking with "tien hsin" were (dessert odor, is! We have five rubbers between the two of us and not two of them are alike; but we are glad for them in case of rainy weather. We also salvaged one sheet of Miss Brennan's, which they had used for a table cloth in the man's guest room, it is new, but full of coffee spots as big as the table, almost, itself; and one sheet of Goldie, in good condition. We have been washing for three days now, having only one tub and a few wash basins. From the time the bandits left the city we had not washed and then all the filthy rubbish with stains of every kind on it, say it was some fine looking laundry! And then that bird water!

// Many nights we hear shooting of the bandits going on and pity the poor women and children. Only those and the very "iao shih" (means honest, men are left at home; the rest have all turned bandits, even well-to-do have to join them to protect their homes from being wrecked. It almost is unthinkable that in really a few days conditions like these could have developed and yet it is so and all prospects for a change seem to be lacking. Around Kuchow the same and any other city we hear of. No traffic between any place as only the most brave ones venture the roads these days.//

And now I must go to bed: my eyes just close by themselves. I really should answer about your plans about returning. Whatever road may come open, from what we write, should you really not think it the best to wait a while longer before thinking of returning? We are practically shut up in the city, you even in the compound. After dark we are not allowed outside, and there are no people in the city as some men who come to look what is left of their "mai-mai" (business). Still it would be harder yet for our own people if we were not here and I fear if we had not returned to the house, our occupants would not have moved out and much less still would have been left of the skeleton. So would not you think for four of us to be here shut up would be a pity, food, water, service all is a scable problem, and I

think

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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think if we first could see each other and talk over plans and conditions. I think we would save much unnecessary energy & heart. We both live in suitcases and ever so often it seems as if we have to run again, to where, we do not know, but sometimes we feel very unsafe even here in the city. When we cannot explain but it still is very unsettled and often we have deliberately to look away from surroundings and conditions, which are constantly changing, away to God and hold on to him for life. Such a comfort we have from saints and such steadying of nerve we need ever so often. When we have a quiet day and remark about it, that very moment often some critical problem comes up which takes much carefulness and wisdom from an high anxiety or nervousness would be disastrous and we calmly stand together and quietly look up to God and often before we are aware of it, he led us out again. David said, "I trust in the covert of Thy wings" and it is blessed to believe it. Also Hebrews 12:1 has been a blessing to us: "seeing so great a cloud... let us run the race set before us with patience".

We still have enough money in hand.... For your evangelists there is very little on hand as one hundred and fifty of it was stolen while we were gone. (They hid it carefully the morning they left so hurriedly) Y.F. did not dare to carry so much on her as refugees were robbed right & left. All the native church money is gone too. Your men and women were paid up to Jan. 1st. But H.C. after the second heavy bombing got out too to T.O. Leo and forgot about paying the men; and on return all was gone.

But, Miss Frank, do not worry about this. We feel radical changes will come of this upheaval and for the present they all know our plight..... I have some American checks, which, of course, I cannot trust to the mail now. So the Lord has provided and will do so according to His promises..... I also received with the very last mail delivery a money order.... Cannot cash it of course, as the P.O. does not function here. Will you please tell them of the receipt and in time to come we surely will be able to cash it somewhere else in China.

Y.F. is well and we are a close trio and try to be brave soldiers for Christ. She also has lost much, but as long as we keep warm this winter, we ought to be thankful; and we are!!!..... And now my dears, all three; how I wished I could tell you all and see your faces and be sure you get this. Mr. Li and H.C. are the only ones in the city to stand by.....

Lovingly,

annie

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 571, dated December 28, 1937, from American Consulate General, Tientsin, China, on subject of "Conditions in Southern Hopei."

FROM CHINA

Dec. 5th, 1937
 Wei Hsien, Via Shanghai, China.

Well, I was back in Wei Hsien again. A party of ten of us left the city the morning after the first bombing, for a village 15 miles away. This was Nov. 12th. On the 15th we moved on further north. On the 14th there occurred the 2nd bombing of the city, but no lives lost, only property damaged here and there in the city.

On Thanksgiving Day, a smaller party of us returned to Wei Hsien, after proper arrangements had been made for our return, i.e. a passport issued for seven days duration. I happened to think, as we walked along the road that it was Thanksgiving Day. We were thankful that our lives had been spared. We had heard reports that we had nothing left, but we thought surely we would find things of use to us, which perhaps the natives would not value. The reports we heard were true nevertheless, but needless to say, we were totally unprepared for the sight which greeted us, nor for the condition in which the house had been left by the people occupying it for nine days. Scarcely one could say, "Your house has been left unto you desolate". Words fail to describe it. One needs to see with ones own eyes, to believe that such ruin could occur. In one room alone, no standing room for the debris was an average of 1 1/2 ft. thick. Regrets were expressed by those in authority in the city, & we were told to make a list of damage incurred. This has been done - giving a total for each of us four missionaries etc. Several days we were engaged in what the Chinese call "pu la, pu-la" (ing i.e. poking through rubbish with a stick, getting together what we could find. I'll not go into details. We thought first we would be going back to the country within a few days, thinking there was no way to live in the city this winter, no way to buy food, four cisterns of water practically all gone - the house with some window panes out, not to say anything of smoked walls and sooty wood-work, etc., etc.

We were delayed by reports of banditry in the country-side. Finally on Tuesday Nov. 30th, Annie went back to the village we had left, to arrange for our Chinese friends who had refuged along with us, while T.F. and I stayed in the city. So much can happen in a day's time now a days & before Annie got back on Wednesday, we heard reports of fighting of bandits. In fact on Tuesday night I was awakened by report from cannon, altho' it was only powder used, they said. At any rate I couldn't sleep any more & my nerves played tricks on me. It was some responsibility to be left here and having mission matters coming up. The Lord comforted my heart from Is. 25:4. Daily Light. And along about 3:00 P.M. Wednesday Annie got back. Wasn't I glad to see her & I told her I wasn't going to let her out of my sight again, haha!

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

So here we are for the time being in the city. Living conditions are deplorable. No business going on in the city & we have to go outside the city to buy our food. Annie brought vegetables, eggs, etc. when she came back from village. Thur. A.M. Annie, H.C. & I escorted the cart (borrowed one) outside the city for about 2 miles & later mules & cart were commandeered for the day, but later on, after some delays, cart & mules were set free, and men & cart went back to their village on Friday.

The present authorities have been & are being very pleasant & are beginning to know us better now. Wed. 8th, Today has been a full one. This A.M. Annie, Mr. Li & I went to headquarters to have our passport renewed. There were three officers present. Language, of course, is the main barrier, but by using four languages & an interpreter we got our affairs across. Again the issue of damage incurred during occupation of city came up, but when it was learned that it was at time of bombing of city, we were told that nothing could be done about it. Well, the Lord has told us to take joyfully the spoiling of our goods....He will provide our needs. I am well & glad to be here.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Febr. 16, 1938.

~~MEM~~
MEM
JWB

Japanese censorship of the press at Shanghai became effective as of December 15th. Two well known papers, the SHUN PAO and the TA KUNG PAO, closed up shop. The SIN WAN PAO has changed hands and is now reported to be operating under a Japanese subsidy of Mex.\$30,000 monthly. Of the four substantial Chinese papers now being published in Shanghai, ~~one is American owned and another is incorporated in Delaware. C.V.Starr, the owner of the TA MEI WAN PAO, has publicly stated his paper will not submit to Japanese censorship.~~
ARR ARR

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 1148

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Shanghai, January 13, 1938.

SUBJECT: Shanghai Chinese Vernacular Editorial
Comment During December on the Sino-
Japanese Difficulties and the Attitude
of the United States.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1938 JAN 13 7 32 PM

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

DIVISION OF
EASTERN AFFAIRS
Department of State

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 1093,
December 3, 1937, and previous despatches on the
above subject and to state that with the Japanese
consolidating their military occupancy of the Shanghai
area, Chinese vernacular editorial comment became
more and more innocuous and ceased entirely on
December fifteenth, when Japanese censorship became
effective.

The SHUN PAO, established in 1872 and reputedly
the oldest Chinese paper in China, and the TA KUNG
PAO suspended publication on December fifteenth.
Preparations were made by the former to resume pub-
lication in Hankow, while the latter, until recently
a prominent Tientsin newspaper, already had a Hankow
edition. The SIN WAN PAO, important daily, suspended
publication on December seventeenth and resumed on
December twenty-second with a rumored Japanese subsidy

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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of yuan 30,000 monthly.

Aside from a number of "mosquito" papers, four vernacular daily newspapers are now operating in Shanghai. They are: the SIN WAN PAO (Chinese owned); the TA MEI WAN PAO (allegedly owned by C. V. Starr, an American citizen); the HWA MEI WAN PAO (a Delaware corporation); and the EASTERN TIMES (Chinese owned). The Chinese papers submit to Japanese censorship while the other two have thus far not done so. Mr. Starr has publicly announced that the papers which he controls, the SHANGHAI EVENING POST AND MERCURY and the TA MEI WAN PAO "submit to censorship from nobody."

Respectfully yours,


C. E. Gauss
American Consul General

800
RPB MB

In quintuplicate.

Copy to Embassy, Peiping.

Copy to Embassy, Hankow.

Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 11, 1938.

~~MSM~~
~~JCV~~
~~JWB~~
~~WAA~~
~~MMH~~

Reference Peiping's No. 1510, January 11, 1938, entitled "Review of Military and Political Activities in North China during December, 1937."

To note marked passages on pages one and two which are in the nature of a summary.

The new provisional régime at Peiping is discussed at some length with particular reference to its form, its personnel, its provisional character, and sphere and power. Under this last heading it is stated that, although the name "Provisional Government of the Republic of China" would indicate that this régime regards itself as the Government of "all China", alleged jealousy between the various Japanese military factions may result in the creation of one or more similar régimes.

Inauguration is reported of the New People's Society which resembles the Concordia Society of "Manchukuo", in its aims and organization. Although Major General Kita, who is prominent in supervision of the activities of this Society, desires to

delegate

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-2-

delegate as much power as possible to Chinese and to reduce Japanese interference to a minimum, it is obviously Japanese-created and Japanese-directed. Even in this connection the various Japanese military factions seem to be disputing with each other for control.

An attempt has been made by the Japanese to initiate a counter movement among well-to-do Chinese in occupied areas in North China to combat ~~the~~ proselytizing by communist agents.

Ambitious plans for the economic development of North China were of little significance in view of disagreement among Japanese leaders, lack of capital, and apparent inability of the Japanese military to control anything but the main routes of communication.

In addition to marked passages on Pages 1 and 2, see also Pages 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 12.

ACM

FE:Ringwalt:VCI

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1510

Peiping, January 11, 1938.

Subject: Review of Military and Political
Activities in North China during
December, 1937.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1938 FEB 7 PM 2 33

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O.N.I. AND M.R.D.

DT

W. E. in FE
File
Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's despatch No. 1466 of November 30, 1937, describing military and political developments which took place during November in North China, and to report developments of this character which occurred during December.

Notwithstanding two developments during December in North China viewed favorably by Japanese, namely, (1) an advance in Shantung and (2) the inauguration of a new provisional regime at Peiping, the future seemed

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

--2--

to hold little promise of Japan's finding in its present continental policy any real solutions of the basic problems of Japan and "Manchukuo". The primary factors in North China which were discouraging during December to Japanese were their inability, or disinclination, to extend their control significantly beyond certain lines of communication already held, evidence of efficient organizing of Chinese between those lines of communication for the purpose of resisting Japanese encroachment, the continuing "mental resistance" of Chinese in such centers as Peiping, as well as the ever-present factors of finance and of conflict of views among various groups of Japanese leaders.

¹
New Provisional Regime at Peiping:

The inevitable though delayed inauguration of an anti-Communist, anti-Kuomintang puppet regime at Peiping took place December 14 under the guidance of Japanese military. Skeleton in form and personnel when inaugurated, it assumed somewhat the proportions of a government on December 31 by the creation of additional organs and an augmentation in personnel.

a. The form of the regime:

Having no head, the regime consists of three committees (or commissions): executive, legislative, and justice. Under the Executive Committee are five organs, referred to by Chinese as "ministries" and by Japanese

as

1. Embassy's despatches Nos. 1500, December 23, 1937, and 1516, January 11, 1938.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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as "sections". (The Chinese character used by both is the same.) These five organs deal with administration, public order, education, legal affairs, and relief. Under this Administration Section (or Ministry) are six bureaus for the administration of general affairs, internal affairs, foreign affairs, financial affairs, industries, and communications.

b. The personnel:

Major General Seichi Kita, in charge of Japanese Special Military Organs in North China, had evidently expected nine Chinese to assume office December 14. One failed him, allegedly Ts'ao Ju-lin. The eight who assumed office are Wang K'eh-min, Wang Yi-t'ang, Chu Shen, Tung K'ang, and Kao Ling-wei, all of whom held office in the old Peking Government when it was under the control of the corrupt and pro-Japanese Anfu Clique, T'ang Erh-ho, who was a cabinet minister in the old Peking Government at times when the Anfu Clique was not in power, Chiang Ch'ao-tsung, who was persuaded last August by the Japanese to emerge from a 20 years' retirement to head the Peiping Local Maintenance Society, and General Ch'i Hsieh-yuan, a militarist of somewhat uncertain reputation. General Ch'i was associated with the Chihli Clique, under which the government at Peking was "incomparably the most idle, shiftless, ineffective regime Peking had known". Wang K'eh-min and Kao Ling-wei, notwithstanding their service with the Anfu Clique, were also associated with the Chihli Clique. With the exception of old Chiang Ch'ao-tsung, the men who assumed office December 14 are or were politicians of skill. In view, however, of the

character

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character of the governments in which they previously served, as well as of the records and the advanced age of some of them, it can scarcely be expected that these men will give competent administration, even if they were free agents, which they are not.

c. Provisional character of the regime:

The provisional character of the regime is indicated by its name: "Provisional Government of the Republic of China"; by its lack of a head; and by its somewhat irregular organization in which, for example, foreign, internal, and financial affairs are relegated to a bureau under a section or ministry which is in turn under a committee. There is evidence that Major General Kita, the chief Japanese figure in the creation of the regime, intended until almost the hour of inauguration to create a committee of nine as a provisional regime but suddenly altered his plan. The alteration was presumably a compromise between him and Japanese officers who viewed with disfavor the formation of a committee. The absence of a head for the new regime is not intentional on the part of the Japanese concerned but is the result of their inability so far to persuade a Chinese of sufficient prestige to assume the leadership. Although Japanese and Chinese concerned claim that the present regime is provisional and will give way in a short time to a "permanent government", it seems more likely that the present regime will be used as the foundation for a "permanent government" at such time as the Japanese may find a suitable head for it.

d.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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d. Sphere and power of the new regime:

Although the name indicates that the "Provisional Government of the Republic of China" regards itself as the government of "all China", it would seem that its geographical limits will depend upon future developments. Alleged ill-feeling or jealousy existing between the Japanese military in North China and the Japanese military in Central China may result in the creation of one or more similar regimes, in somewhat the way that the Kwantung Army has included south Chahar and north Shansi in its Inner Mongolia regime although south Chahar and north Shansi belong racially and geographically to the regime at Peiping. Although the flying at Nanking since its occupation of the five-barred flag, which was adopted by the regime at Peiping, may indicate that the Yangtze area is to come under the Peiping regime, Ambassador Kawagoe was quoted in the press as saying, in reference to the Peiping regime, that similar regimes may be expected to spring up in various parts of China. In fact, the regime at Peiping has at present nominal control only of the Peiping-Tientsin area and certain lines of communication in Shantung, Hopei, and Shansi. Actually any affairs of importance even in Peiping are conducted by the Japanese concerned, while outside of Peiping, with few exceptions, direction of affairs is entirely in the hands of Japanese.

With regard to the 22 districts of Hopei Province under the East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government, it seemed probable during December that they would

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- 6 -

be absorbed by the new regime. There seemed also to be a possibility that south Chahar and north Shansi might be surrendered by the Kwantung Army to the Japanese army in North China for inclusion under the Peiping regime.

e. Dissolution of the Local Maintenance Societies:

As a result of the inauguration of the new regime at Peiping, the Peiping Local Maintenance Society and the Tientsin Local Peace Maintenance Society were dissolved December 17.

Inauguration of the New People's Society:

For the purpose of directing the actions and thoughts of the Chinese people along lines which the Japanese military regard as desirable, the New People's Society was inaugurated December 24 at Peiping. The post of president being left vacant, in anticipation of its being filled by the Chinese who will eventually head the "Provisional Government of the Republic of China", the nominal leader was Chang Yen-ching, recently Minister for Foreign Affairs in "Manchukuo", who assumed the office of Vice President of the new society. Resembling the Concordia Society of "Manchukuo" in its aims and organization, the new society took over as its official organ the Shih Chieh Irh Pao (a Chinese newspaper), changing the name to Hsin Min Pao (New People's Newspaper), and prepared to establish (January 10) the New People's College in which Chinese are to be trained along lines acceptable to the Japanese to hold office in the new regime.

The

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The creation of the New People's Society illustrated again two of the handicaps under which the Japanese military labor in their efforts to turn North China into an area friendly to Japan. Although Major General Kita, who is the most influential figure in directing the activities of the new society, is believed to desire to delegate as much power as possible to Chinese and to reduce Japanese interference to a minimum, the new society is obviously a Japanese-created and a Japanese-directed organ. The conflict of views among the Japanese military was also in evidence in connection with the creation of the New People's Society. It is reliably reported that deep dissatisfaction was aroused among some Japanese officers, who had been active in organizing the society, by Major General Kita's filling posts in the society with his own appointees, thus eliminating the officers referred to from participation in its control.

Activities of Irregular Forces between
Japanese-occupied Lines of Communication:

The Japanese military continued to hold the principal lines of communication in the occupied areas in Shantung, Hopei, and Shansi. Neither in Hopei nor Shansi, however, did any important Japanese advance take place; and Chinese forces continued to control the areas between the lines of communication, making frequent raids on the narrow zones held by Japanese and attacking small Japanese units which ventured too far from those zones. Japanese punitive forces entered the Chinese-occupied areas at times, without, however, extending their sphere of control significantly.

Agents

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Agents of the National Government, in large part Chinese Communists, were active in non-occupied areas of the three provinces, participating in the reorganization of political administration, organizing armed forces, strengthening the will of the people to resist, and proselytizing for the "popular front". This stirring up of the Chinese masses, who are presumably receptive to the ideology of the agents in view of the poverty and suffering intensified by Sino-Japanese hostilities, evidently created apprehension among the Japanese authorities, who allegedly began a counter movement among well-to-do Chinese of the occupied areas to combat the work of those agents. It was said that the agents were not alarmed by the counter-movement, as they believed that any alignment between monied Chinese and the invaders would render their own propaganda the more effective.

Notwithstanding the limited area under control of the Japanese military, the withdrawal of Japanese troops from North China continued during the month under review. The office of the American Military Attaché estimated the withdrawals during December at 30,000, only slightly offset by the arrival of replacements for units not withdrawn. According to that estimate, there were in North China at the end of December 247,000 Japanese troops. In view of the fact that large parts of North China are still under the control of Chinese forces, the withdrawals seemed to indicate not so much that the Japanese were satisfied with the situation as that the need for the troops elsewhere was greater.

Japanese

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Japanese advance in Shantung: Fall of Tsinan:

The situation in Shantung did not alter materially until the latter half of December; that is, Japanese forces remained until that time north of the Yellow River, while to the south the policies and aims of the three principal Chinese leaders, Generals Han Fu-chu and Yu Hsueh-chung and Admiral Shen Hung-lieh, continued to be conflicting and unclear.

Affairs were brought to a head December 18 when Chinese systematically destroyed Japanese cotton mills at Tsingtao allegedly on orders from the National Government, possibly intended both to divert Japanese military activity from South China and to prevent General Han Fu-chu from coming to terms with the Japanese. As a result, the Japanese moved across the Yellow River December 23 at several places east and west of Tsinan and began bombing places along the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway. Chowtsun on that railway was taken December 25 and Tsinan, the provincial capital, was occupied December 27. Prior to retiring from the city, Chinese troops looted and destroyed Japanese and some government property. Forced by these developments to leave Tsinan, General Han Fu-chu established his headquarters at Taian, some thirty miles south of Tsinan on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and, evidently to keep the way of retreat clear, caused to be destroyed on December 25 an important bridge on the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway 75 miles west of Tsingtao, thereby impeding the retreat of General Yu Hsueh-chung's forces in eastern Shantung.

Following

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Following the destruction of the Japanese cotton mills at Tsingtao, some other Japanese property was destroyed, as well as some Chinese property, accompanied by sporadic and small scale looting of Japanese property. Foreign property, other than Japanese, however, suffered no damage. The situation deteriorated rapidly: Japanese forces were advancing by the end of December along the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway in the direction of Tsingtao, although no approach from the sea was apparent; public utilities were disorganized; the municipal government ceased to function; many officials and other Chinese fled; and all Chinese troops were in retreat. A fair degree of order was maintained, however, by Chinese and foreign volunteers.

Uneasiness of Japanese in Peiping:

Although Chinese life in Peiping continued to assume outwardly a more normal appearance, Japanese authorities in the city revealed a growing uneasiness. The number of arrests of Chinese for alleged subversive activities or criticism of the authorities increased during December, as did also instances of the searching of pedestrians. According to a Chinese who was held for some days at the headquarters of the Japanese gendarmerie in the western part of the city, two hundred Chinese were under detention there, and a Chinese released from the headquarters in the eastern part of the city claimed that a considerable number were held there. Third degree methods were allegedly used on some of these prisoners.

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prisoners. The charges on which some of them were detained were reported to be as follows: a dealer sold two bags of flour to the family of a Chinese military officer; a man in his sixties wrote to his son that Chinese impressed by Japanese for labor did not receive pay; a student described in a letter the effect of the Japanese occupation on education in Peiping.

The uneasiness of the Japanese was due to various factors, including reports of the smuggling into Peiping of arms, reports of activities of agents of the National Government and Chinese communists in areas south and west of Peiping, reports that irregulars intended to attack Peiping, letters written by Chinese indicating dissatisfaction with the present situation, and reports that some Japanese had disappeared from the streets of Peiping and had not been seen again (a development which a Japanese Consul states to be a fact).

Slow Progress in Economic Recovery and Development:

Japanese news agencies continued to publish accounts indicating that a profitable exploitation of the resources of North China was rapidly approaching. Actually, developments remained largely in a conversational stage. Shipment of iron ore mined in 1919 at the Lungyen Iron Mines in southern Chahar began with considerable publicity, but the feasibility of mining fresh ore continued to be problematical. An exhibition of Japanese products was held at Kalgan, and certain Japanese discussed at that city the proposal of establishing an association for the distribution of wool produced

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in Inner Mongolia. Japanese continued to arrive from Japan to study the economic possibilities of North China. The East Hopei Electric Company was inaugurated at Tangshan, the seat of the "government" of the East Hopei regime.

Such developments were of little significance, however, in view of the continuing disagreement among Japanese interests as to how economic development should be carried out and in view of the difficulty of finding the funds needed for large-scale exploitation and the facts that Chinese troops still hold large areas of the countryside and that transportation is extremely inadequate even in those zones of communication held by the Japanese military. For example, only one passenger train, composed of box cars, runs daily from Peiping to Shihkiachuang, while from Shihkiachuang south to Honan and west to Taiyuan there are only military trains.

The problem of revision of the import tariff, allegedly desired by the Japanese authorities in North China as a measure of relief to the Chinese, was not solved during December. One of the officials of the "Provisional Government" issued a statement December 16 in which it was said that the "Government" had decided to begin adjustments with the Customs at Tientsin and Chinwangtao. It was learned subsequently that a temporary revision of the import duty on about ten items had been decided on, but it was not implemented during the month under review.

Miscellaneous:

a. Settlement of the T'ungchow affair:

Ch'ih

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
Ch'ih Tsung-mo, head of the East Hopei regime, made reparation on December 24 for the killing by Chinese on July 28, 1937, at T'ungchow of a large number of Japanese. He tendered apologies to the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy at Peiping and handed over Yen 400,000.00 as first payment on Yen 1,200,000.00, compensation to survivors of the affair and families of those killed and for property destroyed.

b. Prince Teh's visit to "Manchukuo":

As representatives of the "Mongol and Border Districts Federated Committee", an organ created by the Kwantung Army for the nominal control of south Chahar, north Shansi, and Inner Mongolia in Chahar and Suiyuan, several Mongols and Chinese, accompanied by Japanese, visited cities of "Manchukuo" during the latter part of December. Prince Teh, leading Mongol in Chahar and Suiyuan, was the chief figure among the representatives.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:


Frank P. Lockhart
Counselor of Embassy

Original and 4 copies to
Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Hankow, Embassy Files.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1519


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Peiping, January 14, 1938.


Subject: 1938 FEB 7 PM 2 19
Japanese Occupation of Tsinan.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

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DT



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

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I have the honor to enclose copies of three communications for the files of the Department which give first-hand information with regard to the occupation by Japanese forces of Tsinan, capital of Shantung Province. Two of the communications are letters of December 31, 1937, and January 6, 1938, addressed to Captain Frank Dorn, attached to the office of the Military Attaché for language study, by Mr. H. T. Chen of the American Consulate at Tsinan, and the other

communication

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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communication is a letter, in the form of a diary, received by the American Board Mission at Peiping from Mr. C. A. Stanley of that mission at Tsinan. A summary is given below.

Heavy gun fire began on the morning of December 24 to the north and east of the city; Japanese planes flew over, without dropping bombs, although Taian, thirty miles south of Tsinan, was heavily bombed that same day; Japanese forces were reported as crossing the Yellow River at Ch'itung; some thirty Japanese planes flew above Tsinan throughout the day of December 25, bombing the outskirts of the city; Chinese began in the evening to burn public buildings; there was looting by the populace, especially of public buildings, goods, and Japanese property; large fires burned all night throughout the city; the Chinese troops withdrew, without fighting, on the night of December 25-26; and Japanese forces entered the city in the early morning of December 27. Following the occupation, the Japanese Special Military Affairs Organ, under Colonel Nakano, assumed direction of affairs, examining stores and banks and enforcing postal censorship. General Ma Liang assumed on January 1 the office of Chairman of the Tsinan Peace Maintenance Society, its most difficult problem being that of finance as the cash resources of the banks in the city were reputedly only \$300,000. The situation in Tsinan was quiet by January 1.

From

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 By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

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From these accounts, it is evident that Tsinan did not suffer from occupation by Japanese military to the degree which many other cities so occupied have suffered.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Frank P. Lockhart
 Frank P. Lockhart
 Counselor of Embassy

Enclosures:

1. Mr. Ch'en to Captain Dorn,
 December 31, 1937.
2. Mr. Ch'en to Captain Dorn,
 January 6, 1938.
3. Diary, November 14-December 28,
 1937.

Original and 4 copies to Department.
 Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
 Copy to Hankow, for Embassy Files.

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CORRECT COPY - SC)

Enclosure No. 1
Despatch No. 1519

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate, Tsinan, China, December 31, 1937.

Captain Frank Dorn,
 American Embassy,
 Peiping, China.

Dear Captain Dorn:

I beg to refer to my letters of 28th and 29th inst. and to inform you that Lieutenant General Nishiwo arrived at Tsinan on the afternoon of the 30th. It is reported that two divisions of Japanese troops crossed the Yellow River at different places and one of them arrived in Tsinan while the other left for an unknown destination. Of the division assigned to Tsinan about 4,000 remained in garrison at Tsinan and the rest has been despatched to the south.

The Japanese troops are reported to have met with stiff resistance on the part of Chinese troops at Shih Liu Li Ho, about 6 miles south of Tsinan and suffered about 400 casualties. Japanese wounded were seen in Tsinan. The front line is now at Kushan. It is also reported that the 51st Army is now at Weihsien and that the Japanese troops have launched an offensive upon Poshan on the spur line of the Kiao-Tsi Railway. Fighting is also reported to have taken place in the vicinity of Tsingchowfu.

The Chief of the Japanese Special Mission, Colonel Chung-yeh, used to be a Japanese military attache in Tsinan and most members of the mission staff are old residents of the city.

General Ma Liang will assume charge of office tomorrow. Report has it that there are in Tientsin several groups of politicians, once officials in Shantung, planning to seize the political control in this province, but according to one member of the Special Mission, it is the intention of the Japanese to have some local celebrities to maintain peace for the time being. Contrary to my expectation, the police are still not yet on duty.

The Special Mission has finished taking stock of the stores in the various banks and are investigating their accounts today. One of the Japanese bankers is reported as saying that it was the original plan to have the banks reopened at once but owing to the shortage of cash on hand a telegram has been despatched to Peiping to seek instructions. The Bank of China and Bank of Communications will most probably be reopened first.

The Japanese troops are billeting the large stores and banks along the 2nd and 3rd main roads in Tsinan, but houses of foreign ownership have not yet been occupied.

All American lives and property are believed to be safe.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) H. T. Ch'en

H. T. Ch'en

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2
Despatch No. 1519

(CORRECT COPY - SC)

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate, Tsinan, China, January 6, 1938.

Captain Frank Dorn,
American Embassy,
Peiping.

Dear Capt. Dorn:

I beg to refer to my letter of the 2nd inst. and inform you that Tsinan is in the same condition as of yore. Most of the Japanese troops have left for the south. It is estimated that the total Japanese troops coming and going amount to between 20,000 and 30,000. Some of their low-ranking military officers, while talking with Chinese friends, are said to be very pessimistic, anticipating their inability to return to Japan. It is reported both from the Chinese and Japanese sources, that about 1,500 Chinese plain clothes men are in the vicinity of Tsinan. Since the 2nd, nothing has been heard locally about the fighting on the east front. The Japanese troops are reported to have occupied Kufow. Rumors have it that the Central Government troops have taken part in fighting south of Taian and it is predicted that severe fighting will take place near the place of Chieh Ho, a strategic point north of Tenghsien. The 22nd Division is reported to have returned to the east through Taian, presumably to be on the defensive in the vicinity of Laiwu.

While General Ma Liang has assumed charge as the Chairman of the Tsinan Peace Maintenance Society, its organization has not yet been completed. The most difficult problem for the society as well as the Police Office is that of finance. No loan can be raised from the local banks, of which the resources in cash are not more than \$300,000. One of the members of the Society has told the writer that it is planning to take over the Shantung Exchange Bureau and make use of its notes to cover the various expenses, either issuing new notes or stamping the old ones. The Chief of the Police Office paid his visit to this Consulate on the 3rd and the writer returned his call with the Interpreter of the British Consulate on the following day. The conversation was merely conventional.

Complying with the instructions of the Peace Maintenance Society, most of the stores in the city have reopened today. There was held this morning at the Chung Shan Park a mass meeting, following which a lantern procession took place. On the lantern appears the following statement: "Grateful to the Imperial Troops."

Japanese censorship has already been enforced, but foreign mail is understood to have not been tampered with. Mail goes as far south as Taian and east as Chowtsun.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) H. T. Ch'en

H. T. Ch'en

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

(Mr. Stanley, Tsinan, to American
Board Mission, Peiping)
A LINE - or two - 0 - TYPE

Enclosure 2
Despatch 1519

Nov. 14th Not very long after breakfast there was an air alarm
Sunday and we heard planes to the North and West far enough
away not to be seen with the naked eye. We heard
four sequences of four explosions each and understand that the
bombs were dropped in the vicinity of the aerodrome. In the af-
ternoon took a walk to Ma An Shan, a small hill about twenty
minutes walk to the south of the Campus and from there saw four
planes circling over the Yellow River region and near the R.R.
bridge.

Nov. 15th Heard gun fire to the West and North at about 8:30
Monday and it is reported that the invaders are at Ch'ihho,
about 15 miles to the West and on the North bank of
the Yellow River. Two air warnings at 9 and 12 in the morning.
Six planes flew directly overhead at noon flying West by South
and evidently headed for the railway. There was more gun fire
and some heavy bombing to the North in the late afternoon and
at 5:30 there were two very heavy detonations which I took to
be blasts blowing up the long R.R. bridge which crosses the
Yellow River just North of the City. This surmise proved cor-
rect, and three or four spans of the ten or a dozen are now
a mass of twisted wreckage. The proprietor of one of the city
garages brought around one of his cars for me to "use" for as
long as I wished. This was about four o'clock. At six he came
around again with tears in his eyes saying that all cars had
been called in by the military to convey wounded and that he
would have to give up all his cars. All rickshas in the city
which could be laid hold of were commandeered for the same pur-
pose.

Nov. 16th Another heavy detonation woke me standing out of a
Tuesday sound sleep at 5:15 this morning and proved to be
the last final touch to the destruction of the R.R.
bridge. Through my binoculars I can see the wreck from the
tower of the Chapel. There was some slight gun fire this after-
noon, this time to the East of the city. Most of the Chinese
troops are supposed to have retired to the south side of the
Yellow River. It has been cloudy and drizzly all day. Gun
fire again in the evening. Mr. Allison, the American Consul,
left this evening and in his going we, as Americans, have lost
all official touch with the outside world. The Committee of
Management, as it is called, for the University met this eve-
ning at President Liu's request to take over, since he expects
to leave at almost any time.

Nov. 17th Busy on Committee most of the morning looking over
Wednesday possibilities "funk holes" to which to retire "all
concerned" in case of heavy bombing or shelling.
Decided on various basements which had reinforced concrete above
them and assigned certain places to the various groups on the
Campus. Would that it may prove unnecessary precaution. Cloudy
and sprinkling. Japanese shops were quietly but systematically
looted this morning. There was heavy firing from the North
late in the afternoon for a couple of hours.

Nov. 22nd After a few days of comparative quiet heard planes
Monday and bombing again in mid-morning, with desultory
firing to the North of the City through the day.

Played

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Played a couple of sets of tennis which was punctured by the reports of shelling and heard the whining of a couple of shells not too far to the East of the Campus attested to by the bringing in to the hospital later in the afternoon of a woman who had had her head bashed by a shell fragment. One plane flew over the city very high, said to have dropped a message for General Han suggesting his surrender.

Nov. 24th Yesterday was comparatively quiet after the rather Wednesday heavy work of the day before but just before noon heavy firing opened from the region just North of the far end of the R.R. bridge which kept up till dark. I surreptitiously crept up to the roof of the Chapel to see what I could see and with glasses could follow the explosions of the shells though I could not see from what they originated. I thought at first they were after the mills which are situated in the sector northwest of the city, but I discovered afterward that the object of the shelling was an armoured train standing on the tracks between the city and Lokow, the shipping mart on the river near the bridge. As evidence that the marksmanship might have been worse there is an armoured train lying about on either side of the tracks stripped of all its fighting paraphernalia. Having accomplished this objective we have been having several days of quiet, externally. Our inward uncertainties are just about as uncertain as they have been all along!

Dec. 24th Heavy firing broke out at about 8:30 yesterday evening to the north and east, and again early this Friday morning. Nine planes in triple formation flew over us from the east about 8:30, and several scout planes later on through the day. Japanese are reported to have crossed the Yellow River at Ch'i Tung or somewhere thereabouts. An attenuated Chinese and Foreign group met at the Shield's house to sing Christmas Carols at 7:30 in the evening. A Merry Christmas indeed!

Dec. 25th Heard by telephone that T'ai'an, to the south of us, Saturday had had about 100 bombs showered down on it yesterday. We had about thirty planes hovering over us throughout the day and there was considerable bombing in the outskirts of the city. The Chinese began burning public buildings in the evening on orders from the Central Government. The populace walked off with everything loose upon which they could lay their hands.

Dec. 26th Fires were going all night and this morning before Sunday breakfast I counted eight huge fires in different sections of the city. Frightened people were rushing about here and there with bundles of clothes and bedding looking for places of safety. Conditions being as they were I called everyone on duty and the day was put in attending to matters of public safety on the Campus. Soldiers were detailed to the gate in the wall in the morning and a sand bag barricade was erected. The information was that the city was to be defended, which did not look too good for us. Six of us went on special watchman's duty for the Campus at ten o'clock in the evening since the police were in a blue funk and had quit. When we went to the main gate just after ten o'clock on our first round we found that the soldiers who had been stationed

there

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there in the morning had left without firing a shot. We made our second round at about 2 a.m. of the 27th, Monday, and after we came together again, since everything appeared to be so quiet, I suggested that we might as well all go home and to our beds. We dispersed at about three o'clock and as I was walking to the house I heard a clear bugle call off to the east playing no note with which I was familiar, and remarked to Dr. Yang who was accompanying me that that must be a Japanese bugle. Arrived at the house I was in bed as speedily as possible but had no more than laid my head on the pillow when I heard voices and here were three of the watchmen with the information that the Japanese were on guard at the gate already and would I please come down so as to be on hand in case of any need. So I had to get up and dress and go again out into the cold. I stayed around the Administration Building till seven o'clock but nothing transpired and after seven I returned home and had my breakfast.

Dec. 28th The Chinese troops evacuated completely. There has
Tuesday been much looting especially of public buildings,
 godowns and Japanese property but very little vio-
lence so far as I have heard. Went to the Post Office to see
what information I could obtain about mails and saw thousands
of Japanese troops marching westward. It is a marvel how they
could have crossed the river and come in so quickly.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 14, 1938. ~~Ed~~
~~PH~~

Tokyo's No. 2738 of January 21, 1938, contains the Embassy's record in connection with the Sino-Japanese conflict for the period January 3 and January 18. The subject matter has been adequately covered in telegrams except the record of the conversations between Mr. Grew and the British Ambassador (Enclosures 2, 9 and 30), of which the following is the substance:

First Conversation:

The British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, is of the opinion that Japan is working to drive Great Britain and the United States apart by slandering the former and professing friendship for the latter, and that if Britain and the United States are not to be driven out of East Asia and lose step by step all of their tangible interests in China they must be ready to take up a definite position together. Sir Robert feels that the only way to stop the Japanese program of interfering with foreign interests is for the United States and Britain to stage a joint naval demonstration, Britain moving a good fleet to Singapore and the United States doing the same to Hawaii, and then tell the Japanese that unless they listen to us we are ready to take measures to protect our interests. Sir Robert stated that

Britain

0194

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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Britain could now spare a strong fleet as the French were able to take care of the Mediterranean.

After the first step, in case the Japanese did not heed us, Sir Robert would close Singapore and the Panama Canal to Japan, thereby ruining her trade and cutting off her supplies. Mr. Grew believed this would mean war. Sir Robert disagreed, but admitted we must be fully prepared for war. Sir Robert thought these measures could be taken without a declaration of war, but did not expect they would be needed, as a mere show of force at Singapore and Hawaii would bring results. Mr. Grew disagreed, thinking such a show would goad the Japanese Army and Navy to further aggression.

Mr. Grew told Sir Robert he doubted if the American people would stand for the suggested action. Sir Robert thought a change had come over the American people and administration. He admitted, however, that nothing to support this view had been communicated to him by Sir Ronald Lindsay.

Sir Robert regretted we were handling the Chinese Customs dispute at Shanghai rather than at Tokyo. He thought a fight conducted in Tokyo would be more effective than one in Shanghai.

Second

019

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Second Conversation:

Mr. Grew told Sir Robert he had reflected on the latter's suggestion, but remained convinced that a naval demonstration would make the Japanese Army and Navy more aggressive and would surely lead to war, and that the American people are not ready to fight for their tangible interests in China. Sir Robert said he was sad if this was so, as in that case Great Britain might as well pull up her stakes in China.

Sir Robert then restated the procedure he had in mind. His idea of the first step would be consultation with a view to arriving at some decision for joint action only in the event that the Japanese interference made it unavoidable. If our two Governments decided on some definite procedure only in case of necessity, the two Ambassadors could quite tly inform Hirota of this decision. Mr. Grew still thought the net result would be to spur the Japanese military to further aggression and that we must not take this first step unless we are ready to go to war. Sir Robert then showed Mr. Grew a draft telegram to his Government of his earlier proposal. Mr. Grew suggested that he redraft it to conform to the present conversation, and stated that in that case he would consider recommending to our Government something along the same line. Such recommendation if made, however, would

visualize

019

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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visualize consultation between the United States and Britain against possible future emergencies and not definite action against Japan.

Third Conversation:

Sir Robert stated he had not yet formulated his recommendations to his Government, because he wished first to see the outcome of the Chinese Customs problem. Mr. Grew comments that Sir Robert seems to have dismissed for the time being the idea of making recommendations, and speculates on the reason for the change.

WHL
FE:Langdon:VCI

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1938 FEB 7 PM 2 08


AMERICAN EMBASSY

No. 2738.

Tokyo, January 21, 1938



OFFICE OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

SUBJECT: SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS.



193.94

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL



793.94/12345

The Honorable

The Secretary of State
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to the Embassy's despatch No. 2717, dated January 6, 1938, I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the purpose of the records, further copies of various notes, letters, memoranda, and other documents relating to the present Sino-Japanese conflict. Documents relating to the Chinese customs administration are being transmitted with the Embassy's despatch no. 2737, dated January 21, 1938.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

710
ESC:mg

Carbon Copies
Received

Annex
List of enclosures.

FEB 10 1938

FILED / MB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunsicker NARS, Date 12-18-75

LIST OF ENCLOSURES TRANSMITTED WITH DESPATCH NO. 2738,
JANUARY 21, 1938.

1. Attaché of the German Embassy, Count Mirbach, with the American Second Secretary, Mr. Andrews.
2. The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, with the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie.
3. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Horinouchi, to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew. (Translation)
4. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy. (Translation).
5. Chief of the First Section of the American Bureau, the Foreign Office, Mr. Ishii, with the American Second Secretary, Mr. Crocker.
6. The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.
7. The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.
8. The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.
9. The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, with the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie.
10. Chief of the First Section of the American Bureau, the Foreign Office, Mr. Ishii, with the American First Secretary, Mr. McGurk.
11. The British Embassy to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.
12. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy (Translation).
13. The American Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
14. The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie.
15. Chief of the First Section of the American Bureau, the Foreign Office, Mr. Ishii, with the American Counselor, Mr. Dooman.
16. The American Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
17. The British Embassy to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.
18. Statement of the Imperial Government, January 16, 1938.
19. The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.
20. The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.
21. The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.

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22. The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.
23. The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.
24. The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.
25. The British First Secretary, Mr. Clarke, to the American Second Secretary, Mr. Crocker.
26. The British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie, to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.
27. The British Embassy to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.
28. Chief of the First Section of the American Bureau, the Foreign Office, Mr. Ishii, with the American First Secretary, Mr. McGurk.
29. The Director of the American Bureau, the Foreign Office, Mr. Yoshizawa, with the American Counselor, Mr. Dooman.
30. The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, with the British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie.

0200

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch
no. 2138 of JAN 21 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

January 3, 1938

843.102 Tsingtao

Attaché of the German Embassy,
Count Mirbach, with the American
Second Secretary, Mr. Andrews.

At noon today Count Mirbach of the German Embassy called me on the telephone stating that the German Embassy had received this Embassy's note which enclosed a copy of Mr. Grew's letter to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning the proposed safety zone at Tsingtao Edgewater Peninsula (Embassy's telegrams no. 2, January 1, and no. 5, January 2, and Department's telegram no. 1, January 1, 1938). Mirbach added that his Ambassador had not as yet received instructions from the German Government to take action on this matter.

G.D.A.

020

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch
No. 2733 of Jan 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

January 7, 1938.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
with the British Ambassador, Sir
Robert Craigie.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Situation.

The British Ambassador called on me this morning for the first time since the holidays and said that he had come for a talk so that we could get up to date on various subjects. He first told me that he had called yesterday on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and had protested against four published interviews given by Admiral Suetsugu, two of them before he became Home Minister and two of them afterwards. (December 11?) One of them was dated November 11 but was published only recently and therefore could easily have been stopped after he became Minister if he had wished to stop it. These interviews were markedly anti-British and in some cases were actually insulting to Great Britain. Sir Robert said he had told Mr. Hirota that as Admiral Suetsugu was a responsible Cabinet Minister it must be expected that he was expressing the views of the Government unless assurances were given to the contrary and he therefore asked Hirota if he would authorize Sir Robert to inform his Government that the views expressed by Admiral Suetsugu in these interviews did not represent the views of the Japanese Government. Hirota replied that Sir Robert knew very well Hirota's attitude toward Great Britain as often expressed and he could therefore give definite

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nite assurances that the views expressed by Admiral Suetsugu in these interviews did not represent his own views. Sir Robert then asked if he might assure his Government that Admiral Suetsugu would make no further public statements of an anti-British character. Hirota said that before answering this question he would have to consult Suetsugu himself. Sir Robert said that the matter was urgent and asked for an early reply.

In this connection I told Sir Robert of similar troubles which I had encountered during my first year or two in Japan and of the occasion on which General Araki, then Minister of War, was reported in the press to have made a speech somewhere in the Kansai containing the quoted words "The United States and Soviet Russia are like castaway cats and ravening wolves baring their claws and teeth for attack". I said that I had protested to the Foreign Minister against this speech and had said that in the interests of good relations between Japan and the United States I felt that General Araki should publicly withdraw these quoted words. After a considerable time had elapsed I was informed by the Foreign Office that the matter had been taken up with General Araki who simply said that his speeches were never made from texts or notes and that he therefore could not be responsible for the way they were reported in the press but no denial that he had used those words was ever forthcoming.

Sir Robert said apropos of Admiral Suetsugu's interviews that it was obviously the definite policy of the Japanese at present to drive Great Britain and the United States apart by slandering the former and professing friendship for the

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the latter and that if we were not both to be driven out of East Asia and to lose step by step all of our tangible interests in China we must be prepared to take up a definite position together. Sir Robert feels that the Japanese are bluffing with regard to our interests in China and that they are merely trying us out to see how far they can go and that unless we call their bluff we must be prepared to make a series of strategic withdrawals until we have both been crowded out entirely. The items he especially had in mind were the customs, the rights of foreigners in Shanghai, the tariffs, the regime in North China, et cetera. I asked Sir Robert what sort of action he had in mind. He said he felt that the only way to call an effective halt to this Japanese program of interfering with foreign interests was for the United States and Great Britain to stage a naval demonstration together, the British moving a substantial number of units of their fleet to Singapore and the United States to do the same to Hawaii. We should then inform the Japanese Government that unless they listen to our representations concerning the safeguarding of our tangible interests in China we intended and were fully prepared to take measures to protect those interests. I asked Sir Robert if the Mediterranean situation was such at the present moment as to permit Great Britain to send a substantial part of her fleet to Singapore. Sir Robert replied in the affirmative and said that the French Fleet was capable of handling the situation in the Mediterranean.

Sir

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Sir Robert then said that if the Japanese did not pay attention to our representations the next step would be to establish a blockade against Japan at Singapore and the Panama Canal which our two countries could make sufficiently effective, totally ruining Japan's export trade and largely cutting off her supplies. I said that this would of course mean war but Sir Robert did not agree; he thought that we could well take a leaf out of Japan's book by taking these measures without a declaration of war and in any case he believed that a mere show of force at Singapore and Hawaii by our two countries would be quite sufficient to bring results without further measures. I expressed doubts as to the soundness of this theory and said I thought that a show of naval strength against Japan might, in the present temper of the Japanese Army and Navy, merely goad them to further aggressiveness and that a blockade even if effective would take a long time to register. Sir Robert said that of course we would have to save Japan's face so far as possible, but he felt convinced that a naval demonstration would alone call the Japanese bluff and would bring results. He acknowledged however that if such a step were taken we must be fully prepared to back it up with further measures if necessary; in other words we must be fully prepared to go to war with Japan.

It may be said that Sir Robert has frequently talked to me before along these same lines. I told him as I had often told him before that I doubted very much if the American people would stand for such measures. Sir Robert said that he senses a recent change in the attitude of the

United

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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United States and intimated that he had reason to believe that our Administration was now seriously considering some such move as he had suggested. I asked him if he had been kept informed of the conversations between Lindsay and our Government on this subject but he said that he had received nothing whatever. Sir Robert acknowledged that the British stake in China was greater than ours but he said at the same time he did not think that we could see our own interests in China wiped out with equanimity. Nevertheless unless we were willing to act with Great Britain in calling a halt to the Japanese program we must definitely visualize the eventual wiping out of all our interests in this part of the world. Unless the step were taken soon it would be too late. The Ambassador added that so far as Great Britain was concerned, not only her interests and prestige in China but her interests and prestige throughout the Far East were at stake.

Sir Robert then turned to the question of the Chinese customs and said he had made further representations to Hirota yesterday. Hirota said that the question was being discussed now not only in Shanghai but in Tokyo and he hoped that soon he would be able to report some arrangement which he hoped would be satisfactory to the British Government. Sir Robert said to me that the manner in which Hirota said this convinced him that Hirota himself did not believe that the proposed arrangement would be satisfactory to us. He said he was sorry that I had not been authorized to carry on the discussions here because he feels that the matter is going to be decided

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0206

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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in Tokyo rather than in Shanghai, and that unless we make some concrete proposals here for a satisfactory settlement of the issue we shall be faced with a wholly unsatisfactory arrangement. He feels that it is entirely unreasonable to expect that Lawford himself should shoulder all the responsibility for standing firm and that he is in a very difficult position and needs our support, Sir Robert does not feel that we shall place ourselves in a position of forcing some arrangement on the Chinese Government. He merely visualizes informal discussions in Tokyo simultaneous with the discussions in Shanghai and wants to impress upon the Japanese Government that it must not put any arrangement into effect until we have been consulted and have approved of it. He feels that the Chinese Government is not at present in a position to take any hand in the matter at all and that we should therefore do it for the Chinese Government both in their interests and in ours. He feels very strongly that if we allow the Japanese to put into effect some arrangement not satisfactory to us and if we allow them to get away with it we shall then be faced progressively with a steady undermining of our other interests in China.

Sir Robert talked for over an hour but the foregoing is a rough summary of his observations. He said that he would probably formulate a telegram to his Government along these lines and would be very glad to show it to me and at the same time to see anything that I might consider sending myself so that our two reports might be as

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0207

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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near together as possible. I said that I would consider the matter and would let him know in due course whether I felt in a position to send anything on this general subject to Washington.

J.C.G.

Note: This conversation should be read in conjunction with the conversations reported in enclosures Nos. 9 and 30 to this despatch.

J.C.G.

0208

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch
No. 2738 of JAN 21 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hori-
nouchi, to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.

(Translation)

Department of Foreign Affairs,
Tokyo, January 8, 1938.

893.102 Tsing Tao

Excellency:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of January 2 with regard to the recognition of Edgewater Peninsula at Tsingtao as a safety zone, and in reply to inform Your Excellency that the Japanese forces are ready to recognize the Peninsula as such a zone and do all in their power to prevent it from becoming involved in hostilities and consequent disaster, on condition that the Chinese make no use of the Peninsula nor of its vicinity for hostilities. It is therefore respectfully requested that Your Excellency take appropriate steps to have nationals of third countries residing in Tsingtao concentrated within the limits stated in order to prevent the accidents to nationals of third countries which are unavoidable during hostilities.

It should be understood that this in no way implies that Japanese forces can be held responsible for losses or damages which may result within the stated limits from hostilities between Japanese and Chinese forces.

I have the honor to be, Excellency, your obedient

servant,

7209
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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servant,

Kensuke Horinouchi,
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency

Joseph Clark Grew,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America.

(Copy sent to the British Ambassador, Tokyo)
(Copy sent to the French Ambassador, Tokyo)
(Copy sent to the German Ambassador, Tokyo)

0210
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 4 to despatch
No. 2738 of JAN 21 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the
American Embassy.

(Translation)

No. 4, American I.

Department of Foreign Affairs,

Tokyo, January 8, 1938.

Memorandum

393.1115
The Japanese Foreign Office has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the memorandum of December 29 from the United States Embassy, in which it is noted that, through American officials at Hankow, a letter dated December 22 has been received from the Southern Presbyterian Mission, Hsuehchow, Kiangsu, at the junction of the Tientsin-Pukow and Lunghai railways, requesting the American officials at Hankow to use their good influence for the protection of American properties and refugees at Hsuehchow. The Japanese Government is requested to take the necessary steps for such protection.

The Japanese Foreign Office has the honor to state in reply that it at once made copies of the American Embassy's memorandum and forwarded these copies to the Japanese military and naval authorities concerned, and that the latter, in their replies, urgently express a desire to obtain a sketch map of Hsuehchow city showing the location of the quarters for refugees, prior to military operations, because there is a possibility of Hsuehchow becoming at any moment a zone of hostilities, in spite of all efforts. The Japanese military command ardently desires to obtain such a sketch map as soon as possible. On January

0211

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6 the Japanese Foreign Office telephoned in this sense to the United States Embassy. On January 7, the Foreign Office received a telephone message from the Embassy stating that it is impossible to send the above-mentioned sketch map from the American Ambassador at Hankow to Tientsin for the reason that the communication between the two cities is interrupted at present; that the American properties at Hsuehchow are distinguishable by their flags; and that Dr. Brown has been requested to raise white flags with a blue cross and clearly to mark American properties so as to prevent attacks when Japanese forces attack Hsuehchow. Simultaneously the Foreign Office also received from the United States Embassy a copy of a telegram embodying the same purport. The substance of the telegram was at once communicated to the Japanese army and navy authorities concerned. Those authorities, in their replies, stated that they shall of course do all in their power to conform to the desire expressed, but that without the sketch map alluded to the location of American properties can not be clearly understood. They further stated that the degree of responsibility undertaken by the Chinese military authorities to allow no soldier to enter the quarters defined nor any munitions to be stored there is not clearly known, that it will therefore be very difficult to protect the rights and interests of the United States, and that past experience indicates that even though Chinese forces at first refrain from using such American properties and quarters for refuge it is quite probable that the Chinese

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Chinese forces will nevertheless purposely mass for action at points close to the said quarters, thereby making it almost unavoidable that remnants of the Chinese forces will thereafter take refuge in the said quarters. In view of all this, the Japanese army and navy authorities concerned express the hope that the Chinese military authorities will be urged not only to carry out their undertaking faithfully as set forth in the letter from the Southern Presbyterian Mission but also to refrain from using places close to the American properties. The Japanese Foreign Office hopes that the United States Embassy will understand these considerations and will request the American agencies in the field to issue an appropriate warning to the Chinese authorities.

021

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 5 to despatch
No. 2738 of JAN 21 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

January 8, 1938.

Mr. Ishii, American Bureau
Foreign Office,

Mr. Crocker.

394-115 Kahn Hospital

I telephoned Mr. Ishii to remind him of a previous telephone call I had made on December 31, inviting his attention to the fact that the reply of the Foreign Office of December 22 to our Memorandum of October 8 failed to include any reference to the question of indemnification for damage and losses in the case of the bombing of the Ida Kahn Hospital at Nanchang, and I asked if he could give me any explanation.

Mr. Ishii replied that he had gone into the matter and the reference was apparently omitted from the Foreign Office note inadvertently and that of course equal consideration would be given to this case as in other similar cases. I asked, then, if we might telegraph the Department to that effect and he said that we might.

I said that we would do so and I thanked him.

E.S.C.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 6 to despatch
No. 2738 of JAN 8 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

January 10, 1938.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
with the Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs, Mr. Hirota.

Subject: Japanese military jurisdiction
over American nationals in China.

When discussing other matters this morning with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I brought up the question of Japanese military jurisdiction over American nationals in China, quite informally and as on my own initiative. The Minister said that the Japanese military authorities in Shanghai had been obliged to issue these regulations to protect themselves from the acts of irresponsible foreigners in Shanghai but he said that the Japanese military authorities perfectly understood the status of extraterritorial foreigners and he thought that there was not the slightest intention of applying these regulations to Americans. Mr. Hirota did not seem disposed to give me specific assurances on this point but took the position that we would have no cause for complaint. I pointed out informally that any attempt on the part of any Japanese agencies to exercise jurisdiction over American nationals in China could not be recognized or countenanced by the United States Government.

J.C.G.

0215

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 7 to despatch
No. 2738 of 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

January 10, 1938.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
with the Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs, Mr. Hirota.

Subject: Looting of American property by
Japanese troops at Soochow and
Hangchow.

393.115
I made informal representations to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs this morning in regard to reports re-
ceived from the American Consul General at Shanghai of
looting by Japanese troops of American property at Soo-
chow and Hangchow, and told him that while I was not yet
in possession of detailed reports I thought he would wish
to know of these general reports immediately so that
prompt action might be taken. The Minister said that he
would at once bring the matter to the attention of the
Japanese military authorities.

J.C.G.

0215

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 8 to despatch
No 2738 of JAN 21 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

January 10, 1938.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
with the Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs, Mr. Hirota.

Subject: Rumors and reports regarding
Sino-Japanese situation.

893.51
793.94119 In the course of my conversation on various subjects
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning he
said that I might like to know of certain rumors and re-
ports which had reached him.

1. The Minister said that reports were circulating
in Japan to the effect that certain American bankers, un-
specified, are considering or have decided to advance
credits to the Chinese Government to the extent of one
hundred and fifty million gold dollars to help China pay
her debts and to stabilize the Chinese currency and at the
same time certain English bankers were considering similar
action to the extent of thirty million pounds sterling.
The Minister did not say whether he had definite confirma-
tion of the accuracy of these rumors.

2. Mr. Hirota then turned to the question of peace
negotiations with China and said that before the Brussels
Conference he had suggested to the American, British, Ger-
man and Italian Ambassadors that Chiang Kai-shek should
take the initiative in approaching the Japanese Government
for peace negotiations. About December 27 the German Am-
bassador in Tokyo had asked Mr. Hirota if he would state the
Japanese peace terms which could be conveyed to Chiang Kai-
shek

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shek through Ambassador Trautmann and that the Minister had then stated the Japanese terms as follows:

- (1) Abandonment by China of all anti-Japan and anti-Manchukuo activities and cooperation with Japan for combating communism.
- (2) The establishment of certain demilitarized zones.
- (3) The settlement of Sino-Japanese economic relations.
- (4) Indemnification for the results of the hostilities.

I asked the Minister if he would care to elaborate on these various points. He said that the demilitarized zones should be created in Inner Mongolia, North China and the district now occupied by Japanese forces south of the Yangtze River between Shanghai and Nanking. Inner Mongolia was to have an autonomous government under the sovereignty of the Chinese Central Government. The régimes in the other demilitarized zones were to have a considerable degree of autonomous power but they also would be under Chinese sovereignty. As for an economic settlement this would include the development of China's natural resources and also a tariff agreement with Japan.

3. The Minister said he was aware that Kung had approached the American Government through Ambassador Wang to ask the American Government's advice with regard to the acceptance of these terms and also to request the mediation of President Roosevelt. Mr. Hirota said that the

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the Japanese Government had asked the Chinese Government for its reply to these terms about January 10th and that they were now awaiting a reply at any moment. Mr. Hirota said that he was telling me this merely because he thought I would like to be informed with regard to the situation.

J.C.G.

0215

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 9 to despatch
No. 2738 of 4500
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

January 10, 1938.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
with the British Ambassador, Sir
Robert Craigie.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Situation.

To continue our conversation of January 7 I went to see the British Ambassador today and told him that I had given careful thought to the points brought out in our last talk. I said that I was now more than ever convinced that (1) such a step as he had in mind, namely a naval demonstration, far from achieving its desired effect would, on the contrary, tend to make the Japanese military and naval authorities more aggressive and intransigent than ever and that in all probability their answer to the demonstration would be to draw an iron band around China and to declare that henceforth China was to be exclusively Japan's sphere of influence; (2) that such a demonstration would in my opinion almost inevitably lead to war and (3) that I did not believe that the American Government and people would be willing to go to war merely to protect American tangible interests in China and that they would be prepared to go to war only in the case of (a) some act in derogation of American sovereignty or (b) an accumulation of affronts involving our national dignity. I therefore did not feel in a position to recommend to my Government such a procedure as Sir Robert had suggested.

Sir Robert said that he was sorry to hear these views
because

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because if this was the attitude of the United States, Great Britain might as well pull up her stakes in China. He said however that he visualized the proposed procedure somewhat differently from the way in which I had stated it. His idea was that the first step would be consultation between our two Governments with a view to arriving at some decision for joint action only in the event that Japanese interference with our interests in East Asia should come to a point where some sort of action was unavoidable. He said he fully understood that the American Government and people would not be willing to go to war merely to protect tangible interests but he thought that the chances were more than probable of other and more serious interference with our rights which might well involve derogation of sovereignty or an accumulation of affronts. It was his thought that if our two Governments could agree on some definite procedure to be taken only in case of necessity we could then quietly inform Hirota of this decision and intimate that we definitely intended to take measures if the Japanese military continued to disregard our interests. Sir Robert thought that such a warning in itself would prove effective and that the civil government would insist on controlling the military. I said that I disagreed with him on this point and I feared that even if such representations were made to Hirota quietly and without publicity, the net result would be just the same, namely, that it would spur the military on to further aggressiveness. We must also remember that it would be most unwise to take even this

first

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first step unless we were fully prepared to follow the procedure to its natural conclusion in case of necessity and that that conclusion would be war. I also asked whether Sir Robert felt that a blockade of Japan at Singapore and the Panama Canal could be carried out by Great Britain and the United States without involvement with other countries through interference with their shipping. Sir Robert said that certainly all the countries which were members of the League of Nations would heartily support such action on the ground that Great Britain and the United States had predominant interests in the Pacific and that this could be done, by taking a leaf out of Japan's book, without a declaration of war.

I then said to Sir Robert "what you have in mind are the preparations which are made by troops in the trenches before they go over the top at the zero hour". Sir Robert said that precisely represented his thoughts and that whether the zero hour ever occurred or not it would be well for our two Governments to arrive at some decision for joint action if and when that action should become necessary. He again pointed out that even though interference with our tangible interests might not render such action necessary, nevertheless it would be eminently wise for us to be prepared for such action as might become necessary in case it were forced upon us by a derogation of sovereignty or an accumulation of affronts which might exhaust the patience of our people. He showed me a provisional telegram which he had drafted to his Government

along

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along the lines of his talk with me on January 7. I suggested that he redraft this telegram to conform to our present conversation and said that I would then be glad to see it and to consider whether I felt in a position to make recommendations to my Government along the general lines of his own recommendations. I said that if I were to send anything of this nature to Washington, I should probably prefer to do it by a despatch or a letter instead of a telegram but that I would consider this point. I made it quite clear to the Ambassador that if I were to make any recommendations at all they would visualize only consultation between the United States and Great Britain for the purpose of being prepared for possible future emergencies but not for any definite action in Japan at this time.

J.C.G.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 10 to despatch
No. 2738 of JAN 21 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

January 10, 1938.

Mr. Ishii, American Bureau
Foreign Office,

Mr. McGurk.

I called on Mr. Ishii at 5 p. m. to deliver to him the two sketch maps of the Hsuehchow refugee areas forwarded by the Consul General at Shanghai. Mr. Ishii said that he would forward the maps immediately to the military authorities and then mentioned that the Foreign Office had again stressed the necessity for the maps in a memorandum which had already been sent to the Embassy. Mr. Ishii thanked me for the maps and I left.

J.F.M.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 11 to despatch
no. 2738 of JAN 21 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The British Embassy to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.

BRITISH EMBASSY
TOKYO

11th January 1938

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF

HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S EMBASSY.

His Excellency,
The Honourable Joseph Clark Grew,
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary,
for the United States of America,
at Tokyo.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(The British Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

AIDE MEMOIRE

693.002
 His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are informed that since the outbreak of hostilities at Shanghai all Japanese merchant vessels calling at that port, including those on regular passenger services, have been regarded by the Japanese authorities as transports. Similarly Japanese-owned wharves on the Shanghai side of the river, where such vessels discharge their passengers and cargoes, have been taken over for military and naval use and no Chinese Customs officers, even of Japanese nationality, are allowed to function either on vessels or wharves. The result is that the Customs have no control whatever over the personal baggage or dutiable goods accompanying passengers in these vessels.

In certain recent cases, where ordinary freight cargoes have been carried to Shanghai from Japan in Japanese vessels for foreign consignees, the shipping company has notified the Customs in advance and the foreign importer has made the usual application to the Customs and has paid duty, although in no similar case has an application been made by a Japanese importer. The Japanese shipping agents do not present any manifests for such cargoes nor are the vessels entered and cleared in the usual way. Consequently no tonnage dues have been paid.

The situation described above involves a serious discrimination against British exports to China. His Majesty's Government view with grave concern the injury thus done to the integrity of the Customs Administration and to British and other foreign interests which the Japanese Government have undertaken to respect. They trust that instructions will be sent to the Japanese authorities at Shanghai for the re-establishment of normal Customs control of all imports and exports other than of articles genuinely required for military use.

British Embassy,
 Tokyo
 11th January, 1938.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 12 to despatch
 No. 2738 of 10/11/1938
 from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the
 American Embassy.

(Translation)

No. 5, American I.

Department of Foreign Affairs,

January 11, 1938.

793.102 Hankow

The Japanese Foreign Office has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the American Embassy's memoranda of December 15 and 28, 1937 setting forth a message sent by the American Ambassador at Hankow to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet at Shanghai stating that the area covered by the former British, Russian and German concessions and present French concession at Hankow and including Butterfield and Swire's property adjoining the Customs House includes the bulk of foreign-owned and foreign occupied property; that in this area Consulates and Embassy staffs are now located; that in the Yangtze off this area are concentrated British, American, French and Italian naval vessels and merchant ships; and that, in view of the difficulty of removing the residents and numerous refugees of third countries, the apprehension caused by recent happenings at Wuhu and Nanking would be relieved if assurances could be obtained from Japan for the safety of that area in Hankow including the Yangtze river front. The Foreign Office is further requested to take appropriate action in support of the proposal of the American Ambassador at Hankow. In reply the Foreign Office has the honor

to

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to state that Japanese forces will not attack the said area if no Chinese forces are within it, if Chinese forces make no military use whatever of it, and if the movements of Japanese forces outside the area are not hindered from within it.

It is to be noted that by the river front of the area is understood only the river bank itself, not extending either to the line in the middle of the river or to the opposite shore.

(Copy sent to the British Ambassador, Tokyo.)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 13 to despatch
No. 2738 of 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Embassy to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 861.

The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs and refers to a communication dated December 31, 1937 (No. 6716-2), from the Navy Department to the Naval Attaché of the Embassy, in which the Navy Department, replying to a request of the Naval Attaché that measures be taken to avoid attack on American nationals and property at Hsuehchow, Kiangsu Province, requested that, "since there is danger of losing time", all cases of this nature be brought to the attention of the Japanese naval authorities in China by the American authorities in the district concerned. The Navy Department added, however, that it will make necessary arrangements in those cases where direct communication between American and Japanese authorities cannot be established.

American officials in China will continue to notify the Japanese military and naval authorities of the presence of American nationals and property in areas where operations by Japanese forces occur or are believed to impend, but the Embassy also will continue in each case of which it may have knowledge to furnish similar information to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and to the other Ministries concerned. It is to be understood that the continuation

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ation of this practice, or alternatively failure to furnish in any specific instance information with regard to the presence of American nationals and property, does not in any way prejudice the responsibility and undertaking of the Japanese Government to avoid injury to American interests in China.

Tokyo, January 11, 1938.

Copy sent by air mail to the American Consulate General, Shanghai, and for Ambassador Johnson, on January 11, 1938.

0230

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 14 to despatch
no. 2738 of JAN 21 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the British Ambassador,
Sir Robert L. Craigie.

Tokyo, January 13, 1938.

My dear Craigie:

As of possible interest to you and with reference to
our recent conversation, I am enclosing two or three
documents which have reference to points brought out in
our talk. These of course are for your confidential
information.

Yours very sincerely,

JOSEPH C. GREW

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation with the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, January 10, 1938. (Chinese customs).
2. Telegram No. 5, January 11, 6 p.m., from Washington.
(Japanese disregard of Chinese customs at Tientsin).
3. Telegram No. 6, January 11, 7 p.m., from Washington.
(Rumors of American loan to China and Japanese peace
terms).

His Excellency

The Right Honorable Sir Robert Craigie, K.C.M.G., C.B.,

His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador

Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,

Tokyo, Japan.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 15 to despatch
 no. 2700 of JAN 21 1938
 from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

January 15, 1938.

Chief of the First Section of the American
 Bureau, the Foreign Office, Mr. Ishii, with
 the American Counselor, Mr. Dooman.

Subject: Illegal Entry by Japanese Soldiers into
 American Property.

I said to Mr. Ishii that, according to a telegram just received from the officer in charge of the American Embassy at Nanking, a serious situation was being created there by Japanese troops forcing their way into American property and removing Chinese, both men and women, apparently on suspicion that the Chinese had committed acts hostile to the Japanese forces. I added that Mr. Allison had repeatedly made strong representations to the Japanese authorities at Nanking, and had made it quite clear that such repeated violations of American rights could not but raise an issue of the gravest kind. He had, further, made it clear that if the Japanese authorities gave previous notification of their desire to search American property, he would be prepared to arrange to have Japanese searching parties accompanied by responsible American citizens.

I pointed out to Mr. Ishii that the conditions described by Mr. Allison could not be reconciled with the assurances repeatedly given by the Japanese Government that American rights and interests in China would be respected, and that the Ambassador requested that the Japanese Government immediately direct the authorities in Nanking to take measures to prevent further acts of the kind of which Mr. Allison complained.

Mr. Ishii

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Mr. Ishii heard me with repeated exclamations of dismay. When I had finished he said that the Foreign Office would take the matter up at once with the War Department.

E.H.D.

Later that afternoon, Mr. Ishii telephoned me and said that the War Department had just telegraphed the military authorities in China to "take the utmost precautions" against illegal entry into American property.

E.H.D.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 16 to despatch
No 2738 of JAN 21 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Memorandum.

393.1163 Am 32

The American Embassy has been informed that on or prior to January 10, 1938 the American Baptist Mission at Tsinia, Shantung, was bombed and badly damaged. It is further informed that the gatekeeper of the Mission was killed, and that the missionary in charge was unharm-
ed. The American Government, repeating the views which it has previously expressed to the Japanese Government concerning unwarrantable attacks upon humanitarian establishments and noncombatants, protests against this attack which has resulted in the death of a non-combatant and serious damage to American property.

Tokyo, January 15, 1938.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 17 to despatch
No. 2738 of JAN 21 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The British Embassy to the American Ambassador, Mr.
Grew.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

Tokyo.

15th January, 1938.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF

HIS BRITANIC MAJESTY'S EMBASSY.

His Excellency,
The Honourable Joseph Clark Grew,
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary,
for the United States of America,
at Tokyo.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(The British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie,
to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Horinouchi.)

(25/70/38)

C O P Y

British Embassy,
Tokyo.

18th January, 1938.

My dear Vice-Minister,

With reference to my letter of 4th January concern-
ing Kuling I write to let Your Excellency know that our
Consul-General at Hankow, who visited Kuling on 8th
January, found there no fortifications, military estab-
lishments or guns. He states that the foreigners there
number 103, of whom 47 are British, 40 Americans, 13
Germans, 1 French, 1 Russian and 1 Estonian, including
24 children, several aged persons and invalids. It
appears further that all Chinese politicians and offi-
cials have left; that there are no Chinese troops; and
that there only remains a small police force and a few
Chinese refugees of no political importance.

Believe me,

My dear Vice-Minister,

Yours very sincerely,

(sgd) R.L. CRAIGIE.

His Excellency,

Mr. Kensuke Horinouchi

H.I.J.M. Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(The Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Horinouchi,
to the British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie.)

C O P Y

Translation.

14th January, 1938.

Urgent

My dear Ambassador,

In my recent letter of the 11th January I replied to Your Excellency's letter of the 23rd December about the designation of a Safety Zone in Hankow and in your letter of the 4th January you informed me that His Majesty's Government hoped for the establishment of a safety-zone at Kuling on lines similar to that at Hankow. I am now in receipt of a further letter of the 13th January giving information of the actual situation at Kuling.

However, though the Japanese forces will take the most careful precautions possible for the safety of life and property of the nationals of Third Countries remaining in Kuling, they regret that it is impossible for tactical and topographical reasons, to agree to regard it as a safety-zone. I would therefore recommend that it should be arranged that nationals of Third Countries remaining in Kuling should as far as possible be evacuated from there to the safety-zones.

Believe me, etc.,

(sgd) Kensuke Horinouchi
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency,
Sir Robert Craigie K.C.M.G., C.B.
His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador.
etc., etc., etc.,

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 18 to despatch
no. 2738 of 35
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Statement of the Imperial Government

January 16, 1938.

Even after the capture of Nanking, the Japanese Government have till now continued to be patient with a view to affording a final opportunity to the Chinese National Government for a reconsideration of their attitude. However, the Chinese Government, without appreciating the true intentions of Japan, blindly persist in their opposition against Japan, with no consideration either internally for the people in their miserable plight or externally for the peace and tranquility of all East Asia. Accordingly, the Japanese Government will cease from henceforward to deal with that Government, and they look forward to the establishment and growth of a new Chinese régime, harmonious co-ordination with which can really be counted upon. With such a régime they will fully co-operate for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations, and for the building up of a rejuvenated China. Needless to state, this involves no change in the policy adopted by the Japanese Government of respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China as well as the rights and interests of other Powers in China.

Japan's responsibilities for the peace of East Asia are now even heavier than ever before.

It is the fervent hope of the Government that the people will put forth still greater efforts toward the accomplishment of this important task incumbent on the nation.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 19 to despatch
no. 2738 of 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, January 17, 1938.

393.1163 Seventh Day Adventist
No. 867.

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to my note No. 796 of
September 17, 1937, and Your Excellency's reply No. 117,
American I, of September 20, 1937, relating to the bombing
on September 12, 1937, by Japanese military aircraft of the
American missionary hospital at Waichow, Kwantung Province,
and to inform Your Excellency that I have been instructed
by my Government to present to Your Excellency's Government
the enclosed claim of the American Seventh-Day Adventist
mission operating the above-mentioned hospital, totaling
7,957.00 dollars Chinese currency. I have been further
instructed to request that this claim be settled by payment
in Chinese currency of the amount claimed or if at the time
of payment the mission so prefers by payment of the sum of
\$2,362.59, the equivalent in American currency at the present
rate of exchange.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your
Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

JOSEPH C. GREW

His Excellency

Mr. Koki Hirota,

His Imperial Japanese Majesty's

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

etc., etc., etc.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(COPY)

WAI ON HOSPITAL & DISPENSARY
Of Seventh-Day Adventists
Wai Chow, Kwangtung,
China.

November 2, 1937.

393.1163 Seventh Day Adventist

American Consul General,
Canton.

Dear Sir:

In regard to the loss caused by the bombing of the Wai On Hospital and the Mission Compound by the three Japanese Air Planes on September 12, I am herewith submitting an estimate of the losses as follows:

Place	Size of Room	Number of Glass	Window	Shutters
	Plastering	blown out.	Size	
First Floor				
Ward	32' x 19' 608 Sq. Feet	15	14"x14"	5 ..
Room 111	9 x 12' 112.5	...	3	
.. 112	9 x 12' 112.5	..		
Closet	6 x 12' 72.	..		
..	4 x 4' 16.	..	5	
Hall	10 x 5' 50	..		
..	15 x 5' 65	..	5	
Entrance	10' x 19' 190	..	2	
Room 101	11' x 8.5' 93.5	..		
.. 102	11' x 11' 121.	..		
	11' x 6' 66	..		
	11' x 6' 66	..	4	
.. 103	12' x 10' 120	..	4	
Pharmacy	19 x 11' 209	..	2	
.. 105	8' x 8' 64	..	3	
.. 108	11' x 8' 88	..		
Second Floor				
Ward	32' x 19' 608	..	11	6 ..
Hall	39' x 6' 234	..	8	
Room 205	12.5 x 9' 112.5	..		
.. 216	12.5 x 9' 112.5	..		
.. 217	12.5 x 6' 75.	..		
.. 201	12. x 18.5' 222	..		
.. 211	12.5 x 10' 125	..	1	
.. 212	12 x 10' 120	..		
Hall	13 x 4' 52	..		
Room 213	12' x 9' 108	..		
214	12' x 9' 108	..		
209	12.5 x 12' 150	..	2	
208	13 x 11' 143	..	3	
207	12 x 10' 120	..	1	
206	16.5 x 11' 181.5..			

Operating

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Operating Room		Glass	32 pieces
Small closet	13' x 5' 65 sq. feet	6	..
Adjoining Oper.	11'x8' 88	9	..
Room 204	12' x 6'72		
Wall	12'x8' 36		
Wall	10'x4' 40		
	12'x 10 120		1 Door
Room 203	12'x 5.5 66		
Instrument	12'x 10' 120		
Room 201	7'x 6' 42		
Hall	24'x6' 144		
Stairs	24'x 5' 120		

Hospital Plaster down 5,438 square feet.

Glass broken by concussion of shells Windows 115 pieces 14"x 14"

Sky Light Heavy plate glass 1 thick

Glass Table Tops and shelves 4 pieces thick.

Doors destroyed 3

Shutters destroyed 11

Locks 8

Screening and frames.

Estimate of cost of repairing.

Plastering Ceiling and walls 5438 Square Feet. 2,000.00

Glass replacing and setting repairing window frames 150.00

Screening and screens frames and painting 75.00

Whitewashing or colorwashing inside 85.00

Repairing walls and colorwashing 85.00

Moving equipment and expense of cleaning 300.00

Roof relaying and tile replacement 20.00

Compensation and medical expense of Mrs. So Shrapnell

through the thigh 200.00

Compensation to Mr. Wong for hospital expense and

XRay Shrapnell in lung and in arm 100.00

Two months' loss of business and time of repairing 1500.00

Medicines destroyed and laboratory equipment broken 1500.00

Loss in Hospital building. 6,025.00

Nurses Home

Plaster 540 square feet. 80.00

Windows and Shutters 20.00

Color Washing 20.00

Roof Repairs and colorwashing 80.00

200.00

Kitchen

150.00

Morgue rebuilding

200.00

Wall Rebuilding and plastering

100.00

Replastering and repairing helpers houses

200.00

Chapel Repairs required

Ceiling 28' x 47' 1316 square feet. 200.00

Windows and shutters repaired 10.00

Window glass 20 pieces 20.00

Repairing Roof 30.00

Repairing walls and sign 10.00

Colorwashing outside and inside 30.00

300.00

Loss

0 2 4

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Loss on foreign dwellings.

Building No. 1

Glass blown from windows 120 pieces or panes	100.00
Flaster on porches and hall	50.00
Roof relaying and repairing on north and east sides	50.00
Pidgeon house destroyed	100.00
Wood house roof relaying and replacing tile	50.00
Wash house or laundry, wall and repairing roof	30.00
Colorwashing outside and inside	30.00
Repairing water tank or leaks caused by concussion.	10.00

House No. 1 Repairs needed on account of bombing.

2400.00

Building No. 2

Glass blown from windows 90 pieces	60.00
Plaster in kitchen, porch and bed rooms	60.00
Roof repairs	60.00
Screening and color washing	20.00

200.00

Building No. 3

Plaster on all ceilings	100.00
Roof repairs and outside plaster	50.00
Color washing	30.00
Glass replacements	20.00

200.00

Estimated loss in Chinese National currency

Total:

\$7,975.00

I hereby certify that the above statement constitutes a true and accurate statement of the damage done to the Seventh-day Adventist Mission at Waichow, and the medical treatment of members of the Mission staff for injuries received, as a result of the bombing of the Mission by Japanese planes on September 12, 1937, and that the statement is based on a thorough investigation of the damage made by me with the assistance of Dr. So Wai Chuen and Mr. Leung King Sing whose signatures testifying to the correctness of the statement appear below.

Sincerely,
(Sd.) P. V. Thomas.

I, Dr. So Wai Chuen, hereby certify that I am employed as a physician by the Mission; and that I was an eye witness to the bombing of the Mission on September 12, 1937; and that the account of said bombing as reported to the United States Consul at Canton in Mr. Thomas' letter of September 15, 1937, which I have read, is true, and that the above statement of losses is accurate, and that the estimate of the amount required to make repairs is correct to the best of my knowledge.

Signed: So Wai Chuen, M.D.

I, Lei Kwong Wing, hereby certify that I am employed as a Nurse by the Mission and that I was an eye witness to the bombing of the Mission on September 12, 1937, and that the account of said bombing as reported to the United States Consul at Canton in Mr. Thomas' letter of September 15, 1937, which I have read is true, and that the above statement of losses is accurate, and the estimate of the amount required to make repairs is correct to the best of my knowledge.

Signed Lei Kwong Wing

Copied by cew .A true copy of .
 .the signed orig- .
 .inal. .

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 92, dated November 24, 1937,
 from Irving N. Linnell, American Consul General, Canton, China,
 on the subject: Claim of Waichow Seventh Day Adventist Mission
 for Damage by Japanese Bombing.

I, Leung King Sing, hereby certify that I am employed
 by the Seventh-day Adventist Mission as a carpenter, and that I
 was an eye witness to the bombing of the Mission on September
 12, 1937, by Japanese planes, and that the account of said
 bombing as reported to the United States Consul in Mr. Thomas'
 letter which was translated to me is true, and that the above
 statement of losses is accurate and the estimate of the amount
 required to make repairs is correct to the best of my knowledge.

Signed, Leung King Sing Chinese
 in

I, Arthur Wong, hereby certify that I am employed as
 an X-Ray Technician and Nurse by the Mission and that I was
 an eye witness to the bombing of the Mission on September 12,
 1937, and that the account of said bombing as reported to the
 United States Consul at Canton in Mr. Thomas' letter of September
 15, 1937, which I have read is true, and that the above state-
 ment of losses is accurate, and the estimate of the amount
 required to make repairs is correct to the best of my knowledge.

Signed, Arthur Wong

0 2 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 20 to despatch
no. 2738 of JAN 21 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

January 17, 1938.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Hirota.

Subject: Looting of American Property in China
by Japanese Troops.

I called this morning on the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the official residence and after reading and presenting our note I said to Mr. Hirota that in the interests of a clear understanding of the situation I desired to make some supplementary observations. Incoming American newspapers and periodicals have shown beyond doubt that the entire American nation has been profoundly stirred by the PANAY incident. Fortunately, owing to the good sense of both of our Governments, the incident was prevented by our exchange of notes from leading to more serious developments. Nevertheless, I felt that the Minister ought to realize that the requests and expectations set forth in our note of December 14 were no idle gestures and that they meant precisely what they said. I therefore could not feel that the PANAY incident could be regarded as liquidated if the Japanese authorities failed to carry out effectively and in good faith the assurances given in the Japanese note of December 24. There had already occurred numerous unlawful interferences by Japanese forces with American nationals, interests, and property in China since those assurances were given and I felt that this looting of American property was an especially serious aggression. If these various acts of interference and

aggression

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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aggression should continue -- and it was quite certain that they would find their way into the American press -- I greatly feared that the American people would begin to question the trustworthiness of the assurances which had been given us as a direct result of the PANAY incident and that public opinion in the United States would become increasingly exacerbated. Facts count more than statements. I therefore desired emphatically to impress upon the Minister the real dangers inherent in these repeated acts of interference and aggression. I reminded the Minister of the furor which had been created in Japanese military circles and in the Japanese press when a Japanese flag had been subjected to disrespect in the streets of Shanghai. The Japanese authorities were consequently in a favorable position to appreciate the feelings of the American Government and people arising out of the reports that American flags in Nanking, Hangchow, and other places had been torn down, burned, and otherwise mutilated. I spoke of the emotional devotion which our flag inspired among our people. The seriousness of such incidents was self-evident.

In conclusion I once again appealed to the Minister gravely and with the utmost emphasis to take further steps which would effectively implement the assurances of the Japanese Government and would obviate the dangers to the relations between our countries which must inevitably and progressively increase if the various acts of interference with American interests in China should continue. I told him in the strongest terms at my command that I was seriously worried at the outlook.

The

024

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The Minister said that he could not at all understand how these undisciplined acts by Japanese troops could have occurred because the strongest possible orders had gone out to both Army and Navy to avoid acts or measures which might interfere with Japan's good relations with the United States. He tried to pin me down as to the precise dates and I left him in no doubt that these acts had occurred subsequent to the Japanese assurances and are still continuing. He authorized me to tell the Secretary of State in reply to my insistence that he would bring my representations to the "highest quarter".

J.C.G.

0 2 4 6

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 21 to despatch
no. 2738 of JAN 6 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, January 17, 1938.

No. 866.

Excellency:

I have the honor, under instruction from my Government, to bring to Your Excellency's attention reports and complaints from American residents that in the course of recent military operations at Nanking and Hangchow and other places, the Japanese armed forces have repeatedly entered American property illegally and removed goods and employees and committed other acts of depredation against American property, which has almost invariably been marked by American flags and by notices in English, Chinese, and Japanese issued by the American authorities and setting forth the American character of the property concerned. According to these reports, not only have Japanese soldiers manifested a complete disregard for these notices but they have also in numerous instances torn down, burned, and otherwise mutilated American flags. I am directed to impress upon Your Excellency the seriousness with which my Government regards such acts and to convey its most emphatic protest against them. My Government finds it impossible to reconcile the flagrant disregard of American rights shown by Japanese troops as described with the assurances contained in Your Excellency's note of December 24, 1937, that 'rigid orders have been issued to the military naval and foreign office authorities to pay....greater attention than hitherto to observance of the instructions that have been repeatedly given against infringement of or unwarranted interference with the rights and interests of the United States and other third Powers'.

In view

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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In view of the fact that a number of these acts are reported as having occurred subsequent to the receipt of the aforementioned assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government, and inasmuch as this disregard of American rights is reported as still continuing, the American Government is constrained to observe that the steps which the Imperial Japanese Government have so far taken seem inadequate to ensure that hereafter American nationals, interests and property in China shall not be subjected to attack by Japanese armed forces or unlawful interference by any Japanese authorities or forces whatsoever. My Government must, therefore, request that the Imperial Japanese Government reenforce the instructions which have already been issued in such a way as will serve effectively to prevent the repetition of the outrages.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

JOSEPH C. GREW.

His Excellency

Mr. Koki Hirota,

His Imperial Japanese Majesty's

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

etc., etc., etc.

(Copy sent to the British Ambassador, Tokyo.)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 22 to despatch
no. 2738 of 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

January 17, 1938.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Hirota.

Subject: Consolidated Taxes in China.

893.512

I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and made an emphatic statement and reservation of American rights and interests with regard to consolidated taxes in China, supported by an aide-mémoire. The Minister said that he would immediately take the matter up with the competent authorities.

J.C.G.

0245

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 23 to despatch
no. 2738 of JAN 21 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.

Aide-mémoire.

Certain Chinese, understood to be the nominees
of the Japanese military, having taken over the Con-
solidated Tax Office in the International Settlement at
Shanghai, the American Consul General at Shanghai informed
the Japanese Consul General on December 12, 1937, of the
interest of the United States in the consolidated taxes.

The consolidated taxes are security for the wheat,
flour and cotton credits of 1931 and 1933, which now form
a consolidated obligation of the Chinese Government, held
by the Export-Import Bank of Washington. The American
Government insists that the Japanese authorities take no
action, or countenance action, in areas from which the
legitimate Chinese authorities have withdrawn, by any
provisional regime, which fails adequately to take into
account the aforementioned obligation of the Chinese
Government to the Export-Import Bank.

The American Government reserves the right to hold
the Japanese authorities accountable for action dis-
regardful of American interests in this matter.

Tokyo, January 17, 1938.

(Copy sent to the British Ambassador, Tokyo)

0250

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 24 to despatch
no. 2138 of 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

January 17, 1938.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Hirota.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Situation.

At the end of my conversation this morning with the Minister for Foreign Affairs he said that he would like to explain to me the background of the announcement made by the Japanese Government yesterday. The Minister said that through the good offices of the German Ambassador certain peace proposals were made to the Chinese Government in December and that an answer was expected during the early part of January. On January 14th the Chinese Government returned a "perfunctory" reply merely asking for further information concerning the proposed terms. The Japanese Government then became convinced of the futility of further negotiations and decided to have no further dealings with the Government now located in Hankow. The Minister said that this did not involve a specific act effecting a breach of diplomatic relations but simply meant a cessation of dealings with Hankow on the ground that the Government in Hankow no longer represents China. The Minister said that there would be no immediate recognition of any regime but that the Japanese Government would await developments. The regime in North China would constitute the "basic power" of whatever government should eventually be recognized and that that government would include such regimes as were friendly to Japan. It was not possible as yet to foresee whether such a regime would develop in Nanking.

J.C.G.

125

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 25 to despatch
no. 2738 of JAN 21 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The British First Secretary, Mr. Clarke, to the
American Second Secretary, Mr. Crocker.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
TOKYO.

Confidential.

18th Jan. 1938.

Dear Ned,

I send you herewith for Mr. Grew's confidential
information the substance of a telegram from our Embassy
at Shanghai dated 15th Jan.

Yours ever,

Ashley.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Substance of a telegram received from the British
Embassy Shanghai dated 15th January 1938.

I have been supplied confidentially with two separate and completely reliable reports from an American missionary at Nanking and a missionary doctor at Wuhu who remained at their posts when the Japanese entered these cities regarding the atrocities committed by the Japanese Army. Reports quote approximately one hundred authenticated cases of rape in the American University buildings in Nanking in the first few days of the occupation.

The Reverend Boynton of the National Christian Council who brought me these reports stated that the Japanese Embassy officials who reached Nanking shortly after the entry of the Japanese troops were horrified when they saw the orgy of drunkenness, murder, rape and robbery which was going on openly in the around the refugee zone. Failing to make any impression on the Military Commander, whose attitude of callous indifference makes it probable that the Army was deliberately turned loose on the City as a punitive measure, and despairing of getting cable through to Tokyo owing to military control, Embassy officials had even suggested to the missionaries that the latter should try and get publicity for the facts in Japan so that the Japanese Government would be forced by public opinion to curb the Army.

I have been promised eye-witness reports from Soochow and Hangchow where the behaviour of the Japanese troops was equally bad and stories, apparently authenticated, regarding their behaviour in the neighbourhood of Shanghai are now coming in.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 26 to despatch
 no. 2733 of Jan 27 1938
 from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie, to the
 American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.

BRITISH EMBASSY
 TOKYO
 18th January, 1938.

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments
 to the United States Ambassador and has the honour to
 transmit to him copies of the undermentioned documents:-

(1) Note addressed to the Japanese Government on the
 22nd December last regarding the violation of Hongkong
 territorial waters;

(Note: A copy of this note was transmitted to the
 Department as enclosure no. 3 to despatch no. 2717,
 dated January 6, 1938).

(2) Reply of the Japanese Government to the above;

(3) Memorandum left with the Vice-Minister for Foreign
 Affairs on the attack made by a Japanese submarine on certain
 fishing vessels;

(4) Letter of the 8th January from the British Consul-
 General at Shanghai to his Japanese Colleague (of which a
 copy was communicated to the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs
 on the 13th January) regarding assaults on British police
 officers at Shanghai.

(5) Further details of one of the cases mentioned in
 (4) above communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs
 on 18th January.

0251

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(The Minist for Foreign Affairs, Mr. rota, to the British
Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie).

C O P Y

Translation.

12th January, 1938

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Received 15th January)

No: 5

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note No. 200 of the 22nd December regarding the firing by a Japanese destroyer on a Chinese Customs patrol boat off Black Point Hongkong, in the afternoon of the 11th December and other matters. I immediately took steps to investigate and confirm the facts of this case and, these having now been established, I have the honour to reply in the following sense.

2. On the 11th December, a Japanese destroyer was riding at anchor at a point about one and a half nautical miles to the west of South West Point. At about 3.15 p.m. she sighted what was thought to be a Chinese gunboat at about three nautical miles in a southerly direction and she ordered her to stop. But the latter Vessel put on speed and the destroyer gave chase firing on her for a short while.

3. Though this firing took place outside British territorial waters, some of the shells fell within those waters.

4. Moreover, since the crew of the Chinese gunboat abandoned her and made off, the Japanese destroyer drew up alongside to make sure of the facts and it was then for the first time that the vessel which had been taken for a gunboat was found to be the Customs patrol s.s. "Chahsin". The destroyer moved off and left her there.

5. As is clear from the foregoing, the Japanese destroyer did not take the Chinese Customs patrol in tow as is stated in Your Excellency's Note. It is moreover scarcely credible to the Imperial Japanese Government that men of the Japanese

Navy

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Navy should have landed without permission and made off with a number of chickens from nearby houses and no sailor landed in that neighbourhood at the time in question.

6. But the facts that Japanese shells fell within British territorial waters in the line of fire and that, since the investigation of the abandoned enemy vessel was carried out in circumstances which did not permit of delay British territorial waters were entered without the consent of a British Authority are nevertheless regretted by the Imperial Japanese Government and those responsible have been dealt with appropriately in accordance with the law.

7. I have the honour to add that the Imperial Navy have, in view of the occurrence of this incident, sent strict instructions to their detachments in China to take adequate precautions against the recurrence of such incidents in future.

I avail, etc., etc.,

(sgd) Koki Hirota (L.S.)

H.I.J.M.'s. Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency
Sir Robert Craigie, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
H.B.M. Ambassador etc.,

etc., etc., etc.,

Tokyo.

025F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(The British Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

C O P Y

MEMORANDUM

843.628
On the 7th October, 1937, His Excellency, the Officer Administering the Government of Hongkong, appointed a Commission to enquire into and to establish the facts in relation to the alleged sinking of certain fishing junks, some survivors of which were brought into Hongkong on board the S/S "Scharnhorst" and the S/S "Kaying". A copy of the report of this Commission is attached hereto.

There were twelve junks working in pairs in the fleet which was attacked on 22nd September. Of these nine were sunk, one was disabled and after drifting for three days was towed into port, and two escaped.

Paragraphs 33 and 34 of this report read as follows:

Paragraph 33. "The conclusions to which we have come are that the ten Chinese picked up by the S/S "Scharnhorst" on 27th September and the two men picked up by the S/S "Kaying" later the same day were all survivors from junk No. 3407 HW, that that junk and nine others while peacefully engaged in fishing were wantonly attacked and sunk by an armed ship of war, that considerable loss of innocent lives including those of women and children was occasioned, and that the attacking vessel was a submarine belonging to the Imperial Japanese Navy."

Paragraph 34. "The result of this unprovoked attack on a fishing fleet is according to the evidence given to us, the complete loss of nine junks of a value of about H.K.\$9,000 to H.K. \$10,000 each and the disabling of a tenth. Of the persons on board 106 are dead, six were wounded and there were 187 survivors."

The

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The junks were technically Chinese and not registered in Hongkong; but they were licensed in Hongkong for revenue purposes to ply in Hongkong waters and they habitually did so. Some of them, however, were owned by British subjects; there were British subjects on board and amongst the survivors; and many of those killed must also have been British.

The conclusions of the report have produced a very painful impression on His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and they reserve their right to address an official communication to the Japanese Government at a later stage, should this course seem desirable, as also to publish the report or any part of it and to claim full compensation for damage, suffering and loss of life caused to British subjects. They would, however, be glad to learn in the first place whether the competent Japanese authorities have any observations on the report which they would wish to offer.

British Embassy,

Tokyo.

13th January, 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(The British Embassy to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs,
 Mr. Horinouchi).

(Copy of letter from the British Consul General at Shanghai
 to his Japanese Colleague).

COPY

8th January, 1938

Sir and dear Colleague,

741.9
 I regret that again within a few days I find myself
 under the necessity of protesting against the violence and
 unlawful actions of members of the Japanese armed forces
 against British subjects.

The facts are as follows:- On December 25th Inspector
 Bennett was proceeding in a police car on Wayside road and
 is alleged to have obstructed a Japanese despatch rider and
 was asked to call at the naval landing party headquarters to
 explain matters. When he called there however a few days
 later he was assaulted and detained and Superintendant Sinclair
 who called later to secure his release was similarly ill-treated.

I understand that the Chairman of the Council sent you
 full statements in connexion with the case in his letter of
 December 30th and has not yet been accorded the courtesy of an
 acknowledgment.

Another and in some ways more serious case was the one in
 which on January 6th at Brenan road crossing Sergeant Turner
 was assaulted and so battered that hospital treatment was
 necessitated. Sub-Inspector Fowler was struck in the face and
 together with Inspector West man-handled and threatened with
 loaded rifles and fixed bayonets by a number of Japanese soldiers:
 in fact it was apparently only due to great restraint shown
 by Inspector West in his handling of the matter and the fortui-
 tous arrival and loyal support given to this officer by Sub-
 Inspector Yamaguchi and other Japanese members of the Municipal
 Police that the consequences were not even more serious. The
 reason given for this assault was again in its origin a very

slight

0255

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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slight one: Probationary Sergeant Turner, who was on duty at East Barrier, considering that the Japanese sentries were being unnecessarily rough with the Chinese peasants passing through, requested the Japanese P.C. 200 to remonstrate with them. P.C. 200 refused to do this and Turner left saying he would report his attitude. Thereupon P.C. 200 alleging Mr. Turner had used insulting language in regard to the Japanese Army instigated the Japanese soldiers to assault him and when Fowler and later West arrived on the scene and endeavored to pacify them continued to assault and threaten all three officers.

I would observe that even if it were true that Turner had made offensive remarks - of which there is no evidence, so that it is merely a case of one man's word against another, while there is always the possibility of a misunderstanding - the Japanese constable had no right to instigate his own nationals to make the assault still less had they any right or excuse for committing breach of the peace of which I complained.

I feel sure that you and the responsible military and naval authorities will agree with me that it is most deplorable that members of the Japanese armed forces should be permitted to act in this lawless manner and I have the honour to request accordingly that you will endeavour to arrange that a strict enquiry be held into these cases and those found guilty suitably disciplined in order to prevent further disorders.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(SGD.) H. Phillips

The Japanese Consul-General
Japanese Consulate-General,
Shanghai.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(The British Embassy to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota)

Copy

74194
 The details of the first of the two cases of violence against British subjects, which formed the subject of a letter addressed to his Japanese Colleague by His Majesty's Consul-General at Shanghai on the 8th January last and of which a copy was communicated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by His Majesty's Ambassador on the 13th January, are as follows:-

An accusation was brought against Detective Inspector Bennett of the Shanghai Municipal Police that when driving a police car on December 25th in Hongkew he had deliberately prevented a Japanese naval motor-cycle from passing. Upon being requested subsequently to attend an investigation at the Japanese naval landing party headquarters he went there with Superintendent Sinclair and was practically bullied by the Japanese officers to obtain an admission that he was wrong. The Superintendent who protested was then forcibly ejected from the office while Bennett was punched in the stomach by one officer. Another officer also pushed his sheathed sword hard against him. Subsequent constant questioning lasted nearly one hour but Bennett insisted that he had driven correctly and made no admission. At one time he was told that "the Japanese swords were sharp". Both police officers were finally allowed to leave.

The Chairman of the Municipal Council wrote to the Japanese Consul-General on December 30th enclosing copies of reports made by the two officers and asking that steps should be taken to ensure that such treatment should not occur again.

British Embassy,
 Tokyo.
 18th January, 1938.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 27 to despatch
no. 2738 of JAN 21 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The British Embassy to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.

BRITISH EMBASSY

TOKYO

18th January 1938

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF
HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S EMBASSY.

His Excellency
The Honourable Joseph Clark Grew,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Pleni-
potentiary for the United States of
America

at Tokyo.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Enclosure to communication dated January 18, 1938, from the British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.)

MEMORANDUM

74190
 On the 10th January a letter was addressed to the Senior Consul at Shanghai by the Japanese Consul-General in the following terms:-

I have the honour to state that I have been asked by the Japanese Naval authorities to inform you of the following and through you the interested Powers.

"As is known a part of the booms on the Yangtse River which were originally constructed by the Chinese for their military purposes has recently been forced through by the Imperial Japanese Navy with a view to utilizing the opening only for military navigation. Since the channel forced through the booms cannot be opened for free navigation without causing under the present circumstances no small obstacle to military operations of Japanese forces any vessel whether it be Government-owned or privately owned other than those of Japanese nationality which has the desire of passing through the channel is hereby cordially requested to get in touch with Japanese Navy and secure beforehand their understanding for its prospective navigation through the booms. Needless to add the Japanese Navy are always ready to give sympathetic understanding to navigation of foreign vessels so far as it is permissible from the military point of view and to offer facilities for the passage of its vessels by supplying a convoy. It is therefore the earnest desire of the Imperial Japanese Navy that vessels of interested Powers taking a full connaissance and appreciation of the above mentioned circumstances will scrupulously refrain from attempting to navigate through the forced channel freely, or in such a way as may invite misunderstanding with the Japanese Navy".

I shall

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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I shall be much obliged if you will be so kind as to circulate the foregoing amongst our honourable colleagues in the usual way.

Assurances similar to those contained in the above letter were given to the Naval Attaché to the British Embassy at the Ministry of Marine on the 12th January.

In view of the above assurances, the Senior British Naval Officer at Shanghai applied for a small up-river convoy for the 18th January.

The reply of the Japanese naval authorities was as follows:-

"While it is the intention of the Japanese Navy to give facilities provided special reasons exist for the passage of ships of friendly countries through the channels opened in obstructions on the Yangtsekiang it is not yet the right moment to agree to passage through the obstruction of merchant ships in general not serving a special purpose in view of the present state of warfare and navigation and large amount of our shipping in movement for military purposes. I am therefore unable to agree to passage of two British merchant ships through the obstruction on Tuesday January 18th. Furthermore for the time being I am unable to state what other time would be suitable for passage of the obstruction."

His Majesty's Ambassador is instructed to protest against this refusal to grant facilities for the two ships in question and to remind the Japanese authorities that, as stated in his memorandum of 28th December last, His Majesty's Government claim absolute freedom of movement for British ships on the Yangtse. This freedom was granted by Articles 10 and 52 of the Anglo-Chinese Commercial Treaty signed at Tientsin on 26th June 1858 and by Article Section 3 (1) of the Chefoo Convention of 1876.

British Embassy,
 Tokyo,
 18th January, 1938.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 28 to despatch
no. 2738 of JAN 21 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

January 18, 1938.

Mr. Ishii, American Bureau,
Foreign Office.

Mr. McGurk.

124.932
I called on Mr. Ishii at 3:30 p.m. and read to him the pertinent parts of Nanking's 19, January 12, 2 p.m., and 23, January 17, 4 p.m., relating to the interference by the Japanese military in the installation of a radio set in the Embassy at Nanking. I then let Mr. Ishii read the Department's 18, January 17, 7 p.m. I said that we should like to have this interference stopped at once and that we hoped it would be done. Mr. Ishii replied that he quite understood and that he would take up the matter immediately. I thanked him and left.

J.F.McG.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 29 to despatch
 no. 2738 of JAN 27 1938
 from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

January 19, 1938.

The Director of the American Bureau, the Foreign
 Office, Mr. Yoshizawa, with the American Counselor,
 Mr. Doonan.

Subject: Violation by Japanese forces of American
 rights and interests in China.

I told Mr. Yoshizawa that I had come under the Ambassador's instructions to supplement and enforce the statements which the Ambassador made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on January 17, when presenting his note on the subject of desecration of the American flag by Japanese soldiers, illegal entry into American property, abuse of Chinese civilians, etc. There had just come in from Nanking a telegram (No. 27, January 18, 4 p.m.), which I requested Mr. Yoshizawa first to read. When he had completed reading the telegram, I said to Mr. Yoshizawa that the Ambassador was genuinely alarmed over the consequences of the actions of the Japanese forces in the field. It was our desire and intention to discuss on their legal and logical merits those questions in which were involved injury to American commercial and economic interests, but where there were involved deliberate offenses to the American flag and violations of the elementary rules of human conduct there existed no basis whatever for discussion. I was, therefore, instructed to say that we expected that, as previous instructions sent from Tokyo had been ineffective, the Japanese Government would take at once the most drastic action to restore and thereafter to maintain conditions which would not create issues of the gravest character.

Mr. Yoshizawa

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Mr. Yoshizawa said that he had seen the Foreign Minister soon after his conversation on January 17 with the Ambassador; that Mr. Hirota had repeated to him the statements made by the Ambassador; and that he had directed Mr. Yoshizawa to translate our note in order that it might be laid before the Cabinet at its next meeting (which was held yesterday). The note had been discussed at the Cabinet meeting, and there was under consideration a plan which, it was thought, would ensure the forces in China complying with orders from Tokyo. I remarked that this plan would seem to indicate that the Japanese Government is satisfied that its orders are not being obeyed. Mr. Yoshizawa ignored my remark and went on to say that he believed that he would be in a position tomorrow to inform me of the plan under consideration.

Mr. Yoshizawa, at my suggestion, took notes of the salient features of Nanking's telegram above-mentioned, and he said that he would get into touch with the War Office at once. It was then about 6:30 p.m., and he fortunately had an appointment with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, when he would not fail to report to Mr. Hirota the purport of the statement which I had been instructed to make.

E.H.D.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 30 to despatch
no. 2738 of JAN 21 1938
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

January 18, 1938.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
with the British Ambassador, Sir
Robert L. Craigie.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Situation.

In the course of conversation on various matters with the British Ambassador when he came to see me this morning, I referred to our talks on January 7 and 10 regarding Anglo-American consultation with a view to possible combined pressure on Japan and asked Sir Robert if he had yet formulated his recommendations to his Government and whether he wished, as he had previously stated, to show them to me in case I should find myself sufficiently in accord with his revised views to permit me to make similar recommendations to Washington. Sir Robert replied that he had delayed drafting these recommendations because he wished first to see how the Chinese customs problem was going to work out. It was therefore tacitly understood that neither he nor I would make such recommendations at the present moment.

(Sir Robert's attitude today, and in another brief talk which I recently had with him after a luncheon at which we were both guests, seemed to me noticeably different from his attitude in our talks on January 7 and 10. In those former talks he seemed to feel that some Anglo-American move was most urgent and I gathered that he then felt that no satisfaction could be expected in the customs problem unless and until such a move were made. He now appears to have dismissed temporarily from his mind the thought

of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

of making the recommendations to his Government about which he was formerly so keen. This may be due to a feeling that I had discouraged such a move and was not in sympathy with his proposals, or it may be due to some development that has occurred in the meantime of which I am unaware, possibly some report from his own Government to the effect that Washington is also unsympathetic to the idea. At any rate, it does not now appear that he intends to press the matter with me and I am frankly somewhat relieved because I doubt very much if I would be able to go along with him to any great extent in combined recommendations, of the kind which he has in mind, to our respective Governments. In any case, Washington knows what it wishes to do, or not to do, without recommendations from me).

J.C.G.

0269

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram was
received in Navy Code
and must be closely
paraphrased before
being communicated to
anyone.

FROM

ALUSNA PEIPING
February 8, 1938
Rec'd 3:20 a.m.

ACTION: NAVY DEPARTMENT
INFO: CINCAF (FLAG & AD)
SECOND BRIGADE USMC
ASST ALUSNA SHANGHAI
COMYANGPAT
CONSOPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA

✓
FILE
EX-111
FEB 11 1938
NAVY DEPARTMENT

793.94

0007. During last week in January ten thousand men, forty hundred horses, fifty trucks, some field artillery, arrived Peiping via Shansai Kwan, departed toward Kalgan. Unconfirmed rumor considered doubtful states these destined for use against Outer Mongolians near Pailingmiao. Believe destination either Shansi or South Hopei. Past month six triple zero effectives moved by rail to Manchukuo. This considered continuation concentration experienced troops that area. 1810.

793.94/12346

JS


F/FG
FILED
FEB 11 1938

0271

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR



FROM SECOND BRIGADE USMC

February 8, 1938

Rec'd 8:20 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF (FLAG AND ADM)
OPNAV

INFO: AMCON SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING

793.94



793.94/12347

8608. No reported change north or south Tsinpu situation Chinese admit loss Suiyuan. On Pinghan Railway Japanese force attacked Chinese defenses south of Inyang Honan 6 February. Irregular activities reported intensified in Suiyuan within 30 miles Paotowchut. 1534.

HPD

F/FG
FEB 10 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C
was
Re: ~~the~~ ^{Feb 3} ~~circum~~ -
~~1938~~
I feel that
this is a matter
which does not
call for action
on our part -
not now and the
basis of the
telegram at least
Jhr

793.94/10291
16221/16221

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Febr. 15, 1938.

MEMO

~~Re: Mr.~~

Mr. Christian of B.A.T. re-
cently placed a large order for
tobacco with the Japanese military
at Shihkiachwang in face of com-
petition with Japanese government
monopolies. Trains on the Pei-
ping-Shihkiachwang run are over-
crowded and the road bed unsafe.
Guerilla warfare is reported in
this area. Japanese appear to
be friendly toward Americans and
distinctly hostile toward British.

ARR

ACW

0272

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RECEIVED
No. 1505, Beijing, December 29, 1937.

F
AM/c

Subject: Conditions at and near Shihkiachwang.

193.9
293.77

X
ONT MID
DT

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

R
Division of
Asian Affairs
me
file
new

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose, as of possible interest to the Department, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had with Mr. W. B. Christian of the British American Tobacco Company on December 20, concerning conditions at Shihkiachwang and in that vicinity. The memorandum explains itself.

7/2
m

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Frank P. Lockhart
Frank P. Lockhart,
Counselor of Embassy.

Enclosure:
1/ - Memorandum of Conversation.

Original and four copies to the Department.
Copy to Hankow for Embassy files.

710,
FPL/es

793.94/12348

793.94/12348
F/EG
12348

027

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Peiping, December 20, 1937.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

Present: Mr. Frank P. Lockhart.
Mr. W. B. Christian.

Subject: Conditions at Shihkiachwang.

Mr. W. B. Christian, the manager for North China of the British American Tobacco Company, came to see me this morning and stated that he had just arrived from a visit to Shihkiachwang on company business. He stated that he found conditions of travel on the railway between Peiping and Shihkiachwang extremely uncomfortable and slow beyond all reason. He stated that in order to obtain a seat on the train leaving Peiping it is necessary to send a Russian for that purpose to the railway station three or four hours before the departure of the train. Only in this way could a foreigner hope to obtain a seat within an hour of the time of departure of the train. The fee for this service is usually LC\$5.00. He stated that only short and light trains are run because many of the bridges have been destroyed and have been temporarily repaired and are still unsafe for any heavy traffic. He stated that the trains are packed like sardines and that irregulars and bandit groups are sometimes encountered along the railway. Only two days before Mr. Christian's arrival at Shihkiachwang the railway had been cut by irregulars at a station this side of that place. At one station a number of wounded Japanese soldiers had been put on board.

Mr. Christian reported that his company's property mess house at Shihkiachwang was now being used as a Japanese hospital. He stated that the Japanese had assured him, however,

0274

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

however, that they would repay the company for any damage done to the property or its furnishings but that they could not surrender the property at this time as it was being used as a hospital. Mr. Christian reported that the Japanese were courteous to him and that they placed an order for 68,000 yen's worth of business with him while he was in Shihkiachwang. He also sold for cash more than LC\$50,000 worth of cigarettes and brought with him an order from dealers for more than LC\$100,000. He stated that business, at least in the cigarette line, is booming at Shihkiachwang and that his only difficulty is in getting fresh supplies to that area. He feels that he will be able to succeed in this with Japanese cooperation.

He reported that the 83rd Division (Japanese troops) are now at Shihkiachwang but that next month they would move to Shuntehfu, which is a city considerably south of Shihkiachwang. Japanese soldiers are everywhere in Shihkiachwang and he talked with foreigners who had recently been to Taiyüanfu and these reported widespread damage from Japanese bombing at Taiyüanfu. In fact the foreigner with whom he talked reported that Taiyüanfu had been all but destroyed.

Mr. Christian reported that invariably the Japanese would inquire of him whether he was an American or a Britisher and that on ascertaining that he was of American nationality, the Japanese were extremely cordial to him and offered every assistance and that some of them were free to remark that they had a thorough dislike of the British and would not put themselves out to help them. Mr. Christian is optimistic for the sale of his company's products at present but he will not venture to predict what difficulties

his

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

his company may encounter a few months or a year hence.
He stated that his order for 68,000 yen's worth of cigarettes was obtained in face of competition from the Korean Tobacco Monopoly and an influential "Manchukuo" (or Japanese) Tobacco Monopoly.

FPL/es

0276

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the Department

Translation of a formal note addressed by His Excellency Dr. Wang Chung-hui, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, to the Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America.

File

Trans. : Hsi 12/20/37
Checked: WRP 12/20/37

Dated: December 19, 1937.
Rec'd: December 20, 1937.

VERY URGENT

W

Excellency:

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Chinese military authorities have decided, owing to military necessities, to block the Yangtze River in the vicinity of the Ma Tang Shan Fort and to forbid passage of all vessels as from December 20, 12 noon. I have the honor also to request that Your Excellency transmit the information to American warships and merchant vessels.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

Wang Chung-hui

-SEAL OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS-

Original and one copy of the translation to Peiping. Four copies of the translation to the Department. One copy of the translation to Consulate General, Hankow.

793.94
793.84

793.94/12349

F/FG 12349

0277

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MSM

JCV

JWE

WPA

MLH

February 11, 1938.

Reference Moscow's No. 882, January 21, 1938, entitled "Special Mission of Dr. Sun Fo in Moscow."

Moscow The Embassy reports on the arrival in ~~city~~ of Dr. Sun Fo who flew from China on a Dutch plane. The purpose of his visit is said to be to establish contact with the highest Soviet authorities. It is probable that Stalin will find it difficult to avoid receiving him. The Kremlin is reportedly embarrassed over the presence of Dr. Sun Fo as it does not wish to assist China to an extent which would aggravate the already strained relations existing between Japan and Russia, and at the same time wishes to avoid alienating the liberal element in China which regards Russia as a bulwark against Japanese aggression. It is believed that Dr. Sun Fo, who has been given a special rank above that of a Foreign Minister, has been authorized to make considerable concessions to Russia in return for promises of military assistance.

Reference is made in this connection to Moscow's 35, February 5, 5 p.m., para-

graphs

0278

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-2-

graphes one and two of which give further information regarding the visit of Dr. Sun Fo. It is stated in this telegram that the mission has obtained its first objective, namely, the creation of an atmosphere of mutual confidence.

ACW
FE:RINGWALT:VCI

0219

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
February 9, 1938.

~~JWB~~
~~EGP~~
~~MMH~~
~~MMH~~
~~MMH~~

Tokyo's No. 2741 of January 21, 1938 gives details of the representations made to the Foreign Office by the American, British, and French Embassies between January 5 and 18 in connection with the protection of their national interests in China.

The substance of the Embassy's report is contained in its several telegrams during the period covered, but it may be of interest to read the full account of Mr. Brew's interview with Mr. Hirota over the looting of American property by Japanese soldiery (pages 6, 7 of enclosure 1).

Certain of the representations made by the British Ambassador (enclosure 2) have not been covered by telegrams, namely, in connection with Home Minister Admiral Suetsugu's anti-British statements, page 1, a Japanese submarine attack on British fishing vessels, page 3, official smuggling at Tientsin and interference with British navigation of the Yangtze, on page 5. The Ambassador claimed absolute freedom of movement for British ships on the Yangtze.

WRL
WRL

0281

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 882.

Moscow, January 21, 1938.

Subject: Special Mission of Dr. Sun Fo in
 Moscow.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.




7 PM JOK

1938 FEB 7 PM 1 39

SECTION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS

ONI MID + Embassy as Peiping

✓ R Copy in FE
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



COPIES SENT TO
 ONI AND MID
 in strict confidence

WA
 new

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

Copy Transmitted by the
 Commercial Office (A-M/O)
 To

Peiping
 2/25/38

793.94/12350

Sir:

With reference to my telegrams No. 333 of Decem-
 ber 21, 1937, 2 p.m., and No. 346 of December 31, 1937,
 1/ 3 p.m., I have the honor to enclose a memorandum setting
 forth the substance of certain statements made to me by
 Mr. Yui Ming, the new Chinese Charge d'Affaires at Moscow,
 on January 11, 1938.

On January 10 one of the Secretaries of this Embassy
 requested

F/FG 12350

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

requested an interview for me with Mr. Keng, the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires, and received a reply that I would be welcomed at the Chinese Chancery on the following morning. I was received at the Chancery by Mr. Yui Ming, who had arrived on the preceding day and had taken over the direction of the Embassy from Mr. Keng.

It will be observed from the attached memorandum that Mr. Yui Ming attaches considerable importance to the Mission of Dr. Sun Fo. He questioned me in detail regarding protocol procedure in Moscow and stated that since the primary purpose for Dr. Sun Fo's visit was to consult with the highest Soviet authorities, Dr. Sun Fo would probably not have much contact with foreigners residing in Moscow.

Mr. Yui Ming told me that the personnel of Dr. Sun Fo's Mission had left China by Dutch airplane on January 8, 1938, and had arrived at Amsterdam five days later. He added that while in Holland Dr. Sun Fo had consulted with a number of the more important Chinese diplomats stationed in Europe.

It will be recalled that Mr. Stalin, during the past three years, has received a number of Ministers for Foreign Affairs visiting the Soviet Union. Since Dr. Sun Fo apparently has been given a special rank by the Chinese Government higher than that of a Minister for Foreign Affairs, it is probable that Mr. Stalin will find it difficult to avoid receiving him. The impression obtains in the Diplomatic Corps that the Kremlin is considerably embarrassed at Dr. Sun Fo's visit since it does not desire to render aid to China to an extent which will increase the tension of the already strained relations existing between Japan and the Soviet Union, and at the same time it does not desire to assume an attitude which may

alienate

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

alienate the great body of liberals in China, many of whom have looked towards the Soviet Union as a bulwark against Japanese aggression. It is believed by many foreign observers that Dr. Sun Fo has powers which enable him to make considerable concessions to the Soviet Union in return for promises of military assistance.

In so far as I am aware, no member of any other diplomatic mission in Moscow has as yet had any conversation with Mr. Yui Ming or any other member of Dr. Sun Fo's special Mission.

Respectfully yours,

Loy W. Henderson
 Loy W. Henderson,
 Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

✓ List of Enclosures:

- No. 1. Memorandum dated January 19, 1938, of statements made to Mr. Henderson by Mr. Yui-Ming, Chargé d'Affaires of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow.

File No. 710 - China

In Quintuplicate to the Department.

LWH:bpg

Copy to RIGA.

4-20-0000000000
 Received *[initials]*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
 No. 882 of January 21, 1938,
 from the American Embassy,
 Moscow, U.S.S.R.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Moscow, January 19, 1938.

M E M O R A N D U M
 OF STATEMENTS MADE BY MR. YUI MING, THE
 NEW CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE CHINESE
 EMBASSY IN MOSCOW, AND MR. HENDERSON,
 AMERICAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, ON JANUARY 18,
 1938.

Mr. Yui Ming told me substantially as follows:

I am acting as a member of a special Mission headed by Dr. Sun Fo which arrived in Moscow on January 17, 1938. Among the other members of this special Mission are the Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs and the Chairman of the Committee of Economic Affairs of the Chinese Parliament. Dr. Sun Fo, the head of this Mission, has been given extraordinary powers and has a rank superior to that of any Chinese Ambassador. It may be said that he even outranks at the present time the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The importance of Dr. Sun Fo's Mission can be ascertained not only from the fact that he has unusually high rank but also from the fact that he himself is one of the most important political figures in China. He has a tremendous personal following among Chinese liberals and intellectuals. In my opinion he is the outstanding liberal of China. He has always had particularly friendly feelings for the Soviet Union.

Although I am not in a position to state positively what developments may take place, it is my personal opinion that Dr. Sun Fo will not remain in the Soviet Union as

Chinese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Chinese Ambassador. I believe that when he has finished his mission he will return to Europe and eventually to China. I also doubt that I shall remain in Moscow. As Counselor I am the fourth ranking official of the Chinese Foreign Office and frankly I do not wish to be away from my duties there too long. I have been named as Counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow primarily so that I may be enabled as Chargé d'Affaires and at the same time as a member of Dr. Sun Fo's Mission organically to connect Dr. Sun Fo with the Embassy. It is, of course, no secret that one of the purposes of Dr. Sun Fo's Mission to Europe is to obtain material aid from the European Powers for China. We are still hoping that the Soviet Government will come to our assistance on a much broader scale than hitherto.

I doubt if Dr. Tsiang will return to Moscow. He is still, however, the Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

LWH

LWH:bpg

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1938 FEB 7 PM 1 50



AMERICAN EMBASSY


Tokyo, January 21, 1938.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

No. 2741.

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS MADE AND STEPS TAKEN BY
THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AND STEPS TAKEN BY
THE BRITISH AND FRENCH EMBASSIES IN TOKYO
WITH RESPECT TO THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT.

BB



Cap in FE
FEB 18 1938
File
VAA

793.94/12351

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1/3 With reference to my despatch No. 2721 of Janu-
ary 6, 1938, I have the honor to enclose outlines pre-
pared by a member of my staff on the following subjects:

- I. Recommendations made and steps taken
by the American Embassy in Tokyo with
respect to the Sino-Japanese conflict
from January 5 to January 18, 1938,
inclusive.

II

FILED
FEB 19 1938


12351

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

- II. Steps taken by the British Embassy in Tokyo with respect to the Sino-Japanese conflict from January 5 to January 18, 1938, inclusive.
- III. Steps taken by the French Embassy in Tokyo with respect to the Sino-Japanese conflict from January 5 to January 18, 1938, inclusive.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph C. Grew.

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GDA:C

Enclosures:
1/2/3 As listed.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 1 to despatch
 No 2741 of Jan. 21, 1938 from the
 Embassy at Tokyo.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION I - RECOMMENDATIONS MADE AND STEPS TAKEN BY THE AMERICAN
 EMBASSY IN TOKYO WITH RESPECT TO THE SINO-JAPANESE
 CONFLICT FROM JANUARY 5 TO JANUARY 18, 1938, INCLUSIVE.

It will be recalled that in the Foreign Office's note dated December 22 concerning the bombing on September 24, 1937, of the Ida Kahn Women and Children's Hospital at Nanchang there was no mention of indemnification. Pursuant to the Department's instructions, on January 7 the Embassy requested the Foreign Office to give assurances that it was prepared to give proper consideration with regard to the losses and damages inflicted on the Hospital. In reply, the Embassy was given oral assurances that the question of indemnification for damages and losses in this case would be given equal consideration with that in other similar cases and that reference to the question of indemnification had been inadvertently omitted from the Foreign Office's note of December 22. (Embassy's telegrams No. 692, December 28, and No. 11, January 7, and Department's telegram No. 386, December 31, 1937).

On the basis of a telegram received from the Consulate General at Shanghai, on January 10 the Ambassador made informal representations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the question of looting of American property by Japanese troops at Soochow and Hangchow. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he would at once bring the matter to the attention of the Japanese military authorities. (Telegram to the Department from the Consulate General at Shanghai No. 43, January 8, and Embassy's telegram No. 16, January 10, 1938).

In accordance with the Department's instructions and on the basis of a telegram from the Consulate General at Shanghai, in the course of a conversation on January 10 the Ambassador took up informally with the Minister for Foreign Affairs the question of disregard by Japanese ships

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of customs requirements for Japanese goods and vessels at Shanghai, pointing out the damaging effect of the present procedure upon the Customs Administration. Mr. Hirota said that this question was now under discussion and that it was hoped that some solution would shortly be found. Mr. Grew took occasion once again to inform Mr. Hirota that a disruption of the Chinese Customs Service and inability of the Customs to meet foreign loan and indemnity quotas would bring most unfortunate consequences to all concerned. The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that this matter was now under discussion and he implied, without specific assurances, however, that the final result would be entire-ly satisfactory to American interests. (Telegram from the Consulate General at Shanghai, No. 1240, December 28, Department's telegram No. 390, December 31, and Embassy's telegram No. 14, January 10, 1938).

Acting on the Department's instructions, in the course of a conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on January 10, the Ambassador made reference informally and as on his own initiative to reports of statements made at a Japanese press conference at Shanghai on December 27 to the effect that Japanese authorities there had asserted that Japanese military law was applicable and would be applied to extraterritorial foreigners who interfered in certain specified ways with Japanese military operations. The Ambassador told Mr. Hirota that the American Government would not be able to recognize or give countenance to any attempt on the part of any Japanese agencies to exercise jurisdiction over American nationals in China.

Mr.

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Mr. Hirota replied that the Japanese military authorities in Shanghai had been obliged to issue these regulations to protect themselves from the acts of "irresponsible foreigners" in that city, but he added that the Japanese military authorities understood perfectly the status of extra-territorial foreigners and that in his belief they had not the slightest intention of applying these regulations to Americans. (Telegram from the Consulate General at Shanghai No. 1235, December 27, 1937, Department's telegram No. 384, December 30, 1937, and Embassy's telegram No. 15, January 10, 1938).

It will be remembered that on December 29 the Embassy addressed a memorandum to the Foreign Office requesting that the appropriate Japanese authorities take the necessary steps to safeguard the refugees in, and properties of, the Southern Presbyterian Mission at Hsuehchow, Kiangsu Province, and that in reply the Foreign Office informed the Embassy that the Japanese military and naval authorities had agreed to respect such American property at Hsuehchow as was marked with "white flags with a blue cross in the center". (Embassy's despatch No. 2721, January 6, 1938). On January 8 the Foreign Office addressed a written reply to the Embassy's representations, stating that copies of the Embassy's memorandum had been forwarded to the Japanese military and naval authorities concerned who had replied that they would do all in their power to conform to the expressed desires of the Southern Presbyterian Mission. However, the Foreign Office's memorandum stated that without definite undertaking by the Chinese military authorities to permit no soldiers to enter such areas or to allow ammunition to be stored there,

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it would be difficult to protect the rights and interests of the United States.

On January 10 the Embassy received the Foreign Office's reply to its representations of January 2 with regard to the recognition of the Edgewater Peninsula at Tsingtao as a safety zone. The reply stated that the Japanese forces were ready to recognize the Peninsula as such a zone and to do all in their power to prevent it from becoming involved in hostilities and consequent disaster, on condition that the Chinese would make no use of the Peninsula nor of its vicinity for hostilities. The Japanese note ended with the statement that Japanese forces could not be held responsible for losses or damages which might result within the area concerned from hostilities between Japanese and Chinese forces. (Embassy's telegrams No. 5, January 2, and No. 21, January 12, 1938).

As reported to the Department in the Embassy's telegram No. 672 of December 23, 1937, the Embassy left a memorandum with the Foreign Office on December 15 requesting that the Japanese authorities give assurances that the Japanese forces would attack neither a certain specified area in Hankow in which Consulate and Embassy staffs were located nor the river front adjoining this area in which were concentrated naval vessels of American, British, French, and Italian nationality, as well as foreign merchant ships. On January 13 the Foreign Office told the Embassy that Japanese forces would not attack the area in question if no Chinese forces were within it, if Chinese forces made no military use whatever of it and if the movements of Japanese forces outside the area were not hindered from within

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within it. The Foreign Office also stated that the river front of the area was understood to mean only the river bank itself and that the river front did not extend either to the line in the middle of the river or to the opposite shore. (Embassy's telegram to the Consulate General at Shanghai dated January 13, 4 p.m., repeated to the Department by Shanghai).

The Embassy heard on January 14 from Nanking through Shanghai that Japanese soldiers in Nanking continued to enter American property at will and to remove goods and employees of American institutions without giving notice or reasons for their actions. On the morning of January 15 the Embassy made representations to the Foreign Office against these acts of the Japanese military in Nanking and in the afternoon the Foreign Office informed the Embassy that the War Department had instructed military authorities both at Shanghai and at Nanking to refrain from irregular entry of American property. (Telegram to the Department from the Embassy at Nanking No. 27, January 13, and the Embassy's telegrams to the Consulate General at Shanghai dated January 15, 11 a.m., and January 15, 5 p.m., repeated to the Department). On January 17 the Ambassador read and presented to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following note:

"I have the honor, under instructions from my Government, to bring to Your Excellency's attention reports and complaints from American residents that in the course of recent military operations at Nanking and Hangchow and other places, the Japanese armed forces have repeatedly entered American property illegally and removed goods and employees and committed other acts of depredation against American property, which has almost invariably been marked by American flags and by notices in English, Chinese and Japanese issued by the American authorities and setting forth the American character of the property concerned. According to these reports, not only

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have Japanese soldiers manifested a complete disregard for these notices but they have also in numerous instances torn down, burned and otherwise mutilated American flags. I am directed to impress upon Your Excellency the seriousness with which my Government regards such acts and to convey its most emphatic protest against them. My Government finds it impossible to reconcile the flagrant disregard of American rights shown by Japanese troops as described with the assurances contained in Your Excellency's note of December 24, 1937 that 'rigid orders have been issued to the military, naval and foreign office authorities to pay greater attention than hitherto to observance of the instructions that have been repeatedly given against infringement of or unwarranted interference with the rights and interests of the United States and other third Powers'.

In view of the fact that a number of these acts are reported as having occurred subsequent to the receipt of the aforementioned assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government, and inasmuch as this disregard of American rights is reported as still continuing, the American Government is constrained to observe that the steps which the Imperial Japanese Government have so far taken seem inadequate to ensure that hereafter American nationals, interests and property in China shall not be subjected to attack by Japanese armed forces or unlawful interference by any Japanese authorities or forces whatsoever. My Government must, therefore, request that the Imperial Japanese Government reenforce the instructions which have already been issued in such a way as will serve effectively to prevent the repetition of the outrages."

In addition, the Ambassador made the following observations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs: the requests and expectations set forth in the American Embassy's note of December 14 concerning the sinking of the U.S.S. PANAY were no idle gestures and meant precisely what they said; in Mr. Grew's opinion the PANAY incident could not be regarded as liquidated if the Japanese authorities failed to carry out effectively and in good faith the assurances given in the Japanese note of December 24; there had already occurred numerous unlawful interferences by Japanese forces with American nationals, interests, and property in China since the Japanese assurances were given, and the looting of American property was an especially serious aggression; if these

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various acts of interference and aggression should continue the American people would probably begin to question the trustworthiness of the Japanese assurances and public opinion in the United States would become increasingly exacerbated; and the tearing down, burning, and mutilation of the American flag would have an especially serious effect on American public opinion. After appealing to Mr. Hirota gravely and with the utmost emphasis to take further steps which would effectively implement the assurances of the Japanese Government and would obviate the dangers to the relations between the two countries which must inevitably and progressively increase if the various acts of interference with American interests in China should continue, Mr. Grew told the Minister that he was seriously worried at the outlook. Mr. Hirota said that he could not at all understand how these undisciplined acts by Japanese troops could have occurred, because the strongest possible orders had been given to both Army and Navy to avoid acts or measures which might interfere with Japan's good relations with the United States. The Ambassador assured the Minister that the acts in question had occurred subsequent to the Japanese assurances and were still continuing. Mr. Grew insisted that he be authorized to inform his Government that Mr. Hirota would bring these representations to the "highest quarter". Mr. Hirota gave such authorization. (Department's telegram No. 16, January 15, and Embassy's telegram No. 34, January 17, 1938).

In accordance with the Department's instructions, on January 17 the Ambassador made representations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the importation into China
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during December 1937 of Japanese kerosene duty free and the placing on the market of this kerosene. Mr. Grew emphasized the discriminatory character of the importation as well as the damaging effect upon the Customs Administration, and pointed out that this was another flagrant act of discrimination inconsistent with the repeated assurances of the Japanese Government and stated that the American Government expected the Japanese Government to take appropriate and prompt steps to assure the carrying out of those assurances. Mr. Hirota said that he would promptly take the matter up with the proper authorities. (Telegram to the Department from the Consulate General at Tientsin No. 3, January 8, Department's telegram No. 6, January 11, and Embassy's telegram No. 36, January 17, 1938).

Pursuant to the Department's instructions, the Ambassador made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on January 17 an emphatic oral statement, supported by an aide-mémoire, concerning the taking over of the Consolidated Tax Office in the Shanghai International Settlement by certain Chinese, understood to be the nominees of the Japanese military. After explaining that the consolidated taxes were security for the wheat, flour and cotton credits of 1931 and 1933, which formed a consolidated obligation to the Chinese Government held by the Export-Import Bank of Washington, the Embassy's aide-mémoire stated that the American Government insisted that the Japanese authorities neither take action nor countenance action by any provisional régime in areas from which the legitimate Chinese authorities had withdrawn which failed adequately to take into account the aforementioned

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mentioned obligation of the Chinese Government to the Export-Import Bank. It was further stated in the aide-memoire that the American Government reserved the right to hold the Japanese authorities accountable for action disregarding of American interests in this matter. (Telegram from the Consulate General at Shanghai No. 52, January 11, Department's telegram No. 17, January 15, and Embassy's telegram No. 37, January 17, 1938).

Mr. Allison of the Embassy in Nanking reported on January 12 that according to information furnished by the Japanese Embassy in Nanking the Japanese military authorities had reluctantly agreed to the installation of a radio set in the Embassy but would not permit a naval man to come ashore and operate it. On January 17 Mr. Allison reported that Mr. Fukui, Acting Japanese Consul General, had called on him and requested that he not bring a naval radio operator ashore at that time. (Telegrams to the Department from the Embassy at Nanking, No. 19, January 12, and No. 23, January 17, 1938). Acting under the Department's instructions, the Embassy approached the Foreign Office on the afternoon of January 18 and with reference to Mr. Fukui's request to Mr. Allison, stated that the American Government was not able to acquiesce in a compliance with the request, expected the installation and functioning of the radio operator at the American Embassy in Nanking not to be interfered with, and asked that instructions be promptly issued by the Tokyo Government to the Japanese authorities in Nanking which would put an end to further delay in the matter and would insure that there would be no further interference in connection with it.

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The official of the Foreign Office approached by the Embassy replied that he understood and that he would take up the matter immediately. (Department's telegram No. 18, January 17, and Embassy's telegram to the Consulate General at Shanghai dated January 18, 3 p.m., repeated to Nanking and to the Department). Mr. Allison reported on the morning of January 18 that he had just been informed by the Acting Japanese Consul General that final arrangements had been made with the Japanese military authorities for the Embassy at Nanking to bring ashore the radio set and naval operator.

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Enclosure No 2 to despatch
 No 2741 of Jan. 21, 1938 from the
 Embassy at Tokyo.

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SECTION II- STEPS TAKEN BY THE BRITISH EMBASSY WITH RESPECT
 TO THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT FROM JANUARY 5 TO
 JANUARY 18, 1938, INCLUSIVE.

The British Ambassador called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on January 6 and protested against four published anti-British interviews which had been given by Admiral Suyetsugu, two of them before he became Home Minister and two of them afterwards, concerning the allegedly anti-Japanese attitude of Great Britain during the present Sino-Japanese conflict. Sir Robert Craigie told Mr. Hirota that since Admiral Suyetsugu was a responsible Cabinet Minister, it must be expected that he was expressing the views of the Japanese Government, unless assurances were given to the contrary, and he therefore asked Mr. Hirota if he would authorize Sir Robert to inform the British Government that the views expressed by Admiral Suyetsugu in these interviews did not represent the views of the Japanese Government. Mr. Hirota replied that Sir Robert could give definite assurances to the British Government that Admiral Suyetsugu's views did not represent his (Hirota's) own views. Sir Robert Craigie then asked if he might assure his Government that Admiral Suyetsugu would make no further public statements of an anti-British character, to which Mr. Hirota responded that before answering this question he would have to consult Suyetsugu himself.

On January 6 the British Ambassador made further representations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Shanghai Customs issue. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the question was being discussed now not only in Shanghai but also in Tokyo, and that he hoped that soon he would be able to report some arrangement

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which he hoped would be satisfactory to the British Government.

As reported to the Department in enclosure No. 2 to the Embassy's despatch No. 2721 of January 6, on January 4 the British Ambassador addressed to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs a letter stating that there remained at Kuling about 120 foreigners, of whom 50 were British subjects, and requesting that Kuling be constituted a safety zone. On January 13 the British Ambassador addressed a second letter to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on this matter, stating that according to a report received from the British Consul General at Hankow there were no fortifications, military establishments, or guns in Kuling; that all Chinese politicians and officials had left Kuling; that no Chinese troops were there; and that there only remained a small police force and a few Chinese refugees of no political importance. In reply, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed a letter to the British Ambassador on January 14 stating that although the Japanese forces would take the most careful precautions possible for the safety of life and property of the nationals of third countries remaining in Kuling, they regretted that it was impossible for tactical and topographical reasons to agree to regard Kuling as a safety zone. The Vice Minister's letter concluded by recommending that it should be arranged for nationals of third countries remaining in Kuling as far as possible to be evacuated from there to safety zones (Embassy's telegram to the Consulate General at Shanghai dated January 15, 7 p.m., repeated to Hankow and to the Department).

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On January 13 the British Embassy left with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs a memorandum concerning the attack made by a Japanese submarine on September 22 on certain British fishing junks, with the consequent killing of British subjects and damaging of British property. The British memorandum stated that the incident had produced a very painful impression on the British Government, which reserved its right to address an official communication to the Japanese Government at a later date and to claim full compensation for damage, suffering, and loss of life caused to British subjects.

The British Embassy left with the Foreign Office on January 13 a copy of a letter dated January 8 from the British Consul General at Shanghai to the Japanese Consul General protesting against the violence and unlawful actions of members of the Japanese armed forces toward British police officers at Shanghai. The note of the British Consul General at Shanghai requested that a strict inquiry be made of these incidents and that those found guilty be suitably disciplined in order to prevent further disorders.

A note was addressed by the British Embassy to the Foreign Office on January 11 protesting against disregard by Japanese ships of customs requirements for Japanese goods and vessels at Shanghai, pointing out the injury done to the integrity of the Customs Administration and to British and other foreign interests which the Japanese Government had undertaken to respect, and requesting that instructions be sent to the Japanese authorities at

Shanghai

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Shanghai for the re-establishment of normal customs control of all imports and exports other than of articles genuinely required for use by Japanese military forces.

On January 15 the British Ambassador received the reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated January 12, to his formal note of December 22, which protested against the alleged serious violation of the territorial waters and of the territory itself of Hong Kong by a Japanese naval destroyer on December 11. (Embassy's telegram No. 673, of December 23, 1937). Mr. Hirota's reply stated that, according to the Japanese investigation of the affair, the Japanese destroyer had not taken the Chinese customs patrol in tow, as was stated in the British note of December 22, and that it was "scarcely credible" to the Japanese Government that men of the Japanese navy should have landed without the permission of the authorities of Hong Kong. Mr. Hirota's note added, however, that the Japanese Government regretted that Japanese shells had fallen within British territorial waters and that British territorial waters had been entered without the consent of the British authorities; that those responsible for the incident had been dealt with appropriately in accordance with law; and that the Japanese Navy, in view of the occurrence of this incident, had sent strict instructions to their detachments in China to take adequate precautions against the recurrence of such incidents in the future.

The British Ambassador left with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on January 18 a memorandum stating that
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between November 30 and December 24, 1937, 25,000 cases of kerosene had been imported duty free into Tientsin under Japanese military permit and were being sold in the open market through Japanese dealers closely associated with the distribution of smuggled cargo brought in through East Hopei. The British memorandum stated further that the British Consul General at Tientsin had been instructed to draw the attention of the local Japanese authorities to this evasion of duty payment, which not only had resulted in a loss of revenue of over \$200,000 but was also resulting in discrimination against British trade.

On January 18 the British Ambassador sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a memorandum protesting against the refusal of the Japanese naval authorities to grant facilities for the navigation of two British merchant vessels on the Yangtze River. The memorandum ended by reminding the Japanese authorities that, as stated in the British Ambassador's memorandum of December 28, the British Government claimed absolute freedom of movement for British ships on the Yangtze River.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

FEB 8 - 1938


DATE:

February 7, 1938.

SUBJECT: FAR EASTERN SITUATION

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE
CHINESE AMBASSADOR, DR. CHENGTING T. WANG.

COPIES TO:



The Chinese Ambassador called at his own request, primarily, he said, to inform me of his call on the President to present to him a letter from Chiang Kai-shek, and also to hand me a copy of the same letter.

I inquired what news he had from China. He said that the fighting was stiff and that his people were making a good showing. I further inquired what he knew about the reports in the press today to the effect that a large amount of war supplies had gone into China through Hong Kong. He promptly replied that the reports were true and that such supplies should be helpful for some time.

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The Ambassador then said that what his country needed was credit, and since they were making extensive purchases of goods in this country, his Government was very anxious for all possible cooperation here in the establishment of credits. I replied that, of course, his Government had considerable available liquid credits here in this country now. He agreed that this was true and that the credits were very substantial. I then commented further that thus far China had only purchased six or seven million dollars of arms and implements of war from this country. He did not press the matter further except to say that they were looking ahead in thus requesting credits.

I went on to say that at present we were interested almost entirely in the passage of the increased armament measure and in getting before the country more clearly our situation and our policies.

The Ambassador then inquired as to the significance of the withdrawal of the United States armed forces from Tientsin. I replied that sometime before the fighting broke out in July last, my associates in the Department were collaborating in the plan relative to the withdrawal of these troops; that the War Department had wanted them returned, for one reason, among others, that it was not considered a wholesome policy to keep these troops in

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one place and away from this country for an indefinite period of time; that, therefore, what is taking place in connection with their evacuation is just about what would have occurred at this time had no fighting arisen between China and Japan, and, therefore, there is no significance to the withdrawal of these troops from the standpoint of China or any other government; that they are no longer of any great use where they are now located and this is a further reason for their evacuation. I said I might go further and say that if trouble had not arisen between China and Japan, the Chinese Government and my Government equally would have agreed in the desire for these troops to come out not later than this date; and that the policy of the Chinese Government relative to the discontinuance of extraterritoriality at Shanghai and elsewhere would have been carried out by this time, including the removal of all remaining guards of foreign governments. The Ambassador did not take issue with this view.

I finally remarked that from every viewpoint, therefore, it must be apparent to him and his Government that there is no significance in the evacuation of this regiment from Tientsin. I said further that the British had recalled their troops temporarily sent to Shanghai

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just as we had recalled ours temporarily sent to that city; and that we took this action in sending the Marines and returning them upon the recommendation of Admiral Yarnell in charge of the Asiatic squadron.

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CHINESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

Hankow, January 30, 1938.

Dear President Roosevelt:

I was greatly pleased to receive on January 24 through His Excellency the American Ambassador here a telegraphic copy of Your Excellency's letter of January 11 in reply to my message of December 24, 1937.

I have been deeply moved by the warm tone in which you have responded to my appeal. Your earnest hope for a settlement of the present conflict with such reasonable provisions as you have indicated coincides with the very object of our sanguinary struggle against Japan's aggression and vandalism. We are not only defending our own rights and our own national integrity, but also striving for the preservation of the rights and interests of all powers concerned. In a settlement you have visualized, we will show due regard even for Japan's rights and legitimate interests in China.

I am happy to learn that you are giving constant study and thought to the problem of the ways and means
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The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

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which may contribute most effectively toward promoting peace and facilitating international cooperation. The United States has always played a leading role in the promotion of international peace and order in general and justice and harmony in the Far East in particular. We recall with gratification the historical instances in which the United States endeavored to meet the disturbing conditions in this part of the world with timely and helpful intervention. At the end of the last century when China was going through the most trying period of her diplomatic relations, it was the American Government which initiated (and has ever since upheld) the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations. It was again through the effort of the President of the United States of America as mediator that a Far Eastern conflict in the beginning of this century was brought to an end. That the Washington Conference at which the Pacific questions were discussed and settled owed its origin and success to the United States of America is a fact which is still fresh in our memory. ✓

Your great country has not only significantly contributed toward the general cause of peace and concord in the Far East, but has from time to time given exemplary

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plary assistance of one kind or another to the Government and the people of China. The United States was the first country which remitted to China the American portion of the indemnity of 1901. The American universities and colleges have imparted useful knowledge to countless Chinese youth who, imbued with American ideals, have returned to render valuable service in the development of this country. The American generous public has given us inestimable aid and relief in time of dire need. American financial help such as the Cotton and Wheat Loan has contributed in no small measure to China's success in carrying out her plan of national rehabilitation and reconstruction. The American Government was the first to conclude with the Chinese Government a treaty restoring to China the right to tariff autonomy. All these and other instances testify to the traditional friendship which exists between the United States and China.

It is the acknowledged leadership of the American Government in the common task for seeking international peace and security that has led all other powers to look to the United States for co-operation in dealing with the present catastrophe in the Far East. It is on the strength of the unexcelled Sino-American friendship that China naturally looks to the United States for assistance

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during our momentous struggle for national existence. Permit me, Mr. President, to appeal to you once more to do everything possible to help hasten the end of Japan's aggression and the realization of the ideal for which both China and the United States of America firmly stand. It is our urgent wish that the United States will enable us to continue our resistance. I leave it to Your Excellency to decide what further measures may be adopted by the United States to bring about the final settlement you have in mind. I am as confident as ever that our common cause for peace and justice for the sanctity of treaties and for orderly and amicable relationship among nations is destined to win.

Very sincerely yours,

Chiang Kai-shek

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No. 2741 dated January 21, 1938,
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION III

STEPS TAKEN BY THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN TOKYO WITH RESPECT
TO THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT FROM JANUARY 5 TO JANUARY 18,
1938, INCLUSIVE (SO FAR AS KNOWN TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY).

The French Ambassador called on the Minister for
Foreign Affairs on January 12 and protested against
the recent bombing of a French Catholic Mission at
Yungning, as a result of which one missionary of French
nationality was killed and another badly wounded.

0311

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1938 FEB 8 PM 1 46

COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

II26 Washington Building
Los Angeles, California
February 4, 1938

February 14 1938.

Ans d

Hon. Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 10 1938
Ch
file
Lang

Dear Mr. Hull:

For purposes of further reference, I desire to obtain a copy of that remarkable document, the TANAKA MEMORIAL. I have followed up every lead as to how to obtain such copy, including those centering in San Francisco and Los Angeles, but uniformly without success. Would you, therefore, kindly inform me where I can obtain a copy? I would be grateful for your helpful information.

Very respectfully yours,

Ernest Lang
Ernest Lang

793.94/12352

FEB 14 1938

FILED

F/FG 72352

0312

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 14 1938.

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/12352 .

Mr. Ernest Lang,
1126 Washington Building,
Los Angeles, California.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of
February 4, 1938, in which you ask where you can
obtain a copy of the "Tanaka Memorial".

A pamphlet containing what is alleged to be an
English translation of the above-mentioned document
was published by the World Peace Movement, 108 Park
Row, New York City. Should this organization no longer
be in existence the Department has no information as to
where a copy of the document in question might be ob-
tained. It is suggested that you may wish to consult
the public libraries in your city for information in
this regard.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Maxwell M. Hamilton
Maxwell M. Hamilton
Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

OK *1/2/38*
FEB 12 1938. PM

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FE:ECG:HES
2-11

Jan 7
FE *1/2/38*

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nat.

793.94/12352

F/FG

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT *Special Gray*

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒
PLAIN

Department of State

1938 FEB 8 PM 6 13

Washington, *Special Gray via Naval radio*
February 8, 1938.
7 pm

AMERICAN CONSUL, *DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS*
CANTON (China). *via R.*

✓ Following for Captain Roberts from War Department;
QUOTE /If it can be arranged with safety, send a/
weekly summary via China Clipper. War Department is
considering sending you to Lungphow via Nanning and re-
turn via Kweilin or possibly to Yunnan and desires your
recommendations. END QUOTE.

793.94

Hull
(m.m.h.)

793.94/12354

ARR
FE:ARR:NN

FE

Enciphered by
Sent by operator M., 19.....

F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 8, 1938.

TO CANTON:

FOLLOWING FOR CAPTAIN ROBERTS FROM WAR DEPARTMENT:

If it can be arranged with safety, send a weekly summary via China Clipper. War Department is considering sending you to Lungchow via Nanning and return via Kweilin or possibly to Yunnan and desires your recommendations.

793.94/12354

The above message was handed to me in its present form by Major Mayer of M. I. D. with the request that it be transmitted.

ACR

F/FG

0315

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Justesen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 842.00 P. R./121 FOR Des#1897

FROM Canada (Palmer) DATED Feb. 5, 1938
fp/ NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Anti-Japanese feeling. Attempted bombing of Japanese
vessel. Report of -.

ML

793.94 / 12355

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

77-94

An indication of the anti-Japanese feeling, particularly on the Pacific coast, may be adduced from the recommendation of Captain MacGregor MacIntosh, Conservative member of the British Columbia Legislature, for a census of all Japanese in British Columbia which he described as imperative as a first step in remedying the most serious oriental penetration of our industrial life. He went on to say that neither Ottawa nor Victoria has any accurate figures of the number of Japanese in the province. Notwithstanding the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908, limiting the number of Japanese entering Canada to one hundred and fifty annually, he voices the opinion:

"In a few short years oriental penetration will become vital to our very existence."

The Vancouver DAILY PROVINCE states that according to the 1931 census, which is regarded as completely misleading, in so far as it affects Orientals, there were in British Columbia 27,139 Chinese and 22,205 Japanese. It infer ally estimates that the actual figures are 30,000 Japanese and 22,000 Chinese, as the census takers were believed to have described many Japanese as Chinese. Mr. H. Hemichi, Japanese Consul at Vancouver, challenged the speech of Captain MacIntosh and stated that the Japanese in British Columbia were legally admitted and discounted the suggestion that in the near future Japan will control fishing, poultry and small farming in British Columbia.

The fact that the recent attempted bombing of the Japanese vessel in Seattle was made by Canadians was duly noted in the press. Otherwise the matter passed more or less as a routine news item of the day. E. W. Lipsett, writing in the Toronto STAR on January 24th, comments that Canada has not yet determined whether an expression of regret to Japan over an attempt of two Canadians to blow up a Japanese steamer in Seattle harbor last week is called for. He quotes Mr. Skelton, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, as saying that the matter has not yet been considered. He goes on to say that it is known that secret municipal and harbor police at Vancouver and Victoria have been instructed to maintain the utmost vigilance to prevent any repetition of the Seattle plot in Canadian waters.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be **FROM**
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.


ALUSNA PEIPING

February 8, 1938

Rec'd 12:35 p.m.

ACTION: NAVY DEPARTMENT

INFO: CINCAP
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
SECOND BRIGADE USMC



793.94
0008. Large scale Jap reinforcements continue pass
southward to Shuntehan Danyang Nippon source reiterates
concentration their troops plus Manchukuoans at Paotsu
preparing for drive southwestward. Reliable reports
confirm Red army daily attack Sinphanti source great
Japanese worry. 1555.

RR

FILED
FEB 11 1938

793.94/12356

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RGC

Moscow

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM Feb. 5, 1938

Rec'd 5:44 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

35, February 5, 5p.m.

Reference to my telegram No. 5, January 8, 7 p. m.

Yuiming, Chinese Charge d'Affaires, told me the following yesterday in strict confidence.

One. (A) The mission of Sun Fo has obtained its first objective, namely, the creation of an atmosphere of mutual confidence which permits a friendly exchange of views (whether or not he meant by this statement that contact had been established with Stalin is not clear).

(B) The negotiations are considered to be of so delicate a nature that the members of the mission avoid seeing any persons except the highest Soviet officials for fear their statements or actions may be given a false interpretation; they are not even telegraphing their home government since they do not trust their own codes. Telegraphing is unnecessary, however, since the mission has full powers to negotiate and sign without reference to the Chinese Government.

(C) Most members have an American education and are carrying

521

761.93/1635
793.94/12357

E/DC

4522

RGC -2- #35 from Moscow

carrying on negotiations with best western traditions; they will give no promise which China will not keep, which it may regret in happier years or which may prejudice the position in China of other friendly powers.

(D) Rumors that the Soviet Government is agreeing to recognize full Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia in return for certain concessions or that the Kremlin is intriguing with the purpose of having Chiang Kai Shek replaced by more liberal Chinese leaders are Japanese inspired.

Two. Although I elaborated somewhat on the various rumors relating to Mongolia, he did not deny that Mongolia figures in the negotiations. It has not been possible as yet to obtain through any authoritative source in this particular the concrete points under discussion.

Three. (A) Japan estimates the present strength of the Trans-Baikal army at about twenty divisions totalling slightly more than 350,000 men. Our Military Attache considers this figure as excessive.

(B) During recent weeks there has been a tendency to move those divisions hitherto stationed in the neighborhood of Baikal towards the east and to replace them with fresh troops from Central Siberia.

(C) His Government

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1623

RGC -E- #35 from Moscow

(C) His Government is somewhat concerned at unfirmed rumors that troops are being concentrated in rather large numbers in central Siberia in localities which would permit their rapid transfer into the Trans-baikal region.

(D) There are two fully equipped Soviet divisions in Outer Mongolia.

(E) In his opinion the Soviet Union does not desire to enter into an armed conflict with Japan at present although during recent weeks it has been following a policy only short thereof.

Four. There is little doubt that shipments of supplies and equipment which could be devoted to military purposes have been going to the Far East in larger volume than usual during the last six weeks. The supplies apparently include both clothing and foodstuffs; nevertheless the foreign observers in whom I have most confidence still feel that these measures ^{are of} (1) precautionary measures only and that the Soviet Union is not seriously preparing to make an attack on Japan.

Five. The Soviet press although continuing to carry on an anti-Japanese campaign nevertheless from time to time displays resentment at rumors that the Soviet Union is preparing to enter the war in the Far East. An article

in

1321

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

624

RGC

-4-

#35 from Moscow

1018
3-1-38

yesterday's
in ~~(#)~~ and PRAVDA for instance denounces the authors of
slandereous rumors who are seeking to excite Japan against
the Soviet Union by intimating ^{GRAY} "that the Soviet Union is
preparing to make an attack on Japan". The article continues:
" they are trying to frighten the Japanese to persuade
them that it is necessary to hurry and beat the Soviet
Union to it. On the other hand they are endeavoring to
provoke the Soviet Union by trying to prove the necessity
of a preventive move against Japan. In vain are the
reactionary English circles secretly nourishing the hope
that they will be able to turn the wave of aggression
away from the British Empire."

HENDERSON

HPD

~~#apparent omission~~

0322

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

b
 [CONFIDENTIAL]

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 35) of February 5, 1938, from the American Embassy at Moscow reads substantially as follows:

On February 4 the American Chargé d'Affaires received in strict confidence from the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires (Yuiming) information to the following effect: The first objective of Sun Fo's mission has been achieved. That objective is the creation of an atmosphere of mutual confidence which allows an exchange of views in a friendly way. (It is not clear whether by this statement Yuiming meant that contact had been established with Stalin.) Most of the members of the mission are American educated and are carrying on negotiations in the best western traditions. They will make no promise which their country (China) will not keep, which may prejudice the position of other friendly powers in China or which China may regret in happier years. The negotiations are regarded as so delicate in nature that members of the mission see no one except highest officials of the Soviet Government for fear a false interpretation may be given to their actions or statements. Since they do not trust their own codes members of the mission are not even telegraphing their own government. However, as the mission has full powers to negotiate and sign without reference to their home government, it is unnecessary to telegraph. Japanese inspiration is responsible for rumors to the effect that the Soviet Government is intriguing with a view to having General Chiang Kai-shek replaced by more liberal Chinese leaders or that in return for certain concessions the Soviet

793194/12357

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Soviet Government is agreeing to recognize full sovereignty of the Chinese Government over Outer Mongolia.

The American Chargé d'Affaires elaborated somewhat on the different rumors concerning Mongolia, but the Chinese Chargé did not deny that Mongolia is being considered in the negotiations. As yet the American Chargé has not been able to obtain from any authoritative source in this particular the specific points which are being discussed.

The present strength of the Trans-Baikal army is approximately twenty divisions with a total of a little more than 350,000 men, according to Japanese estimates, which the American Military Attaché regards as excessive. There has been a tendency during the past few weeks to move toward the east the divisions which have been stationed hitherto in the neighborhood of Baikal and to put fresh troops from Central Siberia in their place. Unconfirmed rumors to the effect that troops in rather large numbers are being concentrated in localities in Central Siberia, which would allow their speedy transfer into the Trans-Baikal region, is causing some concern to the Chinese Government. In Outer Mongolia there are two fully equipped divisions of Soviet troops. Although during the past few weeks the Soviet Union has been pursuing a policy only short of armed conflict with Japan, the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires is of the opinion that the Soviet Government does not want to enter into such a conflict.

There is not much doubt but that shipments of equipment
 and

0324

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

and supplies, including apparently both foodstuffs and clothing, which could be used for military purposes have during the last six weeks been going in larger volume to the Far East than is usual. Nevertheless, it is the feeling of foreign observers in whom the American Charge has most confidence that the Soviet Union is not preparing seriously to attack Japan and that these measures are merely precautionary measures.

Although it continues to carry on a campaign against the Japanese, nevertheless, Soviet newspapers from time to time show resentment on account of rumors that the Soviet Government is making ready to enter war in the Far East. For instance, an article in Pravda and (#) censures the authors of slanderous rumors who are trying to inflame Japan against the Soviet Government by intimating "that the Soviet Union is preparing to make an attack on Japan". The article states also that the authors of these rumors are endeavoring to frighten the Japanese in order to persuade them that "it is necessary to hurry and beat the Soviet Union to it". On the other hand, the authors of these rumors are trying to provoke the Soviet Government by attempting to prove that a preventive move against Japan is necessary, according to this article, and reactionary English circles are vainly nourishing the secret hope that they will be able to turn away from the British Empire the wave of aggression.

793.94/12357

294
 FE:EGC:HES
 2-10

ACR
 FE

0320
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS 1-1235

COMSOPAT

FROM

February 8, 1938

Rec'd 7:43 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: CINCAF
2nd BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF, ADMINISTRATIVE
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING

793.94

0008 Air raids Samshui Railroad west of Canton
three DSP sighted. Other South China ports quiet 2000

SMS:NPL

793.94/12358

FEB 14 1938


FILED

F/FG

032

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED




FROM

COMYANGPAT

February 8, 1938

Rec'd 7:44 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: CINCAF
2ND BRIGADE, USMC
YANGPAT
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMSOPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING



793.94

0008 Eleven Japanese bombers with attending pursuits
raided airdrome and arsenal Hankow 1430 today. Nine
medium bombers attacked air field Ichang at 1300 2330

SMS:NPL

793.94/12359

F/FG
FILED
FEB 11 1938

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ME

1-1236

PLAIN AND GRAY

FROM Hankow via N.R.

Dated February 9, 1938

Rec'd 4 a.m.

COPIES SENT
Secretary of State,
Washington.

DT

February 9, noon.

793.94 Hankow airfield and Hanyang arsenal bombed
yesterday afternoon by eleven Japanese planes, Ichang
airfield by nine, with little damage one Chinese plane
shot down here. Another alarm today but planes did not
arrive.

Sent to Paiping.

JOSSELYN

JS

793.94/12360

FEB 14 1938

FILED

F/FG

0328

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE
NOTE

SEE 500.C 112/1321 FOR Tel 37 noon
FROM Germany (Gilbert) DATED Feb. 2, 1938.
TO NAME 1-1137

REGARDING:
Chinese-Japanese Conflict.
The German press continues its neutral attitude toward the -,
printing without comment despatches reporting efforts of the Chinese dele-
gation to obtain League support for their country.

G

793.94 / 12361

793.94 / 12361

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EV
FE

JR

GRAY

Berlin (part air)

Dated February 2, 1938

Rec'd 8:25 a.m., 3rd.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

37, February 2, noon.

News despatches in the German controlled press concerning the meeting of the League Council were critical in tone and usually under headlines contemptuously expressing the view that the League is a moribund institution.

The only strictly editorial comment on the Council meeting, that of Kircher in two articles in the FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG, was however much milder in tone. Kircher's editorials stated "none of the speakers talked of withdrawal but most of them are so hampered by critical thoughts that they no longer devote their whole strength to that which Wilson's creation should have been or might perhaps still become". The article further stated "one will make quick progress when the others have dropped the prejudice that those outside of Geneva are by nature disturbers of the peace".

While

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #37, February 2, noon, from Berlin.

While Kircher is generally supposed here to work closely with the German Foreign Office the relative mildness of his editorial discussion of the League contrasts with statements in a recent review of nationalist foreign policy published by the Foreign Office. The review attacked the Treaty of Versailles and stated that "since in addition there was an institution which covered with its authority these injustices and degradations of the German people there can therefore be no stop to the struggle of the German people against this institution".

The German press continues its neutral attitude toward the Chinese Japanese conflict printing without comment despatches reporting efforts of the Chinese delegation to obtain League support for their country. The TAGEBLATT printed a news despatch from Geneva claiming that Eden and Delbos have been influencing China's representative at the League not to bring up the question of sanctions against Japan promising him in return that their governments would not only support greater deliveries of munitions to China but would also "bring influence to bear upon President Roosevelt in this sense". This despatch asserted that the American Minister in Bern "had been asked to sound out Washington along this line."

GILBERT

RR:HPD

note
763.72169
Tennant

note
793.94

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.102 S/1603 FOR Tel. 212, noon

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED Feb. 5, 1938
 TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

(Tokyo's No. 76, Feb. 4, 3pm, Grew):
 Several plans being pushed forward for improvement of position
 of Japanese residents in International Settlement in Shanghai;
 intention of government to establish a "Sino-Japanese organ"
 outside Settlement area, and in particular to make Yangtze area
 center of expansion of Japanese interests.

M

793.94/12362

793.94/12362

133

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated February 5, 1938

Rec'd 9:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

212, February 5, noon.

Following is repeated as Tokyo's No. 76, February 4,
3 p.m.

"76, February 4, 3 p.m.

NOTE
793.94

One. The Foreign Minister at a budget committee meeting yesterday stated in reply to an interpellation regarding the plans of the Government in respect of the International Settlement in Shanghai that several plans were being pushed forward for the improvement of the position of the Japanese residents in the International Settlement. He added, however, that inasmuch as there were various regulations within the Settlement area it was the intention of the government to establish a "Sino-Japanese organ" outside the Settlement area, and in particular, to make the Yangtze area the center of expansion of Japanese interests.

Two. If the statement seems to you to have special significance please repeat to the Department and to Hankow as our 76, February 4, 3 p.m., and add such comment as you may care to make. Please inform me of action taken. Grew".

PEG:RR

GAUSS

893.1028. / 1603

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~WAA~~ ~~FE~~
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1326

FROM GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
 ONI, AN, AND

Chefoo via N. R.

Dated February 8, 1938

Rec'd 7:46 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

February 8, 3 p.m.

Please refer to paragraph one my February 6, 11 a.m.

Telegram from Lungkow today stated that Japanese
 troops occupied Lungkow 6th but that they had not seized
 customs there.

ALLEN

SMS:NPL:JS

793.94/12363

FILED
 SEP 23 1938

F/FG

note
 643.002

DT

793-94/12363

WAA
 file

0334

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 760h.65/774 FOR Tel. 11-9pm
FROM Yugoslavia (Lane) DATED Feb. 5, 1948
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Far Eastern situation. Statement of Hitler that he does not wish China to be destroyed despite the British fears to that effect. He said that Great Britain had warned Germany to be careful of Japan as it is a menace to the white race. His answer was that Japan was equally a menace after the great war.

793.94/12364

fp

12364

0334

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1226

FROM

SECOND BRIGADE USMC

February 9, 1938

Rec'd 10:40 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF FLAG & ADMINISTRATIVE

793.94

INFO: AMCON SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING

✓
file
B
WAA

8609. Japanese force driving northwestward along south bank north fork of Hwai River in effort outflank Tsinpu defenses. Japanese claim have crossed Hwai River vicinity Hwaiyuan. Chinese guerrilla reported attacked garrison at Sungkiang on Shanghai Hangchow railway. Other sectors quiet. 1854.

CSB

793.94/12365

FILED
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FEB 14 1938

0336

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR 1-1336
A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)
FROM Canton via N. R.
Dated February 8, 1938
Rec'd 4 a.m., 9th.

AMEMBASSY PEIPING
AMEMBASSY HANKOW
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL SWATOW

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

February 8, 3 p.m.

Practically no air raiding sixth and seventh due rainy weather. Fourth and fifth raiding by about forty planes morning and afternoon flights over many points. Heavy bombing Hankow Railway fourth and Hong Kong Railway fifth failed to cut lines. Waichow and nearby villages reported bombed, machine gunned several times. Whampoa and important highways raided, also numerous small towns in delta and other districts around Canton. Considerable dropping propaganda leaflets also reported. Available information indicates recent increased machine gun attacks on interior points and river traffic; impossible ascertain degree of military justification but undoubtedly causing a number civilian casualties. Rolling stock, especially locomotives, now apparently chief objective of railway raiding probably account of meager and temporary results

(1) of

793.94/12366

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FILED
FEB 15 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- February 8, 3 p.m., from Canton via N. R.

of bombing roadbed and bridges. (END GRAY) Hankow Railway reports eight and Hong Kong Railway four locomotives put out of commission.

(GRAY) Press reports February 5 firing near Kongmoon by Japanese planes on junk belonging to Texas Oil Company and flying American flag; one Chinese boatman reported wounded. This office seeking verification of incident.

Official sources describe naval and aerial bombardments of Bocca Tigris February 4, 5, 6, as severe but ineffective; confirm reports of Japanese shellings and attempted landings of marines at Poon (near Hong Kong border) and vicinity of Tongka (ten miles north of Macao) successfully resisted though force of about 300 marines effected landing on Keiou Island (in Pearl River) about fourteen miles north of Macao. ^{End Gray} Importance of reported Japanese plot believed greatly exaggerated by press. In any event now appears to have been effectively suppressed. No local officials apparently involved; best information indicating that principal local culprit was grandson of former Manchu Canton official. City quiet though precautions still taken and wild rumors, all description circulating evidently Japanese inspired. Some observers believe intended only create diversion to prevent despatch South China troops to north. (GRAY) Current rumors of

departure

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3- February 8, 3 p.m., from Canton via N. R.

departure of Japanese expedition three divisions from
 Formosa unconfirmed and British sources Hong Kong report
 that there are no signs of such movement. (PLAIN) The
 press however reported arrival of Japanese Rear Admiral
 Ta Hsiung (Mandarin Romanization) in South China waters.
 (END PLAIN) Referring to my telegram February 4th, 8 p.m.,
 regarding removal airplane assembly plant to the interior,
 reliably reported that twenty more Gloucester Gladiators
 and twenty Bellanca's now in Hong Kong awaiting shipment.
 Three new ^{type} thousand horsepower twin motor Martin
 bombers with automatically adjusting pitch propeller
 were recently shipped by rail to Hankow.

Vernacular press greets Geneva resolutions fairly
 favorably on ground half a loaf better than none; has
 carried several editorials voicing satisfaction over
 Germany's attitude including one by Government paper
 expressing confidence that German Government reorganization
 is propitious for China. Mailed Hong Kong.

LINNELL

CSB

WB
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

[CONFIDENTIAL]

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of February 8, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

Due to rainy weather there was practically no air raiding on February 6 and 7. On the 4th and 5th there was raiding by about forty planes in morning and afternoon flights over many points. There was heavy bombing of Hankow Railway on the 4th and Hong Kong Railway on the 5th failed to cut lines. Waichow and nearby villages were reported bombed, machine gunned several times. Whampoa and important highways were raided, also numerous small towns in the delta and other districts around Canton. Considerable dropping of propaganda leaflets was also reported. Available information indicates recent increased machine gun attacks on interior points and river traffic; impossible to ascertain degree of military justification but undoubtedly causing a number of civilian casualties. Rolling stock, especially locomotives, are now apparently the chief objective of railway raiding, probably on account of meager and temporary results of bombing roadbed and bridges. The Hong Kong Railway reports four locomotives put out of commission and the Hankow Railway reports eight.

Press reports February 5 firing near Kongmoon by Japanese planes on junk belonging to Texas Oil Company and flying American flag; one Chinese boatman is reported wounded. This office is seeking verification of the incident.

Official sources describe naval and aerial bombardments of Bocca Tigris on February 4, 5, 6 as severe but ineffective
 and

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and confirm reports of Japanese shelling and attempted landings of marines at Poon (near Hong Kong border) and vicinity of Tongka (ten miles north of Macao) successfully resisted, though force of about 300 marines effected landing on Keiou Island (in Pearl River) about fourteen miles north of Macao. It is believed that the importance of the reported Japanese plot is much exaggerated by the press. In any event it now appears to have been effectively suppressed. No local officials are apparently involved, best information indicating that principal local culprit was grandson of former Manchou Canton official. The city is quiet, though precautions are still taken and wild rumors all description circulating evidently Japanese inspired. Some observers believe it was intended only to create diversion to prevent despatch of South China troops to north. Current rumors of departure of Japanese expedition three divisions from Formosa are unconfirmed and British sources in Hong Kong report that there are no signs of such movement. The press, however, reported the arrival of Japanese Rear Admiral Ta Hsiung (Mandarin Romanization) in South China waters. Referring to the Consul General's telegram of February 4 concerning the removal to the interior of an airplane assembly plant, there are reliable reports to the effect that twenty Bellancas and twenty more Gloucester Gladiators are in Hong Kong now awaiting shipment. Recently there were shipped to Hankow by railway three new (?) thousand horsepower twin motor Martin bombers equipped with automatically

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automatically adjusting pitch propeller.

Several editorials voicing satisfaction over Germany's attitude have been carried in the vernacular press. One of these editorials by a Government paper expressed confidence that the reorganization of the German Government is propitious for China. The Geneva resolutions are greeted fairly favorably by the vernacular press on the ground that half a loaf is better than none.

793.94/12366

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 892.00 P.R./105 FOR Despatch #74

FROM Siam (Neville) DATED Jan. 24, 1938
 TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Siamese attitude toward Sino-Japanese hostilities.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 811.015394/29 FOR Despatch #1142

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED Jan. 5, 1938
 TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict: Report on flag incident
 at Wuhu and conditions after Japanese
 occupation.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Hatten Lumber Company

Manufacturers of Lumber

New London, Wisconsin February 7, 1938.

PM 1 17
RECORDS
Mr. Cordell Hull,
Secy of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Secretary Hull:

743.94

Our local Rotary Club has asked me
to talk on the Japanese Invasion of China. I would
appreciate it if your office would be kind enough
to send me any literature you feel free to offer
on this subject.

This question has created a great deal
of interest, and we would of course like to secure
a speaker with first hand information, but as our club
is small, we are doing the next best, and that is to
ask our members to secure the information and give a
talk before the members.

Therefore any references or information
which you would be kind enough to send me will be
appreciated.

Yours very truly

Benj. Hartquist

Benj. Hartquist,
New London, Wis.

BH

793.94/12369

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 24, 1938

In reply refer to
 FE 793.94/12369

My dear Mr. Hartquist:

In reply to your letter of February 7, 1938, in which you request that you be supplied with information which will be helpful to you in preparing a talk on the "Japanese Invasion of China", there are enclosed herewith copies of various documents, as listed below, relating to the situation in the Far East.

It is suggested that you might find it helpful also to consult the librarian of your public library who may be able to supply you with references to current periodicals and newspapers containing information on the subject in which you are interested.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

M. M. Hamilton
 Maxwell M. Hamilton
 Chief
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Enclosures:
 (See following page.)

Mr. Benjamin Hartquist,
 New London, Wisconsin.

793.94/12369

[Handwritten signature]

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Enclosures:

Press releases of the
 Department of State,
 July 16, August 17,
 23, September 20, 22
 (2), 28, 30, October
 6 (3), 16 (2), 27,
 November 2, 13, 15,
 22, 27, 30, December
 6, 12, 13 (4), 14
 (2), 16, 21, 24, 25,
 1937, January 10, 14,
 22, 27 (3), 28, 31,
 and February 4, 1938.

Press releases of the
 White House, Septem-
 ber 14 and October 19,
 1937.

Addresses of the Secretary
 of State, September 15,
 18, and October 22, 1937.

Address of the President,
 October 5, 1937.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Mr. [unclear]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY


January 25, 1938.

Dr. Hornbeck:

The Secretary has seen Mr. Matsukata this morning, but has not yet prepared a memorandum of conversation.

I return these memos, which the Secretary has seen.

a.c.c.



[Handwritten signature]

793.94/12370

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS



January 22, 1938.

COMMENT

I have given thought to the question whether Mr. Matsukata was instructed or inspired by his Government to make the approach of which account is given in the memorandum here attached. (At one point in the conversation, Mr. Matsukata stated with emphasis that he was not an official, was not connected with the Government, and could speak without responsibility.)

I greatly doubt whether his bringing up of the question of good offices was inspired by the Tokyo Government. I think it likely that he has been instructed to make explorations and find out and report on subjects information with regard to which may be of value to his Government in several fields; likely that Ambassador Saito may have suggested that he raise the question of good offices in order to elicit whatever reply and whatever comments such an inquiry might evoke; likely that Matsukata himself feels that pressure by the United States toward bringing the hostilities to an end would be of tremendous value to Japan; possible that he may have gotten his inspiration from conversation with American friends, of whom several in New York and at least one in Washington feel that Japan is destroying herself through continuance and extension of the operation of her armed forces in China.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

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
I feel that the position declared to Mr. Matsukata by Mr. Welles was absolutely sound: that this Government will (now) make no move in this matter unless it has first been asked to do so by the Japanese and the Chinese Governments officially (and formally).

I feel that we should set our minds against any embarkation by the United States Government alone into the field of mediation between Japan and China. If and when we are confronted with the necessity for deciding whether or not we will accept a rôle in that field, we should not accept that rôle without having first considered very carefully the advisability of there being associated with us in it the governments of some other countries, Great Britain in particular.

SKH
SKH

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DATE: January 21, 1938.

SUBJECT: Situation in the Far East and Suggestion by
Mr. Matsukata that the United States Offer
* Good Offices.

PARTICIPANTS:


Mr. Welles

Mr. Kojiro Matsukata (President, Matsukata Japan-Soviet
Oil Company, Limited)

Mr. Hornbeck

COPIES TO:

*Copies sent to Peking Tokyo
London, Paris & Hong Kong
Feb. 7*



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Mr. Matsukata's call on Mr. Welles followed upon a request by Mr. L. J. Hunt of New York City, by letter, and a request made by the Japanese Embassy here that Mr. Welles receive Mr. Matsukata.

Mr. Welles had not been informed that Mr. Matsukata would raise the question which Mr. Matsukata did raise.

Mr. Welles had in advance asked Mr. Hornbeck to be present at the interview.

When Mr. Matsukata entered Mr. Welles' office, Mr. Welles said to Mr. Matsukata that he had known and had considered it a privilege to know, when he was in Japan in the years at the beginning of the World War,

Mr.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Mr. Matsukata's father, and that he was very glad to meet that father's son.

Mr. Matsukata appropriately acknowledged this friendly overture, remarked that Mr. Welles had mentioned meeting his father during the World War, and made the observation that he, Matsukata, had now come here at a time when Japan was "at war". He then referred to some features of the present situation^{and} led up to, and made an inquiry whether the American Government might not tender to Japan and China the good offices of this country. He developed his statement^{and} inquiryⁱⁿ in a manner which implied or warranted inference that he felt that the existing situation is one of disadvantage and hazard to Japan, and he stressed the possibility of its leading to serious controversy or conflict between Japan and other countries, with the implication that it therefore makes the position of other countries hazardous.

Mr. Welles said that he wished to be perfectly frank and wished to make the attitude and position of this Government clear beyond the possibility of any misunderstanding. He would ask Mr. Hornbeck to state on what occasions this Government had already proffered its good offices. Mr. Hornbeck said that, on July 12, five days after the first armed clash between the Japanese and the Chinese near Peiping, the Secretary of State, in conversation with

the

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the Japanese Ambassador, had stated that this Government regretted the outbreak of these hostilities, hoped that they would not spread, and would be prepared to be of assistance to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments, if they were willing, toward composing their differences; that the Secretary had said the same thing to the Chinese Ambassador at that time; ^{and} that, thereafter, on the occasion of almost every interview which he had had with the Japanese and the Chinese Ambassadors respectively, the Secretary had reiterated those points. Mr. Welles raised question of the position taken by this Government at the Brussels Conference, and Mr. Hornbeck went on to say that at the Brussels Conference this Government and the other Conference powers, taking note of the Japanese Government's reply to the Belgian Government's invitation in terms indicating that the Japanese Government was not prepared to attend the Conference, had suggested to and requested of the Japanese Government that that Government appoint a representative to confer with representatives of a few or a small number of the powers; and that the Japanese Government had replied that it was not prepared to do that.

Mr. Welles than referred to Mr. Matsukata's inquiry and stated that he, Mr. Welles, having lived three years in Japan, had long had a most friendly feeling toward

the

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the Japanese people and a great admiration of their many splendid qualities and outstanding achievements; that he shared Mr. Matsukata's view that the present situation is deplorable and fraught with hazards; that the Government of the United States has from the outset been desirous of contributing toward ameliorating the situation in the Far East and toward composing the conflict which is going on there. We have repeatedly proffered our good offices. The Japanese Government has at no time responded favorably. It is our understanding that the German Government a few weeks ago took steps toward mediation, that the Japanese Government informed the German Ambassador in China of the Japanese Government's peace proposals, that the German Ambassador laid these before the Chinese Government, and that the Chinese Government did not find the proposals acceptable. The American Government could not take at this time an initiative; it could act only if it were informed officially by the Japanese Government and by the Chinese Government respectively that those Governments desire an exercise of good offices by it; and that, if we were to embark upon exercise of good offices, our action would have to be on the basis of terms consistent with the Nine Power Treaty.

Mr.

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Mr. Matsukata appeared disconcerted. He said that if the American Government felt that it must fall back on "historical" ground and insist on applying the Nine Power Treaty the whole problem was made very difficult.

Mr. Welles commented on that statement, to the effect that the American Government did not regard the Nine Power Treaty as being merely an "historical" instrument; that this Government regards that treaty as an agreement still in effect between and among the powers parties to it, among which are both Japan and the United States, and that, as we have on several occasions stated, such an agreement is binding until it has been made not so by the common assent of the parties to it, a procedure quite different from a unilateral disregard of it by some one of the parties. Mr. Welles asked whether Mr. Hornbeck would care to make any comment.

Mr. Hornbeck referred to the fact that in 1933 or 1934 this Government, in a communication to the Japanese Government through Mr. Grew, had expressly and formally stated that in our view the provisions of treaties can be altered, but only by recognized processes. He continued, with the raising of an hypothetical question: Suppose that the question of the Nine Power Treaty could be left out of consideration, suppose there were no such treaty; could Mr. Matsukata expect the American Government,

in

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in view of the facts that the Germans have been endeavoring to bring about a mediation and that Japan's terms have been communicated to the Chinese and that those terms are what they are and that the Chinese have rejected them, -- could the American Government at this moment step in and proffer its good offices? Mr. Matsukata replied that the United States was very different from Germany; that the Japanese had confidence in the United States; that the United States is a great and powerful and friendly power; and that he thought that a proffer on our part would be listened to. He said that the Japanese felt kindly toward the United States but were now not well disposed toward Great Britain; that Americans treated the Japanese with an attitude of understanding and consideration but that the British did not; that the Japanese would be receptive toward any efforts which the United States might make in the direction of and in connection with mediation; but that if the British were included in the making of such an effort the Japanese would react unfavorably.

Mr. Welles said that he wanted to make one point perfectly clear; that Mr. Matsukata must not infer from what Mr. Hornbeck had said that the facts of the existence of the Nine Power Treaty and of matters appertaining thereto could be set aside or left out of consideration. He pointed out that Mr. Hornbeck simply asked a hypothetical question.

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question. Mr. Hornbeck said that he too felt it important that Mr. Matsukata should not infer from what he had said that the Nine Power Treaty could be left out of consideration.

Mr. Matsukata again indicated that he felt that this view on the part of the American Government made the question of bringing the hostilities to an end very difficult; and he made a plea for our sweeping all such considerations aside and concentrating entirely on the fact that there exists in the Far East a tragic situation potential of producing even worse situations. He again urged that the United States should take an initiative.

Mr. Welles stated that our position was as follows:

First, That action in the direction of mediation could be taken by this Government only if there came to it an official indication from the Japanese Government and a similar indication from the Chinese Government that good offices or mediation by this Government are desired by those Governments respectively; Second, That this Government could act only on the basis of and in the light of its being understood that the settlement must be consistent with both the principles and the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty; and Third, That it is the position of this Government that the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty are susceptible of modification, amendment and alteration,

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alteration, but only by recognized processes of negotiation and agreement, not by unilateral action on the part of any one power.

Mr. Matsukata arose to take leave. He thanked Mr. Welles for having received him and given him so much time. Mr. Welles again expressed his admiration of Mr. Matsukata's father and his pleasure at having met Mr. Matsukata. Mr. Matsukata, in saying good-bye to Mr. Hornbeck, remarked, "Do not be too hard on us." Mr. Hornbeck, surprised at this remark, replied that none of us has any desire to be "hard on" Japan; that we are animated by no feeling of hostility; and that we are all intent on and hopeful of doing something constructively helpful in our relations with countries of the Far East. Mr. Matsukata said, "In that case it will be all right."

The interview there ended.

Addenda.

1. At an early point in this conversation Mr. Welles took occasion to speak of the adverse effect on public opinion in this country which had been produced by the Panay incident and other unwarranted acts by the Japanese armed forces.

2. At a late point in the conversation Mr. Matsukata
asked

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asked expressly whether Mr. Welles had been informed by Mr. Grew of Japan's peace proposals. Mr. Welles said that he had been informed. Mr. Matsukata asked whether the American Government could not look with approval upon those proposals. Mr. Welles said that before it would be possible for him to come to any conclusion in that connection it would be necessary for him to have more precise knowledge of the implications of the proposals; the proposals were in general and broad terms.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT

SECRETARY OF WAR
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR
SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF
G-1
G-3
G-4
War Plans Division
Statistics Branch
Budget & Legislative Pl. Br.
Adjutant General's Dept.
Army Industrial College
Army War College
Air Corps (Liaison Officer)
Cavalry
Chemical Warfare Service
Coast Artillery Corps
Command & General Staff School
Engineers
Field Artillery
Finance
Infantry
Inspector General's Dept.
Insular Affairs
Judge Advocate General's Dept.
Medical Dept.
Military Bureau
Office of Naval Intelligence
Ordnance Dept.
Quartermaster Corps
Signal Corps
Executive for Reserve Affairs

State Dept.:

European Affairs
Near Eastern Affairs
American Republics
Far Eastern Affairs
Office of Philippine Affairs

Commerce Dept.:

Foreign & Domestic Commerce
Automotive & Aeronautics
Trade Division
Transportation Division

For your information and file
Note and return
Note and send to
For Mr. Hamilton

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Dec. 24, 1937.

PART IV
MISCELLANEOUS

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SINO---JAPANESE SITUATION:

Developments December 8-21, 1937 (Map Accompanying) -

193.94

The Panay Incident. On December 9 the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai forwarded to our Consul General a note "stating the intentions of the Japanese military forces regarding the security of foreign ships in the zone of fighting in the Yangtze Valley." This note warned all foreign ships to stay away from Chinese troops and establishments or to keep out of the area entirely, and stated that "the Imperial Japanese forces will do their utmost" to respect foreign ships, "but in case no cooperation is forthcoming from the third powers," the Japanese forces "are not in a position to insure the security of such ships and cannot be held responsible for consequences."

On the afternoon of December 11, the U.S.S. Panay, which was anchored in the river at Nanking, was forced by artillery fire to move up river together with other foreign ships. The British Military Attache and a German Embassy Secretary, both on a British boat, stated that the fire unquestionably came from Japanese batteries, while Captain Roberts, on the Panay, believed that the fire was from Chinese sources. Subsequent events indicate that the fire was undoubtedly Japanese. The shells continued to follow as the Panay and other ships moved up stream. The Panay anchored 12 miles above Nanking and so informed the Shanghai Consulate by radio, requesting that the Japanese at Shanghai and Tokyo be informed. At 9.00 a.m. Dec. 12 shell fire again began to fall close to the Panay and the Standard Oil boats with her. The captain of the Panay decided to move to a safer location farther up the river. About 10.30 a. m. while proceeding up the Yangtze, with the Standard Oil ships Meiping, Meilan, and Meihsia, the convoy was stopped by signals from a Japanese detachment on shore. The Panay hove to. An armed Japanese detachment put out from shore and an officer and two soldiers boarded the Panay and questioned the commander. The soldiers left and the Panay with the convoy proceeded to a point 27 miles above Nanking and anchored there. The Shanghai Consulate was again informed of the new location. This message was received at Shanghai about 12.30 and the Japanese Consulate was immediately informed by telephone and confirmation by written message was sent within 30 minutes. The Japanese Consul General acknowledged receipt by letter dated December 12 stating "the necessary information was immediately transmitted to the Japanese military and naval authorities."

About 1.30 p. m., December 12, while the Panay and the other vessels were anchored at the last point mentioned above, the group was attacked by Japanese aircraft. The Panay was sunk and the other ships, though hit, managed to reach the shore. At least five separate air attacks were made. During the escape of the survivors from the sinking Panay, the planes machinegunned the boats and searched for the men on the beach from low altitudes. Just before the Panay went to the bottom, two Japanese army detachments in motor boats approached the ship, machinegunned the decks, and boarded it. All the vessels were plainly marked with American flags, painted flat on the superstructure and

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

flown from the masts, and Japanese airplanes had flown over the Panay and other American vessels daily during the latter part of their stay at Nanking. The weather was clear and still and visibility was excellent.

The casualties among the foreigners on the Panay and other vessels, resulting from the attacks, were 4 killed and 16 wounded. Most of the survivors landed on the North Bank and moved inland after dark, carrying their wounded on improvised stretchers.

The British gunboats Bee and Ladybird raced to the scene from Wuhu as soon as the news of the disaster reached them. In spite of interference by Japanese military during the early stages of the attempts at rescue, the British got into touch with the survivors. These had pushed inland to escape and were finally assembled on December 15, placed on board the Oahu and Ladybird, and landed at Shanghai on December 17.

The Panay personnel lived up to the best traditions of the Navy. Both the line officers on the Panay were wounded with the first attack and despite their wounds, carried on. The State Department officials on the ship, including Messrs. Paxton and Gassie, who were wounded, likewise carried out a most difficult task with fortitude and vigor. Lieut. Commander Hughes, the Captain of the Panay, placed Captain Roberts, the Assistant Military Attache, in charge of the surviving naval personnel on shore, and he acquitted himself of the difficult task of moving the wounded inland with most commendable zeal and efficiency.

On December 12, before going to the scene of the Panay attack, the British gunboats Ladybird and Bee were attacked by Japanese artillery fire at Wuhu. Both ships were hit several times. One sailor was killed and several were wounded. Upon landing to protest, the British were informed by Colonel Hashimoto, temporarily the senior Japanese officer at Wuhu, that he had orders to fire at every ship on the river. Three separate air attacks were also made upon British ships, including the gunboats Cricket and Scarab, concentrated near Hsia Shan, above Nanking. This area had been previously designated by the Japanese commander in chief as a safety zone.

On December 14 the Japanese spokesman at Shanghai again warned the United States and Great Britain to move their vessels out of the Yangtze to insure their safety. He intimated that the movement of the Oahu to Shanghai (then steaming down from Kukiang to pick up the Panay survivors) was in response to Japanese warnings. The British and American naval authorities informed the Japanese naval authorities that their naval vessels would remain in the river as long as necessary and that the warning would be disregarded. Later the Japanese made every effort to recall the issuance of this warning.

The chain of events beginning with the Japanese warning note of December 9 indicates clearly that the attacks on both the American and British vessels were not accidental. A high Japanese naval officer at Shanghai has informed the American authorities that Japanese naval planes were acting under orders of the army authorities during the drive on Nanking. It seems definite that some Japanese Army official with authority enough to issue orders to artillery and aviation units, had decided to attack all vessels on the Yangtze regardless of nationality. The motives may have been a deliberate campaign to show the Chinese the

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futility of hoping for assistance from weak foreign nations, a desire to impress the world with the might of Japanese arms, or exasperation at the presence of foreign neutrals.

General Matsui commands the Japanese land forces in the Yangtze area, Admiral Hasegawa commands the naval forces there, and Lieut. General Prince Yasuhiko Asaka is reported to have been in direct command of the drive on Nanking. Colonel Hashimoto commands a regiment of heavy field artillery. He was one of the leading spirits in the 1936 army incident at Tokyo and was placed upon the "waiting list" for his participation.

The reaction of most Japanese officials at Tokyo and throughout the world was immediate. Before the United States could dispatch a note of protest, apologies had been presented to the State Department and to United States diplomatic, naval, and military officials throughout the world. The Japanese Government claimed the attack was accidental, accepted full responsibility, and offered indemnity. The Japanese senior naval officials did all in their power to expedite aid to the survivors of the attack. The Japanese Army, which seems to have been directly responsible for the attack, is apparently unwilling to admit its responsibility or to take any steps to prevent its recurrence. It is reported that the Japanese Army, particularly a radical group of "younger officers," is not under the control of their Government or even of their higher commanders. General Matsui is unable or unwilling to enforce discipline in his command, as evidenced by the attacks on neutral vessels and by the Nanking outrages after the capture of the city. The statements of most Japanese Army authorities with regard to this incident have been marked by denials of responsibility and by evasiveness.

The strained situation between the United States and Japan over the Panay incident appears to be getting more tense as the result of late dispatches from survivors of that attack. Editorial comment and mail indicate a desire for a stiffening attitude on the part of the United States. Unless a satisfactory settlement is reached at an early date, the incident may result in pressure from the United States and England after consultation, acting jointly or in parallel, to produce the desired results. British attitude vis-a-vis Japan is also stiffening decidedly. The question of strengthening the British forces in the Far East will probably be discussed in the Cabinet meeting scheduled for December 22.

Even in Japan there are many people who are not satisfied with the Japanese Government's policy in handling the Panay incident. An editorial in the Tokyo Kokumin Shinbun, dated December 21, demanded that the veil of secrecy regarding the Panay incident be lifted. The editorial goes on to say that, if secrecy regarding the Panay and other incidents continues, the Government may be suspected of trying to do a job too big for it, that it is making a bad mess of things, and that this secrecy does not tend to hold the confidence of the people. These are strong words for a Japanese newspaper to use during a crisis and the editor must be a very brave man.

Germany formally registered "objections" to Japanese air attacks on the British steamer Wangpu which carried members of the German Nanking Embassy. This action is not regarded as strong as a protest.

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Italy is reported awaiting United States action in the death of Sandro Sandri, Italian correspondent, who died as results of wounds received during the attack on the Panay. Italian officials indicate they consider the Panay was United States soil.

North China. On the night of December 18-19 Chinese units acting under the reported instructions of the Central Government destroyed all Japanese mills in the Tsingtao area, valued at 250 million yen. It had been claimed that the Japanese had delayed invading Shantung south of the Yellow River because of fear that these mills would be destroyed. The Chinese action is ascribed to: (1) desire of the Central Government to divert a threatened Japanese invasion of South China to Shantung; (2) retaliation for the butcheries at Nanking; and (3) the ascendancy in the councils of Central Government gained by Red radical elements.

Swift Japanese retribution is expected by the Chinese in Shantung. A general exodus from Tsingtao is proceeding. The State Department is urging all American citizens (about 300 are concentrated in Tsingtao) to evacuate at once. The Chinese have sunk 5 small gunboats at the entrance to the inner harbor and are reported to have also mined the entrance. Chinese troops in the Tsingtao area consist of a Marine detachment of 5,000 under Admiral Shen Hung-lieh, and a detachment of Salt Guards. Yu Hsueh-chung, who is rabidly anti-Japanese, is reported astride of the Tsingtao--Tsinan Railway about midway between these two cities. It is probable that Han Fu-chu had no hand in the destruction of the Japanese property. There has been no Japanese military action up to December 21 as a result of the Tsingtao sabotage. Two observation Japanese airplanes flew over the city on the 20th but made no hostile gestures.

In Shansi the Japanese admit they have withdrawn all troops south of Taiyuan to a line from Wenshui to Kih sien. East of Taiyuan they hold only the Cheng-Tai Railway, the section near Taiyuan still being out of commission, and communications are interrupted. They claim to hold the Taiyuan--Tatung line. The Tatung-Kweihua section of the Ping-Sui Railway, while held by the Japanese, is subject to constant raids by Chu Teh's troops. There are sporadic attacks by remnants of the 29th Army in the area east of the Ping-Han Railway, particularly in the Changte-Kwasien area.

Chinese ex-communist troops and irregulars are reported at many points in northwest China. Twenty thousand are reported in northwest Shensi, 7,000 in the Wutaishan area in Shansi, 5,000 in the Ningwu area, and unknown numbers in the mountains in Shansi southeast of Yutze and Taiku and on both sides of the Cheng-Tai Railway. A large concentration of Chinese troops is reported at Sinsiang, on the Ping-Han Railway north of Chengchow.

Japanese report over 15,000 Chinese troops have surrendered in western Shantung and southern Hopei during the last two weeks. They claim they have completely mopped up the area between the Wei and Yellow Rivers and that they now occupy Lintsing and Kwangtai in western Shantung.

A foreign report from Shansi states that the Japanese hold no more than one-third of the province and that part only along certain lines of communication. Some Japanese troops, probably Kwantung Army units, have been withdrawn from Shansi.

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A skirmish was reported at Hsinlo on the Ping-Han Railway, in which a number of Japanese soldiers were killed and wounded.

Chinese report 30,000 Chinese troops in the vicinity of Fengshan, 35 miles south of Peiping.

Kiachow, 30 miles east of Tsinan, and Taian, on the Tsin-Pu Railway, were bombed by Japanese December 14.

Han Fu-chu's representatives are reported preparing a base for him at Yenchang, Honan, for use in case he is forced out of Shantung.

Japanese report that Sian, Shensi, was bombed on December 12 and that many airplanes and hangars were destroyed there.

Central China. The Japanese Headquarters at Shanghai announced the capture of Nanking on December 13 after sanguinary battles. They now hold both sides of the Yangtze from Wuhu to Kiangyin. Isolated Chinese detachments are still putting up resistance in this area. The Japanese are now reported to be exerting pressure north in three columns, one in the general vicinity of the Grand Canal opposite Chinkiang, another is pushing north on the Tsin-Pu Railway, and a third is pressing in the vicinity of Hohsien. There are also increasing signs of activity in the direction of Hangchow, along the railroad and roads leading from Shanghai and it is probable that the Japanese will push on and take the town soon. Reliable reports state that the Japanese are now 12 miles north of Kiangyin, 22 miles north of Chinkiang, 20 miles north of Pukow and 12 miles west of Wuhu. The main drive on Hangchow is proceeding slowly down the Grand Canal and is now at Changan. The Japanese admitted 240,000 troops were employed in the drive on Nanking.

It now appears that many of the best Chinese divisions were withdrawn from Nanking prior to the final attack. The 87th Division is now at Chuchow, north of Puchen; the Salt Division is in the Yangchow area; the 59th and 88th Divisions fought their way out of Nanking to the south and are now reported in the vicinity of Kwangteh; and the badly cut up 32d Division has been withdrawn to Hankow. The bulk of the Chinese forces are now reported southwest of Nanking.

While it is difficult to forecast future Japanese activity in this area, it is not believed likely that they will push much farther west at this time. A drive up the Tsin-Pu to the Shantung border is much more probable. There are reports of Japanese troops now boarding transports at Shanghai and Woosung. While most Chinese sources believe that these troops will be used for a landing in South China, a landing at Haichow, terminus of the Lung-Hai Railway, or on the Shantung coast, is not unlikely.

The Chinese are reported preparing a front in Southern Anhwei with the bulk of their forces to resist Japanese advance toward Hankow. In the vicinity of Hsuechow (junction of the Lung-Hai and Tsin-Pu Railways) the Chinese have a concentration of troops consisting of 3 Kwangsi Divisions, several Central Government Divisions and Provincial troops. These are preparing positions to repel a drive north from Nanking.

Along the Yangtze, several barriers are now in preparation and one strong one at Matang near Kukiang was closed to traffic on December 21. Navigation aids on the river have also been removed.

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There was an utter collapse of Chinese resistance in the Nanking area during the latter stages of the attack on the 12th. Isolated regiments fought well and many held out for several days after the city had fallen. But the bulk of the Chinese troops remaining in Nanking had only the thought of escape. They discarded their arms and shed their uniforms in the hopes of escaping Japanese retribution. The Japanese announce they hold 15,000 Chinese prisoners in Nanking, and 25,000 more ex-Chinese soldiers are in the city in civilian clothes. Foreign correspondents report that the capture of Nanking was marked by butchery and pillage. Wholesale looting, violation of women, murder of civilians, mass executions of war prisoners, have turned Nanking into a city of terror. The Japanese headquarters is now reported to be making every effort to curb the Nanking atrocities.

General Matsui's headquarters are reported to have been moved to Nanking. This lends color to the belief that further military operations in the Yangtze Valley are to continue. A triumphal entry into the city by the Japanese Army and Navy commanders was held on December 17.

An officer of the Japanese Navy at Nanking on December 20 informed Admiral Holt, Commander of the British Yangtze flotilla, that the channels made through the Mudford and Kiangyin River barriers (below Nanking) were made solely for the use of Japanese vessels and not for neutral shipping. He stated that the passage of the HMS Ladybird and the USS Oahu and other ships (bringing the Panay survivors down to Shanghai) could not be taken as a precedent. The British cruiser Cape-town and other British steamers carrying refugees are reported en route downstream, having pushed through the river barriers at Kukiang and above just before they were closed. It is hardly likely that the Japanese will prevent the passage of these vessels downstream. The Japanese have not informed naval commanders of other nations of their restrictions on river traffic as yet.

Japanese air activity was intensified during the attack on Nanking. Chinkiang, Nanking, Wuhu, Fukow, and Pengpu were subjected to mass bombing attacks. Chinese installations and lines of communication on both sides of the Yangtze and retreating columns of troops were subjected to strafing. A troop train at Suchow, junction of the Lung-Hai and Tsin-Pu, was demolished, and the Kunghsien Honan arsenal was also reported bombed. In a surprise attack on Nanchang the Japanese spokesman reported that "slightly over six" Japanese planes had been shot down, and that 16 Chinese planes were destroyed. Japanese air raids were also reported on Nanchang, Sian, Loyang, and other inland cities, on December 14. Eighty-five bombs and two packages of leaflets were dropped on Kukiang on December 20. Hankow was reported bombed on December 21 with little damage.

There have been no reports of Chinese air activity. The new Russian planes previously reported at Nanking and Hankow have not been in evidence, unless they were utilized in the reported Japanese raid on Nanchang. The Idzumo at Nanking opened fire with its antiaircraft batteries on December 9 but no Chinese planes were sighted in the hazy atmosphere.

Reliable reports state that 42 Soviet airplanes plus 100 pilots and mechanics arrived at Nanchang about December 4. More Soviet pilots are reported in Hankow.

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During an aerial bombardment at Wuhu on December 5, two British merchant ships, plainly marked and loaded with refugees were hit and destroyed by the resulting fire. The commander of the British gunboat Ladybird and two other British subjects were wounded and a large number of Chinese refugees were killed and wounded. The Japanese Chief of Staff at Shanghai expressed regret to the British Admiral for the incident. Protests over this incident are now merged with those of the serious attacks on December 12 reported under the Panay Incident.

Kombrig M. J. Brathin, the new Soviet Military Attache, and Colonel J. H. Ratob, his assistant, are reported at Hankow.

Press reports of the events following the Shanghai Parade Incident with particular reference to the "invasion" of the United States Marine Sector by Japanese troops were greatly exaggerated. The Japanese entered the marine sector unintentionally and withdrew immediately upon being informed of their trespass. Two officers of General Matsui's staff later called upon the Commanding Officer of the U. S. Marines and apologized for the incident.

At Shanghai the Japanese informed the United States and other Shanghai defense forces that their intention to post guards on Japanese property in the sector of other nations in the International Settlement had been postponed. Japanese censorship of Chinese newspapers in Shanghai started December 15. The Nantao safety zone adjacent to the French Concession was taken over by Japanese authorities on December 16 as a result of an alleged attack on a Japanese sentry.

South China. There are persistent reports, mainly from Chinese sources, that the Japanese intend to make a landing in South China. Japanese transports with naval convoy have been reported in the vicinity of Hongkong and Formosa. Landings are predicted in the vicinity of Chikkai Island, at Swatow, Amoy, and Foochow. An unverified Chinese report dated December 21 states that 10,000 Japanese troops were landed at Bias Bay.

Japanese aircraft continue to make daily raids on Hongkong--Canton Railways and roads. Chinese report Japanese aircraft carriers in Bias Bay.

A second highway from Canton to the Hongkong border via Tungkun has been opened. The British have also completed a link between the Chinese road and the Hongkong highway. A new highway bridge will be constructed at Shumchun soon, thus creating an unbroken highway between Hongkong and Canton.

Japanese are reported to have pursued and captured Chinese customs vessels in British waters near Hongkong. Thirty Japanese sailors were reported to have landed on a beach in British waters.

The loss of Nanking does not appear to have dampened the war spirit in South China. Government newspapers advise the populace to regard peace talkers as traitors. Madame Feng Yu-hsiang is at Kweilin carrying on propaganda.

General. The creation of a new regime called the "Provisional Government of the Republic of China" was proclaimed at Peiping on December 14 with appropriate ceremonies at which General Kita and other Japanese officials attended. The new government consists of

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an Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Commission under Chinese, most of whom are members of the Anfu clique, prominent in 1924 when Tsao Kun was president. No governmental head has been designated, but it is reported that Tsao Kun and Hsu Shih-chang are likely candidates for president, with Wu Pei-fu as vice president. The new regime claims sovereignty over all Chinese territory from which "Kuomintang troops" have retreated. The East Hopei Autonomous Government is absorbed in the new puppet. The "Mongol Empire" remains a separate entity. While the Chinese officials of the new regime claim de facto Japanese recognition, reports from Tokyo dated December 15 state that Japan will withhold recognition for the present. It is forecast in Peiping that if the Chinese Central Government comes to terms with the "Republic," the Japanese will perpetuate it for the northern provinces only. Otherwise Japanese would threaten to conquer all of China in the name of the "Republic."

Press reports December 17 state that the "Republic" has taken over the Chinese customs administrations of Tientsin, Tangku, Chingwangtao, and Shanhaikwan. Downward revisions of tariffs are forecast. There is no official confirmation of this news as yet but this action is a strong probability.

The Chinese Government on December 21 denounced the self-styled "Provisional Government" at Peiping as a Japanese puppet and a violation of Chinese sovereignty. The Government announced that all acts of the spurious Government are null and void.

A reorganization of the Chinese Central Government with a decided swing to the left is now in prospect. Radical elements believe that concrete aid from Russia will result if the reorganization is effected. It is reliably reported that Yu Yu-jen, President of the Control Yuan, has made the following demands on the Government: (1) Release of political prisoners; (2) general change in military strategy; (3) withdrawal of all restrictions on mass movements; and (4) resignation of the following: Wang Ching-wei, Chairman of the Central Political Committee; H. H. Kung, Finance Minister; Chen Li Fu, Director of the Publicity Department; and other prominent party leaders. These demands are backed by pro-Communist military leaders including Chang Fa Kwei. It is reported that Chiang Kai-shek must swing to the left or lose control.

Chiang Kai-shek, in a radio broadcast on December 16, called on all China to continue resistance. He pointed out that Chinese military losses on all fronts were over 300,000, and losses in civilian life and property were beyond computation, but he predicted that continued resistance would soon cause Japan to exhaust herself.

Reports from Sian state that the Russians have established primary and advanced aviation schools at Lanchow. The equipment consists of single-engined pursuit and observation airplanes. Four-motored bombers are also reported. The Russian airplanes, even when reportedly manned by Soviet pilots, have so far failed to give any promising performances.

Reliable reports state that there are approximately 350,000 Japanese troops now in Manchuria. The normal strength of the Kwantung Army has been reenforced by drafts from Japan and withdrawals from North China. The bulk of the concentration is reported to be east of Harbin. A reliable foreign source predicts that the Japanese will

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strike at Siberia before March 1 by attacking north of Vladivostok and at Blagoveshchensk. Reports from Harbin indicate heavy troop movement through there during the month of November. Most of these are reported to be new troops from Japan.

Reports of unrest in Manchuria continue. Manchoukuoan troops (Manchurian Chinese with Japanese officers) are not trusted far by the Japanese. Most of these forces have been moved south as a precaution against possible disturbances in rear of Japanese troops guarding the border. The Chinese in Manchoukuo bitterly resent the regimentation forced upon them by the Kwantung Army and would be glad of an opportunity to cause trouble. Should the Japanese become involved in Siberia, stern repressive measures will undoubtedly be taken in Manchoukuo.

American and British consular authorities have protested to the Manchoukuo Government over the enforcement of discriminatory exchange control regulations against United States and British banks.

China protested Italy's recognition of Manchoukuo to the League of Nations.

Seventeen members of the Italian Aviation Mission in China arrived at Hongkong from Hankow December 19, 1937, en route home. They deny that they were dismissed and stated that they were recalled by the Italian Government. Many reports during the last few months have indicated that the Chinese did not trust the Italian aviators and had relegated them to inactivity.

According to a mail report from Baghdad, 12 German airplanes, purchased by H. H. Kung on his recent visit to Germany, were expected to pass through Iraq en route to China.

Italian sources report Japan is now building three 46,000-ton battleships mounting 16" guns. Five aircraft carriers, seven light cruisers and 43 destroyers and submarines are also reported either building or projected. According to these reports the Japanese Navy will have 289 men of war totaling 1,109,130 tons by 1941, at which time the United States will just reach Washington treaty strength.

The Japanese Foreign Office lodged a vigorous protest with the Soviet Embassy at Tokyo requesting the immediate release of seven Japanese allegedly held at Vladivostok on "ambiguous" charges.

A Chinese report indicates that Russia is strengthening the Vladivostok forts and is making provisions for 150 planes. The strength of the Vladivostok garrison is reported at 85,000 men. Japanese reports state that Russia is sending two cruisers, 18 submarines, and 6 destroyers to Vladivostok next week, and that 600 pilots and 100 airplanes were sent there last week. Reports from London dated December 21 state that Russia is strengthening her Far East air and sea forces on a large scale. The Battleship "Lieut. Schmidt," the armored cruiser "Red Ukraine," and 20 submarines were reported to have been ordered to the Far East from Sevastopol. Detachments of air force from Moscow and Kiev are also reported to be en route to the Far East.

Admiral Yoshida replaced Admiral Nagano in command of the combined fleet on December 1. The combined fleet contains the 1st and 2d fleets and includes all of the capital ships and most of the modern carriers and destroyers. Admiral Nagano is now on duty as a member of the War Council in Tokyo.

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Tokyo dispatches state Admiral Eisuke Yamamoto and Mitsuru Toyama have issued a manifesto to the nation on December 15 calling for the disbandment of political parties and for the establishment of a national party. A movement is under way in the Minseito and Seiyukai parties for liquidation in favor of a totalitarian state. Tokyo authorities announced the arrest of 370 members of alleged pro-Communist parties in a nation-wide sweep. They ordered the dissolution of the Proletarian Party and the Japanese Trade Union Council.

The Department of Commerce reports that Japan shipped \$5,780,515 in gold to the United States during the week ending on December 3. This brings the total of Japanese gold shipments this year to \$202,109,323.


Mr. William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, formally appealed to Union members to refuse to buy Japanese goods and to organize boycott committees in the central labor unions in each city to request merchants to stop handling Japanese goods.

London reports that a world-wide boycott of Japanese goods will be started January 1 by the International Peace Campaign Committee, which claims to have 400,000,000 members in 43 countries.

American, French, and British officials in China have made representations to Japan suggesting the creation of a safety zone at Hankow to safeguard foreigners, foreign shipping, and refugees.

Tightening of Japan's belt to meet the strain of war is shown by the revised rules issued by the Ministry of Finance governing exchange transactions between Japan and foreign countries. These rules require that Government permission be obtained for the sale of foreign property valued at more than ¥50,000, or for the purchase abroad of real estate, ships, mining, or industrial rights of an annual value of more than ¥50,000. Semiannual reports of the assets of Japanese enterprises abroad are now required. The amount of money that can be shipped abroad, or taken by travelers, and the size of foreign purchases permitted without special authority have also been definitely limited.


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Washington,

February 2, 1938.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

Your 41, January 19, 8 p.m.

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The Department has not observed any recent press reports of or editorial comment relating exclusively to incidents involving the mutilation of the flag. On January 25 the New York Times published an account of continued Japanese excesses at Nanking, referring to them as QUOTE/indescribable UNQUOTE. Japanese lawlessness/as described in this report and in our note of January 17 to the Japanese Government, together with the assault on Allison, the stiffening resistance of the Chinese forces, and the attitude of the Japanese Government towards rights of others in China have formed the chief subjects of recent editorial comment on the Far Eastern conflict, which continues to hold public interest.

Discussing the lawlessness in Nanking, the New York Times on January 26 stated QUOTE Now triumphant soldiers in occupied Nanking are enjoying the fruits of military victory by looting and ravaging of helpless Chinese. It

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is thus Japan is bringing order into China UNQUOTE.
 The Philadelphia Inquirer asserts QUOTE Although there
 may be grounds for charging the Nanking lawlessness
 to mutinous troops, the fact remains that Japan's whole
 program of aggression in China has been such as to
 incite its soldiery to brutal acts UNQUOTE. The
 Baltimore Sun refers to the behavior of Japanese soldiery
 as QUOTE shocking UNQUOTE. The stiffening Chinese re-
 sistance is epitomized in such expressions as QUOTE
 Japan is in trouble up to her neck UNQUOTE, and QUOTE
 War Not Over Yet UNQUOTE, some even predicting Japan's
 ultimate ruin. Skepticism of recent declarations in
 the Diet that foreign rights would be respected is
 expressed in such editorial titles as QUOTE Deceptive
 Diplomacy UNQUOTE, QUOTE Meaningless Words UNQUOTE,
 QUOTE Fair Words from Japan UNQUOTE, QUOTE Open Door
 But How Open? UNQUOTE.

There is considerable editorial sentiment in favor
 of depriving Japan of materials and resources with which
 to consolidate her aggression. On January 28 in
 Washington a ~~League~~ league of women shoppers held a

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QUOTE/Life/Without/Silk/UNQUOTE/fashion show to dramatize
 and encourage individual boycotting of Japanese silk.
 Evidently alarmed by actual and prospective boycotting,
 a delegation of hosiery workers on the same day held a
 parade in Washington to advertise the extent to which
 American labor would be penalized by a boycott of silk.

The President's message to Congress on January 28 asking
 supplementary appropriation for national defense
 was well received by Congress and public.

The press is showing a growing tendency to discount
 the sincerity of recent official Japanese apologies for
 disregard of American rights and for the Allison outrage,
 as well as of popular Japanese expressions of regret for
 injuries done to us. The Baltimore Sun asks how much
 weight can be attached to Japanese assurances if the
 Japanese Government is unable to control its soldiers.
 The Washington Times alluding to the Allison slapping
 advises its readers as follows: QUOTE 'Let's keep our
 shirts on as we managed to do when the Paray was sunk
 UNQUOTE and explains that QUOTE the invading Japanese

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Washington.

- 4 -

soldiers . . . 'seem to be paying no more attention to the home authorities' ideas on proper war conduct than a band of Iroquois raiders in the old days would have paid to the ideas of the medicine men mumbling among the tepees back home UNQUOTE. A Washington Star columnist facetiously remarks QUOTE Foreign Secretary Hirota has ordered his clerks to have an abundant supply of Form No. 2247 SUBQUOTE Apologies to the United States END SUBQUOTE so as to save time whenever the United States protests UNQUOTE, and the same idea is expressed in the New York Herald Tribune's leading cartoon of January 31.

You may consider it desirable when a suitable opportunity presents itself in conversations with officials of the Foreign Office to call their attention to the growing and widespread skepticism in the United States, as illustrated by the foregoing comments, as to the worth of Japanese official assurances.

OR ~~DT~~
 FEB 3 1938. PM

FE:WRL:DT:REK

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

Hull
 P. H.

037
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~FE~~
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336
Y

FROM


COMSOPAT

February 9, 1938

Rec'd 2:35 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV *DT*

INFO: CINCAF ADMV
SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
AMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING



0009. Whampoo area east vicinity Canton bombed, four
sighted; other South China ports quiet. 2000.

CSB

793.94/12372

FILED
F/FG
FEB 14 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
FEB 1 - 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
January 17, 1938.
February 1 1938
Division
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
VILLA CORNELIA
Palm Springs, California

22 AM 9 45

793.94

My dear Secretary:

Of course there are some unladylike things that the Japanese are doing in the Far East but perhaps the most unladylike thing of all is that they are driving the Chinese into Communism.

When Chiang Kai-shek came up from Canton some ten years ago he and his associates were very anti-communistic and gave the communist movement some strong, decisive blows. But now the conduct of the Japanese seems fully to have convinced the Chinese that no one can be more cruel and destructive than the Japanese and they have quite reversed their attitude toward the Communists.

Mrs. Crane and I greatly prize this beautiful valley, the magic of its air and its products. We greatly hope that when you lay down your present fearful responsibilities, which you have carried so wonderfully, we can persuade you to come out here as our guest for a long period of refreshment.

Warm greetings to you and Mrs. Hull.

Charles R. Crane

The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

702 04/12373
793.94/12373

F/FG
F/FG/2373

0378

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 1 1938

My dear Mr. Crane:

It always gives me pleasure to hear from you.

I have read with interest the comments which you make in your letter of January 17 with regard to the situation in China.

I greatly appreciate the kind message and the cordial invitation which you give me in the concluding paragraph of your letter. Judging by its products, I can appreciate your and Mrs. Crane's enthusiasm for the Palm Springs region. Your invitation is very attractive.

Mrs. Hull joins me in kindest greetings to you and Mrs. Crane, and I am

Yours sincerely,

Cordell Hull

The Honorable

Charles R. Crane,

Villa Cornelia,

Palm Springs, California.

PA/H:SKH:ZMK
2-1-38

793.94/12373

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CORRECTED COPY

JR

FROM
GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated February 9, 1938

Rec'd 2 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

229.

February 9, 11 p.m.


FOLLOWING FROM TOKYO.

"Please relay to Johnson.

"We have had no telegrams from Canton with regard to the reportedly tense political situation there. It would be very helpful if you could instruct Linnell to repeat to us his more important telegrams on this subject or to send his periodic resumes'. Please repeat to the Department. Crew".

GAUSS

CSB



795.94/12374

FEB 10 1938

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1336

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated February 9, 1938

Rec'd 2 p.m.


Secretary of State,
Washington.

February 9, 11 p.m.

FOLLOWING FROM TOKYO.

"February 9, 8 p.m.

Please relay to Johnson.



"We have had no telegrams from Canton with regard to the reportedly tense political situation there. It would be very helpful if you could instruct Linnell to repeat to us his more important telegrams on this subject (?) (?) (?) resumes'. Please repeat to the Department. Grew."

GAUSS

CSB

793.94/12374

F/FG

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00/774 FOR Letter

FROM L. R. Barnes, MC () DATED Feb. 8, 1938
 TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Far Eastern situation. Copy of House Resolution No. 417
 requesting statement from the President concerning enforcement
 of the policy of neutrality in Europe and not as to Far East.

fp

793.94/12375

12375

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

February 9, 1938


1-1336

FROM

Rec'd 6:41 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV, WASHINGTON
 INFO: CINCAF
 2nd BRIGADE USMC
 YANGPAT
 COMSUBRON 5
 COMDESRON 5
 COMSOPAT
 AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
 USS MARBLEHEAD
 ALUSNA PEIPING

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



1009 Yangtze River ports quiet 2025

SMS:NPL

793.94/12376

FEB 11 1938

FILED

F/FG

0383

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 7 1938

CONFIDENTIAL - FOR STAFF USE ONLY

No. 1433

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
 American Ambassador,
 Tokyo.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction no. 1427
 of January 25, 1938, there are enclosed for your confi-
 dential information copies of certain documents, as
 listed below, relating to the Chinese-Japanese situa-
 tion.

Very truly yours,

Dorrell Galt

Enclosures:


1. Memorandum of conversation,
 January 21, 1938, between
 the Under Secretary, Mr.
 Matsukata, and Mr. Hornbeck,
 with covering comment by
 Mr. Hornbeck.
2. Memorandum of conversation,
 January 24, between Mr. Tsui
 and Mr. Hamilton.
3. Memorandum of conversation,
 January 26, between the
 Secretary of State and the
 Chinese Ambassador.
4. Memorandum of conversation,
 February 1, between Mr. Suma
 and Mr. Hamilton.

Routine

FEB 7 1938.

FE:EGC:HES
 2-4

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F/FG

12376A

0384

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 7 1938

CONFIDENTIAL - FOR STAFF USE ONLY

No. 534

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,

American Ambassador,

Peiping.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction no. 529 of January 25, 1938, there are enclosed for your confidential information copies of certain documents, as listed below, relating to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

Gorrell Bull

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation, January 21, 1938, between the Under Secretary, Mr. Matsukata, and Mr. Hornbeck, with covering comment by Mr. Hornbeck.
2. Memorandum of conversation, January 24, between Mr. Tsui and Mr. Hamilton.
3. Memorandum of conversation, January 26, between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador.
4. Memorandum of conversation, February 1, between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hamilton.

Routine

CR
 FEB 7 1938

Copy to American Ambassador, Hankow.

FE:EGC:HES
 2-5

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 2-5

793.94/12376B

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12376B



Handwritten signature/initials.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CONFIDENTIAL - FOR STAFF USE ONLY

No. 2139

Herschel V. Johnson, Esquire,

American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
 London.

Sir:


Referring to the Department's instruction no. 2126
 of January 25, 1938, there are enclosed for your confi-
 dential information copies of certain documents, as
 listed below, relating to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation,
 January 21, 1938, between
 the Under Secretary, Mr. M
 Matsukata, and Mr. Hornbeck,
 with covering comment by
 Mr. Hornbeck.
2. Memorandum of conversation,
 January 24, between Mr. Tsui
 and Mr. Hamilton.
3. Memorandum of conversation,
 January 26, between the
 Secretary of State and the
 Chinese Ambassador.
4. Memorandum of conversation,
 February 1, between Mr. Suma
 and Mr. Hamilton.



FEB 8 1938.

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0386

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL - FOR STAFF USE ONLY

No. 676

The Honorable

William C. Bullitt,
 American Ambassador,
 Paris.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction no. 648
 of January 25, 1938, there are enclosed for your confi-
 dential information copies of certain documents, as
 listed below, relating to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

Gordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation,
 January 21, 1938, between
 the Under Secretary, Mr.
 Matsukata, and Mr. Hornbeck,
 with covering comment by
 Mr. Hornbeck.
2. Memorandum of conversation,
 January 24, between Mr. Tsui
 and Mr. Hamilton.
3. Memorandum of conversation,
 January 26, between the
 Secretary of State and the
 Chinese Ambassador.
4. Memorandum of conversation,
 February 1, between Mr. Suma
 and Mr. Hamilton.



OR 4382
 FEB 1938
 29C.

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FE 12/1/38
 Eu 12/1/38

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F/HG 12376d.

0387

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL - FOR STAFF USE ONLY

No. 256

The Honorable

William Phillips,
 American Ambassador,
 Rome.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction no. 245
 of January 25, 1938, there are enclosed for your confi-
 dential information copies of certain documents, as
 listed below, relating to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation,
 January 21, 1938, between
 the Under Secretary, Mr.
 Matsukata, and Mr. Hornbeck,
 with covering comment by
 Mr. Hornbeck.
2. Memorandum of conversation,
 January 24, between Mr. Tsui
 and Mr. Hamilton.
3. Memorandum of conversation,
 January 26, between the
 Secretary of State and the
 Chinese Ambassador.
4. Memorandum of conversation,
 February 1, between Mr. Suma
 and Mr. Hamilton.



JP
 FEB 1940
 Routine

FE:ECC:HES
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Eu
 24

HWT

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12376E

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 22, 1938.

COMMENT

I have given thought to the question whether Mr. Matsukata was instructed or inspired by his Government to make the approach of which account is given in the memorandum here attached. (At one point in the conversation, Mr. Matsukata stated with emphasis that he was not an official, was not connected with the Government, and could speak without responsibility.)

I greatly doubt whether his bringing up of the question of good offices was inspired by the Tokyo Government. I think it likely that he has been instructed to make explorations and find out and report on subjects information with regard to which may be of value to his Government in several fields; likely that Ambassador Saito may have suggested that he raise the question of good offices in order to elicit whatever reply and whatever comments such an inquiry might evoke; likely that Matsukata himself feels that pressure by the United States toward bringing the hostilities to an end would be of tremendous value to Japan; possible that he may have gotten his inspiration from conversation with American friends, of whom several in New York and at least one in Washington feel that Japan is destroying herself through continuance and extension of the operation of her armed forces in China.

JWB

MSA - J.

1/24/38

1389

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

I feel that the position declared to Mr. Matsukata by Mr. Welles was absolutely sound; that this Government will (now) make no move in this matter unless it has first been asked to do so by the Japanese and the Chinese Governments officially (and formally).

I feel that we should set our minds against any embarkation by the United States Government alone into the field of mediation between Japan and China. If and when we are confronted with the necessity for deciding whether or not we will accept a rôle in that field, we should not accept that rôle without having first considered very carefully the advisability of there being associated with us in it the governments of some other countries, Great Britain in particular.

SKH

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

039

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 21, 1938.

SUBJECT: Situation in the Far East and Suggestion by
Mr. Matsukata that the United States Offer
Good Offices.

PARTICIPANTS:

Mr. Welles

Mr. Kojiro Matsukata (President, Matsukata Japan-Soviet
Oil Company, Limited)

COPIES TO: Mr. Hornbeck

GPO 1-1498

Mr. Matsukata's call on Mr. Welles followed upon a request by Mr. L. J. Hunt of New York City, by letter, and a request made by the Japanese Embassy here that Mr. Welles receive Mr. Matsukata.

Mr. Welles had not been informed that Mr. Matsukata would raise the question which Mr. Matsukata did raise.

Mr. Welles had in advance asked Mr. Hornbeck to be present at the interview.

When Mr. Matsukata entered Mr. Welles' office, Mr. Welles said to Mr. Matsukata that he had known and had considered it a privilege to know, when he was in Japan in the years at the beginning of the World War,

Mr.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Mr. Matsukata's father, and that he was very glad to meet that father's son.

Mr. Matsukata appropriately acknowledged this friendly overture, remarked that Mr. Welles had mentioned meeting his father during the World War, and made the observation that he, Matsukata, had now come here at a time when Japan was "at war." He then referred to some features of the present situation^{and} led up to, and made an inquiry whether the American Government might not tender to Japan and China the good offices of this country. He developed his statement, ^{and} inquiry, in a manner which implied or warranted inference that he felt that the existing situation is one of disadvantage and hazard to Japan, and he stressed the possibility of its leading to serious controversy or conflict between Japan and other countries, with the implication that it therefore makes the position of other countries hazardous.

Mr. Welles said that he wished to be perfectly frank and wished to make the attitude and position of this Government clear beyond the possibility of any misunderstanding. He would ask Mr. Hornbeck to state on what occasions this Government had already proffered its good offices. Mr. Hornbeck said that, on July 12, five days after the first armed clash between the Japanese and the Chinese near Peiping, the Secretary of State, in conversation with
 the

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the Japanese Ambassador, had stated that this Government regretted the outbreak of these hostilities, hoped that they would not spread, and would be prepared to be of assistance to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments, if they were willing, toward composing their differences; that the Secretary had said the same thing to the Chinese Ambassador at that time; ^{and} that, thereafter, on the occasion of almost every interview which he had had with the Japanese and the Chinese Ambassadors respectively, the Secretary had reiterated these points. Mr. Welles raised question of the position taken by this Government at the Brussels Conference, and Mr. Hornbeek went on to say that at the Brussels Conference this Government and the other Conference powers, taking note of the Japanese Government's reply to the Belgian Government's invitation in terms indicating that the Japanese Government was not prepared to attend the Conference, had suggested to and requested of the Japanese Government that that Government appoint a representative to confer with representatives of a few or a small number of the powers; and that the Japanese Government had replied that it was not prepared to do that.

Mr. Welles then referred to Mr. Matsukata's inquiry and stated that he, Mr. Welles, having lived three years in Japan, had long had a most friendly feeling toward
 the

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

the Japanese people and a great admiration of their many splendid qualities and outstanding achievements; that he shared Mr. Matsukata's view that the present situation is deplorable and fraught with hazards; that the Government of the United States has from the outset been desirous of contributing toward ameliorating the situation in the Far East and toward composing the conflict which is going on there. We have repeatedly proffered our good offices. The Japanese Government has at no time responded favorably. It is our understanding that the German Government a few weeks ago took steps toward mediation, that the Japanese Government informed the German Ambassador in China of the Japanese Government's peace proposals, that the German Ambassador laid these before the Chinese Government, and that the Chinese Government did not find the proposals acceptable. The American Government could not take at this time an initiative; it could act only if it were informed officially by the Japanese Government and by the Chinese Government respectively that those Governments desire an exercise of good offices by it; and that, if we were to embark upon exercise of good offices, our action would have to be on the basis of terms consistent with the Nine Power Treaty.

Mr.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Mr. Matsukata appeared disconcerted. He said that if the American Government felt that it must fall back on "historical" ground and insist on applying the Nine Power Treaty the whole problem was made very difficult.

Mr. Welles commented on that statement, to the effect that the American Government did not regard the Nine Power Treaty as being merely an "historical" instrument; that this Government regards that treaty as an agreement still in effect between and among the powers parties to it, among which are both Japan and the United States, and that, as we have on several occasions stated, such an agreement is binding until it has been made not so by the common assent of the parties to it, a procedure quite different from a unilateral disregard of it by some one of the parties. Mr. Welles asked whether Mr. Hornbeck would care to make any comment.

Mr. Hornbeck referred to the fact that in 1933 or 1934 this Government, in a communication to the Japanese Government through Mr. Grew, had expressly and formally stated that in our view the provisions of treaties can be altered, but only by recognized processes. He continued, with the raising of an hypothetical question: Suppose that the question of the Nine Power Treaty could be left out of consideration, suppose there were no such treaty; could Mr. Matsukata expect the American Government,

in

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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in view of the facts that the Germans have been endeavoring to bring about a mediation and that Japan's terms have been communicated to the Chinese and that those terms are what they are and that the Chinese have rejected them, -- could the American Government at this moment step in and proffer its good offices? Mr. Matsukata replied that the United States was very different from Germany; that the Japanese had confidence in the United States; that the United States is a great and powerful and friendly power; and that he thought that a proffer on our part would be listened to. He said that the Japanese felt kindly toward the United States but were now not well disposed toward Great Britain; that Americans treated the Japanese with an attitude of understanding and consideration but that the British did not; that the Japanese would be receptive toward any efforts which the United States might make in the direction of and in connection with mediation; but that if the British were included in the making of such an effort the Japanese would react unfavorably.

Mr. Welles said that he wanted to make one point perfectly clear; that Mr. Matsukata must not infer from what Mr. Hornbeck had said that the facts of the existence of the Nine Power Treaty and of matters appertaining thereto could be set aside or left out of consideration. He pointed out that Mr. Hornbeck simply asked a hypothetical question.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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question. Mr. Hornbeck said that he too felt it important that Mr. Matsukata should not infer from what he had said that the Nine Power Treaty could be left out of consideration.

Mr. Matsukata again indicated that he felt that this view on the part of the American Government made the question of bringing the hostilities to an end very difficult; and he made a plea for our sweeping all such considerations aside and concentrating entirely on the fact that there exists in the Far East a tragic situation potential of producing even worse situations. He again urged that the United States should take an initiative.

Mr. Welles stated that our position was as follows:

First, That action in the direction of mediation could be taken by this Government only if there came to it an official indication from the Japanese Government and a similar indication from the Chinese Government that good offices or mediation by this Government are desired by those Governments respectively; Second, That this Government could act only on the basis of and in the light of its being understood that the settlement must be consistent with both the principles and the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty; and Third, That it is the position of this Government that the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty are susceptible of modification, amendment and
 alteration.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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alteration, but only by recognized processes of negotiation and agreement, not by unilateral action on the part of any one power.

Mr. Matsukata arose to take leave. He thanked Mr. Welles for having received him and given him so much time. Mr. Welles again expressed his admiration of Mr. Matsukata's father and his pleasure at having met Mr. Matsukata. Mr. Matsukata, in saying good-bye to Mr. Hornbeck, remarked, "Do not be too hard on us." Mr. Hornbeck, surprised at this remark, replied that none of us has any desire to be "hard on" Japan; that we are animated by no feeling of hostility; and that we are all intent on and hopeful of doing something constructively helpful in our relations with countries of the Far East. Mr. Matsukata said, "In that case it will be all right."

The interview there ended.

Addenda.

1. At an early point in this conversation Mr. Welles took occasion to speak of the adverse effect on public opinion in this country which had been produced by the Panay incident and other unwarranted acts by the Japanese armed forces.
2. At a late point in the conversation Mr. Matsukata
asked

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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asked expressly whether Mr. Welles had been informed by Mr. Grew of Japan's peace proposals. Mr. Welles said that he had been informed. Mr. Matsukata asked whether the American Government could not look with approval upon these proposals. Mr. Welles said that before it would be possible for him to come to any conclusion in that connection it would be necessary for him to have more precise knowledge of the implications of the proposals; the proposals were in general and broad terms.

PA/N:GKH:ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Voluntary Report)

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
OFFICE OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

En for grad...

793.94

744

7143



76

REACTION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA
TO THE UNDECLARED SINO-JAPANESE WAR

793.94/12377

From American Consul General

John K. Davis

John K. Davis

Vancouver, B. C.
Canada.

Date of Completion: February 3, 1938
Date of Mailing: February 4, 1938

FILED
FEB 23 1938

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Reaction as Indicated by Editorial Comment	4 - 10

Introduction

F/16

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Introduction:

The reaction in British Columbia to the earlier phases of the undeclared Sino-Japanese war was one of hostility caused by what was considered by Canadians in this province as the unwarranted brutality towards Chinese civilians by the Japanese naval and military forces, as well as by the realization on the part of a very small percentage of the population of the probable adverse effect of increasing Japanese control of China upon Canadian trade and the possibility of Japanese aggression in Canada. In recent months the feeling of hostility towards Japan has increased, but the grounds upon which it is based have somewhat changed. Instead of being predominantly an emotional reaction caused by sympathy with "the under dog", the hostility has increasingly been based upon more reasoned grounds of self interest, and consequently has become both more intelligent and more likely to remain as a semi-permanent feeling. This development has been occasioned by a combination of several causes. The sinking of the U.S.S. PANAY and the shelling of H.M.S. LADYBIRD have brought home to the average citizen that the menace of Japanese ruthlessness is not confined to Chinese civilians but actually imperils British and American lives and property as well, and this realization has made him angry. The behavior of Japanese troops occupying Nanking has also indicated that the Japanese ruthlessness is not confined to isolated instances occurring in the heat of battle, but is more or less a considered and deliberate policy. The Canadian government's decision to place batteries at various points -- and particularly one of two 6-inch guns in Stanley Park in Vancouver -- has startled the average complacent citizen into a realization that his highest officials believe that a Japanese attack upon the British Columbia coast is not merely the figment of some journalist's fertile imagination but is sufficiently probable to warrant the taking of practical steps to meet it. A still more compelling factor has been the recent disclosure that the estimates made in recent years of the number of Japanese in British Columbia and of their rate of increase

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have been incorrect and that both have actually been far greater than has heretofore been believed. This has caused the average Canadian in this province to realize that the whole question of the Japanese policies of aggression has a more direct bearing upon the lives and fortunes of himself and his children than he had ever before thought possible. A combination of these several considerations has caused and is increasingly causing the hostility of the population towards Japan both to increase and to take on a deeper and more significant tone.

The Reaction of Individuals and Some Officials:

A noticeable change has occurred in recent months in the comments made upon the Sino-Japanese war in private conversations both with representative private citizens and with high officials. In the earlier months of the conflict the average important business man or official usually confined his statements to expressions of revulsion at the needless sufferings imposed upon non-combatants and speculations as to how long the war would last and how soon normal trade might be resumed between this province and China. He was interested, but casually and not deeply or apprehensively. The same attitude was also typical of the higher officials. In recent months, however, a marked change has occurred. In conversations the same types now evidence a greater knowledge of the situation and its implications, particularly the endangerment of British influence and trade in China, the close connection between what Japan is doing in China and the embarrassments Britain is suffering from the totalitarian powers in Europe, and the menace to Canadian trade in China being caused by Japanese expansion. He is outraged and angry over the attacks upon American and British naval vessels in the Yangtze, resentful at the encroachments by Japanese in the industries of this province and alarmed to discover that there are more Japanese here than he had thought and that their numbers are increasing more rapidly than he had previously been told. In brief, he has ceased to have only an academic interest in the war and has been rudely awakened to the fact that it has a direct bearing upon his own fortunes and the future of his children.

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In a recent conversation with the Lieutenant-Governor of the province he expressed the conviction that the future of western Canada is very directly affected by what is transpiring in the Orient, that it behooves the Canadian people not to be complacent but to cooperate with the mother country in organizing coordinate defence measures. He also stressed the necessity for close Anglo-American cooperation in countering the Japanese threat, and the belief that eventually firmer measures than those thus far used would have to be undertaken.

Reaction as Indicated by Editorial Comment:

There has been a considerable volume of editorial comment upon the undeclared Sino-Japanese war and its various implications. The greater part of these comments have consisted of the animadversions of the different editors on various points and have been of no special significance; there have been, however, a number of editorials which are of interest as giving an insight to the typical reactions in this province to the war and the possible effect it has, and may have upon the lives and fortunes of Canadians living in Western Canada.

There are five leading daily newspapers in British Columbia, two being Liberal, Two Conservative and one Independent. The two Liberal papers, THE VANCOUVER SUN and the VICTORIA DAILY TIMES, have had the most to say and have been highly critical of Japan's actions and have evidenced the most concern as to the possible adverse effect upon Canada. THE VANCOUVER DAILY PROVINCE, Conservative and a Southam paper, has been critical of Japan and has also evidenced some concern. THE DAILY COLONIST, Conservative, of Victoria is inclined to be mildly hostile to the United States and to be pro-Japanese. It has, however, evidenced some resentment over the adverse effect upon general British interests of some of Japan's actions. THE NEWS-HERALD, Independent, Vancouver, has been forthright in its criticism of Japan.

In general the local press is highly critical of the brutal manner in which Japan has conducted an allegedly unwarranted war of aggression; has strongly resented the utter disregard of the rights of British and Americans in China; has found the outbursts of some Japanese leaders both ridiculous

and

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and dangerously significant; has expressed the belief that Japan's unbounded ambitions are a menace to the Canadian Pacific coast; has expressed restrained alarm over the large and increasing local Japanese population; and has expressed a belief that the solution to the entire series of problems lies in closer cooperation between Great Britain and the United States.

The largest number of editorials upon any single phase of the war appeared in connection with the Japanese attacks upon American and British naval vessels on the Yangtze River. In general this comment has been to the effect that the attacks have evidently not been mistakes but premeditated acts to determine the Anglo-American reaction; that, in view of the series of incidents which have occurred, Japan's apologies are insufficient redress and are meaningless; that there is little hope of any satisfactory solution unless the United States and Great Britain can unite in concerted pressure of some kind upon Japan; and that Japan's overweening ambition presages eventual danger to Canada and particularly the coasts of British Columbia.

The VANCOUVER DAILY PROVINCE in an editorial captioned "On the Yangtze" in its issue of December 13th expresses the opinion that "The Japanese will be polite and punctillious and go through the diplomatic motions" and that, since they do not want to run the risk of war, the American and British governments will do nothing effective unless sustained by some sudden flare-up of public opinion.

THE NEWS-HERALD comments in its issue of December 14th under the heading "Too Much Patience". It finds that:

"The situation in China today is that a nation turned bandit is engaging in national banditry against the nationals of the country and the bandit attitude is being taken toward all who happen to be in the country"

"Japanese morality has but one side. Anything the Japanese leaders think will benefit Japan is perfectly moral to them, no matter what international or human laws are broken in respect to the rights of others."

"The Japanese attitude is that they will do what they wish and apologize afterward; apologies cost nothing and the chief thing is to achieve the objective."

"Apologies are not enough. The Japanese are cold-bloodedly trying to drive Europeans out of China as well as to conquer the Chinese."

The nations that have interests in China have shown too much patience.

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patience. It is time for them to engage in police activities for the protection of such nationals as remain, and for the safeguarding of such of their buildings as have not been razed, and to retain title to the real property that is theirs by rights established long before the Japanese invasion.

"It is not necessary to declare war but it is necessary to declare peace against banditry and to enforce that peace".

THE VANCOUVER SUN in its issue of December 15th, in an editorial headed "'Safeguarding' Asia", sarcastically comments upon the Japanese assertion that "the fall of Nanking will serve to safeguard foreign interests in the Far East" and inquires in conclusion:

"Does she mean, do you suppose, the same kind of safety she has been affording foreign shipping on the bosom of the Yangtze-kiang?"

In its issue of December 16th, in an editorial entitled "Murder or War?" its editor contends that the attacks upon the British naval vessels were deliberate and must be regarded either as murder or an act of war, and should be appropriately dealt with. It finds a lesson for British Columbia and states:

"Now this coast of Canada is openly exposed to Japanese attacks. So far as Japan is concerned, the British Columbia coast is the most vulnerable part of the whole British Empire".

Bearing this in mind the editor concludes:

"Pussyfooting and protest may suit other parts of the Empire. But they do not suit those of us who live out here on the potential firing line.

"Was it murder or was it war?"

"We are entitled to know and to govern ourselves accordingly."

In its leading editorial of December 17th the editor comments under the heading "Salvation Lies in Unity" and finds that the solution of the problem created by the Yangtze attacks as well as "the peace and salvation of the world" depend upon the cooperation of the United States and Great Britain. The editor comments upon Japanese efforts to create a difference between these two countries and ^{state that Japan,} together with Germany and Italy, fears most a genuine Anglo-American understanding for common action.

THE VANCOUVER SUN on December 14, 1937 in an editorial headed "Acts of War" finds no excuse for the Japanese attacks and states:

"The profound 'sorrow' of the Japanese foreign office is so blandly hypocritical as to be more of an insult than the actual assault"

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"As every reasonable man knew from the beginning, each of them has been a deliberate and provocative act of war."

While deprecating the actual declaration of war upon Japan for the attacks upon the American and British naval vessels, he states:

"It is absurd, for instance, to go on treating a belligerent country as an erring boy when actually its behavior is that of pure criminal piracy.

It is ridiculous to chide and scold when the object of that treatment merely laughs at us for our moderation.

Perhaps a few similar 'accidents' and 'mistakes' inflicted, to our 'profound sorrow', upon Japanese shipping might have a salutary effect."

THE VICTORIA DAILY TIMES in its December 13, 1937 issue comments on the attacks, reciting the details, and then concludes with this statement:

"One fact upon which Japan must make up her mind is how far she proposes to allow her baiting of Great Britain and the United States to go. She is putting on a bold front and evidently wants to advertise her cocksureness to China that, in spite of their friendliness to the 'injured' nation, London and Washington will stand for a great deal more than they have done until now. Tokio may get a rude awakening sooner than the Japanese government expects."

The VANCOUVER DAILY PROVINCE on December 13, 1937, in an editorial headed "On the Yangtze" comments that:

"The men who rule Japan seem to be adept in the building of a great fire of anger against their nation in the world."

and proceeds to recite briefly the attacks upon the American and British naval vessels, and expresses the opinion that the Japanese have "undoubtedly counted all the chances of collision arising out of just such instances" and have decided to go ahead with their aggression in China. It points out the improbability of America and Britain taking the risk of getting into war by taking any real action and concludes:

"But where the Japanese warlords may miscalculate -- and perhaps where the British and American leaders may find their hands forced -- is in the imponderable sphere of public opinion in the English-speaking nations. The common people, who do not want war over China, still can not forget that this war upon China is undeclared, and as they believe, unprovoked and unjust. The subtleties of diplomacy will not answer the honest question why such a war can go unpunished and unrestrained. This thing we call 'keeping the peace' would not survive an indefinite continuation of the business of the Yangtze."

The violently anti-British pronouncements made by Admiral Nobumasa Suetsugu early in January occasioned half-amused and chiding editorials

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in two British Columbia newspapers and more serious editorial comment in two others.

THE NEWS-HERALD and the VICTORIA DAILY TIMES in their issues of January 6, 1938, both expressed the opinion that these outbursts had been made in order to divert the attention of the Japanese masses from the unanticipatedly heavy costs in blood and money of the invasion of China as well as from the increasingly hostile world opinion.

THE VANCOUVER DAILY PROVINCE in its leading editorial on January 5th takes the Admiral more seriously, and alleges that he was only stating in words what Japan is actually doing *****"steadily shutting the open door in China". It concludes, apropos of Japan's continual "treading on the toes of western democracies whose people are averse to war":

"But it may be impossible to avert war in the end, and it may be impossible to avert war at any price at all. Let us remember it. Let us remember that there is always a last time. We shall not be permitted, even if we would, to give in to the aggression for war."

THE VANCOUVER SUN, in its issues of January 5th and 6th comments upon the Admiral's outbursts and, while counseling restraint on the part of Britain, points out that the Admiral has stated what are probably the prevailing ideas and intentions of the Japanese. It concludes, much as does the VANCOUVER DAILY PROVINCE, that:

"Unless the white race decides to adopt the idea of divine inspiration of the yellow race, it looks as though Admiral Suetsugu is right -- so far as the conflagration is concerned, anyway."

The recent statement of the Japanese Minister for War, General Sugiyama, that Japan must prepare for war with "a country other than China" and the remarks reported to have been made in Shanghai by General Matsui that if Britain went "beyond maintaining her political and economic relations with the Kuomintang, a conflict of most serious nature" may develop between Japan and Great Britain was commented upon editorially in THE NEWS-HERALD on February 2nd. The editor concludes with these paragraphs:

"General Matsui's address may have been an officially inspired postscript to the Sugiyama pronouncement, a warning that England and not Russia, was meant."

The strengthening of defences at Hongkang is being speeded against any eventuality. More sea, air and land forces are being concentrated at Singapore.

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The sinister alliance between Italy, Germany and Japan is a growing threat to the peace of the world. The danger is fully realized in the councils of the civilized nations which have the protection of civilization in their keeping. They are therefore preparing for the worst while hoping for the best."

The comments in the press upon the adverse effect of Japanese aggression on Canadian and British trade in China have in most instances been made as asides in editorial comments upon other subjects. However, there have been some editorials dealing exclusively with this question. THE VANCOUVER DAILY PROVINCE in an editorial in its issue of January 6, 1938 headed "Japan's Grip Tightens" points out that the three doors to China's trade are Tientsin in the North, Shanghai in the center and Canton and Hongkong in the South. It asserts that:

"The doorway at Tientsin has been clanged shut. The Japanese are in control at Shanghai, and, presumably, intend to remain in control. And there are threats that Hongkong will be blockaded, or that, even if it is not, Canton will be cut off."

It points out that control of the ports means control of the customs and that Japanese practice is alleged to be for their own goods to be permitted to disregard the payment of duties, and thus to be able to undersell competing goods. It points out the great British interests in the Yangtze valley and the greater British interests in the south, and that if the flow of trade is severed "Hongkong will lose its value as a commercial center -- may even lose its value as a British possession."

The more immediate British Columbia trade interest in the Sino-Japanese undeclared war is touched upon in the January 14, 1938 issue of THE FINANCIAL NEWS of Vancouver, B. C., under the heading of "B.C. and Japan" which appeared in a column headed "Business in Review". In this it is pointed out that an appreciable part of Western Canada's foreign trade is with Japan and that this trade would be interrupted were Britain to take a strong stand as to China. It adds:

"Western Canada, however, should not overlook the fact that behind the more spectacular news of conquest is proceeding the economic conquest of North China, already controlled by Japan and chiefly for Japanese industrial advantage.

Japan, for instance, is a buyer of British Columbia highgrade pulp for rayon. But Japan is rushing construction of industries in Manchukuo to supply this demand. Four plants are reported to be nearing the producing stage.

Having shut out foreign trade in northern China, Japan is at once

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once commencing to exploit the resources of the land and to extend steadily southward the territory over which the Japanese-controlled Peiping government is to hold sway. It may be assumed that each successive province brought under the Peiping administration will have its door at once closed to foreign trade by the simple procedure of according Japanese goods a preferred or duty-free position in the market and taxing other imports heavily or by imposing exchange restrictions which make business transactions almost impossible excepting with Japan.

Thus the military and economic campaign being waged in China is designed to make Japan independent of North America for much that is transported across the Pacific at present and to shut off to other lands such as Canada markets which have long existed in China."

File No. 800.
JKD/md

Original and four copies to the Department.
One copy to the Legation at Ottawa.

Sources of Information:
Daily Press.
Private Conversations.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

File
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Memorandum of Conversation.

December 10, 1937.

Subject: Proposal to avoid Fighting inside
the City of Nanking.

Political Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr.

Hsu Mo telephoned to Mr. Peck while the latter was in attendance at an informal meeting of Embassy representatives at the residence of the German Ambassador, at twelve noon, and said that General Chang Chun had asked him to inform Mr. Peck that investigations had been made and it had been ascertained that the International Committee at Nanking had been in error in thinking that General Tang Sheng-chih had given his approval to a plan whereby there should be a truce of three days at Nanking, in the course of which the Chinese forces inside the city should withdraw; the fact was, Dr. Hsu Mo said, that representatives of the International Committee had seen the secretary of General Tang Sheng-chih, not the General himself, and the secretary had said that the proposal was such an important one that it would have to be referred to General Chiang Kai-shek, since the General was without authority to express an opinion regarding it. Dr. Hsu Mo then said that the proposal had been referred to General Chiang and General Chiang had said that he was not in position to accede to it. Mr. Peck inquired whether this meant that the proposal would have to be dropped and Dr. Hsu mo said that he was afraid this was the only conclusion to be drawn.

Two copies to Department;
Copies to Peiping, Nanking.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum of Conversation.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



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Memorandum of Conversation.

December 9, 1937.

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Subject: Proposal to avoid Fighting inside
 the City of Nanking.

Just before midnight the American Ambassador received the radio message despatched by Mr. Atcheson December 9, 6 p.m., which contained the request of the International Committee in charge of the Safety Zone at Nanking that telegrams addressed by the Committee to the Chinese and Japanese military authorities proposing a truce and the withdrawal of Chinese troops from the walled city of Nanking be communicated by the American Embassies in Tokyo and Hankow. Mr. Johnson directed Mr. Peck to call on General Chang Chun and hand him a copy of the message. This Mr. Peck did at 1 a.m., December 10.

In delivering the copy to General Chang Chun Mr. Peck, speaking on behalf of Mr. Johnson, called attention to the fact that the proposal embodies in the message emanated from the International Committee and not from the American Embassy, which was acting merely as the channel through which it was being brought to the consideration of the Chinese authorities; nevertheless, he said, the American Ambassador gave his approval to the plan as a humanitarian project and hoped that so far as its execution might be consistent with the military plans of the Chinese Government it might be carried into effect.

General Chang Chun said that there were features of the proceeding which he did not entirely understand, for example, if the orders issued to General Tang

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Sheng-chih, Defence Commissioner of Nanking, authorized him in certain circumstances to withdraw his troops from the walled city, why did he now ask that the proposal that he do so be submitted to General Chiang Kai-shek; on the other hand, if the withdrawal of his forces from the walled city did not lie within his discretion, why did he express his approval of such a measure? General Chang Chun wondered whether the proposal actually emanated from the International Committee, or from some other source, and he wondered whether General Tang Sheng-chih had actually expressed himself as described. Mr. Peck said he understood the reason for General Chang Chun's perplexity, but he felt that the message set forth a reliable account of what had occurred; in any event, the message contained all the information on the subject possessed by the American Embassy, which was the reason why Mr. Johnson wished to place a complete copy of the message in the hands of General Chang Chun. Mr. Peck suggested that perhaps General Tang wished to have the proposal reach General Chiang through the medium of a foreign diplomatic mission, rather than communicate it directly to General Chiang, in order to emphasize that the idea originated not with General Tang, but with the International Committee; if the idea were not approved it would be rejected as an idea of the Committee, not as a proposal from General Tang, and responsibility for the initiative would be similarly placed if the idea were sanctioned.

General Chang Chun inquired whether the other Embassies had given their approval to the proposal and

Mr. Peck

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Mr. Peck replied that the American Embassy had not yet had time to bring the matter to the consideration of the other diplomatic missions, but would do so early the following morning. Mr. Peck said that he inferred from the position taken by other Embassies in similar circumstances in times past that they would give their support to the present proposal.

General Chang Chun tried to telephone to Nanking, to obtain confirmation of the report contained in the message, but was told that the Nanking telephone exchange did not answer. He then put in a call for Nanchang and told Mr. Peck that he would be in position to obtain confirmation of the message and would telephone to Mr. Peck regarding future developments. He expressed his gratitude to the American Embassy for the interest it was taking in this humanitarian project.

Two copies to Department;
 Copies to Peiping, Nanking.

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SEVENTY-FIFTH CONGRESS
3D SESSION

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

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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1938 FEB 10 AM 9 47

February 9, 1938

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

I. R. BARNES, CLERK



copy
drafted
Feb 11 '38
V.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Will you kindly furnish the Committee, in duplicate,
report on the enclosed measure, H. Res. 418 " Requesting
the President of the United States to furnish certain infor-
mation pertaining to the diplomatic relationship between
Japan and China".

Under the rules of the House this report must be
submitted within seven legislative days.

Yours most respectfully,

I. R. Barnes
I. R. BARNES,
Clerk, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Honorable Cordell Hull

Secretary of State

Washington, D. C.

IRB:S
Encl. (1)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

75TH CONGRESS
3D SESSION

H. RES. 418

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 8, 1938

Mr. FISH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed

RESOLUTION

- 1 *Resolved*, That the President of the United States be,
- 2 and he is hereby, requested, if not incompatible with the
- 3 public interest, to inform the House of Representatives—
- 4 (1) What facts, if any, are in possession of the State
- 5 Department showing that the Japanese Ambassador to China
- 6 has been withdrawn by the Japanese Government;
- 7 (2) What information, if any, is in possession of the
- 8 State Department showing that the Chinese Ambassador to
- 9 Japan has been withdrawn;
- 10 (3) Whether the Department of State is in possession
- 11 of any facts that verify the report published recently in the
- 12 press that Japan's Foreign Minister Hirota told the Japanese

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- 1 Diet that "a state of war exists between China and Japan";
2 and
3 (4) If the State Department is in possession of facts or
4 information substantiating the withdrawal of the Japanese
5 Ambassador from China and the Chinese Ambassador from
6 Japan, and the statement by Japan's Foreign Minister that
7 "a state of war exists between China and Japan", has the
8 State Department taken any action to advise the President
9 that the Neutrality Act should be invoked in accordance with
10 the mandatory provisions of the Act.
- XX

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

75TH CONGRESS }
3D SESSION } **H. RES. 418**

RESOLUTION

Requesting the President of the United States
to furnish certain information pertaining
to the diplomatic relationship between Ja-
pan and China.

By Mr. FISH

FEBRUARY 8, 1938

Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
ordered to be printed

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1938 FEB 10 AM 10 45
Mission Court, 1208 Rennie Avenue,
Richmond, Virginia,
February 4, 1938.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Honorable Maxwell Hamilton,
Chief, Far Eastern Division,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.



reply drafted
Feb 7, 1938
V.

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

I am taking the liberty of sending you from time to time some copies of letters from American missionaries in various parts of China, and other material on the Far Eastern situation which may be of interest to you. In order to protect the missionaries, some of whom are serving now in areas under Japanese control, no letter should be published with name of writer or with any definite address.

This material supplements the news dispatches in the daily papers and throws light on conditions especially in the interior of China under war conditions.

I represent a group of missionaries to China now on furlough in this country who are interested in making known the facts regarding Japan's invasion of China and the devastation and suffering which has followed this invasion. My own work has been at Nanking, where I am a teacher in Nanking Theological Seminary and also engaged in rural extension service. My parents have been in China nearly fifty years and are there today.

Hoping this material will be of some value to you,

Sincerely yours,

Frank W. Price,

Frank W. Price,
CHINA INFORMATION SERVICE.

Washington Office--
Helen M. Loomis, Secretary,
945 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.,
(On leave from Ginling College,
Nanking, China.)

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MAR 4 - 1938

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

30 Rue Doumer
 Shanghai, China.
 Dec. 20, 1937

Mr. Ray Newton
 Emergency Peace Campaign,
 20 S. 18th St.,
 Philadelphia, Pa.

Dear Mr. Newton:

The Shanghai Group of the F.O.R. in China at its last meeting considered the program for peace outlined in your Bulletin No. 3 entitled, "What Should We Do About the Orient?" We are in agreement with most of your far-reaching policy, but we feel strongly that we must disagree with you on the statement, "whether we like it or not, there is very little the United States can do to stop present hostilities." We feel not only that the United States could do a great deal to stop the present hostilities, but that she must do something at once, (1) to stop the terrible destruction of life and property in China by the ruthless military machine in Japan, and (2) to prevent this war becoming a great world conflagration. It seems ~~heartless~~, and more or less useless, to be spending time on a program for peace that will take years to become effective when something could really be done to stop the present hostilities in China.

What specifically could the United States do to stop this war? Two things: (1) Establish an embargo on war materials, credits, and loans to Japan; (2) set up a Commission to work out a proposed solution of the Sino-Japanese question.

(1) Establish an embargo on war materials, credits and loans to Japan. States is supplying 65% of the oil and more than 50% of the iron and steel being bought by Japan. Japan is fighting this war largely with materials United States. An embargo on these materials would greatly affect, if not stop, Japan in her policy of aggression in China.

An embargo on loans and credits would be a further aid. Japan's finances critical at te. She owes more than 10,000,000,000 Yen, and the debt is continuing to increase. Her unfavorable trade balance on June 30, 1937, was the highest in 1924. This unfavorable balance is also increasing. She is making a desperate attempt to uphold her credits by shipments of gold to the U.S. From March to June of this year she sent to the U. S. in five shipments a total of 270,000,000 Yen in gold. In order to keep up her credit she exhausted her own supply of gold and went on the market to buy gold. She already owes private firms in the U.S. \$221,000,000 (U. S. currency). If the U.S. refused her further credits and loans it would be exceedingly difficult for her to finance the war. (all figures above quoted from the statistics issued by the U. S. Department of Commerce).

Moreover, this action on the part of the U. S. would affect the attitude of other nations in offering loans and credits. Great Britain, it seems, is already taking steps to prevent Japan from getting loans and credits in that country. France is the only other country that has sufficient money for loans and credits. If the U. S. and Great Britain took action, France would probably follow. Without war materials and finances Japan could not continue the war.

(2) Set up a Commission, the majority of whom would be experts on problems in the Orient, to work out a proposed solution to the Sino-Japanese question. We were disappointed that the Brussels Conference did nothing along this line. If they did, it

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Mr. Ray Newton - Page 2

was not made public. Such a proposal would of course take all the facts into consideration, attempting to be fair to both China and Japan. It would be submitted to both countries and might become the basis of a permanent solution of the question. Japan at present would probably not consider such a proposal, but if the U.S. should put an embargo on war materials, credits, and loans, she would very likely soon have to.

Who is to put these two suggestions into effect? The U. S. Government. The peace groups should immediately start propaganda for the proposals. Concrete and definite proposals of this kind would probably make a strong appeal to American public opinion, which at present has no outlet for its outraged sense of moral justice. The government would have to do what the people demanded.

But you say, why not apply the Neutrality Act? Because that Act as it stands at present allows Japan to get war materials and carry them away in her own ships. It would, therefore, discriminate against China in favor of Japan. This would obviously be unfair to China, and would aid Japan in her policy of aggression. (If the recently proposed amendments to the Act were adopted, they would make the act quite a different thing).

You probably also are saying that an embargo on war materials, credits and loans would lead to a war between the U.S. and Japan. But would it? The U. S. certainly would not attack Japan, for she does not want war. That is the last thing Japan wants. She has all she can do with China, not to mention the threat of Russia. The fear of Japan's attacking the U. S. is only a ghost which is being used by some to protect their own interests, and by others to support an isolationist policy for the U.S.

There is great moral issue in this war of aggression in China which the peace organizations do not seem to see, or if they see, are apparently unwilling to do anything about. There is a tremendously heavy responsibility resting upon the people of the U.S. to do what they can to stop this war. Will they sit by and see a great nation practically destroyed by a powerful military machine and do nothing about it? What is needed in this state of international chaos is for the people of the U. S. to let it be known by concrete action that they do not propose to support Japan in her war of aggression, or in the breaking of treaties. Mere talk is worth nothing, but action in the form of an embargo war materials, credits and loans, will be effective.

Sincerely yours,

J. B. Hipps (American Members)
for the Shanghai Group of the F.O.R.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 10 1938

In reply refer to
FE

Dear Mr. Price:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of
February 4, 1938, enclosing a copy of a letter from
a missionary at Shanghai in regard to the situation
in China. Your courtesy in furnishing us with a
copy of Mr. Hipps' interesting letter is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

M. M. Hamilton
Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

Mr. Frank W. Price,
China Information Service,
Mission Court,
1208 Rennie Avenue,
Richmond, Virginia.

CR *[initials]*
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January 28, 1938

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
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DOCUMENTS CONCERNING
THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT
Compiled by
MOUSHENG HSITIEN LIN
Research Associate
China Institute in America, New York

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Address by Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Executive Yuan
 National Government of China, July 17, 1937

When China was carrying out its cardinal policy of maintaining external peace and internal unity the Lukouchiao incident suddenly broke out, throwing the nation into a state of profound indignation and causing great concern to the whole world. The consequences of this incident threatened the very existence of China and the peace of East Asia. At this juncture, in answer to the many inquiries, I wish to state the following:

1.—The Chinese race has always been peace-loving. The internal policy of the National Government has always been directed towards maintaining internal unity and, in our foreign relations, mutual respect and co-existence with other nations. In February of this year, at the Plenary Session, a manifesto was issued in which these points were clearly emphasized. For the last two years, as actual facts show, the National Government in its policy towards Japan has constantly sought to confine all pending problems to proper, recognized channels of diplomacy, so that just settlements could be reached.

Our people should understand our national position. We must realize our own position. As a people of a weak nation we should evaluate justly the degree of our own strength. For the past few years we have bent all our efforts towards patient endeavours to ensure peace in the face of grave difficulties and grievous pain, so that we may achieve national reconstruction. For this reason in my report on foreign affairs at the Fifth Plenary Session the year before last, I stated that while there is the slightest hope for peace we will not abandon it; so long as we have not reached the limit of endurance we will not talk lightly of sacrifice; and the subsequent explanation at the Central Executive Session shows beyond cavil our anxiety to maintain peace.

But although we are a weak country, if unfortunately we should have reached that last limit, then there is only one thing to do, that is to throw the last ounce of energy of our nation into the struggle for national existence. And when that is done neither time nor circumstance will permit our stopping midway to seek peace. We should realize that to seek peace after war has once begun means that the terms would be such that the subjugation of our nation and the complete annihilation of our race would be encompassed. Let our people realize to the full meaning of the limit of endurance and the extent of sacrifice thereby, for once that stage is reached we have to sacrifice and fight to the bitter end, though with always the expectancy of eventual victory. Should we hesitate, however, and vainly hope for temporary safety, then we shall perish forever.

2.—There may be people who imagine that the Lukouchiao incident was a sudden and unpremeditated step. But already a month ago there were symptoms that an incident would ensue because of the statements from the other side, made both through their press, and directly and indirectly through diplomatic channels. Besides, before and after the incident we received news from various sources to the effect that the opposite side were aiming to expand the Tangku Agreement; enlarge the bogus "East Hopei Government"; drive out the 29th Army; force out General Sung Cheh-yuan; and try to impose similar other demands.

From the above it can easily be seen that the Lukouchiao incident is not a sudden and accidental development. From this incident we must realize that the other side have a very definite purpose towards us and that peace is not to be easily secured. According to our reports the only way by which the Lukouchiao incident could have been avoided was to allow foreign armies to come and go freely within our territory without limitation, while our own army must abide by imposed restrictions upon its movements, or to allow others to fire upon our soldiers and for us not to return fire.

Any country in the world that has the least self-respect could not possibly accept such humiliation. The four Northeastern Provinces have al-

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ready been lost to us for six years; following that there was the Tangku Agreement, and now the point of conflict — Lukouchiao — has reached the very gates of Peiping. If we allow Lukouchiao to be occupied by force then the result will be that our ancient capital of five hundred years, and the political, cultural and strategic center of our entire North would be lost. The Peiping of today would then become a second Mukden; the Hopei and Charhar provinces would share the fate of the four Northeastern Provinces.

If Peiping becomes a second Mukden, what is there to prevent Nanking from becoming a second Peiping? The safety of Lukouchiao therefore is a problem involving the existence of the nation as a whole, and whether it can be amicably settled comes within the comprehension of our term "the limit of endurance." If finally we reach the stage where it is impossible to avoid the inevitable, then we cannot do otherwise than resist and be prepared for the supreme sacrifice. This resistance is forced upon us, we are not seeking war, we are meeting attacks upon our existence.

Our people must realize that today the Central Government is in the midst of preparing measures to defend ourselves. Weak nation as we are, we cannot neglect to uphold the integrity of our race and ensure the very existence of the heritage of our forefathers, a duty which we must fulfill to the utmost. Let us realize, however, that once war has begun there is no looking backward, we must fight to the bitter end. If we allowed one inch more of our territory to be lost then we would be guilty of committing an unpardonable offense against our race. What would be left to us other than to throw every resource of our nation into a struggle for final victory?

3.—At this solemn moment Japan will have to decide whether the Lukouchiao incident will result in a major war between China and Japan. Whether or not there is the least vestige of any hope for peace between China and Japan depends upon the action of the Japanese army. Even at the very last second before we abandon all hope of peace we would still be hoping for peace; we would still be seeking a solution through proper diplomatic channels.

The following four points will clearly show what our stand on the issue is:

- (1)—Any kind of settlement must not infringe upon the territorial integrity and the sovereign rights of our nation.
- (2)—The status of the Hopei-Charhar Political Council is fixed by the Central Government; we should not allow any illegal alteration.
- (3)—We will not agree to the removal by outside pressure of those local officials appointed by the Central Government, such as the chairman of the Hopei-Charhar Political Council.
- (4)—We will not allow any restriction being placed upon the positions now held by the 29th Army.

These four points constitute the minimum conditions possible as a basis for negotiation for any nation, no matter how weak it may be. And if the opposite side will place herself in our position and have due regard for maintaining peace in the Far East and does not desire to force China and Japan into hostilities and to make them enemies forever, they will realize that these conditions are the minimum that can be considered.

To sum up, during the Lukouchiao crisis the Central Government is ensuring the very existence of our nation. We seek for peace, but we do not seek for peace at any cost. We do not want war but we may be forced to defend ourselves. During this grave crisis the Government may be counted upon to guide the nation with calmness and restraint, the people likewise must show sobriety and discipline. In discharging our obligations to our race let there be no distinction between North and South, age or youth, but let all implicitly and with iron discipline follow the guidance of the Government.

I hope you gentlemen will explain what I have said to all those you meet so that they will understand the situation and appreciate our policy.

Chinese Memorandum to Powers Signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty, July 16, 1937

(A) As to the Status

The Japanese troops in their manoeuvres on the night of July 7, when the trouble started, had no shadow of right to be where they were, for manoeuvres or field exercises or even simple barracking, as points where foreign troops may be are specifically enumerated in Article 9 of the final Boxer Protocol of 1901, and neither Lukouchiao, where the original incident occurred, nor Wanning nor Fengtai are included.

So even shadowy and outdated claims that might be advanced under the terms of that protocol furnish no justification for either the presence of or the demonstrations by the Japanese troops. July 12 at Nanking the Chinese Foreign Minister, Dr. Wang Chung-hui, with all his responsibility as Foreign Minister and with his authority as a recent judge of the International Court at The Hague, issued a statement that declared the Japanese manoeuvres at Lukouchiao to be positively without any treaty sanction.

(B) As to the Circumstances

Like the famous faked bomb outrage outside Mukden in September, 1931, which did not prevent an approaching train from reaching its destination in time and yet served as an excuse for the rape at Manchuria, so on the night of July 7, 1937, Japanese forces under the demand for the recovery of a suppositious missing Japanese soldier, sought to force their admittance into the Chinese-garrisoned town in the night time and are trying to use the inevitable refusal as the jumping-off point for further invasion of North China.

Since then the fighting has been extended to the immediate environs of Peiping while large numbers of Japanese reinforcements are being rapidly sent into the Province of Hopei from Manchuria, Korea and Japan proper.

It is estimated that over 100 Japanese airplanes and 20,000 Japanese troops already have been concentrated in the Peiping-Tientsin area ready to precipitate a major clash at any moment.

Ever since the original outbreaks the Chinese authorities, anxious to reach a peaceful settlement, have used their best efforts to arrange for a cessation of hostilities by the mutual withdrawal of troops. But almost immediately, after each successive arrangement was made, it was nullified by a resumption of their attacks by the Japanese forces.

It need hardly be pointed out that the sudden attack on Lukouchiao and the invasion of North China by large Japanese military forces constitute a clear violation of China's sovereignty contrary to the letter and spirit of the Nine-Power Treaty, the Paris Peace Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The crisis thus precipitated by Japan's aggressive action in China, if permitted to take its own course, will not only immediately disturb peace in East Asia but also may entail unforeseen consequences to the rest of the world.

While China is obliged to employ all the means at her disposal to defend her territory and national honor to the end of her existence she nevertheless holds herself in readiness to settle her differences with Japan by any of the pacific means known to international law and treaties.

But the National Government of China is bound to control closely the basis of settlement since it is a well-known tactic of the Japanese military to promote disruption in North China by insisting upon overawing the local authorities. The Japanese also aim to mislead world opinion by pretending that such specious attempts at local negotiations, intended to flout the National Government, are directed toward minimizing the "incidents" that they continually engineer.

Such local diplomacy invariably intensifies rather than helps heal the disruptive process in North China and constitutes part of the obvious persistent penetrative continental policy pursued by the Japanese.

The issues thus raised are for that reason, above all others, always national and never local, and "localization" is a subterfuge invariably attempted for baffling Chinese unity and confusing world opinion.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Statement of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, July 16, 1937

I have been receiving from many sources inquiries and suggestions arising out of disturbed situations in various parts of the world.

Unquestionably there are in a number of regions tensions and strains which on their face involve only countries that are near neighbors but which in ultimate analysis are of inevitable concern to the whole world.

Any situation in which armed hostilities are in progress or are threatened is a situation where in rights and interests of all nations either are or may be seriously affected. There can be no serious hostilities anywhere in the world which will not one way or another affect interests or rights or obligations of this country.

I therefore feel warranted in making—in fact, I feel it a duty to make—a statement of this government's position in regard to international problems and situations with respect to which this country feels deep concern.

This country constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of peace. We advocate national and international self-restraint. We advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations. We advocate adjustment of problems in international relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement.

We advocate faithful observance of international agreements. Upholding the principle of the sanctity of treaties, we believe in modification of provisions of treaties, when need therefor arises, by orderly processes carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation.

We believe in respect by all nations for the right of others and performance by all nations of established obligations. We stand for revitalizing and strengthening of international law.

We advocate steps toward promotion of economic security and stability the world over.

We advocate lowering or removing of excessive barriers in international trade. We seek effective equality of commercial opportunity and we urge upon all nations application of the principle of equality of treatment.

We believe in limitation and reduction of armament. Realizing the necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for national security, we are prepared to reduce or to increase our own armed forces in proportion to reductions or increases made by other countries.

We avoid entering into alliances or entangling commitments, but we believe in cooperative efforts by peaceful and practicable means in support of the principles hereinbefore stated.

Statement of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, August 23, 1937

At his press conference on Aug. 17, the Secretary of State announced that (1), legislative action to make available funds for purposes of emergency relief necessitated by the situation in the Far East had been asked and that (2), this Government had given orders for a regiment of marines to prepare to proceed to Shanghai. The Secretary then discussed at some length the principles of policy on which this Government was proceeding.

The situation at Shanghai is in many respects unique. Shanghai is a great cosmopolitan center, with a population of over 3,000,000, a part of which has been developed by the nationals of many countries, at which there have prevailed mutually advantageous contacts of all types and varieties between and among the Chinese and people of almost all other countries of the world. At Shanghai, there exists a multiplicity of rights and interests which are of inevitable concern to many countries, including the United States.

In the present situation, the American Government is engaged in facilitating in every way possible an orderly and safe removal of American citizens from areas where there is special danger. Further, it is the policy of the American Government to afford its nationals appropriate protection primarily against mobs or other uncontrolled elements. For that purpose it has for many years maintained small detachments of armed forces in China, and for that purpose it is sending the present small re-enforcement. These armed forces there have no mission of aggression. It is their function to be of assistance toward maintenance of order and security. It has been the desire and the intention of the American Government to remove these forces when performance of their function of protection is no longer called for, and such remains its desire and expectation.

The issues and problems which are of concern to this Government in the present situation in the Pacific area go far beyond merely the immediate question of protection of the nationals and interests of the United States. The conditions which prevail in that area are intimately connected with and have a direct and fundamental relationship to the general principles of policy to which attention was called in the statement of July 16, which statement has evoked expressions of approval from more than fifty governments. This Government is firmly of the opinion that the principles summarized in that statement should effectively govern international relationships.

When there unfortunately arises in any part of the world the threat or the existence of serious hostilities, the matter is of concern to all nations. Without attempting to pass judgement regarding the merits of the controversy, we appeal to the parties to refrain from resort to war. We urge that they settle their differences in accordance with principles which in the opinion not alone of our people, but of most of the peoples of the world, should govern in international relationships. We consider applicable throughout the world, in the Pacific area as elsewhere, the principles set forth in the statement of July 16. That statement of principles is comprehensive and basic. It embraces the principles embodied in many treaties, including the Washington Conference Treaties and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris.

From the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East we have been urging upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments the importance of refraining from hostilities and of maintaining peace. We have been participating constantly in consultation with interested governments directed toward peaceful adjustment. This Government does not believe in political alliances or entanglements, nor does it believe in extreme isolation. It does believe in international cooperation for the purpose of seeking through pacific methods the achievements of those objectives set forth in the statement of July 16. In the light of our well-defined attitude and policies and within the range thereof, this Government is giving most solicitous attention to every phase of the Far Eastern situation, towards safeguarding the lives and welfare of our people and making effective the policies—especially the policy of peace—in which this country believes and to which it is committed.

This Government is endeavoring to see kept alive, strengthened and revitalized, in reference to the Pacific area and to all the world, these fundamental principles.

Statement of Ambassador Chengting T. Wang, August 28, 1937

The Chinese Government notes with gratification the reiteration by the Hon. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, in his statement of Aug. 23, 1937, of the fact that the general principles of policy enunciated in his statement of July 16, 1937, which the Chinese Government has unreservedly accepted, should effectively govern international relationships and should be applicable throughout the world.

Due note also is taken of the appeal of the Secretary of State to China and Japan to refrain from resort to war and to settle differences in accordance with principles which, in the opinion not alone of the American people, but of practically all peoples of the world, should govern in international relationships.

Traditionally it has been the foreign policy of the Chinese Government to settle all international controversies by pacific means. Soon after the outbreak of the incident in Lukouchiao on July 7, 1937, the Chinese Government made in vain several attempts to effect a peaceful settlement of the incident.

In a memorandum under date July 15, 1937, addressed to the leading powers, it was made clear that while China was obliged to employ all the means at her disposal to defend her territory and national honor and existence, she nevertheless held herself in readiness to settle her differences with Japan by any of the pacific means known in international law and treaties.

In a note to the Secretary of State on Aug. 12, 1937, the Chinese Ambassador again took occasion to point out that the stand of the Chinese Government as to the issue with Japan remained the same as that stated in the memorandum of July 15, 1937. Even in a recent move to seek a peaceful solution, the Chinese Government accepted in principle the British proposal for the cessation of hostilities in Shanghai, if Japan would accept the same.

It is to be noted that China has never attempted to resort to war, but to resist foreign aggressions in defense of her territory and national honor and existence. She is ready as ever to settle whatever differences she may have with Japan in accordance with the principles of international law and practice.

It is the sincere conviction of the Chinese Government that the relationships among the nations can be best governed by the realization and fulfillment of the noble principles enunciated and reiterated by Secretary of State Hull, and that the realization and fulfillment of these principles can only be attained by the full cooperation of all the countries.

British Note to the Japanese Government, August 29, 1937

The Japanese Government will be aware of the injuries sustained by Sir Hughe Montgomery Knatchbull-Hugessen, His Majesty's Ambassador to China, as the result of shooting from Japanese military airplanes when motor-ing with members of his staff from Nanking to Shanghai on August 26 last.

The facts were as follows: His Majesty's Ambassador was proceeding from Nanking to Shanghai on Aug. 26, accompanied by a military attaché and the financial advisor to His Majesty's Embassy and a Chinese chauffeur. The party occupied two black saloon cars of obviously private character, each flying a Union Jack, approximately 18 inches by 12 in size on the rear side of the car projecting above the roof.

About 2:30 P. M., and about eight miles northwest of Taitsang, i. e., some forty miles from Shanghai, the cars were attacked by machine-gun fire from a Japanese airplane.

The airplane which fired the machine gun dived from the off side of the car at a right angle to it. This was followed by a bomb attack from a second Japanese airplane from a height of about 200 feet.

The Ambassador was hit by a nickel steel bullet (subsequently found embedded in the car) which penetrated the side of his abdomen and grazed his spine.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has received with deep distress and concern the news of this deplorable event, in respect whereof it must record its emphatic protest and request the fullest measure of redress.

Although noncombatants, including foreigners resident in the country concerned, must accept the inevitable risk of injury resulting indirectly from the normal conduct of hostilities, it is one of the oldest and best established rules of international law that direct or deliberate attacks on noncombatants are absolutely prohibited, whether inside or outside the area in which hostilities are taking place.

Aircraft are in no way exempt from this rule, which applies as much to attack from the air as to any other form of attack.

Nor can the plea of accident be accepted where the facts are such as to show at best negligence and a complete disregard for the sanctity of civilian life.

In the present case the facts which have been recorded above make it clear that this was not an accident resulting from any normal hostile operation, and it should have been obvious to the aircraft that they were dealing with noncombatants.

The plea, should it be advanced, that the flags carried on the cars were too small to be visible is irrelevant. There would have been no justification for the attack even had the cars carried no flags at all.

The foreign, even the diplomatic status of the occupants, is also irrelevant. The real issue is that they were noncombatants.

The aircraft no doubt did not intend to attack His Majesty's Ambassador as such. They apparently did intend to attack noncombatants, and that suffices in itself to constitute an illegality.

It is, moreover, pertinent to observers that in this particular case the Ambassador was traveling in a locality where there were no Chinese troops nor any actual hostilities in progress.

No Chinese troops were in fact encountered by the Ambassador's party until about an hour's drive from the scene of the attack.

His Majesty's Government feels it must take this opportunity to emphasize the wider significance of this event. It is an outstanding example of the results to be expected from an indiscriminate attack from the air.

Such events are inseparable from the practice, as illegal as it is inhuman,

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of failing to draw that clear distinction between combatants and noncombatants in the conduct of hostilities which international law no less than the conscience of mankind has always enjoined.

The fact that in the present case no actual state of war has been declared or expressly recognized by either party to exist emphasizes the inexcusable nature of what occurred.

His Majesty's Government must therefore request:

Firstly, a formal apology to be conveyed by the Japanese Government to His Majesty's Government.

Secondly, suitable punishment for those responsible for the attack.

Thirdly, an assurance by the Japanese authorities that necessary measures will be taken to prevent recurrence of events of such a character.

Statement of the Chinese Government to the League of Nations August 30, 1937

On the evening of July 7th, Japanese troops held illegal manoeuvres at Lukouchiao, a railway junction of strategic importance in the vicinity of Peiping, where their presence could not be defended under any existing treaty or agreement. Alleging that one Japanese soldier was missing, Japanese troops demanded after midnight to enter the adjacent city of Wanping to conduct a search. When permission was refused by the Chinese authorities, the Japanese suddenly opened an attack on Wanping with infantry and artillery forces and thus the Chinese garrison was compelled to offer resistance.

While the Chinese authorities from the very beginning showed their willingness to reach an amicable settlement of the Lukouchiao incident, Japan has sought to exploit the incident for furthering her designs on North China and relentlessly forced China to resort to armed resistance, thus precipitating a sanguinary conflict of which the world has as yet only witnessed the beginning.

With a view to avoiding further hostilities and effecting a peaceful settlement with Japan through regular diplomatic channels, the Chinese authorities with great self-restraint and forbearance, in face of repeated provocative attacks by Japanese forces, proposed a mutual withdrawal of troops in order to separate the two opposing forces and, later, as unmistakable proof of China's peaceful intentions, actually proceeded to withdraw her troops from the scene of conflict even before Japan commenced similar withdrawal.

On the other hand, the Japanese deliberately aggravated the situation by immediately despatching large reinforcements to the province of Hopei, by renewing their offensive in the Wanping-Lukouchiao area and by extending the field of conflict to the immediate outskirts of Peiping.

In spite of such grave provocations, the Chinese local authorities continued their efforts for peaceful settlement and, on July 11th, accepted the following terms proposed by the Japanese:

- 1) Expression of regret by a representative of the military authorities, disciplinary measures against officers directly involved in the conflict and guarantee against recurrence of similar incidents;
- 2) Replacement of Chinese regular troops at Lukouchiao and Lungwang-miao by peace preservation corps; and,
- 3) Effective suppression of anti-Japanese and Communist organisations in the Hopei Province.

On July 12th, the Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy, accompanied by an assistant Japanese military attaché and assistant naval attaché, acting under instructions from his government, called at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and advised the Chinese Government 'not to interfere' with the local settlement which had been reached on the previous day. The Japanese Counsellor received the reply that any local arrangement, in order to be binding, must be approved by the Chinese Central Government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also proposed the mutual withdrawal of troops to their original positions pending the final settlement of the incident.

While the Chinese local authorities were carrying out the terms of the agreement by withdrawing their troops, the Japanese extended their warlike activities and provocative attacks to the Peiping-Tientsin area. By July 15th it was estimated that over twenty thousand Japanese troops and a hundred aeroplanes had been concentrated in this area with further reinforcements held in readiness on the other side of the Great Wall. Under threat of military coercion the negotiations between local representatives were rendered exceedingly difficult, especially as the Japanese attempted to dictate measures for complementing the agreement of July 11th.

On July 16th, China presented a memorandum to the Governments of Powers signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty (with the exception of Japan)

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and the Governments of Germany and Soviet Russia, drawing their attention to the fact that the sudden attack on Lukouchiao and the invasion of North China by large Japanese military forces constituted a clear violation of China's sovereignty, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Nine-Power Treaty, the Paris Peace Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations. It was also stated in the memorandum that, while China was obliged to employ all means at her disposal to defend her territory and national existence, she nevertheless held herself in readiness to settle her differences with Japan by any of the pacific means known to international law or treaties.

On July 17th, the Japanese Embassy presented a memorandum to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, demanding the Central Government not to interfere with local negotiations, nor to make military preparations of any kind. On the same day, the Japanese military attaché, under instructions from the Tokyo War Office, made representations to the Chinese Ministry of War against the entry of Chinese reinforcements into the Hopei Province even for defensive purposes and threatened with 'grave consequences' if the demand be not complied with.

To such preposterous representations the Chinese Government, on July 19th, replied in writing, renewing its proposal for simultaneous cessation of troop movements on both sides and mutual withdrawal of troops to their respective original positions on a date to be agreed upon by both parties. It was also unequivocally stated in the reply that for the settlement of the incident the Chinese Government was prepared to accept any pacific means known to international law or treaties, such as direct negotiations, good offices, mediation and arbitration. Unfortunately, these conciliation demarches failed to receive the desired response. That the Chinese Government went to the utmost limit of forbearance was shown by the fact that it did not raise objection to the terms of the agreement reached on July 11th between the Chinese local authorities and the Japanese army.

Thus it will be readily seen that since the outbreak of the Lukouchiao incident, Japan has sought to exploit it in two ways for realizing her object of military, political and economic domination over North China. On the military side, she persisted in sending to the Hopei Province enormous numbers of armed forces that would only be required for large scale campaigns and, at the same time, sought to prevent the Central Government from taking precautionary defence measures, so that she would be in a position more effectively to bring local authorities to subjection. Diplomatically, she has endeavored to coerce the Chinese Central Government into keeping its hands off North China and agreeing in advance to whatever terms the local authorities, when left alone to face Japanese military pressure, might be forced to accept.

Finally, seeing that China refused to act according to their wish, the Japanese Army presented an ultimatum to the Chinese local authorities on July 26th, demanding, among other things, the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Peiping and its vicinity which, it may be noted, was outside the terms of the agreement of July 11th. Even before the expiration of the time-limit fixed by the ultimatum, Japanese military and air forces launched a big offensive against the Peiping-Tientsin area causing a widespread feeling of horror and dismay by their wanton destruction of civilian lives and property, including many educational and cultural institutions.

After the Chinese troops had withdrawn from the Peiping-Tientsin area, Japanese armed forces further extended their operations into southern Hopei and also northward to the Hopei-Charhar border, where fierce attacks are being made on the strategic pass of Nankou. It was estimated by August 20th that Japanese troops in North China totalled approximately one hundred thousand strong. The concentration of such large forces on Chinese soil shows that Japan is irrevocably committed to a policy of military conquest and expansion on the Asiatic Continent.

Fearing that Japan would bring the war scourge to Shanghai, the financial and economic centre of China, as she did following her occupation of Manchuria, the Chinese Government, during the critical tension in North China,

repeatedly ordered the local authorities at Shanghai to take special precautions against the occurrence of any untoward incident. China's efforts to preserve peace of that great metropolis were, however, frustrated as a result of the incident of August 9th, in which one Japanese naval officer, one Japanese seaman and a member of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps were killed in a clash arising from the Japanese naval men's attempt to approach the Chinese military aerodrome near Shanghai, regardless of Chinese warnings.

While the Chinese municipal authorities immediately proposed that a settlement be sought through diplomatic channels, Japan again preferred the arbitrament of force. Within less than 48 hours, she concentrated about thirty warships at Shanghai and had her armed forces there increased by several thousand. At the same time, demands calculated to remove or undermine Chinese defence were made on Chinese authorities. The expected attack opened on August 13th, four days after the incident, when Japanese naval forces both ashore and afloat, using the International Settlement as a base for operations, launched an offensive against the districts of Kiangwan and Chapei.

Since then, the Japanese have extended their air activity to many provinces, including those of Shantung, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhui, Hupei, Hunan and Kiangsi. Daily raids have been made on Nanking, the national capital of China, and various other cities of economic or political importance. There is every sign that Japan, relying on the numerical superiority of her air force, aims at crippling China's strength for resistance by extensive bombing operations in the most prosperous parts of China, where her economic and cultural life as well as foreign commerce are centred.

The above brief account of what Japan has done, since the outbreak of the Lukouchiao incident of July 7th, brings out the following facts most clearly, truthfully and indisputably.

- 1) Japanese armed forces have invaded China's territory and are extensively attacking Chinese positions by land, sea and air, in Central as well as North China. It is thus a case of aggression pure and simple.
- 2) China is exercising her natural right of self-defence, the failure of all other means of repelling violence having compelled her to resort to force, which is contrary to China's wish.
- 3) Japan's present action in China is the continuation of her aggressive program started in Manchuria in September 1931. Japan has now occupied the Peiping-Tientsin area and is bent upon extension of her occupation to the whole of North China and domination of other regions in spite of all her assurances that she has no territorial designs on this country. She is attempting to destroy all the work of reconstruction which the Chinese nation has so steadily and assiduously undertaken during the last ten years.
- 4) In thus deliberately disturbing the peace of the Far East, Japan has violated the fundamental principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Using war as an instrument of national policy and ignoring all the pacific means for the settlement of international controversies, she has violated the Paris Peace Pact of 1927. Acting contrary to her pledge to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, she has violated the Nine-Power Treaty concluded at Washington in 1922.

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**Address by Foreign Minister Koki Hirota before the Japanese Diet
September 5, 1937**

Ever since the beginning of the present China affair, the Japanese Government, in pursuance of its policy of local settlement and non-aggravation, exerted every effort to effect a speedy solution. The Nanking Government, whose prompt reconsideration was invited, failed to manifest a grain of sincerity but concentrated its armies in North China to challenge Japan, while in the Yangtze Valley and elsewhere in south and central China they embarked on an anti-Japanese campaign of the most vicious kind, which not only prevented our nationals in that region from engaging in peaceful pursuits but also jeopardized their very existence.

In these circumstances the Japanese Government, still desiring to avoid a disturbance of the peace as far as possible, ordered the evacuation of all Japanese residents in Hankow and other points along the Yangtze River. Shortly after that, on August 9, at Shanghai, sub-Lieutenant Oyama and seaman Saito of a Japanese landing party were murdered by the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps.

Even then Japan, adhering to a peaceful course, sought to settle the affair through the withdrawal of the Peace Preservation Corps and the removal of all military works that had been erected in violation of the 1932 truce agreement. China refused to comply with our demands under one pretext or another and proceeded instead to increase her troops and multiply her military works in the prohibited zone and finally launched an unwarranted attack upon Japanese. Thereupon, as a matter of duty, our Government dispatched small naval reinforcements to Shanghai as an emergency measure to insure the protection of our nationals in that city.

In view of these disquieting developments in Shanghai, the Ambassadors at Nanking of five Powers—Great Britain, America, France, Germany and Italy—sent a joint request on August 11 both to Japan and China that the two countries do all in their power to carry out effectively the plan to exclude Shanghai from the scope of any possible hostilities so as to safeguard the lives and property of foreigners therein.

Our Government replied through Ambassador Kawagoe to the effect that while Japan was most solicitously concerned over the lives and property of all foreigners as well as Japanese in Shanghai, China should as a first prerequisite withdraw outside of striking distance her regular troops and Peace Preservation Corps that were advancing on the Settlement and menacing Japanese and to remove her military works in the vicinity of the International Settlement, and that Japan would be prepared to restore her forces to their original positions provided China agreed to take the above steps.

The Ambassador was also instructed to request the Powers concerned to exert their influence toward inducing China to execute those urgent and appropriate measures, which, however, were flatly rejected by China. On Aug. 11 the Consuls General at Shanghai of Great Britain, America and France submitted a certain concrete plan proposing that Japan and China enter into direct negotiations for the purpose of averting the impending crisis.

The text of the proposal was received in Tokyo at midnight, Aug. 13. But in the afternoon of that very day Chinese armies that had been pouring into the Shanghai area took the offensive and on Aug. 14 their war planes dropped bombs not only on the headquarters of our landing party, our warship and our Consulate General, but also all over the International Settlement. No longer could we do anything but abandon all hopes of a peaceful settlement and fight for the protection of our 30,000 nationals in Shanghai. I regret to say that the earnest efforts of the powers concerned were thus nullified by the Chinese outrages.

Shanghai having been converted into a theatre of hostilities, grave concern was naturally shown by the Powers who have vast amounts of capital

invested and large numbers of their nationals residing in the city. Great Britain notified both Japan and China on Aug. 18 that if the Governments of the two countries agreed to withdraw their forces mutually and entrust to foreign authorities the protection of Japanese subjects residing in the International Settlement and on extra-Settlement roads, the British Government were prepared to undertake the responsibility provided the other powers cooperate. The next day—Aug. 19—we were informed by the French Government of their readiness to support the British proposal. The American Government had also previously expressed the hope for a suspension of hostilities in the Shanghai area. Japan, having as great interest in Shanghai as these Powers, is equally solicitous for peace in the city. But, as has been stated above, the actions taken by the Chinese in and around Shanghai are plainly in violation of the truce agreement of 1932 in that they illegitimately moved their regular troops into the zone proscribed by that agreement and increased both the number of armaments and the Peace Preservations Corps, and in that, relying on their numerical superiority, they challenged the landing party and civilian population of our country.

Therefore, in their reply to the British proposal our Government explained in detail Japan's successive efforts toward a peaceful solution as well as the truth regarding the lawless Chinese attacks and stated that hostilities in Shanghai could not be brought to an end save through the withdrawal of Chinese regular troops from the prohibited zone and of the Peace Preservation Corps from the front lines. At the same time our sincere hope was expressed that Great Britain as one of the parties to the truce agreement would use her good offices to bring about the withdrawal of the Chinese troops outside the proscribed zone. Similar replies were sent to France and America.

As for North China, in wilful disregard of various pledges and agreements the Chinese Central Armies moved northward to indulge in a series of provocative actions and large forces began to pour into the Province of Chahar. Our Government therefore have had to take determined steps in this situation.

Thus hostilities have now spread from North to Central China, and Japan finds herself engaged in a major conflict with China on extended fields. I am deeply pained to say that some 50,000 Japanese residents in various parts of China have been forced to evacuate, leaving behind them their huge investments, their business interests acquired through years of arduous toil and other rights and interests, while not a few of them have been made victims of the hostilities. It is also to be regretted that the nationals of other countries in China are being subjected to similar trials and tribulations.

All this is due to no other cause than that the Nanking Government and also local militarist regimes in China have for many years past deliberately undertaken to incite public opinion against Japan as a means of strengthening their own political powers and in conjunction with Communist elements they still further impaired Sino-Japanese relations. Now our loyal and valiant soldiers, with the united support of the nation behind them, are engaged in strenuous campaigns night and day amid indescribable hardships and privations. We cannot but be moved to hear of their heroic sacrifices as well as their brilliant achievements.

It is hardly necessary to say that the basic policy of the Japanese Government aims at the stabilization of East Asia through conciliation and cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo and China for their common prosperity and well-being. Since China, ignoring our true motive, mobilized her vast armies against us we can do no other than counter it by force of arms.

The urgent need of this moment is that we take a resolute attitude and compel China to mend her ways. Japan has no other objective than to see a happy and tranquil North China and all of China freed from the danger of a recurrence of such calamitous hostilities as at present and Sino-Japanese relations so adjusted as to enable us to put into practice our above-mentioned policy. Let us hope that the statesmen of China be brought to take a broad view of East Asia, that they speedily realize their mistakes and that, turning a new leaf, they will act in unison with the high aim and aspirations of Japan.

Supplementary Statement of the Chinese Government to the League of Nations, September 12, 1937

Since the presentation of the last statement to the League under date of August 30th, 1937, Japan's aggression in China has developed in further intensity and ruthlessness resulting in much wanton destruction of non-combatant life and property including those of third powers. The gravity of the situation calls for a supplementary statement in which the Chinese Government wishes to draw special attention to the following outstanding events:

(1) Military and political aspects. The fighting in the Shanghai area which was started on August 13th, 1937, by the Japanese landing party has been intensified with the continual arrival of Japanese military, naval and air reinforcements. It is estimated that in addition to over ten thousand marines, Japan has brought five army divisions to Shanghai with a formidable array of modern war weapons including scores of military aeroplanes. Determined to bring under her control the premier seaport of China, Japan has flatly rejected the proposal advanced by the representatives of third powers for the mutual withdrawal of the forces including the Japanese warships from Shanghai, which proposal China accepts in principle. Hostilities in Shanghai have already exacted an enormous toll in life and property, and with two huge opposing armies locked in a life-and-death encounter, the fighting is likely to be prolonged.

In North China the Chinese troops defending Nankow, after having valiantly held out about a fortnight against fierce Japanese onslaughts, were eventually forced to withdraw when subjected to gas attacks and threatened with flanking movement by units of the Japanese Kwantung army from Jehol. Advancing westward the Japanese forces have occupied various cities on the Peiping-Suiyuan railway as far as Kalgan, the capital of Chahar, which was evacuated by Chinese troops on August 27th. Japanese sources announced on September 4th that a puppet regime styled "South Chahar Autonomous Government" was being formed at Kalgan.

Fighting has continued along northern sections on the Peiping-Hankow and Tientsin-Pukow railways where the Japanese military strength has reached nine divisions totalling no less than one hundred fifty thousand men. Meanwhile, confusion and terror reign in the Peiping and Tientsin area which is completely under Japanese control. Ten foreign missionaries were reported to have been kidnapped in Peiping where the Japanese military have admitted that they are facing the problem of preventing looting by their own soldiers.

With a view to devastating all Chinese seaports, Japanese activity in the air has been extended towards South China. A formation of six or seven Japanese military planes bombed Canton on August 21st, while Swatow and Changchow (Fukien) were raided the same day. Two Japanese seaplanes bombed Amoy on September 3rd shortly after the bombardment of the Chinese forts there by Japanese warships, and Swatow was bombed for the second time on September 6th. With the exception of a few provinces, Japanese air activity has now been extended throughout the length and breadth of China. In carrying out their death-dealing mission, the Japanese airmen have shown most spiteful disregard for distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Details of this sordid aspect of Japan's aggressions will be given presently.

(2) Japan's declaration of the naval blockade. The Japanese Navy declared on August 25th a blockade against Chinese shipping from Shanghai to the south of Swatow. While it was declared from Tokyo that 'peaceful trade' would not be interfered with, the legal adviser to the Japanese Third Fleet operating in Chinese waters, Dr. Jumpei Shinobu, told the foreign Press that foreign ships might be hailed by Japanese warships patrolling the blockaded area. He also intimated the possibility of the Japanese exercising the privilege of preemption toward foreign bottoms found to be carrying cargo which, in their view, would constitute wartime contraband.

On September 5th the blockade was further extended to include an area

from Chinwangtao in the North to Pakhoi in the South covering virtually the entire length of the Chinese coast. Simultaneously, the Japanese naval authorities announced that they reserved the right to hail all merchantmen in Chinese waters in order to ascertain their identity and also asked all foreign shipping companies to inform them of the movement of their ships in Chinese waters.

(3) Japanese bombing of Red Cross units. Flagrantly violating the Geneva Convention of 1929 to which Japan is a signatory, the Japanese forces have repeatedly committed outrages against Red Cross units engaged in humanitarian tasks attending wounded soldiers. Interviewed by the Press on August 29th, Doctor F. C. Yen, a responsible executive of the Chinese Red Cross Society, revealed that seven of thirty Red Cross vans were disabled by Japanese bombs. In many cases Japanese aeroplanes gave chase to these vehicles despite easily discernible insignia. Sometimes bombs were dropped on them.

On August 18th, the Red Cross Hospital at Chenju was bombed. Fortunately, most of the patients had been removed to another place. The stretcher bearer was killed while one doctor and three others were wounded. The following day the Red Cross ambulance corps at Nan-hsiang was likewise bombed by Japanese raiders. Two wounded soldiers were killed while four members of the corps were wounded.

Perhaps the most horrible of the outrages was staged in a cold-blooded manner by the Japanese soldiers at Lotien on August 23rd. The ambulance corps of forty-three members were rescuing the wounded when they were surrounded by Japanese troops. Having torn off the Red Cross insignia on their white uniforms, the Japanese soldiers made them kneel down and then shot at them. One doctor and four nurses were killed outright while three nurses managed to escape. The rest were still missing and were believed to have been killed. Of the three nurses one was shot at while running away from the Japanese and succumbed to injuries the next day.

These horrible acts rendered Red Cross work most difficult. Presently all those working behind the front lines were obliged to carry on duties in the evening when they were less exposed to the danger of possible death. The Japanese allegation that the Red Cross carried war materials was completely groundless. Great care was exercised by the Chinese Red Cross Society in using Red Cross flags. Each of the thirty vans to which special permits were granted by the International Settlement or French Concession authorities at Shanghai to pass through their respective territory was thoroughly inspected before it left for the war zone. There is absolutely no excuse for the Japanese deliberately to bomb the Red Cross ambulances and lorries.

(4) Indiscriminate attacks on non-combatants. Of numerous instances of indiscriminate Japanese attacks from air, few tragic examples serve to illustrate the inexcusable and heinous crimes that have been committed against non-combatants.

On August 17th, ten Japanese planes appeared over Nan-tung-chow approximately eighty miles west of Shanghai and dropped six bombs on the American Mission Hospital there. One bomb hit the main building which caught fire and was destroyed. Several Chinese doctors and two nurses were among those killed while scores were wounded including two American nurses on duty.

On August 28th, twelve Japanese planes raided Nantao, a densely populated Chinese section in Shanghai, which was entirely devoid of Chinese troops or military positions. The bombs which dropped in the vicinity of the South Railway Station resulted in the death of over two hundred civilians and injury to five hundred others. The victims including an exceedingly large percentage of women and children were mostly refugees waiting to entrain for regions of comparative safety.

Over two hundred wounded soldiers and refugees were killed when an omnibus station at Ta-chang a few miles from Woosung was bombed by Japanese aircraft on August 31st. A similar tragedy occurred on the same

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day at Tsang-chow approximately seventy miles south of Tientsin where hundreds of civilians were killed and wounded by Japanese air bombs.

In the early morning of September 5th, sixteen Japanese planes raided the village of Pei-hsing-ching on the western fringe of the International Settlement at Shanghai where no fighting had occurred. Numerous houses were destroyed and a large number of villagers were killed and wounded. While flying over that area, the Japanese planes saw two junks sailing on the Soochow Creek both laden with war refugees. One junk was immediately bombed, resulting in forty killed and sixty wounded while many panic-stricken refugees in the second junk were machine-gunned and killed.

(5) Wanton destruction of educational and cultural institutions. Since the outbreak of hostilities educational and cultural institutions received special attention of the Japanese as objects for their wanton destruction.

One of the first acts of Japanese soldiers after the occupation of Tientsin was to deliberately set on fire with large quantities of oil the well-known Nankai University and the affiliated Middle School. Since then many other colleges and schools were either partially or totally destroyed by Japanese airbombs. These included the Tsonging Girls School at Nan-tung-chow; the Baldwin School for Girls of Kiangsi, the Agricultural Institute and the Normal School for Rural Education at Nachang, the National Central University, its Experimental High School and the School for Children of the Revolutionary Martyrs at Nanking and the National Tung-chi University at Woosung. It is noteworthy that all these institutions were attacked from the air and, with the exception of the National Tung-chi University, were situated hundreds of miles away from the scene of hostilities. Even the latter did not lie within the area of actual conflict nor was it occupied by Chinese troops at the time when it was destroyed.

The above sketch of what the Japanese armed forces have done on Chinese territory in the last two weeks shows clearly that Japan is determined to extend her aggressive action to the length and breadth of this country, with the object, as the Japanese themselves have admitted, of destroying the body politic of China and wiping out the very civilization of the Chinese nation, thereby realizing Japan's long cherished dream of continental conquest.

It is further demonstrated by the above-mentioned facts that the Japanese armed forces, in invading China's territory, show an utter disregard for all rules of international law, all provisions of treaties, and all precepts of humanity. Law and morality give place to violence and anarchy. Intoxicated by the lust for conquest, the invader is bent upon ruthless slaughter and wanton destruction. The lives of four hundred and fifty million people are at stake; the civilization and the security of the whole world are in the balance.

Appeal of the Chinese Government to the League of Nations

September 12, 1937

To the Secretary-General.

Under instructions from my Government, I have the honor to invite you to take cognisance of the fact that Japan has invaded China and is continuing the invasion with all her army, navy and air force. It is an aggression against the territorial integrity and existing political independence of China, a Member of the League of Nations, and clearly constitutes a case to be dealt with under Article 10 of the Covenant. The grave situation which the Japanese aggression has thus created also falls within the purview of Article 11 of the same instrument and, therefore, is a matter of concern to the whole League.

For the facts of the case, I beg leave to refer to the statements which the Chinese Government has communicated on August 30th and September 12th, 1937, to the League for the information of the Members of the League and the Advisory Committee set up under a Resolution of the Assembly of February 24th, 1933, adopted in virtue of paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Covenant.

In view of Japan's present relation to the League and her action in China, the Chinese Government holds, without prejudice to the continuing validity and binding effect of all the decisions hitherto taken by the Assembly and Council in the Sino-Japanese Conflict, that Article 17 of the Covenant is also applicable.

In the name of my Government I hereby invoke the application of Articles 10, 11, and 17 of the Covenant and appeal to the Council to advise upon such means and take such action as may be appropriate and necessary for the situation under the said Articles.

I have the honor, etc.

(Signed): V. K. Wellington Koo,
First Delegate of the Republic of China.

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**Speech by His Excellency Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo
First Delegate of China to the XVIIIth Assembly
of the League of Nations, September 18, 1937**

In the general discussion of the Secretary-General's annual report in the past, it has been a custom for the delegates to refer to the important events of world interest or international concern taking place in the year under review. Following this custom I wish to invite your attention to a situation of the gravest kind which has recently arisen in the Far East. Indeed I feel it my duty to inform you of it because of its utmost gravity pregnant with dire consequences to the peace of the world.

Since two months ago my country has been once more subjected to armed aggression from Japan. The Japanese Government has despatched to China more than 300,000 troops, scores of warships, and hundreds of military aeroplanes in pursuit of political domination and territorial conquest. The Japanese Army, equipped with the most deadly instruments of war, has attacked and occupied Tientsin, Peiping, Nankow and Kalgan in the North, and is continuing to penetrate further into the interior of the country. In the South it has been attempting, with the aid of Japan's mighty fleet, to seize Shanghai, the great metropolis of the Far East. The Japanese Navy has declared an illegal blockade of the entire coast of China and the Japanese warplanes have systematically been carrying out air raids on cities and towns in thirteen provinces, some of which lie hundreds of miles inland. China, notwithstanding all her handicaps, has found herself obliged to resist this renewed armed invasion. A bitter conflict between the ruthless invaders who seek to impose their will by force and the determined defenders who wish to save their country and protect their people is raging at this very moment. Peace has been and remains gravely disturbed.

The systematic destruction of life and property by the Japanese invaders has been appalling. I do not wish to weary you with details but let me emphasize the horrible character of the deliberate attacks by Japanese warplanes on unarmed civilians.

In Tientsin the most crowded parts of the Chinese city were bombed by Japanese aeroplanes killing hundreds of people at a time for no reason other than to terrorize the civilians. The sight of the mangled bodies and the cries of the maimed and wounded were so sickening to the hearts of the foreign Red Cross doctors that they voiced their fervent wish that the Governments of the civilised Powers would make an effort to stop the carnage.

The bombing of the civilian population in the South has been even more frequent and horrible than in North China. One Japanese air raid on a Chinese railway station south of the French Concession in Shanghai killed hundreds of Chinese refugees, mostly women and children, waiting for a train to take them to their homes in the interior of the country for safety. The place was not a military base, nor were there troops present.

Here is a brief description of a foreign witness, the correspondent of the Daily Mail, who cabled to his paper under date of September 9th, less than a week ago: "The shrieks and cries of Chinese mothers rent the air yesterday at Sungkiang, near Shanghai, as, with tear-filled eyes and dazed mien, they stumbled among the charred wreckage of a bombed refugee train, hunting for the mangled corpses of their children. At least three hundred people were killed and 400 more wounded when Japanese warplanes swooped down and bombed the train wrecking five carriages."

The bombing of the unprotected city of Changshu, 80 miles from the coast, killed 2,000 civilians. Nanking, the capital, has been subjected to almost daily raids by the Japanese air force, levying a frightful toll of deaths among the civilian population.

The systematic burning and demolition of schools, colleges, hospitals, Red Cross units and other cultural and humanitarian centres is sheer vandalism. As an illustration, let me refer to the case of Nankai University,

one of the largest and best known private endowed educational institutions in North China. Japanese artillery wantonly turned its fire on the buildings of the University and Japanese warplanes dropped incendiary bombs on them. When the Japanese military authorities saw that the concrete structures had not been entirely razed to the ground, they burned them with oil and blew them up with dynamite.

As a result of the Japanese making use of the International Settlement as the base of their military operations to attack the Chinese in Shanghai, foreign life and property have also suffered and are still suffering grievous losses. Scores of innocent foreigners have been killed or wounded. Foreign ships of commerce and war have been hit and damaged by bombs or shrapnels. Foreign plants, mills, warehouses and office buildings have been occupied by Japanese troops. Seventy thousand foreign residents have been obliged to evacuate the city. The illegal blockade of the Chinese coast proclaimed by the Japanese fleet has been interfering with foreign as well as Chinese ships entering Chinese ports for lawful trade. The menace of Japanese aggression to life and property has been so serious that even the Ambassador of a great and friendly Power travelling on business in a private automobile at a distance of 50 miles from Shanghai was bombed and machine-gunned by two Japanese warplanes.

In a word, the situation in the Far East to-day is one of the gravest character. Japan in the grip of a ruthless war party has openly resorted to force as an instrument of policy and let loose its gigantic and powerful war machine to seek domination and conquest of China on the Asiatic mainland.

It may be asked what were the circumstances which had led to the outbreak of the present hostilities between China and Japan. A full answer is given in two statements which the Chinese Government sent to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations on August 30th and September 12th, and which have been distributed to the Governments of the Member States of the League and to the Advisory Committee of the Assembly on the Far Eastern situation, including the United States. It is unnecessary for me to go into details here; let me merely point out the fact that the Lukouchiao incident, which the Japanese seized as a pretext for starting large-scale military operations in North China, was not much different from many other incidents of Japanese provocation, including the one by which the Japanese claimed to justify their attack on Mukden in the night of September 18th, 1931, and their subsequent occupation of whole Manchuria.

Briefly, the facts are these. In the evening of July 7th Japanese troops held illegal manoeuvres at Lukouchiao, a railway junction of strategic importance ten miles south of Peiping, where their presence could not be defended under any existing treaty or agreement. Alleging that one of their soldiers was missing, the Japanese troops demanded after midnight to enter an adjacent garrisoned city of Wanping to conduct a search. When permission was refused by Chinese authorities, the Japanese suddenly opened an attack on Wanping with infantry and artillery forces. When the Chinese garrison offered resistance in self-defence the Japanese at once resorted to large-scale operations against the Chinese troops in order, to quote their own words, "to punish the Chinese army" and to "uphold the Japanese military prestige."

From that moment on the Chinese local authorities made repeated efforts to effect a peaceful settlement with Japan and, though the responsibility did not rest with Chinese authorities, went out of their way to accept the Japanese demands for an apology, punishment of the officers involved in the conflict and guarantee against recurrence of similar incidents, the replacement of Chinese regular troops at designated points by the Peace Preservation Corps, and effective suppression of the so-called anti-Japanese and Communist organisations in Hopei Province.

The Chinese Government itself repeatedly proposed simultaneous withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese troops. Seeing that Japan insisted upon the so-called non-interference on its part in the local settlement, it went so far in the interest of peace as to refrain from raising objections to its terms.

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But each concession and every act of forbearance on the part of the Chinese Government or the local authorities was taken by the Japanese military authorities as a sign of weakness and fear and was followed by sending more Japanese troops to Hopei Province for the purpose of pressing forward the plan of conquering North China.

The real object of the Japanese policy was disclosed when the Japanese Army, after large reinforcements had arrived, attacked and occupied not only Tientsin but also Peiping, the ancient capital and the leading cultural centre of China. No sooner had they effected their occupation of these two principal cities in North China than they extended their operations into southern Hopei and northward into Charhar Province. Fierce attacks were made on the strategic Nankow Pass and Kalgan, an important city north of the Great Wall. To-day the Japanese troops in North China total more than 200,000 strong and are continuing their invasion southward, northward and westward into the interior.

In the hope of coercing the Chinese Government to submission, Japan has invaded Shanghai, the financial and economic centre of China, as she did in 1932 following her occupation of Manchuria. Here again, in order to have a pretext the Japanese naval authorities provoked an incident on August 9th. One Japanese naval officer and one Japanese seaman attempted to approach the Chinese military aerodrome in the suburb of Shanghai in spite of the Chinese warning. When they were stopped by a Chinese guard, a clash took place in which the two Japanese and a member of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps were killed.

While the Chinese local authorities immediately proposed a settlement through diplomatic channels, the Japanese Navy concentrated thirty warships in Shanghai within forty-eight hours and increased their naval forces by several thousand marines. On August 13th, four days after the incident, the Japanese naval forces, both ashore and afloat, using the International Settlement as a base for operations, attacked the Chinese districts of Kiangwan and Chapei. In defence of her territory and independence China has been obliged, here as in North China, to resist force with force.

The incidents, which appeared to have been the immediate causes of the armed conflict in North China and in Shanghai, are referred to here only for the reason that they have been exploited by the Japanese as convenient pretexts for resorting to armed aggression against China. In both these places where hostilities have been raging in the past weeks, the original incidents were provoked by the Japanese and have since been forgotten by them. If these had not taken place, others would have been created by them.

The important fact is that Japan has been pursuing a fixed program of territorial expansion on the Asiatic mainland, and consecrates the use of force as an instrument to achieve her policy. When the Japanese Army was attacking and occupying Manchuria in 1931, the official spokesman of Japan sought to justify the action by claiming that these three Chinese provinces constituted Japan's life-line essential to her security. When the military occupation of this vast region was completed, Japanese military authorities deemed it necessary to seize Jehol in order to ensure the security of Manchuria. No sooner had they occupied Jehol than North China, Chahar and Suiyuan became the life-line of the Japanese Empire. In the name of assuring strategic and economic security for Japan, the Japanese Army has started a large scale military campaign on China in these regions for the obvious purpose of domination and conquest. The lust for territorial aggrandizement has been the real motive force behind all her military adventures.

It has often been claimed that the pressure of over-population in Japan, increasing at the rate of 800,000 souls a year, has driven her to seek new territories as an outlet. This is, however, only a pretext put forward to enlist sympathy and confound public opinion abroad. Forty years of control of Formosa induced less than a quarter of a million of Japanese immigrants to settle there. Korea, thirty years after her conquest and annexation by Japan, has only 500,000 Japanese residents. For a quarter

of a century Japan has been exercising a predominant influence in South Manchuria, and yet hardly 300,000 Japanese have chosen to live there, and a considerable part of this number is composed of the military forces, railway guards, the employees of the South Manchuria Railway and the Japanese Consular service. The truth is that the density of population per square mile in Japan is not as great as some countries in Europe, notably Belgium, nor does it equal the density of a Chinese Province like Hopei. And the Japanese people themselves, on account of the highly industrialized state of their own country, do not feel the necessity of leaving their homes and settling abroad.

The fact that Japan lacks raw materials within the borders of her Empire and depends upon supplies from abroad is certainly no justification for resorting to armed aggression against a peaceful neighbor. Besides, most of her needs are supplied not from China but principally from other countries such as cotton from the United States, oil from America and the Netherland Indies, iron from India and Malaya, wool from Australia, and wood-pulp from Canada and the Scandinavian countries. As to coal and soya beans of Manchuria, the former had already been under Japan's control and the latter had always been available to her in the open market before its occupation by her armed forces.

China, on her part, had on more than one occasion demonstrated her willingness and readiness to enter into economic co-operation with Japan, but the Chinese good intentions have always been frustrated by the Japanese policy of the mailed fist. It is Japan's preference to plunder at the point of the pistol to cordial co-operation between two free and equal partners which has destroyed the prospect of an economic understanding between the two countries.

There are not lacking in Japan liberal-minded statesmen who see clearly that the future of their country lies in peaceful collaboration with other nations, more particularly with her neighbors in Asia, but public opinion as well as the Press have been muzzled for a long time by the war clan. It is not unnatural that after several series of political assassinations, Japanese statesmen are terror-stricken and no longer attempt to lift their voice and make it heard.

Japan is once more in the grip of the war party which revels in keeping the people in a fearful state of war psychosis in order to usurp political power at home and achieve territorial conquest abroad. It exalts Might and recognises no Right except that which is backed by the sword; it consecrates force as the arbiter of the destiny of nations; it glorifies war as an instrument of empire building. Its idea of peace in the Far East is the "Pax Japonica," and its conception of order, abject acceptance of Japanese domination.

What will be the consequence and effect of this endless Japanese armed aggression in China? To answer this question, it is necessary to understand first the scope of Japan's Continental Policy. Let it be recalled that this policy aims not only at the political domination and conquest of China, but also at the elimination of foreign interests wherever the Japanese sword holds sway and the eventual expulsion of Europe and America from their territorial possessions in Asia.

This statement is not made here with a view to alarming you but it is borne out in public declarations of Japanese statesmen and in the secret documents in the Japanese archives. The experience of the Western nations in Formosa and Korea, and now in Manchuria and Jehol has given ample warning in the past. European and American interests are already feeling the menace from the occupation of Tientsin and Peiping by the Japanese Army. If Japan should succeed in her attempt to dominate Shanghai as well, the end of the vast financial and commercial interests there of Europe and America could be easily foreseen.

It is clear that China, in vigorously resisting Japanese armed aggression is not only trying to defend her own territory and sovereignty, but in effect also to safeguard the rights and interests of the foreign Powers within her

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borders. If China's efforts should fail for want of adequate support from this great institution dedicated to the cause of peace and security among nations or from those foreign Powers whose special as well as general interests in the circumstances are common with her own, then the menace of Japanese aggression will soon fall upon them and the burden of defence will have to be borne by themselves.

To-day Japan still bemoans the fact that her national resources are unequal to her appetite for conquest and handicap her ambition to be the warlord of Asia. If the day should come, which God forbid, when she would be able to lay her hands even on a great part of what China possesses in man-power and natural resources, then she would feel herself so much stronger as to challenge the treaty rights and territorial possessions of Europe and America in the South Seas and the Pacific as well as on the mainland of Asia. History bears testimony to the fact that the ambition for territorial conquests rises in proportion as the means to achieve it grow just as the human appetite for food increases as the power of digestion strengthens.

The effect of continued Japanese aggression, however, is not limited to the menace to the territorial integrity and political independence of China nor to the injury to the material interests of a few foreign Powers. The moral and spiritual aspect of the situation is equally, if not more, significant. It is a challenge to law and order in international relations which have taken three centuries to establish for the common benefit of the community of nations. Such chaos, if prolonged for want of timely checks, will nullify all the past work and present efforts to organize peace and security, and throw the entire world into the pandemonium of a general conflagration with all its horrors of killing and destruction.

In the face of this extraordinary situation, what should be done? Can international law and treaty obligations be always disregarded with impunity? Do we accept lawlessness as inevitable, and are we prepared to see it extend its tentacles unchecked to destroy peace and order in the world? It seems to me that something can be done if we ourselves still respect the treaties we have signed and the Covenant which we have solemnly declared to uphold.

For one thing this policy of continued armed aggression in flagrant violation of international law and treaty obligations should be clearly denounced. As our honorable President has alluded to in his brief but eloquent address, in the supremacy of law lies the sole escape from the anarchy of force. For another thing, the illegal blockade of the coast of China jeopardizing the established rights of navigation and commerce should be expressly repudiated. It is the thin end of the wedge against the time-honored principle of the freedom of the seas.

Furthermore, I hope that the horrors of deliberate and indiscriminate bombing from the air by the Japanese warplanes of Chinese and foreign non-combatants in disregard of the sanctity of civilian life have not escaped your attention and that every voice will be lifted in this Assembly to condemn its practice. As the recent British note sent by Mr. Eden to the Japanese Government has given expression to a universal feeling in the civilised world, the practice is, to use the words of the note itself, "as illegal as it is inhuman," because it constitutes a failure "to draw that clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants in the conduct of hostilities which international law no less than the conscience of mankind has always enjoined."

It may be claimed that the times are difficult and that there are pre-occupations in Europe where the situation is anything but reassuring. But the situation in Europe to-day is really not unconnected with the situation in the Far East. It is a natural consequence of the failure to enforce the obligations of the Covenant at the time of the Manchurian crisis before the League. Peace is indivisible; and its maintenance is of common interest to us all. As recently stated by the Secretary of State of the great Republic of the United States, "Any situation in which armed hostilities are in pro-

gress or threatened is a situation in which the rights and interests of all nations are or may be affected." Our own Covenant says: "Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League." These statements are not mere academic assertions but are based upon the practical experience of great statesmen and diplomats. If the problem of the Far East created by the repeated Japanese aggression is satisfactorily solved by the application of the principles of the Covenant, it is bound to have a most salutary effect upon Europe and will pave the way for an equally satisfactory solution of its own problem.

The League of Nations embodies an ideal and represents an order of international life which must be made to prevail if nations are to feel a sense of security and the world is to be a livable place for all. It is the only priceless issue of the great ordeal of the world which took place twenty years ago, which engulfed so many million human souls, and which has entailed generations of suffering and a train of problems from which the world has not yet fully recovered.

The principle of collective security, which underlies the Covenant and which we have all accepted, is beyond question the only logical and sound basis for any system of organized peace in the world. It is the same principle which has enabled every modern State to evolve peace and maintain order within its borders. International life, if it is to be blessed with peace and order, no less depends upon the full application of this principle.

I hope it will be generally realized that self-interest in the maintenance of peace as well as considerations of justice and the conscience of mankind, dictate that we should co-operate fully and sincerely to devise ways and means to check armed aggression and reduce lawlessness wherever they arise in the world. It is in the loyal and joint discharge of our obligations under the Covenant and other treaties to which we are parties that lies the hope of extinguishing the conflagration in the Far East and reinforcing the peace of the Pacific and Europe.

The rapid success of the Nyon Conference dealing with the Mediterranean problem, though limited in membership, is a striking example of what could be done where there was a will to co-operate.

In short, the Far Eastern situation, on account of its utmost gravity, calls for urgent action by the League. The Chinese Government has formally appealed to the Council, invoking articles 10, 11 and 17 of the Covenant. It is now for the Council to decide whether to proceed itself to consideration and action at once or to seize the Assembly of the question at the same time or to refer it first to the Advisory Committee on the Sino-Japanese conflict set up by the Assembly on February 24th, 1933.

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**United States Note to the Japanese Government
September 22, 1937**

The American Government refers to the statement by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Third Fleet which was handed to the American Consul General at Shanghai on Sept. 19, announcing the project of the Japanese Naval Air Force, after 12 o'clock noon of Sept. 21, 1937, to resort to bombing and other measures of offense in and around the city of Nanking, and warning the officials and nationals of third powers living there "to take adequate measures" for voluntary moving into areas of greater safety.

The American Government objects both to such jeopardizing of the lives of its nationals and of non-combatants generally and to the suggestion that its officials and nationals now residing in and around Nanking should withdraw from the areas in which they are lawfully carrying on their legitimate activities.

Immediately upon being informed of the announcement under reference, the American Government gave instruction to the American Ambassador at Tokyo to express to the Japanese Government this Government's concern; and that instruction was carried out. On the same day, the concern of this Government was expressed by the Acting Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington.

This Government holds the view that any general bombing of an extensive area wherein there resides a large populace engaged in peaceful pursuits is unwarranted and contrary to principles of law and of humanity. Moreover, in the present instance the period allowed for withdrawal is inadequate, and, in view of the wide area over which Japanese bombing operations have prevailed, there can be no assurance that even in areas to which American nationals and non-combatants might withdraw they would be secure.

Notwithstanding the reiterated assurance that "the safety of the lives and property of nationals of friendly powers will be taken into full consideration during the projected offensive," this Government is constrained to observe that experience has shown that, when and where aerial bombing operations are engaged in, no amount of solicitude on the part of the authorities responsible therefor is effective toward ensuring the safety of any persons or any property within the area of such operations.

Reports of bombing operations by Japanese planes at and around Nanking both before and since the issuance of the announcement under reference indicate that these operations almost invariably result in extensive destruction of non-combatant life and non-military establishments.

In view of the fact that Nanking is the seat of Government in China and that there the American Ambassador and other agencies of the American Government carry on their essential functions, the American Government strongly objects to the creation of a situation in consequence of which the American Ambassador and other agencies of this Government are confronted with the alternative of abandoning their establishments or being exposed to grave hazards.

In the light of the assurance repeatedly given by the Japanese Government that the objectives of Japanese military operations are limited strictly to Chinese military agencies and establishments and that the Japanese Government has no intention of making non-military property and non-combatants the direct objects of attack, and of the Japanese Government's expression of its desire to respect the embassies, warships and merchant vessels of the Powers at Nanking, the American Government cannot believe that the intimation that the whole Nanking area may be subjected to bombing operations represents the considered intent of the Japanese Government.

The American Government, therefore, reserving all rights on its own behalf and on behalf of American nationals in respect to damages which might result from Japanese military operations in the Nanking area, expresses the earnest hope that further bombing in and around the city of Nanking will be avoided.

**Statement of Ambassador Chengting T. Wang
September 25, 1937**

The Japanese campaign of conquest in China has entered the tenth week. Throughout this interval the Japanese war machine continuously brought death and devastation on China, which are so cruel and outrageous that history furnishes no parallel. The authors who have wilfully perpetrated such infamous deeds can in no wise escape the responsibility of having grossly violated the principles of humanity and the pertinent canons of international law.

The atrocity of the Japanese Army is manifested in their indiscriminate bombing of open and undefended towns and villages and the willful slaughter of noncombatants, in their culpable destruction of the Chinese Red Cross units, and in their use of asphyxiating and deleterious gases.

Ferocious aerial bombardment is the keynote of Japanese strategy. Japanese aircraft deliberately and systematically bombed wide areas throughout China, often far remote from the theatres of hostilities. Wherever the armed forces of Japan visited, they mercilessly brought death and havoc to the innocent populace, historical places, and cultural and charitable institutions where refugees and the sick and wounded are collected.

Even in distant places far away from theatres of actual fighting, high-power explosive and incendiary projectiles discharged from Japanese aircraft create a reign of horror. In fact their attacks are directed purposely at the defenseless and innocent masses, who do not take part in and are in no way connected with the fighting. The indiscriminate and willful slaughter of non-combatant civilians in open and undefended towns and villages, particularly in the densely populated places and in localities where refugees gather for shelter or evacuation, cannot but be condemned as iniquitous and criminal; and the conditions resulting from such atrocious acts are abhorrent.

The way the Japanese war machine brought ruin to institutions of learning and hospitals in China confounds the decency of mankind. International law and practice generally observed by civilized nations do not permit their destruction, but the Japanese capriciously subjected them to bombardment. The incredulous public can find ample evidence as regards this aspect of the unrighteous behavior of the Japanese militarists, if they will but casually go into the circumstances under which the Nankai University at Tientsin, the Tung-Chi University at Shanghai and the Hospital at Nantungchow were completely demolished, while similar institutions like the University of Shanghai, the Chungshan University at Canton, and scores of others were partially but irredeemably ruined.

The fact that the Japanese forces intentionally attacked the Chinese Red Cross deserves special mention, for it constitutes equally grave offense against international law and conventions, and the principles of humanity. While clearly no military purpose could be served, they brought ruin to the Chinese Red Cross by razing its hospitals, demolishing the ambulances, and killing doctors, nurses, and the sick and wounded.

Reliable reports have it that they purposely inflicted superfluous injuries on the wounded soldiers in the ambulances. It has been quite apparent that the heraldic Geneva Cross is not respected by the Japanese Army, and that the sanitary formations and establishments of China with their personnel and material have been brutally destroyed.

Further violating international law and conventions and the principles of humanity the Japanese militarists have resorted to the use of asphyxiating and poisonous gases. As far as the Chinese Army could detect, the Japanese Army in the northern provinces of China had already employed as a weapon of war asphyxiating and noxious gases in two places; one of these places is the historic Nankow Pass, the fall of which was chiefly attributed to the use of such a weapon; the other being Kwan in Hopei Province on the southern bank of the Hun River, south of Changsintien.

These incidents demonstrate adequately that the Japanese Army has ignored the rules of warfare observed by civilized nations, and international

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conventions to which the Government of Japan had solemnly subscribed. The declaration is advanced by General Katsuki, Japanese Commander in North China, that no quarter will be given to the Chinese soldiers is another illegal act, which civilized nations invariably avoid.

In view of these facts one cannot but conclude that the Japanese Army in China has violated every pertinent principle of the law of nations and on account of its iniquitous treatment of the innocent and the sick and wounded has put itself beyond the pale of humanity.

**Resolution Adopted by the Far Eastern Advisory Committee
on September 27 and by the Assembly of the
League of Nations on September 28, 1937**

The Advisory Committee, taking urgent consideration of the question of air bombardment of open towns in China by Japanese aircraft, expresses profound distress at the loss of life caused to innocent civilians, including great numbers of women and children, as the result of such bombardment. It declares that there is no excuse for such acts, which have aroused horror and indignation throughout the world, and solemnly condemns them.

Statement of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, September 28, 1937

The Department of State has been informed by the American Minister to Switzerland of the text of the Resolution unanimously adopted on September 27 by the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations on the subject of aerial bombardment by Japanese air forces of open towns in China.

The American Government, as has been set forth to the Japanese Government repeatedly and especially in this Government's note of September 22, holds the view that any general bombing of an extensive area wherein there resides a large populace in peaceful pursuits is unwarranted and contrary to principles of law and of humanity.

**Resolution Submitted by the Chinese Delegation to the Far Eastern
Advisory Committee of the League of Nations, October 1, 1937**

Whereas Japan has taken the initiative in sending to China powerful armies which have invaded large portions of Chinese territory;

Whereas Japan has proclaimed a maritime blockage of China and her fleet has bombarded various Chinese ports;

Whereas the Japanese air force has also proceeded in Chinese territory to aerial bombardment, the illegal character of which has been condemned by a Resolution of this Committee on Sept. 27, 1937, which was endorsed by the Assembly meeting Sept. 28;

Whereas Japan has rejected overtures made to her with a view to arrival at a pacific settlement of the dispute;

Whereas she has particularly declined the invitation made to her Sept. 21 to participate in the work of the Advisory Committee;

Whereas Japan has undertaken hostilities in defiance of the provisions of the Washington Treaty of Feb. 22, 1922, of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, of which she was a signatory, and of the fundamental rules of international law;

Therefore, The Advisory Committee condemns the violation of international law and contractual obligations;

It condemns the illegal blockade of the Chinese coasts;

It declares the facts noted above constitute a case of external aggression.

**Letter to The New York Times by Professor James W. Garner
Former President of the American Political Science Association
and of the Institut Internationale de Droit Publique, October 3, 1937**

May I express my whole-hearted approval of your editorial "Bombs Over China," published in The New York Times of Sept. 22? You have, in my opinion, correctly evaluated the character of the undeclared war which Japan is carrying on against China. In certain respects the Japanese methods recall some of the barbarities of the Thirty Years War in the seventeenth century. It is hardly too much to say that the public opinion of the civilized world has been rudely shocked at this reversion by a nation which had come to be recognized as a leader among civilized States, to methods of warfare which it was supposed civilized peoples today condemned.

Air raids against the civilian population of communities remote from the theatre of military operations were not lacking during the World War, but those who were responsible for them usually attempted to justify their action by the claim that they always endeavored to confine their attacks to military objectives and whenever noncombatants were killed or property of a non-military character injured or destroyed that was an incident or unavoidable result of an otherwise legitimate military operation.

In the present situation this extenuating circumstance cannot in most cases be pleaded, and apparently the Japanese Government does not take the trouble to do so. It makes no pretense of an endeavor to confine its bombing operations to defended or fortified towns or to military objectives in those which are undefended or unfortified. All towns, whatever their character, within the radius of action of its air squadrons and all persons and things therein are bombed without discrimination. The shock to the conscience of mankind caused by the methods of air warfare resorted to by certain of the belligerents during the World War aroused a strong and widespread demand for an international agreement which would restrict air warfare to more humane limits.

In response to this demand a commission of jurists and military, naval and aviation experts representing the States which at that time had any considerable air forces met at The Hague in December, 1922, and drafted a body of rules for the conduct of air warfare, with particular reference to the protection of noncombatants and places and objects having no military character against bombardment and destruction by airplanes. Japan was one of the Powers represented at the conference and the Japanese delegation showed unusual sympathy for all proposals looking toward the restriction of air warfare to persons and objects having a military character.

John Bassett Moore, president of the commission, in presenting the matter to it declared that "among the elementary principles which the development of modern rules of warfare, running through several centuries, have been designed to establish and confirm, the principle most fundamental in character * * * is the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, and the protection of noncombatants against injuries not incidental to military operations against combatants."

The soundness of this principle was unanimously recognized by this commission and it agreed to a rule which affirmed that air bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civil population, of destroying or damaging private property not of military character, or of injuring noncombatants, should be prohibited. It then adopted a rule which declared air bombardment to be legitimate only when it is directed against a "military objective," such as military forces, military establishments, munitions depots, etc.

Finally, the commission adopted a rule forbidding the bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings and buildings not situated in the immediate vicinity of the theatre of land operations, although it allowed the bombardment of particular military objectives situated within the prohibited zone. It is interesting to note in this connection that the Japanese delegation desired to go farther and prohibit absolutely all bombardment of towns and villages

outside the immediate area of military operations even when they contained military objectives within their limits.

This admirable code for the regulation of the conduct of air warfare embodying principles which were both humane and reasonable from the military point of view has unfortunately never been put into effect. Here, again, it may be remarked, however, that, although the Government of the United States approved the rules, Japan alone of the other signatories returned a favorable reply to an inquiry addressed to the participating Governments as to whether they were prepared to accept them and put them into force.

Nevertheless, Japan is today engaged in flouting openly and on a large scale these same rules which her representatives at The Hague helped to formulate, which her Government at the time was willing to put into force and which the public opinion of the Japanese nation then apparently approved.

The distinction between combatants and noncombatants which The Hague Commission declared to be fundamental has been thrown into the scrap heap, air raids are being directed almost daily against the civilian population of many towns, cities and districts with no other object in view than to terrorize the inhabitants and drive the nation into submission. Peaceful towns and villages far remote from the theatre of war and in which there are no military forces or military objectives are being devastated and reduced to shambles, dwelling houses which shelter the rich and the poor, school houses, hospitals, government buildings (which, it may be remarked, were not included in the list of military objectives approved by The Hague Commission) and public utility establishments upon which the civilian population is dependent for heat, light, water and other essentials of life—none of which can be regarded as military objectives—are being ruthlessly destroyed, and thousands of peaceful, unoffending inhabitants, men, women and children, who are taking no part in the war, directly or indirectly, and who have no means of escape, are being slaughtered without warning in their homes or at their places of work.

Secretary Hull's note of protest of Sept. 22 to the Japanese Government simply expresses the opinion of the generality of civilized men and women everywhere as well as the judgment of jurists, that the "general bombing of an extensive area wherein there resides a large populace engaged in peaceful pursuits is unwarranted and contrary to principles of law and humanity."

In the face of this policy of "Schrecklichkeit" one is tempted to ask, What has come over Japan since the days when Elihu Root in a noble tribute to the Japanese nation was able to say that no country had a finer record for the high standards of honor and courtesy which it had set in its international relations or for the almost punctilious scruple with which it had performed its international obligations? Whatever may be the reasons for this retrogressive transformation of Japanese policy, it is, as you have well said, as stupid as it is brutal, and indicates that the rulers of Japan have lost the sense of what Thomas Jefferson called a "decent respect for the opinions of mankind."

Speech by President F. D. Roosevelt at Chicago
October 5, 1937

I am glad to come once again to Chicago and especially to have the opportunity of taking part in the dedication of this important project of civic betterment.

On my trip across the continent and back I have been shown many evidences of the result of common sense co-operation between municipalities and the Federal Government, and I have been greeted by tens of thousands of Americans who have told me in every look and word that their material and spiritual well-being has made great strides forward in the past few years.

And yet, as I have seen with my own eyes, the prosperous farms, the thriving factories and the busy railroads—as I have seen the happiness and security and peace which covers our wide land—almost inevitably I have been compelled to contrast our peace with very different scenes being enacted in other parts of the world.

It is because the people of the United States under modern conditions must, for the sake of their own future, give thought to the rest of the world, that I, as the responsible executive head of the nation, have chosen this inland city and this gala occasion to speak to you on a subject of definite national importance.

The political situation in the world, which of late has been growing progressively worse, is such as to cause grave concern and anxiety to all the peoples and nations who wish to live in peace and amity with their neighbors.

Some nine years ago the hopes of mankind for a continuing era of international peace were raised to great heights when more than sixty nations solemnly pledged themselves not to resort to arms in furtherance of their national aims and policies. The high aspirations expressed in the Briand-Kellogg Peace Pact and the hopes for peace thus raised have of late given way to a haunting fear of calamity. The present reign of terror and international lawlessness began a few years ago.

It began through unjustified interference in the internal affairs of other nations or the invasion of alien territory in violations of treaties, and has now reached a stage where the very foundations of civilization are seriously threatened. The landmarks and traditions which have marked the progress of civilization toward a condition of law, order and justice are being wiped away.

Without a declaration of war and without warning or justification of any kind, civilians, including women and children, are being ruthlessly murdered with bombs from the air. In times of so-called peace ships are being attacked and sunk by submarines without cause or notice. Nations are fomenting and taking sides in civil warfare in nations that have never done them any harm. Nations claiming freedom for themselves deny it to others.

Innocent peoples and nations are being cruelly sacrificed to a greed for power and supremacy which is devoid of all sense of justice and humane consideration.

To paraphrase a recent author, "perhaps we foresee a time when men, exultant in the technique of homicide, will rage so hotly over the world that every precious thing will be in danger, every book and picture and harmony, every treasure garnered through two millenniums, the small, the delicate, the defenceless—all will be lost or wrecked or utterly destroyed."

If those things come to pass in other parts of the world, let no one imagine that America will escape, that it may expect mercy, that this western hemisphere will not be attacked and that it will continue tranquilly and peacefully to carry on the ethics and the arts of civilization.

If those days come, "there will be no safety by arms, no help from authority, no answer in science. The storm will rage till every flower of culture is trampled and all human beings are leveled in a vast chaos."

If those days are not to come to pass—if we are to have a world in which we can breathe freely and live in amity without fear—the peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort to uphold laws and principles on which alone peace can rest secure.

The peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignorings of humane instincts which today are creating a state of international anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality.

Those who cherish their freedom and recognize and respect the equal right of their neighbors to be free and live in peace must work together for the triumph of law and moral principles in order that peace, justice and confidence may prevail in the world. There must be a return to a belief in the pledged word, in the value of a signed treaty. There must be recognition of the fact that national morality is as vital as private morality.

A bishop wrote me the other day: "It seems to me that something greatly needs to be said in behalf of ordinary humanity against the present practice of carrying the horrors of war to helpless civilians, especially women and children. It may be that such a protest might be regarded by many, who claim to be realists, as futile, but may it not be that the heart of mankind is so filled with horror at the present needless suffering that force could be mobilized in sufficient volume to lessen such cruelty in the days ahead? Even though it may take twenty years, which God forbid, for civilization to make effective its corporate protest against this barbarism, surely strong voices may hasten the day."

There is a solidarity and interdependence about the modern world, both technically and morally, which makes it impossible for any nation completely to isolate itself from economic and political upheavals in the rest of the world, especially when such upheavals appear to be spreading and not declining. There can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all. International anarchy destroys every foundation for peace. It jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small. It is, therefore, a matter of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that the sanctity of international treaties and the maintenance of international morality be restored.

The overwhelming majority of the peoples and nations of the world today want to live in peace. They seek the removal of barriers against trade. They want to exert themselves in industry, in agriculture and in business, that they may increase their wealth through the production of wealth-producing goods rather than striving to produce military planes and bombs and machine guns and cannon for the destruction of human lives and useful property.

In those nations of the world which seem to be piling armament on armament for purposes of aggression, and those other nations which fear acts of aggression against them and their security, a very high proportion of the national income is being spent directly for armaments. It runs from 30 to as high as 50 per cent.

The proportion that we in the United States spend is far less—11 or 12 per cent.

How happy we are that the circumstances of the moment permit us to put our money into bridges and boulevards, dams and reforestation, the conservation of our soil and many other kinds of useful works rather than into huge standing armies and vast supplies of implements of war.

I am compelled and you are compelled, nevertheless, to look ahead. The peace, the freedom and the security of 90 per cent of the population of the world is being jeopardized by the remaining 10 per cent who are threatening a breakdown of all international order and law. Surely the 90 per cent who want to live in peace under law and in accordance with moral standards that have received almost universal acceptance through the centuries, can and must find some way to make their will prevail.

The situation is definitely of universal concern. The questions involved relate not merely to violation of specific provisions of particular treaties; they are questions of war and peace, of international law and especially of principles of humanity. It is true that they involve definite violations of agreements, and especially of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty. But they also involve problems of world economy, world security and world humanity.

It is true that the moral consciousness of the world must recognize the importance of removing injustices and well-founded grievances; but at the same time it must be aroused to the cardinal necessity of honoring sanctity of treaties, of respecting the rights and liberties of others and of putting an end to acts of international aggression.

It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.

When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.

It is my determination to pursue a policy of peace and to adopt every practicable measure to avoid involvement in war. It ought to be inconceivable that in this modern era, and in the face of experience, any nation could be so foolish and ruthless as to run the risk of plunging the whole world into war by invading and violating in contravention of solemn treaties, the territory of other nations that have done them no real harm and which are too weak to protect themselves adequately. Yet the peace of the world and the welfare and security of every nation is today being threatened by that very thing.

No nation which refuses to exercise forbearance and to respect the freedom and rights of others can long remain strong and retain the confidence and respect of other nations. No nation ever loses its dignity or good standing by conciliating its differences, and by exercising great patience with, and consideration for, the rights of other nations.

War is a contagion, whether it be declared or undeclared. It can engulf states and peoples remote from the original scene of hostilities. We are determined to keep out of war, yet we cannot insure ourselves against the disastrous effects of war and the dangers of involvement. We are adopting such measures as will minimize our risk of involvement but we cannot have complete protection in a world of disorder in which confidence and security have broken down.

If civilization is to survive the principles of the Prince of Peace must be restored. Shattered trust between nations must be revived.

Most important of all, the will for peace on the part of peace-loving nations must express itself to the end that nations that may be tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of others will desist from such a cause. There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace.

America hates war. America hopes for peace. Therefore, America actively engages in the search for peace.

Reports and Resolution Adopted by the Far Eastern Advisory Committee on October 5 and by the Assembly of the League of Nations on October 6, 1937

Summary of the First Report*

1. The first part of the first report, after summarizing the history of the present conflict, citing both Japanese and Chinese versions, says:

"Since July 7, faced by a growing resistance, Japan has not ceased to intensify her action, employing larger and larger forces and more and more powerful armaments. According to Chinese estimates, in addition to 100,000 men in the Shanghai region, the strength of Japanese troops operating in China exceeds 250,000 men.

"As regards the activity of the Japanese aircraft, the Advisory Committee, in its resolution of September 27, condemned the aerial bombardments of open towns in China. The Assembly endorsed this resolution."

2. The report's second part deals with the treaty situation, beginning: "For the purpose of examining the facts of the present situation it does not seem necessary to discuss treaties regulating commercial matters and such matters as the extraterritorial status of Japanese nationals in China. There are only three main treaties which are relevant to our present purpose—namely, the Final Protocol of Sept. 7, 1901; the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, 1922, and the Paris Pact, 1928—to which may be added The Hague Convention, No. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, which has a somewhat different character.

"There are in addition thereto an indeterminate number of bilateral agreements negotiated at various times locally between Chinese and Japanese authorities. The exact terms, scope and interpretation of the validity of these agreements are matters of dispute. They cannot affect or override obligations undertaken by either of the parties in the three multilateral engagements referred to above."

3. "Prima facie, the events described in the first part of this report constitute a breach by Japan of her obligations toward China and toward other States under these treaties. The conduct of hostilities by Japanese forces, under the circumstances described, by land, water and air throughout China is prima facie inconsistent with the obligation to respect China's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and also with the obligation never to seek a solution of a dispute with China of whatever origin or character except by pacific means.

"It would seem that only if it could be shown to be a measure necessary for self-defense (including defense of Japanese forces and nationals lawfully upon Chinese territory) could the position of Japanese forces in China possibly be reconciled with Japan's treaty obligations."

4. "It is clear that the two countries take very different views as to the underlying grounds of the dispute and as to the incident which led to the first outbreak of hostilities.

"It cannot, however, be challenged that powerful Japanese armies have invaded Chinese territory and are in military control of large areas, including Peiping itself; that the Japanese Government has taken naval measures to close the Chinese coast to Chinese shipping; and that Japanese aircraft are carrying out bombing over widely separated regions of the country.

"After examination of the facts laid before it, the committee is bound to take the view that the action taken by Japan has been out of all proportion to the incident that occasioned the conflict; that it cannot possibly facilitate or promote the friendly co-operation between the two nations that Japanese statesmen have affirmed to be the aim of their policy; that these actions can be justified neither on the basis of existent legal instruments nor on that of the right of self-defense, and that they are in contravention of Japan's obligations under the Washington (Nine-Power) Treaty of February 6, 1922, and under the Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact) of August 27, 1928."

* For the full text, see China Reference Series, Vol. I, No. 2.

Text of the Second Report

1. In the report which the Subcommittee has already submitted to the Advisory Committee the facts of the present situation in China and Japan's treaty obligations have been examined. This report shows that the action taken by Japan is a breach of Japan's treaty obligations and cannot be justified.

2. The establishment of understandings of international law as an actual rule of conduct among governments and the maintenance of respect for treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples one with another are matters of vital interest to all nations.

3. The present situation in China is a matter of concern not only to the two States in conflict but, to a greater or lesser degree, to all States. Many powers are already directly affected in the lives of their nationals and in their material interests, but even more important than this is the interest all States must feel in the restoration and maintenance of peace.

This, indeed, is the fundamental purpose for which the League of Nations exists. It has thus the duty, as well as the right, to attempt to bring about a speedy restoration of peace in the Far East in accordance with existing obligations under the Covenant and treaties.

4. The Subcommittee has considered in the first place the obligations that the Covenant places in such circumstances on League Members.

5. The Advisory Committee has been set up under the wide terms of the Covenant's Article III, Section 3, which authorizes the Assembly to deal at its meetings with any matter within the League's sphere of action or affecting world peace.

6. This Article places no limit on the action of the Assembly, and Article XI, which, inter alia, has been invoked by China, provides that the "League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations."

7. The Subcommittee examined the situation with a view to determining what action would be "wise and effectual."

8. It cannot be admitted that the present Far East conflict, which has been shown to involve infringement of Japan's treaty obligations, is one which can as of right only be settled by direct methods between the Chinese and Japanese Governments. On the contrary, the whole situation must be taken into the fullest consideration and particularly any appropriate means must be examined whereby peace may be re-established in conformity with the principles of the Covenant and international law and with the provisions of existing treaties.

9. The Subcommittee is convinced even at this state of the conflict that before examining other possibilities further efforts must be made to secure restoration of peace by agreement.

10. In attempting a settlement by negotiations of the present conflict the League cannot lose sight of the fact that one party is not a League Member and has, in relation to the Advisory Committee's work, explicitly declined to co-operate in political matters with the League.

11. The Subcommittee notes that under the Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington the contractual Powers other than China agreed inter alia to respect China's sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity, and all the contracting Powers, including China, agreed whenever a situation should arise which involved application of the treaty's stipulations and rendered desirable a discussion of such application there should be full and frank communication between the Powers concerned.

It appears, therefore, to the Subcommittee that the first step the Assembly should take in the League's name would be to invite those Members of the League who are parties to the Nine-Power Treaty to initiate such consultation at the earliest practicable moment. The Subcommittee would suggest that these Members meet forthwith to decide the best and quickest means of giving effect to this invitation.

The Subcommittee would further express the hope that the States concerned will be able to associate with their work other States which have special interests in the Far East to seek a method of putting an end to the conflict by agreement.

12. The States thus engaged in consultation may at any stage consider it desirable to make proposals through the medium of the Advisory Committee and Assembly. The Subcommittee recommends that the Assembly should not close its session and should declare the League's willingness to consider co-operation to the maximum extent practicable in any such proposal.

The Advisory Committee should in any case hold a further meeting (whether in Geneva or elsewhere) within a period of one month.

13. Pending the results of the action proposed, the Advisory Committee should invite the Assembly to express its moral support for China and to recommend that League Members should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance and thus increasing her difficulties in the present conflict and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China.

Text of the Resolution

The Assembly adopts as its own the reports submitted to it by its Advisory Committee on the subjects of the conflict between China and Japan;

Approves the proposals contained in the second of the said reports and requests that its President take the necessary action in regard to the proposed meeting of Members of the League which are Parties to the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington of Feb. 6, 1922;

Expresses its moral support for China and recommends that Members of the League should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance and thus increasing her difficulties in the present conflict and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China;

Decides to adjourn its present session and authorizes the President to summon a further meeting if the Advisory Committee so requests.

0445
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Statement of the Department of State of the United States
October 6, 1937

The Department of State has been informed by the American Minister to Switzerland of the text of the report adopted by the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations setting forth the Advisory Committee's examination of the facts of the present situation in China and the treaty obligations of Japan. The Minister has further informed the Department that this report was adopted and approved by the Assembly of the League of Nations today, October 6.

Since the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East, the Government of the United States has urged upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities, and has offered to be of assistance in an effort to find some means, acceptable to both parties to the conflict, of composing by pacific methods the situation in the Far East.

The Secretary of State in statements made public on July 16 and August 23 made clear the position of the Government of the United States in regard to international problems and international relationships throughout the world and as applied specifically to the hostilities which are at present unfortunately going on between China and Japan.

Among the principles which in the opinion of the Government of the United States should govern international relationships, if peace is to be maintained, are abstinence by all nations from the use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations; adjustment of problems in international relations by process of peaceful negotiation and agreement; respect by all nations for the rights of others and observance by all nations of established obligations; and the upholding of the principle of the sanctity of treaties.

On October 5 at Chicago the President elaborated these principles, emphasizing their importance, and in a discussion of the world situation pointed out that there can be no stability for peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all; that international anarchy destroys every foundation for peace; that it jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small; and that it is therefore of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that respect for treaties and international neutrality be restored.

In the light of the unfolding developments in the Far East the Government of the United States has been forced to the conclusion that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, regarding principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, and to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928.

Thus the conclusions of this Government with respect to the foregoing are in general accord with those of the Assembly of the League of Nations.

Letter to The New York Times by Former Secretary of State
Henry L. Stimson, October 6, 1937

Americans are shocked and outraged at what is taking place in the Far East. But to many of them it presents merely a confused picture of distant horrors with which they think we have no necessary connection and to which they can close their eyes and turn their backs in the belief that we owe no duty to the situation except to keep out of it and forget it. It may be useful under such circumstances to try to recall briefly certain broad features inherent in this situation which do relate to us and our ultimate future.

In the first place, many of us do not adequately appraise the size and character of the Chinese nation; the influence of its civilization on Asia in the past and, what is far more important, the influence for good or evil which it may have upon the rest of the entire world, including ourselves, in the years and centuries to come. For 4,000 years China has maintained what is far and away the most persistent cultural solidarity which has existed in the world. In all those centuries no foreign conquest and no passage of time has been able permanently to materially change or deflect her development.

In the next place, the dominant characteristic of this culture of these four hundred fifty millions of people, devoted mainly to agriculture, has been for centuries inherently peaceful. As one evidence of this, their culture has produced for themselves a status where the individual Chinese has required less government than the individuals of any other nation. Although covering an immense territory with enormous numbers, their personal relationships have remained virtually upon a family or patriarchal basis as distinguished from the various forms of community and national government existing elsewhere. Recent Chinese wars have been purely defensive and internal. No outside nation has any reason to fear any armed attack from China provided China continues her own peculiar methods of development and organization. On the contrary all such nations could look forward to profitable commercial intercourse with the millions of Chinese who are as keen, capable and honest in business as they are peaceful as neighbors.

Birth of the Open-Door Policy

During the past century when the age of steam and electricity brought the modern Western World into close contact with the Far East, China was at first regarded as an easy prey for the imperialistic ambitions of the more warlike nations. During the close of the nineteenth century a scramble commenced among such nations to seize and divide up her territory. This effort produced a great rebellion in China known as the Boxer Rebellion. At this juncture our own nation, the United States, successfully put forward a policy designed to arrest this scramble and its disastrous consequences. John Hay, as our Secretary of State, succeeded, with the warm concurrence of Great Britain, in pledging the other nations, to an "Open Door" policy toward China. This policy was based upon two principles: (1) equality of commercial opportunity among all nations dealing with China; and (2), as necessary to that equality, the preservation of China's territorial and administrative integrity.

Twenty years later after the downfall of the Imperial Government of China and the effort of the Chinese to set up a republican form of government were again producing civil war chaotic conditions in China, our Government again stepped forward at the Washington Conference in 1921 and succeeded in having the principles of the Open Door policy of Mr. Hay embodied into a formal treaty between all of the nations having possessions in the Far East, including Japan. This became known as the "Nine-Power Treaty." All of its signatories agreed:

"1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.

3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and

maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States."

A Far-Sighted Treaty

This was one of the most admirable and far-sighted treaties in the history of modern civilization. It has been joined in not only by ourselves, the British Empire, China and Japan, but also by France, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Portugal, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Mexico, and Bolivia. Germany also signed it, though her Parliament has not yet ratified it. It at once stabilized the post-war jealousies and fluctuations in that part of the world.

The United States and Great Britain agreed to limit the size of their fleets and to refrain from further fortifications in the Far East in reliance upon the Japanese agreement to leave China alone and thus to preserve the opportunities of other nations for peaceful commerce with China.

The treaty was based upon a recognition of the importance of giving China a free hand in her gigantic task of economic and political reorganization, and constituted a deliberate policy of renunciation of aggression against her during that process. It represented a common faith that only by such a process under the protection of such an agreement could the fullest interest not only of China but of all nations who had intercourse with her best be served.

Furthermore, this treaty correctly represented the personal attitude of the American people themselves toward China and our sympathy with and interest in her growth and future. For many years our people have been conducting in China the greatest humanitarian and educational effort which has ever been unofficially conducted by the people of one great nation toward another.

From hundreds of American towns and cities thousands of Christian missionaries and American educators and scientists have gone to devote their lives to the assistance of China and the Chinese people on their new entry into the modern world. By American sacrifice and American money, colleges, schools, hospitals and churches have been built throughout Chinese territory even in its most remote and inaccessible portions.

Simultaneously in scores of our own schools and colleges for over half a century we have been receiving thousands of eager Chinese students and educating them according to American social and political principles. The personnel of the Nationalist Government of China today shows marked results of these American efforts. Many of her leading statesmen, directly or indirectly, have been influenced by our work and principles.

For ten years China remained in lawful and recognized occupation of her territory. During that time Japan, being then herself under the government and leadership of statesmen of liberal and responsible views, was faithful to her treaty obligations and maintained toward China a policy of moderation and international good citizenship. Unfortunately, the historic background of Japan was entirely different from that of China. Ninety years ago, Japan was a purely military autocracy organized upon the feudal lines of the medieval ages. And although during the past century she has made marvelous and gigantic strides in the technical arts, in commerce and industrialization; although she had adopted a Constitution with parliamentary features and been extending suffrage among her people, she was far from having reached the stage of liberal democracy. For seven centuries prior to 1850 her privileged class had been that of the soldier, and underneath the veneer of her modern parliamentarianism could be found military leaders, cherishing grandiose ambitions for military conquests, as well as a general population which was very sensitive to the appeal of military fanaticism.

To such imperialist leaders in Japan the depression of 1930 brought their

opportunity. They had long cherished plans for a military exploitation of China, and on the 18th of September, 1931, defying the civil leaders of their own government, the Japanese Army seized Manchuria. Within three months they had torn away from China provinces having an aggregate territory as large as Germany and France combined and which were occupied by a population of some thirty millions of Chinese. A few weeks later, in January, 1932, a Japanese expeditionary force attacked Shanghai, aiming a blow at the very center of China's territory and commerce. But meeting an entirely unexpected, courageous and stubborn resistance by the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army, as well as with vigorous protests from the American Government and the League of Nations, and possibly because the total American fleet was held united at Hawaii on the flank of the Japanese aggression, Japan in a few months withdrew her forces from Shanghai with her objective unattained.

Since then there has ensued a four-year interval, during which significant changes have occurred. In Japan militarism has consolidated its hold upon the Government partly by a campaign of terrorism, which involved the assassination of the more moderate Japanese statesmen, and partly by the appeal which the successful military conquest in Manchuria has made to such an emotional population as the Japanese.

The Campaign in Manchukuo

With militarism thus fortified at home, Japan has boldly claimed an economic and political hegemony over China which is in complete disregard of her former promises in the Nine-Power treaty. Simultaneously she has been pushing forward partly disguised military and political steps to effectuate it. She has instigated attempts to break away some of the Northern provinces of China proper and to form in them separate autonomous governments. She has engineered invasions by Manchukuoan troops into Inner Mongolia.

In these steps she has not been very successful and has found the Chinese resistance to her aggression steadily stiffening. Under the cautious but skillful leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and inspired by the dangers which now so clearly confront them, the people of China have been making hitherto unprecedented progress toward the achievement of national unity and administrative cooperation, and this fact has not escaped the notice of Japan.

Simultaneously events have been occurring in the outside world which might well make Japan think her opportunity had arrived for a new attack on China. The Fascist dictators of Italy and Germany have boldly and successfully carried through coups involving in Ethiopia, the Rhineland and Spain acts of treaty violation and indefensible aggression. On the other hand, the peaceful democracies of the world, being absorbed with the work of recuperation from the depression and other consequences of the great war, have yielded to these lawless acts of the dictators with a lack of their customary spirit.

"Jitters" in Britain and America

In Britain and America, usually in the van of matters of international morality, the people have seemingly been smitten by a temporary seizure of nervous "jitters". This has been excusable in Britain, faced as she has been and now is with an extremely perilous European condition within range of her home cities. But in America, occupying the most safe and defensible position in the world, there has been no excuse except faulty reasoning for the wave of ostrich-like isolationism which has swept over us and by its erroneous form of neutrality legislation has threatened to bring upon us in the future the very dangers of war which we now are seeking to avoid.

Finally, last Winter in Russia, the one nation whose great and growing power lies within reach of Northern China and which is feared by Japan, there occurred domestic incidents which were widely interpreted in the outside world as evidencing grave internal disorders.

Evidently taking advantage of these conditions Japan has struck again, aiming both at Northern China as far as the Yellow River and also at the center of China at Shanghai. No excuse worthy of a moment's consideration has been given for the attack. On the contrary, the statements emanating from

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Tokyo make abundantly clear that there is no such excuse. The Chinese Government is denounced as infamous for not yielding to Japan's wishes in North China, and the announcement is made in the press that the attack will continue until that Government at Nanking is destroyed.

The methods of the attack also indicate that this is the objective. China's coasts are blockaded and her shipping seized and a widespread campaign of bombing the civilian Chinese population, huddled into great defenseless cities and remote from any military movement or objective, is put into effect. These steps make clear a deliberate and systematic attempt by Japan by a general campaign of terrorism practiced upon the civilian population to force the Chinese Government to yield.

Making all allowances for imperfect information, the general scope of what Japan is attempting is abundantly clear. We can also forecast some of the effects which her attempt may have upon the outside world, including ourselves.

What Japan Is Trying to Do

In general Japan is trying to take control of the development of modern China and to twist its form and nature to suit her own aims, both political and economic. She is trying to develop China in a way which is the exact opposite of the purpose and policy of the Open Door and the Nine-Power treaty. Japan makes no secret of this. We do not have to guess. We have a perfectly frank exposition of her plan in what she has already done in Manchukuo and North China.

She does not contemplate "the preservation of China's territorial and administrative integrity." She is actually engaged in carving up China's territory and herself taking over China's administration. She does not propose equality of commercial opportunity among all nations dealing with China. She is seeking to monopolize that opportunity and has already taken effective steps to do so in Manchukuo.

She is thus trying completely to transform China's own business methods and character and culture and to dominate them to her own national ends. Furthermore, she is not seeking to do this by persuasion or education or other peaceful means, but by force and terrorism of the most brutal and barbarous kind.

Japan is not a good colonizer even of backward races. Her colonizing methods have been recently described by an able student of the Far East:

"What capacity she possesses for construction is counterbalanced by a lack in the intangibles of ruling. Her notorious psychological deficiencies have never been mere conspicuous. * * * Not only are the inhabitants of Manchukuo unreconciled; they are hostile, unreconstructedly hostile. * * * Japan has not the capacity to win loyalty by sharing benefits and rewards. * * * The Japanese can command, but they cannot cooperate." * * * "The Price of Japanese Imperialism," by Nathaniel Pfeffer, in *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1937.

She has not even the financial resources which are notoriously necessary for colonial exploitation. Her efforts in Manchukuo have already strained her own national resources to the uttermost. Before she made the present attack, her unstable economic condition was known to all students. Her credit was impaired, her currency in jeopardy and her foreign trade, upon which she was dependent for the necessary exchange to carry on her imports, has been curtailed by drastic restrictions. The conditions of her industrial workers have been becoming progressively more difficult. Real wages in Japan are nearly 20 per cent below 1931, while the cost of living has risen by 25 per cent.

In short, this headstrong little nation, herself on the verge of bankruptcy from the efforts of her previous adventure in Manchukuo, is seeking to recoup herself by a brutal attempt to conquer and exploit a population over four times her size and composed of men who are individually as brave and tenacious as her own people and who are at least their equals in mentality and civilization.

Trouble for the Outside World

In such a situation what is the forecast for us and the rest of the world? Japan probably cannot succeed in permanently dominating the whole or even a major portion of China. But she may temporarily occupy large portions of China and temporarily force into her armies large masses of the good fighting power of the Chinese to use in making trouble elsewhere in the world. And certainly she can disastrously embarrass and retard the efforts which China has been making for development in her own peaceful, commercial way.

Japan can thus cause immense loss to all nations commercially interested in China, and for a time she may make herself a stronger military power than she is at present, with the result of causing great apprehension and danger in the area of the North Pacific. For a considerable time, if Japan is able to proceed in her own way, there will be a great storm center in Northeastern Asia, with grave possible threats and disturbances to us and our own interests. For our Pacific States already occupy ringside seats at this battle.

Such, in brief, is the situation across the Pacific which confronts our nation. It is one of those acute international crises which force the people of this nation to think hard and clearly on subjects which they are not accustomed to deal with in normal times. Our American people are aroused and angry at the callous brutality of the Japanese. There is apparently no difference of opinion in their minds as to the merits of the controversy. Their abhorrence of injustice and oppression causes them immediately and universally to sympathize with China, but they do not see how anything can be done about it. They seem to be getting steadily more angry without knowing whether there is any proper outlet for their indignation.

No one knows better than I the difficulties which confront our Government in such a situation. No one has a keener desire than I to avoid making more difficult the position of my successor in the State Department, for whom I have the greatest respect. But in every democratic nation the task of those entrusted with guiding its course in such a crisis will be made easier or harder accordingly as the attitude of the public is intelligent and far-sighted or the reverse. I therefore conceive it to be a time when every effort should be made by citizens to contribute to the general discussion which is taking place in such a way as to help the understanding of his fellows to the end that it may be intelligent and far-sighted. It is with this object that I venture these reflections upon the subject. In them I shall continue to remain as far as possible in the realm of generalities. It is usually best for the Government itself to propose specific measures without being hampered by specific proposals from the public.

Not a Matter of Sending Armies

In the first place, let me make it perfectly clear that, in my opinion, this is not a case where there should be any thought of America sending armies to participate in a strife that is going on in Asia. Not only is such a course probably militarily impossible; not only would it be abhorrent to our people, but to attempt it would do much more harm than good.

The future character of the civilization of Asia must be determined, whether peacefully or by war, by the men of Asia themselves. If China is to be saved from domination by force, it must be saved by the courage and sacrifice of armed Chinese men. The problem of the preservation of China's peaceful civilization cannot be solved by the armed intervention of the Occident.

But that is very far from saying that the only alternative is inaction or a passive and shameful acquiescence in the wrong that is now being done. The lamentable fact is that today the aggression of Japan is being actively assisted by the efforts of men of our own nation and men of the other great democracy in the world—the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is not only being actively assisted, but our assistance is so effective and predominant that without it even today the aggression would in all probability be promptly checked and cease.

Some Economic Considerations

Let me explain this and make it absolutely clear. Japan's position as a

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war-making nation is far from being self-contained. She is peculiarly dependent upon the outside world for her ability to attack China. While she has ample facilities for manufacturing weapons of all kinds, she is extraordinarily lacking in the raw materials with which to carry on such manufactures. In that respect she is extremely vulnerable. She has no supplies of oil worthy of the name. She has no supplies of rubber whatever. She has very little iron ore—about one-seventh of what she uses even in peace times, and she has almost no cotton.

A further peculiarity of Japan's economic condition is that she purchases her supplies of these vitally essential commodities from a very few nations, and by far the principal sellers are Great Britain and ourselves. During the eighteen months prior to June, 1936, she purchased 75 per cent of her oil from us, and one-half of her importations of iron ore and scrap iron also came from us. During the same period over 80 per cent of her imports of raw cotton came from the United States and British India and the principal supplies of her rubber came from the British Straits Settlements.

Again, in Japan's present tottering financial condition she is able to make these purchases of raw material for her guns and ammunition only by selling enough of her own products to obtain the requisite foreign exchange to pay for her purchases.

One of these principal Japanese exports is raw silk. This is one of the most generally distributed crops of the Japanese Empire, the production of raw silk taking place in virtually every peasant home and farm. Of that crop the United States in 1935 purchased 85 per cent and in the first six months of 1936, 81 per cent; with Great Britain taking nearly all the rest. With the foreign exchange thus obtained Japan is purchasing from us, as I have said above, the raw materials for her guns.

It is not necessary to go further into the picture. Today hundreds of thousands of brave Chinamen are fighting a desperate and hopeless battle. The press reports teem with evidences of their desperate valor and heroic self-sacrifice. But modern war is a matter of machinery and munitions. These brave men are virtually armed only with the rifles and machine guns which they carry. Even their supply of cartridges for these weapons is pitifully inadequate. Their artillery is woefully insufficient; their planes merely a fraction in number of the planes of their opponents, and they have no tanks.

Day after day there is being rained upon them bombs from an unobstructed hostile air force and shells from an overwhelming mass of artillery, while their lines are being pierced at intervals by tanks which they have no means of stopping. Yet they have made a resistance so far which has won the admiration of the world. The odds against which they are fighting are being made possible by us.

So I say that the first glaring fact which stares us in the face in our analysis of the situation is that China's principal need is not that something should be done by outside nations to help her but that outside nations should cease helping her enemy. Given a situation in which the supply of munitions was only somewhat less unequal, China's bravery has already shown that Japan's task would be helpless.

Questions for Britain and America

In the light of these facts, the first question that I should ask of the American and British peoples is: Does the safety of the American nation and the safety of the British Empire require that we go on helping Japan to exterminate, by the methods she is daily employing, the gallant Chinese soldiers with which she is confronted—not to speak of the civilian Chinese population that she is engaged in terrorizing? Is the condition of our statesmanship so pitifully inadequate that we cannot devise the simple means of international cooperation which would stop our participation in this slaughter? I for one do not think so. I believe it can be done and done effectively without serious danger to us.

The second great fact which the present situation brings out is the deep-seated error which has pervaded recent American thinking on international matters. I have heard Theodore Roosevelt say that he put peace above everything except righteousness. Where the two came into conflict he supported righteousness. In our recent efforts to avoid war we have reversed this principle and are trying to put peace above righteousness. We have thereby gone far toward killing the influence of our country in the progress of the world. At the same time, instead of protecting, we have endangered our own peace.

Our recent neutrality legislation attempts to impose a dead level of neutral conduct on the part of our Government between right and wrong, between an aggressor and its victim, between a breaker of the law of nations and the nations who are endeavouring to uphold the law. It won't work. Such a policy of amoral drift by such a safe and powerful nation as our own will only set back the hands of progress. It will not save us from entanglement. It will even make entanglement more certain. History has already amply shown this last fact.

Our Neutrality Legislation

As if to teach us the folly of our ways, since this legislation was adopted, fate has paraded before our shocked consciences two instances of glaring aggression in Ethiopia and the Far East. Progress is not made in the world by attempting to exclude a consideration of the difference between right and wrong, nor is it wise legislation to attempt to impose upon the President, to whom the Constitution gives the duty of the conduct of our international affairs, shackles of restraint to hold him helpless in all future conditions no matter how complex or unanticipated.

Finally, in this grave crisis in the Far East we not only must not fear to face issues of right and wrong, but we must not fear to cooperate with other nations who are similarly attempting to face those issues. The League of Nations was founded upon a Covenant which almost for the first time in human history attempted to base our international civilization upon a reign of law and to make a distinction between a law-breaker and its victim. Five years ago on Japan's first aggression into Manchuria the League, while failing to stop the aggression, did not hesitate to pass judgment upon it in unmistakable language after a full investigation of its facts.

The League did not fail to distinguish between right and wrong in the Far East then, and the then American Government on Feb. 25, 1933, did not hesitate to range itself alongside of the League in that judgment and to declare that its understanding of the facts was in accord with the findings of fact arrived at by the League and that its conclusions were in accord with the conclusions of the League.

Today on China's appeal the League is again engaged in an examination of the present crisis and the formulation of its judgment thereon. Our Government should not hesitate, if the facts are as we believe them, to support the League again by a statement of its concurrence. Such a judgment is not futile. In the process of time law is built up both within and without national boundaries by such decisions and such precedents. Japan is far more friendless today before the tribunal of world opinion than she would have been except for the investigation and judgment which was rendered against her five years ago. We should not fail to take our part in laying such foundations of the structure of international law of the future.

Since the writing of the foregoing letter has come the President's Chicago speech. I am filled with hope that this act of leadership on his part will result in a new birth of American courage in facing and carrying through our responsibilities in this crisis.

Statement of the Japanese Government, October 9, 1937

The League of Nations regards Japan's action in China as violation of the Nine-Power Treaty and the anti-war Pact. The United States published a statement to the same effect.

This was due to misunderstanding Japan's true intentions. The Japanese government extremely regrets this misunderstanding.

The present conflict was caused by Chinese troops' irregular attacks on Japanese troops which were stationed in North China according to treaty stipulations. Japanese were maneuvering at Lukouchiao with a small number of troops, as Japanese garrisons were widely scattered during peace time.

After the outbreak of the trouble, Japan tried to settle locally and the action of the Japanese troops was nothing more than a measure of self-defense. Japan had no other intention whatever.

Aggravation of the conflict in Shanghai and North China was due to the attitude of the Chinese, who, violating the Shanghai truce agreement signed in 1932, stationed 40,000 troops in the demilitarized zone and were planning to murder 30,000 Japanese residents, including women and children.

At that time the Japanese forces were only 3,000 strong. Thus China is responsible for the aggravation of the situation because she disregarded Japan's nonaggression policy and mobilized a huge number of troops against Japan.

This forced Japan to take military action. Japan's military operations in China today have been entirely caused by China's provocative attitude. Japan's action is entirely in self-defense.

What Japan wants in taking the present action is to eradicate China's anti-Japanese policy and maintain peace in the Far East cooperating with China.

Japan has no territorial ambitions.

Accordingly, Japan's action in China violates no existing treaties in any way whatever.

On the contrary, China in carrying out her stubborn anti-Japanese policy, incited by Red influence, is planning to drive out Japanese rights and interests from China by force of arms.

It is China's Government that is violating the spirit of the pact against war, menacing the peace of the world.

Address by His Excellency Dr. Chengting T. Wang, Chinese
Ambassador to the United States, before the Philadelphia
Board of Trade, October 21, 1937

It is always a pleasure to me to talk to an American audience. This is so, not merely because I have received so many personal kindnesses from the American people while a student at Yale University and since my arrival here as representative of my country at Washington, but because I know that I am speaking to persons who both understand and sympathize with the problems which confront my own people. I may also say that we Chinese feel that we understand the conditions that exist in the United States, and comprehend the reasons which dictate the domestic and international policies of this country.

This mutual understanding which exists between the American and Chinese peoples is a matter that causes envious comment upon the part of other peoples. Not always are they able to explain to themselves why they have not succeeded in establishing and maintaining such cordial and cooperative relations as exist between China and the United States, and, in fact, I find that there are some Americans, who while accepting as a fact this happy circumstance, are not able fully to appreciate why it exists. Because this is so, and because this fundamental friendship between the Chinese and American peoples is of such great and beneficent importance, I have thought it worth while, upon this occasion, to state why this understanding and sympathy exists.

My people, even in the more remote regions, are aware of the enormous benefactions we have received from America in the form of missionary effort, and of aid in fields of medicine and education; and we know that we have never had to fear political aggression upon the part of the American Government. For all this we are duly grateful. But, aside from this appreciation we, or at least the more thoughtful of us, have a conviction that there is a fundamental similarity between Chinese and American political beliefs, and when I speak of beliefs I refer to social as well as to political ideals. This fundamental similarity, I am convinced, consists in the fact that both Americans and Chinese are democratically minded.

Social and political democracy has made itself manifest in America since first this country came to be peopled by emigrants from Europe, and no one factor has exercised upon American national life such a continuous and dominating force as the determination of the American people to uphold and realize in practice their democratic ideals. This is, of course, so well known to all of you that it would not have been necessary for me to speak of it except for the fact that I desire to emphasize that for hundreds of years the Chinese people have also been democratically minded in matters political as well as social.

It is true that in China there have existed, and still exist, social classes. Thus, there are classes of scholars, agriculturalists, merchants, bankers, soldiers, and public officials, and, of course, the great body of ordinary laborers, often termed coolies when employed by foreigners. But these classes have never constituted tight social compartments. Transference from one class to another has always been comparatively easy. But the important point is that, no matter to which class a person has happened to belong, he has always had a sense of personal right and dignity, and has had accorded to him by others this individual and personal worth. Even when social intercourse was more conventional and stilted than it now is, there was recognition of this individual worth; indeed, it was this recognition which furnished the basis for the insistence by each one that he should be dealt with in accordance with the rights which were attached to members of his class. Further supplementing the emphasis which the Chinese have always placed upon what may superficially be termed politeness, has been their conviction that by duly ordering social contacts, domestic harmony and prosperity are promoted.

Upon its political, as distinguished from its social, side, the traditional

democracy of the Chinese people, until twenty-five years ago, was obscured to Western eyes by reason of the existence of the imperial form of the central or national government. In fact, this government had few substantial functions to perform and thus touched the everyday life of the Chinese individual at very few points. Such purely political or administrative control as existed over the individual's conduct was provided by the local governments. But the truth is that the control of even these local governments was extremely slight, the people being permitted to regulate their relations with one another according to the dictates of their own judgments as to what was just and expedient. This simple social and political regime was possible because of the cooperative genius of the Chinese people and their strong sense of social obligations instilled into them by the teachings of their great philosophers Confucius and Mencius. Consequently the Chinese people, as regards the immunity of their everyday life from political coercive control, were, and have remained, one of the freest peoples of the world.

Even such political authority as existed was fundamentally democratic in character, for it was dominated by the doctrine that those in authority should seek the general welfare of the governed. Resulting from this doctrine was the principle, constantly placed in practice, that, when a ruler, whether of a district, a province or of the empire itself, oppressed his people, or when, indeed, for any reason, the people were not prosperous under his rule, they might demand and, if necessary, demand by force, that a new ruler be placed over them.

As is well known, the Chinese written language is composed of symbols, known as characters, which, in many cases, may be described as ideographs since they connote ideas rather than words. One of these ideographs is pronounced "Tien" in the northern or Mandarin dialect and is usually translated by the English word "Heaven". What the Chinese have in mind when they employ this character is the over-ruling Moral Providence, impersonal in character, which they conceive to govern the destinies of mankind, and this Moral Providence, they are convinced, decrees that the popular will of a people should prevail. Thus, one of the best known canons of their moral philosophy is that "Heaven wills what the People will." The sovereignty of the people has thus been an age-old tenet of Chinese thought.

In 1911, the Chinese people found it necessary to tear down the imperial facade of their Central Government, and to establish a National Government that was republican in form as well as in substance. Also, they have found it expedient to vest in that Government spheres of control that, until then, had been left to the local authorities, and to require from it the performance of functions which the old Imperial Government had not sought to exercise. These changes were necessitated by political problems presented by China's contacts with other Powers, and also by her growing appreciation that a strong and efficiently administered government supplies an instrumentality for advancing, in a positive manner, the welfare of the people as well as for maintaining domestic order and furnishing protection against foreign attack. Thus, since the establishment of the Republic in 1911, we find the National Government as well as the local authorities concerning themselves with matters of public health, of education and of means of communication and transportation to a degree theretofore unknown. I would like to describe some of the remarkable results which China has achieved in these directions within the last few years, but to do so would lead me away from my main theme of Chinese democracy. I will, however, take time to say a single word with regard to education in China.

No nation of the world has placed, and continues to hold, learning in higher esteem than do the Chinese. Poverty has prevented the provision of anywhere near adequate means of popular education, but never have there existed artificial or conventional barriers to the pursuit of knowledge. For centuries the path to political preferment was an educational one, eligibility to political appointments and promotions being based upon the results achieved in great provincial and national scholastic examinations. And these examinations were open to the humblest Chinese citizen. The Chinese educational

system was thus traditionally democratic, whatever may have been its deficiencies in the supply of schools and teachers and its defects in curriculum. Here, too, I would like to digress long enough to give an account of the very great developments within the educational field that have taken place in China during the last twenty-five years—of the great increase in the number of government primary schools and institutions of higher learning, the modernizing of pedagogical methods, but time will not permit. I can only say that, in this field American influence has been paramount, a fact that was especially commented upon by a commission of educational experts which was recently sent to China by the League of Nations.

The revolutionary changes that have been taking place in China during recent years within the economic and cultural fields as well as within the sphere of government have, of course, presented to my people many problems—problems the solution of which has not been made easier by the attitude and acts of China's powerful island neighbor—but great progress has been made even if the goals sought have not been fully attained. I shall not attempt at this time to give even an outline of these great economic, social, cultural and political movements, but there is one characteristic which is common to them all and which is directly germane to the subject of democracy in China with which, in this talk, I am primarily concerned. This common feature or characteristic is that they have all resulted from a diffused desire and will of the Chinese people. They are popular, democratic movements demanded and supported by the people and not imposed upon them from above. In this fundamental respect the revolutionary movement in China is to be distinguished from that movement in Japan, which led to the promulgation of a written constitution in 1889, and which since then, has seen the transformation of that country from a feudalistic Kingdom into an industrialized and powerful militaristic empire.

As compared with the task in the performance of which China has set herself, the problem presented to leaders of Japan in the later years of the last century was a simple one. The people of that island Kingdom were far fewer in number, they inhabited a much smaller territory and they were habituated to the rule of a strong central authority. Especially potent was this last feature. Thus, all that was necessary was that those in supreme authority should decide what changes were desired and thereupon to take the corresponding action. The public did not need to be persuaded or indoctrinated with new ideas. All that was required was that their rulers should see clearly what they wanted to do and give the appropriate commands. This was done when the written constitution of 1889 was promulgated. This instrument, it is to be emphasized, was issued as a mandate of the Emperor, and, as such, it derives its sole legal force from his will, and, in substance, is no more than a declaration by the Emperor of the manner in which, in the future, he intends to exercise his sovereign authority. In order to make this perfectly clear, it is specifically declared that no changes shall be made in the Constitution except such as are proposed by the Emperor himself. The Constitution upon this point reads:

"When in the future it may become necessary to amend any of the provisions of the present Constitution, We (the Emperor) or Our Successors shall assume the initiative right, and submit a project for the same to the Imperial Diet . . . and in no otherwise shall Our descendants or Our subjects be permitted to any alteration thereof."

It is further provided that:

"The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty and exercises them according to the provisions of the present Constitution."

The chief draftsman of the Constitution was Marquis Ito, and his Commentaries upon that instrument have been accepted as most authoritative as to the meaning and intent of its provisions. With reference to the provisions which have been quoted, Ito declares:

"The Sacred Throne of Japan is inherited from Imperial Ancestors, and is to be bequeathed to posterity; in it resides the power to reign

over and govern the State. (The fact) that express provisions concerning the sovereign power are specially mentioned in the Articles of the Constitution, in no wise implies that any newly settled opinion thereon is set forth by the Constitution; on the contrary, the original policy is by no means changed by it, but is more strongly confirmed than ever."

In order to make assurance upon this point doubly sure, Marquis Ito emphasizes that, under the Constitution, the Emperor continues to be "the source and fountain head of the legislative power"; that "the legislative power is ultimately under the control of the Emperor, while the duty of the Diet is to give advice and consent."

It will, of course, not be feasible for me to give a running critique of the Japanese Constitution. My purpose in making the comments upon it that I have made is simply to make plain its fundamental character, and thus to show to what a comparatively slight degree the promulgation of the Japanese Constitution altered the autocratic monarchical character of the form of political rule that had previously existed in Japan. The extent to which its policies and actions are at present dictated by its military and naval authorities is a sufficient indication of the distance which Japan has still to travel before it can lay claim to the possession of a political regime which furnishes guarantees that the rights of the people will be secure and their will controlling.

In strong contrast to what has happened in Japan, China has founded her revolutionary changes upon a popular will. Her written constitutions, of which she has several, have each of them declared the sovereignty of the people. Thus, the Chinese Constitution in its present form, promulgated in May, 1936, begins with the declaration in its Preamble that it is ordained and enacted "by virtue of the mandate received from the whole body of citizens"; Article one declares the Government to be a Republic; and Article two reads: "The sovereignty of the Republic of China is vested in the whole body of citizens."

Although, as I have shown, the Chinese people by tradition and practice had been prepared for self-government, they had not been accustomed to the rule of a strong and energetic Central Government, and, therefore, the establishment of such an instrumentality of the General Will has been a task that has taxed the intelligence and determination of the people. The jealousies and self-interests of provincial authorities have had to be overcome; the increased financial needs of the Central Government have had to be met; and, in general, an efficient national administrative organization has had to be constructed. However, notwithstanding the added difficulties arising from actions of her neighbor, Japan, progress has been made in all these directions, and especially has this progress been exhibited under our great leader, Chiang Kai-shek.

This unification of China under a strong Central Government would not have been possible except for the fortunate fact that the many millions of the Chinese people are ethnologically and culturally homogeneous. Though there exists in China a variety of spoken dialects, the written language is everywhere the same, and cultural ideals are practically identical. Indeed, I believe myself justified in saying that nowhere on the earth is there presented a large group of individuals so culturally unified as are the Chinese.

The last point which I wish to make in this address is that because the Chinese have vested their great reforms upon a broad popular democratic basis they have secured a firm foundation upon which to continue to build. Because they have pursued this policy they have sacrificed the speed that they might have gained by autocratic commands issued from above — as happened in Japan — but they believe, and I think them correct in this, that they are establishing a regime which will minimize the danger of future causes of social and political discontent. Thus they believe, as I believe, that though the pace of political changes in China has not been as rapid as some eager ones would desire, each advance step has had the support of a firm footing.

In conclusion, let me return to the statement which I made in the early

part of this address, namely, that one of the important reasons why American people have shown a sympathetic and cooperative interest in the welfare of the Chinese people is that, despite many other differences, they perceive that, underlying Chinese efforts, there are those same democratic ideals which Americans themselves so highly cherish. Supplementing this recognition there are, of course, other factors that explain the general sympathetic understanding which goes out from America to China. Among these other factors I need mention only the characteristic American respect for the rights of other nations, and their strong desire that a regime of international law and justice should prevail.

**Address by His Excellency Dr. Chengting T. Wang
Chinese Ambassador to the United States, at the Armistice Eve
Banquet of the International Goodwill Congress in Boston
November 10, 1937**

Since my last arrival in the United States I have been greatly impressed by the widespread interest displayed by the people of this country in matters of international concern. This contrasts strongly with the situation as it appeared to me when I was here thirty years ago as a university student. I am impressed by the number of organizations which exist for the diffusion of information bearing upon international interests; by the variety and number of the publications within this field; and by the space in the newspapers and other journals devoted to these topics. These facts have made me aware that, when I speak before an American audience, I am addressing persons who are already acquainted with the more important of the facts involved in any international situation I may discuss and with the international principles, moral and political, which should govern national conduct with regard to such a situation.

Upon the present occasion, I propose to deal with an international situation which, during recent years, has aroused the interest of Americans as well as of other peoples throughout the world. This situation is that created by the acts of Japan in and against my own country, China. For the reasons which I have stated, I know that the members of my audience are already well informed of at least the more outstanding of these acts, and, therefore, to the extent that I shall find it desirable to rehearse these acts, I shall contribute little that is not already well known. Although this is so, I think it worth while, with regard to any important and not entirely simple matter, that, from time to time, the subject should be dealt with as a whole, its facts reviewed, and its phases and elements correlated.

There are some students in the field of Sino-Japanese relations who are convinced that the recent Asiatic policies of Japan find their roots in ambitions founded and formulated many years ago. Not a little historical evidence has been adduced in support of this view. However, whether this be so or not is not of prime practical importance at the present time. What is important is that the world should know the present extent of Japan's intentions with regard to the subjugation and domination of China. To learn this it will not be necessary to go further back than the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Indeed, it would be possible to begin with the Twenty-one Demands presented to China by Japan in 1915, but the exposition can be made more complete by saying at least a word with regard to the results of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, and of the Russo-Japanese War which followed ten years later.

The Sino-Japanese War grew out of conflicting claims and interests of China and Japan in the Kingdom of Korea. China was defeated in that war, and, by the Treaty of Shimonoseki which brought it to an end, China, in addition to the payment of a large indemnity, was obliged to recognize the independence of Korea over which she had previously claimed a species of suzerainty, and to cede to Japan the great island of Formosa which lies along the southern coast of China together with the smaller Pescadores Islands in the same region. Also, China was compelled to cede to Japan the Liaotung Peninsula, which juts south from Manchuria and constitutes a strategic, commercial and military key to that great northern region as well as to the Gulf of Pechili and thence to the old capital of China, Peking. Representations made to Japan by Russia, Germany and France compelled Japan to forego this last continental acquisition, but, as a result of the war between Japan and Russia which occurred in 1904-5, Japan was able to secure the transfer to herself of a lease previously obtained by Russia from China of this Liaotung Peninsula at the tip of which lie Port Arthur and the City of Dalny or Dairen. This lease, while not divesting China of her sovereignty over this area, placed it under the effective occupation and administration of Japan. As a result of the Russo-Japanese war, Japan also obtained the transfer to herself from Russia of the southern half of the island of Saghalin. Also it should be noted that, be-

fore this time, Russia and Japan had conflicting interests with regard to the establishment of so-called "spheres of interest" within the northern provinces of China, known collectively as Manchuria. By the treaty of Portsmouth, which terminated the Russo-Japanese war, Russia recognized that Japan's railway, mining, and other interests in the southern half of Manchuria should be deemed dominant. Both nations declared, however, that they would not obstruct any general measures, common to all countries, which China might take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria; and both nations also engaged themselves to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria (except those in the Liaotung Peninsula) exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and in no wise for strategic purposes.

I have thought it necessary to mention these provisions of the treaties terminating the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars since they serve to show that, certainly at those dates, Japan already had international ambitions which included the acquisition of territories along the Chinese coast and upon the eastern mainland of the continent of Asia.

In 1914 came the World War. Japan enlisted as one of the Allies in order that she might thus have an excuse for seizing the German leased area of Kiaochow in the Chinese province of Shantung which contains the important city and port of Tsingtao, and also of drawing to herself the railway, mining and other rights which Germany had in that province. In fact, Japan went far beyond this, and occupied areas far outside of the territory that had been leased by China to Germany. I shall not take the time to describe how Japan, at the time of the discussion at Paris of the treaty terminating the war between Germany and the Allies—of which China had become one—Japan refused to return the Shantung leased area; how this injustice to China constituted one of the chief criticisms in America of the treaty drawn up at Paris and was influential in causing the United States Senate to refuse its approval of the treaty; and how, in connection with the Washington Conference of 1921-22, Japan, under pressure, was reluctantly forced to agree to the return of the Shantung leased area to China. The whole story covering these events placed Japan in a very unfavorable light, but I have no time or disposition to review it at this time.

In 1915, Japan suddenly presented to China Twenty-one Demands which, had they been conceded by China in their entirety, would have brought all China under the dominant control of Japan. The present Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wang Chung-hui, in his justified description of these demands in the Washington Conference, after pointing out that they were put forward, not in satisfaction of any pending controversies, or in exchange for any offered *quid pro quo*, said: "History records scarcely another instance in which demands of such a serious character as those which Japan presented to China in 1915, have, without even pretense of provocation, been suddenly presented by one nation to another nation with which it was at the time in friendly relations."

China made what resistance she could to these demands, and managed to secure the postponement of the consideration of the fifth of the groups into which they were divided—the group which contained the most general of the demands and which, if yielded to, would have made Japan politically dominant over and throughout China. Most of the other specific demands China was compelled to concede after an ultimatum threatening war within a few hours had been presented by Japan. Thus, by bald force majeure, China was compelled to sign, in May 1915, a series of treaties and notes the essential validity of which, because of their immoral basis, China has continued to deny. By the treaties thus exacted of China, Japan was able, among other things, to increase her claim to railway rights in Manchuria and the right of her nationals in that area to acquire lands for agricultural and manufacturing purposes. Also, she obtained a formal extension of the term of her lease of the Liaotung Peninsula.

In the Washington Conference of 1921-22, China, aided by the pressure brought to bear upon Japan by the other nations represented in that Conference, and especially by the United States, was able to obtain a number of

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important concessions from Japan, but, with regard to Japan's treaty rights in Manchuria, including those obtained as a result of the Twenty-one Demands, Japan showed herself unyielding. It is, however, to be noted that none of these alleged treaty rights, important though they were, impaired the essential sovereignty of China over the Manchurian provinces. Not even by Japan was the continued sovereignty of China over Manchuria at that time contested.

Most important of the political results of the Washington Conference was the Nine-Power Treaty, later adhered to by five other Powers. The provisions of Article One of this Treaty have been often quoted, but, because of their importance, they cannot be too often repeated. By them, the Contracting Powers, which, of course, included Japan, agreed:

"(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

"(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

"(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;

"(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States."

These undertakings, thus entered into by Japan, gave added emphasis to the many previous promises by Japan, both to China and to other Powers, that she would respect the sovereignty and territorial and administrative integrity of China, and that in her commercial and other relations with China she would be governed by the principle of equal opportunity for all nations and their nationals which has for years been known as the Open Door doctrine. By Article Three of this Nine-Power Treaty, this doctrine was more specifically defined and placed, for the first time, upon a definite treaty basis.

In 1928, Japan signed the Paris Peace Pact under which she declared her condemnation of recourse to war for the solution of international controversies; renounced it as an instrument of national policy in her relations with other States; and agreed, in common with the other signatories, that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they might be which might arise between them should never be sought except by pacific means.

Meanwhile, in 1919, Japan had enrolled herself as a Member of the League of Nations, and as a Member had agreed to employ the various peaceful modes for the settlement of international controversies prescribed in the Covenant of the League. Also, as a Member of the League, Japan had specifically undertaken, by Article Ten of the Covenant, to respect the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League, which included China, and to cooperate with the other Members of the League for the preservation of the territorial integrity and existing political independence of any Member State that may become the victim of an external aggression.

These international multilateral agreements which have been mentioned—the Washington Nine-Power Treaty, the Paris Pact and the Covenant of the League—it is to be noted, were freely and voluntarily signed by Japan, and, therefore, there was nothing to subtract from the moral obligation that is attached to the plighted national word thus given.

By her Twenty-one Demands presented to China in 1915, Japan had made perfectly plain the extent of her aggressive ambitions with regard to China. However, the world had ground for believing, when Japan gave her adherence to the doctrines and undertakings embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations and especially when she had voluntarily and freely given the pledges contained in the Washington Nine-Power Treaty, that she had abandoned these ambitions. Indeed, for a number of years, Japan's actions were not such as

definitely to refute this belief, although those who kept themselves currently informed of conditions in Manchuria, and also of the efforts from time to time made by Japan to hinder China's progress towards political unity and economic development, were not without fear that there had been no real surrender of her intention, when the time should seem ripe and a good opportunity should be offered, again to advance her continental aims without regard to the sovereign rights of China.

That there were grounds for this fear was made evident when, in September 1931, Japan made her sudden attack upon Manchuria, and, by successive steps, and undeterred by the efforts of the League of Nations and the condemnation of the whole world, effected military occupation of all of Manchuria—an area as large as France and Germany taken together and inhabited by a population of thirty millions of Chinese.

China was not able, in 1931, to offer effective resistance to the Japanese invasion and military occupation of her Northeastern Provinces. Only when Japan made her onslaught upon the great commercial city of Shanghai was she able in 1932, to hold the Japanese in check. Even when the Japanese extended their military occupation outside of Manchuria and overran the important Province of Jehol, China had to yield to superior military force. Finally, Japan breached the Great Wall of China which marks, in part, the southern boundary of Manchuria, and began to overrun the provinces of China which lie south of the Wall. Finding herself unable at that time to offer further effective resistance to the armies of Japan, China, in May 1933, agreed to a "Truce Agreement" with the Japanese military authorities.

This Agreement, known as the Tangku Truce, was of a purely military character, and provided that Chinese military units should be withdrawn west and south of a designated line and were to avoid any acts that might provoke further hostilities. The Japanese military authorities, upon their part, engaged themselves not to cross this designated line, not to continue their attacks upon the Chinese troops, and to withdraw their entire forces to the Great Wall.

The four years succeeding the signing of the Tangku Truce witnessed continued disregard by Japan of China's political and administrative rights in the Northern Provinces of China. These violations were so many and of such a diverse character that it is not possible for me to enumerate, much less describe, them. Those who may be interested to learn of them in some detail can find them described in the excellent volume, published this year by Dr. Shuhsi Hsu, entitled *The North China Problem*.

During the period from the Tangku Truce in 1933 to July of the present year Japan pushed forward her determination to dominate North China by making successive demands upon China, which, in the face of force majeure, she was not able to refuse. By July of this year, however, the Chinese came to the desperate determination that it would be fatal for them to make further concessions, and, therefore, that to the extent of their military power, they would oppose the invading forces of Japan. When this resolve became evident to Japan, she, in turn, came to the determination, which she has openly avowed, that the time had come for her to obtain in totality all that she wished from China. A typical instance of the avowal of this determination is that of M. Yosuke Matsuoka. M. Matsuoka is one of the leading public men of Japan. He is now President of the great South Manchuria Railway Company and was the leader of the Japanese Delegation during the discussion by the Assembly of the League of Nations of the Manchurian controversy, and he it was who led his Delegation out of the Assembly and his country out of the League when that body adopted its report of February 24, 1933, condemning Japan for what she had done. In the course of a statement prepared for distribution by the Associated Press, and published in the newspapers of October 10, 1937, M. Matsuoka said, "At last Japan is in for the final, for the knock-out decision."

This, then is a record of Japan's aggressions upon China during the last few years. It is clear that she will not be satisfied until she is able to subject China wholly to her will. What this will mean to the rest of the world is a

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question so large that I am not able to enter upon it at this time. But that it is one of deep significance there can be no doubt.

In closing, I wish to point out with great pride as a Chinese that, throughout all the injuries inflicted upon China since the night of September 18, 1931, when Japan began her military attack upon Manchuria, China has held firmly to her obligations as a loyal Member of the League of Nations, and as a signatory of the Paris Peace Pact. She has at all times expressed her willingness and desire that such controversies as exist between Japan and herself should be adjusted by peaceful means and in accordance with essential justice.

As regards China's conduct following the attack of Japan upon her Manchurian Provinces, let me quote from Professor Willoughby's comprehensive and objective discussion of the Manchurian controversy as dealt with by the League of Nations. In the concluding chapter of his volume entitled *The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations* (p. 668) he says:

"Unless . . . China were to be recreant to her obligations as a Member of the League, it was necessary that she should appeal to the League. Not only did she do this, but, throughout the controversy, she remained loyal to the League. By so doing, she not only preserved her own international honor, but contributed what lay within her power to maintain the structure of international peace which the world, since the Great War, had been so anxiously endeavoring to construct. In this respect, and to this extent," Professor Willoughby adds, "the world owes to China a debt of gratitude."

It may also be said that, even after the outbreak of the present hostilities, the Chinese Government officially declared its willingness that whatever complaints Japan might have against China should be submitted to peaceful methods of adjustment. This was made clear in a memorandum of the Chinese Government, dated July 15, 1937, addressed to the leading Powers, which declared that China held herself ready to settle her differences with Japan by any of the pacific means known to international law and treaties. Furthermore, it may be pointed out that the submission of the present situation by China to the League of Nations necessarily implies her willingness to have her controversies with Japan adjusted in accordance with the peaceful modes provided by the Covenant of the League.

Address by Dr. Hu Shih, Professor of Philosophy and Dean
of National Peking University

Delivered at Foreign Policy Association, New York
November 13, 1937

In my humble opinion, the real issues behind the present conflict in the Far East are two: first, the clash of Japanese imperialism with the legitimate aspirations of Chinese nationalism; and secondly, the conflict of Japanese militarism with the moral restrictions of a new world order.

The primary issue behind all the fighting and slaughtering and bombing, which you read every day during the last three months, is Chinese nationalism driven into a desperate resistance against an external aggression which apparently knows no limit.

Nationalism is a new word in the Chinese dictionary, but national consciousness has never been absent in Chinese history. It has its firm foundation in the racial, cultural and historical unity of her vast population. It always asserted itself whenever China came into contact with a foreign race or culture, especially in those historic periods when she was conquered by a foreign invasion or dominated by an alien civilization. It was Chinese national consciousness that gradually revolted against Buddhism as an alien religion, and finally killed it. It was Chinese nationalism that overthrew the Mongol Empire and drove the Mongols beyond the deserts. It was Chinese nationalism which brought forth the numerous anti-Manchu secret societies and open revolts in the 18th and 19th centuries, and which finally overthrew the Manchu monarchy twenty-six years ago.

Frankly and truthfully speaking, what Japanese apologists loudly advertise to the world as "anti-Japanese sentiments and acts in China" is simply Chinese nationalism resenting and resisting the real and undeniable aggressions of a foreign power, Japan. And in so far as the aggressions are real, Chinese resistance is justifiable and justified. That is why China is having the sympathy of almost the entire world on her side during this war.

In each and every case of outburst of anti-Japanese feeling or anti-Japanese boycott there was invariably a long series of Japanese aggressions preceding it. It was the presentation of the famous 21 Demands with a threat of war that was responsible for the anti-Japanese boycotts of 1915. It was the Japanese refusal to restore Shantung to China at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 that was responsible for the birth of a nationwide Student Movement in China, which revived the anti-Japanese boycotts and which had great influence in contributing to the success of the Nationalist Revolution of 1925-1927.

And, of course, it was the six long years of unwarranted, unlimited and insatiable Japanese invasions and aggressions involving a total loss of Chinese territory as large as a fifth of the Continent of Europe and carrying with them the most humiliating intrigues and insults which no human patience could long forebear,—it was these six years of most bitter and acute suffering of my people that is now bursting, boiling and burning behind this undeclared war in China.

The issue, therefore, is pure and simple: It is Chinese nationalism resisting Japanese invasion; it is the Chinese nation fighting for its very existence.

It is unnecessary for me to develop the thesis that a healthy and normal growth of Chinese nationalism is necessary to the stabilization of the peace of the East. It has been pointed out that, wherever there is a vast country rich in resources but weak in government and self-defence, that country is sure to become a centre of international strife, an arena of imperialistic powers fighting for special concessions and privileges. For decades, the weakness of the Chinese Government has been a temptation to aggressive powers, and the map of China to this day shows clear traces of that imperialistic struggle which prevailed in southeastern Asia during the last decades of the

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last century. Far-sighted statesmen of the world have always maintained that peace in the Far East is only possible when there is a free and independent China to ward off encroachments from outside. That was the idea underlying John Hay's Open Door Policy in China, and that was undoubtedly the political philosophy behind the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington under which the signatory powers pledged "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China and to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government."

China had failed to live up to such expectations until the last decade when, as the world knows, she has actually begun in earnest to unify the country, modernize her institutions and her means of transportation and communication, and build up an "effective and stable government." But our nearest neighbor won't tolerate this endeavor on the part of China. Indeed, she has done everything possible to prevent the rise of a modern national State in China. China needs peace, but Japan has given us seven wars in six years; China wants unification, but Japan insists upon tearing China asunder and setting up bogus governments everywhere under Japanese control. China needs financial and technological assistance from all friendly Powers, but Japan openly declared to the world on April 17, 1934, that she would not tolerate any concerted help to China "even in the name of financial and technical assistance." China needs "an effective and stable government," but the Japanese military have repeatedly declared that the Nanking Government under Chiang Kai-shek must be crushed at any cost.

In short, Japan cannot allow a unified and modernized China to exist, and she has openly avowed her determination to crush it. She has been doing it for all these years, and she is doing it now on a much grander scale. Is it exaggerating the issue when I say that China is fighting for her very existence?

This, then, is the first issue behind the war.

But there is another and larger issue involved in the present conflict, which concerns not China alone, but the whole world. This issue I have stated as the clash of Japanese militarism with the moral restrictions of a new world order. This is the issue which formed the central thesis of President Roosevelt's Chicago speech and of Secretary Hull's Toronto speech. This is the issue of the resolution adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on October 6, and of the statement of the American Government made on the same date endorsing the League resolution. And, curiously enough, this is the same issue behind the theory of the so-called "have-not" nations having a "right" to invade and plunder the possessions of the "have" nations.

Historically, the so-called "have-not" nations, Italy, Germany and Japan, achieved their political unity about the same time—around 1870—and arose to the position of world powers much later than the other great powers. They entered the arena of imperialistic strife at a time when the earth, with the exception of a few storm centres, was already almost completely appropriated by the few colonial empires. During the last decades of the last century, the struggle for colonies and special concessions was very acute, and the law of the jungle reigned in those regions where the absence of a strong native government had invited imperialistic encroachment.

But, with the turn of the century, a new and more humane kind of international relationship was slowly making its first appearance. The same Tsar of Russia, who had been grabbing territories in eastern Asia, was calling the first Hague Conference which resulted in the establishment of the first International Court. The Open Door policy in China was announced by America in 1900. Peace movements and peace foundations were coming up in the democratic countries. A new international idealism was visibly at work for the rise of a new and more idealistic world order.

Even the World War did not uproot this new internationalism, which, because of the terrible sacrifices of the War, had even more sympathetic and enthusiastic supporters and advocates throughout those agonizing years of

the War and the Armistice. Even in the war message of President Woodrow Wilson of twenty years ago, we read that "we are at the beginning of an age where it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states. . . . A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations." The great American President was universally acclaimed the leader of this international idealism, whose state papers and in particular whose "Fourteen Points" were eagerly read and accepted as the tenets of the new world order that was to come after the War.

However disappointing the Versailles Peace Treaty may have been to some of us — a Treaty which the Chinese delegation refused to sign — the Peace Conference has left to the post-war world at least one monumental edifice of Wilsonian idealism in the founding of the League of Nations. The Covenant of the League pledges to respect the territorial integrity of the Member States, stipulates international inquiry, arbitration and conciliation as the means for settling international disputes, and provides economic sanctions against nations resorting to war in violation of the provisions of the Covenant. For more than a decade, the League stood as the most concrete embodiment of the ideals of international peace yet invented by mankind.

During that memorable decade, a number of similarly idealistic pacts and treaties were produced to supplement the League Covenant. These include the Nine-Power Treaty, the Naval Disarmament Treaties, the Treaty of Locarno which brought Germany into the League of Nations and which was then heralded as the stabilizer of the peace in Europe, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris which was to "outlaw war" as a means for settling disputes between nations.

Thus for more than ten years, there actually existed a new and more civilized world order supported by an interlocking and overlapping set of international treaties.

Now, it is not true that this new world order has been beneficial only to the small or weak nations. Law and order, national or international, protects and benefits the strong as well as the weak. If there be any partiality, it is usually in favor of the strong. For law and order the world over is usually made and maintained by the strong and powerful, who naturally derive greater benefits from it. Within the new world order which prevailed in those years the great powers were the greatest beneficiaries. France, for example, never felt safer than in those years. Great Britain practically gave up naval building and abandoned her project of constructing a great naval base at Singapore. Even Japan, who was always grumbling about the naval ratio of 5:5:3 and felt herself oppressed under the Washington Treaties, has never attained such height of international prestige and respect as she enjoyed in those years. She sat in Geneva as one of the "Big Four" Permanent Members in the Council of the League; and she was the undisputed supreme Power of the western Pacific where she enjoyed her new possessions in the Mandate Islands and where her navy was strategically invincible.

Unfortunately, there were certain militaristic groups in certain countries who found the restrictions of this new world order to be detrimental to their aggressive ambitions and who were determined to destroy them at the earliest possible opportunity.

Thus, all of a sudden, this new world order was scrapped by the brutal hand of the Japanese military on the evening of September 18, 1931! In three months, the Japanese army had invaded and occupied all the three provinces in Manchuria. In January, 1932, she started the first Shanghai War which lasted 40 days and which cost 120,000 lives and damaged property estimated at over \$400,000,000 gold. China appealed to the League of Nations and to the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty and of the Pact of Paris, but Japan defied the world by leaving the League and by declaring that she was fighting a war of self-defense and that all the idealistic treaties to which she had been a signatory were no longer applicable to her. With economic depression

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deepening everywhere, the whole world was powerless and helpless in coping with the situation and saving the new world order from ruin.

On January 7, 1932, the United States, through her Secretary of State, Mr. Henry L. Stimson, proclaimed the "doctrine of non-recognition" in identic notes to China and Japan. This doctrine was adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations in a resolution which reads: "The Assembly declares that it is incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League or to the Pact of Paris." This Stimson doctrine remains to this day the solitary reminder of the sanctity of great and idealistic treaties, one of which, the Nine-Power Treaty, however, is recently revived by the calling of its signatory Powers to meet in a conference at Brussels to discuss the Far Eastern situation.

Undoubtedly, the destruction of the new world order by denying the sanctity of treaty obligations is the greatest crime committed by the Japanese Military, by the Japanese Government which submitted to them, and by the Japanese nation which tolerates them and rationalizes and apologizes for them. By her acts of violence, Japan has released all forces of violence which had been placed under check within the new world order. It has been reported that, when Japan finally withdrew from the League of Nations in open defiance of the world, a German Cabinet Minister said to the Japanese Delegate: "We do not think you are right, but we thank you for your example." That was in the year 1933, the year of Hitler's ascendancy to power, and the year in which Mussolini began to plan his invasion of Ethiopia! Japan's example has been faithfully copied by other powers who were signatories to all the early resolutions of the League condemning the action of Japan, including the one embodying the Stimson doctrine of non-recognition, but who, when they saw Japan's acts of violence go unchecked and undisciplined, were inspired to join her in their common cause to fight against the troublesome restrictions of a new world order.

In a sense, China may be said to be fighting the war on behalf of the whole world: After two years of ardent appeals to the League of Nations and to the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris, and after six long years of futile attempts to maintain peace and avoid a war, China is at last forced to fight for her own existence as well as for the maintenance of law and order in the family of nations.

But it is not only the weak nations like China that are the victims of the destruction of the world order which, as I have shown, protects and benefits the strong as well as the weak. In the last six years of international anarchy, all the great powers of the world have been worried, troubled, humiliated, and even seriously threatened by the aggressor nations. Soviet Russia has had to amass a huge army of nearly half a million men on her Far Eastern frontiers. Great Britain has hurriedly resumed and speedily completed her long abandoned naval base at Singapore, and is now spending \$7,500,000,000 on her re-armament program. Even the peace-loving United States has had to revive her huge naval building program and to strengthen her naval fortifications in the Pacific. Even Australia and New Zealand, the two peaceful paradises of the southern Pacific, are seriously worried and are trying hard to build up their forces of national defense against possible attacks from the northern Pacific.

Truly, as President Roosevelt has said in his Chicago speech, "there can be no possibility of peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all. International anarchy destroys every foundation for peace. It jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small."

This, then, is the second and larger issue behind the present conflict in the East. It is the issue of International Anarchy versus World Order.

And, because this era of international anarchy began with Japan's invasion in Manchuria in 1931, Japan must be named "Public Enemy Number One" in the Family of Nations, and must be held responsible for the crime of destroying the New World Order which represented decades of idealistic thinking and which it may require another world conflagration to rebuild.

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**Speech by His Excellency Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo
 First Delegate of China
 at the Nine-Power Treaty Conference at Brussels
 November 3, 1937**

We are assembled here in conference for the purpose of a full and frank communication between us as provided under Article 7 of the Treaty of Washington of February 6, 1922, relating to principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, because a situation has arisen which involves the application of the stipulations of the said treaty and renders desirable the discussion of such application.

What is the situation? It is that which has been created by the armed aggression of Japan, a signatory Power of the same instrument, against my country in violation of Article 1 of the said treaty which provides that the contracting Powers, other than China, agree:

"1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

"2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government;

"3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; and

"4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States."

The facts relating to this Japanese armed aggression have been examined by the representatives of twenty-three nations and their unanimous report has been approved by fifty-one nations of the world. Since these facts are now public knowledge, it is, therefore, not necessary for me to dwell upon them here.

Suffice it to recall to you the findings in the report that it cannot be challenged that powerful Japanese armies have invaded Chinese territory and are in control of large areas including Peiping itself; that the Japanese Government has taken naval measures to close the coast of China to Chinese shipping; and that Japanese aircraft are carrying out bombardments over widely separated regions of the country.

For nearly four months the weight of Japan's mighty war machine has been brought to bear upon harmless, peace-loving China by land, sea and air. During the past four weeks this ruthless aggression has further accentuated its intensity for the domination and conquest of my country, Japanese military occupation of North China covers practically three whole provinces, Hopei, Chahar, and Suiyuam with a population of 30 million, a railway mileage of 3,163 kms., and over 700,000 sq. kms., which is about the combined size of Great Britain and Germany. They have also occupied parts of the two provinces of Shantung and Shansi with a total population of 45 million, a railway mileage of 1,728 kms., and a combined area of 314,000 sq. kms., the size of Italy. They have entered Chapei and Kiangwan in Shanghai which the Chinese forces evacuated after gallantly holding out for 77 days against the most formidable attacks of Japan's modern mechanized forces. Five formidable Japanese armies are attacking the Chinese defence lines on five fronts with a view to forcing a rapid victory in order to impress and perhaps overawe this very Conference.

For the same purpose the Japanese Navy, besides tightening its stranglehold on the main channels of access to the Chinese coast, of 7,540 kms. in length, has been attacking the principal ports in Central and South China and attempted the landing of Japanese marines.

The Japanese Air Force has redoubled its death-dealing power. Not only has it concentrated over 100 planes to attack the Chinese forces at Shanghai in a single battle, but turning a deaf ear to the chorus of universal condemnation

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it has increased its ruthlessness in slaughtering unarmed civilians in disregard of the rules of international law and the time-honored principles of decency and humanity. According to the Japanese Admiralty's own announcement of October 14th last, 62 cities and towns in eight provinces were bombed by Japanese naval aircrafts alone. Widely scattered cities like Nanking, Canton, Soochow, and Taiyuan have been subjected to almost daily attacks. Nanking sometimes from 3 to 15 raids a day. In a single raid on an open, defenceless city of Sungkiang in Kiangsu Province less than a week ago, Japanese bombs from the air massacred nearly 1,000 civilians, of whom a great part were helpless women and children. The civilized world has never seen such utterly ruthless methods of warfare and such stark indifference to considerations of decency.

In the light of the history of the past few years in the Far East, it is evident that the present outbreak of Japanese armed aggression is merely a continuation of Japan's policy of territorial expansion on the Asiatic mainland, already betrayed in all its flagrancy at the time of her attack on Mukden in 1931 with her subsequent military occupation of Manchuria and Jehol.

The setting up of a puppet regime in Manchuria propped up by the Kwantung army and packed with Japanese advisers in all key posts has been only a camouflage of the desire for territorial conquest. The invasion of Chinese Provinces inside the Great Wall; the occupation of Eastern Charhar in 1933; Japan's peremptory demand in 1935 for the removal of the Governor and other high officials of Hopei Province, for the evacuation of the Central Government troops therefrom, and for the expulsion of the Kuomintang Party workers from the same area; her creation in December of the same year of the so-called East Hopei autonomous and anti-communist regime with the aid and protection of the Japanese military guards; her military occupation of North Charhar; and the open attempts of the Japanese military agents in the past two years to establish an autonomous government for the five provinces of North China—all these acts and activities in contravention of the rules of international law and Japan's own treaty obligations show only too clearly her sinister design upon China with whom she claims to have been at peace.

The gigantic campaign of smuggling fostered and promoted by the Japanese military authorities in North China with the double purpose of raising funds to carry on their political intrigues in North China and dealing a financial blow to the Chinese Government at Nanking was another method of disrupting the Chinese administrative integrity in North China and strengthening their hold on that region. The Japanese military authorities seized every occasion on which the Chinese Customs authorities attempted to enforce the Chinese Customs regulations upon the smugglers as a pretext for forcing them first to disarm and then to cease patrolling to prevent violation of the Chinese fiscal laws.

The encouragement by the Japanese military authorities in China of the illicit traffic in drugs and narcotics conducted by Japanese *romins* and Koreans in Chinese territory is yet another proof of Japan's real intentions towards China. In North China, Manchuria, and Jehol, this is an open secret and well known to the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations on opium and drugs. It is a deliberate policy to deprave the Chinese people in the hope of bringing about their moral degradation to a point where they would be powerless to resist the invaders.

The instigation of a Mongolian rebellion and attack on Suiyuan Province in the winter of 1936 under Japanese officers was frankly admitted by General Kita, the Japanese Military Attaché in Shanghai, in an interview published in the New York Times of November 23, 1937:

"The setting up by the Japanese army a week ago of the so-called Mongol State, its new puppet at Kwei-hua in Suiyuan Province, puts a finishing touch to their intrigues in Inner Mongolia."

In the last two years the Kwantung Army has against the protests of Chinese authorities stationed the so-called special service agents at ten strategical points of North China. The Japanese garrison has since adopted the same practice and maintains agents in eight important centers in the five northern provinces of China. During the past four years Japanese military planes have been flying over the Chinese territory in spite of the repeated protests of the Chinese Government.

Japan has been carrying on these unlawful activities in disregard of international morals and in violation of her treaty obligations. Every one of these activities constitutes an attack upon the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, which she has solemnly undertaken to respect in the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington. Instead of providing the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity for China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government, Japan sought by her activities I have just enumerated either to frustrate such opportunity or to deprive China of it. Wherever her invading armies have remained they have sought to disestablish and undermine the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations, as has been clearly demonstrated in Manchuria and Jehol. Time and again she has sought to create embarrassing conditions in China in order to seek special rights and privileges for her nationals to the detriment of the rights of the subjects or citizens of other friendly States.

That Japan by her acts and activities in China during the past few years has contravened her obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, has been established by an impartial tribunal of fifty-one nations. I do not, therefore, propose to ask you to confirm it. It is unnecessary to do so.

The Chinese Delegation regrets that Japan has refused to join this Conference. If she had a case and a clear conscience, she needs have no apprehension that she might not obtain a just hearing. Her refusal is only another proof of her disregard of her treaty obligations, for under Article 7 of the Nine-Power Treaty participation in the consultation is as much a duty as a right.

I am aware, however, that Japan, though not present here, has made known her views in an attempt to justify her policy of aggression in China both in her reply to the invitation to participate in the Conference and in her recent official statement to the world press on the same occasion. She has advanced certain reasons and explanations which are intended to influence the uninformed opinion of the world.

One of the reasons most frequently advanced in her attempt to justify her policy of force and aggression in China is that there has been anti-Japanese feeling in my country. I admit there has existed in the past six years, and exists today, a sentiment of opposition in China, not to Japan as a nation but only to her overt acts of aggression against China or to her open preparation for such aggression. As the Chinese Government has emphasized on more than one occasion, the so-called anti-Japanese feeling is a natural consequence of the Japanese policy towards China. The Chinese people harbour no ill against the Japanese people as such but strongly object to the Japanese policy of force and the mailed fist in contravention of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris. The Chinese feeling of resentment is a fact the cause of which lies in Japan's own hands and springs from her own doing. For what self-respecting people in the world, if placed in the position of the Chinese, would not feel in the same way as the Chinese do towards Japan? Could Japan expect to win China's goodwill and confidence by deliberately and repeatedly seeking by intrigue or by force to infringe her sovereignty, to disrupt her political unity, to dismember her territory, to deprave her people and to destroy her independence?

"The real wonder in the relations between the two countries is not the fact that there has been anti-Japanese feeling in China but the great moderation, restraint and conciliation on the part of the Chinese Government and people towards Japan."

Official protestations of good intentions are powerless to convince the people of the world if they are not based upon the truth. For in international relations just as in individual relations action speaks louder than words.

Japan has again insinuated or alleged that the Chinese Government has been under the influence of the Chinese Communist elements. No one familiar with the recent developments in China can take this accusation seriously. For nearly ten years the Chinese Government has combatted with determination and with all the resources at its disposal the activities of the Chinese Communist Party. The objection has been not so much to the philosophy of Communism itself since the attachment of the average Chinese citizen to the family and to

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landed property is, as has also been attested by the Honourable Delegate of Italy, traditional and profound, but rather to the setting up of a rival government with an independent army, thereby constituting an obstacle to the work of political unification under the National Government.

But the Chinese Communists, like the great bulk of their fellow citizens, are after all patriotic and love their country. Their recent acceptance of the principles upon which the Chinese National Government is founded, their pledge of allegiance to Nanking, the voluntary dissolution of their so-called Soviet organization, and the disbandment of their small army to be completely reorganized by the Central Government in order to enable China more effectively to resist the Japanese aggression prove beyond doubt that the so-called menace of Chinese Communist elements is only a pretext on the part of the Japanese war party to hoodwink the world as to the real aggressive character of its own policy. Its true intention has been betrayed recently when it proclaimed its desire to bring about the fall of the present National Government which has effectively done away with the erstwhile menace of Communism in China and successfully achieved political unification of the whole nation. In this connection it may well be recalled that at the time of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931-32 the Japanese Government, in an attempt to justify its policy of aggression, argued that there was no stable and effective government in China, thereby making it necessary for Japan to undertake the task of maintaining order and tranquillity in East Asia. Today when China has established a most stable government whose authority is accepted throughout the nation, responsible Japanese leaders have openly declared their insistence upon its fall and disappearance, again on the professed ground of assuring tranquillity and order in East Asia. In the face of such obvious contradictions, what confidence could the Chinese Government place in Japan's protestations of innocent intentions towards China?

I wish to say here also that China does not look upon the world as a divided camp of rival political ideologies. She believes in the liberty and right of each nation to choose and adopt for itself any political system which it believes to be best suited to the genius of its people. Each country has a right, in our view, to work out its own destiny. The question of political ideology is primarily a right for self-determination of each people. Just as China recognizes this right of other countries, so she claims the same right for herself. It is an inherent right of every independent State and gives no privilege to Japan to interfere in the domestic problems of China.

It has also been claimed by Japan that the Chinese Government has been conducting for some years a militaristic propaganda aimed at Japan, and that at the same time, by importing vast quantities of munitions, constructing fortifications, and giving intensive training to the troops, it has succeeded in building large, strong armaments. She claims that her aggression in China is "a measure of self-defence in the face of China's challenge." In view of her possession of one of the most powerful war machines in the world equipped with an up-to-date and mighty army, navy and air force and ranking as one of the few strongest military Powers in the whole world, Japan's complaint against China's armaments which are far inferior to her own and which are unjustifiably small in the presence of constant Japanese aggression might be considered as comical if it were not for the tragic consequences which she has already inflicted, and is still inflicting, with her tremendous fighting machine upon scores of open, peaceful cities in China and upon thousands of harmless Chinese people.

China's regret to-day is that her rearming in recent years has not been more rapid and extensive so that she might be able to offer a yet more effective resistance to Japanese aggression and thereby to lessen the toll of suffering ruthlessly imposed upon the Chinese people by Japanese arms.

China had never given any challenge to Japan before the deliberate opening of hostilities on China by Japan. The Chinese armed forces had never invaded a single foot of Japanese territory, nor had the Chinese air force bombed a single Japanese town. China had not wished to make war on Japan and is fighting to-day determinedly and bravely only to resist the unceasing onslaught of the invading Japanese forces. Those Japanese who claim that Japan has been acting in self-defence either betray, to use their own pet expression, a regrettable

lack of sincerity or take all other people for fools. No man of common sense would consider a burglar who has forcibly broken into a house to be acting in self-defence when he is trying to murder the landlord desperately engaged in resisting the criminal intruder.

The Japanese Government claims that the situation in the Far East is difficult for the Occident to understand, and complains that there is a lack of comprehension on the part of the Powers of her intentions. Let me point out that the only difficult point to understand in the Far East is the persistent incessant aggression of Japan against China, not only in violation of her pledged word but also in opposition to her real self-interest.

I know there are in Japan farsighted statesmen who condemn this policy of force against a peaceful neighbor from whom she has borrowed so much in civilization and culture. But these enlightened elements are helpless against the grip of the military hierarchy on the government of the country.

It does no credit to Japan who always complains of the alleged lack of a stable and effective Government in China to have the civil branch of her Government give assurance of her peaceful intentions one day to be belied the next day if not at once by the action of its military authorities. China has had bitter experience of this perpetual "dual diplomacy" which the Japanese statesmen themselves have openly denounced but which the Japanese Government as such has been powerless to overcome.

In the light of the extraordinary acts and activities of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese garrison in North China, to which I have made reference a little while ago, is there any wonder that the Powers of the Occident cannot fully understand the intentions of Japan? Indeed, no people who love law and order and respect the peace and security of other nations could understand this organized lawlessness and aggression on the part of Japan against China.

It is also claimed that Japan's intention is to seek cooperation with China. If that is her object, she has certainly adopted a most extraordinary method to attain it. A reasonable man does not begin to try to make a friend of his neighbor by smacking his face, by "beating him to his knees," and by trying to murder him.

China realizes that Japan is a highly industrialized nation. She has difficult problems to face and her economic well-being depends upon a reasonable assurance of markets and raw materials from abroad. But economic cooperation, to be successful, must be sought by peaceful means and friendly negotiation. It must be a cooperation between free and equal partners on the basis of reciprocity. There have been occasions in the past when China in the midst of her devotion to the task of economic reconstruction and development sought such cooperation from Japan as from other countries, but the Japanese policy of domination and force always prevented its realization. Is it not natural that China, with her own experience of the unceasing bullying and aggression of the Japanese military warlords in North China and in the light of Korea's fate in accepting the so-called cooperation from Japan, should be wary of her professed intentions?

As Prince Konoe said prior to assuming his present post of Premier, "Japan's proposal must be of obvious benefit to China in order to be acceptable. There must be a unity of public opinion in Japan on China policy and effective aid be given to the Chinese nation in its struggle for rejuvenation." So long as Japan hopes by the magic word "cooperation" to enslave China and so long as she continues through the medium of her armed forces to attack, kill and destroy in China, there can be no real prospect of achieving cooperation between the two countries. "Cooperation" in the Japanese vocabulary evidently means only conformation to Japan's will by means of coercion.

In our view, the example of the other Powers in China might well be followed by Japan. China's relations with them in the past had not always been smooth. Their former method of economic cooperation smacked of the character of exploitation and was therefore not always welcome. But since their adoption of the new policy of free, frank and friendly collaboration for reciprocal benefit, all difficulties have disappeared. Goodwill and confidence now prevail in their relations with China and the continued development in the scope and extent of

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their economic cooperation with ever increasing advantage to both sides has fully justified their new policy. It is only Japan who still clings to the archaic idea of making economic exploitation a mask for political domination. Unless and until she abandons this ruthless, outworn policy, and substitutes for it one based upon equality and reciprocity, there can be no real economic cooperation between the two countries. And to be fully acceptable to China, such cooperation, in conformity with the spirit of the open door policy, must be inclusive of other Powers and not exclusive for Japan.

The interpretation which the Japanese Government has put forward in regard to certain local agreements which were previously made to liquidate incidents provoked by the Japanese troops themselves is obviously designed to distort the true facts and confuse public opinion.

It is also claimed by Japan that the present dispute between her and China can only be settled by direct negotiation between the two countries. Such a claim, in our view, ignores the important fact that the lives of the nationals of many Powers as well as their material interests are already affected. Besides, there is a general interest which all States have in the upholding of law and order in international relations and in the maintenance of peace and security between nations. I need not try to develop this point here because the conclusion that the present situation is a matter of concern not only to the two States in conflict but, to a lesser or greater degree, to all States has been solemnly acknowledged by fifty-one nations. The fact that this Conference has been convoked and is sitting testifies to the consensus of opinion of the other signatory Powers of the treaty.

China indeed fully shares this view and, therefore, welcomes the presence at this Conference not only of the Powers which have important interests in the Far East but also of all those which may be only indirectly interested in that region.

The principal fact of the present situation in the Far East is the Treaty of February 6, 1922, to which Japan has solemnly attached her signature and thereby pledged her respect for it. It is not only a violation against China whose sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity have been and are being threatened by Japan's repeated aggression against her, and whose fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to develop and maintain for herself a stable and effective government has been denied her by the Japanese policy of interference and invasion; it also constituted a violation against all the other signatory Powers. Japan's pledge under the treaty is not only a pledge to China but a pledge to all other signatory Powers that she will discharge her obligations in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty.

China, faithful to her signature, has been doing her best to make the Treaty respected by Japan. In the last four months she has been defending at tremendous sacrifice of the life and blood of her sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity against the overwhelming superiority of the Japanese forces of aggression. In doing this she, in fact, defends not only the material interests of the Powers in China but also the general cause of the sanctity of treaties.

China's resistance has been and remains under severe handicaps of all kinds. It is, however, animated by an undaunted spirit and a determined will. The bravery of the Chinese soldier in the face of the most formidable onslaught of Japanese aggression, has given, I hope, no cause for criticism even when judged by the most exacting standard of military gallantry in the world. I cannot believe that the mighty Powers which are represented here at the Conference and which are also parties to the Treaty which China has been trying to defend with her limited resources of power and strength will refuse to do their part in upholding the principle of the sanctity of treaty obligations, a principle which forms an essential basis of peace in the world. On the contrary, let me say that China has the utmost confidence in your loyalty and devotion to the stipulations of the Treaty which gives the mandate for our Conference and in your willingness also to do your utmost in order to make the principle of faith in the pledged word prevail in international relations. Such an effort will as much serve the general interest of civilization itself as render full justice to China.

The delegates of several Powers represented at this Conference have expressed a sincere desire to bring about a cessation of the hostilities now raging between my country and Japan and to work for the restoration of peace by agreement. China, whose love of peace is traditional, appreciates this gesture of goodwill. The Chinese Government which steadily pursued a policy of peace in the past few years in the face of the most flagrant armed aggression from Japan and which clung to that policy even in the trying days just preceding the opening of hostilities by Japan on her has been fighting only to resist the Japanese invasion. We desire peace but we know that we cannot obtain it in the presence of Japanese aggression. So long as that aggression persists, so long we are determined to continue our resistance. It is not a peace at any price that will either render justice to China or do credit to civilization. It is only by accepting a peace based upon the principles of Article 1 of the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, under which we are sitting, that China, by her tremendous sacrifice during the past few months, will be contributing to the cause of law and order in the relations between nations.

Knowing your devotion to the principle of the sanctity of treaties which has been so ably affirmed by the Honourable Delegates of France, Great Britain and United States this morning, however, we wish to assure you of the whole-hearted collaboration of our Government.

We give you this assurance the more willingly because we believe that if the rampant forces of Japanese aggression in the Far East are not effectively checked and faith in the pledged word is not restored, there is every danger that these forces will overrun the boundaries of China and throw the world into a general war from which no important Power will be able to keep aloof for long. As President Roosevelt has so truly said in a magisterial speech, "The peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignorings of humane instincts which to-day are creating a state of international anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality." It is in the interest of the general cause of peace and security between nations as well as in the hope of obtaining justice for China that we wish you success in your effort and are ready to contribute our fullest share for its attainment.

Note to the Japanese Government by the Nine-Power Treaty
Conference at Brussels, November 6, 1937

(1) The representatives of the States met in Brussels, on November 3, last, have taken cognizance of the reply which the Japanese Government sent in on October 27th to the invitation of the Belgian Government and the statement which accompanied this reply.

(2) In these documents the Imperial Government states that it cherishes no territorial ambitions in respect of China and that, on the contrary, it sincerely desires "to assist in the material and moral development of the Chinese nation," that it also desires "to promote cultural and economic cooperation" with the foreign powers in China and that it intends, furthermore, scrupulously "to respect foreign rights and interests in that country."

(3) The points referred to in this declaration are among the fundamental principles of the Treaty of Washington on February 6, 1922 (the Nine-Power Treaty). Representatives of States parties to this Treaty have taken note of the declarations of the Imperial Government in this respect.

(4) The Imperial Government moreover denies that there can be any question of violation of the Nine-Power Treaty by Japan and it formulates a number of complaints against the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government, for its part, contends there have been violations, denies charges of the Japanese Government and, in turn, makes complaints against Japan.

(5) The Treaty has made provisions for just such a situation. It should be borne in mind that the exchange of views taking place in Brussels is based essentially on these provisions and constitutes "full and frank communication" as envisaged in Article VII. This Conference is being held with a view to assisting in the resolving by peaceful means of a conflict between parties to the Treaty.

One of the parties to the present conflict, China, is represented at the conference and has affirmed its willingness fully to cooperate in its work.

The Conference regrets the absence of the other party, Japan, whose cooperation is most desirable.

(6) The Imperial Government states that it is "firmly convinced that an attempt to seek a solution at a gathering of so many Powers whose interests in East Asia are of varying degree, or who have practically no interest there at all, will only serve to complicate the situation still further and to put serious obstacles in the path of a just and proper solution."

It should be pointed out that all these Powers which are parties to the Treaty are, under the terms of this instrument, entitled to exercise the right which the Treaty confers upon them; that all Powers which have interests in the Far East are concerned regarding the present hostilities; and that the whole world is solicitous with regard to the effect of these hostilities on the peace and security of members of the family of nations.

However, the representatives of the States which met at Brussels believed it may be possible to allay Japan's misgivings referred to above; they would be glad to know whether the Imperial Government would be disposed to depute a representative or representatives to exchange views with representatives of a small number of Powers to be chosen for that purpose. Such an exchange of views would take place within the framework of the Nine-Power Treaty and in conformity with provisions of that Treaty. Its aims would be to throw further light on the various points referred to above and to facilitate settlement of the conflict. Regretting the continuation of hostilities, being firmly convinced that a peaceable settlement is alone capable of ensuring a lasting and constructive solution of the present conflict and having confidence in the efficacy of methods of conciliation, the representatives of the States met at Brussels earnestly desire that such a settlement may be achieved.

(7) The States represented at the Conference would be very glad to know as soon as possible the attitude of the Imperial Government toward this proposal.

Note of the Japanese Government on November 12, 1937,
Replying to the Note of November 6, 1937, of the
Nine-Power Treaty Conference

While the Imperial Government note that the opinion of participating Powers is the result of careful consideration the Imperial Government regret that this opinion is insufficient to persuade them to modify the views and policy clearly expressed in their answer dated October 27.

The participating Powers state they would be prepared to designate representatives of a small number of powers for an exchange of views with representatives of Japan within the scope of the Nine-Power Treaty and in conformity with its provision. However, the Imperial Government adhere firmly to the view that their present action, being one of self-defense forced upon Japan by China's challenge, lies outside the scope of the Treaty and that there is no room for discussion of the question of its application.

It certainly is impossible for them to accept an invitation to a conference in accordance with stipulations of that treaty after Japan has been accused of violating its terms.

Since the present affair originated from special conditions in East Asia the most just and equitable solution can be reached through direct negotiations between the two parties directly and immediately interested.

The Imperial Government are firmly convinced that any attempt at negotiation within the framework of a collective organ such as the present conference would only arouse popular feeling in both countries and hinder a satisfactory solution. The Imperial Government would be glad if the Powers, appreciating this view, should contribute toward stabilization in Eastern Asia in a manner consonant with the realities of the situation.

The participating Powers state that all powers having interests in the Far East are affected by the present hostilities and that the whole world views with apprehension the repercussions of these hostilities on the peace and security of members of the family of nations.

The Imperial Government desire to point out that, as has been made clear by Japan's successive declarations, they are doing everything in their power to respect the rights and interests of foreign powers in China and that they have the deepest concern for a firm establishment of peace in Eastern Asia through satisfactory conclusion of the present affair.

Speech by His Excellency Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo before the
Nine-Power Treaty Conference, November 13, 1937

After ten days of effort the Conference finds itself back in the position where it started. The latest reply of the Japanese Government to the appeal of the Conference sent a week ago gives another flat refusal to collaborate in the interest of peace. It throws no new light on any of the points brought to its attention but simply gives a more determined "no" than ever.

It will be recalled that the last communication of the Conference, like the original invitation of the Belgian Government addressed to Japan, was couched in most conciliatory terms. All reference to the League of Nations, which first suggested the idea of holding a conference, was carefully omitted. The unanimous opinion of 51 nations of the world on her invasion of China and the nature of her military operations in Chinese territory was not even alluded to. The studied reticence in regard to her flagrant violation of the Nine-Power Treaty, under which the Conference has been sitting, was a clear assurance that she was not summoned to appear before a tribunal to defend her unlawful actions in China. She was invited to participate in the Conference as an equal partner and implored to extend her cooperation. Particular attention was paid to the language of the communication and every care was taken to avoid any expression that might ruffle the tender susceptibilities of the Japanese Government. The Conference went so far as to take note of her objection to dealing with a large body of Powers represented at the Conference and offered to choose a small number of Powers in order to induce her to consent to an exchange of views with them.

We, of the Chinese Delegation, assured the Conference from the outset of the determination of the Chinese Government to contribute its full cooperation for the restoration of peace consonant with justice and for a settlement of the conflict on the basis of the principles of the Treaty. In our desire to contribute to the success of your effort, we offered even to retire temporarily from the meetings of the Conference in private if our absence would facilitate progress in its discussions.

But neither the spirit of conciliation nor the soft words were of any avail. The refusal of the Japanese Government is more resolute and absolute than ever, and both the language and the tone of its reply seem to indicate clearly that all the painstaking efforts of the Conference to secure her collaboration to serve for the cause of peace and the respect of treaties have been taken as a sign of weakness and served only to inspire her insolence.

The latest reply of the Japanese Government, as I have said, adds nothing new to its previous communications. It repeats the flimsy pretexts and excuses with which I dealt at length in my statement before the Conference on the opening day. The reiterated claim that Japan's present action in China is resorted to as a measure of defence is not only a deliberate distortion of the meaning of the time-honored term but makes a mockery of the universal sentiment of justice and truth. Even if the Japanese Government really believe—which the Chinese Delegation seriously doubts—that Japan's aggression in China was dictated by considerations of self-defence, it could in no way justify her claim that the matter lay outside the scope of the Nine-Power Treaty. The "full and frank communication" envisaged in Article 7 of the Treaty is intended for just such a situation.

The reply again insists upon a direct settlement of the present conflict by China and Japan. Let me inform you here that for four years the Chinese Government patiently tried to reach a peaceful settlement with Japan of the questions outstanding between them, and the present conflict is the result. For every act of concession, every gesture of conciliation on the part of China was taken by Japan as a sign of fear and led to more bullying and browbeating. The acceptance of one demand by China was always followed by the presentation of other demands. Failing compliance by China, the Japanese Army resorted to intimidation and coercion in the form of nefarious activities of smuggling, night manoeuvres, war exercises, and heavy reinforcement to the Japanese garrison in North China in violation of the Protocol of 1901 and out of all proportion either to the purpose of keeping open communication from Peiping to the sea or in comparison with those of the other Powers. The perpetual "dual

diplomacy" practised by Japan through the Japanese Foreign Office and the Japanese Army in her dealings with China has convinced China of the danger and futility of direct negotiation.

It is said that "the present occurrences had their origin in conditions peculiar to the Far East." For our part we do not see that there is anything peculiar in the Far Eastern situation, unless it be the Japanese method of preserving peace in Eastern Asia by armed invasion of peaceful China. Moreover, conditions in the Far East are no more peculiar today than they were at the time the Nine-Power Treaty was signed freely by Japan and the other signatory Powers. Whatever the conditions are—and they are of her own creation or encouragement—they are not beyond the purview of the Treaty but are proper subject-matter for discussion by the interested Powers.

The Chinese Government is convinced that the cooperation of the Conference, far from exciting public opinion in the two countries and making it more difficult to reach a solution, will facilitate a settlement and inspire confidence in its justice and conformity with the principles of the Treaty. It will allay mutual suspicion and distrust and will serve the real cause of peace.

As Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has declared in a statement of last week: "Direct negotiation between China and Japan will merely be another opportunity for Japan to press such demands as are not only unacceptable to China but also unacceptable to the other signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty." For, besides our recent experience, the story of the notorious Twenty-one Demands pressed on China by Japan is still fresh in the memory of those who are familiar with the history of the Far East in recent times.

The Powers at the Conference are asked by the Japanese Government to "make their contribution to stability in East Asia in conformity with the real situation." Does it mean that the Conference should accept the temporary changes brought about by the force of arms and condone Japan's open violation of her treaty obligations as embodied not only in the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington but also in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris? This is the language of the treaty-breaker who wishes to impose upon the Conference a *fait accompli*. I am confident that the participating Powers who are all faithful to their signatures to the Treaty and respect the principles of law and justice will choose to make their contribution to stability in the Far East by upholding treaty obligations and thereby serving the interests of peace.

The issues of the present conflict between China and Japan are not confined to the territorial and political integrity of China. In fact important rights and interests of the foreign Powers in China and their obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty are involved, and more than that, the principle of respect for treaty obligations and the cause of peace, in which all nations rightly feel a deep concern and interest, are at stake.

China asks only to be left in peace and free from external aggression in order to pursue her stupendous task of political and economic reconstruction. The Nine-Power Treaty has assured her of this opportunity and the Japanese aggression has deprived her of it. We ask that the Japanese aggression be stopped and the Nine-Power Treaty be respected. It is a Treaty which all Powers parties to it have a common obligation to uphold.

China, on her part, has been fighting with life and blood of her people to stop Japanese invasion and uphold the Treaty. She has been, and still is, exerting her utmost to defend her political and territorial integrity and to maintain the principle of the sanctity of treaties. She has been fighting against the violation of the Treaty, a violation which is against all other signatory Powers as well as against China. So long as Japanese aggression persists, so long will China continue to resist. The Government and the people of China are determined to fight the aggressor to the end.

Now that the door to conciliation and mediation has been slammed in your face by the latest reply of the Japanese Government, will you not decide to withhold supplies of war materials and credit to Japan and extend aid to China? It is, in our opinion, a most modest way in which you can fulfill your obligation of helping to check Japanese aggression and uphold the Treaty in question.

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In our struggle against the forces of Japanese aggression with a whole nation behind us resolute in purpose and undaunted in spirit, we do not ask the other signatory Powers to fight for us, but we need material help to enable us to continue our effective resistance. In order to shorten the duration of hostilities and hasten the restoration of peace, it is also necessary to refrain from contributing to the financial and economic resources of the aggressor and feeding him with an uninterrupted flow of arms and raw materials for his war industries.

International peace, like national peace, if it is to be made durable, must be defended. The restoration and defence of peace in the Far East at present calls for concerted action of a moral, material, financial and economic character on the part of the other participating Powers in the Conference. Such action must also be timely. For if it is delayed too long because of hesitation and doubt, then violence and disorder now raging in the Far East will soon reach such proportions as will be impossible to restrain and control without undergoing the trials and tribulations of another world war.

Declaration Adopted by the Nine-Power Treaty Conference November 15, 1937*

1. The representatives of the States met at Brussels having taken cognizance of the Japanese Government's reply of Nov. 12, 1937, to the communication addressed to the latter on November 6, 1937, observe with regret that the Japanese Government still contends that the conflict between Japan and China lies outside the scope of the Nine-Power Treaty and again declines to enter into an exchange of views for the purpose of endeavoring to achieve a peaceful settlement of that conflict.

2. It is clear that the Japanese concept of the issues and interests involved in the conflict under reference is utterly different from the concepts of most of the other nations and governments of the world. The Japanese Government insists that as the conflict is between Japan and China it concerns those two countries only. Against this the representatives of the States now met at Brussels consider this conflict of concern in law to all countries parties to the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington of 1922 and to all countries parties to the Pact of Paris of 1928, and of concern in fact to all countries members of the family of nations.

3. It cannot be denied that in the Nine-Power Treaty the parties thereto affirmed it to be their desire to adopt a specified policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East and agreed to apply certain specified principles in their relations with China and, in China, with one another; and that in the Pact of Paris the parties agreed "that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means."

4. It cannot be denied that the present hostilities between Japan and China adversely affect not only the rights of all nations but also the material interests of nearly all nations. These hostilities have brought to some nationals of third countries death, to some nationals of third countries great peril, to property of nationals of third countries widespread destruction, to international communications disruption, to international trade disturbance and loss, to the peoples of all nations a sense of horror and indignation, to all the world feelings of uncertainty and apprehension.

5. The representatives met at Brussels therefore regard these hostilities and the situation which they have brought about as matters inevitably of concern to the countries which they represent and—more—to the whole world. To them the problem appears not in terms simply of relations between two countries in the Far East but in terms of law, orderly processes, world security and world peace.

6. The Japanese Government has affirmed in its note of October 27 to which it refers in its note of November 12, that in employing armed force against China it was anxious to "make China renounce her present policy." The representatives met at Brussels are moved to point out that there exists no warrant in law for the use of armed force by any country for the purpose of intervening in the internal regime of another country and that general recognition of such a right would be a permanent cause of conflict.

7. The Japanese Government contends that it should be left to Japan and China to proceed to a settlement by and between them alone. But, that a just and lasting settlement could be achieved by such a method cannot be believed.

Japanese armed forces are present in enormous numbers on Chinese soil and have occupied large and important areas thereof. Japanese authorities have decided in substance that it is Japan's objective to destroy the will and the ability of China to resist the will and the demands of Japan. The Japanese Government affirms that it is China whose actions and attitude are in contravention of the Nine-Power Treaty; yet, whereas China is engaged in full and frank discussion of the matter with the other parties to that Treaty, Japan refuses to discuss it with any of them. Chinese authorities have repeatedly declared that they will not, in fact that they cannot, negotiate with Japan alone for a settle-

* Italy voted against the declaration, and Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, while endorsing the general principles involved, abstained from voting.

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ment by agreement. In these circumstances there is no ground for any belief that, if left to themselves, Japan and China would arrive in the appreciably near future at any solution which would give promise of peace between those two countries, security for the rights and interests of other countries, and political and economic stability in the Far East. On the contrary there is every reason to believe that if this matter were left entirely to Japan and China the armed conflict—with attendant destruction of life and property, disorder, uncertainty, instability, suffering, enmity, hatreds, and disturbance to the whole world—would continue indefinitely.

8. The Japanese Government, in their latest communication, invite the Powers represented at Brussels to make a contribution to the stability of Eastern Asia in accordance with the realities of the situation.

9. In view of the representatives of the States met at Brussels, the essential realities of the situation are those to which they draw attention above.

10. The representatives of the States met at Brussels are firmly of the belief that, for the reasons given above, a just and durable settlement is not to be expected of direct negotiations between the parties. That is why in the communications addressed to the Japanese Government, they invited that Government to confer with them or with representatives of a small number of powers to be chosen for that purpose, in the hope that such exchange of views might lead to acceptance of their good offices and thus help towards the negotiation of a satisfactory settlement.

11. They still believe that if the parties to the conflict would agree to a cessation of hostilities in order to give an opportunity for such a procedure to be tried, success might be achieved. The Chinese Delegation has intimated its readiness to fall in with this procedure. The representatives of the States met at Brussels find it difficult to understand Japan's persistent refusal to discuss such a method.

12. Though hoping that Japan will not adhere to her refusal the States represented at Brussels must consider what is to be their common attitude in a situation where one party to an international treaty maintains against the views of all the other parties that the action which it has taken does not come within the scope of that treaty, and sets aside provisions of the treaty which the other parties hold to be operative in the circumstances.

Speech by His Excellency Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo before the Nine-Power Treaty Conference, November 22, 1937

A few hours ago the Chinese Delegation received a copy of the text of the draft statement which is now before the Conference. A preliminary study of its contents reveals the fact that it contains nothing more than a reaffirmation of certain general principles. No indication is given of the common attitude which the representatives at the Conference have agreed to consider in the present situation in accordance with the last paragraph of the declaration at the Conference adopted on November 15th last. Nor is there any provision in the present draft for certain concrete steps which I had the honour to propose for the Conference to consider in my statement of November 13th in order to strengthen China's power of resistance and restrain Japan's aggression. As the draft text is now open to a general discussion first, the Chinese Delegation wishes to make a few broad observations without entering into details of the draft for the present.

At its last meeting a week ago the Conference adopted with one dissenting voice and three abstentions a declaration which was based, with a few minor changes, upon a draft text jointly proposed by the American, British and French Delegations. As regards the general principles which were embodied in that declaration, they were approved by all the representatives at the Conference with one exception.

Among other principles it is emphasized that "To them the problem appears not in terms simply of relations between the two countries in the Far East, but in terms of law, orderly processes, world security, and world peace." This statement of the principle brings out, in the opinion of the Chinese Delegation, issues of vital importance to the welfare and civilization of the whole world.

The final paragraph of the declaration reads: "Though hoping that Japan will not adhere to her refusal, the States represented in Brussels must consider what is to be their common attitude in a situation where one party to an international treaty maintains, against the views of all the other parties, that the action which it has taken does not come within the scope of that treaty, and sets aside provisions of the treaty which the other parties hold to be operative in the circumstances."

In other words, this is a clear case of treaty-breaking on the part of one party against all the other parties, and the treaty-breaker not only continues to disregard the stipulations of the treaty but persists in the use of armed force to maintain and prolong his acts of violation.

The task before the Conference is then clear. It is to consider what is to be our common attitude in the situation with which we are thus confronted. In my statement before the Conference on November 13th, I pointed out in the name of the Chinese Delegation that the restoration and defence of peace in the Far East called for concerted action of a moral, material, financial and economic character on the part of the other participating Powers in the Conference and that this action must also be timely. I proposed that concrete aid should be extended to China and that economic assistance and supplies of war materials and credit should be withheld from Japan. It is the firm opinion of the Chinese Delegation that positive measures along these two parallel courses of action should be considered in order to check the forces of aggression and hasten the restoration of peace.

The Conference has tried every form of conciliation in asking Japan to abandon her policy of force and accept a method of peaceful negotiation for a settlement of the conflict. But neither impartial reasoning nor friendly persuasion nor supple accommodation as to procedure has been able to move her in her uncompromising attitude.

To us of the Chinese Delegation it has been obvious that empty words could produce no result. Without positive action, direct or indirect, declarations and resolutions, however firm in character and earnest in spirit, cannot be effective. Japan, disregarding her treaty obligations, makes armed force an instrument of her policy and exalts its employment. The present situation is like a case of armed robbery where words of earnest exhortation or friendly remonstrance serve only to convey the impression of fear and weakness. Just as maintenance

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of domestic peace and order requires something more than laws on the statute book and decrees on the official bulletin board, so in the face of the rabid and raging international violence mere words are impotent to restore peace or justice.

The Conference has affirmed certain fundamental principles of international law and morality indispensable to the maintenance of order, stability, and peace among nations. The question now resolves itself into this: Are the Powers represented at the Conference who have so solemnly and earnestly pronounced their belief and faith in these principles willing to support their words with action?

The events of the past few years in the world have demonstrated that reluctance and refusal on the part of the Powers who desire to uphold law and order in international relations to make a positive contribution by concerted action have tended to encourage rather than deter the forces of violence and disorder. Want of determination to consecrate by active efforts the principles of international law and morality has never failed to be interpreted by the exponents of aggression as a sign of weakness and fear of force.

Nowhere has this interpretation been more assiduously upheld as a correct reading of the signs of the times than in the Far East. For four years China exerted every effort to secure a peaceful settlement of the outstanding questions with Japan. She tried to discuss, reason, negotiate and conciliate, but she was unable to move Japan an inch in the pursuit of the policy of the mailed fist. Even in the presence of the pointed bayonet, China made concessions in the interest of peace. But each concession only served to induce the Japanese bayonet plunge deeper into her body politic.

We have at last been obliged to resist force with force and for four months we have been engaged in most sanguinary hostilities against our will. We have been fighting the invading forces for the double purpose of defending our territory, sovereignty, and even national existence on the one hand, and on the other, upholding the principles of international law and morality and the sanctity of treaties. We have been doing it because we believe that we owe it not only to ourselves but also to the cause of peace and the civilization of the world.

China's resources are limited and the result of her efforts cannot be but modest. But she can assure you that she will continue to do her utmost to discharge her obligation not only as a signatory Power of the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris, but also as a peace-loving member of the family of nations.

The other Powers represented at the Conference, with one exception, have all declared that the present conflict in the Far East is one of concern in law to all countries parties to the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington in 1922, and to all countries parties to the Pact of Paris of 1928, and of concern in fact to all countries members of the family of nations. Will not you, then, with your unlimited resources of power and strength, contribute your share by some positive action, even though it may be indirect, to the cause of upholding the principles of law, order, world security and world peace, or do you really believe that simple declarations of principles and pious professions of faith in the pledged word will be sufficient to make one and the other observed and respected in the world?

By refusing to aid China do you mean she should cease to resist aggression or that she could resist indefinitely without adequate means? After clearly and emphatically establishing the difference in law between the policies of Japan and China in the present conflict, do you still wish to make no distinction in fact in your treatment of them between the aggressor and the victim, as your refusal to cease contributing to Japan's material and economic resources for continuing aggression against China would seem to indicate?

The Chinese Delegation believes that solidarity in purpose must be followed by solidarity in action, without which the cause of organized peace cannot be effectively promoted. The Conference has met for three weeks in the interest of peace. It is our hope that it will not adjourn without making a concerted effort in the form of concrete steps, if not to stop the aggression, at least to hasten its end. Failure to act is sure to be considered in certain quarters as a new defeat of the forces of peace. Instead of contributing to stability and order in

the world, the Conference by its abortive ending will unwittingly augment a sense of general insecurity which already prevails. It may indirectly place small or weak States more at the mercy of the strong and the aggressive and make all peace-loving nations feel more insecure than ever.

The Chinese Delegation, while appreciating the time and labor which the different Delegations have contributed to the meetings, cannot but voice its sense of regret and disappointment at its striking lack of fruitful result not only for the sake of China who, as the victim of aggression, has a right to insist on a common effort to be made by the other signatory Powers of the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington to make it respected but also in the general interest of law, orderly processes, world security and world peace declared by the Conference as matters of concern to all nations parties to the Treaty or not.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Chinese Delegation wishes to reserve the right to propose amendments pending reference to its Government and receipt of final instructions.

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In view of the foregoing considerations, the Chinese Delegation wishes to reserve the right to propose amendments pending reference to its Government and receipt of final instructions.

Report of the Nine-Power Treaty Conference
November 24, 1937

1. The Conference at Brussels was assembled pursuant to an invitation extended by the Belgian Government at the request of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom with the approval of the American Government. It held its opening session on November 3, 1937. The Conference has now reached a point at which it appears desirable to record the essential phases of its work.

2. In the winter of 1921-22 there were signed at Washington a group of inter-related treaties and agreements of which the Nine-Power Treaty regarding principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China constituted one of the most important units. These treaties and agreements were the result of careful deliberation and were entered upon freely. They were designed primarily to bring about conditions of stability and security in the Pacific area.

The Nine-Power Treaty stipulates in Article I that "The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;

(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States."

Under and in the light of these undertakings and of the provision contained in the other treaties, the situation in the Pacific area was for a decade characterized by a substantial measure of stability, with considerable progress toward the other objectives envisaged in the treaties. In recent years there have come a series of conflicts between Japan and China, and these conflicts have culminated in the hostilities now in progress.

3. The Conference at Brussels was called for the purpose, as set forth in the terms of the invitation, "of examining, in accordance with Article VII of the Nine-Power Treaty, the situation in the Far East and to consider friendly peaceable methods for hastening the end of the regrettable conflict now taking place there." With the exception of Japan, all of the signatories and adherents to the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, accepted the invitation and sent representatives to Brussels, for the purpose stated in the invitation.

4. The Chinese Government, attending the Conference and participating in its deliberations, has communicated with the other parties to the Nine-Power Treaty in conformity with Article VII of that Treaty. It has stated here that its present military operations are purely in resistance to armed invasion of China by Japan. It has declared its willingness to accept a peace based upon the principles of the Nine-Power Treaty and to collaborate whole-heartedly with the other Powers in support of the principle of the sanctity of treaties.

5. The Japanese Government, in replying with regret that it was not able to accept the invitation to the Conference, affirmed that "The action of Japan in China is a measure of self-defence which she has been compelled to take in the face of China's fierce anti-Japanese policy and practice, and especially by her provocative action in resorting to force of arms; and consequently it lies, as has been declared already by the Imperial Government, outside the purview of the Nine-Power Treaty"; and advanced the view that an attempt to seek a solution at a gathering of so many Powers "would only serve to complicate the situation still further and to put serious obstacles in the path of a just and proper solution."

6. On November 6, 1937, the Conference sent, through the Belgian Government, to the Japanese Government, a communication in the course of which the Conference enquired whether the Japanese Government would be willing to

depute a representative or representatives to exchange views with representatives of a small number of Powers to be chosen for that purpose, the exchange of views to take place within the framework of the Nine-Power Treaty, and in conformity with the provisions of that treaty, toward throwing further light on points of difference and facilitating a settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict. In that communication the representatives of the States met at Brussels expressed their earnest desire that peaceful settlement be achieved.

7. To that communication the Japanese Government replied that a communication of November 12, 1937, stating that it could not do otherwise than maintain its previously expressed point of view that the present action of Japan in her relations with China was a measure of self-defence and did not come within the scope of the Nine-Power Treaty; that only an effort between the two parties would constitute a means of securing the most just and the most equitable settlement, and that the intervention of a collective organ such as the Conference would merely excite public opinion in the two countries and make it more difficult to reach a solution satisfactory to all.

8. On November 15, the Conference adopted a declaration in the course of which it affirmed that the representatives of the Union of South Africa, the United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics "... consider this conflict of concern in law to all countries parties to the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington of 1922 and to all countries parties to the Pact of Paris of 1928 and of concern in fact to all countries members of the family of nations."

9. In the presence of this difference between the views of the Conference and of the Japanese Government there now appears to be no opportunity at this time for the Conference to carry out its terms of reference in so far as they relate to entering into discussions with Japan towards bringing about peace by agreement. The Conference therefore is concluding this phase of its work and at this moment of going into recess adopts a further declaration of its views.

10. The text of the communication sent to the Japanese Government on November 6, 1937—(See page 68 of this publication)

11. The text of the declaration adopted by the Conference on November 15, 1937—(See pages 73-74 of this publication)

12. The text of the declaration adopted by the Conference on November 24, 1937—(See pages 80-81 of this publication)

**Declaration Adopted by the Nine-Power Treaty Conference
November 24, 1937**

1. The Nine-Power Treaty is a conspicuous example of numerous international instruments by which the nations of the world enunciate certain principles and accept certain self-denying rules in their conduct with each other, solemnly undertaking to respect the sovereignty of other nations, to refrain from seeking political or economic domination of other nations, and to abstain from interference in their internal affairs.

2. These international instruments constitute a framework within which international security and international peace are intended to be safeguarded without resort to arms and within which international relationships should subsist on the basis of mutual trust, good-will, and beneficial trade and financial relations.

3. It must be recognized that whenever armed force is employed in disregard of these principles the whole structure of international relations based upon the safeguards provided by treaties is disturbed. Nations are then compelled to seek security in ever-increasing armaments. There is created everywhere a feeling of uncertainty and insecurity. The validity of these principles cannot be destroyed by force, their universal applicability cannot be denied, and their indispensability to civilization and progress cannot be gainsaid.

4. It was in accordance with these principles that this Conference was called in Brussels for the purpose, as set forth in the terms of the invitation issued by the Belgian Government, "of examining, in accordance with Article VII of the Nine-Power Treaty, the situation in the Far East and to consider friendly methods for hastening the end of the regrettable conflict now taking place there."

5. Since its opening session on November 3rd the Conference has continuously striven to promote conciliation and has endeavored to secure the cooperation of the Japanese Government in the hope of arresting hostilities and bringing about a settlement.

6. The Conference is convinced that force by itself can provide no just and lasting solution for disputes between nations. It continues to believe that it would be to the immediate and the ultimate interest of both parties to the present dispute to avail themselves of the assistance of others in an effort to bring hostilities to an early end as a necessary preliminary to the achievement of a general and lasting settlement. It further believes that a satisfactory settlement cannot be achieved by direct negotiation between the parties to the conflict alone, and that only by consultation with other Powers principally concerned can there be achieved an agreement the terms of which will be just, generally acceptable and likely to endure.

7. This Conference strongly reaffirms the principles of the Nine-Power Treaty as being among the basic principles which are essential to world peace and orderly progressive development of national and international life.

8. The Conference believes that a prompt suspension of hostilities in the Far East would be in the best interests not only of China and Japan but of all nations. With each day's continuance of the conflict the loss in lives and property increases and the ultimate solution of the conflict becomes more difficult.

9. The Conference therefore strongly urges that hostilities be suspended and resort be had to peaceful processes.

10. The Conference believes that no possible step to bring about by peaceful processes a just settlement of the conflict should be overlooked or omitted.

11. In order to allow time for participating Governments to exchange views and further explore all peaceful methods by which a just settlement of the dispute may be attained consistently with the principles of the Nine-Power Treaty and in conformity with the objectives of that Treaty the Conference deems it advisable temporarily to suspend its sittings. The conflict in the Far East remains, however, a matter of concern to all of the Powers assembled at Brussels—by virtue of commitments in the Nine-Power Treaty or of special interest in the

Far East—and especially to those most immediately and directly affected by conditions and events in the Far East. Those of them that are parties to the Nine-Power Treaty have expressly adopted a policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East and, to that end, are bound by the provisions of that Treaty, outstanding among which are those of Articles I and VII.

12. The Conference will be called together again whenever its Chairman or any two of its members shall have reported that they consider that its deliberations can be advantageously resumed.

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Statement Made to the Nine-Power Treaty Conference by Dr. V. K.
Wellington Koo, November 24, 1937

The Chinese Delegation notes that the revised text of the draft declaration contains a number of modifications and clarifications of the original text. The new draft, like the old one, reaffirms certain general principles which China has always accepted. But in view of the continued raging of the hostilities in the Far East, the Chinese Delegation believes that a mere reaffirmation of these principles cannot be considered as a satisfactory result of the Conference, because it is not adequate to deal effectively with the grave situation.

The Chinese Delegation regrets that the suggestions which it made to the Conference, particularly at the meeting on November 22nd, with a view to the adoption of certain positive and concrete measures, have not been considered by the Conference. For the reasons which it explained in its statements before the Conference on November 13th and 22nd, the Chinese Delegation holds that such common action is indispensable in any effort to restrain the Japanese aggression and hasten the restoration of peace in the Far East.

The Chinese Delegation notes that the suspension of the sittings of the Conference is to be only temporary and deemed advisable in order to allow time for participating Governments to exchange views and further explore all peaceful methods by which a just settlement of the dispute may be attained consistently with the principles of the Nine-Power Treaty and in conformity with the objectives of that Treaty. As regards such further exploration by participating Governments, the Chinese Delegation cannot refrain from expressing its conviction that, in order to make this additional effort successful, it is not only essential that such effort should be made actively and promptly but that it is also indispensable to consider at the same time the necessity of common action in the form of positive aid to China and restrictive measures against the aggressor.

While prepared to accept the declaration in the spirit of solidarity, the Chinese Delegation requests the Conference to take note of this statement and attach it to the declaration of the Conference.

U. S. and Japanese Official and Diplomatic Correspondence
Concerning the Panay Incident
December 12 to December 25, 1937

Ambassador Joseph C. Grew's Report from Tokyo to Secretary of State Hull
December 12, 1937

The Minister for Foreign affairs has just called on me in person at the Chancery and has informed me of the receipt of a Domei report from Shanghai that, following fleeing remnants of the Chinese army, Japanese planes had bombed three Standard Oil vessels and had sunk the U.S.S. Panay while in the close vicinity on the Yangtze above Nanking. The Minister said that he had as yet received no official report, but that he had come immediately to express to our Government the profound apology of the Japanese Government and that Ambassador Saito would do the same to you.

He said that Admiral Hasegawa had accepted full responsibility for the accident. He said that immediately after my visit this morning he had communicated my reportings to the Japanese Naval and Military authorities. Hirota said "I cannot possibly express how badly we feel about this."

The Navy and War Ministers have sent similar expressions of regret to the Navy and War Departments in Washington through the Naval and Military Attachés here.

Simultaneous Preliminary Instruction from
Secretary of State Hull to
American Ambassador Grew in Tokyo

Telegrams from Hankow indicate that yesterday and today American and British Naval and merchant vessels at various points on the Yangtze above Nanking were repeatedly fired on and bombed. A Japanese source is reported to have stated at Wuhu that Japanese military forces have orders to fire on all ships on the Yangtze.

Today the U.S.S. Panay and three Standard Oil steamers at point twenty-seven miles above Nanking are reported bombed and sunk and survivors—including Embassy personnel, navy personnel and some refugees—are now at Holsien.

Please immediately inform Foreign Minister Hirota, ask for information and request that the Japanese Government immediately take appropriate action. Impress upon him the gravity of the situation and the imperative need to take every precaution against further attacks on American vessels or personnel.

When we have further particulars I shall give you further instruction.

Memorandum Handed by the President of the United States to the Secretary
of State at 12:30 P. M., December 13, 1937

Please tell the Japanese Ambassador when you see him at 1 o'clock:

1. That the President is deeply shocked and concerned by the news of indiscriminate bombing of American and other non-Chinese vessels on the Yangtze and that he requests that the Emperor be so advised.
2. That all the facts are being assembled and will shortly be presented to the Japanese Government.
3. That in the meantime it is hoped the Japanese Government will be considering definitely for presentation to this Government:
 - a. Full expression of regret and proffer of full compensation;
 - b. Methods guaranteeing against a repetition of any similar attack in the future.

(Signed) F. D. R.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

State Department Public Statement, December 13, 1937

The Japanese Ambassador called upon the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock this afternoon. He informed the Secretary that the Foreign Minister of Japan, before receiving official reports concerning the bombing and sinking of the U.S.S. Panay, called upon Ambassador Grew in Tokyo and offered regrets.

The Japanese Foreign Minister had instructed Ambassador Saito that reports were to be given to the Secretary of State. The Ambassador also was instructed to extend full regrets and apologies, which he came to the Secretary to do.

The Ambassador added that the American authorities had informed the Japanese authorities of the position of the American vessels, and that therefore the bombing was a very grave blunder.

The Ambassador said further that the Japanese authorities were trying to furnish relief to the survivors at Hohsien, but that the place was one where Japanese and Chinese troops are fighting and that it was a difficult matter to get relief to them.

**United States Note to Japan Formally Protesting
The Bombing of American War and Commercial Ships
December 14, 1937**

The Government and people of the United States have been deeply shocked by the facts of the bombardment and sinking of the U.S.S. Panay and the sinking or burning of the American steamers Meiping, Meian and Meisian by Japanese aircraft.

The essential facts are that these American vessels were in the Yangtze River by uncontested and incontestible right; that they were flying the American flag; that they were engaged in a legitimate and appropriate business; that they were at the moment conveying American official and private personnel away from points where danger had developed; that they had several times changed their position, moving up-river, in order to avoid danger; and that they were attacked by Japanese bombing planes.

With regard to the attack, a responsible Japanese Naval officer at Shanghai has informed the Commander-in-Chief of the American Asiatic Fleet that the four vessels were proceeding up-river; that a Japanese plane endeavored to ascertain their nationality, flying at an altitude of 300 meters, but was unable to distinguish the flags; that three Japanese bombing planes, six Japanese fighting planes, and two Japanese bombing planes, in sequence, made attacks which resulted in the damaging of one of the American steamers and the sinking of the U.S.S. Panay and the other two steamers.

Since the beginning of the present unfortunate hostilities between Japan and China, the Japanese Government and various Japanese authorities at various points have repeatedly assured the Government and authorities of the United States that it is the intention and purpose of the Japanese Government and the Japanese armed forces to respect fully the rights and interests of other Powers.

On several occasions, however, acts of Japanese armed forces have violated the rights of the United States, have seriously endangered the lives of American nationals and have destroyed American property. In several instances the Japanese Government has admitted the facts, has expressed regrets and has given assurance that every precaution will be taken against recurrence of such incidents.

In the present case acts of Japanese armed forces have taken place in complete disregard of American rights, have destroyed American property and have taken American life, both public and private.

In these circumstances the Government of the United States requests

and expects of the Japanese Government a formally recorded expression of regret, an undertaking to make complete and comprehensive indemnifications, and an assurance that definite and specific steps have been taken which will insure that hereafter American nationals, interests and property in China will not be subjected to attack by Japanese armed forces or unlawful interference by any Japanese authorities or forces whatsoever.

**Note Handed by Foreign Minister Koki Hirota to
United States Ambassador Joseph C. Grew
December 14, 1937**

Regarding the incident of Dec. 12, in which the United States gunboat Panay and three steamers belonging to the Standard Oil Company were sunk by bombing of Japanese naval aircraft at a point about twenty-six miles above Nanking, I had the honor, as soon as unofficial information of the incident was brought to my knowledge, to request Your Excellency to transmit to the United States Government sincere apologies from the Japanese Government.

From reports subsequently received from our representatives in China it has been established that the Japanese air force, acting on information that Chinese troops, fleeing from Nanking, were going up-river in steamers, pursued them and discovered such vessels at the above-mentioned point. Owing to poor visibility, however, the aircraft, although they descended to fairly low altitudes, were unable to discern any mark showing any one of them was an American warship.

Consequently the United States gunboat Panay and the vessels of the Standard Oil Company, being taken for Chinese carrying fleeing Chinese troops, were bombed and sunk.

While it is clear in the light of the above circumstances, that the present incident is entirely due to a mistake, the Japanese Government regret most profoundly that it has caused damage to a United States man-of-war and ships and casualties among those aboard, and desire to present hereby our sincere apologies.

The Japanese Government will make indemnifications for all losses and deal appropriately with those responsible for the incident. Furthermore they already have issued strict orders to the authorities on the spot with a view to preventing recurrence of a similar incident.

The Japanese Government, in fervent hope that the friendly relations of Japan and the United States will not be affected by this unfortunate affair, have frankly stated as above their sincere attitude, which I beg Your Excellency to make known to your Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew expressions of my highest consideration.

**Japanese Note Replying to the United States Protest
December 24, 1937**

Monsieur L'Ambassadeur:

Regarding the unfortunate incident occurring on the Yangtze River about twenty-six miles above Nanking on the 12th instant, in which Japanese naval aircraft attacked by mistake the U.S.S. Panay and three merchant ships belonging to the Standard Oil Company of America, causing them to sink or burn with the result that there were caused casualties among those on board, I had the honor previously to send to Your Excellency my note dated the 14th of December.

Almost simultaneously, however, I received Your Excellency's note No. 838, which was sent by the direction of the Government of the United States, and which, after describing the circumstances prior to the occurrence of the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

incident, concludes that the acts of the Japanese forces in the attack were carried out in complete disregard of the rights of the United States, taking American life and destroying American property, both public and private; and which states that in these circumstances the Government of the United States requests and expects of the Japanese Government a formally recorded expression of regret, and an undertaking to make complete and comprehensive indemnifications and an assurance that definite and specific steps have been taken which will insure that hereafter "American nationals, interests and property in China will not be subjected to attack by Japanese armed forces or unlawful interference by any Japanese authorities or forces whatsoever."

As regards the circumstances surrounding the present unfortunate incident, I desire to state that while it is concluded in Your Excellency's note that the incident resulted from disregard of American rights by Japanese armed forces, it was entirely due to a mistake, as has been described in my note above-mentioned. As a result of the thorough investigations that have been continued since then in all possible ways to find out the real causes, it has now been fully established that the attack was entirely unintentional.

I trust this has been made quite clear to Your Excellency through the detailed explanations made to Your Excellency on the 23rd instant by our naval and military authorities.

With reference to the first two items of the request mentioned in Your Excellency's note, namely, a recorded expression of regret, and indemnifications, no word needs to be added to what I have already said in my aforementioned note.

As regards the guarantee for the future, I wish to inform Your Excellency that the Japanese Navy issued without delay strict orders to "exercise the greatest caution in every area where war-ships and other vessels of America or any other third Power are present, in order to avoid a recurrence of a similar mistake, even at the sacrifice of a strategic advantage in attacking the Chinese troops."

Furthermore, rigid orders have been issued to the military, naval and Foreign Office authorities to pay, in the light of the present untoward incident, greater attention than hitherto to observance of the instructions that have been repeatedly given against infringement of, or unwarranted interference with, the rights and interests of the United States and other third Powers.

And the Japanese Government are studying carefully every possible means of achieving more effectively the above stated aims, while they have already taken steps to ascertain, in still closer contact with American authorities in China, the whereabouts of American interests and nationals, and to improve the means of communicating intelligence thereof speedily and effectively to the authorities on the spot.

Although the attack on the man-of-war and other vessels of the United States was due to a mistake as has been stated above, the Commander of the flying force concerned was immediately removed from his post and recalled, on the grounds of a failure to take the fullest measures of precaution. Moreover, the staff members of the fleet and commander of the flying squadron and all others responsible have been duly dealt with according to law.

The Japanese Government are thus endeavoring to preclude absolutely all possibility of the recurrence of incidents of a similar character. It need hardly be emphasized that, of all the above-mentioned measures taken by the Japanese Government, the recall of the Commander of the flying force has a significance of special importance.

It is my fervent hope that the fact will be fully appreciated by the Government of the United States that this drastic step has been taken solely because of the sincere desire of the Japanese Government to safeguard the rights and interests of the United States and other third Powers.

I avail, et cetera

KOKI HIROTA

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Text of the Reply by Secretary of State Hull to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo
for Delivery to Foreign Minister Hirota
December 25, 1937

The Government of the United States refers to its note of Dec. 14, the Japanese Government's note of Dec. 14 and the Japanese Government's note of Dec. 24 in regard to the attack by Japanese armed forces upon the U.S.S. Panay and three American merchant ships.

In this Government's note of December 14th it was stated that "the Government of the United States requests and expects of the Japanese Government a formally recorded expression of regret, and an undertaking to make complete and comprehensive indemnifications and an assurance that definite and specific steps have been taken which will insure that hereafter American nationals, interests and property in China will not be subjected to attack by Japanese armed forces or unlawful interference by any Japanese authorities or forces whatsoever."

In regard to the first two items of the request made by the Government of the United States, the Japanese Government's note of Dec. 24 reaffirms statements made in the Japanese Government's note of December 14th which read: "The Japanese Government regret most profoundly that it (present incident) has caused damages to the United States man-of-war and ships and casualties among those on board, and desire to present hereby sincere apologies. The Japanese Government will make indemnifications for all the losses and will deal appropriately with those responsible for the incident."

In regard to the third item of the request made by the Government of the United States, the Japanese Government's note of Dec. 24 recites certain definite and specific steps which the Japanese Government has taken to insure, in words of that note, "against infringement of, or unwarranted interference with, the rights and interests of the United States and other third Powers" and states that "the Japanese Government are thus endeavoring to preclude absolutely all possibility of the recurrence of incidents of a similar character."

The Government of the United States observed with satisfaction the promptness with which the Japanese Government in its note of December 14 admitted responsibility, expressed regret, and offered amends.

The Government of the United States regards the Japanese Government's account, as set forth in the Japanese Government's note of Dec. 24, of action taken by it as responsive to the request made by the Government of the United States in this Government's note of December 14.

With regard to the facts of the origins, causes and circumstances of the incident, the Japanese Government indicates in its note of December 24th the conclusion at which the Japanese Government, as a result of its investigation, has arrived. With regard to these same matters, the Government of the United States relies on the report of findings, of the court of inquiry of the United States Navy, copy of which has been communicated officially to the Japanese Government.

It is the earnest hope of the Government of the United States that the steps which the Japanese Government has taken will prove effective toward preventing any further attacks upon or unlawful interference by Japanese authorities or forces with American nationals, interests or property in China.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

APPENDIX A
The Covenant of the League of Nations
Articles 10, 11, 17

Article 10.

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Article 11.

1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

2. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threaten to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

Article 17.

1. In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purpose of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be necessary by the Council.

2. Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute an enquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

3. If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purpose of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.

4. If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purpose of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

APPENDIX B
The Nine Power Treaty
Articles 1 and 7

Article 1

The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;

(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

Article 7

The Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of the present Treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned.

APPENDIX C
The Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact)
Articles 1 and 2

Article 1


The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

Article 2

The High Contracting Powers agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Special Supplement to the "China Weekly Review"



WOMEN'S WAR WORK ISSUE

ELEVEN SPECIAL ARTICLES

•
ACTIVITIES OF CHINESE WOMEN'S CLUB

BY MRS. Z. D. ZAU

PENCIL SKETCHES BY SCHIFF

•
"INSIDE STORY" OF THE RED CROSS DRIVE

BY ADA LUM

RUSTLING SILKS AND PADDED COTTON

BY EARL H. LEAF

•
THERE CAN BE NO MIDWAY COMPROMISE

BY A CHINESE OBSERVER

WAR POEM CONTEST

SHANGHAI, CHINA, DECEMBER 25, 1937

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THE CHINA WEEKLY REVIEW Special Women's Work Supplement

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HAIL THE NEW CHINESE WOMAN

THE glory of the Chinese woman, as exemplified by her heroic deeds and unselfish devotion to duty while her beloved country fights for its very existence, will live forever in the history of the Chinese nation.

From far and near have come reports telling of the courage and sacrifices displayed by Chinese womanhood. In the fastnesses of the Shansi mountains, Chinese girls fight side by side with their menfolk in guerilla warfare against the invading Japanese troops and Mongol puppets; stolid peasant women carry heavy loads of foods and supplies from the immediate rear to the soldiers on the front lines; a girl scout smuggles the Chinese flag and some dainties to the gallant "Lost Battalion" in Chapei; dainty society women brave death or maiming for life traveling through raining bombs and bursting shells to bring clothing and comforts to Chinese troops in Chapei, Soochow and elsewhere; shy Chinese maidens invade the streets of the International Settlement to button-hole strangers for Red Cross donations; Chinese women doctors and nurses remain at their

posts while shot and shell reduce their quarters to masses of ruins.

The pages of this supplement to the *China Weekly Review* will attempt to tell the reader about some of the activities of Chinese women, young and old, which took place while Shanghai was the theater of war, and now when the front lines have moved far away.

The emancipation of Chinese women only began about twenty years ago when they first threw off the dead weight of centuries-old domestic suppression and participated in the women's rights movement. Chinese girls were in the forefront of the student movement against the decrepit Manchu Throne and once again took a leading part in the military and political struggle to preserve the nation from the clutches of the Chinese militarists. The fight against feudalism ended in victory and now they are sacrificing their lives, homes, money and bending all their talent and zeal towards national salvation in the present fight against foreign imperialism.

Tiao Chan for centuries has been revered in story and song as the paragon of women's patriotism—but there are many Tiao Chans in the present conflict. From homes, clubs, schools, cabarets, farmhouses, churches, social welfare organizations, sing-song houses, theaters, concert halls, factories, movie studios, business offices and elsewhere, Chinese women have poured forth to join the struggle. Women and young girls have been "killed in action" on the battlefields, beside operating tables in hospitals and cots in first aid stations, and on Red Cross ambulances, while serving their country with daring and honor.

The change in the military situation and withdrawal of the Chinese troops from Shanghai has compelled changes in the work undertaken by the women of Shanghai. They have lost contact with the soldiers and are no longer permitted to engage in patriotic activities in the International Settlement or French Concession.

The energy and zeal of the Chinese women in Shanghai has now found an outlet in Red Cross drives and refugee work here, while their sisters in the interior are continuing to write glorious history.

FIRST SUPPLEMENT SOLD OUT

The first supplement of *China At War*, published with the December Fourth issue of the *China Weekly Review* was devoted chiefly to the activities of the International Red Cross.

The next issue will be a special number on China's Youth. As all copies of the first supplement were sold out, it is recommended that those wishing extra copies of this issue should obtain them from the Business Office of the *China Weekly Review*, 160 Avenue Edward VII, Shanghai, at a cost of 10 cents each.

CHINESE WOMEN PLAY THEIR PART

By Hsu Wei-sze

THE present conflict with Japan has proved the mettle of Chinese women of today. In Shanghai, although they did not parade the streets and indulge in mass meetings and denunciations, they were doing their share towards the country's defence. Many foreigners failing, to find them in places of amusement, thought they had fled to safer parts of the land. Instead, they were busily engaged night and day for the comfort and relief of both soldiers and refugees.

In the emergency hospitals, carefully reared girls served as volunteer nurses. The soldiers and doctors have only praise for their competence. When there were not enough beds, they gladly surrendered theirs to make the soldiers comfortable, and slept on the floor. On night duty in the early weeks of the defence, with stray bombs, air raids and misdirected shells ever-present menaces, they went about their duties calmly, unheeding the explosions bursting near the unit.

Qualified women doctors were mainly engaged in caring for expectant mothers and their babies. These were brought to an emergency maternity hospital established by the members of the Margaret Williamson Hospital in a primary school building in Tifeng Road. Many babies were born in the streets, or in refugee camps. Often the mothers died, or the babies died and the mothers were dangerously ill as the result of flight, fear and malnutrition. Besides caring for the mothers and babies, every effort was made to find lost members and reunite families separated during wild flight from their homes.

Prominent women leaders, noted for social activities, undertook the training of emergency nurses, and graduated many classes of girls to serve either in hospitals in Shanghai or further inland at military units, or behind the actual fighting lines. Refugee women were trained by the W.C.T.U. of China as mothers' helpers. This organization procured work for them, enabling them to pay for their own keep. Extra money earned was for the women themselves, but they insisted on turning most of it over to the organization to help other refugees. Also under this organization, sewing women were trained to remake garments from old, and simple tailoring. People wanting sewing done paid the W.C.T.U. a nominal sum, which was credited to the women sewers. They also were thus taught a trade for future use, and enabled to pay for their keep, and still have money left over to help others.

It is significant that all organizations have found the poor people who have been helped anxious to do their share for others less fortunately placed.

Under the leadership of Miss Hu Lan-shih, a noted woman writer, companies of industrial girls were formed to work as interpreters and helpers to farmers and soldiers in the fighting lines. Working just behind the scenes of actual conflict, these girls gave aid to the farm folk, helping them when sick, and interpreting for them to the soldiers in the area. This was most important, as most of the soldiers were from many other parts of China, and unable to explain their needs to the farmers. These girls also helped the medical corps when possible as they had excellent first-aid training.

The Y.W.C.A. headquarters was a hive of activity, making garments for refugees, and co-operating with the Chinese Women's Club in the establishing of a refugee

None Too Young or Old To Aid Soldiers, Refugees

camp principally for women and children. Under their system, schooling for children and adults, and practical training was given to inhabitants of their camp.

Many women established emergency hospitals. They collected donations from personal friends, and interested volunteers to serve in the hospitals. They took over personal superintendence, both day and night. Usually, several friends joined together to work shifts, so that one responsible woman was on duty every hour both day and night. Visitors to these units remarked on the excellent housekeeping arrangements, attention to detail in comforts for the wounded men, and absence of waste. Personal interest in every patient in these hospitals was evident, and the understanding between these society women and the rough ordinary soldiers was a revelation to outsiders.

Other women spent their time visiting and inspecting carefully all hospitals in both foreign areas. If conditions were not satisfactory, help was given, or the facts were reported to the Chinese Medical Association, which then took steps to remedy the situation. Busy doctors and superintendents were enabled to reach sources of supplies rapidly in an emergency, without formality or delay. Much of the buying of supplies was left to competent women to handle. There was no waste.

Some paid regular visits to the hospitals to write letters to the families of the wounded. Others were serving at refugee camps. Thousands more were busily engaged the whole time sewing on sheets, padded clothes, pyjamas, and making other medical necessities. Whole families worked together, supplying much of the cloth out of their own funds, and making up hundreds of sheets, thousands of bandages and gauze dressings, and dozens of cotton padded vests for the soldiers, civilian victims of bombings, and other refugees. All have shown a marked distaste for publicity of any kind.

Women with friends abroad wrote personal letters, explaining the actual state of things in China, and about Shanghai particularly, and asking for help for the hundreds of thousands of refugees. In response to this appeal, large funds have been raised abroad, and the money remitted to Shanghai for extension of relief work.

Women's sympathy has been invaluable in bridging the gap which formerly lay between common soldiers and the educated Chinese people. For the first time in China's history, the common soldier is appreciated, and taken care of. There have been innumerable personal expressions of gratitude by these men, and the news, carried back to the fighting lines, had vast influence on the morale of the defenders.

The Girl Guides, sister organization to the Boy Scouts, have also rendered valuable services in first aid work. Although not encouraged to serve behind the lines with the Scouts, the Guides have done their share in collecting money for comforts for the men, and warm clothing for the children and refugees. They and the Scouts together have earned an unimpeachable reputation for honesty. Theirs is the spirit of the new race of Chinese women—the spirit which has lain dormant or undisclosed for centuries, and is now showing openly. For the next generation, there is no fear.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHINESE WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS AID COUNTRY IN ACTIVE WORK BEHIND LINES

By Lin Yin-feng

SHANGHAI was fortunate in having large Chinese women's organizations and clubs which, at the first sign of hostilities, were able to gather their resources together, and call on every member to do their share of relief work. About 28 women's organizations were working feverishly, and are still continuing their efforts. The nature of relief work has changed from care and comforts for wounded soldiers and civilians to care, housing and clothing of refugees.

Within three days, the first Red Cross Emergency Hospital on Kiaochow Road was opened, and the initial furnishing and emergency supplies were supplied by the Chinese Women's Club, one of the most active and prominent women's organizations in Shanghai.

The Young Women's Christian Association and the Women's Christian Temperance Union of China were equally active. An enormous amount of effort and organization in every case brought forth excellent results. The Y.M.C.A. headquarters on Bubbling Well Road were turned into a hive of industry. Sewing machines were brought into the large auditorium downstairs, and the whirr of busy machines—the snip snip of scissors and the hum of constant activity took possession of the place.

First attention was given the wounded soldiers. More than 2000 suits of pyjamas and 2500 cotton padded vests for cold weather were made. Tens of thousands of bandages were made from bolts of material, and pounds of cotton wool were made into tiny balls for medical use. Bolts of gauze were cut and folded into neat squares for dressings, and other medical supplies were collected and distributed to various emergency and civilian hospitals. Biscuits, candy, fruit, flour, hats, socks, shoes and other comforts and necessities were also gathered and distributed.

A refugee camp housing 500 persons was established with the co-operation of the Chinese Women's Club, and here 8054 pieces of clothing and numerous coverings were distributed. Sixteen outside organizations helped contribute to the Y.W.C.A. projects. Another camp is just opening with 300 people.

With the co-operation of the Y.M.C.A. students were given scholarships to the value of \$755.00. Students living at the Y.W.C.A. hostel were given a special reduction of \$24.00 monthly. Sixty girls from the Industrial section were housed free of charge at the first refugee camp in return for overseeing and teaching the refugees.

The Y.W.C.A. also participated in the women's section of the Liberty Bond drive, and sold approximately \$15,000.00 worth of bonds. Chinese women in Shanghai, under the leadership of Madame H. H. Kung were campaigning to raise \$1,000,000.00 for this fund.

The W.C.T.U. of China is under the chairmanship of Mrs. Herman Liu, wife of the principal of Shanghai University. They have conducted three classes in nursing in addition to other relief activities, and trained refugee women and girls as mothers' helpers. Emergency hospitals were visited to comfort the wounded. Comfort bags were made up and distributed throughout the hostilities, as was the collection and distribution of clothes to refugees.

Women, taught to sew and tailor, made 2000 padded cotton vests, and a department was formed for remaking old garments for children. A small fee was charged for

No Task Too Small or Big For Patriotic Ladies Here

this service, and the women were able to pay for their food and keep, with a small sum over for themselves.

This organization also collaborated in the drive for Liberty Bonds, and many rings, ornaments and other gold and silver articles were given into the melting pot to buy bonds.

The most recent activity of the W.C.T.U. was the charity bazaar held last Sunday, which other women's organizations also took active part in running. The Sun Company donated space and many saleable goods. The money realized by the sale will be used to start another refugee camp and finance other charitable projects.

With all these activities, Chinese women had little time left for amusements. Wherever they went, members of the C.W.C. carried bags of knitting along, and worked as they talked at meetings, or discussed relief problems with friends. This was the first club to begin the gigantic task of knitting sweaters for the soldiers, and other clubs speedily took up the work. With so many willing hands working, the task was not so formidable, and many of the officers were provided with handmade sweaters.

Mah-jongg parties, formerly one of the chief occupations of most society women, were turned into work parties instead. Women met together as before, but carried bags of knitting, or were busily engaged tearing and rolling bandages, or cutting and folding gauze squares instead of shuffling and piling mah jongg tiles.

The young set took up the work in earnest also. They continued to have parties, but instead of dancing at hotels, they held parties in various homes. The young men spent their money for bandage and gauze material, and cut and tore the stuff into proper lengths. The girls rolled bandages and folded gauze, often enlisting the men for actual rolling and folding also. Not a minute was wasted.

Besides the volunteers serving in emergency hospitals, other women were busy running hospitals and refugee camps. The industrial girls, thrown out of

BUSY AND ACTIVE FINGERS



Tea parties and mah-jongg were completely forgotten by Chinese women during the hostilities at Shanghai as they joined in energetic work to aid Chinese soldiers. Above are seen two members of the Chinese Women's Club sewing soldiers' vests, and they are being assisted by the foreign lady at the right. China Photo Service

WOMEN HELP SOLDIERS



The activities of Chinese women during the hostilities did not restrict their movements to behind-the-lines work. Members of the Chinese Women's Club, Mrs. Elsie Soong and Mrs. "Newsreel" Wong are shown above distributing winter clothing to the Chinese troops on the Chapei front a few weeks ago. China Photo Service

Several emergency hospitals were opened and superintended by women. Several of Shanghai's most prominent Chinese women planned and collected funds for the Red Cross Emergency Hospital No. 24 on Jessfield Road. This unit is considered one of the best in the city. The soldiers are treated more like children than fighting men. Their whims are humored, and their small possessions are guarded carefully and kept for them. There are always students available to write letters home to their families, and plenty of good food is supplied. Different soldiers like different kinds of rice. Very well, declared Mrs. C. F. Liu, Mrs. S. H. Tong and Miss Li Ya-ching, who are in control, the soldiers will be given rice cooked three different ways—hard, soft, and as rice soup.

The hospital equipment, which is good for an emergency unit, was begged or borrowed from friends. Foreign and Chinese doctors and nurses donate their time, and the patients receive the finest attention. One could feel the contentment in the place—even when dozens of fresh cases—serious ones—were admitted daily, and many men were dying despite all the efforts of the medical staff to save them.

This is but one instance. There are many more. Girl Guides took their places alongside the Boy Scouts in those first terrible days of bombings in the settlement, concession and at the South Station. They stood guard at the hospital gates, or helped the doctors with first aid dressings—nor did they shrink from sights which haunt veteran practitioners yet.

Until things were properly organized, many were on duty twelve hours a day, and then had to turn out in emergencies and dress new wounds.

The existing organizations of these associations and clubs enabled them to do a vast amount of fine work with little notice and minimum waste of time and energy. This great emergency has shown the people of Shanghai the value of competent organization, and the need for clubs to give practical training in working together, and functioning as a whole, and not only as individuals.

Considering the vastness of the work undertaken, and the efficiency and speed with which tasks were completed, these women's clubs have performed incredible amounts of work. The women in Shanghai have proved themselves more than "flower vases"—only capable of having tea parties, and acting as charming hostesses. They have not been seen dancing at the big hotels because they had other work to do. They dance only when there is no greater necessity.

employment by closure of the big cotton and silk mills, were used to teach the children and refugees rudimentary lessons. The women's housekeeping both at emergency hospitals and at refugee camps was above reproach, and several were enlisted to help the Chinese Medical Association in buying of materials.

Mrs. Elsie Lee Soong, one of the most adventurous women, and a member of the Chinese Women's Club, personally supervised a large consignment of comforts sent to soldiers in the fighting lines just at the back of the Lotien sector. The goods occupied a large truck, lent for the occasion by Madame Kung, and Mrs. Soong traveled with the truck saw that the comforts were actually delivered to the troops.

Thousands of bandages, medical supplies, cigarettes, biscuits, cotton padded vests and knitted sweaters made up the consignment. Mrs. Soong left with the truck just after dark, and made the long hazardous trip to the office of the commander of the division receiving the goods. Three times the occupants of the truck had to dive for shelter hastily, as air-planes overhead seemed to sight the truck. Mrs. Soong was glad she had worn riding breeches and leather riding boots. A graceful long Chinese gown would have hampered her escape.

The officers of the division received her joyfully. They were impressed by the courage of a Chinese woman in coming to the front, where shells were bursting nearby all the time she was talking with them. The soldiers were gladdened by the comforts they received, and by the knowledge that a Chinese woman had dared the perilous journey to deliver them safely.

Following this trip, Mrs. Soong and Mrs. H. S. Wong, wife of "Newsreel" Wong visited the troops in Chapei to deliver more cigarettes, biscuits, bandages and padded vests to the troops there. Fame of the knitted sweaters spread rapidly among the troops, and officers of several divisions sent in requests to the C.W.C. headquarters for more sweaters. The club purchased several hundred pounds of wool, and started knitting furiously.

WAR TIME SERVICES OF Y. W. C. A.

By Lydia Johnson

A CROSS-SECTION of the woman and girl-life of the community—shared in by school girls, factory girls, business girls, students, home women, professional women, the educated and uneducated, the rich and the poor, all united in a common purpose, to develop character and to serve society—that is the picture of the Young Women's Christian Associations in most of the large cities and a growing number of rural centers in China.

And what are they doing in these unprecedented times? Twelve cities in which there are Y.W.C.A.'s, and at least two rural centers, have had, or are experiencing the effects of war at first-hand. Two City Associations and two rural centers have had to close temporarily and evacuate with the populace. But from all over the country come reports of how Y.W.C.A. women are carrying on, and how they have risen to emergencies and found the best ways to render the maximum of service. The Associations are the rallying point for mobilizing woman-power to meet the pressing needs that have come with war, and for recruiting volunteer workers for all kinds of community service. Y.W.C.A. women are working as volunteer aides in hospitals, as directors and assistants in refugee camps, as teachers for refugee children; Y.W.C.A. buildings are hives of activity for all kinds of emergency relief projects; Y.W.C.A. Hostels are full to overflowing with girls.

The outbreak of hostilities found hospitals inadequately equipped to handle the tremendous number of casualties, civilian and military which poured in upon them. Bandages, sheets, hospital garments, bedding, were woefully lacking in sufficient number, and had to be provided in huge quantities. A call went out from Y.W.C.A. headquarters for 20,000 suits of hospital pajamas, and immediately Y.W.C.A.'s all over the country, even in far-off Chengtu, organized committees, solicited or purchased cloth, borrowed sewing-machines, and set themselves to work to fill the need. 300 here, 500 there, 1000 there, and in a few weeks the task was done. From local hospitals came calls for sheets and bandages, and the meeting rooms and class rooms of City Associations turned into workshops, as women and girls cut cloth, stitched and sewed, rolled bandages. Girls came for educational classes or for club meetings, it is true, but remained to take a hand in the work. In Wuchang it was discovered that wounded soldiers who were being shipped through to military hospitals farther inland, needed dressings for their wounds or mats to lie on for the long train journey, and so Y.W.C.A. Committees were detailed to meet all incoming contingents and to minister such comfort and aid as was possible. In Shanghai groups of unemployed factory girls volunteered to wash the mangled clothing of the wounded, a service which the already overloaded hospital staffs could not undertake; some went out with the trucks at night to pick up the wounded from the battlefields.

First Aid.

The bombing disasters which inaugurated the war provided a tremendous stimulus to first-aid classes, and courses were given in practically all the Y.W.C.A.'s of China, attended by many hundreds of people. Lectures on air-defense, particularly in relation to what the ordinary citizen might do as precautionary measures, have also been largely attended. Many of the women and girls taking the first-aid courses have become volunteer aides in hospitals, and others are helping in clinics for refugees.

Refugees

Some cities have had large inundations of refugees, and here again the Y.W.C.A. has co-operated in meeting the needs. In Central China, especially in Changsha, the Wu-Han cities, Chungking, students in great numbers have flocked in because of the removal of their schools to these and other inland centers. In these cities the Y.W.C.A. Hostels are full to overflowing with women students; in Changsha additional hostel quarters have been opened for this purpose. Trained student secretaries are functioning in these centers, to help where and when necessary, and the Y.W.C.A. has a share in administering Student Relief Funds.

From Canton to Chengtu, Young Women Aid Country

Destitute refugees are another problem, notably in the larger cities, and here also the Y.W.C.A. has a share in relieving the needs, either alone or in co-operation with other organizations—in providing housing, collecting and distributing clothing and bedding, providing milk for babies, sending volunteer teachers to help in the educational programs of the camps, managing refugee clinics. In Tientsin the Y.W.C.A. took as its special responsibility the needs of some 300 boat families living on the canals, and is also helping provide for numbers of unemployed factory girls.

In Shanghai the Refugee Camp for Women and Children operated by the Y.W.C.A. has taken care of more than 500 refugees. In addition to the first requisites of food and shelter, many special features combined to make this Camp one of the best in the city. Under expert supervision, old clothing was re-made by the women into suitable garments for themselves and their children, and they likewise made padded cotton quilts, so that with the coming of cold weather each family was outfitted with necessary clothing and bedding. The children had classes each day, taught by volunteer teachers, as well as singing, dramatics and regular play hours. Medical attention was available when needed; re-union of broken families was effected; a number of women were placed in jobs as house-servants and amahs in private Chinese families.

Unemployed Women's Refugee Camp

The Shanghai Y.W.C.A. is continuing this type of service in a more specialized form, in an "Unemployed Chinese Women's Refugee Camp" recently opened. It has accommodation for 300, chiefly single girls, but married women without male support are



Enthusiastic volunteers in the just concluded Red Cross Drive shot on Bubbling Well Road. China Photo Service

also received, with their children. The emphasis is placed upon training these women in various occupations, and to place them in jobs where they can be self-maintaining. With this in mind, all the work of the Camp, cooking, cleaning, housekeeping, is being done by the girls and women themselves. There are courses which will fit them for work as amahs—washing and ironing, sewing, knitting; instruction in sanitation and hygiene; a course in the care of children, using the children in the Camp for "demonstration" purposes. Already a request has come from an employer who wants skilled embroiderers, and girls are being trained in this work. An employment placing service will function to assist girls in finding jobs.

Regular Program Activities

In spite of, and along with, all these emergency projects, the Y.W.C.A. is continuing, in a large measure, its regular program of educational classes, social gatherings, mothers' clubs, school girl activities, etc. The Employment Bureau in Shanghai has a large task in endeavoring to find jobs for the hundreds of unemployed foreign women. Tientsin is conducting a free day-school for underprivileged children. Chefoo runs an excellent kindergarten, and so on.

A Secretary in one of the war-torn cities wrote in recently: "The Association here will function as long as it is humanly and sanely possible!" And that is the spirit in which the Y.W.C.A. in China is carrying on in its service to girls and women!

SAGA OF THE SOONG SISTERS


By Ho Ju-yu

THE Saga of the Soong Sisters has been told countless times during these past formative years of the Chinese Republic by all manner of person from the high-priced writers in magazines with world-wide circulations to the lowly story-teller vagabonding from village to village in the Chinese hinterland.

The story of this remarkable family need not be gilded with powerful adjectives and fancy phrases to make it worth the telling and retelling, for only the simple truth is sufficient to make a thrilling story. Nowhere else in the world do three sisters hold such exalted positions in the councils of a nation. The influence they have achieved is not due to the offices held by their famous husbands, but to their own strength and wisdom.

The three women, Mme. H. H. Kung, nee Soong, Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, nee Soong Mei-ling, and Mme. Sun Yat-sen, nee Soong Ching-ling, have made their mark in history. Pearl Buck, in a recent issue of Cosmopolitan, attempted to summarize and evaluate the lives of the Soong sisters, at the same time admitting that a book should be written about them as a writer could not do justice to the subject in the brief confines of a magazine article.

Of Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Pearl Buck writes:



One of the young and pretty volunteers, Miss Beatrice Lee, who assisted in the recent Red Cross Drive by collecting funds. China Photo Service

They Stand in the Forefront of Chinese Women's Movement

"The youngest of the three sisters is Soong Mei-ling, better known as Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

"There were many rumors about Mei-ling. She was a handsome girl, and she is a handsome woman. . . . Popular rumor betrothed Soong Mei-ling to this man and to that.

"But no one was prepared for the announcement of her engagement to Chiang Kai-shek. In the first place, Chiang Kai-shek was already long married. He was the most powerful figure in new China.

"It was impossible to imagine the beautiful and exquisite Mei-ling married to Chiang Kai-shek. When her betrothal was announced, therefore, everyone said Soong Mei-ling was marrying for power.

"So the marriage began. It has been perhaps the most successful of the marriages the sisters have made, and this youngest of the three is the most powerful, the most respected woman in China.

"Madame Chiang, like her sisters, has chosen to work with and through her husband. But this is not to say that she has not made a tremendous personal contribution to her times. She has accomplished far more than she could have done had she not married Chiang Kai-shek. He is a very different man from the one she married. She has educated him, given him knowledge and culture. . . .

"In every conference with foreign envoys she it is who translates. The envoy has no means of knowing what color she puts upon what is said. She has often been, therefore, the intermediary between China, and the foreign powers, and has had an influence which it is impossible to overestimate.

"But for myself, I would trust her judgment and her character. . . ."

Of Madame Sun Yat-sen, Miss Buck writes:—

"Madame Sun Yat-sen, the second sister, is an entirely different person. If Madame Kung's life has been practical, that of Madame Sun has been pure romance. She is a beautiful woman.

"The story of Madame Sun's early life is well enough known. Young, ardent, alight with idealism, she early dedicated herself to Sun Yat-sen and his cause. She served him as his secretary. Then, because he loved her and she loved him, they were married. It meant divorcing the faithful simple woman who was his first wife.

"Together, Sun Yat-sen and Soong Ching-ling knew they could achieve what separately they could not. And the older wife, good and simple as she was, was always bewildered by her brilliant, daring husband.

"It was a rare marriage. A new strength and clarity seemed to come into Sun Yat-sen. The revolution took shape.

"His young wife never left him. She worked with him, her brilliant mind feeding his, making him far greater than he really was. Then, just as the revolution was mounting to crisis, he died of cancer.

"When he was gone she might have tried to step into his place. So high was the feeling of devotion of the people toward Sun Yat-sen when he died that his wife might have been swept on it to a position few women in the world have ever had. But that was not her way. . . ."

"Madame Sun is not on friendly terms any more with her brother-in-law, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. As Pearl Buck says in her excellent article (which should be read in its entirety): "She believes that the people in the present government have betrayed Sun Yat-sen and the revolution. She is in closer touch with the Communist organizations—which, incidentally, Generalissimo Chiang himself appealed for aid to stem the Japanese advance."

Of Madame H. H. Kung, Miss Buck writes:—

"She is an active, strong-bodied woman, rather short, and the least beautiful of the three sisters. Her profile is concave, the forehead and chin prominent, the nose somewhat insignificant, the cheeks flat, the face rather wide. But it is a strong and powerful face.

"It is to be seen that her ability is executive. She is a good manager, particularly of money affairs. She would have been a good banker. Indeed, it is said that she has been an important figure in the Shanghai stock exchange.

"There was a good deal of popular resentment against her at one time because she was too powerful. She then cleverly withdrew enough to satisfy critics and escape further public notice. That is one of the secrets of the power which she, and other Chinese women, wield in the affairs of life. They are willing to forfeit public notice and recognition in order to hold their power. . . ."

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE "INSIDE STORY" OF THE RED CROSS DRIVE

By Ada Lum

THE Shanghai International Red Cross solicitation for funds ended today! The Red Cross Girls and Girl Guides, in their attractive uniforms, have sold their last badge and solicited their last donation for this drive. The excellent results they have achieved leaves no doubt that these willing young workers will be called upon at some future date to repeat their fine performance.

Originally, it was planned to have some foreign and Chinese women soliciting for donations at the theaters and in the big hotels. Schoolgirls were not considered, although I felt that they would be more suited for the work. Late on Thursday, only seven Chinese women and about 20 foreign volunteers were ready to don uniforms and push the campaign.

Mrs. W. Tornroth had worked in the American Red Cross drive during the Great War, and enthused the committee with her idea of publicising the campaign through the girls in uniform. But hundreds of girls were needed—Chinese girls—she asserted. Society girls were bashful about the idea, and we were in despair.

That afternoon, Mrs. Tornroth, some of her friends, and a foreign news correspondent gathered to discuss the situation. I was the only Chinese present. Just then, two of the women who had been fitted for uniforms came in to announce that they would be unable to participate in the drive.

They left, and the assembly turned with one accord on me in violent denunciation. There went the reason for China's failure as a nation! The upper classes still insisted on clinging to their class superiority. Perhaps they would dole out a little money, but they would never consider working to help the poor.

In vain I insisted that they were working, that they were doing everything to help both the poor and the soldiers. They retorted that they saw no evidence of a major war going on in Shanghai. In Japan, every woman walked along the street sewing or knitting. No one could pass a Japanese woman without putting at least a sen in the little tin each one carries. "I've written home to say that this is Japan fighting the Chinese army," the correspondent flung in accusation at me.

"You've got to make every soul in this town know there's a war going on. It isn't enough for them to work at home, or under cover. You've got to have publicity. You'll never collect any money otherwise," said Miss F. Donaldson. They decided that the drive would be lucky to make \$30,000.

"Get enough girls in Red Cross uniforms, and you'll still put it over," cried Mrs. Tornroth. "How many?" I was told to get 400 girls, and they would see they all got uniforms.

If the success of the drive—of raising money to house and feed the pitiful, lost waifs who huddle in every lane and doorway—depended on getting girls to canvass Shanghai, we had to have girls. The only place where we could get such numbers quickly would be the big schools, and Girl Guides. High school girls would be young, energetic and well mannered, besides being clever at languages. Girl Guides were already known for their fine work during actual hostilities.

What was the matter with China?
 The Foreigners Asked; The Reply
 Came In an Unexpected Way.



This young girl, daughter of one of the wealthier families, enjoyed the service she rendered during the recent Red Cross Drive. *China Photo Service*

I appealed first to the Girl Guides through the twin organization of Boy Scouts. They promised to get 50 Guides to help. Next appeals were made to the principals of the four leading schools S.M.C. Secondary School, Besant School and Mary Farnham through Mrs. Z. D. Tan. All these were most encouraging, but decided I should have to ask the girls' co-operation personally.

Beginning early Saturday morning, I visited each school, and also talked with the Girl Guides. I told them what foreigners thought about our attitude towards the war, and poor people. I asked them to let me show the world that Chinese will help their own people.

Their eager response was stimulating. "Tell us what to do and we'll do it." I had 450 volunteers, and later refused offers of several hundred more because there were not enough uniforms.

That night I was able to telephone Mrs. Arthur N. Young and Mrs. Tornroth to have 400 uniforms

ready for the girls by Wednesday. Mrs. Tornroth's tailors worked every night until midnight preparing crosses and scarfs. On Wednesday morning, before nine o'clock, the first squads of girls were in the Shanghai streets selling badges and receiving donations.

The badge makers could not turn out quantities fast enough, so we gave them receipts to be changed for badges later on. Then the receipt books gave out and had to be reprinted twice.

I had told the girls that each squad must bring in \$100 or they couldn't face me. There was no doubt about their ability. Most of the tins contained well over \$100, and one of the Girl Guide's tins contained \$387.41. Many of the tins came in with more than \$300—so fast that four or five people were constantly kept busy counting the contents of the tins.

There was money everywhere. We counted on tables, on couches, and in desperation emptied tins on the floor when there was no other room left. There were still more tins being counted downstairs in the shop. For nights we dreamed about money—coppers, cents, dimes, dollars and ten dollar bills.

The first day we were surprised to have \$1581.40. The following day, when a larger number of girls were soliciting, we counted in \$5414.94. The Japanese soldiers' parade next day seriously halted the drive, and it was not until Monday that the girls were able to turn out in force again. Many squads continued to solicit even during those days, and there was literally no place where they did not go. Churches, cabarets, theaters and all other places where money could be were visited successfully.

Monday's receipts were a record. \$7178.36 was brought in from the tins, and we were counting until late at night. By this time, a dozen people, including two trained cashiers from the Central Bank, had been called in to help.

There was no stopping the girls. The mistresses had to plan the campaign, sending each class out in turn, but the girls wanted to go every day. They were enthused about the reception they got from even the coolies in the street. They were often stopped by working people, and asked what it was all about. Watchmen, carpenters, coolies, and even a beggar girl—all contributed their mite without being asked.

The coppers and cents in the tins, often amounting to \$2 or more, represented self sacrifice of many poor people. It was the willingness of these donors that fired the girls' imagination, and spurred them on to greater efforts.

Papers gave fine publicity to the girls in their attractive costumes—the Red Cross Girls in white scarfs and red crosses on forehead and breast, and the Guides in their trim working uniforms, and red cross armbands. Foreigners and Chinese, public and news correspondents agreed heartily "It's a grand show."

A final accounting showed:

December 1	...	1,581.40
" 2	...	5,414.94
" 3	...	1,842.40
" 4 & 5	...	2,472.05
" 6	...	7,178.36
" 7	...	3,301.46
" 8	...	2,774.60
" 9	...	1,573.53
" 10	...	466.35
" 11	...	2,281.39
		\$28,886.48

Unfortunately, on December 8, 9 and 10 all schools were having mid-term examinations, and very few students could go out collecting. Even so, the total receipts of the tins was half the entire receipts of the campaign.

(Continued on page 9)



Girl Guides of the S.M.C. Secondary School assisting under the leadership of Miss Ada Lum in the collection of funds during the recent Red Cross drive. *China Photo Service*

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The badge makers could not turn out quantities fast enough, so we gave them receipts to be changed for badges later on. Then the receipt books gave out and had to be reprinted twice.

I had told the girls that each squad must bring in \$100 or they couldn't face me. There was no doubt about their ability. Most of the tins contained well over \$100, and one of the Girl Guide's tins contained \$387.41. Many of the tins came in with more than \$300—so fast that four or five people were constantly kept busy counting the contents of the tins.

There was money everywhere. We counted on tables, on couches, and in desperation emptied tins on the floor when there was no other room left. There were still more tins being counted downstairs in the shop. For nights we dreamed about money—coppers, cents, dimes, dollars and ten dollar bills.

The first day we were surprised to have \$1581.40. The following day, when a larger number of girls were soliciting, we counted in \$5414.94. The Japanese soldiers' parade next day seriously halted the drive, and it was not until Monday that the girls were able to turn out in force again. Many squads continued to solicit even during those days, and there was literally no place where they did not go. Churches, cabarets, theaters and all other places where money could be were visited successfully.

Monday's receipts were a record. \$7178.36 was brought in from the tins, and we were counting until late at night. By this time, a dozen people, including two trained cashiers from the Central Bank, had been called in to help.

There was no stopping the girls. The mistresses had to plan the campaign, sending each class out in turn, but the girls wanted to go every day. They were enthused about the reception they got from even the coolies in the street. They were often stopped by working people, and asked what it was all about. Watchmen, carpenters, coolies, and even a beggar girl—all contributed their mite without being asked.

The coppers and cents in the tins, often amounting to \$2 or more, represented self-sacrifice of many poor people. It was the willingness of these donors that fired the girls' imagination, and spurred them on to greater efforts.

Papers gave fine publicity to the girls in their attractive costumes—the Red Cross Girls in white scarfs and red crosses on forehead and breast, and the Guides in their trim working uniforms, and red cross armbands. Foreigners and Chinese, public and news correspondents agreed heartily "It's a grand show."

A final accounting showed:

December 1	...	1,581.40
" 2	...	5,414.94
" 3	...	1,842.40
" 4 & 5...	...	2,472.05
" 6	...	7,178.36
" 7	...	3,301.46
" 8	...	2,774.60
" 9	...	1,573.53
" 10	...	466.35
" 11	...	2,281.39
		\$28,886.48

Unfortunately, on December 8, 9 and 10 all schools were having mid-term examinations, and very few students could go out collecting. Even so, the total receipts of the tins was half the entire receipts of the campaign.

(Continued on page 9)



Girl Guides of the S.M.C. Secondary School assisting under the leadership of Miss Ada Lum in the collection of funds during the recent Red Cross drive. China Photo Service

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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SPECIAL WOMEN'S WORK SUPPLEMENT

December 25, 1937

RUSTLING SILKS AND PADDED COTTON

By Earl H. Leaf

SOME years ago a very popular syndicated cartoon entitled "Impossible Situations" provided daily amusement for American newspaper readers. While designed chiefly as humor, the artist frequently conveyed some highly thought provoking message to the readers.

Just such an impossible situation comes to my mind now as, in a retrospective mood, I jot down brief notes on Chinese women leaders whose personalities and careers I have studied, from near or far, during the past several years.

The situation I have in mind is an Afternoon Tea party at, say, the luxurious and exclusive Park Hotel in Shanghai, attended by Mlles. Soong Mei-ling, Soong Ching-ling, Soong Ai-ling, Kang Ke-ch'ing, Ho Tze-chun and Chiang Ping-tze.

On another page of this supplement Miss Ho Ju-yu has quoted Pearl Buck's review of the unusual personalities and achievements of the Soong sisters. The last three ladies are perhaps not so well known to the outside world, although their careers are none the less remarkable. They can be more easily identified by calling them Mrs. Chu Teh, wife of the "Red Napoleon," Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army (ex-Reds), Mrs. Mao Tse-tung, wife of the Chief of the Soviet Military Council, and Miss Ting Ling, China's foremost girl writer.

It would be a strange tea party: the exquisite Soong sisters, products of generations of aristocratic breeding in a family of merchant princes, and the trio of Communist women, Mrs. Mao Tse-tung, ex-farm girl and daughter of a petty hsien official in Kiangsi, Mrs. Chu Teh, ex-kitchen slave, Miss Ting Ling, who lost a husband and a lover before firing squads during various Kuomintang "campaigns against cultural banditry" and herself suffered long imprisonment for her leftist writings.

The Soongs in rustling silks or rich velvets, the Red trio in padded, ill-fitting army uniforms, facing across the tea table, weighing, judging, studying each other. Polite tea-time chatter would find no place in the conversation of these six famous women, each a genius in her own way. Perhaps they could not leap the gulf of social and economic differences that lie between them, although Soong Ching-ling would be at equal ease on either side of the table. Hereditarily she would belong with her sisters, intellectually she would be with the others.

However, there would be no need of defining social strata, economic levels or other artificial standards for the mind of each of those present would quickly rise above and beyond such artificialities to a higher realm of plan and thought. Now, they would realize, they are making common cause against a common enemy.

The smooth, self-assured Mme. Kung; the dynamic, trigger-thinking Mme. Chiang; the ardent, beautiful Mme. Sun; the shy, gallant Mme. Mao; the emotional Ting Ling and her Mona Lisa smile; the active, brilliant Mme. Chu Teh—ah, what a tea party and what a congress of female leadership! They fought and they hated for years but old grudges are forgotten now as they unite in the struggle—sleek silk gown and padded cotton coat—side by side. There would be no contest of wit or intellect at this gathering but only a seeking of a way to strengthen their country's battle for the right of self-determination.

Fantasy of Tea Party With Six Famous Women Present

Much has been written about the Soong sisters but little about the other members of our imaginary tea party. On a visit to the Red capital last year, I had the opportunity of meeting and enjoying long conversations with them during the lazy April afternoons.

Like Hsi Shih, the ancient Queen of Wu who was so delicate that she swayed as a reed sways in the slightest summer zephyr, Madame Mao Tse-tung, who prefers to be called Commander Ho Tze-chun, gives the impression of fragile daintiness far more fitted for the tea table than the roar of cannon in front line warfare.

Few people, seeing such a dainty maid, could believe that for ten years she has worn nothing but the simple uniform of the Red Army uniform, that she has strapped guns and swords on her belt weighing more than she does, fought on the front, carried full grown men to field hospitals from the battle line, nursed the sick, comforted the dying, organized corps of women fighters and suffered almost fatal shrapnel wounds at the beginning of an 8,000 mile march from south to north China.

So intensely has she lived during the nine years she has been married to Mao Tse-tung that she had no time to rest even when swollen with child. Five children have been born to them in seven years and all were given to peasants along the route.

At the start of the "Long March," she not only was with child, but was struck by a bomb from a Government plane and injured in twenty places. Eight of the wounds were serious, any one of them might easily have been fatal, and she still carries bits of shrapnel in her frail body.

She is now 28 years old and her bitter experiences have not dimmed the spirit of this remarkable woman. She was born in Yungshan, Kiangsi, the daughter of a small landlord who went bankrupt in the 1911 revolution. Her sister married Mao Tze-tan, who was executed by Government troops in 1927, and herself disappeared from sight shortly thereafter. Then Mrs. Mao decided to dedicate her whole life to the cause of the revolution. She married Mao Tse-tung the following year and has never left his side since then, fighting many battles from Kiangsu to Shensi.

Kang Ke-ch'ing commenced life as a peasant girl of a family so destitute that she could not be fed at home. Her parents rented her out as a servant, cowherd and cook. Slavery and drudgery was her only future in the small village of Wanan, Kiangsi.

Now, at the age of 26, she is the wife of Chu Teh, and a teacher of political science in the Yennan Red Army schools, and teacher of military science to the Women Vanguards of the Red Army.

In between those periods are twelve years of political struggle and armed warfare by the side of her famous husband. As a simple, ignorant peasant girl who could not read or write a single Chinese character and had never been out of her native village, she had the intelligence to know there was a broader horizon to life and she was determined to fight for it and for the rights of her equally oppressed sisters-in-slavery.

She deserted her scullery and organized the Women Vanguards of her district, becoming a director of the Women's Revolutionary Society. After many successes and failures, including imprisonment, she had finally organized more than 3,000 women, armed with everything from rifles to kitchen pots, who joined Mao and

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MADAME CHIANG SUPERVISES WORK



This picture graphically illustrates how Madame Chiang Kai-shek, wife of the Generalissimo, personally took part in hospital work at Nanking. She is shown above with Dr. J. Heng Liu, Minister of Health, at the Central Hospital in Nanking supervising the transport of a wounded Chinese pilot. Shortly after this photo was taken, the hospital was bombed by Japanese planes.

China Photo Service

Chu when they appeared in that district in 1928. Close association with Chu Teh led to romance and they were married according to the Communist procedure. During the first and second expedition of the Nanking troops against the Reds, Mme. Chu was in command of the Headquarters and Communications Guards, also finding time to organize 200 women cadres many of whom became officers in the two battalions of Women Vanguards which, in Szechuen, defeated and disarmed a brigade of provincial troops.

Now she is with the Eighth Route Army in Shansi, participating in the guerilla warfare being waged there by the Reds against the Japanese army.

Ting Ling, daughter of the petty gentry in Hunan province, fled all conventions and forsook a path of least resistance to fight her way to the high road of literary

(Continued from page 7)

Every praise is due these girls for their unselfish labor. Several times, when the contents of a tin was just under a round figure, the girls would contribute the difference themselves. They worked with no thought of gain, for long, footsore weary hours. They took no rest, and did not know the meaning of the word "defeat." Typical of this is the collection made by a squad at the Race Course today. The committee had tried in vain to get permission for the girls to solicit during the race days. We were unsuccessful. The girls brought in one of the final tins of the drive containing \$454.16—they had not waited for permission.

Proceeds of the drive to date were far greater than most people expected. It is generally agreed that the spirit of these girls, and the interest they have aroused, have been largely responsible for the good results.

To the Red Cross Girls, the Girl Guides, and all the unknown donors—our thanks. The spirit of the

achievement. Leftist tendencies resulted in the death of her husband, Hu Yeh-p'ing, who was executed by the Government in an early purge. More than twenty of her other friends were executed or disappeared and she herself spent more than a year in a Nanking prison, but she continued the struggle for what she considered right.

Today she is reportedly with the Red Army in Shansi gathering material and making voluminous notes, between battles, in preparation for writing the story of China's struggle as seen from the battlefield.

Although every woman will not agree with the political ideology of these three Communist women, their devotion to duty and spirit of self-sacrifice add further chapters to the glorious history of Chinese women's activities in the present war.

Red Cross is abroad, and there is no fear for all the tomorrows.

WAR POEM CONTEST


The War Poem contest announced in the first issue of the *China Weekly Review* supplement has evoked a gratifying response.

The editors are still looking forward to receiving poems from many others who have not yet submitted manuscripts. Those who have not yet sent in their verses are reminded that the closing date is December 31st.

The rules for the contest are printed again on the inside back cover. This is your chance to win a \$25 first or \$10 second prize.

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WOMEN YOUNG AND OLD AID WAR RELIEF WORK



By SCHIFF



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SPECIAL WOMEN'S WORK SUPPLEMENT

December 25, 1937

ACTIVITIES OF CHINESE WOMEN'S CLUB TOLD BY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEE

By Mrs. Z. D. Zau,
 Chairman of Hospital
 and Purchasing Committee

Special Attention Given To
 Care of Wounded Heroes

THE hostilities which broke out in Shanghai on August 13 found Chinese women quite unprepared for the work with wounded soldiers and refugees. Most of the members of the Chinese Women's Club had worked during the 1932 trouble, and knew that we should have to have several committees to handle the emergency work. Of course we did not realize at the time that there would be such a gigantic struggle, and that the conflict would increase to such a size in so short a time.

Luckily, we prepared at once for working.

A hospital supplies committee was formed, with Mrs. Ernest Tso in charge. This committee called on all members of the club who were in Shanghai at the time to come and join in the work. They were all most willing to help and do what they could for their country. We bought several bolts of bandage material, and more cloth for making pyjamas for the wounded soldiers.

Within three days after the fighting broke out, we had helped the Red Cross Society of China to prepare the first emergency hospital on Kiaochow Road for 400 wounded soldiers. We made sheets, pillowcases, and suits for the men, and also provided small comforts. At first it was considered better to confine our efforts to the one hospital. Soon the executive committee decided, after visiting other hospitals, that we should spread our activities, and help every hospital that needed something.

After "bloody Saturday," the hospitals for civilians, like the Chinese Lester Hospital on Shantung Road, and every other hospital was short of bandages, bed linen and clothes to put on the hundreds of poor refugees who were blasted to pieces by the bombings.

Luckily, we had already finished a large quantity of extra supplies, and we were able to distribute to the hospitals as soon as we found their need. The club members also collected hundreds of old sheets, towels and old clothings for the refugees.

Mrs. Tso came regularly every day to supervise the making of bandages, and also to give out work and receive back finished supplies. At that time, there were only about 40 members of the Club in Shanghai but we had our friends, and servants, and all the neighbors helping with the work all the time.

Besides the hospital supplies committee, we formed a hospital visiting committee, and a special purchasing committee. For the hospital visiting committee, we took turns to visit the men in all the hospitals, and observe conditions in each one. We wrote letters for men who wanted to let their families know where they were, and what was happening. Sometimes we enlisted the aid of students to write for them also.

They liked to see us, and talk with us sometimes when they were a little better. They said it was good to see family women come to visit them, and inquire about their health. This was the first time in Chinese history that the common soldiers were treated so nicely. Many of our friends who had qualified in first aid training were serving as volunteer nurses at hospitals.

Sometimes the doctors wanted supplies—bandages, gauze pads and dressings, or pyjamas, sheets, soaps and other medical supplies. We could not always give them what they needed, but we were so glad to be able to go back to the club rooms and bring for them the supplies we had ready. The soldiers were so good and patient, we hated to think of them needing things we could give them. Other times, we were able to advise the doctors where to apply to get what they needed. Some hospitals needed some advice on organizing the work, and we were able to help there too.

My husband was at the railway hospital, and the men there used to watch for us coming every afternoon, because some friends took turns in bringing them some cakes or plain buns for tea. They were all just like children, and in nearly every hospital, some little comforts were provided for them.

CLUB WOMEN BUY BONDS



Energetically rallying to the cause of their country, countless unnamed hundreds of women, wealthy and poor, bought Liberty Bonds in the recent campaign launched by the Chinese Government. Above photos show actual purchasers of bonds. During the time of the gold and silver contribution movement most of the more wealthy women in this city who had any gold jewelry and silver ornament flocked to the Central Bank to contribute their share to their country. China Photo Service



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We learned how to buy very well. Sometimes, when we buy for ourselves in a hurry, we pay more money and finish quickly. But when we bought for the soldiers, we used so much time in making sure we had the best stuff, at the cheapest prices. All the merchants were good, and often let us have the goods at less than cost because we were doing charity work.

We worked also with the Y.W.C.A. to open a refugee camp for women and children. We had some vocational training in this camp, and we are hoping to open another one very shortly.

As more members were able to return from summer resorts, we were able to enlarge our work. We began knitting woolen sweaters in preparation for the winter months which we knew were coming, as early as September. The first hundred and fifty finished were sent to the aviators at Nanking, to keep them warm when they flew high in the sky. Everyone liked them, so we bought more wool and made hundreds more.

We have had many good friends and helpers outside members of the club. The American Women's Club took 100 lbs of wool and made sweaters for us. Other people helped us with making gauze and cotton pads, and rolling bandages. One American lady in Chicago learned of our work, and sent us a donation of \$500 U.S. money. We have had altogether in cash donations \$5,528.95 and \$2,000.00 in Liberty Bonds. We ourselves were actively participating in the national drive for Liberty Bonds, and sold \$9,000.00 and also bought \$5,000.00 more from the club sinking fund. Most donations came from non-members and foreign friends.

The members of the club entertained all newspapermen and foreign war correspondents at tea in the home of Mrs. H. Lin Cheng as we heard that the newly arrived men from all countries were wanting to know what Chinese women were like. We called on all members in Shanghai to make a point of being present that day. Mayor O. K. Yui kindly turned over the time set aside for his press conference to us so that the men could talk with Chinese women, and form their own first-hand impressions.

Afterwards, we had many nice letters from the correspondents, thanking us for the party. We had a lot of pleasure from being able to meet such famous men too. At first the young girls were nervous, because they thought they would not know what to talk about with such clever men. Afterwards they were alright, because no-one talked politics at all—just an informal gathering of friends together. About 80 guests came, and we were happy to see so many accept our invitation.

Altogether, by actual working we finished about 16,000 bandages, 8000 gauze pads, 50 lbs and two bolts of gauze made into swabs for dressings, 1000 suits of pyjamas, 1000 blankets, 600 knitted sweaters, 100 pairs of knitted gloves, 28 sacks of cotton balls and 30 lbs of cotton made into swabs, 2500 cotton padded vests, 620 towels, 150 lbs of biscuits, 20 boxes and 5000 cigarettes, 19 large tins of powdered milk, two cases of lysol soap, other washing soap, 10 tins of Lysol, a case of tea, 300 fans, and hundreds of old clothes such as raincoats, curtains, shirts, trousers, cotton quilts, old shoes socks etc. which we sent to refugee camps and hospitals.

With the exception of the supplies we sent directly to the front lines, and to the divisions which requested them, the rest of these things were distributed among 30 refugee camps and hospitals, both civilian and for wounded soldiers.

Besides working ourselves, we made the children help too. We considered it was a good opportunity to make them realize they had a share in the welfare of China too. They must learn to think and plan for themselves an other people too. That is why we were proud of the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides.

Just now, we are doing what we can for the refugees. My sister, Mrs. W. S. New is in charge of making clothes for the refugees in Nantao. They use old clothes, and remake them. Sometimes people send donations for new clothes. There are always things needed now for refugees. The hospital units are in need of sheets, blankets, quilts and clothes. We sent some out only a few days ago, and are planning to send more very soon.

In times like these, it is good to know we can help a little. This war has taught us many things. We realize the necessity for being practical. We think our club has done quite a lot, but we are planning to do more in the future. At present, our free school premises are to be lent to the education project for refugee children. This is easy, for our children are only attending school until 2 o'clock every day. Then the classrooms can be used until night for teaching the refugees. We are glad our place can be used for such a good purpose.

Everything we have done is for China and our people. We will go on doing what we can to lessen the suffering about us.

DANCING QUEEN CAPTURES TRAITOR REFUSES TO BECOME MATA HARA

Miss Liu Chi-chow may be a beautiful girl, a master of the Japanese language and a former student in Japan, but she is intensely loyal to her native China and as the result of this loyalty and patriotism one Ong Fu-ma, also a former resident of Japan, is under arrest charged with a serious crime, for which, if convicted, he may pay the extreme penalty.

Miss Liu is a "wu niu", or cabaret taxi dancer, a class of girls which since the opening of hostilities in the Shanghai area has time and again demonstrated their love for their country by their sacrifices and unselfish work in behalf of wounded soldiers.

Employed at a leading cabaret, she was on a recent evening approached by Ong, who described himself, according to the girl, as a sort of liaison officer for the Chinese Government. He showered Miss Liu with attention, flowers and presents. She sent both the flowers and presents to hospitals for wounded soldiers.

After a few nights of attention to the girl the self-described officer openly asked her if she would like to earn a handsome sum of money in the pay of the Japanese.

The clever girl, with a view of trapping Ong, agreed. Ong proposed to send her to Nanking, where she would be required to seek the company of Government officials and employees and to gain from them military secrets.

To this the girl agreed. Ong proposed to meet her at her home the following day, supply her with money and certain names, and to send her to Nanking by motor-car.

The girl, realising that the cabaret where she is employed is in a foreign concession, which might lead to complications and frustrate her plans if Ong was apprehended in the establishment, suggested a meeting place in Nantao. Ong agreed.

Three Chinese detectives of Nantao, secreted in the meeting place, listened to their conversation, hear Ong's instructions to the girl, and saw him pass her a roll of banknotes.

Ong went to jail and was handed over to the military authorities.

Miss Liu opines that other alleged agents of the Japanese will give her a wide berth when seeking the services of a beautiful Chinese girl for espionage activities.

The owner of the cabaret where the girl is employed was so pleased with her loyalty that he gave Miss Liu a bonus of \$100.00. Miss Liu promptly invested the sum in Liberty Bonds, marking her fifth investment in the bonds.

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CHINESE WOMEN FORM UNITED FRONT

By Sieu Ming Kuo

WE Chinese women detest war; but we love righteousness and humanity even more. What are the Chinese women doing during this unprecedented crisis? With a united front the women throughout the whole country are feverishly carrying on war-relief work. There have been twenty-three women's organizations in Shanghai, which united to form the Union of Women's organizations to consolidate their strength in carrying out the work of war relief. Each organization has been doing a great deal of work in comforting the fighting elements at the front and the wounded soldiers in the hospitals, in taking care of refugees' camps, and in making garments and rolling bandages for both soldiers and refugees.

When this appeal was made, women all over the country responded immediately to the call. Practically in every home in Shanghai during the past weeks, you could have heard the rattling of the sewing-machine or seen the delicate fingers of mothers and daughters plying their needles intently. Even the women servants have contributed from their meagre savings towards the making of cotton vests! When the refugees' need of cotton quilts was made known, housewives instantly started collecting thick warm quilts from house to house. The spirit of serving those who are struggling for the very existence of the nation, and those suffering from terrible losses in the war areas, seems to be contagious. Even those women who are confined to their homes, and who have never participated in any activity in public life, are eager to contribute whatever they can spare.

Some women who expressed their spirit in more active form, served behind the lines at the front! A group of girls went to the front to serve the soldiers and civilians. With their leader Miss Hoo Lai Shi, these young and brave girls did their best to comfort the soldiers and to take care of the farming population who could not leave the fighting zone. The spirit of these girls was admirable. A letter was sent by the group which shows that in the midst of terrific shelling and bombing they carried on their work with incredible cheerfulness. It is said in the letter that the presence of the girls working with the people in the front is like a bunch of flowers in the wilderness; they brighten and they cheer.

Another group of women who came from the province of Hunan under the leadership of the well known authoress, Miss Hsieh Bin-yin, has also gone to the front to work side by side with the soldiers. Their remarkable courage and enthusiasm commands great respect from the public.

Besides all these kinds of emergency work, the Chinese women are planning more fundamental schemes to conserve and to increase the nation's financial resources. Under the leadership of Madame Kung, the women of Shanghai formed a women's section to push the sale of the Liberty Bonds. The section was composed of about 300 units, and each leader of a unit saw that Liberty Bonds are bought by the women of this city. Their goal was one million dollars. Women of all classes bought Liberty Bonds. There was the gold and silver contribution movement in which most of the women in the city who had any gold jewelry and silver ornament flocked to the Central Bank to contribute their share to their country. The staff of the Central Bank had a very busy time, collecting these gold and silver articles.

Some women leaders in Shanghai started an economy movement in which they aimed to encourage the Chinese

23 Women's Organizations Form Union for Relief Work

women to reduce their daily household budget in order to do their share for the country. They believed that no matter how small the amount may be, if every home in the whole country does its share, the result will be very significant. Some women proposed that they should fast once or twice a week, that they should make fewer frocks and use less cosmetics so that each penny saved will help to augment the national coffers! Moreover, such a movement bears in it a very important educational meaning. This daily process of saving and giving will eventually form a good habit of serving society out of one's own purse. The public spirit which is somewhat lacking in the Orient in the past, will be greatly promoted thru this movement.

Then there is the important problem of education. Although a number of schools were already opened in Shanghai, thousands of children in the concession and Settlement were prevented from attending by the continuous bombing and shelling which rendered communication precarious. Consequently, the educated women of Shanghai devised means to meet such an emergency; many organized what we call "Terrace Education," that is to say, in every lane or terrace where a number of children are living together, various classes are being organized according to the age of the children in some homes in the terrace. Some educated mothers or tutors undertake the work of teaching. The school hours usually last from eight to twelve in the morning. The curriculum consists chiefly of Chinese, arithmetic, composition, drawing and singing. Such classes prove to be quite successful. Children do not have to go far away from their homes, yet their education is not neglected. Each child also gets a great deal of individual attention from the teacher, as classes are not very large.

This is a survey of work done by the Chinese women in Shanghai during the War. Similar kinds of work are also being carried out by women in different parts of China. In Hankow, Changsha, Hangchow, everywhere, women's organizations spring up like mushrooms to meet the present crisis. Throughout all China, women are bustling with activities for they realize that this is a war of nation-wide self-defense and every citizen must do his or her share.

In this long-drawn struggle for existence, more and more man power will be drawn from the interior to the front. But the productive power of the country must be preserved. In the near future, our women will have to take over much of the work done by men in time of peace. Some women leaders have already realized the significance of this problem. They are planning to train women for work in different spheres. When the moment comes, women must prepare to carry on the financial, commercial and industrial work in the cities, and to take part in all the rural work in the country. They also must train themselves to keep up the work of transportation and communication. And finally, as the war goes on, the responsibility of educating the mass will fall heavily on the shoulders of our women. Theoretically, the Chinese women are now on the same level with men; but, because of traditional prejudices and social background they are still much behind their men in professional work and technical training. Now the moment has come when women should respond to the call of taking up the full responsibility of citizenship. It is more than obvious that the Chinese women are answering the call gallantly.

REFUGEES GET VOCATIONAL TRAINING

By Mrs. S. C. May

MUCH has been written about the refugee situation in Shanghai and it is not proposed herein to repeat what has already been said and what is already well-known. That the situation remains a serious one, that refugee camps are the locale of pitiful scenes of the inevitable tragic aftermath of a war in which no furries are spared, that finances prove to be a stumbling block, all this is too well known to bear repetition.

The refugee situation may be divided, for convenience, into three phases. The first phase concerns the immediate welfare of the refugees. This stage is, even now, slowly passing into a second phase,—and a difficult one,—that of training the refugees for some kind of self-supporting work. The third phase will be the final liquidation of refugees as a community problem, but this third and final phase is, unfortunately, a long distance off. I intend here to touch only briefly on the second phase.

Several schemes dealing with the second phase have been evolved, and at least two are in operation. (It can be said, in the interest of truth, that all schemes were not altogether proposed with a detached interest upon the part of sponsors and that this should be the case in such times is indeed to be regretted.)

Perhaps one of the most important project now actually under way was conceived by Miss Eleanor Hinder of the Shanghai Municipal Council's Industrial Section. Realizing the possible pitfalls into which such work might fall, Miss Hinder's project may be regarded as necessarily conservative and that for that reason, ideal. It provides essentially for the organization of women in refugee camps and the training of these women in useful handicraft work which at the moment will benefit themselves directly and which later, should serve as necessary training for useful occupation. In addition, the work done by the women goes a long way toward relieving the demoralizing effect of idleness and introspection which before was so prevalent among the refugee camps. This enterprise, different from other equally important projects, is to teach refugees to make sweaters and shoes for their own use.

A Small group of Shanghai Women Train Refugees

Actual steps taken may be briefly outlined. A trained staff of investigators and workers, recruited mainly from colleges, are making methodical visits to the some 170 refugee camps and centers in the city. Essential data, such as the number of women in the camp, working facilities, etc., is collected so that the needs of each individual camp can be efficiently met. On the basis of these reports, the committee administering the project sends voluntary teachers to the various camps and instruction in various handicraft arts is at once started. The teachers have been recruited from the ranks of the YWCA, the Door of Hope, and the Moore Memorial Church Mission and their services, may it be emphasized, are purely voluntary. Necessary equipment—as such—and raw material is purchased by the committee and supplies to each camp. Since wool is too expensive, cotton forms the raw material basis of knitting activity. Weaving and other handicraft arts are, of course, carried on, and all work is of a constructive nature with future needs well in mind.

To date, the project has been in operation for about one month, instructors being active in about 20 of the 170 refugee camps. In each camp where the project is working an average of 100 women are receiving instruction. So far, necessary finances have been taken care of by a grant from the International Red Cross but the work, even at its present comparatively limited scope, requires some \$1,000 per month.

The administrative committee of the project consists of Mrs. C. S. May, in charge of the depot, Miss Louise Stops, in charge of finances, and Miss Dju, in charge of making wholesale purchases. Needless to say, these and all others connected with the project have unselfishly donated their entire time and energy.

Without undue self-praise, it may be said that the project is underway to a good start. The difficulties faced, however, and especially in view of the necessity for increasing the scope of operations for real and comprehensive effectiveness, are numerous. Finances have already been mentioned. Another problem is the scarcity of volunteer teachers. Many completed surveys have been made and actual operation await competent teachers to go into the camps. This problem will also become more acute when the scope of operations is extended.

CHINESE GIRLS PERFORM MANIFOLD DUTIES



Joining their countless civilian compatriots, hundreds of Chinese girls labored incessantly during the war at Shanghai to contribute in 1,001 ways to the aid and comfort of Chinese soldiers. They are shown here rolling and cutting bandages, only one of their manifold tasks.

China Photo Service

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunsinger NARS, Date 12-18-75

LUXURY BUYING CURTAILED BY WOMEN

Money Saved to Aid Refugees,
Store Survey Shows Trends.

CHINESE women are buying only necessities since the outbreak of hostilities. A general census of the stores reveals that few new shipments of luxury goods arrived for Christmas and that pre-festival buying was limited.

Big department stores report that since hostilities in the immediate Shanghai vicinity ceased, business has been fairly brisk. Any day finds the large stores fairly well crowded, but many departments are noticeably empty of customers. There are beautiful winter silks, tinsel brocades, velvets and other rich materials designed for holiday wear. But there is barely a customer in the whole department. The only dress goods being sold are the warmer materials—heavy woollens and the like.

This year, with so much suffering and want at every turn of the head, the women who after all do most of the buying of the nation are determined not to waste money uselessly. With coal much more expensive, and likely to be dearer yet, they are decreasing the number of stoves and the amount of coal in heating plants. Instead they are planning to wear warmer clothes of woolen stuff.

Hot water bottles and gloves are also in demand. The small size hot water bottles are carried by Chinese women in winter, to warm their hands when they are out in the cold. Less heating in houses, and more errands to run out of doors has made warm gloves and more hot water bottles imperative. Even old ladies come out in the cold to purchase wool for knitted garments, cotton stuff for refugee clothes, and materials for other warm garments they are constantly making.

Cheap unbleached cotton material is hard to buy, for the demand has been so great. Many older women have generously contributed gifts of padded cotton quilts, sheets and pillows for refugees and hospitals. With most factories out of commission, and cotton dearer to buy, the demand exceeds the supply. A bolt of cheap sheeting costs \$2 more than formerly.

All manner of cheap heavy cottons are in demand. Sewing parties have replaced many of the mah jongg parties which were the chief diversion of the older set with no outside activities. Woolen yarn factories have sprung up all over the foreign areas, and are turning out huge quantities of gayly colored yarns, to be knitted on flying needles for refugee children into gay warm garments. Also, the big families have so many of their own people refugeeing with them, and all those little ones must be provided with warm clothes too.

All food departments are doing large volumes of business. When weather is cold, and there is less heating, there must be more food to supply body heat. Large families, living together for convenience, have many children who like good things to eat, and the grandmothers and aunts keep stores of biscuits, candies, fruits and dried stores in their cupboards. The old ladies like to wander around the grocery departments themselves, and choose the goods.

Chinese foodstuffs departments are always busy. Since fresh vegetables and meat became scarce and prices skyrocketed, tinned vegetables such as bamboo shoots, peas and other greens, and dried fish, meat and fruit had a good sale. Fresh consignments of these have come up from the south with incoming boats calling at this port again.

Fur stores are having sales but there are few buyers. One woman was tempted to try on a beautiful black seal

coat. It was undoubtedly a bargain, and excellently cut and styled. She looked at her reflection longingly and sighed. "I'd love it, but I'll just have to wear my old coat another year. Think how many refugees the money will feed!"

Toy departments are showing exquisite dolls and furry animals, but many are left over from last year. Few fresh consignments are expected although there was more activity in these sections just before Christmas. The stores are anxious to sell the goods they already have, and wait to order fresh shipments for next year. They are not expecting to sell the more expensive toys this year, for so many children are being made to realize that thousands of poor little boys and girls need food and warm clothing. Chinese mothers are teaching the children to face responsibilities as soon as they are old enough to understand.

There will still be Christmas trees and gifts, but on a much simpler scale, and the difference will go to one of the refugee funds, if not to their own poor relatives.

Several groups of women were asked informally whether they were making new clothes this year. The answer was the same in each case. "I haven't made any new dresses since the hostilities began, and I don't intend to while there is so much want around. The children had to have new things, but I parceled up their old clothes and sent them to refugee camps."

The managers of stores are generally hopeful. "As soon as things are nearer normal, we expect to do a fair holiday trade still," one of them declared. "People must go on living. With more people buying again, there will be more work available. We recovered after the 1932 trouble, and there is no reason why we should not do so again."

TAILORS CO-OPERATE TO MAKE SOLDIERS' VESTS

Tailors in Shanghai are busy men these days. It is the season for making new clothes, for winter will soon be here. But the tailors declare they are too busy.

An old customer is incensed—a new customer, of a mere ten or so years takes the situation philosophically and inquires the reason, when the tailor finally appears in person. He is too busy making padded vests for the soldiers, she is told.

He is not the only tailor sewing soldiers' vests. Every day, they are to be seen riding by with piles of finished coats, taking them to central receiving stations. The cheapest price for making these vests eight cents apiece. Prices vary slightly according to a tailor's equipment.

Although much actual seaming can be done by machine, teasing the cottonwool into soft layers, placing and stitching it into position must be done by hand. Fine cotton flies everywhere, and makes the atmosphere choking. All final finishing is handwork. Any woman cannot make more than two or at most, three vests in a single day. A tailor is only a little faster.

Heavy Demand

One hundred thousand vests were presented for the Double Tenth festival, and double that number is required now. These are comforts—separate from the uniforms supplied by the government. All women's organizations have ordered large numbers from their individual personal tailors, and are working day and night themselves adding to the numbers, although another section of women prefer to knit woolen sweaters to be worn underneath the uniforms.

The fine organization of large tailors has freed hundreds of women for other tasks more suited to them, and they point, with professional pride, to the neatness of garments they have made.

CHINESE NURSES PERFORM HEROIC DEEDS

By Miss A. Sharpe,
Superintendent of Nurses,
Lester Chinese Hospital

Red Cross Nursing Unknown
In China Until This Year,
But Tasks Quickly Learned

CHINESE women have come into prominence as modern trained nurses during the present hostilities. They are rendering gallant service to their country with no thought of themselves. Some have made the supreme sacrifice while rendering aid to their country's defenders. They have slipped away from this world quietly, but the memory remains to inspire the girls of today, and help them realize more clearly the true function of a nurse.

Until 40 years ago, modern nursing was almost unknown. Thirty years back only dullards at school were available as trainees, for girls from good homes were not allowed by their parents to enter the profession. Until 20 years ago, the majority had only Higher Primary school education.

Even so, the practical bent of most Chinese girls, their desire to be students, and their cheerfulness makes them apt nurses. Nursing is purely western in background and outlook. It was really wonderful therefore that these girls were able to adapt themselves so quickly to conditions so new to them.

Only recently Chinese girls have begun to nurse men patients. It was formerly considered unsuitable, and men were generally employed. Changing social customs have led the girls to adjust themselves, and now they nurse men with natural dignity as if they had always performed this service.

Latterly, nursing schools are making a senior middle diploma a requirement for entrance, and a few schools in China require a pre-nursing College course. The Nurses' Association of China has long made a minimum entrance requirement of the Junior



One of the volunteers from one of the larger schools is here seen rolling and cutting bandages for wounded soldiers. China Photo Service

Middle Diploma, and this is demanded by Government school today.

Many Chinese women are ably filling administrative posts which require higher standards of education. There is still a dearth of these and in this great country many more are needed. Parents and teachers do not yet realize the importance and dignity of nursing, its possibilities as a career and how satisfying it can be. Modern nursing requires education and refinement—the scientific approach as well as practical devotion. Women must be able to deal with every kind of person and situation, and to impart the knowledge they obtain.

Public Health Nursing was in its infancy until five years ago. The recent nation-wide campaign led to hopes that this would be extended throughout the country. This work has been seriously interrupted by recent warfare.

Red Cross nursing as understood in other countries, was unknown until this year. However, nurses are showing themselves able to pioneer in both Red Cross and military nursing. Called upon to care for soldiers and wounded and "war sick" civilians, they acquitted themselves valiantly. When forced to evacuate, they have taken their patients along. They have gone into the front lines with relief units to pick up the wounded, and have not been deterred because some have been called upon to give up their lives.

The few thousand trained nurses (less than 8000 in all) have distributed themselves throughout the country, heading corps of volunteers with first aid training—often they were called upon to do doctors' work in emergencies, and they have not spared themselves in any way.

Refugee camps in Shanghai are ample witness to them. One graduate of the Lester Hospital is helping in a clinic in the morning, and is on duty all night at one of the refugee camps. There is no doctor available at that time, she has often to act for him and has great responsibility delivering babies and attending to many very serious emergencies. She has proved her worth many times over.

Dr. F. C. Yen, head of the Red Cross Society of China, could tell many tales of unselfish heroism of these women. Besides doing their own work, they are training volunteers to be of valuable aid. When one considers the terrible toll, both military and civilian, that this warfare is exacting, one realizes how pitifully inadequate is the number of trained nurses.

They have given up fine positions with good payment, to work all day and night, practically, without recompense save the gratitude of the patients, and the knowledge that they are serving their people. After all, the ideal of service is before every nurse.

We do not know where all our graduate nurses have gone. We knew some were at Lotien, Soochow, and various other military hospital concentrations, but since the withdrawal from Shanghai, with communications cut, we have not heard. We know they are doing what they can to serve, whatever the circumstances in which they are working.

Nor are they content, once trained, to rest upon this knowledge and seek no farther. They are watching modern trends in other countries, and are ready and eager to follow these. They will not wait for a long slow painful evolution into what they realize are the best things for the profession.

Many are receiving invaluable experience in military hospitals. Cases which would never occur, perhaps, in peaceful times are frequent, yet they rise to each fresh emergency with ready initiative and courage.

I commend the resolution and ready aid which the Girl Guides displayed during the bombings in Shanghai.

They are so young—only 14 to 16 years—yet they saw sights that no young eyes should look upon. Still they did not hesitate, but did their considerable share in getting the wounded and dying some kind of relief. They are fine girls—well built, and with good initiative, with excellent training in first aid. Most would make fine administrative nurses with proper training.

Volunteers from the large schools were rendering good service throughout the tenses periods of actual hostilities around Shanghai. They were an enormous help to the few trained nurses available. These are the type of girls China needs to train as nurses—not for Red Cross and military service, but for general nursing and public health. The Chinese nurses have proved that, when emergency arises, whatever its nature, they can cope with it efficiently.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DANCING DOLLS LEARN TO COMFORT WOUNDED SOLDIERS

By Bruno Kroker

IN gay times, they are socially disowned. They are regarded as perhaps a "fifth estate" beyond the pall of polite society. They are regarded as gold-diggers, and while stories of some of their fortunes cause wide speculation, it is equally true that their general plight and level of living is indeed a hard one. They are criticized by the Government, frowned upon by "moral" citizens, condemned by "upright" persons, especially women. By their employers they are regarded only as so much living material for income. They receive no favors from their employers, ask for none. They are the Shanghai dance-hall girls, the "taxi-dancers."

But the Shanghai hostilities have upset the traditional attitude toward the taxi-dancer. Exploited in normal times, war conditions found their burden doubly heavy. Thousands were thrown out of employment, thousands left without the meagre security they once enjoyed. But they astounded their critics and have rallied to their country's cause in a way that caused sincere admiration.

Unable to shoulder arms in the defence of their country, Chinese taxi-dancers banded together for a common cause and formed the Shanghai Taxi Dancers' National Salvation Association, which organization was exerting every possible influence in the days when the Chinese troops still were stationed in adjacent areas to the foreign defence districts of Shanghai. Their role in easing the lot of many wounded and their aid to troops in every possible way made them an important factor in the much-needed civilian support of the Army.

Compelled by these patriotic dancing hostesses, many cabaret owners converted their establishments into hospitals for wounded soldiers. More recently, when the refugee problem began to harass the local population and countless thousands of refugees thronged the streets of the International Settlement and the French Concession, it was on the combined request of hundreds of members of the Taxi Dancers National Salvation Association that many local cabaret owners opened the doors of their establishments for a more humanitarian purpose, namely, to accommodate thousands of these homeless refugees.

Shanghaianders in general were forced to sincerely applaud when the slender bobbed-haired and charming Chinese dance hostesses lost no time in engaging in war relief work. Of the hundreds of professional dancing girls, many joined the Red Cross Society and other relief organizations, and set about the business of ministering to the wounded soldiers in various hospitals. Still others busied themselves preparing bandages and comfort kits for the men at the front. Scores spend their daylight hours comforting and even entertaining wounded soldiers in the many hospitals here while the majority recently did splendid work in the refugee camps.

As a result of the removal of hostilities from the Shanghai area a number of foreign and Chinese cabaret owners have reopened, but their hours of business are restricted and thus the girls employed manage to find plenty of time to aid in war relief work.

Even now the Shanghai Dancing Girls' National Salvation Association is collecting cash donations for the aid of the wounded and is engaged in relief work for the countless destitute refugees who are still thronging the streets, unable to find some quarters or shelter and food, living a hungry existence without the bare necessities of life.

The leader of their organization is Miss Lu Li-tuan, a pretty Cantonese girl who formerly was the reigning "queen" of one of the city's largest and most popular night life amusement establishments. The association has seven departments. At the opening meeting of the society a manifesto was issued which calls upon all Chinese taxi dancers to enroll in the organization and to support the movement.

The manifesto points out that while the taxi-dancers may be looked down upon by some persons owing to their social position, they nevertheless are determined and prepared to demonstrate clearly their loyalty, patriotism and unselfishness in every possible manner and to give full support to those who need help in these trying times.

The manifesto further states that many of the girls who dance for a livelihood have also lost their homes and loved ones as the result of Japanese bombs and Japanese shells, both here in this locality and in the interior cities where many of the girls' relatives reside.

"Though you may have lost your homes and dear ones," says the manifesto in part, "dry your tears, banish the ache in your heart and work as one for the country that in the end we may be avenged."

An important decision on the part of the association calls for a program of education for the purpose of thoroughly training the girls for National Salvation work.

Miss Pearl Liang, American-born Chinese taxi-dancer, formerly of Los Angeles, California, and who was one of the prime movers in forming the association, declared that more than 500 girls had already volunteered their services about a month ago and it is

Cabarets Became Hospitals, Taxi-Dancers Organize Aid for Soldiers and Refugees

believed that by now virtually every taxi-dancer in Shanghai has enrolled in the Association.

And now it may be hoped that if and when peace returns, and the taxi-dancers return to their routine of entertaining others, they will no longer be regarded as social pariahs. They have clearly demonstrated that they are indeed human beings and that their patriotism cannot be questioned. And in so doing, they command every respect and admiration, especially from those who formerly condemned them.

What Christmas Means To One Patriotic Mother

A little more than five months ago the Chung Way-tso family was probably one of the happiest in China. Mr. Chung, who was 57 years of age, had a charming wife, three stalwart sons, one pretty daughter, a comfortable home and a good job as general manager of the Oriental Merchandising Company, with a factory and head office in Shanghai.

Every member of the Chung family believed in a Supreme Being. They were devout Christians and regularly attended services at the Moore Memorial Church. All members of the family spoke English almost as well as Chinese. Chung, senior, spent 14 years in the United States, where he resided in the city of Pasadena, California.

The first blow to be struck at the happy Chung family came on August 14 of this year. The factory of the concern employing Chung was struck by a Japanese bomb. It was a direct hit and the subsequent fire entirely destroyed the building and contents.

The disaster resulted in loss of employment for Chung.

Not wishing to imperil his wife and daughter Chung sold his home and household effects and sent the feminine members of his family to Quinsan, while he and two of his sons, C. T. Chung and W. T. Chung, enlisted in the Chinese army.

The third son was too young for service. Chung, an intelligent, educated man, was shortly thereafter commissioned.

The second blow fell on August 29, when the daughter, Miss Arlene Chung, contracted pneumonia and died within 49 hours. Mrs. Chung returned to Shanghai, bitterness and sorrow in her heart, her home gone, her daughter dead, her husband and two sons at the front, daily risking their lives for their country.

Day after day the Christian woman visited the Moore Memorial Church and prayed to Almighty God for the safety of her loved ones.

On September 24, at 9:10 a.m., while leading a detachment of men in a raid on the Japanese lines, Chung, by then a captain, fell mortally wounded. He died on the field of battle and his last resting place is unknown.

Not a week later the eldest son, C. T. Chung, maimed for life and nearly blind from the explosion of a hand grenade, was brought to Shanghai and hospitalized.

At the Moore Memorial Church she prayed for her remaining son in the service. Mrs. Chung felt that God would spare him; that Providence would not bring more suffering and grief upon her.

But it was not to be. A brief military message on December 2, told of the death of her second son.

Almost overnight the black hair of the sorrowing woman turned white.

The Christmas holidays bring an atmosphere of peace-on-earth good-will-to-men. But what will Christmas mean this heart-broken Chinese mother?

Gone now, her husband, two of her sons, her daughter, and her home.

December 25th, on which the Savior was born, is just another day to Mrs. Chung. In millions of Christian homes the world over there is laughter, rich foods, music, gifts and happiness.

In the Chung home? Misery and sorrow.

THERE CAN BE NO MIDWAY COMPROMISE

By a Chinese Observer

IN his historical statement of July 17, 1937 in which he laid down the absolutely minimum conditions for a peaceful solution of the Sino-Japanese impasse General Chiang Kai-shek made it perfectly clear that "once war is started between these two countries (China and Japan) there can be no midway compromise for midway compromise means voluntary surrender and the extinction of China as a political entity." The events of the past four months have only made increasingly clear the veracity and validity of the Generalissimo's statement.

For China this is a war for her very national existence. If she resists and continues to resist she may win out in the end and become a truly free and independent country. If she gives up now under whatever deceptive and sugar-coated terms she is doomed to be a protectorate of Japan. But China absolutely refuses to be a protectorate of any country, far less Japan. If China chose to be a protectorate of the Island kingdom she had ample opportunity of doing so in 1915 when Japan presented her notorious twenty-one demands. The nationalistic feeling of the Chinese people even in those days was positively too strong for that sort of thing. And there is every evidence that this nationalistic feeling has grown considerably during the past 22 years and there is every reason to assume that under the incessant and ruthless impact of the Japanese bombs, cannons and machine guns this nationalistic feeling will continue to grow and to grow at a phenomenal pace. This is one most powerful and one might say decisive factor that any intelligent and judicious discussion of peace, compromise or mediation must take into consideration.

For Japan all this peace talk which we have been hearing so much these days and which we shall surely continue to hear from time to time is all to her advantage. In the first place she can use it to consolidate her gains. Secondly she can use it to drive a wedge between the stout-hearted and far-sighted elements in the Chinese government and population on the one side and the weak-kneed and short-sighted elements on the other. Thirdly, she can utilize this peace talk to slow up or even stop assistance of foreign powers for China. And lastly she can parade her peace intentions before the world and employ them as a camouflage to destroy the possibility of effective cooperation among the various powers whose interests are fundamentally in conflict with that of her own.

Japan wants a quick "peace," a peace that will cost her nothing and gain her much. For China then the counter-strategy is to drag out this struggle as long and as extensively as possible until the enemy is worn out and exhausted both militarily and economically so that she will have to retreat even as she retreated from Siberia and Vladivostok years ago. This is precisely the strategy that China is following. In accordance with this strategy Japanese occupation of this city or town will not be an asset but a liability to the enemy in both a military and economic sense. Guerilla tactics which have proved so effective and successful in North China particularly that

*It is conservatively estimated that Japan has now at least 500,000 troops in China including Manchuria and this number is bound to swell up as the war is prolonged and extended further into the interior.

Japan Uses Peace Talk As Wedge Between Chinese Elements

under the direction of the 8th Route Army which has had abundant experience in such tactics will be intensified and extended to all areas under Japanese occupation. Synchronizing with this intensification and extension of guerilla warfare there is bound to be a systematic expansion of the mass movement in which people will be organized and armed and educated to boycott Japanese goods and to refuse to co-operate with the Japanese in any way. With these guerilla troops constantly harassing the enemy's rear and with the passive resistance of the masses what could Japan do with the occupied areas? And unless these areas could be exploited to Japan's economic advantage within say the next two or three years, a humanly impossible feat, Japan's shaky financial structure is bound to crack under the strain of maintaining vast numbers of troops in the occupied areas in China and in the face of an extensive and organized boycott of Japanese goods not only in unoccupied areas but to a large extent in the occupied areas as well, to say nothing of the boycott of Japanese goods in other parts of the world.

Japan may set up puppet governments here and there in the occupied areas but they will remain puppet governments and no more. Yin Ju-kan's puppet regime in East Hopei should serve as a good example of how much these puppet governments will amount to for Japan in the end. But whether puppet governments or no puppet governments an active force of opposition will be kept up alive as long as Japan cannot conquer the whole of China or as long as no genuinely Chinese government will sign away China's birthright as a free and independent country. The former is a feat which, if it can ever be accomplished, will surely exhaust and ruin Japan in the process. The latter possibility can practically be eliminated because no independent Chinese government is or can be so daring and strong as to risk such a step.

Thus this war between China and Japan is a war of endurance. As for China she can drag on almost indefinitely. Of course she will suffer. But what really worthwhile achievement in this world has come about without suffering on the part of some people? Intelligent and patriotic Chinese fully realize the price of national freedom and independence and are ready and willing to pay it at whatever figure. The question then is not how long can China hold out but rather how much longer can Japan go ahead with this reckless program of aggrandizement and conquest without cracking up in view of her steadily worsening internal conditions, political, social and economic and in view of the increasing sharpening of conflict of her interests with that of Soviet Russia, Great Britain and the United States of America?

Anxiety for the safety of twenty Chinese women who volunteered their services with the Chinese troops is felt in Chinese circles in Shanghai following the withdrawal of Chinese forces from the Shanghai and Nanking areas.

The twenty women were last heard of at Quinsan, where they helped attend the wounded, writing letters for them and sewing their clothes. Ever since the evacuation of Quinsan by Chinese forces about a month ago, no word has been received from any of them.

The party organized by Chinese cultural circles, was headed by Miss Tan Shu-sheng.

An Intellectual's Viewpoint

Editor's Note:—An article appeared in the Editorial Commentary, one of the best features of the T'ien Hsia Monthly,—in November which is so indicative of opinion among intellectual Chinese that we sought and obtained permission to reproduce it in these columns. The initials W.Y.N., which appear at the foot of the article, do not conceal the identity of the editor of the T'ien Hsia Monthly, Mr. Wen Yuan-ning.

No one likes to meet with reverses, but no man worth his salt will throw up the sponge in any course of action he has set his heart on, just because he has once suffered a set-back. The kind of man a person is shows up never so well as when he is up against a wall. Mr. Tall Talk is apt to change gender and become Miss Faint Heart when the barometer registers thundery weather. In such times, perhaps, those give the best account of themselves who in sunny days are not specially conspicuous for courage. The never-say-die remain anonymous until action finds them out. Then their manhood makes its appearance and, like Primitive Man before he knew the use of weapons, with nothing but his manhood to defend himself against sabre-toothed tigers and giant mammoths, they overcome obstacles by the sheer might of their will-to-succeed. Humanity survives, because these have been.

Is not the survival of China with her hoard of unique human values, which we call Chinese civilisation, due to just the grit of her teeming sons and daughters, mostly peasants and farmers, who throughout the centuries have successfully asserted their humanity in the face of all circumstances, such as catastrophic floods, famines and wars, that make for degradation and beastliness? That this unconquerable spirit is still alive among our people has been proved again and again during the present war—perhaps not among all our people, but certainly among our soldiers and refugees, who come from a class—the peasantry—that is the backbone of China.

It would be worse than pusillanimous for any Chinese who has any self-respect at all to think of saving his own skin and bank account by entertaining thoughts of peace without honour, after such great sacrifices in lives and homes that have been made by millions of our less fortunate brothers and sisters who even in the best of times have so little to thank their country for. If these are willing, not cheerfully—to say that would be cant—but with dumb fortitude, to put up with all kinds of privations and sufferings to see their country's struggle for justice and freedom through to the desired conclusion, which every Chinese patriot hopes for, surely the least we can do, those of us who work behind the lines, is not to lose heart just because of a few minor reverses our Army has suffered during the last two weeks. We must remember that what matters in the long campaign to which our country is irretrievably committed is not how many battles we may be losing now, but who wins the last one.

In the life-and-death struggle in which our country is at present engaged, there can be no room for such petty feelings as hatred and vengeance against the Japanese people and nation. Our cause is just, and we must fight cleanly and with our souls untarnished. Only thus shall we be worthy of victory when it does come. Only thus, too, can we ennoble the great sacrifices we have made, are making, and will make in the days that are ahead of us. It is so easy to be human when everything goes off happy as a marriage bell. But the supreme test of our humanity comes in when times are out of joint, such as they are now. To be kind and gentle amidst a sea of carnage and cruelty; to keep being reasonable when everybody else is mad; to tend human lives in whatever skin they may happen to be, yellow, white or black, as carefully as we would the flowers in our gardens—that is what we must desperately try to do. We are confident that China will always be China so long as we can be like that. Let us therefore fight our enemies as men, and not as brutes.

How long the war will continue, no one knows. But so far as our people are concerned, it must go on until our land is free from Japanese soldiers. We have no illusions that the way is going to be rosy for us. Right from the beginning, our leaders have repeatedly told us

that in fighting this war of self-defence we have to throw in every ounce of energy we have if we are out to win. There is no looking back. We have gone into it with our eyes open, and after we have counted the cost. Because there is no other way, we have gone into it after having discounted all possibilities of help from outside. After all, it is our own country's existence we are fighting for. What right have we to complain, now that we are in the thick of the fight, if no Power is willing to lift a finger to help us? There is no call for us to be either optimistic or pessimistic about the course of the war, but we have every reason to be hopeful about its outcome, provided we are sufficiently determined to bite our way through to victory no matter what the cost. That lies within our power.

The Nine-Power Conference at Brussels has released a whole flood of rumours about our Government patching up some sort of peace with the Japanese. This suspicion is absolutely without foundation. There is not the slightest hint of our Government backing down on any of the vital issues in which our country is involved vis-a-vis Japan. The removal of the capital to Chungking is a clear indication of our Government's resolve to carry on the war, even should Nanking be occupied by Japanese troops. But this is not to say that we are not prepared to discuss peace with Japan through the good offices of the Nine-Power Conference, provided Japan undertakes to respect Article I of the Nine-Power Treaty in its entirety. In that Article, the signatory Powers, of which Japan is one, agrees:

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;
2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;
3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

Peace on any other terms is impossible. Our people will not be satisfied with anything less; and we are sure far-sighted Japanese will also concur in our opinion. Lasting peace between China and Japan is what every fair-minded Chinese and Japanese want; and we would be lacking in candour if we were to hold out any false hopes of peace to the Japanese on any other basis but the above. The concluding sentence of T. S. Eliot in his essay on "Catholicism and International Order" comes in very pertinent here: "There must always be a middle way, though sometimes a devious way when natural obstacles have to be circumvented; . . . a way of mediation, but never, in those matters which permanently matter, a way of compromise." We cling to the middle way, the way of peace and moderation. Will the Japanese people join hands with us in walking along that middle way? W.Y.N.

Chinese Women Optimistic

Confidence in China's ultimate victory was expressed by many Chinese women recently when questioned regarding the outcome of present hostilities. These were purely personal opinions. Reasons for their attitudes varied, but remarks agreed in principle.

"China is badly equipped for war. We did not want to fight, and were poorly prepared," said Miss L. T. Zee, principal of a girls' high school. "Only superior fighting facilities have enabled Japan to gain her strong hold on our territory. There is no comparison between the soldiers themselves. In spirit and initiative, Chinese are infinitely superior. I believe that the internal resources of the country will enable our men to hold out long enough for us to weaken Japan financially. We must not underestimate Japan's capacities either, but our raw resources are so much superior that we shall outlast them and come back to final victory."

War Poem Contest

The Editor has pleasure in offering a prize of \$25.00 for the best poem—serious, humorous or satirical—submitted to him before December 31, 1937, dealing with the Shanghai phase of the Sino-Japanese war. A prize of \$10.00 will be given for the second best poem.

The rules governing the contest are:—

1. The poem is not to exceed 42 lines.
2. The Editor's decision shall be final.
3. No correspondence will be entered into with competitors.
4. The Editor reserves the right to publish any non-winning poems without payment.
5. None of the poems submitted will be returned.
6. All entries should either be typed or written in block letters.
7. Competitors wishing to enter the contest under pseudonyms may do so but should give also their real names (not for publication).
8. Entries should be addressed to the War Poem Contest Editor, the China Weekly Review, 160 Avenue Edward VII.

Trained in First Aid

Miss Zee's girls are trained in first aid, and before the reopening of school, many were serving in emergency hospitals as volunteer nurses. They were impressed by the fine morale and fighting spirit of the wounded soldiers. The girls have been helping actively in the Red Cross drive for funds, and with the making of clothes for refugees.

"If the Japanese are prepared to offer terms which are compatible with China's honor, the Chinese Government will agree to a peace conference," thought Mrs. Z. T. Shen, energetic social and club worker who has taken a big part in relief work of every sort during the months of fighting around Shanghai. "It seems possible from present indications that the Japanese themselves are not so anxious to carry on a long war. They are finding China more difficult to conquer than they anticipated. It is likely that they may want to come to an end, as long as they have some concrete gains to show," she continued. "At the same time, China is not likely to sign unbearably harsh demands. There seems decided hope that the present peace rumors will take concrete form shortly—and perhaps the outcome to China will be more favorable than appears from official reports."

Gone Too Far

"China has gone too far not to go further, and fight to the end," Miss Y. S. Hsu, general secretary of a large organization in Shanghai declared. "Also, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has shown a consistently firm attitude throughout the campaign, and it is unlikely that the National Government would sacrifice uselessly the hundreds of thousands of civilians and soldiers who have lost their lives in the present invasion, and let the Japanese take possession of the greater part of the country."

"The final outcome of the war will be favorable to China," considered Miss Shih Shao-yi, noted writer who has had many prominently featured articles published since the beginning of hostilities. "The strong attitude of the Chinese people as a whole, their wonderful bearing up under untold suffering and in the face of despair, cannot but uphold the defenders, and affect the final outcome," she concluded.

Mrs. R. S. Wang, prominent young society matron, was in Tientsin at the outbreak of hostilities. She witnessed the fighting in that city, and the sufferings of the people under Japanese domination. She returned to Shanghai with her children in time

to see the staunch defence of Chinese military forces in the Shanghai area. "I have no doubt about China winning the final victory," she stated. "Although military reverses are being encountered, this is due to inferior fighting equipment. But there are vast reserves of moral and physical strength. Although the main armies are forced to fall back under terrible bombardment, the guerrilla tactics in the rear of Japanese main forces are having their effect. Manchuria has been under Japanese puppet rule for six years. They have still serious difficulties with so-called 'bandits' who inflict telling thrusts on Japanese units all over the territory. They kill and wound many men each time, and take away with them captured supplies and arms which enable them to carry on their offensive warfare." Mrs. Wang has been extremely active with relief work among refugees.

Chinese Now United

"We may lose territory, but our people will be more than ever united," emphasized Mrs. H. L. Zung, noted women organizer. She is confident that China's cause will prevail. "Our people will realize the importance of patriotism and work together. I feel that the integrity of China will be China's salvation. It may be a long struggle, and China may lose all her territory to the invader." She shrugged slightly, and went on. "From the historic point of view, China has been conquered many times, yet the capital has returned finally, after change or revolution, to Nanking. The government may shift far west again, yet it will always return to Nanking. China will come into its own."

The economic structure of the country has something to do with this. "The entire economic structure will help in changing the character of the invaders, and render them unable to resist the remorseless pressure of the Chinese race. Conquest—especially of a country with China's conditions, with cheap servants and luxury possibilities—entices the conqueror to luxurious living and laxity of thinking. Not even the most warlike people who invaded this country was ever able to resist, and the Chinese people rose to overthrow them eventually. Bitter experience will make the Chinese people understand the importance of nationalism, and result in the overthrow of Japan," she asserted.

"Even so, I cannot believe that Japan will prevail in a military conquest. Our soldiers are too fine, and the pressure we are continuously bringing to bear will have its eventual effect also. I have no doubt about the outcome of this war."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A CHAIN LETTER

Shanghai, December 25, 1937.

To the Public:

Red Cross Week closed recently and with it a drive to raise \$100,000 locally. This is only a small fraction of the sum which is required to see the refugees through the winter. Still, it is Shanghai's quota and it gives every Shanghai resident a chance to do what he himself can towards alleviating the misery he readily sees on all sides as he walks the downtown streets.

If every one of you who reads this letter will not only take the initiative of making a contribution yourself but will also pass the word on to five of your friends and urge them to do likewise, even though the campaign has officially closed, the responsibility can be met and the sum raised.

The collective effort of *individual* men and women is sufficient and still needed to overcome many obstacles. This is made to you personally.

The Shanghai International Red Cross

Director's Office, 505 Honan Road
Campaign Headquarters, 129 Nanking Road

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Address Communications to E. H. Lockwood or Y. L. Lee, Y.M.C.A., Canton.

廣州青年號外

CANTON COMMITTEE FOR JUSTICE TO CHINA

COPIES OF THIS PAMPHLET MAY BE SECURED ON APPLICATION

Why A Committee For Justice to China?

E. H. Lockwood Secretary Y.M.C.A.

On the day when Japanese planes in one of their air raids on the almost defenseless city of Canton dropped bombs which caused the death of more than three hundred people, many of them women and children, living in a residential section far removed from any fortified areas, a small group of American citizens met and agreed on a message which was sent to the American Government. It was also agreed at this time that a longer statement should be made to be printed and sent to English speaking people of influence in all parts of the world. This circular is the statement which has been prepared. It was decided by the committee, appointed to prepare plans for the future, that a Canton Committee for Justice to China should be formed to be composed of persons in Canton, both Chinese and foreigners, who have connections with English speaking countries and wish to give to friends outside of China an interpretation of events as they appear to residents of Canton.

A Military Party a Curse to Japan

We do not wish to condemn all of the Japanese for many of us have had Japanese friends and we do not believe that the military clique of Japan can represent them. We believe that Japan is cursed with a strong military party who have felt their power slipping and one of the reasons for the present aggression in China is the desire of this military party to keep itself in power. We believe that there are silent forces of good will in Japan which are not heard at the present time but which are not in sympathy with the policy which their government is following at the present time. Sooner or later these now silent, forces will make themselves heard and will overcome the military party which now is mad in its venture in China.

Military Men Will Ruin Japan

There has never been in history a country dominated by military leaders which has had a long and continued success. We do not believe that Japan will prove an exception. Military men are good servants but they are poor masters and this is a lesson which Japan will learn in time. But in the meantime, the military leaders are murdering defenseless citizens of China and they will cause much more misery before they are brought to account for their crimes.

THE FIVE POINT OBJECTIVE OF THE CANTON COMMITTEE FOR JUSTICE TO CHINA

1. United Action between the United States and Great Britain in the present Sino-Japanese Crisis.
2. Economic Boycott of Japan by Western Powers.
3. Aid to China in the purchase and transportation of means of defense.
4. Immediate Meeting of all Powers Signatory to the Nine Power Pact.
5. Contributions for relief work for those who suffer from Japanese atrocities not only in Canton but in all parts of China. They should be sent to the Committee Headquarters, YMCA., Canton.

China Not Helpless

Compared to Japan, China is not strong in military equipment but she has made advance in recent years and the country is preparing to continue the struggle for a long period. One good effect of the attack of Japan is to bring about the unity of the country to its final stages for China today is united as she has never been united before. She is fortunate in the leadership of Marshall Chiang Kai Shek who stands far above any leader of Japan today not only in his intellect but in his moral and spiritual qualities. In recent days when we have seen a great city threatened by death from bombing planes there has been great concern and much fear; but greater than fear and concern is the determination of the people to struggle to the end against the military leaders of Japan.

Appeal to Residents of South China

Membership in the Committee for Justice to China is open to all English speaking residents of South China, both Chinese and foreigners. Those who wish to affiliate with the organization can do so by sending in their names to the headquarters in the YMCA of Canton. There are no membership dues. Our desire is to unite all those who have connections with residents of foreign countries whom they wish to keep informed of events in China, particularly in the Canton Delta. We believe that all foreign residents and returned students have in Western countries friends, some of them influential in education, government or business who can act more intelligently and forcefully if from time to time they have letters or printed information to give them the ideas of those who are close to the events in China. China is in a struggle for existence and needs the help of foreign countries if she is to have the victory. We believe that this support from foreign countries may come more readily if those of us who have connections with friends outside of China use them in this time of crisis.

A Tentative Five Point Objective

We urge the friends of China in foreign countries to work with us for the five point objective which is printed below. It should be understood that these points of objective are only tentative and may be changed as conditions change. We believe they offer the minimum of aid to China at the present time and that they will appeal to the sense of fairness of all those who believe in justice not only in China but throughout the world.

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WHENCE THE PROVOCATION?

H. C. Brownell.

How came China and Japan to have a falling out? The Western world knows something of the struggle that began decades ago. It remembers the declared war by which the Tokyo government forced China to surrender suzerainty in Korea and to cede Formosa and the Pescadores. But does it realize with what creeping steps Japanese imperialism has aggrandized itself in the past quarter century, the subtlety with which the military and their diplomatic henchmen have gone about their work?

Let us look at what has happened in Manchuria. The story is familiar enough of the political subjection of the 30 million Chinese of Manchuria. The sequel is also pretty well known—the monopolizing by the Japanese of all authority and policy making behind a transparent screen of dispised puppets. Education has, moreover, been reorganized so that the subjects shall develop manual skills and not aspire to professions demanding a liberal training or critical judgment. Initiative is to be kept strictly in the hands of the invaders. They are to direct. The Chinese are to follow. They are to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for the conquerors.

Of the undeclared war on Shanghai in 1932 one does not need to say much. On the minds of many visitors to that great city since 1932, the picture is indelible of scores of blocks in complete ruins. For a time the fire-scarred walls of the greatest publishing house in Asia and its famous Oriental Library stood as mute evidence of what "a Monroe doctrine for Asia" really means.

Peiping and Tientsin have likewise their story of bullying at the hands of unwelcome guests. Before this year the numbers of the Japanese garrison were swollen out of all relation to the protocol of 1901 by which it was pretended that the establishment was authorized. These intruders have again and again manoeuvred in the countryside by night as much as by day. They have demonstrated in the streets of the ancient capital with entire disregard of ordinary traffic. Streets have been blocked and pedestrians thrown back (Americans and Frenchmen as well as Chinese) while the ceremony was performed of presenting a banner bestowed on a regiment by His Imperial Majesty. Caterpillar tractors have torn up the asphalt pavement, the repairs left to the Chinese municipality. Chinese owned houses and schools have been seized for the use of Japanese. At Tientsin the Chinese secretary of the city government was actually arrested and carried off by the Japanese from his office. Two or three small incidents were provoked and magnified into a pretext for forcing a large Chinese contingent out of its barracks at Fengtai so that their places could be taken by regiments from Japan. Drilling of Peiping students was forbidden. Of course at any time the Chinese commander *might* have stubbornly refused any concessions. This would have meant immediate war and China knew she was still unprepared. She had to play for time while making every possible effort to develop her defences.

The so-called autonomous regime of northeastern Hopei is another piece of Japanese workmanship. Having subsidized bandit gangs to terrorize the population (some 6 millions) they used the disorder as a pretext for overrunning the region and fighting the legitimate Chinese troops back to a line near Peiping and Tientsin. Then they proclaimed the "demilitarization" of the territory, planted an all powerful "adviser" beside every district executive, and set up a puppet chief at Tungechow with 30 Japanese "experts" to pull the strings.

What need is there to mention repeated threats during the last three years that an overwhelming force from Japan would amputate five northern provinces and create another subject state out of them. Sometimes the talk was of the Yellow river as the southern boundary, sometimes all Shantung, which the river bisects, was to be included. Anyhow, the Kuomintang was to be suppressed as the one patriotic organization spread over all China. Nationalism in China is a "threat to the peace of East Asia."

To facilitate excising Chinese territory and to make it seem more reasonable to the Japanese public and to foreign nations strenuous efforts were put forth by military agents in North China centers to use rowdies (in Japan they would be called ronin, in China they are the lowest of the low) to raise the flag of revolt. Grievances were furnished them from Tokyo and money of course. These independent regimes were to stand ready at a signal to hand over to their Japanese employers. In Shantung as well as Hopei, however, these insurgents met with short shrift and nowhere except in the East Hopei territory described above did one of them make any headway.

Enough said. What ground have Japanese "spokesmen" to stand on when they attribute to Chinese unreasonableness the present conflict? Would any intelligent, self-respecting people sit still under such treatment and not prepare to resist the invader, nay to recover a portion of what has been lost? What writer of history texts or school readers would so prostitute himself as to speak of those who have wronged his country in the honeyed words Tokyo demands? The Chinese reject the proffered hand of friendship forsooth! This a mailed fist that is offered them, a side swipe on the ear—and then they are asked to say thank you and co-operate. Co-operate in what? Would it not be as a slave and his slave-driver co-operate in producing for the enjoyment of the master?

It can be left to the conscience of mankind to pass judgement on the effort of Japan to subjugate the Chinese nation.

Professor H. E. Brownell is Professor of History in Lingnan University and has lived in China for twenty five years. He was one of the first of the Rhodes Scholars sent from America to Oxford and has for years made a study of Oriental affairs.

Dr. W. W. Cadbury has been for many years a physician with the Canton Hospital in Canton. He is a Quaker and when a Quaker writes as Dr. Cadbury does in this article the reader may be assured there is a reason.

To all Men and Women of Good Will:

For more than twenty years Japan has been preparing for the subjugation of the Chinese race. Beginning with the twenty-one demands issued in 1915, her next step, after the Great War, was in 1931 when she seized Manchuria and destroyed a large section of the city of Shanghai. A threat was made in 1935 to isolate five northern provinces of China from the rule of Nanking. But "Der Tag" had not yet come!

During the last summer there were rumors of disorganization in the Eastern armies of Soviet Russia. Great Britain and France were completely pre-occupied with the serious crisis in the Mediterranean.

The policy of the present Government at Washington was definitely opposed to any interference in foreign conflicts and, with the probable invocation of the Neutrality Act, Japan would gain an immense advantage over China. Meanwhile the Chinese nation had become united and was growing stronger every day. The critical moment was at hand.

On July 7 came the first act of aggression, when Japanese troops attacked the Chinese at the Marco Polo Bridge, just outside of Peiping.

Hostilities spread to Tientsin, Peiping and to Shanghai. Here the Japanese forces used the International Settlement and foreign ships as a protection for their attack upon the Chinese forces massed across the Soochow Creek and the Whampoo River. Despite this advantage and in the face of the highly mechanized forces of Japan, the united Chinese people have put up a remarkable resistance.

For this "insincerity" on the part of China, the Japanese have perpetrated many reprisals. An American Mission Hospital at Nantungchau; an American school in Nanchang; an American Hospital in Waichow, all have been subjected to deliberate attacks by Japanese aircraft.

Trains and junks carrying Chinese refugees, mostly women and children, have been deliberately attacked, and thousands of innocent non-combatants have been slain.

Reliable reports indicate that within a few days air raids in Nanking have killed hundreds of civilians; in Hankow more than 600 and in Canton 1,000. Dr. Bates in an article in this pamphlet tells of one of the bombing raids in Canton.

Eleven universities have been deliberately attacked and in some cases completely destroyed.

Public buildings, the pride of the Chinese people, tho having no connection with the military arm of the nation, have been partially or completely ruined. One need only mention the headquarters of the Kuomintang in Nanking, the Civic centre in Shanghai and the magnificent Sun Yatsen Memorial Hall in Canton.

Despite all of these atrocities, the Chinese people have shown remarkable self-restraint. No reprisals have been reported upon Japanese cities, and the usual hatred engendered in war time, toward an enemy, has been kept in control to a remarkable degree.

Those of us representing the ideals of freedom and democracy to the Chinese, in some cases during twenty or thirty years of intimate contact with them, have grown to greatly admire the people of this nation; and especially during the past few years, under the leadership of Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai Shek, we have observed the rapid upbuilding of a great people, among whom the principles of democracy hold the first place in the minds of the rulers.

At this time, when the Chinese have proved themselves qualified for sound and liberal government, Japan, having made alliances with the two other totalitarian states, has launched a most vicious attack upon the very existence of the Chinese people. Her avowed purpose is to break the will of the nation. Thus by employing every engine of war and the full force of her mechanized unites she has set out to destroy whole towns and villages including their inhabitants.

Thus the Japanese (military and naval forces) in the mad lust for conquest are bent on the complete destruction of the Chinese nation.

Will they stop with China? Assuredly no! Encouraged by her allies in Europe nothing will satisfy Japan but the subjugation of all the countries of the Pacific to her "Imperial Way" and the elimination there of the freedom of the mind and the spirit of man.

We who have endured, in some small measure, the tragic sufferings of the Chinese at the hands of her invading enemy are distressed at the recent trend to recall Americans home at this time of China's greatest need. We believe that those who have given lives of service to this land should be expected to remain if possible in this time of crisis. Many of us have important tasks "behind the lines": to maintain the institutions so greatly depleted of staff. We cannot fight in the battle front but there is much to be done in the bank and business offices, in the hospitals, churches, schools and colleges. If our Chinese colleagues want our help and counsel, this is no time to desert them, in order to run to safety.

We call upon our fellow citizens in the U.S.A. and friends in the British Empire to support the Chinese in their fight for freedom and democracy against insuperable odds. Let us not be found guilty of any share in this slaughter of innocent women and children, by contributions in arms, in money, or any other supplies that may be utilized by the Japanese forces in their murderous invasion.

As Madame Chiang Kai Shek has declared China is fighting for the nations of the World for freedom from the tyranny where men and women become mere units of a machine. Now is the time for the freedom loving people of the World to unite in upholding their ideals.

Dr. W. W. Cadbury.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A Statement to Friends of China in Foreign Countries.

Hon. Tsang Yang-fu, Mayor of Canton.

The Japanese military is pursuing a policy of aggression and terrorism in direct contravention against international peace compacts and principles of humanity. China is now resisting with all her national resources against this aggression in order not only to safe guard her own sovereignty but also to protect the peace of the world. Consequently she looks forward to all friendly powers for moral support and she believes that no country which upholds the principles of justice would give any material support and assistance to the aggressor.

China will resist to the bitter end irrespective of the attitude of the powers and the nature of the reply of the League to her appeal. It seems obvious that China has to face today what other peace loving countries will have to face tomorrow and we leave this to the friendly powers to realize for themselves. We feel that nations should be conscious of this growing menace to world peace and should therefore take concerted action to check the Japanese aggressive activities and the League should without further hesitation take concrete steps to uphold justice.

If America, Britain, France and Holland do not expect to give up all of their rights in Asia and most of their trade they will need to act now to give strength to China who is really fighting their battle. But Chinese are determined that no matter what foreign nations do it is our duty to resist the Japanese and this resistance will continue not for months but for years, if necessary. We remember the proverb which comes to us from the West, "He, whom the gods destroy, they first make mad". The Japanese militarists are mad in a lust for power and we firmly believe that in the long run they will be destroyed and we intend to do our part in this destruction no matter how much we suffer. There is no other way.

~~Dr. F. E. Bates is a missionary doctor in charge of a hospital in the eastern suburbs of Canton not far from the flying field which has for many days been subjected to heavy bombing. This is the best residential suburb of Canton. Nearly everyone has moved from this dangerous area but Dr. Bates with his wife, aided by a few loyal Chinese assistants, have kept the hospital open and have not even bothered to put sand bags at the doors and windows. At one thirty in the afternoon (in clear daylight) on Sept. 22, Japanese planes dropped six bombs on a residential area killing not less than three hundred persons, mostly women and children. When the bombing stopped Dr. Bates drove a truck to the scene and brought out wounded and dying people. Through lack of money, Dr. Bates does not have an ambulance for his hospital. It may appeal to some friend of China to give an ambulance to this gallant American physician for use in this crisis.~~

Cantonese Civilians Murdered by Japanese Bombs.

Dr. F. E. Bates

We arrived at the scene of the bombing on Sept. 22 within twenty minutes after the explosion. The "all clear" signal had not yet been given, but the disaster was evidently so great that at every turn police

and soldiers facilitated our passage through the otherwise closed streets. The smoke and dust of the explosion had not yet cleared away, and the road for some distance was heavily piled with twisted timbers, broken glass, bricks, plaster, and all manner of building material. As we approached the scene of the bombing, police and soldiers on every side were calling and beckoning us to the place where wounded lay. As soon as it became evident that a rescue party had arrived there came from every corner and hole in the debris which had, but a few moments before, been their living quarters, the most wretched, pitiable pieces of humanity that can be readily imagined. Some were seen with blood dripping off their faces crawling over the demolished buildings calling loudly their loved ones who were buried under the fallen structures. One old lady, past eighty years of age, sat on the curb holding her bleeding head calling urgently to us to rescue her children and grand children who were buried in the mass beside her. Numerous children were running about in a semi-dazed way trying to find mothers who could be seen no where. One man, badly cut about the head and face, came out of a little hole where a bit flooring from the upper story had formed a triangle with the wall and floor below carrying a little girl about ten years old. He pled with us to bring him back in the first load. His wife, two smaller children, and mother were buried under the houses and he seemed terribly fearful that something would happen to separate his only living child from him.

The story might be continued almost indefinitely, for the sights of those few moments, while we were filling the hospital cars with the wounded, were many indeed. We were but one of six hospitals which went to rescue. Between groans of pain some were mourning for lost members of the family. Others whose families could all be accounted for had lost all of their worldly possessions. Where would they be able to pass the nights after leaving the hospital? Where could they get food? The scenes of human pain and woe were almost innumerable and defy description. They were not living near a military camp, an arsenal, important railroad, or any kind of military defense works. It was one of the busy streets of this section of Canton, and yet the pitiless eye of the invader regarded not men. His was but a program of ruthless destruction and terror.

Dr. F. E. Bates is a missionary doctor in charge of a hospital in the eastern suburbs of Canton not far from the flying field which has for many ways been subjected to heavy bombing. Nearly everyone has moved from this dangerous area but Dr. Bates with his wife, aided by a few loyal Chinese assistants, have kept the hospital open At one, thirty in the afternoon (in clear daylight) on Sept. 22, Japanese planes dropped six bombs on a residential area killing not less than three hundred persons, mostly women and children. When the bombing stopped Dr. Bates drove a truck to the scene and brought out wounded and dying people.

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Editorial from

THE NATION

December 25, 1937

America Must Choose

IN THIS issue we carry two important statements on American foreign policy. The first, by Norman Thomas, twice Socialist candidate for President, is a stern warning against what he feels to be the danger of collective action for peace under present circumstances. The second, by Raymond Leslie Buell, president of the Foreign Policy Association, contains an equally vigorous admonition against the dangers inherent in the isolationist position which Mr. Thomas partially reflects. That two leading opponents of war can take such conflicting positions on this issue is indicative of the cleavage which runs through the country on the question of American foreign policy.

Yet despite this sharp divergence of opinion, the country must somehow make up its mind between these two policies. An attempt to follow a middle course between isolation and collective security would be the most dangerous of all. Vacillation and inconsistency only lead to fiascos such as the Brussels conference and the shameful conduct of the democracies toward Spain. The United States must either withdraw from the world, economically and politically, and rely on "the advantages of our geographic and historic position," to quote Mr. Thomas, or aid in the creation of an international system of law which will prevent war. Thus far this country has sought to enjoy all the privileges and advantages of its world position without sharing in the responsibilities inherent in those privileges. And to an extent which few Americans like to admit, the present state of world anarchy is the result of this policy. The utter lack of responsibility which so bewilders foreigners attempting to appraise American policy must be attributed almost entirely to isolationist sentiment.

While professing to believe in collective security in principle, Mr. Thomas asks precisely at what nation it should be directed. According to our understanding of the term, collective security cannot be directed at anyone. Therein lies the all-important distinction between collective security and a system of alliances. Collective security implies an agreement between a group of nations, which is open to all, by which each nation undertakes to bring pressure on any other which resorts to war in violation of its pledge. The United States has never entered such an arrangement, although its signature to the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact may be interpreted as imposing certain obligations.

It is highly important, however, to note that collective security does not imply necessarily the use of military force. The task of eliminating war from the world is largely one of developing non-violent substitutes for

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military force, to be used, when necessary, for the enforcement of international law and order.

But what if economic sanctions fail? Are we then to resort to military force to check fascist aggression? It is at this point that Mr. Thomas and many other pacifists draw back, assuming that there is some occult force by which economic sanctions are automatically transformed into military action—and war. We do not consider this a fair assumption. Economic and financial sanctions cannot fail if they are honestly applied. No country, least of all Japan, Italy, or Germany, can carry on war and maintain its population if cut off from all assistance from the outside world. Moreover, the application of collective economic pressure does not in any way imply or prepare the way for subsequent resort to military force. To take an extreme case, if a desperate, impoverished Japan seized the Dutch East Indies to get oil, economic sanctions, as Mr. Buell points out, would ultimately bring it to terms since it would still be unable to obtain adequate supplies of iron ore, cotton, wool, antimony, magnesite, manganese, tungsten, chrome, bauxite, tin, lead, nickel, and a number of other raw materials which are essential to modern industry, and without which no country could hope to wage war.

Admittedly, the prospect of joint economic action against Japan is slight. Mr. Thomas may be correct in saying that the chances for effective collective pressure were much greater in the Ethiopian crisis than at the present time. But what he does not state is that the weakness of the League in the early days of the Manchurian crisis, the failure of the powers to apply oil sanctions against Italy, and the collapse of the Brussels conference can be partly traced to one cause—the inability or unwillingness of the United States to cooperate because of isolationist sentiment. If this sentiment could be overcome, to an even greater extent than it has been in the past few weeks, there is every indication that Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union would cooperate in any program for the Far East that this country might propose.

Mr. Buell shows in some detail how the program of the isolationist groups, to which Mr. Thomas gives aid and comfort, creates a real threat of war. This threat will continue to exist as long as the United States, the world's greatest commercial and financial power, refuses either to join in collective efforts to prevent war or to participate in a program for worldwide economic appeasement. While the fascist powers are demanding access to raw materials and markets to further the solution of their admittedly grave economic problems, the United States is sitting tight, behind a high tariff wall, on more than half the world's gold supply and an overwhelming share of the world's supply of raw materials, refusing either to "divvy up" or to join in practical measures to protect countries like Ethiopia, Spain, and China. Because of the "advantages of our geographic and historic position" America is virtually safe from attack, but our refusal to join in any common action to protect less fortunate nations has created a condition of international anarchy in which no country can be safe.

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THE NATION

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How Can We Escape War?

Neutrality Plus Socialism

BY NORMAN THOMAS

COLLECTIVE security is a phrase or an idea increasingly dear to such assorted Americans as Earl Browder, Dorothy Thompson, and the editors of *The Nation* and the *New York Times*. The League for Peace and Democracy (formerly the League Against War and Fascism) in its official program dodges the phrase but, following President Roosevelt's lead, advocates "the necessity of concerted action to quarantine aggressors," which if it means anything means to most people collective security. But what does collective security mean for Americans on the eve of the year 1938 of what is called by courtesy the Christian era? One suspects that its advocates find it easier to agree that those of us who disbelieve in it are "isolationists," "futile pacifists," "unwitting tools of fascism," or "Trotskyists" than to define what they mean by it or how they would apply it in the present crisis.

Now collective security as an abstract idea is reasonable, but we must consider it as a concrete proposal for action under present conditions, not under the conditions that prevailed at some former time or which may prevail in the future. The advocate of collective security must tell his fellow-Americans plainly how he would answer such immensely pertinent questions as these: Assuming that collective security is something to be achieved against aggressor nations, precisely at which nations should it be directed? Japan? Or Japan and Germany and Italy, the latter two being clearly aggressors in Spain? Who will be our partners in achieving it? Presumably the "democratic" nations. But which are they? Great Britain? France? Russia? If, as is probable, collective security should begin with economic sanctions, what reason have we to think that the sanctions would be effective, or if effective that they would be an alternative rather than a preface to war? If collective security means war, why should we expect that war to be essentially different from the first war to make the world safe for democracy, or likely to result in a better peace? How can the United States wage war without establishing at home a military dictatorship, universal conscription, and fascism?

It is because I have not heard, read, or imagined any remotely satisfactory answer to these questions that I reject the idea of American participation in collective security as enormously dangerous. I am aware of the difficulties of keeping the United States out of a war if it becomes a world war; I should prefer to keep war out of the world. But I object to being dismissed as an isolationist when I insist that we have a right to utilize for our peace the advantages of our geographic and historic

position, and that it is more practicable to keep the United States government out of war than to use it in war for ideal ends. Moreover, if we fail, I think that those of us who tried to keep the United States out of war will have a better hearing from the potential builders of a new social order than those who must assume responsibility for another war with its tragic suffering and ultimate futility and disillusionment. I believe in cooperation for peace and the maximum possible isolation from war. Those who have turned deaf ears to every plea for cooperation for peace while there was time have no right to demand that I support cooperation for war.

From war and all its effects there is no complete escape for any nation in an interdependent world, but there is no fatalistic inevitability of history or economics which compels the United States to fight Japan, now or later. The assumption of the inevitability of imperialist war between the United States and Japan rests among other things on the refusal to see that our real hope against both imperialism and fascism lies in sanctions which some day the workers of Japan will join with their brothers in China and in other lands in enforcing, and not in the triumph of one set of capitalist powers interested in preserving the status quo over another set which wants to change it.

Let us look now in some detail at the bitter facts which make a collective security of democratic states in our crazy, capitalist-nationalist world a utopian dream. There have been many occasions when the omens for successful action by non-fascist nations to restrain an aggressor were far more auspicious than they are now. But nothing happened. Great Britain and France, probably alone, certainly with the aid of the U. S. S. R., by vigorous diplomacy and a discreet threat of economic sanctions could have blocked Mussolini's war on Ethiopia before it began. In the end, too late, through the League of Nations they imposed weak sanctions which only irritated the Italian people and drove them closer to their dictator. Even Russia continued to sell oil to Mussolini. And even Russia today is purchasing a new naval vessel from the fascist yards of Livorno. Simply by permitting the Spanish government the usual rights of a nation Great Britain and France—yes, and America—could probably have ended the fascist war in Spain before it menaced the peace of mankind. Great Britain, the same Britain which is now expected to fight for democracy, preferred to take chances on Mussolini rather than on any sort of social revolution in Spain. In 1931, before Hitler came to power and before the Japanese were so deeply committed to the Chinese conquest, it is quite possible that the League of Nations, the U. S. S. R., and the United States could have prevented the rape of Manchuria by economic sanctions or the threat of them. There

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was no remote approach to agreement among them. Why, then, expect them suddenly today to agree on effective sanctions against Japan, to saying nothing of Italy and Germany?

And if by a miracle they should agree on effective sanctions, including an embargo on cotton, scrap iron, and oil, would not a united Japan seek to break that blockade before it was strangled by it? Would not the consequence be a prompt attack on the Dutch East Indies to get oil? And could this nation, partly responsible for provoking that attack, refuse to aid the victim? It is dangerous irresponsibility, in view of all the probabilities, for Communists or liberals to do what I heard Clarence Hathaway do before the Negro Congress in Philadelphia: assure the audience that effective economic sanctions would bring Italy, Germany, and Japan to terms *without any danger of war*. On the contrary, the danger is so great that advocates of such sanctions at least should press for an armament program in the United States far more costly than our present billion-dollar military budget. "Collective security," in other words, means for the United States certain militarism and all but certain war.

That war would not be for "democracy." What is the common denominator of democracy which would unite Stalin's non-capitalist but totalitarian state with the capitalist but non-totalitarian states of Messrs. Roosevelt, Chamberlain, and Chautemps? Truly a new age of faith is upon us when men and women old enough to remember how we proposed to make the world safe for democracy in one war and got Hitler—or with eyes to observe events in India, the Near East, and tragic Spain—can believe in a crusade for democracy led by Stalin, Roosevelt, Chamberlain, and the French General Staff. As I write these lines, the British government is showing a far greater interest in finding terms on which Hitler may be satisfied than in building a British, French, and Russian alliance.

It is indeed probable that Great Britain and France may fight one or more of the fascist nations, but it will not be for democracy; it will be for their national and imperial interests. If the United States fights Japan, it will be for national "honor," to avenge some injury or slight, to keep a Far Eastern trade worth less than our annual military budget in time of peace. It will not be to make China safe for those Chinese whom we continuously and cheerfully affront by our unilateral exclusion act. The only service of our idealists will be to provide rationalizations highly useful to the militarists. Those rationalizations will be more sophisticated than the Wilsonian rationalizations of 1917 but not essentially different from them, or truer than they were.

To these arguments I have heard no plausible answers. The less romantic among the advocates of collective security meet the issue something like this: "We grant that the motives behind collective security may be mixed. Nevertheless, we should seek alliances now because sooner or later we shall have to fight Japan and probably other fascist nations too. This is a good time to get it over, before Japan has strengthened its position by its

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conquest of China. To defeat the fascist aggressors, from whatever motives, is the one essential to any hope of building a decent world in which constructive forces can operate."

This statement misjudges the probable effect of a temporary Japanese victory in China as badly as it misunderstands the cause and cure of fascism. Japan will probably be able to impose its own terms of peace in China. But not for long. It has the undying hatred of a patient people whose ancestors have always absorbed their conquerors. Guerrilla war, passive resistance, Communist risings aided by the U. S. S. R., not only in China but possibly in Japan itself, will still further weaken the structure of a nation already greatly strained by the economic weakness of its position and the costs of war. If foreign nations made war on Japan, the rulers and the masses might unite against the foe; the difficulties of gathering the fruits of a costly victory will have no such effect.

Fascism and imperialism are the products of our capitalist-nationalist civilization at a certain stage of its development or disintegration. They are the offspring, horribly ugly but legitimate, of the status quo which we are asked to preserve. Victory for the armies of Stalin, Chamberlain, Roosevelt, and Chautemps might remove certain dictators and might—or might not—encourage constructive revolution in the conquered states. But certainly in the victorious empires there would be no constructive revolution. The result, as our Communist friends ought to realize, would not be the world Lenin sought in 1917 but a world in which all the major causes of war and fascism would still be operative. Stalin might be among the victors, but not socialism or democracy. The unity of workers with hand and brain would still remain to be achieved. And in that unity lies our best hope of ending the division of men and nations into the houses of Have and Have Not. The chances are that a victorious United States, if not too exhausted, would stay in China to finish the work of "civilization" which the Japanese militarists had begun. Our government might take the devil's role of arch-imperialist. For, never forget, the victory of the United States, however high and holy our alleged aim, would with absolute certainty require the militarization of our people and the establishment of virtual fascism at home. And that fascism would of necessity be imperialistic.

Even today the War Department is ready for universal conscription, to draft us all for trench or work bench. The first and perhaps the greatest of the enormous casualties of our next war will be liberty and democracy at home. This will be the one sure consequence of the attempt to use the American capitalist government, in or out of an alliance, to establish peace or democracy by war. It will be a result not limited in duration to the war. No one can tell how long it would take a brutalized, exhausted people, drugged by war and possibly by the thing we call "victory," to throw off its chains.

Are we, then, condemned to do nothing? It is true that no means is at hand to bring to us or to the world the democracy and peace as dear to us as to any advocates

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of collective security. We pay, and pay a tragic price, for all our mistakes and lost opportunities since the summer of 1914. In any course is some danger and to any program some objection.

I should agree with Mr. Buell's program, as far as it goes, with two important exceptions. I believe (1) that his third point, an international embargo on raw materials, is today an impossible and dangerous version of collective security; and (2) that the desirable improvement in the neutrality law is not an increase in Presidential powers of discretion. Whatever praise is due the President's Chicago speech as a condemnation of aggression, it was an undemocratic gesture toward changing American policy, a gesture inconsistent with the President's preceding acts, and one which led the world to expect something more than another futile conference to add to Norman Hezekiah Davis's long and unbroken record of failure. Yet many of those most suspicious of Mr. Roosevelt's ambitions praised this very undemocratic method of changing our foreign policy in a matter literally of life and death to us all.

The stock argument that neutrality of the sort envisaged by our present imperfect law is of advantage to Japan as against China is simply untrue, unless, indeed, one believes that we should be ready to fight for the right to ship guns to China. This is what some of my Chinese friends frankly desire. In reality, to call this undeclared war of Japan's "war," to ban all loans, to prohibit all shipments of munitions to Japan as well as to China, and to make it harder for Japan to buy and transport other materials would diminish the advantage over China which Japan's superior merchant marine and banking facilities now give it. If the government would immediately enforce the neutrality law and withdraw our citizens and fighting forces from danger zones in the Far East, it would be in a better, not a worse, position to use such moral pressure as might possibly make for peace. Neutrality in a world war would impose economic hardships on this nation which should be considered and as far as possible anticipated. But those hardships would be less than the costs of war.

Beyond this program for the government, I heartily agree with *The Nation's* support of a popular boycott by consumers of Japanese goods. Properly conducted, such a boycott is not open to the objections to official embargos backed by navies.

Above all, any long-range program for peace requires an active struggle for a new social and international order impossible under capitalist nationalism. This alone can give the economic assurance to nations in the House of Have Not which Mr. Buell suggests that we should give to Japan. No defeat of Japanese militarists will mean much for peace in a world which continues to deprive not only the working class generally but certain races and nations in particular of sure access to the material means necessary for their well-being. The ominous portent of fascism but strengthens our fundamental analysis of the cause and cure of war. "Workers of the world unite" is still the best slogan for achieving a genuine collective security.

The Failure of Isolation

BY RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL

DURING the past few years many American liberals have abandoned hope of building a world order which will prevent war. Appalled by the difficulty of finding a constructive way out of the existing international chaos, they now want to insulate the United States from "other people's wars" by a policy which may be called the New Isolation.

The New Isolation has at least four planks in its platform:

1. Economic self-containment, so as to cut the economic ties between the United States and the outside world. Although few liberals advocate the complete application of this doctrine, many have supported the idea that upon the outbreak of war the United States should prohibit the export of essential raw materials to all belligerents.
2. Conscription of capital in time of war; taking the profits out of war.
3. Continental self-defense.
4. A popular referendum before any declaration of war except in the event of invasion.

Despite the ardor with which the New Isolation program has been supported, it has already proved a failure. The movement for mandatory embargos produced nothing better than the Neutrality Act of May, 1937. This act prohibits the export of munitions in time of war but allows the unrestricted export of raw materials provided belligerents pay cash and transport such materials in non-American ships. Instead of cutting the economic ties of the United States with warring countries, the Neutrality Act, if applied, will make us an indirect ally of the power with the largest navy and financial resources—Japan in the Orient and Britain in Europe. In its present form, therefore, it is as likely to involve us in war as were the pre-war rules of neutrality.

The movement to draft capital and take the profits out of war has also proved a delusion. Despite its advocacy of anti-war-profits bills, the Nye Munitions Committee in June, 1936, quietly published a report which admitted that it is virtually impossible to take the profits out of war. "It is obvious," the report declared, "that the most important contribution toward victory to be made in the economic sphere is the bringing about of the tremendous and rapid increase in production that is needed. Yet it is extremely unlikely that this production will be forthcoming without the evils of profiteering. . . . Whenever the attempts to eliminate these evils conflict with the efforts to stimulate production, it is the former rather than the latter which must be sacrificed."

The idea of continental defense has made even less progress. For all our pacifism, our unwillingness to make any international commitments, and our supposed geographic security, the United States is spending a billion dollars a year upon its armaments. We have a navy and an air force as strong as that of any other power. Why do Congress and public opinion overwhelmingly support such expenditures? Not because of any plot of the muni-

tions makers, but because of a feeling of insecurity and a desire to be prepared for any eventuality.

Faced with the collapse of these proposals, the New Isolationists are now turning to the idea of a referendum before a declaration of war. At first sight the idea is attractive, but American history gives no evidence that the "people" are any less belligerent than Congress. The only virtue of a referendum is the virtue of delay, but this delay may prove disastrous if it gives an enemy time to seize bases in Latin America and launch an attack against the Panama Canal. Confronted by such a threat, most Presidents and Congresses would ignore any constitutional injunction regarding a pre-war plebiscite and resist the aggression against Latin America, declining to admit that the armed clash which might thus result was "war." So long as the President retains any diplomatic discretion or the right to move the fleet, it remains possible for him to create an "incident" and work up public opinion into a war fever. Similar in nature to the prohibition amendment and the anti-war pact, the proposed referendum on war would have little effect on the foreign policy of the United States, while it would encourage fascist aggression elsewhere. From the standpoint of political theory it is well to remember that the dictators of Rome appealed over the heads of the Senate to the masses, that Napoleon III employed the plebiscite to legitimize his coup d'état, and that Hitler solemnly appeals to the referendum to confirm his most spectacular acts. American democracy is not going to be saved by tying the hands of Congress in times of emergency; its future depends upon making Congress a more responsible and representative body.

Forced to admit these failures, many of the supporters of the New Isolation now show a spirit of complete discouragement. Some of them predict that no matter what we do, the United States will inevitably be drawn into the next war. Unwilling to cooperate with other powers, and unwilling to pay the price for the New Isolation, the United States today drifts along upon a rising tide of chaos. As the sinking of the Panay indicates, the relations between the United States and Japan may at any time develop a crisis. A policy of endeavoring single-handed to protect our interests in a war zone creates the danger of war.

It cannot be denied that the economic interests, the political institutions, and the security of the United States will be seriously endangered by another world war, whether we remain neutral or not. While most observers do not predict a general war in the immediate future, the fact remains that the powers today are spending nearly three times as much on armaments as they did in 1914. Recently the world has been enjoying an economic recovery based partly upon these unproductive armament expenditures, financed by borrowing. Sooner or later the limit of such expenditure will be reached, particularly in the dictatorships, which will be confronted by bankruptcy. What will they do then? Turn workers out of the munitions plants into the streets and run the risk of social revolution? Resort to a gigantic inflation? Or take the risks of becoming involved in a foreign ad-

venture? Unless the present world trend is reversed, one need not be an alarmist to predict that during the next five years the world will experience a new war or a new depression of far greater magnitude than any we have known in the past.

The United States could conceivably escape the ravages of a new depression or a new world war by socializing its economy on a self-contained basis. But in view of our huge agricultural surpluses and the technological advantages of our mass-production industries, which can only be fully utilized through international trade, self-containment would inevitably mean a lowered standard of living. Recent difficulties in obtaining farm legislation and imposing controls on American industry indicate the far greater difficulties that would be involved in a more drastic reorganization of our economic life through democratic processes. The attempt to achieve self-containment would probably lead in the direction of dictatorship, and a dictatorship of the right. The experience of Germany and Italy shows that self-containment, or autarchy, can probably be achieved only through fascism.

As for the effect of war on our political institutions, the United States would probably submit to dictatorship if it entered another war. But there is also grave danger of its being led to sacrifice its liberties in order to keep out of war. Wars are caused as much by clashes of ideas as by clashes of economic interests. And the American people have never shown restraint in expressing their dislike of conditions abroad. There is something ironical in the fact that at the very time when Congress was debating the Neutrality Act last spring, Mayor LaGuardia, John L. Lewis, Hugh Johnson, Cardinal Mundelein, and Senator Borah were denouncing fascism in language more severe perhaps than that used by any responsible leader in France or England. America hates fascism today infinitely more than it hated the German Kaiser in 1914. Possibly we shall continue to confine our hatred to words. But to be logical, an isolationist should favor censorship of the press, newsreels, and movies upon the outbreak of war between foreign nations, for if American opinion becomes unneutral, the task of keeping the country out of war will be extremely difficult, no matter what economic issues are involved. Those Americans who believe that we shall not need to exert the very greatest effort to preserve our traditional liberties in a world full of raging conflict, are living in a fool's paradise.

It may be argued that the United States can remain indifferent to any war until an aggressor has actually invaded the Western Hemisphere. But this argument ignores the fact that if the three aggressive dictatorships—Germany, Italy, and Japan—succeed in their present efforts to dominate neighboring territory, and if they succeed in destroying the present balance of power in Europe, the task of defending this hemisphere from invasion will prove far more difficult than if such prospective wars are nipped in the bud. Moreover, fascism is learning how to make conquests without the force of arms. Today it undoubtedly is at work in Latin America,

the world's greatest reservoir of raw materials. The Vargas dictatorship in Brazil denies that it is fascist, but the test will come when a revolution against the dictatorship occurs. Vargas will undoubtedly pronounce it "Communist" and even appeal to the anti-Communist bloc for aid. It is not fantastic to believe that the Spanish civil war may then be transferred to Latin America. In such an event the Latin American dictatorships—there are only three real democracies south of the Rio Grande—will gravitate toward Rome and Berlin, and away from Washington, if the world's great democracies continue to show signs of paralysis.

Obviously the formula of "isolation" or "neutrality" offers no answer to the tremendous economic, political, and military problems confronting the United States. Certainly the alternative is not a preventive war; the United States cannot be expected to accept any military commitments. The question is whether it can participate in a new effort at cooperation to avert the outbreak of war, for only in such effort is there hope for the future.

In my opinion, the United States can take four concrete steps at the present time, all of which may help to check the present trend toward war:

1. *Strengthen the Hull foreign-trade program.* Four years ago Secretary of State Hull was almost alone among world statesmen in his desire to combat the evil of economic nationalism. Despite domestic as well as foreign opposition, he has steadfastly pursued his goal of reducing excessive trade barriers without injuring any essential industry or adversely affecting the interests of the American worker or farmer. Up to the present the State Department has concluded trade agreements with sixteen nations, and on November 17 it announced that negotiations with Great Britain would soon begin. Those familiar with the attitude of Britain several years ago toward the Hull trade program regard this last achievement as a great triumph. While the British agreement will open new markets for the American farmer, the United States will have to lower certain duties on manufactured goods, and the interests adversely affected are becoming restive. But if public opinion strongly supports the efforts of the Secretary of State, the British trade agreement may lay the foundation for a general removal of trade barriers and for a new effort to bring Germany and Italy back to the world economy, as well as induce Japan to abandon its aggressive policies as a solution for its economic problems.

2. *Amend the Neutrality Act.* In its present form the Neutrality Act makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to throw its diplomatic weight against aggression. Unwilling to assist Japan, President Roosevelt has declined so far to apply the act to hostilities in the Orient. He has been legally justified in taking this position because if neither Japan nor China is willing to admit that the present hostilities have created a legal state of war, the President is under no obligation to do so. Nevertheless, should Japan declare war against China, the President would be obliged to apply the act. Then both belligerents would be barred from our munitions market, but both could buy raw materials upon the

cash-and-carry basis. In fact this would mean that China would suffer, for Japan is self-sufficient in munitions and, unlike China, has a merchant marine which can transport American raw materials. The act would operate similarly to benefit Britain and France in a European war. In its present form the Neutrality Act is unconditionally and automatically pro-Japanese and pro-British. The United States cannot afford thus uncritically to underwrite the foreign policy of any power. It should use its discretion to open or close its markets in accordance with its own interests and not in accordance with the accident of geography. To avoid the dangers implicit in the present act, Congress should amend it so as to give the President discretion to impose an embargo upon the export of raw materials to belligerents.

3. *Cooperate in an international embargo on raw materials.* It would be unwise for the United States alone to stop the shipment of any raw material to Japan. Apart from the political consequences, such a unilateral embargo might merely divert trade to other powers. But an international embargo on the export of such war materials as scrap iron, cotton, and oil, and on the importation of Japanese silk, is an entirely different matter. Britain has indicated that it will go as far as the United States in stopping war in the Orient. Surely the least we can do is to cooperate with all like-minded powers in denying to Japan the raw materials which are necessary for its military aggression, and in declining to buy Japanese silk, which provides the exchange for the purchase of raw materials.

The one argument advanced against an international embargo is that Japan might retaliate by attacking Hongkong, Vladivostok, or the Philippines, and thus provoke war. Actually, the danger of such an attack exists today, in the absence of any collective diplomatic machinery for meeting it without resort to military force. Moreover, once an international embargo was imposed, the Western powers could refrain from taking any military action to defend their possessions in the Orient, realizing that if they applied the embargo long enough Japan would have to withdraw. The international embargo, if the Western powers have the discipline and the restraint to apply it, provides a substitute for war. In imposing such an embargo I would favor evacuation of all our troops from China and the withdrawal of our nationals to the Philippines, thus reducing one source of friction with Japan.

4. *Seek a basis of appeasement in the Pacific.* In imposing an embargo denying to Japan the raw materials of aggression, the outside world should announce its willingness to assist in finding a solution of Japan's economic difficulties once peace is restored. The ultimate objective of our foreign policy should be a new Washington conference for the purpose of restoring China's sovereignty—and this includes the surrender of the special privileges of all powers—and of considering Japan's grievances against the outside world. If an embargo is accompanied by a definite offer of reconstruction, the Orient, and the rest of the world as well, may yet be saved from the anarchy toward which it is now drifting.

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Editorial from

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December 25, 1937

America Must Choose

IN THIS issue we carry two important statements on American foreign policy. The first, by Norman Thomas, twice Socialist candidate for President, is a stern warning against what he feels to be the danger of collective action for peace under present circumstances. The second, by Raymond Leslie Buell, president of the Foreign Policy Association, contains an equally vigorous admonition against the dangers inherent in the isolationist position which Mr. Thomas partially reflects. That two leading opponents of war can take such conflicting positions on this issue is indicative of the cleavage which runs through the country on the question of American foreign policy.

Yet despite this sharp divergence of opinion, the country must somehow make up its mind between these two policies. An attempt to follow a middle course between isolation and collective security would be the most dangerous of all. Vacillation and inconsistency only lead to fiascos such as the Brussels conference and the shameless conduct of the democracies toward Spain. The United States must either withdraw from the world, economically and politically, and rely on "the advantages of our geographic and historic position," to quote Mr. Thomas, or aid in the creation of an international system of law which will prevent war. Thus far this country has sought to enjoy all the privileges and advantages of its world position without sharing in the responsibilities inherent in those privileges. And to an extent which few Americans like to admit, the present state of world anarchy is the result of this policy. The utter lack of responsibility which so bewilders foreigners attempting to appraise American policy must be attributed almost entirely to isolationist sentiment.

While professing to believe in collective security in principle, Mr. Thomas asks precisely at what nation it should be directed. According to our understanding of the term, collective security cannot be directed at anyone. Therein lies the all-important distinction between collective security and a system of alliances. Collective security implies an agreement between a group of nations, which is open to all, by which each nation undertakes to bring pressure on any other which resorts to war in violation of its pledge. The United States has never entered such an arrangement, although its signature to the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact may be interpreted as imposing certain obligations.

It is highly important, however, to note that collective security does not imply necessarily the use of military force. The task of eliminating war from the world is largely one of developing non-violent substitutes for

military force, to be used, when necessary, for the enforcement of international law and order.

But what if economic sanctions fail? Are we then to resort to military force to check fascist aggression? It is at this point that Mr. Thomas and many other pacifists draw back, assuming that there is some occult force by which economic sanctions are automatically transformed into military action—and war. We do not consider this a fair assumption. Economic and financial sanctions cannot fail if they are honestly applied. No country, least of all Japan, Italy, or Germany, can carry on war and maintain its population if cut off from all assistance from the outside world. Moreover, the application of collective economic pressure does not in any way imply or prepare the way for subsequent resort to military force. To take an extreme case, if a desperate, impoverished Japan seized the Dutch East Indies to get oil, economic sanctions, as Mr. Buell points out, would ultimately bring it to terms since it would still be unable to obtain adequate supplies of iron ore, cotton, wool, antimony, magnesite, manganese, tungsten, chrome, bauxite, tin, lead, nickel, and a number of other raw materials which are essential to modern industry, and without which no country could hope to wage war.

Admittedly, the prospect of joint economic action against Japan is slight. Mr. Thomas may be correct in saying that the chances for effective collective pressure were much greater in the Ethiopian crisis than at the present time. But what he does not state is that the weakness of the League in the early days of the Manchurian crisis, the failure of the powers to apply oil sanctions against Italy, and the collapse of the Brussels conference can be partly traced to one cause—the inability or unwillingness of the United States to cooperate because of isolationist sentiment. If this sentiment could be overcome, to an even greater extent than it has been in the past few weeks, there is every indication that Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union would cooperate in any program for the Far East that this country might propose.

Mr. Buell shows in some detail how the program of the isolationist groups, to which Mr. Thomas gives aid and comfort, creates a real threat of war. This threat will continue to exist as long as the United States, the world's greatest commercial and financial power, refuses either to join in collective efforts to prevent war or to participate in a program for worldwide economic appeasement. While the fascist powers are demanding access to raw materials and markets to further the solution of their admittedly grave economic problems, the United States is sitting tight, behind a high tariff wall, on more than half the world's gold supply and an overwhelming share of the world's supply of raw materials, refusing either to "divvy up" or to join in practical measures to protect countries like Ethiopia, Spain, and China. Because of the "advantages of our geographic and historic position" America is virtually safe from attack, but our refusal to join in any common action to protect less fortunate nations has created a condition of international anarchy in which no country can be safe.

The NATION

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHINA REFERENCE SERIES

Vol. I

December 6, 1937

No. I

Second Printing . . . January 12, 1938

The Japanese Way

*A photographic record of
Japan's destruction of civilian
life and property in China,
since July 7, 1937*



TRANS-PACIFIC NEWS SERVICE

1250 SIXTH AVENUE • ROCKEFELLER CENTER

NEW YORK

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Japanese Way



From
THE NEW YORK TIMES

SHANGHAI, Wednesday, Dec. 1.
(AP) ... The destruction of a Catholic orphanage and the death of eighty-six Chinese children in a Japanese air raid at Kashing fifteen days ago were reported to the French Ambassador, Paul Emile Naggiar, by two priests. They said 150 refugees, four French sisters and five Chinese sisters were missing.

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
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ZERO HOUR

Chapei Awaits
 "Goodwill Mission"
 From Japan

*Chinese soldiers ready for the Japanese
 invaders with barricades and hand-
 grenades in the streets of Shanghai.*




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GOODWILL HEADQUARTERS

Inside Japanese Naval Landing Party barracks in the Hongkew district of Shanghai's International Settlement.



HOW TO WIN FRIENDS

Japanese Style

Japanese troops parade through Tientsin streets in front of buildings which they have wrecked.



6 VERY SORRY, EXCUSE, PLEASE

Japanese doctor and nurses pose before corpses of the Chinese Pao An Tui (militia) in Tientsin.



MULE AND MEN

Two hand coolies and their beast of burden meet with the same end by Japanese rifle fire in a Tientsin street.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



JAPANESE
 SALESMEN
 VISIT THE CITY

and leave some of the
 samples with Chinese
 civilians in Shanghai

8



JAPANESE SALESMEN VISIT THE FARM

A Chinese peasant woman killed by Japanese bombs at Songjiang, southwest of Shanghai.

9

0500

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JAPANESE
 SALESMEN
 VISIT THE CITY

and have some of the
 samples with Chinese
 civilians in Shanghai.



JAPANESE SALESMEN VISIT THE FARM

A Chinese person's remains killed by Japanese bombs at Singkong, south-east of Shanghai.

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SLEEP, BABY, SLEEP

Chinese infants at Pingshinchich, Nanking, laid to their final rest by Japanese bombs.



**THE BEGINNING
AND THE END**

Old and young share alike the sad fate of indiscriminate Japanese warfare; aged man and grandson wounded together during a Japanese air raid on Canton.



LITTLE GIRL, WHAT NOW?

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



CAMPUS

*Trunking, the main
 Nankai University
 building, the main
 many cultural in-
 stitutions, were
 destroyed by
 Japanese bombs.*

JAPAN'S
 THEATRE
 OF WAR

*Auditorium of the
 National Central Un-
 versity in Nanking
 partly destroyed by
 a Japanese bomb.*

CHINESE
 HOUSE

*At Kanchow
 near Shanghai.*

With
 a
 Japanese
 Touch

WESTERN
 STYLE
 HOUSE

*At Hankow
 Nanking.*



TOKYO WAR BUDGET IS VOTED BY PEERS

\$600,000,000 Bill Requires
Only Imperial Sanction to
Become Effective

BUSINESS SESSION ENDS

Parliament to Hold Patriotic
Meeting Today to Pledge

Support to Emperor

TOKYO, Sept. 8 (AP)—Japan's
extraordinary Parliament session
ended today after the House of
Peers, without a dissenting vote,
enacted a supplementary war
budget of \$600,000,000.

The budget measure still requires
imperial sanction, but is virtually
the same as law now because it
has been passed by both houses of
the Diet. It was initiated by
Cabinet.

Passage of some minor
time legislation concluded
business session. There will
be ceremonies tomorrow.

The Diet decided to
meet tomorrow, in
Premier, Prince
pledging na-
Emperor H.
Saturday.
failed.



Published at 12:42, Sep. 10, 1942
Department of State, Sept. 10, 1942
By Office of Information, NARS, Date 12/1/42

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20 CHINESE CITIES BOMBED; 2,000 CASUALTIES IN CANTON; JAPANESE HALT

CIVILIANS VICTIMS



City in South China Main
 Target of Enlarged
 Tokyo Air Fleet

NANKING IS NOT

Bad Yet

The

Despite
 all bombing
 and the
 the
 the
 the



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THEY'LL NEVER KNOW



JAPAN'S TRUE MOTIVES



RIVER —



OF HUMANITY

Chinese refugees crowd wharves as Japanese order a large-scale bombing of Nantao, populous section of old Shanghai.

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Nantao, Shanghai.




STREET SCENE

Pootung, Shanghai.



Chongju, near
Shanghai.



JAPANESE BOMBERS KILL 300 REFUGEES FLEEING ON A TRAIN

400 Others Wounded in Raid
Near Shanghai by 5 Planes—
Women and Children Victims

CHINESE MAP AIR DRIVE


Warn Neutral Shipping of It—
Japanese Admit the Chinese
Continue on Offensive

TOKYO FORCE IS AMBUSHED

4,000 Reported Slain in a Trap
Near Peiping—British Fear
Seizure of Important Isle

The Warfare in China

Hundreds of Chinese piled into
a train yesterday to escape from
Nantao which had previously been
bombed by the Japanese. Before
they had gone far, however, Japa-
nese aerial bombs crashed into the
train and 300 of the refugees were
killed and 400 wounded. But the
Japanese may not have it all their
own way in the air, for the Chi-
nese announced that they would
open an aerial offensive
the foe's transports
and warned ves-
sels to be-
the Ja-
towns.




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


Pootung in the Yangtze valley, heavily damaged by Japanese air forces.



View of Pootung, Yangtze valley, showing the damage done by Japanese air forces.

AND QUIET FLOWS THE WHANGPOO



Japanese airplanes raided Soochow station on September 11 and left 11 Chinese refugees killed and 200 injured.



TRAINS SUBJECT TO DELAY

Soochow, on the railway between Shanghai and Nanking, is known to the Chinese as "Paradise under Heaven."

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



NORTH STATION



JAPAN PROVIDES



SOUTH STATION



EMPLOYMENT IN CHINA


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Department of State letter, Aug.
By Milton D. Gustafson NA



Thousands of civilian refugees in Shanghai register at a relief station.

HOMELESS

A Chinese temple (below) converted into refugee camp, and a Shanghai opera house (below right) with sign: "House full; no more refugees taken."



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. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
August 10, 1972
S, Date 12-18-75



Refugee children are taught to read the words written on the blackboard: "Everybody else has a home, but we do not have ours now."



Shanghai monks pose with homeless women and children in front of a temple converted into refugee camp.



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE GLEANERS

Cantonese girls search wreckage of their destroyed home (above), Chinese refugees in Nantao brood over ruins (below).



IT CAN BE STOPPED!

From text of a letter of former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, published in The New York Times on October 7, 1937.

Americans are shocked and outraged at what is taking place in the Far East. But to many of them it presents merely a confused picture of distant horrors with which they think we have no necessary connection and to which they can close their eyes and turn their backs in the belief that we owe no duty except to keep out of it and forget it.

* * *

Our American people are aroused and angry at the callous brutality of the Japanese. There is apparently no difference of opinion in their minds as to the merits of the controversy. Their abhorrence of injustice and oppression causes them immediately and universally to sympathize with China, but they do not see how anything can be done about it.

* * *

In Japan's tottering financial condition she is able to make purchases of raw material for her guns and ammunition only by selling enough of her own products to obtain the requisite foreign exchange to pay for her purchases.

* * *

One of these principal exports is raw silk. With the foreign exchange thus obtained Japan is purchasing from us, as I have said above, the raw materials for her guns. *It is not necessary to go further into the picture.*

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Department of State letter, Aug
By Milton D. Gustafson NAR

BY means of a series of booklets, of which this is the first, Trans-Pacific News Service will bring to the public a description in word and picture of the outrages and atrocities wrought by Japan among the Chinese people by the use of modern engines of destruction. Ensuing numbers of China Reference Series will carry historically important data which will make it obvious that concrete measures must be instituted to curb the growing world menace of Japan in the Far East.

512

3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
ust 10, 1972
S, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

1938 FEB 16 PM 11 February 15, 1938.

MMH

I have looked through this material and find no information therein of special interest which we have not already received from other sources.

Envelopes containing copies of the material were addressed to the Secretary, to the Undersecretary, to you, and even to me. The covering form letters make no mention of an addressee.


It is my opinion that an acknowledgment of the receipt of the material is not called for. You will recall that you acknowledged a letter from Mr. Price last week. Under the circumstances, I think the matter might be allowed to rest there for a while.

FE:Vincent:VCI

0514

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

945 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
February 14, 1938.




Dear Sir:

As Mr. Frank W. Price wrote you sometime ago, we are sending you from time to time information which we think may be of interest to you in connection with the present situation in China.

Included in the materials I am sending today are the Special Supplement to the China Weekly Review on Women's War Work and Documents concerning the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

We trust that these materials will be of interest and help to you.

Sincerely yours,



Helen M. Loomis

Helen M. Loomis M. Loomis, Secretary,
CHINA INFORMATION SERVICE
(On leave from Ginling College,
Nanking, China.)

Mr. Frank W. Price, Editor,
CHINA INFORMATION SERVICE
Mission Court, 1208 Rennie Avenue,
Richmond, Virginia.

F.W. 793.94/12381

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

“CHINESE SAVED BY AMERICANS”

Under the above heading the New York Sun recently published a special cable dispatch received from A. T. Steele, and filed in Shanghai telling of the heroic work done by American missionaries, many of them connected with the University of Nanking and Ginling College, in rescuing Chinese civilians remaining in the city after its fall to the Japanese. Mr. Steele's copyright dispatch said in part:

The fall of Nanking would have been infinitely more frightful if not for the courageous efforts of a handful of American missionaries and German businessmen who stayed throughout the siege.

Working solely for the welfare of 100,000 civilians remaining in the stricken city these foreigners ran risks which came close to costing their lives.

The intervention of American missionaries on behalf of Chinese civilians known to be innocent saved many lives.

The only foreigner wounded in the Nanking siege was a German who was cut by flying glass when a shell exploded outside his window, but all the sixteen Americans who saw the thing through could tell stories of hair-raising escapes. None of them went through a more trying ordeal than two American doctors, C. S. Trimmer and Robert Wilson, who took in all seriously wounded Chinese civilians who were brought to the doors of their Christian hospital.

Amputations were an hourly routine. A shell burst in the hospital yard while Dr. Wilson was performing a delicate operation, shattering the windows and spattering the operating room with shrapnel, but the work went on. The hospital was so overwhelmed with civilian cases it was unable to accept soldiers whom they directed to military hospitals, but in several cases the doctors looked into the muzzles of guns held by soldiers who demanded treatment, or else. It took tact to wriggle out of such situations.


Other Americans braved shrapnel and bombs to go after food supplies for the destitute thousands concentrated within the so-called safety zone. Among the most active was Lewis Smythe, formerly of the University of Chicago, now of the University of Nanking, who showed complete disregard for his own safety.

Miss Minnie Vautrin of Secor, Ill., who was in charge of 1,000 destitute Chinese women and children seeking shelter in the Ginling College, had a hectic time when Japanese shells burst dangerously close and again when Japanese invaded the premises to loot the houses of the Chinese faculty members of this mission school.

Dr. Wilson and Dr. Trimmer are members of the staff of the University of Nanking Hospital—the Christian Hospital referred to above. Miss Vautrin is Professor of Education at Ginling College.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHINA COLLEGES IN THE NEWS



NATIONAL
 EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR
 CHRISTIAN COLLEGES IN CHINA
 150 Fifth Avenue New York, N. Y.

TIME, January 17, 1938

RELIGION

In Nanking

Of some 6,000 Protestant missionaries working in China at the outbreak of the present war, only about 300 have left the country. In some cases in battle areas where there are wounded to care for, the missionaries remain at the colleges and universities, hospitals and medical missions where for years they and their predecessors Christianized and educated the best class of Chinese, nurturing the indigenous Chinese Christian phenomenon of the New Life Movement of the Chiang Kai-sheks. In the *New York Times* last week, details in a lengthy airmailed dispatch by F. Tillman Durdin on the fall of Nanking (*TIME*, Dec. 27) revealed something of the fortitude currently displayed in China by these men of God in the foreign field.

Not many more than a score of white men, most of them Americans and most of the Americans missionaries, remained during the siege in which the Japanese slaughtered 33,000 Chinese soldiers (20,000 by execution), and wounded some 5,000, as well as thousands of civilians who, according to *Timesman* Durdin, "hobbled about, dragged themselves through alleyways, died by the hundreds on the main streets."

Two missionary professors, Dr. Lewis S. C. Smythe and Dr. Miner Searle Bates of the University of Nanking, helped organize a Nanking safety zone which, although the Japanese merely spared it from concentrated bombardment, probably saved thousands of civilian lives. To this zone went thousands of frantic Chinese soldiers, eager to exchange their uniforms for civilian garb, or even to strip themselves to their underclothing lest the Japanese execute them as soldiers.

Upon Rev. John Magee, able Episcopal missionary, lately of Shanghai, fell the job of organizing medical care in Nanking, Chinese army hospitals being completely inadequate. With two missionary doctors and two American nurses—whose dormitories were looted when the Japanese entered the city, as were faculty houses at Ginling College for women—the U. S.-supported University of Nanking Hospital remained open through the siege and fall of Nanking. How Missionary Magee, the university professors and doctors and other missionaries thereafter fared, *Timesman* Durdin did not state nor did he indicate the prospects of the university and Ginling College at Japanese hands. Obviously, however, both would need their share, and probably more, of \$300,000 which U. S. supporters of twelve Chinese Christian colleges and universities are currently trying to raise for emergency needs.

Reprinted from Time Magazine

SHELTER 30,000 REFUGEES

American Missionaries at Nanking Report Great Distress

American missionaries at the University of Nanking in China are sheltering about 30,000 refugees, according to a message received here and made public by W. Reginald Wheeler, vice president of the university's board of trustees. To shield the missionaries, Mr. Wheeler did not divulge the whole message. However, it said in part: "University [of Nanking] sheltering 30,000 refugees. This service from thirteenth [of January] tenaciously maintained amid violent terror. Institutional losses moderate. Majority residences partly looted. Staff splendid despite injuries. Danger. Unspeakable distress. Ginling College [with 10,000 refugees] comparable. Hospital service unique. Relief needs dominate city."

—New York Times, January 23, 1938

AMERICANS IN CHINA

But the most significant job done by Americans in China is neither the buying nor the selling of goods. It is so great a work that it is altogether misunderstood by small minds and even smaller hearts. That is the tremendously important and valuable services of the American missionary.

These men and women have gone to town and village, bringing with them not only the many varieties of Christianity, but a new cultural pattern; in my opinion, a nobler cultural pattern than the Chinese retained amid the disintegration of China's indigenous social and intellectual establishments during the last century.

Take, as an example, St. John's University in Shanghai, or the Shanghai College (which used to be the Shanghai Baptist College) or Lingnan University (which used to be called the Canton Christian College), or Yenching in Peking or Soochow University, or Yale-in-China—these and many more have kept the light of modern learning aflame in China during the dark days of civil war and revolution and change of government.

Reprinted from an article by George E. Sokolsky, noted writer on Far Eastern subjects, published in the New York Herald Tribune on January 3, 1938.

"CHINESE SAVED BY AMERICANS"

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The intervention of American missionaries on behalf of Chinese civilians known to be innocent saved many lives.

The only foreigner wounded in the Nanking siege was a German who was cut by flying glass when a shell exploded outside his window, but all the sixteen Americans who saw the thing through could tell stories of hair-raising escapes. None of them went through a more trying ordeal than two American doctors, C. S. Trimmer and Robert Wilson, who took in all seriously wounded Chinese civilians who were brought to the doors of their Christian hospital.


Amputations were an hourly routine. A shell burst in the hospital yard while Dr. Wilson was performing a delicate operation, shattering the windows and spattering the operating room with shrapnel, but the work went on. The hospital was so overwhelmed with civilian cases it was unable to accept soldiers whom they directed to military hospitals, but in several cases the doctors looked into the muzzles of guns held by soldiers who demanded treatment, or else. It took tact to wriggle out of such situations.

Other Americans braved shrapnel and bombs to go after food supplies for the destitute thousands concentrated within the so-called safety zone. Among the most active was Lewis Smythe, formerly of the University of Chicago, now of the University of Nanking, who showed complete disregard for his own safety.

Miss Minnie Vautrin of Secor, Ill., who was in charge of 1,000 destitute Chinese women and children seeking shelter in the Ginling College, had a hectic time when Japanese shells burst dangerously close and again when Japanese invaded the premises to loot the houses of the Chinese faculty members of this mission school.

Dr. Wilson and Dr. Trimmer are members of the staff of the University of Nanking Hospital—the Christian Hospital referred to above. Miss Vautrin is Professor of Education at Ginling College.

CHINA COLLEGES IN THE NEWS



NATIONAL
EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR
CHRISTIAN COLLEGES IN CHINA
150 Fifth Avenue New York, N. Y.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE WAR AND MISSIONS IN CHINA

Survey of the Situation - December and January

By Frank W. Price

During December and January the area of war, devastation and suffering in China greatly widened. The Japanese drive westward from Shanghai culminated in the capture of Nanking on December 13 and of Hangchow on December 24. Fighting has now extended near Hangchow, around Wuhu and north and northwest of Nanking. The destruction by the Chinese of Japanese mill property at Tsingtau on December 18 provoked the invasion of Shantung province and Tsinan was captured on December 27. Since then the Japanese armies from both north and south have pressed toward the vital railway junction of Suchow near the Kiangsu-Shantung border. Chinese forces have been massed in great numbers to defend the 150 mile wide corridor traversed by the east-west Lung Hai Railway. The closing of the gap between the two invading armies would put Japan in a position to attack Hankow. However, guerilla operations by mobile units are continually harrassing the invaders' lines of communication and have slowed up the Japanese advance. About half of Shansi province has been occupied but the Eighth Route Army (former communist army) has successfully resisted further penetration. In south China there have been fears for some time that a Japanese army would be landed and Canton has been under strict martial law. Air raids upon cities of Kuangtung and upon the vital Canton-Hakow Railway have been increasingly severe.

In spite of critical defeats in the Shanghai-Hangchow-Nanking triangle, and the loss of such productive territory, the government and people of China seem determined to continue the struggle for a long time to come. Generalissimo Chiang in six broadcast messages to the nation has urged greater effort and sacrifice until freedom has been won. Visitors report that he is "full of confidence, physically fresh and buoyant". He and other leaders see hope of ultimate victory through a protracted war which will wear out Japan through the costliness of an extended occupation. The government and army are being reorganized with stricter discipline. General Han Fuh-chu, governor of Shantung province was tried by court martial and executed because of his failure to resist. New troops are being enlisted and trained in central and west China. A great program of "mass mobilization" with preparation of all citizens for participation in national defense is being inaugurated.

The end of the war seems far off. Japan's peace terms have been reported to include the following: collaboration between Japan and China in an anti-communist policy, demilitarized zones and Japanese garrisons in China, an economic agreement between China, Manchukuo and Japan on Japan's terms, war indemnities. A missionary writes from central China, "We do not yet know of any real hope for middle ground between the sweeping Japanese intentions and the Chinese determination to hold some degree of independence. Meanwhile, misery reigns in much of China, and the problems of the future pile up for both countries."

"I feel that we individually and as a race have to suffer much more before there may come a better day for us," wrote Dr. Wu Yi-fang, president of Ginling College for Women as she left Nanking to join a group of teachers and students in Wuchang. But the leaders and people of China have already demonstrated that they can meet danger and suffering with marvelous fortitude.

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Not only have the soldiers shown courage. Thousands of workers of the railways and in postal and telegraph offices have carried on under fire. Mails have been delivered with remarkable efficiency except in some areas now occupied by the Japanese army where the postal system has broken down. Boy and Girl Scouts have risked their lives in rescuing wounded civilians. The women of the nation are organizing for relief work. Schools have moved to central and west China and teachers are serving for mere "living allowances." And millions of the common people, driven from their homes, have accepted their hardships bravely as part of their sacrifice for the nation.

"China is bleeding upon the thorns of this invasion," writes Dr. E. Stanley Jones. Missions and the Christian church are bleeding too. But the Christian witness has been a bright star in the night of suffering. "As I leave China," continued Dr. Jones, "I want to pay my tribute of gratitude to the Christians of China, both missionary and Chinese, who are holding so steady and true in this time of national calamity. I am proud to belong to such a band. There is a toughness of fibre in them that is the result of years of facing crisis after crisis. The missionary enterprise has faced many a crisis in China and has grown under each one of them. It will come through this one, too, perhaps purified."

Shanghai

The fighting has left the Shanghai area but the problem of refugees remains. "In an area of but six square miles, that normally cared for a population of nearly two millions, utterly destitute refugees are now numbered not by tens of thousands but by hundreds of thousands. To us has come the sudden challenge to save this flotsam." More than 175 camps have been established in Shanghai, to house 150,000 people. The Nantao Safety Zone under the direction of Father Jacquinet has 250,000. Including destitute refugees living with relatives or friends there are about three-fourths of a million in need of food. Many missionaries living temporarily in Shanghai have been giving full time to helping in the refugee camps.

People are returning but slowly to the devastated sections around the International Settlement. Chapei is a city of desolation. A few missionaries have been permitted to visit their former centers of work. At the Southern Baptist compound in Hongkew "the condition is terrible." The dormitories of Eliza Yates School were shelled, the class-room building burned and residences have been demolished and looted. The University of Shanghai property is occupied by Japanese soldiers and all faculty residences have been looted. Margaret Williamsons Hospital was destroyed after the fighting had ended. The extent of other damage to mission and church buildings is not yet fully known.

The University of Shanghai, St. John's University and twenty Christian middle schools are continuing their work in the International and French Settlements. Churches are full on Sundays. But Shanghai, formerly a nerve-center of mission work in China, has been cut off to a large extent from the inland. Missionaries have with great difficulty secured military passes to inspect their stations even near Shanghai. The Japanese are evidently working for control of the International Settlement. Censorship on cables and mails has been tightened. The economic future of Shanghai is very dark. But the Christian forces are undaunted as they seek to minister with the love of Christ to those in need. The Christian Broadcasting Station continues to send out news and messages of encouragement to Christian workers all over China.

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East China

The destruction of property in the region between Shanghai and Nanking has been appalling. Air raids, fires from incendiary bombs and shells and finally the burning of property by retreating Chinese troops have laid waste the once great and populous cities of Soochow, Wusih, Changchow, Chinkiang, and Sungkiang. Hundreds of smaller cities and towns have been ruined. Much mission and church property has naturally suffered. All the mission buildings of the Presbyterian Church, U. S. in Kiangyin, hospital, schools and missionary residences were burned. Sections of the Presbyterian and Methodist Hospitals in Soochow were burned. In Kashing a Roman Catholic orphanage was bombed, resulting in the death of 86 children. Hospitals, schools, churches and missionary homes in most of this area have been looted. The beautiful city of Hangchow has been spared the terrible destruction visited on other places, but the city has now only one-fifth its former population.

Property losses have been estimated at \$500,000,000. The life of nearly twenty million people has been tragically disrupted. They have been driven to the four winds before the invading armies and when they return it will be to desolate homes or to farms without animals and seed. One news dispatch from China said that not even in the World War was there such widespread desolation.

Many missionaries refused to leave when the fighting raged in east China. The North China Daily News said of the missionaries in Soochow, "From the beginning of hostilities this intrepid little band with their able Chinese assistants, have carried on without cessation." Dr. Mason Young, Miss Lucy Grier, a nurse, Rev. Charles McDaniel and others took wounded civilians and patients from a hospital for the insane to an island in Lake Tai, and stayed with them for weeks. Other missionaries stayed with Chinese Christians in villages and were not heard of for weeks. Rev. D. F. Stamps and Miss Mary Demarest of the Southern Baptist Mission in Yangchow were reported missing for nearly two months. A missionary doctor wrote, "The future is very dark and this whole section may be swept clean before it is over - we can only live day by day trusting in Him." Twenty-eight missionaries stayed in Hangchow and fourteen in Nanking through the siege and capture of those cities and with them many fearless Chinese Christian workers, caring for thousands of refugees in "safety zones."

The missions which have suffered most heavily in the lower Yangtze region are the Southern Methodist, Northern and Southern Presbyterian, Northern and Southern Baptist, Disciples and London Mission. Fighting now presses in upon stations in north Kiangsu and southern Chekiang.

Dr. Robert F. Fitch of Hangchow writes, "The repercussions will be felt everywhere in east China; cold and hunger will be experienced by millions of the poor. For several months to come, perhaps into the late spring and summer there will be an overwhelming need for further aid from outside sources, especially from the Christian churches of the West."

Nanking

The story of the fall of Nanking and the subsequent days and weeks of disorder and terror has been graphically told in news dispatches from China. A.T. Steele reported in the New York Sun, "The fall of Nanking would have been infinitely more frightful if not for the courageous efforts of a handful of American missionaries and German business men who stayed throughout the siege." But these brave fourteen ran risks which nearly cost them their lives once and again.

A cable from one of the missionaries who had helped to maintain the safety zone received on January 18th, said, "University of Nanking sheltering

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thirty thousand refugees. This service from December 13 has been tenaciously maintained amid dishonor by soldiers, murdering, wounding, wholesale raping resulting in violent terror. Institutional losses moderate. Majority residences partly looted. Staff splendid despite injuries, danger, unspeakable distress. Ginling College situation comparable. Christian Hospital service unique. Relief needs dominate city."

Included in the Safety Zone and hence spared the material destruction inflicted upon the rest of Nanking were the University of Nanking, Ginling College, Nanking Theological Seminary, Women's Bible Training School, Ming Deh Presbyterian School for Girls and many missionary homes.

In spite of the unexpected sudden advance of the Japanese armies both the University of Nanking and Ginling College were able to move their staffs and considerable equipment to central and West China.

It will be of interest to note here that the government succeeded in moving 19,000 out of the 20,000 cases in which it had packed the art treasures from the National Museum.

Nanking is at present little more than a Japanese armed camp, subject to raids from Chinese airplanes. The city and surrounding region have only a small fraction of their former population. The Safety Zone is feeding 50,000 of the most destitute daily.

North China

The people of Hopei province have been experiencing the force of Japanese rule for half a year. A provisional government was set up on December, staffed by notoriously corrupt pro-Japanese puppets. So far no outstanding, able Chinese has been willing to cooperate with the Japanese in their plans for an autonomous north China.

Christian educators are determined to carry on, not to falter in their program, to conciliate where necessary but not to give in on questions of principle. The Japanese officials are naturally seeking to control the schools. All reference to nationalists China have been deleted from the textbooks. The Confucian classics have been substituted for social sciences and ethics. Slogans everywhere extol the aims of the Japanese army. Students have been compelled to join parades celebrating Japanese victories. There have been raids on libraries and offices of teachers, and some teachers have been arrested. Japanese is to be the main foreign language in the universities. However, four middle schools in Peiping and Tungchow have an enrollment of 2350, only one thousand less than last year, and Yenching University now has over 500 students. Yet the strain on principals and teachers is severe. "Do you wonder," one writes, "that our educators, Chinese and foreign, are growing grayer each month now than in five years previously?"

The Japanese advance last summer and autumn into southern Hopei caused widespread desolation. One missionary estimates that seventy per cent of the people of north China evacuated at some time. "Many of our stations were completely wrecked, and the villages were almost empty of inhabitants. Crops were rotting in the fields, unharvested. The whole countryside was lifeless." The invasion was accompanied by constant foraging, looting and raping. "It is all more cruelly ruthless than anything in the American press descriptions," another missionary wrote. Paotingfu suffered especially during and after the siege but missionaries of the American Board and Presbyterian missions have continued to serve there.

In the area occupied by the Japanese evangelistic work is going on. "Chinese Christian leaders," one report says, "are everywhere showing faith,

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courage and determination which no obstacles so far apparently can defeat. These men are an inspiration to their missionary colleagues. The Church in the North does not intend to abdicate." At the county seat of Chowchow an evangelist and his family and other Christians, total of seventeen, were killed by a bomb in one churchyard. "The Chowchow experience," a missionary writes, brings to me forcefully the realization that the church, the real church, is a fellowship. Organization, property and programs may disappear, but little groups of Christians who are one with Christ in God will continue."

The Church of the Brethren mission field in eastern Shansi was first to feel the effect of invasion. A woman missionary from this region writes that the countryside was ravaged bare. "I have spent weeks in the midst of hell. When one thinks of the great areas of this country of which this is a fair example, it is too awful to contemplate." Several members of the Brethren Mission have been reported missing. The New York Times of February 2 carried a report through Hankow that three missionaries had been shot by a Japanese sentry: Rev. and Mrs. Alva Harsh of Petersburg, W. Va., and Miss Minserva Neher, Laverne, Calif.

The Japanese lines at one time reached as far south as Fenchow and Taiku in the American Board Mission field. The Oberlin-Shansi School at Taiku moved first to Yuncheng, Shansi, then to Shanhsein, Honan province. It may move further inland. The Ming I School at Fengyang moved to Tsishan in the southwest of the province where the China Inland Mission has strong work under Chinese leadership. Many missionaries are remaining in Shansi and also in Shensi to the west. The Japanese are said to have about 140,000 troops in Shansi alone.

In Suiuan and Chahar provinces the Japanese army holds the main points though skirmishes continue. In all the northern provinces irregular troops and local defense organizations are making the garrisoning of the area more difficult for the invaders. Relief needs are serious in Pieping, Tientsin, and all the conquered territory.

Shantung

Shantung was spared war until late in December. But Governor Han's vacillating policy left the province without a plan of defense and Japanese occupation was rapid. Here too great hordes of refugees fled before the invading army. Part of Tsinan city was destroyed but the buildings of Cheeloo University have escaped damage, according to latest word. Chinese forces made a stand in the southwest of the province and fighting around Tsining, an important mission center, has been especially severe.

Suffering in Shantung has been accentuated by a big flood last summer which made two million people homeless.

Many missionaries who had been sojourning at Tsingtau have left for Shanghai or other ports. A considerable number, chiefly men, remained at their stations.

Fukien

Southern Chekiang and Fukien have been least touched by war of any coastal region. This may be due to the proximity of Formosa and Japan's plans for development from that island. There have been a few air raids and Amoy has felt the hot breath of attack on several occasions.

Professor E. M. Stowe of Fukien Christian University writes that the University and Christian schools of the province have been carrying on as usual, "a seemingly miraculous oasis in a sea of chaos and blood." Students are par-

icipating in many out-of-school activities. The new Union Theological College at Changchow has opened with 26 students. The churches are active and a new extension service to rural churches is proving very fruitful.

"We will go ahead as long as possible," writes one missionary. Most of the missionary women and children have left the province.

South China

Kuangtung has suffered principally from incessant air raids, the objectives apparently being the destruction of government-owned property, the terrorizing of the civilian population and the prevention of sea-going commerce. Casualties have been high, especially among civilians. The landing of armed forces has been expected for some time.

The churches and schools have tried to continue, many with emergency programs. Hospitals have rendered courageous service. Many Christian institutions have organized first aid corps. The Union Theological and Bible Training Schools in Canton have had one hundred per cent attendance. The College department of Lingnan University has been maintained at Canton, under the leadership of the new president, Mr. Lei Ying-lam. True Light and Pui Ying Schools moved to Hongkong. The Union Normal School and Mei Wa School were bombed on December 31. The dining hall of Union Normal and the main building of Mei Wa were severely damaged. The Ma Kwong Home for the Blind was removed to Macao.

Hainan Island has been fairly quiet in spite of some bombings and the constant fear of attack by gunboats.

One report from south China gave high praise to three women missionaries of the English Presbyterian Mission who had stayed on at Swatow and helped to maintain morale among the Christian leaders and people there.

"I cannot close this letter," writes one missionary, "without giving expression to the evidence of the wonderful spirit of our church leaders in this time of national crisis, especially in their determination to keep the spiritual side of the church uppermost and at the same time express their loyalty to their country. Chinese church leaders have not been heard to preach hate; their prayers always include a petition for Japan, especially the Christians of Japan." "Don't worry about us missionaries," writes another, "but pray for the poor Chinese people."

Central China

The biggest battle of the war is now raging in Northern Kiangsu and Nnhwei and in Honan province. On February 3 the Japanese military commanders asked that all foreigners leave this region because of the fighting. More than 500 missionaries normally live in this area. Several missionaries of the United Church of Canada returned to their stations in Honan after furlough only two months ago, and a great number of missionaries in the fighting zone will no doubt carry on at their own risk.

The Yangtze River below Wuhu is blocked with booms. Since the capture of Nanking and Wuhu there has been a considerable exodus of missionary families from Kuling but a number remain and the schools for foreign children are being maintained. The school at Chikungshan has closed.

The Wuhan cities (Hankow, Wuchang and Hanyang) have been bombed many times and air raids have reached as far up river as Ichang. But otherwise the provinces of Hupeh and Hunan have been quiet, and Christian work has suffered comparatively little. The effect of the great migration from east China is felt everywhere. Many cities have increased rapidly in population. Wounded soldiers pour

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in from the front and hospitals are crowded. Hunan-Yale's Emergency Hospital has prepared to receive 2,000.

Plans for mass mobilization and education of the people in self-defense are being promoted actively in these central provinces. Hunan province is being made an important area in agricultural experiments and rural reorganization which will increase its productivity as a source of food supply.

Dr. W. Y. Chen of the National Christian Council wrote after a visit to central China, "The spirit of the people in the churches is simply wonderful." Many inland stations write of the help which Christian leaders and their families from east China have brought to them in their work. The churches are active in relief work and students of Christian schools are participating in many service activities.

The railway from Nachang to Canton is still open despite repeated bombings. The new motor road from Changsha to Kweilin will be completed soon. The Eurasia planes still fly from Hongkong to central and west China and carry mails.

Bishop L. H. Roote is in Hankow and Bishop A. A. Gilman is on his way there from the United States.

West China

Bishop Ralph A. Ward of the Methodist Church in Szechwan province writes "The rapid and sweeping changes in national life are affecting great changes in Szechwan. Thousands of students and teachers, business and professional people and government officials are bringing a broader outlook, many material things and creative power. Many of the newcomers are Christians. Most of them are at least awakened spiritually. The local Christian communities need adjustment to the new opportunities, not to speak of their need for more vital Christian faith and life for themselves." Such is the unexpected new opportunity in west China.

Szechwan, we must remember, is larger in size than the British Isles. It contains a population of over 70,000,000. It has some of the most fertile farmland in China. There are 60 mission centers of 16 mission societies and more than 430 missionaries in the great area. Since the chance of Szechwan ever being occupied by Japanese armies is very small, the strategic importance of this province from the standpoint of the Chinese government and defense and from the standpoint of Christian work and planning for the future cannot be overestimated.

Government universities have moved to Chungkiang and Chengtu. In one city 24 temporary buildings were erected in 40 days. The University of Nanking has moved to Chengtu and will cooperate with West China Christian University. Cheeloo Methodist School has also moved to Szechwan.

National Organizations

The National Christian Council continues its office in Shanghai but is working more through regional organizations, especially in central and west China. Many mission secretaries and treasurers now have offices also in central China or in Hongkong. The National Christian Council has issued a "Call to a Forward Movement," suggesting a threefold emergency program for the churches: relief, spiritual uplift, and cooperation of the churches with other agencies in service to the people. Christians are being urged to give a cent a day to relief work.

A Y. M. C. A. leader in China writes, "We need your continued undergirding. All are determined to stay though positions dangerous." Mr. George Fitch at Nanking, Mr. Eugene Turner at Hangchow, Mr. R. S. Hall at Tsinan and Mr. Edward

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Lockwood at Canton are among those who are rendering notable service in places of peril. The National Committee of Y. M. C. A.'s has organized emergency services for soldiers in 28 cities. One hundred full-time secretaries have been allocated to this work while two hundred are carrying on the regular Association program where possible. The Peiping Y. M. C. A. has cooperated with the Red Cross in relief work and recreational activities for wounded soldiers. Many secretaries are now receiving only living allowances. Through hut work, soldier clubs, service to wounded in hospitals, help to soldiers at railway junctions, traveling units, a work comparable to that of the Y. M. C. A. during the World War is being done and with very limited funds.

The Y. W. C. A. has organized its women members into many forms of service and is helping to train civilians in first aid, health work, and the meeting of emergency needs.

Education

Fifty per cent of the Chinese colleges and universities have been closed or forced to suspend. The Ministry of Education has established two temporary universities, one at Sian and another at Changsha. Nankai, Central University and Fudan University have new quarters in Chungking. Tsinghua and National Peking University are now located in Changsha. The new location of some Christian colleges has been noted. College students and graduates are not being encouraged yet to join the fighting services but at least one-half of the 45,000 college students are engaged in war-time studies. Many have joined the War-time Students' Service Corps.

Five temporary government middle schools have been established in Kansu, Shensi, Honan, Szechwan and Kweichow, each with about one hundred teachers and one thousand students. Students will be given free board and clothing as most of them are refugees from north and east China.

The Christian colleges are playing a noble part in the national life during the crisis. Yenching, as has been mentioned, carries on in Peiping with an enrollment of over 500. Cheeloo University medical students have been transferred to Chengtu, other students to various institutions.

Gingling College is operating in three units, at Shanghai, at Hwa Chung College and at West China Union University. The University of Nanking has moved to west China. Soochow University suffered heavy losses to its property and is still closed. The University of Shanghai continues work in temporary quarters in the French Concession and St. John's University carries on. Hangchow Christian College has not suffered damage to property although Japanese guns are now located nearby. Some teachers and students transferred to a small town in Anhwei province. Fukien Christian University and Hwa Nan College Foochow, have been able to keep going without serious interruption. Lingnan University, Canton, has 460 students on the campus. The opening enrollment of Hwachung College, Wuchang, was fifty per cent above normal due to admission of students from other schools. West China Union University, Chengtu, has an enrollment twice that of last year. Classrooms and laboratories are utilized in successive shifts. All the colleges are incurring serious deficits this year, although operating costs have been reduced to bare essentials.

Relief Work

The needs for relief in the ever-widening areas of hostilities are appalling. Never have the Chinese themselves done so much for their suffering fellow-countrymen. Chinese doctors have volunteered in large numbers for medical service, one hundred going from Shanghai alone. The Shanghai Chinese churches

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contributed \$40,000. Local relief committees have been formed in a large number of cities. But the need is so great that outside help is imperative.

The Federal Council of Churches, Foreign Missions Conference, China Famine Relief, Inc., and other organizations have appealed for relief funds with limited results. All mission societies have made special appeals. The American Red Cross in September authorized chapters to receive funds but initiated no campaign. But on January 25 a campaign for a goodwill offering was launched with an appeal in the form of a letter from President Roosevelt. Funds will be administered through a committee of prominent Americans in China and the Advisory Committee of China Famine Relief.

The International Red Cross is taking over administration of a large number of refugee camps in Shanghai and is extending the "Morris plan." Major Morris of the Salvation Army has been most successful in conducting clean camps and in feeding the refugees wholesome food at very low cost.

Christian relief committees everywhere are most active in helping. "The least that Christian organizations can do under circumstances like these is to make the maximum contribution to ease pain, to heal the wounded and create channels for the love of our Lord, Jesus Christ, to find expression in the midst of carnage and strife," writes one Christian group. The National Christian Council has sent out flying squads to survey needs in devastated areas and give help where possible.

The outstanding service of the Christian hospitals everywhere has won high praise from all classes of Chinese. The work has been carried on often in great danger and frequently without sufficient medical supplies. One missionary from north Kiangsu went 1200 miles to Hankow and back in order to secure needed drugs. In some areas Christian forces have joined with government forces in medical service. Christian field hospital units are being planned.

The plight of the homeless refugees is saddest in Shanghai and sections of east China. In other areas there is less congestion for refugees are kept on the move. In central and western China the wounded soldier is the most serious problem. The Chinese government and army were utterly unprepared to care for such large numbers of wounded soldiers. Dr. A. R. Kepler after a tour through 8 provinces reported, "I return to Shanghai from my journey with the wounded soldier as my most poignant memory. I can't get him out of my thoughts. He is the most pitiable person in China today. The chances are that he must eat all the bitterness of the refugee, inadequate clothing, insufficient nourishment, no protection from rain and biting north wind, wounds festering through lack of surgical care." It may be days or weeks before he gets from the front line to the medical centers at Nanchang, Sian, Wuhan or Changsha. Dr. Kepler continues, "The war was unwanted by China. The government was not prepared to face so formidable an enemy, and one so thoroughly prepared and equipped with every conceivable modern missile and instrument of destruction. These poor wounded men are a summons to the Christian forces in China and throughout the world to come to their rescue and set agencies in operation which will look after their needs." He urges a Christian Medical Auxiliary to work in close cooperation with government medical units.

One missionary after visiting the vast camp for wounded soldiers and war victims at Sian, wrote, "It is the largest mass of suffering humanity I have ever seen. Yet there was no groaning or complaining even from stretcher cases who were borne past me by tired Boy Scouts."

The danger of epidemics will increase as spring and summer come on, and all kinds of medical supplies will be needed.

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Christians all over China have been contributing to relief funds and women have been making garments for wounded civilians and soldiers. One group made 1600 wadded vests and in each sewed a printed Scripture verse and message of comfort. Missionaries and Chinese Christian workers have been visiting camps of wounded soldiers to give comfort. To one missionary who was on his way to this service Madame Chiang Kai-shek said, "And do not forget to tell them of the One who suffered more than they."

The Outlook and the Opportunity

President Wu Yi-fang of Ginling College, who is also Chairman of the National Christian Council, wrote to friends in America, "In regard to the general situation in China, I don't see any possible improvement immediately and we must face the probable result of withdrawing to Szechwan, Yunan, Kwangsi and Kweichow provinces. As to how long this process may take, no one can tell. I sound, I am afraid, very pessimistic, but in fact I am quite confident of the ultimate triumph of right over might."

President Francis C. Wei of Hwa hung College, now in this country, said recently, "Whether China is defeated or victorious the need for Christianity and for Christian higher education will be greater than before. If China shall be victorious, she will have all the greater need for Christianity to use wisely her new position and power. If she should be defeated, she will need Christian courage and wisdom in dealing with the problems that will confront her."

A missionary leader writes, "As soon as hostilities cease, under restrictions and difficulties such as we have never before experienced, we are going to have a tremendous opportunity to preach and teach our Christian faith." After his two months preaching tour in central and west China, Dr. E. Stanley Jones declared that China presented the greatest challenge to Christianity of any land in the world today.

And, finally, this message from the Executive Council of the Methodist Episcopal Church in China, may be taken as an appreciation and an appeal from all Christians in China today: "Never before have the loyal confidences and intimate cooperation between the Chinese and the missionary groups of our church in China been so plainly evident nor so distinctly stimulating, nor has the Church ever before stood out so clearly as a minister of good will and helpfulness to our suffering people."

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So much capital has been, and is being, made out of the allegedly Communistic leanings of the Chinese Government and people that it is important to make the situation clear to those who may have been impressed and misled by such falsehoods. Persistent efforts have been made by Japan's apologists to represent the Kuo-Min Tang and the Comintern as being alike as two peas, and the complete destruction of the Chinese political party has been repeatedly declared to be among Japan's present war-aims. It will be shown presently that the Kuo-Min Tang is as free from Communist influence as the Nazi party, the Fascisti, and the Japanese Government itself. Prince Konoye, the Japanese Premier, on November 6, 1937, declared that Sino-Japanese hostilities were due to the "machinations" of the Comintern, adding that "it is a moral mission imposed upon Japan by her political structure and national policy to prevent and suppress the evils of Communism and the Comintern."

In reply to the first allegation, that the "machinations" of the Third International are responsible for Sino-Japanese relations having taken so disastrous a turn, there is ample evidence on record to the contrary--evidence of influential Japanese in official and other responsible positions who specifically warned their own Government that the policy being followed in China was not calculated to bring about the more friendly relations allegedly desired. There was no necessity for any "machinations" by the Comintern to bring about a clash; Japanese diplomats and businessmen, political leaders and journalists, pointed out that the wrong tactics had been adopted in handling relations with China, that Japanese militarists and "hot-blooded young officials" were provoking hostility among the Chinese people, and that friendly co-operation between the two nations was impossible of achievement while Japan persistently resorted to measures which were not conducive to co-operation. Not "machinations" of the Comintern, but of the powerful Japanese military clique who arrogated to themselves control of their country's diplomatic affairs, were responsible for the terrible slaughter and suffering in China which has shocked the civilized world.

Prince Konoye himself, a few weeks before taking the post of Premier, publicly admitted that China was suspicious about Japan's real policy, and declared that not until those suspicions were removed could any effective help be given to the Chinese nation in its struggle for rejuvenation, while Japan's proposals for a readjustment of relations "must be of obvious benefit to China in order to be acceptable." Before taking office Prince Konoye recognized that the so-called "dual diplomacy" by Japan's soldiers and diplomats, instead of improving Sino-Japanese relations, merely exacerbated China's wounded feelings; now that he is Premier he discreetly forgets the part his own countrymen played in creating bad feeling, and pretends it was the "machinations" of the Comintern which led to the disastrous clash which has brought death and destruction to a nation struggling for rejuvenation. The neutral observer anxious to get at the facts should take careful note of Prince Konoye's remarkable change of mind, and at the same time remember the significant fact that his former attitude was supported by Japanese who had been Ambassadors in China, and by Mr. Sato (Foreign Minister in the Cabinet which preceded the Konoye Administration).

As to whether Japan has a "moral mission" to prevent and suppress "the evils of Communism and the Comintern," this is a matter for Japan's own national conscience. Certainly she has no "moral mission" to suppress any "ism" in any country but her own. President Roosevelt has recently said that most of the world's troubles nowadays come from interference with the internal affairs of one country by another, and this is deplorably true of China's troubles, most of which have been the direct or indirect result of outside interference. But if Japan believes that Communism is a menace to her well-being, she undoubtedly has the right to take whatever measures seem appropriate and effective to suppress such activities in her own domain. In November, 1936 an anti-Communist pact was signed by Germany and Japan, and on November 6, 1937 the adherence of Italy to this agreement made it a tripartite accord for mutual protection against the activities of the Third International within the territories of the signatory parties.

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If the three countries mentioned believe their national peace and security to be threatened, they are of course quite within their rights in taking measures of protection. The question of having a "moral mission" to suppress Communism does not arise; if serious danger to a nation's peace and security is apprehended, it is the duty of any Government to adopt such safeguards as appear likely to be effective in averting the threatened danger. This is precisely what was done by China when it was recognized, in 1927, that the Communists in the Republic were actively engaged in working against the National Government, whereupon they were expelled from the Kuo-Min Tang and the whole movement put under nation-wide proscription--as, of course, Japan is well aware.

But to return to more recent events. In November, 1936, assurances were given to the Chinese Ambassador in Berlin by Baron von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister, that the agreement signed with Japan in 1936 was in no way directed against China, and that in combatting the activities of the Third International no measures would be taken outside the territory of Japan and the Reich. This statement was made by Baron von Neurath to dispel fears that the German-Japanese accord might become an instrument for further acts of aggression in North China, since it had been so often declared that Japan's mission was "to prevent China from becoming Red, and thus contribute toward the well-being of the entire Orient." As a matter of fact, the allegedly altruistic interest shown by Japan in China's well-being was quite unnecessary, and an official statement issued by the Chinese Government in November, 1936 declared that China did not intend to become a signatory of the then recently anti-Communist pact between Germany and Japan,--not, however, because China was any more enamoured of Marxist teachings than either of those two countries, but because she considered herself fully capable of dealing with the Communist situation so far as the Republic of China was concerned without entering into any sort of agreement with any other country. General Chiang Kai-Shek--who of all men in China should have known exactly how grave the Communist "menace" was, seeing that he was engaged in suppressing their activities--in November last year declared that dispersal of the surviving remnants in the North-West of the Communist forces was exclusively a domestic affair, and would never be affected by outside influences or international politics.

One more point calls for attention before proceeding to review the history of Communist activities in China. On August 21, 1937--while Japanese troops were fighting in "self-defence" in North China, around Shanghai, and in other parts of the Republic--a Treaty of Non-Aggression was concluded between China and Soviet Russia. The provisions of this agreement were very simple and entirely negative in nature, consisting merely of mutual assurances of non-aggression and non-assistance to any aggressor who might attack either signatory. Vigorous attempts were made to represent this harmless and pacific Russo-Chinese pact as affording new proof of secret understanding between the Kuo-Min Tang (as represented by the Chinese Government) and the Comintern (as represented by the Soviet Union). The fact was ignored that Soviet Russia already had various agreements with other countries none of which were favourably inclined toward Communism. The fact was ignored that Germany (Japan's partner in the anti-Comintern pact of 1936) had already entered into an economic agreement with Soviet Russia, and the Italian Fascist Government in 1933 entered into a Russo-Italian pact of friendship. Moreover, Soviet Russia had been recognized as sufficiently "respectable" to be admitted to the League of Nations.

Why, then, should it be considered wrong for China to conclude an arrangement with Russia which confirmed their pledges under the Kellogg Pact not to resort to war as a means of settling any dispute which might arise between them, and--taking that high moral principle a step further--pledged the signatories not to give support to any nation which did not observe its obligations under the Pact of Paris and took aggressive action against one or other of the signatories. Instead of arousing unwarranted suspicion, the Sino-Russian agreement of 1937 should have been welcomed by the civilized world as evidence that at least two great nations had agreed that peace in the Far East would never be disturbed by their actions against each other, nor would they give assistance to any nation which, scorning to follow their pacific example, should enter upon a campaign of aggression. China and Soviet Russia had

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arrived at a friendly understanding which threatened nobody, but this implied no acceptance by China of Marxist theories, nor by Russia of Kuo-Min Tang principles. These matters were recognized as the internal affairs of the signatories with which neither party wished to interfere.

Many a true word is spoken in jest. It has often been said that Japan's great mission--or one of the many which she believes rest upon her shoulders--is "to prevent China becoming Red, and thus contribute toward the well-being of the entire Orient." And how often--long before hostilities were started last summer--have those conversant with the facts smiled at this naive manner of camouflaging Japan's real ambition--yet as things have turned out, Japan has already most effectively brought about the disappearance of Communism from China! True, this has come about not in the way she had intended, by taking military measures of suppression in Chinese territory, but by actually bringing about the surrender to the Kuo-Min Tang of the Communist Party, after their ten years of bitter struggle! Japan's "great mission" has been accomplished unintentionally--and even unwillingly, but the thing has been done, and the last remaining rift in China's national unity removed. There are many phases of the Sino-Japanese situation which are puzzling to foreign observers, and one of the most curious is the "good turn" that Japan has unwittingly done China by waging war upon her, thereby expediting the settlement of a long-standing domestic difference on a political issue.

For eighteen years China had a problem on her hands with which at times she found it very difficult to deal--the existence of a Communist Party which, while at first friendly, subsequently became actively hostile to the National Government. This change of attitude unfortunately necessitated extensive military operations being taken, and more than once Japan suggested that her forces should actively assist in the suppression of Communism in China--an offer which was not only never accepted, but was never even seriously considered. "Beware of the Greeks when they bear gifts," warned a wise Roman of ancient days, and for very obvious reasons China preferred to deal with the Communist problem without availing herself of Japanese military assistance for suppressing the movement. In November, 1936, when the anti-Communist Pact between Germany and Japan was signed, and other countries were invited to join in this agreement, China promptly announced ~~that~~ there was no need for her to participate in the Pact. Further, as already noted, General Chiang Kai-Shek--referring to the military operations then going on for the suppression of Communist forces in the North-West, concerning whose activities Japan had so often evinced such keen interest--said this was exclusively a Chinese domestic affair, and would never be affected by outside influences or international politics. Last December the President of the Judicial Yuan, Mr. Chu Cheng, repeated this declaration of China's policy, adding that it was incomprehensible why a foreign Power geographically separated from the scene of Communist activities should concern itself so painfully over a minor issue which could no longer be regarded as a menace.

Nevertheless, in the summer of 1937 Japan again declared that one of the reasons for her military intervention in North China was to destroy the influence of Communism--and she has done it, but at a fearful price, both for herself and China. The same end could, and would, have been reached without the frightful slaughter throughout the country that has followed from Japan's aggression, but the method adopted was not of China's choosing. On the contrary, the Chinese Government specifically urged the simultaneous withdrawal of the gathering Sino-Japanese forces from the danger-zone around Peiping, so that the incident which had given rise to a most critical situation in North China could be settled by diplomatic negotiation. This proposal was flatly rejected by Japan, and the "interference" of the National Government strongly resented. This intransigent attitude made war inevitable, but it was war that the Japanese wanted. They were ready for it, and were waiting only for an excuse for starting offensive operations.

The fact had been recognized for years by the Chinese Government that 90 per cent of the problem of suppressing Communism in the Republic was of a political and administrative character; the military danger of the situation had been never really serious except in a very limited area, and was further minimized as a result of

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large-scale punitive operations against the Red forces. Meanwhile, by steadily persevering with its programme of social and economic reforms (so far as Japan's constant interference and aggression would permit) the National Government had effectively neutralized the effects of persistent Communist propaganda to the effect that the Kuo-Min Tang (the political party founded by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen which brought about the Revolution in 1911 and the subsequent establishment of the Republic) was not giving attention to economic and social problems affecting the well-being of the masses.

The most enthusiastic supporter of the Kuo-Min Tang will not and cannot claim that much progress was made during the first twenty years of the Republican regime in carrying into effect the Three People's Principles laid down by Sun Yat-Sen. For this disappointing sequel to the Revolution of 1911, aimed at improving the lot of the masses, and which gave so many opportunities for Communist propaganda, Japan herself was largely responsible. By encouraging the ambitions of Yuan Shih-Kai to convert his presidential chair into an Imperial throne, by presenting China with the infamous "Twenty-One Demands," by advancing huge loans to Chinese war-lords and ex-mandarins plotting the destruction of the Republican Government and subsidizing civil war, by refusing to surrender to China the territory in Shantung formerly leased to Germany, by obstructing the victorious northward march of the National Revolutionary troops to Peking, and by openly or secretly giving support or encouragement to every movement aimed at weakening the authority of the National Government and so preventing the establishment of that political unity throughout China which was one of the chief aims of the Revolution, Japan herself created precisely that atmosphere which made it easy for Communist agitators to gain supporters.

It was quite obvious to all at that time that the National Government had not succeeded in uniting the country, but it was not so obvious to the simple peasants who listened to Communist appeals why this national disunity remained. More important to them than the Government's failure to bring rival war-lords under control, and to curb the ambitions of ex-mandarins and their followers, was the fact that the many grievances of the agrarian population dating from the monarchical period had not received the immediate attention and relief that had been expected. That the National Government was unable to give these urgent problems the consideration they deserved because it was fighting for its life against enemies within and without was not realized by the peasants, and consequently many were ready to accept promises that Communism would speedily bring them relief. It was in this way that subversive propaganda met with a measure of success in certain rural districts, especially in Kiangsi, but with the gradual elimination of the war-lords and the corresponding steady increase of the National Government's authority, it was possible to deal with the Communist problem in two ways simultaneously--first, by military operations to suppress rebellious armed forces, and second, by introducing measures for relieving the heavy tax-burden upon peasants, improving land-holding conditions, and encouraging improved methods of cultivation and marketing.

But again Japan was responsible for stimulating the Communist movement in China. As a result of her invasion of Manchuria in 1931, it was necessary for the National Government immediately to transfer troops which had been rounding-up Red forces to places which were in danger of attack by a foreign foe. As a result of this enforced withdrawal of the Government's forces to meet a new and graver emergency, the retreating Communist armies promptly began a counter-offensive and speedily regained control of territory from which they had been cleared. Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 had the effect of undoing all the work that had been done in dispersing the military forces under Communist control, and it was nearly two years before the National Government was in a position to resume its military campaign against Communist troops. Not until the summer of 1933 was General Chiang Kai-Shek able to plan and inaugurate another campaign to clear Kiangsi from Red influence, and start all over again to do the work which Japan's aggressive policy in Manchuria had destroyed.

Since then, however, the military strength and political influence of the Communists in China has been steadily waning, partly in consequence of intensive opera-

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tions carried out by the National Government troops, but more so because of many economic and social reforms carried out by the central and provincial authorities expressly designed to improve the condition of the peasant community. Elaborate plans were put into operation to lighten the tremendous load of taxation imposed upon farmers, to carry out large-scale conservancy-work and so minimize the danger and destruction arising from floods and droughts, to encourage the production of crops of improved quality and increased quantity, to provide better transportation of primary products by rail, road, and river, to provide adequate granaries for use in famine relief, to encourage co-operative effort among farmers, and in many other ways to improve the economic condition of that 80 per cent. of China's population which depends upon agriculture for a livelihood.

All this constructive effort made it clear to the farmers and peasants that the National Government was deeply concerned about their welfare and, given a period free from anxiety arising from Japanese acts of aggression, it could and would do for them all that the Communists said was not to be expected from the Kuo-Min Tang. Thus the discontent in rural areas which provided practically the only field in which subversive agitation against the National Government could hope to succeed gradually disappeared, and with the intensive military operations against Communist armed forces being pressed to a successful conclusion, there was no longer any real internal menace to the authority of the National Government.

For the benefit of those who are not familiar with the facts, it may be explained here that the clash between the Kuo-Min Tang and the Chinese Communist Party came about, not so much as a result of the latter's disapproval of the former's political platform, but mainly because the Communists sought to wrest control of the National Administration from Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's followers. The Communists had no quarrel with the fundamental principles of the Kuo-Min Tang, but they wanted to take control of the revolutionary movement in China and make of it a phase of that world-revolution which twenty-odd years ago was the goal of international Communist agitation. In the early days of the Chinese Revolution an earnest effort had been made by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen to accept Communist support in giving effect to his plans, but on the strict understanding that they were to work as individuals within his Party, and not seek to disrupt it. This pledge, however, was soon broken, with the result that the Communists were expelled and their political activities proscribed. The military operations already referred to were the sequel to this open breach between the Kuo-Min Tang and the Chinese Communist Party.

After Manchuria was occupied by Japan in 1931, advantage was taken of this disastrous development by the Communists to start a new line of attack upon the Kuo-Min Tang. Realizing that it was no longer possible to pretend that the National Government was doing nothing to remedy the grievances of the agrarian population, the Communists now accused the National Government of failing to take effective measures to secure general support with their earlier slogans, addressed mainly to the peasants, the Communists sought to rally national opinion to their support by an appeal to patriotic sentiment and, by denouncing the alleged supineness of the National Government in dealing with aggression, secure the people's mandate to take control of China's national destinies from the Kuo-Min Tang.

It is and was no secret that within the Kuo-Min Tang itself there were differences of opinion as to what should be done in the face of Japan's continual aggression. Some favoured an immediate challenge to the invader, disregarding all other considerations, while others were inclined to make the best terms possible--within the limits of endurance--to secure temporary peace for China, meanwhile concentrating the nation's energies upon preparing for the fight for life which they believed China would eventually have to make, unless there was a fundamental change in Japan's policy. The attitude of Japanese diplomats frequently gave grounds for hoping that such a change was coming, but time and again these hopes were dashed to the ground by aggressive military action on Chinese soil. The National Government, knowing how well-prepared Japan was for an immediate appeal to arms, and realizing that China's national defense scheme was not yet fully carried into effect, did everything possible to avoid an open clash, short of surrendering sovereign rights and terri-

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tory. The Communists, on the other hand, urged that resistance to Japanese aggression should at once take active form, even though China was not quite ready to defend herself against so powerful an enemy.

Further discussion as to which was the wiser course to pursue in the difficult circumstances existing, and whether the limit of endurance had been reached, came to an abrupt end by Japan herself taking the initiative in starting hostilities. Refusing to settle the Marco Polo Bridge "incident" last July by diplomatic negotiation, flatly denying the right of the National Government to "interfere" in North China affairs, and refusing to consider the possibility of friendly neutral mediation in the dispute, the Japanese army started, "in justice and righteousness, to chastize the outrageous Chinese" by launching an attack on Peking on July 27, since when almost the whole of China has been swept by the fire of war. The immediate result of Japan's aggression was to close up the few remaining minor rifts in Chinese political circles among those who, whatever their differences with the National Government, were certainly not Communists, nor in the least inclined in that direction. The next political development was the voluntary renunciation by the Chinese Communist Party of its whole platform as an expression of their patriotic desire to support the National Government in the grave crisis which had arisen as a result of Japan's aggression. The so-called "Red-Menace" vanished from China as quickly as the dew from the grass on a bright spring morning, depriving Japan of one of her main excuses for invading China's territory.

A manifesto was issued by the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in September clarifying the stand of the Party toward the national crisis. Declaring that the Communist Party had adopted a new policy an order to consolidate the unity of the nation, the manifesto laid special emphasis on the following points:--

Realizing that Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's Three Principles are indispensable to the construction of China, the Chinese Communist Party now pledges to exert itself to the utmost for the complete realization of these Principles.

The Chinese Communist Party has decided to abandon all measures aimed at the overthrow of the Kuo-Min Tang Government by force, propagation of Communis doctrines, and policy of forcible expropriation of land.

The Chinese Communist Party has decided to dissolve the Government of the Soviet Republic of China and to support a democratic form of Government with a view to unifying the administrative authority of China.

The Chinese Communist Party has decided to abolish the Red Army and to organize its forces as the Nationalist Revolutionary Army to be placed under the command of the Military Affairs Commission of the National Government. The Revolutionary Army is ready to take up defence duties on the front under the direction of the said Commission.

From a long and stubbornly-fought campaign against the National Government, the Communist forces were accordingly reorganized into the 6th Route Army of the National Government, with General Chu Teh and General Peng Teh-Hui as Commander and Deputy-Commander respectively, and were at once given the opportunity they had so long desired of going into action against the Japanese invaders. For the past two months the former Red armies have been actively engaged in Shansi, and there given a good account of themselves in helping to check the southward advance of the Japanese invaders.

As for the non-military members of and sympathizers with the now defunct Chinese Communist Party, it can be assumed that they will be incorporated in the body politic in much the same way as the vast majority of their former comrades in Germany and Italy have been absorbed. With the disappearance of most of the economic and social grievances which made many of the over-worked and under-paid look to Communism for relief, the peasants and artisans who supported various democratic political groups in those countries now enjoy most of the material benefits they formerly demanded. What has happened in Germany may be expected to happen in China--a crisis threatening the very existence of the whole nation brings about a solidarity of political effort and a determination to establish and preserve absolute unity in face

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of all threats from without. Germany formerly had a trade-union movement which, next to the British, was the strongest in the world; a Communist Party second in strength only to that in Russia; a Social Democratic Party which was the wealthiest Labor Party in the world and controlled powerful militant organizations under the Reich's banner; and a National People's Party which was one of the strongest Conservative organizations in the whole of Europe, supported by the Stahlhelm, a very strong association of ex-servicemen. All these powerful and active political groups have been completely absorbed in Germany under the Nazi regime, and when China is no longer exposed to the danger which now threatens her from without, it will be found that the former Communists will similarly co-operate earnestly and effectively with the Kuo-Min Tang in establishing a democratic Republic based upon the Three People's Principles laid down by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen.

It must be pointed out to those unfamiliar with Chinese affairs that there was a tremendous difference between the outlook of Communists in China and their comrades in Europe. For more than sixty years Communism has been an ideology accepted or rejected in European countries where a relatively high standard of living was general, but where the unequal distribution of wealth and political power caused grave dissatisfaction among the poor and powerless. Even in Germany today it is necessary for the Nazi Government to maintain a Ministry of Propaganda for the special purpose of counteracting the surviving influences upon national thought of half a century of active Marxist teaching. In China the great problem which has to be solved is not so much the equitable distribution of wealth as how to produce it. Poverty is China's most difficult problem, and has been for many centuries. Dr. Sun Yat-Sen made plans for creating an enlightened democracy and enabling it to produce wealth for itself. Chinese Communists have never taken exception to Dr. Sun's plans; his Three People's Principles were always accepted by them as a sound and practical political programme--but they wanted to have the satisfaction of putting them into operation, and in order to secure that privilege sought to discredit the Kuo-Min Tang, upon whose leaders fell the responsibility of carrying out Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's policy after his death.

Communism in China as an active movement dates back only to about 1925, and, instead of being the ideology it was in Europe fifty years earlier, was little more than an expression of disappointment by a limited section of the nation at the slow progress made by the Kuo-Min Tang in putting into effect the principles of the Socialist Republic aimed at by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen in 1911. The reasons for that slow progress have been already explained, but were not understood at the time by the illiterate masses; all they knew was that the problem of filling their rice-bowls was just as difficult after the Revolution as it was before. To them Communism was not an ideology; they knew and cared nothing about the theories of totalitarian or authoritarian States, nor were they interested in plans for establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat. Communism was regarded by them as simply a short cut to the goal which had been indicated by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen but which his followers had not yet attained.

Outside the small circle of men and women who were actually in touch or sympathy with the Third International, "Communism" in China was nothing more than an open expression of popular dissatisfaction at the slow progress made in effecting that socialization of the State which had been initiated by the Revolution of 1911, and it was surprising that Germany should have been misled by Japan into believing that the movement was ideological, and moreover had attained such a hold upon the Chinese people as to be anything like a menace either to the Republic or neighboring States. In other parts of the world the Communists were quite definitely opposed to the social order around them, and sought to change it, whereas the Chinese Communist Party had no quarrel with the Kuo-Min Tang on fundamental political issues--they simply wanted to take charge of the Revolution and wrest administrative control from those who had helped and followed Dr. Sun Yat-Sen. This point is evidently not understood by those foreign observers who have the impression that Communism, to the very limited extent it has ever existed in China, represented the same ideology that aroused such deep resentment in capitalistic States. It seems to have forgotten that the Republic of China is, in fact, a Socialist State--though for the reasons which have

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been already indicated it has not yet been possible to carry fully into effect the political theories aimed at by the Revolutions of 1911 and 1925.

The decision taken in September by the Chinese Communist Party to dissolve its administrative machinery, hand over its military organization to the National Government, and exert itself to the utmost for the realization of Kuo-Min Tang principles and in every way support the Administration it had so long tried to undermine and overthrow, was a step which had been anticipated by those who knew what profound changes had been already made in the Communist platform. In August, 1936--more than twelve months before the decision was reached to dissolve the "Soviet Republic of China"--Mao Tse-Tung, Chairman of the Chinese Soviet "Government" and leader of the Communists in China, had declared that further important points in their platform would be abandoned if such modification would lead to the establishment of a "popular front" in China, lined up to resist Japanese aggression. Hints of Communist willingness to form part of a "popular front" had been thrown out many times but without attracting any favourable reaction. Mao Tse-Tung made a strong bid for such co-operation by sacrificing many principles. He declared (in August, 1936) that the property of land of rich farmers would not be confiscated by the Communists if these wealthy men supported the movement to resist Japan. "Property and factories of merchants and of the larger and smaller capitalists will not be confiscated. On the contrary, we will protect such enterprises, and even help them to develop their business"--Communists protecting and abetting capitalists! Such was the "menace" from which Japan professed so much anxiety to protect China!

The Chairman of the Chinese Soviet "Government" further declared, in August 1937, that "the land and property of all land-owners and militarists who are actively participating in the anti-Japanese war will not be confiscated"--Communist protection not only for landlords but militarists! Mao-Tse-Tung also admitted that the laws and policies of his Soviet "Government" had been already drastically amended, laws for worker-management of enterprises had been repealed, and the Chinese Soviet recognized that "the joint interests of capitalists and workers are built on the foundation of struggle against imperialist aggression." This remarkable re-alignment of Communist policy was intended to pave the way for a working alliance with the Kuo-Min Tang and facilitate the establishment of a "popular front" in China against Japanese aggression. It indicated clearly that, thirteen months before the Chinese Communists finally decided to liquidate their movement completely (as they did in September, 1937), they had abandoned several of their most cherished political theories.

If the German Government had been made aware of Mao Tse-Tung's attitude in August, 1936, it might not have been so easily induced to sign in the following November the anti-Communist pact, believing that Japan was threatened by Communism in China, just as Germany was nervous about her northern neighbour. It is quite evident that the Chinese Soviet "Government," in the summer of 1936, had drifted so far away from its original principles that it was actually more friendly to landlords and capitalists than the Kuo-Min Tang! Constant complaint is made in the foreign Press that Chinese laws are much too lenient towards tenants and mortgagors, that Chinese Judges are disposed to listen too sympathetically to the stories told by persons unable to meet legal obligations, and harden their hearts against those who ask for nothing more than the pound of flesh which, according to the written deed, is their rightful due. Chinese law, drafted and enforced by the Kuo-Min Tang, also imposes effective restraint upon the avarice of money-lenders--whereas the Chairman of the Chinese Soviet "Government" was willing to protect large and small capitalists and "even help them to develop their business". And this was the grave danger, the Communist peril, the Red Menace which Japan considers it her "moral mission" to prevent from over-running China and disturbing the peace of Asia!

The original split between the Kuo-Min Tang and the Communists was largely due to divergence on the issue whether the Revolution in China was or was not to be regarded as a phase of the world-revolution. The leaders of the Kuo-Min Tang insisted that their policy aimed simply at establishing a better political, economic, and social order in China; the Chinese Communists, on the other hand, contended that Dr. Sun's policy was merely an incidental phase of a world-wide movement in which the

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welfare of the Chinese people was a secondary consideration, the main issue being the class-struggle and establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. This attitude has never been adopted or approved by the Revolutionary party in China which has carried on the work begun by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, whose one and only object in bringing about the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty was to liberate his countrymen from the domination of an autocratic monarchy and establish in its place an administration based on the principles of national sovereignty, democracy, and Socialism. His doctrine of the Three People's Principles aimed at establishing for China national equality outside the State ("of the people"), political equality within the State ("by the people"), and an economic equality corresponding to Lincoln's ("for the people.") The Revolution in China preceded that in Russia by six years; it was a national movement, and such it has remained, and it can be confidently expected that those who tried to make it simply a phase of the once hoped-for world-revolution will from now on earnestly co-operate with the Kuo-Min Tang in completing the work begun in 1911.

General Chiang Kai-Shek made the position quite clear in a statement published on September 22, 1937, commenting on the above manifesto issued by the Chinese Communist Party. General Chiang said that the National Government would gladly accept the services of any political organization which sincerely desired to stem foreign aggression and work for the cause of the Nationalist revolution under the leadership of the Kuo-Min Tang. The aim of the Revolution was to seek for China freedom and equality. With this end in view Dr. Sun Yat-Sen enunciated the Three People's Principles, hoping they would serve as the guiding light for a united effort to rescue the country from its perils. Unfortunately, events during the past 10 years showed that not all Dr. Sun's countrymen placed implicit faith in his doctrine, nor did they fully realize the magnitude of the dangers confronting the country. "The path of the Revolution was strewn with serious obstacles which caused a huge expenditure of the nation's resources and much suffering on the part of the people. The effects of domestic troubles thus impaired our strength to meet the external menace, which grew more and more serious as the years passed by." To stop this the National Government made a supreme effort to achieve internal solidarity, and its efforts were at last rewarded. Those who had been dubious about the Three People's Principles realized gradually the paramount importance of national interests and sank their differences for the sake of internal unity, and today there is ample evidence that the Chinese people have fully awakened to the fact that they are bound to live or perish together. All realize that the interests of the nation precede the interests of individuals or groups of individuals. General Chiang Kai-Shek continued:-

"The manifesto recently issued by the Chinese Communist Party is an outstanding instance of the triumph of national sentiment over every other consideration. The decisions embodied in the manifesto, such as the abandonment of violence, cessation of Communist propaganda, abolition of the Chinese Soviets, and the disbandment of the Red Army, are all essential measures towards the mobilization of national strength for the purpose of repelling attacks on our national existence.

"These decisions embody the spirit of the manifesto and revolutions adopted by the last Plenary Session of the Kuo-Min Tang. The allegiance now openly avowed by the Communists to the cause of the Three People's Principles has happily closed the last gap in our national armour. The entire nation shall henceforth strive in one common direction."

General Chiang Kai-Shek pointed out that all Chinese revolutionaries should struggle not for their personal prejudices but for the realization of the Three People's Principles and the common weal of the Republic. "Especially during this period of national crisis, when the fate of China lies in the balance, we should not allow national interests to be overshadowed by past differences. We should lead the entire nation to face the trying circumstances, and through the strength of all safeguard the continued existence of the Republic. The National Government stands for equality in opportunity for all Chinese citizens to serve the Republic. Let no one be deterred from this noble duty, so long as the desire lies in him to take part in the task of national reconstruction under the guiding spirit of the Three People's Principles." The National Government, declared General Chiang Kai-Shek, would gladly accept the services of any political organization which sincerely desired to stem

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foreign aggression and work for the cause of the Nationalist revolution under the leadership of the Kuo-Min Tang. "In the reorientation of its policy the Chinese Communist Party has given clear proof of its solicitude for our national independence and the interests of the country as a whole. I sincerely hope that all members of the Communist Party will faithfully carry out the vital decisions it has reached, and fight shoulder to shoulder with the rest of the nation for the successful completion of the Nationalist revolution." The foundation of the Chinese State rested firmly on the Three People's Principles, declared General Chiang Kai-Shek, and that foundation is immutable and will not be suffered to be changed or altered. "Now that the nation is awakened and solidly united, it may be said with confidence that the course hitherto cautiously steered by the National Government will be continued with the undivided support of the nation. The consolidation of internal solidarity further enables us to marshal all our national resources to combat external aggression in the spirit of self-reliance. I am firmly convinced that in fighting for her own existence China is also fighting for the cause of international peace and justice."

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Mr. Gustafson

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
Honorable Cordell Huef

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

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[Handwritten signature]



A, Lintin; B, Taishan; C, Samun; D, Hopao; E, Pratas (140 miles S. E. of Hong Kong, off the map).
X 1, Swatow; X 2, Swabue; X 3, Pakhoi; X 4, Hoihow; X 5, Chekwan; X 6, Bocca Tigris; X 7, Ngaimun.
1, Canton and suburbs; 2, Whampao; 3, Fatshan; 4, Sainam; 5, Kong Chuen; 6, Yuen Taam; 7, Tsing Yuen;
8, Pakong; 9, Ying Tak; 10, Ma Pa; 11, Kukong; 12, Lok Cheung; 13, Tai Leung; 14, Shek Lung;
15, Cheung Mok Tau; 16, Tong Ka Wan; 17, Kong Moon; 18, Pak Sha; 19, Tsungfa; 20, Wai Chow;
21, Kit Yang.
The following villages, not marked on the map, have been bombed since the map was made: Kung Yik, Sheung Ping, Cheung Muk Tau, Lo Fa and Sun Wui.

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Address Communications to E. H. Lockwood or Y. L. Lee, Y.M.C.A., Canton.

廣州青年號外

No. II

CANTON COMMITTEE FOR JUSTICE TO CHINA

This Pamphlet has been prepared by Prof. C. N. Laird, Lingnan University.

Japan's Statements and Her Real Motives

In the stress of the present conflict in China our hearts are torn by sympathy for our suffering Chinese friends, and perplexed by the effort to understand Japan's "peaceful" purposes, "what she is doing speaks so loud we can not hear what she says." Recently General G. Sugiyama, Japanese War Minister, and General Matsui, in command of the Japanese army in Shanghai, made statements explaining Japan's policy. A few days later their statements were confirmed by the Premier of Japan, Prince Konoye, making the policy official.

Following these statements of policy, the *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong) under the heading "Unanswered Questions" gave an excellent summary of the differences between Japanese motives and actions. Because it expresses our mature convictions we quote it here.

"Japan frequently complains that she is misunderstood and misjudged; but the stereotyped euphemisms persist, and the most careful and dispassionate study fails to discover the high purposes which Japan claims to be serving. The official utterances have a fine ring of emphatic sincerity, which, however, would have been much more impressive had the spokesmen permitted themselves to answer all the questions which the world is asking. The several statements of Japan's aims may be summarised as follows:

1. China is ideologically and sentimentally adhering to an anti-Japanese policy, leaving Japan with no alternative but to eradicate it, and that is Japan's sole aim.
2. China is influenced by Communism.
3. Japan is fighting solely to punish Nanking and its military leaders for their flagrant violation of promises and their outrageous behaviour, and to make them realise their errors.
4. Japan's final aim in the employment of arms is the restoration of friendship between Japan and China.
5. The Japanese army is doing its utmost to avoid the use of arms in China.
6. Japan's enemy is not the good innocent Chinese people.
7. Japan has no interest in China beyond maintaining peace in the Far East.
8. Japan has no territorial ambitions in China. Japan has no intention whatever of retaining territory conquered in China during the past months.

"Small wonder that a Chinese military spokesman was moved to retort bluntly that 'General Matsui is talking through his hat.' Not only are the Japanese statements unhelpful to Japan, but they irritate those who are prepared to mediate for peace. Japan declares that she desires no mediators. Conceding that attitude is natural, if it is feared that 'mediation' means self-interested interference, it must still be insisted that, if Japan's professions are sincere, she must be prepared to state

precisely what she requires of China. The repeated protestations that she demands only China's friendship provoke the repeated reply that friendship is not to be won by slaughter. Although there are in China pro-Japanese groups, it is futile to continue to aver that Japan's enemy is the Nanking Government and not the Chinese people. A government has no body to be torn asunder by bombing, no stomach to be starved by blockade, no children to be terrified and orphaned. The suffering falls upon the people, and, if these are not the official enemy, they are the hotbeds of resistance and everlasting hate. The simple truth is that Japan wants something from China, and is prepared, if necessary and possible, to destroy the whole? Chinese nation to obtain it. What is it that Japan wants

"Observers have catalogued Japan's real aims as follows:

1. To obtain China's raw materials and markets;
2. To exploit Manchuria as an outlet for Japan's population;
3. To prevent China from harassing Japan in her inevitable war with Russia;
4. To dominate the Pacific and destroy the probability that China's potentialities will eventually make China top-dog;
5. To use China's resources and China's man-power to challenge the position of the white races.

"Comparing these five alleged aims against Japan's eight denials and professions as set out above, it will be seen that the one list accommodates the other. To oust the Nanking Government and install a pro-Japanese group—this will officially end anti-Japonism. To suppress Communism—this really means to force China into active antagonism to Russia. To compel China to be friendly—this will make China a military ally. To establish peace in the Far East—this means to destroy China's powers of resistance. To give benefits to China—this can be accomplished by leading China in raids upon the rest of the world. Japan's declaration that she has no further territorial designs upon China tells us nothing. The Manchurian precedent demonstrates the other way of enslaving China. Japan's spokesmen do not answer the fundamental questions. Perhaps the interviewers failed to put them—

1. Is not China's anti-Japonism the result of Japonism?
2. What was the proposition made to Nanking which Nanking rejected?
3. If China promises to be friendly, will Japan withdraw her troops from Chinese territory?

"If these questions are sincerely answered, the world will be in better position to appreciate the issues, the influences and Japan's claims to justice and sympathy. Until they are answered satisfactorily, Japan's motives will remain suspect."

2

Japanese Air Raids Over Kwangtung

South China has not suffered from the ravages of war as, for example, Shanghai has suffered, but air raids almost every day and some days as many as four, by squadrons of Japanese naval planes, have brought death to civilians and destruction to private property in many places in Kwangtung alone. The map on page four of this leaflet will show some of the places that have been attacked; here we can give only a short account of what has occurred in a few localities. (Numbers in parentheses after the name of a place refer to the map on page four.)

Japanese aggression in South China apparently has had three objectives; destruction of government owned property, terrorizing the civilian population and the prevention of any sea-going commerce. The Japanese navy, in carrying out this program, is showing its might against an almost helpless people. Naval planes are carrying out raids daily and war vessels are attacking and sinking defenseless fishing junks, these being the only Chinese owned sea-going ships that did not tie up in port at the beginning of hostilities.

Kwangtung's defense against this ruthless aggression consists in a few aeroplanes now badly outnumbered, small forts at the entrance to a few ports (that at Bocca Tigris, guarding the entrance to the river to Canton, is the one most worthy of its name), and anti-aircraft guns around Canton and at a few other places guarding important bridges on the Canton-Kowloon and Canton-Hankow railroad lines. The only naval vessels were old and small, none being more than a few hundred tons in displacement. The provincial army has been guarding successfully a very long coast line to prevent landing parties getting a foothold on either the mainland or the coveted island of Hainan but it has not been able to prevent a number of islands off the sea coast being occupied and bases for aeroplanes erected thereon.

At first the air raids were directed nominally against the aerodromes and other military establishments, but many civilians were killed because of poor marksmanship, if not by deliberate intention. Being satisfied with the damage they have done to the hangars and landing fields (and attempted to do to the National Sun Yat-sen University) around Canton, they have recently turned their attention largely to the three railroads in the province, the Canton-Kowloon, the Canton-Hankow and the Sunning railroads. The first two named do have military significance, because they are the only remaining means by which munitions may be transported from a foreign port (Hong Kong) to Central China, but it is difficult to see how the one named last can be used for any military purpose.

Railroads in China skirt the old towns and villages, there often being half a mile of open fields between the station with quarters for its staff and the town. The Japanese bombers have not been satisfied to try to blow up the railroads, particularly the bridges, but have also flown low over the neighboring villages, dropping bombs and often machine gunning the inhabitants. Casualties have been far higher among the civilians than among the uniformed railroad guards, and there have been no reports of attacks on any body of troops. Twice recently slow local trains, partly passenger and partly freight, bound for Hong Kong, have been attacked and machine gunned. In the last case the train had stopped at a station when the planes appeared. Most of the passengers scattered into the neighboring fields. The planes swooped low, dropped bombs which demolished

the station and machine gunned the train, killing two men who had not fled. Bound for Hong Kong, the train could not have carried either troops or munitions, but perhaps the intention in attacking it was to prevent Hong Kong receiving a supply of fresh vegetables!

The Rev. G. H. McNeur, who for many years has been a resident of Kong Chuen, 12 miles from Canton on the railroad to Hankow, writes this about the raids on that town.

"Kong Chuen (5) has received attention from the Japanese bombers because the first long bridge on the Canton-Hankow railway crosses the Tsung-fa river at this place. They have made three unsuccessful attempts to bomb the bridge, twice on the forenoon and afternoon of September 27 and again on October 6. At the second attempt six villagers were killed when shops and houses on both sides of the approach to the bridge were shattered.

"On October 6, after dropping their bombs at the bridge and railway, one of the planes dived further down the stream toward Ko Tong Market where a ferry boat with passengers who had not heard the warning was crossing the river. Seeing it, the airman released a bomb which missed its mark but fell among three cargo boats moored by the shore. The explosion killed a man and three children. A babe on its mother's breast was blown to pieces and the woman's breast was torn off. This is modern warfare.

"Although so far there have been few casualties during the frequent visits of enemy planes and these attacks, the terror and anxiety which have resulted among our peaceful and helpless village neighbors, especially women and children, are leaving festering wounds on minds and hearts of which no casualty list can ever be compiled."

Tsing Yuen (7), an unprotected county-seat on the North river, about 40 miles from Canton and ten miles from the railroad, was visited one night and about 50 bombs dropped, destroying county buildings, a Middle School, the Confucian Hall and many private buildings. Two hundred civilians were killed and wounded.

At Kukong (11), 130 miles north of Canton, the North river forks and the city was built between the branches of the river. The railroad from Canton which has followed up along the east side of the main river here crosses the east branch on a high bridge well above the city, turns west and follows the west branch for miles on its way to Central China. As the destruction of this bridge would cripple service on the railroad for weeks, many air raids have been made on Kukong. Some damage has been done to the tracks and buildings at the station but as yet the bridge has not been hit and the tracks have been repaired quickly. Time and again, besides attempting to bomb the railroad, bombs have been dropped on the city across the river from the railroad. In the first air raid, about two o'clock on the morning of August 31, the first point in the province to be attacked was this railroad bridge, but none of the bombs fell on the east side of the river, where the railroad is. Bombs did fall in the heart of the city, killing and injuring forty civilians. A missionary doctor in Kukong sends this note about more recent air raids.

"Raids occurred on the 6th., 7th., 9th. and 14th., the last two being especially bad. In all about 150 bombs were dropped and the southern part of the city is a mass of ruins. Except on the 14th.,

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when a few bombs were dropped on the west bank of the river some distance below the city, there was very little loss of life, as immediately a warning is sounded all the inhabitants leave the city. The people killed below the city were people who had gone there to escape the terror in the city."

Sixty miles north-east of Canton, at Tsungfa (19), a resort has grown up around some hot springs. Even there bombs have been dropped, damaging the small hotel and several private bungalows, and also in the neighboring villages. At the time of the air raid a group of village boys were watching their carabao (or water buffalo) grazing on nearby hills. A plane flew low over the boys, machine gunned and killed seven besides a number of cattle. Many miles from railroads, fortified areas, government owned property, these boys could not be thought guilty of any act which might have even suggested such a cruel and unjustifiable death. Can the people in those villages be made to believe that Japan is aiming to bring peace to China?

Ten miles east of Canton, where the Pearl River widens and turns south-east towards Hong Kong, lies the old port of Whampao (2). If the surrounding hills could talk what stories they could tell of clipper ships, of bronzed sailors of many lands, of the days of the long ago when all of China's intercourse with the West, whether commerce or diplomatic delegations en route to Peking, passed through her portals. In later years, with the opening of other ports, Whampao went to sleep again and the little villages lost their bustle. Then in 1924 came the building, among the low hills behind the old customs house on the southern side of the harbor of a military academy where Marshal Chiang Kai Shek came into prominence and the officers were trained who led the army northward that overturned China in 1926 and 1927.

Then another military academy was built in a suburb of Canton easily accessible by motor road, and the buildings at Whampao were abandoned, except for a few on one side, near the river bank, which were used for training officers for the local naval vessels. The district called Whampao again became as quiet as any of the hundreds of other communities along the rivers of the province.

Recently Dr. Sun Yat-sen's proposal that South China should have a great port has been taken up seriously, Whampao was chosen, a Netherlands Company began dredging and a commission is preparing detailed plans for the development of a great port. This time the buildings are to be on the north side of the harbor, easily connected by motor road with Canton and by rail with the railroads, that are to radiate from Canton.

Then came the Japanese planes, on six days, swooping low again and again without interference to bomb the two diminutive gun boats, hardly larger than launches, and the deserted buildings of the former academies. Imagine the people in the village near the old customs house as the warning bell is rung, they hide in their simple houses packed close together along the two or three streets, they hear the planes low overhead and explosions rock the ground as academy buildings are demolished. Suddenly, four bombs drop in the village and brick walls

and tile roofs tumble, wrecking many shops and houses. The frightened people flee to the hill behind the village, an aviator sees them and, swooping low, machine guns them as they run. Three women fall, two never to rise again. There being no troops on the island to be killed by the attacking planes, perhaps the god of war may be appeased by the death of innocent women.

Looking for the new harbor works at the village of Tung Po on the north side of the harbor, and finding none, the aviators dropped bombs on a group of boats anchored there, leaving death and destruction in their wake.

Kityang (21), a city in eastern Kwangtung, was raided on September 16. Miss Clara Leach, M.D., writes:

"Evidently the aviators were aiming at the government office and at a factory on the riverbank. Both were missed but they did hit homes. There are no military activities here,

"Only two bombs exploded; another is reported to have fallen in the river. The official record gives well over 30 deaths and about 80 injured. Forty-three were brought to us for treatment,—all of the serious cases and some of the mild ones. There were three amputations, two fractured skulls, several badly mutilated in muscle tissue and the rest multiple skin and muscle wounds. All were badly infected by the dirt and flying debris. Two had eye wounds, one severe injuries to the eyelids, the other losing his vision entirely for a time but it has partly returned."


On October 15 eleven Japanese planes, three pursuit and eight bombers, raided the Sunning railroad, which is entirely unprotected, and for two hours rained bombs on towns along its route south from Kongmoon (17). At Au Wan a ferry was bombed, at Kung Yik the railroad repair shops were destroyed but the loss of life was at a temple where people had taken refuge, two being killed instantly. More recently the planes have visited the towns along this railroad again, raining bombs on the houses. At Kung Yik bombs were dropped within a few yards of the building occupied by a school for girls. When Canton was attacked so violently in September this Christian school for girls moved to what was considered a safe place in the country; now that place has been attacked, the school has closed temporarily and they know not where to go or what to do.

These are but illustrations of what the civilian population all through the province has suffered and is expecting to suffer again. Daily the list of places attacked grows longer and it is not possible to either keep the map up to date or show all the places that have felt the wrath of the Japanese military machine.

China needs peace, she needs justice, but without justice she does not want peace. It is far more important that everyone realizes that unless all the forces in the world which believe in righteousness exert themselves and take control, there is no country that can escape for long the horrors that air raids have brought to the peaceful villagers of China.

THE FIVE POINT OBJECTIVE OF THE CANTON COMMITTEE FOR JUSTICE TO CHINA

1. United Action between the United States and Great Britain in the present Sino-Japanese Crisis.
2. Economic Boycott of Japan by Western Powers.
3. Aid to China in the purchase and transportation of means of defense.
4. Positive Action upholding China's sovereignty by Powers Signatory to the Nine Power Pact.
5. Contributions for relief work for those who suffer from Japanese atrocities not only in Canton but in all parts of China. They should be sent to the Committee Headquarters, YMCA., Canton.



A, Lintin; B, Taishan; C, Samun; D, Hopao; E, Pratas (140 miles S. E. of Hong Kong, off the map).

X 1, Swatow; X 2, Swabue; X 3, Pakhoi; X 4, Hoihow; X 5, Chekwan; X 6, Bocca Tigris; X 7, Ngaimun.

1, Canton and suburbs; 2, Whampao; 3, Fatshan; 4, Sainam; 5, Kong Chuen; 6, Yuen Taam; 7, Tsing Yuen;

8, Pakong; 9, Ying Tak; 10, Ma Pa; 11, Kukong; 12, Lok Cheung; 13, Tai Leung; 14, Shek Lung;

15, Cheung Mok Tau; 16, Tong Ka Wan; 17, Kong Moon; 18, Pak Sha; 19, Tsungfa; 20, Wai Chow;

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The following villages, not marked on the map, have been bombed since the map was made: Kung Yik, Sheung Ping, Cheung Muk Tau, Lo Fa and Sun Wui.

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from
THE NATION

How Can We Escape War?

Neutrality Plus Socialism

BY NORMAN THOMAS

COLLECTIVE security is a phrase or an idea increasingly dear to such assorted Americans as Earl Browder, Dorothy Thompson, and the editors of *The Nation* and the *New York Times*. The League for Peace and Democracy (formerly the League Against War and Fascism) in its official program dodges the phrase but, following President Roosevelt's lead, advocates "the necessity of concerted action to quarantine aggressors," which if it means anything means to most people collective security. But what does collective security mean for Americans on the eve of the year 1938 of what is called by courtesy the Christian era? One suspects that its advocates find it easier to agree that those of us who disbelieve in it are "isolationists," "futile pacifists," "unwitting tools of fascism," or "Trotskyists" than to define what they mean by it or how they would apply it in the present crisis.

Now collective security as an abstract idea is reasonable, but we must consider it as a concrete proposal for action under present conditions, not under the conditions that prevailed at some former time or which may prevail in the future. The advocate of collective security must tell his fellow-Americans plainly how he would answer such immensely pertinent questions as these: Assuming that collective security is something to be achieved against aggressor nations, precisely at which nations should it be directed? Japan? Or Japan and Germany and Italy, the latter two being clearly aggressors in Spain? Who will be our partners in achieving it? Presumably the "democratic" nations. But which are they? Great Britain? France? Russia? If, as is probable, collective security should begin with economic sanctions, what reason have we to think that the sanctions would be effective, or if effective that they would be an alternative rather than a preface to war? If collective security means war, why should we expect that war to be essentially different from the first war to make the world safe for democracy, or likely to result in a better peace? How can the United States wage war without establishing at home a military dictatorship, universal conscription, and fascism?

It is because I have not heard, read, or imagined any remotely satisfactory answer to these questions that I reject the idea of American participation in collective security as enormously dangerous. I am aware of the difficulties of keeping the United States out of a war if it becomes a world war; I should prefer to keep war out of the world. But I object to being dismissed as an isolationist when I insist that we have a right to utilize for our peace the advantages of our geographic and historic

position, and that it is more practicable to keep the United States government out of war than to use it in war for ideal ends. Moreover, if we fail, I think that those of us who tried to keep the United States out of war will have a better hearing from the potential builders of a new social order than those who must assume responsibility for another war with its tragic suffering and ultimate futility and disillusionment. I believe in cooperation for peace and the maximum possible isolation from war. Those who have turned deaf ears to every plea for cooperation for peace while there was time have no right to demand that I support cooperation for war.

From war and all its effects there is no complete escape for any nation in an interdependent world, but there is no fatalistic inevitability of history or economics which compels the United States to fight Japan, now or later. The assumption of the inevitability of imperialist war between the United States and Japan rests among other things on the refusal to see that our real hope against both imperialism and fascism lies in sanctions which some day the workers of Japan will join with their brothers in China and in other lands in enforcing, and not in the triumph of one set of capitalist powers interested in preserving the status quo over another set which wants to change it.

Let us look now in some detail at the bitter facts which make a collective security of democratic states in our crazy, capitalist-nationalist world a utopian dream. There have been many occasions when the omens for successful action by non-fascist nations to restrain an aggressor were far more auspicious than they are now. But nothing happened. Great Britain and France, probably alone, certainly with the aid of the U. S. S. R., by vigorous diplomacy and a discreet threat of economic sanctions could have blocked Mussolini's war on Ethiopia before it began. In the end, too late, through the League of Nations they imposed weak sanctions which only irritated the Italian people and drove them closer to their dictator. Even Russia continued to sell oil to Mussolini. And even Russia today is purchasing a new naval vessel from the fascist yards of Livorno. Simply by permitting the Spanish government the usual rights of a nation Great Britain and France—yes, and America—could probably have ended the fascist war in Spain before it menaced the peace of mankind. Great Britain, the same Britain which is now expected to fight for democracy, preferred to take chances on Mussolini rather than on any sort of social revolution in Spain. In 1931, before Hitler came to power and before the Japanese were so deeply committed to the Chinese conquest, it is quite possible that the League of Nations, the U. S. S. R., and the United States could have prevented the rape of Manchuria by economic sanctions or the threat of them. There

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was no remote approach to agreement among them. Why, then, expect them suddenly today to agree on effective sanctions against Japan, to saying nothing of Italy and Germany?

And if by a miracle they should agree on effective sanctions, including an embargo on cotton, scrap iron, and oil, would not a united Japan seek to break that blockade before it was strangled by it? Would not the consequence be a prompt attack on the Dutch East Indies to get oil? And could this nation, partly responsible for provoking that attack, refuse to aid the victim? It is dangerous irresponsibility, in view of all the probabilities, for Communists or liberals to do what I heard Clarence Hathaway do before the Negro Congress in Philadelphia: assure the audience that effective economic sanctions would bring Italy, Germany, and Japan to terms *without any danger of war*. On the contrary, the danger is so great that advocates of such sanctions at least should press for an armament program in the United States far more costly than our present billion-dollar military budget. "Collective security," in other words, means for the United States certain militarism and all but certain war.

That war would not be for "democracy." What is the common denominator of democracy which would unite Stalin's non-capitalist but totalitarian state with the capitalist but non-totalitarian states of Messrs. Roosevelt, Chamberlain, and Chautemps? Truly a new age of faith is upon us when men and women old enough to remember how we proposed to make the world safe for democracy in one war and got Hitler—or with eyes to observe events in India, the Near East, and tragic Spain—can believe in a crusade for democracy led by Stalin, Roosevelt, Chamberlain, and the French General Staff. As I write these lines, the British government is showing a far greater interest in finding terms on which Hitler may be satisfied than in building a British, French, and Russian alliance.

It is indeed probable that Great Britain and France may fight one or more of the fascist nations, but it will not be for democracy; it will be for their national and imperial interests. If the United States fights Japan, it will be for national "honor," to avenge some injury or slight, to keep a Far Eastern trade worth less than our annual military budget in time of peace. It will not be to make China safe for those Chinese whom we continuously and cheerfully affront by our unilateral exclusion act. The only service of our idealists will be to provide rationalizations highly useful to the militarists. Those rationalizations will be more sophisticated than the Wilsonian rationalizations of 1917 but not essentially different from them, or truer than they were.

To these arguments I have heard no plausible answers. The less romantic among the advocates of collective security meet the issue something like this: "We grant that the motives behind collective security may be mixed. Nevertheless, we should seek alliances now because sooner or later we shall have to fight Japan and probably other fascist nations too. This is a good time to get it over, before Japan has strengthened its position by its

conquest of China. To defeat the fascist aggressors, from whatever motives, is the one essential to any hope of building a decent world in which constructive forces can operate."

This statement misjudges the probable effect of a temporary Japanese victory in China as badly as it misunderstands the cause and cure of fascism. Japan will probably be able to impose its own terms of peace in China. But not for long. It has the undying hatred of a patient people whose ancestors have always absorbed their conquerors. Guerrilla war, passive resistance, Communist risings aided by the U. S. S. R., not only in China but possibly in Japan itself, will still further weaken the structure of a nation already greatly strained by the economic weakness of its position and the costs of war. If foreign nations made war on Japan, the rulers and the masses might unite against the foe; the difficulties of gathering the fruits of a costly victory will have no such effect.

Fascism and imperialism are the products of our capitalist-nationalist civilization at a certain stage of its development or disintegration. They are the offspring, horribly ugly but legitimate, of the status quo which we are asked to preserve. Victory for the armies of Stalin, Chamberlain, Roosevelt, and Chautemps might remove certain dictators and might—or might not—encourage constructive revolution in the conquered states. But certainly in the victorious empires there would be no constructive revolution. The result, as our Communist friends ought to realize, would not be the world Lenin sought in 1917 but a world in which all the major causes of war and fascism would still be operative. Stalin might be among the victors, but not socialism or democracy. The unity of workers with hand and brain would still remain to be achieved. And in that unity lies our best hope of ending the division of men and nations into the houses of Have and Have Not. The chances are that a victorious United States, if not too exhausted, would stay in China to finish the work of "civilization" which the Japanese militarists had begun. Our government might take the devil's role of arch-imperialist. For, never forget, the victory of the United States, however high and holy our alleged aim, would with absolute certainty require the militarization of our people and the establishment of virtual fascism at home. And that fascism would of necessity be imperialistic.

Even today the War Department is ready for universal conscription, to draft us all for trench or work bench. The first and perhaps the greatest of the enormous casualties of our next war will be liberty and democracy at home. This will be the one sure consequence of the attempt to use the American capitalist government, in or out of an alliance, to establish peace or democracy by war. It will be a result not limited in duration to the war. No one can tell how long it would take a brutalized, exhausted people, drugged by war and possibly by the thing we call "victory," to throw off its chains.

Are we, then, condemned to do nothing? It is true that no means is at hand to bring to us or to the world the democracy and peace as dear to us as to any advocates

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of collective security. We pay, and pay a tragic price, for all our mistakes and lost opportunities since the summer of 1914. In any course is some danger and to any program some objection.

I should agree with Mr. Buell's program, as far as it goes, with two important exceptions. I believe (1) that his third point, an international embargo on raw materials, is today an impossible and dangerous version of collective security; and (2) that the desirable improvement in the neutrality law is not an increase in Presidential powers of discretion. Whatever praise is due the President's Chicago speech as a condemnation of aggression, it was an undemocratic gesture toward changing American policy, a gesture inconsistent with the President's preceding acts, and one which led the world to expect something more than another futile conference to add to Norman Hezekiah Davis's long and unbroken record of failure. Yet many of those most suspicious of Mr. Roosevelt's ambitions praised this very undemocratic method of changing our foreign policy in a matter literally of life and death to us all.

The stock argument that neutrality of the sort envisaged by our present imperfect law is of advantage to Japan as against China is simply untrue, unless, indeed, one believes that we should be ready to fight for the right to ship guns to China. This is what some of my Chinese friends frankly desire. In reality, to call this undeclared war of Japan's "war," to ban all loans, to prohibit all shipments of munitions to Japan as well as to China, and to make it harder for Japan to buy and transport other materials would diminish the advantage over China which Japan's superior merchant marine and banking facilities now give it. If the government would immediately enforce the neutrality law and withdraw our citizens and fighting forces from danger zones in the Far East, it would be in a better, not a worse, position to use such moral pressure as might possibly make for peace. Neutrality in a world war would impose economic hardships on this nation which should be considered and as far as possible anticipated. But those hardships would be less than the costs of war.

Beyond this program for the government, I heartily agree with *The Nation's* support of a popular boycott by consumers of Japanese goods. Properly conducted, such a boycott is not open to the objections to official embargos backed by navies.

Above all, any long-range program for peace requires an active struggle for a new social and international order impossible under capitalist nationalism. This alone can give the economic assurance to nations in the House of Have Not which Mr. Buell suggests that we should give to Japan. No defeat of Japanese militarists will mean much for peace in a world which continues to deprive not only the working class generally but certain races and nations in particular of sure access to the material means necessary for their well-being. The ominous portent of fascism but strengthens our fundamental analysis of the cause and cure of war. "Workers of the world unite" is still the best slogan for achieving a genuine collective security.

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The Failure of Isolation

BY RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL

DURING the past few years many American liberals have abandoned hope of building a world order which will prevent war. Appalled by the difficulty of finding a constructive way out of the existing international chaos, they now want to insulate the United States from "other people's wars" by a policy which may be called the New Isolation.

The New Isolation has at least four planks in its platform:

1. Economic self-containment, so as to cut the economic ties between the United States and the outside world. Although few liberals advocate the complete application of this doctrine, many have supported the idea that upon the outbreak of war the United States should prohibit the export of essential raw materials to all belligerents.
2. Conscription of capital in time of war; taking the profits out of war.
3. Continental self-defense.
4. A popular referendum before any declaration of war except in the event of invasion.

Despite the ardor with which the New Isolation program has been supported, it has already proved a failure. The movement for mandatory embargos produced nothing better than the Neutrality Act of May, 1937. This act prohibits the export of munitions in time of war but allows the unrestricted export of raw materials provided belligerents pay cash and transport such materials in non-American ships. Instead of cutting the economic ties of the United States with warring countries, the Neutrality Act, if applied, will make us an indirect ally of the power with the largest navy and financial resources—Japan in the Orient and Britain in Europe. In its present form, therefore, it is as likely to involve us in war as were the pre-war rules of neutrality.

The movement to draft capital and take the profits out of war has also proved a delusion. Despite its advocacy of anti-war-profits bills, the Nye Munitions Committee in June, 1936, quietly published a report which admitted that it is virtually impossible to take the profits out of war. "It is obvious," the report declared, "that the most important contribution toward victory to be made in the economic sphere is the bringing about of the tremendous and rapid increase in production that is needed. Yet it is extremely unlikely that this production will be forthcoming without the evils of profiteering. . . . Whenever the attempts to eliminate these evils conflict with the efforts to stimulate production, it is the former rather than the latter which must be sacrificed."

The idea of continental defense has made even less progress. For all our pacifism, our unwillingness to make any international commitments, and our supposed geographic security, the United States is spending a billion dollars a year upon its armaments. We have a navy and an air force as strong as that of any other power. Why do Congress and public opinion overwhelmingly support such expenditures? Not because of any plot of the muni-

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tions makers, but because of a feeling of insecurity and a desire to be prepared for any eventuality.

Faced with the collapse of these proposals, the New Isolationists are now turning to the idea of a referendum before a declaration of war. At first sight the idea is attractive, but American history gives no evidence that the "people" are any less belligerent than Congress. The only virtue of a referendum is the virtue of delay, but this delay may prove disastrous if it gives an enemy time to seize bases in Latin America and launch an attack against the Panama Canal. Confronted by such a threat, most Presidents and Congresses would ignore any constitutional injunction regarding a pre-war plebiscite and resist the aggression against Latin America, declining to admit that the armed clash which might thus result was "war." So long as the President retains any diplomatic discretion or the right to move the fleet, it remains possible for him to create an "incident" and work up public opinion into a war fever. Similar in nature to the prohibition amendment and the anti-war pact, the proposed referendum on war would have little effect on the foreign policy of the United States, while it would encourage fascist aggression elsewhere. From the standpoint of political theory it is well to remember that the dictators of Rome appealed over the heads of the Senate to the masses, that Napoleon III employed the plebiscite to legitimize his coup d'état, and that Hitler solemnly appeals to the referendum to confirm his most spectacular acts. American democracy is not going to be saved by tying the hands of Congress in times of emergency; its future depends upon making Congress a more responsible and representative body.

Forced to admit these failures, many of the supporters of the New Isolation now show a spirit of complete discouragement. Some of them predict that no matter what we do, the United States will inevitably be drawn into the next war. Unwilling to cooperate with other powers, and unwilling to pay the price for the New Isolation, the United States today drifts along upon a rising tide of chaos. As the sinking of the Panay indicates, the relations between the United States and Japan may at any time develop a crisis. A policy of endeavoring single-handed to protect our interests in a war zone creates the danger of war.

It cannot be denied that the economic interests, the political institutions, and the security of the United States will be seriously endangered by another world war, whether we remain neutral or not. While most observers do not predict a general war in the immediate future, the fact remains that the powers today are spending nearly three times as much on armaments as they did in 1914. Recently the world has been enjoying an economic recovery based partly upon these unproductive armament expenditures, financed by borrowing. Sooner or later the limit of such expenditure will be reached, particularly in the dictatorships, which will be confronted by bankruptcy. What will they do then? Turn workers out of the munitions plants into the streets and run the risk of social revolution? Resort to a gigantic inflation? Or take the risks of becoming involved in a foreign ad-

venture? Unless the present world trend is reversed, one need not be an alarmist to predict that during the next five years the world will experience a new war or a new depression of far greater magnitude than any we have known in the past.

The United States could conceivably escape the ravages of a new depression or a new world war by socializing its economy on a self-contained basis. But in view of our huge agricultural surpluses and the technological advantages of our mass-production industries, which can only be fully utilized through international trade, self-containment would inevitably mean a lowered standard of living. Recent difficulties in obtaining farm legislation and imposing controls on American industry indicate the far greater difficulties that would be involved in a more drastic reorganization of our economic life through democratic processes. The attempt to achieve self-containment would probably lead in the direction of dictatorship, and a dictatorship of the right. The experience of Germany and Italy shows that self-containment, or autarchy, can probably be achieved only through fascism.

As for the effect of war on our political institutions, the United States would probably submit to dictatorship if it entered another war. But there is also grave danger of its being led to sacrifice its liberties in order to keep out of war. Wars are caused as much by clashes of ideas as by clashes of economic interests. And the American people have never shown restraint in expressing their dislike of conditions abroad. There is something ironical in the fact that at the very time when Congress was debating the Neutrality Act last spring, Mayor LaGuardia, John L. Lewis, Hugh Johnson, Cardinal Mundelein, and Senator Borah were denouncing fascism in language more severe perhaps than that used by any responsible leader in France or England. America hates fascism today infinitely more than it hated the German Kaiser in 1914. Possibly we shall continue to confine our hatred to words. But to be logical, an isolationist should favor censorship of the press, newsreels, and movies upon the outbreak of war between foreign nations, for if American opinion becomes unneutral, the task of keeping the country out of war will be extremely difficult, no matter what economic issues are involved. Those Americans who believe that we shall not need to exert the very greatest effort to preserve our traditional liberties in a world full of raging conflict, are living in a fool's paradise.

It may be argued that the United States can remain indifferent to any war until an aggressor has actually invaded the Western Hemisphere. But this argument ignores the fact that if the three aggressive dictatorships—Germany, Italy, and Japan—succeed in their present efforts to dominate neighboring territory, and if they succeed in destroying the present balance of power in Europe, the task of defending this hemisphere from invasion will prove far more difficult than if such prospective wars are nipped in the bud. Moreover, fascism is learning how to make conquests without the force of arms. Today it undoubtedly is at work in Latin America,

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the world's greatest reservoir of raw materials. The Vargas dictatorship in Brazil denies that it is fascist, but the test will come when a revolution against the dictatorship occurs. Vargas will undoubtedly pronounce it "Communist" and even appeal to the anti-Communist bloc for aid. It is not fantastic to believe that the Spanish civil war may then be transferred to Latin America. In such an event the Latin American dictatorships—there are only three real democracies south of the Rio Grande—will gravitate toward Rome and Berlin, and away from Washington, if the world's great democracies continue to show signs of paralysis.

Obviously the formula of "isolation" or "neutrality" offers no answer to the tremendous economic, political, and military problems confronting the United States. Certainly the alternative is not a preventive war; the United States cannot be expected to accept any military commitments. The question is whether it can participate in a new effort at cooperation to avert the outbreak of war, for only in such effort is there hope for the future.

In my opinion, the United States can take four concrete steps at the present time, all of which may help to check the present trend toward war:

1. *Strengthen the Hull foreign-trade program.* Four years ago Secretary of State Hull was almost alone among world statesmen in his desire to combat the evil of economic nationalism. Despite domestic as well as foreign opposition, he has steadfastly pursued his goal of reducing excessive trade barriers without injuring any essential industry or adversely affecting the interests of the American worker or farmer. Up to the present the State Department has concluded trade agreements with sixteen nations, and on November 17 it announced that negotiations with Great Britain would soon begin. Those familiar with the attitude of Britain several years ago toward the Hull trade program regard this last achievement as a great triumph. While the British agreement will open new markets for the American farmer, the United States will have to lower certain duties on manufactured goods, and the interests adversely affected are becoming restive. But if public opinion strongly supports the efforts of the Secretary of State, the British trade agreement may lay the foundation for a general removal of trade barriers and for a new effort to bring Germany and Italy back to the world economy, as well as induce Japan to abandon its aggressive policies as a solution for its economic problems.

2. *Amend the Neutrality Act.* In its present form the Neutrality Act makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to throw its diplomatic weight against aggression. Unwilling to assist Japan, President Roosevelt has declined so far to apply the act to hostilities in the Orient. He has been legally justified in taking this position because if neither Japan nor China is willing to admit that the present hostilities have created a legal state of war, the President is under no obligation to do so. Nevertheless, should Japan declare war against China, the President would be obliged to apply the act. Then both belligerents would be barred from our munitions market, but both could buy raw materials upon the

cash-and-carry basis. In fact this would mean that China would suffer, for Japan is self-sufficient in munitions and, unlike China, has a merchant marine which can transport American raw materials. The act would operate similarly to benefit Britain and France in a European war. In its present form the Neutrality Act is unconditionally and automatically pro-Japanese and pro-British. The United States cannot afford thus uncritically to underwrite the foreign policy of any power. It should use its discretion to open or close its markets in accordance with its own interests and not in accordance with the accident of geography. To avoid the dangers implicit in the present act, Congress should amend it so as to give the President discretion to impose an embargo upon the export of raw materials to belligerents.

3. *Cooperate in an international embargo on raw materials.* It would be unwise for the United States alone to stop the shipment of any raw material to Japan. Apart from the political consequences, such a unilateral embargo might merely divert trade to other powers. But an international embargo on the export of such war materials as scrap iron, cotton, and oil, and on the importation of Japanese silk, is an entirely different matter. Britain has indicated that it will go as far as the United States in stopping war in the Orient. Surely the least we can do is to cooperate with all like-minded powers in denying to Japan the raw materials which are necessary for its military aggression, and in declining to buy Japanese silk, which provides the exchange for the purchase of raw materials.

The one argument advanced against an international embargo is that Japan might retaliate by attacking Hongkong, Vladivostok, or the Philippines, and thus provoke war. Actually, the danger of such an attack exists today, in the absence of any collective diplomatic machinery for meeting it without resort to military force. Moreover, once an international embargo was imposed, the Western powers could refrain from taking any military action to defend their possessions in the Orient, realizing that if they applied the embargo long enough Japan would have to withdraw. The international embargo, if the Western powers have the discipline and the restraint to apply it, provides a substitute for war. In imposing such an embargo I would favor evacuation of all our troops from China and the withdrawal of our nationals to the Philippines, thus reducing one source of friction with Japan.

4. *Seek a basis of appeasement in the Pacific.* In imposing an embargo denying to Japan the raw materials of aggression, the outside world should announce its willingness to assist in finding a solution of Japan's economic difficulties once peace is restored. The ultimate objective of our foreign policy should be a new Washington conference for the purpose of restoring China's sovereignty—and this includes the surrender of the special privileges of all powers—and of considering Japan's grievances against the outside world. If an embargo is accompanied by a definite offer of reconstruction, the Orient, and the rest of the world as well, may yet be saved from the anarchy toward which it is now drifting.

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Editorial from

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America Must Choose

IN THIS issue we carry two important statements on American foreign policy. The first, by Norman Thomas, twice Socialist candidate for President, is a stern warning against what he feels to be the danger of collective action for peace under present circumstances. The second, by Raymond Leslie Buell, president of the Foreign Policy Association, contains an equally vigorous admonition against the dangers inherent in the isolationist position which Mr. Thomas partially reflects. That two leading opponents of war can take such conflicting positions on this issue is indicative of the cleavage which runs through the country on the question of American foreign policy.

Yet despite this sharp divergence of opinion, the country must somehow make up its mind between these two policies. An attempt to follow a middle course between isolation and collective security would be the most dangerous of all. Vacillation and inconsistency only lead to fiascos such as the Brussels conference and the shameless conduct of the democracies toward Spain. The United States must either withdraw from the world, economically and politically, and rely on "the advantages of our geographic and historic position," to quote Mr. Thomas, or aid in the creation of an international system of law which will prevent war. Thus far this country has sought to enjoy all the privileges and advantages of its world position without sharing in the responsibilities inherent in those privileges. And to an extent which few Americans like to admit, the present state of world anarchy is the result of this policy. The utter lack of responsibility which so bewilders foreigners attempting to appraise American policy must be attributed almost entirely to isolationist sentiment.

While professing to believe in collective security in principle, Mr. Thomas asks precisely at what nation it should be directed. According to our understanding of the term, collective security cannot be directed at anyone. Therein lies the all-important distinction between collective security and a system of alliances. Collective security implies an agreement between a group of nations, which is open to all, by which each nation undertakes to bring pressure on any other which resorts to war in violation of its pledge. The United States has never entered such an arrangement, although its signature to the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact may be interpreted as imposing certain obligations.

It is highly important, however, to note that collective security does not imply necessarily the use of military force. The task of eliminating war from the world is largely one of developing non-violent substitutes for

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military force, to be used, when necessary, for the enforcement of international law and order.

But what if economic sanctions fail? Are we then to resort to military force to check fascist aggression? It is at this point that Mr. Thomas and many other pacifists draw back, assuming that there is some occult force by which economic sanctions are automatically transformed into military action—and war. We do not consider this a fair assumption. Economic and financial sanctions cannot fail if they are honestly applied. No country, least of all Japan, Italy, or Germany, can carry on war and maintain its population if cut off from all assistance from the outside world. Moreover, the application of collective economic pressure does not in any way imply or prepare the way for subsequent resort to military force. To take an extreme case, if a desperate, impoverished Japan seized the Dutch East Indies to get oil, economic sanctions, as Mr. Buell points out, would ultimately bring it to terms since it would still be unable to obtain adequate supplies of iron ore, cotton, wool, antimony, magnesite, manganese, tungsten, chrome, bauxite, tin, lead, nickel, and a number of other raw materials which are essential to modern industry, and without which no country could hope to wage war.

Admittedly, the prospect of joint economic action against Japan is slight. Mr. Thomas may be correct in saying that the chances for effective collective pressure were much greater in the Ethiopian crisis than at the present time. But what he does not state is that the weakness of the League in the early days of the Manchurian crisis, the failure of the powers to apply oil sanctions against Italy, and the collapse of the Brussels conference can be partly traced to one cause—the inability or unwillingness of the United States to cooperate because of isolationist sentiment. If this sentiment could be overcome, to an even greater extent than it has been in the past few weeks, there is every indication that Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union would cooperate in any program for the Far East that this country might propose.

Mr. Buell shows in some detail how the program of the isolationist groups, to which Mr. Thomas gives aid and comfort, creates a real threat of war. This threat will continue to exist as long as the United States, the world's greatest commercial and financial power, refuses either to join in collective efforts to prevent war or to participate in a program for worldwide economic appeasement. While the fascist powers are demanding access to raw materials and markets to further the solution of their admittedly grave economic problems, the United States is sitting tight, behind a high tariff wall, on more than half the world's gold supply and an overwhelming share of the world's supply of raw materials, refusing either to "divvy up" or to join in practical measures to protect countries like Ethiopia, Spain, and China. Because of the "advantages of our geographic and historic position" America is virtually safe from attack, but our refusal to join in any common action to protect less fortunate nations has created a condition of international anarchy in which no country can be safe.

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THE WAR AND MISSIONS IN CHINA

Survey of the Situation - December and January

 By Frank W. Price

During December and January the area of war, devastation and suffering in China greatly widened. The Japanese drive westward from Shanghai culminated in the capture of Nanking on December 13 and of Hangchow on December 24. Fighting has now extended near Hangchow, around Wuhu and north and northwest of Nanking. The destruction by the Chinese of Japanese mill property at Tsingtau on December 18 provoked the invasion of Shantung province and Tsinan was captured on December 27. Since then the Japanese armies from both north and south have pressed toward the vital railway junction of Suchow near the Kiangsu-Shantung border. Chinese forces have been massed in great numbers to defend the 150 mile wide corridor traversed by the east-west Lung Hai Railway. The closing of the gap between the two invading armies would put Japan in a position to attack Hankow. However, guerilla operations by mobile units are continually harrassing the invaders' lines of communication and have slowed up the Japanese advance. About half of Shansi province has been occupied but the Eighth Route Army (former communist army) has successfully resisted further penetration. In south China there have been fears for some time that a Japanese army would be landed and Canton has been under strict martial law. Air raids upon cities of Kuangtung and upon the vital Canton-Hakow Railway have been increasingly severe.

In spite of critical defeats in the Shanghai-Hangchow-Nanking triangle, and the loss of such productive territory, the government and people of China seem determined to continue the struggle for a long time to come. Generalissimo Chiang in six broadcast messages to the nation has urged greater effort and sacrifice until freedom has been won. Visitors report that he is "full of confidence, physically fresh and buoyant". He and other leaders see hope of ultimate victory through a protracted war which will wear out Japan through the costliness of an extended occupation. The government and army are being reorganized with stricter discipline. General Han Fuh-chu, governor of Shantung province was tried by court martial and executed because of his failure to resist. New troops are being enlisted and trained in central and west China. A great program of "mass mobilization" with preparation of all citizens for participation in national defense is being inaugurated.

The end of the war seems far off. Japan's peace terms have been reported to include the following: collaboration between Japan and China in an anti-communist policy, demilitarized zones and Japanese garrisons in China, an economic agreement between China, Manchukuo and Japan on Japan's terms, war indemnities. A missionary writes from central China, "We do not yet know of any real hope for middle ground between the sweeping Japanese intentions and the Chinese determination to hold some degree of independence. Meanwhile, misery reigns in much of China, and the problems of the future pile up for both countries."

"I feel that we individually and as a race have to suffer much more before there may come a better day for us," wrote Dr. Wu Yi-fang, president of Ginling College for Women as she left Nanking to join a group of teachers and students in Wuchang. But the leaders and people of China have already demonstrated that they can meet danger and suffering with marvelous fortitude.

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Not only have the soldiers shown courage. Thousands of workers of the railways and in postal and telegraph offices have carried on under fire. Mails have been delivered with remarkable efficiency except in some areas now occupied by the Japanese army where the postal system has broken down. Boy and Girl Scouts have risked their lives in rescuing wounded civilians. The women of the nation are organizing for relief work. Schools have moved to central and west China and teachers are serving for mere "living allowances." And millions of the common people, driven from their homes, have accepted their hardships bravely as part of their sacrifice for the nation.

"China is bleeding upon the thorns of this invasion," writes Dr. E. Stanley Jones. Missions and the Christian church are bleeding too. But the Christian witness has been a bright star in the night of suffering. "As I leave China," continued Dr. Jones, "I want to pay my tribute of gratitude to the Christians of China, both missionary and Chinese, who are holding so steady and true in this time of national calamity. I am proud to belong to such a band. There is a toughness of fibre in them that is the result of years of facing crisis after crisis. The missionary enterprise has faced many a crisis in China and has grown under each one of them. It will come through this one, too, perhaps purified."

Shanghai

The fighting has left the Shanghai area but the problem of refugees remains. "In an area of but six square miles, that normally cared for a population of nearly two millions, utterly destitute refugees are now numbered not by tens of thousands but by hundreds of thousands. To us has come the sudden challenge to save this flotsam." More than 175 camps have been established in Shanghai, to house 150,000 people. The Nantao Safety Zone under the direction of Father Jacquinet has 250,000. Including destitute refugees living with relatives or friends there are about three-fourths of a million in need of food. Many missionaries living temporarily in Shanghai have been giving full time to helping in the refugee camps.

People are returning but slowly to the devastated sections around the International Settlement. Chapei is a city of desolation. A few missionaries have been permitted to visit their former centers of work. At the Southern Baptist compound in Hongkew "the condition is terrible." The dormitories of Eliza Yates School were shelled, the class-room building burned and residences have been demolished and looted. The University of Shanghai property is occupied by Japanese soldiers and all faculty residences have been looted. Margaret Williamsons Hospital was destroyed after the fighting had ended. The extent of other damage to mission and church buildings is not yet fully known.

The University of Shanghai, St. John's University and twenty Christian middle schools are continuing their work in the International and French Settlements. Churches are full on Sundays. But Shanghai, formerly a nerve-center of mission work in China, has been cut off to a large extent from the inland. Missionaries have with great difficulty secured military passes to inspect their stations even near Shanghai. The Japanese are evidently working for control of the International Settlement. Censorship on cables and mails has been tightened. The economic future of Shanghai is very dark. But the Christian forces are undaunted as they seek to minister with the love of Christ to those in need. The Christian Broadcasting Station continues to send out news and messages of encouragement to Christian workers all over China.

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East China

The destruction of property in the region between Shanghai and Nanking has been appalling. Air raids, fires from incendiary bombs and shells and finally the burning of property by retreating Chinese troops have laid waste the once great and populous cities of Soochow, Wusih, Changchow, Chinkiang, and Sungkiang. Hundreds of smaller cities and towns have been ruined. Much mission and church property has naturally suffered. All the mission buildings of the Presbyterian Church, U. S. in Kiangyin, hospital, schools and missionary residences were burned. Sections of the Presbyterian and Methodist Hospitals in Soochow were burned. In Kashing a Roman Catholic orphanage was bombed, resulting in the death of 86 children. Hospitals, schools, churches and missionary homes in most of this area have been looted. The beautiful city of Hangchow has been spared the terrible destruction visited on other places, but the city has now only one-fifth its former population.

Property losses have been estimated at \$500,000,000. The life of nearly twenty million people has been tragically disrupted. They have been driven to the four winds before the invading armies and when they return it will be to desolate homes or to farms without animals and seed. One news dispatch from China said that not even in the World War was there such widespread desolation.

Many missionaries refused to leave when the fighting raged in east China. The North China Daily News said of the missionaries in Soochow, "From the beginning of hostilities this intrepid little band with their able Chinese assistants, have carried on without cessation." Dr. Mason Young, Miss Lucy Grier, a nurse, Rev. Charles McDaniel and others took wounded civilians and patients from a hospital for the insane to an island in Lake Tai, and stayed with them for weeks. Other missionaries stayed with Chinese Christians in villages and were not heard of for weeks. Rev. D. F. Stamps and Miss Mary Demarest of the Southern Baptist Mission in Yangchow were reported missing for nearly two months. A missionary doctor wrote, "The future is very dark and this whole section may be swept clean before it is over - we can only live day by day trusting in Him." Twenty-eight missionaries stayed in Hangchow and fourteen in Nanking through the siege and capture of those cities and with them many fearless Chinese Christian workers, caring for thousands of refugees in "safety zones."

The missions which have suffered most heavily in the lower Yangtze region are the Southern Methodist, Northern and Southern Presbyterian, Northern and Southern Baptist, Disciples and London Mission. Fighting now presses in upon stations in north Kiangsu and southern Chekiang.

Dr. Robert F. Fitch of Hangchow writes, "The repercussions will be felt everywhere in east China; cold and hunger will be experienced by millions of the poor. For several months to come, perhaps into the late spring and summer there will be an overwhelming need for further aid from outside sources, especially from the Christian churches of the West."

Nanking

The story of the fall of Nanking and the subsequent days and weeks of disorder and terror has been graphically told in news dispatches from China. A.T. Steele reported in the New York Sun, "The fall of Nanking would have been infinitely more frightful if not for the courageous efforts of a handful of American missionaries and German business men who stayed throughout the siege." But these brave fourteen ran risks which nearly cost them their lives once and again.

A cable from one of the missionaries who had helped to maintain the safety zone received on January 18th, said, "University of Nanking sheltering

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thirty thousand refugees. This service from December 13 has been tenaciously maintained amid dishonor by soldiers, murdering, wounding, wholesale raping resulting in violent terror. Institutional losses moderate. Majority residences partly looted. Staff splendid despite injuries, danger, unspeakable distress. Ginling College situation comparable. Christian Hospital service unique. Relief needs dominate city."

Included in the Safety Zone and hence spared the material destruction inflicted upon the rest of Nanking were the University of Nanking, Ginling College, Nanking Theological Seminary, Women's Bible Training School, Ming Deh Presbyterian School for Girls and many missionary homes.

In spite of the unexpected sudden advance of the Japanese armies both the University of Nanking and Ginling College were able to move their staffs and considerable equipment to central and West China.

It will be of interest to note here that the government succeeded in moving 19,000 out of the 20,000 cases in which it had packed the art treasures from the National Museum.

Nanking is at present little more than a Japanese armed camp, subject to raids from Chinese airplanes. The city and surrounding region have only a small fraction of their former population. The Safety Zone is feeding 50,000 of the most destitute daily.

North China

The people of Hopei province have been experiencing the force of Japanese rule for half a year. A provisional government was set up on December, staffed by notoriously corrupt pro-Japanese puppets. So far no outstanding, able Chinese has been willing to cooperate with the Japanese in their plans for an autonomous north China.

Christian educators are determined to carry on, not to falter in their program, to conciliate where necessary but not to give in on questions of principle. The Japanese officials are naturally seeking to control the schools. All reference to nationalists China have been deleted from the textbooks. The Confucian classics have been substituted for social sciences and ethics. Slogans everywhere extol the aims of the Japanese army. Students have been compelled to join parades celebrating Japanese victories. There have been raids on libraries and offices of teachers, and some teachers have been arrested. Japanese is to be the main foreign language in the universities. However, four middle schools in Peiping and Tungchow have an enrollment of 2350, only one thousand less than last year, and Yenching University now has over 500 students. Yet the strain on principals and teachers is severe. "Do you wonder," one writes, "that our educators, Chinese and foreign, are growing grayer each month now than in five years previously?"

The Japanese advance last summer and autumn into southern Hopei caused widespread desolation. One missionary estimates that seventy per cent of the people of north China evacuated at some time. "Many of our stations were completely wrecked, and the villages were almost empty of inhabitants. Crops were rotting in the fields, unharvested. The whole countryside was lifeless." The invasion was accompanied by constant foraging, looting and raping. "It is all more cruelly ruthless than anything in the American press descriptions," another missionary wrote. Paotingfu suffered especially during and after the siege but missionaries of the American Board and Presbyterian missions have continued to serve there.

In the area occupied by the Japanese evangelistic work is going on. "Chinese Christian leaders," one report says, "are everywhere showing faith,

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courage and determination which no obstacles so far apparently can defeat. These men are an inspiration to their missionary colleagues. The Church in the North does not intend to abdicate." At the county seat of Chowchow an evangelist and his family and other Christians, total of seventeen, were killed by a bomb in one churchyard. "The Chowchow experience," a missionary writes, brings to me forcefully the realization that the church, the real church, is a fellowship. Organization, property and programs may disappear, but little groups of Christians who are one with Christ in God will continue."

The Church of the Brethren mission field in eastern Shansi was first to feel the effect of invasion. A woman missionary from this region writes that the countryside was ravaged bare. "I have spent weeks in the midst of hell. When one thinks of the great areas of this country of which this is a fair example, it is too awful to contemplate." Several members of the Brethren Mission have been reported missing. The New York Times of February 2 carried a report through Hankow that three missionaries had been shot by a Japanese sentry: Rev. and Mrs. Alva Harsh of Petersburg, W. Va., and Miss Minserva Neher, Laverne, Calif.

The Japanese lines at one time reached as far south as Fenchow and Taiku in the American Board Mission field. The Oberlin-Shansi School at Taiku moved first to Yuncheng, Shansi, then to Shanhsein, Honan province. It may move further inland. The Ming I School at Fengyang moved to Tsishan in the southwest of the province where the China Inland Mission has strong work under Chinese leadership. Many missionaries are remaining in Shansi and also in Shensi to the west. The Japanese are said to have about 140,000 troops in Shansi alone.

In Suiuan and Chahar provinces the Japanese army holds the main points though skirmishes continue. In all the northern provinces irregular troops and local defense organizations are making the garrisoning of the area more difficult for the invaders. Relief needs are serious in Pieping, Tientsin, and all the conquered territory.

Shantung

Shantung was spared war until late in December. But Governor Han's vacillating policy left the province without a plan of defense and Japanese occupation was rapid. Here too great hordes of refugees fled before the invading army. Part of Tsinan city was destroyed but the buildings of Cheeloo University have escaped damage, according to latest word. Chinese forces made a stand in the southwest of the province and fighting around Tsining, an important mission center, has been especially severe.

Suffering in Shantung has been accentuated by a big flood last summer which made two million people homeless.

Many missionaries who had been sojourning at Tsingtau have left for Shanghai or other ports. A considerable number, chiefly men, remained at their stations.

Fukien

Southern Chekiang and Fukien have been least touched by war of any coastal region. This may be due to the proximity of Formosa and Japan's plans for development from that island. There have been a few air raids and Amoy has felt the hot breath of attack on several occasions.

Professor E. M. Stowe of Fukien Christian University writes that the University and Christian schools of the province have been carrying on as usual, "a seemingly miraculous oasis in a sea of chaos and blood." Students are par-

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icipating in many out-of-school activities. The new Union Theological College at Changchow has opened with 26 students. The churches are active and a new extension service to rural churches is proving very fruitful.

"We will go ahead as long as possible," writes one missionary. Most of the missionary women and children have left the province.

South China

Kuangtung has suffered principally from incessant air raids, the objectives apparently being the destruction of government-owned property, the terrorizing of the civilian population and the prevention of sea-going commerce. Casualties have been high, especially among civilians. The landing of armed forces has been expected for some time.

The churches and schools have tried to continue, many with emergency programs. Hospitals have rendered courageous service. Many Christian institutions have organized first aid corps. The Union Theological and Bible Training Schools in Canton have had one hundred per cent attendance. The College department of Lingnan University has been maintained at Canton, under the leadership of the new president, Mr. Lei Ying-lam. True Light and Pui Ying Schools moved to Hongkong. The Union Normal School and Mei Wa School were bombed on December 31. The dining hall of Union Normal and the main building of Mei Wa were severely damaged. The Ma Kwong Home for the Blind was removed to Macao.

Hainan Island has been fairly quiet in spite of some bombings and the constant fear of attack by gunboats.

One report from south China gave high praise to three women missionaries of the English Presbyterian Mission who had stayed on at Swatow and helped to maintain morale among the Christian leaders and people there.

"I cannot close this letter," writes one missionary, "without giving expression to the evidence of the wonderful spirit of our church leaders in this time of national crisis, especially in their determination to keep the spiritual side of the church uppermost and at the same time express their loyalty to their country. Chinese church leaders have not been heard to preach hate; their prayers always include a petition for Japan, especially the Christians of Japan." "Don't worry about us missionaries," writes another, "but pray for the poor Chinese people."

Central China

The biggest battle of the war is now raging in Northern Kiangsu and Anhwei and in Honan province. On February 3 the Japanese military commanders asked that all foreigners leave this region because of the fighting. More than 500 missionaries normally live in this area. Several missionaries of the United Church of Canada returned to their stations in Honan after furlough only two months ago, and a great number of missionaries in the fighting zone will no doubt carry on at their own risk.

The Yangtze River below Wuhu is blocked with booms. Since the capture of Nanking and Wuhu there has been a considerable exodus of missionary families from Kuling but a number remain and the schools for foreign children are being maintained. The school at Chikungshan has closed.

The Wuhan cities (Hankow, Wuchang and Hanyang) have been bombed many times and air raids have reached as far up river as Ichang. But otherwise the provinces of Hupeh and Hunan have been quiet, and Christian work has suffered comparatively little. The effect of the great migration from east China is felt everywhere. Many cities have increased rapidly in population. Wounded soldiers pour

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in from the front and hospitals are crowded. Hunan-Yale's Emergency Hospital has prepared to receive 2,000.

Plans for mass mobilization and education of the people in self-defense are being promoted actively in these central provinces. Hunan province is being made an important area in agricultural experiments and rural reorganization which will increase its productivity as a source of food supply.

Dr. W. Y. Chen of the National Christian Council wrote after a visit to central China, "The spirit of the people in the churches is simply wonderful." Many inland stations write of the help which Christian leaders and their families from east China have brought to them in their work. The churches are active in relief work and students of Christian schools are participating in many service activities.

The railway from Nachang to Canton is still open despite repeated bombings. The new motor road from Changsha to Kweilin will be completed soon. The Eurasia planes still fly from Hongkong to central and west China and carry mails.

Bishop L. H. Roote is in Hankow and Bishop A. A. Gilman is on his way there from the United States.

West China

Bishop Ralph A. Ward of the Methodist Church in Szechwan province writes "The rapid and sweeping changes in national life are affecting great changes in Szechwan. Thousands of students and teachers, business and professional people and government officials are bringing a broader outlook, many material things and creative power. Many of the newcomers are Christians. Most of them are at least awakened spiritually. The local Christian communities need adjustment to the new opportunities, not to speak of their need for more vital Christian faith and life for themselves." Such is the unexpected new opportunity in west China.

Szechwan, we must remember, is larger in size than the British Isles. It contains a population of over 70,000,000. It has some of the most fertile farmland in China. There are 60 mission centers of 16 mission societies and more than 430 missionaries in the great area. Since the chance of Szechwan ever being occupied by Japanese armies is very small, the strategic importance of this province from the standpoint of the Chinese government and defense and from the standpoint of Christian work and planning for the future cannot be overestimated.

Government universities have moved to Chungkiang and Chengtu. In one city 24 temporary buildings were erected in 40 days. The University of Nanking has moved to Chengtu and will cooperate with West China Christian University. Cheeloo Methodist School has also moved to Szechwan.

National Organizations

The National Christian Council continues its office in Shanghai but is working more through regional organizations, especially in central and west China. Many mission secretaries and treasurers now have offices also in central China or in Hongkong. The National Christian Council has issued a "Call to a Forward Movement," suggesting a threefold emergency program for the churches: relief, spiritual uplift, and cooperation of the churches with other agencies in service to the people. Christians are being urged to give a cent a day to relief work.

A Y. M. C. A. leader in China writes, "We need your continued undergirding. All are determined to stay though positions dangerous." Mr. George Fitch at Nanking, Mr. Eugene Turner at Hangchow, Mr. R. S. Hall at Tsinan and Mr. Edward

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Lockwood at Canton are among those who are rendering notable service in places of peril. The National Committee of Y. M. C. A's has organized emergency services for soldiers in 28 cities. One hundred full-time secretaries have been allocated to this work while two hundred are carrying on the regular Association program where possible. The Peiping Y. M. C. A. has cooperated with the Red Cross in relief work and recreational activities for wounded soldiers. Many secretaries are now receiving only living allowances. Through hut work, soldier clubs, service to wounded in hospitals, help to soldiers at railway junctions, traveling units, a work comparable to that of the Y. M. C. A. during the World War is being done and with very limited funds.

The Y. W. C. A. has organized its women members into many forms of service and is helping to train civilians in first aid, health work, and the meeting of emergency needs.

Education

Fifty per cent of the Chinese colleges and universities have been closed or forced to suspend. The Ministry of Education has established two temporary universities, one at Sian and another at Changsha. Nankai, Central University and Fudan University have new quarters in Chungking. Tsinghua and National Peking University are now located in Changsha. The new location of some Christian colleges has been noted. College students and graduates are not being encouraged yet to join the fighting services but at least one-half of the 45,000 college students are engaged in war-time studies. Many have joined the War-time Students' Service Corps.

Five temporary government middle schools have been established in Kansu, Shensi, Honan, Szechwan and Kweichow, each with about one hundred teachers and one thousand students. Students will be given free board and clothing as most of them are refugees from north and east China.

The Christian colleges are playing a noble part in the national life during the crisis. Yenching, as has been mentioned, carries on in Peiping with an enrollment of over 500. Cheeloo University medical students have been transferred to Chengtu, other students to various institutions.

Gingling College is operating in three units, at Shanghai, at Hwa Chung College and at West China Union University. The University of Nanking has moved to west China. Soochow University suffered heavy losses to its property and is still closed. The University of Shanghai continues work in temporary quarters in the French Concession and St. John's University carries on. Hangchow Christian College has not suffered damage to property although Japanese guns are now located nearby. Some teachers and students transferred to a small town in Anhwei province. Fukien Christian University and Hwa Nan College Foochow, have been able to keep going without serious interruption. Lingnan University, Canton, has 460 students on the campus. The opening enrollment of Hwachung College, Wuchang, was fifty per cent above normal due to admission of students from other schools. West China Union University, Chengtu, has an enrollment twice that of last year. Classrooms and laboratories are utilized in successive shifts. All the colleges are incurring serious deficits this year, although operating costs have been reduced to bare essentials.

Relief Work

The needs for relief in the ever-widening areas of hostilities are appalling. Never have the Chinese themselves done so much for their suffering fellow-countrymen. Chinese doctors have volunteered in large numbers for medical service, one hundred going from Shanghai alone. The Shanghai Chinese churches

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contributed \$40,000. Local relief committees have been formed in a large number of cities. But the need is so great that outside help is imperative.

The Federal Council of Churches, Foreign Missions Conference, China Famine Relief, Inc., and other organizations have appealed for relief funds with limited results. All mission societies have made special appeals. The American Red Cross in September authorized chapters to receive funds but initiated no campaign. But on January 25 a campaign for a goodwill offering was launched with an appeal in the form of a letter from President Roosevelt. Funds will be administered through a committee of prominent Americans in China and the Advisory Committee of China Famine Relief.

The International Red Cross is taking over administration of a large number of refugee camps in Shanghai and is extending the "Morris plan." Major Morris of the Salvation Army has been most successful in conducting clean camps and in feeding the refugees wholesome food at very low cost.

Christian relief committees everywhere are most active in helping. "The least that Christian organizations can do under circumstances like these is to make the maximum contribution to ease pain, to heal the wounded and create channels for the love of our Lord, Jesus Christ, to find expression in the midst of carnage and strife," writes one Christian group. The National Christian Council has sent out flying squads to survey needs in devastated areas and give help where possible.

The outstanding service of the Christian hospitals everywhere has won high praise from all classes of Chinese. The work has been carried on often in great danger and frequently without sufficient medical supplies. One missionary from north Kiangsu went 1200 miles to Hankow and back in order to secure needed drugs. In some areas Christian forces have joined with government forces in medical service. Christian field hospital units are being planned.

The plight of the homeless refugees is saddest in Shanghai and sections of east China. In other areas there is less congestion for refugees are kept on the move. In central and western China the wounded soldier is the most serious problem. The Chinese government and army were utterly unprepared to care for such large numbers of wounded soldiers. Dr. A. R. Kepler after a tour through 8 provinces reported, "I return to Shanghai from my journey with the wounded soldier as my most poignant memory. I can't get him out of my thoughts. He is the most pitiable person in China today. The chances are that he must eat all the bitterness of the refugee, inadequate clothing, insufficient nourishment, no protection from rain and biting north wind, wounds festering through lack of surgical care." It may be days or weeks before he gets from the front line to the medical centers at Nanchang, Sian, Wuhan or Changsha. Dr. Kepler continues, "The war was unwanted by China. The government was not prepared to face so formidable an enemy, and one so thoroughly prepared and equipped with every conceivable modern missile and instrument of destruction. These poor wounded men are a summons to the Christian forces in China and throughout the world to come to their rescue and set agencies in operation which will look after their needs." He urges a Christian Medical Auxiliary to work in close cooperation with government medical units.

One missionary after visiting the vast camp for wounded soldiers and war victims at Sian, wrote, "It is the largest mass of suffering humanity I have ever seen. Yet there was no groaning or complaining even from stretcher cases who were borne past me by tired Boy Scouts."

The danger of epidemics will increase as spring and summer come on, and all kinds of medical supplies will be needed.

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Christians all over China have been contributing to relief funds and women have been making garments for wounded civilians and soldiers. One group made 1600 wadded vests and in each sewed a printed Scripture verse and message of comfort. Missionaries and Chinese Christian workers have been visiting camps of wounded soldiers to give comfort. To one missionary who was on his way to this service Madame Chiang Kai-shek said, "And do not forget to tell them of the One who suffered more than they."

The Outlook and the Opportunity

President Wu Yi-fang of Ginling College, who is also Chairman of the National Christian Council, wrote to friends in America, "In regard to the general situation in China, I don't see any possible improvement immediately and we must face the probable result of withdrawing to Szechwan, Yunan, Kwangsi and Kweichow provinces. As to how long this process may take, no one can tell. I sound, I am afraid, very pessimistic, but in fact I am quite confident of the ultimate triumph of right over might."

President Francis C. Wei of Hwa hung College, now in this country, said recently, "Whether China is defeated or victorious the need for Christianity and for Christian higher education will be greater than before. If China shall be victorious, she will have all the greater need for Christianity to use wisely her new position and power. If she should be defeated, she will need Christian courage and wisdom in dealing with the problems that will confront her."

A missionary leader writes, "As soon as hostilities cease, under restrictions and difficulties such as we have never before experienced, we are going to have a tremendous opportunity to preach and teach our Christian faith." After his two months preaching tour in central and west China, Dr. E. Stanley Jones declared that China presented the greatest challenge to Christianity of any land in the world today.

And, finally, this message from the Executive Council of the Methodist Episcopal Church in China, may be taken as an appreciation and an appeal from all Christians in China today: "Never before have the loyal confidences and intimate cooperation between the Chinese and the missionary groups of our church in China been so plainly evident nor so distinctly stimulating, nor has the Church ever before stood out so clearly as a minister of good will and helpfulness to our suffering people."

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THE FACTS ABOUT COMMUNISM IN CHINA

So much capital has been, and is being, made out of the allegedly Communistic leanings of the Chinese Government and people that it is important to make the situation clear to those who may have been impressed and misled by such falsehoods. Persistent efforts have been made by Japan's apologists to represent the Kuo-Min Tang and the Comintern as being alike as two peas, and the complete destruction of the Chinese political party has been repeatedly declared to be among Japan's present war-aims. It will be shown presently that the Kuo-Min Tang is as free from Communist influence as the Nazi party, the Fascisti, and the Japanese Government itself. Prince Konoye, the Japanese Premier, on November 6, 1937, declared that Sino-Japanese hostilities were due to the "machinations" of the Comintern, adding that "it is a moral mission imposed upon Japan by her political structure and national policy to prevent and suppress the evils of Communism and the Comintern."

In reply to the first allegation, that the "machinations" of the Third International are responsible for Sino-Japanese relations having taken so disastrous a turn, there is ample evidence on record to the contrary--evidence of influential Japanese in official and other responsible positions who specifically warned their own Government that the policy being followed in China was not calculated to bring about the more friendly relations allegedly desired. There was no necessity for any "machinations" by the Comintern to bring about a clash; Japanese diplomats and businessmen, political leaders and journalists, pointed out that the wrong tactics had been adopted in handling relations with China, that Japanese militarists and "hot-blooded young officials" were provoking hostility among the Chinese people, and that friendly co-operation between the two nations was impossible of achievement while Japan persistently resorted to measures which were not conducive to co-operation. Not "machinations" of the Comintern, but of the powerful Japanese military clique who arrogated to themselves control of their country's diplomatic affairs, were responsible for the terrible slaughter and suffering in China which has shocked the civilized world.

Prince Konoye himself, a few weeks before taking the post of Premier, publicly admitted that China was suspicious about Japan's real policy, and declared that not until those suspicions were removed could any effective help be given to the Chinese nation in its struggle for rejuvenation, while Japan's proposals for a readjustment of relations "must be of obvious benefit to China in order to be acceptable." Before taking office Prince Konoye recognized that the so-called "dual diplomacy" by Japan's soldiers and diplomats, instead of improving Sino-Japanese relations, merely exacerbated China's wounded feelings; now that he is Premier he discreetly forgets the part his own countrymen played in creating bad feeling, and pretends it was the "machinations" of the Comintern which led to the disastrous clash which has brought death and destruction to a nation struggling for rejuvenation. The neutral observer anxious to get at the facts should take careful note of Prince Konoye's remarkable change of mind, and at the same time remember the significant fact that his former attitude was supported by Japanese who had been Ambassadors in China, and by Mr. Sato (Foreign Minister in the Cabinet which preceded the Konoye Administration).

As to whether Japan has a "moral mission" to prevent and suppress "the evils of Communism and the Comintern," this is a matter for Japan's own national conscience. Certainly she has no "moral mission" to suppress any "ism" in any country but her own. President Roosevelt has recently said that most of the world's troubles nowadays come from interference with the internal affairs of one country by another, and this is deplorably true of China's troubles, most of which have been the direct or indirect result of outside interference. But if Japan believes that Communism is a menace to her well-being, she undoubtedly has the right to take whatever measures seem appropriate and effective to suppress such activities in her own domain. In November, 1936 an anti-Communist pact was signed by Germany and Japan, and on November 6, 1937 the adherence of Italy to this agreement made it a tripartite accord for mutual protection against the activities of the Third International within the territories of the signatory parties.

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If the three countries mentioned believe their national peace and security to be threatened, they are of course quite within their rights in taking measures of protection. The question of having a "moral mission" to suppress Communism does not arise; if serious danger to a nation's peace and security is apprehended, it is the duty of any Government to adopt such safeguards as appear likely to be effective in averting the threatened danger. This is precisely what was done by China when it was recognized, in 1927, that the Communists in the Republic were actively engaged in working against the National Government, whereupon they were expelled from the Kuo-Min Tang and the whole movement put under nation-wide proscription--as, of course, Japan is well aware.

But to return to more recent events. In November, 1936, assurances were given to the Chinese Ambassador in Berlin by Baron von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister, that the agreement signed with Japan in 1936 was in no way directed against China, and that in combatting the activities of the Third International no measures would be taken outside the territory of Japan and the Reich. This statement was made by Baron von Neurath to dispel fears that the German-Japanese accord might become an instrument for further acts of aggression in North China, since it had been so often declared that Japan's mission was "to prevent China from becoming Red, and thus contribute toward the well-being of the entire Orient." As a matter of fact, the allegedly altruistic interest shown by Japan in China's well-being was quite unnecessary, and an official statement issued by the Chinese Government in November, 1936 declared that China did not intend to become a signatory of the then recently anti-Communist pact between Germany and Japan,--not, however, because China was any more enamoured of Marxist teachings than either of those two countries, but because she considered herself fully capable of dealing with the Communist situation so far as the Republic of China was concerned without entering into any sort of agreement with any other country. General Chiang Kai-Shek--who of all men in China should have known exactly how grave the Communist "menace" was, seeing that he was engaged in suppressing their activities--in November last year declared that dispersal of the surviving remnants in the North-West of the Communist forces was exclusively a domestic affair, and would never be affected by outside influences or international politics.

One more point calls for attention before proceeding to review the history of Communist activities in China. On August 21, 1937--while Japanese troops were fighting in "self-defence" in North China, around Shanghai, and in other parts of the Republic--a Treaty of Non-Aggression was concluded between China and Soviet Russia. The provisions of this agreement were very simple and entirely negative in nature, consisting merely of mutual assurances of non-aggression and non-assistance to any aggressor who might attack either signatory. Vigorous attempts were made to represent this harmless and pacific Russo-Chinese pact as affording new proof of secret understanding between the Kuo-Min Tang (as represented by the Chinese Government) and the Comintern (as represented by the Soviet Union). The fact was ignored that Soviet Russia already had various agreements with other countries none of which were favourably inclined toward Communism. The fact was ignored that Germany (Japan's partner in the anti-Comintern pact of 1936) had already entered into an economic agreement with Soviet Russia, and the Italian Fascist Government in 1933 entered into a Russo-Italian pact of friendship. Moreover, Soviet Russia had been recognized as sufficiently "respectable" to be admitted to the League of Nations.

Why, then, should it be considered wrong for China to conclude an arrangement with Russia which confirmed their pledges under the Kellogg Pact not to resort to war as a means of settling any dispute which might arise between them, and--taking that high moral principle a step further--pledged the signatories not to give support to any nation which did not observe its obligations under the Pact of Paris and took aggressive action against one or other of the signatories. Instead of arousing unwarranted suspicion, the Sino-Russian agreement of 1937 should have been welcomed by the civilized world as evidence that at least two great nations had agreed that peace in the Far East would never be disturbed by their actions against each other, nor would they give assistance to any nation which, scorning to follow their pacific example, should enter upon a campaign of aggression. China and Soviet Russia had

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arrived at a friendly understanding which threatened nobody, but this implied no acceptance by China of Marxist theories, nor by Russia of Kuo-Min Tang principles. These matters were recognized as the internal affairs of the signatories with which neither party wished to interfere.

Many a true word is spoken in jest. It has often been said that Japan's great mission--or one of the many which she believes rest upon her shoulders--is "to prevent China becoming Red, and thus contribute toward the well-being of the entire Orient." And how often--long before hostilities were started last summer--have those conversant with the facts smiled at this naive manner of camouflaging Japan's real ambition--yet as things have turned out, Japan has already most effectively brought about the disappearance of Communism from China! True, this has come about not in the way she had intended, by taking military measures of suppression in Chinese territory, but by actually bringing about the surrender to the Kuo-Min Tang of the Communist Party, after their ten years of bitter struggle! Japan's "great mission" has been accomplished unintentionally--and even unwillingly, but the thing has been done, and the last remaining rift in China's national unity removed. There are many phases of the Sino-Japanese situation which are puzzling to foreign observers, and one of the most curious is the "good turn" that Japan has unwittingly done China by waging war upon her, thereby expediting the settlement of a long-standing domestic difference on a political issue.

For eighteen years China had a problem on her hands with which at times she found it very difficult to deal--the existence of a Communist Party which, while at first friendly, subsequently became actively hostile to the National Government. This change of attitude unfortunately necessitated extensive military operations being taken, and more than once Japan suggested that her forces should actively assist in the suppression of Communism in China--an offer which was not only never accepted, but was never even seriously considered. "Beware of the Greeks when they bear gifts," warned a wise Roman of ancient days, and for very obvious reasons China preferred to deal with the Communist problem without availing herself of Japanese military assistance for suppressing the movement. In November, 1936, when the anti-Communist Pact between Germany and Japan was signed, and other countries were invited to join in this agreement, China promptly announced that there was no need for her to participate in the Pact. Further, as already noted, General Chiang Kai-Shek--referring to the military operations then going on for the suppression of Communist forces in the North-West, concerning whose activities Japan had so often evinced such keen interest--said this was exclusively a Chinese domestic affair, and would never be affected by outside influences or international politics. Last December the President of the Judicial Yuan, Mr. Chu Cheng, repeated this declaration of China's policy, adding that it was incomprehensible why a foreign Power geographically separated from the scene of Communist activities should concern itself so painfully over a minor issue which could no longer be regarded as a menace.

Nevertheless, in the summer of 1937 Japan again declared that one of the reasons for her military intervention in North China was to destroy the influence of Communism--and she has done it, but at a fearful price, both for herself and China. The same end could, and would, have been reached without the frightful slaughter throughout the country that has followed from Japan's aggression, but the method adopted was not of China's choosing. On the contrary, the Chinese Government specifically urged the simultaneous withdrawal of the gathering Sino-Japanese forces from the danger-zone around Peiping, so that the incident which had given rise to a most critical situation in North China could be settled by diplomatic negotiation. This proposal was flatly rejected by Japan, and the "interference" of the National Government strongly resented. This intransigent attitude made war inevitable, but it was war that the Japanese wanted. They were ready for it, and were waiting only for an excuse for starting offensive operations.

The fact had been recognized for years by the Chinese Government that 90 per cent of the problem of suppressing Communism in the Republic was of a political and administrative character; the military danger of the situation had been never really serious except in a very limited area, and was further minimized as a result of

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large-scale punitive operations against the Red forces. Meanwhile, by steadily persevering with its programme of social and economic reforms (so far as Japan's constant interference and aggression would permit) the National Government had effectively neutralized the effects of persistent Communist propaganda to the effect that the Kuo-Min Tang (the political party founded by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen which brought about the Revolution in 1911 and the subsequent establishment of the Republic) was not giving attention to economic and social problems affecting the well-being of the masses.

The most enthusiastic supporter of the Kuo-Min Tang will not and cannot claim that much progress was made during the first twenty years of the Republican regime in carrying into effect the Three People's Principles laid down by Sun Yat-Sen. For this disappointing sequel to the Revolution of 1911, aimed at improving the lot of the masses, and which gave so many opportunities for Communist propaganda, Japan herself was largely responsible. By encouraging the ambitions of Yuan Shih-Kai to convert his presidential chair into an Imperial throne, by presenting China with the infamous "Twenty-One Demands," by advancing huge loans to Chinese war-lords and ex-mandarins plotting the destruction of the Republican Government and subsidizing civil war, by refusing to surrender to China the territory in Shantung formerly leased to Germany, by obstructing the victorious northward march of the National Revolutionary troops to Peking, and by openly or secretly giving support or encouragement to every movement aimed at weakening the authority of the National Government and so preventing the establishment of that political unity throughout China which was one of the chief aims of the Revolution, Japan herself created precisely that atmosphere which made it easy for Communist agitators to gain supporters.

It was quite obvious to all at that time that the National Government had not succeeded in uniting the country, but it was not so obvious to the simple peasants who listened to Communist appeals why this national disunity remained. More important to them than the Government's failure to bring rival war-lords under control, and to curb the ambitions of ex-mandarins and their followers, was the fact that the many grievances of the agrarian population dating from the monarchical period had not received the immediate attention and relief that had been expected. That the National Government was unable to give these urgent problems the consideration they deserved because it was fighting for its life against enemies within and without was not realized by the peasants, and consequently many were ready to accept promises that Communism would speedily bring them relief. It was in this way that subversive propaganda met with a measure of success in certain rural districts, especially in Kiangsi, but with the gradual elimination of the war-lords and the corresponding steady increase of the National Government's authority, it was possible to deal with the Communist problem in two ways simultaneously--first, by military operations to suppress rebellious armed forces, and second, by introducing measures for relieving the heavy tax-burden upon peasants, improving land-holding conditions, and encouraging improved methods of cultivation and marketing.

But again Japan was responsible for stimulating the Communist movement in China. As a result of her invasion of Manchuria in 1931, it was necessary for the National Government immediately to transfer troops which had been rounding-up Red forces to places which were in danger of attack by a foreign foe. As a result of this enforced withdrawal of the Government's forces to meet a new and graver emergency, the retreating Communist armies promptly began a counter-offensive and speedily regained control of territory from which they had been cleared. Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 had the effect of undoing all the work that had been done in dispersing the military forces under Communist control, and it was nearly two years before the National Government was in a position to resume its military campaign against Communist troops. Not until the summer of 1933 was General Chiang Kai-Shek able to plan and inaugurate another campaign to clear Kiangsi from Red influence, and start all over again to do the work which Japan's aggressive policy in Manchuria had destroyed.

Since then, however, the military strength and political influence of the Communists in China has been steadily waning, partly in consequence of intensive opera-

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tions carried out by the National Government troops, but more so because of many economic and social reforms carried out by the central and provincial authorities expressly designed to improve the condition of the peasant community. Elaborate plans were put into operation to lighten the tremendous load of taxation imposed upon farmers, to carry out large-scale conservancy-work and so minimize the danger and destruction arising from floods and droughts, to encourage the production of crops of improved quality and increased quantity, to provide better transportation of primary products by rail, road, and river, to provide adequate granaries for use in famine relief, to encourage co-operative effort among farmers, and in many other ways to improve the economic condition of that 80 per cent. of China's population which depends upon agriculture for a livelihood.

All this constructive effort made it clear to the farmers and peasants that the National Government was deeply concerned about their welfare and, given a period free from anxiety arising from Japanese acts of aggression, it could and would do for them all that the Communists said was not to be expected from the Kuo-Min Tang. Thus the discontent in rural areas which provided practically the only field in which subversive agitation against the National Government could hope to succeed gradually disappeared, and with the intensive military operations against Communist armed forces being pressed to a successful conclusion, there was no longer any real internal menace to the authority of the National Government.

For the benefit of those who are not familiar with the facts, it may be explained here that the clash between the Kuo-Min Tang and the Chinese Communist Party came about, not so much as a result of the latter's disapproval of the former's political platform, but mainly because the Communists sought to wrest control of the National Administration from Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's followers. The Communists had no quarrel with the fundamental principles of the Kuo-Min Tang, but they wanted to take control of the revolutionary movement in China and make of it a phase of that world-revolution which twenty-odd years ago was the goal of international Communist agitation. In the early days of the Chinese Revolution an earnest effort had been made by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen to accept Communist support in giving effect to his plans, but on the strict understanding that they were to work as individuals within his Party, and not seek to disrupt it. This pledge, however, was soon broken, with the result that the Communists were expelled and their political activities proscribed. The military operations already referred to were the sequel to this open breach between the Kuo-Min Tang and the Chinese Communist Party.

After Manchuria was occupied by Japan in 1931, advantage was taken of this disastrous development by the Communists to start a new line of attack upon the Kuo-Min Tang. Realizing that it was no longer possible to pretend that the National Government was doing nothing to remedy the grievances of the agrarian population, the Communists now accused the National Government of failing to take effective measures to secure general support with their earlier slogans, addressed mainly to the peasants, the Communists sought to rally national opinion to their support by an appeal to patriotic sentiment and, by denouncing the alleged supineness of the National Government in dealing with aggression, secure the people's mandate to take control of China's national destinies from the Kuo-Min Tang.

It is and was no secret that within the Kuo-Min Tang itself there were differences of opinion as to what should be done in the face of Japan's continual aggression. Some favoured an immediate challenge to the invader, disregarding all other considerations, while others were inclined to make the best terms possible--within the limits of endurance--to secure temporary peace for China, meanwhile concentrating the nation's energies upon preparing for the fight for life which they believed China would eventually have to make, unless there was a fundamental change in Japan's policy. The attitude of Japanese diplomats frequently gave grounds for hoping that such a change was coming, but time and again these hopes were dashed to the ground by aggressive military action on Chinese soil. The National Government, knowing how well-prepared Japan was for an immediate appeal to arms, and realizing that China's national defense scheme was not yet fully carried into effect, did everything possible to avoid an open clash, short of surrendering sovereign rights and terri-

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tory. The Communists, on the other hand, urged that resistance to Japanese aggression should at once take active form, even though China was not quite ready to defend herself against so powerful an enemy.

Further discussion as to which was the wiser course to pursue in the difficult circumstances existing, and whether the limit of endurance had been reached, came to an abrupt end by Japan herself taking the initiative in starting hostilities. Refusing to settle the Marco Polo Bridge "incident" last July by diplomatic negotiation, flatly denying the right of the National Government to "interfere" in North China affairs, and refusing to consider the possibility of friendly neutral mediation in the dispute, the Japanese army started, "in justice and righteousness, to chastize the outrageous Chinese" by launching an attack on Peking on July 27, since when almost the whole of China has been swept by the fire of war. The immediate result of Japan's aggression was to close up the few remaining minor rifts in Chinese political circles among those who, whatever their differences with the National Government, were certainly not Communists, nor in the least inclined in that direction. The next political development was the voluntary renunciation by the Chinese Communist Party of its whole platform as an expression of their patriotic desire to support the National Government in the grave crisis which had arisen as a result of Japan's aggression. The so-called "Red-Menace" vanished from China as quickly as the dew from the grass on a bright spring morning, depriving Japan of one of her main excuses for invading China's territory.

A manifesto was issued by the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in September clarifying the stand of the Party toward the national crisis. Declaring that the Communist Party had adopted a new policy an order to consolidate the unity of the nation, the manifesto laid special emphasis on the following points:--

Realizing that Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's Three Principles are indispensable to the construction of China, the Chinese Communist Party now pledges to exert itself to the utmost for the complete realization of these Principles.

The Chinese Communist Party has decided to abandon all measures aimed at the overthrow of the Kuo-Min Tang Government by force, propagation of Communis doctrines, and policy of forcible expropriation of land.

The Chinese Communist Party has decided to dissolve the Government of the Soviet Republic of China and to support a democratic form of Government with a view to unifying the administrative authority of China.

The Chinese Communist Party has decided to abolish the Red Army and to organize its forces as the Nationalist Revolutionary Army to be placed under the command of the Military Affairs Commission of the National Government. The Revolutionary Army is ready to take up defence duties on the front under the direction of the said Commission.

From a long and stubbornly-fought campaign against the National Government, the Communist forces were accordingly reorganized into the 8th Route Army of the National Government, with General Chu Teh and General Peng Teh-Hui as Commander and Deputy-Commander respectively, and were at once given the opportunity they had so long desired of going into action against the Japanese invaders. For the past two months the former Red armies have been actively engaged in Shansi, and there given a good account of themselves in helping to check the southward advance of the Japanese invaders.

As for the non-military members of and sympathizers with the now defunct Chinese Communist Party, it can be assumed that they will be incorporated in the body politic in much the same way as the vast majority of their former comrades in Germany and Italy have been absorbed. With the disappearance of most of the economic and social grievances which made many of the over-worked and under-paid look to Communism for relief, the peasants and artisans who supported various democratic political groups in those countries now enjoy most of the material benefits they formerly demanded. What has happened in Germany may be expected to happen in China--a crisis threatening the very existence of the whole nation brings about a solidarity of political effort and a determination to establish and preserve absolute unity in face

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of all threats from without. Germany formerly had a trade-union movement which, next to the British, was the strongest in the world; a Communist Party second in strength only to that in Russia; a Social Democratic Party which was the wealthiest Labor Party in the world and controlled powerful militant organizations under the Reich's banner; and a National People's Party which was one of the strongest Conservative organizations in the whole of Europe, supported by the Stahlhelm, a very strong association of ex-servicemen. All these powerful and active political groups have been completely absorbed in Germany under the Nazi regime, and when China is no longer exposed to the danger which now threatens her from without, it will be found that the former Communists will similarly co-operate earnestly and effectively with the Kuo-Min Tang in establishing a democratic Republic based upon the Three People's Principles laid down by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen.

It must be pointed out to those unfamiliar with Chinese affairs that there was a tremendous difference between the outlook of Communists in China and their comrades in Europe. For more than sixty years Communism has been an ideology accepted or rejected in European countries where a relatively high standard of living was general, but where the unequal distribution of wealth and political power caused grave dissatisfaction among the poor and powerless. Even in Germany today it is necessary for the Nazi Government to maintain a Ministry of Propaganda for the special purpose of counteracting the surviving influences upon national thought of half a century of active Marxist teaching. In China the great problem which has to be solved is not so much the equitable distribution of wealth as how to produce it. Poverty is China's most difficult problem, and has been for many centuries. Dr. Sun Yat-Sen made plans for creating an enlightened democracy and enabling it to produce wealth for itself. Chinese Communists have never taken exception to Dr. Sun's plans; his Three People's Principles were always accepted by them as a sound and practical political programme--but they wanted to have the satisfaction of putting them into operation, and in order to secure that privilege sought to discredit the Kuo-Min Tang, upon whose leaders fell the responsibility of carrying out Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's policy after his death.

Communism in China as an active movement dates back only to about 1925, and, instead of being the ideology it was in Europe fifty years earlier, was little more than an expression of disappointment by a limited section of the nation at the slow progress made by the Kuo-Min Tang in putting into effect the principles of the Socialist Republic aimed at by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen in 1911. The reasons for that slow progress have been already explained, but were not understood at the time by the illiterate masses; all they knew was that the problem of filling their rice-bowls was just as difficult after the Revolution as it was before. To them Communism was not an ideology; they knew and cared nothing about the theories of totalitarian or authoritarian States, nor were they interested in plans for establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat. Communism was regarded by them as simply a short cut to the goal which had been indicated by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen but which his followers had not yet attained.

Outside the small circle of men and women who were actually in touch or sympathy with the Third International, "Communism" in China was nothing more than an open expression of popular dissatisfaction at the slow progress made in effecting that socialization of the State which had been initiated by the Revolution of 1911, and it was surprising that Germany should have been misled by Japan into believing that the movement was ideological, and moreover had attained such a hold upon the Chinese people as to be anything like a menace either to the Republic or neighboring States. In other parts of the world the Communists were quite definitely opposed to the social order around them, and sought to change it, whereas the Chinese Communist Party had no quarrel with the Kuo-Min Tang on fundamental political issues--they simply wanted to take charge of the Revolution and wrest administrative control from those who had helped and followed Dr. Sun Yat-Sen. This point is evidently not understood by those foreign observers who have the impression that Communism, to the very limited extent it has ever existed in China, represented the same ideology that aroused such deep resentment in capitalistic States. It seems to have forgotten that the Republic of China is, in fact, a Socialist State--though for the reasons which have

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been already indicated it has not yet been possible to carry fully into effect the political theories aimed at by the Revolutions of 1911 and 1925.

The decision taken in September by the Chinese Communist Party to dissolve its administrative machinery, hand over its military organization to the National Government, and exert itself to the utmost for the realization of Kuo-Min Tang principles and in every way support the Administration it had so long tried to undermine and overthrow, was a step which had been anticipated by those who knew what profound changes had been already made in the Communist platform. In August, 1936--more than twelve months before the decision was reached to dissolve the "Soviet Republic of China"--Mao Tse-Tung, Chairman of the Chinese Soviet "Government" and leader of the Communists in China, had declared that further important points in their platform would be abandoned if such modification would lead to the establishment of a "popular front" in China, lined up to resist Japanese aggression. Hints of Communist willingness to form part of a "popular front" had been thrown out many times but without attracting any favourable reaction. Mao Tse-Tung made a strong bid for such co-operation by sacrificing many principles. He declared (in August, 1936) that the property of land of rich farmers would not be confiscated by the Communists if these wealthy men supported the movement to resist Japan. "Property and factories of merchants and of the larger and smaller capitalists will not be confiscated. On the contrary, we will protect such enterprises, and even help them to develop their business"--Communists protecting and abetting capitalists! Such was the "menace" from which Japan professed so much anxiety to protect China!

The Chairman of the Chinese Soviet "Government" further declared, in August 1937, that "the land and property of all land-owners and militarists who are actively participating in the anti-Japanese war will not be confiscated"--Communist protection not only for landlords but militarists! Mao-Tse-Tung also admitted that the laws and policies of his Soviet "Government" had been already drastically amended, laws for worker-management of enterprises had been repealed, and the Chinese Soviet recognized that "the joint interests of capitalists and workers are built on the foundation of struggle against imperialist aggression." This remarkable re-alignment of Communist policy was intended to pave the way for a working alliance with the Kuo-Min Tang and facilitate the establishment of a "popular front" in China against Japanese aggression. It indicated clearly that, thirteen months before the Chinese Communists finally decided to liquidate their movement completely (as they did in September, 1937), they had abandoned several of their most cherished political theories.

If the German Government had been made aware of Mao Tse-Tung's attitude in August, 1936, it might not have been so easily induced to sign in the following November the anti-Communist pact, believing that Japan was threatened by Communism in China, just as Germany was nervous about her northern neighbour. It is quite evident that the Chinese Soviet "Government," in the summer of 1936, had drifted so far away from its original principles that it was actually more friendly to landlords and capitalists than the Kuo-Min Tang! Constant complaint is made in the foreign Press that Chinese laws are much too lenient towards tenants and mortgagors, that Chinese Judges are disposed to listen too sympathetically to the stories told by persons unable to meet legal obligations, and harden their hearts against those who ask for nothing more than the pound of flesh which, according to the written deed, is their rightful due. Chinese law, drafted and enforced by the Kuo-Min Tang, also imposes effective restraint upon the avarice of money-lenders--whereas the Chairman of the Chinese Soviet "Government" was willing to protect large and small capitalists and "even help them to develop their business". And this was the grave danger, the Communist peril, the Red Menace which Japan considers it her "moral mission" to prevent from over-running China and disturbing the peace of Asia!

The original split between the Kuo-Min Tang and the Communists was largely due to divergence on the issue whether the Revolution in China was or was not to be regarded as a phase of the world-revolution. The leaders of the Kuo-Min Tang insisted that their policy aimed simply at establishing a better political, economic, and social order in China; the Chinese Communists, on the other hand, contended that Dr. Sun's policy was merely an incidental phase of a world-wide movement in which the

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welfare of the Chinese people was a secondary consideration, the main issue being the class-struggle and establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. This attitude has never been adopted or approved by the Revolutionary party in China which has carried on the work begun by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, whose one and only object in bringing about the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty was to liberate his countrymen from the domination of an autocratic monarchy and establish in its place an administration based on the principles of national sovereignty, democracy, and Socialism. His doctrine of the Three People's Principles aimed at establishing for China national equality outside the State ("of the people"), political equality within the State ("by the people"), and an economic equality corresponding to Lincoln's ("for the people.") The Revolution in China preceded that in Russia by six years; it was a national movement, and such it has remained, and it can be confidently expected that those who tried to make it simply a phase of the once hoped-for world-revolution will from now on earnestly co-operate with the Kuo-Min Tang in completing the work begun in 1911.

General Chiang Kai-Shek made the position quite clear in a statement published on September 22, 1937, commenting on the above manifesto issued by the Chinese Communist Party. General Chiang said that the National Government would gladly accept the services of any political organization which sincerely desired to stem foreign aggression and work for the cause of the Nationalist revolution under the leadership of the Kuo-Min Tang. The aim of the Revolution was to seek for China freedom and equality. With this end in view Dr. Sun Yat-Sen enunciated the Three People's Principles, hoping they would serve as the guiding light for a united effort to rescue the country from its perils. Unfortunately, events during the past 10 years showed that not all Dr. Sun's countrymen placed implicit faith in his doctrine, nor did they fully realize the magnitude of the dangers confronting the country. "The path of the Revolution was strewn with serious obstacles which caused a huge expenditure of the nation's resources and much suffering on the part of the people. The effects of domestic troubles thus impaired our strength to meet the external menace, which grew more and more serious as the years passed by." To stop this the National Government made a supreme effort to achieve internal solidarity, and its efforts were at last rewarded. Those who had been dubious about the Three People's Principles realized gradually the paramount importance of national interests and sank their differences for the sake of internal unity, and today there is ample evidence that the Chinese people have fully awakened to the fact that they are bound to live or perish together. All realize that the interests of the nation precede the interests of individuals or groups of individuals. General Chiang Kai-Shek continued:-

"The manifesto recently issued by the Chinese Communist Party is an outstanding instance of the triumph of national sentiment over every other consideration. The decisions embodied in the manifesto, such as the abandonment of violence, cessation of Communist propaganda, abolition of the Chinese Soviets, and the disbandment of the Red Army, are all essential measures towards the mobilization of national strength for the purpose of repelling attacks on our national existence.

"These decisions embody the spirit of the manifesto and revolutions adopted by the last Plenary Session of the Kuo-Min Tang. The allegiance now openly avowed by the Communists to the cause of the Three People's Principles has happily closed the last gap in our national armour. The entire nation shall henceforth strive in one common direction."

General Chiang Kai-Shek pointed out that all Chinese revolutionaries should struggle not for their personal prejudices but for the realization of the Three People's Principles and the common weal of the Republic. "Especially during this period of national crisis, when the fate of China lies in the balance, we should not allow national interests to be overshadowed by past differences. We should lead the entire nation to face the trying circumstances, and through the strength of all safeguard the continued existence of the Republic. The National Government stands for equality in opportunity for all Chinese citizens to serve the Republic. Let no one be deterred from this noble duty, so long as the desire lies in him to take part in the task of national reconstruction under the guiding spirit of the Three People's Principles." The National Government, declared General Chiang Kai-Shek, would gladly accept the services of any political organization which sincerely desired to stem

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foreign aggression and work for the cause of the Nationalist revolution under the leadership of the Kuo-Min Tang. "In the reorientation of its policy the Chinese Communist Party has given clear proof of its solicitude for our national independence and the interests of the country as a whole. I sincerely hope that all members of the Communist Party will faithfully carry out the vital decisions it has reached, and fight shoulder to shoulder with the rest of the nation for the successful completion of the Nationalist revolution." The foundation of the Chinese State rested firmly on the Three People's Principles, declared General Chiang Kai-Shek, and that foundation is immutable and will not be suffered to be changed or altered. "Now that the nation is awakened and solidly united, it may be said with confidence that the course hitherto cautiously steered by the National Government will be continued with the undivided support of the nation. The consolidation of internal solidarity further enables us to marshal all our national resources to combat external aggression in the spirit of self-reliance. I am firmly convinced that in fighting for her own existence China is also fighting for the cause of international peace and justice."

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945 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
February 14, 1938.

Dear Sir:

As Mr. Frank W. Price wrote you sometime ago, we are sending you from time to time information which we think may be of interest to you in connection with the present situation in China.

Included in the materials I am sending today are the Special Supplement to the China Weekly Review on Women's War Work and Documents concerning the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

We trust that these materials will be of interest and help to you.

Sincerely yours,

Helen M. Loomis

Helen M. Loomis M. Loomis, Secretary,
CHINA INFORMATION SERVICE
(On leave from Ginling College,
Nanking, China.)

Mr. Frank W. Price, Editor,
CHINA INFORMATION SERVICE
Mission Court, 1208 Rennie Avenue,
Richmond, Virginia.

"CHINESE SAVED BY AMERICANS"

Under the above heading the New York Sun recently published a special cable dispatch received from A. T. Steele, and filed in Shanghai telling of the heroic work done by American missionaries, many of them connected with the University of Nanking and Ginling College, in rescuing Chinese civilians remaining in the city after its fall to the Japanese. Mr. Steele's copyright dispatch said in part:

The fall of Nanking would have been infinitely more frightful if not for the courageous efforts of a handful of American missionaries and German businessmen who stayed throughout the siege.

Working solely for the welfare of 100,000 civilians remaining in the stricken city these foreigners ran risks which came close to costing their lives.

The intervention of American missionaries on behalf of Chinese civilians known to be innocent saved many lives.

The only foreigner wounded in the Nanking siege was a German who was cut by flying glass when a shell exploded outside his window, but all the sixteen Americans who saw the thing through could tell stories of hair-raising escapes. None of them went through a more trying ordeal than two American doctors, C. S. Trimmer and Robert Wilson, who took in all seriously wounded Chinese civilians who were brought to the doors of their Christian hospital.


Amputations were an hourly routine. A shell burst in the hospital yard while Dr. Wilson was performing a delicate operation, shattering the windows and spattering the operating room with shrapnel, but the work went on. The hospital was so overwhelmed with civilian cases it was unable to accept soldiers whom they directed to military hospitals, but in several cases the doctors looked into the muzzles of guns held by soldiers who demanded treatment, or else. It took tact to wriggle out of such situations.

Other Americans braved shrapnel and bombs to go after food supplies for the destitute thousands concentrated within the so-called safety zone. Among the most active was Lewis Smythe, formerly of the University of Chicago, now of the University of Nanking, who showed complete disregard for his own safety.

Miss Minnie Vautrin of Secor, Ill., who was in charge of 1,000 destitute Chinese women and children seeking shelter in the Ginling College, had a hectic time when Japanese shells burst dangerously close and again when Japanese invaded the premises to loot the houses of the Chinese faculty members of this mission school.

Dr. Wilson and Dr. Trimmer are members of the staff of the University of Nanking Hospital—the Christian Hospital referred to above. Miss Vautrin is Professor of Education at Ginling College.

CHINA COLLEGES IN THE NEWS



NATIONAL
EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR
CHRISTIAN COLLEGES IN CHINA
150 Fifth Avenue New York, N. Y.

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TIME, January 17, 1938

RELIGION

In Nanking

Of some 6,000 Protestant missionaries working in China at the outbreak of the present war, only about 300 have left the country. In some cases in battle areas where there are wounded to care for, the missionaries remain at the colleges and universities, hospitals and medical missions where for years they and their predecessors Christianized and educated the best class of Chinese, nurturing the indigenous Chinese Christian phenomenon of the New Life Movement of the Chiang Kai-sheks. In the *New York Times* last week, details in a lengthy airmailed dispatch by F. Tillman Durdin on the fall of Nanking (*TIME*, Dec. 27) revealed something of the fortitude currently displayed in China by these men of God in the foreign field.

Not many more than a score of white men, most of them Americans and most of the Americans missionaries, remained during the siege in which the Japanese slaughtered 33,000 Chinese soldiers (20,000 by execution), and wounded some 5,000, as well as thousands of civilians who, according to *Timesman* Durdin, "hobbled about, dragged themselves through alleyways, died by the hundreds on the main streets."

Two missionary professors, Dr. Lewis S. C. Smythe and Dr. Miner Searle Bates of the University of Nanking, helped organize a Nanking safety zone which, although the Japanese merely spared it from concentrated bombardment, probably saved thousands of civilian lives. To this zone went thousands of frantic Chinese soldiers, eager to exchange their uniforms for civilian garb, or even to strip themselves to their underclothing lest the Japanese execute them as soldiers.

Upon Rev. John Magee, able Episcopal missionary, lately of Shanghai, fell the job of organizing medical care in Nanking, Chinese army hospitals being completely inadequate. With two missionary doctors and two American nurses—whose dormitories were looted when the Japanese entered the city, as were faculty houses at Ginling College for women—the U. S.-supported University of Nanking Hospital remained open through the siege and fall of Nanking. How Missionary Magee, the university professors and doctors and other missionaries thereafter fared, *Timesman* Durdin did not state nor did he indicate the prospects of the university and Ginling College at Japanese hands. Obviously, however, both would need their share, and probably more, of \$300,000 which U. S. supporters of twelve Chinese Christian colleges and universities are currently trying to raise for emergency needs.

Reprinted from *Time Magazine*

SHELTER 30,000 REFUGEES

American Missionaries at Nanking Report Great Distress

American missionaries at the University of Nanking in China are sheltering about 30,000 refugees, according to a message received here and made public by W. Reginald Wheeler, vice president of the university's board of trustees. To shield the missionaries, Mr. Wheeler did not divulge the whole message. However, it said in part: "University [of Nanking] sheltering 30,000 refugees. This service from thirteenth [of January] tenaciously maintained amid violent terror. Institutional losses moderate. Majority residences partly looted. Staff splendid despite injuries. Danger. Unspeakable distress. Ginling College [with 10,000 refugees] comparable. Hospital service unique. Relief needs dominate city."

—*New York Times*, January 23, 1938

AMERICANS IN CHINA

But the most significant job done by Americans in China is neither the buying nor the selling of goods. It is so great a work that it is altogether misunderstood by small minds and even smaller hearts. That is the tremendously important and valuable services of the American missionary.

These men and women have gone to town and village, bringing with them not only the many varieties of Christianity, but a new cultural pattern; in my opinion, a nobler cultural pattern than the Chinese retained amid the disintegration of China's indigenous social and intellectual establishments during the last century.

Take, as an example, St. John's University in Shanghai, or the Shanghai College (which used to be the Shanghai Baptist College) or Lingnan University (which used to be called the Canton Christian College), or Yenching in Peking or Soochow University, or Yale-in-China—these and many more have kept the light of modern learning aflame in China during the dark days of civil war and revolution and change of government.

Reprinted from an article by George E. Sokolsky, noted writer on Far Eastern subjects, published in the *New York Herald Tribune* on January 3, 1938.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

"CHINESE SAVED BY AMERICANS"

Under the above heading the New York Sun recently published a special cable dispatch received from A. T. Steele, and filed in Shanghai telling of the heroic work done by American missionaries, many of them connected with the University of Nanking and Ginling College, in rescuing Chinese civilians remaining in the city after its fall to the Japanese. Mr. Steele's copyright dispatch said in part:

The fall of Nanking would have been infinitely more frightful if not for the courageous efforts of a handful of American missionaries and German businessmen who stayed throughout the siege.

Working solely for the welfare of 100,000 civilians remaining in the stricken city these foreigners ran risks which came close to costing their lives.

The intervention of American missionaries on behalf of Chinese civilians known to be innocent saved many lives.

The only foreigner wounded in the Nanking siege was a German who was cut by flying glass when a shell exploded outside his window, but all the sixteen Americans who saw the thing through could tell stories of hair-raising escapes. None of them went through a more trying ordeal than two American doctors, C. S. Trimmer and Robert Wilson, who took in all seriously wounded Chinese civilians who were brought to the doors of their Christian hospital.

Amputations were an hourly routine. A shell burst in the hospital yard while Dr. Wilson was performing a delicate operation, shattering the windows and spattering the operating room with shrapnel, but the work went on. The hospital was so overwhelmed with civilian cases it was unable to accept soldiers whom they directed to military hospitals, but in several cases the doctors looked into the muzzles of guns held by soldiers who demanded treatment, or else. It took tact to wriggle out of such situations.

Other Americans braved shrapnel and bombs to go after food supplies for the destitute thousands concentrated within the so-called safety zone. Among the most active was Lewis Smythe, formerly of the University of Chicago, now of the University of Nanking, who showed complete disregard for his own safety.

Miss Minnie Vautrin of Secor, Ill., who was in charge of 1,000 destitute Chinese women and children seeking shelter in the Ginling College, had a hectic time when Japanese shells burst dangerously close and again when Japanese invaded the premises to loot the houses of the Chinese faculty members of this mission school.

Dr. Wilson and Dr. Trimmer are members of the staff of the University of Nanking Hospital—the Christian Hospital referred to above. Miss Vautrin is Professor of Education at Ginling College.

0575
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

SECOND BRIGADE USMC

CO ✓
SENT TO
CINCPAC


FROM

February 10, 1938

Rec'd 8:20 a.m.

ACTION: CINCPAC OPNAV

INFO: AMCON SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING



8610. Japanese continue progress northwestward from Hwaiyuan, another column failed in attempt cross Hwai River near Wuhu 18 miles north east Linhwaikwan. On Pinghan front Nipponese in possession Chilitien north Tangyin and Tsingfeng 50 miles east Anyang. Chinese Hanking slow progress toward Wuhu now reported in possession airdrome southern outskirts city. 1828.

HPD

793.94/12382

FEB 14 1938

FILED

F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

COMSOPAT
FROM

February 10, 1938

Rec'd 1:50 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: CINCAF (ADMIN)
SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF
COMGANPAV
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING

0010. Destroyers exchanged gun fire Bocca Tigris
Fort. Air raids railroads vicinity Canton, other South
China ports quiet. 2000.

KLP

793.94/12383

FEB 11 1938

F/FG
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1638

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

SPECIAL GRAY AND GRAY

1-1336

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated February 10, 1938

Rec'd 1:44 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

53, February 10, 3 p.m.

I have just been informed by Bos, of the Netherlands Legation, who has come to Nanking for a few days, that in a conversation this morning with Fukui the actions and reports of the foreigners in Nanking were severely criticized. According to Bos, Fukui tried to impress upon him that conditions here were improving daily, that the Japanese soldiers were well under control and that any reports to the contrary made by foreigners were just "anti-Japanese propaganda".

While it is true that conditions have improved to some extent there are still numerous reports of disorder and violence committed by Japanese soldiers. A similar attempt has been made to impress upon the Japanese authorities that complaints made to them of the actions of Japanese troops are not the result of anti-Japanese feeling but are made in an effort to assist the responsible people to know what is going on and thus put a stop to it. However, with the Acting Japanese Consul General adopting

793.94/12384

F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4633

-2- #53, February 10, 3 p.m. from Nanking via N. R.

adopting the attitude shown above constructive work
is almost impossible.

Sent to Embassy, Hankow, Peiping and Shanghai.
Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo.

ALLISON

KLP:CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunsaker NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

1-1336

GRAY
FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated February 10, 1938

Rec'd 2:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

232, February 10, 4 p.m.

My 195, February 3, 7 p.m.

Japanese operations on the southern Tsinpu front

have resulted in the capture of Pekpu and Hwaiyuan. The Japanese claim to have succeeded in effecting a crossing of the Hwai River but in view of the strong Chinese resistance along the northern bank of the river it is doubtful whether the Japanese units have succeeded in gaining firm foothold or have crossed in large numbers. It is reported that the Japanese are now developing an attack west of Hwaiyuan with Pohsien as the immediate objective. If this operation is successful Chinese positions in the vicinity of Hsuehow will become untenable. However, informed Japanese here state that more important offensive operations are imminent on the Pinghan railway and that a strong Japanese column is already moving south from Taming southern Hopai and has captured Nanlo.

Reports

793.94/12385

FEB 11 1938

F/FG

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-#232, February 10, 4 p.m. from Shanghai via N. R.

Reports are current in Chinese circles in Shanghai that Wuhu has been recaptured by the Chinese. While this report is discounted by foreign military observers it is believed that strong Chinese guerrilla bands have been operating against Wuhu during the past week and have raided Japanese positions in the immediate vicinity of the city. Japanese admit that some Chinese troops have appeared on the northern bank of the Yangtze opposite Wuhu. Repeated to Hankow and Peiping.

GAUSS

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1338

COMYANGPAT
FROM
February 11, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: CINCAF (FLAG & ADMN)
SECOND BRIGADE USMC
YANGPAT
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMSOPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
NAVAL ATTACHE PEIPING

793.94

Division
FAR EAST
B-1
Department of State
ms 18
ms 18

0010. Yangtze River ports quiet. 2120.

DDM

100 Y
—

25

793.94/12386

F/EG
FEB 14 1938

058

~~_____~~

1-1336

PLAIN
FROM

Dated February 10, 1938

REC'd 7 a.m., 11th.

[Handwritten signatures]

193,94

795.94/12387

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ONLY BY

KETCHAM

DT

FILED
DEC 11 1938

F/FG

058

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1238

FROM

PLAIN AND SPECIAL GRAY

Canton via N. R.

Dated February 10, 1938

Rec'd 8 a.m., 11th.

COPIES SENT TO
 AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

February 10, 6 p.m.

Canton-Hong Kong Railway bombed on eighth and ninth. Hamshue Railway on eighth and Hankow Railway on ninth with immaterial damage. Canton Hong Kong highway bombed on eighth and west river highway at Shuising with civilian casualties. Considerable Japanese aerial scouting recently. Three Japanese warships accompanied by five scouting planes which dropped no bombs exchanged shellfire with Bocca Tigris forts without damage to vessels or buildings early this morning.

Referring to my February 3, ¹²³⁰⁷ 4 p.m., reliable Hoihow source confirms that following Japanese aerial bombing on January twenty-eighth, French warship arrived there on twenty-ninth coincidentally with Japanese plane which bombed area again and "according to reliable sources" radioed demand for explanation of ship's visit to Hoihow of French Consul who replied it was necessary for protection of French nationals. French vessel reportedly

left

793.94

793.94/12388

F/FG
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- February 10, 6 p.m., from Canton via N. R.

left for southern Hainan on February first. Hoihow
air raid damage ^{15 houses and 9} ~~1500~~ casualties.

Mailed to Hong Kong.

LINNELL

RR:WWC

WB
3-2-72

058

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

SENT TO

FROM

SECOND BRIGADE USMC

February 11, 1938

Rec'd 9:40 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF (FLAG & ADMN)
OPNAV

INFO: AMCON SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING
ASST ALUSNA SHANGHAI

Division
1.1
144

8611. Believed Japanese have made small scale crossings Hwai river at Penglu and Wuhu. Northern Tsinpu sector quiet on Pinghan Japanese reported occupied Tangyin 15 miles south Anyang and Puyang 12 miles south Tsingfeng. 1826.

CSB

793.94/12389

F/FG

FILED
FEB 14 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1238

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated February 11, 1938

Rec'd 8 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

104, February 11, 5 p.m.

Embassy's 68 / January 28, 3 p.m.

Reports indicate that the Japanese are continuing preparations for advances southward along the Peiping Hankow Railway and in Shansi. The number of Japanese troops going south on that railway has increased; the number of Japanese forces on the Taiyuan plain has been increasing; railway materials have been sent south, presumably for repair of the line destroyed south of Changteh; Japanese expeditions to cause the retirement of irregular forces west of the Peiping Hankow Railway and north and south of the Shihkia Chuang Taiyuan Railway have reportedly increased for the purpose of rendering flank attacks against the Japanese more difficult. Rumors of a westward movement of Japanese troops in Suiyuan cannot be confirmed here. Repeated to Hankow, by mail to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

CSB

793.94/12390

F/FG

TELEGRAM dated February 11, 1938, from LOCKHART, U.S. COUNSELOR AT PEIPING, re Peiping-Hankow Railway

DISTRIBUTION:

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U	Under Secretary	Sumner Welles
C	Counselor	R. Walton Moore
A-M	Assistant Secretary	George S. Messersmith
A-S	Assistant Secretary	Francis B. Sayre
SA	Special Assistant to the Secretary of State	Leo Pasvolksy
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Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry, NARS, Date 12-18-75

058

0588

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Far East

Feb. 11. Lockhart, U.S. counselor of Embassy at Peiping, cabled that reports indicate that the Japanese are continuing preparations for advances southward along the Peiping-Hankow Railway, and in Shansi. The number of Japanese troops going south on that railway has increased; the number of Japanese forces on the Taiyuan plain has been increasing; railway materials have been sent south, presumably for repair of the line destroyed south of Changteh; Japanese expeditions to cause the retirement of irregular forces west of the Peiping-Hankow Railway and north and south of the Shikiachuang-Taiyuan Railway have reportedly increased for the purpose of rendering flank attack against the Japanese more difficult. Rumors of a western movement of Japanese in Suiyan can not be confirmed in Peiping.

0589

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

GRAY

FROM

Foochow via N. R.

Dated February 10, 1938

Rec'd 11th, 12:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

February 10, 7 p.m.

One. Kienow and Yenping, important river towns in the interior of Fukien on route now being used for transport of Chinese troops and military supplies, are reliably reported to have been attacked yesterday afternoon by three Japanese planes which are said to have dropped eighteen bombs on the air field at Kienow. No casualties reported and damage was slight. Tension here is increasing, although some local Chinese believe that Foochow may continue to escape attack.

Two. Citizens committee of eleven prominent local Chinese called on Consulate yesterday morning to bespeak for the Chinese cause sympathetic presentation on the part of foreigners in China and to ask support of anti-aggression movement. I informed committee that I would report fact of its call to the Embassy and the Department.

To Department. Hankow and Peiping.

WARD

DDM:HPD

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F/FG

FEB 11 1938

0591

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336

MBo

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM
GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated February 11, 1938

Rec'd 9:22 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

237, February 11, 10 a.m.

On February 9 the China press carried a news item of an interview with the local office of Mitsui and Mitsubishi in regard to rumored Japanese plans for economic developments in China. The reporter was informed that various interested organs are considering such plans the nature of which could not be divulged. An official of one of the companies told the reporter that "present plans for Japanese enterprises in China are much larger than anyone believes (omission) anyone in Shanghai perhaps in the whole world". Referring to the hopes of the non-Japanese foreign communities in Shanghai to be able to resume business much as they did after the 1932 incident, the official remarked "but I think things will be very different after this incident."

There is a quiet rumor among local Italian circles that

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FEB 13 1938

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2- No. 237, February 11, from Shanghai.

that Italy will send economic missions to Manchuria and
Japan this spring.

GAUSS

RR:WVC

059

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FORM DS-278 6-3-48		DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEPHONIC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION OR CORRESPONDENCE FROM THE FILES	
NAME OF CALLER <i>Gilbert</i>		DATE <i>3/5/54</i>	HOUR
OFFICE SYMBOL <i>PTB</i>	ROOM	TELEPHONE <i>5595</i>	
SEARCH BEGAN		SEARCH COMPLETED	
SUBJECT OF CORRESPONDENCE DESIRED <div style="text-align: center;"> <p><i>#</i> <i>1 - Nanking</i></p> <p><i>from Allison</i> <i>124.932 / 578</i></p> <p><i>Dept's 61 3/9 7 P.M.</i></p> <p><i>Tel # 53</i></p> <p><i>Mrs. Dowling</i> <i>1948</i></p> </div>			
<input type="checkbox"/> DESIRED BY SPECIAL MESSENGER <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Indicate)			
CASES SUGGESTED FOR SEARCHING <div style="text-align: center;"> <p><i>Emb. 2/10 5 P.M.</i></p> <p><i>793.94 / 12384</i></p> <p><i>811.015394 / 29</i></p> </div>			
NAME OF PERSON TAKING CALL			
SEARCH MADE BY			
<input type="checkbox"/> SEARCH COMPLETED AND PAPERS SENT <input type="checkbox"/> NO RECORD FOUND		DATE	HOUR
FILE NUMBERS OF PAPERS SENT			

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HAMILTON FISH
 28TH DIST. NEW YORK

COMMITTEES:
 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 BANKING AND CURRENCY

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

1938 FEB 11 PM 1 49

February 10, 1938.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 A-M/F *Ray file*
 FEB 21 1938
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY
 OF STATE

Hon. Cordell Hull,
 Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am attaching hereto a copy of
 H. Res. 418, which is self-explanatory.

Will you please send me the
 information requested in this resolution at
 your earliest convenience?

Thanking you for your attention
 to this matter, I am,

Sincerely yours,

Hamilton Fish

FEBRUARY 10 1938

DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS

1938
 Department of State

793.94/12393

FILED
 FEB 21 1938

F/FG

12393

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

75TH CONGRESS
3D SESSION

H. RES. 418

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 8, 1938

Mr. FISH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed

RESOLUTION

- 1 *Resolved*, That the President of the United States be,
2 and he is hereby, requested, if not incompatible with the
3 public interest, to inform the House of Representatives—
4 (1) What facts, if any, are in possession of the State
5 Department showing that the Japanese Ambassador to China
6 has been withdrawn by the Japanese Government;
7 (2) What information, if any, is in possession of the
8 State Department showing that the Chinese Ambassador to
9 Japan has been withdrawn;
10 (3) Whether the Department of State is in possession
11 of any facts that verify the report published recently in the
12 press that Japan's Foreign Minister Hirota told the Japanese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2

- 1 Diet that "a state of war exists between China and Japan";
2 and
3 (4) If the State Department is in possession of facts or
4 information substantiating the withdrawal of the Japanese
5 Ambassador from China and the Chinese Ambassador from
6 Japan, and the statement by Japan's Foreign Minister that
7 "a state of war exists between China and Japan", has the
8 State Department taken any action to advise the President
9 that the Neutrality Act should be invoked in accordance with
10 the mandatory provisions of the Act.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 14, 1938.

S:
 Mr. Secretary.

You will note that we are sending as an enclosure to the letter to Mr. McReynolds a translation of a portion of Mr. Hirota's statement in the Diet on January 25. That statement contains some remarks which, especially when taken out of context, may be used by those who wish to embarrass the Administration. For instance, Mr. Hirota said, "it is unnecessary to repeat that both internally and externally the present struggle is in fact a war. Accordingly the question of the steps to be taken at the termination are the same as those of war". As an offset to such remarks, Mr. Hirota also said, "we have not yet taken the step of declaring war".

We believe that the furnishing to Mr. McReynolds of the entire relevant section of Mr. Hirota's statement is likely to cause less of embarrassment and misunderstanding than would be the case should we furnish Mr. McReynolds only certain of Mr. Hirota's remarks.

W. W. W.

793.94/12393

MMH/REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Translation of the pertinent portion of statement
 made by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Hirota,
 in the Japanese Diet on January 25, 1938.

"The first point of the present interpellation was a question of the significance of calling the present Sino-Japanese relations an incident and not a war. As is well known, the present trouble arose from the Lukowkia bridge incident, becoming gradually aggravated until turned into a general conflict. Up to the present time, if we look at the situation between Japan and China, it is clearly a great struggle, for the Far East an extraordinary struggle. However as you know the situation in the Far East is not one like that of Europe based on concepts of international law. Speaking from racial as well as other considerations the relations of these two countries cannot be regulated by war. Actually Japan has from the outset of this incident announced that it was combatting the anti-Japanese movement as represented by the Chiang regime and the military cliques. On the one hand there has arisen in North China a government which, friendly to Japan, is adopting a joint anti-Communist policy. Arguing from this standpoint it is beyond need of proof that the relations between China and Japan are not a war in which the Chinese Government and its people are looked upon as enemies. Ordinarily, according to the dictates of international law, in the case of war it is usual to

make

793.94/12393

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

make a declaration of war at the outset or later. As a result of the declaration of war it is customary for third countries to assume the obligations of neutrals. In the present situation in the Far East the advantages and disadvantages of the application of the principles of international law to this situation must be considered carefully. In the light of the situation in China and in international relations we have not yet taken the step of declaring war. However, depending on developments this step may become necessary. Consequently it is unnecessary to repeat that both internally and externally the present struggle is in fact a war. Accordingly the question of the steps to be taken at the termination are the same as those of war. If we look at the attitude of the Chinese National Government up to the present time we see that it lacked entirely any sincere intention to negotiate with Japan and we therefore severed all international intercourse with it. However from the standpoint of actual fact the relations between Japan and China must be postponed. Having reached this state, Japan with extraordinary determination is urging the reflection of all China and is building everlasting peace in the Far East."

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON

FEB 16 1938

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have your letter of February 15, 1938, transmitting in duplicate a proposed report to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, relative to H. Res. 418, "Requesting the President of the United States to furnish certain information pertaining to the diplomatic relationship between Japan and China".

The original of your proposed report is returned herewith, and you are advised that there would be no objection to the submission thereof to the Committee.

Very truly yours,

W. B. Bell
Acting Director.

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State.

Enclosure:

Original of
proposed
report.

0600

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED

My dear Mr. Bell:

In accordance with Circular No. 344 of the Bureau of the Budget, dated November 15, 1937, there is transmitted herewith a proposed reply to a request from the Committee on Foreign Affairs for a report on H. Res. 418.

It is requested that you indicate whether the proposed reply is in harmony with the program of the President.

Sincerely yours,

RECEIVED

Enclosures:

1. Original and one copy of report.
2. Bill.

The Honorable

D. W. Bell,

Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

FE:CV:VCI
2/16/58

FE
my M. K.

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FEB 15 1938.

2/16/58
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0601

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/12390

FEB 14 1938

My dear Mr. McReynolds:

The receipt is acknowledged of a letter of February 9, 1938, from Mr. I. R. Barnes, Clerk of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, asking the Department to furnish the Committee on Foreign Affairs a report, in duplicate, on H. Res. 419, "Requesting the President of the United States to furnish certain information pertaining to the diplomatic relationship between Japan and China".

With regard to the inquiry contained in section (1) of the Resolution, the Department has information to the effect that, although the Japanese Ambassador to China has returned to Japan, the Counselor of the Embassy has remained in China as Chargé d'Affaires.

With regard to the inquiry contained in section (2) of the Resolution, the Department has been informed that

The Honorable

Sam D. McReynolds,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives.

793.94/12393

0602

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

that the Chinese Ambassador to Japan returned to China under instruction from his Government but that he was not handed his credentials by the Japanese Government, and that the Counselor of the Chinese Embassy has remained in Japan as Chargé d'Affaires. On January 21 the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office made a statement to the press as follows: "Although it has ceased to deal with General Chiang Kai-shek's régime, the Japanese Government will continue to accord diplomatic and consular privileges to Chinese diplomatic and consular officials representing the National Government." It appears to be the view of the Japanese Government that the de jure status of the Japanese and Chinese diplomatic and consular officials in China and Japan, respectively, remains unchanged.

With regard to the inquiry in section (3) of the Resolution, it is believed that the remark attributed to Mr. Hirota as quoted in the Resolution is based upon a press report from Tokyo under date February 2 which refers to a statement made in the Diet on February 2. The Department has been officially informed that there was no session of the Diet on February 2 and that the press report probably has reference to Mr. Hirota's statement in the Diet under date January 25. There is enclosed

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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-3-

enclosed a translation of the pertinent portion of that statement as telegraphed to the Department. It will be observed that the remark quoted in the Resolution does not occur in the statement and the Department has no information indicating that Mr. Hirota made such a remark. The comment may be made in this connection that replies to interpellations in the Diet generally consist of impromptu remarks which are at times characterized by ambiguity which while often passing unnoticed in a language as vague and impersonal as the Japanese language may be lacking in clarity and be subject to misconstruction when translated into English. However, it would appear to be clear from the statement of Mr. Hirota that Japan has not declared war upon China and that Mr. Hirota does not consider that a de jure state of war exists between the two countries. In this connection attention is invited to his statement that "In the light of the situation in China and in international relations we have not yet taken the step of declaring war".

With regard to section (4) of H. Res. 418, there must be taken into account, in deciding whether the President should be advised in regard to the invocation of the Joint Resolution approved May 1, 1937, commonly referred to as the Neutrality Act, various factors -- and especially

0604

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
-4-

especially the broad, general interest of this country and its nationals. In the present situation in the Far East, the President has been of the opinion that, in the light of all of the facts and circumstances, and with due and conscientious consideration of both the letter and the spirit of the neutrality legislation, the intent of that legislation and the general interests of this country and its nationals are best served by not invoking the provisions of the Joint Resolution.

Sincerely yours,

George H. Bush

Enclosure:
 Translation of portion of
 Mr. Hirota's statement in
 the Diet on January 25.



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 18 1938.

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/12393

My dear Mr. Fish:

Reference is made to your letter of February 10, 1938, enclosing a copy of H. Res. 418 and expressing a desire to receive the information requested in that Resolution.

In response to a letter under date February 9, 1938, from the Clerk of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, with which was enclosed a copy of H. Res. 418, I sent a reply under date February 14, 1938, to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. It is my understanding that the information contained in my letter to the Chairman of the Committee is available to you as a member of the Committee.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

The Honorable

Hamilton Fish,


House of Representatives.

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FEB 17 1938

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1238

FROM PLAIN

Hankow via N. R.

Dated February 11, 1938

Rec'd 12:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

February 11, 6 p.m.

Unknown number of Japanese planes bombed Wuchang
between one and two this afternoon objective apparently
air field. Damage unascertained. Visibility so poor
almost no antiaircraft fire.

Sent to Peiping.

JOSSELYN

HPD

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FEB 15 1938

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated February 11, 1938

Rec'd 10:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.


239, February 11, noon.

Referring to my 125 January 22, 1 p.m. concerning

Wuhu incidents. Japanese Consul General has now handed me a letter with attached memorandum covering investigations made by consular and military authorities from which it appears that as to the flag incident they have been unable to find Japanese soldiers involved in the case. The memorandum shows that during a recent visit of doctor to Shanghai he told a Japanese Consular Officer that he did not personally witness the incident and that when he hurriedly arrived on the scene he failed to see any Japanese soldier in the neighborhood.

As to the incidents involving American property, the letter states "the Japanese authorities have also exhausted every possible means of investigation in regard to these cases but they have so far been unable to find out the soldiers responsible for the incidents. I feel constrained however to express to you my profound regret

OVER



0608

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1545

No. 239, February 11, from Shanghai.

over the prima facie involvement of Japanese soldiers
in such incidents and to state at the same time that
the Japanese authorities are ready to consider the pay-
ment of reasonable compensation for damages caused to
such American property in Wuhu upon receipt of full
details from the sufferers concerned."

Repeated to Hankow.

GAUSS

CSB:

0609

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

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Washington.

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February 15, 1938.

8 P. M.

RECEIVED
COMM. DIV.
FEB 15 1938

AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI (CHINA) VIA N.R.

142

Your 239, February 11 noon.

No further action would appear to be called for except
to suggest to ~~missionary representatives referred to in~~ American claimants
~~your 1219, December 23, 9 p.m.~~ the preparation of claims
covering any property losses sustained as a result of acts
of Japanese forces at Wuhai.

Hull
JMH

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1938 FEB 15 1938

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

G-2 Report

APR 17 1938

DIVISION OF

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Foreign Relations
Japan's Recent Statements of
Policy Toward China.

The announcement of Japan's "inamutable policy" toward China, approved at an Imperial Conference (the fifth ever held in Japanese history) on January 11th after having been formulated at an emergency cabinet meeting the day before, was made to a waiting world on January 16th. The "momentous decision" as it was generally called in Japan, was guarded with the utmost secrecy for five days, during which the speculations of Japanese and foreign political experts concerning its probable nature filled many columns in the public prints.

The substance of the statement announcing the momentous decision was that the Japanese Government had decided not to deal in future with the Nationalist Government of China, but to co-operate with the newly established Provisional Government of the Chinese Republic. The announcement also carried a statement that Japan's policy of respecting China's territorial integrity and the interests of other powers in China would remain unchanged.

After all the ballyhoo raised by the Japanese press about the momentous decision, its nature when announced did not seem very exciting. A declaration of war against China would have been momentous indeed, an announcement of the actual recognition of the new Provisional Government would have caused considerable stir, but a mere statement that Japan was breaking off relations with a government which her Army and Navy have been exerting every effort for some months to stamp out of existence could not be expected to raise much of a commotion either in Chinese or foreign circles.

Since the first announcement of its changed policy toward China, the Japanese Government through the Premier, Prince Konoye; the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hirota, and other less important mediums such as the official spokesmen of the Foreign Office has gone to considerable lengths to make clear a number of points concerning foreign policy which have important bearing not only on the relations of Japan with China but with some other countries as well.

Japan has taken care to point out that while the withdrawal of recognition of the Chinese Government necessarily entails a severance of diplomatic relations, it in no sense implies a declaration of war, and she has quoted as a precedent the Anglo-Soviet rupture of 1927. It has also been made clear by Japan that as she will not in future deal

From W/A, China

Report No. 9632

February 7, 1938

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Division of

CHINA (Political)

APR 17 1938

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CHINA (Political)

APR 17 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4-2 Report

3850

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Foreign Relations

Japan's Recent statements
of Policy Toward China

with the Chinese Nationalist Government and has not yet recognized the Provisional Government, for the time being she will deal with local Chinese authorities in handling such matters as may come up from day to day. Thus even the "Chiang Kai-shek Government," as the Japanese call the present Chinese Central Government, is accorded the recognition of a local regime based upon Chungking.

In announcing her new policy toward China, Japan has apparently felt it necessary to justify her action by the statement that it was made imperative by the rejection of the Chinese Government of "the conditions upon which the Japanese Government was willing to open direct negotiations for a settlement of the existing situation," as the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office so loquaciously stated it on January 18th. In other words, Japan claims she was forced to adopt the new policy by China's rejection of her peace terms.

Since January 16th, when Japan repudiated the Nationalist Government and announced her support, but not recognition, of the Provisional Government of the Chinese Republic, the Premier, Prince Konoye, and the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hirota, have been kept busy answering questions in the Diet concerning Japan's new policy toward China. Examination of the statements of these two gentlemen makes it clear that Japan awaits the establishment of a new Chinese Government which will not necessarily grow out of the present Provisional Government. It is admitted, however, that the Provisional Government will undoubtedly be the mainstay of other regimes to be created in other parts of China in future.

When this new Chinese Government is established, so Japan's highest civil officials have stated, whether it comes from the present Provisional Government or not, it will be recognized by Japan as a party with which Japan can negotiate. Under no circumstances, so it is stated, will Japan negotiate with the Nationalist Government. A statement has appeared from an official Japanese source that the only possible chance for the "Chiang Kai-shek Government" to continue its existence is to submit to the new Provisional Government. The difference between such a course and self-dissolution is difficult to see, and the Chinese Government will indeed be in desperate straits before it takes any such action.

Prince Konoye and Mr. Hirota have been careful to state, quite unnecessarily it seems, that Japan will not await the formation of the new government in China "with folded arms," but will act as its "foster mother." It would

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Justesen NARS, Date 12-18-75

G-2 Report

3850

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Foreign Relations

Japan's Recent Statements
 of Policy Toward China

seem that the term "mid-wife" might be a more appropriate one to use in this connection. The statements of the Premier and the Foreign Minister concerning the form which the new government, with Japan's active assistance, will eventually assume have been vague, probably intentionally so. Hints have been dropped, however, that while it may resemble Manchukuo at its inception, it will ultimately assume a different form, particularly in its economic relations with other countries. It is worthy of note that in speaking of the new government about to be, the Japanese diplomats have often reiterated the familiar themes that Japan does not intend to conquer China nor to close the Open Door. Foreign capital, so it has been stated a number of times, will be welcome in the development of the new government.

While clearly stating that severance of diplomatic relations with the Chinese National Government is not tantamount to a declaration of war, Japan has also been careful to make it plain that she is holding the possibility of such a declaration as an ace-in-the-hole to be played should the necessity therefor arise. A recent declaration on this subject was made by Prince Konoye on January 29th when he stated in the Diet that a declaration of war is still contemplated and whether or not it is made depended upon the future attitude of Chiang Kai-shek, a statement of threatening tone but vague meaning.

Questions asked in the House of Peers on January 25th as to why the Japanese Government had not declared war forced Mr. Hirota, the Foreign Minister, to the apparently somewhat equivocal explanation that the present was not considered an "expedient" time to declare war. Mr. Hirota further explained, vaguely enough it seemed, that Japan was not fighting all of China, as a pro-Japanese, anti-Comintern regime had recently been brought into being in North China. Thus he seemed to intimate that under such circumstances a declaration of war would be both unnecessary and inappropriate.

It seems probable that the bugaboo of a possible declaration of war will be raised by Japan from time to time for the sake of its possible intimidating effect upon China and other countries, principally those who would be most adversely affected by a blockade of the China Coast.

A note of importance concerning Japan's policy toward China was sounded in the Diet on January 24th by the War Minister, General Sugiyama, when he stated that Japanese troops might remain in China after the termination of the

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Justesen NARS, Date 12-18-75

G-2 Report

3850

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Foreign Relations

Japan's Recent Statements
 of Policy Toward China

present hostilities. He admitted, however, that no final decision had been reached on this point, as the Army was too busy with other matters at the present time to give proper consideration to the matter. It seems significant that General Sugiyama said nothing about the possibility that organs of the Japanese Government other than the Army might have something to do with the making of so important a decision.

Although the sincerity of the declaration was recently sharply challenged in the Diet, Japan is still reiterating her familiar slogan that she has no territorial ambitions in China. As recently as January 27th Prince Konoye stated in the Diet that Japan need have no such ambitions in China. "There is no contradiction," said the Premier, "between the wish for the establishment of a new regime in North or Central China and the spirit of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China."

In recent statements of the Japanese Government concerning its policy toward China, remarks have been included for the benefit of other countries, notably England and Russia. Mr. Hirota stated in the House of Peers on January 25th that every means must be taken to make third powers understand that a new state of affairs exists in the Orient, a statement which appeared very much in line with another one previously made by the Premier to the effect that the aim of Japanese diplomacy should be to make Great Britain and Russia alter their attitude toward China, by which he doubtless meant to cease helping China.

So far the only visible result of Japan's altered policy toward China has been the recall of the respective ambassadors of the two countries. Dr. Hsu Shih-ying, the Chinese Ambassador to Japan, closed up the Tokyo Embassy, at least partially, on January 18th and sailed from Yokohama for home on the 20th. Mr. Shigeru Kawagoe, the Japanese Ambassador, sailed from Shanghai on January 28th. Even so, diplomatic relations cannot be said to have been entirely severed between the two countries. The Counsellor and some other members of the Japanese Embassy staff will remain in China, according to an official announcement of the Japanese Foreign Office, but only for the purpose, so it is stated, of discussing necessary questions with the diplomats of nations other than China. It is understood that some of the staff of the Chinese Embassy will remain in Tokyo to wind up affairs, but the Japanese Government has announced that those staying will not retain any diplomatic status and will be considered only as Chinese private citizens, who will, however, be fully protected.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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3850

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Foreign Relations

Japan's Recent Statements
of Policy Toward China

To the impartial observer of the present situation in the Orient, the recent pronouncements of the Japanese Government concerning its policy toward China, some of the most important of which have been commented on above, seem to bear a ring of considerable sincerity and appear to indicate a desire, considering the circumstances, to act with some degree of justice and humanity toward China. After all, it may be argued, Japan's declared intention of setting up a new government in China with which she can co-operate does not imply a threat to destroy China as a sovereign nation, particularly if Japan is sincere in reiterating that she has no territorial ambitions in this country. The fly in the ointment, however, is the fact that these enunciations of Japan's policy toward China have almost all come from the civil end of the government, and past experience has shown all too clearly that the final say in Japan's relations with China, or with any other country for that matter, will come from the Army and Navy.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

David D. Barrett
 Major, Infantry
 Assistant Military Attache

Distribution:
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 1 File

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 890.00/79 FOR Memorandum
State Department
Far Eastern Division
FROM (Jones) DATED Feb 5, 1938
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: The situation in the Far East: review of the past week.

FRG.

793.94/12396

12376

061

~~COMSOPAT~~

February 11, 1938
FROM

FROM

REC'd 7:22 p. m.

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COPIES SENT TO
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

795.94/12397

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FEB 15 1938

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061

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336

MEo

FROM

This message was received
in navy code and must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to any-
one.

ALUSNA PEIPING

February 11, 1938

Rec'd 3:35 p.m.

TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT
INFO: CINCAF (FLAG AND ADMIN)
2ND BRIG USMC
ASST ALUSNA SHANGHAI
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
AMBASSADOR CHINA

✓
M/A
f/c
WAA

0011 Some information, consistent rumors describe
concentration Jap troops at Paou for offensive against
Outer Mongolians -or Ningshia latter believed objective
for base aerial operations on Lanchow line communi-
cations and possible military drive south if conditions
favor. Red guerrilla operations increasing Hopei area
with first hand reports that Raoyawg controlled by
them. Choshien thirty five miles from Peiping experi-
encing nightly raids. Most villages now piik organi-
zed armed 1800.

CSB:

793.94/12398

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FILED
FEB 12 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

¹⁻¹³³⁹
This telegram must be closed
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone (a)

CANTON VIA N.R.

Dated February 11, 1938

Received 8:28 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

February 11, 5 p.m.

Your February 9, 8 p.m. to Embassy, Hankow.

Present situation Canton estimated as follows:

Military and civil authorities taking special precautions against suspected espionage and possible disaffection and making extensive preparations for possible invasion. Rumored disaffection almost complete exaggeration; none discovered in military forces.

Canton and West rivers completely closed to navigation. Japanese naval vessels active in entrances and at many points on coast of South China. Chinese forces being reinforced at coast points thought to be likely points of attempted landings. Japanese planes from cruisers and aircraft carriers making frequent attacks throughout south but chiefly on railways and highways.

Chinese authorities express confidence that they can repel any attempt to invade Kaungtung or Kuangsi.

Rainy

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F/FG

0619

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EDA - 2 - February 11, 5 p.m. from Canton

Rainy season now beginning will greatly increase
difficulty land invasion.

Copies telegrams on situation will ^{be} sent you
hereafter.

Telegram repeated to Amembassy Hankow, Amembassy
Peiping, Amembassy Tokyo.

LINNELL

EMB:RGCC

0621

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

[CONFIDENTIAL]

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of February 11, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

There is given below an estimate of the present situation at Canton.

The West and Canton Rivers are almost entirely closed to navigation. In entrances and at many places on the coast of South China Japanese naval vessels are active. Japanese airplanes from aircraft carriers and cruisers make frequent attacks throughout the south but principally on highways and railways. At coastal points thought to be likely places for attempted landings the Chinese forces are being reinforced.

The rainy season, which is beginning at this time, will increase the difficulty of land invasion very much. Confidence is expressed by the Chinese authorities that they can repel any attempt which may be made to invade Kwangsi or Kwangtung.

Rumors of disaffection are almost complete exaggeration. No disaffection has been found in the military forces. The civil and military authorities are making extensive preparations for possible invasion and are taking especial precautions against possible disaffection and suspected espionage.

793.94/12399

FE:EGC:HES
2-12

APR
FE

0621

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94 / 12-400

See 793.94 / 12-403

162

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMYANGPAT

1-1338

FROM February 12, 1938

COPIES SENT

Rec'd 5:40 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: CINCAF (FLAG & ADMN)
SECOND BRIGADE USMC
YANGPAT
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMSOPAT
AMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING

Division of
Foreign Affairs
FEB 13 1938
FEB 13 1938

793.94

0011. Air raid occurred Wuhan area 1315 today with
approximately twenty-five heavy bombers vicinity
commercial air field. Changsha also raided. 2205.

JS

793.94/12400

F/FG
FILED
FEB 13 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECORDS
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
FEB 11 1938
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RELATIONS
February 10, 1938.
S:
Mr. Secretary.

It seems to me that this letter from Chiang Kai-shek to the President does not require a reply. I suggest that the Department so inform the President and that the Department suggest to the President that the Department be authorized to write to the Chinese Ambassador here, making acknowledgment on behalf of the President of the receipt by the President of the letter, and asking the Ambassador to inform Chiang Kai-shek.

SKH
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
FEB 15 1938
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

FE - & Hornbeck
The Secretary desires
your advice on
the President's group.
all

0624

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

My dear Mr. President:

In reply to the question raised in your memorandum of February 8, it seems to me that the letter which General Chiang Kai-shek addressed to you under date January 30 and which was delivered to you by the Chinese Ambassador on February 7 does not require a reply. I would suggest that you authorize the Department to write to the Chinese Ambassador here, making acknowledgment on your behalf of the receipt by you of the letter, and asking the Ambassador to inform General Chiang Kai-shek.

I return herewith your memorandum of February 8 and General Chiang Kai-shek's letter of January 30.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:
Memorandum of
February 8;
Letter from
General Chiang Kai-shek.

Cordell Hull

The President,
The White House.

FE:MMH:REK
2/10/38

FE
7/7/41


PAH
5-21

793.94/ 12400A

F/A

0624

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



February 1, 1938.

✓ Mr. Secretary:


I think that you would find
it interesting to note, largely
by way of review, the few items
which I have marked in this
G-2 digest of last week's
developments in the Far Eastern
situation.

SKH
SKH

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

0626

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



SUMMARY

The military situation during the period under review is marked by a virtual stalemate on the Lunghai fronts where the Japanese are definitely checked in the positions they reached more than three weeks ago. They are now engaged in building up their forces, particularly in the north, while the Chinese are shifting units to strengthen their lines. Japanese aircraft continue to bomb Chinese installations throughout Central and South China, reaching as far inland as Ichang on the Yangtze for the first time. A Chinese air force of apparently increasing strength and boldness, provenly manned at least in part by Russians, attacked several points in the Japanese lines.

United States-Japanese relations are again strained by continuing examples of violations of United States rights, culminating in the unprovoked attack on Mr. Allison at Nanking. The unscrupulous Japanese method of publicizing the news of the Allison incident is adding to the tension. Attacks on Great Britain, in the Diet and elsewhere in Japan, continue to exacerbate British-Japanese relations. Soviet Far Eastern experts are reported to be pleased with the present Japanese preoccupation in China which relieves pressure from the Soviet borders. Aid for China is being discussed by representatives of England, France, and Russia, now at Geneva.

THE ALLISON INCIDENT

John M. Allison, 3d Secretary to the American Embassy at Nanking, was assaulted by a Japanese soldier on January 26. Mr. Allison was investigating the case of a Chinese woman who had been forcibly removed from American property and raped. The only reports of the incident available for the first two days were from Japanese sources. These alleged first, that Mr. Allison had tried to force his way past a sentry, and second, that he had insulted the Japanese Army. Both these statements are apparently outrageous lies. Ambassador Grew at Tokyo has been ordered to make "appropriate representations" to the Japanese Government.

GENERAL

Moscow dispatches state that Russia's Far Eastern experts are elated by the present turn of events in the Sino-Japanese situation. They believe that after years of indecision the Japanese have at last turned definitely to the south and away from Siberia. With Japan militarily thoroughly occupied in North and Central China,

E. H. Gustafson May 19 1973

793.94/12401

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Russia will have a much needed breathing spell to consolidate her position, both within her own borders and in the great central Asian areas marked out as her special "spheres of influence." Russia now feels that Japanese pressure has been removed from her Far Eastern borders for a considerable period and the process of colonization and industrialization in that area can proceed without interruption. Russia will continue to support the Chinese Government judiciously; not for the sake of world revolution but in order to prolong Japanese preoccupation in China and so relieve pressure against Soviet borders.

Reliable reports from Hankow state that about 1,500 Russian 4-ton trucks are busily engaged in hauling munitions on the Turkestan route. One hundred to two hundred trucks arrive at Lanchow daily. Most of Lanchow trucks are handled by Russian personnel. East of Lanchow, by Chinese chauffeurs and mechanics. Fifty Russian airplanes and four Russian tanks were observed at Lanchow on January 1. The highway is being surfaced along its entire length by large gangs of coolies. A missionary near Urumchi reported that 250 airplanes, mostly fighters but some bombers, and 1,500 Soviet armored cars have passed eastward toward Lanchow.

During the Chinese air raid on Nanking on January 26 one airplane was shot down and one made a forced landing. Both were piloted by Russians, thus giving the Japanese proof of Russian participation. A Japanese airplane shot down at Nanchang recently, was piloted by an Italian.

A Domei report from Berlin states that the Sino-Soviet agreement now being negotiated by Sun Fo in Moscow calls for: (1) recognition by Soviet of Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia; (2) the granting of two million ruble credit to China; (3) an increase in the number of Russian military instructors in China; and (4) the granting by China of certain trade rights to Soviet Russia. All the above was denied by the Chinese Government at Hankow.

A report originating in Hsinking states that General Terauchi, now in command of the Japanese North China District with headquarters at Peiping, will soon take command of the Kwantung Army and that General Matsui, now in command in Central China, will take over the North China command. No mention is made of the disposition of General Uyeda, the present Kwantung Army commander.

General Matsui in an interview with Kaizo (Japanese magazine) December 31 stated "It will not be necessary to advance on Hankow since Chinese have lost fighting spirit and emissaries now discussing peace have received no instructions from my Government. All that happens in the Shanghai area is decided solely on my responsibility. In principle, I do not recognize neutrality of foreign settlements, therefore I intend to exercise China's sovereign rights over concessions. If

0628

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

we act with determination foreigners will respect our authority. It is necessary from time to time to demonstrate our strength and I will take advantage of a favorable opportunity in the future to do something on this line." The Japanese Government issued an official statement January 24 to the effect that General Matsui was misquoted and his remarks exaggerated.

Considerable discussion of the British part in furnishing munitions to China is taking place in the Japanese Diet. Foreign Minister Hirota has tried to tone down the general and sometimes sharp criticism of England for permitting munitions to pass through Hongkong.

Reuters Tokyo reports that at a meeting on January 22 of six Japanese Admirals and two Generals, all retired or on reserve, for a discussion as to British-Japanese war, the following opinions were published: "Japan has little to fear from England since troops who learn marching in dance halls are not even a match for the Chinese. The British people have no patriotism and use colonial troops for fighting. Britain will not fight because she lacks both desire and courage. Japan must peel off the thick skin of the British for all Orientals to see. Japan must give Britain a painful little blow in order to show them that Japan means business." Published remarks of this nature will not tend to ease the Japanese-British strained relations.

General Sugiyama, Japanese War Minister, in answering questions in the Japanese House of Peers, on January 28 said that "military authorities are convinced that military reorganization on an extensive scale is necessary and that the employment of a large force of troops is imperative for the long-term warfare which the China incident entered."

At Tokyo the National Mobilization Bill which gives the Government extensive powers over production and distribution of commodities, labor, finance, commerce, press, and public meetings is now receiving finishing touches in the legislative bureau.

Shozo Murata, Chairman of O. S. K., has submitted to the Japanese cabinet a plan to have all Japanese cargoes carried on Japanese ships. He states the plan would increase Japanese shipping earnings 160 million yen yearly and would tend to support Japanese foreign exchange.

Reports from Geneva state that on January 28 the British, French, and Russian Foreign Ministers, who are also delegates to the meeting of the League Council, had agreed on a tentative plan to aid China against Japan. A part of the plan is to seek United States cooperation in the project.

0629

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

A new customs schedule made effective in North China by the "Provisional Republic" on January 22 reduces by one-third the tariff on 16 items of export including bristles, linseed, raw cotton and wool. Tariffs on 60 items of import are also reduced, the most important reductions being about 15 per cent on kerosene and 24 per cent on gasoline. While the new tariff rates are applicable to all nations, the items selected are those in which Japan is most interested. The Chinese Central Government at Hankow on January 24 instructed the Customs Inspectorate not to recognize the "illegal change" in the North China customs duties announced by the "Provisional Republic." Smuggled sugar is being offered for sale at Shanghai at less than half normal price. Over five million pounds of sugar are reported to have been smuggled into the Shanghai area.

NORTH CHINA

According to a foreign report, 30,000 Japanese troops stationed in the Paotingfu area on the Ping-Han railway have been moved to the Tsin-Pu for action in southern Shantung. The Paoting garrison has been replaced with Manchoukuoan troops. Same report states that the Japanese dare not venture outside of Paoting walls in detachments of less than 200 on account of Chinese raids.

Japanese troops have been landed at Lunkau, Shantung, between Chefoo and Tsingtao to assist in mopping up the Shantung peninsula.

British sailors were landed at Weihaiwei to protect British interests endangered when the local Chinese peace preservation units deserted upon the approach of Japanese troops.

British military patrols have been posted throughout their Tientsin Concession in order to restore confidence after the raid by gunmen on Li Tu's house last week.

Reports from Peiping indicate that the new railway from Tungchow (just east of Peiping) to Jehol via Kupeikou will be completed in February. Japanese report that despite extensive damage in the vicinity of Weihai, the Tsinan-Tsingtao railway would resume operation after February 15. Japanese locomotives and rolling stock are now being unloaded at Tsingtao.

Chinese report that the Ping-Han railway between Changts (Anyang) and Weihai, about 60 miles south, has been completely destroyed. Large railway embankments have been leveled and deep ditches dug across the right of way. Japanese authorities at Peiping have commandeered 500 camels for transport use to Tsehsien on the

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Ping-Han north of Anyang. This may indicate a rail breakdown or a possible renewed Ping-Han offensive.

Approximately 12,000 Japanese recruits have arrived in the Peiping area according to reliable reports. The Japanese military authorities have served notice that they intend to use the buildings of Chinghua (a university supported by the United States Boxer Indemnity and situated just north of Peiping) as barracks for their troops.

LUNGHAI SECTOR

The situation both north and south of the Lung hai railway appears to have reached a stalemate. The Japanese are reinforcing their Shantung forces but except for mopping up the Shantung peninsula have made no progress south for the past three weeks. A similar situation exists south of the Lung hai; there the Japanese drive is stalled south of Pengpu. Five Chinese divisions are reported to have been transferred from Haichow to Pengpu.

Japanese aircraft continue operations in the Lung hai sector. By arrangement with the Japanese, United States-owned property in the Lung hai sector will be marked with white flags with blue crosses in the center, in order to safeguard the property from Japanese air attack.

CENTRAL CHINA

Heavy fighting continues in the vicinity of Wuhu with many casualties on both sides. The Chinese claim the recapture of Holsien and the Japanese state they have withdrawn from there after mopping up irregular units. Slight action is also reported southwest of Hangchow.

Japanese planes raided Ichang on the Yangtze at the entrance to the gorges on January 24 for the first time. Over 80 bombs were dropped. No foreign casualties were reported. The U.S.S. Tutuila is stationed at Ichang. Japanese bombers raided Hankow and Nanchang on January 27.

Chinese state their air force is growing in strength. They claim destruction of the Japanese airfield at Wuhu and that they inflicted heavy casualties on Japanese positions south of Wuhu. Thirteen Chinese planes are reported to have raided Nanking on January 26. The Chinese claim that they destroyed 20 Japanese planes on the ground. The Japanese claim three of the attackers were brought down.

0631

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

A press dispatch from Tokyo states that General Matsui's request for four additional divisions was refused at the Imperial Conference.

Japanese troops and some civilians continue their depredations in Nanking despite all protestations. It is feared that the taking over of the work of the International Relief Committee by the local autonomous government will lead to hardship and starvation as soon as present food stocks are exhausted. In a discussion among the foreign representatives at Nanking of the approaching slow starvation of thousands of Chinese refugees, it was significant that the German Consul wished to take a strong stand with the Japanese authorities while the British representative wished to temporize.

American and British forces at Shanghai are being reduced. One battalion of British troops will leave Shanghai on February 2. The 6th U. S. Marines and Brigade Headquarters will leave for the United States on February 18. There are unconfirmed rumors that the Italians intend to reinforce their present detachment of about 700.

SOUTH CHINA

Japanese medium and heavy bombers continue to operate over Kwangtung concentrating on the railways and roads with no important damage reported. Antiaircraft fire is reported to be greatly improved.

On January 25 Japanese cruisers shelled a village near Nantow, about 25 miles north of Hongkong and apparently made a landing feat with small boats. Chinese land batteries and troops repelled the landing.

Press reports from Hongkong state that emergency crews of military and naval engineers, technicians and laborers are working 24 hours a day, rushing to complete a 40 million dollar defense program. The full quota of defense planes for Hongkong is said to comprise over 200 airplanes of all types.

CONF

1632

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1330

EG

FROM

This message must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Canton via N. R.

Dated February 11, 1938

Rec'd 8:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

February 11, 11 a.m.

FOR WAR DEPARTMENT FROM ROBERTS

"American priest from Yuanliang, Hunan reports first
of January ten divisions Yunnan troops marched through
there for Changsha. They were in summer uniforms but had
new equipment French type including helmets, rifles,
bayonets and machine guns. They were well disciplined and
orderly. Last of January about fifteen divisions Kweichow
troops passed through same way with standard but not new
equipment and were very disorderly brawling with towns-
people and among themselves. Also reports south of
Changsha six train loads approximately two thousand troops
of Fifth Division moving north. American missionary
from Chengchow, Honan, reports one hundred forty two troop
trains moved through there from east about first February
on way to Tungkuan to cross Yellow River, proceed north to
west of Taiyuan, cross into northeast Shansi and with units
of Reds attack Peiping-Hankow railway in Paoting area.
From own observation he estimated not less than seventy
thousand

793.94/12402

F/FG

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- February 11, 11 a.m. from Canton via N. R.

thousand central Government troops well equipped, clothed
 and disciplined. Other details in airmail report following".

LINNELL

RGC:KLP

0634

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

[CONFIDENTIAL]

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of February 11, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton quotes a message from Roberts for the War Department which reads substantially as follows:

On January 1 ten divisions of Yunnan troops marched through Yuanliang, Hunan Province, bound for Changsha, according to a report received from an American priest from Yuanliang. These troops were orderly and well disciplined and, although they wore summer uniforms, they had new French type equipment, including machine guns, rifles, bayonets, and helmets. About fifteen divisions of troops from Kweichow Province passed through Yuanliang the same way the last of January with standard but not new equipment. These Kweichow troops brawled among themselves and with townspeople and were very disorderly. Reports also south of Changsha six train loads moving north carrying approximately two thousand troops of the Fiftieth Division. About February 1, according to reports from an American missionary from Chengchow, Honan Province, 142 troop trains from the east moved through Chengchow on their way to Tungkuan to cross the Yellow River, continue north to a point west of Taiyuan, cross into the northeastern part of Shansi Province, and in company with units of Reds attack the Peiping-Hankow Railway in the area around Paoing. This missionary estimated, from his own observation, that there were at least seventy thousand troops of the Central Government well disciplined, equipped and clothed. An air mail report which is following contains other details.

gac
 FE:EGC:HES
 2-14


793.94/12402

WCP
 FE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG



FROM COMYANGPAT

February 12, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: CINCAF (FLAG & ADMN)
SECMA BRIG
YANGPAT
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMSOPAT
AMBASSCHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSMA PEIPING

0011. Air raid occurred Wuhan area 1315 today
with approximately twenty five heavy bombers vicinity
commercial air field. Changsha also raided. 2205.

HPD

793.94/12403

FILED
FEB 13 1938

F/FG

063

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FROM SECOND BRIGADE USMC

February 12, 1938

Rec'd 10:10 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF
OPNAV

INFO: AMCON SHANGHAI
COMSUEBON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
ASST ALUSNA SHANGHAI
COMYANGPAT
CONSOPAT
AMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING

793.94

8612. Japanese have crossed Hwai River in considerable numbers near Linhwaikwan and advanced several miles to northward. On Pingham front heavy fighting in progress south of Tsingfeng. 1825.

HPD


793.94/12404

F/FG

FILED
FEB 13 1938

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

G-2/2657-H-439



February 5, 1938.

2CR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

743-941

1. Herewith are Summary and Situation Map covering events in China for the week ending February 5, 1938.

2. The outstanding developments for the past week have been:

a. Japanese advance to Pengpu on the South Lungai front - a gain of 35 miles.

b. An abortive attempt at an Anti-Chiang coup d'etat at Canton aided by Japanese air and naval diversions.

c. Increasing Japanese verbal attacks on Germany for continuing heavy munitions shipments to China.

d. Reports emanating from Tokyo indicating a slackening of Japanese morale due to apparent lack of progress since the January 11th Imperial Conference.

793.94/12405

FEB 15 1938

FILED

F/FG

12405

2 encls.

E. H. W. McCABE,
 Colonel, General Staff,
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

LE McPherson *Mar 19,*
1973

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

G-2 Digest of Information
Sino-Japanese Situation
January 30 - February 5, 1938

THE ALLISON INCIDENT

The Allison incident was settled satisfactorily on January 31 by the acceptance by the United States of the Japanese reply. In addition Allison was informed by the Japanese military authorities in Hanking that 20 members of the military detachment at the scene of the incident, including the commanding officer and the soldier who did the slapping, would be tried by court martial.

GENERAL

A reliable source from Tokyo reports that the continued lack of progress in China since the much heralded and publicized Imperial Conference in Tokyo on January 11, is having an adverse effect on Japanese morale. Tokyo is now also digesting the reports of Geneva discussions among British, French and Russian foreign ministers regarding aid for China. Taking these points into consideration it is probable that the Japanese Government will find it expedient to take some pronounced action. This action may take the form of a declaration of war against China. While the Government realizes that a declaration at this time would do little more than divert Hongkong munitions shipments to other points of entry, and might even bring on further embarrassments, such an action may be found necessary in order to bolster home morale.

A two-hour meeting between cabinet members and members of the Imperial G.H.Q. was held at Tokyo on February 4. It is reported that the political and military aspects of the Chinese situation, including the formation of a puppet regime in Central China, were discussed.

War Minister General Sugiyama in response to a questioner in the Diet February 3 stated that 20,000 Japanese soldiers had been killed in the war to date. (This is definitely an understatement and probably represents about one-fifth of the number killed.)

A Reuter dispatch from Tokyo dated January 30 reports that the Japanese Cabinet is concerned over public mistrust and criticism of the policies of the Finance and Commerce Ministers. Attacks are being made on the raw material control scheme and yen exchange maintenance policy as not being concrete enough to meet the present emergency.

0639

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Tokyo police on February 1 arrested 22 persons, mostly professors and lecturers, charged with subversive activities, and 30 other persons charged with having given ideological guidance and financial support to the popular front movement.

A reliable report from Italy dated January 29 states that 80 Italian aircraft and 80 Italian pilots, some of whom had recently returned from Spain, have been ordered to Japan. This is confirmatory of a Far East dispatch about January 15 reporting the purchase of 80 Fiat twin-engined bombers by Japan. Chinese have also reported that a Japanese plane shot down at Manchang was piloted by an Italian.

A confidential report from Tokyo states that the percentages by countries of origin, of munitions shipments passing through Hongkong, are approximately as follows: United States and Belgium together, 2 per cent; Great Britain, 3 per cent; France, 12 per cent; Italy, 21 per cent; Germany, 62 per cent. The report fails to give the period of time covered or whether the percentages are by value or tonnage. Tokyo news dispatches indicate a more critical attitude toward Germany. These dispatches report that during the period January 15 to 31, 10 German and 8 British vessels loaded with munitions docked at Hongkong. cargoes included niter, aircraft, trucks, barbed wire, and ammunition.

A mail report from a reliable correspondent who returned from Manchuria and Korea in December states that the Japanese have established base hospitals for their China casualties on the southern part of the Korean peninsula, and for that reason it is almost impossible for a foreigner to go south of Seoul. He reports that 60,000 Chinese irregulars are active north and east of Harbin. The Asanlung Army is now more independent of Tokyo than ever before. A definite schism between the Asanlung Army and the North China District Command is also reported.

The 15th U. S. Infantry will be ordered to sail from China on March 4 on the U.S.A.T. Grant for Fort Lewis, Washington. It is reported that two companies of Marines from the Legation Guard at Peking will be moved to Tientsin upon the departure of the 15th Infantry.

The plan for aiding China agreed upon by British, French and Russian representatives at Geneva has apparently petered out into innocuous action. American cooperation with the other powers in lending material aid to China was definitely blocked by the Neutrality Act. Since it appears to be an axiom that the powers at Geneva will take no action against Japan without the fullest American participation, the plan for concerted action dwindled into such individual action as the powers themselves may decide upon.

0640

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

NORTH CHINA

Continued activity by Chinese irregulars on both the Ping-Han and Tsin-Pu Railways in Hopei is reported. Small detachments tear up the tracks during the night and disappear by morning. Chinese claim their "mobile units" have retaken Kaoyang, 20 miles southeast of Paoxing, on the Ping-Han. Chinese forces are also reported to be consolidating south of Taiyuan, Shansi. A Japanese naval landing party completed the occupation of Chefoo on February 3 without opposition.

Japanese efforts to strengthen the "Provisional Republic" are bearing little fruit. Reports indicate that the Chinese in the occupied areas still fail to "cooperate" thus causing the Japanese much dismay and heavy economic losses. It is further reported that General Kita, the power behind the puppet regime, is to be recalled and that he will be replaced by Colonel Isogai, his present assistant.

The East Hopei regime which was established in 1935 under the aegis of the Kwangtung Army, was absorbed into the Peiping "Provisional Republic" on February 1. An agreement was signed by General Kita and Chih Tsung-wei, President of the East Hopei Government, on January 30, in which the "Provisional Republic" undertakes to carry out the East Hopei Government's commitments to Japan and Manchoukuo. This is significant as the first relinquishment by the Kwangtung Army of territory originally established under its control. The "Mongol Empire," the South Chahar Government, and the North Shansi Government still remain under the control of the Kwangtung Army.

An amusing report from Tokyo states that the Mongol Border Autonomous Committee, a Kwangtung Army-sponsored organization representing the "Mongol Empire," the South Chahar, and the North Shansi Governments, has offered Japan a large tract of land along the upper reaches of the Yellow River (Ningsha or Kansu?) for colonization.

Japanese engineers are still working on a temporary railway bridge across the Yellow River at Tainan. It is expected that this bridge will be completed by February 15 and that through traffic between Tsingtao and Tientsin will then be resumed. A military pontoon bridge has been in use at Tainan since early January. It is estimated that it will take over a year to build a permanent railway bridge.

Reports emanating from the Chinese 8th Route Army (ex-Communists) state that the three American missionaries who disappeared at Showyang, Shansi on the night of December 2, 1937, were killed by a Japanese sentry. Showyang was then and is now occupied by Japanese troops.

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LUNGSHAI FRONT

On the northern front the Japanese appear to be on the defensive. Chinese have recaptured Mengyin and are driving northwest toward Mintai, and west toward Gueshui, 34 miles west of Mengyin.

On the southern Lungshai front the Japanese after three weeks finally succeeded in driving about 35 miles northwest along the Tsin-tu Railway to Fengpu. The advance was preceded by a drive to the west to Tingyuan, about 30 miles southwest of Ningkwang, thence north to Fengpu. Chinese are holding the north bank of the Hwai River, a sizable stream just north of Fengpu and are organizing a strong defensive position at Kueben, 30 miles north. The Japanese are reported to be reorganizing to continue their advance. The Japanese claim their rapid advance has cut off one Chinese division at Fengpu south of the Hwai River. These may be the usual Chinese rear guard units. Chinese reinforcements are reported on their way south from Suchow. A strong Chinese force is also reported at Kuoehang, 20 miles southwest of Fengpu.

Seven additional Chinese divisions were reported to have arrived in the Suchow area.

The North China District headquarters through the Japanese Embassy at Peiping issued a notice on February 2 requesting that all foreign establishments in the area extending from lines connecting Tsingtao, Yenchow, Taining, Changte, and Taiyuan (roughly the southern limit of Japanese advance in North China), and southward to the Yangtze River, be marked with white flags with blue crosses, in order to protect them from Japanese bombers. It was further requested that the locations of these establishments be given, preferably by marking them on local maps and then forwarding the maps to the Japanese military authorities. "Unofficial" request was also made that all foreigners in this area be encouraged to evacuate.

In this connection the American Baptist Mission at Taining which was bombed during the Japanese attacks there, has been paid 6,500 yen for damages. Payment was made by Japanese military officers after an investigation and apology at the Mission on January 26.

CENTRAL CHINA

Chinese counterattacks in the Fuhu area continue with indecisive results. Fighting was reported at Tihanchen, 24 miles southwest of Fuhu. It is reported that 5,000 Japanese troops en route from Tientsin are destined for the left bank of the Yangtze opposite Fuhu. All Japanese attempts to cross the Chientang River in the vicinity of Hangchow have been repulsed.

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The British Ambassador at Tokyo called the attention of the Japanese Government to the fact that certain Japanese vessels landing at Shanghai are excused from paying tonnage fees and passengers and freight on those vessels enter without due customs procedure. Quantities of Japanese sugar, rayon, paper, hardware and foodstuffs are now being sold in Shanghai at prices which clearly indicate that no duties had been paid on these items.

Tokyo reports that a plan for the establishment of a new regime in Central China, centered at Shanghai, will be submitted to the cabinet. The new puppet government will control areas under Japanese occupation and will be independent of the Peiping "Provisional Republic."

Japanese soldiers continue to systematically destroy all Chinese industry in the Shanghai area. Machinery is destroyed or removed.

Reports of military lawlessness at Hanking continue. The situation is further aggravated by the appearance there of Japanese Ronin (civilian rowdies). There is danger that the forced dispersal of 250,000 civilian refugees, who have nowhere to go and no means of subsistence may lead to rioting and further atrocities. The Japanese continue to resent actively any attempt to observe their activities. According to a British report, Japanese feeling against the American and German embassies is mounting.

Major General Nomura who was sent as a representative of the Imperial G.H.Q. with instructions to Central China Japanese forces regarding the prevention of further violation of foreign rights, arrived at Hanking on February 2 by airplane and returned to Shanghai the same day. His subordinate, Lieut. Col. Hirota is due at Hanking in a few days and will be the permanent representative of the Imperial G.H.Q. there. It is hoped that the presence of these officers will tend to prevent further outrages.

Certain quarters in Shanghai are spreading reports that there is disaffection at Hankow. They state that the Kuomintang rightists are fearful of the communists' inroads into the government, and that the Kuomintang fears the common people more than it fears Japan. These recalcitrants would be glad to compromise with Japan if moderate peace terms were offered. While there are many malcontents in Hankow, it is not believed that they are as yet a serious menace to continued Chinese resistance.

SOUTH CHINA

An attempted Japan-sponsored coup d'etat by anti-Chiang K'ai-shek malcontents at Canton, coupled with intensive Japanese air

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and naval attacks in the Canton area began on February 4. It is apparent that Lu Teh-shen, the chairman of Kwantung, and the military authorities there had ample warning of this attempt, for martial law was declared in the area on February 3 and the Pearl River barrier closed. Seven hundred reportedly undercover Japanese agents were rounded up in Canton and will probably be executed. On February 4 intensive Japanese air and naval attacks were staged in the Canton area while a number of Japanese planes circled over the city, apparently watching for a signal showing the success of the coup d'etat. A group of Chinese pirate chieftains, backed by Japanese, are reported to have formed an autonomous administration on several of the small islands and pirate strongholds on the Kwantung Coast. Present signs indicate that the attempted coup has fizzled out.

Swatow also reports Japanese activity on February 4, four bombs were dropped at Chaochowfu and shell fire was heard from the direction of Haiman Bay, 12 miles south of Swatow. Local authorities are said to fear a landing in the vicinity.

Reliable reports from Tokyo state that a large Japanese force, estimated in some quarters as 100,000 strong, has been concentrated at Formosa. While this report lends color to rumors of impending Japanese landings in South China, it does not appear that the benefits that might accrue from a landing in force will compensate for the further dispersal of the Japanese military machine. Unless the Japanese are assured of an easy turnover in Canton to a government favorable to them and thus find little or no resistance, a landing is believed unlikely.

Canton papers report the mobilization of additional units in Kwangsi. A large number of trained reserves are reported en route north via Aweiin, Hengchow and Hankow. These units are believed to be destined for the Lunghai fronts.

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

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JAPAN TOURIST BUREAU

351 FIFTH AVENUE

NEW YORK, N.Y.

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"E ADDRESS
TOURIST"



December 1, 1937

Gentlemen:

We take pleasure in sending you the accompanying pamphlet entitled, "The Sino-Japanese Crisis, 1937", which has been carefully prepared by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in New York.

This pamphlet, we feel, is unbiased, factual and interesting account of Japan's activity in China. We feel that a reading of it is essential to the full understanding of the conflict and is in no sense mere propaganda intended to present Japan's side only.

As you will see, many of the authorities quoted are foreign and neutral.

May we ask that you give this pamphlet a fair consideration - not in the midst of business hours, but when you have the leisure. ~~X~~ You will find it interesting and informative.

Very truly yours,

JAPAN TOURIST BUREAU

I. Yokota,
Representative for North America

IY:hr

** It will not stand
leisurely consideration*

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United States State Department
Far Eastern Division
Washington, D C

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The Sino-Japanese Crisis 1937

First Comprehensive, Authentic, Factual Statement,
 with Official American and Japanese Documents

JAPANESE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF NEW YORK
 500 FIFTH AVENUE
 NEW YORK CITY

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Chinese censors struck [certain] facts and opinions from cables and radio messages filed and even changed news cables to make it appear that doubt existed in the minds of foreign officials here that possibly the bombs came from Japanese planes, but this is distinctly not true.

New York Times Shanghai dispatch filed at Hong Kong, September 2, 1937.

During the world war the French Press Bureau had photo-chemigraphic department whose "principal work consisted in making photographs and cuts of wooden figures with cut-off heads, torn-out tongues, gouged-out eyes, crushed skulls, and brains laid bare. The pictures thus made were sent out as unsailable evidence of enemy atrocities to all parts of the world where they did not fail to produce the desired effect."

From Behind the Scenes of French Journalism by a French Chief Editor.

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PREFACE

If the facts herein presented are weighed without bias, these conclusions are inevitable:

1. For 16 years Japan strove to befriend China. China replied with anti-Japanese agitation. This agitation was not an outgrowth of Manchukuo's session under Japanese guardianship—it had been going on for almost ten years while Japan was following a decidedly conciliatory policy in China's interest.
2. The present clashes in the Peiping-Tientsin area and at Shanghai were caused by the aggressive acts of Chinese Armies. For three weeks Japan did all in her power to avoid hostilities and to settle the "incident" in the Peiping-Tientsin region through peaceable negotiations. All such Japanese endeavors were frustrated by the repeated, wilful aggressions of the Chinese forces who wanted to crush the Japanese by superior numbers. For three weeks Japan did not mobilize home troops. China mobilized immediately after the Marco Polo Bridge clash.
 At Shanghai, the official foreign representatives, who participated in the Sino-Japanese negotiations for forestalling hostilities in that area, are agreed that Japan was goaded into taking military action by provocations by the Chinese who evidently wanted to fight.
3. In the above light, Japan can by no stretch of the imagination be called the aggressor. She acted in self-defense. This being so, Japan has violated neither the Nine Power Treaty nor the Kellogg Pact, neither of which bars defensive military action. Can any nation be expected to write notes and consult the numerous signatories of the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty while its troops, rightfully stationed in a foreign country, are being repeatedly assaulted, while 200 of its civilian nationals are being massacred (Tungchow), while another 10,000 (Tientsin) and still another 30,000 (Shanghai) of its nationals are in imminent danger of being attacked, all by the regular soldiers of that foreign country?
4. What Japan wants in North China is the establishment of a condition which will not menace Manchukuo, and which will permit her to engage in peaceful pursuits of commerce and industry in cooperation with the Chinese. Japan is convinced that such a condition cannot be established while the Blue Shirts (similar to Soviet Russia's Secret Political Police or G.P.U.), Communists, and other anti-Japanese organizations are permitted to operate with the Central Chinese Government's connivance and encouragement.
5. North China will not become a second Manchukuo. The Emperor of Manchukuo will not move to Peiping to occupy the palace which belonged and still belongs to him. The establishment of the above-mentioned peaceful condition is all Japan wants.

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Japan, in short, is the aggrieved party in this unfortunate conflict which she did everything to avoid. She is grieved because her endeavors of 16 years for peace and friendship with China have been greeted with taunting rebuff by the other side. She is grieved because her acts and motives have been grossly misconstrued and misjudged abroad, particularly in America for which she has nothing but respect and friendliness.

Just now, the outside world is governed by emotions rather than by reason on this question. Yet this is the time of all times when reason should control passion. America wants peace. Japan wants peace. Japan is grateful to America for all that America has done for her since the historic days of Commodore Perry. No untoward developments should be permitted as between the two nations.

Americans may not unreservedly accept the above five conclusions. But they will at least concede that the case is a complicated one—that it requires a careful study before they commit themselves to any rash conclusion. They will recognize that China's claims are open to debate and call for scrutiny.

If in the face of the clear evidence presented herein America insists upon calling Japan the aggressor, Japan will never reconcile herself to the pained and painful thought that grave injustice has been inflicted upon her. She will be hurt to the quick that a nation whom she has for eighty long years regarded as her best friend has failed her.

Economically, Japan's relations with America have been most satisfactory. America is Japan's best customer. Japan is America's third best customer. Normally, Japan alone buys from America more than China and all the rest of Asia and Oceania combined. We hope this happy condition will not change. The war-emergency measure, restricting Japan's imports, affects only less than one per cent of her normal imports from America, and this only temporarily.

With these thoughts we present this pamphlet to the American public in the interest of Peace and Good Neighborhood, of Justice and Fair Play.

Japanese Chamber of Commerce of New York.

Part I The Crisis

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There can be no doubt that the Chinese forced the fighting in the Shanghai areas, while foreign powers took little cognizance of the fighting in North China. It was hoped that by making a last stand at Shanghai, possibly some form of intervention or at least greater notice of China's case would be taken. Furthermore, the terrain north of Shanghai was much more suitable for defensive action than that of North China. The best Chinese troops also were in this area.

New York Herald Tribune, Shanghai Dispatch, September 16, 1937.

Qualified foreign army and naval observers and precision instruments aboard American, British and French warships in the Whangpoo River disclose that the Japanese have kept their pledge that their bombers will not fly over the Shanghai refugee area. The Chinese have refused to give a similar pledge.

New York Times, Hong Kong Dispatch, August 27, 1937.

CHAPTER I

FOREIGN TROOPS IN NORTH CHINA

Any conditions which make comparisons damaging to China's "face" possible are outrageous in the sight of all patriotic Chinese; so the continued existence of foreign communities, persisting in some dignity and prosperity, while China goes to pot under native mismanagement, is in itself intolerable.

RODNEY GILBERT in *"The Unequal Treaties: China and the Foreigners"*

In 1900 North China was shaken with a great anti-foreign uprising known as the Boxer Rebellion, encouraged and fostered by the Chinese Government itself. The extermination of all foreigners was the objective of the Boxers. To attain this objective the Boxers directed their first assault against the Legation quarters in Peking (now Peiping).

For eight weeks from June 19, 1900, hordes of Boxers besieged the British Legation in Peking, in whose compounds all other Legations and foreigners had taken refuge. For eight weeks they were bombarded and subjected to murderous assaults day and night.

Never before in all the history of the whole world had any government attempted, through instigated mob uprising, to massacre an entire diplomatic corps accredited to that government. On July 16, one of the beleaguered Americans, the late Dr. W. A. P. Martin, a sincere friend of the Chinese, penned the following appeal "to the Christian world":

Since July 19, we have been shut up in the British Legation and others adjacent, and bombarded day and night with shot and shell. The defence has been magnificent. About 1,000 foreigners (of both sexes) have held their ground against the forces of the Empire. Some thousands of Chinese converts are dependent on us for protection. The City Wall near the legation is held by our men, but the Chinese are forcing them back and driving in our outposts. The mortality in our ranks is very great; and unless relief comes soon we must all perish. Our men have fought bravely, and our women have shown sublime courage. May this terrible sacrifice prove not to be in vain! We are the victims of pagan fanaticism. Let this pagan empire be partitioned among Christian powers, and may a new order of things open on China with a new century.

At the beginning of the ninth week of the murderous siege a combined British, French, American, Japanese, Italian, German, Russian, and Belgian force carried the walls by storm, and entered the Legation quarters just in time to save the 1000 foreigners from a wholesale destruction.

In the wake of this tragedy, the Boxer Protocol was signed between the foreign powers and the Chinese Government. By virtue of the Protocol foreign troops were stationed along the railway between Peking and Tientsin so that the foreigners in the Capital could at least keep a line of escape open to the seacoast in case of emergency.

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Today, 37 years after the Boxer uprising, the foreign powers do not as yet feel safe in relinquishing the right of stationing garrisons. The anti-British uprising of 1926-7, the Nanking and Shanghai outrages of 1927, and the Tsinan outrages of 1928 are still fresh in their minds.

The Nanking outrages included the looting of the British, American, Japanese and other consulates; assaults upon foreign women; murder of the American vice-president of Nanking University, two Englishmen, a French and an Italian priest; the wounding of the British Consul General and a number of others, all by Nationalist troops. Soon thereafter, these troops attempted to seize the International Settlement in Shanghai.

The Tsinan outrages of 1928 were directed mostly against the Japanese residents in that city in Shantung Province, resulting in the looting of hundreds of Japanese establishments, and in the killing of tens of Japanese.

The foreign troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area are accustomed to hold periodic maneuvers. At Peiping, the American soldiers usually hold maneuvers in a place known as Happy Valley, while the British and other European soldiers use an area north of the American grounds. The Japanese use a flat area near the Marco Polo Bridge some two miles from Peiping.

The notes exchanged in 1902 between Japan and China provide that, except in the case of gun practice with live ammunition, no advance notice need be given the Chinese authorities.

But the Japanese military authorities in North China, out of courtesy and a desire to forestall any untoward incident, always informed the local authorities in advance whenever maneuvers were to be held.

In July, 1937 the foreign garrisons in North China consisted of the following:

	<i>Soldiers</i>	<i>Machine Guns</i>	<i>Cannon</i>	<i>Tanks and Armored Cars</i>
Japanese	4,080	173	38	9
American	1,227	121	13	2
British	999	64	10	0
French	1,839	135	26	10
Italian	384	62	4	4

The Japanese residents engaged in business in this area total 17,000, whom 4,080 Japanese soldiers are expected to protect. All Americans and Europeans combined total 10,338 for whose protection 4,449 soldiers are stationed.

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CHAPTER II

CLASHES AT PEIPING

What needs most to be said about China now is that the Chinese are very close to losing their balance. If they do not pull themselves up, they will repeat the mistake they made almost ten years ago, with the same disastrous consequences.

NATHANIEL PEFFER in *Asia*, New York.
(Written in Shanghai, April, 1937)

On the evening of July 7, 1937, some 150 Japanese soldiers were engaged in the usual maneuvers on their usual grounds near the Marco Polo Bridge. As always, the Chinese authorities had been advised in advance. The Japanese soldiers carried no live ammunition. They used blanks.

Unexpectedly, at 11:40 of the same evening, these Japanese soldiers were fired upon by Chinese troops of the 37th division of the 29th Army from the direction of the Marco Polo Bridge and the village of Lung-wang-miao.

The Japanese did not and could not return the fire because they had no real shots. They halted their maneuvers, retreated some distance, and notified their headquarters in the former British barracks at Fengtai some two miles away. Reinforcements arrived a little after midnight. Then the Japanese replied to the Chinese fire.

Meanwhile, the local Chinese and Japanese military authorities in Peiping were advised of the incident. Immediately they formed a joint Sino-Japanese mediation party and dispatched it to the scene. As a result, at 6 A. M., July 8, the fighting stopped.

But at 3 P.M. and again at 6 P.M. of the same day, the Chinese soldiers resumed firing upon the Japanese.

Next morning, July 9, a truce was arranged between a responsible representative of the 29th Army and Colonel Matsui of the Japanese force.

On July 10, between 5 P.M. and 8 P.M. more than 200 Chinese soldiers brought forth trench mortars and launched a new attack, thus utterly disregarding the truce agreement. The Japanese, naturally, opened fire. However, a truce was again arranged, as the Japanese were anxious to localize the incident and to liquidate it at once.

On July 11, the Japanese Government sent instructions to the Japanese military authorities on the spot and urged them to bend their endeavors for an early settlement.

At 4 P.M. on the same day an agreement was reached between Colonel Matsui on the Japanese side and General Chang Tsujung (Mayor of Tientsin) and Ying Yung (Chief of the Public Peace Bureau of Hopei Province, in which Peiping is located) on the Chinese side.

The terms of this agreement were:

(1) Apology by the representatives of the 29th Army, and the punishment of those directly responsible.

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(2) The Chinese troops to evacuate Lukouchiao village (at Marco Polo Bridge) from which they fired upon the Japanese, and to be replaced by the Peace Preservation Corps for the purpose of keeping the Chinese troops sufficiently separated from the Japanese.

(3) Adequate measures to be taken for curbing the activities of the anti-Japanese Blue Shirts and Communists.

There was nothing extraordinary in these terms. They were of a nature to be easily complied with. Item 3 for the curbing of the Blue Shirts and Communists had already been agreed upon long before this incident. Both the Blue Shirts and the Communists were the most dangerous and disturbing elements conducting nefarious yet violent anti-Japanese campaigns both among the civilian Chinese and the Chinese soldiers. To restore normal intercourse between Japan and China, the curbing of their activities was imperative.

On July 13, General Sung Cheh-yuan, Commander of the 29th Army and Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council (which had ample power to deal with such matters as the above) went to Tientsin and took up the negotiations with Lieutenant-General Katsuki, Commander of the Japanese garrison.

General Sung virtually accepted the above terms and on July 18, expressed to General Katsuki his regrets over the Marco Polo Bridge incident. Thus the first step was taken toward a speedy settlement.

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CHAPTER III

CHINA'S WILL TO WAR

At a time when Japanese statesmen have clearly shown their desire to view Chinese affairs by a "new concept," it is unfortunate that certain asperities in argument have lately manifested themselves in Chinese comment on Sino-Japanese relationships. . . . The man who cries before he is out of the wood is apt to receive a nasty shock. So also is he who banks too much on a forbearance which emanates from a sense of strength mistaken by him for weakness.

North China Daily News (British)
Shanghai, May 22, 1937

We have seen that by July 18 the competent Chinese authorities in North China had practically agreed to settle the incident locally and peaceably.

But Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek's Government at Nanking had been bent upon provoking war. It had decided to strike at Japan while Japan's military preparations were not completed. It had exaggerated the significance of such events as the short-lived revolt of a small body of Japanese soldiers in Tokyo in February, 1936, and it hastened to the conclusion that the Japanese Army had but feet of clay. It believed that China had at least an even chance of winning a war with Japan and of regaining the lost territory of Manchukuo.

Nor was this Chinese belief unnatural. China had 198 divisions comprising 2,250,000 officers and men. This gigantic army has further been reinforced by 200,000 Communist soldiers whom Nanking worked hard to set against Japan.

In comparison the Japanese Army is a puny affair, consisting of 17 divisions of 250,000 officers and men, peace footing.

China, moreover, had acquired in large numbers modern implements of war such as airplanes, machine guns, tanks, etc., with foreign instructors to teach Chinese in their use. Many of her numerous divisions have been trained by foreign officers.

Small wonder that Chinese military leaders had decided to strike.

Following the Marco Polo Bridge incident of July 7, the Nanking Government lost no time in sending troops to the North. On July 9 it mobilized 4 divisions. It also mobilized air forces. These, of course, were in addition to the large forces already in North China.

By July 19, no less than 30 divisions (about 200,000 men) of the Chinese Army had been concentrated in North China. Of these about 80,000 were in the neighborhood of Peiping.

By July 22 Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek's own divisions had entered Hopei province. This was in violation of an agreement of 1935 under which Nanking pledged itself not to advance any of its troops into this province. The agreement was signed by General Ho Ying-chin, Nanking's War Min-

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ister and Chairman of the Peiping branch of Nanking's Military Council, and by General Umedzu, Commander of the Japanese Garrison at Tientsin.

By July 23 there were at least 250,000 Chinese soldiers in North China. Such a great military concentration, such a feverish mobilization can be understood only in the light of Nanking's thirst for war.

That China was bent upon war was fully recognized by competent American and European observers. On May 22 the *North China Daily News*, authoritative British newspaper in Shanghai, sounded this warning to Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek:

"At a time when Japanese statesmen have clearly shown their desire to view Chinese affairs by a 'New Concept,' it is unfortunate that certain asperities in argument have lately manifested themselves in Chinese comment on Sino-Japanese relationships. . . . The danger of overcalling a hand is well-known to diplomatists as well as to bridge players. The success of General Chiang Kai-shek in obtaining the recognition of China's equality of status as the result of his unification of the country, will only be prejudiced if the occasion is taken to claim for China a measure of military or political strength unwarranted by the facts. The man who cries before he is out of the woods is apt to receive a nasty shock. So also is he who banks too much on a forbearance which emanates from a sense of strength mistaken by him for weakness."

Mr. Nathaniel Pepper, a keen critic of Far Eastern affairs and a sincere friend of China, writing from Shanghai last April in *Asia* (New York) for June, struck much the same note of warning against China's "will to war." Said he:

"What needs most to be said about China now is that the Chinese are very close to losing their balance. If they do not pull themselves up, they will repeat the mistake they made almost ten years ago, with the same disastrous consequences. In fact, it is difficult just now to say which China has more to fear: Japan or China, the ambitions of the Japanese Army or the state of mind of the Chinese people. The latter, I am inclined to think. For it may succeed in bringing on a war that is not easy to prevent in any case but that could still be prevented. . . .

"China won a great moral victory last autumn. It stood off Japan by sheer force of will. But the victory has borne an over-confidence, a recklessness and an impatience to exploit the victory that may very well bring on that which the Chinese have had most reason to dread till now—a formal attempt by Japan to conquer the country by force. What began as a resignation to war if necessary, as a last resort, in self-preservation, is now in a fair way to becoming a will to war. One has only to be here in China for forty-eight hours to be shocked by the recklessness with which not only students but mature and influential Chinese talk and think of war."

It was this *Will to War* on the part of China which defeated Japan's *Will to Peace* this year.

By July 11 the Japanese Government, while ordering the Japanese mili-

tary authorities on the spot to endeavor for peaceful settlement, had been forced to take cognizance of China's feverish war activities which had immediately followed the Marco Polo Bridge incident.

On July 19, the Nanking Government flatly notified Japan that it would recognize no local settlement of the incident, and that Tokyo must negotiate directly with Nanking. This, of course, meant that Nanking would reject the terms which had been agreed upon between the Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council and the Commander of the Japanese Garrison.

The Hopei-Chahar Political Council was organized in 1935 with the explicit agreement of the Nanking Government. It had settled many important local questions such as restoration of mail and railway communications between Manchukuo and North China, and the establishment of customs offices along the Manchukuo-Chinese border. It had also amicably settled delicate questions arising from the murder by anti-Japanese Blue Shirts of three Chinese newspaper publishers friendly to Japan, and the assassination of a pro-Japanese Commander of the Peace Preservation Corps at Luan-chow.

All this while, the Nanking Government never raised any objection to such local settlements of such local matters.

Now, however, China's military leaders are evidently convinced that they are prepared to confront Japan in the arena.

Hence their flat rejection of the Japanese proposal for a peaceable local settlement.

Japan insists upon peaceable local settlement of this matter (1) because preservation of the local autonomy enunciated by the Hopei-Chahar Political Council was deemed essential to peaceful, normal relations between North China, Manchukuo and Japan, (2) because the increasing extension of Nationalist influence in North China also meant Communist and Blue Shirt inroads, (3) because such a condition will lead to the joining of forces between these disturbing elements and the red regime of Outer Mongolia.

CHAPTER IV

JAPAN STRIVES FOR PEACE

- The central authority has grown weaker and weaker until at present its mandates are practically without effect. In the meantime the military leaders in the various provinces, realizing their power and subject to no restraining influence, have worked each for himself, rising and falling like the tide. Temporary combinations are effected for the purpose of eliminating anyone who appears to be gaining the ascendancy; but when this is accomplished, the allies split up to fight among themselves, until the time is ripe for another effort at military consolidation.

Walter H. Mallory in his *China: Land of Famine*.

We have noted that by July 19 the semi-autonomous North China authorities (the Hopei-Chahar Political Council) had taken a definite step toward the speedy liquidation of the incident started at the Marco Polo Bridge on July 7.

But with the Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek's Nanking Government bent upon war, mobilizing 250,000 soldiers in North China alone, urging the local war lords to fight the Japanese, using Blue Shirts and Communists to stir up anti-Japanese agitation among the soldiers and populace, and vetoing in advance any local settlement of the question, Japan's hope for a peaceable liquidation was doomed.

Small wonder the officers and men of the 37th division, which provoked the Marco Polo Bridge incident, continued defiant and recalcitrant—this in spite of the fact that this division belonged to the 29th Army whose Commander in Chief was General Sung Cheh-yuan himself who had agreed upon a peaceable local settlement. Other divisions were equally defiant.

On July 20, despite Sung Cheh-yuan's pledge, the troops of the 37th division renewed attack upon the Japanese, again in the neighborhood of the Marco Polo Bridge.

Again General Sung Cheh-yuan assured General Katsuki, the Japanese Commander, that he would cause the withdrawal of the 37th division by noon of July 21.

On the same day, July 21, at 11 A.M., at Nanking, Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek held a war Council, and formulated war-like measures against Japan.

On July 23 General Hsiung Pin, assistant chief of Nanking's General Staff, a right-hand man of Chiang Kaishek, flew to Peiping and Paotingfu (Capital of Hopei Province, 90 miles south of Peiping) and admonished the local armies to fight the Japanese, and promised a generous aid with money, men, and arms from Nanking.

No wonder that, notwithstanding General Sung Cheh-yuan's pledge for the withdrawal of the 37th division, this same army continued to remain practically in the same position facing the Japanese.

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Still, on July 25, the Japanese Commander expressed the opinion that the incident would be peaceably settled.

Even as he was speaking those optimistic words, the Chinese army cut the Japanese military telephone line between Peiping and Tientsin. It was found that the line was cut at Langfang, half way between those two cities.

On July 25, at 4:20 P.M., a corps of Japanese engineers accompanied by a company of soldiers, went to Langfang under an explicit understanding with General Chang Tsu-Chung, Commander of the 38th division which occupied that area.

By 11 P.M. on the same day the repair work had been done. The Japanese engineers and soldiers were eating supper at the railway station. Suddenly these Japanese, while still eating, were attacked by Chinese soldiers using rifles, hand grenades, machine guns, even trench mortars.

The Japanese, under cover of darkness, stood the ground in the face of the enormously superior numbers. Using the field telephone line they had just repaired, they notified their headquarters at Tientsin.

Langfang is some 40 miles from Tientsin—too far to send a rescue force by ordinary means when the besieged party was in an imminent danger of annihilation.

So at 7 A.M. the next day (July 26) several Japanese planes were sent to Langfang, bombed the Chinese position, and rescued the Japanese.

It was the old Chinese story—the Commander of this Chinese division had agreed to let the Japanese repair the wire, but his subordinates, whether with the connivance of their commander or not, attempted to massacre the Japanese.

By then General Katsuki, the Japanese Commander, had reluctantly come to the conclusion that the Chinese Commanders could not be trusted, either because their orders were disregarded by their subordinates, or because they were themselves treacherous, or because they were forced to eat their own words under Nanking's promptings.

Consequently, on July 25, the Japanese Commander sent to General Sung Cheh-yuan a note which proved to be the ultimatum. The note voiced regret at the occurrence of new clashes and blamed them entirely on the failure of the 29th Army to carry out the terms of the agreement concluded with the Japanese authorities, and also on that army's maintenance of a provocative attitude.

If the 29th Army authorities still intended to prevent aggravation of the situation, the note demanded that they demonstrate their sincerity by promptly effecting a complete evacuation of the entire Peiping area by the 37th Division.

The note specified that the troops of the 37th Division near Lukouchiao and Papaoshan be withdrawn "by noon tomorrow," July 26, to Chang-sintien, south of Lukouchiao; that all troops of the same division immediately leave Peiping; and that these troops, together with those of the

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37th division stationed at Hsiyuan, a short distance northwest of Peiping, be moved from the area north of the Peiping-Hankow Railway to the west bank of the Yungting River by Wednesday noon, July 28th.

Specifying further that all these troops must be withdrawn promptly to the Paoting area, 90 miles south of Peiping on the Peiping-Hankow Railway, Lieutenant-General Katsuki warned that, should the Chinese fail to carry out the demand, the Japanese Army would be "compelled to conclude that the 29th Army's authorities lack sincerity, and to take any action it may deem appropriate." In that event the 29th Army must take full responsibility for anything that might happen.

Needless to say these terms were not complied with. So, on July 28, at 5 A.M., the Japanese troops began to march toward the Chinese lines.

On July 27 the Japanese Cabinet abandoned the hope for peaceable settlement, and ordered the mobilization of reinforcements to China. Note the date. Three weeks had elapsed before Japan ordered home troops to the scene of trouble while Nanking had mobilized on July 9. For 21 days Japan strove to minimize and localize the clash and to arrive at an amicable solution. But China was bent upon war.

Strangely, on July 27, at 11 P.M., the Nanking Government came forth with a vaguely couched overture that it would negotiate on the basis of the terms which had been agreed upon between the North China authorities and the Japanese garrison commander. It was too late. Nanking itself had cast the die. It had virtually said to the Japanese, "Come on and fight if you dare." It was evident that this eleventh hour overture was made merely for foreign consumption—to clothe with plausibility the pretense that China wanted peace. It was made with full knowledge that it was all too late to be practicable.

Furthermore, events in North China during the preceding three weeks had conclusively proved, as we have noted, that China's words could not be trusted. Had Nanking really wanted to negotiate it should have cancelled its warlike preparation and withdrawn the troops from certain areas in North China. This Nanking dared not to do. It had overcalled its hand, fanning anti-Japanese feeling among the soldiers as well as among the masses. It had sowed the wind. It was destined to reap the whirlwind.

On July 29, 3,000 soldiers of the 29th Army massacred more than 200 Japanese civilians in Tungchow, north of Peiping.

Almost simultaneously, on the same day, soldiers of the 29th Army launched attack upon the Japanese concession at Tientsin with more than 10,000 Japanese civilians living in it.

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CHAPTER V

ENTER SHANGHAI

The Japanese did not want a repetition of the fighting here and exhibited forbearance and patience and did everything possible to avoid aggravating the situation. But they were literally pushed into the clash by the Chinese, who seemed intent on involving the foreign area and foreign interests in this clash.

New York Times Shanghai Dispatch, August 30, 1937

When China is involved in trouble with Japan in the North, there is always trouble in the South, particularly the Shanghai sector. It was so in 1932. So it is on the present occasion.

The reason is obvious. In order to divide and weaken the Japanese Army in North China, the Chinese strategists think it a good move to "start something" in the South.

In the Shanghai sector Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek's crack divisions are firmly entrenched. They are provided with all the paraphernalia of modern warfare. Their underground and surface fortifications are supposed to be impregnable. Here they fight in a terrain familiar to them but strange to the Japanese. Everything is to their own advantage. The temptation is too great for them not to draw the Japanese to this vantage ground.

As the *New York Herald Tribune*, on September 19, editorially observed, the Shanghai part of the present conflict

"was precipitated by hot-heads in Nanking who seem to have thought that it would be a great moral victory and would give China's cause much advertising abroad, if the Japanese Navy's six or eight thousand marines could be driven out of Shanghai before the army could come to their support."

At Shanghai, even more than at Peiping, the Japanese were eager for peace. Obviously, it was to their advantage not to divide their forces while the North China situation was so serious. But here, as in the North, China precipitated an "incident."

On August 9, at 6 P.M., a Japanese naval officer, Lieutenant Oyama and his seaman chauffeur, while driving along Monument Road, an extension of the International Settlement, were suddenly pounced upon by a large body of Chinese soldiers of the so-called Peace Preservation Corps.

Oyama was instantly killed, with more than thirty bullets riddling his body. His seaman aide was seriously wounded and died shortly afterward. Both Oyama and the sailor belonged to the Japanese naval headquarters in the International Settlement.

The Monument Road is under the jurisdiction of the International Settlement and is open to the passage and residence of all foreigners. There was absolutely no reason why the two Japanese should be attacked. Lieutenant Oyama was not armed, nor was his seaman aide. Yet they were murdered in cold blood.

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Furthermore, the above road is in the demilitarized zone established by the truce agreement of May, 1932, concluded between the Japanese and the Chinese military authorities after a brief fighting at Shanghai in that Spring. This zone extended for some 15 miles to the North, West, and South of the foreign area. The agreement was witnessed and thus virtually approved by British, American, French, and Italian representatives. In order to supervise the execution and operation of that agreement a permanent International Committee, consisting of Japanese, Chinese, British, American, French, and Italian representatives was organized.

Within the demilitarized zone no regular Chinese soldiers were to be stationed, but only a Chinese police force known as the Peace Preservation Corps, over whose organization, equipment, and distribution there was no foreign supervision. At the time the above murder took place, this police force was known to comprise some 20,000 men who were in reality soldiers.

The men on the staff of the Peace Preservation Corps were not to carry rifles, but only pistols. But an autopsy of the murdered Japanese Navy men showed that the bullets lodged in their bodies were from rifles.

For some time before the murder incident, the foreigners in Shanghai had reason for believing that the Chinese, in violation of the 1932 truce agreement, had smuggled rifles, machine guns, and even cannon into the demilitarized zone. This could be easily done, as the International Committee had no authority to supervise the military equipment of the Peace Preservation Corps in that zone.

On August 10, the morning following the murder, the Japanese Consul General in Shanghai requested a meeting of the aforesaid International Committee of which the foreign consuls concerned and the Chinese Mayor of Shanghai, Mr. O. K. Yui, were members.

At this meeting the Japanese made a full report on the murder incident, and proposed that the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps be temporarily withdrawn from the section adjacent to the International Settlement and the French Concession.

The foreign members of the Committee approved this plan, while Mayor Yui promised he would do all in his power to carry it out. Meanwhile Vice-Admiral Kiyoshi Hasegawa instructed the Japanese Naval headquarters in the International Settlement to keep cool and do nothing to complicate the situation. He landed no marines.

On August 11, Mayor Yui, evidently under pressure from Nanking's military authorities, abruptly notified the Japanese Consul that he was "powerless" and "could do nothing." Consequently, on that evening, a contingent of Japanese marines were landed for precaution.

By the morning of August 12, it had become clear that Chinese regulars, in addition to the Peace Preservation Corps, had poured into the demilitarized zone and even occupied Chapei, contiguous to the Japanese section of the International Settlement.

Alarmed by this, the International Committee held another meeting at

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4 P.M. on the same day, August 12. The Japanese again proposed the withdrawal of the Chinese troops from the demilitarized zone, but the proposal was futile as the Chinese militarist temper had become such as to defy any foreign mediation or good offices.

The next morning, August 13, skirmishes were fought between Chinese regulars and Japanese marines.

On August 14 the British Chargé d'Affaires at Tokyo suggested to the Japanese Government (1) that the Chinese troops be withdrawn from the area adjacent to the International Settlement and the French Concession, (2) that the Japanese marines, who had been newly landed, be withdrawn from the International Settlement, (3) that the area evacuated by the Chinese troops be policed by an international force.

Japan was favorably inclined toward this suggestion. Just then news reached Tokyo that Chinese planes had launched aerial bombing aimed at the Japanese flagship "Idzumo," the Japanese Consulate buildings, Japanese naval headquarters, and Japanese cotton mills in the International Settlement. This rendered the consideration of the British proposal impracticable. Japan had to conclude that China was bent upon war. Since then Japan declined to consider any foreign mediation similar to the above British proposal.

The authoritative New York Times correspondent at Shanghai, on August 30, reported:

"Official foreign observers and officials of various foreign governments who participated in various conferences here in seeking to avoid the outbreak of local hostilities, agree that the Japanese exhibited the utmost restraint under provocation, even for several days keeping all of the Japanese landing force off the streets and strictly within their own barracks, although the move somewhat endangered Japanese lives and properties.

"Opinions may differ regarding the responsibility for opening of hostilities in the vicinity of Peiping early in July," said one foreign official who was a participant in the conferences held here before August 13, "but concerning the Shanghai hostilities the records will justify only one decision. The Japanese did not want a repetition of the fighting here and exhibited forbearance and patience and did everything possible to avoid aggravating the situation. But they were literally pushed into the clash by the Chinese, who seemed intent on involving the foreign area and foreign interests in this clash."

Mr. Victor Keen, the New York Herald Tribune correspondent in Shanghai, under date of September 16, expresses the same view:

"There can be no doubt that the Chinese forced fighting in the Shanghai areas, while foreign powers took little cognizance of the fighting in north China. It was hoped that by making a last stand at Shanghai, possibly some form of intervention or at least greater notice of China's case would be taken. Furthermore, the terrain north of Shanghai was much more suitable for defensive action than that of North China. The best Chinese troops also were in this area."

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CHAPTER VI

A CAMPAIGN OF LIES

The paramount desire in the minds of a vast majority of American citizens at present is neutrality and peace at almost any price. How to cause that public sentiment in America to change, London and Paris diplomats ask. Build up a villain, is their answer, produce an undiluted criminal, replete with surrounding stories of brutalities and cruelties.

BOAKE CARTER, in the *New York Mirror* and other papers.

When a Chinese airplane bombed the Cathay and Palace Hotels, the best foreign hostelrys in the International Settlement, China's official propaganda bureau spread news that the bomber was Japanese.

"Within 24 hours," writes Mr. Mark J. Ginsbourg, Shanghai correspondent of the Washington, D. C. *Post*, the propaganda bureau "issued an essential correction informing one and all that as a result of a thorough investigation by our staff members, it was learned that the bomber in question was Chinese, not Japanese.

Again, on August 22, Chinese planes bombed the International Settlement, this time hitting the Sincere and Wing-on department stores. Again the Chinese propaganda bureau declared that the missiles were from Japanese planes.

The New York *Times* Shanghai correspondent, to avoid Chinese censorship, filed his dispatches on this bombing at Hongkong, instead of at Shanghai, so that he could tell the truth.

His dispatch dated Hongkong, August 27 (five days after the bombing), said in part:

"That some International action should be agreed upon providing for armed measures or other restraints to prevent irresponsible Chinese aerial bombing and the killing of helpless civilians in Shanghai's International Settlement and the French Concession is the consensus of foreign consular, naval and military officials in Shanghai."

That same dispatch complained of Chinese censorship, saying:

"Chinese censors struck the foregoing facts and opinions from cables and radio messages filed and even changed news cables to make it appear that doubt existed in the minds of foreign officials here that possibly the bombs came from Japanese planes, but this is distinctly not true."

Further, the New York *Times* dispatch, dated Hongkong, September 6, says about the same bombing:

"The Chinese disavowed responsibility, declaring that the missiles were from Japanese planes. Now, however, it has been definitely determined that these bombs were both of Italian manufacture bought by China from Italy. American and British naval investigators here concur in this finding

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and Italian officials admit the origin of the bombs. This seems conclusive proof, since the Italians say Japan never bought any such war supplies from Italy."

Remember that all these American correspondents at Shanghai are genuine friends of China. Their sympathies are for the Chinese. Yet they could not stand China's campaign of lies—such flagrant lies as have seldom been indulged in by any responsible agency of any responsible government.

If, as the New York *Times* Shanghai correspondent says, the Chinese censors are so bold as to strike out words written by foreign correspondents and write in entirely different words, the world must be wary of news emanating from Nanking, Shanghai, or Canton about allegedly indiscriminate bombings by Japanese planes over Chinese cities.

These dispatches always give prominence to civilian casualties from Japanese bombings, but omit damages suffered by Chinese military establishments or Government buildings, of which the Japanese authorities have records as accurate as such records could be.

The Nanking correspondent of an Occidental news agency with worldwide ramifications has been an American educated Chinese who is connected with the publicity bureau of the Nanking Foreign Office.

This campaign of lies extends to press wirephotos and newsreels from China. For the sake of convenience foreign news agencies in China employ Chinese photographers along with their own countrymen. That, perhaps, accounts for the pollution of Chinese wire photos and newsreels. What guarantee is there against such pollution, if even news dispatches are changed to suit the Chinese censors?

Certain American theatres have been displaying newsreels, showing two Chinese, blindfolded and kneeling, being shot. Investigation proved that the films were made in 1931, and that the victims were Chinese looters shot by Chinese. When this was proved, the films were withdrawn.

Recently, many American newspapers printed a photograph, showing a Chinese woman, blindfolded and tied, being used as target for bayonet practice by a Japanese soldier! The face of this soldier is not Japanese, but distinctly Chinese. The blindfolded figure appeared like a dummy rather than a human being. The picture showed the soldier sticking his bayonet into the body, but no blood flows out of it!

When Colonel T. Tokahashi, of the Japanese army, was confronted by New York reporters with this photograph, he said: "The technique of the Japanese soldier as we are trained is entirely different than that displayed in the photographs. We do bayonet charges from the hips up. The soldiers do not use their weapons in the manner shown in the photographs. If a Japanese soldier affect the poses shown by the persons practicing in the pictures he would be punished."

Finally, a few of the typical specimens of the way the American press misconstrued, unintentionally of course, Admiral Hasegawa's chivalrous

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forewarning (Official Document No. X) of his intention of bombing "the Chinese forces as well as all establishments pertaining to military operations in and around Nanking":

1. "To blow Nanking off the Map" (New York Daily News based upon a United Press dispatch, Sept. 20).
2. "Concentrated air attacks on all sections of Nanking" (New York Times, Sept. 20).
3. "Unrestricted aerial bombing of Nanking" (New York Journal of Commerce, Sept. 20).
4. "Japan massed a gigantic warplane fleet today to destroy Nanking, capital of China and home of more than 1,000,000 people" (New York World Telegram, Sept. 20).
5. "Japanese hope to raze Nanking to the ground" (New York Journal-American, Sept. 20, based upon an International News Service dispatch).
6. "Japanese determination to raze China's modern capital" (Brooklyn Daily Eagle, Sept. 20, based upon Associated Press dispatch).
7. "Apparent determination to raze China's modern capital" (New York Post, ditto).
8. "That Japan intends to attempt to demolish Nanking as a city and as a seat of government and reduce all the fine new buildings in China's ten-year-old capital to blackened rubbish heaps was clearly indicated by Admiral Hasegawa's declaration that he means to strike a paralyzing blow, hoping thereby to hasten the end of the conflict" (New York Times special dispatch from Shanghai, Sept. 21).

Only the New York Herald Tribune's special Shanghai dispatch by Mr. Victor Keen gave the full text of Admiral Hasegawa's warning, and reported judiciously.

Part II

Leading to the Crisis

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Japan was once our best and most faithful friend among the nations. We lost her confidence and friendship when we began to base our foreign policies on the subtle advice of Europe's diplomats and statesmen, playing their own games of empire.

Dr. Albert Shaw, in The Digest.

Participation in an advisory committee aiming at the condemnation of one of the belligerents in a foreign war, risks the abandonment of neutrality by becoming a party to a common front, and in the present case, an anti-Japanese front, and might lead to acts which Japan will construe as hostile. If this happens, it would be done, I venture to believe, not in the interests of the United States, but of other nations.

Professor Edwin M. Borchard, Yale University.

CHAPTER VII

CHINA'S FIRST OPPORTUNITY

In private conversations with the members of the Yamen (Imperial Chinese Government) I have tried to turn their views from the spectre of intervention to what I conceive to be China's true policy, and that is a sincere, friendly, rapprochement with Japan.

HON. CHARLES DENBY, American Minister to China, 1895.

Back in 1904-5 Japan, a little David, fought Czarist Russia, a colossal Goliath, upon Chinese soil. She fought first to save China, and secondly to save herself. The two were the same thing, because Russian absorption of China meant Japan's own eventual doom.

While Japan was fighting to save China, what was China doing? China, instead of cooperating with Japan, secretly helped Russia. Secretly she had entered into an alliance with Russia against Japan.

Yet, despite all Chinese obstructions, puny Japan defeated the Russian colossus, and gave back to China the vast territory of Manchuria which Russia had planned to annex. In this titanic struggle Japan sacrificed unnumbered lives and untold treasure.

At the end of the struggle all that Japan asked for and obtained was a speck of territory around Port Arthur (the Russian Gibraltar of yester-years), a few hundred miles of railways, and a few mines along them. These she took, not from China, but from Russia. Their retention by Japan was a measure of safeguard against Russia's renewed advance.

Japan, acting so magnanimously, hoped that China might reciprocate. She hoped China would cooperate with her in the development of Manchuria's resources, and in the strengthening of its defense against Russia's possible, even probable, "comeback."

Here was China's opportunity. She could have made Japan her true friend, ready to stand by her through thick and thin. With Japanese help, China could have developed Manchuria, and made it a bulwark against further Russian aggression.

Instead, China flirted with the bigger powers of the Occident, not excepting even Russia, which had only yesterday schemed China's destruction.

China reasoned: "Japan is small and poor. She was admitted into the family of powers only recently. In Europe and America there are nations, rich and powerful. These we must befriend, and by so doing we could perhaps drive Japan out of Manchuria."

So reasoning, China invited this, that and the other powers into Manchuria, all for the purpose of undermining the Japanese foothold—the foothold which Japan had considered essential to preserve herself and China against a possible Russian revenge.

Thus did China throw away her first opportunity—a pitiable case of shortsightedness.

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The record of the events which followed is a record of Japan's struggle to secure her position in the face of China's constant obstruction, and China's never-ceasing intrigue with Western powers behind Japan's back. The so-called "Twenty-One Japanese Demands" upon China in 1915, is an outstanding example of that struggle. Japan, unable to persuade China to cooperate with her, was sometimes forced to take drastic measures, much to her own distaste and regret.

History repeats itself. Thirty-two years ago Japan saved China and herself from "White" domination of Czarist Russia. Today she is again striving to save China and herself from much the same danger—this time "Red" domination of Communist Imperialism which has already appropriated Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan).

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CHAPTER VIII

CHINA SCRAPS TREATIES

No nation which refuses to exercise forbearance and to respect the freedom and rights of others can long remain strong and retain the confidence and respect of other nations. No nation ever loses its dignity or good standing by conciliating its differences, and by exercising great patience with, and consideration for, the rights of other nations.

—PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

The Washington Conference of 1921-2 furnished China with another opportunity for befriending Japan. China cast it to the wind, as she did her first opportunity. Blindly, she continued to follow the old policy of wilful antagonism toward Japan.

At the Washington Conference Japan made considerable concessions to China—concessions no other power similarly situated would have made.

In Shantung she gave back to China all the important rights which she had obtained, not from China, but from Germany.

In Manchuria itself Japan gave up certain important concessions which she had obtained from the Chinese government.

Japan withdrew troops which she had placed in certain interior points in China for the necessary protection of her nationals.

She formally and definitely renounced her proposals which constituted group V of the so-called twenty-one demands of 1915—proposals which had been on the tapis.

These Japanese sacrifices were not entirely disinterested. Japan made them in the hope that henceforth China would change her policy of antagonism towards her and that the two nations might enter into a new era of cooperation for the good of both.

At the final session of the Washington Conference, Baron Shidehara, on behalf of the Japanese delegation, made this statement:

"Japan believes that she has made to China every possible concession, consistent with the sense of reason, fairness and honor. She does not regret it. She rejoices in the thought that the sacrifice which she has offered will not be in vain, in the greater cause of international friendship and good will.

"We are vitally interested in a speedy establishment of peace and unity in China, and in the economic development of her vast natural resources. It is indeed to the Asiatic mainland that we must look primarily for raw materials and for the markets where our manufactured articles may be sold. Neither raw materials nor the markets can be had, unless order, happiness, and prosperity reign in China under good and stable government. With hundreds of thousands of our nationals resident in China, with enormous amounts of our capital invested there, and with our own national existence largely dependent on that of our neighbor, we are naturally in-

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terested in that country to a greater extent than any of the countries remotely situated."

Here was an unmistakable intimation that Japan was anxious to cooperate with China on the broad principle of live and let live.

Following the Washington Conference, Japan faithfully adhered to the spirit which she had expressed at that conference. Take, for instance, her attitude relative to the Lincheng incident.

In May, 1923, the so-called "Blue Express" on the Nanking-Tientsin railway was carrying thirty-five European and American tourists, including several women, from Nanking to Peking. They were all captured by bandits at Lincheng, in Shantung province, and were held for ransom for several weeks. For several weeks the captives were subjected to indescribable privation—cold, hunger, thirst, sleepless nights.

The foreign powers were so shocked that some of them informally proposed that all of the main railways in China be guarded by an international police force under foreign control. A certain European power or powers approached Japan with this suggestion. Had Japan endorsed it, China might have lost control of her own railways.

Japan, remembering the idealism professed by the powers at the Washington Conference, objected to the suggestion—which, of course, nipped the plan in the bud.

Even at the Opium Conference at Geneva in 1925, Japan cooperated with China with a view to the abolition of opium traffic in China.

In 1925, Baron Shidehara became Foreign Minister, which further strengthened Japan's liberal policy toward China. At the International Tariff Conference, held at Peking in 1925 for the purpose of readjusting the powers' tariff relations with China in accordance with the Washington Conference treaty, Japan expressed her hope for "the inauguration of a regime of tariff autonomy (for China) backed by an adequately strong and unified government, and a complete removal of all restrictions which might impede the freedom of intercourse and trade between China and other powers."

In 1926, Baron Shidehara, speaking before the Legislature, laid down these four principles of Japan's Chinese policy:

1. "Respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and scrupulously avoid all interference in her domestic strife.
2. "Promote the solidarity and economic rapprochement between the two nations.
3. "Entertain sympathetically and helpfully the just aspirations of the Chinese people, and cooperate in their efforts for the realization of such aspirations.
4. "Maintain an attitude of patience and toleration in the present situation in China, and at the same time protect Japan's legitimate and essential rights and interests by all reasonable means at the disposal of the Government."

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The above announcement was in reply to China's demand for the abolition of extraterritoriality. Meanwhile, the International Commission organized by the powers, which participated in the Washington Conference, had been in China, studying the Chinese judiciary with a view to determine whether or not extraterritoriality should be abolished.

The commission's report, written mostly by Mr. Silas H. Strawn, representing the American Government, disclosed a most arbitrary militarist domination of the Chinese judiciary and a universal miscarriage of justice. It was emphatic that the termination of extraterritoriality was out of the question.

And yet Baron Shidehara was willing to negotiate with whatever government existed in China for gradual abolition of extraterritoriality. It was understood that as a general principle he would agree to the termination of extraterritoriality, but that in the railway zone in Manchuria the Japanese judiciary must be maintained at least for some years to come.

That was a great concession. Yet to this conciliatory policy, China's reply was the *arbitrary, unilateral abrogation of the treaty with Japan!* China never showed a desire to meet Japan half way.

From 1925 to 1927 a violent anti-foreign, particularly anti-British, agitation swept through the provinces south of the Yangtse River. This culminated in the horrible Nanking outrage of March 24, 1927, when all the foreign consulates and many of the foreign firms and residences and the missionary institutions were looted. The foreigners murdered included the American vice-president of Nanking University, two Englishmen, a French and an Italian priest. A number of foreign women were indescribably outraged.

Throughout that period Japan continued to be conciliatory. When the British and American warships at Nanking trained their guns at certain sections of the city to shield the fleeing foreigners before the nationalist hordes, the guns of the Japanese ships were silent—this in spite of the fact that the Japanese consulate, along with other consulates, had been sacked and that the consular staff, including the women, had been unspeakably abused.

In the wake of the Nanking outrage a certain power approached Japan with the suggestion that an international force occupy certain strategic points on the Yangtse as a guarantee of security of foreign lives and property. The suggestion received no encouragement from Japan, and was dropped.

In May, 1929, Baron Shidehara appointed Mr. Sadao Saburi, one of his trusted lieutenants, as Minister to China. Mr. Saburi was instructed to carry out a certain conciliatory programme formulated by Baron Shidehara.

Mr. Saburi, after a brief stay in Nanking, returned to Japan, and killed himself! He left no explanation. But many presumed, and the presumption persists, that the new Japanese Minister had been so viciously rebuffed by the Nationalist politicians at Nanking that self-annihilation seemed to him

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the only honorable way to wipe out the personal disgrace. He followed the code and practice of the *Samurai* of old.

Then Baron Shidehara appointed Mr. Torikichi Obata as successor to the ill-fated Mr. Saburi. To his amazement, China rejected Mr. Obata as *persona non grata* simply because he had happened to serve as a secretary at the Japanese Legation at Peking when Japan presented to China the so-called "Twenty-One Demands" in 1915. Not only did Obata have no part in the formulation of those demands, but he was known to have objected to some of them and to have gone to Tokyo to present before the Foreign Office his views for the modification of the terms.

Yet China, turning a deaf ear to all Japanese explanations, rejected Mr. Obata. This taunting attitude, so luridly revealed in Mr. Saburi's suicide, and again brought to bold relief in Mr. Obata's rejection, caused a furor in Japan. Some of the metropolitan newspapers published editorials under the ominous title: "We Shall Never Forget!"

Even then Baron Shidehara did not lose hope. On January 21, 1930, he, speaking before the Legislature, said:

"If one takes a broader view of the future well-being of both Japan and China, one will be satisfied that there is no other course open than to pursue the path of mutual accord and cooperation in all their relations, political and economic. Their real and lasting interests, which in no way conflict but have much in common with each other, ought to be a sufficient assurance of their growing *rapprochement*. If the Chinese people awaken to these facts and show themselves responsive to the policy so outlined, nothing will more conduce to the mutual welfare of both nations. . . .

"It ought not to be difficult for the Chinese people to realize what we have in mind, if they only recall the whole-hearted cooperation which the Japanese representatives extended to the Chinese throughout the whole course of the Peking Tariff Conference and of the sittings of the International Commission on Extraterritoriality in 1925-1926. The attitude which was then taken by Japan is the attitude she is now taking in handling the question of unequal treaties. In that spirit we gladly accepted, as early as 1926, the Chinese proposal to open negotiations for the revision of the Sino-Japanese Commercial Treaty."

All this was of no avail. As Mr. Rodney Gilbert, author of two penetrating books, "What Is Wrong With China," and "China's Unequal Treaties," observes, any conciliatory policy towards China by any foreign power serves only to "confirm the Chinese in his self-esteem; it convinces him that he is above the law and rightly so, and that any attempt to call him to account is imperialistic aggression."

Between 1923 and 1927 this Chinese characteristic has been made worse by the "Red" counsels given by the Soviet agents whom Nationalist China invited as advisers. These Red advisers put to the mouths of the Chinese such slogans as "Down With Foreign Imperialism," "Down With Foreign Militarism," "Down With Unequal Treaties," "Down With Great Britain," and "Down With the Japanese."

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Against the stone-wall of wilful anti-foreignism, Japan's liberal policy made no impression, making Baron Shidehara appear to be a blind optimist.

Even as Shidehara was speaking such sensible, conciliatory words as we have quoted, Nationalist China was pushing a scheme to rid Manchuria of Japanese enterprises.

The upshot of it all was the Manchurian upheaval of the fall of 1931, resulting in the appearance of the new state of Manchukuo—another example of China's shortsightedness. China, begrudging Japan the few rights and privileges that the latter had legitimately acquired in Manchuria, lost the whole of Manchuria. For that China has nobody to thank but herself. Had China responded to Baron Shidehara's repeated overtures of friendliness in like spirit, the Manchurian incident would never have happened.

Must we agree with Mr. Humphrey Marshall, American High Commissioner to China in 1852-1854, that "the Chinese Government concedes justice only in the presence of a force able and willing to exact it"?

Must we agree with Robert M. McLean, who succeeded Mr. Marshall, that "diplomatic intercourse can only be had with this Government at the cannon's mouth"?

Must we agree with Lord Elgin who said in 1858 that the Chinese are "a people that yield always to force, but never to reason"?

As recently as 1925 Mr. Silas H. Strawn, a distinguished American lawyer, went to China full of sympathy for China. It took him only a few months to be utterly disillusioned. Speaking in Shanghai, he said:

"It is a primal instinct of human nature to attempt to blame someone else for one's misfortunes or shortcomings. . . . I believe I can confidently state that I have thus far seen no convincing evidence that China's present-day troubles are in any degree attributable to the so-called unequal treaties, or to the imperialistic attitude of the Foreign Powers. On the contrary, the evidence seems to be overwhelming that the troubles of China today are internal rather than external, and that unequal treaties, extra-territoriality, tariff autonomy, and imperialism are political slogans which are availed of by the agitators to excite the people of China into a frenzy of unrest. . . . By telling the truth about the situation I may be able to help the Chinese people. . . . In the solution of this problem, as in that of any other different question, we must commence with a knowledge of the facts and not rely upon false premises if we hope to arrive at an accurate conclusion."

The same condition as was described by Mr. Marshall, Mr. McLean, Lord Elgin, and Mr. Strawn defeated Japan's conciliatory policy, caused one of her ministers to China to kill himself in despair, and to send the enlightened, liberal Baron Shidehara to oblivion in disgrace, at least for the moment.

During this period of Japan's conciliatory policy China resorted to a wholesale scrapping or violation of her agreements with Japan. The following are the more important of the agreements so violated:

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1. Refusal to honor Articles 2 and 4 of the 1915 "*Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia*" granting the Japanese the right to lease land for commercial and agricultural purposes.

2. Arbitrary increase of export customs duty on coal from the Japanese-operated Fushun and Yentai mines from one-tenth to four-tenths of a Haikwan tale per ton. This violated Article 2 of the "*Detailed Regulations for Fushun and Yentai Mines*," May, 1911.

3. The building of parallel lines to the South Manchuria Railway in violation of a protocol to the 1905 Peking treaty.

4. Failure to carry into effect the provisions of the "*Agreement Relating to the Chientao Region*," September, 1909, whereby China agreed to extend the Changchun-Kirin Railway to the Korean border. This agreement was supplemented by new agreements in 1918 and 1927.

5. Discrimination against Japanese goods on the Chinese railways in Manchuria in violation of the Washington Nine Power Treaty, February, 1922.

6. Disregard of the 1915 treaty respecting Manchuria by demanding the return of Port Arthur and Dairen.

7. Demand that the Japanese guards be withdrawn from the railway zone in disregard of the 1905 agreement.

8. Refusal to negotiate detailed regulations concerning Sino-Japanese joint mining enterprise along the South Manchuria Railway, although Article 4 of the "*Agreement Concerning Mines and Railways in Manchuria*," September, 1909, provides for the adoption of such regulations.

9. Imposition of discriminatory high import duty on tobacco by the Chinese maritime customs at Dairen, Manchuria. This violated Article 12 of the "*Agreement Regarding Establishment of Maritime Customs Office at Dairen*," May, 1907.

10. Refusal to sell the necessary land for railway construction to the South Manchuria Railway, thus making it impossible for the railway to obtain, from lands along its lines, the stones, sands, etc., necessary for their repair and maintenance. This violated Article 6 of the Sino-Russian agreement of September, 1896, the provisions of which are applicable to the South Manchuria Railway under the Portsmouth Treaty between Japan and Russia, September, 1905, and the Peking Treaty between Japan and China, December, 1905.

11. Issuance of a secret order making it impossible for the Japanese to reside and travel outside the railway zone in South Manchuria. This violates Article 3 of the "*Treaty Respecting South Manchuria*," May, 1915.

12. Persecution of the Koreans in violation of Article 3 of the "*Agreement Relating to Chientao*," September, 1909, which provides that "China recognizes the residence of Korean subjects, as heretofore, on agricultural lands lying north of the River Tumen."

13. Illegal levy of taxes within the railway zone along the lines of the South Manchuria Railway. This contravened Article 6 of the Sino-Russian agreement of September, 1896, which provides that the "company (the South Manchuria Railway in the case of Japan, the Chinese Eastern Rail-

way in the case of Russia) shall have the absolute and exclusive right of administration of its lands."

14. Refusal to appoint a Japanese traffic manager or an adviser on the management of the Taonan-Anganchi railway financed by the South Manchuria Railway, though the loan agreement provided for such appointment to ensure its efficient operation.

15. Making it impossible for the Japanese traffic managers and accountants on other Japanese-financed but Chinese-operated lines to exercise the authority of supervision provided in the loan agreements.

16. Protests against the manufacture of shale oil from Fushun coal by the South Manchuria Railway.

17. Misappropriation of the receipts of the railways financed by Japanese concerns, resulting in non-payment to the service of Japanese loans.

CHAPTER IX

TECHNIQUE OF ANTI-JAPANESE AGITATION

I have seen no convincing evidence that China's present-day troubles are in any degree attributable to the so-called unequal treaties or to the imperialistic attitude of foreign Powers.

HON. SILAS STRAWN, *Speaking in Shanghai, 1925.*

We have seen that for almost a decade following the Washington Conference, Japan did every possible thing to befriend China, and that China's response was a studied effrontery.

During this period China developed a technique of anti-Japanese agitation, and used it with deadly effect. In June, 1928, the National Convention of anti-Japanese Societies, which were subsidized by the Nanking Government, issued this declaration:

"The objective of our anti-Japanese movement is to ruin the Japanese by causing our economic rupture with them. The pressure will next be brought to bear upon all the rest of the Imperialist nations with the ultimate object of nullifying all unequal treaties."

Until August, 1929, the government-subsidized "Societies for the Revocation of Unequal Treaties" openly enforced anti-Japanese boycott by meting out direct punishment to Chinese merchants handling Japanese goods.

This caused diplomatic complications with Japan. To circumvent Japanese protest the Nationalist Government, in August, 1929, stopped such open and direct actions. Instead it ordered that the "Merchants' associations (not political societies) of every district shall hold themselves responsible for rescuing the nation from foreign economic aggression." The government held "such associations liable to punishment in the event of their failure to inquire into and deal adequately with every case of transactions in Japanese goods by individual merchants." This order was, of course, secretly distributed.

School text-books are another means of anti-Japanese propaganda. Many of these denounce foreigners generally, but emphasis is laid upon the condemnation of the Japanese.

The *National Humiliation Reader* contains dramas showing the wickedness of all foreigners and exhorting the rising generation to repel foreign aggression at all costs.

The *New Age Reader*, says: "China's burning question is foreign encroachment. The foreigners compel us to lease lands. They commit crime on our soil, yet they do not submit to our law and our jurisdiction. Our maritime customs were forcibly usurped and have been administered by foreign imperialist."

The Nationalist China ignores that neither the foreign settlements nor the foreign administration of maritime customs were imposed upon China

by alien overlords, but that both were initiated by the Chinese Government itself for its own convenience.

Many text-books on Ethics teach children to despise and hate the Japanese. In many schools pupils are asked such questions as: "Who is China's greatest enemy?" The answer expected is, of course, "the Japanese."

In the army clever catechisms are used to exhort the soldiers to look upon Japan as China's avowed enemy who must be crushed. This method is further reenforced with anti-Japanese war songs to the cadence of which the soldiers are drilled to march. Here is an example in rough English translation:

"We will knock you down and make you impotent.

"We will throw your rifles away.

"We will destroy your cannon.

"We will destroy your hegemony.

"We will brace our spirits in firm unity.

"That we may overthrow Imperialism.

"Overthrow! Overthrow!"

Remember, all this was going on while Japan was pursuing a policy of conciliation. To Japan it was a tragic case of one-sided endeavor to be friendly with her neighbor. There can be no normal intercourse between any two nations, as long as the ideology and national policy of one is uncompromising antagonism towards the other.

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CHAPTER X

HEADING TO THE CLASH

The Chinese Government concedes justice only in the presence of a force able and willing to exact it.

HUMPHREY MARSHALL, American High Commissioner to China 1852-54.

We have seen that for ten years before 1931 China had pitted artificially fostered Japanophobia against Japan's conciliatory policy, and that her design to drive Japan out of Manchuria resulted in the appearance of Manchukuo as a new state.

The Chinese nationalists would not admit that the secession of Manchuria was due to her own fault. They blame it entirely on Japan, and use it to further anti-Japanese agitation as a means of uniting their divided country.

Their new slogan is "Regain lost Manchuria." They have instigated the rabble armies, which were driven out of Manchuria, to stir up trouble along the border. For much the same purpose, they have sent to the North Nationalist soldiers disguised in plain clothes. They have sent "Blue Shirt" agitators to the same region to intimidate, even assassinate pro-Japanese Chinese of influence. The so-called "volunteers" and even bandits have been secretly encouraged to harass Manchukuo borders.

For a long time after the secession of Manchukuo, Nationalist China cut off all means of communication with that new state. Even today, after long, tortuous negotiations, only one through train a day is permitted to run between Manchukuo and Peiping. Even this is operated under a constant fear of obstruction. Mails to and from Manchukuo are tampered with on the Chinese side. Prizes have been offered for the heads of Manchukuo officials.

Naturally, in the early stages of Manchukuo, there were numerous border troubles and incidents. That necessitated at times a show of force on the part of Japan as the guardian of Manchukuo. The result was the setting up of a narrow strip of buffer territory known as the East Hopei Autonomous Region, and a conclusion of various agreements between the Japanese military authorities and the responsible military representatives of the Nanking Government.

Under one of these compacts the Nanking Government agreed not to send Nationalist troops and Blue Shirts into Hopei Province. This arrangement was necessary for peace in North China and the security of Manchukuo. The agreement, however, has never been strictly observed by Nanking.

During the last few years the Communist agitators filtering into Hopei Province and Communist armies advancing in the same direction became a new source of Japan's worry. The alliance between the Blue Shirts and

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the Communists under the banner of "Down with Japan" and "Regain Lost Manchuria," boded ill for peace in the north.

Nor was that all. Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek himself struck a bargain with the Communist forces. Last December he was captured at Sianfu by two pro-communist war-lords. He was released by paying a huge ransom as well as by agreeing to liquidate his eight-year-old campaign against the Communists and to effect an alliance between the Nationalists and the Communists.

To save his life and his face the shrewd Chiang Kaishek did some clever anti-Japanese "sales talk" to the Communists. The Communists had no love for Chiang Kaishek, but wanted some of his money and arms. Thus was the bargain made.

As a consequence 200,000 Communist soldiers became a part of the Nationalist army. Last January the Nationalist Party, which had been an avowed enemy of the Communists, changed its front, and adopted a resolution to work with them against Manchukuo and Japan. Thus did the Communization of North China become a real menace.

The Blue Shirts are a reactionary body, organized to strengthen Chiang Kaishek's autocratic rule. They are also the "G.P.U." of China, feared and dreaded by all outsiders. They are ruthless, unscrupulous. They intimidate, assassinate, blackmail. They do away with politicians or militarists who stand in Chiang Kaishek's way.

At first the Blue Shirts were not particularly anti-Japanese. But as Chiang Kaishek decided to exploit the Japanese menace as a means of uniting the country, the Blue Shirts, too, became anti-Japanese. Their alliance with the equally ruthless Communist agitators would have stirred up no end of trouble in North China had they not encountered Japan's restraining influence there.

Following the secession of Manchuria, Japan tried hard to mollify China. But China, ignoring that the secession was due to her own shortsightedness, continued to scheme the eventual rendition of Manchuria. Whenever Japan sought rapprochement, China was sure to demand the rendition of Manchukuo. That, of course, was impossible.

In 1934, when the Nationalists and the Blue Shirts had still been fighting the Communists, Japan made these three proposals to China:

1. Stop anti-Japanese agitation under Nanking's encouragement or connivance.
2. Cooperation between Japan and China for the development of the still dormant natural resources in North China.
3. Cooperation to check the spread of Communism.

Since 1934 Japan repeated the same overture over and over again. These proposals were reasonable and sensible. Had they been adopted, they would have benefited both countries. And Nanking knew it.

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And yet Nanking chose to cut off its nose to spite its face. Instead of cooperating with Japan, Nanking allied itself with the Communists, which would in the end prove the height of shortsightedness. Is it any wonder Japan favors some sort of local autonomy for North China, whose freedom from Communist and Blue Shirt agitation is vital to her and to Manchukuo. Had Nanking acted upon the Japanese proposal, there would have been no need for Japan's manifest solicitude for such autonomy.

This Chinese shortsightedness is all the more deplorable, as we look back over the political developments at Tokyo since last March. Last March Mr. Naotake Sato became Japan's Foreign Minister. Before accepting the office, Mr. Sato conferred with military leaders, and arrived at the conclusion that he would meet with no opposition from them if he launched a liberal China policy.

Mr. Sato, speaking before the Legislature, clearly intimated that Japan must somewhat recede from North China in order to effect a rapprochement with Nanking. He intimated that North China autonomy would not be essential to Japan, if Nanking and Tokyo cooperated upon equal footing.

Mr. Yuki, Finance Minister, echoed Mr. Sato by saying: "Japan's economic policy cannot stand without regard to China. The Army understands this now, and agrees that economic cooperation in China is essential."

Yet Nanking was uncompromising. Manchukuo still rankled in its mind. It was then that the authoritative British journal in Shanghai, the North China Daily News, issued this warning to Nanking:

"At a time when Japanese statesmen have clearly shown their desire to view Chinese affairs by a 'new concept' it is unfortunate that certain asperities in argument have lately manifested themselves in Chinese Comment on Sino-Japanese relations. . . . The man who cries before he is out of the wood is apt to receive a nasty shock. So also is he who banks too much on a forbearance which emanates from a sense of strength mistaken by him for weakness."

The final sentence is most significant—to "mistake forbearance for weakness." Lord Elgin once said that "I have been China's friend," and that he had nevertheless to resort to "bullying" to make any reasonable point of view acceptable to the Chinese. So has it always been in China. Times change, but the leopard never changes its spots.

Part III

Official Documents

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The faking of pictures in the World War became a vast industry.

A picture taken by Karl Delius, of Berlin, showed delivery of mail bags in front of the Field Post-office of the German army in Kavevara. This was reproduced in the London Daily Mirror of December 3, 1915, with this caption: "Made to Wash Huns' Dirty Linen."

An official photograph of German officers inspecting munition cases behind their lines was reproduced in London's War Illustrated, January 30, 1916, as "German Officers Pillaging Chests in a French Chateau."

So when you see atrocity pictures again nowadays—try and be a little skeptical about their supposed truth. You'll be helping to keep down mass emotionalism and your country out of other people's wars.

*Boake Carter, in the New York Daily Mirror,
October 5, 1937.*

No. 1

SECRETARY HULL'S STATEMENT TO THE PRESS, JULY 16, 1937

I have been receiving from many sources inquiries and suggestions arising out of disturbed situations in various parts of the world.

Unquestionably there are in a number of regions tensions and strains which on their face involve only countries that are near neighbors but which in ultimate analysis are of inevitable concern to the whole world. Any situation in which armed hostilities are in progress or are threatened is a situation wherein rights and interest of all nations either are or may be seriously affected.

There can be no serious hostilities anywhere in the world which will not one way or another affect interests or rights or obligations of this country.

I therefore feel warranted in making—in fact, I feel it a duty to make—a statement of this government's position in regard to international problems and situations with respect to which this country feels deep concern.

This country constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of peace. We advocate national and international self-respect. We advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the national affairs of other nations.

We advocate adjustment of problems in international relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement. We advocate faithful observance of international agreements.

Upholding the principle of the sanctity of treaties, we believe in modification of provisions of treaties, when need therefor arises, by orderly processes carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation.

We believe in respect by all nations for the rights of others and performance by all nations of established obligations. We stand for revitalizing and strengthening of international law. We advocate steps toward promotion of economic security and stability the world over.

We advocate lowering or removing of excessive barriers in international trade. We seek effective equality of commercial opportunity, and we urge upon all nations application of the principle of equality of treatment.

We believe in limitation and reduction of armaments. Realizing the necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for national security. We are prepared to reduce or to increase our own armed forces in proportion to reductions or increases by other countries.

We avoid entering into alliances or entangling commitments, but we believe in co-operative effort by peaceful and practicable means in support of the principles hereinbefore stated.

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No. 2

JAPAN'S OBSERVATIONS ON SECRETARY HULL'S STATEMENT

The Japanese Government wishes to express its concurrence with the principles contained in the statement made by Secretary of State Hull on the 16th instant concerning the maintenance of world peace. It is the belief of the Japanese Government that the objectives of those principles will only be attained, in their application to the Far Eastern situation, by a full recognition and practical consideration of the actual particular circumstances of that region.

No. 3

SECRETARY HULL'S STATEMENT ON AMERICAN POLICY ON THE
SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION, AUGUST 23, 1937

At his press conference on Aug. 17, the Secretary of State announced that (1), legislative action to make available funds for purposes of emergency relief necessitated by the situation in the Far East had been asked and that (2), this Government had given orders for a regiment of marines to prepare to proceed to Shanghai. The Secretary then discussed at some length the principles of policy on which this Government was proceeding.

The situation at Shanghai is in many respects unique. Shanghai is a great cosmopolitan center, with a population of over 3,000,000, a part of which has been developed by the nationals of many countries, at which there have prevailed mutually advantageous contacts of all types and varieties between and among the Chinese and people of almost all other countries of the world. At Shanghai, there exists a multiplicity of rights and interests which are of inevitable concern to many countries, including the United States.

In the present situation, the American Government is engaged in facilitating in every way possible an orderly and safe removal of American citizens from areas where there is special danger. Further, it is the policy of the American Government to afford its nationals appropriate protection primarily against mobs or other uncontrolled elements. For that purpose it has for many years maintained small detachments of armed forces in China, and for that purpose it is sending the present small re-enforcement. These armed forces there have no mission of aggression. It is their function to be of assistance toward maintenance of order and security. It has been the desire and the intention of the American Government to remove these forces when performances of their function of protection is no longer called for, and such remains its desire and expectation.

The issues and problems which are of concern to this government in the present situation in the Pacific area go far beyond merely the immediate question of protection of the nationals and interests of the United States.

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The conditions which prevail in that area are intimately connected with and have a direct and fundamental relationship to the general principles of policy to which attention was called in the statement of July 16, which statement has evoked expressions of approval from more than fifty governments. This government is firmly of the opinion that the principles summarized in that statement should effectively govern international relationships.

When there unfortunately arises in any part of the world the threat or existence of serious hostilities, the matter is of concern to all nations. Without attempting to pass judgment regarding the merits of the controversy, we appeal to the parties to refrain from resort to war. We urge that they settle their differences in accordance with principles which in the opinion not alone of our people, but of most peoples of the world should govern in international relationships. We consider applicable throughout the world, in the Pacific area as elsewhere, the principles set forth in the statement of July 16. That statement of principles is comprehensive and basic. It embraces the principles embodied in many treaties, including the Washington conference treaties and the Kellogg-Briand Pact to Paris.

From the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East we have been urging upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments the importance of refraining from hostilities and of maintaining peace. We have been participating constantly in consultation with interested governments directed toward peaceful adjustment. This government does not believe in political alliances or entanglements, nor does it believe in extreme isolation. It does believe in international cooperation for the purpose of seeking through pacific methods the achievement of those objectives set forth in the statement of July 16. In the light of our well-defined attitude and policies and within the range thereof, this Government is giving most solicitous attention to every phase of the Far Eastern situation, toward safeguarding the lives and welfare of our people and making effective the policies—especially the policy of peace—in which this country believes and to which it is committed.

This Government is endeavoring to see kept alive, strengthened and revitalized, in reference to the Pacific area and to all the world, these fundamental principles.

No. 4

PACIFIC BLOCKADE OF CHINA COAST

A. Japanese Foreign Office Announcement, August 26, 1937

Although Japan has been forced to adopt measures of self-defense in the face of lawless attacks upon her forces by Chinese armies and their wanton disregard of Japanese lives and property and violations of Japan's rights and interests in China, it has always been the desire of the Japanese gov-

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ernment to minimize the scope of the present affair. However, the Chinese armies, by their repeated outrages and provocations, have intensified still further gravity of the situation.

In these circumstances, with a view to prompting China's reconsideration and to effecting a speedy settlement, the Japanese naval authorities found it necessary to close traffic of Chinese vessels on the Chinese sea coast from 32° 4' north latitude and 121° 44' east longitude, to 23° 14' north latitude and 116° 48' east longitude, beginning at 6 p.m., August 25, 1937.

The above measure is solely one of self-defense against the lawless acts of the Chinese, and applies only to Chinese vessels. It may be added that peaceful commerce carried on by third powers will be fully respected, the Japanese navy having no intention of interfering with it.

B. Japanese Navy's Statement, August 26, 1937

The Imperial navy has decided to block the navigation of all Chinese ships along the Chinese coast from the Yangtsekiang to Foochow, Amoy, and Swatow, commencing August 25 at 6 p.m. While Japan has been obliged to take self-defensive measures for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese residents in China, the Japanese government from the first has desired to confine the trouble to a minimum area.

Nevertheless, the situation has been aggravated through the challenges by Chinese forces and accordingly the Imperial navy has decided to blockade the Chinese coast so that China will reflect and the situation improve.

The blockade of the Chinese coast is intended chiefly for weakening China's fighting strength and the Imperial navy has no intention of unnecessarily seizing Chinese ships and their cargoes. It will confine its action to self-defensive measures in accordance with international justice.

The Imperial navy will respect the peaceful trade of other countries and has no intention of interfering with it.

No. 5

STATEMENT BY MR. KOKI HIROTA, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, AT AN INTERVIEW WITH THE FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS, SEPTEMBER 1, 1937

There has developed between Japan and China a situation which is indeed very regrettable. I shall not touch upon the origin and development of the present incident, which you all know so well. I wish only to emphasize here the high degree of patience and forbearance with which the Japanese Government have consistently been striving to bring about a peaceful settlement. At the time of the Lukouchiao Affair, our Government, hoping to the last to reach a pacific solution through a local settlement, did everything possible to prevent aggravation of the situation, in spite of repeated bad faith of the Chinese Nanking Government which manifested

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a complete lack of sincerity and not only rejected the agreement arrived on but also moved vast armies northward, challenging Japan directly. Moreover, they incited and instigated popular feeling against this country to such an extent that the lives and property of our nationals throughout China were suddenly jeopardized. As the conflict began to spread, we lost no time in ordering the evacuation of Japanese residents from Hankow and other points on the Yangtze as well as from various places in Shantung and South China. This measure was taken with a view to forestalling the occurrence of any untoward incidents, and this, more than anything else, demonstrated powerfully our sincerity in observing our avowed policy of non-aggravation. Of course this measure involved untold sacrifices on our part as it amounted to a complete abandonment of business interests acquired after many years of arduous toil by our nationals. However, we decided to bear even those for the purpose of avoiding aggravation of the situation. Again, when on July 11 the Cabinet decided despatching contingents in view of the North China situation which was growing worse every moment, we still clung to the anticipation of bringing about an amicable solution and continued to nourish the hope that the Nanking Government would reconsider their attitude. Thus to the last moment we sought and strove for pacific settlement, firmly determined as we were to prevent an armed clash and we took exactly the same attitude in regard to the Shanghai Affair.

In some quarters abroad people seem to be under the erroneous impression that at Shanghai Japan was retaliating for the murder of an officer and a sailor of her naval landing party by the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps. Nothing could be further from the truth. Of course China was entirely to blame for the shooting of our marines, but our Government with the greatest self-restraint endeavored to reach an amicable local settlement through diplomatic channels. Hostilities broke out in Shanghai because China, in violation of her agreement for the cessation of hostilities around Shanghai concluded in 1932, rushed her regular troops into the forbidden area and strengthened her forces both as to number and equipment and then deliberately provoked the Japanese. Our Government firmly believe that as a first prerequisite these Chinese forces should be made to withdraw from the fighting area and the Chinese military works in the vicinity of the International Settlement should be removed if the city is to be spared the disastrous effects of armed conflict. In other words, foreign lives and property in Shanghai are menaced not by the small Japanese forces defending the settlement but rather by the Chinese armies which, relying upon their vastly superior numbers, undertake an offensive against the Japanese. In fact, in our desire to maintain peace and security in and around Shanghai, we were giving favourable consideration to the proposal of the Powers to preserve these regions from the danger of hostilities when the Chinese launched a sudden attack upon the International Settlement, our Consulate General, and our warships on the Whangpoo, bombing them indiscriminately

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from the air, and our forces were compelled to return fire for the defense of our nationals numbering more than 30,000 in the city. Both in North China and at Shanghai it was without question unwarranted Chinese provocations that precipitated hostilities. The fundamental causes lay in the fact that the leaders of Present-day China have long fostered anti-Japanism as a tool for political purposes, exploiting diplomatic issues to enhance their prestige and to that end they have, through collusion with communists, openly and energetically prepared for war with Japan. The Sino-Soviet non-aggression pact, concluded a few days ago, is of especial significance in this regard. To this, Japan as a bulwark against communist encroachment upon East Asia, cannot afford to remain indifferent. A major conflict is now in progress between Japan and China despite our earnest efforts to avert it. However, striving as our armies are for the protection of our legitimate rights and interest and for the attainment of enduring peace in East Asia, the Japanese Government are prepared as ever to recall their expeditionary forces and join hands with China in friendship the moment the Chinese Government demonstrate their sincerity in reconsidering and rectifying their attitude toward Japan. But, in view of the fact that the Japanese people cannot tolerate the recurrence of such deplorable affairs and with the situation already assuming the serious proportions it has, we are firmly determined to pursue our declared policy until the possibility becomes ripe for a fundamental settlement. Japan and China are, after all, neighbors and old friends. It should not be such a difficult task to realize the ideal of mutual prosperity and well-being in the interests of the peace of East Asia and of the world. I cannot conceal my fervent hope that the Chinese Government will reconsider the policy they have pursued up till now vis-a-vis Japan. As regards the rights and interests of third Powers, I can assure you that they will be fully respected by Japan. Our Government is giving careful consideration to the matter of safeguarding them. At the same time, in order that peace may be restored as soon as possible, the Powers are invited to cooperate with Japan by refraining from any action which would be likely to prolong the present hostilities. I deeply regret to hear that the victims of the conflict included many foreign residents. Since the press has an important role to play in the promotion of international understanding and good will, especially in such a critical situation as is now prevailing, I wish, Ladies and Gentlemen of the press, to appeal to you for your wholehearted cooperation.

No. 6

TEXT OF JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER KOKI HIROTA'S ADDRESS BEFORE
DIET, SEPTEMBER 5, 1937

Ever since the beginning of the present China affair, the Japanese government, in pursuance of the policy of local settlement and non-aggravation, exerted every effort to effect speedy solution. The Nanking government,

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whose prompt reconsideration was invited, failed to manifest a grain of sincerity but concentrated armies in North China to challenge Japan, while in Yangtze Valley and elsewhere in South and Central China they embarked on an anti-Japanese campaign of the most vicious kind, which not only prevented our nationals in that region from engaging in peaceful pursuits but also jeopardized their very existence.

In these circumstances the Japanese government, still desiring to avoid disturbance of peace as far as possible, ordered the evacuation of all Japanese residents in Hankow and other points along the Yangtze River. Shortly after that, on August 9, at Shanghai, Sub-Lieut. Oyama and Seaman Saito of a Japanese landing party were murdered by the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps.

Even then Japan, adhering to a peaceful course, sought to settle the affair through the withdrawal of the Peace Preservation Corps and removal of all military works that had been erected in violation of the 1932 truce agreement. China refused to comply with our demands under one pretext or another and proceeded instead to increase her troops and to multiply military works in the prohibited zone and finally launched an unwarranted attack upon the Japanese. Thereupon, as a matter of duty, our government dispatched small naval reinforcements to Shanghai as an emergency measure to insure protection of our nationals in that city.

In view of these disquieting developments in Shanghai, Ambassadors at Nanking of five powers, Great Britain, America, France, Germany and Italy, sent a joint request on August 11 to both Japan and China that the two countries do all in their power to carry out effectively a plan to exclude Shanghai from the scope of any possible hostilities so as to safeguard lives and property of foreigners therein.

Our government replied through Ambassador Kawagoe to the effect that, while Japan was most solicitously concerned over the safety of lives and property of all foreigners as well as Japanese in Shanghai, China should as the first prerequisite withdraw outside striking distance her regular troops and peace preservation corps that were advancing on the Settlement and menacing Japanese and to remove military works in the vicinity of the International Settlement and that Japan be prepared to restore her forces to their original positions provided China agreed to take the above steps.

The Ambassador was also instructed to request the powers concerned to exert their influence toward inducing China to execute those urgent and appropriate measures which, however, were flatly rejected by China. On August 11 the Consul Generals at Shanghai of Great Britain, America and France submitted a certain concrete plan proposing that Japan and China enter into direct negotiations for the purpose of averting the impending crisis.

The text of the proposal was received in Tokyo at midnight on August 13. But in the afternoon of that very day the Chinese armies that had been pouring into the Shanghai area took the offensive and on August 8 their war

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planes dropped bombs not only on the headquarters of our landing party, our warship and our Consulate General but also all over the International Settlement. No longer could we do anything but abandon all hopes of peaceful settlement and fight for the protection of our 30,000 nationals in Shanghai. I regret to say that the earnest efforts of the powers concerned were thus nullified by Chinese outrages.

Shanghai having been converted into a theater of hostilities, grave concern was naturally shown by powers who have vast amounts of capital invested and large numbers of their nationals residing in the city. Great Britain notified both Japan and China on August 18 that if governments of the two countries agreed to withdraw their forces mutually and to entrust to foreign authorities the protection of Japanese subjects residing in the International Settlement and on extrasettlement roads the British government was prepared to undertake the responsibility provided other powers co-operate.

The next day, August 19, we were informed by the French government of their readiness to support the British proposal. The American Government also previously expressed hope for the suspension of hostilities in the Shanghai area. Japan, having as great interests in Shanghai as these powers, is equally solicitous for peace in the city. But, as has been stated above, actions taken by the Chinese in and around Shanghai are plainly in violation of the truce agreement in 1932 in that they illegitimately moved their regular troops into the zone prescribed by that agreement and increased both the number of armaments and the Peace Preservations Corps and in that relying on their numerical superiority they challenged the landing party and the civilian population of our country.

Therefore, in their reply to the British proposal our government explained in detail Japan's successive efforts toward peaceful solution as well as the truth regarding the lawless Chinese attacks and stated that the hostilities in Shanghai could not be brought to an end save through the withdrawal of Chinese regular troops from the prohibited zone and of Peace Preservation Corps from front lines. At the same time, our sincere hope was expressed that Great Britain, as one of the parties to the truce agreement, use her good offices to bring about the withdrawal of the Chinese troops outside of the prescribed zone. Similar replies were sent to France and America.

As for North China, in willful disregard of various pledges and agreements, the Chinese central armies moved northward to indulge in a series of provocative actions, and large forces began to pour into the Province of Chahar. Our government, therefore, has had to take determined steps.

Thus hostilities now spread from North to Central China, and Japan finds herself engaged in major conflict with China on extended fields. I am deeply pained to say that some 50,000 Japanese residents in various parts of China have been forced to evacuate, leaving behind them their huge investments and their business interests, acquired through years

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of arduous toil and other interests, while not a few of them have been made victims of hostilities. It is also to be regretted that the nationals of other countries in China are being subjected to similar trials and tribulations.

All this is due to no other cause than that the Nanking government and also local militarist regimes in China have for many years in the past deliberately undertaken to incite the public opinion against Japan as a means of strengthening their own political powers and, in conclusion, with Communist elements, they still further impaired Sino-Japanese relations. Now our loyal and valiant soldiers, with the united support of the nation behind them, are engaged in strenuous campaigns night and day amid indescribable hardships and privations. We cannot but be moved to hear their heroic sacrifices as well as their brilliant achievements.

It is hardly necessary to say that the basic policy of the Japanese government aims for the stabilization of East Asia through conciliation and co-operation between Japan, Manchukuo and China for the common prosperity and well-being. Since China, ignoring our true motive, mobilized her vast armies against us, we can do no other than to counter it by force of arms.

The urgent need at this moment is that we take a resolute attitude and compel China to mend her way. Japan has no other objective than to see a happy and tranquil North China and all China freed from danger of recurrence of such calamitous hostilities as at present, and Sino-Japanese relations so adjusted as to enable us to put into practice our above-mentioned policy. Let us hope that the statesmen of China be brought to take a broad view of East Asia, that they speedily realize their mistakes and that, turning a new leaf, they will act in unison with the high aim and aspirations of Japan.

No. 7

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S WARNING TO AMERICANS IN CHINA

(Special Dispatch to the *Baltimore Sun*, September 6, 1937)

Great Salt Pond, Block Island, R. I., Sept. 5—President Roosevelt gave notice today that American citizens who decline to come out of China will remain there at their own risk.

The President said that the policy with respect to evacuation of American citizens in China is the same as that applied to American citizens in Ethiopia in 1935 and in Spain in 1936.

In each instance they were urged by American diplomatic and consular officials to evacuate and were aided in doing so, the United States Government making it clear that it would take no responsibility for the protection of those who chose to remain.

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The President has set no deadline after which the Government will formally renounce the obligation of protecting, as best it can, American citizens in China. There are still 7,780 American citizens in China, the President said. Some of them are, or were, at distant inland points and so require time to arrange their affairs and reach points of evacuation on the coast. But diplomatic and consular officials have endeavored to reach every American citizen in China with an urgent recommendation that he leave the country. Those who fail to heed this recommendation will remain in China at their own risk, the President warned today.

The "stay-at-your-own risk" warning that the President issued today to American citizens in China, struck a stronger note than has been sounded up to now by either him or the State Department. While backing up the evacuation recommendations issued to American citizens in China by diplomatic and consular officials on the ground, State Department officials have emphasized that there would be no precipitate withdrawal and indicated that those who remained at such points as Shanghai, would be given as much protection as possible.

The President volunteered no exception today for the 2,000 or more American citizens who remain in the International Settlement at Shanghai or for those who remain at Peiping and Tientsin, the other points where American armed forces are stationed. At the same time, he gave no intimation that withdrawal is imminent for the marine guard from Peiping or the regular army detail from Tientsin, both of which forces are authorized by the Boxer protocol, or the marine guard in the International Settlement, which soon would be reinforced by another marine regiment from San Diego.

Likewise, the vessels of the Asiatic fleet will remain along the China coast, although their location from time to time will depend on where new pressure areas develop requiring their aid in evacuating American citizens. By implication the President's comments today emphasized the large and complex dimensions of the evacuation problem quite as much as it did the warning to American citizens that the United States will take no responsibility for them if they choose to remain in China.

No. 8

STATE DEPARTMENT'S WARNING TO AMERICAN SHIPPING
SEPTEMBER 10, 1937

The conflict in the Far East has resulted in the creation of a danger zone along the coast of China which makes it dangerous for American merchant vessels to operate in the adjacent waters.

The Japanese authorities have announced a blockade of the entire coast from Chinwangtao to Pakhoi against the entrance or egress of Chinese shipping.

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The Chinese authorities have announced their intention, in view of the blockade, to take apparent action against all Japanese naval vessels along the Chinese coast and have requested that naval and merchant vessels of third powers avoid proximity to Japanese naval vessels and military transports and have their respective national colors painted on their top decks in a conspicuous manner.

The Chinese authorities have also announced the following:

(A) The mouth of Min River in Fukien Province has been closed to navigation and all shipping through that place has been suspended as of September 4.

(B) Beginning September 9 no foreign merchant vessels will be permitted to navigate at night in waters between Bocca Tigris Forts and Canton.

The State Department was informed that the hydrographic office of the Navy Department included the announcement in the hydrographic radio bulletin issued today and in the daily memorandum for the information of mariners issued by the hydrographic office, under the heading "Caution regarding dangers to merchant ships in Far Eastern waters."

No. 9

STATE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT ON WAR TRADE, SEPTEMBER 14, 1937

Merchant vessels owned by the Government of the United States will not hereafter, until further notice, be permitted to transport to China or Japan any of the arms, ammunition or implements of war which were listed in the President's proclamation of May 1, 1937.

Any other merchant vessels flying the American flag which attempt to transport any of the listed articles to China or Japan will, until further notice, do so at their own risk.

The question of applying the Neutrality Act remains in *status quo*, the Government policy remaining on a twenty-four-hour basis.

No. 10

VICE-ADMIRAL KIYOSHI HASEGAWA'S COMMUNIQUE OF SEPTEMBER 19, 1937

Warning in Advance of Intended Aerial Bombing of Nanking

(For Press Reports on this warning, see Chapter VI of this Pamphlet)

It being the objective of the Japanese operations to bring the present state of hostilities to an early conclusion terminating the hostile actions of the Chinese forces, and Nanking being the principal base of Chinese military operations, the Japanese naval air force may, on the afternoon of the 21st.

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resort to such offensive measures as bombing and otherwise upon the Chinese forces, as well as upon all establishments pertaining to military operations and activities in and around Nanking.

It needs no reiteration that the safety of lives and property of nationals of friendly powers will be taken into full consideration during the projected offensive. However, in view of the possibility of such nationals becoming dangerously involved in the Chino-Japanese hostilities despite such precautions, the commander in chief of the 3d Fleet is constrained earnestly to advise such officials and residents living in and around Nanking to take adequate measures of voluntary moving to areas of greater safety. Foreign warships as well as others proposing to avoid danger in the Yangtse River are advised to moor upstream from Hsiasanshan.

No. 11

ADMIRAL HARRY P. YARNELL'S REPLY TO THE FOREGOING COMMUNIQUE
OF VICE-ADMIRAL HASEGAWA

My Dear Admiral Hasegawa:

I have received a notice issued through the Japanese Consul General in reference to proposed bombing of Nanking by the Japanese naval air force, operations to begin afternoon of September 21. This notice contained advice to foreign ships to move upstream from Hsiasanshan.

The United States Navy has at Nanking two river gunboats, the Luzon and the Guam. These two ships are anchored abreast the Butterfield & Swire pontoon. So long as the United States Embassy and other American nationals remain in Nanking, it is necessary that these two vessels remain also.

These two vessels are distinguished by the United States flag spread horizontally on their upper works. It is requested that you issue the necessary instructions to the Japanese naval air force to avoid dropping bombs in the vicinity of these vessels. In the case of Japanese Army planes bombing this vicinity, it is requested that similar instructions be issued.

No. 12

TEXT OF THE AMERICAN PROTEST, DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1937, AGAINST
JAPAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT TO BOMB NANKING

The American Government refers to the statement by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Third Fleet which was handed to the American Consul General at Shanghai on Sept. 19, announcing the project of the Japanese Naval Air Force, after 12 o'clock noon of Sept. 21, 1937, to resort to bombing and other measures of offensive in and around the city of Nanking.

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and warning the officials and nationals of third powers living there "to take adequate measures for voluntary moving into areas of greater safety."

The American Government objects both to such jeopardizing of the lives of its nationals and of non-combatants generally and to the suggestion that its officials and nationals now residing in and around Nanking should withdraw from the areas in which they are lawfully carrying on their legitimate activities.

Immediately upon being informed of the announcement under reference, the American Government gave instruction to the American Ambassador at Tokyo to express to the Japanese Government this government's concern; and that instruction was carried out. On the same day, the concern of this government was expressed by the Acting Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington.

This government holds the view that any general bombing of an extensive area wherein there resides a large populace engaged in peaceful pursuits is unwarranted and contrary to principles of law and of humanity. Moreover, in the present instance the period allowed for withdrawal is inadequate, and, in view of the wide area over which Japanese bombing operations have prevailed, there can be no assurance that even in areas to which American nationals and non-combatants might withdraw they would be secure.

Notwithstanding the reiterated assurance that "the safety of the lives and property of nationals of friendly powers will be taken into full consideration during the projected offensive," this Government is constrained to observe that experience has shown that, when and where aerial bombing operations are engaged in, no amount of solicitude on the part of the authorities responsible therefor is effective toward ensuring the safety of any persons or any property within the area of such operations.

Reports of bombing operations by Japanese planes at and around Nanking both before and since the issuance of the announcement under reference indicate that these operations almost invariably result in extensive destruction of non-combatant life and non-military establishments.

In view of the fact that Nanking is the seat of government in China and that there the American Ambassador and other agencies of the American Government carry on their essential functions, the American Government strongly objects to the creation of a situation in consequence of which the American Ambassador and other agencies of this Government are confronted with the alternative of abandoning their establishments or being exposed to grave hazards.

In the light of the assurances repeatedly given by the Japanese Government that the objectives of Japanese military operations are limited strictly to Chinese military agencies and establishments and that the Japanese Government has no intention of making non-military property and non-combatants the direct objects of attack, and of the Japanese Government's expression of its desire to respect the embassies, warships and merchant vessels of the powers at Nanking, the American Government cannot believe

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that the intimation that the whole Nanking area may be subjected to bombing operations represents the considered intent of the Japanese Government.

The American Government, therefore, reserving all rights on its own behalf and on behalf of American nationals in respect to damages which might result from Japanese military operations in the Nanking area, expresses the earnest hope that further bombing in and around the city of Nanking will be avoided.

No. 13

JAPAN'S NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 29, 1937, IN REPLY TO AMERICA'S NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 22, REGARDING NANKING BOMBING

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have duly noted the contents of Your Excellency's note No. 780 of September 22 regarding the bombing of Nanking by Japanese forces.

As Your Excellency's government is well aware, Nanking is exceptionally strongly fortified and it is the most important strategic base of military operations for the Chinese forces.

The bombing of the military facilities and equipment located in and around the said city is a necessary and unavoidable measure for the attainment of the military objectives of the Japanese forces. It goes without saying that bombing operations by Japanese forces will be strictly confined to such scope and will not be aimed at non-combatants, as evidenced by the fact that warning was given even to Chinese non-combatants.

The frequently stated policy of the imperial Japanese government to respect, as far as possible, the rights and interests of third countries and the safety of the lives and property of the nationals thereof remains unaltered in the present bombing operations.

The recent proposal of the imperial Japanese government that the officials, citizens and vessels of your excellency's country take refuge was the result of the desire to avoid, if possible, the occurrence of injury to nationals of third countries, which might be unavoidable, notwithstanding the greatest precautions which may be taken by the Japanese forces.

It is hoped that Your Excellency's government will understand that the imperial Japanese government has desired the safety of the nationals of third countries, in spite of the fact that the Japanese forces are restricted in their strategic movements by reason of the giving of advance warnings, and it is earnestly hoped that your excellency's government, with full appreciation of the circumstances, will cooperate with the measures taken by the imperial Japanese government.

Furthermore, the view of the Imperial Japanese government with regard to damages sustained by nationals of third countries as a result of the present hostilities in China is as stated in my note of August 31.

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No. 14

ADMIRAL HARRY P. YARNELL'S STATEMENT, SHANGHAI, SEPTEMBER 24, 1937, REGARDING PROTECTION OF AMERICAN LIVES AND PROPERTY

Naval vessels will be stationed in ports where American citizens are concentrated, and will remain there until it is no longer possible or necessary to protect them or until they have been evacuated. This policy, based on our duties and obligations, will be continued as long as the present controversy between China and Japan exists, and will continue in full force even after our nationals have been warned to leave China and after an opportunity to leave has been given.

Most American citizens now in China are engaged in businesses or professions which are their only means of livelihood. These persons are unwilling to leave until their businesses have been destroyed or they are forced to leave due to actual physical danger.

Until such time comes our naval forces cannot be withdrawn without failure in our duty and without bringing great discredit on the United States Navy.

In giving assistance and protection our naval forces may at times be exposed to dangers which will in most cases be slight but in any case these risks must be accepted.

No. 15

STATE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT, OCTOBER 6, 1937

The Department of State has been informed by the American Minister to Switzerland of the text of the report adopted by the advisory committee of the League of Nations setting forth the advisory committee's examination of the facts of the present situation in China and the treaty obligations of Japan. The Minister has further informed the department that this report was adopted and approved by the assembly of the League of Nations today, October 6.

Since the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East, the Government of the United States has urged upon both the Chinese and the Japanese governments that they refrain from hostilities, and has offered to be of assistance in an effort to find some means, acceptable to both parties to the conflict, of composing by pacific methods the situation in the Far East.

The Secretary of State in statements made public on July 16 and August 23 made clear the position of the Government of the United States in regard to international problems throughout the world and as applied specifically to the hostilities which are at present unfortunately going on between China and Japan.

Among the principles which in the opinion of the Government of the

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United States should govern international relationships, if peace is to be maintained, are abstinence by all nations from the use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations; adjustment of problems in international relations by process of peaceful negotiation and agreement; respect by all nations for the rights of others and observance by all nations of established obligations, and the upholding of the principle of the sanctity of treaties.

On October 5 at Chicago the President elaborated these principles, emphasizing their importance, and in a discussion of the world situation pointed out that there can be no stability for peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all; that international anarchy destroys every foundation for peace; that it jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small; and that it is therefore of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that respect for treaties and international morality be restored.

In the light of the unfolding developments in the Far East the Government of the United States has been forced to the conclusion that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power treaty of February 6, 1922, regarding principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, and to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928. Thus the conclusions of this Government with respect to the foregoing are in general accord with those of the Assembly of the League of Nations.

No. 16

JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT

The League of Nations regards Japan's action in China as violation of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Antiwar Pact. The United States published a statement to the same effect.

This was due to misunderstanding Japan's true intentions. The Japanese government extremely regrets this misunderstanding.

The present conflict was caused by Chinese troops' irregular attacks on Japanese troops which were stationed in North China according to treaty stipulations. Japanese were maneuvering at Lukouchiao with a small number of troops, as Japanese garrisons were widely scattered during peace time.

After the outbreak of the trouble, Japan tried to settle locally and the action of the Japanese troops was nothing more than a measure of self-defense. Japan had no other intention whatever.

Aggravation of the conflict in Shanghai and North China was due to the attitude of the Chinese, who, violating the Shanghai truce agreement signed

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in 1932, stationed 40,000 troops in the demilitarized zone and were planning to murder 30,000 Japanese residents, including women and children.

At that time the Japanese forces were only 3,000 strong. Thus, China is responsible for the aggravation of the situation because she disregarded Japan's nonaggression policy and mobilized a huge number of troops against Japan.

This forced Japan to take military action. Japan's military operations in China today have been entirely caused by China's provocative attitude. Japan's action is entirely in self-defense.

What Japan wants in taking the present action is to eradicate China's anti-Japanese policy and maintain peace in the Far East cooperating with China.

Japan has no territorial ambitions.

Accordingly, Japan's action in China violates no existing treaties in any way whatever. On the contrary, China in carrying out her stubborn anti-Japanese policy, incited by Red influence, is planning to drive out Japanese rights and interests from China by force of arms.

It is China's government that is violating the spirit of the pact against war, menacing the peace of the world.

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What the democracies would like is to remain undisturbed in the enjoyment of all their possessions. They would like to keep what they have, not only their colonies and their dependencies, but also their monopolies and their preferences, and they would like never to have to defend what they have. Thus they can barely persuade themselves to make the relatively small concessions embodied in Secretary Hull's policies, and for the rest they would like to keep the world in order by reminding it that it would be as noble as it would be convenient for them if all treaties were habitually respected.

*Walter Lippmann, in the New York Herald Tribune,
October 16, 1937.*

According to the Department of Commerce at Washington the emergency ordinance just put into effect by the Japanese Government affects only less than one per cent of the total value of American exports to Japan.

In the first seven months of 1937 Japan bought \$192,000,000 worth of goods from the United States. In July alone American exports to Japan totalled \$27,000,000.

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AMERICA'S ORIENTAL TRADE

(Value in dollars)

1935

	<i>Exports To</i>	<i>Imports From</i>
JAPAN	203,155,000	151,142,000
CHINA	38,984,000	63,783,000

1936

JAPAN	204,186,000	172,395,000
CHINA	46,535,000	73,252,000

0678

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA


1-1336

COMSOPAT
FROM
February 12, 1938

Received 3:55 p.m.

ACTION NAVY OPNAV
INFO

CINCAF ADM
2ND BRIGADE USMC
COMDESRON 5
COMSUBRON 5
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
AMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING



793.94

0012. South China ports quiet. 2000.

sms;enb

793.94/12407

F/A
FILED
FEB 13 1938

1679

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS


Plain

FROM
COMYANGPAT

Rec'd 7:32 p.m., February 12,
1938.

OPNAV Washington.
INFO CINCAF
MARBRIG U.S.M.C.
YANGPAT
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMSOPAT
AMBASSADOR CHINA

USS MARBLE HEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING



0012 Yangtze River ports quiet 2030

sms emb

793.94/12403

FF/A
FEB 14 1938

068

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

VM

1-1230

FROM

2nd BRIGADE USMC

February 13, 1938

Rec'd 12:15 p.m.

ACTION: CINCAF (FLAG & ADMIN) OPNAV
 INFO: AMCON AT SHANGHAI, COMSUBRON 5-ASST NAVATTACHE
 SHANGHAI-COMDESRON 5-COMYANGPAT-GOMSOPAT-AMAMBAS-
 SADOR CHINA-USS MARBLEHEAD NAVAL ATTACHE PEIPING

793.94

8613 No reports Tsingpu situation on Pinghan line,
 extensive guerilla activities in progress south
 Paotingfu, rail line reported ruptured several places.
 Japanese have recaptured airdrome south Wuhu. 1828

HPD

793.94 / 12409


F/A
 FILED
 FEB 16 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

CINCUS




February 13, 1938
 FROM
 Received 4 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO:

CINCAF (FLAG) & (ADMIN)
 2ND BRIGADE
 COMSUBRON 5
 COMDESRON 5
 COMYANGPAT
 AMBASSADOR CHINA
 USS MARBLEHEAD
 NAVAL ATTACHE PEIPING



0013 Fifteen bsp two blp raided vicinity Canton,
 objective believed railroads north and west of city,
 other south China ports quiet. 2000

KLP

793.94/12410


FILED
 F/A
 FEB 16 1938

168

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA



COMYANGPAT

FROM


February 13, 1938

Rec'd 4 p.m.

ACTION: CENAV

INFO:

CINCAF (FLAG) & (ADMIN)
2ND BRIGADE
YANGPAT
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON
CINCUS
AMBASSADOR CHINA
USC MARBLEHEAD
NAVY ATTACHE PEIPING



0013 Yangtze River ports quiet. 2147.

KLP

793.94

793.94/12411

R/A
FILED
FEB 19 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJP

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased
 before being communi-
 cated to anyone, (C)

FROM

Tokyo

Dated February 12, 1938

Rec'd 1:10 p. m.

Secretary of State,



Washington.

100, February 12, noon.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.~~

One. My British colleague who talks to me
 freely and so far as I can judge frankly, has told me
 of the following conversation with the Minister for
 Foreign Affairs on February 9 which would appear to
 be significant owing to the marked change in the
 Minister's usually placid, courteous and friendly
 bearing. The fact that for the first time in our
 respective dealings with him Hirota twice lost his
 temper with Craigie might be due to nervousness
 engendered by the strain of the current sessions of
 the Diet or the mounting irritation at the tone,
 insistence and volume of Craigie's continual repre-
 sentations both oral and written in connection with
 British interests in China or perhaps to both. The
 Minister's demeanor tends to confirm reports which
 have come to both Craigie and myself that Hirota is
 steadily becoming harder and more intransigent as
 regards foreign interests in the Far East and that

it



793.94/12412

F/A

793.94

701 4196

DECLASSIFIED AUTHORITY: letter
 in July 1994, State Dept.
 By CD Date 11-23-70

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MJP -2- No. 100, February 12, noon from Tokyo

it is Hirota rather than Suetsugu who leads the ultra Chauvinistic element in the Government. I myself have as yet seen no outward demonstration of any change of attitude on Hirota's part as regards American interests.

Two. The conversation referred to arose when Craigie informed the Minister that he is in possession of evidence indicating that Japanese forces have occupied several of the smaller Chinese islands in the general vicinity of Hong Kong and again asked for specific assurances that the statements of the Japanese Government that it has no territorial designs in China apply as well to the islands as to the mainland. According to Craigie the Minister in some instances in their intercourse became very angry, inveighed against the continual British demands for renewed assurances, said that under present war conditions Japan had given all the assurances that can reasonably be expected, and asserted that if the warfare is prolonged Japan may be forced to occupy more territory whether insular or on the mainland. If the warfare becomes permanent, said Hirota, the occupation will also be permanent. Referring specifically to Hainan, Hirota said that the Japanese could

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MJP - 3 - No. 100, February 12, noon from Tokyo

74-94
 could not possibly give a permanent pledge not to occupy. Craigie pointed out that whereas Hong Kong cannot be regarded as a threat to Japan the occupation of these islands by Japanese forces does constitute a very real threat to Hong Kong. The general tone of this conversation appears to have been acrimonious.

Three. Craigie is aware that there are large concentration of Japanese troops in Formosa (see our 793-94/12259 61, January 31, 6 p. m.) and of Japanese ships in the port of Takao and he believes that an attack on Canton or some other point in South China is impending.

803-1
 Four. Craigie's general reaction to this conversation with Hirota is that the longer the warfare is prolonged the greater will be the likelihood of permanent occupation by Japan not only of the islands but of territory on the mainland. He believes that Japanese assurances of "no territorial designs" are likely to be withdrawn at short notice. These prospects so seriously concern British interests that he contemplates recommending or has already recommended to his Government (a) that continued support of Chiang Kai Shek, whether by furnishing war supplies and funds or otherwise, is detrimental

893.21
 to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MJP - 4 - No. 100, February 12, noon from Tokyo

to British interests and (b) that the British Government should be alert to foster any outlook for peace negotiations which might leave to China any hope of eventual resurrection.

(END SECTION ONE)

GREW

HPD:WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

This telegram must be _____ TOKYO
 closely paraphrased
 before being communi-
 cated to anyone (c)

Dated February 12, 1938
 FROM

Received 3:20 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

100, February 12, noon. (Section Two.)

Five. Craigie is informed and believes that it was the Japanese industrialists and politicians and not the military who favored and brought about the withdrawal of recognition from the Central Government.

Six. I think that the nature of the conversation reported above indicates that our own practice of concentrating our representations to the Minister on important issues and with discreet timing is likely to prove more effective than the British practice of constant hammering by almost daily notes, letters, and other communications with continual personal visits to the Minister or the Vice Minister both on important and routine issues. The British procedure appears to be based on the theory that constant hammering will wear away a stone but in the present temper of the Japanese Government and military this practice is liable to defeat its own object

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EDA - 2 - #100, February 12, noon from Tokyo

object through the irritation which it inevitably engenders, clearly demonstrated in Craigie's last interview with the Minister. The representations of the American Government are at least listened to with respect and an evident inclination on the part of the Foreign Office to meet our wishes so far as the military can be influenced in that direction.

74' ad
 Seven. About two weeks ago Craigie told me that he had heard from a trustworthy source that there was to be a change for the better in the Japanese attitude toward Great Britain and that press and other agitation against the British was to be discontinued. I did not put much stock in Craigie's information. Since then General Matsui in the interview which he gave to Woodhead sharply criticised the British for trying to create political issues out of the problem of preserving British economic and commercial interests in China while the Japanese press has expressed the conviction that it was Great Britain which initiated the three power demarche with regard to naval construction. The feeling in Japan against the British is not in our opinion altogether artificially created as Craigie

believes

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EDA - 3 - #100, February 12, noon from Tokyo

believes it to be but flows from the conviction
that the British are constantly endeavoring to es-
tablish a common front against Japan in order to
preserve British political and economic interests
in the Far East. *End of message.*

Repeated to Hankow.

GREW

SIS:ELB

WTS
3-12-36

0691

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Tokyo
Dated February 12, 1938
Rec'd 1:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

100, February 12, noon.
~~Strictly Confidential~~

CONFIDENTIAL: letter

State Dept.

Date 11-22-76

One. My British colleague who talks to me freely and so far as I can judge frankly, has told me of the following conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on February 9 which would appear to be significant owing to the marked change in the Minister's usually placid, courteous and friendly bearing. The fact that for the first time in our respective dealings with him Hirota twice lost his temper with Craigie might be due to nervousness engendered by the strain of the current sessions of the Diet or the mounting irritation at the tone, insistence and volume of Craigie's continual representations both oral and written in connection with British interests in China or perhaps to both. The Minister's demeanor tends to confirm reports which have come to both Craigie and myself that Hirota is steadily becoming harder and more intransigent as regards foreign interests in the Far East and that it is Hirota rather than Suetsugu who leads the ultra Chauvinistic element in the Government. I myself have as yet seen no outward demonstration of any change of attitude on Hirota's part as regards American interests.

Two. The conversation referred to arose when Craigie informed the Minister that he is in possession of evidence indicating that Japanese forces have occupied several of the smaller Chinese islands in the general vicinity of Hong Kong and again asked for specific assurances that the statements of the Japanese Government that it has no territorial designs in China apply as well to the islands as to the mainland. According to Craigie the Minister in some instances in their intercourse became very angry, inveighed against the continual British demands for renewed assurances, said that under present war conditions Japan had given all the assurances that can reasonably be expected, and asserted that if the warfare is prolonged Japan may be forced to occupy more territory whether insular or on the mainland. If the warfare becomes permanent, said Hirota, the occupation will also be permanent. Referring specifically to Hainan, Hirota said that the Japanese could not possibly give a permanent pledge not to occupy. Craigie pointed out that whereas Hong Kong cannot be regarded as a threat to Japan the occupation of these islands by Japanese forces does constitute a very real threat to Hong Kong. The general tone of this conversation appears to have been acrimonious.

Three. Craigie is aware that there are large concentrations of Japanese troops in Formosa (see our 61, January 31, 6 p.m.) and of Japanese ships in the port of Takao and he believes that an attack on Canton or some other point in South China is impending.

Four. Craigie's general reaction to this conversation with Hirota is that the longer the warfare is prolonged the greater will be the likelihood of permanent occupation by Japan not only of the islands but of territory on the mainland. He believes that Japanese assurances of "no territorial designs" are likely to be withdrawn at short notice. These prospects so seriously concern British

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

interests that he contemplates recommending ~~or has already recommended~~ or has already recommended to his Government (a) that continued support of Chiang Kai Shek, whether by furnishing war supplies and funds or otherwise, is detrimental to British interests and (b) that the British Government should be alert to foster any outlook for peace negotiations which might leave to China any hope of eventual resurrection.

Five. Craigie is informed and believes that it was the Japanese industrialists and politicians and not the military who favored and brought about the withdrawal of recognition from the Central Government.

Six. I think that the nature of the conversation reported above indicates that our own practice of concentrating our representations to the Minister on important issues and with discreet timing is likely to prove more effective than the British practice of constant hammering by almost daily notes, letters, and other communications with continual personal visits to the Minister or the Vice Minister both on important and routine issues. The British procedure appears to be based on the theory that constant hammering will wear away a stone but in the present ~~mm~~ temper of the Japanese Government and military this practice is liable to defeat its own object through the irritation which it inevitably engenders, clearly demonstrated in Craigie's last interview with the Minister. The representations of the American Government are at least listened to with respect and an evident inclination on the part of the Foreign Office to meet our wishes so far as the military can be influenced in that direction.

Seven. About two weeks ago Craigie told me that he had heard from a trustworthy source that there was to be a change for the better in the Japanese attitude toward Great Britain and that press and other agitation against the British was to be discontinued. I did not put much stock in Craigie's information. Since then General Matsui in the interview which he gave to Woodhead sharply criticized the British for trying to create political issues out of the problem of preserving British economic and commercial interests in China while the Japanese press has expressed the conviction that it was Great Britain which initiated the three power demarche with regard to naval construction. The feeling in Japan against the British is not in our opinion altogether artificially created as Craigie believes it to be but flows from the conviction that the British are constantly endeavoring to establish a common front against Japan in order to preserve British political and economic interests in the Far East.

Memorandum to Moscow.

GREW

0692

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.4 and 1.5(2) or
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1992
BY: 2016, 01/14/94 NARS, Date: 7/2/94

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJP

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communi-
cated to anyone. (C)

FROM

Tokyo

Dated February 12, 1938

Rec'd 1:10 p. m.


Secretary of State,
Washington.

100, February 12, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

One, My British colleague who talks to me
freely and so far as I can judge frankly, has told me
of the following conversation with the Minister for
Foreign Affairs on February 9 which would appear to
be significant owing to the marked change in the
Minister's usually placid, courteous and friendly
bearing. The fact that for the first time in our
respective dealings with him Hirota twice lost his
temper with Craigie might be due to nervousness
engendered by the strain of the current sessions of
the Diet or the mounting irritation at the tone,
insistence and volume of Craigie's continual repre-
sentations both oral and written in connection with
British interests in China or perhaps to both. The
Minister's demeanor tends to confirm reports which
have come to both Craigie and myself that Hirota is
steadily becoming harder and more intransigent as
regards foreign interests in the Far East and that

it



793.94/12412

F/A

793.94

note
701.419484.021
741.94

it is Hirota rather than Suetsugu who leads the ultra Chauvinistic element in the Government. I myself have as yet seen no outward demonstration of any change of attitude on Hirota's part as regards American interests.

893.0146

84:014

MJP - 3 - No. 100, February 12, noon from Tokyo

could not possibly give a permanent pledge not to occupy. Craigie pointed out that whereas Hong Kong cannot be regarded as a threat to Japan the occupation of these islands by Japanese forces does constitute a very real threat to Hong Kong. The general tone of this conversation appears to have been acrimonious.

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to

0695

DECLASSIFIED: A.S. 11452, Dec. 1 and 5, 1977
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
BY DAVID L. HILLYARD NARS, Date 11/17/88

MJP - 4 - No. 100, February 12, noon from Tokyo

to British interests and (b) that the British Government should be alert to foster any outlook for peace negotiations which might leave to China any hope of eventual resurrection.

(END SECTION ONE)

GREW

HPD:WWC

EDA

TOKYO

Dated February 12, 1938

FROM

Received 3:20 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

100, February 12, noon. (Section Two.)

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0697

DECLASSIFIED: 11-11-80, Ser. 51A) and 51A) or 11-11-80
 Department of State Letter, August 10, 1922
 By William C. Heston NARS, Date 12-11-80

EDA - 2 - #100, February 12, noon from Tokyo

object through the irritation which it inevitably engenders, clearly demonstrated in Craigie's last interview with the Minister. The representations of the American Government are at least listened to with respect and an evident inclination on the part of the Foreign Office to meet our wishes so far as the military can be influenced in that direction.

741.94
 Seven. About two weeks ago Craigie told me that he had heard from a trustworthy source that there was to be a change for the better in the Japanese attitude toward Great Britain and that press and other agitation against the British was to be discontinued. I did not put much stock in Craigie's information. Since then General Matsui in the interview which he gave to Woodhead sharply criticised the British for trying to create political issues out of the problem of preserving British economic and commercial interests in China while the Japanese press has expressed the conviction that it was Great Britain which initiated the three power démarche with regard to naval construction. The feeling in Japan against the British is not in our opinion altogether artificially created as Craigie

believes

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, D.C., August 10, 1947
 Department of State, London, August 10, 1947
 By William C. Burdette SANS, Date 8-10-47

WTB
3-12-36

Repeated to Hankow.

SMS : EMB

TELEGRAM No. 100 from TOKYO, Japan, dated February 12, 1938, noon

DISTRIBUTION:

<u>Office Symbol</u>	<u>Office Title</u>	<u>Chief, or Head of Office</u>
S	Secretary	Cordell Hull
U	Under Secretary	Sumner Welles
C	Counselor	R. Walton Moore
A-M	Assistant Secretary	George S. Messersmith
A-S	Assistant Secretary	Francis B. Sayre
PA/H	Adviser on Political Relations	Stanley K. Hornbeck
PA/D	Adviser on Political Relations	James C. Dunn
PEIS	Adviser on Internat'l Economic Affairs	- Herbert Feis
EU	Division of European Affairs	Jay Pierrepont Moffat
PE	Division of Far Eastern Affairs	Maxwell M. Hamilton

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Miriam D. Guevara NAB, date 12-18-75

0644

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1238

COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.

SPECIAL GRAY
FROM

Canton via N. R.

Dated February 14, 1938

Rec'd 8:15 a.m.

Secretary of State, *DT*
Washington.

February 14, 2 p.m.

FOR THE WAR DEPARTMENT FROM ROBERTS.

"Referring to Department's February 8, 7 p.m., weekly summary, sent to Hong Kong 11th by messenger for despatch by air mail. Same method will hereafter be followed whenever possible.

In view of present situation and conditions in both Kwangtung and Kwangsi it is believed that the results obtainable at present juncture would not be sufficiently worth while to warrant expense of proposed trip. In any event it is recommended that consideration be deferred at least one month to allow local situation to become clarified and through traffic started on new roads in Kwangsi and Yunnan".

LINNELL

RR:WWC

793.94/12413


F/A

RECEIVED
FEB 14 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR



FROM
SECOND BRIGADE USMC

February 14, 1938

Rec'd 8 a.m.

ACTION: CINFAG FLAG & ADMIN
OPNAV

INFO: AMCON SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
ASST NAVAL ATTACHE SHANGHAI
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
NAVAL ATTACHE PEIPING



8613. No reports Tsingpu situation on Pinghan line
extensive guerrilla activities in progress south Paotingfu
rail line reported ruptured several places. Japanese have
recaptured airdrome south Wuhu. 1828.

RR

793.94/12414

FILED
FEB 17 1938

F/A

070

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COPIES SENT TO
CIN. AND M.I.D.

SECOND BRIGADE USMC
FROM
February 14, 1938

Rec'd 8:25 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF FLAG & ADMIN
OPNAV

INFO: AMCON SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
ASST NAVAL ATTACHE SHANGHAI
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
CINCUS
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
NAVAL ATTACHE PEIPING

Division of
NAVIES
NAVY
NAVY
NAVY

193.94
8614. Japanese now across Hwai River in force advance
units reached point 15 miles north Pengpu on Pinghan. Two
columns advancing rapidly southward, one reached point
20 miles south Tangyin, other column occupied Taokow 24
miles southeast Tangyin. 1840.

RR

FILED
FEB 17 1938

793.94/12415

E/A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

1-1838
FROM
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping via N. R.

Dated February 14, 1938

Rec'd 8:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

110, February 14, 6 p.m.

Embassy's 104, February 11, 5 p.m.

One. Passenger trains on the Peiping Hankow Railway have not left or arrived at Peiping yesterday and today except for service between Peiping and Changhsintien, a few miles south of Peiping. This partially substantiates widespread but unconfirmed reports of activities of Chinese irregulars at Paoting and points along the railway south thereof.

Two. Press reports of Japanese advance southward in Southern Hopei have not been confirmed. An American reports that several tens of thousands of Japanese troops have moved during the last few days from Shihkiachuang in the direction of Taiyuan. With large numbers of Japanese troops already in Shansi and in Southern Hopei and Northern Honan, it is doubtful whether irregulars to the north of them can seriously hamper their movements unless the irregulars are supported strongly by the National Government.

Repeated to Hankow. By mail to Tokyo.

RR:WVC

LOCKHART

793.94/12416

FILED

F/A

TELEGRAM No. 110 from PEIPING, dated February 14, 1938, 6 P.M.

DISTRIBUTION:

<u>Office Symbol</u>	<u>Office Title</u>	<u>Chief, or Head of Office</u>
S	Secretary	Cordell Hull
U	Under Secretary	Sumner Welles
C	Counselor	R. Walton Moore
A-M	Assistant Secretary	George S. Messersmith
A-S	Assistant Secretary	Francis B. Sayre
SA	Special Assistant to the Secretary of State	Leo Pasvolksy
LE	Legal Adviser	Green H. Hackworth
PA/E	Adviser on Political Relations	Stanley K. Hornbeck
PA/D	Adviser on Political Relations	James C. Dunn
FEIS	Adviser on International Economic Affairs	Herbert Feis
FE	Division of Far Eastern Affairs	Maxwell M. Hamilton
CI	Division of Current Information	Michael J. McDermott
CC	Chief Clerk and Administrative Assistant	Edward Yardley

(over, please)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

0704

TELEGRAM No. 110 from PEIPING, dated February 14, 1938, 6 p.m. (Continued)

<u>Office Symbol</u>	<u>Office Title</u>	<u>Chief, or Head of Office</u>
CA	Office of Arms and Munitions Control	Joseph C. Green
SAVAGE	Office of the Historical Adviser	Hunter Miller, Chief Carlton Savage, Asst. Historical Adviser
RA	Division of American Republics	Laurence Duggan
EU	Division of European Affairs	Jay Pierrepont Moffat
NE	Division of Near Eastern Affairs	Wallace Murray

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Davis NARS, Date 12-18-75

2705

0704

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

GRAY
Peiping via N.R.
Dated February 14, 1938
Rec'd *:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

110, February 14, 6 p.m.
Embassy's 104, February 11, 5 p.m.

One. Passenger trains on the Peiping Hankow Railway have not left or arrived at Peiping yesterday and today except for service between Peiping and Changhsientien, a few miles south of Peiping. This partially substantiates widespread but unconfirmed reports of activities of Chinese irregulars at Paoing and points along the railway south thereof.

Two. Press reports of Japanese advance southward in Southern Hopei have not been confirmed. An American reports that several tens of thousands of Japanese troops have moved during the last few days from Shihkiachuang in the direction of Taiyuan. With large numbers of Japanese troops already in Shansi and in Southern Hopei and Northern Honan, it is doubtful whether irregulars to the north of them can seriously hamper their movements unless the irregulars are supported strongly by the National Government.

Repeated to Hankow. By mail to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1552

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1226

FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated February 14, 1938


Rec'd Noon

COPIES SENT
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

255, February 14, noon.

A number of acts of terrorism were committed last week. Four severed heads of Chinese were discovered in the French concession, the first being that of the editor of an anti-Japanese vernacular paper, the other three not having been identified. To two of the heads were attached warnings in Chinese against carrying on anti-Japanese activities. Bombs were also detonated without injuring any one, on the premises of the SHANGHAI EVENING POST AND MERCURY, the HWA MEI WAN PAO which is allegedly partially owned by an American citizen and a vernacular paper being operated by British subject. It is understood that Chinese employed by these papers received threatening letters before the bombings occurred warning them not to publish further anti-Japanese items. In the case of the bombing of the EVENING POST AND MERCURY the police arrested two Chinese who have confessed the crime but from whom no information appears to have been elicited thus far regarding the



793.94/12417

F/A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4653

-2- #255, February 14, noon, from Shanghai via N. R.

the identity of the party or parties who instigated the bombings. It is believed in some circles, however, that both the bombings and beheadings were committed by a terrorist organization working directly or indirectly under Japanese direction. Repeated to Peiping and Hankow.

GAUSS

CSB

0709

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Washington Star

FEB 10 1938



793.94/12417

AMERICAN PUBLISHER GUARDED IN SHANGHAI

Bodyguard Provided After Bomb-
ing of Newspaper Plant—Anti-
Japanese Propaganda Charged.
By the Associated Press.

SHANGHAI, Feb. 10.—H. P. Mills,
American publisher of a Chinese
language newspaper here, was accord-
ed a bodyguard by the International
Settlement police today after his news
plant was bombed and he received a
letter threatening death.

Mills, who is from New Orleans,
made his appeal for protection to the
American consulate. His newspaper,
the Hwa Mei Wan Pao, and another,
the Fang Wei Pao, were bombed and
wrecked by terrorists tonight. Three
Chinese were injured.

The papers have been accused of
printing anti-Japanese articles, and
the letter to Mills was reported to
have demanded that such publication
be halted.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM Chefoo via N. R.

Dated February 14, 1938

Rec'd 12:04 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

February 14, 2 p.m.

Japanese marines have been proceeding eastward from
Chefoo to Muping (Ninghai) by motor 13th and 14th. Current
reports indicate that armed Chinese in bodies of
considerable size in mountains south of Muping are
opposed to Chinese authorities of the new regime. There
are no Americans in Shantung east of Chefoo.

ALLEN

DDM:RR

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 14 1938
Department of State

FILED
FEB 14 1938

793.94/12418

F/M

TELEGRAM From CHEFOO (Unnumbered), dated February 14, 1938, 2 p.m.

748,94/12418

DISTRIBUTION:

Office Symbol

Office Title

Chief, or Head of Office

S	Secretary	Cordell Hull
U	Under Secretary	Sumner Welles
C	Counselor	R. Walton Moore
A-M	Assistant Secretary	George S. Messersmith
A-S	Assistant Secretary	Francis B. Sayre
LE	Legal Adviser	Green H. Hackworth
PA/H	Adviser on Political Relations	Stanley K. Hornbeck
FEIS	Adviser on International Economic Affairs	Herbert Feis
FE	Division of Far Eastern Affairs	Maxwell M. Hamilton
CI	Division of Current Information	Michael J. McDermott
CC	Chief Clerk and Administrative Assistant	Edward Yardley
FA	Division of Foreign Service Administration	Nathaniel P. Davis

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Davis NARS, Date 12-18-75

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

21
GRAY
Chefoo via NAR.
Dated Feb. 14, 1938
Rec'd 12:04 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

February 14, 2 p.m.

Japanese marines have been proceeding eastward from Chefoo to Muping (Ninghai) by motor 13th and 14th. Current reports indicate that armed Chinese in bodies of considerable size in mountains south of Muping are opposed to Chinese authorities of the new regime. There are no Americans in Shantung east of Chefoo.

ALLEN

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

~~COPY SENT TO~~
~~ONLINE~~

FROM COMSOPAT

February 14, 1938

Rec'd 2:14 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: CINCAF FLAG
SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF ADMINISTRATION
CONYANGPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA

Division of
1938
Department of

0014. Air raid north and east vicinity Canton two
BSP six BLP, other South China ports quiet. 2000.

WWC:JLS

793.94/12419

FILED
FEB 17 1938

0714
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CA

Plain

COPIES SENT TO
~~CHINA~~
DT

FROM COMYANGPAT Feb. 14.

Dated Feb. 14, 1938

Rec'd 9:11 p.m.

Opanv, Washington, Information Cincaf,
Secmarbrig, Yangpat, Comsubron Five,
Comdesron Five, Comsopat, Ambassador
China, Alusna Peiping.

0014 Yangtze river ports quiet 1905.

DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 17 1938
Department of State

793.94

JS

793.94/12420

FEB 17 1938

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED

FEB 12 1938

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

5 Sheldon Terrace,
New Haven, Conn.,
10 February 1938.

Mr. Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Hull:

I write you as one of thousands of American citizens who are greatly distressed by the direction in which our present foreign policy with regard to the Far East is leading us. It appears that we have already drifted a long way down that same road that brought us, in 1917, into war.

In view of the widespread disapproval of the course of action that Japan is pursuing in China, and in the face of our President's remarks at Chicago about "quarantining" aggressor nations, why is it that the reports of your department on armament shipments month after month list large shipments of arms to Japan?

In the face of the State Department's warning to American citizens last September that if they remained in China they must do so at their own risk, and in view of the popular sentiment against protecting American business interests in China at the risk of involvement in war, why are American ships being used to convoy tankers and protect American trade -- as was obviously the case in the Panay incident?

And why do these shipments of arms to both combatants and these measures to protect American interests in China go on in violation of the expressed will of the representatives of the people as revealed in the Neutrality Law? Since when have the President and the Department of State been above the law and not responsible to the people?

These are questions that not only I, but scores of members of my congregation and my fellow-citizens are asking. I trust that you will give them the consideration that is their due.



Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Lurger

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1938 FEB 14 AM 11 47

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



793.94/12421

F/FG

12421

0716

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 25 1938.

In reply refer to
OA 793.94/12421.

Mr. Harold L. Lungar,
5 Sheldon Terrace,
New Haven, Connecticut.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of February 10, 1938 in regard to the shipment of arms to Japan and the protection of American citizens and interests in China.

There is transmitted herewith a copy of the Joint Resolution of Congress approved May 1, 1937, amending the Joint Resolution approved August 31, 1935. You will observe that section 1 (a) of this Joint Resolution states that whenever the President shall find that there exists a state of war between or among two or more foreign states, he shall proclaim such fact. Should the President issue a proclamation finding that a state of war exists between China and Japan the export of arms to both those countries would immediately be prohibited by the terms of the Neutrality Act. In
the

793.94/12421

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

the absence of such a finding, however, there exists no legal authority for preventing the export of arms either to both those countries or to Japan alone.

I may add that the primary purpose of the Joint Resolution of May 1, 1937 is to keep this country out of war. The question as to whether and when the provisions of the Resolution shall be invoked is properly left to the sound discretion of the President.

In deciding whether he should invoke the Resolution in a particular situation the President must take into account various factors and particularly the broad general interests of the country and its nationals. In the present situation in the Far East the President concluded that in the light of all the facts and circumstances when weighed from the practical rather than from a purely theoretical or narrow technical point of view, it would not be to the best interests of this Government and its nationals to invoke the provisions of the Joint Resolution.

In connection with your inquiry concerning the protection of American citizens and interests in China, there is enclosed a copy of a letter addressed to the Vice President, United States Senate, on January 8, 1938,

by

0718

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

by the Secretary of State, with regard to the situation
in the Far East.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Charles W. Yost, Assistant Chief
Office of Arms and Munitions Control

Enclosures:

1. Joint Resolution of
May 1, 1937.
2. To the Vice President,
January 8, 1938.

CR
FEB 25 1938

CA:RVH:MPW:SS
2/24
ewg

FE
REV

A true copy of
the original
is being
sent to
the
State
Department

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
A portion ~~of~~ this telegram ^{FROM} Canton via N. R.
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated to anyone. (A) Dated February 14, 1938

Rec'd 9:09 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

February 14, 3 p.m.

Vernacular press showing renewed anxiety over

possible application American neutrality legislation.
Kwantung Government paper urges cancellation of
legislation and abandonment of isolation policy as only
means whereby America can assist in attainment of
international justice and peace.

Director of Chinese section Hong Kong Railway
announced following summary results of Japanese raiding
of railway up to February 1: ninety-seven raids, eight
hundred forty-five bombs. Damage: bridges five, stations
fifteen, rails two hundred eight, sleepers eight hundred
sixty, other structures (including staff buildings, goods
shelters, work shops) twenty-one, engines six, cars twelve.
Total cost of repairs national currency dollars two
hundred ninety-three thousand seven hundred seventy.

Regarding recent Japanese ^{plot} ~~plots~~ (END PLAIN AND GRAY)
local officials state (GRAY) it was engineered by pro-
Japanese politicians Chen Chung Fu and Li Sze Hao at

Hong Kong

793.94/12422

FILED

F/FG

WBS
5/5/38

793.94

793.94

712
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CORRECTED PAGE

-2- February 14, 3 p.m. from Canton via N. R.

WB
5/5/38

Hong Kong. These two approached Li Fu Lin, local veteran Kuomintang leader, (END GRAY) who promptly informed Yu Han Mou and was instructed by latter to continue negotiating until details of plot learned. (GRAY) Plot involved considerable number Formosans and ^{other} ~~one~~ important Chinese and few hundred local traitors including leader mentioned in my February 8, 3 p.m., and attempt to start (END GRAY) military mutiny by ^{INITIAL} ~~an~~ defection of battalion of Kaungtung troops which contained a number of former military subordinates of Li Fu Lin. (GRAY) Having obtained information and reportedly some Japanese money, authorities forestalled coup by wholesale arrests. (END GRAY) The troops which had been excited through personal ^{explanation} loyalty to Li were quieted after capitulation (with the exception of one company which had to be forcibly disarmed.

WB
5/5/38

(GRAY) Military authorities have given permission for navigation on Canton River to be resumed on February 15th.

Mailed Hong Kong, Swatow.

LINNELL

RR:WVC

172

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- February 14, 3 p.m., from Canton via N. R.

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(GRAY) Military authorities have given permission for navigation on Canton River to be resumed on February 15th.

Mailed Hong Kong, Swatow.

LINNELL

RR:WWC

(*) Apparent omission.

0722

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

[CONFIDENTIAL]

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of February 14, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

Vernacular press is showing renewed anxiety over possible application of American neutrality legislation. Kwangtung Government paper urges cancelation of legislation and abandonment of isolation policy as the only means whereby America can assist in attainment of international justice and peace.

Director of Chinese section, Hong Kong Railway, announced following summary results of Japanese raiding of railway up to February 1: 97 raids, 845 bombs. Damages: bridges 5, stations 15, rails 208, sleepers 860, other structures (including staff buildings, goods shelters, work shops) 21, engines 6, cars 12. Total cost of repairs in national currency \$293,720.

According to information received from officials in Canton, the recent Japanese riots were engineered by pro-Japanese politicians Chen Chung Fu and Li Sze Hao at Hong Kong. These two approached Li Fu Lin, Canton veteran Kuomintang leader. The latter promptly informed Yu Han Mou with regard to the matter and Yu Han Mou instructed Li Fu Lin to go on with negotiations until he should learn the details of the plot. The plot involved a considerable number of Formosans and one important Chinese and a few hundred traitors in Canton, including the

0723

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

the grandson of a former Manchukuo Canton official, and an attempt to start mutiny among the military by means of defection of a battalion of troops from Kwangtung, among which were a number of Li Pu Lin's former military subordinates. Having obtained information and reportedly some Japanese money, authorities forestalled coup by wholesale arrests. Except for one company which had to be disarmed forcibly, the troops which had been aroused through personal loyalty to Li Pu Lin were quieted after capitulation.

Military authorities have given permission for navigation on Canton River to be resumed on February 15.

795.94/12422

89C
FE:EC:HES
2-16

ACR
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tientsin/116 FOR #576 to Embassy, Nanking

FROM Tientsin (Caldwell) DATED Jan 13, 1938
TO NAME 1-1127 *P.O.

REGARDING:

Military activities of the Japanese in Tientsin district during the month. Comment regarding inauguration of a "Provisional Government of the Republic of China" in Peiping on December 14, 1937.

M

793.94 / 12423

12423

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

B. Relations with Other Countries.

Japan.

793.94
1. Military Activities. With the exception of sporadic fighting with Chinese guerilla bands and small units of Chinese troops in southern Hopei, very little military activity on the part of the Japanese in the Tientsin district was reported during the month. Local newspapers carried reports that both the Japanese and Chinese were planning to assume the offensive in Shansi but no major military action took place.

Apparently all Japanese troops that could be spared from Hopei and Shansi, and possibly Chahar, were transferred to the Shantung front where the Japanese crossed the Yellow River on December 23 and advanced in the direction of Tsinan and Chouts'un, an important town on the Tsinan-Isingtao railway about seventy miles east of Tsinan. The Japanese reported the occupation of Chouts'un on December 25 and Tsinan on December 27.

2. Political Activities. As a result of the political activities of the Japanese in North China, apparently directed by General Kita, a "Provisional Government of the Republic of China" was inaugurated in Peiping on December 14, 1937. A detailed list of the officials

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

officials of this Government is now being prepared and will be forwarded shortly. The new Government was apparently busy throughout the remainder of the month in efforts to organize itself and decide who its officials would be, with little evidence of much accomplished.

072

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P.R./528 FOR #3840

FROM Great Britain (Johnson) DATED Jan. 31, 1938
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: British Labor's attitude toward Far Eastern situation.

A Labor deputation asked Mr. Chamberlain to ensure that the British Government would fulfil its obligations under the League and take the lead to assist China and to restrain Japanese aggression.

mb

793.94 / 12424

12424

0728

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

British Labor's Attitude Toward Far Eastern Situation

As mentioned in last week's report a deputation was appointed by the executive leaders of all sections of British Labor and Trade Union movements to present to the Prime Minister Labor's views regarding Japanese aggression. The Labor deputation, as reported in the press, asked Mr. Chamberlain to ensure that the British Government would fulfil its obligations under the Covenant of the League and take the lead at the League Council meeting to assist China and to restrain Japanese aggression. "The deputation insisted that the peaceful nations have an undoubted superiority of resources and could force Japan to renounce aggression if they would only apply sanctions in the proper spirit and not with the weakness that marked the Abyssinian affair." The Prime Minister was reported to have discussed the deputation's suggestions with them and to have explained the manner in which the Government is following developments in the Far Eastern situation.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4654

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1234

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated February 15, 1938

Rec'd 8 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

111, February 15, 4 p.m.

A secretary of the Japanese Embassy called this afternoon and stated that his Embassy has been informed (by?) and the Chief of Staff of General Terauchi's forces that Chingchow will be attacked in the near future, that Japanese planes in a recent reconnoiter over Chingchow observing that Chinese military trains were located near churches, factories, and other property belonging to nationals of third powers, that this proximity might result at the time of attack in destruction of such property, and that, in accordance with the Japanese policy of avoiding damage to the property and person of nationals of third powers, it was suggested that the Ambassador might wish to take steps to persuade the Chinese authorities concerned to increase the distance ~~disintegration~~ between the military trains and the foreign property referred to.

The Secretary stated that he is making the same statement to other diplomatic missions in Peiping and that

793.94/12425

FEB 23 1938

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393.005

WB
3-2-38

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4555

-2- #111, February 15, 4 p.m., from Peiping via N. R.

that it is his understanding that similar representations
are being made by Japanese officials to diplomatic missions
at Tokyo.

Sent to Ambassador and Tokyo.

lockhart

SMS:RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1336

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

COPIES SENT TO
ORIGIN

Dated February 15, 1938

Rec'd 12:47 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

259, February 15, 5 p.m.

Since February 12 the Japanese each day have been

despatching small patrols consisting of from two to
twelve soldiers in charge of a junior or noncommissioned
officer into the International Settlement area south of
Soochow Creek. These patrols march up Nanking Road,
circumvent Thibet Road, and by Peiping Road to the Bund
and back to Hongkew.

I am informed by the intelligence officer of the
4th Marines that according to the Shanghai municipal police
the Japanese did not notify them of their intention to
despatch such patrols into the Settlement and that upon
bringing the matter to the attention of the Japanese
military authorities the police were informed that the
Japanese were merely exercising the same right as is
enjoyed by the other foreign defense forces of sending
out patrols to protect their respective military details.
In the area south of Soochow Creek Japanese details consist
of an occasional Japanese military truck, despatch rider

or

793.94/12426

FILE/FG

FEB 18 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4657

-2- #259, February 15, 5 p.m., from Shanghai.

or staff car.

On three occasions these patrols upon reaching the junction of Bubbling Well Road and Thibet Road have sought to march up Bubbling Well Road which is within the American defense sector. In each instance they have been courteously turned back by the United States Marines on duty at this point.

No serious incidents have occurred thus far but it would not be surprising if Chinese special service agents or terrorists attempted to bomb these patrols whose presence south of Soochow Creek is extremely provocative. Repeated to Hankow and Peiping.

GAUSS

SMS:WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

FROM COMYANGPAT

February 15, 1938

Rec'd 7 p.m.

ACTION: CPNAV

INFO: CINCPAC
SECOND BRIGADE USMC
YANGPAT
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMSOPAT
AMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING

793.94

0015. Yangtze river ports quiet. 2000.

NPL:EIB

793.94/12427

FEB 19 1938

FILE

F/FG

073

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Chutefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

COPIES SENT TO
MILITARY AND NAVAL
ATTACHES

FROM

COMSOPAT

February 15, 1938

Received 5:23 p.m.

ACTION OPNAV
INFO: CINCAF ADMN
SECOND MARBRIG
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
COMYANGPAT
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEI PING

793.94

0015 Hill passage opened for traffic. South China ports
quiet 2000.

NPL:EMB

793.94/12428

FILED
FEB 19 1938

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CL

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (A)

HANKOW VIA N. R.

Dated Feb. 15, 1938

Received 5:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

104, February 15, 3 p.m.

The situation presented in my telegram No. 76, February 3, 2 p.m. as it must of necessity affect American commercial, economic and cultural interests in China is ^{depressing.} It is true that Japan has assured the United States that it has no intention to damage American interests. When American property has been damaged Japan has made haste to compensate the loss. Japan has expressed regrets and made apologies for insults and injuries. But nevertheless it becomes increasingly plain that American interests are being materially and adversely affected as the Japanese military machine rolls ruthlessly and relentlessly on destroying everything in its path. Witness the taking over of the Chinese customs, the making of a new tariff favorable to Japanese trade, the importation of Japanese goods into these areas such as kerosene and rayon in North China, without payment of duties, the destruction of American mission premises, hospitals and schools in Soochow and Wusih, the continued occupation of the American Baptist College at Shanghai, the occupation of Tsinghua at Peiping. We evacuate our people only to have them go back to businesses that have

793.94/12429

FILED

FEB 16 1938

073F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CA

--2--104 from Hankow..

4859

that have been wrecked, mission stations that have been sacked, and unable to say who wrecked them as they had not personally witnessed the wrecking. In many cases evacuated Americans tactfully refused permission to return to their stations or businesses after the Japanese military have completed occupation of the area and hostilities have ceased. I have found it impossible to envisage any plan which might be helpful in enabling Americans to resume where the present hostilities have forced them to leave off. American merchants cannot hope to compete with Japanese for what little business will offer when the period of reconstruction begins, except of course as they may sell to Japanese. American cultural enterprises which had begun to find a new place for themselves in cooperation with newly founded cultural efforts of the Chinese nationalism will suffer because of that cooperation and will find it necessary to cooperate with the Japanese effort at suppression of Chinese nationalism. The whole business of the future of American interests, economic, commercial and cultural, will be so beset with difficulties that many will be discouraged and quit the field.

Repeated to Peiping and Shanghai. Shanghai please relay to Tokyo and show to Commander-in-Chief.

JOHNSON

NPL EMB

0737

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

b [CONFIDENTIAL]

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 104) of February 15, 1938, from the American Ambassador at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

The Ambassador refers to his telegram (no. 76) of February 3 and states that the situation set forth in that telegram, as it must necessarily affect American economic, cultural, and commercial interests in China, is depressing. The Japanese Government has, it is true, assured the United States that it has no intention of injuring American interests. Although Japan has made apologies and expressed regrets for injuries and insults and has hastened to compensate the loss when American property has been damaged, nevertheless, as the Japanese military machine rolls relentlessly and ruthlessly onward destroying all in its path, it becomes more and more plain that American interests are being adversely and materially affected. As examples of this situation may be mentioned the occupation of Tsinghua College at Peiping; the destruction of American mission premises, schools, and hospitals at Soochow and Wusih; the continued occupation of the American Baptist College at Shanghai; the taking over of the Chinese customs; the importation into these areas, without payment of duties, of Japanese goods such as rayon and kerosene in North China; the making of a new tariff favorable to Japanese trade.

793.94/12429

0738

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

trade. American citizens have been evacuated only to return to mission stations that have been sacked, businesses that have been wrecked, and as they had not personally witnessed the wrecking they are unable to say who is responsible for the wrecking. Evacuated American citizens have in many cases tactfully been refused permission to return to their businesses or stations after hostilities have ceased and the Japanese military have completely occupied the area. The Ambassador is unable to envisage any plan which might assist Americans to resume their affairs where the present conflict has forced them to leave off. American cultural undertakings which had begun to find for themselves a new place in cooperation with newly founded cultural efforts of Chinese nationalism will be injured as a result of that cooperation and they will of necessity have to cooperate with the effort of the Japanese to suppress Chinese nationalism. Except as they may sell to Japanese, American merchants cannot expect to compete with the Japanese for such little business as may exist when the period of reconstruction begins. Many American interests will be discouraged and quit the field as a result of the difficulties which will beset the whole future business of American interests, commercial, cultural, and economic.

793.94/12429
 FE:EGG:HSS
 2-17

ACR
 FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

CINCAF (FLAG)

~~COPY~~

February 15, 1938

FROM Rec'd 7:11 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: AMCON SHANGHAI
AMBASSADOR CHINA

793.94
note
893.0146
124.9318

0015. On 12 and 13 February small armed Japanese army patrols entered American sector. On 14 February two armed soldiers on motorcycles were halted by Marine patrol at border of sector and sent back. General Beaumont addressed letter of protest against these unauthorized entrances to Japanese Military Attache. At 0915 today armed Japanese patrol 4 privates 1 noncommissioned officer which entered sector via Bubbling Well Road were turned back by Second Lieutenant Nickelson and while being escorted out of sector noncommissioned officer becoming angry pushed Lieutenant Nickelson who returned push. Incident settled on arrival Japanese police interpreters and Lieutenant Colonel Rupertus and Japanese escorted out of sector without further trouble. At 1300 armed Japanese patrol of 8 men attempted enter sector turned back by Marine sentries at border. Marines now negotiating with Japanese Military Attache requesting latter stop these patrols. Japanese appear anxious to cooperate but no definite

793.94/12430

F/EG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #0015, February 15, from CINCLAF (FLAG).

definite agreement reached. Present instruction to Marine
 sentries are to avoid use armed force in prevention
 Japanese armed soldiers from entering American sector.
 1900.

NPL:EMB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JWB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DDM

HANKOW

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be- **FROM**
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (A).

Dated February 16, 1938

Rec'd 8:47 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

107, February 16, 9 a.m.

The last paragraph of my despatch No. 9 of February
 11 now in the mails refers to a letter graphically de-
 scribing Japanese activities in Nanking following its
 capture. Letter was written by George Fitch who expects
 to call on Hornbeck in March and copy was handed to High
 Commissioner McNutt who is understood to be on his way
 to Washington.

JOHNSON

WVC
 CSB

793.94

793.94/12431


FILED
 FEB 23 1938

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5560

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



JR

1-1338
AMEMBASSY PEIPING
AMEMBASSY HANKOW
AMCON SHANGHAI

GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

FROM Canton via N. R.

Dated February 16, 1938

Rec'd 8:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

February 16, 4 p.m.

Foreign flag chiefly British Canton bound river


steamers including A P C oil lighters on first voyage following reopening of river signaled and boarded by two parties from three Japanese destroyers below Bocca Tigris yesterday and warned dangerous to proceed because forts likely to be shelled. China navigation steamer FATSHAN proceeded Canton despite warning without incident reporting a few shells heard but no bombardment. All other vessels returned Hong Kong or Macao. Believed Japanese hoped by action to discourage river traffic.

Press reports recent courtesy visit to Canton of Eighth Route Army representative.

Mailed Hong Kong, Tokyo.

LINNELL

WVC:SMS



FILED
FEB 26 1938

793.94/12432

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

FROM SECOND BRIGADE USMC

February 16, 1938


Rec'd 11:35 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

DT

ACTION: CINCAF FLAG
CINCAF ADMN
OPNAV

INFO: AMCON SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
ASST NAVAL ATTACHE SHANGHAI
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING



8016. On Pinghan Line Japanese attacking Chinese positions north Sinsiang, reported occupied Fankio 10 miles north Kaifeng. On southern Tsinpu front Japanese meeting considerable resistance south Cuchen. Chinese mobile units active on both railways behind Japanese lines. 1838.

CSB

793.94/12433

FILED
FEB 21 1938

F/FG

074

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 740.00/292 Confidential File FOR Memorandum

FROM State Department (Wallas) DATED Feb. 1, 1938
TO Under Secretary NAME 1-1127 SP2

REGARDING: Conflict between China and Japan. Statement of Italian Ambassador that from the commencement of, - his government had been animated by the belief that because of military superiority of Japan, it was in interest of China herself to make peace as quickly as possible.

fp

793.94/12434

Confidential File

12434

074^c
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD

1-1230
This message was received FROM
in navy code and must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

ALUSNA PEIPING

February 16, 1938.

Rec'd. 3:22 p. m.

Info Cincaf (Flag and Admin)
2nd Brig USMC
Asstalusna Shanghai
Comyangpat
Comsopat
Amambassador China

✓
Division
file
rec'd VNA

793.94

0016. Their losses according reliable Japanese
source average three hundred killed daily on northern
Tsinpu and Lunghai fronts. This would indicate addi-
tional one thousand casualties per day wounded plus
sick as evidence terrific struggle now underway. Changes
in Provisional Government delayed by difference opinion
Nippon advisors meanwhile Wangkehmin conducting affairs
efficiently economically refuses carry out Jap dictation
without careful study. 1300

HPD

793.94/12435

FEB 19 1938

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 693,002/503 FOR Tel. #29 Noon

FROM Tientsin (Caldwell) DATED Feb. 11, 1938
TO NAME 1-1127 o p o

REGARDING: Kerosine imports into Tientsin under Japanese Military
during December-January. Outlines amount of - a portion
of which has been placed on the market. Correction of
figures given in Tel. #18 of Jan. 24 3 p m.

kfc

795.94/12436

12436

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

SPECIAL GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated February 11, 1938

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

29, February 11, noon.

I have been reliably informed that total imports of kerosene into Tientsin under auspices of Japan military during December January were 1,195,080 gallons of which at least 385,000 gallons have been placed on the market. Due to clerical error figures for gasoline given in second paragraph of my telegram No. 18 of January 24, 3 p.m., were incorrect and should have been 550,000, 400,000 and 230,000 respectively.

Repeated to Embassy Peiping and Hankow.

CALDWELL

CSB

0748

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~FE~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

1-1336
✓

FROM

COMYANGPAT

February 16, 1938

Rec'd 4:52 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: CINCAF
SECOND BRIGADE USMC
YANGPAT
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMSOPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
31 1938
Department of State
WAS

793.94

0016 Yangtze River ports quiet 1845.

NPL

EMB

793.94/12437

FILED
FEB 21 1938

F/FG

0749

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

FROM

COMSOPAT


February 16, 1938

Rec'd 4:55 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: CINCAF

SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA



0016. Air raid railroads north of Canton two
B S P sighted. Gunfire between destroyers and
Bocca Tigris forts on fifteenth. Other South China
ports quiet 2000.

NPL

EMB

793.94/12438

F/FG

RECEIVED
FEB 21 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE893.00 P. R. Chefoo/129..... FORDespatch #36.....

FROM Chefoo (.....Allen.....) DATEDJan. 15, 1938.....
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:
Sino-Japanese relations: Report on Japanese invasion
in Chefoo area during December, 1937.

aa

793.94/12439

793.94/
12439

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1. Japan:

793.94
 The last week in December was marked by grave apprehension in the Chefoo Consular District as a result of the Japanese invasion of Shantung territory east of the Yellow River. Earlier in the month Chinese troops destroyed bridges along the Chefoo-Weihsien Motor Road (see Consulate's telegram of December 6, 4 p.m.) although they did not render the road impassable. Chinese troops visited the Japanese-operated gold mines at Chaoyuan, according to a British resident of Lungkow, and destroyed machinery and equipment.


Japanese naval forces which landed at the Chang-Shan Islands north of Tengchow (P'eng-lai) (see Consulate's

Consulate's telegram of December 20, 11 a.m.) departed before the end of the month.

The visit of the Japanese mine-layer ITUKUSIMA to Chefoo on December 29 was reported in the Consulate's telegrams of 12 noon and 2 p.m. that date.

0752

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



My dear Mr. President:

In reply to the question raised in your memorandum of February 8, it seems to me that the letter which General Chiang Kai-shek addressed to you under date January 30 and which was delivered to you by the Chinese Ambassador on February 7 does not require a reply. I would suggest that you authorize the Department to write to the Chinese Ambassador here, making acknowledgment on your behalf of the receipt by you of the letter, and asking the Ambassador to inform General Chiang Kai-shek.

I return herewith your memorandum of February 8 and General Chiang Kai-shek's letter of January 30.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:
Memorandum of
February 8;
Letter from
General Chiang Kai-shek.

The President,
The White House.

FILED
FEB 12 1938

075

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 16 1938

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

The President has requested that I make acknowledgment on his behalf of General Chiang Kai-shek's very courteous letter of January 30, which you handed to the President on February 7, and that I ask you to be so kind as to inform General Chiang that the President has read his letter with appreciation and is continuing to give attentive consideration to the situation in the Far East.

I am, my dear Dr. Wang,

Sincerely yours,

U. S. Hall

His Excellency

Dr. Chengting T. Wang,

Chinese Ambassador.

793.94/12400A
FE:JCV:VCI 2/15/38

FE

11/11

PAH
SKH

KOL
PR

F/FG

793.94/12440

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD

1-1338


FROM

FOURTH MARINES SHANGHAI

February 17, 1938.

Rec'd. 8:30 a. m.

Action Cincaf (Admn) Opnav
Info Amcon Shanghai
Comsubron 5
Asst Alusna Shanghai
Comdesron 5
Gomyangpat
Comsopat
Amambassador China
Uss Marblehead
Alusna Peiping



793.94

8617. Japanese northward advance southern Tsinpu front reached point 13 miles south Kuchen, Japanese offensive activity central Shansi increased southward advance reported reached Pingyao 50 miles south Taiyuan and Wenshui 31 miles southwest Taiyuan. 1730

CSB

793.94/12441

REC'D
FEB 21 1938

REC'D

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DT

FROM CINCAF (ADMN)

February 17, 1938

Rec'd 8:35 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: AMCON SHANGHAI
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 17 1938
Department of
State

793.94
0017. My 0015 1900 Japanese Gendarmerie commander expressed regrets over entrance patrols in American sector, stated men unaware of limits and that such patrols would be instructed not enter sector in future. 1640.

CSB

793.94/12442

F/FG

FILED
FEB 21 1938

375

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94 / 12443

SEE 393.115/178 FOR Telegram #108, 7 pm.

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED February 16, 1938.
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Violation of American property in China by Japanese armed forces.
Quotes note from Japanese Foreign Office requesting that vertical,
as well as horizontal beacons be erected in certain described areas
where American interests are located. Other requirements specified.

wth

12443

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

MBo

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated February 16, 1938

Rec'd 1:40 p.m.

note
793.94
393.1115

Secretary of State,
Washington.

108, February 16, 7 p.m.

The following is our translation of a note received
from the Foreign Office today:

"Tokyo, February 15, 1938. Excellency. I have
the honor to state that in the present incident in
spite of the fact that the Imperial army in its policy
of respecting to the utmost the lives and property of
third countries in China has exerted the fullest efforts,
it is regretted that there have been instances where the
property of nationals of third countries suffered inci-
dental damages to some degree during the fighting be-
tween the Japanese and Chinese armies owing to the in-
ability to discern the location of property or the lack
of distinguishing marks or the use of the above mentioned
property for military purposes.

While the policy of the Imperial armies with respect
to the protection of the lives and property of nationals
of

178

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2- No. 108, February 16, from Tokyo.

of third countries in China is unchanged, in view of the recent illegal methods of warfare employed by the Chinese army following the extension of the sphere of fighting operations between the Japanese and Chinese armies, there have been attendant cases of misuse of the flags of third countries and in order to provide greater facilities to commanders on the spot in the protection of lives and property of nationals of Your Excellency's country, it is respectfully requested that you inform Americans or administrators of American property outside the zones now occupied by the Imperial forces, to wit (one) the district south of Tsingtao, Yenchow, Taming, Changteh, and Tayuan lines (excluding these cities and towns) to the Yangtze River, particularly the lines of the Sunghai Railway, Tientsin Pukow railway and the Paiping Hankow railway; (two) the districts along the Yangtze River; (three) the districts along the Canton Hong Kong Railway and (four) in various ports on the eastern China Sea and on the South China seacoast to carry into effect the following provisions: (A) in addition to setting up horizontal beacons clearly discernible from high altitudes, to set up large vertical beacons clearly discerned from a great distance on the ground

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3- No. 108, February 16, from Tokyo.

ground; (B) to define by street maps if possible the exact location of the above mentioned property and to transmit this together with the designs of such beacons without delay to the nearest Imperial army authorities or to the nearest Japanese Embassy or Consulate; (C) not to permit Chinese armies to station themselves in the vicinity of such property or to set up military establishments there; (D) not to permit the use of the above mentioned beacons by Chinese armies; (E) to communicate at the earliest opportunity with the nearest Imperial army authorities or with the nearest Japanese Embassy or Consulate in case of damage occurring. With respect to (B) above in ~~those~~ cases where it is difficult to communicate the exact location of property and the designs of beacons to the nearest Imperial army authorities or the nearest Embassy or Consulate, it is requested that Your Excellency so far as possible report this information to the Foreign Office.

It is believed aside from the foregoing if the nationals of Your Excellency's country residing in areas where fighting is going on between the Japanese and Chinese armies would take refuge beforehand in safety

ZONES

161
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MBo 4- No. 108, February 16, from Tokyo.

zones, this, together with the fullest care on the part
of the Imperial armies, would contribute greatly to the
prevention of unfortunate incidents."

Repeated to Shanghai for Hankow.

GREW

CSB:

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

REB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COMSOPAT


February 17, 1938

FROM

Rec'd 6:26 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: CINCAF
SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF (ADMIN)
COMYANGPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING



793.94

0017 Air raids north and east vicinity Canton
airfield Whampoa area and railroads seven S L P
six B S P sighted. Other South China ports quiet 2000.

NPL

793.94/12444

FEB 21 1938

F/FG

076

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

PLAIN

1-1336

COPIES SENT TO
ONLINE AND MIB.

FROM

Hankow via N. R.

Dated February 18, 1938

Rec'd 8:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.


February 18, 4 p.m.

Hankow airfield bombed by twelve Japanese planes at
one p.m., today, damage negligible.

Sent to Peiping.

JOSSELYN

HPD



793.94/12445


EB 21 1938

FILED

F/FG

076

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





A MESSAGE TO AMERICA

793.94

Broadcast by

Dr. Sab-Ke Alfred Sze

from Shanghai



793.94/12446

12446

(1)

A few days ago I was privileged to send a public message to my many American friends through a press interview which was carried by various news agencies. In that message I told you that China expects more of America than of any other nation because of the traditional ties of friendship which link our two nations.

I would like in my talk to-day to tell you what we in China do expect of you as private citizens of the United States.

In the first place we appeal to you for your sympathy during the greatest crisis of our history. Speaking as I am to the sound of guns and airplanes here in Shanghai and seeing daily thousands of wounded soldiers and civilians who are filling all our hospitals, I have no hesitation in saying that we are fighting with our backs to the wall in a struggle for our very existence. With my American education as a background, the happiest days of my life being spent in High School at Washington and in College at Cornell, and with the memory of my experiences during 13 years when I had the privilege of representing my country in the United States, I cannot but think that every citizen of the United States with your keen sense of justice will give us all your sympathy.

We know you will show us sympathy because we cannot think you could do otherwise. It is as if your neighbour's house was set on fire; whether it be arson or accident, you cannot help feeling bad about it. China has always been not only your good neighbour but your close friend. I firmly believe you will play the part of a good neighbour and friend to China at this time.

Indeed, I believe that many of you will go further—that many of you will send us material assistance in this our hour of need. We in China have heard with the warmest appreciation of the large donations being received by the American

(2)

Red Cross for the relief of sufferers from this terrible war. We have already received here with heartfelt gratitude the first consignments of medical supplies which friends in America have sent to us through the Chinese Medical Association. To those of you, who are so generous and who can afford it, I say "Give and Go On Giving". With tens of thousands wounded and millions destitute and homeless, God knows the need is great enough!

Now I wish to suggest that there is something else which *everyone* can do—the poorest and the humblest among you as well as the oldest and the youngest. *You can*—if you *will*—*boycott Japan*. If every private citizen throughout the world, who believes in justice and fair play, was to boycott Japan, even unofficially, we can in a short time bring the aggressor to justice and to reason. You—every one of you—have it in your power to stop this war with all its terrible suffering inflicted on millions of innocent people. Boycott Japan and persuade all your reasonable friends to do so!

I am aware that there are in your country—as there are in other countries—some persons who, in their zeal to preserve absolute neutrality and avoid entanglement in a foreign war, would oppose the step which I have advocated. I would agree with such persons wholeheartedly if this was a conflict in which the issue was doubtful and the responsibility unknown. But this is a case in which there is no doubt at all as to who is the aggressor and who the victim of aggression. Are Japanese troops ravaging Chinese territory or are Chinese forces invading Japan? We are not suggesting that you should give up your neutrality and send the United States Army, Navy and Air Force to China to fight on our side. Nothing is further from our minds. I would not be honest with you if I did not tell you that the Chinese people are bewildered by the excessively rigid interpretation of the neutrality policy adopted by certain Americans. When a

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

0764

076

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(3)

nation advocates a form of neutrality which ignores the fact that one of the parties is an aggressor, it may bring about a situation where the aggressor is favoured. For instance it has been suggested that American missionaries in China should assist in observing neutrality by leaving their posts, because, by remaining they would be helping to uphold the morale of the Chinese people in their resistance against Japan. If American neutrality were to be carried to such an extreme, it is time that the people of the United States look into the matter and see whether there is not something wrong with such a rigid interpretation.

The Chinese people respect the wishes of the American people to be neutral. But we also remember that America is a signatory of the Kellogg Peace Pact and the Washington Nine Power Treaty which have been broken by Japan. I suggest that Americans owe a moral obligation to the victim of such treaty infringements.

When your neighbour's house has been set on fire by a robber, can you remain deaf to his cries for help? Do you advocate sitting still and continuing treating the robber on the same terms as his law-abiding victim? It is both natural and just that you as private citizens should seek some positive alternative. You can at least stop supplying the robber the means whereby he continues to ravage your neighbour's house.

If you do so and all your united efforts succeed, you will find that you have contributed to the greatest single step of progress in history. You will prove that might is not right unless that might is backed by right. You will usher in a new era, when reason, fair play and world justice will triumph—when the private individual has shown that he can stop the aggression of governments and military cliques which have run amok. We stand today on the threshold of a great opportunity—an opportunity to create a new order of things—and in your hands lies the power to achieve this.

October 6, 1937.

0766
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMYANGPAT


FROM

February 18, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

793.94
INFO: CINCAF (FLAG AND ADMN)
SECOND BRIGADE USMC
YANGPAT
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMSOPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING



0017. Nine Jap bombers raided airfield Ichang 1100
today and dropped approximately one hundred light bombs
also pamphlets over city. Other Yangtze Ports quiet.
2200.

DDM

793.94/12447

FILED
FEB 21 1938

FILED

F/FG

076

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1236

FROM

COPIES TO
G.N.I. AND A.I.P.

Hankow via N. R.

Dated February 18, 1938

Rec'd 8:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

February 18, 4 p.m.

I am reliably informed Chinese military have (*) today,
Yellow River bridge on Peiping-Hankow Railway north of
Chengchow, Honan.

Sent to Peiping.

JOSELYN

WWC:SMS

(*) Apparent omission

793.94/12448

EX 24 1938

F/FG
FILED

0768

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4561

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

eda

GRAY

SHANGHAI VIA N.R.

FROM

Dated February 17, 1938

Received 5:16 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington


272, February 17, 2 p.m.

Reference Penultimate paragraph my 259, February
15, 5 p.m.

I am informed by intelligence officer of the Fourth
Marines that Lieutenant Colonel Oka of the Japanese
Military Attaches office called this morning at Marine
headquarters and apologized for attempts made by Japa-
nese patrols to enter the American defense sector. He
said that these attempts had been made due to ignorance
and added that instructions had now been issued to all
patrols to refrain from entering the defense sector.
Colonel Oka inquired regarding ^{the possibility} ~~tidings~~ of Japanese
patrols entering some sections of the American sector
by mutual arrangement but was informed by Colonel Price
that he was not in favor of such arrangement, that such
patrols were unnecessary and would merely cause friction
and provocation whereupon Colonel Oka dropped the matter.

Japanese patrols twice a day continue to march
through the downtown area of the International Settlement.

No



793.94/12449

FILED

FEB 21 1938

F/F G

793.94
note
893.102 S

108
3-2-38

0769

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1582

EDA - 2 - #272, February 17, 2 p.m. from Shanghai

No incidents have occurred thus far.

Repeated to Hankow and Peiping.

GAUSS

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336


FROM February 18, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

From Naval Communications
for the information of
Department of State.

793.94
1618. General Matsui reported being relieved by
General Hata. 1712.

HPD



793.94/12450

FILED
FEB 21 1938

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



CABLE "LIBERATE"



DARBY FULTON
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MISSIONS

POST OFFICE BOX 330
NASHVILLE, TENN.

January 19, 1938



113 SIXTEENTH AVE. S

Confidential

The Honorable Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:-

I enclose herewith a letter that I have just received from
Rev. H. Maxcy Smith, D. D. of 169 Yuen Ming Yuen Road, Shanghai, China.
This is being sent purely for your information, thinking that the conditions
described in the letter will be of interest to you.

May I explain that Dr. Maxcy Smith is the representative of
the Presbyterian Church in the United States in the Associated Mission Treas-
urers office in Shanghai. He has been in China about twenty-five years, and
is a man of high integrity, possessing also a thorough knowledge of things in
China.

Dr. Smith's letter gives a rather vivid picture of the con-
ditions in Soochow and other places following the occupation of this area
by the Japanese armies.

With high esteem, I am,

Respectfully yours,

Darby Fulton

CDF/b

793.94/12451

F/FG

12451

FILED
FEB 23 1938

0772

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

Dec. 25, 1937

Rev. C. D. Fulton, D. D.
P. O. Box 330
Nashville, Tenn.

Dear Dr. Fulton:

Merry X-mas! The office is closed for X-mas holiday and I am writing at 14 Route Winling. I hope to have an opportunity to send this letter by a passenger to be mailed in the U.S. and thus avoid the censorship. I do not know how thorough the censorship is but the Japanese have set up their offices and staff for censorship and so in my recent letters I have had to write with considerable restraint in order to be reasonably sure that my letters would reach you.

Dr. Young and Messrs McDaniel of the Southern Baptist Mission and McHulity of the Episcopal Mission, three of the five who have been at Kuang-feh in charge of refugees under the auspices of the Red Cross and of the mental patients from our Soochow Hospital, arrived in Shanghai on the night of the 22nd. We had heard nothing direct from them for about six weeks. All this time we had been making increasingly strenuous efforts to contact them. On Dec. 6 we placed letters in the hands of the American Consul who turned them over to the Japanese Consul with the request that he send them to Kuang-feh and get replies direct from our friends there. He promised to do this and there were messengers going at frequent intervals from the Consulate but it seems that he made little or no effort to carry out his promise. If he did those to whom he issued orders did not obey them. We were however assured a number of times that there would be an answer in a day or two. About Dec. 17th. we made through our Consul more urgent requests to be put into communication with the Kuang-feh party. On the 20th. our Consul in a personal interview impressed on the Consul the importance of securing replies to our letter at once. There was no reason why it could not have been done in two days at the outside for the Japanese control the whole territory and have messengers and various other means of communication. We prepared cables to the Boards in U. S. concerned informing them of the situation, that the U.S. authorities here had done what they could without result and suggesting that the State Department be approached with a view to getting pressure applied at Tokyo. At this juncture a member of the Associated Press staff who is a son of one of the Kuang-feh party visited the Japanese Consul and told him that if we did not hear from the party within two days he would see that a full account of the whole matter would be published in every important paper in the U.S. On the 22nd. the above named arrived in Shanghai. The letters we had sent on the 6th. were not handed them until the day before they reached Shanghai, that is on the 21st. Letters which they intrusted on several occasions to the Japanese authorities to transmit to us, although they were promised that this would be done have never shown up. What Dr. Young has told us deepens the conviction that has been forming that the Japanese policy is to discredit foreigners, especially Americans and British before the Chinese. The Japanese army is now on a rampage of murder, looting, rape and wanton destruction of property by fire and breakage on a very large scale. Dr. Young tells us they have been able to go to Soochow city several times since they left there, that all mission property has been systematically and progressively looted until nothing now remains in missionary residences. They saw Japanese soldiers removing heavy furniture from their own houses, pictures were thrown on the ground and tramped on, doors broken down, pianos used for fire wood, safes chiselled open and contents removed. In one house

0776

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

they stood by while the safe was being opened. These houses had the American flag flying over them and proclamations posted saying that they were American Mission property. The nurses' quarters and women's wards of the E. B. Hospital have been burned and the other part of the hospital was fired but before much damage was done the fire was extinguished by servants. It will take too long to tell you in detail about the destruction wrought but our missionaries in Soochow have lost all their personal belongings, the houses have been badly damaged, and part of the E. B. Hospital burned.

As the Japanese were approaching the city panic reigned. To deliver a sick patient to his home in the city, Dr. Young put him in a ricksha and pulled it himself. The insane patients, as has been said, were taken to Kuangfah. On the last trip Lucy Orier had to walk all the way, the boats having been commandeered. The distance is 14 miles.

There are one or two Chinese who speak Japanese with them at Kuangfah and they have used them as interpreters. It has been necessary for them to interview the officials in Soochow--the Japanese and the puppet government they have set up. On these occasions they have been treated with great indignity. Once on reaching the city gate altho they had passes to enter, they were not allowed to do so. The Chinese along with them were told to enter but the foreigners made to wait outside the city gate. After a long time a messenger came with another pass but before going far another official stopped them and searched them saying that the Commander's pass which they showed was not in order, that the color of the ink was not right, etc. Finally when they were allowed to go on to the government offices they were kept waiting a long time and then the Chinese head of the puppet government was sent out to them (they were not allowed to enter the office). Before they were able to get the business in hand before the man sent to interview them two Japanese came along and said, "Enough of this, Go!"

Lucy and Mr. McMillan of the So. Baptist Mission remained at Kuangfah. The refugees besought them not to all leave at the same time and Lucy felt she could not leave her girls, nurses, etc. even for a short time. These who came to Shanghai understood that the pass given them would enable them to return but the Japanese Consul here tells them that this is not the case and refuses to let them go back as they intended to do. He told them that their presence was neither desired nor needed. When they pleaded the necessity of getting money and medicines back, the Consul replied, "We will take the money and we will provide the medicines." When told that there were nearly 100 patients mental cases for whom we felt a responsibility the Consul said, "What are their names? implying that there were no such patients. Then he said the Japanese are anxious to demonstrate their good will towards the Chinese, and that they were able and ready to care for both patients and refugees and that no foreign assistance was desired. The American Consul is not accepting the refusal to let them return to Kuangfah and we are taking it up vigorously immediately after the X-mas holiday which will be next Tuesday. It is not believed that there is a woman left in Soochow who has not been violated. One night at Kuangfah some Japanese soldiers entered the dormitory of the refugee girls. Mr. McDaniel heard them and stormed into the room blessing them out in English and they left. All the time they were in Kuangfah they were practically prisoners, and we feel that now Lucy Orier and Mr. McMillan are in a real sense hostages and therefore it is not wise to tell what we know to the Press. I have only time to tell you a few incidents to illustrate the situation. Correspondents were able to report what happened in Nanking but the same sort of thing is believed to be going on throughout our whole territory. Bishop Moore of the Southern

0774

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

Methodist Church has just arrived in Shanghai. He brought letters from the Japanese Ambassador at Washington and others to the Japanese authorities here but they have refused him every request and refused to give him the opportunity to learn anything about their mission work, the welfare of the Christians or the condition of the property. The Bishop is right much stirred up and was preparing a cable to the Methodist Board to make public the facts in the U.S. in the hope that publicity would have its effect on the Japanese authorities. A group of us here have requested the Bishop to withhold his cable until we have an opportunity for conference which has been arranged for 10:30 tomorrow morning. We are afraid he will include things that will endanger the welfare of some who are still in isolated places.

We all expected that when the Japanese took possession of Chinese territory that there would be severe discipline but that there would be order and we have been greatly surprised at the abandon with which all sorts of excesses have been indulged in right under the eyes of the officers. And another thing that surprises us is the bland way in which the officials make explanations that would insult the intelligence of the mentally deficient. We have pictures of Japanese carrying loot out of mission hospitals and missionary homes just across the border of the French Concession here in Shanghai and when complaint is made the reply is that it is impossible for the Imperial Army to stoop to such acts.

St. John's University has made it possible for us to house the patients now at Kwangfu and the staff here and we are now considering the removal of them all from Kwangfu to Shanghai. It is certain that the Japanese will refuse permission but possible that consular pressure, now that the American attitude is stiffening, may bring it about. We are also taking up at once the matter of getting into communication with the Kiangyin group. We can imagine no reason why we should not be allowed to communicate at once either by letters sent through the Japanese authorities or by permits to make the trip there except that the army wishes to put as much obstruction as possible in the way of American interests. There is no military reason why we should not now visit freely the stations that have been occupied for several weeks by the Japanese and where there are no Chinese troops at all.

At this writing all of our people are well as far as known.

With all good wishes,

Yours cordially,

(signed H. Maxcy Smith)

P. S. One other thing I will mention. It is reported that the gardener of the Hospital compound at Elizabeth Blake begged the Japanese on his knees not to destroy the Hospital. Their answer was to throw an incendiary bomb in the second floor of the Nurses' quarters--the rooms occupied by Misses Satterfield and Grier. This was on Dec. 17th.

0715
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 24, 1938.

Dear Mr. Fulton:

Thank you very sincerely for your letter of January 19, enclosing a letter from Rev. H. M. Smith of Shanghai. I shall read this letter with special interest. I do appreciate your spirit of cooperation in giving me the benefit of its contents.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. C. Darby Fulton,
Box 330, Nashville,
Tennessee.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 890.00/80 FOR Memorandum
FROM State Department
Far Eastern Division (Jones) DATED Feb. 12, 1938
TO NAME 1-1127 a p o

REGARDING: Situation in Sino-Japanese conflict: Report on
developments of the past week.

793.94/12452

12452

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NOV 5 1937

Acknowledged
by Form
File 988

R U S S E L L + G O U L D

DEPARTMENT

ATE

1937 NOV 7 AM 9 44

DESIGNER... TELEPHONE PR 2020... 402 SWETLAND BLDG... CLEVELAND

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

November 1, 1937.

From A
egc.

Hon. Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hull:

A great many of my friends, myself included,
feel the current practice of permitting such deluges of
anti-Japanese propaganda from apparently British sources
to sweep our nation, is a repetition of the mistakes that
ultimately forced us into the World War. We heartily
disapprove of such tactics and wish to go on record on
this score. We are firmly of the opinion that the
United States has far and away enough problems within
its boundaries to take care of, without borrowing trouble
from any of its neighbors.

Very truly yours,

Russell L. Gould
793.94/12454

rlg:eak

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 3 - 1937
Department of State

793.94/12453

F/FG

0778

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6
FE
R E S E R V E + G O U L D


1937 NOV 12 PM 45

NER... TELEPHONE PR 2020... 402 SW ELLAND BLDG... CLEVELAND


DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

November 22 1937

Reply dated
Nov 16 1937



November 8, 1937.



Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
Washington, D. C.

Dear President Roosevelt:

I had in mind returning the attached to the
Secretary of State but on second thought believe you
might be interested in seeing how correspondence to
the Secretary is handled. I can hardly believe this is
pursuant to your governmental policy.

Very truly yours,

12453
Russell L. Gould

rlg:eak
enc

793.94/12454

FILED
MAR 9 1938

F/FG 12454

0779
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 5, 1937.

The Secretary of State acknowledges the receipt
of your communication of November 1, 1937,
and takes pleasure in informing you that appropriate
attention has been given to the contents thereof.

793.94

*Returned for a
courteous answer
K. L. G.*

0780

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 22 1937

In reply refer to
RE 793.94 Gould, Russell L.

My dear Mr. Gould:

The Department has received, by reference from the White House, your letter of November 8, 1937, addressed to the President, in which you comment upon the form letter sent you by the Department in acknowledgment of your letter of November 1, 1937.

The Department receives each day great numbers of letters and telegrams expressing all shades of opinion in regard to the foreign relations of this Government. While without exception the opinions expressed receive careful consideration, the Department has found it impossible to acknowledge by individual letter all of the communications received by it. In your consideration of this matter and with reference to the Far Eastern situation which formed the general subject of your letter of November 1, I trust that you will bear in mind that the views and policies of the American Government are made known to the public by means of statements issued frequently to the press and by means

Mr. Russell L. Gould,
402 Swetland Building,
Cleveland, Ohio.

793.94/12454

F/FG

0781

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

means of addresses, delivered by senior officials of the Government, which receive wide-spread publicity. I am sure that you will realize that, with regard to situations in which it has been deemed advisable to declare the Government's attitude and policy in public statements, it is usually impracticable to elaborate upon those statements in communications addressed to individual inquirers. Furthermore, the personnel of the Department of State is of necessity limited by the appropriations made available by Congress and no provision is made for the automatic acquisition of additional personnel in periods of emergency.

In view of the foregoing, I trust that you will realize that no discourtesy is intended by the sending of form acknowledgments to certain types of communications and that this practice has been adopted by the Department in view of the fact that every endeavor is made to keep the public fully and currently informed and because the demands upon the personnel of the Department are so great as to render impossible the handling of this large volume of correspondence in any other way.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Maxwell M. Hamilton
 Chief

Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

FE:KFP:RCM:EJL:VCI

FE

OR ✓
 NOV 22 1957



Approved by Mr. Wilson
 M.M.H.


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR _____ FOURTH MARINES
COMMISSIONED TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
February 18, 1938
FROM
Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF FLAG AND ADMIN
OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
AMCON SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
ASST ALUSNA SHANGHAI
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING



793.94

8618. Line of Japanese southward advance central Shansi passed through Wenshui Kiehshu and Liaohsien last named town 70 miles southeast Taiyuan Japanese drive Pinghan line after occupation Weiwei station held up on north bank Wei river. Other units captured Yangwu and Shanpiaochen respectively 25 miles northwest and 11 miles north Kaifeng. Tsinpu situation unchanged. Rumored General Matsui being recalled to be replaced by General Shuroku Hata. 1842.

SMS:WWC

793.94/12455

EX 21 1938

F/A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

SMS

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
 ONI AND MID.

Peiping via N R

Dated February 18, 1938

Rec'd 9:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

122, February 18, 4 p.m.

Embassy's 104, February 14, 6 p.m.

Division of
 EASTERN AFFAIRS

FEB 18 1938

Department of State

One. Information available in Peiping with regard to the four areas involved in the struggle for control of the Lunghai Railway area is as follows: (a) progress of the Japanese forces in the Tientsin-Pukow Railway area north of the Lunghai is slow, if not held up, with Chinese counter-attacking in the vicinity of Tsining, some 100 miles northwest of Hsuehowfu, and possibly elsewhere; (b) south of Hsuehowfu, Chinese forces are allegedly threatening the Japanese at Pengpu and Huaiyuan by thrusts from the east and southwest, although a Japanese column is said to have reached the south bank of the Kuei River, about 80 miles south of Hsuehowfu, on the north bank of which there are allegedly strong Chinese defenses; (c) in Honan, the Japanese allegedly hold a 15 mile area bounded on

east

793.94/12456

5021
 FEB 1938
 F/A

793.94
 793.01
 (P)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

sms 2 - No. 122, February 18, 4 p.m. from Peiping

east by Weihwei, which is some 80 miles south of the Yellow River on the Peiping-Hankow Railway, and extending westward to Huihsien, while other Japanese units have advanced south through the lower tip of Hopei and have reached Yangwu in Honan, 10 miles north of the Yellow River and 25 miles northeast of Chengchow; and (d) in Shansi, two southward advances have apparently begun as Japanese have reportedly occupied Wenshui, 25 miles southwest of Taiyuan, and also Chiehhsiu, some 60 miles straight south of Taiyuan on the Taiyuan-Szechuan Railway. In Honan, the Yellow River appears to be the chief barrier for the Japanese and in Shansi the Japanese forces will soon enter mountainous areas.

Two. The traffic on the Peiping-Hankow Railway, reported in the above-mentioned telegram as interrupted, has been resumed.

Three. Reports are again current in Peiping that a head will soon be chosen for the Provisional Government. Tsaojulin's name is frequently mentioned, whom some Chinese would welcome as unmistakable evidence of the puppet character of the regime. There are also rumors that Tang Shoa Yi will arrive here shortly.

Indications

CHINA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

sms 3 - No. 122, February 18, 4 p.m. from Peiping

WBS
2/20/75

Indications now are that a separate regime will be
formed in the lower Tsung and Lissu-Hao, a follower
of Wang K'eh-Min, has reportedly gone south ^{to} ~~and has~~
~~assist~~
~~become (*)~~ in achieving harmony between the Peiping
regime and the proposed regime.

Repeated to Ambassador. By mail to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

(*) Apparent omission.

WWC

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR COPY 1-1838

FROM COMSOPAT

February 18, 1938

Rec'd 1-13 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: CINCAF ADMIN
SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 18 1938
Department of
State
WAX

0018. South China ports quiet. 2000.

KLP:WWC

793.94/12457

FILED
FEB 23 1938

F/FG

0 7 8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1236

FROM

COPIES SENT TO
ONT AND M.A.D.

Shanghai via N. R.


Dated February 18, 1938

Rec'd 12:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

793.94
277, February 18, 6 p.m.

My No. 232, February 18, 4 p.m.



On the southern Tsinpu front the Japanese after successfully crossing the Hwai River and consolidating their positions have pushed north along the railway to within 10 miles of Kucheng. However, they are reported to be meeting with considerable opposition along the Kwei River which flows to the south of Kucheng. Chinese counter offensive operations on the Tsining front are believed to have been fairly successful and have brought Japanese operations in that area to a standstill. It is reported locally that units from one Japanese column driving southeast of the Pinghan Railway have reached the northern bank of the Yellow River opposite Kaifeng.

GAUSS

WWC:SMS

793.94/12458

FEB 22 1938

FILED
F/FG

0788

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


COMYANGPAT

1-1386

Dated February 18, 1938
FROM

Recd 8:32 p.m.

Opnav Washington
Info Cincaf
2nd Brig USMC
Yangtze Patrol
Comsuroon 5
Comdesron 5
Comsopat
Ambassador China
USS Warblehead
Alusna Peiping



0012. Fifteen Japanese bombers protected by ten
pursuit attacked Hankow 1300 today and dropped several
heavy bombs vicinity military airfield 2125.

KLP

FILED
FEB 23 1938

793.94/12459

F/FG

1789

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Gray

NANKING VIA N.R.

COPIED BY
1-1386
ONE WORD FROM

Dated Feb. 18, 1938

Recd 6:39 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

61, February 18, 4 p.m.

793.94
893.107 Nanking

I am pleased to be able to report that within the past ten days there have been a noticeable improvement in conditions in Nanking. Most of the Chinese are returning from the so-called "safety zone" to former homes in other parts of the city. While reports still come in from time to time of disorder and unlawful acts of Japanese soldiers, the number of such reports has materially decreased and there is definite evidence that the Japanese authorities are making efforts to better the present living conditions of the local population. Restrictions on movements of foreigners are gradually being loosened, and permission has recently been obtained for the return to Nanking of an American doctor whose presence is urgently needed at the Nanking University Hospital, an American institution.

Sent to Embassy Hankow, repeated to Department, Peiping and Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo.

ALLISON

EMB NPL

FILED 1563

Division of
PAK EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 17 1938
Department of State

793.94/12460

FILED
FEB 22 1938
F/FG


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1286

FROM

EG



FOURTH MARINES

February 18, 1938

Rec'd 9:05 a.m. Feb. 19th

ACTION: CINCAF (ADMINISTRATIVE CINCAF OPNAV
SECOND BRIGADE USMC)

INFO: ANCON SHANGHAI CHINA
CONSUBRON FIVE
ASST NAVAL ATTACHE SHANGHAI
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
CONSOPAT
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSMA PEIPING



8619. On Penghan Japanese have occupied Sinsiang
58 miles South Changteh southward advance Shansi front
reached Yitanchen six miles south Kiehxiu and Licheng
36 miles south Lioshien. Japanese held up southern
Tsinpu front Chinese counter attack vicinity Hwayuan.
1838.

PEG:RR

793.94/12461

FILED

FEB 23 1938

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

PLAIN AND GRAY

1-1336

SENT TO FROM
PLAIN AND GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated February 19, 1938


Rec'd 9 a.m. Feb. 18th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

123. February 19, 4 p.m.

Embassy's 122, February 18, 4 p.m.



One. According to the local Japanese military spokesman Japanese forces in Shansi captured Genyang (Fenchow), some twenty five miles south of Wenshui and fifty miles southwest of Taihtuan, February seventeen; other units have advanced south from Chiehhsui to Chihhsiangohen; a third force is moving in the direction of Shensi toward the highway center of Lishih, having captured Tungshchchen; and a fourth force has entered southeast Shansi from Honan and captured Licheng February eighteen. The spokesman stated that Japanese have occupied Sinhsiang, thirty miles north of the Yellow River on the Peiping Hankow Railway, and that the force which captured Yangtzu ten miles north of the Yellow River, as reported in the above mentioned telegram, is now moving northwest toward the Peiping Hankow Railway.

Two. According to an American eye witness, five Chinese planes dropped a few bombs near Tsinanfu February 12. Presumably the bridge over the Yellow River was objective; damage not known. Repeated to Hankow, by mail to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

CSB

793.94/12462

FILED

FEB 23 1938

F/FG

779

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4564

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

GRAY
FROM Tokyo

COPIES SENT TO
ONE AND MILD

Dated February 19, 1938

Rec'd 9:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.


117, February 19, noon.

The following memorandum was submitted to me today
by the Military Attache:

"with reference to the statement by the War Minister
in this morning's papers concerning the 'replacement'
of units in China, the 'strengthening of the fighting
power of the Japanese Expeditionary Army' at cetera,
a visit to the War Office for the purpose of clarifying the
above statement has brought forth the following information:

That the moves contemplated do not necessarily mean
either a strengthening or a weakening of the forces in
China from a numerical standpoint but rather a reorganiza-
tion and redistribution with a view to a strengthening of
the Japanese forces organically and strategically for the
more or less prolonged condition of hostilities which the
Japanese high command now feel lies before them, and that
while the moves to this end may well involve the
replacement of certain units, it is likely that the units
replaced will be those not necessary in the type of
operation

operation



793.94/12463

FILED

FEB 24 1938

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

665

-2- #117, February 19, noon, from Tokyo.

operation which they visualize for the future.

When questioned as to whether this statement by the War Minister implied any change in the objectives of the Japanese Army the officer to whom I spoke stated with considerable emphasis that their objectives remained the same, i.e., the destruction of the Chinese forces opposing them and the anti-Japanese communistic influences in China and he added that the big question at present lies in the decision as to the manner by which these ends may best be achieved".

Repeated to Shanghai for Hankow.

GREW

RR:CSB

0797

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

1-1380

FROM ASST ALUSNA SHANGHAI


February 19, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: CINCAF (FLAG AND ADMN)
SECOND BRIGADE
FOURTH MARINES
ALUSNA PEIPING



1619. Regarding release General Matsui reported
official announcements made on about twenty three
February General Hata not Kwantung army man, no reason
for Matsui release given at present. 0951.

HPD

793.94/12464

FILED
FEB 23 1938

F/FG

079²

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4566

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BB

GRAY

1-1336

FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

COPIES SENT

ONE AND MORE


Dated February 19, 1938

Rec'd 10:50 a.m.

DT

Secretary of State,
Washington.

280, February 19, 11 a.m.



It is learned from reliable Japanese sources that General Matsui will in all probability return to Japan shortly and will be succeeded by General S. Hata who is said to be more conservative and more amenable to the Japanese Diet and the civilian elements of the Japanese Government.

108
2-2-38

It is added that the reasons for General Matsui's recall may be (a) the ~~(*) in discipline~~ ^{indiscipline} shown by the troops under his command which has resulted in serious complications with Great Britain and the United States, (b) the statements made from time to time by General Matsui to press representatives indicating an extreme independent attitude which may not have been pleasing to some sections of the Japanese Government (c) the question of supreme command of Japanese forces in China which is likely to arise when the Japanese armies in north and central China meet at Hsuehow. It is said that General Terauchi commanding Japanese troops in North China is the abler man and will be given supreme command.

793.94/12465

FILED

FEB 23 1938

F/FG

0794

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4857

BB -2- #280 February 19, 11 a.m. from Shanghai

command hence the appointment of General Hata who is
Terauchi's junior. Repeated to Hankow, Peiping and
Tokyo.

GAUSS

CSB

~~(*)~~ emission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huetten NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

1-1336

FROM COMYANGPAT

February 19, 1938


Rec'd 1:15 p. m.

SENT TO
CHINA AND WILD

OPNAV

WASHINGTON, D.C.

793.94
INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
YANGPAT
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING



0019. Yangtze river ports quiet 2045

CSB

793.94/12466

FILED

FEB 23 1938

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

1-1326

FROM COMSOPAT

February 19, 1938


Rec'd 1:17 p. m.

COPIES SENT TO
~~SECRET~~ D. A. I. D.

OPNAV

WASHINGTON, D.C.

INFO: CINCAF
SECOND MARBRIDG
CONSUB FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING



0019 Air raids north and east vicinity
Canton and railroads, other south China ports quiet
2000.

CSB

793.94/12467

EB 2 8 1938

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

PLAIN, GRAY, & SPECIAL GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
ONE AND NED.

Carried via N.R.

Dated February 19, 1938


Rec'd 4:37 p. m.

Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.

Amembassy, Peiping

Amembassy, Hankow

Amconsul, Shanghai



February 19, noon.

Japanese hostilities since ninth have included;
chiefly one brief shelling of Bocca Tigris by two or
three destroyers on tenth, twelfth, fifteenth at consider-
able distance. Most ^{Shells falling short} (2) (2) two air raiding on tenth to
twelfth inclusive particularly no raiding due unsuitable
weather. From twelfth to date (except fifteenth when no
raiding) usually two or three raids daily on Hankow
Railway southern section (Canton to Yingtak) and
Hong Kong Railway southern section (Canton to Yingtak)
and Hong Kong Railway both southern sections and points
near Canton. Total about three hundred bombs dropped
along the two lines. Lines still operating. One Japanese
bomber raiding Hankow line shot down sixteenth. Planes
several times appearing over Canton subjected to consider-
able ground fire. Tianho airfield, spur line and northern
suburbs

795.94/12468

FILED

FEB 23 1938

F/FG

0800

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REB

2- From Canton, Feb. 19, noon.

suburbs bombed seventeenth by eleven planes with apparently inconsequential results despite new power diving tactics. Highways to Bocca Tigris and north and towns northwest of Canton also raided. Information from reliable sources indicates Japanese making increasing practice of machine gunning interior villages.

One eighteen. Approximately fifty-five planes in nine groups heavily bombed numerous points along southern sections both Canton ~~Hong Kong~~ ^{Hankow} and Canton Hong Kong Railways inflicting widely distributed damage not interrupting through service bombed also Tsungfa (presumably air field) Shiukwan destroying dwellings with reported civilian casualties and Bocca Tigris all without important military damage.

Steamer traffic now normal.

Appreciation of London anti-aggression conference manifested by meetings, parade, speeches, and editorials. Provincial Government paper carries editorial expressing hope that United States will see its way to cooperating with other nations sufficiently to permit conference resolution being put into effect.

Sent to Peiping, Hankow, Shanghai.

LINNELL


NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

COMSOPAT




February 20, 1938

FROM

Rec'd 10:54 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: CINCAF (FLAG AND ADMINISTRATION)
SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING



0020. Air raid railroads vicinity Canton. Other
South China ports quiet. 2000.

SMS

793.94/12469

FEB 23 1938

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastrom NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

COPIES SENT TO
 COM AND M.I.D.
DT

FROM

COMYANGPAT

February 20, 1938

Rec'd 11:05 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: CINCAF (ADMINISTRATION AND FLAG)
 SECOND BRIGADE USMC
 YANGPAT
 COMSUBRON FIVE
 COMDESRON FIVE
 COMSOPAT
 AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
 USS MARBLEHEAD
 ALUSNA PEIPING

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 FEB 21 1938
 Department of
WAX

0020. Yangtze River ports quiet. 1935

SMS


793.94/12470

FILED
 FEB 22 1938

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED




FROM FOURTH MARINES

February 20, 1938

Rec'd 10:34 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF (ADMINISTRATION)
 OPNAV
 CINCAF

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
 AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
 COMSUBRON FIVE
 ASST ALUSNA SHANGHAI
 COMDESRON FIVE
 COMYANGPAT
 COMSOPAT
 AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
 USS MARBLEHEAD
 ALUSNA PEIPING



8620. On Pinghan Japanese units driving westward from Sinsiang captured Kwoki and Siuwu. Japanese claim capture Lishih western Shansi. South of Hwai River Chinese made counter-attacks vicinity Tingyuan. 1841.

SMS

FILED
 FEB 23 1938

793.94/12471


F/FG

180

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG



FOURTH MARINES

February 20, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF (FLAG & ADM)

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA
OPNAV
NAV ATTACHE PEIPING CHINA



793.94

8620. Digest Sunday press Domei Peiping reports Japanese dispatch 19 February claimed Japanese detachment in renewing southward thrust from Sinsiang, 100 kilometers south of Changteh, Honan, captured Hwokiahsien 20 kilometers south Sinsiang, 18 February. Unable stem Japanese drive Chinese forces reported falling back towards north bank Yellow River. Reuter Hankow reports according to Chinese reports 45 Japanese planes attacked Hankow 18 February. Met by 30 Chinese pursuit planes of Soviet make. Chinese claim 10 Japanese pursuit planes and 2 heavy bombers shot down. Japanese claim 30 Chinese planes shot down but decline reveal number planes Japanese lost. Reuter Canton reports Japanese planes dropped 14 bombs on Canton Kowloon Railway morning 19 February. Local N C D N reports persistent rumors state General Matsui to be relieved command Japanese forces central China by General Shuroku Hata. N C D N states according

793.94/12472

F/FG

0805

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- February 20, 1938, from Fourth Marines

according reliable sources General Hata arrived Shanghai
18 February..Local N C D N reports another severed
Chinese head found French Concession 19 February..
Head unidentified. Domei Tokyo reports Japanese
War Office announced 19 February for first time annals
Japanese army 400 Koreans will see action under
Japanese colors. 1050.

SMS

1804

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huesteggen NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 3823




London, January 25, 1938.

SUBJECT: Soviet Aid to China


~~FE~~
~~PAW~~
~~EU~~

793.94
note
893.01 Extra Marylin
861.00

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL *gfk*



The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.



Sir:

1/

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
a confidential memorandum given me by the Foreign
Office, containing such information as is available
to the British Government regarding the help being
given by the Government of Soviet Russia to China.

Respectfully yours,

Herschel V. Johnson
Herschel V. Johnson
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Enclosure:

1. Copy of memorandum.

HVJ/MW

4 copies -
cde

793.94/12473

FEB 24 1938

FILED

F/FG


180

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure 1 in despatch No. 3823 of January 25, 1938,
from the Embassy in London.

(COPY)

MEMORANDUM



A. What help is the Soviet Government giving
to China?

(i) About August, 1937, negotiations for the
acquisition of Russian aircraft by the Chinese Govern-
ment had started. The Soviet Government were apparently
willing to make a free gift of some 250 aircraft to
China in return for certain concessions of a political
nature. What the conditions were is not known; but
they were evidently unacceptable to Chiang Kai-shek,
who, however, persuaded the Russians to sell him these
aircraft. Again, the conditions of the sale are not
known, but are presumably fairly easy for China.

(ii) By the end of November, 1937, it is estimated
that 100 Russian aircraft had reached China, having been
flown by Russian pilots via Sinkiang and Kansu. Some,
at any rate, of the Russian pilots and mechanics remained
in China and are being employed by the Chinese Government
at the same rate of pay as regular Chinese officers and
airmen. They are reported to have given up their Russian
nationality in order not to implicate their own Government.

(iii) The aircraft that have arrived are of the fol-
lowing types:-

- (a) T.B.3 - Heavy Bomber
- (b) S.B. - Medium Bomber
- (c) I.16 - Fighter.

(iv) It is estimated that the total number of air-
craft concerned in this deal is about 250 and nothing
is known of any further negotiations between China and
Russia.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Russia. It is reasonable to suppose that more than the 100 aircraft referred to in paragraph (ii) above have by now reached China, but no reliable reports on this subject have been received.

(v) There is no definite evidence of Russian anti-aircraft guns, bombs or any other aeronautical material having reached China up to the present time.

B. Is it true that the Soviet Government is more interested in spreading its "cultural propaganda" in the intervening spaces of Mongolia rather than in giving actual help to China?

To all intents and purposes, no information is available regarding Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia beyond the statements published in the press last year on the subject of the defensive alliance into which the U.S.S.R. had entered with the so-called Outer Mongolian Government. Similarly, no information is available regarding the cultural propaganda which is no doubt undertaken in Outer Mongolia by the Russians. A note, however, has been prepared on Soviet influence in Sinkiang, which may be of some interest.

C. What is known about the internal position of the present régime in Russia?

The present "purge" in all branches of the Soviet civil administration, economic system and fighting forces has undoubtedly affected the industrial and military efficiency of the régime (the increasing chaos in Soviet industrial

893-016111 Mongolia

861.00

0809

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

industrial and scientific establishments having been attested by several foreigners previously employed in the Soviet Union, but recently expelled in consequence of the prevailing xenophobia), and has given rise to considerable passive discontent which may be expected to increase, if anything, in the immediate future. The efficiency of the armed forces, moreover, has been impaired, at least temporarily, by the recent re-introduction of the system of "political Commissars" attached to the troops, with extensive powers to supervise their political education. There is, however, no sign whatever of disaffection in the army as a whole, or of such discontent as exists in the country being sufficiently active to constitute a danger to the régime - effective opposition to which would, in any case, be very difficult to organise, owing to the efficient system of terrorism maintained by the political police; and, since the execution in June last of Marshal Tukhachevski and the other seven Army leaders accused - it is not known on what evidence - of sabotage and pro-German leanings, there has been no ground, on the information in the possession of His Majesty's Government, for suspecting any individuals of designing a "palace revolution" in their own interest. As far as can be seen, therefore, no change of régime is likely in the near future.

781

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 24, 1938.

Eu:

Inasmuch as a number of the questions raised in the enclosure to the attached letter from Senator Hayden call for attention by Eu, FE is referring the letter to Eu with the suggestion that the questions which pertain to the Far East be answered along lines as follows:

"With regard to the suggestions, contained in numbered paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of Mr. McCleneghan's letter, there are enclosed copies of various public documents, as indicated below, which relate to the attitude of this Government and the policy which it is following in the conduct of its international relations, with special reference to the situation in the Far East. It is hoped that the enclosed documents will prove of value to you in replying to the questions raised by Mr. McCleneghan.

"In connection with numbered paragraph 5 of Mr. McCleneghan's letter, I may say that the United States has no territorial or economic "concessions" in China. This Government owns certain of its diplomatic and consular

establishments

181
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-3-

establishments in China and you are of course aware that the United States, in common with several other powers, possesses extraterritorial rights in China and has an interest in the administration of the International Settlement in Shanghai. As bearing upon this matter, there is enclosed a copy of the text of a letter addressed to Senator William H. Smathers under date December 18, 1937."

Inter

mm/d

Enclosures:

Press releases of July 16,
August 17, 23, 1937,
January 10, 31, February 4, 12, 1938.

Addresses of the Secretary
of State, September 19,
20, October 22, 1937.

Copy of text of letter to
Senator Smathers under date
December 18, 1937.

for *my*
FE:Vincent:NN/SMJ

781
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-2-

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Inter *mm/1*

Enclosures:

Press releases of July 16,
August 17, 23, 1937,
January 10, 31, Febru-
ary 4, 12, 1938.

Addresses of the Secretary
of State, September 19,
20, October 22, 1937.

Copy of text of letter to
Senator Smathers under date
December 18, 1937.

for *Ray*
FE: Vincent: NN/SMJ

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

CARTER GLASS, VA., CHAIRMAN
 KENNETH MCKELLAR, TENN.
 ROYAL S. COLELAND, N. Y.
 CARL HAYDEN, ARIZ.
 ELMER THOMAS, OKLA.
 JAMES F. BYRNES, S. C.
 MILLARD E. TYDINGS, MD.
 RICHARD B. RUSSELL, JR., GA.
 ALVA B. ADAMS, COLO.
 PATRICK MCCARRAN, NEV.
 JOHN H. OVERTON, LA.
 JOHN H. BANKHEAD, ALA.
 JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, WYO.
 WILLIAM GIBBS MCADOO, CALIF.
 HARRY S. TRUMAN, MO.
 F. RYAN DUFFY, WIS.
 EDWARD R. BURKE, NEBR.
 HERBERT E. WITCHCOCK, S. DAK.
 THEODORE F. GREEN, R. I.
 KENNEDY F. REA, CLERK
 JOHN W. R. SMITH, ASST. CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

February 19, 1938

1938 FEB 21 AM 9 30

March 1 1938.

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State
 Washington, D. C.

My dear Sir:

I am enclosing herewith a letter I have received from Mr. W. A. McCleneghan, Pastor of the Methodist Church at Willcox, Arizona, protesting against what he considers to be the belligerent and threatening attitude of the Administration with reference to the Orient.

I shall appreciate your favoring me with your detailed comments on the various contentions advanced by Reverend McCleneghan in order that I may make a suitable response to the accompanying letter.

Yours very sincerely,

Carl Hayden

P. S. Please return enclosure together with carbon copy of your reply for my files.

ACK. REPTED 2/27/38
 DIVISION OF EASTERN AFFAIRS
 FEB 21 1938
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94/12474

FILED
 MAR 2 1938
 F/FG

0814

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

[COPY:Eu:RFI]
[COMPARED:]

THE METHODIST CHURCH
Willcox, Arizona
W. A. McCleneghan, Minister

February 14, 1938.

Honorable Carl Hayden,
Senate Chambers,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Hayden:

I am writing you because of my growing concern, both as a citizen and as a Christian, for the consequences of the belligerent and threatening attitude of the Administration with reference to the Orient. I will not take your time by citing facts and arguments, but wish to request that you give your earnest consideration and support to the following suggestions:

1. Defeat of the naval building program.
2. Defeat of the Hill-Shepherd Bill, or any similar legislation.
3. Demand the definite formulation of the President's "Far Eastern Policy" and public discussion of the same by Congress.
4. Demand the withdrawal of American soldiers, marines, and naval forces from Chinese territorial waters.
5. Proposal for the United States to take the lead in securing the yielding of territorial and economic concessions secured from China by the United States, Great Britain, and France, on condition that Japan do likewise.
6. Convoking of an international conference for the purpose of making available to Japan, Germany, and Italy, such opportunity for freer trade as will make it possible for them to acquire raw materials needed for their industries as will make military aggression unnecessary and unprofitable.

In my own conviction these are some of the steps which must be taken if we are to move in the direction of peace and justice and Christian action. Do they

not

7815
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

not also correspond much more closely to a "Good Neighbor" policy than the things which the Administration is now proposing?

Respectfully yours,

W. A. McCLENEGHAN

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 1 1938.

In reply refer to
Eu 793.94/12474.

My dear Senator Hayden:

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 19, 1938, enclosing a communication which you have received from Mr. W. A. McCleneghan, Pastor of the Methodist Church at Willcox, Arizona, in which he makes various suggestions with regard to the foreign and national defense problem of this country. You ask for my comments on the questions raised by Mr. McCleneghan.

Mr. McCleneghan does not favor the increase of our naval forces for national defense. As a statement of my point of view in this connection, I enclose a copy of my recent letter to the Honorable Louis Ludlow.

With regard to the Hill-Sheppard Bill, to which Mr. McCleneghan refers, I suggest that comment be requested from the War Department.

With regard to the suggestions contained in numbered paragraphs 3 and 5 of Mr. McCleneghan's letter, there
are

The Honorable

Carl Hayden,

United States Senate.

793.94/12474

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

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In connection with numbered paragraph 5 of Mr. McCleneghan's letter, I may say that the United States has no territorial or economic "concessions" in China. This Government owns certain of its diplomatic and consular establishments in China and you are, of course, aware that the United States, in common with several other powers, possesses extraterritorial rights in China and has an interest in the administration of the International Settlement in Shanghai. As bearing upon this matter, there is enclosed a copy of the text of a letter addressed to Senator William H. Smathers under date of December 18, 1937.

Regarding numbered paragraph 4, in which Mr. McCleneghan demands the withdrawal of American armed forces from China, his attention might be called to the letter from the Secretary of State to the Vice President, of January 8, 1938. As bearing upon this subject, moreover,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

over, there is enclosed a copy of a statement given to the press on February 4, announcing the pending withdrawal from Tientsin of the Fifteenth Infantry, and a copy of a statement given to the press on February 17, 1938, announcing the departure of the Sixth Marines from Shanghai.

The suggestion contained in Mr. McCleneghan's numbered paragraph 6 has been duly noted.

I return herewith Mr. McCleneghan's letter to you, a copy having been retained for the files of the Department of State.

Sincerely yours,

Gordell Hull


Enclosures:

Routine

— *KA* *JE*
 FEB 26 1938.
 MAK 1 1938.

1. Address of the Secretary of State at Toronto.
2. Press releases dated July 16, August 17, 23, September 15, 18, December 20, 1937, and January 10, 31, February 4, 12, 1938.
3. From the Reverend W. A. McCleneghan.

Eu:RTP:RI 2/25



Sub
P/E
K

get

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1280
COPIES SENT TO
ONE AND M.L.D.
DT

FROM


FOURTH MARINE

February 21, 1938

Rec'd 8:40 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF FLAG & ADMIN

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
AMCON SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
ALUSNA SHANGHAI
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING



8621. On Pinghan Railway Japanese within 10 miles Yellow River, another unit captured Poai 42 miles west Sinsiang. Southward drive on railway from Taiyuan reached Singshengchen 10 miles south Kiehshiu. Japanese attack from Wuan, Honan, toward Luan, Shansi, within 15 miles of objective. Japanese renewed offensive southwest Tsinning. 1836.

RR:WWC

793.94/12475

FEB 25 1938

FILED

F/FG

182

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.115/179 FOR Tel. #-12 pm,
Relayed from Embassy at Tokyo
as its 113, 7 pm.

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED February 17, 1938.

TO NAME 1-1127 ***

793.94 / 12476

REGARDING: Protection of foreign lives and property in China. Japanese Foreign Office states that it has been ascertained that there are numerous cases of the Chinese armies deliberately stationing trains and setting up objects of a military nature near churches and factories of nationals of third countries. Adds that Imperial government cannot assume responsibility for incidental damage suffered by reason of proximity to the Chinese.

wth

12476

0821

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

FROM Dated February 21, 1938

Rec'd 11:04 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

124, February 21, 7 p.m.

Embassy's ¹²³ February 19, 4 p.m.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 FEB 21 1938
 Department of
 State

793.94
 893.77
 893.77

Arrivals of fresh Japanese troops at Tientsin for the week ending February 15 are estimated by an official observer to total 10,000. Intelligence officers' estimate of Japanese strength in North China on that date are as follows, in thousands: Americans 210, French 250 Italian 300.

According to that observer, double tracking of the railway between Tientsin and Tangku is scheduled to be completed in May, and seven additional sidings are being constructed between Tientsin and Shanhaikwan to speed up traffic. Couplings on one half the Peining Railway rolling stock have been changed to permit connecting with South Manchurian rolling stock. (This has especial significance in the light of current reports of the implementation shortly of a through freight agreement between Manchuria and North China).

The recent official Japanese announcement that
 troop

793.94/12477

FILED

FEB 23 1938

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #124 February 21, 7 p.m. from Peiping

troop "replacements" would be sent to China is believed by observers to presage an increase of troop strength sufficient to enable the Japanese operations in North China (including the Lung hai sector) to be intensified. The two Japanese columns driving southward on the Taiyuan plain are now pressing on the Lingshih Pass; one column is advancing southward in East Shansi from Liaohsien, headed toward a junction with the column which drove into the province from Honan on the east and which now has reached Luan in Southeast Shansi; and, one report is to the effect that the column driving westward in Shansi has already captured Lishih, commanding one of the chief routes from the western part of the province across the Yellow River into Shensi. The spokesman at the Japanese Embassy is quoted as stating that the Japanese propose to destroy the bases of the Chinese troops in Shansi, as being the best means for dealing with guerrilla attacks against the Japanese lines of communication on the North China plain. The Japanese claim to have successfully repulsed Chinese attacks on their positions at Tsining (Shansi) and Tingyuan (Anhwei) on the northern and southern Tsin-P'u Railway fronts. Repeated to the Ambassador. By mail to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

~~THB~~
~~MSM~~
~~WAT~~
~~FEV~~
~~MAH~~

Tokyo's 2757 encloses
 the record of the handling of
 the following matters:

Encl. I - Illegal entry of Amer.
 property at Nanking; Skipping of
 Atkinson; Marking of railroad car
 carrying 3 blue packets; marking of
 Tughe's Mission; Changes in North China
 Tariff.

Encl. II (British Embassy) Restrictions
 in Shanghai areas; high handed actions in
 Shanghai; Shanghai customs duties evasions;
 North China customs Tariff.

Encl. III - (French Embassy) North China
 customs Tariff.
 All this has been reported in telegrams. L

1821

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1938 FEB 21 PM 2 00

B

FE

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Tokyo, February 5, 1938.

No. 2757

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS MADE AND STEPS TAKEN BY
THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AND STEPS TAKEN BY
THE BRITISH AND FRENCH EMBASSIES IN TOKYO
WITH RESPECT TO THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT.

793.94

	Yes	No
1		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Copy in FE
Division of
AN EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 23 1938
Department of State
File
VAA

793.94/12478

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1/3 With reference to my despatch No. 2741 of January
21, 1938, I have the honor to enclose outlines prepared
by a member of my staff on the following subjects:

- I. Recommendations made and steps taken
by the American Embassy in Tokyo with
respect to the Sino-Japanese conflict
from January 19 to February 1, 1938,
inclusive.

II

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
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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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- II. Steps taken by the British Embassy in Tokyo with respect to the Sino-Japanese conflict from January 19 to February 1, 1938, inclusive.
- III. Steps taken by the French Embassy in Tokyo with respect to the Sino-Japanese conflict from January 19 to February 1, 1938, inclusive.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph C. Grew.

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CDA:s

Enclosures:
✓ 2/3 as listed.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
No. 2757 of February 3, 1938 from
the Embassy at Tokyo.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION I - RECOMMENDATIONS MADE AND STEPS TAKEN
BY THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN TOKYO WITH
RESPECT TO THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT
FROM JANUARY 19 TO FEBRUARY 1, 1938,
INCLUSIVE.

On January 19 Mr. Looman, the Counselor of the Embassy, called on Mr. Seijiyo Yoshizawa, Chief of the American Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Office, read to him a telegram from the Embassy at Nanking dated January 18 concerning the illegal entry by Japanese soldiers into American property at Nanking, and reenforced in the strongest possible terms the statements which the Ambassador had made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on January 17. Mr. Yoshizawa said that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had on January 18 laid before the Cabinet the American note of protest dated January 17 and that a drastic measure to assure compliance by Japanese military forces with instructions from Tokyo was being considered. (Department's telegram No. 16, January 15, Embassy's telegrams No. 34, January 17 and No. 40, January 19, and telegram from the Embassy at Nanking No. 27, January 18).

The Embassy was informed by the Foreign Office on January 26, that, as one of the measures to be taken to prevent injury to rights and property of foreign nationals in China, Major General Homma and Lieutenant-Colonel Hirota were being sent to Nanking. Subsequently, the Embassy's Military Attaché was informed by the War Office that General Homma had proceeded to China as a direct representative

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representative of Imperial Headquarters and had carried instructions from Imperial Headquarters to General Matsui regarding the prevention of acts violative of foreign rights and interests, and that Lieutenant Colonel Hirota was to proceed to Nanking where he would be stationed under the orders of General Matsui. (Embassy's telegrams No. 43, January 20, No. 53, January 26, and No. 60, January 31, 1938).

During the course of an investigation on January 27 into the illegal entry by Japanese soldiers on January 24 into American property and the forcible removal of a Chinese woman refugee therefrom, Mr. Allison, Third Secretary of the Embassy in Nanking, and Mr. Charles Riggs, an American citizen, were slapped in the face by a Japanese soldier. A full report of this incident was made by Mr. Allison to Mr. Fukui, acting Japanese Consul General in Nanking. Mr. Fukui's attitude was that Mr. Allison and Mr. Riggs should not have been in the soldiers compound where the incident took place and that the soldier had told them to leave and was therefore seemingly within his rights in slapping them. Mr. Allison told Mr. Fukui that there could be no excuse for the slapping and that he would expect a call from the Japanese military to explain the matter. On the morning of January 28, Major Mingo came to the Embassy in Nanking and on behalf of the commander of the Japanese forces expressed regrets for the incident, offered apologies, and stated that a strict investigation was

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was being made of the unit responsible for the affair. Mr. Allison told Major Longo that he appreciated his call and that while he personally accepted his apology he could not say what view of the matter would be taken by the American Government, which might demand some further settlement. (Telegram from the Consulate General at Shanghai, January 28, 5 a.m. quoting telegram from the Embassy at Nanking, January 27, 2 p.m.).

In compliance with the Department's instructions, the Ambassador called on the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs on the evening of January 29 and orally informed him of the substance of two telegrams from Mr. Allison, Third Secretary of the American Embassy at Nanking, concerning the incident involving Mr. Allison, Mr. Riggs, and a Japanese soldier. In addition, Mr. Grew emphasized, as under instructions from his Government, that in weighing the gravity of the affair the American Government took into account the fact that the whole incident, including the slapping by a Japanese soldier of a diplomatic representative of the United States Government, was not an isolated case but represented one of many and could not be dissociated from a series of cases of irregular entry of American property and disregard of American rights by Japanese soldiers. The Ambassador emphasized also that in the light of all these continuing incidents and of the statement made by Mr. Fukui of the Japanese Embassy at Nanking that Mr. Allison was placing too

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too much confidence in the reports of American missionaries, it was important that the American Government's representative at Nanking ascertain the truth in regard to reports of the continued invasions of American property. The Ambassador then pointed out that Mr. Allison was investigating an unauthorized and unwarranted entry of American property; that in company with a Japanese consular policeman and Japanese gendarmes Mr. Allison proceeded to the American property in question; that the investigation led from the American property to property which was a former residence of Catholic priests but now occupied by Japanese soldiers; that the purpose in going to the last mentioned property was to identify if possible the persons who had without warrant entered the American property in question; that Mr. Allison and Mr. Riggs without encountering any sentry or guard followed the Japanese gendarme inside the open gate of the compound occupied by the Japanese soldiers; that as soon as a Japanese soldier indicated that they should withdraw, they began doing so; and that the soldier slapped Mr. Allison before Mr. Allison had time to get out of the gate and while he was in process of backing out of the compound. Mr. Grew informed Mr. Morinouchi that the American Government expected to receive a suitable expression of regret and an assurance that the Japanese Government would take adequate measures to punish the offenders.

When Mr. Morinouchi indicated that there were certain discrepancies between Mr. Allison's version of the incident and that of the Japanese military in Nanking, the Ambassador
emphatically

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emphatically pointed out that the seriousness of the assault on an American diplomatic officer could not be mitigated by any quibbling over details and that the effect on American public opinion of complete Japanese redress was bound to be impaired by delay in making such redress. Furthermore, Mr. Grew pointed out that these repeated incidents were naturally creating a most unfortunate effect on the American people, who were wondering whether any reliance could be placed on the trustworthiness of the assurances given by the Japanese Government as a result of the PALMYR disaster. (Department's telegram No. 30, January 28, and Embassy's telegrams No. 36, January 29, and No. 57, January 30).

On the evening of January 30 the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed to the Ambassador in the name of the Japanese Government profound regret at the assault on Mr. Allison and gave assurances that after strict investigation the Japanese Government would take suitable and adequate measures to punish those concerned in the affair. The complete reply of the Japanese Government follows:

"1. Whatever the antecedent circumstances might have been, the striking by a Japanese soldier of an American consular officer is a most regrettable occurrence. A Japanese staff officer has already expressed, in the name of the commanding officer, regrets and apologies over the incident, and although Mr. Allison has apparently accepted such regrets and apologies, the Imperial Government for its part hereby expresses its profound regrets over the occurrence of this unfortunate incident.

2. In view of the serious character of this incident, the Imperial Government gives assurance that, after strict investigation, it will take suitable and adequate measures to punish those concerned in this affair.

3. Whenever incidents of this character take place, discrepancies are likely to occur between the respective

contentions

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contentions of the persons involved; and in this instance there are substantial differences between Consul Allison's report as described in the complaint of the American Government, and in the report received by the Japanese Government, in respect of the circumstances leading up to the slapping of the American Consul by the Japanese soldier. The determination of the actual facts must await a careful investigation which is now to be undertaken, and it is desired accordingly to reserve the carrying out of such investigations."

The Ambassador expressed to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs his personal appreciation of the prompt steps taken to meet the American Government's expectations but stated that he must communicate with the Department of State before informing him that the American Government officially accepted the Japanese reply. (Embassy's telegram No. 38, January 30).

Mr. Allison reported on January 30 that he had on that day been informed by Major Hongo that after a preliminary investigation the commanding officer and twenty men of the unit concerned in the incident were being court-martialed. (Telegram from the Embassy at Nanking No. 44, January 30).

Pursuant to the Department's instructions, on February 1 the Ambassador informed the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs that the American Government "accepts the Japanese reply". On behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs the Vice Minister expressed "gratitude" to the Ambassador at the action of the American Government in accepting the Japanese reply. (Department's telegram No. 52, January 31 and Embassy's telegram No. 64, February 1).

On January 25 the Embassy informed the Foreign Office that, according to a telegram received from the Embassy

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at Hankow, three enlisted men of the Yangtze Patrol were leaving Hankow for Canton on the morning of January 26 in a railway carriage to be marked on top with a large American flag. (Telegram from the Embassy at Hankow No. 51, January 24, and Embassy's telegram to the Consulate General at Shanghai January 25, 11 a.m.).

On the basis of a telegram from the Embassy at Hankow received through the Consulate General at Shanghai, the Embassy addressed to the Foreign Office a memorandum dated January 28 requesting that the appropriate Japanese authorities take the necessary steps to safeguard American property at Tientsien, Chantung Province, marked with white flags with blue cross in the center. The Embassy's memorandum pointed out that the only American property at Tientsien of which the Embassy had knowledge was that of the Southern Presbyterian Mission, north of the city and east of the railroad. (Telegram from the Consulate General at Shanghai January 24, 11 p.m. repeating telegram from the Embassy at Hankow January 23, 6 p.m., and the Embassy's telegram to the Consulate General at Shanghai January 26, 7 p.m., repeated to the Department).

In accordance with the Department's instructions and after consultation with the British Ambassador, on January 31 the Ambassador addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a note reiterating the American Government's interest in the preservation of the integrity of the Chinese customs and in the safeguarding of the customs revenues, and protesting against the arbitrary and illegal

action

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action of the provisional régime in Peiping in causing a revaluation to be made of Chinese customs rates on certain articles entering into the foreign export and import trade of North China. The Ambassador's note pointed out that in the opinion of the American Government the Government of China was the only authority which could legally cause a revision to be made in the Chinese customs tariff and that the present representations were being addressed to the Japanese Government because of its "inescapable" responsibility for the creation and the acts of the provisional régime in Peiping. (Department's telegram No. 21, January 30, Embassy's telegram No. 59, January 31).

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch
 No. 2757 of February 3, 1938
 from the Embassy at Tokyo.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION II - REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY THE BRITISH EMBASSY,
 TOKYO, WITH REGARD TO THE SINO-JAPANESE
 CONFLICT, JANUARY 20 TO FEBRUARY 1, 1938,
 INCLUSIVE.

In a memorandum to the Foreign Office dated January 20 the British Embassy recalled that on December 27 Sir Robert Craigie had been informed by Mr. Morinouchi that the northern areas of the International Settlement at Shanghai and their extensions were being opened free of restriction to all foreigners on December 27 and that Chinese would be admitted, subject to permit, on January 5. The British Embassy's memorandum stated that according to reports recently received, although the restrictions had undergone some relaxation, the removal of British property from Chinese wharves and godowns was still not permitted by the Japanese Naval Landing Party and that the complete re-opening of the areas to Chinese had still not been effected.

Apropos of the possible bombardment by the Japanese of the Chinese lines of communication in the neighborhood of Tungkuan, the British Ambassador addressed to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs a letter dated January 20 stating that steps had been taken by the British Chargé d'Affaires in China to notify British subjects of the proposed action by the Japanese forces but that the action of the Chargé d'Affaires did not in any way diminish the general responsibility of the Japanese Government for ensuring that no attacks should be made on British subjects proceeding upon their peaceful avocations.

On January 22 Sir Robert Craigie addressed to Mr. Morinouchi a communication to the effect that the British
 Government

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Government was grateful for the assurance given by Mr. Hirota on January 6 that in areas where there are vessels of third Powers the greatest caution would be exercised by the Japanese forces, "even in circumstances where such caution involves the loss of an opportunity of attacking the Chinese forces". The British Ambassador expressed the hope that Mr. Hirota's assurance would remove the possibility of any future attack such as that made in November 1937 on two barges belonging to the Asiatic Petroleum Company, and added that the British Government reserved the right to present a claim in respect of this attack.

In a letter to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs dated January 24 the British Ambassador enclosed copies of reports from Shanghai and protested against assaults by members of the Japanese armed forces on British members of the Shanghai Municipal Police. On February 1 Sir Robert Craigie again protested in writing to Mr. Horinouchi against these incidents and expressed the hope that the Japanese Government was prepared to give the British Government full satisfaction in these cases. The British Ambassador's communication ended with the statement that these incidents only went to confirm the impression that the Japanese naval and military authorities in Shanghai were determined to act toward nationals of third Powers in an arbitrary and high-handed manner.

On January 26 the British Ambassador addressed a letter to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs expressing the hope that in the event of a Japanese attack on Wei-hai-wei British property in the city would be duly respected and that

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the concentration centers for foreigners at King's Hotel and the Anglican Mission in Wei-hai-wei would be treated by the Japanese forces as safety zones.

On February 1 the British Ambassador made written representations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs protesting against the announcement of the provisional régime in Peiping to the effect that a revised customs tariff would be put into effect in North China. The British Ambassador's representations stated that his Government confidently expected that the Japanese Government would use "its undoubted authority" to secure the immediate withdrawal of the revised customs tariff and that the British Government would hold the Japanese Government responsible for any losses sustained by British interests as a result of the imposition of the revised tariff.

The British Embassy left with the Foreign Office an aide mémoire dated February 1 reiterating the grave concern of the British Government over the discrimination against British and other foreign interests at Shanghai arising from the fact that Japanese vessels were paying no tonnage dues and the passengers, and goods carried by them were not subject to customs procedure.

Sir Robert Craigie presented a memorandum to Mr. Morinouchi on February 1 stating that a Chinese organization, acting under the orders of the Japanese military authorities at Shanghai, had taken over the Chinese Government Internal Revenue Administration in the International Settlement. The British Ambassador pointed out in his memorandum that payment of the consolidated tax by British factories was the result

of

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of various voluntary agreements entered into by the firms concerned with the Chinese Government without any admission or liability for such payment and that one of the terms of such voluntary agreements was that goods which had paid the consolidated tax should be exempt from any further internal taxation in any part of China. The memorandum requested that the Japanese authorities would take no action and would countenance no action by any provisional régime in the areas from which the legitimate Chinese authority had withdrawn which would fail adequately to take into account the obligations of the Chinese Government under the aforementioned agreements. (Embassy's telegram No. 69, February 2, 1938).

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch
No. 2737 dated February 3, 1938,
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

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SECTION III. - NOTE SENT BY THE FRENCH EMBASSY
IN TOKYO WITH RESPECT TO THE SINO-
JAPANESE COMMERCE FROM JANUARY 19
TO FEBRUARY 1, 1938, INCLUSIVE (SO
FAR AS CONCERN THE JAPANESE EMBASSY).

Acting under his Government's instructions, the French Ambassador addressed a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on February 1 protesting against the arbitrary and illegal action of the provisional régime at Peiping in putting into effect a new customs tariff for North China. The note stated that such representations were being made to the Japanese Government because of its authority over the Peiping régime, expressed the hope that the Japanese Government would invite the attention of the provisional régime to the illegality of its action, and asserted that the French Government would be obliged to hold the Japanese Government responsible for damages to French rights and interests which might result from an arbitrary revision of the customs tariff in China. (Embassy's telegram No. 70, February 2).

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
COMSOPAT

FROM

February 21, 1938

Rec'd 2:00 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: CINCAF
2ND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING



0021 Air raids railroads and north and east environs
Canton sixteen BLP sighted, exchange of gunfire destroyers
and Bocca Tigris forts on twenty and twenty first, other
south China ports quiet 2000.

KLP:

793.94/12479

FEB 25 1938

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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HM

FROM

GRAY

AMEMBASSY PEIPING
 AMEMBASSY HANKOW
 AMCONSUL SHANGHAI

Chefoo via N.R.

Dated February 21, 1938

Rec'd 1:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

My February 21, 2 p.m.

Order has been restored at Muping by Japanese forces
 but new disorders have occurred west of Chefoo. Chinese
 "mobile units" are active in vicinity of Tengchow (Peng-
 lai) and along motor road west to Lungkow. Accurate
 reports are not yet available but rumors indicate or-
 ganized armed resistance to authority of new regime.

ALLEN

WTC:RR

793.94/12430

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 FILED
 FEB 23 1938

MICROCOPY

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END

