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**NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS**

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS  
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 57

1930-39

793.94/14001-14250  
Sept.-Oct. 1938



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975



## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

### INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE

# BOMBING of CANTON

Published by the Canton Committee for Justice to China

793.94/14001



793.94/14001



Photo by  
F. A. Nixon


## Foreword

**T**HIS pictorial review of the bombing of Canton by the Japanese Air Force is an attempt to give a visual and factual demonstration of the effects of the indiscriminate bombing of an undefended city by high powered modern bombers. For nine months, since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese hostilities, Japanese planes have subjected Kwangtung, important South China province, to daily raids, causing the death of over 4,500 civilians and the wounding of over 8,500 others. On May 28th this year and for 20 days including the moonlight nights which followed, the raids on Canton City became intensified, taking a large toll of civilian life and destroying millions of dollars worth of property. Casualties from May 28th to June 7th were over 1,500 killed and 5,500 wounded. Hundreds of buildings were razed to the ground, three churches, ten schools, two universities and two hospitals being damaged. Foreign property which was bombed, includes the French-owned Doumer Hospital, the American Lingnan University and the British Church Missionary Society's St. Hilda's School for Girls.

Canton is one of the best known cities of China, being the cradle of the Chinese Revolution. It is a prosperous and progressive modern Chinese town with a population of one million and a half. In peaceful times it is the Mecca for tourists. It is from here that 95 percent of the Chinese trading and living abroad come from and it is to this place these oversea Chinese hope to return. One of the first Chinese cities to have trade intercourse with foreign countries, it is the leading Commercial centre in South China. Canton is also a cultural city. Hundreds of Government and private schools where the principles of modern education are applied, have been established in the city. It is here that the Central Government established the big University in commemoration of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen. It is here that Lingnan University has functioned for more than 30 years. Schools for medicine and other professions are numerous. It was here that the Western medicine was introduced into China which is now carried on by a large number of modernly equipped Government, Mission and private hospitals and medical colleges. It was here that the first missionary came to China to preach the Christian religion. And most important of all, Canton is the birthplace of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, leader of the Chinese Revolution and Father of the Chinese Republic. In his memory the Chungshan Memorial Hall, the finest building in China, has been built and now stands at the foot of the famous Kwan Ying Shan (Goddess of Mercy Hill) as a tribute to his revolutionary achievements.


Within the last 25 years Canton has become a modern city; narrow streets have become wide avenues; old yamen compounds have been transformed into public parks; sky-scrapers appear on the sky line; the river still teems with thousands of boats and sampans which help to make a most picturesque waterfront.

The Cantonese people are most progressive and industrious. They cherish ideals of peace and democracy. While noted for their commercial enterprise, they are keen promoters of culture, education and international goodwill. These are the people whom the Japanese in their ruthless aggression have sought to demoralize and to destroy with indiscriminate aerial bombing. This booklet is an attempt to show what the Japanese raiders have accomplished and what can happen to an open town and its civilian population ruthlessly bombed from the air.



SUPPLIES FOR WAR FROM WESTERN COUNTRIES (PARTICULARLY FROM GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES) ARE ONE CAUSE FOR THE SUFFERING THROUGHOUT CHINA WHICH THESE PICTURES ILLUSTRATE. ONLY BY STOPPING TRADE WITH JAPAN CAN WESTERN NATIONS CEASE TO BE PARTNERS WITH JAPAN IN THE CRIMES JAPAN IS COMMITTING IN CHINA TODAY.

CANTON COMMITTEE FOR JUSTICE



### MODERN CANTON

The South China metropolis has in recent years built many wide streets and modern buildings, some of which are among the finest in the Far East. In the upper picture is shown the magnificent Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall and lower is the Municipal Building, both of which the Japanese air raiders have unceasingly sought to reduce to ruins.


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
Canton is one of the best Revolution. It is a prosperous and of one million and a half. In peace that 95 percent of the Chinese trade these overseas Chinese hope to return with foreign countries, it is the least a cultural city. Hundreds of modern education are applied, the Central Government established Dr. Sun Yat-sen. It is here that the first missionary came to China to preach the Christian religion. And most important of all, Canton is the birthplace of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, leader of the Chinese Revolution and Father of the Chinese Republic. In his memory the Chungshan Memorial Hall, the finest building in China, has been built and now stands at the foot of the famous Kwan Ying Shan (Goddess of Mercy Hill) as a tribute to his revolutionary achievements.

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BUSY CANTON BUND as it appears at peaceful times.



STREETS IN WONGSHA ABLAZE following a severe air raid which reduced 500 houses to complete ruins and caused the death of 300 people.

Photo by F. A. Nixon.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# CANTON SUFFERS WORST RAID OF WAR

## CASUALTIES EXCEED 2,000

### BOMBS ON SCHOOLS

### WONGSHA STATION NOW SMOULDERING RUINS

### MISSILES FALL IN CITY DISTRICT DOING TERRIBLE DAMAGE


### FIRES SPREAD TERROR

Over 2,000 casualties are reported from Canton following indiscriminate bombing of residential areas by Japanese planes throughout Saturday and Sunday. The raids were the most disastrous since the outbreak of hostilities and the casualties are stated to exceed those resulting from all other air attacks to date.

The vicinity of Wongsha Station, which appears to have been the main objective of the Japanese raiders, was reduced to a shambles. It is estimated that over 400 houses were demolished on Saturday alone, and the casualties on that day were placed at 600 dead and 900 wounded. Yesterday's toll was 1,000 dead and 500 injured.

During yesterday's raid three schools were hit, with

str... tried to cross t... closely guard... ed again...



#### SOUTH BOMBINGS

##### Official Figures From August to June

Canton, June 20.  
 The following are official figures released by the Chinese authorities here this morning in connection with the Japanese air raids in Kwangtung province:

From August 31, 1937 to June 7, 1938 the number of air raids over Kwangtung were 1,400; over Canton City, 800; number of Japanese planes raiding province, 5,986; number of bombs dropped in Kwangtung, 10,292; number of houses destroyed, 5,027; number of civilians killed, 4,595; number of civilians injured, 8,555.

Casualties in Canton city from May 28 to June 7, 1938 were over 1,500 killed and 5,500 injured.—Central News.



Photo by F. A. Nixon



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Quatefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

# Sunday Herald

THE LARGEST CIRCULATION IN SO

號五月六年八十三百九千一英 HONG KONG, JUNE 5, 1938 日八

UTH CHINA

初月五年寅戊次歲 年七十二國民華中 Price, 10 Cents Per Copy



## 2,000 VICTIMS OF

Hundreds Buried Alive W

SEETHING MASSES  
 SEEK FLIGHT FR  
 STRICKEN CITY

"CANTON TO-NIGHT IS A  
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## JAP. SAVAGERY

hen Bomb Hits Arcade



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Oliver C. Davis / 12-18-75  
 NAB, Date



**THE JAPANESE WAY** Woman killed in kneeling position while taking shelter in a street corner with her infant son, carried on her back as a bomb fell. Both the mother and child met their tragic end.



Father, mother and son all killed as a bomb exploded in the street outside their shop. Over one hundred others died in the same manner in this area.



25 people killed in the street when one of the bombs intended for the French embassy landed. Hospital located and a plaid outside the Hiroshima building on the front. The hospital itself was downed by two bombs.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST. MONDAY, JUNE 13

## AID IN MOONLIGHT

### BOMBS SHAKE WINDOWS IN SHAMEEN

RES OF BOAT PEOPLE KILLED  
ON SATURDAY NIGHT



THE PRIDE OF THE JAPANESE AIRMAN!  
 Red Cross ambulance machine-gunned  
 by Japanese plane while rescuing  
 bombing victims. Forty bullets hit and  
 perforated the car.

Below are shown Red Cross workers  
 rendering aid to sufferers. Picture on  
 the left shows young woman who has  
 had her left leg amputated.





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**Canton Mayor Sends  
 Message to all Mayors in  
 Europe and America.**

**MS** R. TSENG YANG-FU, Mayor of Canton, cabled the following message to all mayors in Europe and America on June 6:

"As Mayor of Canton, a densely populated open Chinese city whose civilian population is being subjected to daily wanton bombing by Japanese planes, I wish to bring your attention to the continued wholesale slaughter of men, women and children with bombs indiscriminately rained from the sky. Since May 28th, twenty ruthless raids have been made on the business and residential sections of Canton, killing 2,000 and wounding 5,500 civilians. Hundreds of mothers were horribly crushed to death with babies clasped to their breasts. Hundreds of homes, three churches, six schools, two hospitals and the Red Cross Headquarters have been destroyed. I appeal to you for support in condemning and checking such indiscriminate murderous bombings, because I feel that in the interest of mankind as a whole, Mayors of all cities of civilized countries should know of the continued horrors here and join in a strong protest against the massacres. Each protest that you might voice today could help forestall similar barbarous attacks on your own city and people in future. Canton does not ask for your pity; new China will look after herself, but Canton shall never forget your sympathy and assistance in this hour of trial and any move you can make will be in defense of the right of man to live."

**Message to London Mass Meeting.**

"On behalf of the 1,500,000 people of Canton I wish first of all to thank our British friends and other sympathisers most heartily for all their sympathy and support in our hour of trial. Not in the war zone and densely populated, Canton has been subjected by Japanese aircraft for the last nine months to indiscriminate bombing, which has been intensified since May 28th. The total casualties up to May 28th exceed 3,500, while raids during the past fortnight resulted in 1,500 dead and 6,000 wounded, all of whom were unarmed civilians, including many women and children living far away from any military establishment. The Japanese raiders deliberately attacked our business and residential areas for the purpose of massacring and terrorising our people. As homes in widespread areas went up in flames or toppled under bombs rained indiscriminately from the sky, hundreds of women and children were blown into the air and hundreds of others were trapped and crushed under fallen timbers and masonry. Educational and cultural institutions, churches, hospitals and Red



Mr. Tseng Yang-fu, Mayor of Canton, who has faced and tackled a most trying situation with great calm and courage, declares commenting on the recent air raids on his City: "The Japanese bombings have achieved the horrible death of thousands of civilians, but failed to achieve the demoralization of our populace. The aggressor's bombs could destroy our property and life, but not our morale nor our determination to fight to the end. The people of Canton will never surrender to either Japanese threats or yield to terrorism."

Cross Headquarters as well as rescue parties were made targets and wantonly destroyed. At present the city is ceaselessly raided day and night. If these barbarous bombardments are unchecked, the whole humanity will be doomed to the same fate which Canton is suffering today. As Mayor of the city now undergoing such harrowing experience and in the interest of mankind as a whole, I appeal to you for every possible assistance in restraining the aggressor from continuing the wholesale slaughters here. Any step you can take today towards restraining Japan from continuing their atrocities and obtaining justice for us will help forestall further inhuman attacks on mankind and help safeguard civilisation. Your sympathy with our suffering and your protest against the outrages are giving us great encouragement and strengthening our conviction that justice must eventually triumph over brutal might and righteousness is not giving way to savagery."

**ARMED GIRL VOLUNTEERS** The Japanese ruthless bombings have failed to achieve the demoralization of the Cantonese but have on the contrary increased their determination to fight the Japanese aggression with all resources available. These uniformed and armed volunteers are not men but girls who have joined the Model Volunteer Regiment and are undergoing vigorous military training. They drill hard and are always cheerful, even during an enemy air raid on the city.



## The Bombing of Canton Civilians.

By A. J. FISHER,

Chairman of Canton Committee for Justice to China.

THE intensified bombing of Canton during the 20 days—between May 28 and June 16—constitutes one more outrage of the Japanese air-force on the civilian population in China. If all the places that were bombed in Canton fall under the heading of "military objectives" then nothing is safe from being an "objective". The knitting factory, private houses and shops, the slaughter house, schools, colleges, hospitals and house boats, (peacefully anchored by the river side). Can these by any stretch of the imagination be considered as "military objectives"? The dead and the wounded who were brought to the hospitals were not soldiers but the common people. The coolie about his daily task, the mother at her household task, carrying a baby on her back; these were the people that were killed, maimed and wounded. If as it is claimed the aim was to hit military establishments then one must say that their aim was very far from the mark. Admit that the railroad station is a "military objective", but why should bombs apparently intended for the railway station be dropped close to a hospital, (the Hackett Medical Centre) a mile away; or a slaughter house 100 rods away. One can only answer that—either the bombers do not care what or where they hit, or they were not capable of handling high explosives, and therefore should not be entrusted with dangerous weapons. It is those who send them on these errands of destruction who are the real culprits. No amount of explanation can ever get around the fact that the bombing of Canton during these 20 days was indiscriminate, ruthless and murderous. The blood of the thousands of innocent victims cries out against them and will continue to speak for generations to come. And what about the maimed and crippled? Many of them suffering a worse fate than death! Will they ever be disposed to love those who made them thus? The Japanese spokesman say: It was done to "demoralize" the people!—an admission which makes the other claim that they bomb only "military objectives" false! Yes, it did strike terror into the hearts of many people. More than half of the population of Canton moved out; but as far as demoralizing the people is concerned, my observation is, that it has increased the determination to resist the aggressor to the very limit.

To those of us who lived through these days of anguish—anguish for the masses of the people who earn their daily rice by the sweat of their brow, wondering where the next missile from a plane a mile up in the sky would fall, carrying death and destruction to the masses huddled below in crowded streets and houses, it seemed a hellish and murderous affair.

What has Japan gained by this frightfulness? As soon as the bombings cease, the masses of people go back to their work. Railroads have been bombed again and again it is true, but as soon as the sound of the planes cease, gangs of workmen begin to repair the damages and the trains go on, crowded with freight and passengers. There is a grim determination on the part of the people not to be "demoralized". Apparently one of the Japanese objectives is to try and split-up China, to alienate the South from the Central Government, but as far as one can observe, the people are more than ever united, South, North, West,—all standing by the Central Government.

It is said that one should learn from history. This is even more true of present events. This bombing of Canton cannot be treated as an isolated incident. It concerns us all. We are "our brothers' keeper"! Those who love justice, peace and righteousness must stand against such unwarranted injustice. China's cause is the cause of those who really love peace and justice. Japan's way means more and bigger wars. China is fighting for her national existence, for freedom and independence, for the right of national development and to preserve her culture, all of which are threatened with destruction and annihilation by the onslaught of the Japanese military power. China is really fighting the world's battle for democracy. It has been pointed out again and again by China's statesmen as well as others that this is not alone a battle between China and Japan. World forces are at work here. The principles of freedom are at stake. It therefore behoves all those who love freedom and truth to help and sustain China in this cause.

## The Folly of International War.

By REV. G. F. ALLEN,

Lecturer in Theology and Warden of St. Andrew's Hostel, Union Theological College, Canton; Formerly Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford.

I am very glad to have this opportunity to add my word on the tragic waste and suffering, which we have seen in recent weeks in Canton. It is not good that we should allow our minds to dwell on horrors and atrocities; but it is good that we should have the facts brought home to us, just how great a suffering modern air warfare can cause. This pamphlet will do a great service, if it both elicits sympathy and aid for China, and also warns the other nations towards what goal their armaments may be leading.

The photos in this pamphlet speak for themselves. There is one thing they cannot do, and that is to describe the years ahead. Broken buildings can be repaired; broken bodies in many cases cannot. The most tragic feature of the bombing is the large number of people, generally very poor and dependent on their strength for earning their living, who are now left to manage the rest of their life as best as they can, with their bodies maimed and an arm or a leg lost.

There are only two possible reasons for causing such suffering, the destruction of military objectives or the breaking of the morale of the people. Despite many months of attack, and some weeks of intensive bombing on the city of Canton, both these objectives have failed. The railways run as usual. The life of the city goes on. The spirit of the people is excellent. From a military point of view, air attack seems far less effective than had been expected. From a psychological point of view, it cannot but leave a lingering bitterness in the hearts of multitudes of innocent people, who have to submit to so much unreasonable and undeserved pain.

In all such warfare, it is the civilians who are bound to suffer. In ancient days, war was an affair between armies, and at times had almost the nature of a gentleman's agreement to fight a friendly duel. I think we foster in our minds the illusion that war can still be fought as an honourable and friendly affair, and feel slightly offended when we think the rules of honour are broken. When we think in such terms, we are living in a world of illusion; and the sooner the illusion is broken the better. The facts are, that war is a life and death struggle between nation and nation; and that in this struggle it is the weak and innocent who suffer. In modern warfare the rules of decency always are broken and always will be; the beast in the heart of man is unchained, and for a long time after the war can only with great difficulty be persuaded to submit again to the restraints of reasons. In air warfare,

even if the claim is made in all good faith that the aim is to destroy military objectives, it is quite impossible to fulfil this claim. Whatever the nation at war, the aim from a thousand feet high cannot be exact. Whenever a city is bombed, it is the civilian population who pay the cost with their maimed bodies and their life.

It would be hypocritical for the other nations to blame Japan, when they are themselves heaping up armaments of attack and defense. A more drastic cure is needed. There are in every nation many varied groups who love the ways of peace. The members of the great Christian churches follow, or claim to follow, the Prince of Peace. The members of other world religions in general seek for peace. All those engaged in art or learning, even if they be alienated from the Church, agree with the Church in wanting peace for the quiet pursuit of beauty and of truth. The forces of labour, who after all form the majority of every nation, have no desire to see their strength used for destroying their fellow workers in other lands. All those who love the joys of home life, and all who care for women and for children, of necessity hate to see the pains of war let loose on those they love. When these various groups make up almost the whole of the population of every nation, why is it that they are so amazingly ineffective in forming the political policy of nations?

Perhaps the sufferings of Canton, and of many other places in China, may not be in vain, if they stir into activity and power these slumbering forces. We need to claim throughout the world, that those who love peace, and not that strange and rare minority who find pleasure or profit in war, shall form the policy of our governments. Having seen the tragic folly and waste to which modern instruments of war can lead, we need to work with a whole new faith and vigour, to banish war altogether as a method of international relationship. Most difficult of all, we need to find a new way of turning and changing the policy of an aggressor. We need to restrain the aggressor's capacity for war, taking the risk that in so doing we may for the moment draw his attack against ourselves. More important still, we need to find access to those people who love peace, who are always also present within the aggressor nation; and we need to encourage them to make their power felt in changing the policy of their nation. It is not an easy task which lies before the world. But on the one hand lies the path of destruction and ultimate chaos; on the other hand lies the promise, that all things are possible to them that believe.

## Doctor Describes What He Saw During Air Raids.

By DR. W. W. CADBURY, Prof. of Medicine, Sun Yat Sen Medical College, Canton.

IN fulfillment of the Japanese threat to bombard the city of Canton, the massacre began on May 28. For 9 days the invaders brought death and destruction to the citizens of this open city. On June 6, as I was making rounds in the hospital, I heard the rattle of machine guns sweeping the streets. Men, women and children were rushing wildly for shelter. Bombs soon began to fall. Planes roared but five hundred feet overhead. The building shook with the shock of bombs falling nearby. Soon the Red Cross units began to carry in the wounded,—men, women and children. Not one wounded soldier! All innocent civilians!

As the wounded came in, one of our woman doctors gave each a hypodermic of morphine and anti-tetanic serum. Between 60 and 70 required amputations of an arm or leg. There were many injuries of the chest and abdomen. Six tables with as many surgeons operating till late at night. One day's toll of casualties brought to Canton Hospital, actually registered 154. Hundreds of others were treated elsewhere. The killed were numbered in thousands.

Among the victims brought in was a doctor who was helping in the Red Cross Relief himself. He was struck down when the bomb fell in front of the Red Cross Headquarters. He was dying, both legs horribly mangled. His wife and little boy stood beside him weeping. Next, a man with one leg hopelessly crushed. He was bleeding and was in a dying condition.

Five times the air-men dived for the French Hospital, with the tricolor clearly painted on the roof. Two bombs hit and destroyed the X-ray room, laboratory and operating theatre. All was in readiness to perform operations. Crowds driven away from shelters near the hospital fled to the Tiger Balm Building; a newly built concrete structure. The raiders again power-dived and

dropped a bomb close by, and then another in the river crowded with sampans. Scores of men, women and children were killed here alone. Late in the afternoon I saw 40 bodies, horribly mutilated, laid out for identification. Some were disemboweled and others had their brains blown out. Many of the serious cases were brought to our hospital. Newspapermen who had covered Nanking, Hsuehchow and other northern cities declare that this is the worst massacre in this or any other war!

Among the victims rushed to the hospital was a Mrs. *Leung* expecting a baby in a few weeks. One leg was badly wounded; her husband killed, sister-in-law and mother-in-law also badly wounded. There was *Poon*—a coolie; family in the country. He sent them regularly \$10.00 a month. His crushed leg was amputated. He wept bitterly as he realized he could no longer support his family again with only one leg! Two sisters were working in a shop on the Bund. They rushed for shelter to Wing On Tong and were badly injured. There was also *Lam*, half of his face destroyed—he died later. He had a wife and little son, and an old father and mother dependent on him. His brother and his brother's wife and son were all killed. *Ue*,—with 4 little children to support, received a serious wound and lost his right leg. He had a shop for selling vegetables but all lost in the general ruin. *Hoh*,—employed at the little railway station at Pingwu. A Japanese bomber flying 7,000 feet high released 4 deadly bombs. One hit his home, wounding his wife and 2 little children and himself. Next door lived carpenter *Cheung* another bomb hit his house. His father and four year old daughter were killed instantly. The wife was carrying the baby girl. She was struck dead and the baby girl had one leg blown off. These were but a few of the hundreds of similar or even more horrible cases we actually handled in our hospital.

## American Doctor Tells of Suffering of Victims.

THE following is an extract from a letter written by Dr. J. Oscar Thomson, American surgeon in the Canton Hospital, describing the horrible suffering of recent air raid victims who were brought to the hospital for treatment:

"As I write this many Japanese bombing planes are flying overhead, at a great height, above and in the clouds, over the densely populated open city of Canton, hundreds of miles from fighting zones. Through the clouds we can see the planes diving and dropping their bombs.

As we made our rounds and examined those of the wounded operated upon who did not die, we could hardly hear ourselves talk because of the zooming of the bombers and the dropping of the bombs.

In this Hospital alone patients were operated upon on seven tables simultaneously. One old man was a railroad guard, one a fireman who was trying to put out a fire caused by incendiary bombs; the rest were all civilians — men, women and children. More than forty were admitted, of these six died. They were hopeless cases, with large wounds. One man had his whole lower extremity blown off, others legs, arms and hands. Bombs were dropped close to the Hackett Medical Centre and a private hospital nearby. Hackett is also full of wounded.

In our Hospital there were already many wounded non-combatants, who had suffered at the hands of the Japanese bombers, from bomb fragments and machine-gun bullets. In one room are three babies, and in the adjoining one four elderly men, all wounded at the Ping Wu station of the Kowloon-Canton railway, British financed, when bombs were dropped on them. A mother was holding her four months old girl baby. A bomb fragment cut off the baby's left foot and killed the mother. The baby will probably live —without one foot.

Another one with a large wound in his head died as he reached the Hospital. The boy of nine with the brain matter extruding from a wound in his skull we hope will recover, but epilepsy may follow.

When the western suburbs were bombed a while ago, the bombers swooped down and machine-gunned the people as they ran out of their collapsing houses. A baby five months old was brought to us with a bullet wound through its hip. One young woman was a member of a happy family of seven. A bomb dropped and one of her feet was blown off. When she recovered consciousness she learned that all of the other members of her family had been killed. Then there is the mother of four small children. One of her legs was shattered and the other knee blown open. She is recovering. They were passengers on a train coming south on the Hankow railway—obviously therefore non-military. Bombers dropped the missiles on the train and on the passengers as they fled to the fields. The half dozen men who were wounded when the airmen bombed and machine-gunned their boat on the East river carrying firewood are now able to leave the Hospital, "killed" ".

## Another Eye-witness Describes Raid Horrors.

**F**OLLOWING is an extract of a speech delivered at the protest meeting held under the auspices of the Hongkong League of Nations Society, by the Rev. N.V. Halward, of Church Missionary Society, who was an eye-witness to the recent bombings:

Having seen the mutilated bodies of children amidst the ruins of their homes my heart has been filled with horror and shame at the thought that human beings could be so devilish. And so as one who has been on the spot in Canton and has personally seen some of the horrors perpetrated by the Japanese during the past fortnight, I have no hesitation in denying all that the Japanese say in defence of their murderous and indiscriminate attacks on a practically defenceless civilian population living in an open city which is nothing but the commercial centre for South China.

We have seen the mangled remains of scores of civilians—men, women and children—and many wounded from the effect of bomb explosions, and for the Japanese to say that casualties were caused by Chinese anti-aircraft fire is a monstrous lie.

On the morning of May 30 some of the Japanese planes bombed the north-eastern district of Canton. I realised at once that there must be many casualties as the place where I saw the bombs drop was a crowded area. Our Scouts were ready to go out and give a hand and as soon as we thought the planes had gone off we started. We had reached the edge of our compound when more planes came over and from over our heads released at least 15 bombs on the same area as before. Ten minutes later we were in the scene and no words of mine can adequately convey to

you an idea of the destruction wrought to those poor people's houses and shops. Scores of dead, dying and wounded were strewn amongst the wreckage, whilst others more fortunate were standing dazed from the horror which had so suddenly come upon them.

Two days later we went to the scene of another bombing again in a crowded civilian area just off the Wai Oi Tung Road. Here we laboured for over an hour to release a small boy of seven who was pinned under a pile of masonry and debris. He was released practically unscathed but his mother and elder brother lay dead, crushed to pulp nearby.

I think it should be clear to the world at large by now that the Japanese militarists are indulging in an orgy of frightfulness in order to terrorise the population into submission. This view has been further borne out by the statement made in London by the Japanese Ambassador to a deputation of the China Campaign Committee. He is reported to have said that the Japanese Government had found it necessary to destroy the anti-Japanese movement in China and that the bombing of Canton had been undertaken in order to demoralise the Chinese people. If the Japanese really think that these are the methods which are going to make the Chinese love their culture and co-operate with them they are sadly mistaken. Instead, their ruthless and savage methods have engendered in the hearts of thousands an undying hatred for Japan and the people who are causing the destruction all over China.

In conclusion I would urge that it is high time that the Governments of Great Britain, France and the United States of America and other countries should take strong action to restrain Japan in her campaign of aggression in which so many thousands of innocent civilians are suffering."

## Canton Foreign Doctors Urge Help to China.

**T**HE following is an extract from an open letter signed by leading British and American doctors in Canton, including Dr. Derolle (French) Dr. R. L. Lancaster (British), Dr. W. W. Cadbury, Dr. C. A. Hayes, Dr. F. Oldt, Dr. T. D. Stevenson, Dr. J. O. Thomson and Dr. P. J. Todd (Americans), testifying to the recent massacre of Chinese men, women and children by Japanese air raiders in Canton and urging all democratic countries to help China to fight the Japanese aggression:—

"We, foreign physicians working in Canton and some of us in connection with the International Red Cross, witnessed many terrible sights during the inexcusable, ruthless and barbarous bombing of this city, which the Japanese Ambassador in London himself admitted was ordered with the intention of demoralizing the Chinese people. This object was, however, unsuccessful. The lives and rights of hundreds of foreigners were totally disregarded.

In the event of the capture of other large Chinese cities, such as Hankow and Canton, unless the nations of the world rise up in righteous indignation to prevent it, we may expect a repetition of what happened at Nanking—looting, arson, murder of civilians, and raping on a tremendous scale, by a huge Japanese army of occupation run amok. Will you in America, Britain, France and other civilized countries, who have expressed your friendship for the Chinese people, continue to provide credits and materials for the Japanese armies to capture and destroy the cities of China and their noncombatant population? If you are not with China you are against her.

June 13, the *South China Morning Post*, Hongkong, reports: "The Japanese Consul General in Hongkong has delivered replies to the British, French and American protests against Japanese flying over Shameen (the Anglo-French concession) and bombing the Lingnan University (American). To the British and French the reply reiterated that instruction had been sent to the Japanese navy to respect foreign territorial rights which must be rigorously carried out." June 16, *S. C. M. Post* reports: "Eight Japanese planes again violated the neutrality of Shameen yesterday when they flew over the foreign settlement on their way to Wong Sha" (railway station).

As they crossed Shameen where all of the Foreign Consulates are, they opened fire with their machine-guns on the Chinese just across the canal who thought that was a safety zone. We have some of the wounded in our Hospitals. If this order was actually given by the Japanese Government in Tokyo, it was disregarded by the Japanese

airmen. This proves that the Japanese military forces are completely out of control.

At Nanking the army refused to obey orders issued from the Japanese Embassy. We submit that the Japanese military forces have broken the international law of nations, the laws of decency and humanity and have trampled on the personal rights and interests of America, Britain, France and other countries.

Now is the time for all those nations that believe in law and order, in whom the rights of humanity are still held supreme, to sever completely all relations with the Government of Japan.

The Japanese repeatedly insist that foreign flags must be flown. Why? The French Hospital, the Hackett Medical Centre, the Hospital of the New Zealand Presbyterian Mission, had large flags painted on the roofs. The first was bombed. The second had bombs dropped between several of its buildings. The third had bombs dropped beside it.

In the June 4 number of the *Saturday Evening Post*, Edgar Snow writes: "It is gravely to be doubted whether an isolated China can defeat a Japan helped by the entire world,—the democratic Powers financing the conqueror by extending credits to Japan directly or indirectly. Given after that, a mere decade in which to exploit their prize, given the continued assistance of the Western People—who blissfully imagine that all this is no direct concern of theirs—Japanese militarists will then build an army and navy capable of wrecking the earth, themselves included, and great numbers of the despised white men, whom the Japanese are now gleefully making their footballs in China."

Are you helping to hasten the doom of civilization for a little temporary gain? You who are providing the money and the materials for the slaughter of the Chinese women and children—you who believe in peace at any price rather than in the righteousness which exalteth a nation—you have no come-back if some day an enemy bombs your city from the air, calling it a fortified zone, and your homes and public utilities and educational institutions, military objectives—or if, when it is captured, your homes are looted and burned, you and your fellow citizens murdered, your wives and daughters raped and murdered, as at Nanking and many other places. The success of the Japanese armies is due to your help. The suffering of the Chinese people is due to your apathy and to your purchase of Japanese goods.

That Japan is the aggressor in this conflict has been abundantly proved to the world. She has wantonly invaded a peace loving country, which has never attacked another nation, and is in no way responsible for the present "incident".

If the democratic nations of the world do not rise at this time to help China, then it is our opinion that freedom and democracy in the world are doomed to extinction."



## Foreign Eye-witness Gives Graphic Account of Massacre of Factory Girl Workers.

By H. H. POMMERENKE, American Presbyterian Missionary.

WHILE the Japanese airmen are again bringing death and destruction to Canton in their renewed bombing of the city, I recall with a horrible feeling the bombing of the Tai Lee Sewing Factory, which resulted in the massacre of over 150 girl workers and the wounding and maiming of many others. It was on April 10th of this year when the writer was attending a worship service at the Tenth Street Methodist Church that the raid occurred. Two bombs were dropped on the building inside which several hundred women workers were sewing clothes. As I looked out of a window immediately after the explosions I saw horribly mangled bodies at the ruins and wounded people covered with blood running in all directions.

From around a corner there came a young woman bespattered with blood. I ran into the street whence they had come. After having gone a few steps I saw an injured woman stumble into a small shop and then fall into the arms of another woman. People covered with dust poured into the street. After going a short distance I saw more men and women lying or sitting in the narrow street covered with blood from head to foot. While trying to get in touch with Hackett Medical Center two men brought to the door in their arms a man whose leg had been blow open from knee to hip. The entire bone was exposed, broken and crossed.

There was a roaring fire. It was a clothing factory that was hit in a building that was once a theater in the very heart of Canton's famous Sai Kwaan residential district—densely populated with relatively few wide streets.

In full view of everybody were many corpses of those who had been burned to death.

Where there was an opening in the debris people called in the hope of getting a response. Men dug anywhere. Of course digging was rewarded by the finding of people in all states of life, death and injury. There was great competition among stretcher bearers to have the privilege of carrying off the injured person to an ambulance.—Stretchers soon began to look more like Persian rugs than bits of canvas stretched over frames.—The group to which I attached myself dug and found a top-knot of a woman's hair. We finally got the back of her head un-

covered but we had a most difficult time disengaging her. Across the back of her neck was a four or six inch pole. That was sawed away with great difficulty with a most inadequate instrument. Then we found that her neck was resting on the edge of a board. We could not yet make out whether she was alive. Another beam was across her knees. She was tightly pinned down. Although her forehead was badly perforated she was alive.

At the foot of a two storey wall that was leaning on the top and ready to fall any minute two legs were seen kicking. Near by many had been burned to death and beyond recognition.

A baby was heard crying. There is renewed activity to find it. It was found next to the child's mother who had died. Other children were found with crushed skulls. A wooden ceiling had fallen killing all under its heavy beams—gashed bodies, flattened faces, etc.

A block from the disaster on another road another group of men were busy with coffins.—I counted fifty eight rough coffins side by side on the street and four in an ambulance-hearse. All were occupied and almost all were women. About half of these were disfigured and charred beyond recognition. Some coffins contained only torsos.

It was a beautiful day—a really beautiful day. Spring was in the air—It was Palm Sunday, just a week before Easter. It was the time of year when people rejoice because of renewed life and nature. These factory girls and women had been chatting and gossiping, talking about weddings and the rearing of their families, talking of dresses and food and about how they would spend their low wages and hard earned money. Some of the girls owned their own sewing machines and got a higher wage than others. Some of the girls worked industriously so that they could save enough ten cent pieces to make down payments on their "Singers". Though life was hard they made the best of their lot. They knew laughter and song.—Then all of a sudden, splinters of steel penetrated abdomens, chests, heads, limbs were torn, skulls were bashed in, necks broken and the factory was reduced to a complete shambles. Over 150 were killed and many others wounded. Some were burned to death. The sight was most appalling.

## English Journalist Condemns Raids.

INTERVIEWED upon his arrival in Hong Kong by the South China Morning Post, Mr. Hessel Tiltman, war correspondent for London Daily Express and author of several books on Chinese affairs including, *The Far East Comes Nearer* and *The Uncensored Far East*, who is one of the small band of foreign newsmen who have been covering the Canton raids, declared: "The horrors of Canton should never have been permitted to happen and, unless the world is insane, will never be permitted to happen again.

The schoolboy excuses of Japanese Spokesmen deceive nobody. During the past three weeks I have been in more than three dozen air raids during which bombs have been dropped indiscriminately over more than one hundred points of a congested and almost undefended city. The result was what one would expect—during those days I have seen enough blood and horror to last a lifetime. But it wasn't the blood of soldiers or government officials. It was the blood of innocent civilians—more than half of them women and children.

"The responsibility for these mass murders does not rest with the kindly, gentle people among whom I have lived in Japan. I do not believe for one instant that my friends and neighbours at Tokyo—if they could have seen what I have seen—would tolerate this crime.

"Nor does responsibility rest with the half and quarter trained boys who are sent up in powerful warplanes to throw high explosives on other people's homes. Their general aim is appalling, but presumably their superiors don't care.

"Responsibility belongs to the Japanese High Command which planned, ordered, permitted and persisted in this murder campaign. For them it is impossible to feel anything but profound contempt. Even to-day when, thanks to the neutral, impartial evidence of consular officials, doctors and newspaper correspondents, the whole world knows the truth, Japanese Admirals and Spokesmen still talk about hitting "military objectives" when actually their bombs have demolished English-owned schools and small homes. By so doing they have crimsoned the Sun-flag with a stain which it will take generations to erase."

Mr. Tiltman added that no praise could be too great for the calm courage with which the people of Canton, from General Wu Teh-chen, Governor of Kwangtung, to the poorest coolie, were facing the hours of supreme trial.

"Directly the first bomb falls in a raid the ambulances and rescue-squads are racing to the scene, superbly indifferent to the bombs crashing around them.

"In the course of covering the news in forty countries and across four Continents I have seen human courage at its best and finest, but never have I seen a grander and more moving display of comradeship and personal bravery than in Canton during the recent red weeks. The Cantonese are not only prepared to live for China—they have proved their readiness to die for China. Thousands have died—and earned from the world a salute to the brave."

### Canton Committee For Justice to China.

198, The Bund, Canton

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



A busy section of the  
Nuremberg Race Laws  
bombs were dropped  
killing 75 men and  
women in the street  
and others seeking  
shelter in a dug-out  
nearby.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

\* Confidential: Not for publication in connection with writer's name

July 25, 1938

Dear Friends:

I have just learned that my letter of April 15 reached you, and so am encouraged to write again. We are in the midst of wickedness and inhuman atrocities on such a colossal scale that the mind is too benumbed to take it all in. With such heart-rending scenes of suffering about us, Jeremiah 9:1 is often in our minds and on our lips: "Oh that my head were waters, and mine eyes a fountain of tears, that I might weep day and night for the slain of the daughter of my people."

On the night of April 21 I was awakened by loud explosions very near the house we live in, and from the window of my room could see flashes of light accompanying the explosions. The next morning parts of four cannon shells were located in small craters to the north, south, east and west of our house, each about one hundred feet away. Fortunately none struck the house. We complained to the local Japanese officials, but they denied flatly that the missiles came from their guns, though the direction and size belied them. As they refused to investigate the matter, I wrote letters to several consuls and there has been no repetition since.

Just a month later we were distressed and discouraged by the fall of Hsuehowfu. However, the unusually early floods of the Yellow River which soon followed showed that the Chinese were wise in abandoning it, so as not to be cut off from the inland. The heavy floods in China, fully six weeks earlier than usual, look like God's intervention in this war of aggression, and the same is true of the disasters that later befell Japan. It is reliably reported that after the fall of Hsuehowfu 400 wounded Chinese soldiers who could not get away were brutally murdered by the Japanese. This seems to be their policy everywhere. In Nanking they offered kind treatment and work to any one of the refugees who had been soldiers. About 200 men acknowledged that they had been soldiers. They were taken outside the city and used in the bayonet practice of the Japanese army! Only one man escaped alive with five vicious wounds to tell the horrible story. This is truly the tender mercies of the heathen!

Some weeks ago my wife and I met a Chinese peasant coming out of the city literally covered with blood - I don't understand how he was able to walk. He couldn't talk, but a little boy with him said that he had been hacked on the neck by a Japanese soldier. The man has been in our hospital and, to our amazement, is recovering! Soon after the battle here an old man was caught and badly mutilated by Japanese soldiers. He jumped into a well and drowned himself. Just a few days ago Japanese soldiers not far from us caught five young women and raped them on the spot. One of the women jumped into a well but was rescued. Almost daily we hear of villages being burned and pillaged, and the inhabitants being slaughtered. We had absolute evidence that some of the Japanese soldiers in the country villages were going around nude chasing women and chickens. We reported this to the local commander, who was loathe to believe that his soldiers were guilty of such conduct; but when he left the room his Chinese interpreter whispered to us that they knew of worse things than we reported. The commander asked if the soldiers had red badges on their collars. When we laughingly replied that collar badges were not visible on naked men, he joined heartily in the laugh at his own expense. This was the first time I have seen one of these fiends really laugh.

Here is a prayer meeting a la Japanese that occurred in a neighboring village where there is a large church. The soldiers came into the village and found their way into the church, where many women were kneeling in prayer. The soldiers rudely turned their faces up to see which of them were young, and dragged the young women away to rape them. In this same village a drunken or insane Japanese soldier ran amuck and killed several people, before his gun could be taken from him. After he was captured some wanted to kill him, but one man advised against it, lest other soldiers should come and take severe reprisals. So his gun was restored to

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him, and the first thing he did was to shoot the man who advised the others to spare his life. Several others were killed and wounded before other soldiers came up and took the man away. They apologized for breaking up the prayer meeting and killing the people. The Japanese way is to do your wickedness first and apologize later.

After a city not far from us fell, a missionary there stepped out of the compound gate and was threatened with death by a soldier standing at the gate. The missionary produced his U.S.A. passport, which the soldier snatched out of his hand, tore in pieces, and threw on the ground. This seemed to appease his wrath, and the missionary managed to get back into the gate. In this same place an insane Japanese soldier ran amuck at the gate of the refugee camp conducted by the Mission. He banged on the gate and the Chinese were afraid not to open it. As soon as it was opened he rushed in and killed and wounded several with his bayonet. He was caught and disposed of, nobody knows how or where. The Japanese officials investigated for weeks, trying to extort information under the pretext that the man's brother demanded that the body be found and cremated. As a result one man jumped into a well and killed himself. First and last ten Chinese were killed, or wounded, or committed suicide in connection with the incident. Finally the officials put a missionary lady through a three hours' grilling trying to make her say that she knew where the body was. She remained firm, and was told that when the Japanese get complete control missionaries would be driven out of China. Then they found and cremated a Chinese corpse, and tried to force the same missionary to sign a statement that it was the body of the Japanese soldier! She of course refused.

On June 2 Dr. Scovel, an American missionary doctor in Tsining, was wounded by a Japanese soldier who ran amuck in the hospital yard. He had wounded several when his gun was wrenched away from him. Another soldier demanded that it be returned to him. At this juncture Dr. Scovel came out to see what the trouble was and the man shot him, wounding him badly but not fatally.

Here is the way a young woman newspaper reporter was treated. "Yesterday Miss..., a young woman from New Zealand who has been here over one month and who failed to get through to Hankow by walking - being badly treated on the way - left on another try to get through to Tsinanfu. If she reaches you people, do help her. She is anything but a believer, and I am so concerned about her - body and soul. After leaving here yesterday morning, the man who went with her to set her on the right railway track, returned to say that the Japanese had taken her into a room, and stripped her and pointed a gun at him, telling him to run. This he evidently did from the looks of his clothing. They had removed her rings and taken her money he said. The last he saw of her was when she came out of the room crying. But she must have gone on. No word has come to us." (Quoted from a letter written by a friend in the place concerned). Later we learned that she reached Tsingtao, being aided by a more kindly disposed Japanese officer. She said that they accused her of being a spy, and said that if she had had a gun they would have shot her. She replied: "Give me a gun and you will have no excuse for not shooting me!" They replied that they needed their guns for better purposes.

Two months ago our compound was visited by some Japanese and renegade Chinese, all dressed in Chinese clothes, but with mausers ill-concealed under their long gowns - a friendly visit! They had a list of names of men under suspicion of being connected with the murder of a refugee on our compound some nights before, but only found one man whom they said they only wanted to question, assuring us and him that he would receive no harm. After they left we discovered that they had thrown a cordon of armed men around our compound to prevent the escape of anyone. The man was severely tortured and forced to confess that he was connected with the Chinese guerrillas, when he really was not. We have done all in our power to get him released but to no avail. They evidently are holding him till his severe wounds are healed, to prevent us and others from seeing how they have tortured him.

-3-

In the midst of all these inhuman atrocities, it is a great grief to us to know that our own country is selling planes, ammunition, and other supplies to Japan. Japan is the United States' second largest purchaser of air-planes. It truly makes us ashamed of our country to think that she is supplying Japan with the planes to bomb non-combatants, and destroy mission schools and hospitals, as well as American business interests in China. It is poor business as well as bad morality. It is indeed one of the anomalies of this strange war that the U.S., the professed friend of China, is supplying Japan with planes and ammunition, while Germany the professed ally of Japan is China's largest supplier. M. Escara, a Frenchman well acquainted with Far Eastern affairs, in the July 5 issue of the China Press says: "Up to the present Germany is supplying more material and ammunition to China than any other power. The United States are making money by selling supplies to Japan, and their idealism does not clash with their business mentality. Their role at the Brussels Conference was nil."

Here is a man with a large comfortable house in which he and his family live. It is attacked suddenly by bandits who occupy the best rooms, loot the place, break the pictures and mirrors, split the parlor furniture up to burn in the grate, take all the valuables and food, kill some members of the family, outrage the women, drive the rest into other parts of the house, arm some of the boys they have captured and force them to fight against their own kin. When the police come to investigate, these bandits insist vociferously that they have a divine mission to accomplish, and all they do is for the benefit and peace of the occupants of the house, whom they dearly love! When the police remonstrate they are accused of being "insincere," and failing to appreciate the lofty altruistic motives of the bandits. When friends of the family call they are shot at, insulted, and slapped in the face by these loving bandits. The bandits also send out good will spokesmen to the neighbors to explain their position, and try to remove the blot off of their good name. Unfortunately some of the neighbors are afraid of the bandits and do nothing to drive them out. Others are deceived by the specious talk of their ever-present spokesmen and supply them with guns and ammunition, and others do the same for the sake of gain.

From all our mission refugee camps we hear of great blessing upon the people, and of many believing in the Lord. We still have between 2,000 and 3,000 with us here. It is good to hear the little children singing gospel songs every night at dusk out in the open. Some, old and young, are learning to read the Bible and to pray. Some one has said that these refugee camps are "oases in hell." This morning I preached to three hundred or more. When I asked for a show of Bibles many held them up. When I asked for those who believe in Jesus to raise their hands practically all hands went up. All joined in the Lord's prayer and many found the passages of scripture to which I referred them. I preached to them on Revelation 14:6 the ETERNAL GOSPEL, which (1) enjoins the worship of the eternal God, (2) is based on the eternal covenant, Hebrews 13:20, (3) flows from eternal love, Jeremiah 31:3; I John 4:16, (4) operates through the eternal Spirit, Hebrews 9:14, (5) proclaims an eternal kingdom, II Peter 1:11, (6) offers eternal life, John 3:16, (7) threatens eternal punishment, Matthew 25:41-46, (8) issues in eternal glory, Psalm 73:24; II Corinthians 4:17. They listened well.

When China comes out victorious in this struggle, as I believe she will, the door of missionary opportunity will be wider open than ever, because the missionaries at great personal risk and inconvenience have stayed by the people and opened these refugee camps. Madam Chiang Kai-shek on April 6 made a notable address to the missionary prayer meeting in Harkow, in which she expressed her deep appreciation of all that missionaries had done by staying in China, and guaranteed after the conflict is over full religious liberty in all China and the removal of all restrictions from the teaching of the Bible in missionary schools. I wish you could read the whole address. I quote only a paragraph:

-4-

"I am speaking to you this afternoon personally, and I want to bring you a message from the Generalissimo. You may take it to be a personal tribute to your courage, your undaunted valor, and your self-sacrificing spirit in helping our people in this war. You all know what has happened in Shanghai, in Nanking, in Hangchow, in Wuhu, and in other places in the fighting area. And you know how missionaries have succored the wounded, have helped our refugees, and have faced the bayonets, cannon and bombs, and the unbridled lust of the Japanese soldiers on our soil, and they have stood their ground. The Generalissimo and I feel that no words which we could speak could sufficiently express our debt of gratitude to the missionary body all over China who have been a help to the distressed and the best of friends to the hundreds of thousands of refugees. You may remember a few years ago that it was quite the fashion to decry missionary efforts. There was even a commission sent from America to investigate mission work because there was a general feeling that missionary efforts had been a failure. There were also people who asked where were the successors of Morrison, Livingstone, and Young-Allen. Is the missionary spirit dead? If we are really impartial and look around us and see what has happened in the last nine months, I would say that their successors are right here.... You have asked me to tell you how you can cooperate to help us in this national crisis. My answer is, 'Continue your efforts in the same direction.' What do I mean by this? One day one of the cabinet ministers in the Government, a man who is a non-Christian remarked that he was studying the Bible. Some one asked him, 'Are you a Christian?' 'No,' he replied, 'but I see that the people in the country who are the most sacrificing are the Christians, therefore there must be something in their Christianity.'..... I am glad to tell you that those who criticized you and criticized Christianity in years past are the ones who are - what shall I say - vociferous? - articulate in their praise of Christianity."

Some months ago an American magazine characterized Madame Chiang as "the First Lady of the world," and I do not think they were far from wrong. For ability and courage she is hard to equal.

We have had abundant rain, fine crops, remarkably cool weather until the last few days, and good health. The Lord has provided for all our needs. Banks have been closed since last November, but people have brought us money to be used and repaid when the war is over. So we have had no lack of this commodity. It was a great disappointment to us not to be able to see Helen, our second daughter, before she left for the U.S. after graduating from the Pyong Yang High School in June, and so far not to be able to see William our youngest who is in Tsingtao, but our disappointments are His appointments. Helen sailed on June 29 from Kobe and we heard from her as she left Yokohama. She got away before the terrific storm came.

With all good wishes, and assuring you that your letters are reaching us and bring untold encouragement to us, I am

Sincerely,

\* Martin A. Hopkins  
(of Tientsin, China)

\*Please be very careful not to publish any part of the above letter in connection with the writer's name or location.

Rec'd at Nashville, Tennessee, September 10, 1938

Address: Rev. Martin A. Hopkins, Care Dr. H. Maxcy Smith, 169 Yuen Ming Yuen Road, Shanghai, China

Postage: Letters five cents, postcards three cents

*I am mailing this to you as I wonder if you  
see these missionary reports. Wm Megginson  
Lynchburg, Va*


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PRESBYTERIAN ORPHAN'S HOME  
LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA

5  
RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1938 SEP 29 AM 9 52

DIVISION  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS




Hon. Cordell Hull.

Washington,  
D.C.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



**Memorandum of Conversation**  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS


1938 OCT 1 PM 12 25

DATE: September 22, 1938.

SUBJECT: Invocation by the League of Nations of Article 17 of the  
Covenants  
AND RECORDS

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Zaung Teh Ing, Counselor of the Chinese Embassy,  
Mr. Hamilton.

COPIES TO:



*Copy sent to Peiping (Chungking)*

Mr. Ing called by appointment. He said that the

Ambassador had asked him to call to inquire whether the American Government would be willing to support the League action in invoking Article 17 of the Covenant and whether the American Government would take parallel action with members of the League to impose sanctions to restrain aggressors and maintain the peace of the world.

In reply, I said to Mr. Ing that the situation was not quite that which one would take it to be from his questions; that according to our information the League had, pursuant to Article 17 of the Covenant, extended an invitation to Japan to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of the Sino-Japanese dispute and that newspaper reports stated that Japan had decided

to

*793.94  
note 16  
509.C  
Covenant*

793.94/14003

F/FG



5049

- 2 -

to decline this invitation. I said further that, as Mr. Ing knew, questions relating to Article 17 of the League Covenant were matters for consideration and determination by the League and that this Government was not a member of the League. I said that the general attitude and policy of this Government had been made clear repeatedly; that they were known to the Ambassador and to the Chinese Government; and that I would therefore not undertake to elaborate in regard to them. I mentioned several times that the only action taken by the League so far was to address an invitation to Japan pursuant to Article 17 of the Covenant. (My purpose in calling attention to this fact was to indicate that until the League had decided on the question of further action there existed only a hypothetical basis for the questions which Mr. Ing had asked.) I said that I could make no comment other than as indicated above. I said that I would, however, make note of the questions propounded by the Chinese Government and would bring those questions, together with the comments which I had made, to the attention of higher officers of the Department.

Toward the end of his call Mr. Ing told me that he was asking these questions under instruction from the Chinese Government. I then repeated the statements which I had previously made, as set forth above.

MMH/REK

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

FOURTH MARINES

1-1226

FROM

October 4, 1938

Received 11:25 a.m.

ACTION CINCAF

OPNAV

INFO

RUSNOS

AMCON SHANGHAI

COMSUBRON FIVE


COMDESRON FIVE

ASST ALUSNA

AMBASSADOR CHINA

STATION SHIP SHANGHAI

ALUSNA PEIPING



6604. Japanese claim captured Panpenshan forts on south  
bank of Yangtze opposite Tienkachen Nippon planes bombed  
Chungking today. 1900.

CSB

793.94/14004

OCT 7 1938  
FILED

F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

A portion of this telegram  
must be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated to  
anyone. (Br)

FROM

Hankow via N.R.

Dated October 3, 1938.

Rec'd 7:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

*in confidence*

October 3, 11 a.m.

(GRAY) SEE my September 19, 2 p.m., September 23,  
3 p.m., and September 28, 10 a.m.

The most important theatre of hostilities during  
September was north of the Yangtze where the Japanese  
advanced half way from Shangcheng to Macheng, captured  
Teschiachen on September 30 and at the close of the month  
were engaging Chinese west and southwest of Loshan.

On south bank Japanese offensive approached immediate  
vicinity Yangsin and drove southwest from Juichang two thirds  
distance to Wuning. Tantz Tehan sector held comparatively  
intact by the Chinese.

Both sides suffered heavy casualties during September,  
losses in several south bank engagements being as severe  
as at Shanghai. Malaria, dysentery and cholera also have taken  
heavy toll especially from the Chinese (END GRAY).

Russian technical advisers to the Chinese have been  
active at the various fronts. There is no conclusive evidence  
of Soviet tactical advisers with the Chinese forces.

(GRAY)

793.94/14005

F/FG

-2- October 3, 11 a.m., from Hankow.

(GRAY) Chinese air force known to have been in action at front only at Loshan for one day; reported but unconfirmed Chinese aerial activity on southern front.

Japanese aerial activities confined principally to zone activity as stated, secondary bases and railways. Chinese rail and air communications seriously disrupted.

Improvement reported in attitude of the people immediately behind front line towards troops.

*General \** / There has been a betterment in case of wounded and sick troops but medical facilities in comparison with western standards are shockingly inadequate.

The construction of street defense works in Wuhan continued throughout September.

*General \*\** The press and public continue to be hopeful of concerted intervention by the democratic powers. Disappointment and resentment were widely expressed over American sale of war material to Japan. The press issued inspired mandate preceding convocation of League Council calling for effective and immediate action to check Japanese aggression in China. Official statements on invocation of Article 17 characterized by wishful thinking not expressed privately.

Amalgamation of Peiping and Nanking regimes aroused scant and scornful comment (END GRAY).

Chouenlai

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

CORRECTED THIRD PAGE

RAW  
-3- October 3, 11 a.m., from Hankow.

Chouenlai has returned to Handow. The significance of his presence here has not yet been determined.

W. H. Donald still absent from Handow is understood to be out of favor with General Chiang Kai Shek and especially the Ch'en Ch'eng Hoying Ch'in clique surrounding the Generalissimo aside from the Russians whom Chiang obviously mistrusts his leading foreign advisers at present are group of Germans headed by captain Stinnes former member of the Strasser faction liquidated by Hitler. Madame Chiang's principal foreign adviser is now George W. Shepard, New Zealand missionary.

Well over 50% of the machinery in Wuhan has been transferred westward. A vigorous movement is well under way to establish industrial cooperatives in the northwest and southwest aiming at a decentralized industrial structure. Cooperatives and small factories have already begun functioning in southwestern Shensi.

Sent Peiping, Chungking, Shanghai, Canton.

JOSSELYN

793.94/14005

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 3, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

At the present time, with the exception of the Russians whom General Chiang Kai-shek apparently does not trust, a group of Germans comprise Chiang's principal foreign advisers. This group is headed by Captain Stinnes who was formerly a member of the Strasser clique which was liquidated by Hitler. It is understood that W. H. Donald is not in favor with the Generalissimo and especially the faction surrounding Chiang headed by Ho Ying-ch'in and Ch'en Ch'eng. Donald is still away from Hankow. At the present time a missionary from New Zealand, a George W. Shepard, is chief foreign adviser to Madame Chiang Kai-shek. It is not yet known what is the meaning of the presence in Hankow of Chou En-lai who has come back to that city.

The most important theatre of hostilities during September was north of the Yangtze where the Japanese advanced half way from Shangcheng to Macheng, captured Teschiachen on September 30 and at the close of the month were engaging Chinese west and southwest of Loshan.

On south bank Japanese offensive approached immediate vicinity Yangsin and drove southwest from Juichang two thirds distance to Wuning. Tantzeh sector held comparatively intact by the Chinese.

Both sides suffered heavy casualties during September,  
losses

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

losses in several south bank engagements being as severe as at Shanghai. Malaria, dysentery and cholera also have taken heavy toll especially from the Chinese.

Chinese air force known to have been in action at front only at Loshan for one day; reported but unconfirmed Chinese aerial activity on southern front.

Japanese aerial activities confined principally to zone activity as stated, secondary bases and railways. Chinese rail and air communications seriously disrupted.

Improvement reported in attitude of the people immediately behind front line towards troops.

The Consul General has no proof of the presence with the Chinese forces of Russian tactical advisers although on some fronts Russians have been active as technical advisers.

The construction of street defense works in Wuhan continued throughout September.

With the intention of bringing about a centralized industrial structure there is on foot an intensive movement to set up in the southwest and northwest industrial cooperatives. Already in the southwestern part of Shensi province small factories and cooperatives have begun to operate. More than half of the machinery in Wuhan has been sent towards the west.

The press and public continue to be hopeful of

concerted

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hughes NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

concerted intervention by the democratic powers. Disappointment and resentment were widely expressed over American sale of war material to Japan. The press issued inspired mandate preceding convocation of League Council calling for effective and immediate action to check Japanese aggression in China. Official statements on invocation of Article 17 characterized by wishful thinking not expressed privately.

Amalgamation of Peiping and Nanking regimes aroused scant and scornful comment.

793.94/14005

egc.  
FE:EC:JPS  
10-6

HCP  
FE  
raw



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 760f.62/1462 FOR Tel #1293 5pm

FROM Shanghai ( Gauss ) DATED Oct. 4, 1938  
TO \_\_\_\_\_ NAME \_\_\_\_\_ I-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Crisis in the Far East

Message from the American Association  
expressing hope that immediate  
consideration will be given to the  
necessity of effecting an early  
solution of -, and expressing  
appreciation of efforts of the  
President and Secretary of State  
in bringing about a peaceful sol-  
ution of the crisis in Europe.

dg

793.94 / 14006

14006.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quateman NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1330

FROM

RAW

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

PLAIN


Fourth Marines

October 5, 1938.

Rec'd 8:25 a.m.

Action: Cincaf Opanv  
Info: Rusnos  
Amcon Shanghai  
Comsubron 5  
Comdesron 5  
Astalusna Shanghai  
Comyangpat  
Comsopat  
Amambassador China  
Station Ship Shanghai  
Alusna Peiping.

793.94



793.94/14007

8605. Liki strategically located town thirty-nine miles southwest of Juichang and thirty miles west of Tehan reported captured today by Japanese. No information regarding other fronts. 1823.

VWC

RR

OCT 7 1938  
RECEIVED

-F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

1-1226

FROM

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (Br)

Canton vis N.R.

Dated October 5, 1938.

Rec'd 8:30 a.m.

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.E.

Secretary of State

Washington.

October 5, 5 p.m.

Reference is made to recent rumors of threatened

Japanese invasion of South China and the reported departure  
of Japanese troopships October 1.

High Chinese officials state that a Japanese flotilla  
composed of 38 transports and about 15 warships was seen  
off Foochow, that three of the ships went south toward Amoy  
while the rest proceeded to Formosa.

It is not known whether the weather forced these ships  
to go to Formosa or whether they went there to reorganize  
the troops. If the latter came from the Hankow zone the  
second alternative may be the correct one.

LUNNELL

PEG

793.94/14008

F/HG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 5, 1938, from the American  
Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

According to information received from Chinese of-  
ficials of high rank a small fleet of Japanese ships  
comprising approximately 15 warships and 38 troop ships  
appeared off Foochow. All of these vessels went on to  
Formosa except three which proceeded southward in the  
direction of Amoy. Why the vessels went to Formosa is  
not known. They may have been forced to go there on  
account of the weather or, if the troops came from around  
Hankow, it may be that the vessels went to Formosa to  
reorganize the troops.

The above information is sent in connection with  
reports of the departure on October 1 of Japanese trans-  
ports and rumors which have been current recently of a  
threatened invasion of South China by the Japanese.

793.94/14008

28C.  
FE:EC:JPS  
10-6-38

FE  
28C

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to

# TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

Naval Radio

Washington,

"Br"

October 5, 1938

6 PM

This cable was sent in confidential code.  
It should be carefully enciphered before  
being communicated to anyone. *Ben*

38 OCT 5 PM 5 07

AMERICAN CONSUL,

CANTON (CHINA) *Via NR*

For purposes of record, the Department would appreciate receiving, by naval radio, in connection with your October 5, 5 p.m., a further report on the subjects dealt with in your June 15, 4 p.m.

*Welles, Acting  
(M.D.)*

*793.94/14008*

FE:MMH:DT

*FE  
7/2/4*

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

D. O. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/14008

F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

FOURTH MARINES


FROM October 6, 1938

Rec'd 9:28 a.m.

ACTION: CINCUS  
OPNAV

INFO: RUSNOS  
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
ASST ALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CHINA  
STATION SHIP SHANGHAI  
ALUSNA PEIPING

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



8606 Military situation on Yangtze and Honan  
fronts unchanged. 1831.

KLP:WWC

793.94/14009

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 890.00/113 FOR Memorandum  
State Department  
Far Eastern Division  
FROM Penfield DATED Oct 1, 1938.  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: The situation in the Far East: Sino-Japanese conflict.  
Developments of the past week.

FRG.

793.94 / 14010

14010

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 693.001/352a FOR Tel. #339, 2 p.m.

~~FROM~~ Japan ( ) DATED Oct. 1, 1938  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Open Door in China.  
In response to representations the Japanese  
Government has given categorical assurances  
that equality of opportunity or the - will  
be maintained.

rr

793.94/14011

14011



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS


DATE: September 23, 1938.

SUBJECT: Action by the League powers at Geneva.

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Chengting T. Wang, the Chinese Ambassador,  
Mr. Hamilton.

COPIES TO:

793.94



The Chinese Ambassador called. He said that he had dropped in to say goodbye and that, in as much as he was coming for that purpose, he would take up with me a matter of business which had just arisen today. He then proceeded to say that he had received a telegram of today's date from his Government to the effect that the Chinese Government had reason to hope that the governments represented at the present League meeting at Geneva would take some action helpful to China in the way of invoking one of the articles of the Covenant, and that if the American Government could speak confidentially to the British and French Governments in regard to the matter, such action by the American Government would be helpful. The Ambassador did not express himself very clearly but the foregoing represents my understanding of the substance of his approach.

I

793.94/14012

FILED

OCT 7 - 1938

F/Fa

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

I told the Ambassador that I would make record of his approach and that I would bring it to the attention of the Secretary. I made no further comment.

*M.D.G.*

MMH/REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 8 1938

793.94/14012

CONFIDENTIAL -- FOR STAFF USE ONLY

No. *616*

To the American Ambassador,

Peiping.

The Secretary of State encloses for the confidential information of the American Ambassador copies of memoranda of conversations, as described below, in regard to possible action by the powers with reference to the Far Eastern situation.

Enclosures:


1. Memorandum of conversation, September 22, between the Counselor of the Chinese Embassy and Mr. Hamilton; */14003*
2. Memorandum of conversation, September 23, between the Chinese Ambassador and Mr. Hamilton; */14012*
3. Memorandum of conversation, September 23, between the Chinese Ambassador and Mr. Moffat; */13984*
4. Memorandum of conversation, September 23, between the Chinese Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck. */13971*

OR *✓*  
OCT 7 1938. PM

Copy to Ambassador, Chungking.

*egc.*  
FE:EGC:JPS  
10-7-38

FE  
*7/2/38*



*MTH*  
F/FG

793.94/14012

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 13-18-75

598

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GPO

FROM

RAW

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (Br)

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

481, October 6, 1 p.m.

Department's interest is invited to Mc Hugh's report  
No. 9 of September 14 on present political situation in  
China submitted to Director General of Naval Intelligence.


JOHNSON

CSB

Chungking via N.R.

Dated October 6, 1938.

Rec'd 1:30 p.m., 6th.



793.94/14013

F/FG

FILED  
OCT 11 1938

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD

COMSOPAT

FROM


October 6, 1938.

Rec'd. 9:10 p. m.

Action: Opanav

Info : Rusnos  
Comsubron 5  
Astalusna Shanghai  
Comdesron 5  
Cincac  
Comsopat  
Ambassador China  
USS ASHEVILLE  
USS SACRAMENTO  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
USS TULSA  
USS PEARY  
USS PILLSBURY  
Fourth Marines  
Alusna Peiping

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



0006. On third Shiuchow attacked thirteen planes  
twenty bombs nganchanngau twenty bombs. Daily raids rail-  
roads. On sixth nineteen bombs loop line area Canton as  
well as observation flights Bocca Tigris Whampoo sections  
twenty three low wing medium B. L. P. and ten F. L. P.  
flights. 2355

NPL

793.94/14014

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 500.C 115/1166 FOR Tel #262 7 pm

FROM Geneva ( Bucknell ) DATED Oct. 5, 1938  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Japanese withdrawal from the International Labor Office. Kitaoka confirmed the probability of - , and asserted withdrawal from League Commissions only was felt insufficient reprisal against the action of the League Council.


793.94/14015

14015

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

0-2/26:7-11-139



September 30, 1938.

793.94  
L. E. Shapshman

Mar 19,  
1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. Herewith are Summary and Situation Map covering events in China for the period September 22-30.

2. The important events for this period have been:

a. Minor Japanese advances on all Hankow fronts except in the Teian area early in the week followed by minor reverses later, with no appreciable change in the military situation.

b. Reports indicating that Hankow is feeling effects of continuous Japanese military pressure and that signs, including a mass exodus, indicate probability of an early evacuation of the Wuhan area. Hanyang (on the Canton-Hankow Railway south of Changsha) is reported as probable new Chinese military headquarters in case of a retirement from Hankow.

c. Reports of increasing deterioration of Chinese finances.

d. Resignation of Japanese Foreign Minister Ugaki because of differences with military leaders over control of the administration of occupied areas in China.

e. Action by League of Nations Council making Article XVI of Covenant which authorizes application of sanctions, applicable against Japan.

2 encls.  
ml

E. H. W. McCABE,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

CONFIDENTIAL

793.94/14016

F/FG

FILED  
OCT 2 - 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3-2 Digest of Information  
Sino-Japanese Situation  
September 22-30, 1938

MISCELLANEOUS

*L.E. Wilgashman Mar 14 1973*  
 Confidential reports from Hankow state that Chinese finances are rapidly deteriorating. Cash reserves are reported to be less than U. S. \$10,000,000. Finance Minister Lung has decided to default on certain loans at the end of this month and severe effects on the Chinese currency are expected when this news becomes public. Unless help in the form of foreign loans is forthcoming soon, it is doubtful if the Chinese currency can be maintained for more than a month at its present level.

General Ugaki, Japanese Foreign Minister, tendered his resignation to the Emperor on September 26 because of alleged differences with the Japanese military High Command over the control of an administrative organ to handle affairs, including economic exploitation in Japanese-occupied territory. Some observers believe that Ugaki's motive in submitting his resignation was to bring the dispute before the Emperor for decision. Should General Ugaki's resignation be accepted it is believed that his successor will inaugurate a much firmer foreign policy. The question of who should control China affairs has been a bone of contention between the military command and the Foreign Office for nearly a year and was an important factor in the shake-up of the Japanese Cabinet in May resulting in the replacement of Hirota by Ugaki. An unconfirmed report states that Premier Konoye will take over Ugaki's portfolios in addition to his normal duties. Yosuke Matsuka, now President of the South Manchuria Railway Company has also been mentioned as a likely candidate for the post.

Reports from Tokyo state that Japan is hopeful that a European war will be averted, and that in the event war does break out, Japan will avoid becoming involved. Reasons advanced are: Japan's difficulties in securing raw materials and maintaining her markets abroad would be measurably increased by the world economic disturbance caused by war; that if she aligned herself with Germany, Japan would lose British, French and possibly American sources of supply, sources now most essential to her present task in China. Observers in touch with the Japanese Foreign Office believe that in the event of war in Europe, Japan will make no sudden drives on foreign interests in China but will adopt a policy of "watchful waiting." These observers, however, fail to take into consideration the strength of the radical army group in Japan. This group undoubtedly will press for immediate action against foreign interests, and regardless of the logic of the case or the wishes of the Foreign Office, the Japanese Army will probably act in accordance with plans already formulated by their Special Service Corps.

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With an eye on the European crisis, the League of Nations Council at a secret meeting at Geneva on September 26, agreed to declare that Article XVI of the Covenant was now applicable to Japan. Under this article, optional sanctions may be applied against Japan, by the individual members of the League. Chinese representatives at friendly national capitals have lost no time urging that sanctions be actually applied. However, judging from previous experiences it is hardly likely that any important results will be accomplished.

A battalion of the British Seaforth Highlanders, about 750 strong, left Shanghai on September 26 on a few hours notice for Hongkong. One battalion of the Durham Light Infantry still remains in Shanghai. British officials in China state that the Seaforth Highlanders are being transferred for maneuvers at Hongkong and that their return to Shanghai is anticipated. Reports from London state that the move, while previously scheduled, had been accelerated by the serious situation in Europe.

Tang Shao-yi, venerable Chinese statesman and Kuomintang leader, was attacked at his home in the French Concession in Shanghai by Chinese posing as his friends. Tang was seriously injured. The Japanese Special Service Corps has been endeavoring for some time to get Tang to take the executive post in the proposed super puppet government for China and also to act as an intermediary in negotiating with Chiang Kai-shek's government.

NORTH CHINA THEATER

Little military activity was reported in this area. The gates of Peiping were closed on the night of September 26-27 after reports of guerrilla fighting north of the city. Press reports from Hankow state that 3,000 Chinese mercenaries with the Japanese Army mutinied at Shih-chiachuang (on the Ping-Han Railway 160 miles southwest of Peiping). The mutineers are reported to have killed several hundred Japanese soldiers and to have captured supplies of munitions. Chinese claim Shihchiachuang is now in their hands.

CENTRAL CHINA THEATER

Japanese succeeded in gaining a little ground on their drive on Hankow early this week but late reports indicate a slowing up of the attack on all fronts and minor Chinese successes, west of Juichang, near Kwangtai and in the Leshan area.

South of the Yangtze the situation in the Teian area continues stationary. The Japanese have pushed about 10 miles southwest of Juichang but have been held up and even forced back by strong Chinese counterattacks in which the Chinese claim to have destroyed the spearhead of the Japanese advance.

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North of the river, severe fighting continues in the vicinity of Tienchiachen. Japanese have claimed the capture of this important point controlling a river barrier several times this week, but Chinese are still believed to be holding out. Chinese claim their attacks in the Kwangsi area have succeeded in easing the pressure on Tienchiachen.

In the north Loshan, about 40 miles east of the Ping-Han Railway, has been captured by the Japanese but stiffened Chinese resistance has held up a westward advance. In the Shangsheng area the Japanese have taken Shawa. From Loshan and Shawa Japanese are now driving toward Machang. Late Chinese reports claim that forces under Li Tsung-jen have inflicted a decisive defeat on the 13th Japanese Division in the Shawa area. The area north of Machang is considered to be the critical point of the Japanese attack. A Japanese success there would mean early evacuation of Hankow. Heavy Chinese reinforcements are now reported in the area and en route.

Unconfirmed reports state that severe fighting is also in progress on the north bank of the Yellow River where the Japanese are attempting to force a crossing opposite Loyang.

Hankow was bombed with comparatively little damage on September 26. This is the first air attack on the city since August 16. Japanese aircraft however have been most active against Chinese defense positions in all sectors of their drive on Hankow. The only mention of Chinese aircraft in weeks is the report of an attack on Japanese positions near Loshan. No information on results accomplished was received.

Hankow is full of wild rumors and a general exodus is in progress. According to our Military Attache the best sources in Hankow estimate the city will be held for five more weeks. Chiang Kai-shek will continue to defend the Wuhan area but not to the point of hazarding a serious debacle. Plans have been made for moving his headquarters to the vicinity of Hanyang (on the Canton-Hankow Railway south of Changsha) when he is forced from the Wuhan area. The Kwangsi troops under Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi are now north of the Yangtze and with the fall of the Wuhan area they will probably withdraw to the northwest toward Sian.

SOUTH CHINA THEATER

The Japanese have been conducting extensive air raids on Kwangsi and southwest Kwangtung from the vicinity of Haichow Island (near Pakhoi). The railroads in South China have been periodically strafed but no interruption to traffic is reported. The provincial capitals of Kweichow and Yunnan received their first bombing this week. Kweiyang was bombed September 26 and Yunnanfu on September 29. Little damage is reported. An attempt to bomb Yunnanfu on September 21 was interrupted by bad weather.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Unconfirmed reports from Chinese sources state that 20 Japanese warships and transports are concentrated off the Pratael Islands (south-east of Hainan Island) and that the French Far Eastern Fleet is converging on the Gulf of Tonkin. The Japanese concentration may be part of the long rumored expedition against South China.

Plans for extensive shipment of munitions to China via Burma at the end of the rainy season in October are under way, according to reports from Rangoon. The "Burma Railways" is making preparations to transport the supplies via rail to Lashio and then by road 120 miles to the Chinese border where the Chinese Government will handle the shipments.

COMMENT

While the Japanese have made comparatively little actual progress in their drives on Hankow during the last few weeks, the continuous and heavy pressure is beginning to have its effects on the Chinese. Signs presaging the early evacuation of the Wuhan area are increasing. Chinese finances too are showing definite signs of strain. Both the military situation and the financial situation are likely to react on each other and result in most serious effects on the Chinese cause. If any of the powers are seriously interested in maintaining strong Chinese resistance against Japan, now is the time for them to act. A loan to China at this time would go far in delaying or even averting a Chinese break down.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/14265 FOR Tel #-; 10am

FROM Canton (Linnell) DATED Oct 5, 1938.  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese situation; developments of month of September for  
Canton, South China, area.

FRG.

793.94/ 14017

14017

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

EG

This message must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (Br)

Canton via N. R.

Dated October 7, 1938

Rec'd 8 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

October 7, 3 p.m.

Department's October 5, 6 p.m.

Local officials state it has been verified that  
Japanese transports referred to are now at Formosa.  
No other news concerning them has been received here.  
The weather in South China is at present very un-  
settled with typhoons in several localities.

British official and mercantile circles in Hong  
Kong are reported in Canton to believe that an invasion  
of South China is imminent. The Chinese authorities  
express confidence in their ability to defend South  
China. It is reported that Kwangtung recently sent  
two divisions of troops to the front but that three  
more divisions which were intended for the front are  
being held here for the present.

With reference to my June 15, 4 p.m., I would  
repeat that if a land invasion should occur a general  
evacuation of Americans should be urged at once and it  
is believed that most of the women and children would  
leave

793.94/14018

F/FG

NOTE  
393.1115

FILED  
OCT 13 1938

5050

-2- October 7, 3 p.m. from Canton via N. R.

leave voluntarily; many of the missionaries especially the priests and best of the doctors would however insist upon remaining unless the invading forces came to their immediate vicinity; that the invasion would place those Americans in outlying portions of this district in little more danger than they are at present.

The situation is being closely watched and all Americans will be urged to leave if an invasion begins.

More than 75 Japanese planes yesterday raided Kwangtung and Kwangsi, many bombs were dropped on the two railways and the Canton Hankow Railway was temporarily out of commission but train will run tonight.

LINNELL

CSB

b  
Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 7, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

During the course of an air raid in Kwangtung and Kwangai provinces on October 6 more than seventy-five Japanese planes dropped many bombs on the two railways. Although traffic on the Canton-Hankow Railway was stopped temporarily a train will run on the night of October 7.

According to reports in Canton persons in British mercantile and official circles in Hong Kong are of the opinion that an invasion of South China is about to take place. It is reported also that a short time ago two divisions of troops from Kwangtung province were sent to the front but that three other divisions which it was intended should be sent to the front are for the present being kept in Canton. Confidence that they will be able to defend South China is expressed by the Chinese authorities.

There are typhoons in several parts of South China and at the present time the weather in that area is very unsettled. No information has been received in Canton in regard to the flotilla of Japanese ships referred to in the Consul General's telegram of October 5 except that officials in Canton state that it has been confirmed that

at

793.94/14018

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

at the present time the Japanese troop ships are at Formosa.

A close watch is being kept on the situation and in case an invasion occurs all American citizens will be urged to leave. The Consul General is of the opinion that, in case of a land invasion, a general evacuation of Americans should be urged immediately and he thinks that the majority of the women and children would go of their own free will. The Consul General is of the opinion, however, that unless the invaders came very close to their establishments, the best of the doctors, the priests, and many other missionaries would insist upon staying at their posts. Americans living in outlying sections of the Canton Consular District would not be placed in much greater jeopardy by the invasion than they are at the present time.

793.94/14018.

egc.  
FE:EC:JFS  
10-8-38

FE  
new



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HRE

FROM

*paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence DT*

A portion of this telegram  
must be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated to  
anyone (Part A)

SHANGHAI

Dated October 7, 1938

Rec'd 7:55 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1315, October 7, 8 p.m.

Japanese troop movements.

*following*  
information obtained from Fourth Marines'  
intelligence reports:

(GRAY) One. On October 1 some 16,000 Japanese troops  
arrived in Shanghai from Japan and are believed to have  
proceeded up the Yangtze in transports at once; (two)  
infantry, artillery and cavalry are said to be arriving in  
Tsingtao from area around Hsuehowfu and after reconditioning  
proceeding south reportedly to Formosa. (three) there is a  
considerable concentration of transports full of troops in  
the neighborhood of Shanghai between Point Island and  
Woosung.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping and *Canton* (4). Code text by  
mail to Tokyo. (END GRAY)

GAUSS

NPL

793.94/14019

F/FG

RECEIVED  
OCT 13 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 1315) of October 7, 1938, from the American Consul General at Shanghai reads substantially as follows:

On October 1 some 16,000 Japanese troops arrived in Shanghai from Japan and are believed to have proceeded up the Yangtze in transports at once. Infantry, artillery and cavalry are said to be arriving in Tsingtao from area around Hsuehowfu and after reconditioning proceeding south reportedly to Formosa. There is a considerable concentration of transports full of troops in the neighborhood of Shanghai between Point Island and Woosung.

Intelligence reports of the regiment of American marines stationed in Shanghai were the source of the above information.

793.94/14019

EGC.  
FE:EGC:JFS  
10-8-38

JEP.  
FE  
KEL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 711.00/1136 FOR Tel. # 11 a.m.

FROM Hankow (.....Josselyn.....) DATED Oct. 7, 1938  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Editorial in TA KUNG PAO stating that the Japanese-Chinese controversy can be resolved only through restraint of Japan and aid to China; after overthrow of Japanese military clique then may there be hope of establishment of limitation, reduction of armaments and economic reconstruction.

793.94 / 14020

14020

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HR

FOURTH MARINES

FROM October 8, 1938

Rec'd 1:10 p.m.

ACTION: CINCAF  
OPNAV

INFO: RUSNOS  
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
ASST ALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CHINA  
STATION SHIP SHANGHAI  
ALUSNA PEIPING

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

file  
OCT 10 1938  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

8608 Japanese military authorities announced they captured Kichun about eight five miles down river from Hankow today. This capture was reported by Chinese several days ago. Heavy fighting continues all other fronts, 1832.

KLP

793.94/14021

STAMP  
OCT 12 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AC

FOURTH MARINES

October 9, 1938

FROM

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF  
OPNAV

INFO: RUSNOS  
AMCON SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COLDESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
CONSOPAT  
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA  
STASHIP SHANGHAI  
ALUSNA PEIPING

793.94

8609. Chinese admit two stations on Pinghan line  
south of Sinyang in Japanese hands. 1807

RR

793.94/14022

FILED  
OCT 12 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 11, 1938.

~~REV~~  
~~ABC~~  
~~WAS~~  
~~RE~~

You may care to glance at the summary of Tsinan's despatch to Peiping of September 3 which is contained in the transmitting despatch from Peiping (no. 1714 of September 12, 1938).

FE:Penfield

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, September 12, 1938.

No. 1714.

Subject: Guerrilla Attack on Tsinan August 12, 1938.




COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DT

193.94

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 10 1938



793.94/14023

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to Tsingtao's tele-  
grams of August 14 and August 15, 10:00 a.m., in  
regard to an attack on August 12 at Tsinan by Chinese  
guerrillas, and to enclose copies of a despatch dated  
September 3, 1938, from Mr. H. T. Chen, Chinese Clerk  
in the Consulate at Tsinan, giving a detailed account  
of the attack.

1/

OCT 13 1938

FILED

Mr.

F/WE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 2 -

Mr. Chen reports that the guerrillas in question numbered about 300 and were part of the 69th Army commanded by General Shih Yu-san; that they entered the southeast suburb gate, killed the sentries there, and hoisted the national flag over the gate; and that they retreated after street-fighting with the Japanese garrison. Mr. Chen states that some 30,000 irregulars were operating at the time of the writing of his despatch in the vicinity of Tsinan and were engaging nightly in skirmishes with Japanese troops (for a general review of guerrilla activities in North China, see Embassy's telegrams 516, August 23, 4:00 p.m. and 543, September 1, 4:00 p.m.), and that of 50 magistratres appointed to various Shantung hsien only 21 have control over their respective districts.

Mr. Chen's despatch also discusses general political and other conditions in the Tsinan district.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

  
Laurence E. Salisbury,  
First Secretary of Embassy.

✓  
Enclosure:

- 1/ Copy of despatch dated  
September 3, 1938, from  
Tsinan.

710  
GAjr/js.

Original and two copies to Department.  
Copy to American Embassy, Chungking.  
Copy to American Embassy, Tokyo.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE 1  
TO DESPATCH NO. 1714

AMERICAN CONSULATE,  
Tsinan, China, September 3, 1938.

American Embassy,  
Peiping.

Sirs:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch of August 2, 1938, and to report that on August 12th, at about 6 o'clock a.m., approximately 300 Chinese mobile unit men entered the Tsinan city by the southeast suburban gate, killing a few Japanese sentries. En route to the Tsinan city they passed through the Machuang village, where they exterminated a garrison of about 30 Japanese. They were reported to be under the control of Meng Chao-chin (孟兆青), who is the Commander of the 2nd Vanguard Corps of the 69th Army under the command of General Shih Yiu-san. This corps is about one thousand in number and is stationed in the vicinity of Changchiu (章邱). The three hundred men entering the city were in grass-green uniforms and carried big swords, pistols or rifles. They marched off with a flourish of trumpets and, after entering the suburb, were divided into two parts, one entering the walled city with a view to attacking the house of Governor Ma Liang and the other surrounding the Provincial Government building. The Chinese National flag was hoisted over the south city gate for about one hour and a photograph was taken of

the

- 2 -

the gate to show their success. They did no harm to the inhabitants and the police, nor did they plunder any of the shops. However, before the gate of the Provincial Government building was broken open, the Japanese troops arrived by trucks, and then street fighting was in progress for about an hour. Being outnumbered, these guerrillas retreated with not more than ten killed and two or three caught alive. It is reported that a larger band planned to come in succession, but unfortunately their plan was frustrated by the Japanese troops.

It is reported that about thirty thousand mobile unit men were then scattered around Tsinan and that the Japanese troops were engaged in fighting them for several days, firing being audible almost every night. According to the local vernacular paper there are about five thousand Japanese troops in Tsinan. The communique issued by the Japanese Special Mission reveals that some of the units have been driven away or dispersed, while others are still lying close to the city.

Rumor had it that a conference had been held somewhere near Tungchangfu by Admiral Shen Hung-lich, Chairman of Shantung, General Shih Yiu-san, Commander of Guerrilla Units in Shantung, Mr. Fan Chu-hsien (范 策先), Special Commissioner of Northwestern Shantung, Mr. Liu Ching-liang (劉 景良), Special Commissioner of Northeastern Shantung, and the Chief of the Eighth Route Army to discuss the matter of launching a general attack upon the Japanese occupied areas at the same time. In spite

of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

of the fact that fighting was fought on the north bank of the Yellow River near Lokow (洛口), 12 li north of Tsinan, and in the vicinity of Chihoh (齊河), Changtsing (長清), and Taian (泰安), the guerrilla bands invading these places were alleged to have all been repulsed. The Tsin-Pu Railway from Tsinan to Tientsin was badly damaged and traffic on the line was suspended for ten days until August 28nd. Traffic on the Kiao-Tsi line was also interrupted occasionally.

It is also reported that the 8th Route Army, about ten thousand in number; the remnants of the 3rd. Route Army, now under the command of Generals Chan Shu-t'ang and Wu Hua-wen; and General Shih Yiu-san's own troops, about 20,000 in numerical strength; are better equipped with arms than those under Fan Chu-hsien, Liu Ching-liang and others.

As a precautionary measure defense works were built around the Commercial Settlement and to the east of Tsinan in the form of trenches, fortresses and barbed wire entanglements. Laborers were nominally commandeered from house to house, but an amount ranging from 5 cents to five dollars was actually collected for the employment of labor. While the works were in the course of construction, Governor Ma Liang and other leading provincial authorities went to inspect them, and public functionaries were despatched by all official organizations to assist the laborers for three days.

All suburban gates are closed to traffic except for the Pu Li Gate, through which every passenger is expected to undergo an inspection. The Hsin Chien Gate, which separates the Cheeloo Hospital from the Cheeloo University, is closed to Chinese but open to American or British

residents

- 4 -

residents, who are no longer required to show military passes.

Despite the rampancy of guerrilla activity to the detriment of the Japanese army, paradoxical as it may seem, that about 1,200 Chinese mobile unit men under the leadership of Liu Ping-kung (劉秉公) threw in their allegiance to the Japanese at Tsining, and that they have been reorganized into a defense corps stationed for the protection of Tsining District.

The widespread presence of Chinese mobile units in Shantung has proved a great handicap to the promotion of provincial administration. While 50 magistrates have been appointed, only 21 have full jurisdiction over their respective districts. The rest are either just able to reach the borders of their own districts or are only maintaining temporary offices in the neighboring districts. Eight of them have not yet assumed charge. This is the reason why the Japanese are on the watch of an opportunity of bringing about the allegiance of the Chinese mobile units.

In this connection it may interest the Embassy to know that an opportunity has been found in the person of the notorious Chang Shao-t'ang (張紹堂), Secretary General of the defunct Shantung Government. Mr. Chang is reported to be unusually active in Tientsin in the attempt to obtain the governorship of Shantung by making terms with the Japanese. The following is said to consist of his terms: If appointed as Governor of Shantung, he will first of all offer 5 million dollars to tide the province

over

- 5 -

over its financial difficulties. His next step would be the negotiation for the allegiance of the Chinese mobile units in Shantung, and in this regard he had reasons to believe that his efforts will turn out to be a great success. The reason why Mr. Chang is so anxious to get the governorship at such a time of uncertainty is unknown, but unless he has a strong reason for so doing, he will not offer to pay such a high price. Those familiar with the matter are inclined to the belief that, if his terms are agreed to by the Japanese, the agreement is not caused so much by his alleged ability to convert the guerrilla units as by his offer to tide the province over its financial difficulties.

The provincial treasury is still in a stringent condition. While the Chairman of the Executive Commission, Mr. Wang Ke-min, has promised to do his best in continuing to subsidize the Provincial Government, the subsidy is not forthcoming. Consequently, the payment of all expenses has to be postponed. The expenditure for the month of August was estimated at about \$435,400, an increase of approximately \$130,000 as compared with the expenditure of July as a result of improvements made along the lines of education, police and reconstruction.

The Commissioner of Finance has made an endeavor at opening up the sources of revenue in the field of taxation, but he has been handicapped by the element of time and has, therefore, achieved little success. While it was officially announced that the land tax for the latter half of the year 1938 would start to be collected from the

first

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

first of September, the proceeds will not come in until about a month later. According to the August 19th issue of the Hsin Min Pao the collection of the business tax in Tsinan will begin at the middle of this month, foreign business concerns being temporarily exempted (page 3 of this office's despatch dated July 18, 1938). The only tax which is expected to bring in \$50,000 this month is the national salt tax, of which the proceeds are to be forwarded to the Provisional Government at Peking.

The same kind of financial difficulty is being experienced by the judicial circles in this province, which are also under government subsidy. The judicial expenditure for August was expected to be supplied by the Provincial Government, when the subsidy from Peking terminated at the end of July. Since the Provincial Government is still looking forward to subsidy from the Provisional Government, the President of the High Court, Mr. Chang Ch'ao-chi, has repeatedly submitted petitions to the Provisional Government for the continuation of the financial assistance.

Another financial problem which has caused the Commissioner of Reconstruction, Mr. Chuang Wei-p'ing, pay a trip to Peking, is the projected construction of an airport in Tsinan, involving the expenditure of about \$700,000. Mr. Chuang reported to the Provisional Government all the details of the project and also requested instructions concerning the supply of the required fund. According to the September 2nd. issue of the local vernacular paper the Provisional Government has promised to supply

- 7 -


supply \$600,000.

Complying with the instruction of Governor Ma Liang, Mr. Chuang also requested the Provisional Government to postpone the amalgamation of the Shantung River Conservancy Labor Relief Committee (山東河務工賑委員會) into the River Conservancy Bureau of Tsinan (濟南水利工程局) in view of the success of the former. Due to the existence of a fixed program, however, it is impossible to change it. Such being the case, it has been decided that the amalgamation will take place sometime this month, and that Mr. Wang Lu-hung (王露洪) of the Shantung River Conservancy Labor Relief Committee will be appointed as Director of the River Conservancy Bureau of Tsinan after the amalgamation.

According to the announcement of the railway authorities through passenger and freight traffic between Tsinan and Hsuehowfu was resumed on September 1st.

Inasmuch as Dr. R. T. Shields, Acting President of Cheeloo University, informed this Consulate that his mail to the American Consul at Tsingtao had been tampered with, it is deemed advisable, in view of the strictness of the martial law, that confidential political despatches to the Embassy will henceforth be entrusted to reliable travellers to Peiping instead of being sent through the mail.

Respectfully yours,



H. T. Ch'en,  
Clerk.

Original & 5 copies  
to the Embassy;  
Copy to Consulate,  
Tsingtao.  
800  
KCC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW FROM COMSOPAT  
October 10, 1938.  
Rec'd 7 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: RUSNOS  
COMSUBRON 5  
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON 5  
CINCAF COMYANGPAT  
ANAMPASSADOR CHINA  
USS ASHEVILLE  
USS SACRAMENTO  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
USS TULSA  
USS PEARY  
4TH MARINES ALUSNA PEIPING



793.94/14024

0009 On sixth eighty-nine plants seven flights Kwangtung  
Kwangsei Kweifung west of Wuchow ten bombs on eighth raids  
railroads observation flights delta area twenty medium biplane  
blp nine medium low wing blp 3 flp sighted on ninth raids  
railroad and Kwangsi Canton attacked twenty bombs Haichuen  
section fourteen bombs Wongscha station area three in river  
off station number incendiary twelve medium monopolanes blp  
three monoplane flp sighted Sanchau Island south west Macao  
can now handle about fifty planes 2215.

F/WB

OCT 12 1938  
RECEIVED



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW  
FROM

American Embassy Chungking  
American Consul Shanghai  
American Consul Tientsin  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.

614, October 10, noon.

One. There is a renewed outbreak of guerrilla activities, presumably because today is the double tenth. Machine gun firing is audible west of the city and trains are not leaving Peiping this morning on the Peiping Tientsin and Peiping Hankow Railways.

Two. The following telegram has just been received from the marines at Tientsin: "Local station agent informs us all communication and traffic between Tientsin and Peiping suspended indefinitely."

SALISBURY

RR

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated October 10, 1938.

Rec'd 7 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94/14025

F/M B

OCT 12 1938

RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

RAW

CINCAF

October 10, 1938.

Rec'd 9:09 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: RUSNOS

AMCONSHANGHAI

COMSUBRON 5

ASST ALUSNA SHANGHAI

COMDESRON 5

COMYANGPAT

COMSOPAT

AMAMBASSADOR CHINA

STASHIP SHANGHAI ALUSNA PEIPING

793.94

✓ file  
H  
OCT 13 1938  
M

793.94/14026

8610 Sinyang reported captured by Japanese forces late today. Japanese minesweepers claim reached Shihweiyao on Yangtze seventy-eight nautical miles from Hankow; Japanese also state force crossed Yellow River, cut Lunghai railway at unnamed point 1856.

OCT 13 1938

FILED

F/WB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

RAW  
This telegram has been  
received in Navy Code and  
must be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone.


MARDET TIENTSIN

October 10, 1938.

Rec'd 7 a.m.

ACTION: NAVY DEPARTMENT

INFO: CINCAF  
4TH MARINES  
MARDET PEIPING



793.94

0010 800. Nippon troops half of whom disembarked  
hospital ship week ending yesterday via Chinwangtao Tientsin-  
ward 400 wounded boarded same vessel 0930.

793.94/14027

rr

OCT 13 1938  
FILED

F/WB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW <sup>apo</sup>

FROM


This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (B)

Paris

Dated October 10, 1938.

Rec'd 9:18 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



1721, October 10, noon.

STRICTLY PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FOR AMBASSADOR  
BULLITT FROM EDGAR LOWRER.

"Confidentially informed by our mutual Geneva friend  
three important Chinese leaders, namely, H. H. Kung, Chang  
Chun, Vice Premier, and Foreign Minister are interpreting  
recent betrayal Europe to mean China should abandon Russia  
for Germany and conceivably German negotiated compromise  
with Japan. I consider it very significant."

WILSON

RR

HPD

OCT 17 1938

FILED

793.94 / 14028

F / A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY

No. 3263

Tokyo, September 22, 1938

SUBJECT: PROTECTION OF FOREIGN RIGHTS AND INTERESTS  
IN HANKOW - PROPOSED SAFETY ZONE.

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1938 OCT 8 AM 10 52

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

No.	

793.94/14029

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Washington

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's despatch  
no. 3249 of September 21, 1938, with which were trans-  
mitted various documents relating to efforts to safeguard  
foreign lives and property in the forthcoming Japanese  
attack on Hankow, and to enclose a copy of a letter  
1/ dated September 19, 1938, from the British Ambassador  
to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning the  
boundary of the proposed safety area.

Respectfully yours,

*Joseph C. Grew*

Joseph C. Grew

Enclosure:  
as stated.

350

ESC:mg

Copy to Ambassador Johnson

Copy to Consulate General, Hankow.

NOV 3 1938  
RECEIVED

F/WB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch  
No. 3263 of Sept. 22, 1938,  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

(With the compliments of the British Embassy to  
the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, September 19, 1938.)

The British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie to the  
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Horinouchi.

Copied to:  
Foreign Office,  
Shanghai.

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
TOKYO.

(125/70V/1938)

19th September, 1938.

My dear Vice-Minister,

In an aide-mémoire addressed to the United States  
Embassy dated the 11th January, of which Your Excellency was good  
enough to send me a copy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave  
an assurance that, if certain conditions were fulfilled, the  
Japanese forces would not attack the area in Hankow covered by  
the former British, Russian and German Concessions, the French  
Concession and Messrs. Butterfield and Swire's property adjoining  
the Customs House.

I have now been asked to explain to Your Excellency  
that in the local discussions between the representatives of  
the Foreign interests in Hankow and the Japanese Consulate-General  
regarding the specified area, the railway line at the back of the  
former and present Concessions being an easily distinguishable  
landmark, has been accepted by both sides as the landward boundary  
of the area.

Believe me,

My dear Vice-Minister

Yours very sincerely,

(SGD) R. L. CRAIGIE

His Excellency

Mr. Kensuke Horinouchi,

H.I.J.M. Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

FE Oct. 10, 1938.

Reference attached despatch No. 5249, Sept. 21, 1938, from Tokyo, in regard to Safety Zones.

There is nothing new in the despatch under reference. It amplifies information already transmitted in essence by telegraph and reports action taken in accordance with the Department's instructions.

It requires no action.

VAA  
FE:Adams

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY

No. 3249

Tokyo, September 21, 1938

SUBJECT: PROTECTION OF FOREIGN RIGHTS AND INTERESTS  
IN HANKOW (PROPOSED SAFETY ZONE).


RECEIVED STATE  
OCT 11 1938

1938 OCT 8 AM 10 49

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS



793.94  
893.1021



793.94/14030

The Honorable

The Secretary of State  
Washington

Sir:

With reference to the Embassy's telegram no. 577, <sup>793.94/13814</sup>

1/

September 5, 3 p.m., I have the honor to enclose a  
copy in translation of note verbale no. 81, Asia I,  
dated September 3, 1938, from the Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs, concerning the safety of rights and interests  
in Hankow of third countries, in view of the forth-  
coming attack to be made on that city and its environs  
by the Japanese forces.

As

F/WB

NOV 3 1938  
FILED



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75


-2-

As reported in the Embassy's telegram no. 594, September 12, noon, the Embassy addressed a note, no. 1038, dated September 12, 1938, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs setting forth the American Government's views in regard to responsibility for safeguarding foreign lives and property, and undertakings in connection with the proposed safety area at Hankow, in accordance with the Department's telegraphic instruction no. 309 (undated) via Shanghai, received on September 11. A copy of this note is enclosed.

2/  
3/ There is also enclosed a copy of an identic letter dated September 12, 1938, which I sent to my British, French, German, and Italian colleagues, enclosing a copy of the Embassy's note no. 1038 and expressing the thought that they might wish to take similar action.

Previous documents relating to a proposed safety zone at Hankow were sent to the Department as follows; under the subject: "Sino-Japanese relations":  
despatch no. 2707, December 23, 1937, enclosure 18;  
despatch no. 2717, January 6, 1938, enclosures 6, 8, 22, and 23;  
despatch no. 2738, January 21, 1938, enclosure 12; and  
despatch no. 2802, March 3, 1938, enclosure 3.

Respectfully yours,

  
Joseph C. Grew

Enclosures:  
1,2,3, as stated.

350

ESC:mg

Copy to Ambassador Johnson.  
Copy to Consulate General, Hankow.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch  
no. 3249 of September 21, 1938,  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy.  
(Translation)

Asia I/No. 81

Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Note Verbale

The Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the American Embassy and has the honor, in view of the attack which is soon to be made on Hankow and its environs by the Imperial Army, to convey to the American Embassy the following communication regarding the safety of the rights and interests in Hankow of third countries.

Information concerning the safety of the rights and interests in Hankow of third powers was conveyed in a note verbale dated January 11 of this year. From that time up to the present the attack on Hankow has been limited to aerial bombardment.

Since the capture of Hankow is soon to be carried out by means of military force both by land and water, the Imperial Government by enlarging upon and explaining the purport of the above-mentioned note verbale is desirous of contributing toward assuring the safety of the rights and interests of third countries.

As was stated in the preceding note verbale, the conditions under which the Imperial Army will not attack the specified area are that Chinese forces are not present

within

- 2 -

within the said area; that absolutely no military advantage of the area be taken by the Chinese Army and that the movements of Japanese forces outside the area are not hindered from within the area. In consequence of these conditions:

1. The Chinese forces are not to be allowed to pass through the said area.
2. The Chinese forces' arms, ammunition, military supplies, et cetera, are not to be allowed to be stored in or to be transported through the area.
3. The Chinese forces are not to confront the Imperial forces by taking a position in front of this area.
4. The area is not to be utilized by the Chinese military authorities for espionage, communications, or as a base of operations for creating disturbances behind the Japanese lines.
5. Vessels used by the Chinese forces are not to be allowed to navigate along or to anchor at the river front in the said area.
6. Plain clothes troops, assassins, and criminals are to be considered as elements of the Chinese Army and the foregoing conditions are properly to be applicable also to them.

The Imperial forces consider these to be especially important items in connection with the need for planning for the safety of third-party interests at the time of the capture of Hankow, and accordingly they urgently ask that the countries concerned will take steps to see that they are

strictly

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

strictly carried out.

In regard to the abuse by the Chinese forces of third-party rights: the experiences during the hostilities in the western part of Shanghai last year fully evidence that, in the event that the Chinese forces confront the Imperial forces in the vicinity of foreign property or use such property as cover, as an unavoidable consequence the property of third parties is unintentionally subjected to fire.

Accordingly it is particularly to be added that as long as there are Chinese military forces or military emplacements within one thousand meters from the outer edge of the established area at Hankow herein referred to, it is exceedingly difficult for the Imperial forces to bear responsibility for unforeseen damages to the rights and interests of third parties which may occur as a result of an attack on such Chinese forces or emplacements.

September 3, 1938.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 2 to despatch  
no. 3249 of September 21, 1938,  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
No. 1038

The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the Ministry's note verbale dated September 3, 1938, Asia I, No. 81, relating to the safety of the rights and interests at Hankow of third countries.

This note verbale has been carefully studied by the American Government.

The American Government's views in regard to military operations in and against a definitely arranged specified area at Hankow are well known to both the Japanese and the Chinese Governments. In this connection, however, the Japanese Government will doubtless understand that the American authorities cannot assume any responsibility to either side in the present unfortunate hostilities between Japanese and Chinese forces for any actions or undertakings of the other side.

Attention is called to the fact that from time to time the American authorities have, with the purpose of facilitating the protection of American lives and property and without prejudice to the general rights, supplied the Japanese authorities with maps showing the location of American properties in areas of hostilities in China, including properties in Hankow and Wuchang. The specified area at Hankow consists very largely of  
foreign

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

foreign owned property including a considerable amount of American property. A considerable number of American citizens are amongst the large foreign community in that area, and, as the Japanese Government is aware, there are also American citizens and American property in Wuchang.

Irrespective of the outcome of efforts made to separate the specified area at Hankow from all military activities, the American Government fully expects that the Japanese authorities will so conduct their military activities in China as to avoid injury to American lives and properties and makes full reservation of its rights and of the rights of its nationals in the event of the failure of the Japanese authorities to do so.

Tokyo, September 12, 1938.

Copy to British Ambassador, Tokyo.  
" " French " "  
" " German " "  
" " Italian " "

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 3 to despatch  
no. 3249 of September 21, 1938,  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the  
British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie,  
the French Ambassador, Mr. Charles Arsène-Henry,  
the German Ambassador, General Eugen Ott, and  
the Italian Ambassador, Mr. Giacinto Auriti.

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

September 12, 1938.

My dear Colleague:

Upon instructions from my Government I am  
today addressing a Note Verbale to the Foreign  
Office in reply to the Japanese note of September  
3, relating to the so-called Safety Zone at Hankow.

I am sending you a copy of our reply in the  
thought that you may perhaps wish to take sub-  
stantially similar action, and I shall appreciate  
your courtesy if you will be good enough to let  
me know whether you decide to take such a step.

I am, my dear Colleague,

Very sincerely yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5051

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HR


This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.. (Br)

Hankow Via N. R.

FROM Dated October 9, 1938

Rec'd 8:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



October 9, noon.

My September 28, 10 a.m. and October 3, 11 a.m.

One. Conversation with Chou En-lai and a press  
statement by him indicate that the Chinese Communist  
Party as a result of the Yen-an conference of September 28  
to October 7 has recommitted itself to the united front.

Two. At the time of the departure of the political  
leaders mentioned in the Consulate General's telegram of  
September 28, 10 a.m. there was evident resentment on the  
part of the Communists against the Government because of  
the latter's effective opposition to the Communist propa-  
ganda and mass mobilization program for Chinese held  
territory especially the Wuhan area.

Three. After his return here on October 1 Chou En-  
lai once more pledged the Chinese Communist Party to  
cooperation with the Kuomintang during and after the  
present hostilities, allegiance to the leadership of  
Chiang Kai Shek, recognition of the three peoples

principles

793.94/14005

OCT 14 1938  
RECEIVED



5052

HR -2- October 9, noon, from Hankow

principles as the political base of the united front and asked for obliteration of the memory of ten years of civil strife. The Chinese Communist Party intends to continue, however, its independent existence. It calls for the establishment in each province and hsien a people's political council that democratic principles may thereby be put into effect.

Four. Chou En-lai is now conferring with Kuomintang leaders in an effort to strengthen the united front.

Five. The zeal of the Chinese Communist Party for the united front is real for it is by means of the united front that the Reds hope to hold defeatist elements in the National Party to prolonged resistance against Japan. To insure continuance of the united front it has quieted its vociferous agitation concerning the suppression of Communist China organizations and thorough mobilization of the people.

Six. The Central Government so far as can be ascertained has made no concession to the Communists in Chinese held territory. So long as the ruling faction retains its present character it will hardly establish genuinely representative congresses for fear that the Communists, using democracy as a Trojan horse, will ride

into

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5053

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GPO

FROM

HR -3- October 9, noon, from Hankow

into power.

Seven. Freedom of action in Chinese held territory is at present for the Chinese Communist Party a secondary and academic issue overshadowed by the military, political and economic situation confronting it in a steadily expanding area of actual and potential Communist control behind the advancing Japanese lines.

Eight. Finally it is increasingly evident from its program of action for the present and any predictable future that the Chinese Communist Party is not justified in designating itself as a Communist organization. Its action for the present and any predictable future envisages little more in the way of social revolution than land reform, cooperatives, lower rents and interest and in official life plain honesty. Repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Shanghai.

JOSSELYN

WWC:KLP

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 9, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

It was apparent at the time Chou En-lai, Wang Ming and Chin Po-ku left Hankow for Yenai (see telegram of September 28 from Hankow) that the Communists were resentful at the Central Government on account of the Government's successful opposition to Communist propaganda and the program for mass mobilization in the Wuhan district and other Chinese-held areas.

Chou En-lai returned to Hankow on October 1 and asked that the memory of ten years of strife between the Government and the Communists be erased and promised once more that the Chinese Communist Party would work along with the Kuomintang during the present conflict and afterwards, would recognize the Three Peoples' Principles as the political base of the united front, and would be loyal to General Chiang Kai-shek as leader. It is clear from a press statement issued by Chou and conversation with him that as a result of the conference which took place at Yenai from September 28 to October 7 the Chinese Communist Party has again pledged itself to the united front and at the present time Chou is carrying on conversations with leaders of the Kuomintang in an endeavor

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

endeavor to make more forceful this united front. However, it is the intention of the Communist Party to retain its existence independently and it asks that in order to put democratic principles into effect a people's political council be set up in each hsien and province.

So far as is known no concession has been made by the Government to the Communists in areas held by the Chinese. As long as the character of the faction in power remains as it is at present it is unlikely that truly representative congresses will be set up lest the Communists come into power through the use of democracy as a blind.

The Communists hope by means of the united front to force the defeatists in the Kuomintang to continue resistance to the Japanese for a long time and therefore their ardent interest in continuance of the united front is genuine. They have quieted down their loud agitation in regard to complete mobilization of the people and the putting down of Chinese Communist organizations in order to make sure that the united front would continue. The economic, political and military situation facing the Chinese Communist Party in the continually growing area of potential and real Communist dominance back of the advancing lines of the Japanese is more important than freedom of action in the area held by Chinese. At the present

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

present time such freedom of action is a matter of academic and secondary importance. Inasmuch as now and in the predictable future plain honesty in official life, lower rents and interest, land reform, and cooperatives constitute almost the only elements of social revolution contemplated by the program of action of the Chinese Communist Party, it becomes more and more evident that the Party is not warranted in calling itself a Communist organization.

793.93/14031.

29C.  
FE:EGC:JFS  
10-11

HEP.  
FE  
*[Signature]*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

PLAIN

GPO

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated October 11, 1938.

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

615, October 11, 2 p.m.

Embassy's 614, October 10, noon.


Train services were resumed yesterday afternoon.

Apparently minor engagements occurred at two or three points  
along the Peiping Tientsin Railway.

Repeated to Chungking, Shanghai and Tientsin.

SALISBURY

RR



OCT 14 1938

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note  
843.77

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quateman NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

FOURTH MARINES


FROM

October 11, 1938.

Rec'd 9:02 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF OPNAV  
INFO: RUSNOS  
AMCONSHANGHAI  
CONSUEBRON 5  
COMDESRON 5  
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMABASSADOR CHINA  
STASHIP SHANGHAI  
ALUSNA PEIPING

COPIES SENT TO  
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.



8611 Heavy fighting centers south of Yangtze about  
Yangshin where Japanese still trying occupy city. Chinese  
claim their mobile troops have occupied Taian and Yenchow  
Shantung also reiterate reports of their victory west of  
Tehran 1853.

RR

WVC

793.94/14033

OCT 13 1938

FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tientsin/124 FOR #655 to Embassy

FROM Tientsin ( Caldwell ) DATED Sept. 2, 1938  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Developments in Tientsin district relating to Sino-Japanese  
conflict: report on same.

wb

793.94/14034

14034



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

B. Relations with Other Countries.

1. Japan.

(a) Operations in Shansi. Very little precise information was obtainable in Tientsin during the month regarding conditions in Shansi. Two American residents of central Shansi who left the province about the middle of August reported that the Japanese operations appeared to have been shifted to southern Shansi with little activity on the part of either the Chinese or Japanese in the central section of the province. Reports from Japanese sources claimed considerable successes on the part of

-3-

of the Japanese at and near the principal Yellow River crossings in south Chansi.

A foreigner who travelled in northeast Chansi during August reported the Chinese 8th Route Army in complete and undisturbed control of this area.

(b) Chahar and Suiyuan. Japanese sources reported fighting in Chahar and Suiyuan between Japanese and their Mongolian allies and General Ma Chan-shan's ( 馬 占 山 ) Chinese forces, but no independent confirmation of this fighting was obtainable.

(c) Hopei.

(1) Activities of Chinese Partisans.

A foreigner who travelled in the interior of Hopei during July and August reported much activity on the part of supporters of the Chinese Government in the political organization of the countryside. Chinese troops operating in east Hopei were quite active, attacking the railway between Tientsin and Shanhaikuan a number of times and on several occasions damaging the track to such an extent as to considerably delay trains between Tientsin and Mukden.

(2) Attack on Taku. A Chinese force of about 1500 men attacked Taku on the night of August 12, capturing and carrying away a number of Chinese and inflicting several casualties on the Japanese. (10) There was a certain amount of fighting in the area to the south of Tientsin and west of Taku during the following three or four days.

(3)

-4-

(3) Japanese Reinforcements. Apparently due to the increasing activity of the Chinese partisans, the number of Japanese troops in Tientsin and Tang'u and at other points along the railway between Peiping and Shanhaikuan were considerably increased during the latter part of August. The number and activity of Japanese airplanes operating from the air field at Tientsin was also greatly increased, sometimes as many as twenty airplanes being seen in the air over Tientsin at one time.

(4) Guerrilla Warfare. On August 30 trains from Peiping were delayed several hours due, it was reported, to Chinese attacks on the Japanese railway guards. On the same day trains from Mukden which were due in the early morning arrived in Tientsin in the late evening due to damage caused to the railway tracks by Chinese at Chihmen and Anshan, two small stations east of Luanhsien on the Pei-Ning Railway. (11)

According to the local press, the Japanese military Headquarters at Peiping announced toward the end of August that a "mopping up" campaign was in progress against the Chinese troops, or "bandits" as they are described by the Japanese military, in Hopei and Shansi and particularly in east Hopei. Notwithstanding this announcement, however, the activity on the part of the Chinese troops and guerrillas was definitely on the increase and information obtained from sources in Tientsin believed to be in contact with

these

-5-

these troops was to the effect that a campaign against the Japanese in the east Hopei, Tientsin and Peiping areas would be inaugurated early in September. The same sources reported that General Lu Chung-lin (鹿鍾麟), the Governor of Hopei, appointed by Hankow, was in the neighborhood of Tientsin and was directing the activities of the Chinese. It was also reported that the east Hopei Baoantui, who were transferred to guard duty along the Tientsin-Pukow and Peiping-Hankow Railways some months ago, were being returned to east Hopei.

Service between Tientsin and Tsinan on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway was suspended several times during August on account of damage to the railway by Chinese troops, mainly in Shantung north of the Yellow River but also near Tientsin. On one occasion train service was suspended for a week.

Chinese bandits or irregulars were active in the immediate suburbs of Tientsin, kidnapping and robbing a number of Chinese. The Chinese police being unarmed cannot cope with these marauders and the Japanese military appear to be equally unable to suppress them.

(d) Withdrawal of Japanese Residents from British and French Concessions at Tientsin.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ishimoto of the Special Service Department of the Japanese Military Headquarters in Peiping informed press representatives in Tientsin on August 31st that all Japanese must withdraw from  
the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the British and French municipal areas within two weeks in accordance with instructions from the Japanese military authorities. He was reported to have stated that this action was taken because of the lack of cooperation shown by the British and French authorities in the suppression of communistic and anti-Japanese elements now conducting subversive activities in their areas and also because the authorities of these two areas were hampering financial and monetary stabilization. (12) Although the Italian concession in Tientsin is small and there are few Japanese residents or business houses in this area, it is noteworthy that the Japanese do not appear to have been ordered to evacuate therefrom.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 893.77/3162 FOR Tel-: 4pm

FROM Hankow (Josselyn) DATED Oct 7, 1938  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict: Peiping-Hankow Railway, reportedly,  
cut today at Liulintien.

Informers concerning-, presumably by Japanese thrust southwest  
from Loshan.

FRG.

793.94 / 14035

14035

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM

PLAIN



COMSOPAT

Undated

Rec'd October 11, 1938

6:35 p.m.

ACTION OPNAV  
INFO RUSNOS  
COMSUBRON 5  
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
AMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS ASHEVILLE  
USS SACRAMENTO  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
USS TULSA  
USS PEARY  
USS PILLSBURY  
FOURTH MARINES  
ALUSNA PEIPING



793.94/14036

0011 On tenth railroads raided Saichuen section and  
air field Canton attacked. Twenty bombs seven medium low  
wing B L P two medium biplanes B L P sighted. Fifty eight  
planes in five groups reported in Kwangtung operations.  
On eleventh railroads air raids twenty planes reported eight  
low wing medium B L P three monoplanes F L P sighted light  
cruiser and planes reported scouting Bias Bay and then  
departing 2245.

OPNAV

NPL

OCT 13 1938

FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Mittin O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 359.

Copy for Department of State.

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Tsingtao, China, August 17, 1938.

Subject: Attack on Tsinanfu.

For Distribution Check	
To: M	In U.S.A.
For: Sokolov	ONIAMID

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Ambassador,  
Peiping, China.

Sir:

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND W.I.D.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
AUG 27 1938  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE

I have the honor to refer to this consulate's telegrams of August 14 and August 15, 10 A. M. with regard to the attack on Tsinan and to enclose a copy of a letter dated August 14, addressed to this consulate by Mr. H. T. Ch'en, Clerk of the American consulate at Tsinan. A Chinese newspaper item of this date states that the Chinese troops were a part of the 69th Army and not the 31st Army as reported in this consulate's telegram of August 15, 10 A. M. All reports indicate that Tsinan is quiet and regular passenger trains for Tsinan left Tsingtao yesterday and today.

A Chinese who left Tsingtao some months ago for the interior (SHA HO (沙河), 180 li north of the railway line) and who has just returned to this city states

793.94/14037

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- 2 -

states that Japanese planes are daily seen; that rumors and reports of bombings and machine gunning are frequent and that the agrarian population is suffering under a great strain; the Yu Chi Tui appear over and over again; their demands are for money or food, and the burden of supporting these mobile bands is great. Pressed back from the Tsingtao-Tsinan line into a region where the inhabitants are suffering greatly, these bands have been compelled to establish exclusive zones of operations; invasions of outside bands have resulted in armed clashes. The plight of the farmer in Shantung is now tragic; at any moment he and his family may be the target for a Japanese bomb or machine gun, or he may be the victim of the cruelest treatment to force him to yield the trivial cash he is likely to have, or to feed a group of strangers, the Yu Chi Tui, with the food on which he is relying to tide him over for several months. The situation is becoming desperate for many and the result must be for some time to come such an impoverishment of the masses that they will indeed be the most feeble of partners in the "economic cooperation" which Japan seeks.

Respectfully yours,

Samuel Sokobin,  
American Consul.

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -


Enclosure:

1. From Tsinan Consulate, Aug. 14, 1938.

800

SS/CHS

Original to Embassy, Peiping,  
5 copies to Department of State,  
Copy to Embassy, Chungking,  
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo,  
Copy to Consulate, Chefoo,  
Copy to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

Copy of  
the signed orig-  
inal. 

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate, Tsinan, China, August 14, 1938.

Samuel Sokobin, Esquire,  
American Consul,  
Tsingtao.

Dear Sir:

I beg to refer to my telegram of today's date and to report that according to today's issue of the Shantung Hsin Min Pao (山東新報) approximately 600 Chinese mobile unit men invaded Tsinan from the east at 6:30 on the morning of the 12th, a part of them penetrating as far as inside the city. The Japanese precautionary force first closed the city gates and then marched out through the south and east gates and routed the invaders. One section of the precautionary force advanced by automobiles from the north to surround them, and as a result of severe gunfire the bandits were forced to retire in three directions, east, south-east, and north. They were pursued into the hills on the south-east and are mopped up. Those lying hidden in the city were completely arrested on the 12th as a result of the vigorous search made jointly by the Japanese gendarmerie and precautionary force. Over a hundred of the bandits were killed, many must have been wounded, and 20 were caught alive.

It is regretted that a more "detailed" account of the trouble cannot be mailed at the present time for obvious reasons.

Tsinan is quiet. All Americans here are safe except that no information has yet been received from the Catholic sisters at Hungkialou, a village to the east of the Tsinan city. Martial law was declared immediately after the trouble took place, and remained in force until 7 o'clock this morning. Traffic was practically at a standstill. Telegraphic service to Tientsin and Peking is interrupted. The north-bound train did not leave Tsinan this morning. Curfew will be resumed this evening at 7 o'clock.

Respectfully yours,

(signed)  
H. T. Ch'en,  
Clerk.

800

Copied by CHS.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 21, 1938.

~~JCV~~ ~~JWH~~  
~~RCM~~ ~~WCH~~

Tsingtao's despatch 361 of August 25

(1) After referring to the Consulate's predictions of large-scale Japanese anti-guerrilla operations, quotes a press item on the launching of a large mopping up-campaign against the "42,000" guerrillas operating in Shantung, under the nominal leadership of General Shih Yu-san;

(2) Attributes the campaign to Japanese avidity for economic control and exploitation of Shantung rather than to military necessity, and cites, in evidence, Japanese concern over financial losses caused by the guerrillas' interference with transportation of badly needed Poshan coal to Tsingtao;

(3) Predicts Japan's complete success in pacifying and economically exploiting the Province and concludes with the statement that "some American firms will prosper as a consequence, but to the Japanese mind it will be inconceivable that the rewards of their efforts and sacrifices to eliminate Chinese guerrillas should be shared with commercial rivals, American, British, or other European."

FE:Chase

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 361

Copy for Department of State

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Tsingtao, China, August 25, 1938

Subject: Guerrilla Warfare and the Japanese  
Military Campaign in Shantung.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Ambassador,  
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Consulate's  
telegram of July 13, 2 P.M., 1938, and to this Consulate's  
despatch no. 342 of July 16, 1938, file no. 800, subject:  
Guerrilla Warfare Near Tsingtao and the Japanese Military  
Campaign in Shantung.

In that telegram and despatch this Consulate reported  
its belief that "before this (Sino-Japanese) incident is  
settled, the Japanese will concentrate first on the prov-  
ince of Shantung in a grand campaign to clear this province  
of Chinese troops, regular or irregular perhaps for all  
time." An item of unusual interest in this connection  
has appeared in the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS of August 20,  
1938, and is here reproduced in full:

"Shantung Guerrilla War"

Tsinan, August 19.

One of the largest mopping-up campaigns in  
the present Sino-Japanese hostilities got under  
way here today as operations were launched by  
Japanese forces against 42,000 Chinese guerrillas  
in Shantung.

A Japanese vanguard yesterday put to flight  
a Chinese irregular band at a point 16 kilometres  
southwest of here as the campaign was launched.  
About 10,000 guerrillas are believed to be roam-  
ing the Shantung plains near here, with another  
10,000 in the area immediately to the south. Other

guerrilla

ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE

OCT 27 1938

9-M/C

OFFICE OF THE ADVISER ON  
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS  
OCT 28 1938  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94/14038

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

guerrilla concentrations were listed by Japanese officers as follows: north bank of the Yellow River - several hundred; Sangtseien - 7,000; Pingyuan - 3,000; and Techow, 3,500.

While officially acting under the orders of Gen. Shih Yu-san, one-time Manchoukuo general, the guerrillas have poor communication facilities, thereby vastly reducing their striking power.

Gen. Shih succeeded in swelling his forces by gathering under his banner remnants of various battered Chinese units, as well as refugees.

DOMEI"

The significance of this campaign appears to the Consulate not to be connected with any urgent requirement that the guerrillas be eliminated from Shantung because of their effect on the major military objectives of the Japanese but to be connected with the Japanese objective of economic control of Shantung Province. It is hardly necessary to dwell on the importance to Japanese commercial interests of a prosperous region free from the depredations of guerrillas, mobile units, bandits, and the like; suffice it to say that the presence of such bodies of Chinese armed men constitute an obstacle to the orderly development of commerce and industry here and to the Japanese exploitation of the resources of Shantung Province.

One example will indicate the importance attached by the Japanese to the economic aspect of the need for the elimination of guerrillas: Along the 25 mile branch line which connects the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway with the Poshan coal mining district in Shantung there are 250,000 tons of coal above ground which the Japanese have not been able to transport freely to Tsingtao because of guerrilla activity in the coal mining district. This coal is sorely needed by the Japanese, not only in Tsingtao where the

cotton

- 3 -

cotton mills will shortly resume operations, but for bunkers, in Shanghai, and in Japan. At the present price in Tsingtao that coal is worth more than \$7,000,000 and even allowing for a decline in the price once the coal moves freely into Tsingtao, a figure of \$5,000,000 approximately, is involved. It was inconceivable that the Japanese should not take steps to move this coal to its natural outlet at Tsingtao, and accordingly the DOMEI news item which appeared in the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS of August 18 to the effect that "Chinese bandits were driven out of the Poshan and Tzechwan mining districts by Japanese troops from August 1 to 10" was not at all surprising.

The Japanese campaign to clear Shantung from irregulars, guerrillas, or mobile units, in short, from all Chinese armed men, appears to be under way. The great probability is that the Japanese will achieve their aim to the greatest degree; the result will be an extraordinary economic exploitation of the province; mines will be developed; one or two new railways are sure to be built, cotton mills will be erected, and the harbor of Tsingtao expanded into a great port. Some American firms will prosper as a consequence, but to the Japanese mind it will be inconceivable that the rewards of their efforts and sacrifices to eliminate Chinese guerrillas should be shared with commercial rivals, American, British, or other European.

Respectfully yours,

Samuel Sokobin,  
American Consul.

Original to Embassy, Peiping,  
Copy to Embassy, Chungking,  
5 copies to Department of State,  
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo,  
Copy to Consulate, Chefoo,  
Copy to C-in-C, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy for Department of State.

**CONFIDENTIAL.**

No. 362

For	Dist	Section	Check	No.
Per	G	Int. Sec.		
Sokolov		Int. Sec.		
		ONI-MID		

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Tsingtao, China, August 27, 1938.

SUBJECT: Guerrillas and Bandits in Shantung.

The Honorable

Mr. Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Ambassador,  
Peiping, China.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
in confidence

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this consulate's  
despatch no. 361 of August 25, 1938, file no. 800,

SUBJECT: Guerrilla Warfare and the Japanese Military Campaign in Shantung.

The consulate has just received information from  
two missionaries to the effect that "Manchurian" troops,  
Chinese soldiers, under Japanese leadership are  
now stationed in the region south of the Tsingtao-Tsinan  
Railway between Kiaochow, Kaomi and Chu Ch'eng. One  
informant reports that the notorious bandit leader Liu  
Auei-t'ang (劉桂堂), also known as Liu Hei-ch'i  
(劉黑七), who is supposedly cooperating with the  
Japanese forces against his more patriotic brothers,  
the guerrillas,\* has recently appeared at Wangt'ai  
(王台), about 18 miles south of Kiaochow, where  
he demanded C\$2,000 from the Chamber of Commerce  
under threat of burning the village. As usual, a  
compromise...

\*See Tsingtao's Monthly Political Report for March  
1938, page 15.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE

OCT 25 1938

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



- 2 -

compromise was reached upon payment of C\$800, but other villages in the vicinity were burned because of their inability or unwillingness to satisfy the bandits' demands. Liu and his several hundred followers are now in a village only one mile from Wang-t'ai, which latter place has meanwhile been garrisoned by "Manchukuo" troops officered by Japanese. These troops, however, have made no effort to interfere with the operations of Liu and his men.

The bandit leader Chang Pu-yun (張步雲),\* while making no pretense of cooperating with the Japanese forces, is reported by this same missionary recently to have exchanged flour and other looted goods with the Japanese garrison at Kaomi for arms and ammunition!! This hardly seems possible, but it is given for what it is worth. Chang, who was an officer under Chang Tsung-ch'ang (張宗昌) and later under Han Fu-chu (韓復榘), has recently been active in the vicinity of Kaomi and is in complete control of King Chih (景芝), about 20 miles southwest of Kaomi.

The presence in the Chu Ch'eng area of the Liu Kuei-t'ang band and of the Chinese bandits who are alleged to have received arms and ammunition from the Japanese constitutes a great problem for the villagers who are as much harassed by these bands as they are by those bandits and guerrillas who have no taint of Japanese aid.

In...

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\*\*See Tsingtao's despatch no. 327 of May 28, 1938, subject: "Political Conditions in Weihai", last paragraph.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -


In the fear that information as to actual conditions obtaining in the interior may reach the outside world through them, possibly lies one of the causes for the refusal on the part of the Japanese military to permit foreigners to return to their up-country stations via the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway.\*\*\* Apparently the Japanese army hopes by suppressing facts and disseminating propaganda to convince the world that it is China's saviour. That the Japanese authorities do not welcome adverse publicity abroad is evidenced by the suppression of news of the recent incident involving a passenger plane of the China National Aviation Corporation and Japanese military aircraft and by their unwarranted censorship of mails and cables.

Respectfully yours,

Samuel Sokobin,  
American Consul.

800  
SS:COH/QML

Original to Embassy, Peiping,  
Copy to Embassy, Chungking,  
Five copies to Department of State.

A true copy of  
the signed original.  



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\*\*\* See Tsingtao's telegram of August 10, 1938, 2 p. m.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 1668

THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



Confidential

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Shanghai, September 16, 1938.


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1938 OCT 11 PM 3 51

OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

SUBJECT:

Photographs of Executions by  
Japanese Armed Forces.




THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:



1/

I have the honor to enclose, as of possible interest, a set of twelve photographs of executions and other activities of the Japanese armed forces. They have been obtained from a reliable source which states that most of them are reprints from prints of negatives of films sent by Japanese soldiers to photographic shops for developing. The propensity of the Japanese for taking photographs is well known and close examination of specimen no. 8 will show a soldier with a camera evidently sighting for a photograph.

Photographs nos. 1 and 2 show Japanese soldiers with Chinese boy captives.

Photographs nos. 3 and 4 depict an individual execution.

Photograph no. 5 also shows an individual execution.

Photograph no. 6 shows a Japanese in naval uniform with a head in his hand and a decapitated body at his feet.

Photographs

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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-2-

Photographs nos. 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 show Japanese soldiers in the act of executing and bayoneting uniformed Chinese soldiers, evidently prisoners. These executions took place in the presence of numbers of Japanese troops and were apparently carried out by soldiers detailed for the purpose.

Photograph no. 12 shows Chinese peasants apparently begging for mercy.

Photograph no. 13 was taken near Jessfield Bridge in Shanghai and shows a Japanese soldier with a baby carriage of foreign design.

Respectfully yours,

*Frank P. Lockhart*  
Frank P. Lockhart  
American Consul General

Enclosures:


1/13/- Photographs as described.  
Single copies.

800  
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In Single Copy

Copy to Embassy, Tokyo, by Courier.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 24, 1938.

Reference Tientsin's despatch no. 329, August 26, 1938, entitled "Japanese Occupation of Chinese Industrial Plants in the Tientsin Consular District".

The report under reference, prepared by Mr. Hinke, is of exceptional interest and should be noted with care. Mr. Hinke does not give his sources but he seems to know what has happened to the most important industrial plants in the provinces of Hopei and Shansi and in Inner Mongolia.

Of the ~~cotton mills~~ in actual operation at the present time in the Tientsin consular district the Chinese now control 29 percent of the spindles, 15 percent of the doublers, and 5 percent of the looms, in comparison with 59.7 percent of the spindles, 54.5 percent of the doublers, and 24.4 percent of the looms a year ago. The differences are accounted for by the seizure of Chinese mills by Japanese interests aided by Japanese military. When existing plans for expansion have been completed 75 percent of the cotton mills in north China will be operated by the Japanese.

Of the flour mills in the Tientsin consular district 12 mills with a rated daily capacity of 31,200 bags are reported to have been taken over by Japanese interests, and only 6 mills, of which 4 are located in Tientsin, remain in Chinese hands.

Except

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-2-

Except for the power plants in the foreign concessions in Tientsin and the plants operated by the Kailan Mining Administration every important power plant in the Tientsin consular district is believed to be operated at the present time under Japanese supervision. Fourteen electric light and power plants are reported to have been seized by Japanese interests.

Except for three mills located in the foreign concessions areas at Tientsin which produce woolen yarn and three Tientsin woolen mills under foreign management, practically all of the woolen mills in the Tientsin consular district have been taken over by the Japanese, including mills at Peiping, Taiyuan, Kalgan, and Kweisui.

Of the larger chemical plants in the Tientsin consular district only one mill remains under Chinese management. The others (producing salt and soda ash) have been taken over by and are now operated by the Oriental Development Company.

Except for the Kailan Mines, which remain under British management, all important mines in the Tientsin consular district have been taken over and are being managed by Japanese interests.

In the two provinces of Inner Mongolia the Japanese appear to be operating every important mine and industry.

Particular

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-3-

Particular attention is called to enclosure no. 5, this being a map showing clearly the extent to which industrial plants in the Tientsin consular district have been occupied by the Japanese.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 329

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, August 26, 1938.

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT  
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS  
NOV 9 1938  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Japanese Occupation of Chinese Industrial  
Plants in the Tientsin Consular District

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THE HONORABLE  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON.

NOV 14 1938  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
HORNBECK

I have the honor to enclose copies of lists, com-  
piled as of July 15, 1938, by a large American firm in  
Tientsin, indicating the extent to which the Japanese  
have taken over control of Chinese industrial estab-  
lishments in North China.

DIVISION OF  
TRADE AGREEMENTS  
NOV 25 1938  
TA

Enclosure No. 1 lists: (A) Chinese mills under  
Chinese management; (B) Chinese mills taken over by  
Japanese interests, (1) prior to the Sino-Japanese hos-  
tilities, and (2) subsequent to the beginning of Sino-  
Japanese hostilities; and (C) new Japanese plants.  
These lists are not complete, and the notes in the "Re-  
marks" concerning the extent to which mills are operat-  
ing may not be accurate in all cases.

The Cheng Feng Coal Mines, located at Chinghsing-  
hsien, Hopei, (daily capacity 3,000 tons), listed in  
(A) as under Chinese management, are reported to be  
actually operated at present under the name "Great Wall  
Coal Mining Company", by the Hsing Chung Kung Ssu, a  
subsidiary of the South Manchurian Railway Company.

The plant

793-94/14041  
NOV 15 1938  
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
MR. WELLES

F/FG 14041



- 2 -

The plant of the Tientsin Electric Light Company was completed in May, 1938, and was publicly placed in operation at half its rated capacity of 30,000 k.w. on May 14, 1938.

Both the Toyo Paper Mill and the Nakayama Steel Works have been operating in Tientsin during the past six months, and are now reported to be expanding their installations. Precise particulars of projected increases in capacity are not known.

2/ Enclosure No. 2 is a list of industrial plants in Shansi Province now reported as "managed" by Japanese interests, the control having been established by force majeure. The concerns containing the characters Hsi Pei (西北) in their Chinese names were formerly owned and operated by the Shansi Provincial Government. Fifteen Japanese firms are reported to have "taken over" a number of the larger industrial plants in Shansi, but it is not known to what extent other smaller Japanese firms may be operating occupied Chinese industrial plants in Shansi, or what, if any, plants may still remain in Chinese hands. It is believed, however, that the attached list includes most of the larger industrial units within the Province. Some of the concerns listed in Enclosure No. 2 are also listed under the heading (B,2) of Enclosure No. 1.

Cotton Mills.

- 3 -

Cotton Mills.

Negotiations are reported to be under way for the acquisition by unknown Japanese interests of the Kwang Yi Cotton Mill at Changtsho, Honan, listed in Enclosure 1, A.

Of the new Japanese factories, listed under (C) in Enclosure No. 1, the capacity of the Yu Feng Cotton Mill at Tientsin is reported to have been increased from 50,000 to 100,000 spindles during the past six months. The mill, which operated 52,384 spindles and produced 5,003 bales of cotton yarn (of 415 pounds each) in the first half of 1938, will probably begin operating at its full rated capacity in the near future.

The buildings to house 30,000 spindles of the projected Shwang Hsi Cotton Mill at Tientsin are reported to have been completed, but difficulties in obtaining permits for the export of the spindles and other machinery from Japan and for the transfer of working capital to Tientsin are reported to be delaying the completion of the mill. Certain other Japanese spinning interests are reported to have bought sites for plants at Tientsin and to be encountering similar difficulties. Japanese milling interests are said to be desirous of carrying out expansion programs in North China in order to take advantage of

lower

- 4 -

lower labor costs and closer proximity to consuming markets, but their plans are apparently being held up by the Japanese Government for the present, probably to prevent the movement of capital and industry from Japan.

The following table showing the nationality of the owners or operators of the cotton mills in the Tientsin consular district, was compiled by this office from the attached enclosures and from a list of cotton mills in North China prepared by the Japanese Cotton Mill Owners' Association of Tientsin.

General Summary of Cotton Mill in the  
Tientsin Consular District.

	<u>No. of Mills</u>	<u>No. of Spindles</u>	<u>No. of Doublers</u>	<u>No. of Looms</u>
Total Chinese Mills				
Operating	6	167,654	5,600	834
Japanese-Owned Mills	6	232,348	16,620	12,703
Japanese-Managed Mills	8	177,168	14,312	3,274
Total:	20	577,170	36,532	16,811
Inactive Chinese Mill	1	13,480	---	---
New Japanese Mills	7	310,000	---	6,400
Proposed Mill Increases				
Chinese		17,756	---	---
Japanese		132,348	---	6,000
Total:	8	560,104	---	12,400
Grand Total:	28	1,133,186	36,532	29,111

From this table and enclosures Nos. 3 and 4 it is calculated that, in the mills in actual operation, the Chinese now control 29% of the spindles, 15% of the  
 doublers

- 5 -

doublers and 5% of the looms, in comparison with 59.7% of the spindles, 54.5% of the doublers and 24.4% of the looms a year ago. The differences are accounted for by the seizure of Chinese mills by Japanese interests aided by the Japanese military. On the basis of the total projected capacity of cotton mills completed and projected for this consular district, the Chinese will control only 17.5% of the spindles, 15% of the doublers and 2.8% of the looms, when existing plans have been completed. Prior to July 1, 1937, 75% of the mills were under Chinese management as against only 25% of operating mills in 1938. When present projected Japanese plans are completed only 25% of all mills will be Chinese operated, including one mill reported to be liquidated.

All of the mills listed as "Japanese-owned" were bought or built by Japanese interests prior to the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities in July, 1937; all of the mills listed as "Japanese-managed" are Chinese-owned mills which Japanese interests are reported to have "taken over" by force majeure under the protection and on behalf of the Japanese military and in most instances, without the consent of or remuneration to the legal Chinese owners.

3/ In this connection, there is enclosed a translation of a list recently published in Japanese of cotton

mills

- 6 -

mills in North China, compiled by the Japanese Cotton Mill Owners' Association of Tientsin. This list includes all existing or projected cotton mills in the Provinces of Hopei, Shansi and Honan (north of the Yellow River), as well as mills outside of this consular district located in the Provinces of Shantung and Shensi.

4/ There is also enclosed a statement compiled by this Consulate General from the data contained in Enclosures Nos. 1 and 3 showing cotton mills in this district which are (1) Chinese-owned; (2) Japanese owned; (3) Chinese-owned but "taken over" by Japanese interests; and (4) projected plant increases and new Japanese mills.

Flour Mills.

According to Enclosure No. 1, (A), six Chinese flour mills with a rated daily capacity of 29,000 bags (four of which are located in Tientsin) remain in Chinese hands, but twelve mills with a rated daily capacity of 31,200 bags are reported to have been "taken over" by Japanese interests. Of the mills still under Chinese management, it is reported in the local press, that the Fu Sheng Mill in Tientsin, with a rated daily capacity of 6,500 bags, is being taken over by the Hopei Provincial Bank.

Of the

- 7 -

Of the Chinese flour mills listed in (B,2) as "taken over" by Japanese interests subsequent to the beginning of Sino-Japanese hostilities, the Japanese are reported to have purchased the following plants:

Chia Jui Flour Mill, Tientsin,  
Buyer: Nippon Seifun Kissen Kaisha.  
Capacity: 5,700 bags daily.

Wei Yi Flour Mill, Peiping.  
Buyer: Nisshi Seifin Kissen Kaisha.  
Capacity: 6,000 bags daily.

Power Plants.

Fourteen electric light and power plants are reported to have been "taken over" by Japanese interests, including plants in Peiping, Paotingfu, Shihchiachwang, Taiyuanfu, Kalgan, Kweisui and Paotowchen. Except for the power plants in the foreign concession areas in Tientsin and the plants operated by the Kailan Mining Administration, it is believed that every important power plant in this district is being operated under Japanese supervision. A number of flour mills are operated in conjunction with the smaller power plants.

Woolen Mills.

The Japanese have made progress in occupying Chinese woolen mills. Three mills producing woolen yarn with a rated daily capacity of 6,300 pounds, are reported to be still under Chinese management. All

of these

- 8 -

of these mills are located within the foreign concession areas at Tientsin; three Tientsin woolen mills specializing in carpet yarns remain under foreign management. A large Japanese concern (Kanegafuchi) has purchased from Chinese interests the Tung Hwa Woolen Mill (daily capacity: 3,000 pounds of woolen yarn) which was formerly operated by an American carpet manufacturer. Japanese concerns have "taken over" or occupied woolen mills (specializing in the production of blankets and cloth used in the manufacture of uniforms) at Peiping, Taiyuan, Kalgan, and Kweisui.

Soda Ash and Alkali Plants.

Of the larger chemical plants located in this district, only the Li Chung Acid Works remains under Chinese management. This concern produced 240 long tons of sulphuric acid in the first half of 1938 as against 30 tons in corresponding period of 1937. The plant closed for repairs in June and July but resumed operations in August, 1938.

According to information obtained by a Chinese on the staff of this Consulate General, the Oriental Development Company has "taken over" the Chiu Ta Salt Refinery (daily capacity: 3,000 piculs of salt), the Yung Li Chemical Works (daily capacity: 186 tons of soda ash) and the Pu Hai Chemical Works (daily capacity: 45 tons

of soda

- 9 -

of soda ash). After the Japanese military had occupied these properties last summer, representatives of the Oriental Development Company called on the former Chinese managements of these concerns in order to persuade them to sell out to the Japanese on Japanese terms or else to "co-operate" with the new management. The Chinese, however, declined to agree to the Japanese proposals, whereupon the Oriental Development Company itself undertook the management of the plants, hiring some Chinese who had previously been in the employ of the Chinese operators. Information concerning the output of these industrial plants during the past six months (while under Japanese management) is not available. The Oriental Development Company, according to the previous Chinese owners, is operating their plants under the protection and on behalf of the Japanese military.

Mines.

Except for the Kailan Mines, (which remain under British management), all important mines in this consular district have been "taken over" or are being managed by Japanese interests. In the case of the Lung Yen iron mines, Japanese interests are reported to have appropriated the 60,000 ton ore dump left at the mine head by the former Chinese operators. Shipments of this ore and coal shipments from former

Chinese



- 10 -

Chinese mines located near Tatung are already said to have been made to Japan.

Conditions in Inner Mongolia.

In the Provinces of Inner Mongolia, Chahar and Suiyuan, the Japanese appear to be operating every important mine and industry. These operations are apparently handled by individual Japanese concerns acting on behalf of and with the protection of the Japanese military.

Conditions in Shansi.

In Shansi Province, all industrial plants formerly operated by the Shansi Provincial Government are reported to be operating under Japanese managements, which also are reported to have "taken over" all of the more important private Chinese industrial establishments.

Conclusions.

Japanese commercial interests seem to have followed closely on the heels of Japanese military occupation of Chinese industrial centers in this district. So far as this Consulate General can ascertain, no material damage was done to Chinese industrial establishments as a result of the Sino-Japanese

conflict;

- 11 -

conflict; making it easy for the Japanese to resume operations. However, by no means all of the industrial plants "taken over" by the Japanese are operating at capacity. The flour mills of Tientsin, during the first half of 1938 produced only 10% of the wheat flour output for the corresponding period of 1937; it appears unlikely that production in "occupied" mills was higher than for the Tientsin mills. Disturbed conditions in the interior and a shortage of wheat are the principal factors responsible for the curtailment of wheat flour production.

It is doubtful if "occupied" cotton mills are operating at more than 30% of rated capacity. In a number of instances, output of "occupied" mills is destined for Japanese military consumption instead of for commercial use, but no data is obtainable regarding the quantities produced by such plants. In other cases, so-called "occupied" mills are either operating at fractional capacity or not at all.

Map showing Location of Industrial Plants  
in the Tientsin Consular District.

5/ As Enclosure No. 5, there is attached a map showing the location of the industrial plants named in Enclosures No. 1 to 4, and indicating mills still


under

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 12 -

under Chinese management, mills owned by Japanese,  
mills "taken over" by Japanese, and "projected" Japanese mills.

Respectfully yours,

  
David C. Berge,  
American Consul

Enclosures:

1. Table showing Industrial Plants in Tientsin Territory Situated in Areas Occupied by Japanese Forces.
2. List of Plants in Shansi Controlled by Japanese Interests.
3. Translation of Table of Cotton Mills in North China as of April, 1937, Published by Japanese Cotton Mill Owners' Association, Tientsin, China.
4. List of Cotton Mills in the Tientsin Consular District by Nationality of Ownership or "Management".
5. Map Showing Location of Industrial Plants in the Tientsin Consular District.

865  
FWH:lin

Original and four copies to the Department.  
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.  
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.  
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.  
Copy to Commercial Attache, Shanghai.  
Copy to Agricultural Commissioner, Shanghai.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 329 dated August 26,  
 1938, entitled "Japanese Occupation of Chinese  
 Industrial Plants in the Tientsin Consular District".

INDUSTRIAL PLANTS IN TIENSIN TERRITORY SITUATED  
IN AREAS OCCUPIED BY JAPANESE FORCES

A) CHINESE MILLS OPERATING UNDER CHINESE MANAGEMENT

With the exception of Cotton Mills, capacity is given in  
 quantities produced per day.

<u>LOCALITY</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DAILY CAPACITY</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
<u>Tientsin</u>	Pei Yang Cotton Mill	25,232 spdls.	Operating full
	Heng Yuan Cotton Mill	35,000 "	- do -
	Ta Sheng Cotton Mill	7,400 "	- do -
	Chen Hwa Paper Mill	4,000 Kgs.	- do -
	Fu Hsing Flour Mill	6,500 Bags	Operating half
	Shou Feng Flour Mill (3 Mills)	18,000 "	Not operating
	Jen Li Woollen Mfg.Co.	Woolen Thread 3000 Lbs.	Operating half
	Oriental Woollen Mfg. Co.	Woollen Thread 3000 Lbs.	Operating half
	China Woollen Mfg.Co.	300 "	Not operating
	Hsin Cheng Paper Mill	2,000 Kgs.	Operating full
	San Ho Sheng Brewery	150 Hl.	Operating half
	Chee Hsin Cement Works	4,000 Kegs	Operating 1/4
	Chien Yi Flour Mill	3,500 Bags	Operating half
	*Kwang Yi Cotton Mill	25,824 spdls.	Operating full
<u>Changteho</u>	Ta Ho Heng Flour Mill	1,000 Bags	Operating half
	**Cheng Feng Mines	3,000 Tons	Not operating

\*Negotiations reported underway for transfer to Japanese interests.

\*\*Operated by Japanese - Hsing Chung Kung Ssu.

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B) CHINESE MILLS TAKEN OVER BY JAPANESE INTERESTS

1. Taken over prior to the Chinese-Japanese hostilities

<u>LOCALITY</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DAILY CAPACITY</u>	<u>NEW JAPANESE INTERESTS</u>	<u>OPERATION</u>
<u>Tientsin</u>	Ta Fu Cotton Mill	49,572 sps	Tientsin Boseki K.K.	Full
	Pao Cheng Cotton Mill	57,124 "	"	"
	Hwa Hsin Cotton Mill	97,288 "	Kanegafuchi	"
	Yu Yuan " "	95,112 "	"	"
<u>Tangshan</u>	Hwa Hsin " "	26,800 "	Toyo Boseki K.K.	"

2. Taken over after the Chinese-Japanese hostilities

<u>LOCALITY</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DAILY CAPACITY</u>	<u>New Japanese Interests</u>	<u>Operation</u>
<u>Tientsin</u>	Tung Hwa Woolen Mill	3,000 Lbs.	Kanegafuchi	Full
	Chia Jui Flour Mill	5,700 Bags	Nippon Seifun K.K.	Half
<u>Tangku</u>	Yung Li Chemical Works	186 Tons	Hsing Chung K.S.	Resumption July 15
	Chiu Ta Salt Ref.	3,000 Pcl	"	Full
<u>Hanku</u>	Pu Hai Chemical	45 Tons	"	Resumption Unknown
<u>Changli</u>	Chi Tung Elec. L. Plant	110 KW	Tokyo Dento K.K.	Operating

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LOCALITY	NAME	DAILY CAPACITY	NEW JAPANESE INTERESTS	OPERATION
<u>Peking</u>	Wei Yi Flour Mill	6,000 Bags	Nisshi Seifun K.K.	Full
	Chingho Weaving Plant	4,500 Lbs. W. Thread	Manmo Keori K.K.	"
	Peking Electric Light Plant	30,000 KW	Peking Municipality	Operating
<u>Paotingfu</u>	Paotingfu Electric Light Plant	950 K.W.	Tokyo Dento K.K.	"
<u>Shihkia-chwang</u>	Ta Hsing Cotton Mill	30,144 Spdl	Kanegafuchi	2/3
	Shihmen Electric Light Plant	510 K.W.	Tokyo Dento K.K.	Operating
	Chu Feng Flour Mill	500 Bags	Nitto Seifun K.K.	1/3
<u>Hantan</u>	Yi Feng Flour Mill	1,000 Bags	Nitto Seifun K.K.	Resumption unknown
<u>Fenglochen</u>	Liuhekow Mines	2,000 tons	Hsing Chung K.S.	1/3
<u>Changteho</u>	An Yang Electric Light Plant	130 K.W.	Tokyo Dento K.K.	Operating
	Pu Yun Flour Mill	1,000 Bags	Nitto Seifun K.K.	1/2
<u>Weihsueifu</u>	Hwa Hsin C.M.	22,400 Spls	Toyo Boseki K.K.	1/2
<u>Sinsiang</u>	Tung Feng F. M.	5,500 Bags	Nitto Seifun K.K.	1/2
	Sinsiang Electric Light Plant	155 K.W.	Tokyo Dento K.K.	Operating
<u>Nanhotow</u>	Ching Hsing Mines	4,000 Tons	Hsing Chung K.S.	1/4
<u>Yangchuan</u>	Pao Chin Mines	250 Tons	Hsing Chung K.S.	Resumption unknown
	Pao Chin Iron Works	14 Tons	Okura Trading Co.	Resumption end of year

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LOCALITY	NAME	DAILY CAPACITY	NEW JAPANESE INTERESTS	OPERATION
<u>Yutza</u>	Chin Hwa C.M.	41,744 Spdls	Toyo Boseki K.K.	Resumption unknown
	Wei Yu F. M.	1,000 Bags	Nitto Sei-fun K.K.	1/2
	Wei Yu Electric Light Plant	205 K.W.	Nitto Sei-fun K.K.	Operating
<u>Kih sien</u>	Chin Yi Weaving Mill	200 Looms	Shai. Boseki K.K.	Resumption unknown
<u>Kiangchow</u>	Ta Yi Cheng C.M.	18,480 Spdls	- do -	Operating
	Yung Yu Cotton Mill	8,400 "	- do -	"
<u>Taiyuanfu</u>	Chin Sheng C.M.	6,800 "	Kanegafuchi	Resumption unknown
	Hsi Pei Tannery	250 Shts.	- do -	"
	Chin Feng F.M.	3,000 Bags	Nitto Sei-fun K.K.	1/2
	Chin Sheng F.M.	2,000 "	- do -	Resumption unknown
	Chin Heng Paper Mill	60,000 Shts	Oji Seishi K.K.	"
	Lantsun Paper Mill	11,000 Kgs.	- do -	"
	Hsi Pei Cement Mill	1,500 Kegs	Asano Cement K.K.	Resumption September
	Hsi Pei Steel Works	240 Tons	Okura Trading Co.	Resumption March 1939
	Hsing Chi Elec. Light Plant	1,100 K.W.	Tokyo Dento K.K.	Operating
	Chin Sheng Elec. Light Plant	180 K.W.	Nitto Sei-fun K.K.	"
<u>Pingyao</u>	Chin Sheng F.M.	2,500 Bags	- do -	1/4

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<u>LOCALITY</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DAILY CAPACITY</u>	<u>NEW JAPANESE INTERESTS</u>	<u>OPERATION</u>
<u>Pingyang</u>	: Pingyang Electric	: 135 K. W.	: Nitto Seifun	: Opera-
	: Light Plant	:	: K. K.	: ting
	: Pingyang F. M.	: 1000 Bags	: - do -	: Not
	:	:	:	: opera-
<u>Kalgan</u>	: Kalgan Electric	: 732 K. W.	: Mongolian	:
	: Light plant	:	: Elec. E'prise	: "
	: Kung Ta Woollen	: 35 Blankets	: Kanegafuchi	:
	: Mill	:	:	:
<u>Tatungfu</u>	: Tatungfu Elec.	: 260 K. W.	: Mongolian	: "
	: Light Plant	:	: Elec. E'prise	:
	: Chin Pei Coal Mines	: 1500 Tons	: S.M.R.	: $\frac{1}{2}$
	:	:	:	:
<u>Kweihwating</u>	: Suiyuan Electric	: 1000 K. W.	: Mongolian	: Opera-
	: Light Plant	:	: Elec. E'prise	: ting
	: Suiyuan F. M.	: 3000 Bags	: - do -	: $\frac{1}{4}$
	: Suiyuan Woollen	: 1500 lbs.	: Manmo Keori	: Resump-
	: Mill	: W. Thread	: K.K.	: tion
<u>Hsipaotow</u>	: Paotow Electric	: 260 K. W.	: Mongolian	: Opera-
	: Light Plant	:	: Elec. E'prise	: ting
	:	:	:	:

EWS:CTS.

Tientsin, July 12/38.



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C. )

NEW JAPANESE PLANTS

<u>LOCALITY</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DAILY CAPACITY</u>	<u>INTERESTS</u>	<u>OPERATION</u>
<u>Tientsin</u>	Yu Feng C.M.	100,000 Spls.	Toyo Boseki	Operating
	Shwang Hsi C.M.	30,000 "	Fukushima Boseki	End of Yr.
	San Tai C.M.	50,000 "	Shanghai C.M.	Unknown
	? C.M.	100,000 "	Kishiwada Boseki	"
	Ta Kan C.M.	150,000 "	Dai Nippon Boseki	"
	? C.M.	50,000 "	Naigai Wata	"
	Chung Hsing C.M.	40,000 "	Kurashiki Boseki	"
	? W.M.	?	Manmo Keori	"
	? Celluloid	?	Dai Nippon Celluloid	"
	Toyo Paper Mill	30 Tons	Toyo Seishi	Sept. or Oct. 1938
	Nakayama Steel Works	?	Nakagama Steel Works	Operating
	Tientsin Electric Light Co.	2 - 15,000 K.W.	Tokyo Dento K.K.	1/2
	? Dye Mfg. Co.	?	Meike Seuryo	Unknown
	Wei Hsin Chemical Works	?	Wei Hsin Chemical Works	"

Tientsin, July 12, 1938.

EWS:CTS.

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Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 329 dated  
August 26, 1938, entitled "Japanese Occupation  
of Chinese Industrial Plants in the Tientsin  
Consular District".

LIST OF PLANTS IN SHANSI CONTROLLED BY JAPANESE INTERESTS

Kanegafuchi Boseki K.K. ( Kung Ta )

No. 1 Plant	( Chin Sheng Cotton Mill )	-	Taiyuanfu
No. 16 "	( Hsi Pei Woolen Mill )	-	Taiyuanfu
No. 17 "	( Hsi Pei Tannery )	-	Taiyuanfu
No. 18 "	( Hsi Pei Chemical Works )	-	Taiyuanfu

Nitto Seifun K.K.

No. 2 Plant	( Hsin Chi Elec. Co's Flour Mill )		Taiyuanfu
No. 7 "	( Chin Feng Flour Mill )	-	Taiyuanfu
No. 9 "	( Wei Yu Flour Mill )	-	Yutze
No. 30 "	( Ching Sheng Flour Mill )	-	Pingyao
No. 31 "	( Chin Yi Flour Mill )	-	Linfen
No. 36 "	( Tung Chi Elec. Co's Mill )	-	Taiku
No. 39 "	( ? )	-	Kih sien

Daido Denryoku K.K. ( Joint with Hsing Chung K. S. )

No. 2 Plant	( Hsin Chi Electric Co. )	-	Taiyuanfu
No. 15 "	( Hsi Pei Power Plant )	-	Taiyuanfu

Okura Trading Company

No. 3 Plant	( Pao Chin Iron Works )	-	Yangchuan
No. 6 "	( Hsi Pei Steel Works )	-	Taiyuanfu
No. 8 "	( Brick Factory )	-	Taiyuanfu

Manshu Kosho

No. 10 Plant	( Iron Casting Works )	-	Taiyuanfu
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Toyo Boseki K.K.

No. 12 Plant	( Chin Hau Cotton Mill )	-	Yutze
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Shanghai Cotton Mill

No. 11 Plant ( Chin Hau Weaving Mill )	-	Kihsien
No. 33 " ( Ta Yi Cheng C.M. )	-	Kiangchow
No. 34 " ( Yung Yu C.M. )	-	Kiangchow

Hsing Chung Kung Ssu

No. 4 Plant ( Yangchuan Coal Mine )	-	Yangchuan
No. 5 " ( Hsi Shan Coal Mine )	-	Taiyuanfu
No. 25 " (		
No. 26 " (		
No. 27 " ( Small Coal Mines		
No. 28 " (		
No. 29 " (		
No. 38 " (		

Toa Tobacco K.K.

No. 13 Plant ( Cigarette Factory )	-	Taiyuanfu
------------------------------------	---	-----------

Nippon Kayaku K.K.

No. 14 Plant (		
No. 19 " ( Gun powder Mfg.		
No. 20 " (		

- Taiyuanfu

Chung Hua Match K.K.

No. 21 Plant (		
No. 32 " ( Match Mfg. Plants		
No. 37 " (		

- Taiyuanfu

Toyoda Jidosha K.K.

No. 22 Plant ( Automotive Repair shop )	-	Taiyuanfu
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Oji Paper Mill

No. 23 Plant ( Chin Heng P.M. )	-	Taiyuanfu
No. 24 " ( Hsi Pei P.M. )	-	Lantsun

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Asano Cement K.K.

No. 35 Plant ( Hsi Pei Cement Works ) - Taiyuanfu

Nansen Godo Denki K.K.

No. 11 Plant ( Chin Hua Weaving Mill's P.H. ) - Kih sien

No. 9 " ( Wei Yu Flour Mill's P.H. ) - Yutze

No. 30 " ( Chin Sheng Flour Mill's P.H. ) - Pingyao

No. 31 " ( Chin Yi Flour Mill's P.H. ) - Linfen

No. 36 " ( Tung Chi Electric Co. ) - Taiku

No. 33 " ( Ta Yi Cheng Cotton Mill's P.H. ) - Kiangchow

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Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 329 dated August 26, 1938,  
 entitled "Japanese Occupation of Chinese Industrial Plants  
 in the Tientsin Consular District".

Translation of Table of Cotton Mills in North China as of April, 1937. Published by Japanese Cotton Mill Owners' Association, Tientsin, China.

Name of Mill	Location	1937 Installations			***Installation 1938			Projected Installation			Power	Number of Laborers	Cotton Production			
		Spindles	Doublers	Looms	Spindles	Doublers	Looms	Spindles	Doublers	Looms			Spools	Bales	(2,000 yards)	(4,000 yards)
Hong Yuan	Tientsin, Hopei	35,000	---	490	35,440	**2,540	**130	---	---	---	1,400 K.W. 1,500 H.P.	2,300	50,485	13,922	6,222	---
Pei Yang	Tientsin, Hopei	25,232	2,400	---	27,056	---	---	12,544	---	---	1,000 K.W.	1,100	35,756	10,334	---	---
Ta Sheng	Tientsin, Hopei	2,920	1,800	---	32,000	**780	1,880	5,272	---	---	300 K.W.	320	9,000	2,500	---	---
Ta Hsin	Chihchiachwang, Shensi	30,144	---	500	30,144	---	500	---	---	---	1,500 K.W.	2,466	115,937	32,744	12,020	---
Pao Chi	Paothaiien, Hopei	15,480	---	---	15,480	---	---	---	---	---	800 H.P.	---	---	---	---	---
*Hua Hsin	Tangshan, China	25,800	2,000	500	25,800	2,000	500	---	---	---	1,250 K.W. 1,400 K.W.	1,996	52,428	17,802	13,422	---
*Yu Ta	Tientsin, Hopei	40,320	5,400	---	39,747	2,520	---	---	---	---	1,500 H.P.	1,322	80,412	22,863	---	---
*Tientsin Cotton Sp. Co., Ltd.	Tientsin, Hopei	27,028	---	---	27,028	2,520	---	39,348	---	---	2,428 K.W.	694	16,028	4,322	---	---
*Kung Ta No. 6	Tientsin, Hopei	65,112	---	1,000	71,360	976	1,000	20,000	---	---	2,000 K.W.	5,300	145,932	21,240	3,425	---
*Kung Ta No. 7	Tientsin, Hopei	34,228	---	---	30,272	---	---	63,000	---	---	3,000 K.W.	1,400	25,412	12,152	---	---
*Yu Fong	Tientsin, Hopei	50,000	---	1,000	---	---	---	50,000	---	---	2,000 K.W.	1,500	9,694	333	2,515	---
*Tai Kuo (Dai Nippon)	Tientsin, Hopei	---	---	---	---	---	---	50,000	---	---	1,000	---	---	---	---	---
*The Shanghai Silk Sp. Co., Ltd.	Tientsin, Hopei	---	---	---	---	---	---	30,000	---	---	700	---	---	---	---	---
*Haw Kee	Tientsin, Hopei	---	---	---	---	---	---	30,000	---	---	700	---	---	---	---	---
*Kureha S. & W. Co.	Tientsin, Hopei	---	---	---	---	---	---	50,000	---	---	1,000	---	---	---	---	---
*Kishiwata S. & W. Co.	Tientsin, Hopei	---	---	---	---	---	---	50,000	---	---	1,000	---	---	---	---	---
*Chu Kuo	Tientsin, Hopei	---	---	---	---	---	---	50,000	---	---	1,000	---	---	---	---	---
*Naigaiwata	Tientsin, Hopei	---	---	---	---	---	---	50,000	---	---	1,000	---	---	---	---	---
SUMMARY:											4,800 K.W.	---	---	---	---	---
(Chinese Capital Mills	5 Mills	107,776	4,200	990	---	---	---	17,776	---	---	2,300 H.P.	6,304	210,522	52,541	18,541	---
(Japanese Capital Mills	6 Mills	245,548	7,400	2,500	---	---	---	182,348	---	---	11,800 K.W. 1,500 H.P.	12,212	336,952	72,984	19,426	---
(Projected Mills as shown above	7 Mills	---	---	---	---	---	---	310,000	---	---	6,400	---	---	---	---	---
Total of 18 Mills		351,324	11,600	3,490	---	---	---	510,104	---	---	16,000 K.W. 2,800 H.P.	18,516	547,790	132,525	37,767	---

\*Japanese Capital Mills  
 \*\*Suspended  
 \*\*\*Obtained from 1936 list  
 #Reported in liquidation

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Name of Mill	Location	1937 Installations			*** Installations 1936			Projected Installations			Power	Number of Laborers	Cotton Consumed piculs	Production Yarns Cloth	
		Spindles	Doublers	Looms	Spindles	Doublers	Looms	Spindles	Doublers	Looms				Bales	(1,000 sq.yds)
Cheng Ta	Shantung, Tsinan	28,016	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	900 H.P.	---	---	---	---
Cheng Tung	- do -	18,000	---	---	---	---	---	18,000	---	---	500 K.W.	733	59,898	24,285	---
Yen Feng	- do -	15,384	---	240	---	---	---	15,120	2,400	240	1,000 H.P.	802	54,000	15,600	---
Tsingtao Hua Hsin	Tsingtao	48,044	10,640	500	---	---	---	---	---	---	1,500 K.W.	2,437	84,400	24,290	---
*Naigaiwata	- do -	90,400	8,000	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	8,750 K.W.	---	---	---	---
*Fu Ssu	- do -	31,360	1,600	480	---	---	---	---	---	---	11,725 H.P.	3,619	253,000	66,000	---
*Kung Ta No. 5	- do -	107,188	9,240	3,818	---	---	---	26,450	---	1,000	1,500 K.W.	1,559	98,741	18,788	17,166
*Hsin Lung	- do -	48,660	3,746	520	---	---	---	47,000	---	950	7,500 K.W.	7,255	312,408	11,819	104,917
*Pao Lai	- do -	43,632	2,040	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1,500 K.W.	1,659	88,870	22,259	9,720
*Tai Kuo	- do -	101,192	14,156	2,160	---	---	---	35,000	---	840	3,800 K.W.	1,446	80,168	22,400	---
*The Shanghai Silk Sp. Co., Ltd.	- do -	40,448	---	720	---	---	---	51,800	---	1,000	5,000 K.W.	1,915	272,879	37,112	65,742
*Feng Tien	- do -	35,640	---	540	---	---	---	35,000	---	480	1,800 K.W.	1,915	90,115	10,197	22,139
*Tung Hsin	- do -	30,720	---	1,152	---	---	---	35,000	---	480	2,600 K.W.	1,539	85,000	14,676	16,886
*Yu Fong	- do -	---	---	---	---	---	---	55,000	---	860	1,300 K.W.	1,670	12,315	---	4,886
SUMMARY:								60,000	---	1,000	---	---	---	---	---
(Chinese Capital Mills)	4 Mills	109,444	10,640	240	---	---	---	30,120	2,400	240	2,700 K.W.	3,990	197,692	56,688	---
(Japanese Capital Mills)	9 Mills	523,204	38,768	8,790	---	---	---	250,250	---	5,100	1,900 H.P.	---	---	---	---
(Projected Mill as shown above)					---	---	---	---	---	---	33,750 K.W.	---	---	---	---
Total of 14 Mills		632,648	49,402	9,530	---	---	---	340,370	2,400	6,340	11,725 H.P.	24,582	1,286,900	209,185	239,856
Kwang Yi	Honan	25,824	---	---	21,440	---	---	---	---	---	75 K.W.	---	---	---	---
Yu Fong Ho Chee	- do -	56,448	5,600	234	56,448	5,600	---	---	---	---	800 H.P.	1,400	46,080	14,840	---
Chu Hsin	- do -	6,592	---	---	6,592	---	---	---	---	---	2,180 K.W.	3,237	169,898	42,874	6,787
The Weihui Hsin Hsin	- do -	22,400	2,000	---	22,400	1,200	---	---	---	---	180 H.P.	395	11,461	2,722	---
Yu Ann	- do -	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	80 K.W.	---	---	---	---
SUMMARY:								50,000	10,000	1,000	---	---	---	---	---
(Chinese Capital Mills)	4 Mills	111,264	7,800	234	---	---	---	---	---	---	2,305 K.W.	6,398	301,173	80,911	6,787
(Projected Mill as shown above (Chinese))					---	---	---	---	---	---	1,760 H.P.	---	---	---	---
Total of 5 Mills		111,264	7,800	234	---	---	---	50,000	10,000	1,000	2,305 K.W.	6,398	301,173	80,911	6,787

\*Japanese Capital Mills

\*\*Suspended

\*\*\*Obtained from 1936 list

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Name of Mill	Location	1937 Installations			***Installations 1936			Projected Installations			Power	Number of Laborers	Cotton Consumed piculs	Production	
		Spindles	Doublers	Looms	Spindles	Doublers	Looms	Spindles	Doublers	Looms				Yarns Sales	Cloth (1,000 sq. yds.)
Ta Hua	Shensi	11,960	1,150	380	---	---	---	13,800	2,400	500	700 K.W.	760	24,927	6,905	5,097
Yu Tai	- do -	---	---	---	---	---	---	12,800	---	200	1,000 K.W.	---	---	---	---
SUMMARY:															
(Chinese Capital Mill)	1 Mill	11,960	1,150	380	---	---	---	13,800	2,400	500	700 K.W.	760	24,927	6,905	5,097
(Projected Mill)	1 Mill	---	---	---	---	---	---	12,800	---	200	1,000 K.W.	---	---	---	---
(Total of 2 Mills)		11,960	1,150	380	---	---	---	26,600	2,400	700	1,700 K.W.	760	24,927	6,905	5,097
Chin Hua	Shensi	41,744	752	490	41,744	752	490	---	---	---	700 K.W.	1,590	56,624	16,941	10,666
Ta Yih Cheng	- do -	18,480	1,040	404	18,480	1,040	404	---	---	---	550 H.P.	869	30,682	7,662	4,222
Yung Yu	- do -	8,400	520	168	8,400	520	141	---	---	---	332 K.W.	648	21,127	5,830	7,124
Chin Cheng	- do -	6,000	---	252	6,000	---	250	---	---	---	170 K.W.	430	---	---	5,546
Chin Hua	- do -	---	---	200	---	---	---	---	1,504	---	2,352 K.W.	---	---	---	---
SUMMARY:															
(Chinese Capital Mills)	5 Mills	74,624	2,312	1,504	---	---	---	---	1,504	---	1,050 H.P.	6,025	221,900	62,645	37,964
(Total of 5 Mills)		74,624	2,312	1,504	---	---	---	---	1,504	---	1,050 H.P.	6,025	221,900	62,645	37,964

\*\*Suspended

\*\*\*Obtained from 1936 list

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 329 dated August 26,  
 1938, entitled "Japanese Occupation of Chinese  
 Industrial Plants in the Tientsin Consular District".

List of Cotton Mills in the Tientsin Consular District  
 by Nationality of Ownership or "Management".

CHINESE-OWNED COTTON MILLS.

<u>Name of Mill</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>No. of Spindles</u>	<u>No. of Doublers</u>	<u>No. of Looms</u>
<u>Hopei Province.</u>				
Pei Yang	Tientsin	36,000	---	---
Heng Yuan	"	35,000	---	600
Ta Sheng	"	8,230	---	---
#Pao Chi	Paochihsien	13,480	---	---
Projected Plant Increases		17,756	---	---
Total:		110,466	---	600

Honan Province.

Yu Fong Ho Chee	Chenghsien	56,448	5,600	234
Chu Hsin Ting Chee	Wushehsien	6,592	---	---
Kwang Yi	Changteh	25,384	---	---
Projected Plant Increases		---	---	---
Total:		88,424	5,600	234

JAPANESE-OWNED COTTON MILLS.

Hopei Province.

Tientsin No. 1	Tientsin	27,028	2,520	---
Tientsin No. 2	"	40,320	4,900	---
(Tientsin Boseki K. Kaisha)				
Kung Ta No. 6	Tientsin	68,120	---	2,905
Kung Ta No. 7	"	50,128	---	1,530
(Kanegafugi Boseki K. Kaisha)				
**Yu Feng	Tientsin	52,384	7,200	1,020
Hua Hsin	Tangshan	26,800	2,000	500
(Toyo Boseki K. Kaisha)				
Total:		264,780	16,620	5,955
Projected Plant Increases		182,348	---	6,748
Total:		447,128	16,620	12,703

# Reported in liquidation, April,  
 1937.

\*\* Installation of spindles reported increased to  
 100,000 as of August 1, 1938.

CHINESE-



- 2 -

CHINESE-OWNED MILLS UNDER JAPANESE MANAGEMENT.

<u>Name of Mill</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>No. of Spindles</u>	<u>No. of Doublers</u>	<u>No. of Looms</u>
<u>Honan Province.</u>				
Weihua Hwa Hsin (Toyo Boseki K. Kaisha)	Weihui	22,400	2,000	---
Yu Ann (Feng Tien Spinning & Weaving Company).	Changtseho	50,000*	10,000*	1,000*
Total:		72,400	12,000	1,000
<u>Shansi Province.</u>				
Ta Hsin (Kanegafugi Boseki K. Kaisha)	Shihkiachwang	30,144	---	500
Chin Hua (Toyo Boseki K. Kaisha)	Yutze	41,744	752	480
Ta Yi Chang (Shanghai Boseki K. Kaisha)	Kiangchow	18,480	1,040	404
Yung Yu (Shanghai Boseki K. Kaisha)	Kiangchow	8,400	520	168
Chin Cheng (Kanegafuchi Boseki K. Kaisha)	Taiyuan	6,000	---	252
Chien Hua (Shanghai Boseki K. Kaisha)	Banhsien	---	---	500
Total:		104,768	2,312	2,274
Projected Plant Increases		---	---	6,000
Total Projected Mills Tientsin, 7 Mills.		310,000	---	6,400
Grand Total:		1,133,186	36,532	29,211

GENERAL

\* Projected April, 1937. No information available regarding actual installations.

- 3 -

GENERAL SUMMARY

<u>Chinese Mills</u>	<u>No. of Mills</u>	<u>Spindles</u>	<u>Doublers</u>	<u>Looms</u>
Hopei Province	4	92,710	---	600
Honan Province	3	88,424	5,600	234
Total:	7	181,134	5,600	834
In Liquidation	1	13,480	---	---
Reported transferred to Japanese	1	25,384	---	---
Total:	2	- 38,864	---	---
Projected Mill increases	2	+ 17,756	---	---
	2	- 21,108	---	---
Net Total Chinese Mills operating	5	142,270	5,600	834

Japanese Mills:

Owned Mills - Hopei Province	6	264,780	16,620	12,703
Total: Japanese-Owned Mills		264,780	16,620	12,703
*Managed-Mills Honan	2	72,400	12,000	1,000
Reported transferred to Japanese	1	25,384	---	---
Managed-Mills Shansi	6	104,768	2,312	2,274
Total: Japanese-Managed Mills	9	202,552	14,312	3,274
Net Total Japanese Mills operating:	15	476,332	30,932	15,977
Projected Plant Increases		132,384	---	---
Projected New Mills	7	310,000	---	6,400
Projected Increases:		442,384	---	6,400
Grand Total: Japanese Mills:	22	918,716	30,932	28,377
Total: All Mills Operating	22	618,602	36,532	16,811
Total: All Mills Operating and Projected.	28	1,133,186	36,532	29,211

\*Includes one mill reported in progress of construction April, 1937, including 50,000 spindles, 10,000 doublers, and 1,000 looms. No information is available as to actual installations.

SUMMARY BY PROVINCES


	<u>Hopei</u>	<u>Shansi</u>	<u>Honan</u>	<u>Total</u>
	<u>Mills Spdls.</u>	<u>Mills Spdls.</u>	<u>Mills Spdls.</u>	<u>Mills Spdls.</u>
Chinese-Owned	4 110,466	---	3 88,424	7 198,890
Japanese-Owned	6 264,780	---	---	6 264,780
Japanese-managed	---	6 104,768	2 72,400	8 177,168
Japanese projected	7 492,348	---	---	7 492,348
Total:	17 867,594	6 104,768	5 160,824	28 1,133,186

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 329 dated August 26,  
 1938, entitled "Japanese Occupation of Chinese  
 Industrial Plants in the Tientsin Consular District".

MAP SHOWING INDUSTRIAL PLANTS IN THE TIENSIN CONSULAR  
 DISTRICT "OCCUPIED" BY JAPANESE.

- Chinese Mills under Chinese Management.
- Japanese-owned Mills.
- Chinese Mills "Occupied" by Japanese.
- Projected Japanese Mills.
- Provincial Boundaries.
- +++++ Railways.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



ALL FE:

Shanghai's despatch 1666 of September 13 encloses articles by Morris, U.P. Far Eastern Manager, on conditions in Japan:

(No.1) Talks with Japanese leaders revealed surprising Japanese confidence, attributable to passing of the Changkufeng crisis and its threat of Russian air bombing and ruin of the drive for Hankow. Shigemitsu's "brilliant diplomacy" and the "amazing bogging down of the Soviet military machine" were hailed as having removed the menace, vindicated the moderates' non-involvement in war, and left Japan free to resume her never-ending "incident".

(No.2) A Diet member confided that those opposing the China campaign will only dare voice opposition indirectly, by petitioning for relief of the suffering middle classes which the Government cannot give without halting the campaign; that there is a limit to the punishment the middle classes will take. Morris found the liberal, Ozaki, a sad "political hermit".

(No.3) Japan lacked external signs of war.

(No.4) Japan's gestures of growing regard for foreign interests mean little. All believe Britain will continue support of Chiang Kai-shek. Such support by foreign nations means their worse, ~~not better~~, treatment by Japan.


(No.5) Ever alert to keep America humored, Japan's high command recently warned that America is in no mood for trifling. They see Washington "re-shaping its policy", with popular support. Permission for American business men to visit Nanking is the first gesture. More will follow if Konoye has his way.

The articles are unusually interesting, especially the marked portions of 2, 4 and 5.  
FE:Chase *sc*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 1666

THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Shanghai, September 13, 1938.

Articles Written by Mr. John R. Morris,  
Far Eastern Manager of the United Press,  
on Conditions in Japan.

130

Classified	For	For	For	For	For
	M				

THE HONORABLE Lockhart ONI-MID

COPIES SENT TO  
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose, as of possible

1/ interest to the Department, copies of a series of  
articles written by Mr. John R. Morris, Far Eastern  
Manager of the United Press, reporting his impressions  
conditions in Japan during a recent visit to that  
country. It is possible that these articles may have  
reached the Department from some other source but in  
order to make certain that copies are available to  
the Department I requested Mr. Morris to furnish this  
Consulate General with the material.

Respectfully yours,

Frank P. Lockhart  
Frank P. Lockhart  
American Consul General

Enclosure:

1/- Series of Articles by Mr.  
John R. Morris on Conditions  
in Japan.

800  
FPL MB  
In Quintuplicate.  
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.  
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.  
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

793.94/14042

F/FG Nov 2

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 1666 of Frank P. Lockhart, American Consul General at Shanghai, dated September 13, 1938, on the subject: "Articles Written by Mr. John R. Morris, Far Eastern Manager of the United Press, on Conditions in Japan."

Copy

August 24, 1938.

JAPAN SEEN CONFIDENT AFTER PASSING OF CHANGKUFENG CRISIS

By John R. Morris  
(Far Eastern Manager, United Press)

TOKYO, AUG. 24.-- The Japanese Government and the nation as a whole entered the second month of the second year of what was once called officially the "China Incident of 1937" with an apparent spirit of confidence surprising to many observers. Conversations this correspondent has held during the last few days with government officials, Diet members, and a host of others including Japanese reporters and taxi drivers, suggest that one of the strongest elements in the current feeling of confidence here is intense relief at dissipation of the Russian war threat.

The exact genesis of the Changkufeng border incident is still obscured by opposing and contradictory versions submitted by the Japanese and Russians, but it is certain that the Japanese government, high army command and the people at large who had heard so much of long-range Soviet bombers wished for nothing so much as to avoid a show-down with the hated Reds at this time. With the army slowed down to a crawl in its drive on Hankow, and stopped in its tracks at several strategic points, and with the air force needed urgently to blast Chinese defenders from their positions and disrupt Hankow's communications with the South, the prospect of Soviet fliers dropping high explosives on Tokyo was dismaying to most Japanese.

The bombing practice in which Bleucher's airmen indulged over Korean villages and the hordes of Russian tanks which lumbered over the border spitting hot steel at the Emperor's soldiers were regarded here as ominous samples of what Japan proper might expect if Japanese diplomacy had failed at Moscow. What happened, to the great relief of the Japanese masses and to most of the Japanese in high places with whom this writer has talked, was that Ambassador Mamoru Shigemitsu displayed his characteristic skill with extraordinary success and the Russian military machine bogged down to an amazing extent. The amazed and delighted ones, according to the most reliable information available here in the capital, were the Japanese army officers on the border who reported that the Russians apparently had made no adequate study of the terrain over which they sent their gigantic tanks, with the result that in some cases the Japanese rescued rather than captured the metal monsters.

Information

-2-

Information that appears thoroughly trustworthy indicates now that the Japanese military authorities were reporting incomplete figures when they announced only 158 Japanese were killed at Changkufeng, but even if the losses on this side were much greater, the fact remains that the boys from the rice fields stormed the coveted hill and the survivors among them succeeded in planting the rising sun firmly on its crest. With this achievement, and Ambassador Shigemitsu's brilliant success at Moscow, the Red bogey died a sudden death at Changkufeng and the Japanese ever since have been celebrating the wake.

The Japanese before Changkufeng were fairly confident of their ability to tame the Soviet bear single-handed, and there were times when the rapid advance of their armies in China made some of them heedless of whether the Red army struck now or later. To be sure, there were some reckless officers who appeared eager to provoke Britain, France and the United States into belligerent acts although the general assumption abroad was that Japan's legions were rather fully occupied on the Asiatic mainland at the time. More recently, however, a soberer element in the government and army have put a quietus on most of the fire-brands who seemed to be suffering from severe delusions of invincibility. And as the most pregnant threat of military intervention in aid of China came from across the northern Manchoukuo border. The hot-heads were withdrawn from there and the officers remaining were instructed to be circumspect in all they did and said. The army's undivided attention was to be devoted to the capture of Hankow.

The theory held by Japanese here is that the Soviet government desired at once to test the strength of its Far Eastern army in the field and create a diversion for the Japanese on the road to Hankow without actually precipitating a major war at this time. Perhaps only Orientals, which ethnologists agree includes the Russians, could contrive to fight a series of battles as bloody as those at Changkufeng and still confine the campaign to the proportions of a border incident.

Granted that this latest was the most serious of a long series of incidents (The Japanese provoked one a year ago last June to try the Russian temper before embarking on the present China Campaign), it seems unlikely that either Russia or Japan will resume soon the trial by arms which in Far Eastern circles generally is considered inevitable in view of the two countries' conflicting aims and interests. The Japanese in their present mood would prefer first to terminate the China incident which long since had to/dated the Incident of 1937-38, and which before it is ended may cause the world to recall that Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking last September said this war might last a hundred years.

(2)

Copy

August 25, 1938.

LIBERALISM DEAD IN JAPAN: MIDDLE CLASS NEEDS RELIEF

By John R. Morris  
(Far Eastern Manager, United Press)

TOKYO, AUG. 25.-- Although the Japanese Diet is almost as incongruous an institution in war time as the 1940 Olympiad at Tokyo would have been if the games had not been transferred to another venue, the two Houses of the National Legislature will meet as usual in December. I asked a member of the Lower House whether any opposition party would be audible and his reply was sufficiently frank to make the use of his name impossible in this dispatch.

"There can be no open opposition in the present state of affairs," this representative of the people said. "The government demands unquestioning support and obedience of Diet members as well as of its soldiers and the public generally."

At the same time, according to this member, who himself would oppose the government on many issues if he dared, the Cabinet will be attacked persistently by members who in the most polite and even abject terms will plead for relief for the numerous middle class who thus far have been the chief sufferers from the war in China. As prices went upward, their incomes too often declined and now many of them are lacking sufficient nutritious food although there is no real shortage of food supplies available for those who can pay.

The strategy of the camouflaged opposition, my informant explained, will be to beg for relief measures which the government could grant, if at all, only at the cost of stopping the war and the accompanying drain on the country's financial resources.

Asked if he thought the government would be swayed by these pleas, the cautious member pondered his reply for many minutes and at last replied that he thought the government would admit the urgency of the problem, promise early relief and then turn its attention back to the more urgent question of winning the war against China. Then the Diet would conclude its perfunctory session and there would remain nothing to do but repeat the process a year later if the same circumstances prevailed then.

Except



- 2 -

Except, this informant added, choosing his words with the utmost care, the middle class which already is suffering such privation cannot continue indefinitely without relief. Our people are not so innured against hardship as the Chinese, nor even so stoical as the German proved themselves to be during the last year of the World War.

The conversation was now well within dangerous territory, and the speaker suddenly declined to speak any more. On being pressed for elucidation of his last remark, he declined to say more and to a question regarding the possibility of serious social disturbances, he said there was no reason to expect such. Neither do the best informed foreigners here anticipate the Japanese revolution which some prognosticators abroad have foreseen as the end of the present adventure on the mainland. But for what it was worth, here was the opinion of one member of the Japanese Diet that the middle class could stand only so much punishment of the sort it is taking now, and he was unable to say what would happen when they could stand no more.

With this in mind, I went to call on Mr. Yukio Ozaki, Japan's most noted liberal and a member of the Diet continuously since its establishment. I had known Mr. Ozaki personally for about 16 years, and was aware that if any parliamentarian in this country would dare to speak his mind, he would be the first. To my personal knowledge, he had done so frequently when his frankness was tantamount to a request for assassination.

Ozaki, the unterrified liberal, was resting at his Karuizawa villa, and he advanced to shake hands with a weariness which seemed to imply more than the toll of his many years. With a troubled and even slightly bewildered expression, he assured me he knew nothing of current affairs, that he was a "Political Hermit" and that he could venture no prediction regarding the war except that he assumed Hankow would fall before long. One could hardly be certain any more, he said sorrowfully, of what one read in the papers.

The conversation with the once great and vigorous statesman thereafter was confined for the most part to generalities and at the end left the unavoidable impression that there was small place for men such as Ozaki in Japan of today.

3

COPY

AUGUST 26, 1938

EVIDENCES OF WAR LACKING IN JAPAN

TOKYO, Aug. 26 -- Japan may indeed be engaged in a life-or-death struggle with her ponderous mainland neighbor, but the external signs to be observed by the casual traveller in and near the capital are both few and insignificant. As a resident of this country during six peace-time years and a frequent visitor thereafter, this correspondent returned to Tokyo this month to find life in the metropolis proceeding under almost normal conditions. Nine months previously spent for the most part within sight and sound of the opposing armies afforded a striking contrast to the outward placidity prevailing here.

The thing which strikes the war-time visitor to Yokohama or Tokyo is not that there are occasional remainders of the tremendous struggle being waged on the continent but that these remainders are seen so infrequently. A Japanese cruiser standing off to starboard as our American steamer, the SS President Coolidge, came up the bay was an ominous hint that the China Incident of 1937 was still unsettled. A few minutes later a Navy seaplane flew low over the Coolidge and apparently dropped a smoking flare near a fleet of peaceable fishing boats, but the passengers who recalled the bombs which crashed into the dining salon of the Coolidge's late sister ship, the S.S. President Hoover, off the Yangtze's mouth last August were smiling their confidence that there would be no repetition of that ghastly tragedy.

Inspections of passengers by immigration and public health officers were even less exacting than in peace time and my luggage was passed by an obliging customs inspector immediately although I had listed, as required, the books and magazines I was carrying and they included Robert Berkov's laudatory biography of Chiang Kai-shek, "Strong Man of China", and the August issue of Reader's Digest, which reproduced Pearl Buck's article from the Redbook entitled "Japan Loses the War". My brief case, which might have interested a Hollywood spy-chaser since I have spent much time this last year as close as possible to Chinese military headquarters, was not even opened by the inspector, although this could not be attributed to lack of personal curiosity on his part as he had looked closely at some family photographs I carry habitually and grinned his appreciation of one very young lady's nine-year-old beauty.

Ashore

- 2 -

Ashore and outside the customs compound, the scene was equally serene. The shop-keepers of Benten-dori were smiling happily for the Coolidge had brought a large list of passengers, including many Navy families new to the East, and these are notoriously easy customers on their first visits to fascinating Nipponese market streets.

The U. S. S. Marblehead, a familiar and friendly sight to American residents of China and the Philippines, was at anchor in Yokohama H arbor but her friendly mission of the moment was to transport Navy officers and mail from the Coolidge to the U.S. Asiatic Fleet which at this season is as usual at Tsingtao and Chefoo, Shantung peninsular ports.

The ride from Yokohama to Tokyo in a commodious electric train, accompanied by a Japanese colleague, was uneventful as ever and at the door of Tokyo's famed Imperial Hotel, urbane and hospitable as ever, was that internationally famous host, T. Inumaru, the Imperial's Manager. The same guests and residents, or their counterparts, were sipping cocktails or whiskey tansan in the hotel's cavernous lobby, and this correspondent felt very much at home and peace.

The nervous tension induced by the threat of Russian air raids was passing into history on the day of my arrival and Manager Inumaru expressed his sentiments in a manner understood in any land. He ordered long, cool classes of refreshment on the house.

Gasoline restriction imposed as a war measure has had, so far as could be observed, nothing but beneficial effects. Tokyo's carreening taxis are still available in large numbers but cruising for fares has been prohibited and thus the traffic congestion problem has been solved in part though a Tokyo taxi pilot with a fare is still a menace to life and limb. But the ride's exciting.

One of the severest hardships Tokyoites and film fans elsewhere in the Empire have suffered has been the prohibition against new imports of foreign movies, now in effect a little more than a year. Consequently, a cinema palace I passed today was advertising for its current attraction the late Jean Harlow in "Libeled Lady". But since this will be the last of the talented Missouri actress' pictures to be seen anywhere, the Japanese are flocking to see the blonde likeness of their one-time favorite in great numbers.

(19)

Copy

August 27, 1938.

JAPAN PREPARING FOR RETALIATION AGAINST  
POWERS SUPPORTING CHINA

By John R. Morris  
(Far Eastern Manager, United Press)

TOKYO, Aug. 27.-- Reiterated assurances of Japanese intentions to respect foreign interests in China have been given the foreign Powers, but especially the United States and Britain, through various official and unofficial channels this week. The Government's unwillingness to make a public declaration to the same effect is believed to have been due merely to the fear that this might imply an official admission of lack of proper respect for foreigners' rights in the past. But short of an official public promise of better conditions for foreigners in the Japanese-occupied areas of China, everything possible is being done to convey the new assurances to the American, British and French governments.

The most solemn commitments to avoid even unnecessary inconvenience for foreigners in the affected areas have been given the Powers' ambassadors here by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gen. Kazushige Ugaki. Various official, semi-official and ostensibly unofficial spokesmen have voiced the same sentiments during the last few days to the foreign newspaper men here, including this correspondent. The first of the week, three of the capital's leading newspaper, Nichi-Nichi, Asahi and Yomiuri, simultaneously gave great prominence to a story purporting to reveal the Government's plan to readjust its foreign policy as it affects the Powers interested in China.

In spite of all this week's efforts to create a new impression and a better feeling abroad, which unquestionably were inspired by the highest Government circles, representative Americans and Britons whose business affairs on the mainland have suffered during the conflict appeared to be not greatly impressed. Their comments indicated that it would require a long period of better treatment at the hands of the Japanese Military men in actual positions of authority in China before they would regain much confidence in assurances of future non-interference.

Britons

- 2 -

Britons especially are skeptical of predictions of any real change in conditions which have prevailed since the war began, for even the promises which have been broadcast so persistently this week have been qualified by a warning that to obtain Japanese respect for British interests in China, Britain must reverse her present policy of friendly relations with the Chiang Kai-shek regime. The Asahi, in an editorial known to reflect the views of at least some very high officials, wrote:

"The question of British rights and interests in parts of China occupied by the Japanese army is continually before Parliament. In fixing our attitude toward British interests in the occupied areas, we shall have to take account of the policy which Britain has followed toward the incident. Is there any reason for this country to pay as much respect to the rights of a country which has been hostile toward it and has been aiding its enemy as is paid to those of their countries which are neutral in the conflict?"

The seriousness of this blunt threat of retaliation against British interests in occupied territory for British aid to Chiang Kai-shek's government is increased by the almost certain knowledge that there will be no change in the offending British attitude. The feeling here among the best informed Britons and Japanese alike is that the Chamberlain Cabinet will continue to extend as much aid as possible to Chiang, until and unless convinced he is a losing horse. Current reports from Hankow that the Generalissimo has won the Communists' approval of his plan to withdraw from Hankow before his remaining Central Army divisions are annihilated is interpreted here as removing still farther into the distant future the date when the despised "Soong dynasty" can be expected to fall. The new strategy at Hankow means merely that the same Chinese Nationalist Government, with little or no change in its highest personnel, will fall back to a less accessible capital and there if necessary make yet another "last stand" against the invaders. In its new capital, according to the most authoritative opinions obtainable here, Chiang Kai-shek doubtless will enjoy the same helpful co-operation Great Britain has given him since the war began. And Japan through unofficial press writers if not through more direct and official channels has served notice that in that case British interests behind the Japanese lines cannot expect the respect due neutrals.

Far from being reassuring news, therefore, this week's revelations of a new and friendlier foreign policy for the future are held by some experienced observers here to be merely the sign of Japan's growing realization of the seriousness of the present situation as it affects relations with the Occidental Powers. What this country wants and is coming to demand is a hands-off policy by every foreign nation while the Japanese Army completes the task of bringing China to her knees. This process of maintaining

peace

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

peace in East Asia already has been prolonged far beyond Japan's original expectations and the Japanese are increasingly impatient of the foreign "meddling" which has been at least partially responsible for disturbing delays and reverses. If the foreign governments who are accused of thus blocking the Japanese peace program persist in their present policies, the most reliable informants here say they should prepare not for easier conditions in future but for more serious collisions.

Copy

August 28, 1938.

TOKYO CABINET SEEKS TO PLEASE AMERICA:  
MILITARY COMMAND INTERFERES; AMERICAN SEEN STIFFER

By John R. Morris  
(Far Eastern Manager, United Press)

TOKYO, AUG. 27.-- While Japan during the last few days has conducted a vigorous diplomatic and publicity campaign to convince the Powers that their rights in China will be protected in the areas Japan has conquered, a special effort has been directed toward the United States in the hope of alleviating existing anti-Japanese sentiment there. At the same time, the high command in Tokyo has warned Japanese Military and Naval authorities in China that Washington to day is in no mood for trifling. It is quite generally conceded that another Panay incident inevitably and immediately would be followed by the gravest consequences for American-Japanese relations, but in addition to that the American State Department is becoming more and more insistent on practical measures for the protection of American interests on the continent.

Since the beginning of the China incident, succeeding Japanese cabinets have done their utmost to prevent serious friction with the United States which might intensify the emergency in which this country finds itself at present. Neither American officials nor, in general, American business men here have doubted the sincerity of the Japanese government on this score at any time. On the other hand, considerations of so-called military necessity and at times an apparent disagreement on policy on the part of commanders in the field have led to numerous cases in which the American government claims American rights were disregarded and violated. In some instances the American flag allegedly was defiled, in others American officials and civilians were abused and insulted, and the Panay incident was merely the climax of a long series of lesser incidents which evoked official American protests.

That the bombing and sinking of the Panay, with the loss of American lives, could be settled by an official apology and the payment by Japan of the exact indemnity demanded by Secretary Hull was due, in the opinion of well

informed

- 2 -

informed observers, principally to the skill and speed with which the then Foreign Minister, Mr. Koki Hirota, handled the distressing and dangerous situation. It will be recalled that Minister Hirota kicked diplomatic precedents out the window in order to present himself at the American Embassy with an official apology before Ambassador Joseph Grew was even aware the gunboat had been hit. The press by the State Department simultaneously with the bulletin that an American warcraft had been sunk by foreign airplanes. None deny that this had a calming effect on American public opinion, without the events which followed might have been quite different. which

Present Japanese solicitude for American official and public opinion is believed here to be born of the knowledge that the tempers of the American government, press and people have changed appreciably during the last six months. The most astute observers are of the opinion not only that another accident to an American warship would find the public reaction at home entirely different, but also that the Roosevelt Administration has been reshaping its policy vis-a-vis the Far East and a majority of the American electorate favors the change.

Secretary Hull's reiterated challenge to the American people to accept responsibility for the role a great nation must play in foreign affairs and President Roosevelt's recent references to foreign policy have made a profound impression in Japan, without giving offense to the Japanese people or the present government. It is felt here that if President Roosevelt had waited until today to deliver the "international quarantine" speech which he gave prematurely at Chicago last October 5, the American public and press would applaud instead of rejecting it in a panic of alarm that it might aggravate our relations with the governments who were targets of that attack. At the same time, Japanese profess not to be offended by the speech in which President Roosevelt carefully refrained from naming any names, because they say the shoe doesn't fit Japan and it is only those who misunderstand Japan who think it does.

Indicating the complete sincerity of the Japanese government in its announced desire to placate Americans and minimize interference with American interests in China, several measures recently have been taken. For example, a small group of American business men was permitted to return from Shanghai to Nanking to trade. There is no information here yet regarding the commercial success or failure of their venture, but it is understood that Japanese salesmen are filling their order books at the former Chinese capital and elsewhere in occupied territory. The Americans at least are being given the chance they asked to land at Nanking and try for a share of the business.

Reliable reports reaching here show that Americans in China still are far from satisfied with the extent to which the Japanese have removed restrictions interfering with trade restored property seized from American citizens

or



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Chastain NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

or institutions and generally started the return to normal conditions. But a start has been made, and informed opinion here is that greater progress will be made in the future if Premier Kono and his Cabinet have their way. The difficulty and the ever-present source of potential danger is that in most instances in which American rights have been infringed by Japanese in China, the action has resulted from the order of a military commander in field and admittedly there is a wide range of cases in which the Tokyo government does not pretend to supersede the authority those commanders exercise.

Copied by Jm *A*  
Compared with Jw *JS*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 760f.62/1581 FOR tel #655 midnight

FROM Japan ( Grew ) DATED Oct.10, 1938  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Japanese offensive on Hankow

Increased vigor shown in the last few days  
in the - may be due to the desire to reach  
that objective in anticipation of European  
developments toward a plan for assuring a  
general peace

dg

793.94 / 14043

14043 -

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

FROM

GRAY

Hong Kong via N.R.

Dated October 12, 1938

Rec'd 7:28 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

October 12, 10 a.m.

793.94


According to usually reliable sources in Hong Kong, 30,000 Japanese troops began landing early this morning in Bias Bay for invasion of South China. There is much confusion in information available and some sources assert that landing is small and only a demonstration. There is no special excitement yet noticeable here although my Japanese colleague is this morning holding secret conference with Japanese newspaper men and other representative members of his colony. U.S.S. MINDANAO expected to leave Canton this morning for Hong Kong.

Sent to Chungking.

SOUTHARD

EDA

WWC



793.94/14044

FILED  
OCT 13 1938

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

RAW  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (Br)

FROM

*in confidence*  
(Blue attached to DT  
Canton's Oct 12, 1 pm)  
Canton via N.R.

Dated October 12, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*For copy of paraphrase see*  
*793.94/14046*

Division  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 14 1938  
Department of  
State  
*WAA SF*

October 12, 11 a.m.

Chinese headquarters report an attempted Japanese  
landing at Bias Bay last night but stated that this was  
not successful. Details not yet available.

LINNELL

WWC

CSB

793.94/14045

OCT 14 1938

STANDARD

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

5056

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

Department of State

This cable was sent <sup>OR</sup> confidential Code.  
It should be <sup>Charge to</sup> fully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone. *Rm*

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
"Br" PARTIAL PLAIN

Washington,

October 12, 1938.

6 PM

AMERICAN CONSUL,

CANTON (China).

RUSH.

*793.94/14046*

Your October 12, 1 p.m., and October 7, 3 p.m.

In view of the publicity which is being given in the American press to the landing of Japanese troops and of the resultant frequent inquiries made of the Department by the press and other interested persons, the Department would appreciate receiving each day, as long as the situation continues to be critical, a rush telegram summarizing such information as you have been able to obtain relating to politico-military developments. Include pertinent information and comment on the question of the safety of American citizens at Canton and at other places in your consular district. Please telegraph the number of Americans now residing in Canton and keep the Department informed as to ~~the~~ number and names of those who withdraw. Department assumes that you are urging Americans ~~to withdraw~~ *draw promptly* the desirability of withdrawing.

FE:MMH:EJL

*WA deny jmb*  
*FE*  
*7/2/4*

*PA/H*

*Hull*

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

D. O. R.—No. 50

1-1662 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

001 12 4333 PM

793.94/14046

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (Br)

FROM

Canton via N.R.

Dated October 12, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

October 12, 1 p.m.

Chinese headquarters confirm Japanese troops landed  
this morning Bias Bay. Fighting in progress.

LINNELL

CSB

*paraphrase*  
SENT TO  
O.N.C. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence* DT

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 11 1938  
Department of State

793.94/14046

F/FG

OCT 14 1938  
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

PARAPHRASE

Two telegrams of October 12, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton read substantially as follows:

It has not been possible as yet to obtain information as to details but, according to a report received from Chinese headquarters, Japanese tried to land at Bias Bay on the night of October 11. This attempted landing was unsuccessful, according to Chinese headquarters. A later report indicates that fighting is going on and a report that on the morning of October 12 the Japanese forces landed at Bias Bay is confirmed by Chinese headquarters.

793.94/14045, 793.94/14046.

*egc.*  
FE:EOC;JPS  
10-12

*dkp.*  
*ms*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 13, 1938.

The Foreign Office communication contained in Tokyo's telegram 657, October 12, 10 a.m., states that the policy of the Japanese Government with regard to the rights and interests of foreign powers in China remains unchanged. We have already placed ourselves on record with regard to the question of Japanese responsibility for any injury by Japanese forces to American property and lives in China. In these circumstances, and as the Foreign Office communication asks for no reply but indicates that a further notification in concrete terms will follow, it is suggested that the question of any action be held in abeyance until such notification is received.

793.94/14047

FE:Ballantine:HES



## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

GRAY

FROM

TOKYO VIA SHANGHAI AND H.R.

Dated October 12, 1938

Received 7 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

657, October 12, 10 a.m.

Hostilities in China

The communication quoted below was brought to us this morning by the Foreign Office, with the request that it be treated as a statement made directly by the Vice Minister to me. We are informed that identic communications are being delivered to other missions. Quotation follows in full: "With the imminent fall of Hankow and the ~~disclosures~~ <sup>elimination</sup> from Central China of the influence of the Chiang Kai Shek regime, which will thereby become a merely local regime, the Imperial Japanese forces have decided upon launching military operations along the coast of Kwangtung Province with the object of dealing more effective blows at Chiang's regime and thereby accomplish the purpose of the present expedition.

The said operations are purely military and are to be undertaken for the sole purpose of intercepting the principal routes of the arms and munitions supply for the Chinese forces and destroy the major points of hostile machinations

COPIES SENT TO  
O. N. M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Department of State

793.94/14047

F/FG

193.94  
1427/38  
WTS

EDA - 2 - #657, October 12, 10 a.m. from Tokyo

machinations against Japan.

The policy hitherto pursued by the Imperial Japanese Government with regard to the rights and interests of third powers in China remains unchanged, and of course, the best of efforts will be done to prevent any damage to them in the pending operations.

The Imperial Government, therefore, requests that third powers will understand the real intentions of Japan and pay special attention, extending cooperation to the efforts of the Imperial forces for minimizing as far as possible any damages to the rights and interests of third powers, with a view to precluding the occurrence untoward incidents, and at the same time forestall Chinese machinations to drag third powers into the maelstrom of armed conflict.

I hereby make informal notification of our request, pending further notification of our request in concrete form for the prevention of untoward incidents which will be made in due course of time, both at Tokyo and on the spot".

The press announces that the landing of Japanese forces on the coast of Kwangtung Province took place this morning.

Sent to Chungking, Hong Kong, Canton and Peiping.

GREW

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL

PLAIN

Washington,

Naval Radio

OCT 13 1938 5 30

October 13, 1938.

8 pm

AMEMBASSY

282 PEIPING (China). via N.R.

Repeat to Commander in Chief of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet/  
Tokyo's 657, October 12, 10 a.m., reporting communication  
from the Japanese Foreign Office in regard to military  
operations in China.

Hull  
(7.7.A)

OCT 13 1938. FE

793.94/14047

VAA  
FE:WAA:VCI

FE

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19 .....

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/14047

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE UNDER SECRETARY

Dec. 2, 1938.

PA/H  
Dr. Hornbeck

This file has come down  
to us for indication of action  
taken and for filing instructions.

Will you be kind enough  
to endorse the correspondence  
and indicate the action taken  
and if you see fit send to  
the confidential files.

U:ALC:MW

*See memo by  
PA/H of Oct. 19/38*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE UNDER SECRETARY


October 19, 1938.

Draft returned by President  
with request to make  
changes.

Handed to Dr. Hornbeck by  
Mr. Welles.


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Hyde Park, N. Y.,  
October 17, 1938.



Can you make this message  
to Chiang Kai-shek a little  
more personal and a little  
warmer?

F. D. R.



*See memo by PA/H  
of Oct. 19, 1938*

793.94/140471

DEC 10 1938

2 FILED Confidential File

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Eisenhower NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 12, 1938.

My dear Mr. President:

As I said to you on the telephone on Monday, the newly appointed Chinese Ambassador left with the Department a personal message addressed to you by General Chiang Kai-shek. This message, contained in a sealed cover, is transmitted herewith. A copy of the message was furnished me.

The Secretary of State and I feel that you might appropriately reply to this message along the lines indicated in the draft attached herewith.

Since the message to you from General Chiang Kai-shek was sent by cable and was not a signed message, we feel that the appropriate manner of conveying your reply would be for the Department to communicate to the Chinese Ambassador the reply which you desire to make in order that the Ambassador may cable it to his Government.

Will you let me know if the suggested reply meets

The President,

The White House.

Confidential File


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

with your approval.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "M. D. Gustafson". The signature is written in a cursive, somewhat stylized script. The first part of the signature, "M. D.", is more compact and blocky, while "Gustafson" is more fluid and extends to the right.

Enclosures:  
Sealed envelope.  
Draft.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Suggested communication to be addressed by  
the President to General Chiang Kai-shek in  
reply to General Chiang Kai-shek's communi-  
cation to the President (through the Chinese  
Embassy) of October 8.

The appointed Chinese Ambassador at this capital  
has communicated to me your message of October 8.

The situation in the Far East has been and continues  
to be a subject to which I give close attention and a  
great deal of thought. The need for a solution of the  
tragic conflict which has arisen in the Far East through  
pacific negotiation, on a basis of justice and neither  
through the exercise of force nor under the threat of  
the exercise of force, is daily becoming more imperative  
in the interest of the re-establishment of the reign of  
law and order in the world. I am profoundly hopeful that  
in this manner adjustments and settlements may be found  
in the Far East which will remove causes of conflict,  
conform to the standards of real equity, and thus con-  
tribute effectively to the cause of peace.

You may rest assured that if in my opinion an ap-  
propriate opportunity is presented for me to assist in  
the furtherance of these objectives, I shall gladly avail  
myself of the occasion.

His Excellency  
General Chiang Kai-shek,  
Chairman, National Defense Council,  
Hankow, China.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 12, 1938.

My dear Mr. President:

As I said to you on the telephone on Monday, the newly appointed Chinese Ambassador left with the Department a personal message addressed to you by General Chiang Kai-shek. This message, contained in a sealed cover, is transmitted herewith. A copy of the message was furnished me.

The Secretary of State and I feel that you might appropriately reply to this message along the lines indicated in the draft attached herewith.

Since the message to you from General Chiang Kai-shek was sent by cable and was not a signed message, we feel that the appropriate manner of conveying your reply would be for the Department to communicate to the Chinese Ambassador the reply which you desire to make in order that the Ambassador may cable it to his Government.

Will you let me know if the suggested reply meets

The President,

The White House.

793.94/14047 12

Confidential File

F / FG



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

with your approval.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Sumner Welles

Enclosures:  
Sealed envelope.  
Draft.

U:SW:MW

A true copy of  
the signed origi-  
nal.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Suggested communication to be addressed by  
the President to General Chiang Kai-shek in  
reply to General Chiang Kai-shek's communi-  
cation to the President (through the Chinese  
Embassy) of October 8.

The appointed Chinese Ambassador at this capital  
has communicated to me your message of October 8.

The situation in the Far East has been and continues  
to be a subject to which I give close attention and a  
great deal of thought. The need for a solution of the  
tragic conflict which has arisen in the Far East through  
pacific negotiation, on a basis of justice and neither  
through the exercise of force nor under the threat of  
the exercise of force, is daily becoming more imperative  
in the interest of the re-establishment of the reign of  
law and order in the world. I am profoundly hopeful that  
in this manner adjustments and settlements may be found  
in the Far East which will remove causes of conflict,  
conform to the standards of real equity, and thus con-  
tribute effectively to the cause of peace.

You may rest assured that if in my opinion an ap-  
propriate opportunity is presented for me to assist in  
the furtherance of these objectives, I shall gladly avail  
myself of the occasion.

His Excellency  
General Chiang Kai-shek,  
Chairman, National Defense Council,  
Hankow, China.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75



*141061*

*ribbon copy of the*

The paper hereunder attached was handed this morning by Mr. Hornbeck to the Appointed Chinese Ambassador. Mr. Hornbeck stated to the Ambassador that the President wished it to be understood by General Chiang that he, the President, was giving close and sympathetic attention to the situation and the problem which were the subject of General Chiang's communication and that he was observing every development with a desire so to act as to contribute, while safeguarding the interests of the United States, toward an alleviation of the distress, destruction and suffering, which are inherent in and produced by the Chinese-Japanese hostilities. The Ambassador said that he well understood that the President could not make any commitment at this time; and, in the brief conversation which ensued, the Ambassador made it clear that he entertained no thought that a mediation undertaken at this time could be conducive to any settlement other than one in which China would come off badly.

*793.94/14047*

*2*

*793.94*

*mat*

Stanley K. Hornbeck

*10 1938*

*Confidential File*

*F/FG*

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5058

Communication to be made through the Appointed Chinese Ambassador, from President Roosevelt to General Chiang Kai-shek, in reply to General Chiang's message to the President, through the Appointed Chinese Ambassador, of October 8.

The appointed Chinese Ambassador at this capital has communicated to me your message of October 8.

The situation in the Far East has been and continues to be a subject to which I give close attention and a great deal of thought. The need for a solution of the tragic conflict which has arisen in the Far East through pacific negotiation, on a basis of justice and neither through the exercise of force nor under the threat of the exercise of force, is daily becoming more imperative in the interest of the re-establishment of the reign of law and order in the world. I am profoundly hopeful that in this manner adjustments and settlements may be found in the Far East which will remove causes of conflict, conform to the standards of real equity, and thus contribute effectively to the cause of peace.

You may rest assured that if in my opinion an appropriate opportunity is presented for me to assist in the furtherance of these objectives, I shall gladly avail myself of the occasion.

793.94/14047 1  
2 Confidential File

F/FG

A true copy of  
the signed original.  
PA/H: Jms

SKH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



Mr. Welles:

This sealed and unaddressed cover was handed to me by the Chinese Ambassador on the evening of October 8 with the statement that it contained a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek for communication personally and in strict confidence to President Roosevelt.

*10 1938*

*SKH*  
Stanley K. Hornbeck

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

2CR

October 22, 1938.

The paper here attached was handed to Mr. Hornbeck by the Appointed Chinese Ambassador on the evening of October 8 with the request that it be conveyed to the President.

Mr. Hornbeck placed this paper in the hands of the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, on October 10.

This paper was given by Mr. Welles to the President, together with certain memoranda, under cover of a letter of October 12.

When the file came back from the President, with a memorandum of October 17, the memoranda which accompanied it were not returned. *(copies of memoranda are attached)*

Stanley K. Hornbeck

793.94

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5059

Translation of a cablegram received today from  
General Chiang Kai-shek (from Wuchang).

Please communicate personally and in strict confidence to the  
kind consideration of President Roosevelt the following message  
in my own name :

"Mr. President, you have recently told the world that "force  
produces no solution for the future good of humanity"; that  
"should hostilities break out, the lives of millions of men,  
women, and children in every country involved will be lost in  
circumstances of unspeakable horror"; and that "in the event of  
a general war the American people face the fact that no nation  
can escape some measure of the consequences".

"These words of yours once more rekindle in the Chinese Govern-  
ment and people their faith in the love of peace and justice of  
the American nation.

"May I point out, Mr. President, that, while your powerful appeals  
have contributed so much to the appeasement of Europe, the resort  
to brutal force and slaughter still prevail in the Far East and world  
peace is still far from realization? I am confident that you, Mr...  
President, who have already done so much in the past for peace, ~~cannot~~  
surely will not ignore the problem of peace in the Far East. The  
American Government whose mediation decades ago brought about the  
termination of the Russo-Japanese War, is certainly most closely  
concerned with the peace of the East.

"It is said that, owing to heavy human losses and economic  
difficulties, Japan is beginning to realize that force solves no  
problem. More than once she has sought mediation for peace by  
Germany and Italy.

793 994/14047

Confidential File

5060

Page 2

"But, Mr. President, my people feel that they can only look to your Government for leadership in the active search for peace, because we have complete faith that the kind of peace the American Government is inspired to sponsor will be a just peace.

"Now that the European situation is settling down, may it not be possible for the American Government to initiate a move for the peace of the Far East by inviting all the Governments interested to attend a Conference, stipulating a general cessation of hostilities as a pre-condition and aiming at seeking a lasting settlement through calm and fair-minded deliberation? May I not venture to suggest that success in such a move would surely mean the crowning achievement of the policy in the Far East with which your Government has identified itself ever since the Washington Conference?

"I also wish to point out that the present moment seems to be the most opportune time for such a move, because the Japanese are engaged in a most difficult war for the attack and occupation of the Wu-Han cities."

Chiang Chung-cheng.  
October the Eighth.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
OCT 9 - 1938  
OCT 10, 1938.

Mr. Welles:  
Mr. Secretary:

The papers hereunder are:

- A communication from President Chiang Kai-shek to President Roosevelt (in a sealed and unaddressed cover);
- A copy of the said communication;
- A memorandum containing comment on the communication and suggesting the type of reply which might be made;
- A draft of a possible reply;
- A memorandum giving a brief account of similar exchanges of communications during the past year.

It will be recalled that in the late weeks of 1937 the Secretary of State frequently informed both the Chinese and the Japanese Ambassadors of the willingness of this Government to perform good offices in the event of its being informed by both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments that those Governments desired that there be mediation. At that time and subsequently the Chinese Government has on several occasions indicated that it would be agreeable to mediation and on other occasions has asked for one type or another of assistance. The Japanese Government, however, has done neither of these things. It is believed that at this time no mention need be made, unless perhaps orally, of this Government's offer, still outstanding, of good offices.

SKH

Confidential File

793.94/14047

1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/14047

DEC 10 1938

FILED

1

2

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Translation of a cablegram received today from  
General Chiang Kai-shek (from Wuchang).

Please communicate personally and in strict confidence to the  
kind consideration of President Roosevelt the following message  
in my own name :

"Mr. President, you have recently told the world that "force  
produces no solution for the future good of humanity"; that  
"should hostilities break out, the lives of millions of men,  
women, and children in every country involved will be lost in  
circumstances of unspeakable horror"; and that "in the event of  
a general war the American people face the fact that no nation  
can escape some measure of the consequences".

"These words of yours once more rekindle in the Chinese Govern-  
ment and people their faith in the love of peace and justice of  
the American nation.

"May I point out, Mr. President, that, while your powerful appeals  
have contributed so much to the appeasement of Europe, the resort  
to brutal force and slaughter still prevail in the Far East and world  
peace is still far from realization? I am confident that you, Mr.  
President, who have already done so much in the past for peace, cannot  
surely will not ignore the problem of peace in the Far East. The  
American Government whose mediation decades ago brought about the  
termination of the Russo-Japanese War, is certainly most closely  
connected with the peace of the East.

"It is said that, owing to heavy human losses and economic  
difficulties, Japan is beginning to realize that force solves no  
problem. More than once she has sought mediation for peace by  
Germany and Italy.

Page 2

"But, Mr. President, my people feel that they can only look to your Government for leadership in the active search for peace, because we have complete faith that the kind of peace the American Government is inspired to sponsor will be a just peace.

"Now that the European situation is settling down, may it not be possible for the American Government to initiate a move for the peace of the Far East by inviting all the Governments interested to attend a Conference, stipulating a general cessation of hostilities as a pre-condition and aiming at seeking a lasting settlement through calm and fair-minded deliberation? May I not venture to suggest that success in such a move would surely mean the crowning achievement of the policy in the Far East with which your Government has identified itself ever since the Washington Conference?

"I also wish to point out that the present moment seems to be the most opportune time for such a move, because the Japanese are engaged in a most difficult war for the attack and occupation of the Wu-Han cities."

Chiang Chung-cheng.  
October the Eighth.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

October 10, 1938.

Reference: Communication from Chiang Kai-shek, October 8, to President Roosevelt.

It is believed that the reply to be made by the President to the communication from General Chiang Kai-shek of October 8 (communicated to the Department of State by the newly appointed Chinese Ambassador) should consist of little more than a polite acknowledgment with an assurance of interest and attention; and that, when such a communication is delivered to the newly appointed Chinese Ambassador for transmittal by him to General Chiang, an oral statement in comment upon the proposal and inquiry made in General Chiang's letter, with perhaps some indication of this Government's reasoning in regard to the suggestion that a conference be called, be made. This might be done either by the President himself or by the Secretary of State or the Under Secretary or Mr. Hornbeck.

It is believed that an attempt to call a conference at this time with regard to the Far Eastern situation would produce far more of harm than it could possibly produce of good. It is believed that the same would be

true

793.94/14047 1

2

Confidential File

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

true of any attempt which might be made by the American Government to say anything at this time on the subject of mediation in relation to that situation. It is believed, however, that it would be inadvisable and inexpedient to say either of those things to Chiang Kai-shek or even to state them categorically to the Chinese Ambassador. It therefore is believed that the reply made to Chiang Kai-shek should be noncommittal and the oral statement made to the Ambassador should take the form for the most part of drawing him out on the subject of possible results in the event that this Government were to act in conformity with the Chinese Government's suggestions.

There is submitted herewith a draft of a possible communication in reply to General Chiang's communication.

*SKH*

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 10, 1938.

In connection with the telegraphic message of October 8 from General Chiang Kai-shek to the President, the following review of previous approaches of a similar or related character may be of use:

On October 14, 1937, the Chinese Ambassador and Dr. Hu Shih called upon Secretary Hull. Dr. Hu, apparently bearing a message from General Chiang to the President, said that the Chinese Government desired that a peace be brought about based upon such principles as would not permit Japanese interference and infiltration contrary to existing treaties and in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. The Ambassador and Dr. Hu both said that they would like very much to see the Nine Power delegates convene (Brussels Conference) as early as possible but added that they were of course anxious to guard against any proposals of settlement by the Powers which would impair the integrity of China.

On December 31, the Chinese Ambassador handed the President a message addressed to the President by General Chiang on December 24, 1937. The message expressed, inter alia, gratitude for moral support received from the United States and confidence that the American Government will do its best to uphold all legal and treaty rights and maintain

law

793.94/14047 1  
2 Confidential File  
F/FG

-2-

law and order so necessary for the peaceful conduct of international relations, and concluded with a request for assistance. On January 11 the President replied briefly to the effect that the problem of ways and means which might contribute most effectively toward promoting peace were receiving our constant study and thought.

In a letter under date of January 30, 1938, General Chiang acknowledged receipt of the President's message, reviewed briefly American policy in regard to China, appealed to the President to do everything possible to help hasten the end of Japan's aggression, and requested material and economic assistance. This letter was simply acknowledged in a note from Secretary Hull to the Chinese Ambassador.

In a telegram under date of July 27, Ambassador Johnson at Hankow reported that the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs had requested him to express the hope to the Secretary that, at a favorable moment, the Government of the United States, acting along parallel lines with Great Britain and perhaps France, would extend an offer of good offices to China and Japan with a view to bringing to an end hostilities in China. In a telegram under date of August 12, which was sent to Tokyo for forwarding to Ambassador Johnson, the Department expressed the opinion that, in as much as neither the Chinese Government nor the Japanese Government appeared to be prepared at that time to agree to terms of peace which would be acceptable to the other, an offer of good offices would have no chance of success.

FE:Vincent:HES

*Siet*



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastner NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 10, 1938.

DRAFT:

Suggested communication to be addressed by  
the President to General Chiang Kai-shek  
in reply to General Chiang Kai-shek's  
communication to the President (through  
the Chinese Embassy) of October 8.

Dear General Chiang:

The appointed Chinese Ambassador at this capital  
has communicated to me your message of October 8.

The situation in the Far East has been and continues  
to be a subject to which I give close attention and a  
great deal of thought. That situation and the many  
problems which are inherent in or which arise out of  
or relate to it are of concern to all who are inter-  
ested in the outstanding questions of human welfare  
and the progress of civilization. I am profoundly  
impressed with the need for constructive thinking and  
intelligent action by all governments and peoples  
concerned toward bringing about adjustments and settle-  
ments in the Far East which will remove causes of  
conflict, conform to high standards of practical justice  
and contribute effectively to the cause of peace.

Sincerely yours,

His Excellency  
General Chiang Kai-shek,  
Chairman, National Defense Council,  
Hankow, China.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 10, 1938.

DRAFT: (2)

Suggested communication to be addressed by  
the President to General Chiang Kai-shek  
in reply to General Chiang Kai-shek's  
communication to the President (through  
the Chinese Embassy) of October 8.

Dear General Chiang:

The appointed Chinese Ambassador at this capital has  
communicated to me your message of October 8.

The situation in the Far East and the many problems  
which are inherent in or which arise out of or relate to  
it are of concern to all who are interested in the out-  
standing questions of human welfare and the progress of  
civilization. I am profoundly impressed with the need  
for constructive thinking and intelligent action by all  
governments and peoples concerned toward bringing about  
adjustments and settlements in the Far East which will  
remove causes of conflict, conform to high standards of  
practical justice and contribute effectively to the cause  
of peace. This subject is one to which I continue to  
give close attention and a great deal of thought.

Sincerely yours,

His Excellency  
General Chiang Kai-shek,  
Chairman, National Defense Council,  
Hankow, China.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 11, 1938

DRAFT (3)

Suggested communication to be addressed by  
the President to General Chiang Kai-shek  
in reply to General Chiang Kai-shek's  
communication to the President (through  
the Chinese Embassy) of October 8.

Dear General Chiang:

The appointed Chinese Ambassador at this capital  
has communicated to me your message of October 8.

The situation in the Far East has been and continues  
to be a subject to which I give close attention and a  
great deal of thought. The need for a solution of the  
tragic <sup>conflict</sup> ~~controversy~~ which has arisen in the Far East  
through pacific negotiation, on a basis of justice and  
neither through the exercise of force nor under the  
threat of the exercise of force, is daily becoming more  
imperative in the interest of the re-establishment of  
the reign of law and order in the world. I am profoundly  
hopeful that in this manner adjustments and settlements  
may be found in the Far East which will remove causes of  
conflict, conform to the standards of real equity, and  
thus contribute effectively to the cause of peace.

You may rest assured that if in my opinion an appro-  
priate opportunity is presented for me to assist in the  
furtherance of these objectives, I shall gladly avail  
myself of the occasion.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Sincerely yours,

His Excellency  
General Chiang Kai-shek,  
Chairman, National Defense Council,  
Hankow, China.

5061

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in strict confidence*

RAW

FROM

TOKYO

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (B)

Dated October 12, 1938

Rec'd 8:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

660, October 12, 3 p.m.

Our 657, October 12, 10 a.m.



One. My British colleague understands that all prepa-  
rations for landing Japanese forces on the coast of Kwang-  
tung province for a drive on Canton have been made for some  
time past and that the Japanese were only awaiting certain  
circumstances to put the plan into execution. He believes  
that the circumstances which have brought matters to a head  
are; (a) information that Chiang Kai Shek when he leaves  
Hankow may proceed to the south instead of to the west, and  
(b) a desire to distract public attention in Japan from the  
delays and occasional defeats incidental to the drive on  
Hankow, or both.

Two. Craigie yesterday told the Vice Minister that a  
drive on Canton could have a seriously adverse effect on  
Anglo-Japanese relations from the following points of view:  
(a) the danger to Japanese residents in Hong Kong from an

793.94/14048

F/FG

enflamed

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5062

-2- 660, October 12, 3 p.m.

enflamed Chinese populace; (b) the serious problem of Chinese refugees flocking into the colony; (c) the attendant problem of food supplies; and (d) the risk of incidents involving British shipping. The Vice Minister merely replied that such of these points as concerned the Japanese authorities on the spot would be referred to them for consideration.

Repeated to Hong Kong for Chungking.

GREW

RGC

EDA

120

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

b

Confidential

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 660) of October 12, 1938, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

It is the understanding of Craigie (British Ambassador) that before landing troops in Kwangtung Province preparatory to a drive on Canton the Japanese have merely been waiting for certain circumstances and that their plans have been made for some time. A desire on the part of the Japanese to divert public attention in Japan from the occasional defeats and delays in connection with the offensive against Hankow and/or information to the effect that instead of proceeding to the west General Chiang may go toward the south when he leaves Hankow are the circumstances which brought the matter of the invasion of Canton to a head, in the opinion of Craigie.

On October 11 Craigie informed Horinouchi (the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs) that relations between Great Britain and Japan could be adversely affected to a serious extent by an offensive on Canton from the viewpoints of (a) the serious problem which would be created by the large number of Chinese refugees coming into Hong Kong; (b) the danger arising from possible incidents involving British vessels; (c) the peril from an enraged Chinese people to Japanese living in Hong Kong; and (d) the matter

793.94/14048

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

matter of a sufficient supply of food in view of the increase in Chinese refugees. The only answer made by Horinouchi to Graigie was that there would be referred for consideration to the <sup>appropriate</sup> Japanese authorities in the field such of the points mentioned by Graigie as concerned those authorities.

793.94/14048

EP.C.  
FE:EC:JPS  
10-12

FE  
rem



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD

PLAIN

FROM

Swatow via N. R.


Dated October 12, 1938.

Rec'd. 10:55 a. m.

Amembassy Chungking  
Amembassy Peiping  
Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



October 12, 3 p. m.

793.94  
Japanese naval vessels intermittently shelled Chinghai coast later shifting to Hope Bay from four to seven this morning with damage negligible while single plane circled Swatow dropped two bombs near railway station one exploding with no damage. Following vessels reported departed southward from positions outside Swatow this morning; one cruiser, three destroyers and ten transports.

YOUNG

RGC

793.94/14049

FILED  
OCT 13 1938

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED



RAW

FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. A-3


Hong Kong via N.R.

Dated October 12, 1938

REC'd 8:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington,

*Tel to Hong Kong  
dropped*



October 12, 6 p.m.

In continuation of my telegram of October 12, 10 a.m.,  
best sources of information here confirm successful Japanese  
landing at Bias Bay and predict first objective will be cut-  
ting Hong Kong-Canton Railway line rather than move against  
Canton. Railway about 34 miles from place of landing and  
prompt progress is predicted by local observers. Captain  
Roberts informs me there are three Chinese divisions to  
oppose the advance from Bias Bay but there is no prediction  
as to how well they will fight. Hong Kong anticipates rush  
of refugees and on this account food shortage is possible.  
Manila has refused permission Hong Kong Government to pur-  
chase supplies listed my telegram of September 26, 3 p.m.  
Hong Kong air plane observer says he counted 120 vessels  
in Bias Bay this morning. U.S.S. MINDANAO arrived here  
this afternoon and plans to start on return to Canton on  
afternoon October 19. MINDANAO has no news from U.S.S.  
TULSA at Swatow which would confirm persistent local rumors  
that

793.94/14060

FILED  
F/FG  
OCT 15 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- October 12, 6 p.m., from Hong Kong.

that Swatow has been heavily bombed today. We have just  
tried to telephone Canton and have been informed no connec-  
tion possible for seven hours.

Sent to Chungking.

SOUTHARD

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL

PLAIN

Washington,

Naval Radio

Charge to  
This cable was sent in confidential code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone. *Bm*

October 12, 1938.

6 PM

AMERICAN CONSUL,

HONG KONG. (China) via NR

793.94/14050  
Your October 12, 6 p.m., and previous.

Department assumes 'of course' that you 'are repeating'  
your telegrams 'to Canton' and to 'Chungking'. For purposes  
of 'record', please 'so indicate' in your 'future' telegrams.

*Hull*  
(-m. m. H.)

793.94/14050

OCT 12 1938. PM

FE:MMH:EJL

FE  
RECEIVED  
10/12/38

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_\_

D. O. R.-No. 80

1-1482 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F / FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R./149 FOR Despatch #1718

FROM China (Salisbury) DATED Sept. 13, 1938.  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

#### REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese relations: Report concerning-  
for month of August, 1938.

aa

793.94/ 14051

14051

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

4. Japan:

a. The offensive against Hankow:

19394  
The Japanese offensive against Hankow had formed by the end of July into five general lines of attack. Forces on the south bank of the Yangtze west of Poyang Lake were moving in two directions, one westward from Kiukiang toward

Juichang

---

4. Hankow's telegram to the Embassy August 16, 4 p.m.

- 6 -

Jiuchang (about 15 miles distant) and the other south toward Tahan (about midway between Kiukiang and Nanchang), but it was not known whether the latter detachments planned to attack Nanchang or to swing west toward the Hankow-Canton Railway with the ultimate intention of going north toward Hankow along that line; on the north bank detachments from Fankiang to the east reached Susung, units from the north bank opposite Kiukiang went north to Hwangsei, and a column from Tsienhsan (about 40 miles west of Anking) passed Iaim in the direction of Yingshan (near the Anhwei-Hupeh border). A column from Hefei (about 100 miles north by east of Anking) which in June captured Liuan (about 50 miles west of Hefei) and in July withdrew, renewed in August its westward drive which appeared to be part of a general encircling movement toward Hankow. To supplement this movement from the north the renewed Japanese drive in south Shansi (see page 8 ) was directed against Yellow River crossings; and the Japanese military spokesman at Peiping announced after the capture late in August of Fenglingtu, south Shansi, that the Japanese forces would cross the river at Tungkuang and part of them would move eastward toward the Pinghan Railway and then southward to cooperate in the Hankow offensive. Thus Hankow would be attacked in the final stages of the campaign from the southeast (and possibly the south), the east, the northeast and the north in a diminishing circle.

Heavy fighting occurred throughout the month in the Yangtze area which was defended by 800,000 Chinese against 300,000 Japanese troops, some ninety Japanese naval

Yanagis.

- 7 -

vessels, and a large number of planes. Bombing operations against Chinese positions were intensified, particularly in the Tchan area, developing into perhaps the heaviest aerial attacks of the hostilities. Heavy casualties on both sides were reported and about 20 percent of the Chinese troops (and, according to Chinese military sources, 50 percent of the Japanese) were reported ill with cholera, malaria, and dysentery.

The Japanese captured Kwangmei, north of the Yangtze, August 2 but the Chinese cut in at the end of the month behind this position at Taihu and Susung. Japanese forces on the south bank, after breaking extremely stubborn Chinese defenses, captured Juichang (about 15 miles west of Kiuziang) August 24, and a column from Juichang started southeast toward Tchan. Another column pushed south along the west bank of Poyang Lake and troops which landed near Singtze (about 30 miles south of Kiuziang) captured that place August 22. On the east shore of the lake a Japanese landing effected at Tchang was repulsed.

In the Hefei area of northern Anhwei, some 10,000 Japanese troops began a westward drive in the last week of August, captured Lian, and divided into two columns headed respectively for Kushih (about 80 miles to the northwest across the Honan border) and Huoshan (about 30 miles south by west of Lian). Some 100,000 Chinese troops led by General Pai Chung-shi were reportedly opposing the Japanese in this area. The projected drive from Shansi in the north was not begun during August, as the Japanese failed to cross the Yellow River.

Although



- 8 -

Although Japanese naval vessels reached and shelled Yushueh, about thirty miles up river from Kiukiang, the greatest progress westward of Japanese land forces was just west of Juichang, leaving the Japanese spearhead still over one hundred miles from Hankow.

b. The South Shansi campaign:

The Japanese campaign in south Shansi, which was renewed early in July but became inactive in the middle of that month because of heavy rains and withdrawal of troops to Manchuria, was resumed in the second week of August, coincident with the cessation (August 11) of fighting on the Korean-"Manchukuo"-Siberian border. Japanese troops captured on August 17 Yungchi (Puchow) <sup>5</sup> in extreme southwest Shansi and, according to Japanese reports, some 100,000 Chinese troops began massing in northern Honan to resist Japanese attacks on Yellow River crossings. With the capture in the last days of August of Fenglingtu (south Shansi on the north bank of the <sup>6</sup> river opposite Tungkuang, Honan), the Japanese military spokesman at Peiping announced that all chief cities and towns in Shansi were in Japanese hands. Tungkuang was being shelled from across the river at the end of the month by Japanese artillery and Japanese announced plans were to make a crossing there, capture Tungkuang, and divide <sup>7</sup> into two columns. One of these would proceed west against Sian with the ultimate purpose of cutting the channel of supplies for the National Government coming via Sinkiang, and the other would move eastward to the Pinghan Railway and then south to cooperate in the offensive against Hankow (see page 5 ).

c.

- 
5. Embassy's (Peiping) 511, August 22, 2 p.m.
  6. Embassy's (Peiping) 531, August 31, 5 p.m.
  7. Embassy's (Peiping) 535, September 1, 4 p.m.

- 3 -

c. Aerial warfare:

Japanese aerial activities continued over wide areas, with concentrated attacks upon the outer defense lines. Objectives included the city of Canton and railways and highways in Hunan, Hupoh, Kiangsi, Kwangtung and Kwangsi. As the Chinese air force was active only during the early part of the month (at the front on the south bank of the Yangtze), the Japanese had virtual command of the air in all areas of operations. The most intensive bombings of the hostilities were reportedly conducted by the Japanese in the Tahan section (Kiangsi, on the Kiukiang-Hanchang Railway). The Huhai cities were bombed in the first three weeks of the month eight times, resulting in non-combatant casualties exceeding 2,000 and the destruction of more than 1,000 houses, shops, and other structures in densely populated sections. There was unprecedented loss of life from air raids at Guangsha (Hunan), Hanchang (Kiangsi), and at Yangsin and Kingshan (Hupoh). A British commander of a Chinese customs vessel and two members of the Chinese crew were machine-gunned and killed August 2 by Japanese planes about 36 miles below Hankow on the Yangtze (the vessel had been removing beacons which would have aided Japanese vessels in coming up river).

In raids upon Canton August 8 and 9, about 700 people in the central part of the city were killed and wounded and 122 buildings were destroyed. Japanese bombings disrupted service on the Canton-Hankow Railway from August 11 to 29. Government and factory buildings

in

- 10 -

in Wuohow, Kwangsi, were attacked several times and Kweilin, Kwangsi, was bombed.

Chinese reports that Chinese planes successfully bombed early in the month Japanese naval vessels in the Amoy-Kinsiang area were not confirmed.

8  
d. Fighting in Suiyuan and Chanan:

Meager information concerning conditions in Suiyuan and Chanan, chiefly from Japanese sources, indicated that fighting occurred early in August (a) between irregulars and Japanese units west of Fungchen, Suiyuan, (on the Pingui Railway about midway between Kalgan and Kweisui), (b) between troops of General Ma Chan-shan and Japanese-Mongol units 45 miles southwest of Kweisui, and (c) between Japanese detachments and irregulars or bandits not far north of Kalgan.

e. Increase in guerrilla activities:

Guerrilla activities were generally intensified during August. Three raids near Shanghai penetrated close to the International Settlement (guerrillas occupied for a short time the Hungjao airdrome and in one skirmish a British resident of the Western Area was killed). Irregulars believed to belong to the new Fourth Route Army were active near Kunu and Hanking; and Kuyung (30 miles east by south of Hanking) was reportedly attacked August 12. Tsinan was attacked the same morning by a band which penetrated into the walled city, and Taku, near Tientsin, was attacked the night of August 20 by a force of 1,500 who carried away

several

- 
8. Tientsin's monthly political review for August (despatch 658, September 2).
  9. Tsingtao's August 14 and August 15, 10 a.m. Embassy's despatch 1714, September 12.

- 11 -

several Chinese and inflicted a number of Japanese casualties. Attacks on railways were frequent and traffic was interrupted several times on the main lines in Japanese occupied areas. Following a wreck in July on the Pingnan line which reportedly resulted in heavy casualties, there occurred in August another wreck south of Peotingfu which caused 200 casualties, and traffic in that section was suspended for several periods. On the Tsingpu line near Tienchow, Shantung (near the Hopei border) several bridges were blown up in the second week of August with consequent suspension of traffic Tientsin-Tsinan for over a week. Attacks on the Peiping-Mukden Railway both between Shanhaikuan and Tientsin and between Tientsin and Peiping were made later in the month. A section of track and several freight cars were damaged August 25 by an explosion near the Hsichin Gate of Peiping. Railway stations at Changli, Shinsen and Huanhsien (East Hopei) and Lanfang (half way between Tientsin and Peiping) were attacked subsequently. Tracks were cut between Tangshan (East Hopei) and Peitaino Junction (near the beach resort visited by a large number of Americans and other foreigners during the summer). Fighting between guerrillas and Japanese troops occurred twice near Lanfang.

According to foreign travellers from central and west Hopei and east Shansi, guerrillas associated with and considered a part of the 8th Route Army claimed to have 200,000 irregulars in four organized areas of Hopei and

- 
10. Embassy's (Peiping) 543, September 1, 4 p.m.
  11. Embassy's (Peiping) 510, August 25, 4 p.m.

- 12 -

and to have sent 25,000 to East Hopei. The chief lack of the guerrillas was stated to be rifle ammunition but they were well supplied with hand grenades of their own manufacture and were obtaining considerable amounts of explosives.

Notwithstanding their success in harassing Japanese outposts and lines of communications and in killing small detachments of Japanese soldiers, the guerrillas continued to be comparatively ineffective as a military force. Their effectiveness, however, appeared in August on the increase as their training and organization progressed, and it was reliably reported that Japanese indiscriminate attacks by planes, troops, and artillery against villages thought to harbor guerrillas were turning the countryside population into active supporters of the organized guerrillas (who in general treated the people well), with one result that frequently the survivors of Japanese attacks on civilians joined with guerrillas for active service against the Japanese. There were indications that the guerrilla movement would continue to grow in Hopei, Shantung and Shansi, and that irregular activities, already a formidable problem to the Japanese military, would become a menace to them of increasing magnitude.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 489.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hankow, China, August 23, 1938

Subject: Japanese Occupation of Shangkiu  
(Kweitch), Honan.

793.94

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OCT 12 1938

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

For Distribution		Yes	No
Grade	For		
In U.S.A.		✓	✓
Javis ONI-MID			

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, in  
quintuplicate, a copy of this Consulate General's  
despatch No. 559, dated August 23, 1938, to the  
Embassy, Chungking, on the above mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

*P. R. Joselyn*  
P. R. Joselyn  
American Consul General

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
A-M/C  
OCT 19 1938  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE

Enclosures:

American Consul General, Hankow, to  
American Embassy, Chungking, despatch  
No. 559, August 23, 1938.

In quintuplicate.

800

JD/CFS

793.94/14052

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 559.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hankow, China, August 23, 1938

Subject: Japanese Occupation of Changkiu  
(Kweichow), Honan.

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Ambassador,  
Chungking, Szechuan.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a memorandum concerning conditions in Changkiu, formerly known as Kweichow, Honan, during and immediately following Japanese occupation of that city. The memorandum is based upon a conversation with an American missionary living in Changkiu during that period.

Respectfully yours,

P. R. Jesselyn  
American Consul General


Enclosure:

Memorandum.

Original to Embassy, Chungking.  
In quintuplicate to Department.  
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.  
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.  
Copy to Consulate General, Tientsin.  
Copy to Consulate, Tsingtao.

SDS

JD/CYS



File No. 800  
JD/CFS

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HANKOW August, 20

1938.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Japanese Occupation of Shangkiu  
(Kweitch), Honan.

Conditions in Shangkiu (Kweitch), Honan, immediately following Japanese occupation this May and June were described today at this office by an American missionary from that town. The missionary in question left Shangkiu in mid-July, proceeding here via Hsuehchow, Tsingtao and Hong Kong.

The Chinese population of Shangkiu, excepting for about "a dozen people", fled the city upon the approach of the Japanese forces. Most of the civilians went into the surrounding countryside. About 4,000 entered a refugee camp established by the various missions at Shangkiu in the Canadian mission hospital outside of the city.

The Japanese troops thoroughly looted the city. No harm befell the foreigners living in Shangkiu. One of the first moves of the Japanese after occupation was to dissolve the refugee camp. Some of the refugees departed into the countryside, some returned to their residences in one of the suburbs and about 400 were quartered in an empty granary.

Before disbanding the refugee camp, Japanese officers entered it and coerced some of the leading citizens to form a provisional government. The men so honored were most reluctant to accept the appointments bestowed upon them, and sought by every excuse to avoid being elevated to positions of such dubious dignity. My informant was told by the Japanese authorities not to attend the meeting which actually organized the provisional government. The Japanese in charge of these activities was a civilian, head of the Propaganda Corps. He was described by the missionary as being an extremely low type of Japanese ruffian. One of his more time-consuming functions was the direction of torture of suspect Chinese.

An American missionary woman in Shangkiu (presumably Miss Olive P. Riddel, who is the only one listed by this office as being there) was, some time before my informant's departure, proceeding from her home to the Church Mission hospital when she was accosted by two Japanese soldiers. They indecently searched her and then attempted to force her to go up an alley-way. Her protestations prompted one of the soldiers to draw his revolver and further threaten her. She declared that they could shoot her but that she would not accede before their threats. The soldiers finally desisted and she went on her way.

Guerrilla




DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Guerilla forces were active in the rural areas surrounding Shangkiu. They were, up to the time of my informant's departure, bandits rather than organized patriotic partisans. Their principal concern was fleecing wealthy Chinese who had fled from nearby towns. They constituted however sufficient threat to the Japanese so that the latter did not venture more than a few miles into the countryside surrounding Shangkiu.

The peasantry desired only to be left alone so that they might harvest their crops. They elaborately minded their own business and those near Shangkiu, with the sense of protective coloring typical of the unorganized Chinese peasant, worked their fields with white bands on their arms on which were stamped the risen sun. They also flew Japanese and five-barred flags on their homes.

John Davies, Jr.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

REB

FROM

FOURTH MARINES


October 12, 1938

Rec'd 3:20 p. m.

ACTION: CINCAF, OPNAV

INFO:

RUSNOS  
AMCON SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
STATIONSHIP SHANGHAI  
ALUSNA PEIPING



8612. Japanese effected large scale landing without resistance Bias Bay zero four thirty this date fighting developing near Namshan on Swatow Canton highway. Two companies British troops ordered to border cope influx Chinese refugees British women evacuating Canton tomorrow one three seven Japanese planes bombed Swatow Waichow Canton Kowloon railway other points Kwangtung. Sinyang Honan reported captured by Japanese 1928.

CSB

795.94/14053

F/FG

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FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~FE~~

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

COMSOPAT


FROM

October 12, 1938

Rec'd 4:22 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV WASHINGTON

INFO: RUSNOS  
COMSUBRON, FIVE  
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS ASHVILLE  
SACRAMENTO  
MARBLEHEAD  
TULSA  
PEARY  
FOURTH MARINES



COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

ejr

742.94  
0012. Landing made Bias Bay surprise attack began  
4:30 a. m. east shore first occupied entire day area now  
controlled. Troops reported as first line and making con-  
siderable progress inland Canton-Kowloon railroad indicated  
as objective about sixty transports and thirty thousand  
troops in present landing coast north of Swatow entrance  
vicinity of Namoa Island and coast south of entrance  
vicinity Haimum Bay was shelled from 4 to 7:30 a. m.  
railroad communication Kowloon, Canton interrupted by  
bombing. 2355

EMB

ROW

OCT 14 1938

FILED

795.94/14054

F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~FE~~

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

PLAIN

AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING

Hongkong via N. R.

Dated October 12, 1938

Rec'd 3:20 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

FROM  
Director  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 11 1938  
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

882

October 12, 3 p. m.

793.94

Following is newspaper published text of a proclamation issued through the Japanese Consulate General in Hong Kong by the commander-in-chief of the Japanese expeditionary force in South China.

"The National Government of China, in its national policy, has been resisting Japan and cooperating with the Comintern. Since the outbreak of the hostilities, its troops fought against the local and brave soldiers of our Imperial Army and navy, and lost battle after battle at the sacrifice of millions of men and officers. Nanking, its capital surrendered to us last winter, and again, this spring, they suffered a crushing defeat at Hsuehow. And, now, the cities of Wuhan are in imminent danger. All the while, the four hundred million people of China have been driven into the depth of an undescrivable misery, and still the National Government is indulging in the illusion of the war of resistance against Japan. This is to the profound regret

793.94/14055

F/FG

REB

2- From Hongkong, Oct. 12, 3 p. m.

regret of our empire.

Such circumstances have obligated the Imperial Japanese Government to dispatch a large expeditionary force to operate in Kwantung Province, the base of anti-Japanese and pro-Comintern China, for the purpose of bringing China to a quicker disillusion.

The expeditionary force of ours started landing with an irresistible vigour on the eastern coast of Kwantung Province, and under a perfect joint operation of the land, sea and air forces, has attended a complete success.

The Japanese forces, as proclaimed repeatedly by the Imperial Japanese Government, has NEVER been hostile against the people of China. Therefore, the innocent populace of this district should be at ease in the face of the Japanese forces and carry on their daily business in peace as usual. Even those belonging to the regular army or the peace preservation corps will be forgiven, should they abandon arms in repentance of their past and cooperate with us, and for such, the safety of their lives and properties will be guaranteed.

No leniency will be shown to those however who offer resistance against our forces, attempt to inflict injury upon

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REB

3- From Hongkong, Oct. 12, 3p.m.

upon our forces, or are in collusion with the enemy.

What the Empire of Japan demands from China is nothing but that China will, to realize her mistakes committed in the past, so that she will give up her national policy of resistance against Japan and cooperation with the Comintern, to witness a true and genuine coalition between Japan and China for the cause of perpetual peace in the Far East. The operation of our expeditionary force will never be discontinued, unless and until the time comes when this grand, glorious purport of Japan will have been accomplished."

SOUTHARD

CSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

FROM

Fourth Marines

October 13, 1938

Received 8:42 a.m.

ACTION CINCAF

OPNAV

INFO RUEBNC

AMCON SHANGHAI CHINA  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
ASST ALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSCPAT  
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA  
STASHIP SHANGHAI  
ALUSNA PEIPING

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

8613. Japanese planes actively bombed South China  
points yesterday Japanese troops continue landing operations  
Bias Bay with fighting reported vicinity Haichung. Yangtze  
operations continue unabated with fighting in progress South  
bank Yangtze opposite Kiacun also southwest Yangthsin and  
near Tahan 1827.

WWC

793.94/14056

F / FG

5063

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (Br)

CANTON VIA N.R.

FROM

Dated October 13, 1938


Received 7:30 a.m.

DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION  
OCT 13 1938  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State

Washington

October 13, 1 p.m.



COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

*in confidence* E.J.L.

Japanese are assembling strong land forces at Bias Bay and attempted routes will be either via Tamshui to Pingwu or by Tanshui and Waichow to Cheungmuktau in order to cut the Canton-Hankow Railway at Pingwu or Cheungmuktau. The Chinese claim to have excellent fortifications along both routes.

The Canton-Hankow Railway was seriously bombed yesterday and service at least temporarily stopped. Warning has been given by the Chinese authorities that the Pearl River may be closed to traffic at anytime.

Yesterday I requested that all American women and children in Canton and vicinity leave for Hong Kong at once and many have gone by steamer this morning. I have also sent a general circular to all Americans in this district pointing out danger of situation and urging evacuation unless their remaining is necessary.

I have just been informed confidentially that the Pearl River will be closed tonight.

Department's October 12, 6 p.m. Following fifteen Americans

793.94/14057

F/F/G

*not*  
393.1115



5084

EDA - 2 - October 13, 1 p.m. from Canton

Americans left Canton today for Hong Kong:

✓ Mrs. Ted Flots and two children,

Mrs. Mary Jephtha Watson,

Alic Joy Campbell,

Floyd Carmen,

*Plane*  
Evelyn Clare Wells,

Margaret Frances MacDonald,

Betty Jane Brownell,

Ruth MacDonald,

Mrs. Edward Lee and two children,

✓ Mrs. Charles S. Lee and son.

White Americans now in Canton 82, Chinese-Americans 70.

LINNELL

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 13, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

Service has been stopped at least temporarily on the Canton-Hankow railway as the result of the serious bombing of the railway on October 12. The Chinese authorities have issued a warning to the effect that at any time traffic on the Pearl River may be stopped. The Consul General has received confidential information to the effect that the River will be closed to traffic on the night of October 13.

The Japanese are bringing strong land forces together at Bias Bay. They will attempt to advance by way of Tamshui and Waichow to Cheungmuktau for the purpose of cutting the Canton-Hankow railway at Cheungmuktau or Pingwu, or they will advance by way of Tamshui to Pingwu. The Chinese say that they have both routes well fortified.

The Consul General has circularized all Americans in his district inviting their attention to the danger of the situation and urging that they evacuate unless it is necessary that they remain. There are in Canton at the present time 70 Chinese-Americans and 82 white Americans. On October 13 the 15 Americans whose names appear below left for Hong Kong: Mrs. Ted Flots and two children, Mrs. Mary Jeptha Watson, Alice Joy Campbell, Floyd Carmen, Evelyn Clare Wells, Margaret Frances MacDonald, Betty

Jane

793.94/14857

123  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Jane Brownell, Ruth MacDonald, Mrs. Edward Lee and two  
children, Mrs. Charles S. Lee and son.

793.94/14057

EQC.  
FE:EDC:JPS  
10-13

HSP  
FE  
RAV

5065

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM Tokyo

Dated October 13, 1938

Rec'd 10:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

665. October 13, 5 p.m.  
Our 657, <sup>14047</sup> October 12, 11 a.m.

One. The naval and military attaches, in appraising the landing of Japanese forces on the South China coast, agree that: (a) the primary purpose is to block ingress into China of arms and munitions over the only railway leading from a port not under Japanese control. Whereas such supplies are also being received from Indo-China and Russia, the quantities are probably not large when compared with the volume received over the Hankow-Kowloon line and probably insufficient to meet Chinese needs over a long period of time; (b) the fact that this move was made now and not later, say after the capture of Hankow, seems to indicate that the Japanese high command had satisfied itself that the main Chinese forces intend to retreat from Hankow to the south and southwest. This would be a rational course for the Chinese to follow, as the five southwest provinces must hereafter provide the greater part of the resources of money, personnel

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 12 1938

Department of State

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Dim Confidence  
DT

793.94/1 4058

F/FG

6066

-2- 665, October 13, 5 p.m., from Tokyo.

personnel and material for continued resistance. In view of these considerations, an advance along the railway toward Hankow is probably contemplated.

Two. Careful search of press comment this morning reveals little of Japanese objectives, military and political, not covered in the appraisal (?) outlined. Editorials emphasize, (a) the importance of cutting off military supplies shipped through Hong Kong; (b) the importance of depriving the Chinese forces of their last substantial base of operations; (c) the need for "correcting the misapprehensions of the Kwangsi-Kwantung faction who have long been a thorn in the side of Sino-Japanese cooperation, concerning the strength and motives of Japan"; and (d) the importance of Japan and other concerned powers guarding against the Chinese exploiting the complicated international situation in South China to involve Japan with third powers, notably Great Britain.

Three. We have been unable to obtain comment from any responsible Japanese which would offer basis for the tempting conjecture that the move in South China was made at this time to hasten settlement of the general military situation in anticipation of European developments discussed in our 655, October 10, midnight.

Repeated to Hong Kong for Chungking.

WC  
CBS

GREW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 665) of October 13, 1938, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

No responsible Japanese have made comment which could be used for the basis of the enticing guess that the Japanese have moved in South China at this time in order to bring about a settlement of the general military situation more quickly, in expectation of developments in Europe mentioned in a telegram (No. 655 of October 10) from the Embassy at Tokyo.

In making estimates in regard to the matter of the landing of the Japanese on the coast of South China the military and naval attaches are in agreement on the following points: (a) the fact that the Japanese chose the present time to make their move in South China rather than to await a later date - after the capture of Hankow for instance - appears to mean that the Japanese high command felt convinced that the Chinese plan to withdraw the bulk of their forces to the south and southwest from Hankow. This would be a sensible thing for the Chinese to do as, in the future, the larger part of the personnel, material, and money for continued resistance to the Japanese must be supplied by the five southwest provinces. Therefore, it is probable that an advance toward Hankow along the railway

is

793.94/14858

1 2 3 4

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

is planned; (b) one of the principal reasons for the move in South China is to stop the entry of arms and munitions into China by way of the only railroad running from a port which is not under Japanese control. Although arms and munitions are received from Russia and Indo-China the quantities received in this way probably are not sufficient to supply the needs of the Chinese over a long period of time and they are probably small compared with the quantities received by way of the Hankow-Kowloon line.

The press comment in the morning newspapers of October 13 contains little more information in regard to the political and military objectives of the Japanese than is contained in the estimate outlined above. Editorials in the press stress (a) the need for enlightening the Kwangsi-Kwangtung clique, who for a long time have been a source of trouble in connection with cooperation between China and Japan, in regard to Japan's motives and strength; (b) the value of blocking the ingress of military supplies shipped via Hong Kong; (c) the value of Japan and other interested powers taking steps to prevent the exploitation by the Chinese of the difficult international situation existing in South China for the purpose of involving Japan with Great Britain and other third powers; (d) the value of shutting the Chinese forces away from their last important base of operations.

FE:EOC:JPS

FE *rev*

793.94/14058

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5067

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

PLAIN

FROM

Hong Kong via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1938

Rec'd 3:48 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

October 13, 6 p. m.


The following statement was made today by the Governor of Hong Kong to the Legislative Council in connection with the Bias Bay landing:

"The outbreak of hostilities so close to its border is of course a matter of grave and regretful concern for this colony. Three quarters of our fresh vegetables and a large proportion of our fresh meat supplies come from that province.

Secondly, the colony must face the prospect of an additional serious refugee problem arising from this invasion: as honourable members are no doubt aware, certain steps are being taken to cope with that eventuality: these together with the military <sup>and</sup> ~~anti~~-police precautions which are necessary in such circumstances will entail heavy charges upon the colony's funds.

Again, the interruption of Hong Kong's long established trade

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DI



793.94/14059

F/FG

743.94

WA  
3/5/39

WA  
3/10/39



5068

REB

2- From Hong Kong, Oct. 13, 6 p.m.

trade with China will bring heavy losses upon the  
revenue and upon commerce.

I need not mention the many other ways in which  
this colony will or may be adversely affected.

I am confident, however, that the citizens of Hong Kong  
will face these new difficulties with good sense and  
dignity, relying upon the British Government to do all in  
its power to protect their interests."

Repeated to Chungking and Canton.

SOUTHARD

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HRE

GRAY

FROM HONG KONG

Dated October 13, 1938

Rec'd 5:15 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

October 13, 4 p.m.

In continuation of my telegram of October 12, 6 p.m. I have so far today been unable to confirm in Hong Kong that Japanese are materially progressing inland from Bias Bay. Local estimates of time required for their progress to the railway vary from three days to three months. In so far as concerns Hong Kong the Chinese authorities appear to be greatly restricting news from Bias Bay front. Hong Kong appears to take calm view of events and no important excitement is evident here. Expected rush of refugees not yet materialized although emergency police conditions have been declared by the governor and frontier guards have been reenforced periodically by police and military. U. S. S. MINDANAO was able to leave here this morning to return to Canton but we have in port arrived today 6 United States submarines with 2 tender ships all of which expect to be here until October 24th. Repeated to Chungking and Canton.

SOUTHARD

NPL

793.94/14060

F/FG

793.94  
MEX  
21.30 A.F.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CA

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone (B)

PARIS

FROM Dated October 13, 1938

Rec'd 4:10 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1751, October 13, 7 p.m.




CONFIDENTIAL

The Chief of the Far Eastern Division at the Foreign  
Office said to me this afternoon that the Japanese invasion  
of South China which has begun with the landing of troops  
at Bias Bay had been under consideration by the Japanese  
authorities for a long time. The Japanese navy had always  
wanted to take this action but the Foreign Office had  
opposed it for fear of complications with foreign powers.  
With the fall of Ugaki and decline of Foreign Office  
influence the navy view had prevailed.

(END SECTION ONE)

WILSON

NPL



~~SECRET~~

793.94/14061

FILED  
OCT 25 1938

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5070

FE

CA

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
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to anyone (S)

PARIS

FROM Dated October 13, 1938

Rec'd 5:06 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1751, October 13, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

793.94  
Hoppenot believed the first Japanese objective will be to cut the railway in the section north of Kowloon and that for this purpose troops will be landed on the east bank of the Canton River in addition to those landed at Bias Bay. After this has been done he expects the Japanese to attack Canton but believes that in order to avoid the difficulties of an approach overland through the mountain and lake regions the Japanese will move troops on junks up the Canton River. He said that the force of some 35,000 men already landed at Bias Bay should be sufficient to cut the railway. A considerably larger force will be needed to capture Canton although his information indicates that the Chinese military at Canton are lukewarm about putting up a strong defense and that recently the best troops which had been stationed there have been moved to the north.

He believes that the Japanese intend to set up an autonomous government in Kwantung and that while they will be able to accomplish their objectives in this area including cutting off of supplies going to Hankow from Hong Kong this will have little effect upon the ultimate outcome of the conflict.

(END SECTION TWO)

WILSON

NPL

5071

HRE

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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fore being communicated  
to anyone (B)


Dated October 13, 1938

FROM

Rec'd 6:20 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington



1751, October 13, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Hoppenot said that he did not like the looks of things. The Japanese are becoming "excited" and unpleasant in conversations in Tokyo between the Foreign Office and the French Embassy and between the Japanese Embassy and the Foreign Office here. The Japanese Embassy had protested because a few Chinese officers and soldiers in mufti had been allowed to cross Tonkin going from Kwangsi to Yunnan. The French Foreign Office had replied that they could not prohibit Chinese transiting Tonkin, that a few Chinese soldiers in civilian attire could not be distinguished from ordinary civilians and that in any case there was no declared war and France had no obligation to prohibit even Chinese troops from crossing Indo-China. The Japanese Embassy, however, maintained its point of view and insisted that the (regarding?) French should do something yeoman situation. Also the Japanese counsellor (the Ambassador is quite ill) had lately protested a decree authorizing the authorities in Indo-China to prohibit the export of iron ore and manganese. Hoppenot had explained that this decree had been issued only in order to permit the prohibition of exports if it should appear

5072

HRE 2-#1751 From Paris October 13, 7 p.m. (Sec 3).

appear in the future that these ores were needed in Indo-China and had pointed out that the decree had not been applied and that Japan was continuing to receive shipments of these ores. Japanese counsellor nevertheless had insisted that Japan had the "right" to obtain these ores and had been unpleasant about the matter.

(END SECTION THREE)

WILSON

CA

5073

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

FROM


This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (B)

Paris

Dated October 13, 1938.

Rec'd 5:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



1751. October 13, 7 p.m. (SECTION FOUR).

Hoppenot stated that there was a clear relation be-  
tween recent events in Europe and the changing attitude of  
the Japanese. Throughout the month of September it had seemed  
as if the Japanese attitude in the Far East and the German  
attitude in central Europe had been synchronized. The British  
had noted this as well as the French. Hoppenot expressed the  
opinion that the only hope of preventing the situation in the  
Far East from steadily deteriorating would be for the United  
States to express its views strongly to Japan on the necessity  
of reasonable behaviour by the latter. I asked if he felt  
that French interests were menaced by this new Japanese in-  
vasion. He said that he feared there would be difficulties  
concerning the French concession at Canton and also that the  
Japanese might seize Hainan. I asked what the French would  
do in this latter case. He said that France would protest.  
France would certainly not go to war with Japan over Hainan.

WILSON

WVC

5074

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HJD

FROM Paris


This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone. (B)

Dated October 13, 1938.

Rec'd. 6:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.



1731, October 13, 7 p. m. (SECTION FIVE).

Hoppenot said that the Japanese had charged that shipments of war material to China were continuing to pass over the French railway in Indo-China. The French Government had replied that for the past two months not a single rifle had been carried on this railroad and had asked the Japanese Government to produce facts to substantiate its charges. The Japanese had insisted that shipments were going forward all the time and that it would be beside the point to present detailed information. I asked Hoppenot if it were really true that the French were not letting any shipments of war material go over the railway to Yunnan. Hoppenot said that this was absolutely true. I remarked that this was bad luck for the Chinese. He said that it was indeed bad luck but no matter how much the French might love the Chinese they could not risk war with Japan on their account.

I asked if the Russians were increasing their

shipments



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

5075

HJD -2- No. 1751, October 13, 7 p. m. (SECTION FIVE)  
from Paris

shipments of war materials to China. Hoppenot replied  
that they were. They also were sending large numbers of  
aviation instructors as well as a number of military  
experts to take the place of the German mission. With  
the cutting of the Canton-Hankow Railway the shipment  
of Russian war material will have to <sup>be</sup> (A) overland via  
Sinkiang since the Burma route is not yet in condition.  
END MESSAGE.

WJB  
5/23/39

WILSON

WAC  
RCC

(\*) ~~Apparent omission~~

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

b

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

A confidential telegram (No. 1751) of October 13, 1938, from the American Chargé d'Affaires at Paris reads substantially as follows:

On October 13 the Chargé d'Affaires had a conversation with Hoppenot (Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the French Foreign Office) at which time the latter made statements to the following effect:

The Japanese, both in discussions which take place between the Japanese Embassy and the French Foreign Office and between the Japanese Foreign Office and the French Embassy in Tokyo, are becoming unpleasant and excited, and he (Hoppenot) does not like the way things look.

In reply to a Japanese charge that war materials were being sent to China over the French railway in Indochina the French Government had said that this railway has not transported one rifle during the last two months. Having been asked by the French Government to substantiate the charges with facts, the Japanese Government had replied that there would be no point in submitting detailed information in regard to shipments of arms and insisted that such shipments were being carried on the railway all the time. In reply to a question from the American Chargé as to the truth of the statement that

793.94/14861

-2-

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

that no shipments of war materials were being carried over the railway to Yunnan, Hoppenot said that this statement was the absolute truth, and agreed with the Chargé's remark that this was most unlucky for the Chinese. Hoppenot remarked, however, that the French could not risk a war with the Japanese on account of China, no matter how much they might like the Chinese.

In reply to an inquiry from the American Chargé in regard to shipments of Soviet war materials to China, Hoppenot said that the Russians were increasing their shipments and he remarked also that they were sending to China numerous military experts to replace the Germans and many aviation instructors. Since the road via Burma is not yet fit for use, it will be necessary to transport war materials from Russia overland by way of Sinkiang after the railway from Canton to Hankow is out.

Recently the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, acting for the Ambassador who is incapacitated by illness, had protested to the French Foreign Office in regard to a decree which authorized the Indochina authorities to place a ban on the exportation of manganese and iron ore. It had been explained to the Japanese that the only purpose in issuing this decree, which had not been applied, had been to make possible an embargo on exports in case, at any time in the future, it should  
become

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

become apparent that these ores were needed in Indochina. Although it was pointed out also that these ores were still being shipped to Japan the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy had shown a very unpleasant spirit and had insisted that the Japanese had the right to have the materials in question. A protest had been received also from the Japanese Embassy on account of the fact that a small number of Chinese military in civilian dress had been permitted to cross a part of northern Indochina en route to Yunnan from Kwangsi Province. To this protest the French Government had responded that it was impossible to tell the difference between a small number of Chinese soldiers dressed in civilian clothes and ordinary civilians, that the French Government could not keep Chinese from crossing the area in question and that in any case it was not obligated to keep even Chinese soldiers from doing so since war had not been declared. However, the Japanese held to their view, insisting that something be done about it.

In Hoppenot's opinion the changing attitude of the Japanese and events which have recently taken place in Europe bear a definite relation to one another. Both the French and the British have noticed that the attitude of the Japanese in the Far East and the attitude of the Germans in Central Europe appeared to be synchronized

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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-4-

chronized during the month of September. In reply to an inquiry from the Chargé d'Affaires whether the invasion of South China by the Japanese would endanger French interests, Hoppenot expressed the fear that the Japanese might seize the Island of Hainan and also that there might be trouble at Canton in regard to the French Concession there. Hoppenot said, in reply to an inquiry on the subject from the Chargé d'Affaires, that the French Government would protest if the Japanese seized Hainan but that certainly France would not go to war with Japan over this island. Hoppenot declared that it was his belief that the only way that the Far Eastern situation might be kept from steady deterioration would be for the United States to tell Japan in strong terms its views with regard to the necessity for reasonable behavior on the part of the Japanese.

The Japanese have been considering for some time the invasion of South China which began with the landing of troops at Bias Bay. The Foreign Office has opposed this invasion because of a fear of involvement with foreign powers, although the Japanese Navy has always desired to make this move. The Navy had its way when Ugaki resigned as Minister for Foreign Affairs and the influence of the Foreign Office declined.

It is Hoppenot's belief that, in order to attain what he thinks is their first objective - to sever the  
 railway

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

railway in the area north of Kowloon - the Japanese will land soldiers on the east bank of the Canton River in addition to the 35,000 troops which have arrived at Bias Bay and which should be able to cut the railway. After the railway has been cut, Hoppenot anticipates that an attack will be made upon Canton for which purpose a very much larger force will be required, although he is in possession of information to the effect that recently the best troops stationed at Canton were transferred to the north and that the Chinese military authorities are not enthusiastic about defending the city strongly. In order to avoid the difficulties which would be attendant upon approaching Canton overland through the lake and mountain areas the Japanese will, in Hoppenot's opinion, send their troops up the Canton River on boats. He also expressed the opinion that although the Japanese will be able to cut off the shipment of supplies from Hong Kong to Hankow and to obtain their other objectives, this will not greatly affect the final outcome of the conflict. He thinks that the Japanese contemplate the establishment in Kwangtung Province of an autonomous government.

793.94/14061.

*eg.c.*  
 FE:EDG:JPS  
 10-15

*HEP*  
 FE  
*Heard*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Swatow NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

FROM

PLAIN

Swatow via N.R.

Dated October 13, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m., 14th.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND C.I.O.

Secretary of State,


Washington.

October 13, 4 p.m.

Three air raids by single bombing planes dropped total  
of three bombs near railway station small damage reported.  
Jap vessels outside harbor, ten transports, two cruisers and  
one destroyer. No (repeat no) troop landings effected.

YOUNG

WWC




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F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED



...  
MJD  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone.

FROM

USS ASHEVILLE (*Chinwang tao*)  
October 14, 1938.  
Rec'd. 7 a. m.

Action: Cincaf

Info : Comsopat

Passed to Navy Department Fourth Marines for info

0013. Six Japanese transports departed today  
fully loaded with troops landing boats and field  
equipment. 2120

WC

793.94

793.94/14063

OCT 17 1938  
FILED

F/FG



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
FROM COMSOPAT

October 14, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: RUSNOS, COMSUBRON 5  
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS ASHEVILLE  
USS SACRAMENTO  
USS TULSA  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
USS PEARY  
USS PILLSBURY  
FOURTH MARINES

793.94



0013. On twelfth one hundred thirty planes in attacks over Kwangtung with about five hundred civilian casualties. Shelling of coast near Swatow continued during day. Three destroyers, one cruiser and ten transports departed headed south. On thirteenth advance from Bias Bay of about ten miles made to vicinity Tamshui where fighting now in progress, troops equipment and supplies continue to be landed. One hundred thirty-eight planes raided both railroads and a number of places in Kwangtung with concentration of Waichow planes also supported the advance 2330.

WWC

793.94/14064

F/F G

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

FROM

PLAIN

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.


FOURTH MARINES

October 14, 1938.

Rec'd 8:15 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF OPNAV

INFO: RUSNO AMCON SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON 5  
AST ALUSNA PEIPING  
COMDESRON 5  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA  
STASHIP SHANGHAI  
ALUSNA PEIPING



793.94  
8614 Jap forces driving on Canton occupied Tamshui  
about seven miles inland from Bias Bay located twenty-three  
miles from Canton-Kowloon Railway. Situation central China  
unchanged. 1838.

V/WC

793.94/14065

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 894.00 P/R./129 FOR Despatch #3245

FROM Japan ( Grew ) DATED Sept. 20, 1938  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations: Report concerning-, for  
month of August, 1938.

aa

793.94 / 14066

14066

193-94  
12-15  
(a) China.

1. Military Operations.

Military operations during the month under review were largely devoted to two main areas: the first and most important was that involved in the drive toward Hankow, the second was that covered by the Japanese forces pushing toward the Yellow River in southwest Shensi. In addition there were the activities of the air force in bombing operations in South China, and the continued efforts to "mop up" the guerrillas active in all parts of China behind the front lines.

Operations along the south bank of the Yangtze River were for the most part devoted to consolidation and preparation for the attack which began about August 23. Intense heat added to the difficulties and the "died of disease" notices in the casualty lists published in Japan seemed to be increasing. The Chinese offered stubborn resistance to the Japanese drive which turned southward toward Teian. This movement was probably designed to prevent a later attack, after the Japanese have moved on Hankow, by the Chinese from that direction.

On the north bank of the Yangtze River the Japanese forces continued a frontal attack, pushing up the valley toward Hankow. Land operations followed closely the Navy's operations in clearing the river. There was close cooperation between the two services. An interesting development was the concentration of Japanese forces at Luchow indicating, as reported in the press on August 23, a probable advance over the mountains toward Hankow. This would indicate a possibility of four lines aiming towards Hankow, the first from the south bank of the Yangtze which would proceed after taking adequate precautions to prevent a flank attack by the Chinese from the south. Second, a direct push up the north bank of the Yangtze, the third, an attack either directly across the mountains between Luchow and Hankow or skirting the mountains to the north and proceeding down the railway to Hankow or toward the south and joining the forces proceeding

- 14 -

along the north bank of the Yangtze. The last probable line of attack would come from the forces in southwest Shansi crossing the Yellow River and proceeding southward along the railway toward Hankow.

In Shansi Province the Japanese forces astride the Tatung-Puchow railway continued pushing Chinese forces in Southwest Shansi slowing back to the Yellow River. While the Japanese troops had reached the Yellow River they did not effect a crossing but were a definite threat to the Lunghai Railway on the opposite bank and to the Chinese connection with Soviet supplies by means of this railway.

Guerrilla activities became more effective and called for increasing thousands of combat troops to maintain the communication and supply network behind the advancing lines. In Chahar Province serious defeats inflicted on the Chinese forces were reported in the press on August 4 and August 17.

During the first seventeen days of August some seventy encounters with Chinese irregulars attempting to interrupt the Pinghan and Tsinpu railway lines were reported in Hopei Province. The local press on August 12 reported a bold attack on Tsinan itself. This encounter was said to have required more than a day of fighting before the irregulars were driven off. In Kiangsu Province in many instances the guerrillas were the aggressors and "bandits" were even reported very near Wuhu and Nanking. There were also outbreaks at Hangchow, Tengchow, and Jukao. The greatest problem remains guerrilla warfare. In spite of continued "mopping up" campaigns, it is estimated that there are approximately 300,000 still to be "liquidated" in Hopei, Shansi, and Shantung alone.\*

2.

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\* Data for this section supplied by the Military Attaché.

-15-

## 2. Air Activities.

The Army planes, except for a raid on Hankow on August 21, seemed to be devoting their efforts to support of the ground troops in their Yangtze Valley advance. The Navy's planes were unusually active in bombing arterial railways in South China and the defenses of Hankow and Canton.

## 3. Relations with the Occupied Areas.

It was reported to the press on August 6 that the South Manchurian Railway Company will take over control of coal mining and marketing in Shantung Province. It was also stated that it has not yet been decided whether the entire industry will be operated by a single company or by separate concerns, but that in the meantime all Japanese and Chinese coal mining interests in the province will be placed under this company.

A news despatch from Tientsin dated August 5 stated that a general "link system" for exports from North China has been decided upon in order to promote foreign trade for that region with countries other than Japan.

During the middle part of the month of August the East Asia Agricultural and Forestry Council held a three day session at the official residence of the Agriculture and Forestry Minister; and on August 18 there was announced in the local press an agrarian policy for Japan and occupied areas in China adopted by this Council. This policy included plans for rice, wheat, cattle raising, forestry and sericulture and covered all of the areas under Japanese domination from Karafuto to Central China.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 890.00/114 FOR Memorandum  
State Department  
Far Eastern Division  
FROM Penfield DATED Oct 8, 1938.  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: The situation in the Far East; Sino-Japanese relations.  
Developments of the past week.

793.94/14067

FRG.

14067

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

GRAY

FROM PEIPING VIA N.R.

Dated October 13, 1938

Received 3:48 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

620, October 13, 1 p.m.

Embassy's 535, September 1, 4 p.m.

One. Japanese announced plans to effect a crossing of the Yellow River from South Shansi into Shensi or Honan have not yet succeeded, notwithstanding heavy artillery bombardment over a long period, of Tungkuan, Shensi (opposite Fenglingtu, extreme South Shansi which the Japanese captured August 28) and Mengtsin, Honan (southwest of Menghuang which was captured by Japanese September 13). Consequently Japanese forces in South Shansi have been unable to attain either of their objectives of (a) joining in the offensive against Hankow and (b) proceeding against Sian to cut the channel of supplies from Soviet Russia through Sinkiang.

Two. In western Shansi Japanese unit reportedly reached on September 15 <sup>Liulin Chen</sup> ~~Liulin~~, near the Yellow River west of Lishih and another unit operated in the latter part of the month near east Tsikowchen, not far from the river and 35 miles north of Liulin Chen. In east central Shansi Japanese forces captured



793.94/14068

F/FG

WAB  
4/24/39



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 620, October 13, 1 p.m., from Peiping.

captured on October 2 the town of Wutai (about 80 miles northwest of Taiyuan and said to be a headquarters of Eighth Route Army forces) and, according to a Japanese military spokesman here, Japanese units are now investing the fortified nearby hill of that name.

Three. Repeated to Chungking, Hankow, Shanghai by mail to Tokyo.

SALISBURY

TWC

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

A portion of this telegram must Canton via N.R.  
be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

FROM Dated October 14, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

October 14, 2 p.m.

On the afternoon of the twelfth, I telegraphed U.S.S.

MINDANAO at Hong Kong recommending immediate return to Canton and she arrived Canton 4 p.m., thirteenth. Pearl River was closed at 7 p.m. same day.

Following persons also left for Hong Kong ~~September~~ <sup>October</sup> 13:  
(PLAIN) L. K. Little en route to United States, Mrs. Theodore D. Stevenson and two children, Mrs. W. E. Macdonald (END PLAIN).

I have been informed officially but confidentially as follows: General Li Chai Sum has been given command of the defense of Kwangtung. Yesterday the Japanese took Tamshui but the Chinese claim to have driven them out again and to have killed about one thousand.

Many Kwangsi troops have already been brought to the front and more are en route.

The Kwangtung Provincial Government has completed preparations for removal to the interior of the province. Many of the lower officials are leaving today but the high officials will remain at Canton for the present.

On

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WLB  
11/15/38

*Paraphrase*  
*in confidence*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 14 1938  
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- October 14, 2 p.m., from Canton.

On Canton-Hong Kong Railway, bridges at Wanglick and Sinchuen and various sections of track have been bombed and attacks by air are continuing; it is estimated that present damage could be repaired in a few days.

One hundred and seventeen Japanese airplanes in nineteen groups yesterday bombarded railways, highways and towns especially Tamshui, Waichow, Pingtam and Tsengcheng. A sugar mill was destroyed at Pingtam. Casualties were large, especially at Tamshui. (PLAIN)

The Mayor of Canton has published a notice advising women, children and old people to leave the city and move to safe places in the interior. (END PLAIN)

Sent to Chungking.

I LINNEL

PEQ

WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

ConfidentialP A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 14, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

On September 13 L. K. Little en route to United States, Mrs. Theodore D. Stevenson and two children, and Mrs. W. E. Macdonald left for Hong Kong. The Mayor of Canton has published a notice advising women, children and old people to leave the city and move to safe places in the interior.

Arrangements have been made by the Kwangtung Provincial Government to move to the interior of the province. For the present time high officials will stay in Canton although a number of the lower officials are now leaving. At seven o'clock on the evening of October 13 the Pearl River was closed. At four o'clock on the afternoon of that day the U.S.S. Mindanao arrived at Canton from Hong Kong in response to a telegram sent the afternoon before by the American Consul General in which he recommended that the vessel return to Canton immediately.

On October 13 the highways and railways, Waichow, Tsengcheng, Pingtam, Tamshui and other towns were bombed by a fleet of 117 Japanese airplanes which were divided into 19 groups. There were a large number of casualties, especially

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

especially at Tamshui, and at Pingtam a sugar mill was destroyed. It is believed that only a few days would be required to repair the damage which has already been done to various parts of the track of the Canton-Hong Kong Railway and to bridges at Sinchuen and Wangliok.

Kwangsi troops are on their way to the front, a number having already arrived there, according to confidential official information received by the Consul General. The Consul General has received also official confidential information to the effect that the defense of Kwangtung Province has been placed under the command of General Li Chai-sum. Tamshui was captured by the Japanese on October 13 but according to Chinese statements they have again been expelled, losing about 1000 killed.

793.94/14069

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

This telegram must be \_\_\_\_\_ Tsingtao via N.R.  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (Br)

FROM Dated October 13, 1938

Rec'd 9:02 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

October 13, 3 p.m.

One. It is conjectured that division of troops referred  
to in paragraph one of my monthly telegraphic political re-  
view of October 3, 9 a.m. are part of those now being used  
in South China invasion and that the Japanese were awaiting  
advent of cooler weather before commencing Canton campaign.

Two. Missionary who has returned from interior journey  
impressed by the strong hold the Japanese have on the railway  
communications in Shantung, the improvement in railway opera-  
tion and the weakening of a hostile spirit among the masses  
who were weary of the unsettled state of affairs and longed  
for a settlement of some sort.

Sent to Chungking, Peiping. By air mail to Tokyo.

SOKOBIN

PEG

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence*

*File*  
DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 14 1938  
Department of State

793.94/14070

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 13, 1938, from the American Consul at Tsingtao reads substantially as follows:

Developments which impressed a missionary who has returned from a trip into the interior are that (a) operation of the railway has improved, (b) the antagonistic attitude of the mass of the people who are tired of the disturbed condition of affairs and desire some kind of a settlement is weakening and (c) the Japanese have a strong control of railway communications in Shantung Province.

It is surmised that the Japanese have been delaying their attack on Canton until the coming of cooler weather.

793.94/14070.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (Br)


FROM Hankow via N.R.

Dated October 13, 1938

Rec'd 6 a.m., 14th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*all paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence*



October 13, 11 a.m.

High Chinese military sources here believe that at  
least 80,000 Japanese troops are committed to the Bias Bay  
operation. Part of this force is said to be composed of one  
and one half divisions withdrawn from the Yangtze south  
bank offensive on this city.

This depletion of the invaders strength south of the  
river may explain to some extent the Chinese victory west  
of Tahan announced on October 1. The Chinese claim that  
two Japanese brigades were destroyed is believed to be ex-  
aggerated.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Canton.

JOSSELYN

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OCT 14 1938  
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

ConfidentialP A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 13, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

According to the Chinese, two brigades of Japanese were destroyed at the battle west of Tehan which was announced on October 1 as a victory for the Chinese. This Chinese claim in regard to the destruction of Japanese is believed to be an exaggeration.

It is reported that a division and a half of Japanese troops taken from those advancing on Hankow on the south bank of the Yangtze River are included in the force consigned to carry on operations at Bias Bay which, in the opinion of Chinese of high military rank, is to include not less than 80,000 Japanese troops.

The above mentioned Chinese victory west of Tehan may to some extent be explained by this weakening of the strength of the Japanese forces on the south bank of the river.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Tsingtao

Dated October 14, 1938

Rec'd 1:10 p.m.

793.94  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.


October 14, 2 p.m.

Reliably informed Pingtu in Shangtung where Baptist Mission was bombed by the Japanese in June has been occupied by Japanese forces who are now engaged in vigorous campaign against the guerrillas. Japanese are using Chinese mercenaries in this campaign.

Sent to Peiping, Chungking. By mail to Tokyo.

SOKOBIN

PEG



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

FROM

GRAY

Hong Kong

Dated October 14, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

October 14, noon.

There is reasonably reliable confirmation

in Hong Kong that Japanese are making good progress from Bias Bay and are now about halfway to the Kowloon-Canton Railway which is expected to be cut in the vicinity of Shumchun station not far from the colony frontier and at Cheung-Muktau further inland. Opinion here indicates that Chinese opposing forces are numerous but have not so far made a firm stand. Reported here that Chinese provincial and municipal governments are moving from Canton to Yangyuen. Both railway and river communication with Canton is suspended. No serious influx of refugees over colony frontiers has yet materialized. Police precautions are being taken to protect Japanese residents in Hong Kong but this office knows of no specific developments which make the procedure urgent.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- October 14, noon, from Hong Kong

urgent. There exist here strong rumors that Japanese forces of three cruisers and seven transports are about to land below Bocca Tigris between Chapin and Taichau bays but I have so far been unable to confirm this. No special excitement in Hong Kong although wind at times brings what seems to be sound of explosions from both north and south.

Repeated to Chungking and Canton.

SOUTHARD

PEG:WVC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

This message must be  
closely paraphrased <sup>FROM</sup>  
before being communicated  
to anyone. (Br)

Swatow via N. R.

Dated October 14, 1938

Rec'd 1:31 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 14, 4 p.m.

Three unsuccessful attempts to land Japanese

troops outside Swatow yesterday created great  
apprehension locally and the evacuation of women  
and children and aged estimated at ten thousand  
to interior points ordered by military authorities  
was carried out during the night. Naval vessels  
including transports anchored near the entrance of  
the harbor appeared to be prepared to enter on the  
next flood tide but at an early hour this morning  
all of them departed unexpectedly to take up po-  
sitions in the vicinity of Swabue where it is be-  
lieved attempts may be made to effect landing in  
conjunction with that one now in progress at Bias  
Bay. The city is quiet and no further hostilities  
are anticipated here in the near future unless re-  
verses elsewhere cause retaliation.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping.

YOUNG

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CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 14, 1938, from the American Consul at Swatow reads substantially as follows:

On October 13 it seemed that Japanese transports and other naval vessels which were at anchor near the entrance of the harbor of Swatow were ready to come into the harbor on the next high tide. However, early in the morning of October 14 all of these vessels left unexpectedly and stationed themselves near Swabue. It is thought that an effort may be made to land troops at Swabue in connection with the landing of troops now going on at Bias Bay. Great anxiety was caused in Swatow by the three unsuccessful attempts of these vessels to land troops and, by order of the military authorities, during the night of October 13 the evacuation to interior places of an estimated 10,000 inhabitants, consisting of old persons, women and children was carried out. Unless defeats in other places bring about retaliation no further hostilities are expected to take place in Swatow which is quiet at the present time.

793.94/14074.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

G-2  
ECONSEC

3-2/1057-1-139

October 7, 1938.



MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. Herewith are summary and Situation Map covering events in China for the period October 1-7.

2. The important events for this period have been:

a. Japanese capture of north and south bank defenses of the Tienchiachen river barrier (85 miles southeast of Hankow) and penetration of Chinese lines about 30 miles east of Teian (south of Kiukiang), with little change in other sectors of the Yangtze valley front.

b. Japanese occupation of Wutaishan in northeastern Shansi, long a base for Chinese guerrilla operations.

c. Reports of a Japanese convoy consisting of 15 warships and 38 transports the south China coast confirming reports of probable action in South China.

d. Trial balloon emanating from Berlin citing the "four Munich powers" aided by the United States, as possible mediators in the Sino-Japanese conflict after the fall of Hankow.

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OCT 15 1938

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2 encls.  
ml

E. K. W. McCABE,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

G-2 Digest of Information  
Sino-Japanese Situation  
October 1-7, 1938

1938

L. H. Johnson Mar 19,  
1973

MISCELLANEOUS

Reports from Tokyo state that Prince Konoys has taken over the portfolios of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Affairs vacated by General Ugaki. Mr. Saito, now Ambassador at Washington, will be recalled to Japan because of ill health and will be replaced by Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kensuke Horinouchi. Renzo Sawada, former Counsellor of Embassy at Peking, will become Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Dr. Hu Shih, newly appointed Chinese Ambassador, arrived in Washington on October 6.

With reference to the League action in applying Section XVI of the Covenant to Japan, a Tokyo spokesman announced that Japan would take prompt retaliatory measures against any nation that applied sanctions. Reports from Tokyo state that the Polish Ambassador assured the Japanese Government that Poland would not enforce sanctions against Japan. Recent Warsaw dispatches reported that Japan had assured Poland of Japanese support in Poland's demands for the cession of the Teschen area in Czechoslovakia.

A significant press dispatch from Berlin dated October 5 states that the "four Munich powers" are now making "soundings" toward mediation in the present Sino-Japanese war when a favorable opportunity, such as the fall of Hankow, presents itself. The impetus for this move appears to originate in Germany. It is hoped that England will be able to sound out China, and that Germany through her "close contact with Tokyo" will be able to bring Japan into the frame of mind for mediation. The dispatch states that if the "four Munich powers" aided by the United States "whose influence with both Chinese and Japanese is great" were to make an effort at mediation at the proper time, it would be difficult for the two warring nations to fail to cooperate in the effort.

Indicative of the close tie between the Japanese military and Germany is a telegram sent by Minister of War Itagaki direct to Hitler congratulating him on the German successes in the Czechoslovakian issues. Other members of the Japanese Cabinet sent felicitations on the peaceful solution to all the powers involved, including Czechoslovakia.

**NORTH CHINA THEATER**

Japanese reports from Peiping state that their forces on October 4 occupied Wutaishan, a holy mountain in northeast Shansi, long a base for the Chinese 8th Route Army (ex-communist). The Chinese forces withdrew intact to the northeast. Further Japanese claims state that

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four columns are converging on the retreating Chinese in the Wutaishan area.

About one division of Japanese troops embarked at Tsingtao during the early part of this week and departed for the south under naval convoy. Additional troops are being assembled from the interior and it is expected that these too will be sent south.

Japanese are reported to be taking elaborate precautions to prevent alleged planned destruction of important Japanese properties in Peiping and Tientsin by fire. Incendiarism by Chinese Blue Shirts is reported in Peiping and Tientsin.

#### CENTRAL CHINA THEATER

On the Yangtze River Japanese forces succeeded in capturing Tienchiachen on the north bank on September 30 and the Peipaishan forts on the south bank on October 5, giving them control of the river barriers at that point. Chinese admit the loss of these points and state that while minesweepers are now working along the barrier, no Japanese vessels have been able to cross up river as yet. At least three more substantial river barriers are reported between Tienchiachen and Hankow.

South of the river Japanese forces claim to have reached Loki (15 miles northwest of Wuning) on October 5. According to Japanese claims they are now in a position to outflank Teian (30 miles east of Loki) where strong Chinese defenses had been holding up the Japanese advance toward Nanchang for a month.

West of Juichang (on the south side of the river) the Japanese have advanced a short distance toward Yangsin against stubborn Chinese resistance. There is little change in the situation in the other sectors of the Central China front.

Japanese aircraft have been active strafing Chinese positions in Central China. Chungking and Lianghsiang (115 miles northeast of Chungking) were bombed on October 4. This is the first raid on Chungking since the start of the war. Chinese aircraft were reported in action on the Loshan front and at Tienchiachen but little important damage by either side is reported.

Chinese claim that Japanese losses on the Yangtze fronts during August and September total 80,000. While our Military Attache believes these figures to be high, it is known that 25,000 Japanese replacements arrived at Kiukiang September 14-18 and that malaria and dysentery are taking heavy toll on both sides. Japanese on the other hand claim that 30,000 Chinese were killed in the two weeks preceding the fall of Tienchiachen.

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At Shanghai, Chen Lo, foreign minister of the puppet Central China regime, protested to the French Ambassador against French defenses constructed on Chinese territory in Sincaw and Hungjao near the French Concession. The local Japanese press reports that Japanese authorities will also protest this action. These defenses are believed to have been erected because of fear of Japanese action during the European crisis.

SOUTH CHINA THEATER

Japanese aircraft continued their operations against South China railways and important centers, but little damage was reported. The Japanese appear to have abandoned Saichow Island as a base for air operations. Recent raids have come from the direction of St. John Island west of Hongkong.

According to Chinese reports a Japanese convoy consisting of about 15 warships and 38 transports was sighted off Foochow. With the exception of three of these vessels which sailed toward Amoy, the entire convoy is reported to be moving toward Formosa. Foreign observers in South China now anticipate a Japanese expedition against Canton, and state that the city can be taken within two months. Chinese too expect an attack on South China, probably via Bias Bay or Honghai Bay, then to Baiyeung (85 miles east of Canton) but suspect the effort to be merely a ruse to draw troops from the Hankow defenses.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF  
STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 7, 1938.

~~TOP~~  
~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FORN DISSEM~~  
~~NO RELEASE~~

The attached issue No. 11 of the China Information Service contains mostly well known types of pro-Chinese propaganda in regard to Japanese bombing and other atrocities, the heroic efforts of missionaries and their Chinese staffs to shoulder the tremendous burden of relief work put upon them, guerrilla successes, boycott progress, sanctions against Japan, etcetera.

793-94 Of moderate interest are:

First Article (page 1), in which the State Department is bitterly arraigned for (1) attempting to clean missionaries out of China and thereby ruining American prestige and decades of fine work; (2) encouraging Japanese attacks on missions by "broadcasting" (instead of quietly advising) missionaries that they remained at their own risk; (3) creating chaos and wars among Far Eastern peoples for the past 56 years by deceiving them with fictions of policies which they find in a pinch we will not support.

Second Article (page 3), in which a missionary in Anhwei describes hard experiences under Japanese bombing and military occupation, the fairly decent treatment of her mission by the Japanese in contrast to their atrocities against Chinese civilians (which seem milder than at Nanking, however).

Eleventh Article (page 21), wherein the Chinese Consul General at New York pleads for America to assist China by sanctions and reiteration of its stand against aggression.

E. Chase

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHINA INFORMATION SERVICE, Issue No. 11, September 15, 1938.

EDITORS

Frank W. Price,  
Washington, D. C.

Harry B. Price,  
8 West 40th Street,  
New York City

CHINA INFORMATION SERVICE  
945 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.  
Washington, D.C.

ISSUE ELEVEN  
September 15, 1938

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EDITORS

Earl H. Leaf  
33 West 55th Street  
New York City

SECRETARY  
Helen M. Loomis,  
Washington, D. C.

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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

Non-Participation in Aggression As a National Policy  
Address by Dr. Tusne-Chi Yu

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THE PATHOS OF PACIFISM AND THE WAR CREATED BY MORAL INERTIA

When Pershing landed on the French shore during the World War, it is said that his first words were: "Lafayette, we are here." He thus expressed America's gratitude to one who dedicated himself to the cause of the American revolution at a time when the colonies were subjected to foreign invasion.

It has been long recognized by the American Government that the American missionaries in China are America's Lafayettes in that land, dedicated to her welfare, representing American friendship and therefore assets of great value. I recall Consul-General Goodnow's testimony shortly after I arrived as a missionary in China in the year 1898. He said that President McKinley had especially enjoined upon him consideration for and protection of missionary work in China since the work that they had done for somewhat less than a century and the sympathies that they had created between the citizens of America and the Chinese people were of extreme importance. During the World War when American missionaries raised the question as to whether they should drop their work in China and take charge of coolie labour corps in France, President Wilson's answer was that the best thing that American missionaries could do was to stay at their tasks in China, promoting American sympathy and prestige in a nation of great significance in international relationships.

But when China is at last invaded, our consular officials all along the coast, in obedience to orders from the State Department, brought continuous pressure for over a month on American missionaries to leave the country. In other words, they said to each of us: "Lafayette, get out." It was only later that the State Department relaxed its prohibitions due to consultation with mission boards. The work of a century and a quarter, the use of millions of dollars worth of property as instruments of humanitarian service to the Chinese, the aid given to hundreds of thousands of Chinese by missionaries acting as distributing agents for the International Red Cross and the British Relief Fund would have been frustrated, gratitude and sympathy would have been destroyed, American prestige would have become non-existent and a moral and political tragedy of the first rank would have been effected. It was even publicly announced by the President of the United States that missionaries must stay at their posts in the interior at their own risks. No one knows this better than the missionary. If he is to be told, it should be by private advice from his consul, but the broadcasting of this admonition by the American President is an admission of weakness and an invitation to the invader to take more liberties than he would otherwise dare to take with the result that consular protection certificates on American property in the interior have almost universally been worthless and Japanese soldiers have torn them down from the gates where they were posted. The fall in American and also in British prestige is so serious that it is my opinion that the great majority both in missionary and in business circles are ashamed inwardly of being the nationals of these two countries, altho' they hesitate to make this admission outwardly.

The purpose of America's Far Eastern treaties is the same as that of the Monroe Doctrine, which has been to secure the territorial integrity and political autonomy of the continent or nation concerned. As an American admiral said to me not long ago, "I do not believe in our country making a treaty which it does not mean to support." Because of the Monroe Doctrine European powers have known that invasion of any of the South American republics meant war with the United States. Because we intended to support this doctrine by force, war has been

avoided and the South American republics have been free to work out their political destiny in peace.

In our Far East policies, ever since our first treaty with Korea in which we promised our "good offices in case any power dealt oppressively or unjustly with the Korean Government", the case has been just the opposite. Evidently we have never intended to support these treaties by force and the result has been a series of violations and invasions from which the South American republics have been free.

After the Hay treaty was formulated under American sponsorship and initiative, the Russians began pouring their troops into Manchuria in direct violation of this treaty. The American Government was not concerned enough even to initiate an international protest from the signatories of this treaty, still less to secure international action to enforce it. The result was the Sino-Japanese war. If we had then stood by Japan in her fear of Russian aggression, we might have saved her from her subsequent broadening road to a militarist policy. Our inaction has been largely responsible for the militarist policy of Japan. It was to Japan's credit that she restored Manchuria to China, did not keep it for herself, and only claimed the rights which Russia had already secured in Manchuria. But Japan had been taught that America's high-sounding policies in the Far East were but shadows of a pious hope without the will to support this hope. We have unnecessarily irritated Japan's pride with respect to the immigration question.

We have formed further treaties protecting the integrity of China. But in the present war we have made no distinction between the invader and the invaded. The result has been that in spite of our avowed aims for the promotion of peace in the Orient in treaties formulated during a period of 56 years, we have basely repudiated these treaties, we have been disloyal both to Japan and to China and the result is that a great race of industrious, peace-loving people has been driven from its homes and starved and murdered by the wholesale.

The "Police of Humanity" stand by with arms folded and discuss the blessings of peace while this carnage goes on. When police discuss pacifism one naturally suspects their motives. As a missionary I would say what any American missionary would say in Japan should Japan be invaded by a foreign power. Our sympathies in such case would be with Japan, and against the aggressor and the invader. Therefore it is my belief that the very least that the League of Nations can do is to meet affirmatively and sympathetically the demands made by China at the last League Council meeting in May, 1938. These demands have been considerably moderated as far as the requirements of the original League Covenant is concerned. I believe it would be a blessing to the people of Japan as well as to the people of China to bring to fruition through outside aid China's efforts to defend her own soil. I see no prospects of peace even in a thoroughgoing Japanese victory. The soul of this people will continue to revolt against a strong foreign domination and will continue for years-to-come a struggle of intolerable expense to themselves and to the Japanese people. Human wealth, human welfare are preserved and promoted by developing that sense of security and spontaneous, indigenous effort which is the natural and inevitable right of the Chinese as well as of the Japanese.

Robert F. Fitch.

RFF/ep  
13.7.38

TRIALS OF A MISSIONARY

Woman Living In City Occupied By Japanese Describes Experiences

Diplomacy Alone Succeeds With Conquerors;  
Foreigners Protect Fearful Refugees,  
Humor And Entertain Soldiers

Old Jazz Tunes Heard By Japanese

Somewhere in the Anhwei war zone Japanese soldiers are being entertained by a 50-year-old foreign missionary woman pianist whose limited repertoire includes "I Wonder if They're thinking of Me at Home," "I've Been Working on the Railroad" and similar out-moded songs. Another missionary in writing about events in the unnamed town now occupied by Japanese says: "I have just been relieving at her house, and I wish you could hear the jazzy selections she picked out to play for them. It sounded like a third rate cabaret for shure."

The following smuggled notes from the diary of one of the American woman missionaries now serving as a night nurse in a hospital in her city giving any interesting insight into life in occupied areas where foreigners have been permitted to remain. For some unknown reason, the writer refers to the Japanese as "sun," "sunbeams" and "sunshine". The following notes have reached Shanghai by a round-about way, the last entries in her diary having been made on February 10:

Japanese Approach

Today, February; we hear that the sun has risen almost to our neighboring city, so the rest of the men's hospital staff resigned--three men (also two doctors) and one girl. They almost persuaded the other little girl nurse to go too, but Bob dissuaded them. The head nurse was having his vacation, but we soon hauled him back on duty. That left him and the one woman nurse to take care of a raft of seriously sick men, and I decided to do night duty myself.

Coming off night duty February sort of tired and sleepy, I crawled into bed and went to sleep. Pretty soon I heard planes, but I can't be bothered with those, so I decided not even to wake up. About 11:00 p.m. I heard a noise I have never heard before--lots of explosions, but the building did not shake and rattle. We were being bombed! I did not quite realize it, but was crawling out of bed on general principles when the old servant dashed up and said the Chinese equivalent of "Missy, the planes have come, You come to the dugout, quick-quick, quick-quick," I was not quite so excited as he, so I stopped to put on my fur coat over my bathrobe and nightgown.

In the dugout were the doctor, the nurse, the cute Chinese interne, and an adorable Chinese girl who has been adopted by some American missionary, besides the old servant. The other end of the city was being bombed, and we counted nineteen or twenty bombs as they exploded. Later we found shell fragments in the garden of the Women's Hospital. By the way, it occurred just as the boat was leaving with all our departing staff on it. The minute the planes left, I grabbed some clothes and went to the hospitals. Everyone was much excited, but O. K. They

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apparently had used small bombs, as we had none of the rattling which we got previously, when our neighboring city was bombed.

#### Terrible Sights

Then the wounded began to pour in! Lordy, what sights we saw; The doctor and I and all the doctors and nurses from the Women's Hospital pitched in and were busy for several hours. In comparison with what other places have had, our little bombing was a mere drop in the bucket, but it was enough for me. There was absolutely nothing here to interest our visitors. Although previously we have had thousands of soldiers here, all had gone weeks ago, leaving only the few who in peace time are stationed here for guard duty. With the exception of one or two, the people who were caught by the bombs--and horribly maimed-- were all innocent, peace-loving, minding - their - own - business citizens.

That afternoon witnessed another wholesale exodus of a large proportion of the remaining citizens. I'd give anything if I could describe it to you--it's amusing, but just plain pathetic! People trudging along with their few possessions slung over their shoulders, and going no place in particular--just away." Another huge crowd decided that hospital compounds were sort of charmed, and began moving in bag and baggage. People who themselves didn't plan to stay thought that it was good safe place for their possessions. There was a regular stream of men filing in with boxes and bundles on their shoulders, until we put a stop to it.

#### "Sun" in Vicinity

It is February 3, Last night we had word that the sun had risen on our neighboring city, and we don't know whether it was Chinese or Japanese who burned it last night. Today, about noon, the first little rays of sunshine shone on us - although otherwise it was cold, gloomy day - and later more came. There was absolutely no righting--they just walked in and took possession. We heard that they were here, so three of us decided to walk down the street and "see what we could see." We met several, who looked at us (and we at them) but didn't offer to stop us. They were going from door to door, trying the ones which were locked (plenty, as a huge percent of the population had fled) and searching the places which were open. They must make a pretense of searching, you know!

All the way up and down the street were people with their nice, warm quilts slung over their shoulders, which they had been ordered to carry to the quarters of the new arrivals. A little later instead of quilts, it was chickens--nice, fat chickens which the people had probably bought up for their New Year season! O, Well, sunbeams must eat, you know! They hadn't been in town more than an hour when we heard that one man was a little slow about carting his bedding and food to the new headquarters, so they just him dead.

#### Entered Hospital

When they started to enter the hospital compound, of course, the doctor was sent for post haste. I don't know what language he talked to convince them they didn't want to enter. They really were very polite--to him. I am certain that we foreigners won't be molested--my huge, big hope is that we can save our Chinese staff and friends from being shot down. There are a number of mighty



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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good-looking and well-educated young men in our compounds, and I am scared silly to think of what might happen to them.

In the school compounds (schools were closed a couple of months ago) are quartered hundreds of refugees. Poor things--they are packed in tighter than sardines, they and their bedding and a wild assortment of food. There are little dinky stoves all over the place and everything is in confusion. Many are local people; many are from nearby places. And I am wondering just what the food situation will be shortly. Maybe being sort of off the beaten path, as it were, the country people will still be able to come in with their vegetables, chickens, etc.

February 8

I guess we are in the war for sure now, although to date there has been no fighting here. However, tonight's radio report says that the sunbeams are driving toward us, and that at present they had made their headquarters here. Well, we all know they are here, although I have been sleeping days and have not contacted them as the others have. Each one of us, except me, has a special place to watch and try to protect. One of us is down at the Boy's School, where there are about 1500 refugees. She is farthest away and has the most interesting experiences. She has some tea up in her office and entertains the various groups of sunbeams which come to call. She has quite nice visits with some of them. Occasionally one knows a word or two of English and usually they can write Chinese, even though we have discovered only one or two who can speak it. So they keep their notebooks handy and carry on written conversations.

Some of the soldiers object to "staying put" in the office and want to look around, much to the terror of the refugees. As far as I know, they have not taken any food or bedding from the camp, but one nearly did drag away a good-looking girl. The missionary teacher arrived on the scene just in time to say "No," very emphatically, and keep on saying it for about 15 minutes, when he finally decided to leave without the girl. But plenty more in the town weren't so fortunate, and after the first day the sunbeams arrived hundreds of people flocked into our compounds for protection. A little group got to our compound and were just making arrangements to live there a while, when one of the brothers rushed up saying, "the soldiers have already got my sister." One of us went back with him and found the girl hiding in some hut with a soldier standing guard outside to prevent her escape. In she walked, took her by the hand and said, "come along with me," and got by with it!

Nightmare At First

The first day they were here was a nightmare for everybody--but me, who slept soundly. Little groups came around all day long and wanted to see our places. We had to take them through, and pretend that we were thrilled to go pieces. They were not always very polite, especially one we have dubbed "Fiercy". One took a quilt, flash-light, food, and money from one of the missionaries. Another marched her around the dugout at the point of his big, long gun--stuck into her back. Two of the visitors were doctors, and were so thrilled with the hospitals that they immediately brought three of their wounded men in. We spent all of one day trying to pull one brute through--so that he could go out and kill more Chinese. He died, though. The sunbeams are prone to deny that they have lost any men, so we know for certain of one who was killed.

February 10 and it seems that when I boarded the little "Roseville" and set sail for this land, I got myself into a war; I cannot say that we Americans have suffered, except occasionally, perhaps, for a little sleep. We have plenty to eat and have more or less pleasant contacts with the sunbeams, and are ourselves in no danger that we know of. There are five refugee camps and seven of us. That leaves one of us on deck in each camp at all times, with the doctor and me extra to circulate as needed.

#### Sight-Seeing

Have nothing else to do with their spare time, the sunbeams come sight-seeing. There are absolutely nothing here to see excepting our institutions. We have hordes and hordes of sight-seers-good, bad and indifferent. Some obediently go where you take them; some indicate that they would like to pry behind some closed door, others desist when you wave your hand and say "No". Some go regardless of all you say or do. At the door of the Women's Hospital we tell them that this place is not open to visitors (mostly in sign language, but sometimes written in Chinese. Very few understand either English or Chinese, but there seems to be enough likeness in the written languages to get the ideas across); but that they may visit the Men's Hospital across the street. In the Men's Hospital we tell them we would rather they didn't go into the wards where the patients are, but come upstairs and we will show them the X-ray rooms, etc.

Most of them are like great big college kids out on a lark. We joke together and I flirt as I have never flirted before. We write our names for each other in our little books, which we carry, and everyone else is just grand. Occasionally one will know some English, then one of us asks if there is not some way in which we can contact the major to arrange for food for the refugees. So far we have not met the gentleman! However, we know his name, and occasionally, if we use his name in a string of otherwise unintelligible conversation, we succeed in keeping out some of the visitors.

#### Missionary Entertains

In one house there is a pinao, and a few times the missionary living there has been roped in to entertain them. According to her own admission, she plays very little, and she was struggling through the simplest thing she could find, and trying to sing to them (she is about fifty), when she happened to notice the name of her selection. It was "I wonder if They're Thinking of Me at Home!" Yesterday her selection was "I have been Working on the Railroad." Another invites them in and gives them tea to drink, let them smoke cigars while they are doing it (!!) and plays on the phonograph for them.

Really, most of the men are just nice as they can be! I like to think that they are here because they have been told to come, and really don't know any better than to believe all the reasons they have been taught why this war must be fought. Many of them say, "We are not fighting the Chinese people; we are just fighting Communism." Occasionally some will say, "We want to protect the Chinese people." Yesterday some came with a proclamation saying that peace and prosperity must prevail, therefore the merchants must reopen their shops and the farmers go on with their planting.

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#### Many People Shot

And along with all this, great numbers of our citizens have been either shot or stabbed to death for no better reason than that they were a little slow to open up a door, or to carry some load. Perhaps they attempted to resist an attack on their wife or daughter, or maybe, even, they were only innocent passers-by who chanced to come down the street in time to witness an attack upon some woman right out in the open! Or, perhaps, they had some scar which might possibly prove (?) that they had been a soldier--sometimes the only scar needed for such proof is a vaccination mark!--or maybe their offense was that they were unable to find someone whom our sunbeams were seeking.

One old woman and her husband had been working for them. The husband made an escape and, when we saw them, a couple of sunbeams had the woman in tow tramping the streets searching for him. She seemed unconcerned enough as they went around from place to place, but pretty soon we heard a shot down the street--so now she does not work for them any more. They publish to the world that they are protecting the Chinese people, and maybe the ones who say it think they are. But I would like to know how they account for all the dead!

#### Another Funny Thing

Another funny thing happened yesterday! A group of "high-ups" came to call--a couple of doctors, a couple of reporters, very interesting young men who spoke English pretty well, a raft of soldiers to guard them, and a few others, who apparently were officers. We had nice visits, showing them whatever they wanted to use of the hospital and talking a lot of shop with them (as much as our limited language would permit). They took some hastily dashed off notes to mail for us, drank our tea, and smoked in our chapel. All in all, we were on pretty good terms, and when they left they rather urged that we all go to round up some children, and we all posed for two pictures which the reporters took.

Now, the sequel to that will be that in as many papers as carry sunbeams news will be shown these pictures with captions something like this--"American missionaries Welcome - Army. Army Protecting Children."

#### Little Industries

There are now about 3,000 refugees packed into our compounds. It is so interesting! Many little industries have sprung up within our gates, and I just love to go around and watch. We have many grindstones (rescued one by one from various places in the city, while sunbeams backs were turned) for making flour. These are run by donkeys, cows, or people hitched to them. For awhile it was warm, but this last week it has been bitterly cold and we have had much rain and snow. What once were lovely lawns and gardens are now sloppy, filthy, huge mud puddles. Most of our beautiful houses and school buildings will have to be done over completely.

One day last week a section about a mile long in the business section of the city was set on fire. The country just north of here is filled with Chinese soldiers, who have succeeded in wiping out the "other side" who have succeeded in crossing the river. But the sunbeams decided they must destroy a section of the city, bordering on the river, in order to avoid giving the Chinese a foothold

for entering. So from mid-afternoon until the wee small hours of the morning we watched houses, stores (with provisions in them,) one of our churches, and what-not go up in flames.

#### Women Stand Strain

In the South Residence compound there are several hundred refugees. Helen is the 'face' for that gate. She has stood up well physically under the strain and long hours. In the girls' School compound there are about four hundred. Mabel is on duty there, at the Women's School are several hundred women and children.

Two compounds are now connected through the back of the neighbor's Ancestral Hall, and the Hall itself is being used as part of our refugee camp. Harriet is in charge of the Boys' School camp, where there are almost two thousand refugees. I have the women's Hospital. Besides the regular patients, staff and servants, we have some 60 refugees foreigners all sleep at our respective posts and usually the nights have been calm.

#### Babies Still Arrive

Except in the Hospital where babies still insist upon coming in the wee small hours, and often before their mothers are ready to welcome them. The first night I slept here a baby was born at the front gate of the hospital. A few nights later one was born outside my office door at midnight and two hours later I was awakened by a woman's cry for the doctor, and her baby came soon afterwards, while I kept her small son company. He was staying here with her. I had often heard of people walking the floor with distraught husbands, but never with a seven year old child, waiting for the mother to bear her fourteenth child.

Some times I watch both hospital gates and the one at our Inn, too. The doctor is a man of all works these days, which doesn't include much medical practice! It has been wonderful how the hospitals have been able to carry on and have the necessary supplies. Of course, our patients are much fewer and many can not pay. Several have become ardent Christians. Our electric lights still function. One morning we had early Japanese soldiers visiting us. They had heard the engine and thought it was gun fire! I might say that kala azar practice has decreased while our contraceptive practice has just begun. This service will not be too difficult for you to understand.

#### Women Molested

"No harm has come to any one within our compounds, but the Catholic Mission has not been so fortunate, and night visitors have harmed the women. Poor old priest, it is hard for him. We have found that patience, courtesy, and friendliness were absolutely the way to deal with the situation. Firmness has often been required! Harriet had one harrowing experience which ended all right due to her calmness and bravery. Bob and I both flew to help, but she had succeeded before we got there.

"Church for Christian refugees is held each Sunday morning at the Women's Chapel and evangelistic meetings with different groups as possible. The first two Sundays I had service in our parlor because it was not safe to go out, even the back way. Both times I escorted the preachers to the service while heavy guns boomed from the nearby mountains and big shells whistled over our heads. It was not so dangerous as it sounds because the shells were aimed at troops two or three miles away.

# MISSIONARIES AND THE WAR

By

ROBERT F. FITCH

Very recently a letter came to hand from a highly educated, wealthy, and prominent church worker in Pennsylvania in which she expressed her bewilderment over the present missionary situation in China. She urged the recipient of this letter to return to the States until after the war on the ground that there was "nothing to do" under prevailing circumstances but that perhaps some fresh work might be undertaken after the present war had ceased.

It is an interesting fact that Mr. Herbert Hoover, previous to his being president, after having raised 30,000,000 dollars from the American public for Red Cross relief in Russia made the acknowledgment that ninety-five per cent. of these funds came from the Christian Church of America, and yet in the minds of the general public the Church received no credit. The International Red Cross and the British Relief Fund have been using the widest possible publicity in advertising the present needs of China, but it is not sufficiently realized that when it comes to the use and distribution of these funds in hundreds of cities and villages throughout the country, the work must be largely done by the missionaries of both the Protestant and Catholic churches. Yet, the general public and even educated church workers in Christian lands still have the idea that there is nothing for missionaries to do and that they might as well retire to some more useful occupation in the home base. Just as I was preparing to write this article a friend came in from Hsu-chow where he had experienced nine months of almost continuous bombing. When the final turn-over came, the Government hospitals were suddenly closed, the Chinese doctors and their staffs in the fear that they together with their patients would be massacred by the invaders fled, leaving the patients without any care or attention. The result was that on the first day of the turn-over this friend in a Christian hospital with the Chinese staff that remained loyal to the institution had to take care of 175 cases of disabled soldiers of whom 170 had wounds filled with millions of maggots.

Another account, which has just come to me, tells of the brave conduct of General Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen who were the last to leave Hsu-chow. When their party arrived at Nan-hsu-chow the report was to the effect that the former "was a city devoid of life save for several missionaries still living in dug-outs." Perhaps it could be said of them that while they were waiting in these dug-outs for the turn-over to take place, "there was nothing for them to do," but in the weeks and months that preceded this period of dug-out inactivity as well as in the weeks and months that preceded this period of dug-out inactivity as well as in the time following it there has been an intensity of service which has almost broken the bodies of many strong men and women. A friend of mine was in one of these dug-outs during a period of active bombing, felt the ground around and beneath him heaving like the violent breathing of a human being and according to his testimony, though there was "nothing to do" for his hands and feet, yet he did some active and serious thinking.

I remember how in Hangchow just before the occupation when with 2,000 wounded soldiers in the city's Government hospitals, because of the fear of a general massacre the Government staffs fled. The wounded soldiers who could possibly get away were urged to do so, but 600 of them were suddenly put under the care of the

C.M.S. hospital there. Before the turn-over, full opportunity had been given to the staff, including some of the young nurses in training who were 16 and 17 years of age, to leave their positions, but the Chinese doctors and women to the last individual decided to remain, realising that if they did so they would obey the instructions of the superintendent requiring them during the period of bombing to stay by the bedside of the sick and wounded until the bombings were over unless in the meantime they were forcibly driven by explosions, incendiary or otherwise, from their posts of duty. During the half year between that time and the present they have toiled incessantly from early until late in a labour of love.

This is but one illustration of scores of hospitals in many parts of China where missionaries and their Chinese staffs have remained loyal to their sense of duty. One single woman who arrived in a city not far from Shanghai only two years ago and whose acquaintance with the language therefore must be somewhat limited, has given herself in a most heroic way to the needs of the city of her adoption. In one of her letters she told of robbing and looting, of the killing by the enraged populace of some Japanese soldiers and the burning of more than thousand houses. "Beggars are filling the city because so many people have been deprived of their homes and their possessions."

In the midst of these conditions, though not having been trained in medicine, she brought herself to give medical care as well as the care of a nurse to hundreds of victims, working so hard that her digestion was seriously affected and at times she could only drink hot water and had to go to bed for a few extra hours of rest.

It is a marvel that not more missionaries have been killed. It is almost beyond one's comprehension. Let me quote from another letter which I can testify reveals an experience which characterises the experiences of many others.

"What a day! Five heavy bombers flew over the city this morning at 10:30 a.m. and dropped bombs all the way from the East Gate to the West Gate. Fortunately our new bomb-proof shelter was completed and about sixty people took refuge in it. I was in the house with a demented girl about eighteen years of age, left to the care of the hospital as the servants had left her there alone. When the bombs began to fall they shook the whole house until I thought all the window panes would go. Three planes bombed from east to west. One bomb struck the temple on the way to East Gate, and killed the abbott and two priests.....The women's Centre was struck by two bombs, one just inside the front gate and another just at the back gate and is pretty much a wreck. Another bomb fell half way from the hospital to the well and wrecked two houses.....The whole hospital compound was filled with dust and papers.... On the street nearest us a whole family was killed around the table except two little children who were brought to the hospital. One had both legs taken off and died about noon, and the other had one foot all torn to pieces so it had to be amputated. A steady stream of wounded came into the hospital up to six o'clock to-night. Every bed downstairs is full and we treated no less than forty people. The courtyard and the dispensary were full with all hands helping. Old Chen Nai Nai who helped with baths at the Women's Centre was wounded in both arms and one leg and may not live until morning. The man I wanted to hire as a gardener was killed. The wounds are simply terrible and we have all been half sick....."

From another city, Sister A. writes: "If I live to be a hundred I will never forget last Sunday. I don't know how many were brought in. Many we were able to

treat and send away, and many had to go to the Hospital for first aid, terribly mutilated and broken. One died immediately after receiving attention, before we could get him to the Hospital. Besides the bombing there were so many I. S. No one will ever know how many deaths! The next day, Monday, at 7 a.m., many, many more were brought in, and on Tuesday it was the same. I have brought some pigs. We are doing many things we never expected to do, but this is War! ..... Many babies have been left here....."

Another writes these words: The most important thing is that we have been mercifully spared, and have at least been helpful in sheltering some 800 or more refugees, as well as keeping going this service for women and babies in the Convent here. Men are constantly impressed for labour, and women are far from safe on the streets by day, or in their homes at night .... One of our important jobs is convey work: helping people to find and bury their dead; taking sick people to the hospital or relatives to see their sick; keeping a watch on bucket lines twice a day, bringing water into the compound or taking nightsoil out; escorting twenty or more coolies with baskets to the coal yard to replenish our supply, and even driving in pigs to feed our multitude! Most of the Chinese leaders in the group have been most helpful. Men and women generally have been willing to turn a hand, whether in carrying water, or nightsoil, or bringing coal, rice or vegetables. To-day I had a squad of twenty out burying six men who had been killed by soldiers nearly three weeks ago. It's good the weather has been cold ....."

Still another writing from a well-known city, closes the description of a bombing raid with these words: "How we escaped with as small a casualty list as we did is more than can be explained except by divine intervention.

Some of our men have organized mobile units to serve wounded soldiers and transmit them from the front line to base hospitals, sometimes accompanying them for a week to ten days on the trains and playing the part of an older brother for them. Some of them have worked so hard, have so exhausted themselves in body and soul that they do not want to talk about those days of tragedy and of toil. But if they do seek release, it is only that they can secure a bit of rest in a place of peace, such as is enjoyed by most of the readers of this Journal, in order that they may return to those fields of labour to which they have dedicated themselves.

I must draw to a close with one more quotation which exhibits that inner fineness and courage of spirit which is worthy of the church's best traditions. "And what shall I say more? For the time will fail me if I tell of all the splendid individuals that are here, of all the noble and heroic deeds of these days, of all the adorable babies and charming children who have been such a large part of my pleasure (at one time we had 350!--a lot of pleasure), of the gallant and brave spirit of many in face of great loss and suffering, of human pottiness and frailty that show themselves too often, of the little tragedies and comedies of compound life, and of my great sense of privilege and joy and deep thankfulness in having been granted this priceless boon of living here with these my people through these days when terror by night and by day threatened and our God true to his promises kept us all from all harm moment by moment and blessed us and heard prayer for us and showed us His glory and goodness and grace. Suffice it to say that there are inner possessions of character and soul which neither guns nor death nor destruction nor the wrath of men can reach and destroy and there is the love of God in Christ Jesus from which none of these things has separated us."

In our moments of leisure it might be good for us who live in comparative Comfort and ease to think of those missionaries who are of our own flesh and blood and who, in their care of the thousands of wounded and hundreds of thousands of the hungry and the helpless, are still looked upon by many with commiseration because they "have nothing to do" and hence should cease their loafing and withdraw to more worthwhile occupations.

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Address Communications to E. H. Lockwood, Secretary, 198, The Bund, Canton. No.VIII.

CANTON COMMITTEE FOR JUSTICE TO CHINA

June 25, 1938.

#### WAS THE BOMBING INDISCRIMINATE?

A certain amount of confusion exists on this subject. We suggest that the answer is threefold.

1. (a) No one denies that there are certain military posts and barracks in Canton. But the mere presence of soldiers constitutes no defence against air-attack. Moreover hardly any of these have been hit, and from the military point of view, is the killing of a few soldiers worth the expense of the hundreds of bombs rained on this city?

(b) No anti-aircraft guns were put up in the city until after it had been raided. It is therefore misleading to describe Canton as heavily fortified.

(c) Can we in any case justify attacks on military objectives in such a densely populated place as Canton, where it can be shown that far more civilians than military have been killed?

2. There have been other objectives aimed at by the Japanese:

(a) Wong Sha Railway Station, terminus of the Canton-Hankow Rly. It should be noted that war-materials from Hong Kong to Hankow do not go through this station, but round by a loopline which cuts out Canton altogether.

(b) Essential services of Water and Electric Light. This in itself is an attack on the health and well-being of every non-combatant.

(c) Government Offices, and residences of Civil Government officials, again showing this to be a deliberate effort to paralyse the social life of the civilian and not the military population.

(d) Cultural institutions, and National Monuments, such as the Sun Yat Sen Memorial Hall, and the National Sun Yat Sen University.

3. A great many other bombs have been dropped in almost every section of the city, for which we can see no reason at all. These must therefore be described as purely indiscriminate acts of terrorism. Finally it is important to add that the Japanese marksmanship has been very inaccurate, so that the effects have been those of indiscriminate bombing even in those cases where the intention was not so.

#### THE BOMBING OF CANTON: A DOCTOR'S EXPERIENCE.

As Surgeon to the Canton Hospital,--the oldest Hospital in the Orient, where China was opened at the point of a lancet,--I have been asked by my colleagues, the American and British Physicians and Nurses of Canton, the ancient city of Rams, to tell you something of the bombing of this great city, during a period of two weeks.



Address Communications to E.H. Lockwood, Secretary, 198, The Bund, Canton. No.VIII.  
CANTON COMMITTEE FOR JUSTICE TO CHINA  
June 25, 1933.

Large squadrons of Japanese naval bombing planes, often numbering thirty or more, daily and nightly fly over this city, and are from the sky raining death and destruction. Thousands of high explosive bombs have been dropped at 250 different places throughout the city, killing more than a thousand people and wounding many times that number. The planes usually fly at a great height, so that discrimination is absolutely impossible even were this not an obvious attempt to terrorize the people, to demoralize the city, and destroy the private property and public institutions of the community, with the object of conquering and enslaving the Chinese people.

We, foreign physicians, who have witnessed these ruthless and barbarous bombings, and have ourselves cared for more than 500 severely wounded men, women and children, all non-combatants, in our Hospitals, have cabled to America and Great Britain, appealing to the humane people of the world to take decisive steps immediately to stop these persistent and terrible mass massacres. These dispatches have been signed by Doctors W. W. Cadbury, C. A. Hayes, R. L. Lancaster, F. Oldt, T. D. Stevenson, P. J. Todd, J. O. Thomson on our own initiative, and also on behalf of the Chinese Medical Association.

We have all served in China for many years and are accustomed to caring for large numbers of wounded soldiers, but this is the first time that the wounded are often brought to our Hospitals, particularly the Hackett Medical Centre and the Canton Hospital, while the airmen are bombing other places. At times the bombers return and many Red Cross workers have been wounded. Some are in our Hospitals. The Hospitals of Canton resemble field hospitals after a large battle, but the wounded are not soldiers. They are ordinary people like you and your loved ones. The whole personnel of our institutions are required to care for the wounded men, women and children. Everyone works steadily until all have been operated upon and relieved of pain; but the staff is almost exhausted. As many as 160 severely wounded people have been admitted to each of several of our Mission Hospitals within a period of an hour or two, Ninety-nine per cent of the deaths and casualties are due to high explosive bombs, the same that are being used to blast the Chinese armies that are defending their country, their homes and their families. The explosive force of the bombs, the bomb fragments and the collapsing buildings cause terrible wounds. The dead are more fortunate--for the wounded children and women as well as men, with large and painful wounds, often lie in agony, pinned down in ruins of their homes, awaiting rescue, or death from hemorrhage or shock--often whole families are killed, sometimes one may be left maimed, penniless and homeless. The Chinese men say, "We don't care if they kill us men, but why do they kill our women and children?" Women of Japan, why do your "chivalrous" airmen, soldiers and sailors kill women and children in large numbers?

Is this "just and fair" as your military leaders declare? Do you approve of this? You in foreign countries who are providing the Japanese militarist raiders with the materials for this slaughter of the innocents--their blood is on your heads.

We can never forget the young doctor brought to us with both thighs shattered, one twisted as if by a typhoon. For lack of a bed he lay on the floor quietly, uncomplainingly, quite conscious, calmly awaiting death, for he had done his duty, nobly and courageously. His distracted wife, weeping daughter and sor-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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CANTON COMMITTEE FOR JUSTICE TO CHINA  
June 25, 1938.

rowing brother begged us to save his life. We could do nothing but relieve his pain. His wounds were too severe and he had lost too much blood. We had to turn away from that pathetic group to save the lives of others. "Greater love hath no man than this--that a man lay down his life for his friends."

The Red Cross organizations and personnel, boy and girl scouts, and the staff of our Hospitals are doing magnificent work. They are well worthy of your support. The heads of our medical institutions and of the Health and Red Cross services are splendid Chinese men and physicians, distinguished and worthy graduates of American and British medical schools mostly.

Our Hospitals are full of wounded--those whose limbs needed to be amputated--expectant mothers injured--children with shattered bones. Very few cases with bomb wounds of the abdomen survive, they are too serious. You would be interested in many of those who fill our wards. There is the newsboy whose calf muscles are torn away: The fruit peddler whose leg was blown off. He cannot now provide for his family. The young woman, a member of a happy family of seven. A bomb dropped on their home and one of her feet was blown off. When she recovered consciousness she learned that the other members of the family had been killed. The fireman who was machine-gunned by the airmen while putting out a fire caused by an incendiary bomb. After dropping their bombs near the Wong Sha (yellow sand) station in the city, the bombers swooped down and machinegunned the people as they ran out of their collapsing houses. A mother was injured, as nine year old boy was killed and a baby boy five months old had a bullet through the thigh. There is the mother of four small children whose legs were shattered and who will be bedridden for months. The baby girl of four months, part of whose foot was blown off and mother who was killed while she was nursing her, will probably live. A cobbler with his right hand shattered. With most of these people it is a hand to mouth existence. If they cannot work they cannot eat. Many would prefer to be killed rather than be maimed, for they can neither support themselves nor their families, but are a burden to them. We try to save as many limbs as possible, but have had to sacrifice dozens, and will have to provide them with artificial ones. One of our girl nurses remarked 'If I am struck by a bomb I hope I will be killed outright rather than have a limb blown off!' It is very unpleasant for everyone in Canton--for there are no neutrals nor non-combatants--when the bombers dive overhead, and no one knows where the bombs will drop and scatter fragments of human bodies all over a wide area. Most unpleasant is it for those who have already gone through both mental and physical torture once to anticipate further suffering. The wounds are extensive and multiple, requiring quantities of dressing and medicines. We are grateful to the Lord Mayors' Fund, the Red Cross Societies and individuals for help. Much more will be required. Are you acting the part of the Good Samaritan?

A Japanese spokesman declared that "accurate bombing of Canton had been carried out". These objectives "accurately bombed" include the French Hospital on the Bund with large flags painted on the roof. (The beautiful young woman whose leg we had to amputate thought that it was a safety zone). Bombs struck directly a group of sampans in the river, people on the main streets of the city, schools (mission and others), hundreds of private homes and shops. We have wounded from those places in our hospitals. We refuse to term these and the essential Public

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utilities, such as the power plant and water works, and administrative offices of a great municipality "military objectives". Bombs fell close to buildings of the Hackett Medical Centre and beside the Hospital of the New Zealand Mission adorned with flags, and on Lingnan University. We must assume from their own statement that the Japanese air force considers these "military objectives" and deliberately bombed them. Our Hospitals are functioning under great difficulties. The destruction of the major power plant deprives us of our lighting systems, X-rays, refrigeration of serums and food supplies, water pumping, elevator service, cooling fans--Canton is the sub-tropics. It is mid-summer. With the destruction of the public utilities which is the Japanese declared intention, the city could be destroyed by fire caused by many incendiary bombs. Thousands of people have taken refuge close to Shameen--the Anglo-French Concession here, but the Japanese bombers have made a practice of diving low over the Consulates flying the American, British, French and other flags to slaughter the people nearby. Is it fair to the Chinese to tolerate this? Are we respecting the treaties our nations voluntarily signed with the intention of securing the integrity and sovereignty of China from just such an aggression?

The ruthless bombing of non-combatants has not been confined to Canton. Four hundred air-raids have been made upon various places throughout this Province during the past 9 months--an average of nearly two daily. The Despatches of such reputable press agencies as Reuter and United Press have been substantially correct. You may have read that several Japanese planes machine-gunned two passage boats with hundreds of passengers, most of whom were killed or wounded. That six planes attacked a group of cargo junks with firewood, killing and wounding. The Japanese airmen dropped incendiary bombs on a sewing factory full of young women, scores of whom were killed, as many maimed and burned--a terrible sight. That bombs were dropped on a train on the Hankow railroad coming south and that the aeroplanes then opened fire with machine guns killing and wounding passengers. That half a city was destroyed and many injured in an unsuccessful attempt to destroy a small "military objective". That bombs were rained on stations of the British financed Kowloon railway killing and wounding old men, women and babies. These reports are not propaganda, but the truth, for some of the wounded have been admitted to our Canton hospitals and those of our medical colleagues at Swatow, Kong Chuen, Fat Shan, Shiu Chow, Kong Moon, Tsung Fa and other places, and treated by Doctors H.R. Worth, J. L. Eaton, G. W. Hollings, H. R. Hartnell, R. L. Cockfield, F. E. Bates and Nurse James and others of the Presbyterian, Methodist, Anglican, Seventh Day Adventist and United Churches of England, the United States of America, Canada and New Zealand.

The killing of non-combatants but strengthens the determination of the Chinese to resist in order to bring peace and security to China and Asia. Canton cannot be captured from the air. Will the people of Britain and America allow it to become a second Nanking? Will you not actively help to hasten the time when there shall be neither sorrow nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain--the time when nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more?--or will you continue to be an isolationist and watch the hands of the clock of civilization and of Christianity put back to the dark ages--America and Britain were given their goodly heritage for a world mission. In the judgment of the nations will America and Britain hear the words: "In as much as you have done it unto the least of these (Chinese women, children and men) my brethren--you have done it unto me?"

This letter has been written during day and night raids still continuing.

J. O. Thomas, M.D., F.A.C.S., Canton CHINA, June 12,  
1938.

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Address Communications to E.H. Lockwood, Secretary, 193, The Bund, Canton, No. VIII.  
CANTON COMMITTEE FOR JUSTICE TO CHINA  
June 25, 1938.

A REFUTATION OF JAPANESE STATEMENTS MADE IN CONNECTION WITH  
THE CANTON BOMBINGS.

As one who is on the spot here in Canton and has personally seen some of the horrors perpetrated by the Japanese during the past fortnight I have no hesitation in writing to deny all that the Japanese say in defence of their murderous and indiscriminate attacks on a practically defenceless civilian population living in a city which is nothing but the commercial center for South China.

The statements issued by the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo, by the Japanese Admiralty Publicity Bureau and by other spokesmen, are not only out raged lies, but infer that protests to foreign powers have only been sent in by the Chinese authorities to arouse sympathy for their cause. The Canton Committee for Justice to China was responsible on Monday, May 30th for sending off to different parts of the world cables of protest by foreigners many of whom had personally seen the ghastly results of indiscriminate bombing. In the majority of cases bombs have fallen not on military or government objectives or anywhere near them but on crowded civilian areas. This can be vouched for by many foreigners who like myself have gone out to render what help we could in bombed civilian areas. We have seen the mangled remains of scores of civilians--men, women and children--and many wounded from the effect of bomb explosions, and for the Japanese to say as they have that casualties were caused by Chinese anti-aircraft fire is a monstrous lie.

The apologists for murder state that their pilots scrupulously avoid passing over Shameen which is a British and French Concession. I have on occasions been in Shameen during raids and seen distinctly Japanese planes cross the whole length of the island.

This is done by them in order the more easily to deal death and destruction to the adjacent crowded city. The Japanese Consul General in Hong Kong stated in reply to the protest made by the British Consul General in Canton that it was most difficult for the Japanese planes when flying at a height of 10,000 feet to discern such a small object as Shameen--an island some 15 acres in area. If that is so then it would be equally impossible for these same planes to aim accurately at what they call military objectives within the city and which are much smaller in area than Shameen. The Japanese Consul General's own words confound him.

The Japanese have also stated that in numerous cases the Chinese authorities have set up military and government establishments in close proximity to foreign property throughout the city of Canton. This again is an absolute lie as practically all the foreign property owned in Canton is either in Shameen or Pak Hok Tung and Lingnan which are both on the outskirts of the city. Within the city apart from three hospitals and the large compound surrounding the Roman Catholic Cathedral there is practically no foreign property at all.

One could write much more in refutation of the excuses made by Japanese official spokesmen, but I think it should be clear to the world at large by now that the Japanese militarists are indulging in an orgy of frightfulness in order to terrorise the population into submission.

In conclusion I would urge that it is high time that the Governments of Great Britain, France and the United States of America should take strong action to restrain Japan in her campaign of murder by refusing to allow her any supplies of oil and other such essential materials which are enabling her to carry on this unjust war in which so many thousands of innocent civilians are suffering.

N. V. Halward.

IMPRESSIONS FROM NORTH CHINA

Our first stop was Chingwangtao, and I thought that in this place, after having been under the rule of the East Hopei regime for nearly three years, the people would be somewhat reconciled to being under alien oppression. This, however, I found not to be the case. Nobody I talked to was in any way used to or had in any way accepted the foreign domination.

PEIPING: Business is poor. It is poor even for the new Japanese shops because nobody except their own nationals buy from them. It seems evident that those small Japanese traders rushed into Peiping in the hope of making a fortune in a short time, an expectation which so far has by no means materialized. This state of affairs is not helped by the definite feeling of insecurity which prevails not only among the Chinese population but also among the foreigners and even among the Japanese themselves. In contrast to the official pronouncements, the Japanese here seem to feel not quite so certain that they are going to be here forever. For instance, the Japanese bought a piece of land across from the P.U.M.C., paid for it, but instead of starting work on the proposed building they asked the P.U.M.C. people to take care of it for the time being and they would be responsible for the upkeep, taxes, etc. I mention this just to show that despite their grandiose plans they are not yet fully convinced that they will remain in Peiping.

This feeling of insecurity is, of course, due to the mounting guerilla activities. The territory held by the Japanese along the Ping-han Railway is actually narrowing, not widening. The Reverend Elmer Galt for three consecutive days spent six hours each day on the station at Peiping waiting in vain for a train to Paoting. Everybody getting into Peiping is most carefully searched before being admitted into the city. Even matches have become objects of suspicion. The reason for this is the following occurrence which has been repeated time and again:

Originally the Chinese Government in the center of Hopei prohibited the farmers from shipping their produce, principally cotton, into the Japanese-controlled areas. However, they soon found that they needed money. Consequently, permission was given to the farmers to sell their cotton to the Japanese. Now, when such a load of cotton had been delivered and the money collected, it would happen that, accidentally, one of the coolies would drop a match and the whole thing would go up in flames. This is the reason why matches are now contraband.

There is actual fear of uprising within the city of Peiping itself. The Chinese people are all sure that the occupation is only temporary. The only difference exists in the estimated length of the occupation. The more optimistic ones say six months; the more conservative ones count on two to three years. All of them are more than ever united in their devotion to China and the Generalissimo.

The Japanese claims that the Mohammedans are behind them is pure fiction. What actually happened was that with great pressure they got several of the old fogies to become the puppet heads of the Mohammedan federation, the headquarters of which are located in Peiping's biggest Mohammedan temple. It is characteristic that on top of its guarded entrance is a machine-gun in charge of Japanese soldiers. The pronouncements are dictated by the Japanese advisors to the secretary of the Federation, who brings them to the "leaders," but they do not even bother to read them. They are simply chopped and then given to the newspapers.

TIENTSIN: The railway from Peiping to Tientsin is heavily guarded. In the city itself Japanese construction is going on full blast and the invaders seem to be thoroughly entrenched. Here one notices little of that feeling of insecurity so conspicuous in Peiping. In order to obtain workers, the Japanese are promising

better wages than British firms are paying. But this is a decided deception. As a whole the Japanese treat the Chinese people like so much dirt and this is in no small way responsible for a general longing for the return of Chinese rule. In previous years I had gathered from various sources that if the Japanese would only treat the common people well and pay them decently they would have no difficulty in establishing their regime and have it liked. But their mistreatment of the people actually plays into the hands of the Chinese Government.

CHEFOO: A small Japanese garrison holds this place, which, when I was there, did not even dare to venture out of the city gates because the Chinese guerillas were sitting on the hills surrounding the city. Business is dead, but businessmen hope from day to day that the Chinese will re-occupy the place.

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REPORT ON BOYCOTT - August, 1938.

The boycott has cut Japanese trade in half, according to Robert Norton, Executive Secretary of the Committee for a Boycott Against Japanese Aggression. A semi-official statement recently published in the Washington Post analyses the trade statistics and reached the conclusion that the boycott rather than the general trade recession in the American market is responsible for the drop. Low-cost merchandise such as toys, light bulbs, and canned crab meat and tuna fish, show drops from one-third to three-fourths in value for the first five months of 1938. These articles are usually the least affected by a depression, but in this case they have suffered even more than luxury goods.

The committee is now planning to intensify the campaign to cut the remaining half of Japan's export trade. Official statistics for the month of June recently received from Tokyo indicated that in that month Japan's exports have decreased at an even greater rate. Chonosuke Yada, former consul-general in New York and leader of the newest Japanese "good-will" mission to visit New York, made the following statement in an interview published in the New York Journal American on July 22: "The American boycott has hurt some sections of Japan severely and is the most damaging one we have had," adding that export trade fell off 20 percent in Japan during the first year of the war.

The boycott's effectiveness is already reflected in Japan's decreased purchasing power, according to Mr. Norton. The Japanese government has even been forced to dip into the Gold Reserves of the Bank of Japan to purchase essential war materials and to attempt to rehabilitate the depressed cotton textile industry which was the backbone of Japan's foreign trade before the outbreak of hostilities. It is now recognized that Japan has exhausted all of her assets abroad, including those of private citizens, and is dependent upon cash payment for supplies of war materials.

Trade statistics show that Japan's sales to this country have been reduced at the rate of over nine million dollars per month during the first half of this year. This loss already amounting to over 54 million dollars in 1938, is a serious blow to a hard-pressed nation faced with the heroic struggle for resistance by the Chinese people.

The boycott committee is receiving many inquiries about stockings purported to be made of Chinese silk. Mr. Norton warns of the danger of attempting to substitute Chinese silk for Japanese. While there is no evidence of abuses up to

the present, the use of Chinese silk would offer an opening to unscrupulous manufacturers who might even manufacture hosiery of certified Chinese silk for a time and then shift to Japanese silk without any protection on the part of the consumers. Since 95% of our silk imports during the first few months of this year came from Japan, and only one-half of 1% from China (part of which came from occupied areas) the committee urges American people to boycott all silk. The Japanese have completely taken over the silk industry in the Yangtze Valley.

Consumers Union reports that 15 samples of so-called rayon mesh hose they tested, the legs were made entirely of silk. Rayon is not strong enough to be used in mesh hose. Consumers are therefore warned not to buy rayon unless satisfied by tags or labels that the hose contains no silk and that it is not made in Japan.

Two new rulings will help the boycotter. The Federal Trade Commission is expected to enact its proposed rule requiring identification of silk fibres. The Treasury Department has recently ruled that after August 22, 1938 un-dyed or unfinished hosiery imported into the United States must be stamped with indelible ink which cannot be obliterated or destroyed by dying or other processing or manufacturing operations. This will enable purchasers to avoid Japanese lisle or rayon.

Three of the questions originally raised against the boycott have now been fully answered by experience. It is now evident that the boycott does not lead to war. Also there can be no more doubt of its effectiveness. It has not led to the starvation of the Japanese people and does not threaten to do so.

Mr. Maxwell Stewart represented the Committee for a Boycott Against Japanese Aggression at the WORLD CONFERENCE FOR ACTION ON THE BOMBARDMENT OF OPEN TOWNS AND THE RESTORATION OF PEACE in Paris, where measures were adopted to intensify the boycott on a world-wide scale.

Report from CHINA CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE, London, England.

August 1938.

We would like firstly to tell you something about our work in Britain at the present moment.

We recently held a China conference at the China Institute in London with two sessions for representatives of local committees and other people working specially for China, one special session for the representatives of all Churches, and one special session for businessmen. As a result of this we have received many suggestions for extending the campaign and made many new contacts.

Our chief task in Britain at the moment is to secure support for the resolutions of the Paris Conference and to organise a campaign in support of China's demands to the League Assembly. We want the private British delegation to the League Assembly, decided on in Paris, to be as large and as representative as possible, and in order to demonstrate the support of the people of this country for China we hope to stimulate shoals of letters and telegrams to be sent to Lord Halifax, pressing for assistance to China.

I am enclosing a copy of the special China resolutions passed at the Conference and of a scheme for a campaign around the League Assembly. This scheme we are circulating widely, together with the Conference resolutions. All over this country conferences are to be held to follow up the resolutions of the Paris Conference, and these will be worked in together with the campaign around the Assembly.

Mr. Chu Hsueh-Fan, the Chinese Workers' delegate to the International Labour Office, is at present visiting this country. His visit began with a dinner at the National Trade Union Club, arranged by ourselves, and he is now speaking at various trades councils meetings and interviewing prominent trade-unionists.

Further, we are considering how we could organise support for a British loan to China and how we can make October 10th, China's National Independence Day, into a day of national support for China.

We shall be delighted to hear news of your activities and of how you propose to carry out the resolutions of the Paris Conference.

We have discussed the suggestions of the Paris meeting and will gladly undertake the tasks entrusted to us. You will notice that the meeting felt that in order to make the scheme work, committees in other countries should send in reports of their activities by the first of each month.

We feel sure that, whether the Committee in your country is a relief committee or whether it does both relief and political work, it will be useful for you to hear what is being done elsewhere. However, in order to carry out this work thoroughly, we will be involved in considerable extra expense. An addition will have to be made to our Staff, and there will be extra postage and office expenses. We hope you will share these expenses with us and will be able to send us regular contributions towards them. If each committee could give us regular sums amounting to 20 to 30 per year, this would enable us to properly fulfill this necessary duty of acting as an international clearing house for China work, supplying news, literature and ideas, and telling each country what the rest of the world is doing. Would you kindly advise us by return of post, what contribution you will be able to make in order that we may set our increased organization in motion.

Yours sincerely,

Arthur D. Clegg,  
National Organiser.



CHINA RESOLUTIONS

of the

WORLD CONFERENCE ON THE BOMBARDMENT OF OPEN TOWNS  
AND THE RESTORATION OF PEACE

We wish to draw your attention to the resolutions on China passed by the recent Conference on the Bombardment of Open Towns, held in Paris. The Conference was attended by over 1000 delegates from 30 countries.

We urge you immediately to begin to carry out these resolutions particularly by organising a press campaign in support of China's demands to the League Assembly on September 12th, by sending shoals of letters and telegrams to Lord Halifax at Geneva supporting these demands, by joining in the many conferences all over the country to carry out the resolutions as a whole, or by initiating such a conference if one is not being held in your area. Please let us know what we can do to help you.

RESOLUTIONS

This Conference, representing millions of people throughout the world, sends greetings to the Chinese people, who in their heroic resistance of Japanese aggression, are defending the principles of peace and democracy not only in China, but the world over, and protests against the ruthless slaughter of the civilian population by aerial bombardment which has become a feature of the fascist aggression.

This Conference pledges itself:

- 1) To render all assistance to China as guaranteed by the Nine Power Treaty, the League Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and resolutions of the League Assembly, and in furtherance of such assistance to mobilise world opinion in support of China's legitimate demands to the League Assembly:
  - a) By campaigns to bring pressure on all National delegations to the next session of the Assembly;
  - b) By the organization of simultaneous meetings in every capital on the eve of the Assembly, and
  - c) By sending an International Delegation to China.
- 2) To oppose any attempt at a settlement inconsistent with the preservation of the independence and integrity of China.
- 3) To demand assistance to China by direct loans to the Chinese Government
- 4) To give concrete expression to the deep feelings of international solidarity with the Chinese people by intensifying their campaign for relief.
- 5) It recalls the decisions taken by the I.P.C. Conference in London in February, 1938, in support of the individual boycott of all Japanese goods, and notes that Japan has already felt the effects on her international trade of these

individual efforts to fight against Japanese aggression. It calls on everyone to intensify the boycott.

6) It reiterates the appeal which she has already addressed to the peaceful governments that they shall call a boycott on all military material and above all on petrol.

The Conference also decided to set up an International Peace Hospital in China. We will let you know more of this later.

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CAMPAIGN TO SUPPORT CHINA'S DEMANDS FOR LEAGUE ACTION AT THE MEETING OF THE LEAGUE ASSEMBLY ON SEPTEMBER 12TH

WHAT ARE CHINA'S DEMANDS

1. Loans and credits to China. The Governments of Great Britain and France could easily give a loan to China. The League could guarantee an international loan as it has often done in the past.
2. The increase of the League Medical Units. At present the League supports only three epidemic prevention units. China's population is over 400,000,000.
3. The refusal to support Japan with arms and raw materials of war.

At the last League Assembly meeting in October 1937 the nations pledged themselves to do what they individually could to support China. Almost nothing has been done. This Assembly must demand to know what the nations have done and what they intend to do.

## Non-Participation in Aggression As a National Policy

Address by DR. TSUNE-CHI YÜ, Consul-General  
of the Republic of China, at New York

June, 1938

Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen:

The beautiful song in the Spanish language which we have just heard reminds me of a Spanish proverb which says: "*En este mundo traidor nada es verdad ni mentira. Todo es del color del cristal con que se mire.*" In English, it means, "In this treacherous world nothing is true and nothing is false; everything is of the color of the glass through which one looks at it." I quote this proverb only to affirm before you that I cannot subscribe to its connotation. There are things in life which are eternal, unchanging and everlasting. Among these, truth is perhaps one of the most outstanding. Truth is uniform and one; it maintains its identity in spite of time and space. Truth of centuries ago is still truth at the present moment, and it will continue to be truth in the centuries to come; truth here is exactly the same as truth in Europe and in the Far East.

It is with the sentiment of a worshiper of truth that I venture to say before this distinguished audience a few things with more frankness than might ordinarily be expected.

Truth compels us to realize that we are now living in an era which is just as interesting as it is tragic. It is tragic because when we look at the march of events everywhere, we find

world unrest and wanton destruction of human life. It is interesting because we have a golden opportunity to choose between right and wrong, justice and injustice, decency and indecency, courage and the antithesis of courage. This opportunity is not only yours and mine. It is available to every living being of this generation in every country, especially in countries that are founded on principles of democracy.



Cleveland, Ohio, Plaindealer

Not War—Murder!

China and the United States both have democratic institutions and sentiments. China considers America its best friend, and the Chinese people consider Americans their most sympathetic friends in their struggle for national existence. We appreciate the American understanding more deeply than most American friends realize. In the face of this life and death struggle not only for our national existence but also for democracy at large, we look at the American attitude with every consideration. After all, it was America through whose institutions the Chinese students received their liberal education in past decades, that was chiefly responsible for the establishment of the republican form of government in China and for the impetus and incentive for democracy. While China is still fighting for democracy, we Chinese refuse to admit that we are being deserted by America. We choose to feel that America, the older Republic on this side of the Pacific Ocean, is


giving the younger Republic on the other side of the Pacific an opportunity to find her own solution, much in the same way as the father of a family encourages his young boy to go out and make good on his own.

In other words, nothing can shake our confidence in the genuine and traditional friendship between our two countries, because that friendship is based on mutual respect for justice and democracy. Nevertheless, I would be failing in my duty should I ignore this opportunity to point out to you the inherent dangers that have been current in the American public because of the lack of full comprehension of what is going on in China today.


In the first place, it is to the advantage of the American public to realize and admit that the undeclared war in China is not only a struggle between China and Japan, but also one which involves every democratic institution, especially the United States of America. Some part of the public of this country has entertained the idea that America should remain isolated, and the so-called isolationists would argue that America should remain all by herself in international disputes. The fallacy of this theory cannot be gainsaid. I can illustrate this to you by simply pointing out that China was the oldest and probably the greatest advocate of isolationism in human history, and as a result has paid a heavy price for that advocacy. As you know, China used to consider herself as the "Middle Kingdom" within "the four seas." She was proud of the fact that she was absolutely isolated from other countries. But when improvements in modern science made it possible for rapid approach to the China coast, the castle in the air which had been conceived by the builders of the "Middle Kingdom" fell as a house of cards, and the door of China was forced open. This is a single historical instance, sufficient to demonstrate that it is just as impossible for the United States to maintain a policy of complete isolation as it was impossible for China to do the same thing.

Three hundred years ago it used to take eight months to cross the Pacific Ocean; one hundred years ago it took eight weeks to do so, and today it takes only eight days to bridge that ocean by virtue of the China Clipper. Who can be certain that one hundred years hence the world might not witness the bridging of the Pacific in eight hours, especially when we know that experiments are being made to fly in the stratosphere at tremendous speed?

Furthermore, there is another fallacious belief maintained by certain groups in this country; that is, in



Who's Civil



Washington, D. C., Post

zing Whom?

view of the bitter experience of America's participation in the World War, America should maintain a policy of "peace at any price." That this policy is detrimental to the interests of the United States seems to be beyond question. Peace is precious, and like anything that is precious, it exacts a price. No nation can expect peace by hoping for peace, by inaction and procrastination. Peace is a privilege. He who is entitled to have that privilege must assume the obligation of working for it. Sad indeed is the situation that the policy of "peace at any price" and the policy of complete isolation work hand in hand in such a way that they might be considered to be tantamount to an invitation to aggression and war. For instance, Japan has been controlled by her militarists and military machinery. Many innocent Japanese have been imbued with the idea of false patriotism, vanity, conquest and glory. The Japanese soldiers are laboring under the delusion that America is too craven-hearted to fight, and that American isolation and "peace at any price" dogmas will certainly prevent the United States from doing anything positive to obstruct the designs of the Japanese militarists. In other words, the inertia, isolationism, inaction and procrastination toward world affairs which exist in certain circles in this country today are really encouraging the Japanese to have their own way in all lands bordering on the Pacific.

Please understand clearly that the innocent Japanese people are victims of the Japanese militarists as much as the Chinese civilians. In the philosophical sense, men are victims of environment and heredity. With the heritage of the Americans who have made this country great because of the courage, the spirit of the covered wagon and the sense of justice of your ancestors, and with the heritage of the Chinese who have done much for human culture, we have a joint opportunity to do the right thing by shaping and re-shaping our environment in such a way that law and order may prevail in the interest of all innocent victims of aggression.

As I have stated, we are now standing at the crossroads of right and wrong, justice and injustice. Happily there is this opportunity for living beings of this generation—you and I and all the other believers in democracy—to take part in developing and following the right course. We are witnessing a history-making period and we are charged with the duty of brightening or darkening some pages of the human record, which future generations will review with pride or dismay.

I am happy to recall the achievements of American statesmen in the past and anticipate even greater

achievements by your statesmen in the future. With reference to the questions of the Far East, your Secretary of State John Hay enunciated the Open Door Policy; your Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg was chiefly responsible for the Anti-War Pact; and your Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson crystallized them into international justice by his policy of Non-Recognition.

I feel that there remains at the present moment a challenge to our well-wishers in America to demonstrate their friendship for China and their love for international justice through practical statesmanship based on what I might term a policy of "Non-Participation in Aggression." There is hiding in America today a great opportunity for your statesmen. It is high time for you to realize that the least your country can do is to reiterate what is right and what is just, without committing your country to any risk of war.

Read the newspaper headlines. Read about the bombing of our civilian populations in different cities. The responsibility, of course, is Japan's. But who else is responsible? The American merchants and American people are partly responsible. Who furnished the oil for the airplanes with which the Japanese bomb our villages and towns? Who is sending Japan the raw materials of war? We have no other answer, and it pains me to say that American merchants are responsible in part. Yet we Chinese consider America our best friend. Cannot your statesmen formulate a "Non-Participation in Aggression" policy and stop sending oil and raw materials of war with which the aggressors bomb our civilians? This is in particular a challenge to the American people, and in general a challenge to the democratic countries for the crystallization into action of a plan which would work in the interest of justice and fair play.

You might be interested to know what I think of the outcome of the Far Eastern crisis. My answer is that as far as China is concerned, you may rest assured that a nation with 470,000,000 people, a nation with 4,000,000 square miles, a nation with a continuous history of two score centuries, and a nation that has survived many human and natural catastrophes because of its unbelievable vitality, shall not perish from the earth. As for the Americans, I wish they would realize that China is not only fighting for her own existence and democracy but is also fighting on the first line of defense of American ideals and institutions. What has made America great is its pioneer spirit of courage, its sense of justice, its active participation in what is constructive in human life, rather than inertia, isolation or "peace at any price." As a friend of America, I say to you as friends of China, that we have to shoulder the joint responsibility of defending democracy and justice for our mutual interests.

As for Japan, I do not wish to make further comment except to quote the words of Jane Austen, to wit: "There will come a time when there shall be light—when man shall awaken from his lofty dreams and find his dreams still there; nothing has left save his sleep."

May we who are privileged to live in this important epoch, with our inherited traits of which we are proud, under the present circumstances which afford us the opportunity of choosing between right and wrong, do whatever we can within our respective spheres of authority and activity to bring about light to the Japanese militarists. Human beings are endowed with certain instincts and passions, of which love and hate are probably the most dominant. Let us love our neighbors, and let us hate injustice!

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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945 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

EDITOR  
Frank W. Price

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
JUN 12 1939  
SECRETARY Department of State  
Helen M. Loomis

ISSUE TWELVE  
October 10, 1938

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AN APPRECIATION

From one of our subscribers comes the following:

"There are very few instances in history where a case such as that of China has been presented so effectively, so fairly and so successfully. Throughout the country, the sentiment mobilized for China and her Cause has dominated the thinking of the American people. In this area, probably the most typically Anglo-Saxon on the American scene, up in the prairies of Iowa, through the Far West, the situation is the same. It is one of the finest jobs in which the representatives of missions have had a leading part. From the results reached and for the goal attained, your efforts have ranked high among those bearing much fruit."

We appreciate the many words of encouragement which have come from those who are receiving the China Information Service.

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JAPANESE STATEMENT AND ANSWER

SHANGHAI EVENING POST  
July 10, 1938.

MADAME CHIANG STATEMENT HIT BY JAPAN ARMY

-----  
Charges of "Inhuman" Acts By Soldiers Said Insult  
-----

JAPANESE WOULD "NEVER FORGIVE"

-----  
(United Press)

PEIPING, July 8.-- Colonel Junzo Hiracka, the Japanese military spokesman here, took strong exception to Madame Chiang Kai-shek's war anniversary statement and the Peking Chronicle today quoted him as saying that the Japanese Army was insulted and would "never forgive" her.

The Colonel's statement was a reply to the exclusive statement given the United Press by Madame Chiang and which the Chronicle printed yesterday without crediting the article to any agency.

He said he agreed that foreign women missionaries deserved great praise but indicated that Madame Chiang, apparently to court sentimental sympathy of American women, alludes to many an "inhuman act" of "lustful Japanese soldiers" demanding favors of Chinese women at the "point of bayonets."

"This is indeed a grave insult given the imperial Nipponese Army. Although we have enough generosity left to sympathize with Madame Chiang in her present impasse we can never forgive her.

"In my capacity as Japanese army spokesman in North China I would like to put this question.

"Was there ever in North China any incident warranting Madame Chiang's statement?"

He cited the two visits made to Kaifeng in the past three weeks when he said he saw Dr. Francis Clougherty and other foreign missionaries who were unanimous in praising the strict discipline maintained among the rank and file of the Japanese forces. The friendly, kind-hearted attitude of the Japanese soldiers toward foreigners likewise did not fail to receive their wholehearted approbation.



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"CHARGES OF INHUMAN ACTS BY  
JAPANESE SOLDIERS AN INSULT" ?

Editor,  
North China Daily News,  
Shanghai

Dear Sir:

In a United Press Dispatch from Peiping, which appeared in the Sunday issue of the Shanghai Evening Post, the Japanese military spokesman in Peiping is quoted as saying that the Japanese Army was insulted by Madame Chiang's war anniversary statement and would "never forgive" her.

The spokesman cited Dr. Francis Clougherty and other foreign missionaries at Kaifeng who "were unanimous in praising the strict discipline among the rank and file of the Japanese forces."

I do not question Dr. Clougherty's words but then what happened at Kaifeng must have been, alas, altogether exceptional. May I quote from the confidential report of an American missionary made from North China in February 1938:

"After one of the attacks on the garrison at T. a large number of civilians were reported to have been burned to death with kerosene or gasoline taken from the local stores of one of the foreign agencies....

The Father Superior of a group working in Shantung reached Peking only a few days before I came away. According to Dr. P. he reported atrocities repeatedly occurring in their vicinity of the same type that became so familiar here when news began to come out of Nanking. The ill treatment of women was not confined to houses and courtyards but was extended to the open streets, and on one occasion a civil officer had beaten one of the foreign priests."

To the above must be added what Mr. Archibald T. Steele reported to his paper, the Chicago Daily News, from Peiping, under date of January 13:

"In six months of warfare the Japanese army has piled up a shameful record of brutality and irresponsibility in North China. By blundering and inhuman tactics they have antagonized millions of the Chinese population and have driven tens of thousands into the arms of the Communists -- their most hated enemies....

"While here in Peking, peace and order prevail and gaudy posters depict North China as an earthly paradise, missionaries arriving from interior districts of Shansi, Hopei and Shantung bring stories of indiscriminate slaughter, looting and cruelty which I would find difficult to believe if I had not witnessed equally sordid events in Nanking. What happened in Nanking has occurred on a smaller scale in many cities and towns of North China. The result is that conditions through-

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out North China are infinitely worse than when the Japanese started their "holy war" a half year ago.

"A missionary just arrived from Shansi whose name, for obvious reasons, cannot be disclosed, told me this: 'The Japanese army bungled a glorious chance in Shansi. The 12,000,000 people of that province were thoroughly fed up with the corrupt provincial administration and were ripe for a change of government. Had the Japanese army shown a spark of benevolence and humanitarianism they would have won much popular sympathy. But instead they swept into the province like a horde of savages--killing on the slightest provocation, pillaging indiscriminately and in some cases burning villages. To be sure, they are easing up now, but the damage has been done.'

"All these stories run to a surprisingly similar pattern and are painfully illustrative of irresponsibility and lack of discipline among the Japanese soldiers and junior officers at the front. I would not venture to say that such primitive tactics are condoned by higher officers for there are some to whom I have related these events who appeared shocked and nonplussed. But these outrages, combined with such flagrant breaches of foreign rights as the sinking of the Panay and the bombing and sacking of mission properties, are indicative of an easygoing indifference and complacency among the higher-ups which cannot be easily explained away....

"In Taiyuan, the Shansi capital, the carnival of pillage which began with the Japanese entry went on for several weeks. After the Japanese troops had finished picking over the contents of shops and homes, remaining Chinese inhabitants were invited to help themselves to the leftovers. Some looting of shops was done by the Shansi soldiery before they fled, but it was kindergarten stuff compared with what was to come. Many innocent people died. The Japanese went from house to house demanding valuables and sometimes women.

"The Japanese left a sorry record too in Paoting, the Hopei capital, and in many smaller communities. Most nauseating exhibition of all was the cold-blooded murder of nine Catholic priests at Chengtingfu, southern Hopei province, on the day of the Japanese occupation. The details of this grizzly spectacle are just leaking out and the evidence is still indecisive as to whether the slaughter of the nine harmless Europeans was perpetrated by Japanese soldiers or by Manchurian soldiers under Japanese control. But the record clearly shows that the priests were killed after the Japanese occupation of the town and under the nose of the Japanese army. Ten soldiers wearing Japanese style uniforms forced their way into the mission, blind-folded the missionaries, including one bishop, loaded them into a truck and transported them to a field where the Japanese had been cremating Chinese dead. The priests were cruelly bayoneted and shot as they stepped off the truck. Their bodies were tossed into a pile and burned...."

If any forgiving is to be done, it is the Chinese who will have to do it.

Thanking you for giving your valuable space to the foregoing for the sake of truth, I am

Sincerely yours,  
AUSTRIAN

#### AMERICAN DOCTOR'S DEFLIANCE OF DANGER

Bombing or no bombing, Dr. Logan H. Roots, American surgeon who was stricken with appendicitis on the eve of the disastrous August 11th and 12th raids, is anxious to return to the Church General Hospital in Wuchang, a city opposite Hankow on the Yangtze, which has become an acute danger zone because of frequent Japanese air attacks killing and wounding more than 2,000 Chinese civilians during the last two months.

Recuperating in a hospital in Hankow, the American doctor gets more and more impatient every day at his slow progress. Apparently the change in role from that of a physician to a patient does not suit him. In fact nothing will please him more than being able to walk and work again amongst his Chinese patients.

True, the city of Wuchang since the beginning of August, has become greatly deserted by its residents for fear of being blasted to bits at any time by missiles indiscriminately released from Nipponese warplanes. Many, however, remain. As they are liable to be wounded, they will need doctors. That is why, Dr. Roots said, he wants to be back in Wuchang as soon as possible.

The saddest news to Dr. Roots after his operation was to hear of the removal of his hospital to Hankow for practical reasons. On several occasions, Japanese bombs exploded dangerously close to the hospital. Leaderless, many on the staff were greatly unnerved. Others, especially the women nurses, were almost exhausted by the continual strain of emergency work under intense danger.

Dr. Roots has decided to go back to Wuchang to re-open the hospital, and he is going to stay there until his services are no longer needed. Sometimes it is discouraging, he said, when one thinks of the amount of time and energy needed to save one life or one limb, while all around innocent people are being slaughtered en masse in aerial warfare.

Before he entered hospital himself about two weeks ago, Dr. Roots treated hundreds of wounded civilians at his own institution. Most of the cases were frightful ones. After each Japanese bombing, he and his colleagues had to operate on scores of casualties at a time.

The Church General Hospital is supported by the American Church Mission. Dr. Roots was trained in Harvard. His father was until recently Anglican Episcopal Bishop of Hankow, who is now on a world tour after having worked in China for more than 40 years. -- END.

#### WAR AND THE LIVING COSTS OF THE CHINESE MASSES

In contrast to what is happening in Japan, the war, in general, has not radically effected the rice bowls and other daily necessities of the Chinese people on the streets and farms who form the backbone of their nation's manpower against the Japanese invaders.

In many places in the rear of the fighting lines, where, due to the poor transportation facilities, native goods are flooding the market, there has not been any increase in the cost of living. Conversely, the prices of many home products in those places have dropped since the outbreak of the war. In Hankow, despite an unprecedented wartime boom on imported goods and luxuries, the commodity prices for the average consumer have not risen to unreasonable heights since the pre-war days. This increase in the price index was largely due to the continuous pouring in of refugees in Hankow, who at one time totalled half a million, representing a 50 per cent rise over the city's peacetime population. This abnormal situation, however, is being relieved with the gradual removal of the surplus population into the interior.

According to the figures compiled by the Hankow Municipal Government, a litre of rice was sold at 11 cents in retail shops on July 1, 1937, just one week before the Lukouchiao outbreak. It jumped to 13 cents on July 16, or nine days after the start of the hostilities, but, since then, it has been stabilized at 12 cents. A catty of green vegetables has jumped from 3 to 5 cents but that of pork has come down from 32 to 30 cents. The price of eggs has remained stable during the period under review.

By far the most substantial increases in the living costs which Hankow housewives are experiencing are in clothing and fuel. A foot of white cotton cloth which could be obtained at 11.2 cents a year ago is now sold at 17.4 cents; while the price of a foot of black woollen cloth has risen from 16.2 to 29 cents. Destruction of Chinese cotton mills and silk filatures along the Shanghai-Wusih sector by the Japanese was mainly responsible for the price souring of clothing materials in Hankow.

Firewood, which is the popular fuel in modest Chinese homes, has risen from 1 cent in July, 1937, to 1.5 cents a catty at present. A slight increase, however, is registered with the price of coal briquettes which rose from 90 cents to \$1.10 per picul.

Perhaps the most spectacular phase of Hankow's wartime price boom is to be seen in rent. Fortunately enough the average resident of the poorer class does not have to worry about this item in the monthly bills, as his snug home is usually located in areas where the war has not affected rent. Profiteering on rent is only practiced by first tenants in the French Concessions and the ex-British Concessions, now known as the Third Special Administrative District. In the latter area, the Wuhan Garrison Headquarters is taking definite steps to stop this victimisation of people who have moved to the ex-British Concession to escape from the air raid peril. In the territories directly under the administration of the Municipal Government, there are now many vacant houses to be let at reasonable terms.

At the back of this stupendous task of feeding the 2,000,000 stomachs in the tri-city of Hankow, Wuchang and Hanyang, is the Wuhan Food Adjustment Association, which was recently organized by the Hankow Municipal Government, the Wuchang District Government, the Provincial Department of Finance, the Provincial Reconstruction Department and the Hankow Chamber of Commerce. From regulating staple prices to storing surplus favor for emergency, the Association, which is financed by the Hupeh Provincial Government and which in turn extends loans to small food merchants, is now the controlling body in the marketing and selling of foodstuffs in the Wuhan area.--END.

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"SCORCHED EARTH" PLANS FOR KIANGSI

Nanchang, August 8. -- Chinese authorities, both civil and military, in Kiangsi, where a highly decisive battle may mark the early stages of the second year of the Sino-Japanese war, have determined to make it extremely costly for the Japanese to occupy any part of the province, and even if occupation is effected, to make it utterly unprofitable for the invaders. The much-publicized "scorched earth" policy, which has seen enforcement elsewhere in China, will be more strictly carried out in the lower Yangtze province of Kiangsi.

On more than one occasion, Governor Hsiung Shih-hui who was sometime Garrison Commander of Woosung and Shanghai, has declared there is a growing popular demand on the part of the people in Kiangsi to place as many obstacles in the way of the Japanese as humanly possible. According to a comprehensive plan, which has already been partially practiced in war zones in the northern part of the province near Kiukiang, all forms of Chinese wealth will be either removed or, if and when necessary, destroyed instead of being left behind for the Japanese troops to use.

That the Nipponese soldiers must not be allowed to feed on Kiangsi rice forms the first of four points in this programme. Kiangsi is a rich rice-producing region. The soil and climate in most places are so fertile and favourable that farmers in Kiangsi have two rice crops instead of one a year. By the end of July, the first harvest, an unusually bountiful one, had already been garnered, thus assuring every one in the province of an adequate food supply for the rest of the year. If the Japanese should get hold of this rice, the food question of a large portion of their armed forces now operating in the lower Yangtze valley will be solved.

Now, to forestall such a possibility, the authorities in Kiangsi have taken every precautionary measure. For instance, in areas near Kiukiang, which fell into the Japanese hands on July 26, all food supplies were carefully removed by the Chinese. Another article of daily use which the Chinese take care in evacuating is salt. Hence, to feed their troops in Kiangsi, the Japanese will have to transport every grain of rice and salt from their bases.

Kiangsi leads other Yangtze valley provinces in highways. Practically all important parts of the province are linked up by national highways or regional roads, and until recently there was regular bus service. Now the Chinese mili-

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tary authorities have been systematically destroying these roads and bridges along them to checkmate the Japanese advance and at the same time, to make these arteries of overland communication useless to the Japanese.

An excellent example of the thoroughness with which the Chinese have destroyed such lines of communication may be found in the methodical tearing up of the northern half of the 150-kilometer-long Kiukiang-Wanchang Railway. First, the rails were removed. Then all bridges were dynamited. This was followed by the removal of the sleepers. To complete the job, the Chinese army engineering corps responsible for this work, ordered the digging of ditches right across the roadbed at so many places and so deep that the line will become utterly useless to the Japanese if they should seize it.

The same thing is true with highways. In areas threatened by the Japanese, the Chinese have sometime ago made them impassable. Barriers have been placed across these roads which oftener than not were cut up into small segments with all bridges along them totally destroyed by fire or torn up. All materials thus removed either from the railway or from the highways were meticulously carried to the rear for building new lines, whereas railroad sleepers were used for the erection of defense works in northern Kiangsi.

Then, to complete the programme of leaving nothing to the Japanese, the Chinese authorities in Kiangsi have decided to lay waste the entire countryside whenever they should find it necessary to withdraw therefrom. They have a plan of burning all houses so that the Japanese would not find a single roof to take shelter under. This would entail the wholesale destruction of thousands upon thousands of houses both in towns and villages.

Insofar as the first two parts of this programme relating to the removal of all food supplies and the destruction of all communication lines in the war zones, there is sufficient evidence to prove that the Chinese authorities in Kiangsi really mean business. The burning of all houses will obviously be more difficult to accomplish. One thing is, however, certain, that is, the Chinese authorities, both military and civil, and the people of Kiangsi, are bent on making the Japanese campaign in their province as expensive and unprofitable as possible. --END.

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#### CHRISTIAN TALKING PICTURE COMPANY ORGANIZED IN HONGKONG

Desirous of utilizing the motion picture as a medium for propagating the Christian gospel, especially at the present moment when the Chinese people are suffering many trials and tribulations on account of the Japanese invasion, a group of prominent businessmen in Hongkong have organized a Christian Talking Picture Company, to be capitalized at \$100,000, for the purpose of manufacturing Chinese native "talkies" to be distributed to various cinema houses throughout China.

Headed by the Right Rev. P. O. Hall, Bishop of Hongkong, the company has enlisted the support of practically all the leaders of the Chinese Christian churches in the British colony. Bishop Logan H. Roots, formerly of the American Church

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Mission in Hankow, also gave his approval and support to the scheme during his brief stay in Hongkong before he departed for the United States in May. His speech introducing the company to his church members was recorded in a news-reel, which was later screened in various theaters in Hongkong.

The need of more "clean" pictures to heighten the morale of the people is an urgent one, reads the company's prospectus. The company's prospectus further points out that among the Chinese followers of the Christian faith, not a few of them attend the cinema houses more regularly and more often than they do the church. It is suggested, therefore, that motion pictures be utilized to impart the Christian gospel to the audience, while at the same time giving them wholesome entertainment. It further states that when this plan materializes, such pictures will become the self-assumed preachers and the cinema houses their congregations.

The company has officially registered with the Hongkong Government and formal subscription for shares has already been opened to the public. The Bank of Communications and the Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation, both of Hongkong, are acting as official bankers for the company.

Meanwhile, Mr. Lo Ming-yau, formerly manager of the United Photoplay Service of Shanghai, has been appointed managing-director of the company. A veteran showman, Mr. Lo has been in the motion picture business for more than ten years. He has produced many wellknown pictures in China, including "Humanity", and "The Fisherman's Song". His latest picture, "The Song of China," was brought to the United States by Mr. Douglas McLean of Hollywood, who put it on a road-show throughout America.

Aside from showing its pictures in the big cities and towns, it is the plan of the company that in the future small projectors will be used for the tours through the rural villages throughout the country, where temporary tents will be erected as show-houses for the benefit of the country-folk. It is thus hoped that by using the cinema as a medium, the Christian gospel will be enabled to penetrate into the out-of-the way corners and into the hearts of the rural people, so that they may be converted to the Christian faith.

According to its present plan, the company will endeavour, as soon as facilities are available, to produce English-speaking pictures for distribution to various countries in Europe and America.--END.

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FROM WEST CHINA

The following letters have been received by a West China missionary now on furlough. The signators are of the real gentry of Szechuan Province. Mr. Liao, former head of the Foreign Language College, later Professor of English of Szechuan University was the sponsor of the religious toleration clause as finally adopted by the Chinese Constitutional Assembly.

Chengtu, West China,  
July 30, 1938.

We have heard of your activities in connection with the "China Week" or in other endeavors on behalf of China's suffering masses, some of you in raising funds for relief of wounded soldiers and of the millions of refugees from the war areas, and others in forwarding medical supplies and workers for plague prevention. This is indeed a token of the ties that bind humanity -- especially all those with Christian aspirations for the cause of brotherhood and democracy -- in a common fellowship for the amelioration of prejudice and the evils of perverted nationalism.

We extend our most heartfelt thanks for the sympathetic interest you have manifested in China's cause and trust that you with us will continue to fight for righteous principles in national life. (Will you put us still further in your debt by abstaining from purchasing goods from Japan or supplying that country with material essential for the conduct of her war with China?) By this co-operation you will contribute your share to the ultimate redemption of this land from the military and economic bondage contemplated by the war clique of Japan.

China wishes to cast in her lot with those who stand for democracy. Your help may be a factor in turning the scales in favor of a better world, one in which aggression will be frowned upon and tolerance and charity inculcated. We hereby assert our desire for oneness with every endeavor to break down racial barriers and to join in the great comity of nations that ultimately must take responsibility for the preservation of world civilization.

Signed on behalf of the gentry of Szechuan Province, West China.

-----  
Chengtu, Szechuan,  
July 31, 1938.

You may have recently seen the appeal from the gentry of the Province of Szechuan, West China, asking your help in the struggle of China against Japanese aggression. We herewith again bespeak your help in the publication of this letter and in forwarding it to those who have already manifested a sympathetic interest in our cause. We want all our friends to know that the Chinese people are most grateful for what her friends have already done to help China in many different ways. We are far removed from you in point of distance, but, the world daily grows smaller and we would fain be at one with the larger fellowship of those with common aims looking towards a better world order. That China's millions shall travel that road is surely a matter of importance for all lovers of peace and order. We shall be grateful to you if this letter of thanks, can be made available to those who have already manifested their sympathy with our cause.

Yours sincerely,

S. C. Liao.



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OPEN LETTER TO ALL FRIENDS OF CHINA

From the Gentry of Szechwan Province

We--representing 70,000,000 Szechuanese--appeal to the sympathetic and justice-loving nations of the world for practical support so that Japanese oppression may not attain its aim: the destruction of civilization and attainment of world power.

Our Government realized from the outbreak of hostilities that Japanese ambition was not only endangering our country but was also destructive of world peace. Therefore our determination is to encourage our fellow-patriots to resist to the end, regardless of cost, and we are fortunate that the nations of the world recognize our purpose.

It has been acknowledged in addresses by Madame Roosevelt, by the Archbishop of Canterbury, by Dr. Nathaniel Feffer and by Premier Blum that we are fighting for an issue that is nothing less than world peace, and that it is the duty of all peace-loving nations to help China. Such statements as these cannot but evoke our gratitude and stir us to still greater effort.

But we are impelled to go into greater detail. Japanese militarism is cruel and unscrupulous; they will regard neither justice nor humanitarianism in the endeavor to attain their object--first, supremacy in Asia; next, in the world. Wherever their troops go civilians are killed and women are raped. Canton--a city without anti-aircraft equipment--has been repeatedly bombed and great numbers of our people have been killed or injured. Moreover, the Japanese destroyed the Yellow River dykes, thereby flooding Honan, Shantung and Anhwei, and causing great loss of life. Many colleges and institutions of higher learning have been ruthlessly destroyed. Vast quantities of opium are being bought from Persia and under Japanese protection forced on the Chinese people, serving the double purpose of destroying Chinese morale on the one hand, and on the other, serving as a source of income in lieu of war indemnities that the Japanese know cannot be collected in any other way. In all her doings Japan makes it very evident that she is not only the enemy of China, but of the human race.

The Chinese people are now completely under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang--one and all determined from the vanguard to the rearguard on resistance to the foe,--even to death. To those sympathetic nations, who amid all the international confusion of interests have upheld righteousness and justice by material gifts to us, we can only offer our deepest thanks. We recall international events of the past few years, and see them as steps by which the present invasion has come about. The Japanese occupation of our four North-Eastern provinces was a direct step toward the latter occupation of Abyssinia by Italy; in the same way Germany broke the Locarno Peace Treaty and sent troops to occupy the Saar. Next came the Lukuchiao incident, and this year Germany has forced Austria under German control. Those events have all been tolerated by peace-loving nations in the effort to avoid war. But, as the Chinese sage says, "A spark may fire a whole plain". This Japanese invasion of China may well cause a fire that will extend over the world. For this reason we cannot but appeal to all the sympathetic nations of the world to tolerate such outrages no more,

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

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but to adopt drastic measures to exterminate this dangerous fire in Eastern Asia. May the full force of the League of Nations be brought to bear on Japan, so that world peace and civilization may not be ruined by Japan. This is to secure not only the good of China, but of the entire world.

Signed by

D. K. Chow;	Su Djao Kwei;	Tang Dzong Yao
Hsu Hsiao Gang;	S. C. Liao;	Lo Chuen Si;
Pen Lan Tson;	Pei Tich Hsia;	Tsai Lan Djai;
Wang Boi Han;	Ho Bei Djong;	Fong I Pei;
Liu Din Djwin;	Pen Dji Hsion;	Chen Dzi Iu;
Hwang Ruen U;	Su Djiao Hsiang;	Djao Hsi Hsiang;
Li Ren Fu;	Hsu Hsiao Hwei;	Hsiao Bei Hao
	Gao Dzi Tsai	

P. S.--Please circulate this letter amongst your friend.

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GREATER CHUNGKING IN THE MAKING  
(From the Committee's Special Correspondent)

Chungking (Szechuan), Aug. 25. -- A new Chungking, limitless in growth and possibilities, is rising on top of the old Szechuan river-port 1,322 miles up the Yangtze. With such speed, is this greater Chungking being built that it will rank with China's biggest pre-war trading centers before the present hostilities.

The dramatic growth of Chungking dates back only to last December when China moved her Central Government to this western city. Hitherto, it was a city of 400,000 population who went on with their peaceful occupations, little perturbed by war so far away. Its city proper measured only a little more than seven square miles, while the outlying odd fifty square miles that made up the municipality of Chungking consisted of soil practically untouched and unexploited by the modern architect or industrialist. The farmers who lived in one cluster of mid-mountain grass-roof house or another along the bank of the river that flows merrily by continued to till their good earth and pray to their Buddha for good harvests.

With the arrival of the Central Government, things suddenly changed. Chungking ceased to be a semi-secluded city. There could be no shutting its doors. Swiftly it became the capital of a United China at war in its truest sense, for with the government had come people from all parts, north, south and east, and of all trades, merchants, industrialists, educators and others.

All that had come had to be accommodated. New factories, schools and shops were needed. Settling down in this strange city was aided by the architects, the engineers, the technicians, the carpenters and the masons who were among the new citizens.

Before the war, building contractors in Chungking comprised only a handful of men. Now their enlarged force includes some of the country's best architects. Mr. S. S. Kwan of Messrs. Kwan, Chu and Yang, for one, is a well-known American-trained Chinese architect to whose credit numerous fine buildings in North China and elsewhere now still stand, or have fallen under Japanese aerial bombardment. He designed many buildings in Nanking, including the one for the exhibition of historical documents of the Kuomintang.

Another noted American-trained architect is Mr. Tung Ching of the Allied Architects. His laurels include the structures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Metropolitan Hotel in Nanking and the Metropole Theatre in Shanghai. The Bank of China has an architect of high caliber in Mr. Chien-Shou Luk, a British returned student, while the Voh Kee Building Contractors has four architects in Messrs. G. D. Su, W. P. Lei, P. Chow and T. W. Hsiao who were all trained abroad.

These numerous building firms from Shanghai and Nanking and other leading cities of China have also brought to Chungking their own big forces of technicians and common labourers. The Voh Kee, for instance, transported to Chung-

king more than 500 of its skilled employees from Nanking and, since its removal here, recruited 2,500 additional men locally.

The minions of the building trade, constantly increasing in numbers with new arrivals and new local recruits, are turning every cubic of untouched Chungking ground loose, extending from the city proper to the outlying districts. While the architects are busy from early morning till late at night drawing rolls upon rolls of designs in their offices, the labourers are working by shifts day and night driving their shovels into the soil to lay the foundations of Chungking's new city skyline.

With this tremendous labour, mental and manual, has Chungking been speedily turned into the true capital of a China, united in resistance against Japan. The greater Chungking in the making is absorbing into its boundless expanse the best commercial and industrial elements of all the other leading cities of the country. Nanking had its banking center at Hsin Chieh Kow. Off the street with same name here are already shooting into the sky the high buildings now under construction for the Central Bank of China, the Bank of China and other financial houses. Along this and other streets are countless numbers of new shops, department stores, restaurants, barber shops, beauty parlours, tea houses and amusement centers bearing the signs of "Nanking," "Shanghai," "Tientsin," "Peiping," "Canton," "Tsingtao," "Tsinan" and "Hankow."

Even the mountains that surround Chungking have not been neglected in this unprecedented construction boom in this great new city of many cities combined. Atop the hills or in the mountain glens or slopes already stand many new buildings, while other structures, completed or still under construction, are mirrored upside down in the river.

These new buildings house the numerous factories or schools that have moved to Chungking. Of the new factory premises, that of the Yu Feng Cotton Mill which is being built at feverish speed outside the city will be the most imposing. The Central University which moved to this part from Nanking last December has fifty low buildings, classrooms and dormitory, at Sha Ping Pa, west of Chungking, which were completed in forty days.

The volume of construction in Chungking today as compared with eight months ago, according to an old Chungking hand, has been increased by 85 per cent. This upward trend will continue with the unending influx of people and industries.--END.

China Information Committee  
Hankow, China  
Aug. 26, 1938

INFLUX OF INDUSTRIES TO SZECHUAN  
(From the Committee's Special Correspondent)

Chungking (Szechuan), Aug. 23.-- Szechuan, the land of myth and mystery, is now humming with the activity of modern industries. War left Shanghai minus a great number of the leading Chinese factories that gained for that city its fame as the busiest industrial cosmopolitan center in the Orient. Most of those factories whose removal inland began simultaneously with the withdrawal of the Chinese troops from the Shanghai sector have now found their way into Szechuan Province.

In Chungking, Szechuan's leading river port and gateway, are found 56 factories most of which were formerly located in Shanghai. Of these, 22 factories are for the manufacture of metallic goods, five for electric and radio apparatus, ten for chemical products, seven are printing plants, and seven comprise weaving and spinning mills.

Twenty-four of these factories have now resumed operations in Chungking, while the remaining 32 are expected to set their machinery rolling in the near future. Ten of the factories now in operation are engaged in the manufacture of military supplies in addition to the five that were originally located in Chungking turning out war materials.

It is nothing short of a miracle for all these factories with their men, heavy machines and other property to have been transplanted all the way from Shanghai to this far-off Szechuan city. For this, the Shanghai factory owners who have formed an association here in this western city have to thank the Chinese government.

The Chinese government, through its Ministry of Economics, has extended millions in loans to these Chinese industrialists to enable them to move their factories and to resume operations in this new city. Under the Ministry of Economics is a special committee known as Industrial and Mining Readjustment Commission which the Chinese merchants can always approach and apply for financial and technical aid.

In addition, the Ministry has entered into an agreement with the Joint Savings Society whereby the latter upon the guaranty of the Ministry may issue loans to the factory owners. Loans granted by the Society in accordance with stipulations of the said agreement, have to date totalled \$4,000,000.

The first problem that confronts a factory owner after he has moved all his factory property and machinery to Chungking is to get a site on which he may set up his plant. Lest the local landlords should exploit the situation and increase the price of land, the Ministry of Economics has organized a Land Evaluation Committee consisting of representatives of the Chungking City Government, the Reconstruction Bureau of the Szechuan Provincial Government, the Industries and Mining Readjustment Commission and other interested parties. This committee is to fix a price for the land which is acceptable to both parties.

Another problem facing the factory owners is personnel and labour. Some of the factories in their removal to Chungking have carried part of their technical staff from Shanghai, but it was impossible to transport all the working hands. To help solve this question, the Industries and Mining Readjustment Commission has set up a special recruiting office inviting all who have had experience in skilled labour or as technicians in factories to register. To date, hundreds have registered with the office.

Besides, the Ministry of Economics will render help and facility in the transportation of working men from the war areas to Szechuan.--END.

China Information Committee  
Hankow, China, Aug. 26, 1938.

NEWS FROM NANKING

From

Confidential Supplement  
to  
National Christian Council, Summer Series, Shanghai

June 20, 1938.

Statement Prepared by Dr. Robert O. Wilson, University Hospital, Nanking.

Shanghai, June 18: "This is my first opportunity to leave Nanking since last September and I have been asked to jot down a few items that might be of interest to those receiving this letter.

"The University Hospital, as you all know, has been able to keep open throughout the whole trying period of last winter and spring. The organization of the Safety Zone Committee with the presence of 14 Americans and 5 Germans staying in the city, was perhaps the chief factor in permitting the hospital to remain open. Without them, we should have been lost.

"When the Chinese staff, particularly the doctors, began to leave in November, and when all of them had left in early December, we were greatly disappointed in them and heartsick at their abandoning of their jobs. We had felt that when the occupation was complete that discipline would be quickly restored, and that the hospital could function normally with perhaps only minor inconveniences. We, of course, foresaw the great need for the hospital, as numbers of people must necessarily remain in the city.

"As the full horror of the situation unfolded itself in the first few weeks of occupation my own mental attitude changed to a feeling of profound thankfulness that our Chinese colleagues were not present to witness and perhaps be victims of the humiliation and rape of their city.

"We were able to carry on with the help of a few nurses that remained and others that either were stranded in Nanking, having fled from points between Nanking and Shanghai, and a few of our own nurses who have come filtering back. We may truly say that the Lord has been good to us".

One of Dr. Wilson's first remarks upon arrival in the International Settlement of Shanghai was: "How good it is to be again in a place where Chinese can hold up their heads.

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NANKING NEWS

WAR'S TOLL AT NANKING

(From The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, August 3, 1938.)

A Sober, and decidedly sobering, picture of what war has meant to one important section of China is presented in a forthcoming publication by the Nanking International Relief Committee called "War Damage In the Nanking Area" and just made available for perusal in manuscript form.

This is the first quantitative and factual study of war damage in any Japanese-occupied area. It presents dispassionately a comprehensive picture of war devastation, showing its cause--only one or two per cent of the huge actual losses were caused by actual war operations!--. its toll in detail, and the continued need for relief. Publication of this material in booklet form will undoubtedly create a profound sensation wherever it may be read.

Both urban and rural surveys were conducted by Dr. Lewis S.C. Smythe, professor of sociology at the University of Nanking, and assistants, on behalf of the Relief Committee. A foreword describes the viewpoint and method. "Our own position," writes Dr. M. S. Bates of the University and the committee, "is humanitarian, without regard for the nationality of war victims. In this report we seldom use the terms 'Chinese' and 'Japanese', and consider persons simply as farmers or housewives or children." The survey covered from December, 1937, when the Japanese occupied Nanking, to March, 1938.

Because of past claims and counter-claims as to responsibility, the foreword briefly sums up causation of the injuries listed:

The burning in the municipal areas immediately adjoining the walled city of Nanking and in some of the towns and villages along the southeasterly approaches to Nanking, was done by the Chinese armies as a military measure--whether proper or improper is not for us to determine. A very small amount of damage to civilian life and property was done by military operations along the roads from the southeast, and in the four days of moderately severe attack upon the city. Practically all of the burning within the city walls, and a good deal of that in the rural areas, was done gradually by the Japanese forces (in Nanking, from December 19, one week after entry, to the beginning of February). For the period covered in the survey, most of the looting in the entire area, and practically all of the violence against civilians, was also done by the Japanese forces--whether justifiably or unjustifiably in terms of policy, is not for us to decide. Beginning early in January, there gradually developed looting and robbery by Chinese civilians; and later, particularly after March, the struggle for fuel brought serious structural damage to unoccupied buildings. Also, there has latterly grown up in the rural areas a serious banditry which currently rivals and sometimes surpasses the robbery and violence by Japanese soldiers...Losses to life and property from actual warfare are shown by these surveys to be one or two per cent of the total. The rest could have been prevented if both sides had wished to give sufficient consideration to the welfare of civilians, including reasonable protection by military and civilian police.

The work is divided into an introduction, describing the random sampling method and organization employed; next comes the city survey, followed by the agricultural survey, concluding with results in bearing on relief needs and program. There are also appendices, tables and maps. The effect is one of painstaking care under conditions of extraordinary difficulty.

Dealing with population, the city survey opens with a pre-war population estimate of Nanking setting this figure at 1,000,000, which was reduced by repeated bombings and the removal of Government organs so that at the time the city fell (December 12-13) it stood between 200,000 and 250,000. At the time of a March (1937) survey the population was 221,150 of whom 27,500--12 per cent-- were living in refugee camps while outside the camps but within the Safety Zone Area were an additional 68,000, 31 per cent of the total. "Some idea of the crowding, the price paid for partial security, is indicated by the fact that 43 per cent of the population, 14 weeks after the fall of the city, was living in an area which had only 4 percent of the total number of buildings noted in the Survey and which comprised roughly one-eighth of the total area within the walls." The survey showed a wartime sex distribution, with a noticeable decline in the percentage of males due both to death and to flight. In the age-group between 15 and 49 years the decline was from 124 males per 100 females to 111, or 11 per cent. "This change presents the fact that a large number of women and children are deprived of men who were the support of the family...Within the city the refugee camps showed a very high figure for broken families..."

Statistics gathered on deaths showed that 3250 civilians were killed by military action under known circumstances; of those killed 2400 (74 per cent) were killed by soldiers' violence apart from military operations. "There is reason to expect under-reporting of deaths and violence at the hands of the Japanese soldiers, because of the fear of retaliation from the army of occupation..." Of the 3100 injured under known circumstances, 3050 (98 per cent) were definitely by soldiers' violence aside from warfare. "There was a noticeable tendency to ignore injuries from which some sort of recovery had been made. 89 percent of the deaths and 90 per cent of the injuries by soldiers' violence occurred after December 13, when occupation of the city was entirely completed."

In addition, 4200 were taken away under military arrest and as persons seized temporarily were seldom so reported and as very few of those mentioned were heard from in any way up to June, there is reason to believe most of the 4200 were killed early in the period. In other words all these probably should be added to the total of those slain.

Ignoring minor cases and the casualties of military operations, those killed or injured by soldiers' violence or taken away represents 1 person in 23, or 1 in every 5 families, without counting cases of rape. Of the 6750 violently killed or injured, only 900 or 13 per cent came to grief through military operations. Four thousand four hundred women had husbands killed, injured or taken away; the corresponding number regarding children and fathers is 3250.

"A revealing picture of the tragedy," says one paragraph, "is shown in the relatively large number of persons over 60 years old who were killed by soldiers; 28 per cent of all men so killed, and 38 per cent of the women. Elderly people were often the most reluctant to leave their homes in exposed areas, and they were considered in advance to be safe from wanton attack." A false assumption, events proved!



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Among the represented population of 221,000, 26 per cent of the population, or 58,000, were formerly employed. In March the total came to 20,500 or but 14 per cent of those 15 years old or more. Seventy-eight per cent of all families in the city, or 37,050, reported no earnings while 44,650 families, or 94 per cent, reported not enough earnings to sustain life. "Life was continued by the use of buried hoards and other surviving accumulations, which were spread through kinship, friendship and loans; and were supplemented by organized relief plus irregular release from military storehouses, chiefly in the form of pay to a comparatively small number of laborers."

Families remaining during the war period were in general the poorer groups but they showed total losses of \$40,000,000 of which 2 per cent only was due to military operations, 52 to fire, 33 to military looting and 9 to other robbery, with 4 per cent unknown.

\* \* \* \* \*

Eighty-nine per cent of Nanking's buildings suffered damage or destruction of which 2 per cent suffered from military operations, 24 per cent by fire and 63 per cent by looting. Practically without exception the other 11 per cent were entered and robbed in some degree. Outside the wall, 62 per cent of the buildings and contents for all sections was \$246,000,000, of which \$143 millions was outside the walls, \$103 millions inside. Only 1 per cent of this was due to military operations, 67 per cent was due to fires and 31 per cent to robbery. The full report contains great detail on all these points.

The agricultural survey attempted to cover the Ningshu area, six hsien or counties grouped around Nanking. The five types of losses reported totalled nearly \$41,000,000 in the four and a half hsien south of the Yangtze (all that could be fully included as of March), or \$220 per family. The approximate annual income per family is only \$289 so such an average loss is justly termed "a fearful blow".

Buildings alone comprised 59 per cent of the total losses, \$129 per family--most of them going by fire. Labor animals accounted for 16 per cent of the losses, farm implements 13 per cent, stored grain 10 per cent, and crops but 2 per cent due to the seasonal state. Normal planting was reduced to 72 per cent. There is need of seed and other things, and 133,000 members of farm families had not returned.

One person was killed in every seven families, mostly by soldiers' violence, comparing with one city resident in every five families killed, injured or taken away, "which works out to about an equal degree of social evil and distress."

\* \* \* \* \*

In a final comparison of city and farm, the observation is made that the farmer's basic capital for production (land) has not been destroyed while many city people have lost all important material means of production. "The average farmer has left to him more to struggle with and more to struggle than the average denizen of Nanking in this year of distress."

The obvious relief needs are taken up in the final portion of the report which discusses a wide variety of consideration, pointing out among other things that whereas the 1931 flood disaster had one government concerned with the problem as a whole and putting large resources into help, at present there are various authorities (in some sections none), and fighting is the chief concern.

"Administrator of public welfare may well marvel at the endurance and self-reliance of the plain Chinese people," observes the report, "yet the price in health and in all opportunities of life has been heavy, and ought not to be further exacted."

SUCHOWFU (KIANGSU) NEWS

Not for publication.

June 25, 1938.

Long, long it has been in my mind to write you, but what was the use? Here we were entirely cut off from the outside world, and not even a post office in existence. When the Japanese army took the city, they went at once to the office and looted it, tearing up the mail still waiting to be sent out. Some of it was very important mail, too, as we found our letters, and pictures of the destroyed Memorial Church torn in two and thrown away. And this letter registered and addressed to the American Consul!

It is a long tale we have to tell, but it would not be wise to tell it now. Only this I will say: none of us will ever forget the horror of the last month. Not alone for ourselves, but far, far more for all these helpless people about us. Crashing bombs; whizzing guns and cannon; the awful rattle of the tanks along our streets; and the constant watchfulness of those who had made this city one vast ruin.

And more - for war is war, and such things happen during such times; but there are things worse than artillery at its worst, and our own eyes have seen plenty, and our ears hear more from day to day. Women and girls stand poor chance of lives of purity if not in hiding, or with us in the refugee camps. Fear has been on all faces, and in all hearts. Even last night I did not take off my clothes, because of circumstances about us, which made us all apprehensive. x x x x.

The hospitals have been over-flowing with sick and wounded; some will be crippled for this life; some will never be entirely normal because of the frights they have had; some will bear the marks of lust and inhumanity to their graves; some have lost their little ones through fear; some are so sick with various troubles due to the experiences they have undergone, and to the food we have to give them to eat - little children need proper food and it is not to be had these times. x x x x.

I am just back from the morning rounds in hospital and camp. Diphtheria is one of the epidemics now to fight. Flies are on hand by the millions. Why were they ever created? Maternity cases abound. But in spite of close quarters and discomfort and coarse food, it is surprising how the Chinese keep up their spirits. Why, I just know I would be groaning half the time if I had to endure what they are enduring right now. Hundreds of them have lost everything they possess; many have seen their dear ones crushed and burned to death; many have no idea where husbands, wives, children and parents have gone. One woman was even smiling as we dressed her wound. She had to have a bullet taken from her back. It had passed through the child in her arms, instantly killing it, and then came near doing the same with her. The father was slain before their eyes. And yet she can SMILE! This city is one vast state of ruin. Our Memorial church and our North Gate chapel are past occupation; but I wonder if I would wish it otherwise, when I see the homes so destroyed on all sides as far as the eye can reach. Not a roof to be seen, only crumbled brick and stone. Under the ashes lie many who will never be found. x x x

How long is it to last? No one can even imagine. A Japanese in an official position was asked, and replied, "I cannot even imagine." And yet, at the beginning it was publicly declared that all would be over in a couple of months. Between our city houses and the compound in the suburbs, is a big vacant place where school boys used to run and shout and play; now on it are kept hundreds of instruments of torture - awful tanks; great guns; cannon; trucks and everything in readiness for a minute's notice to go into action. I hate to pass them. x x x x

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P E I P I N G N E W S

Not For Publication.

From a Missionary

June 22, 1938.

I can only hit the high spots of all that has happened since our return to Peking. Last month, a party of eight prominent Japanese Christian leaders came to China on a goodwill mission to the Chinese Christians. Before the party arrived, the local newspapers announced that they planned to hold public meetings for the exchange of views with their Chinese fellow Christians. After they got on the ground, they soon found that no one was willing to attend such a meeting, so had to be content with a tea party that was wholly a social function and attended by a very few Chinese Christians and foreign missionaries, there were many private interviews.

We declined to attend even the tea party. The Japanese are prone to take pictures at public gatherings and publish them with misleading captions. Our refusal to attend also took into consideration the fact that the Chairman of the committee that sent this delegation over is a retired military officer, and a friend of his, who is an active officer in the army occupying Peking, acted as their advance agent. It was an ill-timed visit so far as the promotion of friendly relations was concerned. While they were here, the Chinese students were forced to stage the fourth "parade of humiliation" to celebrate the fall of Hsuehchow.

E. did have an hour and a half visit with the local Japanese pastor and the General Secretary of the Japanese National Committee of the Y.M.C.A. We also had dinner with three other delegates, all connected with the Congregational Church in Japan. I felt that these three men regretted the use of military pressure (one of them is a sincere pacifist). But they felt that the invasion of China was unavoidable. Why? Because the Chinese had so persistently resisted Japanese advances along economic, political and cultural lines.

They explained the Nanking atrocities by saying that the common soldiers there were seasoned men of the regular army who refused to obey orders from their young officers. Letters written by American friends in Nanking confirm this. I felt that a flush of shame passed over the faces of these men as we discussed their army's terrible conduct. One thing they said made me blue, viz., that Japan could hold out for another two years quite easily. Her policy is to open up new gold mines so that she can increase her present annual output of fifty tons of gold to enough to pay for the unfavorable balance of trade. I can not help but feel that they were unduly optimistic about the possibility of such an achievement. They admitted that the common soldiers now being sent to China are unmarried young men because their government has found them cheaper. Pensions for the widows and orphans left by married men who are killed have been making too much of a drain on the national treasury. They also said that Japan's best troops are not in China at all, but are concentrated on the Siberian border. They frankly said that class strife is brewing in Japan because the soldiers are being drawn from the poorer classes of society while families with money find ways of getting exemption for their sons.

A couple of weeks ago, E. made a trip to a town seventy miles east of Peking to sell the church property there. At forty years of age, this church passes out

of existence as an organization, but in the public schools that are now run in the town and in the shops dispensing Western medicine, he discerned evidences of popular acceptance of goals first envisaged for that town by Christian missionaries, and towards which they struggled determinedly for years. Furthermore, there are still a number of individual Christians in the town and one of our liveliest village churches eight miles out in the country, an offshoot of the work first started in the city. He has been indulging in some interesting speculations over the coincidence of the closing of this organized church just as the Japanese are establishing themselves in the town by means of political organizers, to introduce their culture. They include worship in the old temples and the teaching of the Japanese language in the schools instead of English. Their basic slogan is, "Asia for the Yellow Race."

Last week, the powers that be, promoted a "Clean-Up Week." Every school was instructed to clean up its class rooms one day, dormitory rooms the next, yard the next and so on down to Sunday when all the students had to go to the parks and pull weeds. This week they immediately followed with a "Week for the Extirpation of Communists and the Destruction of the Nationalist Party." It included an inspection of each school by one or two Japanese and a squad of Chinese police, and the expurgation of their libraries. They confiscated all the "dangerous literature" that the schools had not already burned. Pictures of Sun Yat Sen, Chiang Kai Shek and the Nanking flag, together with maps that did not show Manchukuo clearly marked were held to be dangerous. Five teachers from Yu Ying were summoned to the police station for questioning. One was an athletic teacher in whose room they found a pictorial supplement issued in commemoration of the National Track and Field Meet at Nanking in 1936. They objected to his having it because on the cover were portraits of Sun and Chiang. The authorities have now demanded that within five days every school send them two complete lists of all the books in their libraries. Yu Ying Academy has 17,000. It is physically impossible to comply with this demand.

You may forget all I have said above if you will remember the following. This fall, if you learn that Dr. Walter Judd is going to speak in your town or near it, don't let anything prevent you from going to hear him and taking all your family, friends and neighbors. I'll refund all your expenses for attendance if you can honestly say afterwards that it wasn't worth while. He is the Superintendent of one of our North China American Board Hospitals, but feels that under present circumstances the most effective thing he can do is to acquaint Americans with the situation out here and stimulate them to action which will contribute towards a permanent solution of the problems which are its underlying cause. Get him into your home, if possible, and make him stay for meals. If I could move audiences of young and old the way he can, I'd do the same thing.

### "CHINA'S SORROW" CHANGES COURSE SOUTHWARD

Reenacting the tragedy of 1855 when it dramatically changed its outlet to the sea from Haichow south of the Shantung mountains to the Gulf of Chili, the Yellow River, "China's Sorrow," has again altered its course--this time in a southerly direction.

According to measurements taken by the water station at Hua-yuankow, one of the dyke breaches east of Chengchow, the mid-August discharge of the Yellow River is 2,500 cubic feet per second, and the flood water discharge 2,400 cubic feet per second. Ninety-six per cent of the river water is draining into the now basin.

At present, one can wade through knee-deep water across the Yellow River within the confines of Yuanwu, a district on the north bank of the river in north Honan and east of the Peiping-Hankow Railway.

#### Three Explanations

Three reasons accounted for the sudden change of course, namely, the dyke-break at Huanyuankow, the higher river bottom than the land behind its south bank, and the large quantities of silt deposited on the river bed east of the branch.

Flood waters escaping through the Huayuankow opening are now flowing across a plain 230 miles long in east Honan and north Anhwei, and are reaching as far south as Chengyangkwan.

What makes the destruction and misery caused by the change of course through such a wide territory more appalling is the fact that at several places the river bottom is already higher than the plain south of the embankments. That is why the water in the flooded areas is several feet deeper than the regular flow. This causes an inflow of the Yellow River water into the low-lying plain in east Honan and north Anhwei.

Already heavily silt-laden--Hwang Ho's normal silt discharge per second is 27.5 tons--a change of discharge has caused a quicker accumulation of silt. The more the silt is deposited the higher the bed rises and the narrower the river channel. The ultimate result is, as has already been mentioned, a new direction of flow.

#### Rise Expected in Autumn

In the opinion of water conservancy experts, if summer freshets do not rush down from the upper reaches, if autumn rainfalls are scarce and if the mercury does not take a sudden jump, there may be a chance of the lower reaches of Hwang Ho beyond Huayuankow gradually drying up and becoming an alluvial plain. However, river experts believe that the water will rise again in early fall.

If the Hwang Ho discharge remains at its present rate of 2,400 cubic feet per second--a very low figure--conservancy workers declare, the flood may not be greatly aggravated. But they entertained serious doubts. As a matter of fact, they were worrying lest the Yellow River would not hold down to its normal discharge of 6,800 to 10,000 cubic feet per second.

Explaining the reason for the unusual drop in the water level and discharge of Hwang Ho in the middle of August, Mr. Wu Shu-sheng, a veteran survey engineer of the Yellow River Conservancy Commission, said that the delayed arrival of the high water period may be due to the slow thaw in the mountains at the river's sources.

#### Will the New Dykes Hold?

Now that "China's Sorrow" has again altered its outlet, it is feared that disastrous results cannot be averted unless the new dykes at present under construction are sufficiently strong to hold the water in check during the rising period.

The 1855 drama and the present change of course were only two of the many movements the river has made in its history. For a long time Tientsin was its favorite outlet to the sea. At other times, it selected the Yangtze River near Chinkiang as its rendezvous with the ocean. Until the latest dyke breaches occurred it ran into the Gulf of Chili south of Tientsin.

The first of the three great natural divisions of China, the Yellow River basin is about 600,000 square miles, and the river itself is roughly 2,500 miles long. If this area, before the outbreak of the war, was an estimated population of about 100,000,000. The most difficult part of the river begins at Kaifeng.

Hwang Ho derives its name and colour from the yellow loess soil which it gathers between Shensi and Shansi. Because of the enormous quantities of silt brought down from the loess country, the bed of the river is constantly raised and this necessitates the building of higher and higher embankments. In some places, the river is elevated as much as 60 or 70 feet above the neighboring country.--END

China Information Committee  
Hankow, China  
Aug. 26, 1938

NOTE ON JAPAN'S GOLD POSITION.

Since July 1937 Japan's gold reserves and gold transactions have been kept secret but recently reports from the Tokio correspondent of the "Times" and the "Berliner Boerser Zeitung", together with earlier references by the correspondent of the "Economist" show that in the last 18 months Japan has been losing gold heavily.

On January 1st 1938 Japan's total gold reserves were 411 metric tons. Between March and July 1937 116 metric tons were shipped and 48 tons were bought.

By July 1938 the reserves had decreased to 232 metric tons or about 800 million yen, i.e., all Japan's secret reserves were exhausted and for further purchases abroad she had to use the gold reserve of the Bank of Japan, which had been kept at 801 Million yen since the revaluation of July 1937. In July of this year arrangements were made for setting aside 87 tons (300 million yen) to maintain imports. Sales of this are already occurring. On August 10th "The Times" reported that \$5,800,000 (22 million yen) had been sent to America. This loss of gold has occurred despite the efforts to increase gold production and decrease imports. In 1936 140 million yen of gold was mined, in 1937 the figure is variously estimated from 140 to 190 million yen. In 1938 the Japanese hope to increase this figure to 240 million yen, but it is not known whether they are succeeding.

The adverse balance of trade has been cut from 641 million yen for the first 6 months of 1937 to 196 million yen for the same period of 1938. But these figures include trade with the yen bloc, usually favourable to Japan and trade with the outside world which alone affects the gold position would show a far more serious adverse balance as Mr. Ikeda the Japanese Finance Minister has indicated. The cut in imports has been considerable. For example, the average monthly imports of tin from Malaya from January to June this year was 646 tons, but in June only 339 tons and in July 163 tons were imported.

CHINA CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE,  
London, England,  
August 18, 1938.

TRAVELS OF AN AMERICAN ENGINEER

Not For Publication.

Hongkong, August 12, 1938.

It was on the 18th of August of last year that my son and I went up to Canton. As luck would have it, this was the memorable day of the first air-raid on that unfortunate city. \* \* \* \*

The first and second alarms had sounded, followed shortly by the appearance in the southern sky of five enemy planes. During the course of our drive through the city we had a good opportunity to observe the effect of the raid on the people. It is not to be wondered that the atmosphere was one of panic. (This cannot be said of those who remain in Canton today, however; upon the first alarm being given, they walk quietly to the places of "safety" decided upon - without outward demonstration of any emotion, as they await their fate.) But on this day people were running in every direction. All were warned off the big new Pearl River Bridge, and a few seconds after we passed over it in our car the central section was drawn up, thus lessening the chances of a Jap bomb making a direct hit. Shops, offices and hotels closed their doors. With terror clearly written on their faces, men and women with babies in their arms and older children clinging to them huddled alongside the larger buildings, such as the tall new Oi Kwan Hotel, the Sun Company Building, and other local "skyscrapers." Then began the exodus of people from the city. x x x x

After the first terrible fright the population became accustomed to the air alarms; the second alarm would find the streets practically deserted, with the police standing calmly at their posts. It was estimated that 40% of the city's population left, but soon many returned. Periodic bombing of the stations, roads and bridges, and almost daily "routine bombing" of the Canton-Kowloon and Canton-Hankow Railroads have interrupted traffic only for short periods; at no time has the railway service been discontinued for more than 36 hours. This efficiency in repairing frequent damages to the railroads was not anticipated by the Chinese or foreigners.

On one occasion I happened to be walking to a friend's house when the Jap planes arrived and started to bomb the railway station and the Pearl River Bridge. x x x The bombs missed the bridge by several hundred yards, landing in this district, (poor, thickly populated). The reports were terrific - although I was about a half a mile away the ground and buildings around me shook so badly that many windows in the neighborhood were broken. Within half an hour I saw the scene of destruction; I must admit that I never want to experience such a sight again. The debris was piled 20 and 30 feet high. Some 200 people were killed or wounded; many panic-stricken survivors were digging or tearing the debris away in their endeavor to rescue their loved ones. One old man, who was past knowing what he was saying or doing, was pacing up and down, repeating in Chinese, "Wild beasts kill only when they are hungry."

During this year I have travelled in China more than ever before; I have been surprised at the government's ability to organize and carry out a constructive program during such a period of stress. On one trip into the interior of Kwangsi Province I witnessed the bombing of river sampans carrying firewood and on another occasion the bombing of the Wuchow air-field. Notwithstanding all this wanton destruction, China is going forward. The roads of Kwangsi have been widened, and the bridges strengthened as well as widened, so that hundreds of trucks are now continually running over these roads, loaded down to their helper-springs with munitions.

The Kwangsi Government has moved many of its offices into the limestone caves for which that province is famous. It has constructed a railroad nearly 200 miles



long within the short period of six months. It has mobilized the population of the province and has trained hundreds of thousands of men. Within the same short stretch of time there has been established at Luchow an Aviation School under the supervision of American airmen.

On another trip into the interior, we traveled to Hungyang, half-way point on the Canton-Hankow Railway. From here we were to travel by car to Kweilin, the capital of Kwangsi, in the famous limestone country of South China. Enroute we were impressed by the continuous stream of freight trains carrying ammunition and equipment to the front. For hours our train was sidetracked, giving right of way to this other more important service. Upon arriving at Hungyang we were again deeply impressed with the military organization that had taken over the city, the large military hospital and with the hundreds of trucks that were pouring in, loaded with ammunition - apparently from the French Indo-China frontier.

From Hungyang we drove by car to Kweilin over a recently constructed road that had been sufficiently surfaced to withstand the strain of heavy trucks. We were surprised to be able to count as many as 175 White trucks which passed us enroute. I was told that these were only a part of 500 that had recently been purchased for the transportation of munitions. Besides these there were Studebakers, Chevrolets, and Fords making up a constant procession. From Kweilin we traveled southward overland to Wat Lun and Wuchow. x x x x

Most of my travelling has been by air, for the Eurasia (a Sino-German Company) and C.N.A.C. (subsidiaries of Pan-American Airways) have been in continual operation. My most exciting flight was from Wuchow to Hongkong -- particularly so, as my wife was with me. We had just left the Wuchow air-field when an air-raid was reported. In order to avoid the invaders the pilot flew above the clouds to 22,000 feet. As we approached Hongkong we could see the Jap planes below us towards the north, bombing Canton. Passing between Macao and Bocca Tigris (the Chinese fort near the mouth of the Pear River) we could see Japanese warships slowly steaming up the river, firing on the Chinese positions.

The air-raids on Canton have become mere routine for the Japanese, as Canton is practically defenseless, the Chinese air force being forced to concentrate its activities in the Yangtse Valley. The comparatively few anti-aircraft guns are not of the most modern type; the almost constant presence of clouds in the sky shield the invaders, so they bomb the great city with impunity. Scarcely a day passes without four or five alarms and two or three visits from the enemy fliers.

This is quite the reverse to conditions in Hankow, where for over a three-months period there were only three raids - and each time the Japanese met with defeat. On April 29th they visited Hankow and lost 21 planes, 14 of which were accounted for by the officers of the American gunboat on the river. From then until May 30th not a raid occurred. On the 30th they again visited Hankow, losing 11 planes, according to foreigners' report. It was said that they lost many more, and perhaps this is true.

During this raid I was in Hankow and saw 40 to 50 planes (Chinese) take off. Eight or ten flew over the airdrome continually, but no Jap planes appeared. Later when the raid was over, I counted at least 34 planes returning. Just how many actually came back I do not know, but I can say that the Chinese losses were very light, for they could not have lost more than four or five from actual count. From that time until the middle of June, just after I left Hankow, no further raids of any account occurred, so this and the other bombings I have witnessed makes me feel that the cowardly brutes were only bombing undefended areas - that they are afraid of venturing where they might encounter Chinese defending planes.

During my stay in Hankow I was impressed with the orderly regime of the government. Business was being carried on, and though most officials concurred in the opinion that it is only a question of time before the Japanese would take Hankow, they all agreed that the loss of this city would not mean defeat. At present writing the floods seem to be holding back the enemy; about 130 miles of mountainous country lies between Kiukiang (recently captured by the Japs) and Hankow. There are still several booms in the Yangtse below Hankow. All these factors - the floods, the uneven terrain, and the determination of the Chinese to defend their capital to the last trench - make it a tough affair for the invader, well-equipped though he be.

In Hankow I had a talk with Mr. Edgar Ansel Mowrer, League of Nations peace representative, who had just come from the front. He told me that the Chinese was a wonderful soldier. He said that the Chinese were putting up a fight equal to the best, and the only thing he regretted was their lack of equipment. His exact words were, "They cannot fight with their hands; they need bullets and mobile equipment." He added further that it was tragic to be in the front line and watch the Japs come forward with their heavy guns and motorised outfits.

The Chinese showed the world at Taierchwang that they have the stamina. The day is gone when the Chinese soldier was "a forlorn figure with a cotton umbrella". The Japanese back in '31 who came in contact with the Big Sword wielders found this out to their grief. x x x x

The people of north and east China have been gradually migrating back into the interior. The government is encouraging refugees to take up reclaimed land in Szechwen, Kweichow and Yunnan Provinces. These provinces today are much better connected with each other than ever before. x x x x

Seven new power plants, though of but small size, have been completed with government aid in important cities of these provinces, and other new power plants are under construction. The taxation of industrial enterprise also has been somewhat rationalized. Over two hundred factories and industries have moved from the Shanghai and Nanking areas into these interior districts. For example, the Ma Char Silk Filatures of Shanghai, taken over by the Japanese, have begun again in Szechuen Province with a \$3,000,000 start. The Central Government in the same province has inaugurated a \$20,000,000 sugar refinery. Chungking, Yunnanfu, and many other cities almost inaccessible in the past are now the backbone of China's future industry; this war has developed and brought about a modern transportation system that is opening up roads and railroads and airways that are bound to become important commercial links in the immediate future.

Speaking of roads, you have no doubt heard of the new road being constructed from Burma into Yunnan. x x x x The stimulus of Japanese aggression has now got it really under way, thanks to the impact of General Chiang Kai-shek's will, backed by the good Governor of Yunnan. Work was started last December, and the road was to be opened in March - but by March no major bridge had been built. All the same good work has been done by these workmen without any machinery - "Their nearest approach to a machine is a cylindrical boulder, which with the help of a water-buffalo does duty as a steam roller." They are peasants - something between 100,000 and 170,000 in number. Their food is supplied by the wealthier classes. Yunnanfu is said to be the next choice on the list of capitals for China. That may not be necessary, but there is no doubt that Hankow is planning the industrialization of the southwestern province, which would make the road of growing importance.

And so, after the past year's traveling about in war-torn China, I feel that I have reasons to be in an optimistic mood about her future. x x x x

USE OF ARMED FORCE

BISHOPS' VIEWS ON JUSTIFICATION

DANGER OF "SHEER EXPEDIENCY"

(Reprinted from The London Times July 7, 1938)

The use of armed force in defence of international law is held to be justified in a statement issued on behalf of the Archbishop of York and other leaders of the Church of England. The statement expresses anxiety lest the recent trend of events should develop into a drift away from all moral principles and result in an acceptance of sheer expediency as the guide of British action.

The signatories are:--

The Archbishop of York, the Bishops of Bath and Wells, Bristol, Carlisle, Chelmsford, Derby, Dover, Lichfield, St. Asaph, Southwark, Southwell, and Deans of Chichester and Exeter, the Provost of Wakefield, and the rector of Birmingham (Canon Guy Rogers).

The statement (in which cross-headings have been inserted) is as follows:--

We who sign this statement represent a great multitude who have been rendered anxious about the moral basis of foreign policy and rearmament as a result of the recent trend of events. It is to many people far less evident than it was three years ago on what moral principles foreign policy should be based, and in what conditions it may be justifiable to have recourse to armed force.

TWO FAILURES

We are persuaded that the deterioration in this sphere, which is universally acknowledged, is due to the failure to stand by principles which they professed on the part of the States members of the League of Nations at various critical points; we mention two--the failure to take any kind of effectual action on the Lytton Report after the invasion of Manchuria, and the holding up of sanctions in the case of Abyssinia at the point where they might have begun to be effective; in both cases our own country had a large measure of responsibility.

At present we are confronted with situations in China and in Spain which give rise to grave misgivings, and all are aware that similar situations may arise at any time in central Europe.

We desire, therefore, to affirm that the supreme goal of foreign policy should be the establishment and maintenance of international law. It seems to be assumed that our country would resort to war in self-defence, which is generally understood to include defence of the territorial integrity of the British Empire; from that we do not dissent, though we should wish the decision whether a casus belli exists to rest with an impartial authority, unless a territorial aggression has actually taken place.

#### MORAL JUSTIFICATION

But we wish to affirm with all possible emphasis that there is clearer moral justification for the use of armed force in defence of international law than for a war of the old type in defence of territorial possessions or economic interests. And we are far from satisfied that this order of moral priority is universally accepted by our fellow-citizens or by the Government.

Several examples might be given of what we mean. The continued wars in China and Spain, accompanied, as they are, by the most appalling suffering of the civilian population, including women and children, constitute clear breaches of both law and morality. Perhaps the clearest instance of a single factor to which both national interests and international law are applicable is the bombing of British ships in Spanish harbours. These ships are acting lawfully, and the attacks on them are unlawful. Not so much in defence of British interests as in defence of law, we hold that the Government should take effectual action to check these outrages and face considerable risk with that object. We have no competence to suggest how this should be done, but are encouraged by the success of the Nyon Agreement to believe that the difficulties are not insuperable, and that a firm stand for moral principle would not necessarily involve war.

#### DANGER OF DRIFT

There is a real moral case for a repudiation of the use of armed force altogether; but our country has not been persuaded that it is sound. There is no moral case for building and maintaining armaments without clear moral principles to direct their use. We are anxious lest the recent trend of events should develop into a drift away from all moral principles, and result in an acceptance of sheer expediency as the guide of our action.

We recognize the paramount obligation of avoiding general war, if that can be done without gross betrayal of principle; but we contend that an even greater evil is involved in international anarchy, which would, moreover, almost inevitably lead to general war.

We desire, therefore, to reiterate our conviction that the maintenance of international law must, on moral grounds, take precedence of any national interests in the direction of foreign policy, and should be its supreme goal.

Other points follow from this, including revision of the existing international law and the securing of fair access to raw materials. But of all claims the authority of international law stands first.

In connection with the above article, one of our subscribers draws attention to a statement in the New York Times for September 23 written by the Archbishop bearing upon the condition of British diplomacy in Europe at the present time. Permission was not granted for the Service to reprint this statement. Those desiring this statement may write to Miss Loomis enclosing three cents in stamps for typewritten copies.

EXTRACTS FROM SURVEY BY A. MORGAN YOUNG

September 21, 1938.

THE ROAD TO HANKOW

Machinery is proving inexorably more powerful than man, and the Japanese forces are closing in on Hankow - not without reverses and heavy losses, but high explosives blast their way through by degrees. Besides the high explosive there has been some use of gas also, and it has attracted much more attention than it did when it was used at Shanghai - as was attested by reliable witnesses. Indeed, its earlier use seems to have been forgotten - perhaps because on the earlier occasion no formal complaints were made to Japan. Various reasons have been given for Japan's comparatively small use of gas. Perhaps it is simply that high-explosive has been found, on the whole, more efficient, and is certainly safer for the attackers when they expect to be able to make an advance: they do not want to walk into their own poison.

The Japanese are reported to be working desperately hard to open the road down to Hankow from the north. Similarly they made a large divergence and a great expenditure of ammunition to capture the railway from Kiukiang to Manchang, so as to give them a fresh line of approach from the south. These may come under the definition of "encircling movements", dear to the strategist, but they certainly indicate no great confidence in the three previous lines of approach, by the Yangtse and the terrain immediately to the north and south. It may be, however, that experience in the north has shown the invaders that they must have as wide an area of conquered (or desolated) country in their rear or their lines of communication will be in jeopardy continually.

Japanese news sources tell of jealousies and disagreements between the Chinese generals and their armies, but much of this has an air of gossip and is obviously inspired rather by hope than by fact. Japan has her puppets in the north, some of whom may sincerely believe that resistance is vain and that it is therefore best to take what benefits the conqueror offers. But they are only a small group: China's millions seem to be confirmed in their conviction that Japan is the enemy and do not falter in their resistance.

THE PATH TO HONOR

Some interesting personalities accompany Japanese missions abroad. Such an one is Captain Amakasu, the Vice Chairman of a Manchukuo Mission of Goodwill and Amity, which has been touring Europe and America. Captain Amakasu achieved fame in the days of the great earthquake which shook Japan on September 1st, 1923. He was a gendarmerie officer, and, during the days immediately following the quake, took an active part in rounding up all Socialists and Communists and all even suspected of those doctrines. Among those so arrested were Osugi Sakae, his wife, and her little nephew, about eight years old, and the three were lodged in separate cells of the prison. Osugi was a man of powerful and original mind, unattached to any school of politics, and perhaps more of a philosophic anarchist than either Socialist or Communist. A day or two after their arrest, Captain Amakasu, accompanied by two privates, visited their cells, each of which he entered in turn, while the privates kept guard without. He told Osugi to remain seated, and, after a few words, stepped behind him, put his arm round his neck and his knee in his back, and strangled him, his victim not uttering a sound. He did the same to Osugi's wife, but she being alarmed, turned a little and was not strangled so neatly, uttering some horrible gurgles in the performance. The little nephew, hearing this, screamed aloud, and Amakasu, entering his cell, strangled him with his hands.

He then reported what he had done, and was put under arrest, and eventually tried by court-martial. The Press acclaimed the deed, the Mainichi, with its million circulation, declaring that he was regarded as a national hero. There are many Japanese precedents for exterminating whole broods, down to the youngest babe, but sixty years of imitating Europe had rather debilitated the national spirit, and there was much criticism of the murder of the child. At the court-martial Amakasu confessed frankly to the murders, saying that Communists were poisonous people and that he was acting for the country's good. The Court, much embarrassed, decreed an adjournment. The two privates were offered rewards and immunity if they would confess to the murder of the child; but such promises are more often broken than kept, and they refused. Amakasu was instructed what to say, and, when the trial was resumed, he said, reluctantly and with his eyes cast down, that he had no recollection of what had happened. The court-martial passed a sentence of imprisonment, from which he was very soon released for special service in Manchuria. In 1932 he was put at the head of a special body of military police, charged with cleaning-up operations, and it was his men who hunted General Ma Chan-Shan's band, and falsely reported that they had killed that Manchurian Hero. They also earned a bad name for themselves by their ruffianly behavior generally. No doubt Amakasu's presence helps the Chinese members of the Goodwill Mission to keep up their enthusiasm for the new regime in Manchuria and guards them against the corruption of "dangerous thought".

#### DEVELOPING CHINA

Japan is so anxious to do good to China that she is not waiting till Manchukuo becomes a paying concern, or even until she has conquered China, before doing a bit of development in the occupied territory. Not that there was any obstruction before, for over half of China's 1,300,000 spindles are owned by Japanese companies, and most of these are now working overtime, though other foreign-owned mills in China generally find all sorts of obstacles to resuming work, and the Chinese mills can only work for Japanese benefit. But one of the results of the occupation has been the formation of the China Raw Silk Reconstruction Company, with a capital of 5,000,000 yen. This will cause much searching of heart among those Japanese silk interests which are not participating in the new venture. Chinese silk, at its best, is superior to Japanese, and the American silk magnates have often cogitated plans for organizing the industry so as to be able to play off the producers against each other. Of late years they have paid less attention to this because they could get silk at what price they liked, owing to the improvements in rayon, and they have told the Japanese producers that, in the last resort, they must find a way to produce their silk as cheaply as rayon. Under Japanese supervision, the Chinese may do this, and if they do, it will be the end of Japanese sericulture, which for some years was the mainstay of Japanese commerce. The Chinese, however, speak of the possibility of "guerrilla industries". In the course of their elaborate organization, the Japanese add considerably to the original cost of any product which they undertake on a large scale, and it is always possible to provide some annoying competition. The Japanese are the first to admit that the Chinese are very formidable competitors. They will find them still more formidable if, as seems extremely likely, prices get out of hand in Japan. The utmost strictness is being exercised in order to check the rise, espec-

ially of daily necessities, in Japan, but every now and then the authorities have to give way on some point, since it is impossible to make traders do business at a loss.

One of the projects for China's benefit is a Japanese Development Corps for China. How far that would go, even if the Japanese won an unconditional victory, would depend a good deal on the Chinese; and as even the easy-going Koreans have never been able to stand as much supervision as the Japanese would like to give them, the Chinese are hardly likely to obey this "corps" with alacrity even for their own "development". However, Mr. Shinji Sogo, who is President either of this or some other plan for developing China is quoted as predicting an economic collapse in China after Hankow is taken. In this collapse, he says, the British will be the greatest sufferers. Perhaps he does not count the Chinese or thinks that they are sufficiently used to suffering not to be included. Of course, Japan is to rebuild on the ruins. But that is emphasised less than the disappearance of the British economic interest. This, after all, is the main thing.

Quite early in the struggle a leading Japanese paper said that it was not China they were fighting but Britain; and from many points of view this is no more than the truth. Yet it shows a somewhat petty impatience. In the natural course of events Japan was gaining ground rapidly, and had become the most important commercial factor in China. It would have taken so little to earn the friendship of China and would have been so profitable. But the necessary degree of patience was not forthcoming. The grab was made in Manchuria, and the results were so disappointing that the army had to go on to something more; it was one of those roads where acceleration is fatally easy.

CHINA INFORMATION SERVICE, Issue No. 12. October 10, 1938. Page 36.

THE CHINA JOURNAL

The China Journal under the direction of a new Board of Editors, has become one of the outstanding magazines published in the Far East and should be read by every person in this country who hopes to keep abreast of political, military, cultural, economic and religious developments in China.

Everyone who has lived in China is thoroughly familiar with The China Journal which has been published for many years in Shanghai by Mr. Arthur de Carle Sowerby. The reputation of the magazine is of the highest but the new editorial blood now injected into the publication will widen its scope of information and interpretation, and deepen its interest and appeal.

Under the reorganization plan, Mr. Arthur Sowerby, the previous editor, and Mrs. Clarice S. Sowerby, the previous manager, founders and proprietors of The China Journal, will continue as collaborators with the new editorial board. Mr. H. J. Timperley, advisory editor of Asia Magazine and China correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, becomes another advisory editor. Mr. Hubert Freyn is editor, Mr. Bruno Kroker, managing editor, Mr. Alexander Buchman, art adviser, and Mr. W. V. D. White, manager and secretary.

Articles in The China Journal are thoroughly authentic. Contributors are the best informed writers and scientists of every nationality throughout the Far East, while the editorial point of view is international. Writers in the last issue, a War Anniversary number, include Messrs. Randall Gould, editor of The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, Arthur de Carle Sowerby, Harry Faxton Howard, Hubert Freyn, Robert F. Fitch, John Ahlers and Rewi Alley. It is profusely illustrated with half-tones, colored maps and a beautiful reproduction in colors, suitable for framing, of a painting by Mr. F. Gerassimoff, called "Kuan Ti, China's God of War, Still Stands Amid Ruins".

The China Journal is the kind of a publication one reads from cover to cover and places on the bookshelf as a permanent work of reference. Regular monthly features and departments include: Events and Comments, Literature and Art, Travel and Exploration, Industry and Finance, Scientific Notes, Shooting and Fishing Notes, and Book Reviews.

The subscription for one year, payable in advance, is US\$6 per year. Offices are located at 117 Hongkong Road, Shanghai. Subscriptions also can be placed through the Journal's representatives in America, Mr. Earl H. Leaf, 33 W. 55th St., New York City.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. August NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
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COMYANGPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS ASHEVILLE  
4TH MARINES



0014. On thirteenth coastal bombardment vicinity Swatow continued. Entrance north channel examined by launches. Three bombs railway station, three warships, ten auxiliaries off port not present on 14th. On fourteenth attackers from Bias Bay occupied Tamshui and area advancing in direction Tungkong Pingau and the Canton-Kowloon Railway as well as to the north towards Waichow. Another landing force at Nimshan is moving northwest towards the Swatow road and Waichow. Increased naval activity Taichow Bay. Sanon air raids one hundred planes battle area and railroads. No train communication Hong Kong. Canton river entrance blocked this date. 2359.

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OCT 17 1938

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MY

FROM

GRAY

Moscow

Dated October 15, 1938

Rec'd 8:50 a.m.



CONFIDENTIAL  
O.N.S. 100-100000

Secretary of State

Washington

359, October 15, noon.

Today's IZVESTIYA carries a special article entitled "The Japanese Invasion of South China" which asserts inter alia that recent events have shown how profoundly mistaken was the point of view of Chamberlain and the British conservatives who hoped to make a friendly agreement with Japan at the expense of China particularly with a view to giving Japan a free hand in the north in return for assurances of non-interference with British interests in South China. The article asserts that it was not the fault of the British bourgeoisie that such an arrangement was not made but that now the "Japanese plunderers have drawn full conclusions from the Anglo-French policy of capitulation to the aggressors in Europe, a policy only clearly demonstrated at Munich. The events in Europe have confirmed the point of view of those representatives of Japanese military circles which have been pointing out that the less consideration is given to Great Britain, the more Great Britain is insulted



793.94/14079

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MY -2- No. 359, October 15, noon, from Moscow

insulted and challenged, the more it will yield and compromise". Japan, the article asserts, has accepted the Munich agreement as a signal for the immediate realization of their plans in South China and the "Japanese military already sees in the offering a new conference similar to that at Munich where the independence and integrity of China will be brought as an offering to the appetite of the aggressors in the name of 'peace at any price'".

KIRK

G'  
CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Foochow/127 FOR #67

FROM Foochow (..... Ward ..... ) DATED Sept 7, 1938  
TO ..... NAME ..... 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict: developments of month of August, 1938.

FRG.

793.94 / 14080

14080

II. Foreign Relations.

A. Relations with the United States.

Nothing to report.

B. Relations with other countries.

1. Japan.

a. Naval actions.

793.94  
(1) Japanese men-of-war. According to the local vernacular press and other reports from Chinese sources, there were from three to five Japanese naval vessels lying outside the mouth of the Min River during most of August, an aircraft carrier being one of their number for some days.

(2) Chinese junks plundered. In spite of Chinese regulations strictly prohibiting their putting out to sea, and in the face of the Japanese blockade, a considerable coastal trade has been kept up between Foochow and various points along the northern Fukien coast by fleets of large Chinese sailing junks. This trade was during August the object of marked attention from the Japanese naval vessels engaged in the maintenance of the blockade.

On August 2 four such Chinese craft encountered a Japanese warship which plundered and burnt two of them, their crews being unaccounted for. The other two junks managed to escape to report the incident. Six days later a flotilla of sixteen Chinese junks was set upon by two Japanese naval vessels, according to a Chinese press report, and completely plundered, whereafter they were burned.

None

None of their crews survived, according to the same reports. The loss sustained by junk and cargo owners was set at above Yuan \$200,000. In a similar attack reported as occurring on August 20, seventeen junks were plundered and destroyed, and, with the exception of some thirty able-bodied men who were made captive, their passengers and crews were all killed. The loss in this instance was estimated at Yuan \$500,000. Several other attacks on Chinese shipping were reported during August, one of which was noteworthy for the fact that the account of it states that the merchant involved and his crew were released unharmed.

(3) Threatened landings. Landings from Japanese men-of-war along the coast of this district appear to have been twice threatened - probably not very seriously - during the month: once near Futsing and the second time off Dionglon. Chinese reports assert that in both cases the defensive preparations of Chinese garrisons discouraged execution of the scheme.

b. Aerial activities. Neither Foochow nor any point in the consular district was bombed during August, and the air-raid alarm sounded only three times in the whole month: on the 27th, the 29th, and the 30th. This unexpected period of comparative repose was regarded in Foochow as being due to the concentration of the Japanese air force in bombing areas in the present war-zone along the Yangtze, and it is probable that the planes which flew over the district

in



in the closing days of the month were headed inland for Nanchang or some other more important objective than this city.

c. Rumors of a planned attack. Although a rumor - which appeared to accord in part with the facts - current in the middle of August was to the effect that the plans of certain Japanese naval commanders for further attacks on the South China coast had been refused the sanction of Tokyo, and that they had been ordered instead to use the force at their command to enforce a more complete blockade, signs of a certain amount of nervousness again became evident at the close of the month, when it was being said that the "navy clique" was continuing its preparations for a further attack on Fukien.

d. More conscription regulations. The conscription regulations of the Province were further tightened by new rules issued on August 21 making the local officials directly responsible in cases in which able bodied-men are found to have been issued documents making it possible for them to leave their native places to evade the draft.

e. Air funds drive. A six-month drive to collect Yuan \$200,000, to be contributed to assist the construction of military aircraft for the Central Government, was begun on August 1 in Foochow.

C. Relations of a General International Character.

Nothing to report.

D.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Shanghai/119 FOR #1657-

FROM Shanghai ( Lockhart ) DATED Sept 8, 1938.  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations: August, 1938. Developments in  
summary.

FRG.

793.94/ 14081

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Sino-Japanese Relations.

793.94  
Military Operations. The Japanese advance against Hankow, after the capture of Kiukiang, developed a spur to the northeast in addition to the main push along the river and to the south. The principal lines of this offensive were directed from Hefei (合肥) and Shusheng (舒城) in Northern Anhwei toward the east in the direction of Hanyang on the Pinghan Railway through mountainous terrain. At the end of the month, severe fighting was reported at Yehkiatsi (叶家集) near the Anhwei-Honan border after the capture of Liuan (六安) and Huoshan (霍山). However, Chinese reports state that they had retaken Susung (宿松), Taihu (太湖) and Tsienshan (潜山) and were threatening to retake

Haining

- 18 -

Hwaining (aking) along a line between the Japanese advance, described above, to the northeast and their main communications along the Yangtze. The Japanese have not denied the Chinese reports of the recapture of Taihu and Taienshan, but nothing more has been heard of the threat to Hwaining. Some slight success was reported to have crowned the Chinese efforts on the Hekiang-Kiangsu border. They are believed to have resulted in the capture of Nanxiang (南乡) between Wuhang (吴兴) (Wushow) and Hanghsien (Hangchow) in Chekiang. The troops responsible for this capture and also for an unsuccessful attack on Suich on the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo line, belong to the newly organized Fourth Army which is gaining considerable strength under the direction of two Communist leaders, Hsiang Ying (项英) and Yeh Ting (叶挺). (16)

During August the Japanese Military Headquarters for the Central China campaign were rumored to be about to be transferred from Shanghai to Nanking, ostensibly to put them closer to their present base of operations upriver, but perhaps also to give more support to the Chinese officials of the "Reformed Government" at Nanking, who are understood now to be more disposed than formerly to take up their duties in Nanking. The notorious General Toihara was reported here during August to advise on methods to strengthen the puppet Government at Nanking. (17)

Guerrilla activities. Wandering bands of armed but not uniformed irregulars continued to operate in areas of this Consular District under Japanese control. Although they made several spectacular raids, three times

appearing

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 16 -

appearing at Hangjao on the borders of the Shanghai Settlement (18) and once actually cutting the Nanking-Hankow Railway for a time, they did not otherwise seriously interfere with the Japanese lines of communications vital to their advance on Hankow.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

FROM

FOURTH MARINES

October 15, 1938

Rec'd 11:35 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF OPNAV

INFO: RUSNOS

AMCON SHANGHAI

COMSUBRON


ASST ALUSNA

SHANGHAI COMDESRON

COM YANGPAT COM SOPAT

AMBASSADOR CHINA STATION SHIP SHANGHAI CHINA

ALUSNA PEIPING



8615 Waichow about seventy miles due east Canton on south bank of East River reported captured today by Japanese force which advanced directly north from landing on Bias Bay. Other troops which turned west from Tamshui reached point approximately twelve miles east Canton Kowloon Railway and ten miles north British leased territory 1835.

CSB

793.94/14082

FILED  
OCT 18 1938

F / PG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

NC

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

GRAY

CHUNGKING via N. R.

Dated October 16, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington, D. C.

495, October 16, 1 p.m.

The last sentence of Hong Kong's October 15, 11 a.m.  
has been repeated to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

JOHNSON

Japanese invasion Bias Bay

HMI  
GEB

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 17 1938  
Department of State

793.94/14083

F/FG

FILED  
OCT 20 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

COMSOPAT

FROM

Dated October 16, 1938

Rec'd 11:40 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: RUSNOS  
COMSUBRON 5  
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS ASHEVILLE  
USS SACRAMENTO  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
USS TULSA  
4TH MARINES  
ALUSNA PEIPING  
COMDESDIV 15.



COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

0017. Severe fighting about Waichow column that moved southwest from Tamihui has occupied Lungkong ten miles from railroad heavy guns and equipment being landed Bias Bay air raids fighting areas and railroads twelve bombs vicinity Wongsha station Canton and six on air field twenty BLP including six mono heavy two engine and four mono FLP sighted 0025.

HTM

793.94/14084

OCT 19 1938  
RECEIVED

F/FG



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NC


4th MARINES

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Rec'd 11:55 a.m.  
October 16, 1938

ACTION: CINCAF  
OPNAV

INFO: RUSNOS  
AMCON SHANGHAI  
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON 5  
COMDESRON 5  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
STASHIP SHANGHAI ALUSNA PEIPING



793.94

793.94/14085

8616 Report state Japanese continue bombing highway  
east of Waichow 300 railway cars loaded with troops report-  
ed destroyed during bombing of Wuchang across river from  
Hankow 1920

CSB

OCT 18 1938

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

NC

COMSOPAT

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. A

Rec'd 11:57 a.m. October  
16, 1938

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: RUSNOS

COMSUBRON 5

ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI

COMDESRON 5

CINCAF

COMYANGPAT

AMAMBASSADOR CHINA

USS ASHEVILLE

USS SACRAMENTO

USS MARBLEHEAD TULSA PEARY PILLSBURY

COMDES DIV 15

4th MARINES

ALUSNA PEIPING



793.94/14086

0015 In Bias Bay area attacking columns from Tamshui  
and Nimshan approaching Waichow the major objective which  
has been heavily bombed the column moving southwest from  
Tamshui toward Pingwu and railroad has occupied Pingshan  
and now advancing on Lungkong air raids railroads and  
fighting zone concentration Waichow 2340.

CSB

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CORRECTED COPY

NC

A portion of this telegram  
must be carefully paraphrased  
before being communicated to  
anyone. (BR)

HONG KONG via N. R.

Dated October 15, 1938

Secretary of State

Washington

October 15, 11 a.m. (Gray)

In continuation of my telegram of October 14, noon

the most reliable information here indicates Japanese  
invasion from Bias Bay continues to progress and that small  
numbers of Japanese troops have landed at various places  
on west side of Kut Peninsula between Namtow and Chapin  
Bay. (End Gray)

Provincial and municipal governments are now reliably  
reported here to be moving from Canton to an unnamed place  
near Kiangsi border where there have previously been  
prepared appropriate radio installations. (Gray)

No considerable numbers of refugees have yet come over  
colony frontier but we are reliably informed that important  
numbers leaving Canton for Macao overland via Chungshan  
district with Hong Kong as probable destination. As our  
only reliable communication with Canton, Hankow, and Chung-  
king is at present via naval radio, I respectfully suggest  
that we have continuously <sup>for? use?</sup> by radio during present emergency  
at least one United States naval vessel to send and receive  
our telegrams. Repeated to Chungking, Canton.

CSB

SOUTHARD

*of paraphrase*  
CONFIDENTIAL  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in conference*

REC'D 6 a.m.  
✓  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
Ch B

793.94/14087

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AC

A portion of this telegram must be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Hong Kong via N. R.

Dated October 15, 1938

FROM Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

October 15, 11 a.m. (Gray)

In continuation of my telegram of October 14, noon, the most reliable information here indicates Japanese invasion from Bias Bay continues to progress and that small numbers of Japanese troops have landed at various places on west side of Kut Peninsula between Namtow and Chapin Bay. (End Gray)

Provincial and municipal governments are now reliably reported here to be moving from Canton to an unnamed place near Kiangsi border where there have previously been prepared appropriate radio installations. (Gray) No considerable numbers of refugees have yet come over colony frontier but we are reliably informed that important numbers leaving Canton for Macao overland via Chungshan district with Hong Kong as probable destination. As our only reliable communication with Canton, Hankow, and Chungking is at present via naval radio, I respectfully suggest that we have continuously by radio during present emergency at least one United States naval vessel to maintain contact with Canton, Hankow, and Chungking, and receive our telegrams. Repeated to Chungking,

emergency

793.94/14087

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AC - 2 - October 15, 11 a.m. from Hong Kong

Emergency at least one United States naval vessel to send  
and receive our telegrams. Repeated to Chungking, Canton.

SOUTHARD

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 15, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hong Kong reads substantially as follows:

In continuation of my telegram of October 14, noon, the most reliable information here indicates Japanese invasion from Bias Bay continues to progress and that small numbers of Japanese troops have landed at various places on west side of Kut Peninsula between Namtow and Chapin Bay.

No considerable numbers of refugees have yet come over colony frontier but we are reliably informed that important numbers are leaving Canton for Macao overland via Chungshan district with Hong Kong as probable destination. As the Consulate General's only reliable communication with Canton, Hankow and Chungking is at present via naval radio the Consul General suggests that he have continuously <sup>on?</sup> <sup>(was?)</sup> by radio during the present emergency at least one United States naval vessel to send and receive the Consulate General's telegrams.

There is reliable information in Hong Kong to the effect that the municipal and provincial governments are departing from Canton for a place near the Kiangsi border, the name of which is not known. Appropriate installations for the use of radio are reported to have already been set up at this place.

FE:EDC:JPS  
 10-17

FE  
 REV

793.94/14087

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (br)

FROM CANTON VIA N.R.

Dated October 15, 1938

Rec'd 11:55 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND W.L.D.  
*in confidence*

October 15, 4 p. m.

Chinese headquarters state severe fighting in progress  
near Nimshan on Swatow Waichow highway near to Bias Bay.  
This attack is directed at Waichow and that place is being  
severely bombed from the air. Another battle is progressing  
between Pinghsan and Lungkong on the road from Tamshui to  
Ping<sup>W</sup>tu, a station on the Canton-Hong Kong Railway. The  
Japanese have occupied Tamshui and are pressing on directly  
toward Waichow.

The Pearl River has been further blocked by the closing  
of the passage at Beddingfield Point. The Chinese estimate  
that the Japanese forces already landed number from ten to  
twenty thousand including Koreans and Formosans.

The Canton Hospital may be closed and the American  
doctors connected with it go to work at Hackett Memorial  
Hospital which is fully American owned.

There are no Americans known to be in the area of fight-  
ing and no American property except the Seventh Day Adventist  
Hospital

793.94/14088

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REB

2- From Canton, Oct.15,4p.m.

Hospital at Waichow whose American staff is in Hong Kong.

Lingnam University is entirely closed; consideration is being given to carrying on some of its classes at Hong Kong. The American faculty, however, wish to keep a number of the American teachers at Lingnam to guard physically the property if the invasion reaches Canton.

Eighty-three Japanese planes in nine groups yesterday bombarded both railways and towns in the zone of hostilities especially Waichow, many casualties reported at latter place.

Mayor has given interview stating Canton will be defended at all costs.

Sent to Chungking.

LINNELL

RR

CSB



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 15, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

On October 14 Waichow and other towns in the area of fighting and both railways were bombed by nine groups of Japanese airplanes totaling eighty-three planes. At Waichow, which suffered especially from the bombing, many casualties were reported.

A Seventh Day Adventist Hospital is at Waichow, The American staff of the hospital is at Hong Kong. This hospital is the only American property in the zone of hostilities and so far as is known there are no American citizens in that zone.

Consideration is being given to the matter of continuing at Hong Kong some of the classes of Lingnam University which is closed entirely. However, it is the desire of the American faculty of Lingnam to retain some of the American teachers at the university for the purpose of affording physical protection to the property in case Canton is invaded.

Canton will be defended regardless of cost, according to an interview given out by the mayor of the city. According to a Chinese estimate, some ten to twenty thousand soldiers, including Formosans and Koreans, have been landed by the Japanese. Closing of the channel at Beddingfield

136  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

field Point has further blocked the Pearl River.

The Japanese have taken Tamshui and are advancing straight on toward Waichow. Heavy fighting is said by Chinese headquarters to be going on in the vicinity of Namshan (near Bias Bay) on the highway between Swatow and Waichow. This advance is directed at Waichow which is receiving severe air bombardment. Between Pingshan and Lungkong on the route from Tamshui to Pingwu\* another battle is being waged. It is possible that the Canton Hospital may be closed and that the American doctors stationed there may work at the entirely American owned Hackett Memorial Hospital.

\* A station on the Canton-Hankow Railway.

793.94/14088.

EGC.  
FE:EGG:JPS  
10-17

MR.  
FE  
REV

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5076

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

FROM

PLAIN

Hong Kong via N. R.

Dated October 15, 1938

Rec'd 11:50 a. m.

793.94  
nch  
793.00

COPIES SENT  
O.N. AND M.I.D.  
D/

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
OCT 15 1938  
WASHINGTON  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 15, 6 p. m.

Telegram to Hong Kong  
WAX  
OCT 15 1938  
B

I have just received the following letter from the  
Japanese Consul General in Hong Kong:

"I have the honor to inform you that I have received  
an instruction from the Minister of Foreign affairs this  
morning to the effect that the Commander-in-Chief of the  
Japanese Expeditionary Forces to South China has requested (#)  
to transmit the following notice to the competent author-  
ities in South China.

Heavy fighting is expected in the near future in a  
zone within the radius of about two hundred kilometers  
around Canton, and another within a radius of about one  
hundred kilometers around Swatow. According to past  
experiences, such as the unfortunate incident involving His  
Excellency Sir Knatchbull-Hugessen, the former British  
Ambassador to China, it is impossible to differentiate from  
air any sign or display drawn or laid down on the top of a  
motor

793.94/14089

F/FG

5077

REB

2- From Hong Kong, Oct.15,6p.m.

motor car. Therefore, all the nationals of the third countries are earnestly requested to refrain from going through the said areas in motor cars.

Japanese forces, not being in a position to guarantee the safe passage of motor cars travelling in the said zones, all the nationals of the third countries are also advised, should circumstances oblige them to travel through these areas in motor cars, to use their own discretion to avoid any possible attack from the Japanese forces.

I should be very much gratified if you would kindly convey this information by telegram to your colleagues in Canton and Swatow."

Sent to Canton, Swatow, repeated to Chungking.

SOUTHARD

GW

(#) Apparent omissions

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5078

PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

## TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒

Collect

Charge Department  
 OR

Department of State

PARTAIR

PLAIN

Charge to

Communicated to anyone before  
*Bm*

Washington, Naval Radio  
 October 18, 1938.  
 6 PM

AMERICAN CONSUL,

HONG KONG. *Via NR.*

Your October 15, 6 p.m., in regard to travel of  
 Americans by motor car in areas of hostilities around Canton  
 and Swatow, *which you should repeat to Peking with this*  
*and reply for relay to Tokyo.*  
 Please reply to the Japanese Consul General that on  
 October 16 the American Ambassador to Japan, in response to  
 two communications, reiterated to the Japanese Foreign Office  
 the previously expressed attitude of the American Government  
 that though American nationals have been and are being advised  
 to take certain measures for their safety and for the protection  
 of their property, and that so far as practicable and reasonable  
 such nationals are doing so, nevertheless obligation to avoid  
 injury to American lives and property rests upon the Japanese  
 military authorities irrespective of whether American nationals  
 do or do not repeat not take such precautionary measures; *and that* the  
 American Ambassador added that the American Government expects  
 scrupulous observance of the assurance given by the Japanese  
 Government that it intends to respect foreign interests and to  
 make the QUOTE best of efforts UNQUOTE to prevent any damage  
 to them.

Repeat to Canton, Swatow and Chungking.

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M. \_\_\_\_\_ 19 \_\_\_\_\_

D. O. R.—No. 80  
 793.94/14089

FE:WAA:REK

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

FE 7/11

PA/H *Sick*

793.94/14089

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

NC

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone. (BR)

HANKOW via N. R.

Dated October 15, 1938

Rec'd 11:40 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence*  
DT

*Ch B*  
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 17 1938  
Department of State  
*m d e*

October 15, 8 p.m.

This office is reliably informed that the Chinese  
intend to make a determined effort to drive northward  
from the Tsen sector to Kiukiang. Certainly the Chinese  
command has sufficient troops at its immediate disposal for  
such an operation but there is a question whether there can  
be achieved the requisite coordination among the field  
units to execute successfully the offensive.

The foregoing is the only note of optimism in a pre-  
vailing atmosphere of pessimism. The public is unaware  
the proposed offensive and the Government apparently  
places slight reliance on it: both are accelerating  
general evacuation.  
CSB

JOSSELYN

793.94/14090

F/FG

13

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 15, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

An air of pessimism prevails in Hankow, the only optimistic note being the reported plan of the Chinese to make a determined attempt to advance northward to Kiukiang from the Tehan sector. This report has been received by the Consul General from a reliable source. The Government which seemingly does not rely greatly on the result of the proposed drive and the public which does not know about it are both hastening general evacuation. Although the Chinese military command has at its immediate disposal enough soldiers to carry out such an offensive the question is whether the field units can be coordinated sufficiently to bring such an operation to a successful termination.

793.94/14090

egc-  
FE:EGC:JPS  
10-17-38

JKP  
FE  
RMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

COMYANGPAT

FROM October 17, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF  
INFO: OPNAV

0517. Unknown number observation planes over Wuhan  
fifteen thirty to sixteen hundred sixteenth, no bombs  
dropped. 0840.

793.94

DDM

COPIES SENT TO  
C.N.I. AND A.I.D.



793.94 / 14091

FILED  
OCT 19 1938

F / FG



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EDA

FOURTH MARINES


October 17, 1938

Received 11:06 a.m.

ACTION CINCAF  
OPNAV  
INFO

RUSNOS  
AMCON SHANGHAI, CHINA  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
ASST ALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
ALUSNA PEIPING

COPIES SENT TO  
Q.N.I. AND M.I.D.



7516. Canton Kowloon Railroad claimed cut fifteen miles north Hong Kong border early morning hours today Japanese troops advancing West Waichow reported reached Poklo sixty one miles east Canton. Japanese reformed Government official killed early today by political assassins New Asia Hotel. Assassin escaped. 1825.

CSB

793. 94/14092

F/FG

FILED  
OCT 20 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone (BR)

CANTON VIA N.R.

Dated October 16, 1938

FROM

Received 3:10 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

October 16, 9 p.m.

Chinese headquarters report severe fighting close to  
Waichow and appear to think it may be taken. Japanese  
columns have advanced via Pingshan on the Waichow Swatow  
highway via roads from Tamshui and from Lungkong which the  
Japanese now hold. The present line of defense runs from  
south of Lokchong to the east of Waichow but the main for-  
tifications in this area are west of Waichow and it is possi-  
ble that the Chinese will abandon Waichow and fall back  
to this line.

Repairs to the Canton Hong Kong railway were nearly  
completed but bombing yesterday and today have done great  
damage and the railway authorities are becoming hopeless  
of restoring communication for the present.

Air bombardment of Canton was resumed today some  
damage done to buildings near Canton Hankow station with  
a number of casualties.

It is reliably reported that about ten Japanese trans-  
ports with landing equipment are en route to South China

from

u

793.94/14093

FRG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EDA - 2 - October 16, 9 p.m. from Canton

from Tangku and other transports are moving south from  
Swatow area; it is thought that these may be destined for  
an attempted landing at the mouth of the Pearl River.  
Repeated to Chungking.

LINNELL

RR:CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

[CONFIDENTIAL]

PARAPHRASE

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram of October 16, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

On October 16 Canton was again bombed. There were a number of casualties and buildings in the vicinity of the Canton-Hankow Railway station were damaged to some extent. Bombings on October 15 and 16 caused considerable damage to the Canton-Hong Kong Railway, repairs on which were almost completed. The authorities of the railway have about given up hope of reestablishing communication for the time being.

According to reliable information there are a number <sup>in or</sup> of Japanese transports/on their way to South China, including ten with landing equipment from Tangku and others proceeding in a southerly direction from the vicinity of Swatow. It is believed that these transports may be used in an effort to land at the mouth of the Pearl River. Japanese troops have gone forward by way of Pingshan on the road between Swatow and Waichow and along highways from Lungkong and Tamshui which are now held by the Japanese. Although the line of defense now runs from a point to the south of Lokchong to a point east of Waichow, the principal fortifications in this region are to the west of Waichow. Heavy fighting near Waichow is reported by Chinese headquarters which seem to be of the opinion that Waichow may be captured. The Chinese may possibly give up Waichow and fall back on the above-described line of defense.

10-18

FE:EGG:HES

JRP.  
FE *cell*

5079

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone (BR)

HONG KONG VIA N.R.

Dated October 17, 1938

Received 7 a.m.

FROM

Secretary of State

Washington

October 17, 2 p.m.

I have just talked with my Japanese colleague who

assures me that the Japanese forces are about to enter  
Pingwu on the Hong Kong-Canton Railway. He also says that  
he thinks there is no intention of landing strong Japanese  
forces from Pearl River in west Kwangtung because forces  
from Bias Bay will easily reach Pearl River in a day or so.  
He also has told me that he has by authorization of his  
Government offered Hong Kong Government to arrange for  
Japanese merchants in Formosa to supply this colony with  
vegetables and other foodstuffs in case of shortage but  
that local government has not yet accepted. He says  
Formosa has plenty of food supplies to spare. My colleague  
telegraphed his Government at the request of Bishop of  
Hong Kong and associated religious representatives for  
delimitation of neutral zone for refugees along the rail-  
way just over the Hong Kong frontier and has had "tacit  
consent" from Tokyo which he has communicated to the  
Bishop here. My colleague very confidentially says he  
knows that there are a number of influential Cantonese

who

793.94/14094

F/Hg

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

5080

EDA - 2 - October 17, 2 p.m. from Hong Kong

who are willing to treat with the Japanese and that some approaches have been made but certain individuals among them are not entirely trusted and that accordingly no negotiations have been definitely entered into.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping.

SOUTHARD

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*b*  
[CONFIDENTIAL]

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 17, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hong Kong reads substantially as follows:

The American Consul General has just received from the Japanese Consul General oral information to the following effect:

Under authorization from the Japanese Government the Japanese Consul General has offered to make arrangements for Japanese merchants in Formosa where there are more than enough supplies of food to send foodstuffs, including vegetables, to the Colony of Hong Kong if there should be a shortage. However, the Hong Kong Government has not as yet accepted this offer.

In response to a request from the Bishop of Hong Kong and associated representatives of religious organizations the Japanese Consul General asked his Government to permit the fixing of a neutral area for refugees along the railway just over the frontier of Hong Kong. The Japanese Government tacitly agreed to this request and the Bishop was so informed.

793.94/14894

Japanese troops are on the verge of entering Pingwu.\* As Japanese troops will arrive at the Pearl River from Bias Bay easily within a couple of days, the

Japanese

\* A station on the Hong Kong-Canton Railway.

1 3 1 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Japanese Consul General believes that the Japanese do not plan to land a large number of soldiers in west Kwangtung from this river.

Some approaches toward negotiations with the Japanese have been made and there are many influential Chinese in Canton who are willing to negotiate. However, no negotiations have been begun as there are some of these Chinese whom the Japanese do not trust entirely. This latter information was given to the American Consul General quite confidentially.

793.94/14094

FE:EC:HES  
10-18

Handwritten initials: *FE* and a signature.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RDA

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone (BR)

HONG KONG VIA N.R.

FROM Dated October 17, 1938

Received 7 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

in confidence DT

October 17, 11 a.m.

793.94

Hong Kong continues to buzz with conflicting news as to Japanese progress from Bias Bay but the best foreign opinion here is that the Chinese have so far shown no promise of effective resistance to Japanese who have consolidated their position at Tamshui and should today or tomorrow reach Lungkong for final drive on the railway. Neither Chinese nor Japanese sources of information here appear to be reasonably reliable. All Japanese announcements here boil down to "we are steadily advancing" and Chinese announcements to "we will fight to last man". Expert opinion here indicates that the Japanese have and will retain complete control of the air because few of the hundreds of Chinese under training for the past few months have been sufficiently amenable to their instructors to qualify as combat pilots. We are not yet able to confirm here whether main Japanese drive is for the rail road or directly on Canton but it is thought that railway is at present the major objectives. There is little doubt that the

793.94/14095

F/HG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EDA - 2 - October 17, 11 a.m. from Hong Kong

the Japanese have landed in at least small numbers on west Kwangtung peninsula and that there are numerous Japanese naval vessels and transports in the Pearl River in that vicinity. Japanese here insist that their forces which landed at Namtao Friday have now straddled railroad but the Chinese deny it. Only a few hundred refugees have so far crossed the frontier into the colony and they include a few Chinese soldiers with rifles.

Repeated to Canton, Chungking, Peiping.

SOUTHARD

RGC:CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PARAPHRASE

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram of October 17, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hong Kong reads substantially as follows:

It does not seem that information coming from Japanese or Chinese sources in Hong Kong can be considered moderately trustworthy. All Chinese statements are to the effect that they will fight to the last and the Japanese statements are that they are going forward steadily. Although Hong Kong is full of contradictory reports in regard to the advance of the Japanese from Bias Bay the foreigners in Hong Kong most competent to express an opinion think that up to this time the Chinese have shown no signs of ability to resist the Japanese effectively. The Japanese have strengthened their position at Tamshui and should arrive at Lungkong on October 17 or 18 for a last offensive on the railway connecting Canton and Hong Kong.

As yet only a few hundred refugees, including a small number of Chinese soldiers carrying rifles, have crossed into the colony of Hong Kong. It seems fairly certain that there are a great many Japanese transports and naval vessels in the Pearl River near the west side of the Kwangtung peninsula and that at least a small number of troops have been landed in that area. The Chinese deny the claim of the Japanese that Japanese troops

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

troops which landed on October 14 at Nantao have now taken up positions astride the railway. Hundreds of Chinese have been receiving air training for the last few months but on account of unresponsiveness to their instructors only a small percentage of them have been able to qualify as combat pilots and for this reason the Japanese are now and will remain in full control of the air, in the opinion of experts in Hong Kong.

Although it is believed that the railway is the principal objective of the Japanese at the present time, the Consul General has not been able to learn definitely whether this is the case or whether they will advance directly on Canton.

793.94/14095

egc.  
FEHGC:HES  
10-18

FE

REB

A portion of **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**  
this telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (br)

CANTON VIA N.R.

FROM Dated October 17, 1938

Rec'd 8:12 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

October 17, 2 p. m.

Chinese admit loss of Waichow and Poklo.

Following strictly confidential:

A small section of local troops in the vicinity of  
Waichow traitorously yielded to Japanese and the leaders  
have been shot by order of the Chinese command ~~to~~; The  
latter say this incident is ended and that they can hold  
the main defense line back of Waichow.

Intensive bombing of the Canton-Hong Kong Railway  
continues especially at ~~Cheungmuklan~~ *Cheungmuklan*. The main bridges  
at Shekki are still being defended by anti-aircraft guns  
and are still safe.

(PLAIN) The following Americans left this morning  
for Hong Kong via Shekki and Macao:

Mr.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*strict confidence*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
18 1938  
Department of State  
*Ch B*  
*m file*

793.94

793.94/14096

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

REB

2- From Canton, Oct. 17, 2p.m.

Mr. and Mrs. Ernest August Wagner and two children,  
Mrs. Roy Pierson, Mrs. Francis True; also Father Linesch  
from Hankow and Miss Agnes Thonstad from the Lutheran  
United Mission.

Sent to Chungking. (END PLAIN)

LINNELL

EMB

ROW

138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

[CONFIDENTIAL]

PARAPHRASE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

An urgent telegram of October 17, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

The Canton-Hong Kong Railway, especially at Cheungmuktau is still under heavy bombardment. Anti-aircraft guns are still protecting the principal bridges at Shekai which are safe as yet. The fall of Poklo and Waichow is admitted by the Chinese.

*Strictly Confidential*

The leaders of a small body of local troops near Waichow which surrendered treasonably to the Japanese were shot under instructions from the Chinese command which states that the incident is closed. The principal line of defense back of Waichow can be held by the Chinese forces, according to the Chinese command.

On the morning of October 17 the following Americans left for Hong Kong via Shekai and Macao:

Mr. and Mrs. Ernest August Wagner and two children, Mrs. Roy Pierson, Mrs. Francis True; also Father Linesch from Hankow and Miss Agnes Thonstad from the Lutheran United Mission.

793.94/14096

290.  
FE:EGG:HES  
10-18

HE  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW



COMSOPAT

FROM

October 18, 1938

Rec'd 6 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: RUSNOS  
COMSUBRON 5  
ALUSNA PEIPING  
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS ASHEVILLE  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
USS TULSA  
COMDESDIV 15  
4TH MARINES



793.94/14097

0017. Waichow and Poklo occupied on main advance forces also proceeding along East River towards Sheklung, column from Tamshui and Lungkong has reached vicinity Kowloon Canton Railroad at Pingwu air raids fighting areas and railroads with concentration Poklo and towns on line Waichow Sheklung thirteen bombs Whampoa section six air field Canton twenty-five BLP four FLP sighted railroad highway telephone telegraph Canton Hong Kong interrupted large scale departure civilians from Canton. 2355.

DDM

FILED  
OCT 20 1938

F/A



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS


FROM

FOURTH MARINES

October 18, 1938

Rec'd 10:08 a.m.

ACTION CINCAF  
OPNAV



793.94

INFO: OPNAV  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
ASST ALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
STATION SHIP SHANGHAI  
ALUSNA PEIPING



0618. No changes in South China or Yangtze sectors,  
Japanese troops south of Shangcheng near Hupch, Honan  
border claim have crossed watershed Tapien Mountains now  
driving down slopes toward Macheng. 1850

793.94/14093

FILED  
OCT 20 1938

F/A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
\$

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒

PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Naval Radio

Washington,

October 15, 1938

3P

793.94

AMERICAN CONSUL,  
HONG KONG.

Your/and/Canton's/telegrams/in regard to/south/China/  
situation,are very/helpful./ You will/of course/continue/  
to/interchange/between/your/offices/such/messages/and to/  
repeat/them/to/Chungking./ In addition,/so long/as/naval/  
radio/facilities/are available,/please/repeat/messages/to/  
Peiping/for relay/in/whole/or in/substance/to Tokyo./ When/  
naval/radio/is not/available,/information/of/importance/  
should be/telegraphed to/Shanghai/for/repetition/by/  
Shanghai/to the/offices/mentioned./

Repeat to/Canton/for its/guidance/and to/Chungking/  
and/Peiping/for information./

Hull  
(M.D.S.)

FE:RCM:MMH:DT

FE

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/14098A

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5081

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated October 17, 1938

Rec'd 6:57 p.m. OCT 18 1938

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DT

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1344, October 17, 6 p.m.

Following is text of letter received today.


"Japanese Embassy in China. Shanghai October 15, 1938.

Numbered GO 8. Your Excellency, I have the honor to inform you that I have been requested by the Japanese naval authorities to transmit to Your Excellency the enclosed memorandum.

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, Your Excellency's obedient servant, Masayuki Tani, Minister Plenipotentiary. His Excellency Mr. Nelson Trusler Johnson, American Ambassador to China, Chungking."

Two. The memorandum mentioned is as follows: "(1) it is a matter for gratification that owing to the wholehearted and sympathetic cooperation given by third power authorities in complying with the request made to them by the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Fleet on June 11 and June 12 relative to the movements of neutral vessels on the Yangtze River, there has arisen no untoward question in the zone of hostilities above Wuhu such as might impair friendly relations with any third power. For the friendly consideration

and



793.94/14099

F/A

5082

-2- 1344, October 17, 6 p.m., from Shanghai.

and understanding thus shown by the various powers, the Commander-in-Chief is deeply grateful.

(2) Although the number of mines already destroyed by the Japanese fleet units in their military operations on the Yangtze far exceeds one thousand, even greater efforts must be made to remove the danger from this source as the season of receding water of the Yangtze approaches. There is also the danger from the activities of Chinese soldiers along the bank, whose attacks are directed for the most part against hospital ships and unarmed transports. The greatest tactical difficulty our fleet has encountered in its efforts to eliminate the danger from such attacks of the enemy along the bank has been the necessity of ascertaining, before launching an attack, whether there was not some neutral vessels or buildings located in close proximity to the enemy's position, - a necessity which has not infrequently caused us to miss the most opportune moment for the attack.

The zone of intensive fighting, which we intimated in our earlier communication has been in the Yangtze basin below Hwangshihkang, has now moved upstream to the region between Hwangshihkang and Hankow and its vicinity. Desiring to avoid the occurrence of any unpleasant and mutually

regrettable

5083

-3- 1344, October 17, 6 p.m., from Shanghai.

regrettable incident, we beg to request the powers concerned, with due consideration to the position of the Imperial Japanese fleet, to cause their respective vessels to seek refuge upstream from Hankow and to take such measures as may be necessary to prevent the use of any buildings belonging to their respective nationalities, as well as areas immediately adjacent to such buildings, by the Chinese for military purposes.

(3) Although, with regard to the misuse of third power as above set forth by the Chinese in ways calculated to give rise to needless questions which it is the desire of the third powers and Japan alike to avoid, we requested the powers concerned on an earlier occasion to vigorously protest against such misuse by the Chinese, it has become apparent to us that the Chinese are now even more unscrupulous than before in this nefarious practice. It is therefore hoped that the powers concerned will give this matter their further consideration. It is the intention of the Imperial Japanese fleet authorities to treat as Chinese property, in accordance with the law, any property such as wharves, hulks, et cetera, whenever it appears to us manifest that the Chinese have hoisted a third power flag over a property which is not completely neutral property.

(4)

5084

-4- 1344, October 17, 6 p.m., from Shanghai.

(4) Appreciation has already been expressed of the steps taken by the Standard Oil Company to comply with our request regarding measures to be taken to render neutral ships easily recognizable. We are grateful also to the British naval authorities for the step they have since taken to paint the awnings of their gunboats on the Yangtze in special colors which, according to the experience of our air units, have rendered those vessels more distinguishable than before. And to the authorities of the other powers concerned, we desire to ask that the undertaking of the Imperial Japanese fleet that the flag painted on the awning is not, by itself, adequate for the purpose be given their sympathetic reconsideration, and to reiterate the request that some suitable way be devised.

(5) The Chinese have constructed two additional booms, one below Shihhweiyao and another above it, thereby stopping all river traffic at those points. Although a passage necessary for military purposes will be opened through these booms as soon as they have fallen into our hands, such openings, as in the case of the Matung boom, cannot be made available for use by any vessels other than our naval vessels and military transports until such time as the Commander-in-Chief considers that the operations of the Japanese forces will no longer

5085

-5- 1344, October 17, 6 p.m., from Shanghai.

longer be hampered thereby.

(6) The Japanese authorities greatly appreciate the information which the various powers have hitherto given regarding the location and movements of their vessels on the Yangtze above Kiukiang. And now that the hostilities are progressing into the vicinity of Hankow, it is hoped that the powers which have not before given us such information in detail will do so.

It is requested that liaison with the Imperial Japanese naval authorities be maintained, as heretofore, through the naval representatives stationed at Shanghai."

Three. The letter and memorandum above quoted also formed enclosures to a letter dated October 15 from the Japanese Consul General to the senior consul, and later circulated by him, reading as follows:

"Number 12. Sir and dear colleague, I have the honor to send you herewith enclosed a copy of a letter of Mr. M. Tani, under today's date, addressed to his colleagues.

I should be grateful if you would be good enough to take necessary steps at your earliest convenience to circulate the same to our honorable colleagues with the request that contents of the same be brought as soon as possible to the notice of the interested parties of the respective powers.

Sent

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

5086

-6- 1344, October 17, 6 p.m., from Shanghai.

Sent to Chungking, repeated to Hankow, copy to  
Admiral Yarnell, by mail to Peiping and Tokyo.

GAUSS

WLP



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5087

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to

Department of State

X NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE X

PARTIAL

PLAIN

Charge to

Washington, NAVAL RADIO

Charge to

October 18, 1938.

6 PM

AMEMBASSY,

CHUNGKING (China). Via NR

RUSH. 793.94/14099

2701  
Shanghai's 1344, October 17, 6 p.m.

The Department suggests for your consideration that the letter quoted in Shanghai's telegram under reference might be filed without acknowledgment or that you might reply to the letter simply with a reference to your reply to Mr. Tani's letter of June 11 and a tactfully worded statement that your attitude and that of the American Commander in Chief continue to be as outlined therein; <sup>and if you</sup> ~~should you~~ consider that a reply is called for the Department would appreciate being informed of the substance thereof prior to its communication to Mr. Tani. <sup>contemplated</sup>

The Department is confident that in this <sup>connection</sup> ~~matter~~ you and the Commander in Chief will bear in mind its 177, June 13, 11 p.m., with regard to the <sup>unfortunate consequences of unintended</sup> ~~matter of~~ publicity. Please also refer to Department's 214, July 24, 1 p.m. <sup>811.30 AF/HLO</sup>

Please confer with Admiral Yarnell and inform the Department of his and your views.

FE:TCV:EJL

FE

PA/H

Hull

SKH

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/14099

E/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone (BR)

FROM

HANKOW VIA N.R.

Dated October 17, 1938

Received 6 a.m. 18th

Secretary of State

Washington

October 17, 8 p.m.

The proposed counter attack mentioned in my October  
15, 8 p.m., has not materialized.

A high general staff officer stated this evening that  
he considered the Japanese threat to the south Hupeh section  
of the Canton-Hankow Railway as being very serious. The  
Japanese objective is believed to be Sianning and they are  
said to be about 20 miles from the railroad. A part of  
the general staff is therefore withdrawing tonight presum-  
ably to Changsha or Hengchow.

Repeated to Peiping, Chungking.

JOSSELYN

RGC

793.94/14100

F/A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 17, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

On the evening of October 17 a high ranking officer of the general staff expressed the opinion that the threat of the Japanese to the south Hupeh section of the Canton-Hankow Railway was a very serious one. It is reported that the Japanese are about twenty miles from the railway and their objective is believed to be Sianning. Therefore, a portion of the general staff is leaving Hankow presumably for Hengchow or Changsha. An advance northward to Kiukiang from the Tehan sector which the Chinese were reported to be planning (see Hankow's telegram of October 15) has not taken place.

793.94/14100.

29C.  
 FE:ECJ:JPS  
 10-19

WFE  
 RW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CORRECTED COPY

RAW

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

FROM

Hong Kong via N.R.

Dated October 18, 1938

Rec'd 10:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

October 18, 3 p.m.

Principal development here today is apparent confirmation of Japanese occupation of Canton-Hong Kong Railway from frontier to Shangkun station. Best local information and opinion also confirms Japanese claim to occupation, except for mopping up, of entire territory around and from Bias Bay north to East River and west to Pearl River. Local Japanese opinion expects occupation of Canton within a week and local British military opinion is that while the Chinese have great numbers of reasonably well equipped troops for defense of Canton the quality of the leaders is very poor and will not permit organization of sustained effective resistance. Certain local Japanese source claims Chinese leadership poor partly because undermined by percentage of leaders who have been reached by Japanese influence. Please see my despatch no. 149 and 150 of April 1 and 2, 1938. Chinese here who are usually well informed say they can learn nothing from Kwangtung authorities who seem dazed and without precise information and newspapermen of various nationalities confirm this.

793.94/14101

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- October 18, 3 p.m., from Hong Kong.

this. I asked the Hong Kong Colonial Secretary if provisions would be obtained by this Government from Formosa as offered by the Japanese Consul General and his reply was facetious and in the negative. Hong Kong businessmen and officials appear philosophic about injury to Hong Kong from cutting of connections with Canton.

Repeated to Canton, Chungking, Peiping.

SOUTHARD

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

FROM

Hong Kong via N.R.

Dated October 18, 1938


Rec'd 10:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

October 18, 3 p.m.

Principal development here today is apparent confirmation of Japanese occupation of Canton-Hong Kong Railway from frontier to Shuklung station. Best local information and opinion also confirms Japanese claim to occupation, except for mopping up, of entire territory around and from Bias Bay north to East River and west to Pearl River. Local Japanese opinion expects occupation of Canton within a week and local British military opinion is that while the Chinese have great numbers of reasonably well equipped troops for defense of Canton the quality of the leaders is very poor and will not permit organization of sustained (?) resistance. Certain local Japanese source claims Chinese leadership (?) partly because (?) by (?) leaders who have been reached by Japanese influence. Please see my despatch NO. 149 and 150 of April 1 and 2, 1938. Chinese here who are usually well informed say they can learn nothing from Kwangtung authorities who seem dazed and without precise information and newspapermen of various nationalities confirm this. I asked the Hong Kong Colonial



793.94/14101

OCT 25 1938

F/A  
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- October 18, 3 p.m., from Hong Kong.

Colonial Secretary if provisions would be obtained by this Government from Formosa as offered by the Japanese Consul General and his reply was facetious and in the negative. Hong Kong businessmen and officials appear philosophic about injury to Hong Kong from cutting of connections with Canton.

Repeated to Canton, Chungking, Peiping.

SOUTHARD

CSB

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 18, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hong Kong reads substantially as follows:

In response to an inquiry from the American Consul General whether the Hong Kong Government would accept the offer of the Japanese Consul General to make arrangements for Japanese merchants in Formosa to send food-stuffs to Hong Kong the Colonial Secretary made a negative, facetious reply. Officials and business men in Hong Kong seem to take a philosophic attitude with regard to injuries to Hong Kong resulting from the severing of the connections between Canton and Hong Kong.

Newspapermen of various nationalities confirm information received from usually well-informed Chinese in Hong Kong to the effect that Kwangtung authorities appear to be stunned and without definite information and that nothing can be learned from them.

The seeming confirmation of the occupation by the Japanese of the Canton-Hong Kong Railway from the frontier to the station at Sheklung was the main development in Hong Kong on October 18. According to the most reliable opinion and information obtainable in Hong Kong, the claim of the Japanese that they have occupied all the territory around and from Bias Bay north and west to the East and Pearl Rivers respectively, except for mopping up,

is



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

is true. It is the opinion of Japanese in Hong Kong that Canton will fall within a week. The opinion of the British military in Hong Kong is to the effect that, although there are a great number of Chinese troops reasonably well equipped to defend Canton, organization of prolonged effective resistance will not be possible on account of the poor quality of the leaders. According to certain Japanese sources in Hong Kong the leadership of the Chinese is poor, partly on account of the fact that it has been insidiously weakened by a percentage of leaders who have fallen under the influence of the Japanese. Reference is made to despatches No. 149 and 150 of April 1 and April 2, 1938, from the Consul General at Hong Kong.

793.94/14101.

898.  
 FE:EGC:JPS  
 10-20-38

FE  
new

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

CORRECTED COPY  
A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (BR)

CANTON VIA N.R.

Dated October 18, 1938

Received 9:51 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

October 18, 4 p.m.

The Exchange Department of the Central Bank of China has moved to Hong Kong and the office of the bank in Canton is closed. The authorities are <sup>expediting</sup> the evacuation of women and children and old people by today putting ten busses on a run to Fayuen and Chungfa.

Arrangements have been made if the Japanese come to Canton to place a naval sentry at the gate of Hackett Memorial Hospital where most of the American doctors here will collect for service.

BEGIN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Canton Hong Kong Railway officials say the Chinese military have blown up the railway bridge at Tongtoha midway between Pingwu and Cheung Muktau and one of the bridges at Sheklung and, that the Japanese have destroyed from the air a small bridge about 10 miles south of Sheklung. END STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Chinese troops have evacuated school building close to Hackett Memorial Hospital after repeated representations to military authorities. The Chinese continue to deny that  
the

793.94/14102

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3/26/37

EDA - 2 - October 18, 4 p.m. from Canton

the Japanese forces have reached the railroad at any point and they also deny that there has yet been any serious attempt by the Japanese to land at Namtau or elsewhere at the mouth of the Pearl River.

They assert that they are holding their long prepared and fortified line of defense which runs from Sheklung to Tsingchoin mountains separating the plain of the East River from the lowlands about Canton.

There is great congestion at Shekki of refugees trying to get passage by bus to Macao and if the Hong Kong Consulate General could arrange special trip of busses or automobiles from Macao to Shekki to take evacuated Americans sent to Shekki by this Consulate General it would be of the greatest assistance. (PLAIN) Left for Shekki: Miss Lynn Lee Shew; Letitia Left Too (Mrs. P. O. Wen Huang) was name of woman cabled as Mrs. Francis True (END PLAIN).

Repeated to Peiping, Chungking, Hong Kong.

LINNELL

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 18, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

As a result of repeated representations made by the Consul General to the military authorities, Chinese soldiers have evacuated a school building near the Hackett Memorial Hospital.

The Chinese declare that they are maintaining their line of defense which has been prepared and fortified for a long time. This line of defense extends from Sheklung to Tsingehoin mountains dividing the plain of the East River from the lowlands surrounding Canton.

The Chinese still deny that the Japanese have made any serious effort to land troops at Nantau or at any other point along the mouth of the Pearl River, and they deny also that Japanese troops have arrived at any point on the railroad. According to information received from officials of the Canton-Hankow Railway, a small bridge about ten miles to the south of Sheklung has been destroyed by Japanese air bombardment, and one of the bridges at Sheklung and the railway bridge at Tongtoha, halfway between Cheungmuktau and Pingwu have been blown up by the Chinese military.

Strictly Confidential

The office in Canton of the Central Bank of China is closed and the exchange department of the Bank has been moved to Hong Kong. On October 18 ten busses were

put

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

put in service from Canton to Fayuen and Chungfa by the authorities in order to make easier the evacuation of women, children, and the aged. If the American Consul General at Hong Kong could arrange for a special automobile or bus service to Shekki from Macao to carry evacuated Americans which the Consul General at Canton sends to Shekki it would be very helpful as there is a great congestion of refugees at Shekki attempting to get transportation to Macao by bus. Left for Shekki: Miss Lynn Lee Shew; Letitia Left Too (Mrs. P. O. Wen Huang) was name of woman cabled as Mrs. Francis True.

In case the Japanese come to Canton most of the American doctors will gather for service at the Hackett Memorial Hospital and arrangements have been made to station a naval sentry at the gate of the Hospital in this event.

793.94/14102.

*sqc.*  
FE:EGG:JPS  
10-20-38

*HJP.*  
FE  
*per*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

A portion of this telegram **FROM**  
must be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated to  
anyone. (Br)

Canton via N.R.


Dated October 18, 1938

Rec'd 9:51 a.m.

*Telegram to Canton*

Secretary of State,

Washington.



October 18, 4 p.m.

793.94  
The Exchange Department of the Central Bank of China  
has moved to Hong Kong and the office of the bank in Canton  
is closed. The authorities are (?) the evacuation of women  
and children and old people by today putting ten busses on a  
run to (?) Yuen and Chung <sup>Ga</sup> *continuing* <sup>Ping</sup> *Wuktau*.

Arrangements have been made if the Japanese come to  
Canton to place a naval sentry at the gate of Hackett Memorial  
Hospital where most of the American doctors here will collect  
for service.

BEGIN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Canton Hong Kong Railway  
officials say the Chinese military have blown up the railway  
bridge at Tong <sup>Gow</sup> (?) Ha midway between <sup>Ping</sup> (?) Wu and Cheung Wuktau  
and one of the bridges at Sheklung and, that the Japanese  
have destroyed from the air a small bridge about 10 miles  
south of Sheklung. END STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Chinese

793.94/14102

F/A

-2- October 18, 4 p.m., from Canton.

Chinese troops have evacuated school building close to Hackett Memorial Hospital after repeated representations to military authorities. The Chinese continue to deny that the Japanese forces have reached the railroad at any point and they also deny that there has yet been any serious attempt by the Japanese to land at Namtau or elsewhere at the mouth of the Pearl River.

They assert that they are holding their long prepared and fortified line of defense which runs from Sheklung to Tsingchoin mountains separating the plain of the East River from the lowlands about Canton.

There is great congestion at Shekki (?) refugees trying to get by bus to Macao and if the Hong Kong Consulate General could arrange special trip of busses or <sup>Shueki</sup> (?) <sup>Shueki</sup> to take evacuated Americans sent to <sup>Shueki</sup> (?) by this Consulate General it would be of the greatest <sup>assistance</sup> (?). (PLAIN) Left for Shekki: Miss Lynn Lee Shew; Letitia Left Too (Mrs. P. O. Wen Huang) was name of woman cabled as Mrs. Francis True (END PLAIN).

/ Repeated to Peiping, Chungking, Hong Kong.

LINNELL

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Blustein NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

October 15, 1938.

1938 OCT 18 AM 11 57

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

Mr. Secretary.



Japanese-Chinese Hostilities  
Public Opinion and High Policy.

793.94  
not  
741.93

The following interesting "outline of policy" was circulated some months ago in certain British circles for consideration with a view to adoption as a "Statement of Policy" by the (British) "China Campaign Committee".

"Statement of Policy"

"We believe that the British Government and the British people should support the Chinese people in their struggle against Japanese aggression:

BECAUSE the people of China have been for years trying to rebuild their country and to re-organise their society. In December, 1937, when China's unity was restored, great possibilities were opened up for further advances. The Japanese militarists are seeking to destroy all China's progress in industry and education.

BECAUSE Japan's war on China and her violation of treaties is a threat to world peace and the whole system of world security. An attack on one people is a threat to all peoples. By her threat to Britain, the British Dominions, the United States and the U.S.S.R. in the Far East Japan

is

793.94/14103

F/FG  
14103



- 2 -

is helping the aggressive powers in Europe.

BECAUSE to defeat Japan would not only bring world peace nearer and allow China to continue to develop in freedom, but would enable the Japanese people to throw off their present oppressive and dictatorial government and establish friendly relations with other powers and peoples in the Pacific.

BECAUSE a Japanese victory would mean intensive exploitation of the Chinese people and a consequent flooding of the world markets with fresh supplies and cheap goods to the detriment of the standard of life of this and other countries. A Chinese victory would mean that China would need assistance in building her industry and communications. Her custom would bring work to many parts of Britain.

Further, as Manchuria did not satisfy Japan, the conquest of China would only lead to further wars, while a Chinese victory would mean that all the countries of the Pacific could live without fear of war.

BECAUSE the Japanese methods of war, their wanton bombing and persecution of civilians is an offence against all human decency."

5147

PA/H:SKH:REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Chute NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

COMSOPAT

FROM

October 19, 1938

Rec'd 6 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: RUSNO SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
AST ALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
AM AMBASSADOR CHINA  
ASHEVILLE  
SACRAMENTO MARBLEHEAD  
TULSA  
COMDESDIV 15  
4TH MARINES  
ALUSNA PEIPING



COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
DT

0018. Fighting vicinity Poklo Japanese consolidating advances landing additional forces Bias Bay increased Chinese resistance air raids fighting zones and railroads with concentration Poklo Sheklung areas ten bombs air field nine Saichuen section Canton fifteen BLP six FLP sighted intermittent communication via launches and passenger junks to Shekki bus to Macao thence steamer to Hong Kong 2350.

DDM

793.94/14104

F/FQ

OCT 20 1938

RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

This telegram was received FROM  
in Navy Code and must be  
closely paraphrased before  
being communicated to any-  
one.


COMYANGPAT

October 19, 1938

Rec'd 7 30m

CINCAF,

Navy Department.



793.94  
0018. Tunnel on Pinghan at Wushenkwan 104 miles north  
Hankow blown up but believed Japs proceeding south via pass  
to westward. 2215.

DDM

793.94/14105

FILED  
OCT 22 1938

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

opo

FROM

GRAY

Tokyo via Shanghai and N.R.

Dated October 17, 1938

Reg'd 6 a.m., 19th

Secretary of State

Washington.

672, October 17, 3 p.m.



Our 577, September 5, 3 p.m., and 594, September 12,  
noon, Hankow safety zone.

Following is a translation of a note verbale dated  
October 14, received October 16, from the Foreign Office:

"The Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its  
compliments to the American Embassy in Tokyo and has the  
honor to acknowledge the receipt of the latter's note verbale  
dated September 12, 1938, in which the views of the American  
Government concerning the safety of the rights and interests  
of third countries in a specified area at Hankow were set  
forth.

In the above-mentioned note verbale, the American Govern-  
ment urgently requested that the Japanese authorities so con-  
duct their military operations in China as to avoid injury  
to the lives and property of American nationals. The fact  
that the Imperial military forces are already, to as great  
an extent as possible, strictly adhering to a policy of

giving



793.94/14106

F/EG

5089

-2- 672, October 17, 3 p.m., from Tokyo.

giving consideration to the safety of the lives and property of the nationals of third countries has previously been made clear by frequent communications and public statements by the Japanese Government, and has been substantiated by past examples. Accordingly, even if a lack of concurrence and cooperation on the part of the Chinese authorities should unhappily prevent the implementation of the arrangement between the Japanese Government and the powers concerned looking toward the safety of the lives and property of the nationals of third countries as a whole in a specified area in Hankow, there will be, of course, no change in the policy followed up to the present.

When the Chinese military utilize the rights and interests of third countries for military operations, that is, when they offer military resistance from points in close proximity to such interests or use such interests as cover, it becomes practically impossible to avoid the occurrence of unforeseen damage to the rights and interests of third countries. Nevertheless, according to reports from all sources, the Chinese military are utilizing the rights and interests of third countries, within and without the area in question, they are building military emplacements, and they are storing arms, ammunitions, military supplies, et cetera. It is important that the powers concerned, if they are

5090

-3- 672, October 17, 3 p.m., from Tokyo.

are desirous of securing the safety of those interests, should take effective and appropriate measures to prevent acts of the Chinese forces which can be anticipated to jeopardize or injure such rights and interests. If, on the contrary, measures which should appropriately be taken are not taken, and the powers concerned demand of the Japanese Government alone satisfaction in regard to the results of damages to rights and interests, such demands cannot be said to be just. For this reason the Imperial Government must continue to hold the view, as set forth in its note verbale dated September 3, 1938, that in such circumstances the Japanese Government cannot assume responsibility for damages to rights and interests. October 14, 1938."

Repeated to Chungking and Hankow.

GREW

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (BR)

FROM

HONG KONG VIA N.R.

Dated October 19, 1938

Received 8:18 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

October 19, 11 a.m.

Reasonably reliable British and other information

available here indicates Japanese continue mopping up in area mentioned in my telegram of October 18, 3 p.m., and continue slowly advancing along East ~~the South~~ River towards Canton without meeting importantly effective Chinese opposition. One column reported 40 miles northeast of Canton. Advance expected to speed up in the direction of Canton as soon as fresh troops and supplies arrive from Bias Bay where landing facilities have been greatly improved. Estimated here that more than 50,000 first class Japanese troops with full equipment have now been landed and gone inland from Bias Bay. Best sources here continue to indicate inefficiency of Chinese leadership at Canton at least partly due to jealousy between political and military notables, and Japanese occupation of Canton is thought to be a matter of days only with November 3, as final date for completion of occupation. Chinese here think

WRB  
5/23/59

793.94/14107

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EDA - 2 - October 19, 11 a.m. from Hong Kong

think Wu Te Chen is nullifying efforts of Yu Han Mou to organize military resistance at Canton. Only travel between Canton and Hong Kong is now river steamer to Macao, motor road to Shekki and thence to Canton by motorboat with average of 24 hours to complete somewhat difficult journey one way. Land wire to Yunnanfu is definitely cut and any telegrams we send there must be by wireless.

Repeated to Canton, Chungking, Peiping.

SOUTHARD

WWC:CSB



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 19, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hong Kong reads substantially as follows:

The only way that travel is carried on now between Canton and Hong Kong is by river steamer to Macao, motor road to Shekki, and motor boat from Shekki to Canton. An average of twenty-four hours is required to make the rather difficult trip one way. Any telegrams which the Consul General at Hong Kong sends to Yunnanfu must go by wireless due to the definite cutting of the land wire to that city.

30,000 first class Japanese troops fully equipped have now been disembarked and proceeded inland from Bias Bay according to estimates in Hong Kong. Information available in Hong Kong, including that received from reasonably reliable British sources, is to the effect that the Japanese continue to mop up the entire area around and from Bias Bay north to the East River and west to the Pearl River, and that they are continuing to advance slowly along the East River in the direction of Canton without meeting effective Chinese opposition of importance. Landing facilities at Bias Bay have been much improved and as soon as fresh supplies and troops come from there it is expected that the Japanese

advance

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

advance in the direction of Canton will be hastened. It is reported that one column of Japanese troops has arrived at a point forty miles northeast of Canton.

Chinese in Hong Kong are of the opinion that attempts made by Yu Han Mou to organize military resistance at Canton are being nullified by Wu Te Chen. It is believed that it will be only a matter of days before the Japanese take Canton with the final day for completion of occupation November 3. According to the best information available in Hong Kong there still exists inefficiency on the part of Chinese leadership at Canton which is due to some extent at least to jealousy between military and political persons of high rank.

793.94/14107.

*egc.*  
FE:EGC:JPS  
10-20-38

*JKP*  
FE  
*BCU*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

FOURTH MARINES

FROM

October 19, 1938

Rec'd 1:20 p.m.

ACTION: CINCAF OPNAV

INFO: RUSNOS

ANCON SHANGHAI

COMSUBRON 5

ASSTALUSNA SHANGHAI

COMDESRON 5

COMYANGPAT

COMSOPAT

AMEMBASSADOR CHINA

ALUSNA PEIPING C

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 20 1938

Department of State

9619. Sheklung outskirts reported reached Canton  
Kowloon Railroads from this city south to Cheungmuktao now  
said Japanese controlled Japanese detachments said proceed-  
ing west from railroads toward Bocca Tigris forts. South  
of Yangtze Chinese troops retreating from Yangshien directly  
west and northwest toward Tayeh claimed harrassed by  
Japanese land and air forces 1833.

CSB

793.94/14108

FILED

NOV 21 1938

F/R

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 893.00/14267 FOR Telegram #-, 2 p.m.

FROM Hankow ( Josselyn ) DATED Oct. 14, 1938.  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Attitude of General Chiang Kai Shek toward Government and Kuomintang officials is one of exasperation; upbraiding officials as failures and declaring them unworthy of their positions. Morale of headquarters has been depressed, due to poor showing made at Sinyang and drives on the Canton-Hankow line.

aa

793.94 / 14109

14109-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 393.1163 Augustana Synod Mission/28 FOR Tel-; 10am

FROM Hankow (Josselyn) DATED Oct 17, 1938.  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Hsuechang heavily bombed by Japanese planes, today, damaging  
American mission property, notwithstanding distinct national-  
ity markings.

FRG.

793.94/14110

14110

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~EE~~  
~~FE~~

Noted  
793.94

RAW

PLAIN

American Embassy Chungking

Hankow via N.R.

American Embassy Peiping

Dated October 17, 1938

American Consul Shanghai

Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

October 17, 10 a.m.

Following telegram dated October 15 from Benson Hsuchang Honan "Jap planes today bombed Hsuchang heavily, seriously damaged Augustana Synod, city property though well marked and beflagged damage four thousand Chinese dollars, no foreign casualties, Chinese considerable". Map sent Shanghai June 15 acknowledged June 28. Shanghai repeat Tokyo.

JOSSELYN

DDM

393.1163 Aug 28/28  
Augustana Synod  
Shanghai

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

A portion of this telegram **FROM**  
must be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone. (Br)

Canton via N.R.

Dated October 19, 1938

Rec'd 1:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

October 19, 7 p.m.

No material change in military situation. Chinese are

rushing troops to front, many reported to come from Hunan  
and Kwangsi and claim some successes in fighting near Poklo.  
Military <sup>representatives</sup> express confidence in ability to withstand in-  
vasion.

(GRAY) Movement of Government offices from Canton con-  
tinues. Office of Special Delegate for Foreign Affairs for  
Kwangtung and Kwangsi goes to Kweilin, Kwangsi, and some  
of the non-military sections of military headquarters are  
leaving for unannounced destination. Governor, mayor and  
other high officials still here.

I am reliably informed that all Chinese banks are closing  
and employees leaving today by special launch for Shekki.

Great numbers of the Chinese civilian population have  
disembarked Canton and exodus continues.

Sent to Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong (END GRAY).

LINNELL

CSB

4

*paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence* DT

✓  
DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 19 1938  
Department of State  
*file*

793.94

1073  
1/26/39

793.94/1411

OCT 25 1938

RECEIVED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 19, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

There has been no change of importance in the military situation. Confidence that they will be able to withstand invasion is expressed by military authorities. Some successes in the vicinity of Poklo are claimed by the Chinese. Chinese soldiers, many of whom are said to come from Kwangsi and Hunan Provinces, are being rushed to the front.

Movement of Government offices from Canton continues. Office of Special Delegate for Foreign Affairs for Kwangtung and Kwangsi goes to Kweilin, Kwangsi, and some of the non-military sections of military headquarters are leaving for unannounced destination. Governor, mayor and other high officials still in Canton.

According to reliable information all Chinese banks are closing and employees leaving on October 19 by special launch for Shekki.

Great numbers of the Chinese civilian population have disembarked Canton and the exodus continues.

793.94/14111.

*egc.*  
 FE:EGC:JPS  
 10-20

*HP.*  
 FE  
*rev*



REB

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (br)

HANKOW VIA N.R.

Dated October 19, 1938

Rec'd 3:33 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

October 19, 3 p. m.

It is reliably learned today that the Chinese attri-  
bute their recent military <sup>reverses</sup> (A) in the defense of Wuhan to  
insufficiency of seasoned troops. Curiously enough, this  
may be true. If the Chinese were as mobile and coordinated  
as the Japanese they could not with justification make this  
statement. As they are, the Chinese are apparently in-  
capable of moving forces swiftly to where they are most  
essential.

The Chinese defense line is slowly falling back towards  
Hankow. A desperate attempt is being made to hold the  
sector protecting Sianning, Hupoh. There is no indication  
that a crucial stand is being prepared at any other point.

The conscription here of transport and other war  
service labor began yesterday.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping.

JOSELYN

NPL-EMB

793.94/14112

F/EG

OCT 25 1938

FILED

0 4 2 8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram of October 19, 1938, from the American  
Consul General at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

On October 18 conscription of war service labor,  
including that of transport, was put into effect at Han-  
kow. Slowly the defense line of the Chinese forces is  
retreating in the direction of this city but the Chinese  
are making a desperate effort to maintain the portion of  
that line which protects Sienning\*. So far as can be seen  
no preparation are being made at any other place for a  
decisive stand.

Reliable information received on October 19 is to  
the effect that insufficiency of seasoned soldiers is  
given by the Chinese as the reason for the Chinese mili-  
tary (?) recently in the defense of Wuhan. This may,  
strangely enough, be the case. Apparently the Chinese  
are not able to move troops rapidly to places where they  
are needed the most. If they were able to coordinate  
their troops and move them quickly as the Japanese are  
able to do they (the Chinese) would not be warranted in  
making this excuse for their reverses.

\* in Hupeh Province.

793.94/14112.

*29C.*  
FE:EC:JPS  
10-20

*JRP.*  
FE  
*W*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5091

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CA

A portion of this tele- FROM  
gram must be closely para-  
phrased before being comm-  
unicated to anyone (C)

PARIS

Dated October 19, 1938

Rec'd 5:45 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1786, October 19, 7 p.m.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FOR AMBASSADOR BULLITT

Wellington Koo asked me this afternoon to transmit  
to you the following personal message from him.

(GRAY) "Japanese campaign against South China intended  
not only to cut communications between Canton and Hong Kong  
but also to establish base for threatening Hong Kong,  
Singapore, Indo-China, Dutch Indies and Philippines. Unless  
effectively checked now Japan will take advantage of next  
crisis in Europe when British and French hands will again  
be tied to press forward, without fear of intervention,  
her policy of southward expansion always strongly advocated  
by Japanese Navy. German Chancellor's Saarbrucken speech,  
Italian intransigence towards France, aggravation of  
Palestine revolt, and Japanese campaign against South  
China all evidence of conspiracy of Berlin-Rome-Tokyo  
axis further supported by Tokyo's appointment Jap Military  
Attache in Berlin as Ambassador to Germany for purpose of  
concluding

*Show to Ambassador  
Rec'd Oct. 25 info  
relet it with  
in Oct. ye.*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
18  
B  
fili

793.94/14113

601 27 1938

F/FB

5092

CA

--2--1786 from Paris..

concluding Nippon-German military alliance.

I told Bonnet above Monday and suggested to him to consult Washington and London with view to making demarche in Tokyo--joint or parallel--in order to persuade her discontinue adventure and concert other measures for the purpose.

After fourteen months of war Japan in no position to counter Anglo-French-American opposition evidenced by Japan's retreat in regard dispute Paracels and Hainan with France and Chang Ku Fang affair with Soviet Union in face of French and Soviet firmness.

I also asked him for assurance of complete transit facilities through Indo-China for Chinese war material so necessary to enable China continue her resistance and abstention from supplying Japan with arms and war material particularly airplanes, oil, and iron ore. I pointed out Washington's advice to American manufacturers to stop furnishing airplanes to Japan has produced appreciable result. He assured me he would approach Washington at once as regards proposed demarche and consider other two suggestions.

Knowing the value of your personal influence and always grateful for your past collaboration, I venture to invoke your support of our appeal when you see President Roosevelt. With cordial regards." (END GRAY)

END SECTION ONE

WILSON

5093

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (C)

FROM

PARIS

Dated October 19, 1938

Rec'd 4:57 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1786, October 19, 7 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

Koo told me that the Chinese Ambassador in London saw Halifax on Monday and suggested that the British consult Washington and Paris regarding a demarche in Tokyo. Halifax replied that he would take the matter under consideration.

Presumably the new Chinese Ambassador in Washington has already talked with the Department along similar lines.

I asked Koo if he really believed a demarche such as he suggests could be effective in persuading the Japanese Navy and Military to withdraw from this South China invasion in which their prestige is engaged. He admitted that it was a bit late but asserted his belief that an unmistakable indication by the three governments that they would stop furnishing Japan military supplies and raw materials needed for her armament industry, unless the South China adventure is abandoned, would be effective.

END OF MESSAGE.

WILSON

NPL-EMB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quast NARS, Date 12-18-75

5094

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CA

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone (Br)

FROM

CHUNGKING VIA N R

Dated October 19, 1938

Rec'd 1:20 p.m.


Secretary of State

Washington

497, October 19, 10 a.m. 793.94/14099

Shanghai's 1344, October 17, 6 p.m.

Does Department have any specific instructions to give  
me as to reply other than an acknowledgment and a statement  
to the effect that while reserving our rights I have comm-  
unicated its contents to the Commander-in-Chief. I propose  
to leave to the discretion of the Navy the matter of the  
disposal of the two vessels now at Hankow under Admiral  
Le Breton. With reference to the matter of the use of build-  
ings or areas adjacent thereto by the defensive activities  
of the Chinese I would like to report to Tani what has been  
said by the Embassy at Tokyo as reported in Tokyo's 671,  
October 16, 3 p.m. I invite the Department's serious attent-  
ion to the contentions made in paragraph five of the memo-  
randum enclosed with Tani's communication as indicating  
quite clearly the fundamental intention of the Japanese to  
close the river to all foreign shipping and traffic indef-  
initely at Shanghai until the Japanese have arranged to  
monopolize



793.94/14114

F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

0095

CA

--2--497 from Chungking..

monopolize traffic in their own interest. It may also be expected that with the crystallizing of the Canton-Kowloon Railway and the blocking of the Pearl River the Japanese will cut Hong Kong completely off from all contact with the Chinese mainland in a similar way and that we may expect to see the Japanese complete the port that the Chinese were interested in building at Whampoa and controlling that port as a <sup>(an)</sup> ~~key~~ *deep-sea* ~~port~~ for Canton to the exclusion of Hong Kong. These situations may, I am convinced, be expected to influence British attitude toward Japan's position in China.

Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo and communicate substance to Commander-in-Chief.

Repeated to Hankow and Shanghai.

JOHNSON

NPL EMB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

apo

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated October 19, 1938

Rec'd 7:25 a.m., 20th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

632, October 19, 5 p.m.


Canton's October 18, <sup>14102</sup> 4 p.m. has been repeated to Tokyo  
as our October 19, 3 p.m.

Repeated to Chungking.

LOCKHART

RR

Political



793.94/14115

FILED  
OCT 21 1938

F/FG



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

FROM

COMSOPAT

October 20, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: RUSNOS  
COMSUBRON 5  
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS ASHEVILLE  
USS SACRAMENTO  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
USS TULSA  
COMDESNIV 15  
FOURTH MARINES  
ALUSNA PEIPING

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O.A. AND W.L.D.

RECEIVED  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 20 1938  
Department of State

793.94

793.94/14116

0020. Japanese main column is making progress from  
Poklo towards Fukuin near Laofou mountain Chinese in strength  
this area and making determined resistance two flanking  
columns moving from Waichow one northeast towards Hoyuen  
another southwest direction Cheungkuktau column in Lungkong  
Pingwoo area southwest Tamshui not yet on Kowloon Canton  
railroad resistance developing this area sectors railroad  
bridges at Shekhang and Tungkun are down air raids fighting  
zones and Canton Hankow railroad airfield Tamshui being used  
by attackers fourteen bombs adjacent Whampoa thirteen BLP  
sighted. 0030.

DDM

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 24, 1938.

Reference Chungking's 503, October 20, 9 a.m.

As the communication of October 17 addressed to Ambassador Johnson by the Japanese Embassy in regard to military operations in the Canton and Swatow areas (see Chungking's telegram under reference) is in substance similar to the communication received by our Consul General at Hong Kong from his Japanese colleague (see Hong Kong's October 15, 6 p.m.) and as the Department's instruction to Hong Kong in regard to the nature of the reply to be made (see Department's October 18, 6 p.m.) was relayed to Chungking for the Ambassador's information, no action by the Department would seem to be required.

*m.m.14*

*new*  
FE:Mackay:VCI

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED


EDA

FROM PLAIN

CHUNGKING VIA N.R.

Dated October 20, 1938

Received 8:45 a.m.



Secretary of State

Washington

503, October 20, 9 a.m.


Reference Hong Kong's October 15, 6 p.m.

Following received from Shanghai.

"Nineteenth, 11 a.m. Following received yesterday  
Japanese Embassy in China. Shanghai, October seventeenth,  
1938. Number G O nine. Your Excellency, I have the honor  
to inform Your Excellency that I have been requested by  
our naval authorities to notify your honourable colleagues  
concerned of the following:

Severe fighting is expected within a radius of two  
hundred kilometers around Canton and one hundred kilo-  
meters around Swatow. According to past experience such  
as the unfortunate incident involving His Excellency Sir  
Hugh E. Montgomery Knatchbull Hugessen, it is impossible  
for airmen to identify the different signs painted or  
posted on roofs or motor cars belonging to nationals of  
third powers. In this connection we may mention that it  
has been proved that same can be said of trains. There-  
fore, the nationals of third powers are earnestly requested

to



793.94/14117

F/FG

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OCT 20 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

EDA - 2 - #503, October 20, 9 a.m. from Chungking

to refrain from travelling in these areas as the Japanese forces are not in a position to guarantee their safety.

This request is based on the sincere wishes on the part of our naval authorities to preclude any possibility in the course of our military operations of causing injuries to nationals of third powers and thus bringing about untoward incidents between Japan and third powers, which they are anxious to avoid. It is earnestly hoped, therefore, that nationals of the third powers concerned would, on their part, cooperate with our naval authorities by complying voluntarily with the above request. In this connection, I should be grateful if Your Excellency would be good enough to take immediate steps to bring the above to the notice of your nationals.

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, Your Excellency's obedient servant, Masuki Tani. Minister Plenipotentiary. His Excellency Monsieur Nelson Trusler Johnson, American Ambassador to China, Chungking.

Sent to Chungking only".

Sent to Canton and Swatow. Repeated to Hong Kong.

JOHNSON

RR:WWC

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW \*\*\*

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

Hong Kong via N.R.

Dated October 20, 1938

Rec'd 7/8 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence*

FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 20 1938

Department of State

October 20, 1 p.m.

*only in*  
The more reliable Hong Kong news today indicates serious fighting *(A)* Tsengcheng vicinity with as yet no genuinely stiff Chinese resistance. Otherwise Japanese appear to continue consolidating their forces in the area outlined in our telegram of October 18, 3 p.m., and to be awaiting further reinforcements reported to be in progress of steady and organized landing at Bias Bay. Chinese announcements of highly optimistic quality are growing in volume but we are unable to find any local source of information which will reasonably confirm such optimism. Through its contacts with British, Chinese, Japanese sources and international newspaper correspondence this office has yet found no substantial reason to doubt general (repeat general) accuracy of information as to Japanese success and Chinese ineffectiveness given in its previous reports. It is predicted here that unless more Chinese efficiency is demonstrated within the next ten days and such development is conceded as possible, Canton is certain to be occupied. Japanese reports here show no waning in

793.94/14118

F/FG

FILED

OCT 25 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- October 20, 1 p.m., from Hong Kong.

in original optimism. Important attack on Bocca Tigris  
continues to be <sup>Persistently</sup> (A) rumored here. Most newspaper comment  
here reflects amazement at extraordinary ease of Japanese  
invasion to date.

Repeated to Canton, Chungking, Peiping.

SOUTHARD

WWC

RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram of October 20, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hong Kong reads substantially as follows:

Predictions in Hong Kong are that Canton will be sure to fall by the end of October unless the Chinese show greater efficiency which it is conceded they may do. Newspaper comment in general reflects wonder at the great ease with which the Japanese up to the present time have been able to invade South China.

According to the more reliable information available in Hong Kong at this time, there is heavy fighting (?) Tsengcheng vicinity with no really stiff resistance on the part of the Chinese as yet. Aside from this it seems that the Japanese are going on with the consolidation of their forces in the entire territory around and from Bias Bay north to the East River and west to the Pearl River and are awaiting the arrival of more reinforcements which are said to be landing at Bias Bay in an organized and steady manner. Rumors of an important offensive against Bocca Tigris continue to be (?) current in Hong Kong.

Although there is a growing volume of very optimistic announcements by the Chinese, no information which will reasonably confirm the optimism shown in these announcements has been found in Hong Kong. The Consul

General

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

General has as yet obtained no information either from international press correspondence or from Chinese, Japanese or British sources which would give good reason to doubt the substantial truth of information given in previous reports in regard to Chinese ineffectiveness and Japanese success. There is no decrease in the original optimism shown in the early Japanese reports from Hong Kong.

793.94/14118.

egc.  
 FE:JPS  
 10-21-38

FE  
 10-21-38



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

XE

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

FOURTH MARINES

FROM

October 20, 1938

Received 11:50 a.m.

ACTION CINCAF  
OPNAV

INFO RUSNOS

AMCON SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
ASST ALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR ALUSNA PEIPING

COPIES SENT TO  
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF  
STATE EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 20 1938

Signature

793.94

8620. No change situation South China reported. On Yangtze front Japanese troops north of river said nearing Kishui approximately fifty miles East Hankow Japanese naval forces claimed threatening Ocheng on Yangtze River about 33 miles southeast Hankow south of Yangtze Japanese claim to be outside walls Tayeh twenty miles northeast Yanghsin Changsha reported bombed yesterday. 1840.

csb

793.94/14119

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 890.00/115 FOR Memorandum  
State Department  
Far Eastern Division  
FROM ( Penfield ) DATED Oct 15, 1938.  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: The situation in the Far East: developments of the past week.

FRG.

793.94/ 14120

14/20

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

G-2/2657-H-439

G-2  
ERWMOc

October 14, 1938

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MORGENTHAU:


Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. Herewith are Summary and Situation Map covering events in China for the period October 8-14.
2. The important events for this period have been:
  - a. Japanese successes in establishing beachheads in Bias Bay for the debarkation of an expeditionary force against Canton, variously estimated at from 35,000 to 60,000 troops.
  - b. Slow Japanese progress in their Central China campaign with Chinese claims of local victories west of Teian and southwest of Yangsin.
  - c. Warning by Japanese military leaders at Shanghai that Japan was prepared to occupy foreign concessions in Tientsin and Shanghai unless concession authorities cooperated in suppressing anti-Japanese activities.
  - d. Increasingly strained Japanese-British relations as a result of League's invocation of Article XVI of the Covenant and because of the Japanese expedition in South China.

E. R. W. McCABE,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

meb

2 encls.



793.94/14121

OCT 21 1938

FILED/FQ

G-2 Digest of Information  
Sino-Japanese Situation  
October 8-14, 1938

*Off. by Shuman*

*Mar 19,  
1973*

MISCELLANEOUS

Press reports from Shanghai dated October 14 state that high Japanese military officials there warned that, unless foreign Concession authorities, particularly at Tientsin and Shanghai, took adequate measures to control "anti-Japanese activities" within Concession borders, the Japanese were prepared to take "extreme measures" including seizure of the Concessions. England and France were cited for their "unfriendly" attitude in this regard while the United States was praised for remaining neutral. Tokyo press on October 13 asserted that the new drive on Canton was necessitated by British and French aid to China through that port.

Information from reliable sources states that urged by Germany, Japan is planning to effect the capture of Canton before the final assault on Hankow. The reasons advanced are that Germany wants the present war to end quickly and before Japan is exhausted. The capture of Hankow will not be decisive, but by taking Canton, Chiang Kai-shek will be cut off from his most potent sources of supply and will be forced to come to terms. Therefore, even though the South China expedition involves an extra effort it is essential that it be effected at this time in order to secure a rapid decision.

Other reasons advanced for the South China expedition are Japanese leaders wish to draw the attention of the Japanese people away from the slow progress and occasional defeats occurring in the drives on Hankow; also that the Japanese have information that the Generalissimo intends to move south after he evacuates Hankow and the Japanese therefore desire to forestall him.

Japanese-British relations have been deteriorating steadily. Japanese blame the British delegate at the League of Nations for instigating League action invoking Article XVI of the Covenant, authorizing sanctions against Japan. The Tokyo press is particularly bitter in its denunciation of Great Britain.

Reports from London state that on October 11 (the day before the attack on Bias Bay), the British Ambassador at Tokyo informed the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs that British-Japanese relations would be seriously affected by an attack on Canton. The Ambassador pointed out that warfare in the south would be liable to result in incidents involving British vessels; that Hongkong would be faced by a serious problem resulting from the influx of refugees; that it might be difficult to protect Japanese in Hongkong from the enraged Chinese. To all this Horinouchi made a noncommittal reply.

CONFIDENTIAL

#### NORTH CHINA THEATER

Japanese claim to be converging on a force of 40,000 Chinese troops of the 8th Route Army and units of Fu Tso-yi's forces now holding positions on Wutai Mountain in northern Shansi. Previous claims stating Japanese had occupied the entire mountain range appear to be premature.

Reports from Chinese sources state that the ex-communists had ambushed a Japanese supply convoy en route across Hopei to the Wutai front, capturing large quantities of supplies.

Renewed outbreak of guerrilla activities on the occasion of the "Double Tenth" (October 10th anniversary of Chinese Republic) caused an interruption of rail traffic between Peiping and Tientsin. Machine gun fire was audible west of Peiping. Chinese also were active in Shantung. They report the capture of Taian and Yenchow (on the Tsin-Pu Railway between Tsinan and Hsuechow) but this report has not been confirmed from independent sources.

Eight hundred Japanese troops, 400 of which disembarked from a hospital ship, moved from Chingwangtao toward Tientsin during the week ending October 9. Four hundred wounded were embarked on hospital ships during the same period.

Reports from Tsingtao state that Japanese troop movements out of that port continue. Units of all arms are arriving at Tsingtao from the area around Hsuechow and after reconditioning are embarked for the south, probably for the South China theater.

#### CENTRAL CHINA THEATER

On the Yangtze River itself the Japanese have made very slow but steady progress. Kichun, about 8 miles up river from Tienchiachen was captured on October 8 and the Japanese claim to have pushed naval vessels to a point 7 miles above Kichun.

South of the river, the Japanese units which captured Lohi on October 5 attempted to drive eastward to cut in rear of the Chinese positions at Teian, and were badly cut up and forced to retreat. Chinese claim to have annihilated two Japanese brigades in this encounter. While this report has not been confirmed from foreign sources it is evident that the Chinese did succeed in inflicting a defeat on the Japanese in that area and have definitely removed a threat to the Teian position from the west. East of Teian Japanese claim to have taken Aikow, about 10 miles southwest of Singtze.

Yangsin (west of Juichang on the south bank of the Yangtze) is still in Chinese hands though the Japanese have claimed its capture several times this week. Late reports from Hankow (unconfirmed) claim

CONFIDENTIAL  
-2-

that the Chinese on October 13 achieved another victory against the Japanese southwest of Yangsin. Further Japanese advance up river, however, will make the Yangsin position untenable, for by the use of waterways in the area the Japanese will be enabled to cut in rear of the Yangsin defenses.

North of the river the Ping-Han Railway continues to be interrupted just south of Sinyang (over 100 miles north of Hankow). Japanese here too have claimed the capture of Sinyang several times during the week, indicating difficulty in that area. It is probable however that the town will fall soon.

Renewed Chinese activities along the Anking-Hofei road are reported. The recapture of Tungshen, midway between the above towns, is claimed by the Chinese.

Japanese continue to pour troops into the Yangtze sector. Forty five thousand are reliably reported to have reached Kiukiang between September 4 and October 6. These are believed to be replacements. In addition one new Japanese division is reported to be en route from Wuhu to Hofei and another has reached Hukow on the Yangtze.

It is reliably reported that Fu Siao-en will be installed as Mayor of Greater Shanghai on October 16. Fu is a prominent Chinese banker and the most notable Chinese to serve on any of the puppet regimes to date. He was pitted against Chiang Kai-shek in 1927 and had to flee to Dairen for safety.

#### SOUTH CHINA THEATER

The long-heralded Japanese expedition to South China has finally become a reality. Coincident with naval feints along the coast as far north as Chinghai (south of Swatow) and accompanied by heavy naval and air bombardment, a landing was effected early on October 12 at the northeastern tip of Bias Bay. Two beachheads have been established and large scale debarkation is now under way. At least 35,000 Japanese troops are taking part in the preliminary effort and more are reported en route. So far, except for local militia which were easily swept aside, the landing has been practically unopposed. Chinese are massing troops to meet the threat. Three Chinese divisions are available in the vicinity of Waiyeung and three more near Canton. It is probable that the first Japanese objective will be the Canton-Kowloon Railway, and a Japanese move from their beachheads toward Tamshui is now reported under way. However, it is believed that it will take several days to a week for the Japanese to disembark sufficient forces for a drive on the railway.

Forty to 50 Japanese vessels are also reported to be concentrating off Swatow (210 miles northeast of Canton), and Chinese believe a landing is imminent there. However, it is doubtful if the Japanese will disperse their available forces so far from Canton.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Heavy air raids throughout Kwangtung were conducted during the landing. Japanese claim to have destroyed three bridges on the Canton-Kowloon Railway on October 12 but this is discounted as reports indicate that a special train for evacuating foreigners was sent from Canton to Hongkong on the night of the 13th. The air bombardment did interrupt traffic on the Canton-Hankow line but the extent of the damage has not been reported. Over 100 Japanese planes were sighted passing over Hongkong on October 12 and on October 13. The Pearl River was closed to navigation by the Chinese military command on the night of October 13. The U.S.S. Mindanao and several British gunboats, now at Canton, will have to remain there.

Reports from Hongkong state that the Chinese Government had decided on energetic aid to Canton and had dispatched several seasoned Central Army divisions to the new war zone. Rumors state 10 Chinese divisions are now en route south from the Hankow area.

There are rumors in British circles that Yu Han-mou (Chinese military leader in Kwangtung) is selling out to the Japanese. If this be true a rapid advance on Canton may be expected. Other reliable sources doubt that any large scale betrayal in South China is possible at this time.

The Japanese Government in a note to foreign Embassies at Tokyo, issued a warning against movement of foreign troops, naval vessels, or aircraft in area between Swatow and Pakhoi. If "sheer necessity" requires such movement, the Japanese Government desires 10 days' notice in advance. Concurrently the Japanese Foreign Office issued a statement that Japan would "respect vested foreign interests" in the zone of the South China expedition.

#### COMMENT

The Japanese probably will be able to cut the Canton-Kowloon Railway within a reasonable time after completing their debarkation. The taking of Canton or any attempt to cut the Canton-Hankow line (barring treachery) should be much more difficult. The Chinese have had over a year to prepare modern defensive positions with strong concrete pill boxes. Foreign observers state the defenses are well sited and will be difficult to take. The regular Cantonese divisions in the area are well trained and equipped (250 field guns, some 88mm., were sent from Hongkong to Canton within the last 10 days), and numerous reserves have been under training for a considerable period. These are now being assembled to meet the invasion. In addition well trained Central Government divisions are reported en route south from Central China fronts.

While the cutting of the Canton-Kowloon Railway will seriously curtail the flow of military supplies into China, considerable quantities will still find their way to Canton via Lingsen in French Indo-China and the roads and waterways from that point. Canton will still retain its

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

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importance as a distributing point for these supplies, as an industrial center, and as the terminus of the Canton-Hankow Railway. The Chinese will undoubtedly make strong efforts to hold the area. The Cantonese have for years clamored for aggressive action against Japan. They now have their opportunity to come to grips with their foe.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REB

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM

HANKOW VIA N.R.

Dated October 20, 1938

Rec'd 3:15 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence DT*

NO EASTERN AFF.

October 20, 3 p. m.

A general staff section chief this morning stated that he expected Sianning to fall within four or five days.

The south movement of military equipment continues, presumably destined for the vicinity of Changsha. Evacuation of civilians noticeably increased today.

General Chiang Kai Shek is still here; it is believed that he will not depart until after the fall of Sianning.

General Kuo Chan, garrison commander, has been assigned to contest the occupation of Hankow with one division, possibly below strength.

Repeated to Chungking Peiping.

JOSSELYN

CSB

793.94/14122

F/FG

OCT 25 1938

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 20, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

On October 20 there was a noticeable increase in the evacuation of civilians from Hankow. The movement of military equipment toward the south, presumably to the Changsha area, is still going on. On the morning of October 20 the chief of a section of the general staff

expressed the opinion that he anticipated that within four or five days Sienning would be captured by the Japanese. To the garrison commander (General Kuo Chan) with one division possibly not up to full strength has been given the task of opposing the occupation of Hankow. It is thought that the Generalissimo will not leave Hankow until after Sienning is lost.

793.94/14122.

898.  
 FE:EPG:JPS  
 10-21

898.  
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 new

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REB

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

A portion of  
this telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (br)

DIVISION OF  
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

FROM

CANTON VIA N.R.

Dated October 20, 1938

Rec'd 4:22 p. m.

OCT 25 1938

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

in confidence

October 20, 5 p. m.

The Japanese are reliably reported to have made

further advances with their main column and fighting is  
said to be in progress outside Tsengshing.

(GRAY) Villagers who have come to Canton from east  
river districts say proclamations have been issued there  
by a new provisional government in the name of Chen Chin  
T'ao recently chairman of the currency reform commission  
and Chen Lien-Pai merchant lately of Hong Kong.

Governor Wu Te Chen in an interview yesterday said  
"We Cantonese will fight to a glorious finish. The people  
of the province have complete confidence in the ability  
of the commander-in-chief of the Kwangtung forces General  
Yu Han Mou to handle the situation. No sacrifices on our  
part are too great for every sacrifice is a contribution  
to the country. We are glad to pay this price to build  
up a new and better China."

Repeated

793.94/14123

F/EG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REB

2- From Canton, Oct. 20, 5p.m.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong. (END GRAY)

(PLAIN) The following Americans have recently left  
Canton for Hong Kong:

Char Tin Yuke

Howard G. Rhoads

Mrs. Grace T. Seetoo and daughter

Ng Mei Lin

Ng May Gord

Ng Mei Kot and

Ng Mei Kwai. (END PLAIN)

LINNELL

NPL

EMB

145

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 20, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

The main column of the Japanese forces has advanced further and fighting is going on outside of Tsengshing according to reliable information received by the American Consul General.

Villagers who have come to Canton from east river districts say proclamations have been issued there by a new provisional government in the name of Chen Chin T'ao recently chairman of the currency reform commission and Chen Lien-Pai merchant lately of Hong Kong.

Governor Wu Te Chen in an interview yesterday said "We Cantonese will fight to a glorious finish. The people of the province have complete confidence in the ability of the commander-in-chief of the Kwangtung forces General Yu Han Mou to handle the situation. No sacrifices on our part are too great for every sacrifice is a contribution to the country. We are glad to pay this price to build up a new and better China."

The following Americans have recently left Canton for Hong Kong: Char Tin Yuke; Howard G. Rhoads; Mrs. Grace T. Seetoo and daughter; Ng Mei Lin; Ng May Gord; Ng Mei Kot; and Ng Mei Kwai.

793.84/14123  
FE:ECG:JPS

FE

10-21

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE October 20 1938. *PAH*  
RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
**Memorandum of Conversation**  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
1938 OCT 20 PM 2 36 DATE: October 13, 1938. *IE*  
*DCR*

SUBJECT: The South China Situation.


DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Yakichiro Suma, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy,  
Mr. Hamilton.

COPIES TO:

*Copies sent to Tokyo + Peiping (Chungking)*

*✓*  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
*ch*  
*file*



793.94

Mr. Suma called at his request. He said that he had called in reference to the landing of Japanese troops in south China. He said that our Ambassador at Tokyo had already been informed by the Japanese Government in regard to this landing of Japanese troops. He said that he was not calling under instruction from his Government but that in view of various statements made to him by Americans in New York that Japan intended to attack Hong Kong or intended to establish a foothold in south China with a view to later expanding southward, he wished to state that such apprehensions were unfounded, and that the objective of the Japanese military operations in south China was to cut the communication system in south China which was being used for

793.94/14124

RECEIVED  
OCT 28 1938  
F/G 11/24

- 2 -

for shipment of munition supplies and thereby to bring about a speedy end to the fighting.

I told Mr. Suma that we did not like anything connected with the fighting; that wherever the fighting spread we saw American lives imperiled and the interests and rights of Americans jeopardized and definitely impaired.

Mr. Suma said that we had been informed at Tokyo that the Japanese Government's attitude with regard to the rights and interests of third powers remained unchanged and that we had been assured that the Japanese Government would respect such rights and interests. I commented that we had had many such assurances but that oftentimes the results were not in accord with the assurances.

We then exchanged some pleasantries in regard to the weather and some comments in regard to Ambassador Saito's illness.

H.C.H.

MMH/REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 20 1938,

No. 1590

To the American Ambassador,  
 Tokyo.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Ambassador a copy of a memorandum of a conversation of October 13, 1938, between the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy and an officer of the Department in regard to the situation in South China.

Enclosure:

Memorandum as stated.

793.94/14124

F/FG

✓  
 CR *W*  
 OCT 18 1938 PM

29.C.  
 FE:EGC:JPS  
 10-14

FE

*T.H.A.*



*MARK*



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 20 1938

No. 618

To the American Ambassador,  
Peiping.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Ambassador a copy of a memorandum of a conversation of October 13, 1938, between the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy and an officer of the Department in regard to the situation in South China.

Enclosure:

Memorandum as stated.

Copy to Chungking.

793.94/14124

F/FG

✓  
CR  
OCT 18 1938 PM

89C.  
FE:EGC:JPS  
10-14

FE  
7/7/41

Handwritten signature and initials

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

COMSCPAT

FROM

October 21, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF OPNAV

INFO: RUSNOS  
COMSUBRON 5  
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON 5  
COMYANGPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS ASHEVILLE  
USS SACRAMENTO  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
USS TULSA

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 21 1938

Department of State

793.94

0020. Japanese main advance reached vicinity Tsengihing River Theng has not yet been crossed in strength fighting in progress defense forming along line Tensghing Sheklung Cheungmuktau. Japanese column moving northeast in encircling movement to cut Canton Hankow Railroad north of Canton has reached Cangshuen half way between Poklo and Hoyuen. Chinese initiating guerrilla tactics vicinity Wanchow and Tamshui. Air raids fighting zone and railroads heavy bombing to eastward two bombs north east section Canton, forty-five BLP three FLP sighted. 2359.

DDM

793.94/14125

OCT 24 1938

FILED

F/F-6

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Hong Kong via N.R.

Dated October 21, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.


October 21, 5 p.m.

Persistent reports are reaching Hong Kong that Japanese have broken through first line of Canton City defence and that Chinese are preparing to evacuate. Not yet possible definitely to confirm this but it is considered in informed sources to be quite possible.

Sent to Canton, Chungking, Peiping.

SOUTHARD

WWC



793.94/14126

F/HG

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

1-1226

A portion of this telegram **FROM**  
must be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated to  
anyone. (Br)

Canton via N.R.

Dated October 21, 1938

Rec'd 4 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
**COPIES SENT TO**  
**O.N.I. AND M.I.D.**  
*in confidence*

*ch B*  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

**OCT 21 1938**

Department of State  
*in file*

October 21, 1 p.m.

(CRAY) Fierce fighting is reported in progress around Tsengchang and on banks of the Sheklung River. It is not as yet possible to ascertain exactly where the Japanese are now but it would appear that they are less than thirty miles from Canton (END CRAY). The authorities in Canton are today destroying by dynamite and fire the factories and utilities the electric light plant has been wrecked by burning the generators with gasoline, the Honam Bridge and the cement factory have been blown up and destruction is continuing. It would seem that the Chinese fully expect that the Japanese will take Canton soon. Almost all civilian population of Canton has left or is leaving now. Repeated to Chungking, Paiping, Hong Kong.

LINNELL

WVC

KLP

OCT 23 1938

RECEIVED

F/FG

793.94/14127

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

ConfidentialP A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 21, 1938, from the American  
 Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

Fierce fighting is reported in progress around  
 Tsengcheng and on banks of the Sheklung River. It is  
 not as yet possible to ascertain exactly where the Jap-  
 anese are now but it would appear that they are less  
 than thirty miles from Canton. Practically all civil-  
 ians are now leaving Canton or have already left. The  
 Canton authorities are now dynamiting and setting fire  
 to utilities and factories. The Honam bridge and cement  
 factory have been blown up. The electric light plant  
 has been ruined by burning the generators with gasoline  
 and the destruction is going on. Apparently the Chinese  
 have no other thought than that the city will soon be  
 captured by the Japanese.

793.94/14127.

*29.C.*  
 FE:ECC:JIS  
 10-22

*JP*  
 FE  
*new*

5096

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)



FROM

Chungking via N.R.

Dated October 21, 1938

Rec'd 8:13 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



Telegram to Chungking Oct 22

508, October 21, 10 a.m.

793.94/14099

Department's 270, October 18, 6 p.m., apparently crossed

my 497, October 19, 10 a.m. Shanghai's 1344, October 17,

6 p.m., has been communicated to Commander-in-Chief by Shanghai and I am confident that Commander-in-Chief will bear in mind Department's 177, June 13, 11 p.m., in dealing with questions thus arising. Department will note that my 497 October 19, 10 a.m., was sent to Shanghai to be communicated to Commander-in-Chief. My personal views are therein set forth. I have not as yet received any comment from Commander-in-Chief but have not expected any as I am sure that Navy will take every feasible step to safeguard American vessels while at the same time doing what is humanly possible to perform primary mission of keeping up communications and protecting American lives. Unless Department has other instructions I would prefer to follow Department's suggestion to file Tani's letter.

JOHNSON

KLP

793.94/14128

F/FG

OCT 21 1938  
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

NAVAL RADIO

Washington,

"Br"

AMEMBASSY,

CHUNGKING (China). *7 R*

✓ 273 Your 508, October 21, 10 a.m., last sentence.

You may file Tani's letter without acknowledgment.

*H.ell*

*SKH*

✓  
OR *12*  
OCT 22 1938.PM

793.94/14128

*JW*  
FE:JCV:EJL

*FE*  
*m.m.H*

*PA/W*  
*TH*

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/14128

F/FG

5097

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

1-1236

FROM

GRAY

Hong Kong via N.R.

Dated October 21, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

October 21, 2 p.m.

Majority of information from our various and most reliable contacts in Hong Kong, excepting Chinese, indicates continued progress of Japanese in direction of Canton including a movement flanking Chinese defences in order to reach that city also from the north. Lungmun north of Tsengcheng variously reported to be in Japanese hands. Japanese advance now appears to be within 25 miles of Canton. Reliably reported here that American hospital and church at Whichow unharmed and safe. I have been in touch with Shaki and have no information of congestion of American refugees there as indicated by Linnell but am at once sending representative of this office to that place to survey situation first hand. Japanese Consul General here has special soldiers to insure safety Americans in war zones and acts promptly on all my requests and recommendations. British Ambassador to China is in Hong Kong en route to Hankow via IndoChina. Repeated to Canton, Chungking, Peiping.

SOUTHARD

EDA  
CSR

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 21 1938  
Department of State

793.94/14129

F/EG

793.94  
not  
393.1115



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

FOURTH MARINES

1-1236

FROM


October 21, 1938

Rec'd 1:05 p.m.

ACTION: CINCAF OPNAV

INFO: RUSNOS  
AMCON SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON 5  
ASSTALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON 5  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMAMPASSADOR CHINA  
STA SHIP SHANGHAI  
ALUSNA PEIPING

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94

8621. Japanese claim iron mines near Tayeh captured yesterday. Column occupying mines now said about ten miles northwest city. Tayeh reported occupied today, naval vessels claimed reached Ocheng northeast this city. Japanese troops are reported at walls Kishui. Japanese tanks said entered outskirts Canton today. 1848.

793.94/14130

CSB

RECEIVED  
OCT 25 1938

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 28, 1938

Reference Tokyo's 3322 of  
October 7, 1938, entitled "Japanese  
Reaction to the League of Nations".

All the material in this des-  
patch with regard to Japan's reaction  
to the invocation of Article 16 of  
the Covenant of the League was re-  
ported in the local press or in the  
Embassy's telegrams, but may be use-  
ful for documentary purposes.

FE: *[Signature]* JPS.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Huelskamp NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE STATE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1938 OCT 21 AM 11 59

No. 3322.

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Division of  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

Tokyo, October 7, 1938.

SUBJECT: JAPANESE REACTION TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

For Distribution Check	Yes	No
in U.S.A.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

DNK MID

COMMUNICATIONS  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 11 1938  
Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to inform the Department that current news reports of action by the League of Nations with regard to the invoking of article 16 of the Covenant against Japan have been paralleled in Japan by an interesting series of warnings embodied in official releases.

On September 28 the Foreign Office issued a statement which made note of the fact that the League of Nations Council was reported to have decided to invoke article 16 against Japan. In view of the international situation, the statement went

793.94/14131

FILED

F/FG 14131

- 2 -

went on, practical enforcement of article 16 would be impossible. Furthermore the enforcement of sanctions would mean that nations applying them recognize a state of war between Japan and China. Japan would then be in a position to alter its fundamental policy of respect for foreign rights and interests in China and could thenceforth conduct its military campaign without restraint.

On the following day, in connection with report of introduction of a resolution on September 28 in Geneva for the application of section 3 of article 17, the newspapers generally carried items to the effect that official opinion favors the withdrawal of Japan from all League of Nations enterprises (e.g. drug traffic control, labor office, economic and health committees). The press gave emphasis to the assertion that the British delegate was instrumental in the League's action, although favoring individual discretion by various member states in the extent of application of sanctions. The newspapers asserted that retaliatory measures by Japan were under consideration but that nothing seemed to have been decided so far.

On the evening of October 3 the Foreign Office spokesman issued a statement that the Japanese Government would be ready to adopt counter measures if foreign nations, acting under the League of Nations report, should impose sanctions against Japan. The statement reiterated the argument that sanctions would automatically involve recognition that a state of war exists between Japan and  
China

- 3 -

China, and that such recognition would prejudice the protection for foreign rights and interests which has hitherto been accorded by Japan. The spokesman asserted that the adoption by the Council on September 13 of the report concerning sanctions against Japan makes it difficult for Japan to maintain the policy of cooperation which she has pursued toward the social and technical bodies of the League. The statement closes with a recommendation that member states study carefully the significance of the report adopted by the Council and give full consideration to its possible consequences.

On October 4 the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed to the British Ambassador dissatisfaction with the part taken by the British in recent League of Nations discussion of sanctions against Japan, as was reported in the Embassy's confidential telegram 643, October 4, 4 p.m. <sup>793.94/13999</sup>

Respectfully yours,



✓  
Enclosures:

Joseph C. Grew.

1. Clipping, "Comment Made Here", JAPAN ADVERTISER, September 29, 1938.
2. Clipping, "Sanctions Vote Likely To Break Last League Ties", JAPAN TIMES, September 30, 1938.
3. Clipping, "League Act Evokes Warning By Japan" JAPAN ADVERTISER, October 4, 1938.

710.

CC:r

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 , to despatch  
No. 3322 , dated Oct. 7 , 1938.  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Thursday, September 29, 1938.

Comment Made Here

The Foreign Office issued the following statement, as reported by Domei, on the decision taken by the League Council on Tuesday to invoke Article 16 of the Covenant against Japan:

"1. When the decision of the League Council, which is reported to have decided to invoke Article 16 of the Covenant, is referred to the Assembly, France, the Soviet Union and other countries will adopt an attitude favoring immediate enforcement of sanctions. Britain will take the position that the enforcement of sanctions should be left to the discretion of individual Powers. More than 10 other countries will support its stand. Judging from present indications, the decision of the Council will be difficult to enforce even if it is supported by the Assembly.

"2. As the nations of the world are beset with acute international problems and as the Powers which are now talking of invoking sanctions are occupied with their own difficulties, practical enforcement of Article 16 will be impossible.

"3. Should the League of Nations invoke Article 16, member Powers will then be in a position to adopt measures for which it provides. The enforcement of sanctions means that those nations who apply them recognize that a state of war exists between Japan and China. This will force Britain and other countries to abandon the position that there is no state of war between Japan and China, a stand they adopted in order to safeguard their interests in China. This country will then be in a position to alter its fundamental policy of respecting foreign rights and interests in China and henceforth conduct its military campaign as it likes."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2, to despatch  
No. 3322, dated Oct. 7, 1938.  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Times.

Tokyo, Friday, September 30, 1938.

## Sanctions Vote Likely To Break Last League Ties

### High Tokyo Quarters Would Favor Com- plete Severance

The opinion is gaining support among influential quarters that Japan should sever all relations with the League of Nations should Geneva formally adopt a resolution invoking sanctions against Japan. Japan has been cooperating with the League, even after her withdrawal from the League, in some enterprises. At present the Japanese Government has official delegates in the Permanent Mandates' Commission, Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, Advisory Committee on Social Questions, and the International Labor Organization. Japan is represented by individual delegates in the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, Permanent Central Opium Board, Economic Committee and Health Committee. These individual delegates should also be recalled, it is opined, since they actually represent Japan.

A resolution was reported to have been introduced on September 28 making the application of Section 3 of Article 17 effective. It is pointed out that the formal adoption of the resolution will cause member States to recognize the presence of de facto warfare between Japan and China, and this recognition will have serious effects on all their later dealings with Japan.

It is also pointed out that in the interpretation of Article 16 Mexico, New Zealand, Colombia, China, Red Spain, Soviet Russia and Iran consider the participation of member States in sanctions as obligatory. But England, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Poland, Canada, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Greece regard participation as optional.

Japan at this moment is in the position of being the object of financial sanctions, and even if the seven member States who regard participation in sanctions obligatory really operate sanctions against Japan, the material effects on Japan will be negligible. Japan's exports to those seven countries amount to just one and one-half per cent of her total overseas trade.

It is recalled that when the question of sanctions was brought up at a recent League meeting, the British delegate declared that the League has the right to carry out sanctions but has no unconditional obligation to do it, that it has only a general obligation to consult member States as to the extent of sanctions to be applied by individual States, and that to what extent individual States should carry out the measures approved by the League should be left to individual discretion.

Naturally, there is talk of Japan instituting retaliatory measures against member States that will invoke sanctions. Nothing seems to have been decided yet, in so far as the paper is able to ascertain, but an expert points out that the adoption of the sanctions resolution will be tantamount to formal admission of the state of warfare between Japan and China. Based upon this fact, these member States will considerably weaken the powerful basis of their demands for Japan's respect of their rights and interests in China. Japan therefore will be entitled to declare for more extensive belligerent rights, it is affirmed.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3, to despatch  
No. 3322, dated Oct. 7, 1938.  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Tuesday, October 4, 1938.

## LEAGUE ACT EVOKES WARNING BY JAPAN

'Counter-Measures' May Be  
Adopted if Member States  
Resort to Sanctions

### STEP STRONGLY REGRETTED

Kawai Points Out Technical  
Co-operation Has Been Un-  
satisfactory in Recent Past

If foreign nations act under the report adopted by the Council of the League of Nations last week and impose sanctions against Japan, the Japanese Government "would be ready to adopt counter-measures," declares a statement issued last night by Mr. Tatsuo Kawai, spokesman of the Foreign Office. The statement points out that application of League sanctions would automatically involve formal recognition of a state of war existing between Japan and China. The absence of such recognition hitherto has been the basis of diplomatic dealings between foreign nations and Japan in which the former have sought protection for their rights and interests in China.

Moreover, the statement adds, in view of the action taken by the League, Japan now finds it difficult to maintain its policy of technical and cultural co-operation with League enterprises.

The communique does not specify the "counter-measures," nor whether technical co-operation with the League will be discontinued, or not, but concludes by hoping that League members carefully will study the practicability of the report and "give full consideration to its possible consequence."

#### Text of Statement

The text of the statement follows:  
"The Japanese Government, having always taken the stand that the China problem cannot be expected to reach a just and adequate settlement by procedures envisaged by the Covenant of the League of Nations, had previously declined to accept the invitation of the League Council based on Paragraph 1 Article XVII of the Covenant.

"On the 13th of last month, however, the Council adopted a report that the League members may individually apply Article 16 to Japan by virtue of Paragraph 3 of Article 17. By thus invoking Paragraph 3 of Article 17, the League of Nations recognizes the existence of a state of war between Japan and China, which is inconsistent with the attitude of its member States which, with regard to the question of respect for their interests in China, profess that no state of war exists between the two countries.

"The Japanese Government attach great importance to this point.

"Moreover, should there be any country resorting to measures of sanction against Japan in accordance with the decision of the League Council, our Government would be ready to adopt counter-measures.

"For the sake of world peace, Japan, after her withdrawal from the League, has continued to co-operate with that body in social and technical fields. However, the League's organs even in these spheres have, since the outbreak of the present affair, gone beyond their proper duties and assumed a greatly deplorable attitude of indulging in political discussions and of standing at every turn the actions of Japan in China.

"Now the adoption by the Council of the report concerning sanctions against Japan has made clear the irreconcilable difference between the positions of Japan and the League, as a result of which Japan cannot but find it difficult to maintain the policy of co-operation she has hitherto pursued toward the League.

"The Japanese Government regrets the decision which the League Council, misled by intrigues of certain Powers, has reached; and they hope that its member States, studying carefully the significance and practicability of the report adopted by the Council, will give full consideration to its possible consequences."

Doi claims to have learned in circles close to the Foreign Office that Japan will sever relations with various organizations under the League, excepting the Permanent Court of International Justice.

The news agency mentions organizations with which relations will be broken off the International Labor Organization, the Permanent Mandates Commission, the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, the Permanent Central Opium Board, the Advisory Committee on Social Questions, the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, the Economic Committee and the Health Committee.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY

No. 3328

Tokyo, October 7, 1938

SUBJECT: ANGLO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AND PROTECTION  
OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN CHINA.


RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OCT 21 PM 12 55

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

CONFIDENTIAL

For Distribution Check	To field	To file
In U.S.A.		

793.94  
no  
741.94



The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Washington

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's telegrams  
793.94/13837  
no. 590, September 8, 11 p.m., and no. 643, October 4,  
4 p.m., reporting conversations on those dates with the  
British Ambassador in which he told me of his conversa-  
tions with the Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning  
Anglo-Japanese relations, especially with reference to  
the protection of British interests in China. There are  
1,2/ enclosed for the record copies of memoranda of these two  
conversations.

Enclosures:  
1,2 as stated.

350  
ESC:mg

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

4 carbon copy  
received

793.94/14132

F/FG  
11/52

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch  
No. 3328 of October 7, 1938,  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Confidential

Conversation

September 8, 1938.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,  
with the British Ambassador, Sir  
Robert Craigie.

Subject: Anglo-Japanese Relations.

In conversation today with the British Ambassador he told me that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had received him this afternoon and in a two-hour session did nearly all the talking, reading from copious notes which Sir Robert Craigie believes the military authorities had furnished him.

The Foreign Minister first stated at length the charge that Great Britain was aiding Chiang Kai-shek and said that an improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations could not be expected until the British attitude should change. Furthermore he charged specifically that whereas the American Navy had followed a correct course throughout the hostilities the attitude and actions of the British Navy had been contrary to Japanese interests.

It was then stated by the Foreign Minister that the fall of Hankow is imminent and would result in the creation of a strong Chinese Central Government which will cooperate with Japan and render further assistance to Chiang Kai-shek useless.

Giving as his reasons the requirements of the military campaign and the terrorist activities of Chinese in Shanghai, the Minister then proceeded to reject seriatim the five points which Sir Robert Craigie had presented on July 26

(see

-2-

(see our 494, July 27, 3 p.m.). A single minor concession was made under the heading "Railways", namely that permission would be granted for the inspection of the North Station in Shanghai by the nominees of the British-Chinese Corporation. The Minister thought, with regard to the Whangpoo Conservancy, that an agreement was impending through local negotiations. (At this point Sir Robert Craigie told me of his regret that owing to French objection the provisional agreement, which he considered reasonable, had failed). When Sir Robert Craigie endeavored specifically to discuss his five points the Minister pleaded ignorance of the details which he said were better understood by the Vice Minister. Sir Robert Craigie replied that affairs of such importance should properly be discussed in detail between an ambassador and the Foreign Minister himself. It is his feeling that with reference to these matters General Ugaki has no detailed comprehension.

Ending the interview Sir Robert Craigie conveyed to the Foreign Minister, as a personal message from Lord Halifax and not as formal representations, certain proposals, which Sir Robert says he will send me later, for the avoidance of bombing civilian populations.

The interview was characterized by Sir Robert Craigie as discouraging and completely unfavorable. He has noted a recrudescence in the last few days of anti-British publicity in the Japanese press and the closeness with which this publicity follows comments made to him by the Foreign Office causes him to feel certain that this is officially inspired propaganda.

I am informed in strict secrecy by Sir Robert Craigie that he has been directed by his Government, in view of the crisis in Europe, to avoid a showdown with the Japanese Government at present and to do the best he can under the circumstances.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch  
No. 3328 of October 7, 1938,  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

October 4, 1938.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,  
with the British Ambassador, Sir Robert  
Craigie.

Subject: Anglo-Japanese Relations.

In one of our periodic talks today the British Ambassador said that he felt that Anglo-Japanese relations were steadily deteriorating and that the reactionaries were intensifying their anti-British campaign.

Because of local press reports that the Prime Minister, upon being asked whether he himself as Minister for Foreign Affairs, would continue the so-called "Ugaki-Craigie conversations", had replied in a condescending tone that while the Vice Minister would normally conduct such interviews he himself would receive the British Ambassador if the latter insisted, Sir Robert Craigie said that he had asked the Foreign Office for a precise report of what the Minister had said.

Sir Robert stated that the Vice Minister yesterday had taxed him with the report that it was the British delegate at Geneva who had drafted the text of the resolution applying the sanction clause of the Covenant to Japan and that the Vice Minister had appeared very angry at this; that he repeated to Sir Robert that some important gesture of friendship to Japan should be made in order to remove the current belief in Great Britain's hostility.

Sir Robert said that he had learned from two sources of plans to take Canton before the final attack on Hankow, and that he has reason to believe that the Germans are inspiring this proposed move on the grounds that the fall of Canton, by effectively cutting off Chiang Kai-shek from the outside world, would hasten a successful conclusion of the conflict, leaving Japan to emerge

as

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

as still a strong power, whereas the fall of Hankow by itself  
would not prove decisive.

J.C.G.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MY

1-1226

FROM

COMSOPAT


October 22, 1938

Rec'd 5 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF  
OPNAV

INFO: RUSNOS  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
ASTALUSHA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
USS ASHEVILLE  
USS SACRAMENTO  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
USS TULSA  
COMDESDIV FIFTEEN  
FOURTH MARINES  
ALUSMA PEIPING  
AMBASSADOR CHINA

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94  
1116  
343.1115

793.94/14133

0021. Civil and military officials troops antiaircraft battles and nearly all of population have left Canton, city now undefended, before leaving Chinese authorities destroyed public utilities ammunition pumps over night plants rice godowns and seriously damaged Honan bridge. The Japanese have broken through the Chinese defense line and are advancing in strength on Canton, occupation of city was begun at three p.m. twenty first when twenty tanks entered Canton. There are a number of fires burning but none so far serious. All foreign nationals are safe. Conditions in the city tonight are generally quiet. During day large number of bombs north and east of city, continuous observation flights one hundred twenty two BLP nine FLP sighted. Chinese reported to have left

OCT 25 1938

FILED  
F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

MY -2- No. 0021 from COMSOPAT, October 22, 1938.

left Boca Tigris forts. ~~EIGHTEEN~~ Americans, SEVENTEEN other  
nationalities departed Shameen at eight fifteen am in American  
Consulate launch with naval guard for Shekki and thence Macao  
and Hong Kong. 2355.

DDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD

1-1286

FROM

FOURTH MARINES


October 22, 1938.

Rec'd. 10:15 a. m.

Action: Cincaf  
Opnav

Info : Rusnos  
Amcon Shanghai China  
Cimsubron 5  
Asstalusna Shanghai  
Comdesron 5  
Comyangpat  
Comsopat  
Amambassador China  
Alusna Peiping

COPIES SENT TO  
CINL AND M.I.D.



8622. Ocheng thirty six miles southwest Hankow  
claimed captured by Japanese troops early today. Naval  
vessels now approximately five miles up Yangtze from  
Ocheng. Hankow heavily bombed today. 1826.

DDM

793.94/14134

FILED  
OCT 25 1938

F/EG




DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**  
**DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS**

October 28, 1938.

In as much as Mr. Johnson does not expressly ask for a reply to his telegram no. 507 of October 21, 9 a.m., and in as much as any reply sent could not be affirmatively responsive or substantially encouraging, it is believed that it is preferable not to attempt to draft a reply to the telegram under reference.



793.94/14135

FE:JWB:EJL

793.94/14135

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 26 1938

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
MR. HORNBECK  
OCT 25 1938

5098

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
OCT 24 1938  
MR. WELLES

EDA

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone (BR)

CHUNGKING VIA N.R.

FROM

Dated October 21, 1938

Received 8:40 a.m.

Secretary of State

SECRETARY OF STATE  
OCT 24 1938  
NOTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED

Washington

OCT 22 1938

507, October 21, 9 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to see him

yesterday the 20th and after referring to Japanese organi-  
zation of South China stated that he was anxious to know  
reaction of United States to this new situation. I ex-  
plained that I was unable to enlighten him as I had no  
information bearing upon this question. Foreign Minister  
then said that Chinese Government, when inquiring at  
London, Paris and Moscow had been told by those powers  
that they were waiting upon initiative by the United  
States before giving assistance to China in the present  
situation. He said that the government and people of  
China hoped that the United States would take the ini-  
tiative in assisting the Chinese to continue resistance  
to the Japanese either by refusing supplies to the Japa-  
nese or by financial assistance to the Chinese or, failing  
such positive acts of assistance they hoped that the  
American Government would take the initiative and concert

with

793.94/14135

FILED

F/FG

5099

EDA - 2 - #507, October 21, 9 a.m. from Chungking

with the powers to bring about peace in the Pacific. He referred with appreciation to the fact that the Government of the United States had already done something in that it had expressed its disapproval of sales of planes to Japan by American plane manufacturers, which he said had had an effect. He hoped we might go farther and similarly disapprove supplies of petroleum products and similar supplies.

(END SECTION ONE).

JOHNSON

WWC:CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

5100

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (Br)

FROM

Chungking via N.R.

Dated October 21, 1938

Rec'd 5:52  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED

Secretary of State,

Washington.

OCT 22 1938

507, October 21, 9 a.m. (SECTION TWO). OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

I remarked that I would be happy to communicate his message to you, that I was not informed as to all measures that the American Government might be able to take within the limits of law. I expressed my conviction that these matters had been thoroughly canvassed by the leaders of the administration and my belief that when this present message came before them there would be found to exist a feeling that the American Government had perhaps done more than any other single power in giving positive assistance to the Chinese Government through its purchase of Chinese silver thereby enabling the Chinese Government to stabilize its currency and maintain it among the currencies of the world. Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted this and expressed gratitude of the Chinese Government and people. He again said that something more was needed now if China was to continue its resistance or if an honorable peace was to be made. With reference to the establishment of peace I said that the American Government was anxious to see peace

reestablished

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5101

RAW -2- 507, October 21, 9 a.m., from Chungking.

reestablished, that we had canvassed the subject of good offices which was previously brought up by the Minister (see my 376, July 27, 2 p.m.) and that as a result we had come to the conclusion that the leaders of the Japanese military were not ready to receive or entertain proposals which would be acceptable to the Chinese. I said, however, that I would communicate the purport of our conversation to you and that I would communicate to him any message that you might care to send.

END MESSAGE.

JOHNSON

WWC

GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD

FROM

COMYANGPAT

October 22, 1938

Rec'd. 7 a. m., 23rd.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 24 1938

Department of State

Action: Cincaf  
Opnav

793.94

0022. Six observation planes over Luhan eight hundred  
no bombs dropped at ten hundred Wuhan raided by forty five  
BLP numerous large bombs dropped each side river near rail-  
way stations spares anti-aircraft fire. 1747

WWC

793.94/14136

101 25 1938

RECEIVED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

5102

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MY

1-1280

FROM

GRAY

Canton via N.R.,

Dated October 22, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State

Washington

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 24 1938  
Department of State

2, October 22, 1 p.m.

American observers report looting by Chinese in Canton last night and today. Destruction of utilities by the Chinese continues and last night Wongscha, the Canton terminal of the Canton Hankow Railway was burned with many of the buildings in the vicinity. Much of the defense apparatus, anti-aircraft guns, et cetera, have been taken out of the city by the retiring local forces and no guns are being fired at the Japanese planes which are flying over the city observing and dropping leaflets, two of which are addressed to commander-in-chief Yu Han Mou, Governor Wu Te Chen and Mayor Tseng Yang Fu, one stating that the Japanese forces have complete command of the air and the eastern part of Kwangtung and urging these three as men of talents to cooperate with the Japanese to establish eternal peace in East Asia and save the people of Kwangtung from terrible sufferings. The second pamphlet says that Canton now being enveloped by a powerful Japanese army, the entire city of Canton will be converted

793.94/14137

FILED F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5103

MY -2- No. 2, October 22, 1 p.m. from Canton

converted into scorched land within a couple of days by which  
time the political and economic development as well as the  
public buildings and frontier will with certainty be destroyed  
and asks, why do you gentlemen do nothing to save the  
innocent people.

LINNELL

CSB



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

5104

McC

1-1230

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated October 22, 1938

Rec'd. 10:15 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State

Washington.

October 22, 2p.m.

Following letter received at noon today: "Japanese  
Embassy in China. Shanghai, October 22, 1938 GO 10.

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to inform you that I have been re-  
quested by the Japanese naval authorities to transmit to  
Your Excellency the enclosed memorandum.

I have the honor to be, with the highest considera-  
tion, Your Excellency's obedient servant, Masayuki Tani,  
Minister Plenipotentiary. His Excellency, Monsieur  
Nelson Trusler Johnson, American Ambassador to China,  
Chungking."

Two. The memorandum reads as follows: "(One) The  
whole of the region traversed by the Pearl River  
becoming a zone of intense fighting from today as a  
result of the irresistible march of the Japanese forces  
upon Canton, the third powers whose naval vessels and  
merchant men are now located on the Pearl River or on  
the

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 24 1938

Department of State

793.94/14138

F/HG

5105

2- October 22, 2p.m., from Shanghai

the waters adjacent thereto are hereby requested to take steps to have such ships take refuge in the open or in the upper reaches of the Pearl River far removed from Canton. (Two).

It is hoped that the third powers concerned will inform the Japanese naval authorities as soon as possible of the location and movements of their naval vessels and merchant men on the Pearl River and adjacent waters.

It is further requested that such ships be clearly marked so as to render them easily distinguishable by our air, naval and land forces. (Three)

Upon capture of the boom which the Chinese have constructed across the Pearl River, the Japanese naval force will open through the said boom a passage necessary for our military operations. And we trust it may be understood that this passage, as in the case of the Matung boom on the Yangtze, cannot be made available to any ships other than those serving the military needs of the Japanese forces until such time as the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese fleet considers that the use of this passage by other ships will no longer interfere with our military operations. (Four)

The

5106

3-October 22, 2p.m., from Shanghai

The above requests being actuated by the earnest desire of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese fleet to avoid the occurrence of any unpleasant incident involving the third power, it is hoped that all the third powers concerned will give us their sincere cooperation toward the attainment of the end envisaged.  
22 October, 1938."

Sent to Chungking. Repeated to Peiping, Canton, Hong Kong. Copy to Admiral Yarnell.

Gauss


PEG

6107

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RR

GRAY



Shanghai via N.R.

FROM Dated Oct. 22, 1938

Rec'd 10:15 a.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 24 1938

Department of State

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

October 22, 5 p.m.

Following letter dated today was received at  
4:30 p.m. from Japanese ~~Consul General~~ <sup>Minister</sup> Tani  
~~addressed to the American Consul~~ <sup>Ambassador</sup> at Chungking:  
I have the honor to inform you that I have been  
requested by the Japanese naval authorities to  
transmit to Your Excellency the enclosed memoran-  
dum.

The memorandum reads as follows:

One. In view of the fact that Chinese troops  
are now crossing the Yangtze River in large  
numbers in the vicinity of Hankow it is anticipat-  
ed that it may become necessary for our forces to  
carry out bombing operations against them and that  
such bombing may be carried out even during the  
night.

In order to avoid the occurrence of mutually  
regrettable questions that might arise (#) any  
unforeseen damage being suffered by neutral naval  
vessels and merchant men present in that neighbor-  
hood, WE

793.94-14139

F/FG

6108

2.- October 22, 5 p.m. from Shanghai

hood, we beg to request the authorities of the third powers concerned to warn all of their respective ships now in the vicinity of Hankow to find anchorage at a point about ten nautical miles up stream from Hankow by midnight of 22nd October.

Two. All third powers authorities are hereby requested to inform the Japanese naval authorities as to the names of all their vessels that will be anchored at the point above mentioned, as well as the names and movements of any of their vessels which may not be able, for unavoidable reasons, to move to the above mentioned anchorage by midnight of 22nd October". Memorandum is dated today.

Sent to Chungking, repeated to Peiping and Hankow. Commander in Chief informed.

GAUSS

WVC  
GW

\*APPARENT OMISSION

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1226  
McC

FROM PLATE

Hankow via R.R.

INFORM AMERICAN EMBASSY,  
CHUNGKING.


Dated October 22, 1938

Rec'd. 11 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

COMM. STAFF TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



October 22, midnight.

Commander Yangtze Patrol has received copy of  
Shanghai's October 22, 5 p.m.

Josselyn

793.94/14140

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Huatkin NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD

FOURTH MARINES

1-1230

FROM


October 23, 1938.

Rec'd. 9:25 a. m.

Action: Cincaf

Info : Rusnos

Amcon Shanghai  
Comsubron 5  
Astalusna Shanghai  
Comdesron 5  
Comyangpat  
Comsopat  
Amambassador China  
Alusna Peiping



8623. Japanese aviation reports general withdrawal from  
Macheng area. Liangshan air field due west of Wanshien  
reported bombed by Japanese planes. 1852.

WVC

793.94/14141

F/FG

OCT 25 1938  
RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD

1-1234

COMSOPAT


FROM October 22, 1938

Rec'd. 7 a. m., 23rd.

Action: Cincaf  
Opnav

Info : Rusnos  
Comsubron 5  
Astalusna Shanghai  
Comdesron 5  
Comyangpat  
Amambassador China  
USS ASHEVILLE  
USS SACRAMENTO  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
USS TULSA  
Fourth Marines  
Comdesdiv 15  
Alusna Peiping

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94

0022. At three p. m. Japanese troops entered Canton and occupied positions throughout city made contact with officials Shameen all foreign nationals safe a large number of planes made observation flights over city in advance of troops many dropped propaganda air raids and bombings outlying towns and troops remnants relatively few Chinese remain Canton it is reported that Japanese have taken over the Boca Tigris forts a number of cruisers destroyers and transports are off Taicban Bay. 2350

WVC

793.94/14142

F/FG



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION  
OCT 25 1938  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

FROM Canton via N. R.

Dated October 23, 1938.

Rec'd. noon.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Amembassy Chungking,  
Amembassy Peiping,  
Amconsul Hong Kong,  
Secretary of State,

Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 24 1938  
Department of State

From to Canton  
re repair of  
damages  
caused by explosion  
Oct 27, 1938  
H.C.M.

10, October 23, noon.

Great fires are burning in several parts of Canton. At  
Wongsha two munition dumps exploded shaking Shameen badly.

Much plaster down and glass broken in consular premises.  
No one injured except Charles Woong cut on face by glass.

The new Asia Hotel, <sup>Sun</sup> ~~Can~~ Company building, post office  
all burned and fire spreading to all sides. Endeavor is  
being made to save customs house but no water supply in city  
and no workers except customs staff.

GW:WWC

LINNELL

793.94/14143

F/FG

NOV 2 1938

793.94

125.2671

WFB  
11/20/37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MJD

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Hankow via N. R.

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

FROM Rec'd. 9:25 a. m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 24 1938  
Department of State

3, October 23, 5 p. m.

(GRAY) The Canton-Hankow railway area opposite Hankow has been intermittently bombed since 6 o'clock this morning. Evacuation from Canton both of civilians and military continues without disorder. (END GRAY)

T. T. Quo, retiring director of special administrative district number three (ex-British concession) by letter dated October 21 informed W. S. Dupree, a British merchant, that under instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dupree was provisionally appointed director.

Preparations have been made by the Chinese military for the demolition of Japanese owned buildings including several in special administrative district number three. The garrison commander informed me this noon that this plan had not been definitely decided on, and that if carried out advance notice would be given.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping.

JOSSELYN

GW  
WWC

NOV 27 1938  
FOLIO

F/FG

793.94/14144

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 3) of October 23, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

The Canton-Hankow Railway area opposite Hankow has been intermittently bombed since 6 a.m., October 23. Evacuation from Canton both of civilians and military continues without disorder.

At noon on October 23 the American Consul General was informed by the garrison commander that it had not been decided definitely whether plans for the destruction of buildings owned by Japanese, preparations for which have been made by the Chinese military, would be carried out. Included among these buildings are several in special administrative district number three, (the former British concession). The garrison commander said that notice would be given in advance if it was decided to carry out these plans.

A British merchant, one W. S. Dupree, was informed by a letter under date October 21 from Mr. T. T. Quo that he (Dupree) was provisionally appointed director of special administrative district number three under instructions from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Quo is retiring as director of this administrative district.

793.94/14144.

egc,  
 FE:EGC:JPS  
 10-24

FE  
 [Signature]

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6109

DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1-1226

Gray

FROM CANTON VIA N R

Dated October 21, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m. October 23.

Secretary of State

Washington

October 21, 6 p.m.

Reliable foreign observers report that tanks flying

the Japanese flag circled through the city and machine gunned some of the people. Evidently this was a flying column ahead of the Japanese forces.

Planes have been flying over the city continuously chiefly observing and dropping pamphlets stating that good people will be accorded protection but that crooked persons will be punished, that the Japanese forces have now occupied North and Central China and have gained the confidence of the Chinese people there and enjoy their deep appreciation.



All shops are closed and the city is now practically deserted.

The Americans at Lingnam, Pahoktung, Honam and Hackett Memorial Hospital still insist on staying in those places for the present. A number of Chinese Americans have been sent to Lingnam, others were evacuated via Shekki and Macao this morning as reported and others have left Canton for the interior. It is believed that none are now in Canton city.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong.

WSB

LINNELL



793.94/14145

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CA

1-1886

FROM

Gray

CHUNGKING VIA N R

Dated October 23, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 24 1938

Department of State

511, October 23, 9 a.m.

Shanghai's October 22, 5 p.m. was duly communicated to

Commander-in-Chief and Commander Ynagtze Patrol. Unless  
otherwise instructed or new situation arises I propose to  
file unacknowledged letter of Tani.

Repeated to Shanghai.

JOHNSON

~~Re removal foreign ships from dangerous Canton area.~~

WSB

793.94/14146

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CA

1-1226

Plain

FROM

COMYANGPAT

Undated

Rec'd 3:45 p.m. October 23, 1938

ACTION CINCAF OPNAV  
INFO COMSOPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS OAHU  
USS TUTUILA  
USS MONOCACY  
4TH MARINES

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 24 1938  
Department of State

793.94

0523. At zero six thirty six observation and three  
pursuit planes bombed and machine gunned defense west of  
Hankow at ten thirty east station Wuchang and railway along  
Bund heavily bombed by eighteen BLP similar raid 1400 to  
1500 with pursuit protection several large fires little AA  
fire from ten thirty five to eleven forty five continuous  
bombing vicinity seven mile creek left bank 2320.

793.94/14147

RECEIVED  
OCT 25 1938

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CA

1-1220

FROM

Plain

CHUNGKING VIA N R

Dated October 23, 1938

Rec'd 3:45 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

512, October 23.

Shanghai's October 22, 2 p.m. having been communicated


to all concerned I do not propose to acknowledge unless  
otherwise instructed.

Shanghai informed.

JOHNSON

Re moving foreign ships from dangerous Canton area

WSB CA



793.94/14148

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1236

FROM

CA

Plain

COMSOPAT

Undated

Rec'd 3:45 p.m. October 23, 1938

793.94  
ACTION CINCAF OPNAV  
INFO RUSNOS COMSUBRON 5  
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON 5  
COMYANGPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS ASHEVILLE  
USS SACRAMENTO  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
USS TULSA  
COMDESDIV 15, 4TH MARINES  
ALUSNA PEIPING.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND N.I.S.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 24 1938  
Department of State  
*[Signature]*

0023. Canton seriously damaged by fires over wide areas started by Chinese in effort destroy city. Many of large buildings along Bund have been burned including post office and power plant. The customs house has been saved. Residents Shameen and sailors from gunboats have been working prevent spread near fires to Shameen which is now believed secure. Heavy ammunition dump explosions Wongscha area did considerable damage buildings Shameen. All foreign nationals safe. Continuous observation flights planes over city. Expect more complete occupation and control of Canton by Japanese shortly, bombing Boca Tigris and vicinity with activity that section Japanese ships 2355.

793.94/14149

F/F/G



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



NOV 1697

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Shanghai, China, September 23, 1938.

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	For	Field	In U.S.A.
		CNI-MID	

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

SUBJECT: Transmitting Publication Entitled  
WAR DAMAGE IN THE NANKING AREA.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS  
PUBLICATIONS SECTION

OCT 24 1938

RECEIVED  
DEPT. OF STATE  
OCT 22 PM 100 868

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

I have the honor to enclose, as of probable  
interest to the Department, copies of a publication  
entitled "War Damage in the Nanking Area" prepared  
under the supervision of Dr. Lewis S. C. Smythe,  
Professor of Sociology, University of Nanking, and  
published by the Nanking International Relief  
Committee, June, 1938.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE  
NOV 23 1938

Respectfully yours,

C. E. Gauss,  
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- A copy of a publication entitled  
"War Damage in the Nanking Area."

800  
HHS:hk/sfk

In quintuplicate  
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.  
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.  
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.  
Copy to Commercial Attache, Shanghai.

793.94/14150

F/E

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# WAR DAMAGE IN THE NANKING AREA

December, 1937 to March, 1938

## URBAN AND RURAL SURVEYS

By

Dr. Lewis S. C. Smythe  
{Professor of Sociology, University of Nanking}  
AND ASSISTANTS

On Behalf of

THE  
NANKING INTERNATIONAL RELIEF COMMITTEE  
COMPLETED JUNE, 1938

793.94 / 14150

THIS REPORT IS TO THE  
NANKING INTERNATIONAL RELIEF COMMITTEE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# WAR DAMAGE IN THE NANKING AREA

December, 1937 to March, 1938

## URBAN AND RURAL SURVEYS

By

Dr. Lewis S. C. Smythe

*(Professor of Sociology, University of Nanking)*

AND ASSISTANTS

On Behalf of

THE  
NANKING INTERNATIONAL RELIEF COMMITTEE  
COMPLETED JUNE, 1938

793.94/14150

## *Foreword*

IN the course of its efforts to aid the impoverished and troubled people of Nanking and adjacent districts, the Nanking International Relief Committee early felt the necessity of discovering with reasonable accuracy their true economic position. What were both the extent and the nature of their losses? How far impaired are their opportunities and abilities for making a living? What supplies of food may be expected from the farms of this area? What are the fundamental deficiencies or obstacles that stand in the way of normal economic effort on the farms and in the city? Such questions were basic to any sound consideration of policy and methods in relief. The only good way to answer them was to go out to seek the facts.

The Nanking International Relief Committee here makes known the results of its inquiries primarily for the information of those concerned with the practice and the support of relief work in this and other areas; secondarily, for the wider public which is or should be concerned with the ravages of warfare among civilians, in whatever country. Our own position is humanitarian, without regard to the nationality of war victims. In this report we seldom use the terms "Chinese" and "Japanese", and consider persons simply as farmers, housewives or children.

The International Committee is aware, however, that statements have been published by Chinese, putting upon the Japanese an exclusive and exaggerated blame for the injuries to the people of the Nanking area; likewise that statements have been published by Japanese, charging the Chinese with burning and looting which they themselves benevolently checked. In order to guard against controversial misuse of the present report, we feel it necessary to make a brief factual statement as to the causation of the injuries listed.

The burning in the municipal areas immediately adjoining the walled city of Nanking, and in some of the towns and villages along the southeasterly approaches to Nanking, was done by the Chinese armies as a military measure—whether proper or improper, is not for us to determine. A very small amount of damage to civilian life and property was done by military operations along the roads from the south-east, and in the four days of moderately severe attack upon the city. Practically all of the burning within the city walls, and a good deal of that in rural areas, was done gradually by the Japanese forces (in Nanking, from December 19, one week after entry, to the beginning

From a humanitarian point of view, we venture merely to point out that losses to life and property from actual warfare are shown by these surveys to be one or two per cent of the total. The rest could have been prevented if both sides had wished to give sufficient consideration to the welfare of civilians, including reasonable protection by military and civilian police.

M. S. BATES

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## INTRODUCTION

### ORGANIZATION AND METHOD\*

The International Committee's Surveys were really two, though each of them was compound. The City Survey was essentially an inquiry among families resident in Nanking, supplemented by an investigation of all buildings unoccupied as well as occupied, and also separating for special attention as food-producers the market gardeners who are scattered through three or four sections of the city. The Agricultural Survey was essentially an inquiry among resident farm families, supplemented by a village survey described in Appendix B, and by the listing of significant prices in market towns.

#### 1. FIELD PROCEDURE.

The family investigators in the City Survey in Nanking were instructed to fill out a family schedule for every family in every 50th inhabited house. A "House" was defined as a "house number" even though in some instances there were several apartments or buildings at one number. In March many entrances were barred, and there was some little difficulty in determining which houses were inhabited. Consequently, some may have been passed over. A control map served to check areas skipped. Each man was assigned a specified section on the map to cover and to record the count of house numbers in selecting his 50th inhabited house. The investigators were well received because of the favorable reputation of the Committee but were careful to explain that they came only to inquire about facts and not as the family relief investigators working in the regular service of the Committee. Men who participated in both activities thought very definitely that the Family Survey was much less subject to exaggeration of losses than the relief investigations.

The building investigators in the City Survey had two tasks: (1) to count every building in the city and indicate whether it had been damaged by military operations, fire or looting; and (2) to make an estimate of the loss on every 10th building. For the purpose a house number was considered a "building", though in some cases it included more than one structure. A well-trained construction engineer worked out unit-cost figures for each of the common types of construction, which greatly facilitated the accuracy of these estimates. Furthermore, of each pair of investigators, one was a contractor. Estimates on loss of contents in uninhabited buildings had to be based on the nature of the building and inquiries from neighbors. A control map located areas overlooked and these were carefully re-done.

\*This "Introduction" is written to inform general readers as to how the surveys were conducted. Those interested in technical considerations are referred to Appendix A, "Further Notes on Organization and Method."

Both the family and building investigations covered the whole of the city inside the walls and the areas just outside some of the gates as well. But they did not take in all that formerly comprised the Nanking Municipality, which included Pukow and a number of surrounding small towns. Only certain small areas and scattered individual houses inhabited by the Japanese military or civilians could not be studied.

In the Agricultural Survey two investigators were sent out across each of the six hsien armed with passes from three organizations. They were instructed to follow a main road one way and then to return zigzagging across the main road in the form of a figure eight in order to cover the areas back from the main roads. On this circuit they were to secure a village schedule from every third village on their route and in that village fill out one farm schedule for every tenth farm family that had returned to the village. A market town price schedule was to be answered for every market town passed through.

## 2. TIME OF DATA.

The field work for the Agricultural Survey extended from March 8th to 23rd. For the City Survey the family investigation extended from March 9th to April 2nd with supplementary work April 19th to 23rd; the building investigation, from March 15th to June 15th. During the longer period for the building investigation there was little change in contents already lost, but there were some cases in which partial taking away of building materials occurred. Rebuilding during the period was practically nil.

## 3. STATISTICAL PROCEDURE.

Both in training the investigators and in supervising the tabulation work it was fortunate that an experienced man trained in Agricultural Economics was available as supervisor; and some men who formerly worked in Professor Buck's tabulation department were here to help in that work. In the writing of the report and the interpretation of the results of the survey the Director has had the invaluable cooperation of Dr. M. S. Bates of the University of Nanking whose extensive knowledge of economic history and of conditions in China has thrown additional light on the statistical findings.

Both the Agricultural and Family Surveys were based on a sample instead of attempting complete enumeration. Consequently, totals and grand averages are estimates based on results learned in the cases studied. But with the exception of rice seed for Luho, explained in the proper place, the data on which the estimates in the tables are based remain as reported by the investigators.

In the Agricultural Survey the average per farm family studied was worked out by hsien and then that average was multiplied by the total number of farm families in each hsien, as given by Professor Buck in his *Land Utilization in China*. The grand total was secured by adding up the hsien totals and any grand averages were then computed from these totals, thereby giving grand averages weighted according to the number of farm families in each hsien. Although a village schedule was used to get a broader picture of general conditions, all calculations were based on the farm schedule. (See Appendix B.)

The totals in the family investigation of the City Survey were calculated by multiplying by 50 the average per family secured from a study of every 50th



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inhabited house. Likewise the estimates of loss in the building investigation were computed by multiplying by 10 the total loss secured from a study of every 10th building. In the printed tables, the convenience of the reader has been considered by dropping as many decimal places as possible. All totals are given in round hundreds.

#### 4. UNITS OF WEIGHT, MEASUREMENT AND CURRENCY:

The measure of grains and vegetables was a *shih tan* by weight which is 100 *shih chin*, or one-half the metric quintal. This is 50 kilograms or 110.23 pounds, which is very close to the English hundredweight (112 lbs.), and is 0.83 of a picul. The mow used for measure of area is the local mow as reported by the farmers; but in calculations the Kiangning mow has been used, as it represents two-fifths of the cultivated area studied. It is equal to 0.06067 hectares. The *shih mow* (standard mow) referred to on occasion is slightly larger, 0.06667 hectares or one-sixth of an acre.

All monetary values in these reports are in Chinese currency. For the period covered in the surveys, the Chinese dollar was practically steady at about \$3.40 per United States dollar or \$17.00 per British pound.

LEWIS S. C. SMYTHE.

## I. CITY SURVEY

### 1. POPULATION

The city of Nanking had before the war a population of just 1,000,000, which was considerably reduced by repeated bombings and latterly by approaching attack and the removal of all Chinese governmental organs. At the time the city fell (December 12-13), its population was between 200,000 and 250,000. The persons reported in our sampling survey in March, multiplied by 50, give 221,150 as the population directly represented by the City Survey. This number was probably 80 to 90 per cent of the total residents at that time, some of whom lived in places not accessible to investigators. (See Note to Table 1 for fuller discussion of population).

27,500 persons were living in refugee camps maintained by the International Committee, 12 per cent of the surveyed population.<sup>1</sup> Outside the camps, but within the Safety Zone Area were an additional 68,000 persons, 31 per cent of the total. Some idea of the crowding, the price willingly paid for partial security, is indicated by the fact that 43 per cent of the population, 14 weeks after the fall of the city, was living in an area which had only 4 per cent of the total number of buildings noted in the Survey, and which comprised roughly one-eighth of the total area within the walls. The fact that practically no burning occurred within the Zone was a further advantage, and suggests the generally preferential treatment given to the Zone area as compared with the destruction and violence outside, even though the Zone was not officially recognized by the Japanese authorities.<sup>2</sup>

1. At its maximum in the second half of December and in January, this number was 70,000. The reduction was irregularly due to the following causes: crowding and discomforts of the camps, though they were generally preferred to the greater dangers and difficulties outside; the need to care for homes and remains of property, whenever there was sufficient security to make the effort worth while; encouragement by the International Committee for return to other parts of the city in every possible case; threats of forcible eviction from the camps as of February 4, fortunately not realized in action, but bringing about much unnecessary suffering and many regrettable incidents.

2. We must here trace the divisions of the city as used for the purpose of the Survey. The Safety Zone Area was bounded by Han Chung Road on the South; by North Chungshan Road from Hsin Chieh K'ou past the Drum Tower to Shansi Road, on the east and northeast; by Shansi Road on the north, continued to Sikang Road, which formed the westerly boundary. Within the Safety Zone Area were the Refugee Camps, reported separately. South of the Safety Zone Area lay Cheng Hsi, reaching to Shengchow Road, and bounded on the east by Chungcheng and Chunghwa Roads. The remaining southwest corner of the city was called Men Hsi. The southeastern corner, north to Pai-hsia Road and east to Tungchimen, was considered as Men Tung. The region from Chungcheng Road eastward to the wall was named Cheng Tung. All the remaining northwestern, northern, and northeastern (as far south as East Chungshan Road) sections were considered Cheng Pei. For purposes of the building investigation, Cheng Pei Tung was split off from Cheng Pei; this eastern section of the north City ran from North Chungshan Road to the wall bounded on the north by the Drum Tower and Peichiko. The four sections outside the wall are easily recognized by their names; the Shuihsimen Area extended northward past Hanchungmen. (See City Survey map of Nanking.) The family investigators found the area outside Tungchimen deserted. Con-

The average size of family for all sections was 4.7. Outside the wall, the average was 4.0, suggesting the presence of more men without families, or of more broken families. Compare the 1932 figures for 2,027 families in the same portions of Nanking from which many of the present population are derived. They show an average family of 4.34.<sup>1</sup> It is probable that in normal times there are more persons detached from their families for reasons of employment. The data on population are given in Table 1.

### DISTRIBUTION BY SEX AND AGE

The March population of Nanking showed clearly the characteristics of a war time population. The present survey reports for all ages, in all sections of the city, a sex ratio of 103.4 (males to 100 females);<sup>2</sup> while the 1932 study showed for all ages 114.5; and in the entire population before the war, there was a very high ratio of males to females, at one time 150. The drop of 9 points in the sex ratio since 1932 is accounted for in part by the withdrawal of males not native to Nanking but formerly working here, and in part by the killings of males in the critical period. Most serious is the acute fall in the ratio for the age-group 15 to 49 years, which roughly represents the productive life of the population; here the decline was from 124 to 111, or 11 per cent. This change presents the fact that a large number of women and children are deprived of men who were the support of the family. If the comparison is carried into narrower age-groups, fluctuations are found because of the fewer cases forming the base for each figure; but the results for the 25 years of young maturity are sufficiently consistent to be startling: 15-19 years, 108 now as against 123 in 1932; 20-24 years, 106/124; 25-29 years, 100/128; 30-34 years, 89/123; 35-39 years, 105/123. The decline in the males of productive age is shown in another manner. Of all males in 1932, those 15 to 49 years old were 57 per cent; in the present survey, they were only 49 per cent, a decrease at the rate of 14 per cent, which constitutes a serious economic and social problem. Correspondingly, of all males those over 50 years of age gained from 13 per cent in 1932 to 18 per cent now, an advance of some 30 per cent.

The variations in sex ratios by sections of the city are of some importance. Although the ratio for all sections was 103, for the refugee camps it was only 80, since they were overcrowded with women seeking security; on

sequently, it does not occur in the family investigation but is included in the building investigation.

The normally crowded sections in the southerly portions of the city (Cheng Hsi, Men Hsi, Men Tung), were the first to show a fair degree of recovery from the practically complete depopulation of the critical period. Together they had 81,000 residents, 37 per cent of the total. (By June this number of residents had doubled, according to the City Government records of registration.)

The sections thus far named had practically 80 per cent of the total for the city. There were only 8,550 persons in the districts studied outside the wall, which suffered so terribly from the burning by the Chinese army and from violence, and in March were still more dangerous on the whole than the inner city.

1. Smythe, "The Composition of the Chinese Family," *Nanking Journal*, University of Nanking, November, 1935, v. 5, No. 2, p. 371-393.

2. The May 31 registration figures of the Municipal Government, patently incomplete for females, show 109.4.

the other hand, in the less secure areas the men were relatively much more numerous, as is shown by the ratios for Cheng Pei, 121, the garden group, 150, outside the wall, 144. If we consider the ages for which security was a most acute problem, 15 to 39 years, we find in the refugee camps sex ratios running very low, from 40 to 67 in different five-year units; for the Safety Zone Area, roughly 90; for Cheng Hsi over 150, for outside the wall, well over 200. Thus men were returning first to the more dangerous localities, with old women and children following along more or less closely; but many of the young women remained in places of relative safety.

The data on sex and age are given in Table 2.

#### FAMILY COMPOSITION

The families remaining in Nanking were classified as "Normal," that is, either husband and wife or husband and wife with children living together; "Broken," man or women with children; and "Non-family," man alone or woman alone. Then each of these three types was repeated "with relatives."

The "normal" families were much fewer in proportion to all families than in an earlier study made among Nanking people in more settled times, 1932: now only 4.4 per cent with husband and wife as compared with 9.5; now only 26.2 per cent with husband, wife and children instead of 33.1 per cent. This represents a reduction of these types by one-fourth. A slight increase in "Normal with Relatives" occurred: 32.3 per cent as compared with 29.8 per cent in 1932. In other words there is a net loss of normal families amounting to 9.5 per cent of the total families, or one-seventh reduction of normal families.

This decline in normal families is largely due to an increase in the broken families, 21.4 per cent as compared with only 12.9 in 1932, or an increase of 8.5 per cent for the four types of broken families. Of that increase 6.9 per cent was in families without a man for support, that is, families consisting of only women with children. This means that the number of broken families was almost doubled. This increase in broken families is more clearly understood when we realize that 14.3 per cent of the members of the families remaining in Nanking had migrated, but only 2.2 per cent of the wives lost husbands by this migration. In addition to these there were 4,400 wives, or 8.9 per cent of the wives, whose husbands had either been killed, injured or taken away. Two-thirds of these were killed or taken away, 6.5 per cent. Or more poignantly, 3,250 children (5 per cent of all children) had their fathers killed, injured or taken away. These broken families could only to a small extent be due to families being divided within the city because only 3 per cent were so reported. The three factors combined of migration, persons killed or taken away, and divided families, broke 11.7 per cent of the families remaining in Nanking, or 5,500 families.

Within the city the refugee camps showed a very high figure for broken families, especially in the case of women with children, 13.2 per cent as compared with 6.6 per cent for all sections and with 3.4 per cent in the more normal times of 1932. Fourteen per cent of the families in the refugee camps were women, children and relatives (the latter usually dependent). Altogether, 27.2 per cent of the families in the refugee camps were women with children and in some cases with dependent relatives. In the camps 35 per cent of the

families had a woman as head, while in the remainder of the population only 17 per cent of the families had a woman head.

A man or woman alone constituted the family in 14 per cent of the families living outside of the wall, as compared with general figure of 7.4 in 1932. In another 16.3 per cent of the families outside the wall, the family was a man with relatives.

For family composition analysis see Table 3.

#### 2. DEATHS AND INJURIES DUE TO HOSTILITIES

##### NUMBER AND CAUSE

The figures here reported are for civilians, with the very slight possibility of the inclusion of a few scattered soldiers. The reports made in the Survey indicate that 3,250 were killed by military action under known circumstances. Of those killed 2,400 (74 per cent) were killed by soldiers' violence apart from military operations.<sup>1</sup> There is reason to expect under-reporting of deaths and violence at the hands of the Japanese soldiers, because of the fear of retaliation from the army of occupation. Indeed, under-reporting is clearly emphasized by the failure to record any violent deaths of young children, although not a few are known to have occurred.

Of the 3,100 receiving injuries under known circumstances, 3,050 (98 per cent) were definitely by soldiers' violence aside from warfare. There was a noticeable tendency to ignore injuries from which some sort of recovery had been made.<sup>2</sup>

89 per cent of the deaths and 90 per cent of the injuries by soldiers' violence occurred after December 13, when occupation of the city was entirely completed.

In addition to those reported killed and injured, 4,200 were taken away under military arrest. Persons seized for temporary carrying or other military labor were seldom so reported. Very few of those here mentioned were heard from in any way up to June. The fate of others gives reason to think that most of them were killed early in the period.<sup>3</sup>

The figures for persons taken away are undoubtedly incomplete. Indeed, upon the original survey schedules, they were written in under the heading "Circumstances," within the topic of deaths and injuries; and were not called for or expected in the planning of the Survey. Thus they have an unusual

1. "Military operations" is here used for shells, bombs, or bullets fired in battle.

2. Among the injuries reported to our Rehabilitation Commission by the 13,530 families applicants for relief, whom they investigated during March, was rape to the extent of 8 per cent of all females of 16-50 years. This figure is a serious under-statement, since most women who suffered such treatment would not volunteer the information, nor would their male relatives. While raping was such a common matter in December and January, people were much freer in admitting rape than under ordinary circumstances. But by March families were trying to hush up the fact that women in their families had been raped. The matter is mentioned here as illustrating the acute insecurity from which the social and economic life of the city has suffered.

3. The seriousness of "taking away" is underlined by the fact that all so listed are males. Actually many women were taken for shorter or longer service as waitresses, for laundry work, and as prostitutes. But not one of them is listed.

significance, and are more important than the simple figures indicate. Thus, those 4,200 must contribute an important addition to the number killed by soldiers.<sup>1</sup>

Ignoring many minor cases, the casualties of military operations and the sum of those killed and injured by soldiers' violence, and of those taken away, represents 1 person in 23, or 1 in every 5 families.

The critical social and economic results of these killings are in part indicated by the following direct calculations from our listings. The number of women whose husbands were killed, injured, or taken away, was 4,400.<sup>2</sup> The number of children whose fathers were killed, injured, or taken away, was 3,250.

Of the 6,750 persons violently killed and injured, only 900 (or 13 per cent) came to grief through military operations.

The data on numbers of deaths and injuries are given in Table 4.

#### DISTRIBUTION BY SEX AND AGE

If we analyze by sex and age those who suffered violence or abduction, we find that the per cent of males in the killed and injured was for all ages 64, and reached for ages 30-44 the high percentage of 76. Able-bodied men were under suspicion of being ex-soldiers; many were killed for having callouses on their hands, supposed evidence of carrying rifles. Among the injured females, 65 per cent were between the ages of 15 and 29, although the terms and method of inquiry excluded rape *per se*.

A revealing picture of the tragedy is shown in the relatively large number of persons over 60 years old who were killed by soldiers: 28 per cent of all men so killed, and 39 per cent of the women. Elderly people were often the most reluctant to leave their homes in exposed areas, and they were considered in advance to be safe from wanton attack.

The men taken away were often accused, at least in form, of being ex-soldiers; or were used as carriers and laborers. Hence it is not surprising to find that 55 per cent of them were between the ages of 15 and 29 years; with another 36 per cent between 30 and 44 years.

The data on sex and age of deaths and injuries are given in Table 5.

#### 3. EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS

##### FORMER CONDITION OF THE RESIDENTS SURVEYED

Among the represented population of 221,000, no less than 58,000 were formerly employed (53,000 men and 5,000 women), equalling 26 per cent of the total population, 33 per cent of persons 10 years and over, 38 per cent of persons 15 years and over. The women (9 per cent of the total formerly

1. A careful estimate from the burials in the city and in areas adjacent to the wall, indicates 12,000 civilians killed by violence. The tens of thousands of unarmed or disarmed soldiers are not considered in these lists. Among the 13,530 applicant families investigated during March by the Committee's Rehabilitation Commission, there were reported men taken away equivalent to almost 20 per cent of all males of 16-50 years of age. That would mean for the whole city population 10,860 men. There may well be an element of exaggeration in the statements of applicants for relief; but the majority of the difference between this figure and the 4,200 of the survey report is probably due to the inclusion of cases of detention or forced labor which the men are known to have survived.

2. The 13,530 applicant families investigated by our Rehabilitation Commission during March, reported data which indicate that 14 per cent of all women over 16 were widows.

employed) were chiefly engaged in trade and general labor, secondarily in manufacturing and in domestic service.

Of all formerly employed, 34 per cent (20,000) were previously in trade; 18 per cent (10,500) in manufacturing and mechanical industries; 12 per cent (6,500) in domestic and personal service; 10 per cent (5,500) in agriculture; 7 per cent (4,000) in general labor; 6 per cent (3,500) in transportation; 5 per cent (3,000) in "combined shops" (that is, shops which both make and sell articles, and which therefore cannot be assigned exclusively to manufacturing or to trade); 3 per cent each (2,000) to public service not elsewhere classified and to professional service; 2 per cent (1,000) to clerical occupations.

The average daily earnings of the persons employed were \$1.01 for the total. For those in trade, the average reported was \$1.20; in manufacturing and mechanical industries, \$1.08; in domestic and personal service, \$0.96; in agriculture, \$0.73; in general labor, \$0.34. The average family income was \$1.23 per day.

The data on former employment are given in Table 6.

#### CURRENT EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME

Employment and earnings in March present a dismal picture by contrast with the report of former conditions for the same people. The total employed were 20,500, of whom 950 (less than 5 per cent) were women. The 20,500 constituted 9 per cent of the whole population, 12 per cent of those 10 years and over, 14 per cent of those 15 years and over.

Of the total employed, 67 per cent (13,500) were in trade,<sup>1</sup> 12 per cent (2,500) in agriculture; 5 per cent each (1,000) in manufacturing and mechanical industries, and in domestic and personal service; 4 per cent (1,000) in transportation; 3 per cent each (500) in combined shops and in general labor; less than 1 per cent each in public service not elsewhere classified and in professional service. The average earnings per person per day for the total were \$0.32. Those engaged in trade reported \$0.31; in agriculture, \$0.20; in manufacturing and mechanical industries, \$0.45; in transportation, \$0.42; on combined shops, \$0.22; in general labor, \$0.25.

The rates of employment were lowest in the refugee camps and in the eastern sections of the city. They were highest among the gardeners, 17 per cent of all ages and 26 per cent of those 15 years and over. Traders were bunched in the Safety Zone, and in Cheng Hsi and Men Hsi, the first districts to open up noticeably; these three areas comprised roughly 40, 20, and 20 per cent of the relatively numerous traders. The Safety Zone still contained 33 per cent of all employed, with the other named areas 15 per cent each. The combined areas outside the wall had less than 5 per cent of all employed, and Cheng Tung less than 4.

The data on current employment are given in Table 7.

The number of families reporting no earnings was 37,050, or 78 per cent of all families in the city. The number of families reporting income insufficient

1. Largely the petty peddling of daily necessities and the roadside selling of the remaining personal possessions of self or others.

to maintain life was \$4,650, or 94 per cent of all families. Our observation agrees with this picture. Life was continued by the use of buried hoards and other surviving accumulations; which were spread through kinship, friendship, and loans; and were supplemented by organized relief plus irregular releases from military storehouses, chiefly in the form of pay to a comparatively small number of laborers.

#### COMPARISON OF PAST AND PRESENT

March employment was 35 per cent of former employment among the resident population reporting; and earnings of those employed were 32 per cent of former earnings. These two factors give a gross income for all residents equal to 11 per cent of former income. This gloomy figure corresponds to the observation of those who knew the situation closely. Family earnings in March were on the average \$0.14 per day, as compared with \$1.22 in former times. Prices were low, but not low enough to help the situation greatly.

When we compare the groups of the employed, we find that those engaged in trade were two-thirds of the former number, but earnings were only 26 per cent of former earnings; those in agriculture, under one-half with 27 per cent of former earnings; in domestic and personal service, under one-sixth with 47 per cent of former income; in manufacturing and mechanical industries, under one-eighth with 85 per cent of former income; in general labor, under one-eighth, but wages of those employed were 73 per cent of old wages. Public service employment practically disappeared, as did professional service; while clerical occupations scarcely were noted.

#### SOURCES OF FOOD

At any time the diet of the mass of the people in China is basically cereal. Under the economic conditions of March that was true *a fortiori*; for the poorer people had practically nothing in the way of vegetables or oils, much less of meat or fruits. Aside from a handful of families that secured flour, all cheeks were dependent upon rice, normally the major cereal of this region. Considering all sections of the city, 17 per cent of the people were getting their rice from food stores (free or at a nominal charge); 64 per cent from small private dealers; 14 per cent from the stores conducted by the Self-Government Committee; 5 per cent from "others" which usually obscured the real source by interposing an intermediary relative.

Inside the wall no people could get food from the kitchens, while at the other extreme were 82 per cent of the people in the refugee camps, plainly among the poorest in the city, on the average. In the Safety Zone Area, 17

1. Of the rest of the population was nearly 38,000. This report on the use of the food kitchen checks very closely with the International Committee's records of feeding some 25,000 persons in late March, though minor corrections are to be made both ways because of other methods of food distribution and other organizations to be considered.

2. The subsistence level was conservatively calculated at \$0.26 per family per day. Gamble's *How Chinese Families Live in Peking* p. 326 shows 1.39 shih tao per month to be the family subsistence level, from the median group down well toward the bottom of the economic ladder. Rice in late March sold for \$10.65 per bag of 212.25 lb. From these \$0.26 shih tao the \$0.26 per day is derived, ignoring fuel, shelter, clothing, or any food save the subsistence cereal.

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per cent were dependent on the kitchens, and in Cheng Hsi 12; both districts were adjacent to the kitchens that were in operation.

The data on sources of food occur in Table 8.

#### 4. LOSSES OF FAMILIES REMAINING IN NANKING

##### MAIN ITEMS PER FAMILY AND IN TOTALS

The families remaining in Nanking during the war period were in general the poorer groups, though they included many small shop-owners and house-owners. A view of their losses shows most specifically the economic condition of resident Nanking people, though it is highly inadequate to indicate the total economic blow that the city suffered, quantitatively or qualitatively.

The average losses per family were \$838, of which \$271 was in buildings and \$567 in movables, the latter divided almost equally between movables for economic uses (such as stock for sale, shop equipment, materials for manufacture, machinery and tools), and movables for domestic uses (such as clothing and bedding, household furniture and utensils, cash and jewelry, family food and supplies, and so forth).<sup>1</sup> Stocks for sale was a large item, \$187 per family; shop equipment, \$65. For these elements of the population, losses of machinery and materials for manufacture were relatively small. Clothing and bedding losses were heavy at \$115, household furniture and utensils at \$110. Food and supplies were listed at only \$8, cash and jewelry at \$10, indications both of moderate reporting and of the poverty of many of the families.

The total losses reported in the family investigation are big enough, though they touch only a relatively poor fraction of the city. Practically \$40,000,000 was recorded chiefly in the following items; buildings, 13 millions; stock for sale, 9; shop equipment, 3; for clothing and bedding, 5 millions, as also for furniture and utensils.

When the total losses of families remaining in Nanking are analyzed by causes, they show that 2 per cent were due to military operations, 52 to fire, 33 to military looting and 9 to other robbery, with 4 per cent unknown. Fire inflicted almost all the building loss, but only 31 per cent of the loss in movables. Indeed, nearly half the movables lost were taken by soldiers, and a seventh by others. The military robbery comprised over \$6,000,000 of movables for economic uses, and nearly \$7,000,000 of movables for domestic uses, blows each in its own way disastrous to the daily life of the Nanking population.

The data for family losses by main items and cause are given in Table 9.

##### DISTRIBUTION BY SECTION AND BY CAUSE

If the total losses \$40,000,000 of families resident in Nanking during March are assigned to the districts of the original addresses of those families (where most of the losses occurred), the results are as follows: Cheng Tung \$12 millions, Men Tung 7, Cheng Hsi 6, Men Hsi and Cheng Pei Tung, each 5; others small. The total losses were divided between business and residence properties as \$19 millions against \$21 millions. In the more important districts, fire losses were proportionately heaviest in Men Tung, 66 per cent of all losses; in Cheng Tung, 62; and lightest in Cheng Hsi and Men Hsi, 34 and 38 per cent of all losses. The differences in causation of loss for business and for residential

1. All money figures are in Chinese currency.

to maintain life was 44,650, or 94 per cent of all families.<sup>2</sup> Our observation agrees with this picture. Life was continued by the use of buried hoards and other surviving accumulations; which were spread through kinship, friendship, and loans; and were supplemented by organized relief plus irregular releases from military storehouses, chiefly in the form of pay to a comparatively small number of laborers.

#### COMPARISON OF PAST AND PRESENT

March employment was 35 per cent of former employment among the resident population reporting; and earnings of those employed were 32 per cent of former earnings. These two factors give a gross income for all residents equal to 11 per cent of former income. This gloomy figure corresponds to the observation of those who knew the situation closely. Family earnings in March were on the average \$0.14 per day, as compared with \$1.23 in former times. Prices were low, but not low enough to help the situation greatly.

When we compare the groups of the employed, we find that those engaged in trade were two-thirds of the former number, but earnings were only 26 per cent of former earnings; those in agriculture, under one-half, with 27 per cent of former earnings; in domestic and personal service, under one-sixth, with 47 per cent of former income; in manufacturing and mechanical industries, under one-tenth, with 35 per cent of former income; in general labor, under one-eighth, but wages of those employed were 73 per cent of old wages. Public service employment practically disappeared, as did professional service; while clerical occupations literally were not found.

#### SOURCES OF FOOD

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1. 17 per cent of the population was nearly 38,000. This report on the use of the food kitchens checks very closely with the International Committee's records of feeding some 35,000 persons in late March, though minor corrections are to be made both ways because of other methods of food distribution and other organizations to be considered.

2. The subsistence level was conservatively calculated at \$0.26 per family per day. Gamble's *How Chinese Families Live in Peiping*, p. 326, shows 1.39 *shih tan* per month to be the family consumption of cereals from the median group down well toward the bottom of the families studied. Rice in late March sold for \$10.63 per bag of 212.25 lb. From these data the figure of \$0.26 per day is derived, ignoring fuel, shelter, clothing, or any food save the dominant cereal.

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1. All money figures are in Chinese currency.



properties were not sharply marked. As might be expected, this population did not share largely in the big fire losses of the main commercial and industrial districts; thus their fire losses in business properties were 21 per cent of all their losses and in all properties; but were greater in residential properties, 30 per cent.

The data for family losses by section of city are given in Table 10.

#### 5. TOTAL LOSSES OF BUILDINGS AND CONTENTS

##### INTRODUCTION BY COUNT OF BUILDINGS

The total count of street-numbers is 39,200, of which 30,500 are inside the wall and 8,700 outside. The three crowded areas of Cheng Hsi, Men Hsi, and Men Tung had nearly 60 per cent of the buildings inside the wall (17,700); indeed, 45 per cent of the grand total.

Report of destruction or of damage to buildings was made only when the injury was sufficiently obvious from the street to call the attention of the investigator. In a number of specific examples we know of injury that was not recorded, but prefer to leave the figures as moderate as possible.

Of all buildings, 2 per cent were destroyed or damaged by military operations; 24 by fire; and additional 63 per cent by looting: a total of 89 per cent by all causes, leaving 11 per cent without obvious injury. It must be noted that most of the buildings burned within the city were thoroughly, even systematically stripped of their contents before the burning; and that practically without exception the fortunate 11 per cent were entered by soldiers who robbed to some degree, later followed by civilian thieves in unoccupied buildings.

Outside the wall, 62 per cent of the buildings were burned, even 78 per cent in the case of Tungchimen. Inside the wall, the percentage was 13, ranging from 29 in Men Tung down to 0.6 in the Safety Zone and 3.5 in the sparsely built Cheng Pei.

Military operations had noticeable effects only in the south and east parts of the city, and in Shuihsimen; though some cases must have been obscured in the areas severely burned.

Looting grossly affected 73 per cent of the buildings within the wall, but is reported for only 27 per cent outside the wall, where so much was burned, reaching 34 per cent in Hsiakwan. Inside areas ran as high as 96 per cent for Chen Pei and 85 for Cheng Pei Tung; the only one below 65 was the Safety Zone Area, in which the low report of 9 per cent appears for buildings showing damage by looting.

If we turn to consider the damage by all causes according to sections, we find that inside areas averaged 88 per cent of buildings affected, outside areas 90. Cheng Pei reported the dismal figure of 99.2 per cent; and indeed all the inside areas were above 90 save the Safety Zone with 10 and Men Hsi with 78. Outside areas touched 99.7 in the case of Tungchimen and 98 in that of Hsiakwan, while Shuihsimen was favored with only 70.

The data on count of buildings damaged or looted are given in Table 11.

##### TOTAL VALUES DESTROYED, BY ITEMS AND SECTION OF CITY

The building investigation shows a grand total of losses of buildings and contents for all sections of \$246,000,000, of which \$143 millions were in-

curred outside the walls, and \$103 millions inside. The grand total consisted first of 58 per cent movables (\$143 millions), in which movables for economic uses were \$114 millions, and movables for domestic uses were \$29 million; and secondly of 42 per cent buildings, amounting to \$103 millions.<sup>1</sup>

The loss in economic movables was especially heavy outside the walls, amounting to \$82 millions there as against \$32 millions inside while on the other hand, movables for domestic uses were \$23 millions within the walls and only \$7 millions outside. Buildings were a little heavier outside, \$55 millions against \$48 millions.

When we analyze specific items in percentages of the grand total, we find that stock for sale was 30 per cent (\$74 millions); shop equipment 6 per cent (\$16 millions), approximated by machinery and tools with \$14 millions; materials for manufacturing were 4 per cent (\$10 millions); rickshas were less than 0.1 per cent (\$270 thousands). Clothing and bedding accounted for 5 per cent (\$11 millions); household furniture and utensils for nearly 4 per cent (\$9 millions); family food and supplies for 0.7 per cent (\$2 millions); cash and jewelry for 0.3 per cent (\$700 thousand); bicycles for a little less; "others" for nearly 3 per cent (over \$6 millions). Almost all the machinery and tool losses occurred outside the wall, as also most of the material for manufacturing and two-thirds of the shop equipment and stock for sale.

In the classification of losses of buildings and contents according to sections of the city, there are a number of points of importance. By far the heaviest total was in Hsiakwan, the largely destroyed center of transportation, storage, and manufacturing: \$117 millions. Cheng Tung, Men Tung, and Men Hsi ranged from \$26 millions down to \$20 millions; Tungchimen reported \$16 millions and Cheng Pei Tung \$14 millions. The smallest total losses were the Safety Zone with \$4 millions and the notoriously poor area outside Shuihsimen.

Of the \$117 millions lost in Hsiakwan, 69 was in economic movables, and 42 in buildings. No other area lost as much as \$10 millions in economic movables, though several were above 6. After Hsiakwan, the next heaviest losers in buildings were Cheng Tung and Men Tung, with \$13 and 12 millions respectively. The Safety Zone was lowest, with \$551 thousands. As might be expected, there was no great concentration of losses in domestic movables, most of the areas ranged from \$5 to 2 millions.

The data for total values destroyed by items and section of the city are given in Table 12.

##### CAUSES OF LOSS: TOTALS AND MAIN ITEMS

Of the grand (or wretched) total of all losses, \$246,000,000, one per cent (\$3 millions) was due to military operations, which chiefly affected buildings. 67 per cent (\$165 millions) was caused by fire, including 97 millions in buildings, 30 millions in stock for sale, 13 millions in machinery and tools, 10 millions in shop equipment. 31 per cent (\$75 millions) of all losses were due to robbery, including 41 millions of stock for sale, 9 millions of clothing and bedding, 5 millions of shop equipment.

The data on causes of loss are given in Table 13.

1. The similarity of these two sets of figures is fortuitous but true.

LOSSES FROM BUSINESS PROPERTIES AND RESIDENCE  
PROPERTIES DISTINGUISHED

The total losses of buildings and contents, \$246,000,000, were reported as \$210 millions from business properties and \$36 millions from residence properties. Of the \$210 millions of losses incurred by business properties, 131 millions were outside the wall, 110 of them in Hsiakwan and 15 near Tung-chimen. Of the \$79 millions in business losses inside the wall, 23 occurred in Cheng Tung, 16 each in Men Hsi and Men Tung; 10 in Cheng Pei Tung; the smallest losses of this type were in the Safety Zone Area, \$2 millions.

The \$36 millions lost in residence properties were divided into 24 millions inside and 12 millions outside the wall. Inside there were \$6 millions in Men Tung, and 4 each in Men Hsi and Cheng Pei Tung; the other areas ran from 2 to 3. Of the \$12 millions in residential losses outside the wall, 7 were in Hsiakwan and 3 in Chunghwamen.

If cause is considered, the heavy business losses are classified as follows: due to military operations, 1 per cent; to fire, 69 per cent; to looting, 29 per cent. The relatively lighter losses in residential properties were due to these factors: military operations, 4 per cent; fire, 59 per cent; looting, 37 per cent. The differences are explicable in part by the fact that many residences lay close to the gates seriously attacked in the southeast portion of the wall; and, for the more important cause of fire, to the deliberate burning of extensive commercial and industrial sections.

The data comparing losses from business and residence properties are given in Table 14.

LOSSES ON MAIN COMMERCIAL STREETS

In order to understand more clearly one aspect of the economic plight of the city not adequately reached by the family or general building investigations, the condition and losses on 8 of the main commercial streets were listed separately for examination (though of course they are included in all general totals, and do not constitute an additional loss). These 8 streets comprised over 2,800 numbers, an average of 350 per street. They lie mainly in the southeast quadrant of the walled city.

2.7 per cent of the buildings were damaged by military operations, 33 per cent by fire, 54 per cent by additional looting (most of the burned stores were casually looted by soldiers, then regularly stripped by the use of fleets of military trucks); making 89 per cent to suffer from all causes. Considering all causes, Pai Hsia, Chung Hwa, Chien Kang, and Tai Ping Roads were destroyed or damaged to the extent of 97 and 98 per cent of the buildings; the others, 70 to 80 per cent. From the positive side, 11 per cent escaped serious damage.

When we consider the individual streets according to the havoc wrought by different methods, we find that military operations were most obvious in Chung Cheng Road (6 per cent of buildings) and in Chung Shan Road (5 per cent), while in some they were insignificant or not reported at all. The percentage of injury by fire was greatest in Tai Ping Road with 68, followed by Chung Hwa and Chien Kang Road with 51 and 47 respectively. Looting in

buildings not burned was naturally the converse of fire injury, since most of the preserved buildings have to be listed as looted. In Tai Ping Road only 27 per cent of the buildings are recorded as looted, as against 76 in Chung Cheng and Chu Chiao Road.

The losses of buildings and contents on the 8 main commercial streets within the city reached a figure just short of \$50,000,000, of which \$47,000,000 was in commercial buildings and their contents. In the report just following, it should be remembered that percentages and differences among the streets are listed in terms of dollars' worth of property lost, not in numbers of buildings as in the items of preceding paragraphs. Chung Hwa Road lost most heavily, with \$12,500,000, a fourth of the total for the 8 streets; Chung Cheng Road, \$11,000,000; Tai Ping Road, \$9,000,000; Chung Shan Road, \$6,000,000; Chien Kang and Pai Hsia Roads, \$4,000,000 each; Sheng Chow Road, \$2,000,000; Chu Chiao Road (the southern extension of Tai Ping Road), \$1,000,000.

If the money losses on the 8 streets are divided by causes, we find 0.7 per cent by military operations, 65 per cent by fire, 28 by additional looting, 6 reported as unknown. When individual streets are considered, Chien Kang Road reported 98 per cent of losses due to fire, Chung Cheng Road 87, Chung Hwa 77, Pai Hsia 69. For additional looting, the streets appear in the converse order, since unburned property is now the subject: Chu Chiao Road 72 per cent of losses due to looting, Chung Shan Road 61, Sheng Chow 47, Tai Ping 29. For Tai Ping, Sheng Chow, and Chu Chiao Roads in particular, sizable percentages are recorded as unknown, doubtless a combination of fire and looting, which must be to some extent interfused in all reports under these two headings.

The data on losses on main commercial streets are shown in Tables 15 and 16.

LOSSES OF BUILDINGS AND CONTENTS PER FAMILY OF  
ORIGINAL RESIDENTS

The weight of total losses may be in part appreciated by an estimate of their extent per family of the original population, which can be calculated with fair approximation.<sup>1</sup> In a sense these figures are academic, since they include the few public buildings destroyed and some important institutional properties, while excluding personal, public, and institutional property removed before the taking of the city. Yet they serve both to bring down figures of hundreds of millions to thinkable concreteness, and to correct the misleading impression given by the low reports from the relatively poor families remaining in Nanking.

The total loss reports show an average per family of \$1,262, of which \$527 was in buildings, \$582 in economic movables, \$152 in domestic movables. The economic movables comprised \$377 worth of stock for sale, \$80 of shop equipment, \$73 of machinery and tools, \$51 of materials for manufacture, \$1 in ricshas. The domestic movables comprised \$58 worth of clothing and bedding, \$44 of household furniture and utensils, \$9 of family food and supplies, \$4 of cash and jewelry, \$3 of bicycles.

1. We find a close check between direct use of the factors of total loss, population considered, and number of persons per family; and on the other hand loss per house-number divided by our figures of 4.9 families per house-number in the original population considered.

The data on losses per family of original residents are shown in the right hand column of Table 13.

COMPARISON OF LOSSES AS REPORTED FROM THE FAMILY INVESTIGATION  
AND THE BUILDING INVESTIGATION

When the losses per family of the original population are compared with the losses of the families remaining in Nanking, it is seen that the buildings are nearly doubled (\$527 to \$271), and movables for economic uses are actually doubled (\$582 to \$291), while domestic movables are almost halved (\$152 to \$276). These reports fairly represent the two situations: the total losses for the entire city were a half greater per family of its population than were the loss for the families remaining in Nanking (\$1,262 to \$838). The city-wide losses included the larger properties of all types: commercial, industrial, institutional. On the other hand, many domestic goods were removed by those who migrated; and losses of the domestic goods which they left in Nanking could not be adequately reported.

The data for comparison of losses for families remaining in Nanking and for all families in the original population may be found in Tables 9 and 13.

## II. AGRICULTURAL SURVEY

The Agricultural Survey attempted to cover the Ningshu Area, a natural and historical unit of six hsien grouped around Nanking. Two of the hsien, Kiangpu and Luho, lie north of the Yangtze River; while to the south are Kiangning (in which Nanking is located), Kuyung, Lishui, and Kaoshun. Owing to conditions explained in Appendix A on Organization and Method, Kaoshun and half of Luho could not be investigated in March. The 4.5 hsien included in the survey had at that time a maximum of 1,080,000 farm population, probably 1,200,000 to 1,350,000 before the war. They also included market towns which originally had some 275,000 inhabitants;<sup>1</sup> and the city of Nanking, formerly with a million, shrunken to approximately 250,000 in March. Thus the whole population of the 4.5 hsien was roughly a million and a half in March (the people of the market towns, however, do not enter the scope of the Surveys). The land area of the 4.5 hsien is 2,438 sq. m.,<sup>2</sup> about that of the State of Delaware or of two fair-sized English counties. Of this area, almost exactly one-third is cultivated, 819 sq. m.<sup>3</sup> It is important to note the bulk of Kiangning Hsien in the Agricultural Survey. It comprises 41 per cent of the cultivated area in the 4.5 hsien, and almost the same percentage of the total farm population.

### 1. FARM LOSSES

#### EXTENT AND SIGNIFICANCE

The five types of farm losses reported (buildings, labor animals, major farm implements, stored grain, crops destroyed) totalled nearly \$41,000,000 in the four and one-half hsien, or \$220 per family. It is important to note that the approximate annual income of a farm family in East Central China, as indicated by Buck's figure for the value of all goods consumed per year by an average family, is \$289.<sup>4</sup> The margin of savings and possible rate of accumulating farm capital are so small that the loss of three-fourths of a year's income is a fearful blow to farm families, both in productive power and in standard of life.<sup>5</sup> Losses of \$220 per family in the present calamity may be compared with the 1931 flood losses of \$457,<sup>6</sup> and the 1932 war losses of \$147.<sup>6</sup> (Both the

1. Estimated from Buck's figures in *Land Utilization in China, Statistics*, p. 417.
2. Buck, *Statistics*, p. 24, shows the correct government figures to be 6315 sq. km. and 2122 sq. km., respectively, from which the sq. m. are now calculated.
3. Buck, *Chinese Farm Economy*, p. 387. All money figures are in Chinese currency.
4. On data of fifteen years ago (from only three localities, and at lower valuations and prices than he has recently given) Buck reports a farm capital for Kiangsu averaging \$478. This figure includes buildings, livestock, supplies, farm equipment, not land and trees. Total capital with land he gives as \$1,775, subject of course to problems of tenancy and mortgage. *Chinese Farm Economy*, p. 57.
5. For Kiangning Hsien, so large an element in the Ningshu area, a current estimate of \$743 is given for the average farmer's buildings, implements, livestock, and furniture. R. T. Ts'ui, *Land Classification of Kiangning Hsien*, soon to be published in "Economic Facts."
6. *The 1931 Flood in China*, p. 13.
6. By another calculation, \$135 per family.

surveys of 1931 and of 1932 included many smaller items not reported this year; and the unit prices used in 1931 are much above the low ones now employed). Lishui Hsien suffered the heaviest losses per family, \$302; the large and populous Kiangning, \$251; Luho only \$111; Kuyung rising to \$147; and Kiangpu to \$239, nearest to the general average of \$220.

#### BUILDINGS

Buildings alone comprised 59 per cent of the total reported losses, \$129 per family. This means that 1.7 *chien*<sup>1</sup> of buildings per family, or two-fifths of all farm buildings in the area, were destroyed—most of them by burning. Building losses were particularly heavy in Lishui, 2.8 *chien* per family; in Kiangpu, 2; and in Kiangning, 1.9. The total number of *chien* destroyed was 308,000 valued at \$24,000,000.

#### LABOUR ANIMALS

Labor animals were second in importance among the types of losses, accounting for 16 per cent of the total, and 0.66 of an animal per family. The latter figure seems high, particularly the portion of it relating to water-buffaloes. In the 1931 flood, the general average for labor animals lost was 0.44 per family, counting the three kinds of animals listed in this survey.<sup>2</sup> Buck reports a normal figure for the Yangtze rice-wheat area of only 0.71, but 1.20 for the important Kiangning hsien,<sup>3</sup> the only one of our hsien there recorded. War losses of animals were proportionately higher in Kiangning (0.84), and in Kiangpu and Luho. For the whole area, the loss was 123,000 head (buffaloes, oxen, donkeys), valued at \$6,700,000 or \$36 per family.<sup>4</sup>

#### FARM IMPLEMENTS

Farm implements represented 13 per cent of all reported losses, and amounted to 3.55 items per family. It appears that most of these losses were of the wooden portions of the implements, burned with the buildings or taken for fuel; the wooden element is largest in the indispensable and costly many-bladed pumps for the irrigation of rice-fields. (0.6 per family). Present losses of the principal tools appear to be a half greater than in the flood of 1931.<sup>5</sup> Buck gives 6.5 items for the normal average (Yangtze Rice-wheat Area, medium-size farms) of the types of implements listed in this survey.<sup>6</sup> Implement losses were heaviest in Kiangning and Lishui, medium in Kiangpu. For the whole area, the loss was 661,000 implements, valued at \$5,240,000 or \$28 per family.<sup>7</sup>

#### STORED GRAIN

Stored grain counted 10 per cent of all losses, and in quantity amounted to 1,100,000 *shih tan*, or 6.1 *shih tan* per family; of which half was rice, a sixth wheat, and a sixth soybeans. Kuyung, at 7.5 *shih tan* per family, Lishui at 7.2, and Kiangning at 6.1, suffered most severely; Luho very lightly at 2.7. The

1. A *chien* is the space between main rafters, averaging about 11' x 16'. Farm residences often contain 4 *chien*, other farm buildings 2 *chien*. See Table 17 Note 1.

2. *The 1931 Flood in China*, p. 17.

3. Buck, *Statistics*, p. 122-123.

4. Buck many years ago indicated for Kiangsu Province a normal inventory amounting to \$53. *Chinese Farm Economy*, p. 57.

5. *The 1931 Flood in China*, p. 18.

6. *Statistics*, p. 396.

7. Buck earlier reported for Kiangsu Province a normal equipment value of \$64. *Chinese Farm Economy*, p. 57.

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average family in the war areas of 1932 lost just over 2 *shih tan*. The average loss in the flood of 1931 was 4.2 piculs (5.1 *shih tan*).<sup>1</sup> The recent grain losses reached a value of \$4,200,000, or \$22 per family.<sup>2</sup>

#### DESTROYED CROPS

Crops destroyed were fortunately a small loss, only 2 per cent of the total. For the winter wheat, like some of the younger women, was partly hidden in the ground during the worst period. Yet this item, relatively small though it was, indicates a real burden upon farm families. More than 8 per cent of the area planted to wheat was destroyed, chiefly by the soldiers' feeding of animals. In Kiangning and Kuyung the crop from 40 to 50 per cent of the intensively cultivated vegetable plots was lost to the farmer. The area of all winter crops destroyed was proportionately highest in Kuyung, 1.4 mow per family; and lowest in Kiangning, 0.62. The total area destroyed was 137,200 mow, or 0.85 per family; the total value \$785,000 or \$4 per family.

The types of recent war losses differ from those of the 1931 flood as fire from water. Counting in values, buildings destroyed in the present calamity are 31 times the crops (\$129 per family, as against \$4). In 1931, crops were twice the buildings (\$215 per family, as against \$108).<sup>3</sup> The 1932 war areas (rural) near Shanghai resembled Ningshu of the past few months, showing building losses as 28 times crops (\$97 as against \$3.50).

The data regarding farm losses are reported in Tables 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, of which the first three are general.

#### 2. WINTER CROPS AND SPRING SEED IMPORTANCE OF FOOD PRODUCTION IN THIS AREA

The importance of food production in this area, and its bearing upon relief needs, is emphasized by two facts. First, the 4.5 hsien here studied have an abnormally large city and town population. Even in the depleted condition of Nanking, it had at least 67,000 families, about one-fourth the number of a year ago; the market towns normally have 53,400 families, from which an unknown number should be subtracted for war migrants; the farm families originally numbered 186,000, from which a possible 30 per cent were absent in March as families, and an additional 11 per cent as individuals.<sup>4</sup> If we add these three figures, without making allowances, to form a total for the area, it exaggerates the importance of the farm families; yet even on this basis, they number only 61 per cent of the total, as against 22 for Nanking and 17 for the market towns. Compare the percentages for the Yangtze Rice-wheat Area as a whole: farms 83; cities 5; market towns, 12<sup>5</sup>. Secondly, transport of food from a distance has been practically impossible under war conditions, and there is scant improvement in sight. Most of the rice brought into Nanking this spring has come from Lishui and Kaoshun.

1. *The 1931 Flood in China*, p. 12.

2. In the prices of fifteen years ago, Buck valued the normal inventory of grain in Kiangsu province as \$29. *Chinese Farm Economy*, p. 57.

3. *The 1931 Flood in China*, p. 13.

4. Cf. Table 21, Note (\*\*\*\*) and reference. Also Appendix B.

5. Buck, *Land Utilization in China*, p. 365.

#### WINTER CROPS: THEIR SIGNIFICANCE

A large part of the cultivated land in this area is normally put into winter crops.<sup>3</sup> For Ningshu, Lin says 70 to 80 per cent;<sup>4</sup> for the Yangtze Rice-wheat Area, Buck reports 62 per cent, and for Kiangning Hsien,<sup>5</sup> 92; for Kiangning, Ts'ui in his recent and close study, says 65 per cent.<sup>6</sup> In general, the winter crop is followed by a summer crop on the same land; while the remainder of cultivated land grows a spring crop. Thus, in use of land, the winter crops represent 40 or more per cent of all crops, and are a large factor in the farm economy as well as in food production for the whole community.

#### EXTENT OF LAST FALL'S PLANTING ...

Last autumn's planting of winter crops was 1,629,000 mow (8.75 per family), or 47 per cent of the cultivated land. If we follow Ts'ui, whose figure seems the best-founded in itself and is supported by the best of Buck's figures (the regional one), this would mean that 47/65, or 72 per cent of normal planting, was carried out. War conditions of active preparations and of bombing, prevailed through portions of this region all through the autumn, and became acute at some points before the normal planting time. Moreover, the weather was unusually dry, another cause of delay which pushed some farmers along till early December, when the full calamity came and field work was impossible. Of the planting, 64 per cent was in wheat, 20 per cent in barley.

#### DESTRUCTION OF CROPS; OTHER SHORTAGE

Of the winter crops planted, 9 per cent are reported as destroyed. The estimated losses were 172,000 *shih tan*, or in money \$765,000. Kuyung Hsien lost most heavily, 18 per cent; Kiangpu only 4; the remainder not far from the average. The different crops suffered at about the same level, save 33 per cent for the intensively cultivated and not inconsiderable plots of vegetables, which were persistently attractive to soldiers, as were the other crops to military horses.

On the area planted but not destroyed (72 per cent of normal, discounted 9 per cent, leaving 65 per cent of normal) farmers expected 63 per cent of normal crops, fairly uniform according to grains. Remarkably dry weather prevailed until March; and there was also minor injury not to be classed as destruction, along with excess of weeds. Nevertheless, the expectation seems low, and this percentage may be colored by the farmers' thoughts of their total yield in ordinary times. To that extent, this figure represents a comprehensive estimate of expectations and shortage. However, the questions were sharply stated, and the investigators and farmers tried to provide the proper answers. If we take 63 per cent of the remaining 65 per cent of normal planting, the result would be an expectation of 41 per cent of the ordinary crop. Perhaps the truth lies between the percentages of 41 and 63. Two later factors must be mentioned. Beginning in March, there was better rainfall, with marked

1. In the following paragraphs, unless otherwise specified, wheat, barley, rapeseed, broadbeans, and field peas are considered; in certain of the tables, vegetables are also recorded.

2. D. Y. Lin, letter March 2, 1938.

3. *Statistics*, p. 207.

4. *Land Classification of Kiangning Hsien*.

improvement of the prospects. But in June the rainfall has been excessive at the time of wheat harvest in some localities, with great spoilage before threshing.

#### EXPECTED CROP IN TERMS OF CONSUMPTION

What does the harvest of wheat and barley mean in provision of food for the population of the hsien studied and the city population linked with them? It is expected to provide 3.40 *shih tan* of grain per family, which would feed them for less than seven weeks, according to grain consumption reports by Buck and by Gamble for farm and city populations, respectively.<sup>1</sup>

The data regarding winter crops are found in Tables 21, 30, 31, 32, of which 21 is general.

#### SHORTAGE OF SEED

Data on this subject are perhaps the least satisfactory in the survey, and they are not counted in the list of losses (where they are of course involved in the losses of stored grain). Answers to inquiries, even assuming that questions were skilfully pressed, concerned estimates and wants rather than plain statements of fact; and in several items seed was also food, in a time of scarcity and uncertainty. Nevertheless the results of the survey were very moderate, and on the whole gave confidence in the essential integrity of farmers and investigators. The requirements reported total \$2.87 per family, under 0.9 *shih tan*. Compare the 1931 flood data, which show a total want of winter and spring seeds in terms of 2.7 piculs (3.3 *shih tan*), of which spring seeds were 1.67 piculs (2.1 *shih tan*), the latter alone more than double the reports of the present inquiry.<sup>2</sup>

#### EVALUATION OF SEED REQUIREMENTS

Farmers reported that they intended to plant, on the average, nearly 15 mow per family of the 18.5 mow which they ordinarily would put into rice; and that they needed seed to the extent of almost 5 *shih chin* per mow of the intended planting. Was such an estimate unreasonable? Buck gives seed use as 5 per cent of total rice production in the Yangtze Rice-wheat Area, which on the base of most frequent yield works out at 19.3 *shih chin* per Kiangning mow.<sup>3</sup> Ts'ui's recent data for Kiangning would give 26.6 *shih chin*.<sup>4</sup> Traditional allowances are lower. In any case, the farmers' figures do not seem excessive.

Among the types of seed required, rice represented 66 per cent by value, and soybeans 20. Total value was \$570,000, of which \$376,000 was rice. It is inferred that there were serious individual and local difficulties, but that by one means or another most of the families affected could find some way of secur-

1. *Statistics*, p. 417, shows 239,450 families in the 4.5 hsien, including town families. We count 67,000 families in Nanking, making a total of 306,450 families. The average consumption of grain per farm family of 5.79 individuals, is 2.3 *shih tan* per month, based on the averages of three localities in South Kiangsu (Wutsin 1, Wutsin 2, and Changshu) as given in *Statistics* pp. 105,107. For the city families, Gamble's figures for a median income group (which extends with slight change down even to \$10 per month) are employed, working out at 1.39 *shih tan*. The weighted average of these two types of consumption is 2.1 *shih tan* monthly for all families in the area considered. *How Chinese Families Live in Peiping*, p. 326.

2. *The 1931 Flood in China*, p. 30.

3. *Statistics*, pp. 238, 210.

4. *Land Classification of Kiangning Hsien*, soon to appear in "Economic Facts."

ing seed for the fields they would be able to prepare for cultivation under the conditions of this spring.

The data regarding seed requirements are reported in Table 22.

### 3. THE WAR AND PERSONS

#### MIGRATION FROM THE FARMS

Investigators' reports show that 133,000 members of farm families resident in March (11 per cent of the estimated original members of those families) had left and had not returned. It must be remembered that possibly three times as many persons in entire families were still away; but we cannot accurately consider them because of inadequate information. (See Appendix B.). Of the 133,000 migrants, 111,000 were from Kiangning, 11,000 from Lishui, and 8,000 from Luho. The absent members from Kiangning were 20 per cent of the estimated total original population; perhaps this hsien was especially high because of its proximity to Nanking, the abundance of communications, and the association of individuals directly or indirectly with the government and private enterprises so largely removed before December 1937.<sup>1</sup>

#### LABOR SHORTAGE

Separate inquiries were made as to the original number of laborers in the family, the actual number of laborers, and the number expected back soon. The results show the actual shortage of laborers to be serious in Kiangning, 19 per cent; but the majority of absentee laborers were expected to return soon, leaving a predicted shortage of 18,000 or 7 per cent of the original number of laborers. For the 4.5 hsien, the actual shortage was 15 per cent; the expected shortage, 8 per cent or 42,800. The expected shortage was highest in Lishui, 12 per cent; and in Luho, 11. (Again see Appendix B for the possible shortage through the absence of whole families).<sup>2</sup>

Data on migration and labor supply are recorded in Table 23.

#### DEATHS BY VIOLENCE

The total deaths reported were 31,000 or 29 per 1,000 residents for the 100 days covered, at the rate of 106 per annum. Compare the normal death rate for China of 27 per annum.<sup>3</sup> 87 per cent of the deaths were caused by violence, most of them the intentional acts of soldiers. One was killed in every seven families, equivalent to a total of some 1,700,000 killings if the same rate were applied to the rural families of the United States; over 8,000,000 among the farm families of all China; perhaps 800,000 among the strictly defined farm families of Japan proper. The conditions of this region and the methods of the survey were such as practically to exclude soldiers of any sort, though it is possible that a few local men acting as police or guards were included. The

1. Migration within the hsien, or within this group of hsien, would leave the family within the net of this survey insofar as the sampling is satisfactory; though some escape in the hills is probable. In the 1931 flood, the total migration of families and of individuals showed more than 70 per cent of migrants remaining within the same hsien; and, apparently, a little more than 20 per cent migrating to other hsien, whether or not adjoining ones. *The 1931 Flood in China*, pp. 27, 33.

2. It is interesting to note the report of 2.8 laborers in an average family originally numbering 6.5. This suggests that according to the farmers' own interpretation of the term "laborer," there are some 43 per cent of the family to be so considered.

3. *Land Utilization in China*, p. 338.

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rate of killing was highest in Kiangpu, 45 per 1,000 in the 100 days; Kuyung 37, Kiangning 21, the others 15 and 12; for the 4.5 hsien, 25.

The per cent of males among the killed was terrific, especially up to 45 years, and amounted to 84 per cent of the killed for all ages. Among the 22,490 males killed, those falling between 15 and 60 years were 80 per cent, a real drain upon economic strength. Among the 4,380 females killed, 83 per cent were above 45 years. More of the younger women migrated in search of safety, or were kept out of harm's way in times of obvious danger; while old women did more than their share of guard duty, as supposably less liable to attack than young women or able-bodied men.

#### DEATHS BY SICKNESS

Deaths from sickness were reported as very low, totalling 4,080 or 3.8 per thousand residents in the 100 days. This is apparently a serious under-reporting; none at all was recorded under the age of 5 years, for example. A similar tendency is noticeable in normal times, and in the past winter attention was inevitably centered upon the great number of abnormal deaths. It is also possible that some deaths by sickness were confused with the killed, though the original questions presented the two as alternatives; and the margin of this confusion, as tested by comparison with the normal death rate, could not have been large enough to affect in noticeable degree the number reported as killed. The 100 days occurred in a healthy season with unusually mild and fair weather, after two successive years of big harvests. It is plain that there was no epidemic or extraordinary disease.

In the great flood of 1931, deaths were reported at the rate of 22 per 1,000 during an almost identical period of time; of the deaths, 70 per cent were definitely attributed to disease, and 24 per cent to drowning.<sup>1</sup> The present survey indicates only 12 per cent from sickness, which could at most be doubled by complete reporting. This only serves to emphasize the extent of the killings.

Data on deaths are reported in Tables 24 and 25.

#### 4. EFFECTS OF WAR: FARMS AND CITY COMPARED

Although before the war the rural population of the 4.5 hsien studied was not much greater than that of Nanking, at the period of the survey in March it was more than four times as great. While the remaining farm families lost only some 11 per cent of their members by migration, and possibly as many as 30 per cent went away and stayed away as entire families; the city lost by migration 14 per cent of the members of remaining families, and some 75 per cent of the original families entire. The surveyed population in Nanking was 221,000, as against 1,078,000 in the farm villages.

On the farms, one resident in every 7 families was killed. In the city, one resident in every 5 families was killed, injured, or taken away; which works out to about an equal degree of social evil and distress.

The total farm losses were \$41,000,000, with no domestic property reported. The total losses for families remaining in Nanking were \$40,000,000; while those of buildings and contents for the entire city were \$246,000,000.

1. *The 1931 Flood in China*, p. 37.



The farm losses per family (domestic property not considered) were \$220, of which buildings were \$129. Among the city population remaining, all losses per family were \$838, of which buildings accounted for \$271, stock for sale \$187, and domestic movables \$276. Total city losses divided among original families would run to \$1,262, of which buildings counted for \$527, stock for \$377, and domestic movables \$152.

It is not possible to compute the losses of farm and city in ratio to their respective total property values. It seems, however, that the farmer's losses do not weigh so heavily against his major property, land; as do the city people's losses against their total property. In any case, the farmer's basic capital for production has not been destroyed; while many city people have lost all important material means of production. These comments are not intended to lessen appreciation for the suffering and hardships of the large farm population; but merely to suggest that the average farmer has left to him more to struggle with and more to struggle for, than the average denizen of Nanking in this year of distress.

### III. RESULTS OF THE SURVEY IN THEIR BEARING UPON RELIEF NEEDS AND RELIEF PROGRAM

The loss of 40 per cent of all farm buildings is a critical blow at the farmer's capital, his standard of living, and his productive power. Some families or parts of families have been delayed in their return to the land because of lack of housing; that means shortage of labor, lessened production, even further worsening through neglect or robbery in the farmer's absence. Moreover, the preservation and care of animals, implements, and stored crops is affected by deficiency of buildings. In recent heavy rains, some farmers were unable to prevent their cut wheat from spoiling before threshing, and did not even have a place for improvised indoor threshing.

Working power is affected by shortage of laborers, of animals, and of implements. Deficiency of laborers is due (1) to irremediable deaths and injuries and to such war migration as will not be reversed in a few months; (2) more largely, to personal insecurity, especially for women. Improvement in such matters depends upon the purpose and the quality of government, a field which relief workers do not enter. Both animals and implements are insufficient, though farmers have done well in exchange and borrowing and cooperation, to make the most of what they have. Direct aid for the bringing in of animals, tools, and wood needed for handles and blades for implements, is desirable. Credits to assist in purchases, and in maintenance of breeding stock and young animals, are widely needed. In principle, and usually in practice, credit can be most usefully and most safely extended through cooperative societies.

Seed does not appear to be a separate problem henceforward. However, grain is the staple food; and serious shortage of food would press some farmers hard for seed.

The current wheat crop is seriously below normal, hurting farm incomes, and constituting a factor in the total food problem. Nevertheless, old supplies of various grains seem adequate to carry, till the autumn rice-harvest, all who have a little purchasing power or credit. More significant is the question of the coming rice crop, which cannot be accurately answered without further inquiry in July after the completion of transplanting. Interrogation of farmers and travelers from different localities brings a picture of wide variation: at many points a practically normal planting; at others a distressing deficiency.

Farmers are scarcely able to restore their injured capital and productive power, while short in those same necessities, and while working under conditions which in part are still those of war and military occupation. For example, as soon as spring crops were in around Nanking many farmers sold their buffalo for slaughter rather than take the risk of keeping the animal. Much less is there any margin against flood or drouth. After two years of excellent harvests, chanceful nature does not guarantee the next two. Indeed, there is already

great concern over the probability of flood in this Ningshu area sprawled across and along the Great River, excessively drenched in June rains and threatened by the extraordinary levels of the Middle and Upper Yangtze, plus the complication of the Yellow and Hwai waters through the Grand Canal (which overload the out-flow from the Lower Yangtze.)

In thinking of this year's relief problem by comparison with that of the flood in 1931, there is the apparent difference that then there was one government concerned with the problem as a whole, and putting large resources into relief. Under existing conditions there are various authorities (in some sections none), the more important of which are so intensely concerned with military and political operations, and are receiving so little of regular revenue from the localities considered, that relatively small efforts at relief have been made thus far. Surely the facts themselves appeal to all present authorities, however constituted, to do their utmost in constructive aid to farmers. Such aid is not only a humanitarian necessity but will strengthen the economic basis of the community and of the government itself, and will be worth infinitely more than propaganda in securing the good will and cooperation of the people. Furthermore, the needs are so great that the total of all potential aid, public and private, would still be inadequate. The experience and resources of the China International Famine Relief Committee, or of any other private, non-political organization concerned with relief, should be welcome as useful supplements to the large-scale relief that governmental authorities ought to be undertaking.

Freedom of transport by water, rail, and highway, is essential to any considerable recovery. In practice such freedom is dependent upon actual security as well as upon policy. Improvement of transport is acutely necessary both for producers and for consumers of food and of household requirements of all sorts. Fuel and raw materials are largely unprocurable in the places where they are most needed.

In normal times needs for credit were great, and interest rates high. Now normal supplies of credit are generally missing, and the necessities for credit are multiplied. Both farms and city need all types of banking and means for transfer of money and credit.

The need for security cannot be over emphasized. In many places, over a period of months, normal labor and normal family life have been continually disturbed by violence; while transport and credit and the incentive for productive effort, alike on the farm and in the shop, have been hamstrung by insecurity. The farmers and the city workers have done splendidly in helping themselves under adverse conditions, but further progress is dependent upon adequate safety for communications; protection of persons and private property against soldiers, bandits, and robbers of all types; and in particular, safe facilities for banks and for stocks of commodities. If political and military conditions do not provide better security, misery will continue and may increase. Insecurity and misery have bred a large part of the present insecurity; and the vicious circle will not easily be broken without unified, vigorous, and enlightened government.

The comparison of the effects of the war upon the farms and upon the city suggests that in the Nanking region more of the cultivators will pull through

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without planned aid, than will artisans and shopkeepers and peddlers. Even in the city, however, tribute must be paid to a population that could endure the experiences of December to March as the climax of a war period, and still have only 35 per cent securing food in part by relief whether through kitchens or through cash. There has been an upturn since March, but reserves are now lower. Furthermore, material resources, excepting for agricultural products, are continually being consumed without chance of replacement. Deterioration is also taking its toll daily. Further economic trouble would bring a sharp worsening. But administrators of public welfare in the United States or in some other countries may well marvel at the endurance and self-reliance of the plain Chinese people. The price, however, in health and in all opportunities of life has been heavy, and ought not to be further exacted.

It has been demonstrated that refugee camps are no longer needed as a major method of relief in Nanking. There are sufficient looted and damaged houses to shelter the present reduced population. Relief can best proceed through homes and personal services, supplying food, medical care, employment, credit, aid in reuniting separated families, to such degrees as ability, intent, and resources permit. Communal cooking may, however, become necessary if fuel stocks are not made available to the public. Every possible encouragement should be given to the restoration and development of municipal services: police, sanitation, light, water, public works. If only some system of garbage disposal could be instituted, health conditions would improve. A police force with some authority could rapidly check the nightly depredations on property and persons.

Finally, reports of losses and of needs are necessarily in terms of totals and averages. It must never be forgotten that many persons, families, villages or city streets, have suffered far more grievously than statistics or generalizations show. The reckoning for the whole community will gain from the corresponding items on the better side of the average; but that by no means brings an automatic compensation to those in the worse position. Relief efforts must look to the actual persons in greatest need, not merely to mathematical reports.

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#### IV. APPENDICES

##### APPENDIX A

###### FURTHER NOTES ON ORGANIZATION AND METHOD

###### 1. Field Procedure.

The technique of random sampling was followed instead of trying to locate "average villages" as done by Professor J. L. Buck in his surveys, because the difficulties existing in the situation made it improbable that investigators could go over the ground twice. Furthermore, it was not possible to put into the field a large group of trained observers such as worked in the war survey of rural areas around Shanghai in 1932. Lacking these opportunities and realizing how patchy war damage was in 1932, it was thought that a random sample selected at regular intervals would be less likely to misrepresent than would a hasty selection of "average villages." Furthermore, there is something to be said in principle for such random sampling by regular intervals as usually less subjective than the attempt to select "representative cases." The one instance in which this method seems to have failed is the average size of farm in Kiangpu Hsien and the resulting excess of total cultivated area. (See Table 17).

The procedure was more successful than at first expected. However, the investigators in Luho Hsien were stopped by the Chinese authorities in control of the northern part of the hsien, and were held as spies until a letter from the Committee was sent to them. The same difficulty occurred in Kaoshun Hsien so early in the field work that that hsien had to be dropped from the results. Only the southern half of Luho is included in the reports. In Lishui Hsien the Chinese authorities in control sent a guard with the investigators; and the guard compelled the investigators to go to villages which they selected and to families in the villages selected by the village head. Consequently, their sample tended to come from the worse areas. In the western part of Kiangning Hsien the investigators let local expediency interfere with selecting every tenth family. A careful check on sampling village by village revealed errors both ways or so haphazard that any attempt at correcting for them by weighting would be just as likely to increase the error as to reduce it. So no correction was attempted. The men in Kuyung, Kiangpu, and Luho followed their sampling instructions very systematically.

At the start of the building investigation in the City Survey, it was only intended to cover the main streets. But it was found difficult to fit together the family and building investigations, because the families remaining in the city were only one-fourth and the poorer part of the original population. Consequently, in order to get an estimate of total damage, the building survey was extended to every building in the city. If this had been expected at the beginning a smaller sample than one in ten would have been taken for estimating

value of loss, with consequent greater speed in securing results, but possible sacrifice of accuracy.

###### 2. Statistical Procedure.

The adequacy of the sample in the Agricultural Survey with 1 family in 206, is midway between the 1 to 359 families in the 1931 flood survey and the 1 to 79 in the survey of the rural areas affected by the Shanghai hostilities (1932). However, the ratio was much lower in Kiangning Hsien (1: 398) and relatively high in Lishui Hsien (1: 140). (See Table 17).

###### 3. Checks on Accuracy.

(1) *Previous surveys* were available in the form of *The 1931 Flood in China*, and the "Survey of the Rural Areas affected by the Shanghai Hostilities (1932)" as well as Buck's *Land Utilization in China*. For instance if the hsien average for rice seed needed as reported in the 1931 flood survey (Table 17) were applied to the 4.5 hsien in the present study, it would yield a figure of 211,000 *shih tan* needed. The result herein (Table 22) is only 125,200 *shih tan*. The average loss per family, \$220, is not too much greater than the loss of \$147 per family in the Shanghai hostilities in 1932 when the more prolonged destruction in this area is taken into consideration. The comparisons are made under each item of loss of damage. The *Land Utilization in China* was useful in comparing reported losses with actual farm inventory in normal times.

(2) *Independent figures* have been secured wherever possible. Independent estimates of the total cultivated area involved were used to check farming area covered. (See Table 17). For the current Nanking city population there are the number of persons registered by the Japanese in December and January, and the registration totals given by the new City Government for May 31st, 1938. No independent count or valuation of buildings in Nanking has been obtainable. Comparison of family losses in the city with losses reported to relief investigators was not possible on all items because their information was much more sketchy and for buildings they failed to secure values of losses in the majority of cases. But on the items of bedding, clothing and money, they reported an average loss of \$162.83 per family helped in March (9,256 families). Our figure of \$124.96 for family loss of the same items is conservative, even allowing for the fact that the above were "relief families"—though 20 per cent of all families in the city!

For comparison with normal conditions of the Nanking population representing the areas and classes that remained, the study of 2,027 families by Smythe in 1932 was the only work available. It made possible, however, some estimate of deviation from "normal."

A further independent check in the city survey was that the group doing the study had lived through the situation and at every point could critically examine every survey result to see whether it agreed with known circumstances. (But in no case were survey results altered). The most striking agreement was the low percentage of damage caused by military operations which fact was readily observed by many on December 14th. Conversely, the extent and method of the burning and looting could only be understood by eyewitnesses. The survey more accurately measures the extent and value of the damage done.

(3) *Internal consistency and moderation* in both the Agricultural and City Surveys support the general conclusions and most points in detail. Such internal checks have been applied all through the report so only a few instances need be cited here. In the Agricultural Survey the variation in hsien results are within the reasonable expectation of what is known of local conditions. Except for crops destroyed (a small factor in the total), the order of loss by hsien shows a fair degree of correlation between items.

In the City Survey the average loss per family as shown by the family investigation agrees very well with that shown by the building investigation when allowance is made for the fact that the poorer section of the population remained (though by no means limited to the very poor). (Compare Tables 3 and 27.) The sex and age distribution of the killed and taken away agrees with the decline of proportion of young males as compared with figures for the 1932 population. The family composition analysis shows a proportion of broken families similar to what one would expect in view of the number of persons migrating, killed and taken away. Compare Tables 2, 3, and 5.)

For instances of moderation, the prices used in estimating agricultural losses are actual current prices which were below average; stored grain losses of 5.9 *shih tan*, while about the same as in the case of the 1931 flood and the 1932 Shanghai hostilities, are low considering the time of year and the fact that the troop movements and military occupation in this area followed two large rice harvests. Furthermore, this year's rice crop had little chance to move before the critical period.

The city losses are moderate. \$271 would only build a very modest house (and a high per cent of families remaining owned their houses); \$291 worth of movables for economic uses is quite within range of the small trade group remaining; as is also the figure of \$276 for domestic movables. The total property loss of \$838 per family is only equal to two year's income previous to hostilities. The item on which exaggeration could have been most expected, in view of the extent of military looting that had taken place, was money. Yet that is only \$9.53 per family—less than what every family not on relief must have paid monthly for rice in order to survive. (See Table 9.)

#### APPENDIX B.

##### MIGRATION OF WHOLE FAMILIES

##### ITS POSSIBLE INFLUENCE ON REPORTS OF RESIDENT POPULATION, MIGRATION, LOSSES, LABOR SUPPLY, DEATHS.

As a supplement to the survey of farm families, investigators were asked to make careful inquiries from at least three leading men in every third village on the survey route, as to their estimate for their own village people on the same points included in the farm family survey.<sup>1</sup> This method was employed in the Flood Survey of 1931, and more widely in the Land Utilization Survey under Dr. Buck's direction. In March, 224 villages were reported in this manner, an average of 50 per hsien (4.5 hsien). This body of data confirmed the general picture of the farm survey, but varied irregularly in specific results,

1. All farmers in Ningshu live in villages; farm families and village families are equivalent terms.

even within itself. Since the data consisted only of estimates on behalf of a community, they are of less value than the more precise individual report of each farm family secured on the spot. We have therefore not employed the village data in our general listing and reports.

But on one point the village data throw light secured in no other way. They give an estimate of the number of whole families which migrated and had not returned; while the farm survey could touch only those whole families or parts of families actually found in the farm villages. Thus they indicate a possible supplement or correction to our farm survey figures on estimate of population, migration, losses, labor supply, and death rate. We do not feel that our detailed figures from village estimates justify printing, but the best inference we can make from them is that only 70 per cent of the original families were actually present in March. Comparison of this with the individual farmers' reports that 11 per cent of their family members were absent, suggests that migration under war conditions was usually by whole families, a result confirmed by the city survey and most remarkably by the practical coincidence of reports from the 1931 flood.<sup>1</sup>

It is possible that some of the supposed 30 per cent of migrant families still remained within the *hsiens* studied, but in remote hilly sections not adequately reached by investigators, though the samples obtained covered the ground fairly well. It seems justifiable to assume that the estimates of losses for the area studied need not be modified by consideration of the family migration, for they are calculated upon the average loss per family studied, times the original number of families. Common observation in city and country alike is that absent families suffered in general more grievous losses than those watchful on the spot; whether by burning or by looting. This disparity was offset only in part by the sometimes successful removal of animals and a limited amount of portable property along with the migrating family; and moreover, most of the losses here recorded were of possessions not easily moved in practice.

If the figures of 30 per cent could be relied upon, it would in Table 23 increase the number of people left and not returned to a total of 496,590 (41 per cent of the estimated total original population of 1,211,200); and would increase the actual shortage of laborers enormously (62,000 families with an apparent average of 2.8 laborers in each, removing a figure of 173,600 laborers from the 447,400 mentioned in the Table as present in March); but would increase the expected shortage of laborers by a lesser figure, unknown because there is no report of intention to return.

The figures for deaths (Table 25) are all in terms of rates for families reporting, and therefore are not subject to change unless we assume that the presumed 80 per cent of families suffered an incidence of death greater or less than did the resident majority. Probably some families who migrated early and to a considerable distance or to the relatively safer portions of Nanking, fared better than the rest. On the other hand, the reason why some families migrated and did not return was simply because they or their accompanying neighbors had already experienced military murder and wounding and burning.

1. "Forty per cent of all people had to leave their homes, thirty-one per cent as families and nine per cent as individuals." *The 1931 Flood in China*, p. 27.

## APPENDIX C

### 1. FAMILY INVESTIGATION SCHEDULE

(City Survey)

File number \_\_\_\_\_

1. Name of family head \_\_\_\_\_ 2. Present address: (a) \_\_\_\_\_ (b) \_\_\_\_\_ 3. Former address: \_\_\_\_\_  
 4. Name of investigator: \_\_\_\_\_ 5. Date of investigation: \_\_\_\_\_  
 6. Total family members \_\_\_\_\_ (Include all members sharing in same economic support)

Relation to head	Age	Former occupation	Former daily income	Present occupation	Present daily income	Killed or wounded					
						Date	Killed	Wounded	Circumstances	Cause*	
1.										Accident	Warfare
2.											
3. etc.											

\* "Accident" was used as a code word to record effect of military operations; "warfare" as a code word for violence by Japanese soldiers apart from military operations.

#### 7. Losses

Item	Number or amount	Original total value	Total value lost	Total value left	Cause of loss		
					Fire	Looting*	Stealing
1. Building address: a) Owned b) Rented	chien chien						
2. Machinery or parts	pieces						
3. Shop equipment	"						
4. Material for manufacture	"						
5. Goods for sale	"						
6. Rickshas	pieces						
7. Household furniture	"						
8. Bedding and clothing	"						
9. Food supplies	"						
10. Bicycles	pieces						
11. Others							

"Looting" was used specifically to record robbery by Japanese soldiers. All other robbery is listed under "Stealing".

#### 8. Migration

Relation to head	Age	Out				In			
		Before Dec. 13	After Dec. 13	Returned		Before Dec. 13	After Dec. 13	Returned	
				Yes	No			Yes	No
1.									
2.									
3. etc.									

#### 9. Sources of cereals last week:

(a) Rice \_\_\_\_\_ (b) Fleur \_\_\_\_\_ (c) Price of rice \_\_\_\_\_ (d) Price of flour \_\_\_\_\_

### 2. BUILDING INVESTIGATION SCHEDULE

(City Survey)

File number \_\_\_\_\_

1. Building \_\_\_\_\_ 2. Name of investigator: \_\_\_\_\_ 3. Date of investigation: \_\_\_\_\_  
 4. Name of street: (a) Owned \_\_\_\_\_ Other address, if any \_\_\_\_\_  
 (b) Rented \_\_\_\_\_ Other address, if any \_\_\_\_\_  
 5. Building loss \_\_\_\_\_

Type of building	Residence	Shop	Factory	Go-down	Number of buildings (tso)	Number of floors	Construction material				Number of fang	Unit value	Minimum estimated value of losses	Maximum estimated value of losses
							Reinforced concrete	Mortised bricks filled with rubble	Wood	Others				
Main														
Secondary														

#### 6. Loss of contents

Items	Original total value	Total value lost	Cause of loss				Remarks
			Fire	Accident*	Looting*	Stealing	
1. Machinery or parts							
2. Shop equipment							
3. Material for manufacture							
4. Goods for sale							
5. Rickshas							
6. Furniture							
7. Bedding and clothing							
8. Food supplies							
9. Bicycles							
10. Cash, etc.							
11. Others							

\* See notes on these headings, Family Investigation.

7. Number of persons now living in buildings \_\_\_\_\_  
 Number of persons formerly living in buildings \_\_\_\_\_  
 Number of persons now employed \_\_\_\_\_  
 Number of persons formerly employed \_\_\_\_\_

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### 3. FARM FAMILY SCHEDULE

Number \_\_\_\_\_

1. Village, \_\_\_\_\_ Hsiang \_\_\_\_\_ District, \_\_\_\_\_ Hsien. 2. Date of information: \_\_\_\_\_ year \_\_\_\_\_ month \_\_\_\_\_ day.
3. Investigator: Name \_\_\_\_\_ Address: \_\_\_\_\_
4. Total number of persons in family (Babies included. Do not include persons not now living with the family.) \_\_\_\_\_
5. Area planted \_\_\_\_\_ (mow) Area owned \_\_\_\_\_ (mow) Area rented \_\_\_\_\_ (mow)
6. Winter crops

Name of crop	Number of mow planted in each crop	Number of mow of each crop completely destroyed	Per cent of a normal (plentiful year) crop expected (including crops not destroyed or partly destroyed)
1. Wheat			
2. Barley			
3. Rape			
4. Broad beans			
5. Field peas			
6. Others			

8. Seeds needed for crops to be planted this year. (If the farmer has the money to buy the seed, and the seed is available locally, do not include in this table.)

Name of crop	Number of tou of seed lacking	If had money, could you buy locally?
1. Rice		
2. Corn		
3. Soybean		
4. Cotton seed		
5. Others		

10. Greatest needs (If the farmer has the money to buy the item, and the item is available locally, do not include in this table.)

Kind	Tou
1. Wheat	
2. Barley	
3. Rice	
4. Corn	
5. Soybean	

11. Original number of *chien* of buildings, total \_\_\_\_\_  
Number of *chien* destroyed completely, total \_\_\_\_\_ partly, total \_\_\_\_\_
13. Number of persons who migrated at time of hostilities and have not yet returned \_\_\_\_\_
14. Laborers: (1) Number of laborers last spring \_\_\_\_\_ (2) Number of laborers now \_\_\_\_\_  
(3) Number of laborers expected to return for spring cultivation \_\_\_\_\_
15. Number of mow made unfit for cultivation because of the hostilities \_\_\_\_\_

Name of crop	Number of mow usually planted	Expected planting this year (mow)	Reasons for change
1. Rice			
2. Cotton			
3. Soybeans			
4. Corn			
5. Others			

#### 9. Losses

Kind	Number
1. Water buffaloes	
2. Oxen	
3. Donkeys	
4. Wheat	(tou)
5. Barley	"
6. Rice	"
7. Corn	"
8. Soybeans	"
9.	
10.	
11. Plows	
12. Harrows	
13. Pumps	
14. Hoes	

#### 12. Deaths during the hostilities.

Relation-ship to family head	Age	Cause of death		
		Violence	Disease	Other (with explanation)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				

Urban Survey: Tables 1 to 16  
Rural Survey: Tables 17 to 32.

Cables

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By Mitten O. Alvarado NARS, Date 12-18-75

TABLE 1  
 FAMILIES STUDIED AND ESTIMATED POPULATION  
 By section of city

Section	Number of families studied	Total family members in families studied	Average size of family	Estimated total number of families	Estimated total family members
A. Inside of wall	906	4,252	4.7	45,300	212,600
1. Safety Zone	298	1,358	4.6	14,900	67,900
2. Refugee Camps	114	550	4.8	5,700	27,500
3. Cheng Hsi	115	544	4.7	5,750	27,200
4. Cheng Tung	55	232	4.2	2,750	11,600
5. Cheng Pei	51	243	4.8	2,550	12,150
6. Men Hsi	126	631	5.0	6,300	31,500
7. Men Tung	103	451	4.4	5,150	22,800
8. Garden	44	243	5.5	2,200	12,150
B. Outside of wall	43	171	4.0	2,150	8,550
9. Hsiakwan	13	46	3.5	650	2,300
10. Chunghwamen	16	79	4.9	800	3,950
11. Shuihsimen	14	46	3.3	700	2,300
All Sections	949	4,423	4.7	47,450	221,150*

\*On the basis of incomplete registrations carried out by the military authorities between the end of December and the end of January, members of the International Committee estimated the population of Nanking at that time to approach 250,000, a figure decidedly above their deliberately cautious guesses of earlier weeks. Semi-official Chinese conjectures ran closer to 300,000. There was no great change in February and March, but a noticeable inflow from less orderly areas near the city probably built up a small surplus over departures, which also were visibly significant. We venture an estimate of 250,000 to 270,000 in late March, some of whom were inaccessible to the investigators, and some of whom were passed by; 221,150 are represented in the survey. On May 31, the residents registered in the five district offices of the municipal government (including Hsiakwan, but apparently no other sections outside the gates), numbered 277,000. This figure is admittedly incomplete, particularly as to women and children, and is commonly amended to nearer 400,000. One year ago the population of the Nanking Municipality was just over 1,000,000, a figure sharply reduced in August and September, rising again to nearly 500,000 in early November. The old Municipality included a larger area than is now considered, comprising at least one-tenth more in population.

TABLE 2  
AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION STUDIED  
shown in percentages

Age group	Percent in each age group					Sex ratio*	
	1938, All Sections					1932**	Present study (1938)
	Male	Female	Male and female	Male	Female	Male and female	Male and female
0-4	8.1	8.7	8.4	10.7	12.1	11.4	96.8
5-9	12.5	12.5	12.5	9.4	9.8	9.5	103.3
10-14	12.3	11.1	11.7	9.9	9.5	9.7	114.0
15-19	8.6	8.2	8.4	9.0	8.4	8.7	108.4
20-24	6.6	6.5	6.6	8.0	7.4	7.7	105.7
25-29	6.1	6.4	6.2	9.7	8.7	9.3	100.0
30-34	5.6	6.4	6.0	8.3	7.7	8.0	89.8
35-39	6.1	6.0	6.1	8.0	7.4	7.8	105.3
40-44	7.8	7.2	7.5	7.4	6.8	7.1	112.1
45-49	8.4	5.3	6.9	6.1	5.7	5.9	103.5
50-54	5.8	5.8	5.8	4.8	4.2	4.5	104.8
55-59	3.9	4.2	4.0	3.7	4.9	4.3	95.6
60 and over	8.2	11.7	9.9	5.0	7.4	6.1	72.2
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	103.4
0-14	33	32	32	30	32	31	105
15-49	49	46	48	57	52	54	111
50 and over	18	22	20	13	16	15	95
Totals	100	100	100	100	100	100	103

\*Number of males per 100 females.  
\*\*The data for 1932 are from the same study as the 2,027 families referred to in Table 3, but only for 1,766 families.

TABLE 3  
FAMILY COMPOSITION  
By section of the city, shown in percentages

Section	T y p e o f F a m i l y												Total per cent in each section
	Normal		Broken		Non-family		Normal with relatives		Broken with relatives		Non-family with relatives		
	Husband and wife	Husband, wife, and children (2)	Man, child- ren	Woman, child- ren	Man alone	Woman alone	Husband, Wife, rela- tives	Husband, wife, children, relatives	Man, child- ren, relatives	Woman, children, relatives	Man, relatives	Woman, relatives	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	
A. Inside of city	4.3	26.3	2.5	6.8	5.1	2.0	5.0	27.7	5.9	6.5	5.7	2.2	100.0
1. Safety Zone	6.0	25.8	2.4	7.7	5.4	1.7	5.0	27.8	4.4	5.7	6.4	1.7	100.0
2. Refugee Camps	4.4	25.4	1.8	13.2	3.5	1.8	5.3	21.0	1.8	14.0	1.7	6.1	100.0
3. Chen Hsi	3.5	25.2	2.6	5.2	3.5	2.6	6.1	25.2	5.2	10.4	9.6	0.9	100.0
4. Chen Tung	3.6	27.3	7.3	9.1	7.3	3.7	1.8	30.9	3.6	1.8	3.6	—	100.0
5. Chen Pei	3.9	19.6	3.9	2.0	7.8	3.9	5.9	25.5	19.6	2.0	5.9	—	100.0
6. Men Hsi	2.4	27.8	0.8	5.6	5.6	2.4	5.5	29.3	7.1	7.9	4.0	1.6	100.0
7. Men Tung	3.9	29.1	1.9	4.9	5.8	1.0	4.9	33.0	3.9	1.9	4.9	4.8	100.0
8. Garden	2.3	29.5	4.5	—	2.3	—	2.3	31.8	15.9	—	11.4	—	100.0
B. Outside of city*	7.0	23.3	4.6	2.3	9.3	4.7	4.6	18.6	7.0	2.3	16.3	—	100.0
9. Hsiakwan	7.7	30.7	7.7	—	23.1	—	—	15.4	—	—	15.4	—	100.0
10. Chunghwamen	6.3	37.5	—	6.2	—	—	12.5	18.7	6.3	—	12.5	—	100.0
11. Shuihsimen	7.1	—	7.1	—	7.2	14.3	—	21.4	14.3	7.1	21.5	—	100.0
All Sections, 1938	4.4	26.2	2.6	6.6	5.3	2.1	5.0	27.3	5.9	6.3	6.2	2.1	100.0
Nanking, 1932**	9.5	33.1	2.3	3.4	5.3	2.1	4.1	25.7	4.6	2.6	7.1	0.1	100.0

\*The number of cases studied in each area outside of the city wall was too small to make the percentage distribution very significant but for the areas combined the sample is comparable with sections in the city.

\*\*A study of 2,027 families in sections of Nanking and class of people from which present population largely came.

(Lewis S. C. Smythe, "The Composition of the Chinese Family," *Nanking Journal*, University of Nanking, November, 1935, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 371-393. Figures cited, p. 382).

In both studies the classification here used is by Dr. Mildred Parten, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, March, 1932, p. 32.

TABLE 4  
NUMBER AND CAUSE OF DEATHS AND INJURIES, BY DATE

Date (1937-1938)	Deaths by			Injuries by			Taken away**	Total killed and injured	Per cent killed and injured by soldiers' violence
	Military opera- tions*	Soldiers' violence	Unknown	Military opera- tions*	Soldiers' violence	Unknown			
Before Dec. 12	600	—	—	50	—	—	—	650	—
Dec. 12, 13	50	250	—	—	250	—	200	550	91
Dec. 14-Jan. 13	—	2,000	150	—	2,200	200	3,700	4,550	92
Jan. 14-Mar. 15	—	—	—	—	—	—	250	—	—
Date unknown	200	150	—	—	600	50	50	1,000	75
Total	850	2,400	150	50	3,050	250	4,200	6,750	81
Per cent of cases of violence oc- curring after Dec. 13th.		89			90				

\*By "military operations" is meant bombing, shelling, or bullets fired in battle.

\*\*Most of those "taken away" have not been heard from in any manner.

TABLE 5  
SEX AND AGE OF DEATHS, INJURIES BY MILITARY VIOLENCE,  
AND OF PERSONS TAKEN AWAY  
shown in percentages

Age group	Death of				Injuries of				Taken away (males only)	Per cent males in killed and injured
	Males by		Females by		Males by		Females by			
	Soldiers' violence	Others*	Soldiers' violence	Others*	Soldiers' violence	Others*	Soldiers' violence	Others*		
Under 5 years	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5-14	6	8	8	—	—	—	8	—	—	50
15-29	25	25	23	—	44	80	65	—	55	61
30-44	22	8	15	14	35	20	11	50	36	76
45-59	19	42	15	57	15	—	8	—	9	68
60 and over	28	17	39	29	6	—	8	50	—	58
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	64
Number per 1,000 in family members re- presented**	8	3	3	2	8	1	6	0.5	19	—
Number of persons	1,800	600	650	350	1,700	250	1,300	100	4,200	—

\*"Others" includes both by "Military Operations" and "Unknown" as shown in Table 4.

\*\*A total of 221,150 persons. See Table 1.

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By Milton D. O'Brien, NARS, Date 12-18-75

TABLE 7  
 PRESENT EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SECTION OF THE CITY

Occupations	Male	Female	Total	Per cent of total population employed	Per cent of persons 10 years and over employed	Per cent of persons 15 years and over employed
Agriculture, mining	2,450	50	2,500	12	10	12
Manufacture, mechanical	900	—	900	5	13	5
Trade	12,550	500	13,050	67	67	67
Transportation	900	—	900	4	13	4
Clerical occupations	—	—	—	—	—	—
Domestic & personal service	650	200	850	5	13	5
Public service not elsewhere classified	150	—	150	1	13	1
Professional service	—	100	100	*	13	*
General labor	350	100	450	3	13	3
Combined shops	550	—	550	3	13	3
Total employed	18,500	950	19,450	100	100	100
Per cent of population employed	9		9			
Per cent of persons 10 years and over employed	11		11			
Per cent of persons 15 years and over employed	14		14			

TABLE 7  
 PRESENT EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SECTION OF THE CITY

Occupations	Inside of wall		Safety Zone	Refugee Camps	Cheng-hai	Cheng-tung	Cheng-pei	Men-hai	Men-tung	Garden	Outside of wall Males only	All Sections			Per cent of all persons employed	Average daily earnings per person employed
	Male	Female										Male	Female	Total		
Agriculture, mining	2,450	50	350	50	—	—	100	—	—	2,000	—	2,450	50	2,500	12	0.20
Manufacture, mechanical	900	—	250	50	100	100	—	150	250	—	50	950	—	950	5	0.38
Trade	12,550	500	5,200	700	2,400	550	850	2,350	950	50	600	13,150	500	13,650	67	0.31
Transportation	900	—	300	150	250	—	50	50	100	—	—	900	—	900	4	0.42
Clerical occupations	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Domestic & personal service	650	200	300	50	100	50	50	200	100	—	100	750	200	950	5	0.45
Public service not elsewhere classified	150	—	100	—	—	—	50	—	—	—	—	150	—	150	1	1.00
Professional service	—	100	—	50	—	—	—	50	—	—	—	—	100	100	*	0.55
General labor	350	100	100	50	50	—	150	100	—	—	50	400	100	500	3	0.25
Combined shops	550	—	200	—	100	50	—	150	50	—	100	650	—	650	3	0.22
Total employed	18,500	950	6,800	1,100	3,000	750	1,250	3,050	1,450	2,050	900	19,400	950	20,350	100	0.32
Per cent of population employed	9		10	4	11	6	10	10	6	17	11	9				
Per cent of persons 10 years and over employed	11		13	5	14	8	13	12	8	23	13	12				
Per cent of persons 15 years and over employed	14		15	6	17	10	15	15	9	26	15	14				

\* Less than 0.5 per cent.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

TABLE 6

FORMER EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, BY OCCUPATION

Occupations	Number			Per cent of all persons employed	Average daily earnings per person employed
	Males	Females	Total		
Agriculture, mining	5,500	100	5,600	10	0.73
Manufacture, mechanical	9,650	800	10,450	18	1.08
Trade	18,200	1,700	19,900	34	1.20
Transportation	3,550	100	3,650	6	1.14
Clerical occupations	900	—	900	2	0.86
Domestic and personal service	6,000	700	6,700	12	0.96
Public service not elsewhere classified	1,800	100	1,900	3	1.03
Professional service	1,600	150	1,750	3	1.05
General labor*	3,050	1,150	4,200	7	0.34
Combined shops*	2,700	150	2,850	5	0.91
Total and averages	52,950	4,950	57,900	100	1.01
Per cent of total population employed				26	
Per cent of persons 10 years and over employed				33	
Per cent of persons 15 years and over employed				38	

\*This classification follows the main groupings of the United States Census, adapted for local use by dropping the two groups of forestry and fishing, and extraction of minerals (the one miner reported was added to the single extractive group of agriculture); and by adding the two groups of general labor and combined shops. "Combined shops" refer to the common case of shops that both make and sell, and therefore do not fall into manufacture or into trade.

TABLE 7

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SECTION OF THE CITY

Occupations	Inside of wall		Safety Zone	Refugee Camps	Cheng-hai	Cheng-tung	Cheng-pai	Men hai	Men tung	Garden	Outside of wall Males only	All Sections			Per cent of all persons employed	Average daily earnings per person employed
	Male	Female										Male	Female	Total		
Agriculture, mining	2,450	50	350	50	—	100	—	—	—	2,000	—	2,450	50	2,500	12	0.20
Manufacture, mechanical	900	—	250	50	100	100	—	150	250	—	600	950	—	950	5	0.38
Trade	12,550	500	5,200	700	2,400	550	850	2,350	950	50	—	13,150	500	13,650	67	0.31
Transportation	900	—	300	150	250	—	50	50	100	—	—	900	—	900	4	0.42
Clerical occupations	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Domestic & personal service	650	200	300	50	100	50	50	200	100	—	100	750	200	950	5	0.45
Public service not elsewhere classified	150	—	100	—	—	—	50	—	—	—	—	150	—	150	1	1.00
Professional service	—	100	—	50	—	—	—	50	—	—	—	—	100	100	*	0.55
General labor	350	100	100	50	50	—	150	100	—	—	50	400	100	500	3	0.25
Combined shops	550	—	200	—	100	50	—	150	50	—	100	650	—	650	3	0.22
Total employed	18,500	950	6,800	1,100	3,000	750	1,250	3,050	1,450	2,050	900	19,400	950	20,350	100	0.32
Per cent of population employed	9		10	4	11	6	10	10	6	17	11	9				
Per cent of persons 10 years and over employed	11		13	5	14	8	13	12	8	23	13	12				
Per cent of persons 15 years and over employed	14		15	6	17	10	15	15	9	26	15	14				

\* Less than 0.5 per cent.

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 By Milton D. Chavira, NARS, Date 12-18-75

TABLE 8  
 SOURCES OF CEREALS DURING PRECEDING WEEK, BY SECTION  
 OF THE CITY, SHOWN IN PERCENTAGES

Section	Rice* from			
	Self-government shops	Small shops	Food kitchens	Friend and other sources
A. Inside of city	14	64	18	4
1. Safety Zone	10	72	17	1
2. Refugee Camps	—	9	82	9
3. Cheng Hsi	15	69	12	4
4. Cheng Tung	29	60	2	9
5. Cheng Pei	23	73	2	2
6. Men Hsi	20	73	2	5
7. Men Tung	20	74	—	6
8. Garden	5	85	8	2
B. Outside of city	16	70	—	14
9. Hsiakwan	31	46	—	23
10. Chungshwamen	19	75	—	6
11. Shushimen	—	86	—	14
All Sections	14	64	17	5

\*Only 2.5 per cent of the families reported the use of flour because there was practically none on the market in March.

TABLE 9  
 LOSSES OF BUILDINGS AND MOVABLE PROPERTY FOR  
 FAMILIES REMAINING IN NANKING, BY CAUSE

Item	Average per family	Total	C A U S E				Unknown
			Military operations	Fire	Military robbery	Other robbery	
Buildings (owned)	\$271.56	12,885,600	496,800	12,291,200	78,600	17,700	1,300
Movable property							
1. Machinery, tools	16.00	759,200	—	424,000	269,200	29,000	37,000
2. Shop equipment	65.01	3,084,600	—	1,833,500	1,025,000	150,000	76,100
3. Materials for manufacture	19.55	927,500	—	163,300	710,200	37,000	17,000
4. Stock for sale	186.71	8,859,300	6,000	2,607,700	4,178,000	1,911,400	156,200
5. Rickshas	3.60	171,000	11,500	65,500	79,200	—	14,800
Total movables for economic uses	290.87	13,801,600	17,500	5,094,000	6,261,600	2,127,400	301,100
6. Household furniture utensils	110.37	5,237,200	63,000	1,886,800	1,619,800	796,800	870,800
7. Clothing, bedding	115.43	5,477,200	24,200	1,196,300	3,155,800	782,900	318,000
8. Family food and supplies	7.98	376,400	3,500	50,300	290,300	15,200	17,100
9. Bicycles	2.59	122,800	12,500	6,000	102,300	—	2,000
10. Cash, jewelry	9.53	452,000	—	16,500	427,800	2,500	5,200
11. Others	29.83	1,415,300	57,100	149,000	1,167,300	26,000	15,900
Total movables for domestic uses	275.68	13,080,000	160,300	3,304,900	6,763,300	1,623,400	1,229,000
Total all movable property	566.55	26,882,500	177,800	8,398,900	13,024,900	3,750,800	1,530,100
Grand total	\$838.11	39,768,100	674,600	20,690,100	13,103,500	3,768,500	1,531,400
Percentage		100.0	1.7	52.0	33.0	9.5	3.8

TABLE 10  
LOSSES OF BUILDINGS AND MOVABLE PROPERTY FOR FAMILIES  
REMAINING IN NANKING (BY ORIGINAL ADDRESS) ACCORDING  
TO TYPE OF BUILDING, CAUSE AND SECTION OF THE CITY,  
shown in percentages

Section	Losses in Dollars			Total*				
	Business	Residence	Total	Per cent Caused By				
				Military operations	Fire	Military robbery	Other robbery	Unknown
Safety Zone	55,000	1,361,800	1,416,800	0.5	49.4	33.5	16.4	0.2
Cheng Hsi	2,712,500	3,339,300	6,051,800	0.4	33.8	47.5	10.3	8.0
Cheng Tung	7,424,400	4,730,300	12,154,700	0.9	61.7	33.6	2.9	0.9
Cheng Pei: Tung	1,321,100	3,384,700	4,705,800	5.4	39.7	49.3	3.9	1.7
Cheng Pei	195,700	378,100	573,800	1.9	10.9	54.9	15.1	17.2
Men Hsi	3,205,200	1,560,000	4,765,200	3.7	37.7	17.6	31.8	9.2
Men Tung	3,084,900	4,205,600	7,290,500	0.6	66.4	20.5	9.8	2.7
Hsiakwan	316,500	919,300	1,235,800	0.2	61.2	36.6	2.0	—
Chunghwamen	381,900	437,000	818,900	—	56.6	14.7	11.4	17.3
Shuihsimen	242,300	177,100	419,900	—	52.8	47.1	0.1	—
Tungchimen	95,000	239,900	334,900	—	91.9	8.1	—	—
Total All Sections	19,035,000	20,733,100	39,768,100	1.6	51.7	33.2	9.6	3.9
Per cent of all losses	48	52	100					

\*The causes of loss showed so nearly the same distribution for business and residence buildings that it was unnecessary to include those percentages in the table.

TABLE 11  
NUMBER OF BUILDINGS DAMAGED OR LOOTED,  
According to type of building, cause and section of the city,  
shown in percentages

Section of the City	Number of buildings	Per cent damaged by			
		Military operations	Fire	Looting	All causes
A. Inside of wall	30,516	1.8	13.0	73.2	88.0
1. Safety Zone	1,493	*	0.6	9.0	9.6
2. Cheng Pei: Tung	5,689	0.6	8.7	86.0	94.3
3. Cheng Hsi	6,581	1.9	12.5	79.9	94.3
4. Cheng Tung	3,417	3.9	10.2	74.8	88.9
4. Cheng Pei	2,222	0.1	3.5	95.6	99.2
6. Men Hsi	4,360	2.5	5.8	63.4	77.7
7. Men Tung	6,764	2.4	29.1	63.1	96.6
B. Outside of wall	8,684	1.1	61.6	27.5	90.2
8. Hsiakwan	3,948	0.9	63.4	34.0	98.3
9. Chunghwamen	2,665	0.6	51.9	27.9	80.4
10. Shuihsimen	876	3.3	60.3	6.8	70.4
11. Tungchimen	1,195	1.3	78.3	20.1	99.7
All Sections	39,200	1.7	23.8	63.0	88.5

\*Two tenths of a per cent of the buildings are known to have been hit by shell fire but the damage was not observed by investigators in March.

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By Nikita D. Khrushchev NARS, Date 12-18-75



TABLE 12

## LOSSES OF BUILDINGS AND CONTENTS, ACCORDING TO SECTION OF THE CITY

Item	Inside of wall	Safety Zone	Cheng Hsi	Cheng Tung	Cheng Pei	Cheng Pei: Tung	Men Hsi	Men Tung	Outside of wall	Hsiakwan	Chung-hwamen	Shuihsi-men	Tungchi-men	All Sections	Percentage
Buildings (owned)	48,321,800	551,200	4,025,900	13,040,300	2,348,700		9,328,600	11,782,800	54,669,700	42,213,400	3,154,100	2,846,500	6,455,700	102,391,500	42
Movable property															
1. Machinery, tools	788,800	135,000	95,300	339,800	—	160,300	3,000	55,400	13,457,500	11,914,000	184,500	—	1,359,000	14,246,300	6
2. Shop equipment	5,351,400	561,200	882,200	1,394,200	213,700	711,700	356,300	1,232,100	10,212,100	8,987,400	255,300	60,400	909,000	15,563,500	6
3. Materials for manufacture	1,009,100	97,500	489,800	152,000	1,200	34,400	65,600	168,600	8,992,600	4,612,800	315,000	3,800	4,061,000	10,001,700	4
4. Stock for sale	24,396,800	399,000	3,201,000	5,891,800	887,900	3,124,200	6,666,800	4,226,000	49,234,000	43,899,200	1,755,000	493,500	3,086,300	73,630,800	30
5. Rickshas	241,700	35,200	20,200	49,700	19,700	64,400	14,500	38,000	30,800	20,900	6,300	800	2,800	272,500	
Total movables for economic uses	31,787,800	1,227,900	4,688,500	7,827,800	1,122,500	4,095,000	7,106,200	5,720,100	81,927,000	69,434,400	2,516,000	558,500	9,418,100	113,714,800	46
6. Household furniture, utensils	6,569,200	862,900	748,500	1,195,500	824,800	983,800	668,900	1,284,800	2,121,500	1,730,900	235,500	78,900	76,200	8,690,700	3
7. Clothing, bedding	8,354,200	912,200	1,343,600	1,147,700	873,300	1,364,800	1,242,800	1,469,800	2,999,300	2,142,400	509,100	196,000	151,800	11,353,500	5
8. Family food and supplies	1,269,900	82,300	183,400	327,000	83,200	170,100	157,000	266,900	434,600	363,700	48,400	22,500	—	1,704,500	1
9. Bicycles	581,000	65,500	65,600	123,000	59,500	98,600	82,600	86,200	62,100	28,900	15,100	17,400	700	643,100	
10. Cash, jewelry	478,500	34,700	73,800	101,500	4,800	73,100	89,100	101,500	225,000	201,800	22,200	1,000	—	703,500	
11. Others	5,725,200	363,400	162,400	2,290,400	140,000	142,300	1,682,900	943,800	855,200	704,200	148,700	2,300	—	6,580,400	3
Total movables for domestic uses	22,978,000	2,321,000	2,577,300	5,185,100	1,985,600	2,832,700	3,923,300	4,153,000	6,697,700	5,171,900	979,000	318,100	228,700	29,675,700	12
Total all movable property	54,765,800	3,548,900	7,265,800	13,012,700	3,108,100	6,927,700	11,029,500	9,873,100	88,624,700	74,606,300	3,495,000	3,876,600	9,646,800	143,390,500	58
Grand Total	103,087,600	4,100,100	11,291,700	26,053,000	5,456,800	14,172,000	20,358,100	21,655,900	143,294,400	116,819,700	6,649,100	3,723,100	16,102,500	246,381,900	100

TABLE 13

## LOSSES OF BUILDINGS AND CONTENTS, BY ITEM AND CAUSE

Items	Total	Cause				Average loss per original family
		Military operations	Fire	Military or other robbery	Unknown	
Buildings	102,991,500	2,176,500	97,205,800	3,609,200	—	527.44
Movable property						
1. Machinery, tools	14,246,300	27,000	13,195,700	1,014,600	9,000	72.96
2. Shop equipment	15,563,500	28,000	10,975,500	5,432,000	28,000	79.70
3. Material for manufacture	10,001,700	21,600	8,280,800	1,609,300	90,000	51.22
4. Stock for sale	73,630,800	100,500	29,842,900	40,725,400	2,962,000	377.08
5. Rickshas	272,500	3,400	28,800	240,300	—	1.40
Total movable for economic uses	113,714,800	180,500	61,423,700	49,021,600	3,089,000	582.36
6. Household, furniture, utensils	8,690,800	146,800	2,520,900	6,005,600	17,500	44.51
7. Clothing, bedding	11,353,300	144,500	2,145,800	9,049,100	13,900	58.14
8. Family food and supplies	1,704,500	12,700	332,900	1,355,100	4,800	8.73
9. Bicycles	643,200	40,500	20,200	582,500	—	3.29
10. Cash, jewelry	703,500	7,700	70,800	625,000	—	3.60
11. Others	6,580,300	160,000	1,449,300	4,971,000	—	33.70
Total movables for domestic uses	29,675,600	512,200	6,538,900	22,588,300	36,200	151.97
Total all movable property	143,390,400	692,700	67,962,600	71,609,900	3,125,200	784.33
Grand total	246,381,900	2,869,200	165,168,400	75,219,100	3,125,200	1,261.77
Percentages	100	1	67	31	1	

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Dwyer, NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Hunsicker NARS, Date 12-18-75

TABLE 14  
 LOSSES BY DAMAGE AND LOOTING OF BUILDINGS AND CONTENTS ACCORDING TO TYPE OF BUILDING, CAUSE AND  
 SECTION OF THE CITY,  
 shown in percentages

Section	Business					Residence					Total				
	Per cent caused by					Per cent caused by					Per cent caused by				
	Losses in dollars	Military operations	Fire	Looting and stealing	Un-known	Losses in dollars	Military operations	Fire	Looting and stealing	Un-known	Losses in dollars	Military operations	Fire	Looting and stealing	Un-known
A. Inside of wall	79,076,300	1	52	43	4	24,011,300	5	45	50	-	103,087,600	3	50	44	3
1. Safety Zone	1,638,400	2	9	91	-	2,461,700	1	12	87	-	4,100,100	1	10	89	-
2. Cheng Hsi	9,214,500	2	44	54	-	2,077,200	1	26	73	-	11,291,700	2	41	57	-
3. Cheng Tung	23,431,800	3	60	28	9	2,621,200	17	31	52	-	26,053,000	5	57	31	7
4. Cheng Pei	3,173,800	2	48	50	-	2,283,000	3	24	73	-	5,456,800	2	38	60	-
5. Cheng Pei: Tung	10,096,900	1	50	49	-	4,075,100	1	52	47	-	14,172,000	1	50	49	-
6. Men Hsi	15,985,100	*	43	55	2	4,373,000	14	49	37	-	20,358,100	3	44	51	2
7. Men Tung	15,535,800	1	61	34	4	6,120,000	2	70	28	-	21,655,900	1	63	33	3
B. Outside of wall	130,653,400	*	79	21	*	12,641,000	1	86	13	-	143,294,400	*	79	21	*
8. Hsiakwan	109,850,700	*	77	23	-	6,968,900	-	86	14	-	116,819,600	*	78	22	-
9. Chungwanmen	4,122,600	-	54	44	2	2,526,500	1	84	15	-	6,649,100	*	66	33	1
10. Shuihsimen	1,886,200	8	57	35	-	1,837,000	6	84	10	-	3,723,200	8	70	22	-
11. Tungchimen	14,793,900	-	100	*	-	1,308,600	*	92	8	-	16,102,500	*	99	1	-
All Sections	209,729,700	1	69	29	1	36,652,300	4	59	37	-	246,382,000	1	67	31	1
Per cent of all losses	85					15					100.0	1	67	31	1

\* Less than 0.1 per cent.

TABLE 15  
 NUMBER OF BUILDINGS DAMAGED OR LOOTED ON  
 MAIN BUSINESS STREETS,  
 According to type of building, and cause, shown in percentages

Street	Number of buildings	Per cent damaged by			
		Military operations	Fire	Looting	All causes
1. Tai Ping Road	233	1.7	68.2	26.6	96.6
2. Chung Hwa Rd.	319	3.1	51.4	43.9	98.4
3. Chien Kang Rd.	585	0.5	47.5	49.6	97.6
4. Pai Hsia Road	411	3.1	34.3	61.1	98.5
5. Sheng Chow Rd.	320	-	25.0	53.1	78.1
6. Chung Shan Rd.	498	5.0	15.5	53.6	74.1
7. Chu Chiao Road	122	-	7.4	76.2	83.6
8. Chung Cheng Road	340	5.9	3.8	75.9	85.6
Total for business streets	2,828	2.7	32.6	54.1	89.4

TABLE 16  
 LOSSES BY DAMAGE AND LOOTING OF BUILDINGS AND CONTENTS ON  
 MAIN BUSINESS STREETS, ACCORDING TO CAUSE,  
 shown in percentages

Streets	Losses in dollars	Per cent caused by			
		Military operations	Fire	Looting	Unknown
1. Chung Hwa	12,452,145		77.0	18.5	4.5
2. Chung Cheng	11,088,775	1.7	86.6	11.7	
3. Tai Ping	9,327,530		49.7	29.0	21.3
4. Chung Shan	5,591,070		39.2	60.8	
5. Chien Kang	4,308,030		97.8	2.2	
6. Pai Hsia	3,819,095	4.2	69.3	26.5	
7. Sheng Chow	2,129,655		35.4	46.9	17.7
8. Chu Chiao	944,725		16.6	72.3	11.1
Total for business streets	49,659,025	0.7	65.2	28.0	6.1

TABLE 17  
POPULATION AND CULTIVATED AREA OF FIVE HSIEN OF NINGSHU

Hsien	Part of hsien studied	Number of farm families* studied	Average size of family**	Average size of farm (mow)	Represented in survey (in thousands)			Total (in thousands)		
					Number of farm families in area studied***	Cultivated area (mow)	Resident rural population**	Farm families***	Cultivated area† (mow)	Rural population††
Kiangning	1	205	5.3	16.7	81.6	1,336.0	433.3	81.6	1,431.0	492.9
Kuyung	1	195	5.7	11.6	39.6	461.3	227.3	39.6	731.0	279.7
Liehui	1	199	6.1	20.8	27.8	577.4	170.7	27.8	525.8	276.7
Kiangpu	1	174	7.0	39.4	15.8	623.1	110.9	15.8	302.8	123.9
Luhø	0.5	182	6.4	21.8	21.2	463.7	135.8	21.2	464.0	178.6
Totals	4.5	905	5.8	18.8	186.0	8,491.5	1,078.0	186.0	3,454.6	1,351.8

\*In the present study the "family" is all persons living and eating together and therefore corresponds to "household", as used by Buck and some others.

\*\*The figures for average size of family represent those persons actually reported in this survey as residents in families visited in March. Compare Table 23 for possible adjustments on account of war migration, which suggest that the original size of these same families was 6.5; and proportionately, the original farm population was 1,211,200. Buck gives 6.0 per farm household for the Yangtze Rice-wheat Area, and 7.2 (on one type of data only) for Kiangning Hsien. His figures for the farm family are clustered near 5.0 for the Area, but are all from sources prone to under-reporting, especially of children; he gives none for Kiangning or other hsien in Ningshu. J. L. Buck: *Land Utilization in China, Statistics*, p. 421.

\*\*\*Statistics p. 417. Buck's figure is employed as the best available. At the time of this survey, the figure might be reduced by as much as 30 per cent through the absence of whole families who leave no trace in the survey of farm families. (See appendix B, where this problem is discussed in reference to its bearing on other results.) In the matter of losses, which bulk large in the present report, such a reduction would not be critically significant, since presumably the absent families lost at least as heavily as the resident ones. Kaoshun had 32,100 farm families but is not included in survey. For the one-half of Luhø the figure actually used was 21,250 farm families.

†*Ibid.*, p. 24.

††D. Y. Lin. Letter, March 2, 1938. (Mr. Lin was formerly head of the Ningshu Agricultural Relief Association; and for years was a leading agricultural expert and administrator in this region.)

TABLE 18  
VALUE OF FARM LOSSES\*  
(in thousands of dollars)

Hsien	Build-ings	Labor animals	Imple-ments	Stored grain	Crops destroy-ed	All losses reported	Per cent of all losses reported	Per cent of all families repre-sented
Kiangning	12,078	3,541	2,785	1,898	210	20,512	50%	44%
Kuyung	2,438	1,050	927	1,122	272	5,809	14%	21%
Liehui	6,042	585	987	686	98	8,398	21%	15%
Kiangpu	2,449	698	301	252	69	3,769	9%	9%
Luhø (%)	993	794	241	218	116	2,362	6%	11%
Total	24,000	6,668	5,241	4,176	765	40,850	100%	100%
Per cent of all losses reported	58.8%	16.3%	12.8%	10.2%	1.9%	100.0%		
Losses per family in dollars	\$129.00	\$35.84	\$28.17	\$22.44	\$4.11	\$219.56		

\*For unit values see Table 20.

TABLE 19  
AVERAGE LOSSES PER FAMILY

Hsien	Number of chieh completely destroyed*	Number of labor animals	Number of implements	Stored grain (shih-tan)	Number of mow of winter crops destroyed	Total losses re-ported per family** (dollars)
Kiangning	1.90	0.84	4.67	6.11	0.82	\$251
Kuyung	0.79	0.43	2.31	7.46	1.40	147
Liehui	2.79	0.38	3.09	7.21	0.77	302
Kiangpu	1.99	0.74	2.63	4.66	0.72	239
Luhø (%)	0.60	0.73	2.88	2.73	0.39	111
Average for 4.5 hsien	1.66	0.66	3.55	6.05	0.85	\$220

\* A chieh is the space between main rafters, not corresponding to the division between rooms. It has a nearly standardized width of 10 to 12 feet; a variable length, averaging in this region 15 to 18 feet. Thus the average floor space is about 175 square feet. The number of chieh per building averages about 4.2 in this region for residences, about 2 for other farm buildings. Compare Buck, *Land Utilization*, pp. 440-442, where the less common romaniza-tion *chien* is employed. These measurements are in terms of the Chinese carpenter's foot, equal to about 12.6 English inches or .32 meter, according to Buck, and to about 13.25 English inches according to other authorities.

\*\* For unit values, see Table 20.

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Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Davis MARS, Date 12-18-75

TABLE 20

LOSSES OF FARM FAMILIES WITH DETAIL OF ITEMS

Items	Average amount lost per family	Unit value*	Value of average loss per family	Total losses of all farm families	Total value of losses for all farm families
	(chien)			(chien)	
1. Buildings	1.656	\$77.90	\$129.00	308,100	\$23,999,500
2. Labor animals	(head)		35.84	(head)	6,668,100
Water buffaloes	0.313	70.00	21.91	58,200	4,076,500
Oxen	0.137	55.00	7.55	25,500	1,404,600
Donkeys	0.213	30.00	6.38	39,600	1,187,000
3. Farm implements	(pieces)		28.17	(pieces)	5,241,100
Plows	0.509	6.50	3.31	94,700	615,300
Harrows	0.449	5.50	2.47	83,700	460,000
Pumps	0.618	33.00	20.41	115,100	3,798,100
Hoes	1.976	1.00	1.98	367,700	367,700
4. Stored cereals	(shih tan)		22.44	(shih tan)	4,175,900
Wheat	1.002	5.00	5.01	186,400	931,800
Barley	0.451	3.00	1.35	84,000	252,000
Rice	2.507	3.00	7.52	466,400	1,399,100
Corn	0.234	2.75	0.64	43,500	119,700
Soybeans	1.563	4.30	6.72	290,800	1,250,300
Others	0.300	4.00	1.20	55,700	223,000
5. Winter crops	(shih tan)		4.11	(shih tan)	765,200
Wheat	0.616	5.00	3.08	114,800	572,900
Barley	0.212	3.00	0.63	39,500	118,300
Rapeseed	0.019	4.50	0.08	3,500	15,700
Broad beans	0.042	4.00	0.17	7,700	31,000
Field peas	0.035	4.20	0.15	6,500	27,300
Total			\$219.56		\$40,849,800

\*The unit value, except in the case of buildings, is based on the average prices found in the market towns during the survey. These market town prices are moderate, some of them markedly low, in the actual lack of buyers and the generally uncommercial conditions of the time. For the building unit value, see Table 26, Note 2.

TABLE 21

ESTIMATE OF VOLUME OF WINTER CROPS

Items used in estimate	Total winter crops	Winter Crops*				
		Wheat	Barley	Rapeseed	Broad beans	Field peas
1. Average number of mow planted per farm	8.75	5.83	1.82	0.29	0.34	0.47
2. Total number of mow planted	1,628,600	1,085,100	338,200	53,300	63,600	88,400
3. Total number of planted mow destroyed	137,200	89,200	31,000	4,500	7,100	5,400
4. Planted mow not destroyed	1,491,400	995,900	307,200	48,800	56,500	83,000
5. Per cent of normal crop expected on area not destroyed	62.7	63.6	58.3	60.4	64.6	67.1
6. Most frequent yield in shih tan per per mow**	—	1.285†	1.273	0.772	1.090	1.198
7. Total crop expected***	1,171,800	814,400	228,100	22,800	39,800	66,700
8. Average amount of crop available per family****	3.82	2.66	0.74	0.07	0.13	0.22

\*In addition to above crops was 0.34 mow planted to vegetables but it was impossible to estimate yield. This would add 42,000 mow to the total of planted mow, not destroyed, in item 4. (See Tables 30 and 31).

\*\*Calculated from quintals per hectare as given by Buck, for Yangtze Rice-Wheat Area. (Land Utilization in China, "Statistics" pp. 223, 225, by 1 Kiangning mow=0.06067 hectares and 1 quintal=2 shih tan, Ibid., p. 473.

\*\*\*These estimates are the sums of the crops expected in each hsien, or the products of items 4 x 5 x 6.

\*\*\*\*Based on 239,450 families in the 4.5 hsien (including town families) and 67,000 families in Nanking, a total of 306,450 families. Buck, Ibid., p. 417.

†R. T. Ts'ui in a forthcoming article in "Economic Facts" finds the most frequent yield of wheat in Kiangning to be 1.74 shih tan per shih mow, that is, 1.583 shih tan per Kiangning mow.

TABLE 22

TOTAL SEED REQUIREMENTS FOR SPRING PLANTING

Hsien	Seeds for spring crops* (shih tan)						Total requirements in dollars†	Average per farm family in dollars
	Rice	Soybeans	Corn	Cotton	Sweet potatoes	Vegetables		
Kiangning	57,900	19,100	3,500	150	—	163	\$266,000	\$3.26
Kuyung**	6,800	1,800	—	190	3,500	4	37,300	0.94
Lishui	16,000	700	—	470	3,900	—	61,900	2.23
Kiangpu	21,300	600	1,800	1,020	600	—	76,100	4.82
Luho*** (½)	23,200	5,500	—	—	—	—	93,100	4.38
Average per family for 4.5 hsien	0.673	0.149	0.029	0.010	0.043	0.001	—	\$2.87
Total seed for 4.5 hsien	125,200	27,700	5,300	1,830	8,000	167	—	—
Total value of seed needed in dollars for 4.5 hsien†	\$375,600	\$119,100	\$14,600	\$5,100	\$20,000	\$34,000	\$568,400	—

\* The amounts of seed needed include what could be purchased locally but for which the farmer did not have money, as well as seed that could not be purchased locally.

\*\* The Kuyung investigators with unusual strictness pinned the farmers down to considering seed requirements only for that fraction of land which they planted last year but could find no possible way to plant this year.

\*\*\*In Luho the investigators soon came to feel that farmers were exaggerating their requirements of rice for seed, because of a local shortage of food rice. As a limitation, the investigators arbitrarily set the figure of one *tou* (11.7 *shih chin*) per mow. Thus the rice-seed figure for Luho was originally reported on the basis of calculation from the area of expected planting. The few initial cases in which the Luho investigators reported the farmer's own figure, give an average of 7.64 *shih chin* per mow which is here used to calculate seed needs from area planted, in lieu of satisfactory data. For other seeds, the Luho investigators recorded the farmer's statements without meeting serious problems.

† The unit values used in computing the value of seed needed were the same market town prices as given in Table 20 with the addition of \$2.80 per *shih tan* for cotton seed and \$2.50 for sweet potatoes. For vegetable seed an estimated value of \$198 per *shih tan* is reached by calculation from two factors: (1) the ratio of the quantity of each important kind of seed needed by Nanking gardeners (as reported in the special garden group of the Family Survey), to the total quantity of seed needed by them; (2) for each kind of seed, a price per *shih tan* based on half the quoted price in the latest edition of the University of Nanking Seed List (in most items that List was far below what the International Committee actually paid in Shanghai for vegetable seeds purchased this spring.)

TABLE 23

MIGRATION AND LABOR SUPPLY\*

Hsien	Estimated total original population	Number of people left and not returned	Per cent left and not returned	Number of laborers			Expected shortage of laborers	Per cent of expected shortage of laborers
				During past year	At present	Expected back soon		
Kiangning	544,300	110,980	20	264,400	213,800	32,600	18,000	7
Kuyung	229,300	1,980	1	95,400	87,900	1,200	6,300	7
Lishui	181,200	10,560	6	54,800	45,900	2,200	6,700	12
Kiangpu	112,300	1,420	1	45,700	40,900	600	4,100	9
Luho (½)	144,100	8,290	6	66,900	58,900	400	7,700	11
Total	1,211,200	133,230	11%	527,200	447,400	37,000	42,800	8%
Average per family for 4.5 hsien	6.5	0.7		2.8	2.4	0.2	0.2	

\*Consult Appendix B.

TABLE 24

SEX AND AGE OF DEATHS

shown in percentages

Age group	Death by violence		Deaths by sickness	All deaths	Per cent of males in killed
	Male	Female			
Under 5 years	3	—	—	2	100
5—14	9	6	14	9	92
15—29	35	11	9	30	96
30—44	24	—	22	21	100
45—59	21	44	41	26	77
60 and above	8	39	14	12	59
Total	100	100	100	100	84

TABLE 25  
 NUMBER AND CAUSES OF DEATHS  
 (during 100 days covered by study)

Hsien	Total resident population represented	Total deaths	Deaths per 1,000 residents	Causes of Death				Total killed	Number killed per 1,000 residents	Deaths from sickness per 1,000 residents
				Violence		Sickness				
				Males	Females					
Kiangning	483,300	10,750	25	7,170	1,990	1,590	9,160	21	3.7	
Kuyung	227,300	9,140	40	6,700	1,830	610	8,530	37	2.7	
Lishui	170,700	2,370	14	1,540	560	280	2,100	12	1.6	
Kiangpu	10,900	5,630	51	4,990	—	630	4,990	45	5.7	
Laho (½)	135,800	3,060	23	2,090	—	970	2,090	15	7.1	
Total	1,078,000	30,905	29	22,490	4,380	4,080	26,870	25	3.8*	

\*Buck in *Land Utilization* gives an annual rate per 1,000 of 27.1 (p. 338). The same rate for 100 days would equal 7.4 per 1,000. See discussion in text.

TABLE 26  
 DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS

Hsien	Original number of chien* per family	Number of chien completely destroyed per family	Per cent all chien completely destroyed	Number of chien completely destroyed	Average loss per family in dollars**	Total building loss in dollars**
Kiangning	4.03	1.90	46	155,000	\$148.01	\$12,077,600
Kuyung	2.99	0.79	26	81,300	61.55	2,437,300
Lishui	4.72	2.79	59	77,800	217.34	6,042,100
Kiangpu	4.76	1.99	42	31,400	155.02	2,449,300
Laho (1/2)	4.54	0.60	13	12,800	46.74	993,200
Total						\$23,999,500
Average per family for 4.5 hsien	4.17	1.656	40	308,100	\$129.00	

\* See explanation in footnote Table 19.

\*\* The building value per chien is Buck's average for the Yangtze Rice-wheat Area, (*Land Utilization* pp. 441, 445) dividing total value of buildings per family (\$631) by the total number of chien (8.1) per farm (\$77.90). If this calculation is made by types of buildings, giving due value and weighting for each, the result would be \$74.77 per chien. If Buck's valuation of all buildings per farm (\$631) were divided by our reported original number of chien per surveyed farm (4.17), the valuation per chien would be \$151.32. All these are Area figures.

R. T. Ts'ui's current and careful study, "Land Classification of Kiangning Hsien" (soon to appear in *Economic Facts*), shows a valuation of \$743 for buildings, livestock, farm implements, furniture. Buck's *Chinese Farm Economy*, p. 57, reports that in the items buildings, livestock, farm equipment, and supplies, the first-named count for 69 per cent in Kiangsu. This percentage of Ts'ui's \$743 would give \$512.67 as value of buildings per farm in Kiangning Hsien, so important in our study. If this figure is divided by 4.03, our reported number of chien per family in that hsien, the result is a valuation of \$127.21 per chien.

The fundamental difficulty in setting a unit value for buildings is that Buck's estimates for the Area are based upon nearly double the number of chien per farm that were reported to our investigators in this locality. (He has no figures for individual hsien in our group.) However, our report of 4.17 chien per farm is supported by Buck's results for South Kiangsu (4.0 chien) in *The 1931 Flood in China*, p. 17. If his valuation per chien is multiplied by a factor from our lower figures as to number of chien, the results are probably below the truth. If, on the other hand, his or other valuations of all buildings are divided by our low figures for chien, the value per chien is probably too high. In the interests of caution, we will follow the first type of valuation. Our loss figure for buildings might well be increased by half.

TABLE 27  
LOSSES OF LABOR ANIMALS

Hsien	Percent of families losing			Number lost per family				Losses in 4.5 hsien	
	Water buffaloes	Oxen*	Donkeys	Water buffaloes	Oxen	Donkeys	All	Number	Value**
								(head)	
Kiangning	27	16	18	0.33	0.20	0.31	0.84	68,500	\$3,541,400
Kuyung	28	8	6	0.29	0.08	0.06	0.43	17,000	1,049,400
Lishui	10	20	3	0.11	0.21	0.06	0.38	10,600	585,200
Kiangpu	44	—	20	0.55	—	0.19	0.74	11,700	698,400
Laho (½)	34	2	32	0.38	0.01	0.34	0.73	15,500	798,700
Average per family 4.5 hsien	27	12	15	0.31	0.14	0.21	0.66		\$35.84
Total								123,300	\$6,668,100

\* The term "oxen" is used for convenience to represent draft cattle, whether steers, bulls or cows. There are practically no dairy cattle in these farm localities.

\*\* For unit value, see Table 20.

TABLE 28  
LOSSES OF IMPLEMENTS

Hsien	Per cent of families losing				Number lost per family				Total number of implements lost	Average loss per family in dollars	Total loss in dollars**
	Plows	Harrows	Pumps*	Hoes*	Plows	Harrows	Pumps	Hoes			
Kiangning	50	51	57	78	0.55	0.54	0.75	2.38	381,100	34.12	\$2,784,600
Kuyung	39	37	44	46	0.46	0.43	0.52	0.90	91,500	23.41	927,300
Lishui	58	47	58	67	0.78	0.49	0.81	1.01	85,900	35.50	986,900
Kiangpu	31	30	35	34	0.37	0.35	0.40	1.51	41,500	19.04	300,800
Laho	19	16	21	49	0.19	0.16	0.21	2.32	61,200	11.39	241,500
Average per family for 4.5 hsien	44	42	49	63	0.51	0.45	0.62	1.98	3.55	\$28.17	\$28.17
Totals									661,200		\$5,241,100

\* The term "pumps" refers to the wooden, many bladed irrigation pumps on the endless-chain principle. 'Hoes' include not only the type familiar in the west, but also the heavy, four-tined variety used instead of a spade.

\*\* For unit values, see Table 20.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Glavin, NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TABLE 29  
 LOSSES OF STORED GRAIN

Hsien	Per cent of families losing						Number of shih tan lost per family						Total amount of grain lost	Total loss in dollars*
	Rice	Wheat	Soy-beans	Barley	Corn	Other	Rice	Wheat	Soy-beans	Barley	Corn	Other	All	
Kiangning	72	19	54	1	14	2	1.96	0.53	3.02	0.02	0.52	0.06	6.11	\$1,897,700
Kuyung	71	63	61	39	3	14	3.67	2.45	0.68	0.45	0.005	0.20	7.46	1,122,600
Lishui	81	53	38	56	—	11	2.87	0.80	0.57	2.28	—	0.69	7.21	685,700
Kiangpu	30	10	2	1	7	13	2.96	0.19	0.04	0.01	0.004	1.46	4.66	251,900
Luhoh	51	32	4	2	—	—	1.64	0.98	0.07	0.04	—	—	2.73	218,000
Average per family for 4.5 hsien	67	34	43	17	7	7	2.51	1.00	1.56	0.45	0.23	0.30	6.05	\$22.44
Total													1,126,800	\$4,175,900

\* For unit values, see Table 20.

TABLE 30  
 AREA PLANTED TO WINTER CROPS  
 (in thousands of mow)

Hsien	Total cultivated area	Total area planted to winter crops	Total mow by crops					
			Wheat	Barley	Rape seed	Broad beans	Field peas	Vegetables
Kiangning	1,366	693	516	57	9	21	55	35
Kuyung	461	315	177	84	11	22	10	11
Lishui	577	233	68	117	22	1	8	17
Kiangpu	623	260	184	40	1	20	15	—
Luhoh (1/2)	464	190	140	40	10	—	—	—
Total	3,491	1,691	1,085	338	53	64	88	63

TABLE 31  
 PER CENT OF AREA PLANTED TO WINTER CROPS  
 TOTALLY DESTROYED

Hsien	Per cent of all winter crops destroyed	Individual Crops					
		Wheat	Barley	Rape seed	Broad beans	Field peas	Vegetables
Kiangning	7	5	6	27	14	4	40
Kuyung	18	17	16	14	13	19	50
Lishui	9	11	10	1	33	11	6
Kiangpu	4	5	2	1	3	1	—
Luhoh	10	12	5	—	—	—	—
Total for 4.5 hsien*	9	8	9	8	11	6	33

\* Weighted by hsien according to number of mow planted.



TABLE 32  
EXPECTED PER CENT OF NORMAL WINTER CROPS ON PLANTED  
AREA NOT TOTALLY DESTROYED

Hsien	Individual crops					Average crop expected per farm family* (shih tan)	Total winter crops* (shih tan)
	Wheat	Barley	Rapeseed	Broad bean	Field peas		
Kiangning	62	41	48	50	65	5.81	474,000
Kuyung	72	73	79	80	77	5.87	232,400
Lishui	53	55	46	70	53	4.58	127,400
Kiangpu	69	70	81	62	74	13.66	215,800
Luho (½)	57	54	80	—	—	5.75	122,200
Per cent for 4.5 hsien	64	58	60	65	67	—	63%
Average volume expected per farm family* shih tan	4.38	1.23	0.12	0.21	0.36	6.30	
Total crops expected* (shih tan)	814,400	228,100	22,800	39,800	66,700		1,171,800

\* Based on most frequent yield per mow (see Table 21). The grand average by crop is weighted by hsien according to number of mow planted, not destroyed.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Nathan O. Davis MRS, Date 12-18-75

volume expected per farm family* shih tan	4.38	1.23	0.12	0.21	0.36	6.30	
Total crops expected* (shih tan)	814,400	228,100	22,800	39,800	66,700		1,171,800


\* Based on most frequent yield per mow (see Table 21). The grand average by crop is weighted by hsien according to number of mow planted, not destroyed.

# NANKING CITY SURVEY MAP

MARCH 1938  
南京調查圖壹玖叁捌年叁月

## NOTES:

1. IN THE FAMILY SURVEY, THE CHENG PEI AREA INCLUDED THE CHENG PEI: TUNG AREA
2. GARDENERS ARE FOUND ON BOTH EAST AND WEST SIDES, NOT FAR FROM THE WALL
3. THE SOUTHWESTERN CORNER OF THE SAFETY ZONE AREA WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE ORIGINAL SAFETY ZONE; IT IS SPARSELY POPULATED



- 一 在家庭調查工作城北區內  
 二 在城牆之東及城內之口  
 三 在城內之口及城內之口

155  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

### *To the Reader*

The Nanking International Relief Committee is the continuing organization of the Committee that established the Nanking Safety Zone in November, 1937. Since the disbandment of the Zone in February, 1938, the Committee has operated purely as a private relief organization dependent on contributions for carrying on its humanitarian work. The Committee has tried to care for the needy in Nanking, and has also extended loans to farmers in the district around Nanking from funds specially given for that purpose.

To all who have helped in its work the Committee would like to express its heartfelt thanks.

As this survey shows, the need for relief continues, and further assistance is therefore earnestly requested. Contributions may be sent to the Treasurer of the Committee, Rev. James H. McCallum, 4 Tientsin Road, Nanking, China, or in the case of remittances by cable, direct to "NANINRELCO" account at the National City Bank of New York, ("Citibank") Shanghai, China.

ON BEHALF OF THE COMMITTEE

W. P. MILLS  
*Acting Chairman.*

Nanking, China  
August 26, 1938.

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

1-1226

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (3r)

FROM Hankow

Dated October 22, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m., 24th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

2, October 22, 5 p.m.

The local correspondent of the United Press stated that in an interview with Chouen Lai today the Communist leader declared that he considers the Japanese South China campaign the first step in Japan's southward expansion.

He further remarked that the Chinese expect to lose entirely the two railroads from Peiping to Canton <sup>but</sup> plan to launch counter-offensives from west of the railways.

Finally he declared not for publication that Chiang Kai Shek <sup>is soon</sup> ~~is planning~~ to make an appeal to the Chinese people. The appeal may embody a statement of policy as Chouen Lai described it as being very significant and having his support.

When the Generalissimo proceeds to his new headquarters presumably within the next few days Chouen Lai will accompany him.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Canton.

JOSSELYN

RR

WVC

793.94/14151

F/FG

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was  
5/23/39

1552

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 2) of October 22, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

The Communist leader, Chou En-lai, will go with General Chiang Kai-shek when the latter leaves for his new headquarters which it is supposed will be within a few days.

During the course of an interview on October 22 with the Hankow correspondent of the United Press, Chou En-lai said that the Chinese expect to lose entire control of the two railways from Peiping to Canton(?) plan to start counter offensives from west of the railways. He said also that he regards the campaign of the Japanese in south China as the beginning of Japanese expansion to the south. He stated (not for publication) that the Generalissimo is planning(?) to address to the Chinese people an appeal which, in view of the fact that Chou En-lai expressed his support of it and described it as being very important, may contain a statement of policy.

793.94/14151.

29.C.  
FE:EGC:JPS  
10-25

H.K.  
FE  
REU

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

1-1338

GRAY

FROM

Moscow

Dated October 24, 1938

Rec'd 7:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

365, October 24, noon.

My 359, October 15, noon.

793.94

The newspaper RED STAR, organ of the Commissariat for Defense in commenting today on the capture of Canton repeats the previously expressed Soviet view that this new Japanese action is a direct result of the capitulation of the democratic powers to Japan's "anti-comintern" allies in Europe and that the resultant economic and strategic blow to Hong Kong is further proof that Chamberlain's policy is destructive to Britain's own interests since the threat to British possessions in the Far East is becoming more real.

The article also states that the capture of Canton does not mean that the war in China is any closer to a conclusion but that on the contrary the Chinese will continue to defend their territory and that widespread guerrilla warfare will prevent the Japanese from consolidating their position in southern China as has proved the case in the northern and central areas.

KIRK

DDM

WWC

16

793.94/14152

F/FG

DIVISION OF  
EUROPE

8110

OLSON

DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 24 1938

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAW

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

FROM Hankow via N.R.

Dated October 22, 1938

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1, October 22, 2 p.m.

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
ONE AND ALL  
*in confidence*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 24 1938  
Department of State  
*Chubb*

One. Responsible military officials make in private conversation no suggestion that with the fall of Wuhan there will be on their part any thought of capitulation to Japan.

Two. They observe that the Japanese have identified the capture of Wuhan with the destruction of Chiang Kai Shek's military power, but now that the main Chinese force is being withdrawn from <sup>Wuhan</sup> area they anticipate a reorientation in Japanese campaign plans. The Japanese are not expected to repeat the Nanking error of concentrating their major effort upon the occupation of the capital and then with its seizure relax their military operations, thus giving the Chinese an opportunity to rally. It is suggested that the drive on Wuhan is now secondary to the campaign directed at the Chinese forces evading the envelopment of this center. The offensive on Sianning is expected to turn southward on the Canton-Hankow railway, that in the Sinyang sector to proceed northward and westward.

Three.

793.94/14153

F/FG

5112

-2- 1, October 22, 2 p.m., from Hankow.

Three. It is recognized, however, that, because the Japanese have identified the capture of Wuhan with the destruction of Chiang Kai Shek's military power they may thereby be deflected from a determined pursuit of the retreating Chinese .

Four. Six hundred Kuomintang youth corps members trained to organize guerrillas have recently been sent behind the Japanese lines in the Yangtze Valley. Central Government authorities behind the Japanese lines are also training local youth for such work. Communist organizers are now active in every Japanese occupied province. The Eighth Route Army has sent sixty of these young men to work in south Manchuria. However, the military effectiveness of partisan activities as now conducted is over-emphasized by most foreign observers.

Five. A Central Government division has been ordered to a locality north of Hopai, Anhwei, another is leaving the area east of Nanchang for northeastern Kiangsi.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping. Peiping please mail code text to Mukden for information.

JOSSELYN

KLP

WFC



*b*

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram (No. 1) of October 22, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

A division of Central Government troops is leaving for the northeastern part of Kiangsi Province from the region east of Nanchang. Another division has been ordered to a place north of Hopei(?), Anhwei.

Authorities of the Central Government back of the Chinese lines are training local youths to organize guerrillas. Recently 600 members of the Kuomintang Youth Corps trained in this work were sent back of the Japanese lines in the area around the Yangtze River. In every province occupied by the Japanese Communist organizers are now working. Sixty of these young men have been sent by the Eighth Route Army to work in south Manchuria. However, the majority of foreign observers place too much stress upon the effectiveness from a military point of view of partisan activities as they are now carried on.

When speaking privately responsible military officials make no suggestion that they will have any idea of surrendering to Japan when Wuhan falls. Their remarks are to the effect that the Japanese have considered that the fall of Wuhan would mean the overthrow of General

Chiang's

793.94/14153

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Chiang's military power but they expect that the Japanese will rearrange their plans of campaign now that most of the Chinese troops are being moved from the area around Hankow. It is not anticipated that the Japanese will make the mistake which they made at Nanking - consolidating their main effort upon the city and then after its fall weakening their military operations - thereby affording the Chinese a chance to collect their forces. It is expected that the drive in the Sinyang sector will go toward the west and north and the one against Sienning will turn toward the south on the Canton-Hankow Railway. The suggestion has been made that the campaign aimed at the Chinese troops which are slipping away from the envelopment of the Wuhan area is more important than the attack on Wuhan. However, it is realized that as the fall of Wuhan and the destruction of the Generalissimo's military power have been regarded by the Japanese as synonymous they may be turned away from following the retreating Chinese determinedly.

793.94/14153.

egc.  
FE:EGC:JPS  
10-25

FE  
row

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (BR)

Hankow via N.R.

FROM Dated October 24, 1938

Rec'd 5 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

4, October 24, 10 a.m.

Chu Teh arrived in Hankow on October 22 and conferred

with Chian Kai Shek concerning military and communications  
between the Eighth Route and Central armies north and south  
of the Yangtze. He returned to the northwest the same day.

Pai Chung Hsi has either left or is about to leave  
here for Changsha where he will direct, it is reliably  
reported, the defense of Hunan and coordinate the war  
activities of Kwangsi with those of Hunan.

The Kwangsi troops in the Tapieh mountains commanded  
by Li Tsung Jen are withdrawing westward to be based on  
Hsiang Yang located on the Han River.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping.

PEG:WWC

JOSSELYN

793.94/14154

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Huie NARS, Date 12-18-75

*b*

Confidential

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 4) of October 24, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

Kwangsi Provincial troops in the Tapien mountains under the command of Li Tsung-jen are moving to the west where they will be based on a point (Hsiang Yang) on the Han River. According to reports from reliable sources Pai Chung-hsi, who has already left or will soon leave Hankow for Changsha, will coordinate war activities of Kwangsi Province with those of Hunan and will direct the defense of Hunan Province. On October 22 Chu Teh arrived in Hankow, returning the same day to the northwest. While in Hankow he discussed with the Generalissimo the matter of military and communications between the Eighth Route and the Central armies to the north and south of the Yangtze River.

793.94/14154.

793.94/14154

*egg*  
FE:ECC:JPS  
10-25

*mi*  
FE  
*new*

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

FS

This message must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

COMYANGPAT

FROM

October 24, 1938

Rec'd 8:30 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF

INFO: RUSNOS

COMSOPAT

NAVY DEPARTMENT

AMEMBASSADOR CHINA

FOURTH MARINES



0024. General civil and military evacuation Wuhan  
shopkeepers warned dispose stock by twenty fifth to  
avoid confiscation. All public officials expect leave  
by that date. Yokohama Specie Bank to be fired, other  
public and Japanese buildings, including large part Jap  
concession, reported so godowns that area opened Sunday  
and contents given to public concession stripped all  
movable material. Large troop movement from north to  
right bank and upstream indicating general retreat.  
More wounded, otherwise medical facilities nil. All  
means transportation vehicular and river except foreign  
confiscated for army and refugees foreign populace  
generally calm. 1415

793.94/14155

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

114

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FS

Canton via N.R.

1-1286

FROM

Dated October 24, 1938

Rec'd 8:30 a.m.


Secretary of State,  
Washington.

15, October 24, 3 p.m.

Japanese officers visited Shameen today and stated the Japanese army would not enter in force. Only a few of the principal centers such as civic center, government headquarters, et cetera, would be occupied. They demand that the telephone system be put in operation as quickly as possible and I am endeavoring to arrange conferences between Mr. Rhame of the China Electric Company which is managing the Canton telephone administration and the Japanese proper authorities.

Japanese aircraft are dropping many leaflets stating that no harm will be done to innocent people, that there will be no harsh treatment, no looting and in general attempting to persuade the people to return to their homes and occupations.

There are refugees under the auspices of Americans as follows: at Pakhoktung in three groups about one thousand, at Hingsum School for the Blind in Fonggett about 600, at Lingnam University about 700. Today it is intended



793.94/14156

F/F G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3115

FS 2-No. 15, October 24, 3 p.m. from Canton

intended to transfer 120 more across the river from the  
Baptist Hospital at Tungshan to Lingnam.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong.

WWC:RCC

LINNELL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 894.00/819 FOR #3300

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED Oct 4, 1938.  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations: proposed establishment of the China Board (Tai Shi In); developments; Prince Konoe's views in premises.

FRG.

793.94/14157

14157



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 793. 94/14158  
Date AUG. 24, 1938  
From NA/PEIPING (NAVAL ATTACHE REP.)  
To SEC. STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- ☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

Ralph E. Hux  
Authority

5-3-73  
Date

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 7117 (2-72)

GSA DC 72-10421

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1336

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

FROM

Hong Kong via N.R.

Dated October 22, 1938

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

October 22, 3 p.m.

No doubt appears to exist in Hong Kong that Canton has been formally occupied by the Japanese and best reports here indicate that there is little destruction in Canton other than that committed by the Chinese themselves prior to evacuation. Reliably informed that Bocca Tigris forts have been evacuated by the Chinese and are being occupied by Japanese. Both British and Chinese in Hong Kong appear to be more or less apathetic to Japanese occupation of Canton and there are the usual and persistent rumors of a "British deal" with the Japanese for resumption of rail and water traffic with Canton. This has so far been impossible to confirm. I am confidentially informed from Japanese sources that Swatow will be occupied within a few days and that no serious opposition is expected and that damage or destruction in that city will be avoided if possible as in Canton. Hong Kong gossip anticipates formation of a provisional government at Canton with possible inclusion of certain Chinese from Hong Kong.

Several

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
CONFIDENTIAL AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence*

Rec'd 1 p.m. 24th

PAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 24 1938

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94/14159

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By ~~Milton D. Rosen~~ NARS. Date 12-18-75

FS 2-October 22, 3 p.m. from Hong Kong

Several Americans who left Canton in special launch  
for Shekki yesterday morning arrived here safely this  
morning bringing mail from Canton Consulate General.

Repeated to Canton, Chungking, Peiping, Swatow.

CSB

SOUTHARD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 22, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hong Kong reads substantially as follows:

On the morning of October 22 some Americans bringing mail from the Consulate General at Canton arrived safely in Hong Kong, having left Canton for Shekki in a special launch on the morning of October 21.

According to reliable information the Chinese have evacuated the Bocca Tigris forts which the Japanese are proceeding to occupy. There seems to be no doubt in Hong Kong that the Japanese have taken formal possession of Canton and best reports are to the effect that destruction committed by the Chinese themselves before their evacuation is about the only destruction in Canton. Confidential information of Japanese origin is to the effect that within a few days the Japanese will take over Swatow, that they do not expect serious opposition, and that, if possible, destruction or damage in Swatow will be avoided as was done in the case of Canton. It seems that both the Chinese and British in Hong Kong are rather indifferent to the occupation of Canton by the Japanese. So far it has not been possible to confirm the usual rumors which persist in regard to a  
 British

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

British deal with the Japanese for the reopening of  
traffic with Canton by water and rail. According to  
gossip in Hong Kong, it is expected that a provisional  
government will be formed at Canton which may possibly  
include some Chinese from Hong Kong.

793.94/14159.

egs.  
FE:EGC:JPS  
10-25

FE  
now

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department  
OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Washington,

1938 OCT 24 10 28

October 24, 1938

38

AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL

HONG KONG

Please mail immediately to Division of  
Communications and Records, code text of your  
October 22, 3 p.m. as originally filed, not  
duplicate, with naval communication for trans-  
mission.

793.94/14159

DCR:DAS:EG

Hull.  
(24.8)

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_\_

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F/FG

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1236

RAW

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (Br)

FROM

Hankow via N.R.

Dated October 24, 1938

Rec'd 2:12 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

October 24, 4 p.m.

*paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND A.I.D.  
*in confidence*

Division of  
AN EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 24 1938

Department of State

793.94  
A foreign adviser to Chiang Kai Shek informed me this  
afternoon that the Japanese are moving from Hwangkang toward  
Hwangpei and that this constitutes the greatest pressure on  
Wuhan at present. He stated that the present Japanese  
enveloping movement on Wuhan makes unlikely any severe fight-  
ing either at Hankow or Wuchang. He stated that Chiang Kai  
Shek will be leaving Hankow within two or three days.

Sent to Chungking.

JOSSELYN

HTM

KLP

793.94/14160

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

ConfidentialP A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of October 24, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

On the afternoon of October 24 the American Consul General was informed by one of the Generalissimo's foreign advisers that within two or three days the Generalissimo would leave Hankow; that the Japanese are advancing from Hwangkang in the direction of Hwangpei, this being the greatest pressure on Wuhan at the present time; that the encircling movement on Wuhan which the Japanese are now making renders unlikely any heavy fighting either at Wuchang or at Hankow.

793.94/14160.

898.  
 FE:EC:JPS  
 10-25


4462  
 FE  
 RCU



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB



FROM COMYANGPAT

October 24, 1938.

Rec'd 7:02 p. m.

ACTION: CINCAF, OPNAV, WASHINGTON

INFO: YANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
FOURTH MARINES



793.94

0524. Intermittent bombing east of city audible  
throughout day. Japanese planes scouting Wuhan at medium  
altitude no opposition. 2120

NPL

793.94/14161

F/FG

K

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB


1-1236

FROM

COMSOPAT

August 24, 1938

Rec'd 4:25 p.m.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HRE

1-1230

PLAIN

FROM

COMYANGPAT


October 24, 1938

Rec'd 6:57 p.m.

ACTION: CINCAF  
OPNAV

793.94/14163 116  
0524. Chinese merchant vessel YU HSING loaded with  
refugees, troops sunk by aircraft mileage twenty eight  
above Hankow twenty three October. 1550

NPL



793.94/14163

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1226

FROM

PLAIN

Canton via N. R.

Dated October 24, 1938

Rec'd 6 a.m., 25th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

12, October 24, 10 a.m.

793-94  
Fires are still burning. Business section almost completely destroyed by fire and looted. Customs house was saved by work of customs staff, British naval units and others. Canton Hospital still intact but unoccupied. Fire has not gone very near Hackett Memorial Hospital and conditions there good. Buildings on bund from near French bridge almost to British bridge gutted by fire, precautions being taken continuously to prevent fire crossing to Shameen. Unless an unfavorable wind should spring up it is believed Shameen is safe.

Conditions in Rungshan reported quiet and men in Baptist Hospital and Seventh Day Adventist Hospital safe, nearly six hundred Chinese refugees at Fingnam. Conditions there and at Payhoktung reported good. Only a few Japanese soldiers have been seen in Canton as yet.

Repeated to Chungking, Paiping and Hong Kong.

DDM

LINNELL

793.94/14164

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Blue NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

PLAIN

AMEMBASSY CHUNGKING  
AMEMBASSY PEIPING

FROM Hankow via N. R.

Dated October 24, 1938

Rec'd 6 a.m., 25th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
ONLAND

7, October 24, 4 p.m.

The press announces today that martial law was put into effect yesterday by the Wuhan garrison headquarters. The death penalty is provided in this proclamation not only for the offense of peace disturbance, treason, seriously disturbing the currency and looting but also for wounding or injuring a foreigner.

JOSSELYN

DDM

793.94/14165

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1286

### FROM

JR  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (br)

Hankow via N. R.

Dated October 25, 1938

Rec'd 6 a.m.

AMEMBASSY CHUNGKING  
AMEMBASSY PEIPING

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

10, October 25, 9 a.m.

Chiang Kai Shek left last night. It is believed  
but not confirmed that he went to Changsha.

JOSSELYN

RR

*paraphrase*  
*in confidence DT*  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
Department of State  
*CH*  
*A*  
*m*  
*fre*

793.94  
note  
10-25-38

793.94/14166

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

ConfidentialP A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 10) of October 25, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

Although it has not been confirmed, it is thought that the Generalissimo went to Changsha when he left Hankow on the night of October 24.

793.94/14166.

890.  
FE:EC:JPS  
10-25

HP  
FE  
rew

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HM

FROM

GRAY

Hankow via N.R.

Dated October 25, 1938

Rec'd 7:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

11, October 25, 11 a.m.

Commander of the Yangtze Patrol states that he  
plans to land 30 men and one officer to cooperate  
with the British police in special administrative  
districts two and three during interim between evacu-  
ation of Chinese police and the establishment of  
Japanese authority.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping.

JOSSELYN

KLP

793.94/14167

F/FG



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1230

FROM CONYANGPAT

October 25, 1938

Rec'd 6 a.m. ✓

ACTION: CINCAF

INFO: OPNAV  
FOURTH MARINES

COPIES SENT TO  
ONLINE FILE  
DT

0525. Large fires Wuchang and Hankow. 0400.

DDM

793.94/14168

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1236

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone.


FROM MARDET TIENTSIN CHINA

October 25, 1938

Rec'd 6 a.m.

ACTION: NAVY DEPT

INFO: CINCAF  
FOURTH MARINES  
MARDET  
AMEMBASSY PEIPING



793.94/14169

0024. Coming from direction Tientsin October 16 to  
23 about hundred Nipponese wounded boarded Red Cross  
ship at Chinwangtao. 0900.

DDM

793.94/14169


F/FG

112

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

PLAIN



FROM Canton via N. R.

Dated October 25, 1938

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

16, October 25, noon.

The transfer of refugees from Baptist Hospital, Tungshan, to Lingnan was carried out yesterday. The fires are still burning and last night buildings on Shakee Bund at the west end of the British Concession were destroyed. Undoubtedly new fires are being started as others die down and a British naval force is now attempting to clear all Chinese out of the buildings on Shakee Bund which have not yet been destroyed.

Another refuge is being started under control of the Salvation Army in the old Pui Ying School at Fati. This is American property. It is expected to have nearly one thousand refugees in a few days.

I have today sent a letter to the Japanese colonel in charge of the forces in Canton asking him to discuss with me the questions of the safety of Pak Hock Tung refugee camp, the setting up of a limited telephone service and other matters. The Telephone Administration

is

793.94/14170

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3119

-2- #16, October 25, noon, from Canton via N. R.

is and has been for some time under the management of the China Electric Company, Limited, an American Corporation, and Mr. Rhame, an American citizen, is in charge here.

Looting continues and much loot is being carried out of the city on sampans by people coming in from outside villages.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping, and Hong Kong.

LINNELL

DDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 68

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
**AMERICAN CONSULATE**  
Foochow, China

SEP 20 AM 11 25  
September 10, 1938.

1-1055  
SUBJECT: Appeal of committee of citizens'  
          representatives for support of  
          the League of Nations in its  
          efforts to check aggression.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of its despatch  
no. 57 of today's date addressed to the Embassy,  
transmitting a copy of a communication addressed to  
myself by a committee of six Chinese residents of  
Foochow, representing respectively the educational,  
cultural, business, farming, industrial, and women's  
organizations of Foochow and Fukien.

Respectfully yours,

*Robert S. Ward*  
Robert S. Ward  
American Consul

✓  
Enclosure:

Copy of this Consulate's despatch  
no. 57, dated September 10, 1938.

800  
RSW:HCY

In quintuplicate.

793.94/14171

F/FG 14171

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 68 dated September 10, 1938, from Robert S. Ward, American Consul at Foochow, China, on the subject of "Appeal of committee of citizens' representatives for support of the League of Nations in its efforts to check aggression".

AMERICAN CONSULATE  
Foochow

September 10, 1938.

Subject: Appeal of committee of citizens'  
representatives for support of  
the League of Nations in its  
efforts to check aggression.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Ambassador,  
Beiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a communication addressed to myself by a committee of six Chinese residents of Foochow, representing respectively the educational, cultural, business, farming, industrial, and women's organizations of Foochow and Fukien, and delivered to me yesterday morning by four of their number, with the request that it be transmitted to the Department of State. In reply I said only that I would be glad to accede to that request.

The Consulate is informed that a similar call was made yesterday by the same group on the British Consul, and that yesterday afternoon a large-scale mass-meeting and demonstration was held to urge support of the League of Nations and concerted action by the so-called "democratic states" to curb aggression. This meeting was followed by a parade of students,


workers,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

workers, and representatives of various governmental and industrial organizations who carried large banners bearing pro-League and anti aggression slogans, which at intervals they also chanted. The column moved briskly, and took half-an-hour to pass any given point. The press of Foochow has yesterday and today carried editorials and headline articles reflecting these same sentiments.

Respectfully yours,

  
The signed original  
is in the possession of  
the undersigned

Robert S. Ward  
American Consul

Enclosure:

Copy of letter dated September 8,  
1938, from committee of citizens'  
representatives.

800  
ASL:HCY

Five copies to Department, under cover of despatch no.  
68 of September 10, 1938.  
Copy to Embassy Chungking.

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 57 dated September 10, 1938, from Robert S. Ward, American Consul at Foochow, China, on the subject of "Appeal of committee of citizens' representatives for support of the League of Nations in its efforts to check aggression".

Foochow, Fukien,  
September 8, 1938.

Consul Robert S. Ward,  
American Consulate,  
Foochow.

Sir:

We, the representatives of the civic organizations of Foochow, take the honor to present to you the following resolutions of the grand meeting of the citizens of Foochow regarding the Sino-Japanese war, and request you to kindly forward the same to your government, the good people of the United States, and to the American representative in the League of Nations meeting:

1. That we appeal to the friendly nations of the world to support the League of Nations in its efforts to uphold international justice and to curtail military aggression.
2. To request all the member-states of the League to put into effective practice the various resolutions of the League in aiding China in every way possible in her present struggle against Japanese aggression, and to cease supplying war materials to Japan.
3. To devise effective means of preventing the Japanese from bombing civilian towns and using poison gas and other inhuman practices in their war in China.
4. China welcomes League representatives to investigate the Japanese atrocities in China.

As a true friend of China and as a representative of a friendly people to the Chinese, you will be willing, we are sure, to report to your people the devastating effects of the Japanese militarists in China on the life and property of the Chinese, as well as the commercial and industrial interests of the third powers. You can be sure that the Chinese people will resist to the limit of their power the Japanese militarists. We shall cooperate loyally with all peace-loving peoples and the League of Nations to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Far East. We do hope, however, that our friends abroad will also do their part in urging their government and their representatives in the League to adopt effective means to end at an early date the intolerable sufferings which the Japanese have been inflicting upon the Chinese people.

On



-2-

On behalf of the citizens of Foochow,

J. L. Ding	陳芝美
Educational Institutions of Fukien	
C. J. Lin	林景潤
Cultural Institutions of Fukien	
M. H. Lo	羅勉侯
Foochow Chamber of Commerce	
C. L. Shih	史家麟
Foochow Farmers Association	
S. F. Suen	孫世華
Foochow Industrial Organizations	
L. C. Wang	王世靜
Women's Organizations	

Copied by: *mm*

Compared with: *ky*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CORRECTED COPY

JR

PLAIN

Hankow via N. R.

Dated November 5, 1938

Rec'd 8 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

42, fifth.

Your 9, third.

Conrad A. Baehr inquired possibility travel  
Nanchang, Ningpu route, for wife and infant by  
letter September 27. He planned remain Tsingan,  
Kiangsi. Doubtful if wife and child left. Communications  
impossible between Hankow and Tsingan. Payment cannot  
be made.

JOSELYN

DDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HM

GRAY

FROM Hankow via N.R.

Dated October 25, 1938

Rec'd 6:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

October 25, 10 a.m.

The Mayor of Hankow is leaving today and all civil officials have left or are leaving. The police have been withdrawn except those in special administered district No. 3. In addition, about 100 police are remaining who will be placed under the orders of the refugee zone committee. For composition of this committee see my telegram August 1, 3 p.m. I understand that the committee have obtained approval of the Chinese authorities for demilitarization of the refugee zone in Hankow and plan to take over control of such zone today.

The British navy have landed approximately 100 men this morning who are being quartered in the British Consulate. They will be used to assist the police.

General Kuo Chan garrison commander and the Wuhan garrison troops are still here but will probably leave soon.

Sent to Chungking, Peiping.

JOSSELYN

RR:WWC

793.94/14172

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1236

FROM

Hong Kong via N. R.

Dated October 25, 1938

Rec'd 7:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

8, October 25, 10 a.m.

This office has learned from first hand observers that the Japanese have actually occupied the Bocca Tigris forts and are now advancing well into the Pearl River delta without having encountered serious opposition. Hong Kong understands that the fires which threatened Canton on Sunday have since burnt out or been controlled and that the situation in Canton is now comparatively orderly and well policed by the Japanese. Pearl River delta is reliably reported here to be the refuge of many armed Chinese soldiers who are <sup>in</sup>engaging / organized banditry and who will, it is predicted, make travel more and more unsafe over the waterways in that area. Air plane observers have reported to this office that the Pearl River from the sea in past Bocca Tigris is full of Japanese ships of all kinds and sizes of which many thought to be carrying troops and supplies. This office has been unable to verify much rumored presence in Hong Kong of Chinese Minister

for

793.94/14173

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #8, October 25, 10 a.m., from Hong Kong via N. R.

for Foreign Affairs and other notables of the Central Government. Hong Kong continues more or less apathetic, as previously reported, to recent developments in South China and there is yet no indication as to how and when will be first move toward resumption of traffic with the hinterland.

Repeated to Canton, Chungking, Peiping.

SOUTHARD

WWC:KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

121  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

MY

PLAIN

1-1336

FROM

Canton via N.R.

Dated October 22, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

4, October 22, 2:30 p.m.

1938  
Two cars with Japanese officers and two lorrys with  
Japanese troops came to British and French bridges of Shameen  
at 2 p.m. today. Japanese officer saluted and shook hands  
with the British Concession Chief of Police and then went on  
to the city. Planes are flying low covering the entry.  
Repeated Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong.

LINWELL

DDM

793.94/14174

F/HG

RECEIVED  
NOV 1 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR

This telegram must be                      Hankow via N. R.  
 closely paraphrased be-  
 fore being <sup>trans-</sup>communicated **FROM** Dated October 25, 1938  
 to anyone. (br)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

#13

RUSH. October 25, 4 p.m.

(GRAY) The Japanese are shelling from the north

and northeast at zone about two miles north of the Standard Oil Company installation which is roughly three miles down river from the outskirts of Hankow.

(END GRAY) Only small scattered bands of retreating Chinese troops are to be seen between Hankow and the area affected by shelling.

(GRAY) Japanese aircraft reported by American journalists to be machine gunning roads leading out of Hankow, especially highway to Shasi which is last one open for refugees fleeing the city.

Refugee zone area is rapidly filling with refugees camping on streets and in doorways.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping.

JOSSELYN

RR : KLP

793.94/14175

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

A rush telegram of October 25, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

The Japanese are shelling from the north and north-east at zone about two miles north of the Standard Oil Company installation which is roughly three miles down river from the outskirts of Hankow. Only scattered bands composed of a small number of retreating Chinese soldiers are to be seen between the above mentioned area and Hankow.

Japanese aircraft reported by American journalists to be machine gunning roads leading out of Hankow, especially highway to Shasi which is last one open for refugees fleeing the city. Refugee zone area is rapidly filling with refugees camping on streets and in doorways.

793.94/14175.

290  
 FE:JPS  
 10-25

HAP  
 FE  
 ROW



0598

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5122

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
✓ CONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

1938 OCT 24 5 37 October 24, 1938.  
7 PM

AI  
Naval Radio

AMERICAN CONSUL,

HONG KONG. *Via NR.*

INFO: AMERICAN CONSUL, CANTON (China).  
AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING (China).

The Department desires to receive by telegraph from each of the three offices to which this telegram is addressed a *confidential* comprehensive summary report of the factors believed to be responsible for the rapidity of the Japanese invasion of south China and the comparative ease with which the Japanese have occupied Canton.  
- Repeated to Canton and Chungking.

793.94/14175A

793.94

CR  
OCT 24 1938. PM

Hull  
P.H.

FE:MMH:EJL

REMY  
FE  
7-7-1

PA/H  
SKR

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

D. O. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FOURTH MARINES


1-1236

FROM October 25, 1938

Rec'd 12:10 p.m.

ACTION: CINCAF  
OPNAV

793.9<sup>0</sup>  
INFO: RUSNOS  
AMCON SHANGHAI  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
ASST ALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESROM FIVE  
COMHYANGPAT  
CONSOPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA



FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS 10

8625. Japanese claim their troops entered Hankow  
seventeen hundred today. Evacuation Chinese applied  
scorched earth policy much of city in flames. Tsungfa  
approximately thirty-five miles north Canton reported  
occupied by Japanese on twenty-third. 1938.

RR:WTC

793.94/14176

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1330

FROM

COMYANGPAT

October 25, 1938

Rec'd 12:30 p.m.

ACTION: CINCAF  
OPNAV

INFO: YANGTZE PATROL  
COMSOPAT  
FOURTH MARINES

7939

0525. Japanese observation planes over Wuhan  
throughout day flying low no defense. Fires and  
explosions Wuchang, Japanese concession, Hanyang, and  
native city Hankow. Japanese Consulate General  
other buildings that area burning, also east railway  
station Wuchang, gates between Sad 2 and 3 and  
Chinese city closed. British Naval sentries at  
Sad/gates. United States naval sentries at Sad 2 gates  
western boundary foreign settlement, quiet, dynamite  
charges removed from Specie Bank. 2015.

RR:WWC

793.94/14177

F/FG

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

1-1386

FROM


COMSOPAT

October 25, 1938

Rec'd 3 p. m.

ACTION: CINCAF, OPNAV

INFO: RUSNOS  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS ASHEVILLE  
SACRAMENTO  
MARBLEHEAD  
TULSA  
COMDESDIV FIFTEEN  
FOURTH MARINES  
ALUSNA PEIPING



0025. Fires continue in Canton though the general situation is somewhat improved. Shameen at present is not threatened. All foreign nationals safe. Reports indicate some resistance continues area north of Tsengshing as well as about Bocca Tigris. Bombing and machine gunning of villages and waterways delta area. 2358.

KLP

793.94/14178

F/FG

REB

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (br)

SWATOW VIA N.R.

FROM

Dated October 25, 1938

Rec'd 11:57 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1, October 25, 9 a. m.

With reference to the telegram from the American Con-  
sulate General at Hong Kong to the Department, October 22,  
3 p. m., I have been reliably informed that there will  
not be destruction of property by Chinese authorities in  
the event of occupation of Swatow by Japanese forces nor  
do I believe that opposition will be offered although I am  
unable to verify the latter point. Shops, stores and linen  
factories are closing and a general exodus estimated at 80%  
of normal population to Hong Kong and to interior points has  
been in progress during the past ten days.

At the present time in Swatow there are thirty-five  
American citizens eighteen men, fifteen women, and two  
infants.

Repeated to Peiping, Chungking, Hong Kong.

YOUNG

WWC

DDM

793.94/14179

F/FG

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND A.I.D.  
*in confidence*

✓  
H  
Ch  
B  
m  
fies

793.94  
210  
378

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 1) of October 25, 1938, from the American Consul at Swatow reads substantially as follows:

There are 35 American citizens - 15 women, 2 children, and 18 men - in Swatow at the present time.

Linen factories, stores and shops are closing and for the past ten days there has been a general evacuation to Hong Kong and points in the interior. It is estimated that eighty per cent of the normal population is evacuating the city. The Consul has received information from a reliable source to the effect that, if the Japanese take Swatow, the Chinese authorities will not destroy property (in this connection reference is made to a telegram of October 22 to the Department from the Consul General at Hong Kong). The Consul is of the opinion that there will be no opposition although he has not been able to verify this.

793.94/14179.

895.  
 FE:EGC:JPS  
 10-26

JUP  
 FE  
 ROW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

123

REB

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

AMEMBASSY, <sup>1-1220</sup>CHUNGKING  
AMEMBASSY, PEIPING  
AMCONSUL, SHANGHAI  
AMCONSUL, CANTON

FROM

HANKOW VIA N.R.

Dated October 24, 1938

Rec'd 4 p. m. 25th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
ONE AND ALL.

✓  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
13  
Department of State  
MA

9, October 24, 8 p. m.

In the Communist daily HSIN HUA JIH PAO yesterday and today Chou En Lai editorially stated that Japan now has demonstrated it has a new policy of expansion the area of hostilities in China in an effort to cut external and internal communications, isolate and demoralize Chinese resistance and bring the conflict to an early end. He anticipates Japanese occupation of all of the Canton Hankow and Pinghan lines and Lunghai to Sain.

The Japanese decision to extend hostilities to South China, Chou declared, came largely as a result of the exhibition of British and French attitude in the Czech crisis. He believed Japan hopes Britain and France will in an attempt to salvage their interest in Far East bring pressure on China to sacrifice herself through capitulation. The application of the Chamberlain policy was a failure in Europe, Chou maintains, and it is definitely not applicable to the Far East because, firstly, China will not compromise with Japan and, secondly, because interests

793.94/14180

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

8124

REB

2-#9, From Hankow, .Oct.24,8p.m.

interests are more patently affected in Far East than  
were in Central Europe.

In the face of the expanding Japanese invasion Chou  
for  
calls/unwavering and protracted resistance, preparation  
for counter offensive when the Japanese are fully  
extended, further development of guerilla operations  
to rear of Japanese and organization of the people for  
total warfare. China must convince the world, he  
declared, that her defensive war is being fought with  
confidence in an ultimate victory and that it will not  
be suspended before that victory.

JOSSELYN

CSB



125

REB

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING  
AMEMBASSY, PEIPING

FROM

Hankow via N. R.

Dated October 25, 1938

Rec'd 4:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

12, October 25, 2 p. m.

Spokesman of National Military Council declared this morning that Chinese have decided to withdraw from Wuhan and move having been prompted by necessity of shifting Chinese forces.

This action he declared is based upon:

One. Fundamental policy of prolonged warfare and all-front resistance. "The Chinese military authorities do not attach importance to the retention or loss of any particular place but take the whole scope of military operations into consideration. They do not greatly concern themselves regarding the advance or withdrawal of the Chinese forces at one particular moment; instead, every possible effort is to be made to prolong the present war so that in the very process of wearing down the enemy's strength China's capacity for resistance may be preserved and strengthened."

Two.

793.94/14181

F/FG

128

REB

2-#12, From Hankow, Oct. 25, 2p.m.

Two. "The real significance of defending the Wuhan area does not lie in the possession of the three cities but in the protection given to the transfer of man power and material resources from southeast and central China to China's northwest and southwest."

Three. "The Chinese military strategy is based on the principle of retaining the initiative -- in order to have freedom of action; they cannot afford to be cornered by the enemy and thus become the passive party in the conflict. After offering resistance the past six months on the Yangtze front, having caused the enemy great losses, slowed down the pace of the Japanese advance, and protected the transfer of man power and materials resources to the interior, it is considered unnecessary further to defend the Wuhan area. Otherwise the Chinese would fall into the enemy trap by centering the main body of their forces in the Wuhan area to be annihilated, and that would be contradictory to the policy of prolonged resistance.

Four. Lastly, one reason why the Chinese authorities do not wish to hold fast to the Wuhan cities is a desire to minimize the peril and suffering which confront foreign residents and women and children who cannot find means to evacuate."

JOSSELYN

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

QPO

FROM

COM YANGPAT

October 26, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF  
OPNAV

INFO: YANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA  
FOURTH MARINES

793 94

0526. Small Japanese force landed Japanese Concession,  
several hundred Chinese stragglers remaining there, three  
transports reported approaching. 1035.

DDM

793.94/14182

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

127

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DT

FROM PLAIN & GRAY

Hankow via N. R.

Dated October 26, 1938

Rec'd 3 a.m.

✓ file  
A B  
m

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

793.94

14, October 26, 9 a.m.

The fires which burned in Wuchang and Hankow throughout yesterday and last night have apparently died down this morning. There has been considerable destruction through dynamiting and fire in Wuchang and at the terminus of the Canton Hankow Railway opposite Hankow and also in the Japanese Concession and in the native city. Believe danger of explosions at the special administrative districts is now past. British navy removed dynamite from several Japanese owned buildings in special administrative districts two and three.

Japanese planes are reconnoitering over Hankow and Wuchang at low altitude. GUAM at Standard Vacuum Installation reported shallow draft air propeller Japanese boats were passing there at eight o'clock this morning. These vessels now reported alongside Japanese Concession.

JOSSELYN

DDM

793.94/14133

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GPO

FROM PLAIN

Hankow via N. R.

Dated October 26, 1938

Rec'd 3 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

16, October 26, 9 a.m.

Japanese naval vessels referred to my 14 reliably  
reported to have landed officers at eight thirty E. S.  
German Concession who met Father Jacquinet and assured  
him that safety zone would be respected. They are also  
reported to have said larger Japanese ships due late this  
afternoon.

JOSSELYN

DDI

793.94/14134

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GPO

FROM PLAIN

Hankow via N. R.

Dated October 26, 1938

Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

19, October 26, 4 p.m.

Six Japanese destroyers preceded by sea sleds  
and followed by other naval craft have arrived at Hankow  
in the river opposite the ex concession. Japanese army  
detachments have arrived at the Japanese concession,  
Hankow. Conditions quiet.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping and Shanghai.

JOSSELYN

DDM

793.94/14135

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GPO

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated October 25, 1938

Rec'd 6:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

October 25, 12 p.m.

Following letter addressed to you as American  
Ambassador by Minister Tani received late this afternoon.

"Japanese Embassy in China, Shanghai, October 25,  
(6?)  
1938. Number GO 12. Your Excellency,

I have the honor to inform you that I have been  
requested by the Japanese naval authorities to transmit  
to you the enclosed memorandum.

I have the honor to be et cetera."

Two. The memorandum reads as follows:

"By our memorandum of 22nd October, we requested  
all neutral naval vessels and merchant men in the  
vicinity of Hankow to find anchorage about 10 nautical  
miles up stream from that city by midnight of the  
said date. Subsequent reconnaissance has shown that  
numerous junks with Chinese troops aboard are swarming  
in the vicinity of neutral ships anchored along the  
Hankow water front in order to escape Japanese attacks.

It

793.94/14136

1130

-2- October 25, 12 p.m., from Shanghai via N. R.

It is therefore our most earnest request that third power authorities, giving due consideration to our desire to avoid the occurrence of unfortunate incidents involving third powers to which the above situation might give rise as well as to the desperate fight now being waged by the Japanese forces for the capture of Hankow, should cause all of their respective vessels to speedily move to the anchorage above mentioned and to take all possible steps to prevent Chinese ships coming into the vicinity of such vessels.

It must be added that, in view of the intensive character of the hostilities now being carried on for the capture of Hankow, it is difficult to give assurances that Chinese troops who thus take advantage of the presence of neutral vessels will not be attacked by reason of their proximity to such vessels. 25th of October, 1938."

Sent to Chungking, repeated to Peiping, Canton, Hong Kong. Copy to Admiral Yarnell.

GAUSS

RR:CSB



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Washington,

October 26, 1938.

6 PM

1938 OCT 26 11 5 20

Bm

AMERICAN CONSUL,

SHANGHAI (China). Via NR

RUSH.

591

Please repeat at once to Tokyo your October 22, 5 p.m.,  
and your October 25, 12 p.m., in regard to letters addressed  
by Tani to Ambassador Johnson on the subject of foreign  
vessels at Hankow.

Hull  
(7.11.38)

OR 10

1938 OCT 26 1938 PM

793.94/14186

FE: JCV:REK

FE

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ....., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1925 1-138

793.94/14186

F/FG

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



DATE: October 13, 1938.

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Alfred C. Elkinton;  
Mr. Welles.

Present: Mr. Hornbeck;  
Mr. Hamilton.

COPIES TO:



Mr. Alfred C. Elkinton of Honolulu called by appointment on Mr. Welles. Mr. Welles had asked Mr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton to be present. Mr. Welles opened the conversation by asking Mr. Elkinton whether he was not a brother of Mrs. Nitobe. When Mr. Elkinton replied in the affirmative, Mr. Welles said that he had known Mr. and Mrs. Nitobe when he was on duty at the Embassy in Japan and that he had always been grateful for the many kindnesses shown him by Mr. and Mrs. Nitobe. When informed by Mr. Elkinton that Mrs. Nitobe had recently died, Mr. Welles expressed his sincere sorrow.

Mr. Elkinton referred to the fact that he had been received by the President and that the President had gone fishing on his boat when the President had visited Honolulu

three

793.94/14187

F/FG 14187

- 2 -

three years ago. Mr. Elkinton said that he was coming merely as a private American citizen, representing no group or faction and not at the instance of anyone else. He said that his call was motivated by a sincere desire that the hostilities between China and Japan cease. He said that when he had read the morning papers of that day (he apparently had reference to reports of the landing of Japanese troops in south China) he had felt very much discouraged and would perhaps not have endeavored to see Mr. Welles had not an appointment already been made. He said that he had visited Japan and China on a number of occasions; that his most recent visit to Japan had occurred last year; and that he was convinced that the people of Japan did not want trouble to occur between the United States and Japan. He said that of course the military group in Japan was at present dominating affairs and he indicated that in his opinion the military group is not animated by reason. He referred to the four-power meeting at Munich and said that that meeting indicated that there was being developed in international relations a new technique, a technique of talking things over before the fighting started rather than after hostilities had broken out. He said that he had a deep hope that something might occur which would afford the American Government an opportunity of bringing the Chinese and Japanese together about the conference

table

- 3 -

table so that the Sino-Japanese hostilities might cease and a peaceful solution be found.

Mr. Welles said that he was very glad that Mr. Elkinton had called and that it was a pleasure to receive callers who were animated by hopes, desires and attitude such as Mr. Elkinton's. Mr. Welles assured Mr. Elkinton that this Government shared Mr. Elkinton's hopes and desires. Mr. Welles then asked Mr. Hornbeck to give Mr. Elkinton a brief outline of the question of this Government extending its good offices to China and Japan. Mr. Hornbeck explained that in conversations with the Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors beginning last summer and throughout the autumn the Secretary had made clear that this Government would be prepared to exercise "good offices" and to be of any appropriate and practicable assistance toward composing the difficulties between China and Japan, provided that both governments should be agreeable to such a procedure. Mr. Hornbeck said that during recent months the Chinese Ambassador had on several occasions brought up this subject. Mr. Hornbeck said that our position had consistently been that our offer of good offices remained open. Mr. Hornbeck added that there had been no indication from the Japanese Government that it would welcome good offices but on the contrary there had been many statements by high authorities of the Japanese Government that Japan would not accept an offer  
of

- 4 -

of good offices. Mr. Elkinton indicated that he was aware of this attitude on the part of the Japanese Government. Mr. Hornbeck then said that no one apparently had been able to conceive of any proposals of settlement which would be at the same time acceptable to both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments. He asked Mr. Elkinton whether he had been able to think of any proposals which would be mutually acceptable to the two governments. Mr. Elkinton said that he had not. He then repeated that he did not have anything specific in mind but that he only wished to lay before Mr. Welles his hope that something might occur which would give this Government an opportunity to take some step which would result in stopping the fighting and bringing China and Japan together in conference. Mr. Welles said again that we had this matter very much on our minds.

After some further conversation along general lines in regard to the situation in the Far East, during which Mr. Elkinton spoke highly of Admiral Yarnell, whom he had known while Admiral Yarnell was in command of the naval base at Honolulu, Mr. Elkinton left Mr. Welles' office. Mr. Hornbeck invited Mr. Elkinton to come to his office and Mr. Elkinton proceeded to Mr. Hornbeck's office where the conversation continued. However, no new points of political or diplomatic <sup>importance</sup> ~~importance~~ were there brought up.

7/7/75

FE:MMH:EJL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

*1597*

No. *1597*

October 24 1938.

CONFIDENTIAL - FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,  
 American Ambassador,  
 Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your confidential information  
 a copy of a memorandum of a conversation of October 13,  
 1938, between the Under Secretary of State and Mr. Alfred C.  
 Elkinton in regard to the situation in the Far East.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

*Charles G. Bell*

Enclosure:

Memorandum of conversation  
 as described.

OR *[Signature]*  
 OCT 26 1938 PM

*29C.*  
 FB:ECU:JIS

FE

*[Handwritten mark]*

10-20-38

*[Handwritten signature]*

793.94/14187

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Memorandum of Conversation  
October 25 1938.

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS. DATE: October 14, 1938.

SUBJECT: Recent communication from the Japanese Government  
in regard to Japanese military operations in south China.  
AND RECORDS

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. João Antonio de Bianchi, Minister of Portugal;  
Mr. Hamilton.

COPIES TO:



The Portuguese Minister called at his request. He said that he had received a telegram from his Foreign Office stating that the Portuguese Government had received at Tokyo a communication from the Japanese Government stating that the Japanese Government had decided to conduct military operations in south China and that the Japanese Government would respect the rights and interests of third powers. The Minister said that his Government had assumed that we had received a similar communication. I replied in the affirmative. The Minister then said that the Portuguese Government would like to exchange views with this Government in regard to the matter; that the Portuguese Government had of course a special interest because of Macao; that the Portuguese Government desired

ir

793.94/14188

F/FG 14188

138

- 2 -

if possible to have any action taken by it conform to any action taken by other powers, always keeping in mind, however, that the position of the Portuguese Government might be special because of Macao. The Portuguese Minister did not state, however, that his Government had decided to take any action in the matter. He asked whether I could give him an indication of our views.

I said that the note which had been presented to our Embassy in Tokyo conformed to the general outline of the communication received by the Portuguese Government, as described by him. I said that at the end of the note received by us there was an indication that we might expect to receive a further communication particularizing the measures which the Japanese Government desired be taken. I said that we had just received from our Embassy at Tokyo the text of an additional note which the Japanese Foreign Office had sent to our Embassy but that we had not yet had time to study this second note.

I told the Portuguese Minister that over the period of the past year we had received a number of such communications from the Japanese Government and that we had several times informed the Japanese Government of our general position, namely, that although American nationals were under no obligation to take precautionary measures,

American



- 3 -

American officials had consistently advised such nationals to take precautionary measures; that many Americans had withdrawn from dangerous areas; that American nationals had placed identifying marks on their properties; that the location of the properties had been communicated to the Japanese; but that whether or not American nationals took such precautionary measures, this Government would be obliged, in case there occurred injury or damage to American nationals or their property resulting from Japanese military operations, to hold the Japanese Government responsible therefor. I told the Minister that after we had given consideration to the two notes which we had received in Tokyo from the Japanese Government, I would expect to inform him of our views in regard thereto.

October 15, 1938.

NOTE: I telephoned the Portuguese Minister this morning and informed him of the substance of the Department's telegram to Tokyo No. 354, October 14, 7 p.m. The Minister thanked me for this information and said that if he heard anything further from his Government in regard to the matter, he would let me know.

*A/ W. L.*

FE:MMH:EJL

162

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 25 1938.

No. 56

To the American Minister,  
Lisbon.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the American Minister a copy of a memorandum of a conversation of October 14, 1938, between the Minister of Portugal and an officer of the Department in regard to a recent communication from the Japanese Government with respect to Japanese military operations in South China. Copies of the relevant portions of certain telegrams, including the telegram to Tokyo referred to in the note to the memorandum, are also enclosed.

793.94/14188

Enclosures:

Memorandum of conversation  
of October 14 between the  
Minister of Portugal and  
Mr. Hamilton;


Telegram No. 657, October 12,  
from Tokyo;

Telegram No. 664, October 13,  
from Tokyo;

Telegram No. 354, October 14,  
to Tokyo.

egc.  
FE:EGC:JPS  
10-20-38

FE



F / PG

162

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 25 1938.

No. 1600

To the American Ambassador,  
Tokyo.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the American Ambassador a copy of a memorandum of a conversation of October 14, 1938, between the Minister of Portugal and an officer of the Department in regard to a recent communication from the Japanese Government with respect to Japanese military operations in South China.


Enclosure:

Memorandum of conversation  
as described.

OCT 24 1938.PM

FE:ECG:JPS  
10-19

FE



793.94/14188

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 25 1938.

No. 621

To the American Ambassador,  
 Peiping.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the American Ambassador a copy of a memorandum of a conversation of October 14, 1938, between the Minister of Portugal and an officer of the Department in regard to a recent communication from the Japanese Government with respect to Japanese military operations in South China.

Enclosure:

Memorandum of conversation  
 as described.

793.94/14183

Copy to Chungking.

OCT 24 1938 PM

FE:EGC:JPS  
 10-19

FE

1/FG

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/14271 FOR Despatch #1712

FROM Shanghai ( Gauss ) DATED Sept. 28, 1938.  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Activities of the "Huang Tao Hui" Society, a  
political organization instigated by Japanese  
and under Japanese control, its principal  
activity being to promote pro-Japanese terrorism.

aa

793.94/ 14189

14189 -

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

743.94

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 893.77/3166 FOR Telegram #1232, 7 p.m.

FROM Great Britain (Kennedy) DATED Oct. 21, 1938.  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

#### REGARDING:

Japanese attacks upon Kowloon-Canton continue:  
Report that British interests would purchase  
Chinese section of the Railway is unfounded;  
according to Leith-Ross, who also stated that  
the only real help to give the Chinese now  
would be munitions and airplanes, which the  
British are not able to furnish.

aa

793.94/ 14190

14190 -

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 751.62/490 Confidential File FOR Tel#1798 6 p.m.

FROM France (Wilson) DATED Oct. 21, 1938  
7p/ NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING:

Comments by Bonnet. Claims the Japanese invasion of South China more cause for worry for the British than for the French.

ml

793.94/ 14191

14191 -

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 893.00/14270 FOR Telegram #002101450

FROM Navy Department ( ) DATED Oct. 22, 1938.  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

#### REGARDING:

Japanese attack on Canton: Troops and tanks entering  
city and occupation about to take place. Plans  
arranged for protection of American nationals.

aa

795.94 / 14192

14192



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EE

RAW

COMSOPAT

October 22, 1938

Rec'd 11:41 p.m., 21st.

note  
793.94

ACTION: CINCAF

INFO: AST LUSNA SPANGHAI  
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA  
PASSED BY CINCAF TO  
OPNAV FOR INFORMATION

0021. The Provincial Government Wutschen has left Canton. General evacuation of civil population nearly completed. Chinese authorities have blown up public utilities and other activities. Japanese have broken Chinese defense lines and are approaching Canton. Occupation of Canton about to take place. Japanese tanks reported entering city. Carrying out plans connection Consul General concentration protection American nationals. 1450.

KLP

14270

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 394.415/5 FOR telegram #680 7pm

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED Oct. 24, 1938.  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING:

Attack of Japanese bombing planes on the British ship  
SANDPIPER on the Yangtze. Report of British  
representations to Japanese Government, protesting  
attack.

793.94/14193

14193 -

FE

RAW

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated October 24, 1938

Rec'd 9:40 a.m.

394.415 Secretary of State,  
Washington.

note  
- 93.94 680, October 24, 7 p.m.

One. In connection with the attack of Japanese bombing planes on His Majesty's Ship SANDPiper on the Yangtze, my British colleague has today sent to his Government the following report of his representations here:

"Prime Minister being engaged I saw Vice Minister at 3 p.m. today and represented great seriousness of this further attack on a British gunboat. I said that while it was to me almost unthinkable that the attack could have been deliberate, the first report pointed to this and, in view of the full information in possession of Japanese authorities regarding position of British gunboats, there must at least have been culpable negligence. To diminish the ill effects of this attack, I urged that the Japanese Government should at once take the initiative in offering the fullest amends.

Vice Minister thanked me for bringing matter promptly to his notice and promised to inform Prime Minister and make immediate inquiries.

Service

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 680, October 24, 7 p.m. from Tokyo.

Service attaches are simultaneously bringing facts to notice of naval and military authorities."

Two. British report of incident follows:

"It is reported that six heavy Japanese bombing airplanes dropped a large number of bombs around H. M. S. SANDPIPER. It would appear that this attack was deliberate as there were nothing but junks in the immediate vicinity so far as can be ascertained. The only damage was to the superstructure, in which two cabins and various other parts of the ship were wrecked. There were a number of holes from bomb splinters; but no casualties. Japanese reconnaissance planes about thirty minutes beforehand flew up and down the river over H.M.S. SANDPIPER before the bombers arrived."

GREW

RR

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

GPO

FROM

FOURTH MARINES

October 26, 1938

Received 10:35 a.m.

ACTION CINCAF

OPNAV

INFO

RUSSNO

AMCONSUL SHANGHAI

COMSUBRON FIVE

ASST ALUSNA SHANGHAI

COMDESRON FIVE

COMYANGPAT

COMSOPAT

AMBASSADOR CHINA

8626. Today twelve Japan naval vessels said reached  
Hankow army and naval troops occupied part of Japan concession  
Wuchang claimed completely occupied. 1850.

CSB

793.94/14194

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

FROM

GRAY

TSINGTAO VIA N.R.

October 26, 1938

Received 8 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

2, October 26, 11 a.m.

The fall of Hankow has had no visible repercussions yet in this region; local financial and commercial markets are unalarmed and the mass of the Chinese population appears unmoved by the recent events.

Two. There is some feeling, however, that the Canton and Hankow developments presage a larger collapse of the Chinese front. The Consulate gathers from Japanese sources that a period of consolidation of Japanese lines along the Peiping-Hankow railway and the Hankow-Canton railway will now follow.

Three. Japanese forces aided by Chinese mercenaries are meeting with success in the campaign against guerrillas and bandits particularly in the Pingtu section of Shantung. The Japanese have established air field at Pingtu. Tsingtao, because of its situation, is of value to Japanese in the pacification of the Shantung promontory.

Four. Missionaries report quite uniformly that

guerrilla

793.94/14195

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EDA - 2 - #2, October 26, 11 a.m. from Tsingtao

guerrilla activities amount to little more than bandit depredations against Chinese villages and the Chinese populace. Also the fact that bands fight with one another to gain possession of arms.

Repeated to Peiping and Chungking. By mail to Tokyo.

SOKOBIN

RGC :DDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 12, 1938.

~~WAF~~  
~~WAA~~

In the attached pamphlet, E. C. Reicher argues that, in place of the old unorganized inefficient China which offered nothing to the West beyond a potentially great market to be safeguarded for the future, the new war-born China is, through patriotic effort and unity, becoming a valuable ally with real economic promise whom the democratic should assist by every means. No new factual information is provided.

*Ku*  
FE:Chase

OCT 13 1938


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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

**FROM A POTENTIAL MARKET TO A TRUSTED ALLY**

By E. C. Reicher



F. C. Reicher was a newspaper correspondent during and after the World War in a number of capitals in Europe and America. A seasoned observer of international affairs, he has brought to the study of the Chinese problems a world point of view. He is now Professor of German and French in the Associated National Universities in Kunming, Yunnan.



793.94/14196

19394

OCT 13 1938  
FILED

CHINA INFORMATION COMMITTEE  
HANKOW CHINA

Reprinted from CHINA FORUM, Vol. II No. 8  
(August 20, 1938), pp. 213-217.

F/EG  
11/96-

AUGUST 20, 1938

213

## FROM A POTENTIAL MARKET TO A TRUSTED ALLY

By E. C. Reicher

WHAT was China for the Western world before the war? The largest potential market. What will China be in the future? A valuable ally of Great Britain, France, Soviet Russia and America in their struggle against the fascist countries. To-day she is receiving the first great shock of aggression which is ultimately aimed at the overthrow of the world hegemony exercised by those powers. While acting as their buffer China is now undergoing the psychological changes and creating the political organizations necessary for playing the important part that history seems to have allotted to her in the future stages of this huge struggle.

Since the middle of the last century the imperialist nations of the West were accustomed to look upon China as "the largest potential market" for the investment of their surplus capital and the absorption of their surplus industrial productions. Attempts at cutting out slices of territory from the huge non-resisting body of the old decadent empire for colonies or spheres of influence were frustrated by the mutual jealousy of the parties concerned which adopted subsequently the policy respecting the Open-Door and the Territorial Integrity of China.

Besides jealousy, however there were at least two other potent factors prompting the imperialistic powers in their attitude of aloofness. One reason certainly was the existence of other large markets and colonies, the development of which promised earlier successes and offered more security for the exporter, the investor and political organizer. These markets continued to absorb most

of their surplus energy and output up to the time of the great depression in 1928. The door of China could be left open and her territory guaranteed for the simple reason that nobody was very anxious to enter. This "open door" really sealed up China as a vault containing treasures for later use, till Japan, being in dire need of markets, broke the seal by violence.

The Chinese could have profited by this respite from foreign interference and built up a national state strong enough to repel foreign aggression whenever it appears. But none of the powers seemed to have ever earnestly thought of this possibility, or to have feared it. Indeed, Chinese political activity in those days succeeded only in making the seal against the outside world tighter, by playing one country against the other and by ingenious devices of diplomatic procrastination and passive resistance. But it failed completely in conjuring and organizing the vital forces of the race to ward off the danger of future invasions. Meanwhile foreign ideas kept filtering through together with the importation of foreign goods and helped to destroy the dilapidated form of the Old Civilization. The vitality of the Chinese race which had receded from the forms it had once created and filled was now allowed to flow into other forms of greater attractive power or even to create new forms, with some of the old forms collapsing. This was the only significant movement in the social and political life of China before the advent of the Kuomintang and the emergence of Chiang Kai-shek as a national leader. Now, Sun Yat-sen's principles became the receptacles into which this new

energy flowed, and Chiang Kai-shek focussed the new vitality in a nucleus of efficient government set up on the basis of those principles. Slowly, but gathering momentum from the resentment caused by the continuous interference and aggression from Japan and considerably accelerated after the loss of Manchuria, a modern state-machinery was crystallizing in Nanking and extending its influence over the adjacent provinces, a small modern army was created, roads leading into the vast interior were built, currency reform was enacted and the unification of China was gradually brought nearer. Yet, the actual progress made appeared insignificant if measured in terms of what was required to meet the impending Japanese invasion successfully, no matter how amazing some of Chiang's successes may have seemed to anybody used to the old ways of China. Indeed, China as a whole was still fully absorbed in her old family life and her old delights derived from tolerance, negligence and quietism, listening distractedly to the alarm-sirens sounding from Nanking, perturbed now and then when the pitch was somewhat higher, but always joyfully returning at the earliest possible moment to her old privilege of peaceful contemplative living. One had the feeling that nothing short of a catastrophe could induce this country of contented day-dreamers to make the strenuous efforts that alone make a modern state-machinery function efficiently. Knowing Chinese life as it was, one could hardly help marvelling at the fact that large institutions, like railways, banks or universities, were functioning at all. This, too, was often found to be the highest praise that Chinese friends would express about their institutions. Apparently it was not any inherent ineptitude for efficiency in the Chinese that held up progress, but just this contentedness in seeing their institutions run at only a fraction of their full capacity.

The apparent unwillingness of the Chinese to adhere to principles of action, their instinctive reliance on principles leading to procrastination and inactivity, their passive resistance against accuracy and efficiency and their relative lack of public spirit and morals were largely responsible for an atmosphere which was unfavorable for the foundation of modern enterprises and the investment of capital. Foreign investors would not risk their capital without security from civil wars and official corruption, and they could not see adequate profits when staffs were irresponsible to the demands of discipline, accuracy and efficiency, and when there were no competent and sufficiently active public organs. After the more creative impulses of the glorious past had long ceased to live, the restraining forces carried over from former centuries by sheer inertia were obstructing progress and reconstruction. This is the third reason why China had remained merely a "potential" market, while other regions, such as South America, large pieces of Africa, British India and Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and Australia had already become integral parts of the world's economic and political structure.

The present war has changed this situation fundamentally. The supreme effort to win the life-and-death struggle is being made. Family philosophy is being uprooted by the emotional waves that the newborn faith of patriotism has aroused everywhere in the Chinese provinces. Activity for the sake of the Chinese community as a whole is being brought to every corner of the country through the bombs falling from the sky and the urgent calls and commands pouring in from the capital. Here, every Chinese now realizes, is one man who has constantly been acting while they were dreaming, acting with the right degrees of forbearance and daring, of cynicism and idealism, if compromise

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and fortitude, one man who can see realities in all ugliness and the visions of his faith in their splendor, and who has valour enough never to falter, never to tarry, never to hasten, unless it be for the sake of the country with which he has identified himself. This man has created the only organization in China working with a high degree of accuracy and efficiency: the army which he has trained. There is no more room left for doubt in the Chinese mind: Here is efficiency, the miracle that is fighting the Japanese successfully. And here is the conviction that it is only this kind of efficiency and the methods by which it has been attained that can save China from disaster. It cannot be the other kind of only pretended efficiency culminating in a ten, twenty or thirty percent efficiency, or the old day-dreaming. And so, in a stream of ever increasing magnitude the services and energies of China's countless millions are pouring into the organization which Chiang Kai-shek and his close collaborators have created and which is rapidly moulding the New China. Many provinces, many organizations, many walks of life have not yet come into the orbit of this enlivening centre of regeneration. But there is no doubt that after the war the whole of China will be changed.

The New China will find a changed international situation. The old imperialistic powers will not threaten her any more. The world has split itself into two hostile camps. The old imperialistic powers are now on the defensive and in dire need of an ally to help keep a common enemy in check which is threatening their possessions and stakes in the Far East. Mere financial and economic power and increased armaments will not do. Japan is too near to the exposed regions. Unless Japan is completely defeated by some other power

or powers joining the present conflict, unless it be that a world war should finally develop ending in a defeat of the non-fascist countries, or unless China should be totally and permanently occupied by Japanese troops, all of these eventualities being rather improbable, the above favorable international situation will arise for China. Then Great Britain, France, Soviet Russia and America will need a strong China and can safely be expected to take a very active part in helping to build up China as an ally. On a scale unprecedented in Chinese history, investments will flow in for two reasons, one economic and the other political.

Foreign capitalists will consider investments to be safe and promising in China after political stability and social responsiveness to organization have been brought about through the efforts made in this war. China will then become an actual market for Western capitalism, but not only a market. Political reasons will dictate to the powers a policy of industrialization. For without industries, especially war industries, China would not be very useful as an ally in the common struggle against the fascist countries. As France has lent enormous sums of money to her allies on the Eastern borders of Germany for political rather than for economic reasons, so China will be in a position to profit by political loans from all the big powers concerned. Those political loans will supplement the private investments which are made merely for commercial profit.

China will fit very well into the league of democratic countries. She is becoming very intensely nationalistic. However, her nationalism is of a different type from the ultra-nationalism which characterizes the fascist countries. As an emotional outburst Chinese nationalism might be comparable to the wave

of patriotism that would arise in any democratic country, such as England or France, when attacked. Its main function as a political creed, however, is but the creation of a community-spirit, i.e. the very foundation on which all Western civilization is based, but which was formerly lacking in China. Loyalty to and life in a community which is above the limits of the village and the family, this is what nationalism brings to China. Nationalism is creating the state, not deifying it as in the fascist countries.

Chiang Kai-shek's government is dictatorial. But he is neither der Fuehrer nor Il Duce of the Chinese people. His personal dictatorship is emancipating the Chinese people from party-dictatorship and allowing them to make the first steps towards democratic government, as shown by the recent creation of the People's Political Council. Nationalism in China is liberating the individual from the shackles of family bonds and age-long conventions. It is a force that is working towards the creation of a government by the people, which had never before existed in China. Fascist ultra-nationalism, on the other hand, has put the individual under the chains of long discarded traditions of former centuries and has in the West crippled the democratic spirit of countries which are otherwise ripe for democratic government.

The Chinese are a very rational people. Their deep-rooted rationality, in fact, is a great obstacle against the creation of any state-consciousness, which rises and falls with the general adoption of rigid principles of conduct not based on personal relationships. There is no danger that this newly born state-consciousness might ever develop into the rampant growth of a state-mysticism as it has done in the fascist countries.

A great opportunity for strengthening the defences of the democratic world against the inroads of irrationalism and despotism seems to be at hand. The principles of ultra nationalism have converted the fascist countries into huge military machines for aggression. The same principles have now undoubtedly precipitated one of them blindly into a futile adventure. Instead of national death Japan brings national rebirth to China.

We Westerners who live among the Chinese and see with our own eyes what is happening have the strong wish that the Western world in general may understand the significance of these historical developments as clearly as we do. Let the world not be blind to the active forces that are rapidly changing China from the old chaos into a modern state. Let the democratic powers grasp the idea that it is now possible to develop a powerful link in the chain of collective security. Let them extend their utmost assistance to help China overcome her acute crisis and prepare for future political and economic collaboration. If the democratic nations do not desert China now, China will succeed.

Foreigners in China also have gained the conviction that the momentum gathered during the struggle of the past year will carry China much further on her way to rejuvenation, and they sincere by hope that those circles which are still marking time will not wait indefinitely. In times of national stress one should not keep aloof until receiving orders from the government. One should be carried to spontaneous action by one's own principles. China's plight is not only a problem for military experts. Every aspect of Chinese life is in rapid evolution and needs adjustments. It is dangerous to wait and see, and tolerate stagnation. Foreign powers are giving

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their assistance only when they know that the Chinese Government can make good use of it. This assistance can be increased when China further streng-

thens herself and thus inspires confidence abroad. China cannot win unless she can combine all these efforts of reform and rejuvenation.

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By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

## THE REAL ISSUE

By E. C. Reicher

F. C. Reicher was a newspaper correspondent during and after the World War in a number of capitals in Europe and America. A seasoned observer of international affairs, he has brought to the study of the Chinese problems a world point of view. He is now Professor of German and French in the Associated National Universities in Kunming, Yunnan.

CHINA INTER-UNIVERSITY COMMITTEE  
HANKOW, CHINA

Reprinted from CHINA FORUM, Vol. II, No. 6

(August 6, 1938), pp. 157-161.

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## THE REAL ISSUE

By E. C. Reicher

WHAT has China gained by resisting Japan? The Japanese have not hesitated to send a substantial part of their fighting forces into the vast interior of the country, and seem ready to send more, if necessary. They have not been afraid of the price and risk involved in this huge expedition and seem to be determined to crush the National Government at all costs. China has won the sympathies of the world and has had munitions and financial assistance from the big powers. But that was all. The powers have not dared to interfere more openly. In America the isolationist tendencies have proved to be much stronger than expected. Soviet Russia has had her purges. Germany's threats to Czecho-Slovakia almost precipitated a European war, and Lord Halifax's policy of compromising failed to appease Hitler. Many hopes that the Chinese government may have entertained at the beginning of the war have thus been frustrated.

How will the future situation be? Will it be possible for China to maintain a resistance equal to that of the past year? Will the drain on Japanese resources really be great enough to make her bend or break in the near future? Has the European situation improved sufficiently to give the powers more freedom of action in the Far East? Will they be able or prepared to interfere at the eleventh hour? No one can answer these questions. Like every other great war, the Sino-Japanese struggle is not very much more than a gamble. Nevertheless it seems safe enough to make the following assumptions: An early victory over Japan could only be brought about by a rapid and radical improvement in the international situation. Any victory over Japan would have to be bought with a devastat-

ed country and enormous losses of life and property. The very existence of China as a sovereign state is at stake.

China's friends in foreign countries, seeing the very dangerous situation in which she finds herself, may have begun to question the wisdom of her policy of long resistance. They may ask whether it would not have been better for China if in July 1937 the Central Government had abandoned the northern provinces, which was the policy of those factions who were favoring a compromise with Japan in order to play for time and to organize the rest of the country for war at a later date. Many people in foreign countries may be inclined to answer this question in the affirmative, and to add that the sooner the Japanese were found to be willing to accept a treaty the better it would be for China, even if it entailed a very substantial loss of territory.

In China, however, many of us hold quite different views. We think that the above problems expressed in terms of territories lost or regained, military defeats and victories, destroyed cities, devastated farmlands and millions of men killed by slaughter, floods and famines—what many people would call the hard facts of the case—are completely overshadowed by a much vaster and even more important problem, which is psychological, social and political. There are results which China has obtained through resisting Japan that are more tangible and of greater importance to her national life than her chances of success in the ever changing and unpredictable military situations. As a result of a decided change in the psychology of her people, brought about by the struggle of resistance, the foundations



have now been laid in China on which a modern state can arise. The modern Chinese state, in fact, is arising, a state which can live and hold out in our world of to-day. If the method of compromising with the aggressor had been perpetuated indefinitely, this could never have happened. It even appears as though the leaders of the Chinese Nation, and in particular Chiang Kai-shek, have not only known how to utilize this tide to the best advantage, but also to manoeuvre it skilfully into the right channels according to a well-conceived plan. Let us recapitulate the outstanding developments of the last year as they appear when seen in this light.

At the time of the Lukouchiao incident China as a whole was no different from what she had been during the last decades: a civilization on its down-grade to degeneration, still living, as if by instinct, but gradually dilapidating and losing the forms that former generations had created. China was not yet conscious of nationality nor capable of concerted action. What there seemed to be of a national consciousness in the minds of most of the people belonging to the literate classes, was scarcely more than a half-hearted acquiescence in a new style of living which was favorable in getting them jobs and in doing business. In the more influential circles it never went far enough to be genuine and convincing. Patriotic appeals, when originating from provincial or party leaders, were at once distrusted and denounced as treacherous moves designed to undermine the authority of the Central Government, which in many cases they certainly were. One was struck again and again by the fatalistic, negligent, apathetic manner in which Chinese intellectuals expressed their resentment against the Japanese outrages, leaving the impression that down in their hearts there was hopelessness and a feeling that the Chinese were unable to put up a successful fight against the Japanese. Occasional outbursts of superficial boasting, in which

everything Japanese was underrated, helped only to underline the utter lack of self-reliance due to the existence of a deep-rooted inferiority-complex. The foreign community had similar negative convictions, and in foreign countries people just took it for granted that the Chinese were unable to fight real battles. Only those very few in China who had been in close contact with the Central Government and the modern troops of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek knew that there had been a change.

Then came the first surprise of this war: the strong resistance which the Chinese troops offered at the Shanghai front for over three months. From a purely strategic viewpoint, as has often been said, this long stand at Shanghai may have been a great mistake. For it cost enormous losses of life and equipment and ended in a complete disorganization of the Chinese army, a wild flight beyond the carefully prepared "Hindenburg line" of fortifications and the disaster at Nanking. Sacrificing so much in the Shanghai-Nanking sector may have been costly and strategically useless. But for psychological reasons it has been a victory of the greatest importance. For here it was being demonstrated before the astonished eyes of the world that the Chinese can fight, fight as well as the Japanese, if not better. The Chinese fighters were shown to be real soldiers, heroic soldiers, well equipped and excellently trained, commanded by efficient officers who proved to be masters in modern front-line tactics. This sensational drama performed in the limelight of metropolitan Shanghai aroused a wave of enthusiasm throughout the country, such as China had not known before. It was a feeling of deliverance from a mental oppression such as one sees in some individuals who, after being used to thinking that they were weaklings, suddenly discover that they are not when the danger has actually come upon them. Without this demonstration of

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fighting ability Chiang Kai-shek could never have dared to change over to his strategically sound policy of retreat into the interior for fear of losing the support of a sceptical country and the access to its resources. The foreign world was just as amazed at what they had seen as the Chinese were themselves, and gave wholehearted applause. The people in foreign countries now began to conceive the idea of ASSISTING China instead of PROTECTING her, as they had thought they were called upon to do but which they were not prepared to risk. They began to think that help extended to the National Government of China would not be lost, and that it may be possible to gradually develop China into a counterweight against the rising tide of Japanese aggression.

The enthusiasm created at Shanghai proved to be powerful enough to carry the people of China over the tragic and disheartening days of Nanking. In the following months a second great surprise helped greatly to deepen the new faith in China and the National Government. It became known that the government had succeeded in completely reorganizing the army up to its former strength. It was evident that the new forces of aroused patriotism had created much more than heroism at the front. Not only had the well-trained battalions of the central troops been efficiently used at Shanghai in co-operation with the provincial troops as an auxiliary force, but the new faith had even made that one thing feasible which in pre-war China had seemed to be beyond all expectation: a co-ordination of all the various fighting forces of China and their subordination under one unified command. It had now been possible to effect political organization on a national basis with a surprisingly high degree of swiftness and expediency. It was clear that the rival military leaders had finally accepted the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. Their readiness was as much motivated by the lessons learned from blunders committed at the Shanghai front as it was by the patriotic move-

ment among the masses and the rank and file of their troops. The ignorance of most of the provincial leaders to the problems of modern warfare and the romanticism in their thinking as well as the inaptitude of their troops had been too glaring a contrast to the realism of Chiang Kai-shek and the wonderful performance of his troops. This gain could probably not have been obtained so easily without the experience of front-line warfare with modern weapons, much less in peacetime.

Meanwhile most encouraging developments had been discernable in the political field. China had always been a country governed by rival clannish groups, who since the downfall of the imperial government had adopted Western demagoguery to further their personal ambitions. In pre-war days Chinese politics had been so utterly complicated on account of the co-existence of rigid systems of political thought, adopted in the letter rather than in spirit and adhered to without criticism, and an unscrupulous readiness to use one's political faith for increasing one's personal influence in the game of pure power-politics, which everyone was waging against everyone else. Yet the seriousness of the situation and the patriotic movement have changed and keep on changing this state of affairs from both ends. All the rival parties are now in close co-operation for the sake of the common cause. The leaders of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party have ended their long deadly strife and found a basis for common action. Opposition from their rank and file against this co-operation is rapidly losing ground. And what seems to be of even greater value is the fact that demagogic slogans of all colours are losing their captivating power in the minds of the Chinese people. The rigid and stubborn traditions of the Kuomintang members, of the Communists, of the conservatives, of the literati, and the apathy of the people are being shaken and shattered. They are becoming more elastic

and pliable and are receding more into the background. Breaking through the limits of clique and party more and more, men of real capacity are introduced into the governing circles around Chiang Kai-shek, whose personal prestige and influence as the most capable man in China, not as a party-leader, has registered a stupendous rise in every field of political activity and in the remotest corners of the country. One of the most interesting and significant developments has been the recent session of the People's Council, a sort of national convention on non-party lines, in which representatives of all political, economic and social groups were free to express their views and criticisms regarding national affairs. This seems to indicate that in spite of, or actually, due to, the emergence of a national leader of undisputed authority and power, a step towards democracy has been made, leading China further away from party-dictatorship.

The regeneration in the field of Chinese politics has begun. The results already obtained are most promising, but China has still a long way to go before it can be said that she possesses the powerful government of a modern state. But who can say how much the present reform-movement may not be accelerated by the future exigencies of the war? Its active spirit is spreading more and more in those circles which are now still staggering along in the old pace of comfortable aloofness but may become active reformists to-morrow. Already the very illuminating idea is being openly advocated: to organize the New China while the war lasts.

The battle at Taiierzhuang in which the Japanese were beaten for the first time in contemporary history, dispelled the rest of doubts as to China's military abilities. It is now clearly understood everywhere that the policy of retreat into the far interior had been adopted for its superior strategic potentialities not forced upon the general staff on account of defeat. The value of this victory was

also mainly psychological. As to the massive bombing undefended cities, such as Canton and Swatow, this might have caused much greater apprehensions if the newly reorganized Chinese airforce had not been so very successful in defending Hankow and destroying most of the enemy planes that had attempted raiding it. Everyone knows now that the havoc wrought at Canton was entirely due to the still insufficient numerical strength of the new highly efficient Chinese air force.

In essence the problem of China is not territorial but psychological. Even if the outcome of this war were to leave China with only a few of her provinces free from Japanese influence, those provinces could then be quickly and efficiently organized as a nucleus for a new China, for a China that would rely on her vital energies rather than on the vastness of her territory and man power. In the ever changing international situation, such a China, even if it be small, would in all probability soon find an opportunity for an attempt at recovering a part or all of her lost territory. The change of mental attitude produced by the experience of this war and the organization of a modern state would certainly outweigh any territorial losses. Taking a long view, therefore we cannot subscribe to the idea that it would in all circumstances be better for the Chinese nation to come to a compromise with the Japanese as soon as they might be prepared to accept any. The question of when to liquidate the war is not a problem of when and how to drive the best possible bargain. When the emotional experiences of warfare have actually led to such adjustments in the minds of the Chinese people and in their political, social and military organizations as could safely be relied upon as representing the minimum necessary for a rapid evolution of the Chinese Modern State, only then would it be good for the Chinese government to begin to consider at all the conclusion of peace on the most favorable terms obtainable at that time.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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A sacrifice of territory would then neither jeopardize internal stability nor weaken the will to build up, as it might to-day.

Territory, after all, is an asset of only relative value. It is much more desirable

to build a state strong enough to recover lost territories than to continue holding a nominal title to vast regions that cannot be defended on account of national weakness.

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

GRAY

TOKYO

FROM Dated October 26, 1938

Received 11:38 a.m.

*Telegram to Tokyo  
Oct. 26, 1938*

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

RUSH.

687, October 26, 8 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 26 1938  
Department of State  
*File*

793.94

One. With reference to a memorandum said to have been submitted by the Japanese naval authorities in Hankow through the Japanese Minister in Shanghai requesting third powers speedily to move their vessels to previously specified anchorage in order to avoid unfortunate incidents by reason of their proximity to numerous junks with China troops aboard stated to be swarming in vicinity of neutral vessels anchored along the Hankow water front, my British colleague has today addressed the following letter to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs:.

"I have just received a telegram from the British Embassy in Shanghai, of which the substance is given in the enclosed document. Although I have not yet received official instructions in the matter I think it only right to let you know without further delay that we must take the strongest possible exception to the communication stated

to

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EDA - 2 - #687, October 26, 8 p.m. from Tokyo

to have been made in Shanghai by the Japanese naval authorities. The position of British vessels anchored along the water front in Hankow is fully known to the Japanese authorities, the vessels are adequately marked and, so long as there are British interests to be protected, British gunboats must remain there for the purpose. It would, in the circumstance, be entirely unwarranted for any further attacks to be made in the immediate neighborhood of any British vessels. As regards the reference to the "intensive character of the hostilities", this was no doubt written before it was known that the Chinese Government would not defend the city of Hankow itself.

I think it only right to warn the Japanese Government, through Your Excellency, of the serious consequences which must, I fear, follow from any further attacks delivered in close proximity to British vessels on the Yangtze and I trust that the most explicit instructions will be sufficient to the proper naval authorities to abstain from such action".

Two. Craigie has this moment written me "perhaps you may see your way clear to making similar representations against an apparent intention of the Japanese naval authorities which bids fair to result in further incidents"?

Three. Having heard nothing (repeat nothing) from

our

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Shulman NARS, Date 12-18-75

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EDA - 3 - #687, October 26, 8 p.m. from Tokyo

our own representatives in Hankow or Shanghai with regard to this matter I hesitate to act without authorization but a brief flash from the Department would ensure action tomorrow morning. The attitude of our Government concerning the safety of our vessels on the Yangtze has already been made perfectly clear to the Japanese Government. Naval Attache concurs. Repeated to Shanghai.

GREW

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

5141

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

Washington,

1938 OCT 26 PM 5 20

October 26, 1938.

AMEMBASSY,

364 TOKYO (Japan).

7 pm

INFO: AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING (China).  
AMCONSUL, SHANGHAI (China). 592, Oct. 26, 7 pm

RUSH 364 793.94/14197

Your 687, October 26, 8 p.m., paragraph three.

You are authorized and instructed to take action similar to that taken by your British colleague but of course avoiding the making of any threat such as appears in the last sentence of this text as quoted in your telegram under reference.

Repeated to Shanghai and Chungking  
J. M. A.

Note: The above telegram was sent direct to Tokyo. Another telegram was sent as Sept 592 Oct. 26, 7 pm direct to Shanghai info. Chungking quoting the entire message to Tokyo.

OCT 26 1938 PM

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

D. C. R.—No. 50

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

CORRECTED COPY

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (A) *of paraphrase*

HONG KONG VIA N.R.

Dated October 26, 1938

Rec'd 10:06 a. m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in strict confidence*  
DT

Secretary of State,


Washington.

11, October 26, 10 a. m.

Referring to the Department's telegram of October  
24, 7 p. m., general opinion among the more conservative  
and best informed contacts of this office in Hong Kong  
is that the rapidity and ease of the Japanese invasion  
of South China and occupation of Canton was mainly  
contributed to by the following factors:

One. Cantonese conviction that the prestige of  
the British Government would deter the Japanese from  
undertaking any South China action likely to injure  
Hong Kong commercially or otherwise.

Two. Cantonese conviction that the Hong Kong  
British were so strongly sympathetic with the Chinese  
cause and were so affectionately devoted to Canton and  
Canton trade, as illustrated by demonstrations of the  
general kind reported in our despatches numbers 243 and  
273 of July 26th and September 1st, that British  
influence



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REB

2-#11, From Hong Kong, Oct. 26, 10a.m.

influence and even force could be depended upon to keep the Japanese out of South China.

Three. Cantonese conceit and conviction that Chiang Kai Shek considered South China so invaluable to his own strength and prestige that he would on the first threat of invasion promptly send sufficient forces to make up for Cantonese lack of defence preparations.

Four. Cantonese reliance on British and other military opinion that the Japanese could not undertake invasion of South China with less than a quarter million men which force, as the Cantonese were assured by these various experts, could not possibly be spared for the purpose.

Five. The much too fulsome and exaggerated praise and dramatization of Chinese patriotism and military prowess chanted almost universally by the foreign press and observers which deluded the always vain Cantonese into an undue conceit that the Japanese would take them at that valuation and thus hesitate to venture an invasion.

Six. Ignorance by the Cantonese of what really would be required in the way of modern military defence  
against

REB

3-#11, From Hong Kong, Oct. 26, 10a.m.

against a potential invasion, their unwillingness to accept expert foreign advice and direction in the matter, and inability to bring themselves to parting with the considerable money which appropriate defense measures would have cost.

Seven. Cantonese disinclination seriously to prepare for defense under the influences or beliefs outlined in paragraphs one to six above particularly when such preparations would interfere with their pursuit of financial gain from the situation developed by the hostilities.

The foregoing paragraphs represent opinions (repeat opinions) concentrated from a wide variety of reputable sources and while this office has no reason to doubt their general accuracy they can not be supported by factual evidence. Among the additional factors which might be considered as exceeding opinion and approaching fact to some degree are the following:

Eight. Japanese bribery of both civil and military officers in Kwangtung either with money or promise of high place in a Japanese controlled government for which plans

5145

REB

4-#11, From Hong Kong, Oct. 26, 10a.m.

plans have long been made. This has been a consistent allegation mainly by Japanese and other foreigners in Hong Kong and was specifically and positively stated to me by the contact mentioned in my despatch No. 150 of April 1st whose statements to me as then reported were discussed in Canton's No. 131 of April 5th. I personally am convinced that bribery played probably a leading part in the case of invasion and occupation and there have been various guarded references to that influence in most of the Hong Kong newspapers which have to defer to the local government's consideration for Chinese feelings.

Nine. The lack of interest of the Cantonese in supporting Chiang Kai Shek, which I have long heard, by Japanese contacts, by the presumably well informed Eugene Chen family, and by British and Americans well informed but without special bias.

Ten. General civic inertia, grafting, and jealousy alleged to exist among Kwangtung civil and military officials.

Of all the above suggested factors, several of which could be contributory, bribery is thought by this office to have been the decisive one and there is now strong circumstantial evidence in Hong Kong that the Cantonese have

5146

REB

5-#11, From Hong Kong, Oct. 26, 10a.m.

have decided to encourage public emphasis and proof of the bribery factor if for no other reason than that they are deeply stung by persistent charges of military ineptitude and lack of courage whereas their previous boasting has been unceasingly to the contrary. This office concurs with most informed local sources in a conviction that the South China leaders must have known for months that a Japanese invasion was inevitable, even if for no other reason than to cut the flow of munitions from Hong Kong, and have been incredibly lax in failing to make at least reasonably effective defence preparations for which they had undoubted facilities.

Repeated to Canton, Chungking, Peiping.

SOUTHARD

KLP:WWC:RGC

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Hong Kong via N. R.

FROM Dated October 26, 1938

Rec'd 10:06 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

11, October 26, 10 a.m.

793.94


Referring to the Department's telegram of

October 24, 7 p.m., general opinion among the more conservative and best informed contacts of this office in Hong Kong is that the rapidity and ease of the Japanese invasion of South China and occupation of Canton was mainly contributed to by the following factors:

One. Cantonese conviction that the prestige of the British Government would deter the Japanese from undertaking any South China action likely to injure Hong Kong commercially or otherwise.

Two. Cantonese conviction that the Hong Kong British were so strongly sympathetic with the Chinese cause and so affectionately devoted to Canton and Canton trade, as illustrated by demonstrations of the general kind reported in our despatches numbers 243 and 273 of July 26th and September 1st, that British

influence



793.94/14198

FILED

F/FG

NOV 1 1938

793.94/14261

-2- #11, October 26, 10 a.m., from Hong Kong via N. R.

influence and even force could be depended upon to keep the Japanese out of South China.

Three. Cantonese conceit and conviction that Chiang Kai Shek considered South China so invaluable to his own strength and prestige that he would on the first threat of invasion promptly send sufficient forces to make up for Cantonese lack of defence preparations.

Four. Cantonese reliance on British and other military opinion that the Japanese could not undertake invasion of South China with less than a quarter million men which force, as the Cantonese were assured by these various experts, could not possibly be spared for the purpose.

Five. The much too fulsome and exaggerated praise and dramatization of Chinese patriotism and military prowess chanted almost universally by the foreign press and observers which deluded the always vain Cantonese into an undue conceit that the Japanese would take them at that valuation and thus hesitate to venture an invasion.

Six.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3- #11, October 26, 10 a.m., from Hong Kong via N. R.

Six. Ignorance by the Cantonese of what really would be required in the way of modern military defence against a potential invasion, their unwillingness to accept expert foreign advice and direction in the matter, and inability to bring themselves to parting with the considerable money which ~~was transferred to~~ <sup>appropriate</sup> defense measures would have cost.

Seven. Cantonese disinclination seriously to prepare for defense under the influences or beliefs outlined in paragraphs one to six above particularly when such preparations would interfere with their pursuit of financial gain from the situation developed by the hostilities.

The foregoing paragraphs represent opinions (repeat opinions) concentrated from a wide variety of reputable sources and while this office has no reason to doubt their general accuracy they can not be supported by factual evidence. Among the additional factors which might be considered as exceeding opinion and approaching fact to some degree are the following:

Eight. Japanese bribery of both civil and military officers in Kwangtung either with money or promise of high place in a Japanese controlled government for which plans



-4- #11, October 26, 10 a.m., from Hong Kong via N. R.

plans have long been made. This has been a consistent allegation mainly by Japanese and other foreigners in Hong Kong and was specifically and positively stated to me by the contact mentioned in my despatch No. 150 of April 1st whose statements to me as then reported were discussed in Canton's No. 131 of April 5th of this year, I personally am convinced that bribery played probably a leading part in the case of invasion and occupation and there have been various guarded references to that betrayal in most of the Hong Kong newspapers which have to defer to the local government's consideration for Chinese feelings.

Nine. The lack of interest of the Cantonese in supporting Chiang Kai Shek which I have long heard, by Japanese contacts ~~facilitated without apparent Japanese (?) acts~~, by the presumably well informed Eugene Chen family, and by British and Americans well informed but without special bias.

Ten. General civic inertia, grafting, and jealousy ~~to~~ alleged to exist among Kwangtung civil and military officials.

of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5- #11, October 26, 10 a.m., from Hong Kong via N. R.

Of all the above suggested factors, several of which could be contributory, bribery is thought by this office to have been the decisive one and there is now strong circumstantial evidence in Hong Kong that the Cantonese have decided to encourage public <sup>emphasis</sup> ~~and~~ and proof of the bribery factor if for no other reason than that they are deeply <sup>stung</sup> ~~by~~ persistent charges of military ineptitude and lack of courage whereas their previous boasting has been unceasingly to the contrary. This office concurs with most informed local sources in a conviction that the South China leaders must have known for months that a Japanese invasion was inevitable, even if for no other reason than to cut the flow of munitions from Hong Kong, and have been incredibly lax in failing to make at least reasonably effective defence preparations for which they had undoubted facilities.

Repeated to Canton, Chungking, Peiping.

SOUTHARD

KLP:WVC:RGC

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 11) of October 26, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hong Kong reads substantially as follows:

The principle circumstances which made it possible for the Japanese to invade South China and take Canton so speedily and easily are, in the general opinion of the best informed and more conservative persons in Hong Kong with whom the Consulate General has contacts, as follows:

a. The conceit of the Cantonese and a strong belief on their part to the effect that the Generalissimo regarded the South China area as so valuable to his prestige and strength that as soon as invasion was threatened he would immediately send a force large enough to make up for the lack of defense preparations by the Cantonese.

b. The Cantonese, who are always vain, have been fooled by the large amount of extravagant praise and dramatization of the patriotism and military ability of the Chinese, subjects almost universally played up by the foreign press, so that they (the Cantonese) felt that the Japanese would accept them at the evaluation placed upon them by the press and would hesitate to invade South China for this reason.

c.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

c. A firm belief on the part of the Cantonese that the British in Hong Kong were so fond of Canton and its trade and sympathized so strongly with the cause of China that British influence and even force could be relied upon to prevent invasion of South China by the Japanese. (In this connection see despatches 243 and 273 of July 26 and September 1, respectively, from Hong Kong).

d. A firm belief on the part of the Cantonese that the Japanese would be discouraged through fear of British Government prestige from taking any action in South China which would be likely to cause commercial or other injury to Hong Kong.

e. The Cantonese had been assured by British and other military experts that Japan could not possibly spare a force of 250,000 men to be used in invading South China and they relied upon the opinion of these experts that it would not be possible for Japan to undertake such an invasion with a smaller force.

f. The Cantonese were not able to bring themselves to spend the large amount of money which suitable measures of defense would have entailed; they were not willing to be advised and directed by foreign experts in regard to modern measures of military defense against a possible invasion; and they were ignorant of what would really

-3-

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

really be needed in this regard.

g. Motivated by the beliefs or influences mentioned above the Cantonese were not inclined to make serious preparations for defense, especially when their efforts to reap financial rewards from conditions developed by the conflict would be interfered with.

Although the Consulate General knows of no reason for doubting the general accuracy of the opinions outlined above which have been compiled from a wide range of reliable sources, there is no factual evidence with which to support these opinions. Certain other circumstances which might be regarded as somewhat more than matters of opinion and as to some extent close to fact are as follows:

a. Alleged jealousy, grafting, and civic apathy in general of military and civil officials of Kwangtung Province.

b. Indifference on the part of Cantonese in upholding General Chiang Kai-shek which has been spoken of for a long time by well-informed but unprejudiced British and Americans, by the supposedly well-informed family of Eugene Chen, and by Japanese contacts.

c. It has been consistently reported, principally by Japanese and other foreigners in Hong Kong that both military and civil officials of Kwangtung Province have been bribed by Japanese either with promises of high positions

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

tions in a government controlled by Japanese which has long been planned, or with money. (In this connection, see despatch No. 150 of April 1 from Hong Kong and despatch No. 131 of April 5 from Canton). Most of the newspapers in Hong Kong which are obliged to defer to the Hong Kong Government's consideration for the feelings of the Chinese have made guarded reference to the betrayal of South China by Kwangtung officials and the Consul General himself personally feels certain that bribery probably played a principle role in connection with the invasion of this area and the occupation of Canton.

Most informed sources in Hong Kong feel certain that it must have been known for months by the leaders in South China that the Japanese were certain to invade that territory if for no other reason than to stop the shipment of arms and ammunition from Hong Kong, and that these leaders were unbelievably remiss in not preparing for at least reasonably effective defense, undoubted means for which they were in possession of. The Consul General agrees with this feeling and is of the opinion that out of all the circumstances mentioned above, a number of which could have been contributory, bribery was the decisive factor. Strong circumstantial evidence now exists in Hong Kong indicating that the Cantonese have determined to encourage the public to emphasize and prove the existence of

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

-5-

the bribery element. They would do this for the reason, if for no other, that they are deeply stung by continued charges of cowardice and military unfitness whereas they had been wont to brag continuously to the opposite effect.

793.94/14198.

*egc.*  
FE:EGC:JPS  
10-28

*HEP*  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

COMYANGPAT


FROM

October 26, 1938

Received 1:12 p.m.

ACTION CINCAP  
OPNAV  
INFO YANGTZE PATROL  
COMSOPAT  
FOURTH MARINES

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND A.I.D.  
CDT



793.94

0026. Jap navy present Hankow four destroyers second class, two light mine layers, one mine layer, seven river gun boats, four torpedo boats, two mine sweepers, two auxiliaries, thirteen transports, one hundred sixty launches and picket boats. 2009.

KLP

793.94/14199

FILED  
OCT 27 1938

F/FG



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

opo

FROM



COMYANGPAT

October 26, 1938

Rec'd 3:09 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
CINCAF

INFO: RUSNOS  
COMSOPAT  
FOURTH MARINES



793.94

0026. At 1430 six DDS arrived off Custom House. Mine sweepers clearing river off entrance water front but believe there are no mines. Observation balloon five miles to southeast. Numerous army small craft and airplanes active. Transports arrived and debarkation troops above Custom House and at ex-Jap concession began. Transports now anchored all along Bund. Occupation of city progressing. Jap troops insist entering Sad two which was included in neutral zone so have withdrawn sentry post at gates. No indication of any disorder. Rear Admiral Kondo in ATAKA expects arrive Thursday a.m. 2010.

KLP

FILED  
OCT 28 1938

793.94/14200

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

REB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

CHUNGKING VIA N.R.

Dated October 26, 1938

Rec'd 1:38 p.m.

Secretary of State




Washington.

514, October 26, 11 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Department's 4, October 24, 7 p.m. to Hong Kong.

It is ~~my~~ my belief that following factors account for rapidity of Japanese invasion of Kwangtung. Excellent weather conditions which at this time of year prevail at Bias Bay. Thus road and dry conditions of rice fields making use of mechanized equipment possible. Japanese landed in force ~~on 27~~ <sup>well prepared</sup> accomplishing military surprise; Chinese who were on inside of circle were apparently uncertain as to point where blow would be delivered. Best Cantonese troops and leaders were in Yangtze Valley. Local jealousy hampered Cantonese leaders in preparing defense. Japanese had complete command of air and were able to bomb also machine gun roads over which Chinese forces were compelled to advance to meet invasion. Mechanized equipment unhampered got ahead



793.94/14201

F/FG

NOV 2 1938

FILED

793 94

11/15/38

11/15/38

5148

REB

2-#514, From Chungking, Oct. 26, 11am

ahead of infantry. I have not heard any evidence to convince me of treachery on large scale sufficient to account for what has happened. I believe stupidity and ineptitude of Chinese leadership chiefly responsible.

JOHNSON

WWC

CSB

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A confidential telegram (No. 514) of October 26, 1938, from the American Ambassador at <sup>Chungking</sup> ~~Amoy~~ reads substantially as follows:

The Ambassador is of the opinion that unfitness and stupidity on the part of Chinese leaders were the principal causes of the happenings in South China. He has obtained no information which causes him to believe that there existed treachery on a sufficiently large scale to account for these happenings. The reasons for the rapidity with which the Japanese invaded Kwangtung Province are, in the Ambassador's opinion, as follows: By landing in force on (?) the Japanese accomplished military surprise. Apparently Chinese who were on the inner circle were not sure where the Japanese would deliver their blow. The Cantonese leaders were hindered in getting ready for defense by local jealousy. The best Cantonese leaders and troops were in the Yangtze River area. The Japanese, having entire control of the air, were able to bomb and machine-gun the highways over which Chinese troops were forced to proceed to meet the invasion of the Japanese. The mechanized equipment being unhampered got ahead of the infantry. The fine weather conditions which prevailed in the Bias Bay area at this season of the year made the roads and rice fields dry so that the use of mechanized equipment was possible.

89C  
FE:EGG:JPS  
10-31

YFE  
RELL

793.94/14201

793.94/14201

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

5149

CORRECTED COPY  
FROM

JR

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N. AND W.L.D.

Hankow via N. R.

Dated October 26, 1938

Rec'd 3:22 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.


20, October 26, 7 p.m.

The Japanese army is all around the ex-concession area and are demanding admission at the various gates. American sailors were withdrawn back to their ship at 6 o'clock tonight except for eight without arms who are remaining at navy Y.M.C.A. and will stand guard at gate to International Hospital in ex-Russian concession. The general outlook in regard to the refugee zone is that there are certain places therein which the Japanese are determined to occupy.

Repeated to Chungking and Peiping.

JOSSELYN

KLP:WWC



793.94/14202

FILED  
OCT 29 1938

REB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Hankow via N. R.

FROM Dated October 26, 1938

Rec'd 3:22 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
CHINA AND S. I.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 27 1938  
Department of State

20, October 26, 7 p. m.

The Japanese army is all around the ex-concession area and are demanding admission at the various gates. American sailors were withdrawn back to their ship at 6 o'clock tonight except for eight without arms who are remaining at Faithsworth and will stand guard at gate to International Hospital in ex-Russian concession. The general outlook in regard to the refugee zone is that there are certain places therein which the Japanese are determined to occupy.

*Der  
has asked  
for inspection*

Repeated to Chungking and Peiping.

JOSSelyn

KLP

WWC

*793.96  
net  
893.102/Hankow*

OCT 28 1938

FILED

793.94/14202

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GPO

FROM

USS GUAM

October 27, 1938

Rec'd 7:15 a.m.

ACTION: COMYANGPAT

PASSED BY CINCAF TO OPNAV FOR INFO

793.94

1027. Flotilla of about one hundred fishing boats  
and harbor craft now proceeding upriver at 0715 TAMON  
MARU also army transport accompanied by dozen military  
launches anchored off Seven Mile Creek and landed small  
force. 0935.

DDM

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 27 1938  
Department of State

793.94/14203

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMYANGPAT

October 27, 1938

FROM

Rec'd 6:30 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF

INFO: AMBASSADOR CHINA  
OPNAV

COPIES SENT TO  
D.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
DT

Division of  
Far Eastern Affairs

Department

*m file*

0027. Landing troops and stores continues no  
disorder said one completely occupied small number  
troops entering said two and three expect policing  
entire city will be turned over to Japanese today  
British and our landing forces will be withdrawn  
indications that Japs will not molest foreign  
property their attitude friendly. 1032,

DDM

793.94

793.94/14204

OCT 28 1938

FILED

F/FG



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

5150

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

PLAIN

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
DT

Hankow via N. R.

Dated October 27, 1938

Rec'd 7:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

21, October 27, 10 a.m.

193.94

No (repeat no) incidents arising out of the Japanese occupation of Wuhan and involving Americans have thus far been reported. The Japanese troops are said to have been orderly last night in the Chinese city as well as in the refugee zone. By nightfall yesterday they were in full possession of the ex-German concession. They now have troops billeted in the ex-Russian and ex-British concessions. This morning a large Japanese force marched through the former British concession.

There are now more than thirty-five Japanese naval vessels and transports, not including sea sleds and other miscellaneous small craft, in harbor. More are arriving. Repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Shanghai.

JOSSELYN

DDM

793.94/14205

F/FG

OCT 28 1938  
RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMSOPAT



FROM October 27, 1938

Rec'd 4 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF  
OPNAV

793.94

INFO: RUSNOS  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS ASHEVILLE  
USS SACRAMENTO  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
USS TULSA  
COMDESDIV FIFTEEN  
FOURTH MARINES  
ALUSNA PEIPING



0026. Situation Canton considerably improved, no serious fires refugee centers for Chinese have been established, city generally quiet Japanese control extended passage through river obstructions in progress arrival Canton naval units expected shortly.  
2359.

DDM

793.94/14206

F/FG

FILED  
OCT 28 1938

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

COMYANGPAT

October 27, 1938

FROM

Received 9:35 a.m.

ACTION CINCAF  
AMBASSADOR CHINA  
OPNAV  
INFO YANGTZE PATROL

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
DT

✓ Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 27 1938  
Department of State  
B  
file

793.94

0027. Occupation policing of city by Japs proceeding  
with no disorders Brits will continue police Sad three giving  
Japs access to bounding streets, other ex foreign concessions  
being taken over by Japs. Our landing force withdrawn except  
for watch at International Hospital and navy godown. All  
quiet at Standvac installation exchange official calls with  
Rear Admiral Kondo. 1540.

CSB

793.94/14207

F/FG

OCT 28 1938  
RECEIVED

5151

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.  
(br)

Hong Kong via N. R.

FROM

Dated October 27, 1938

Rec'd 4 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

18, October 27, 9 a.m.

With further reference to the Department's telegram of October 24, 7 p.m., Hong Kong English newspapers have since the start of the Japanese invasion of South China commented editorially their amazement and puzzlement over the unopposed Japanese advance and have, with the exception of the HONG KONG DAILY PRESS which is understood to have Chinese financing, been inclined to find an explanation in bribery or other factors uncomplimentary to Chinese self-esteem. As indicative of a possible change of thought and argument, which could be more inspired than sincere, there is quoted the following excerpt from an editorial in the usually quite independent CHINA MAIL of October 26: (GRAY) "Between the puzzling circumstances associated with the surrender of Canton last week and the decision yesterday to refuse battle for the Wuhan cities there are obvious parallels: so striking that

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
in confidence

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 27 1938

Department of State

793.94/14208

NOV 2 1938

F/FG

5152

-2- #18, October 27, 9 a.m., from Hong Kong via N. R.

that we may begin to wonder first judgments have not done a grave injustice to Kwangtung's military leaders. If it is fair to assume that the decision to abandon Hankow was based upon high policy and strategical considerations, it is not unreasonable to conjecture whether some of the reports which came through during the weekend, to the effect that General Yu Han Mou retired in direct obedience to orders from high command, did not, after all, contain more than a germ of truth. An objective study of China's military problems must confirm this much: that nothing is really changed by the fall of Canton or Hankow, Japan having once entered upon the invasion of South China." (END GRAY) It is <sup>our</sup> well considered opinion that Hong Kong Government policy favors press comment as favorable as possible to the Chinese.

Repeated to Canton, Chungking, Peiping.

SOUTHARD

KLP:CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Qualen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 18) of October 27, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hong Kong reads substantially as follows:

The editorial comments in the English newspapers of Hong Kong, since the beginning of the invasion of South China by the Japanese, have expressed great surprise and perplexity over the fact that the Japanese advanced without opposition. Except for the Hong Kong Daily Press which is said to be financed by Chinese, these newspapers have tried to find an explanation of this situation in circumstances uncomplimentary to Chinese self respect, including a charge of bribery. The Consul General, after considering the matter carefully, is of the opinion that it is the policy of the Government of Hong Kong to encourage newspaper comment as favorable as possible to the Chinese. As showing a possible change of argument and thought from that indicated above, the Consul General quotes from an editorial in the October 26 issue of the China Mail and remarks that this possible change could be less sincere than inspired. The excerpt from the China Mail which is usually entirely independent in its opinions is as follows: "Between the puzzling circumstances associated with the surrender of Canton last week and the decision yesterday to refuse battle for the Wuhan cities there

793.94/1428

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

there are obvious parallels: so striking that we may begin to wonder first judgments have not done a grave injustice to Kwangtung's military leaders. If it is fair to assume that the decision to abandon Hankow was based upon high policy and strategical considerations, it is not unreasonable to conjecture whether some of the reports which came through during the weekend, to the effect that General Yu Han Mou retired in direct obedience to orders from high command, did not, after all, contain more than a germ of truth. An objective study of China's military problems must confirm this much: that nothing is really changed by the fall of Canton or Hankow, Japan having once entered upon the invasion of South China."

793.94/14208.

*E.G.C.*  
FE:ECG:JPS  
10-28

*H.R.*  
FE *new*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone (BR)

FROM

HONG KONG VIA N.R.

Dated October 27, 1938

Received 6 a.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 27 1938

Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

in confidence DT

19, October 27, noon.

In the course of a confidential conversation with the  
British Commodore in command at Hong Kong he remarked to me  
that he did not think the British would permit the develop-  
ment on the Pearl River of another Yangtze situation as  
regards the use of the river for commercial traffic. His  
opinion is that after the Japanese at Canton have had "a few  
days to adjust themselves" adequate pressure will be brought  
to bear to open the Pearl River to at least limited commercial  
traffic. The British naval officer indicated is thought to be  
of sufficiently high rank to give his opinion some degree of  
authority.

Repeated to Canton, Chungking, Peiping.

EDA:DDM

SOUTHARD

OCT 29 1938

FILED

F/FG

793.94/14209



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 19) of October 27, 1938, from the American Consulate General at Hong Kong reads substantially as follows:

An officer of the British Navy (the British Commodore in command at Hong Kong), whose rank is believed to be sufficiently high to lend a certain amount of authority to his opinion, stated confidentially to the American Consul General that he did not believe a situation with regard to the use of the Pearl River for commercial traffic similar to the situation on the Yangtze would be allowed to develop by the British. This officer was of the opinion that, after they had had a little time to adjust themselves, the Japanese would be pressed to the point of allowing the opening of the Pearl River at least to the extent of limited commercial traffic.

793.94/14209.

89C.  
FE:EC:JPS  
10-27

JLP?  
FE  
NEW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated October 27, 1938

Rec'd 8:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1373, October 27, 3 p.m.

As instructed in Department's 591, October 26, 6 p.m.,

I have repeated to Tokyo in one message as my October 27,  
1 p.m., my October 22, 5 p.m., and my October 25, 6 p.m.,  
to Chungking.


Repeated to Chungking, Peiping and Hankow.

GAUSS

WVC:CSB

Foreign vessels at Hankow.

793.94/14186



793.94/14210

F/FG

OCT 28 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

**CONFIDENTIAL**

G-2  
KRM:AC

0-2/2657-E-439



October 21, 1938.

DCR



**MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:**

**Subject: Far Eastern Situation.**

1. Herewith are Summary and Situation Map covering events in China for the period October 15-21.
2. The important events for this period have been:
  - a. Unexpected and startling initial success of the Japanese expedition against Canton.
  - b. Steady progress of the Japanese operations against Hankow.
  - c. Growth of defeatism and discouragement in Chinese Government circles.
  - d. Commitment of the Japanese to a wide extension of the theater of war and of their communications unless China accepts defeat in the near future.

**E. E. W. McCART,**  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

2 encls.  
ml

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

*L. E. Hilpshman* May 3, 1974  
*Mar 19, 1973*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

793.94/14211


F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Chas. Inf. Sec. NARS, Date 12-18-75


~~RA~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0-2/2657-M-139



October 21, 1938.



MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. Herewith are Summary and Situation Map covering events in China for the period October 15-21.
2. The important events for this period have been:
  - a. Unexpected and startling initial success of the Japanese expedition against Canton.
  - b. Steady progress of the Japanese operations against Hankow.
  - c. Growth of defection and discouragement in Chinese Government circles.
  - d. Commitment of the Japanese to a wide extension of the theater of war and of their communications unless China accepts defeat in the near future.

793.94/1421

E. R. W. McCABE,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

2 encls.  
ml

RECEIVED

NOV 11 1962, S. 303 and 304 of (1)

NOV 11 1962, S. 303 and 304 of (1)

*Philipman*  
Mar 19 1973

F / FG 14211

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

C-2  
TJB

C-2 Digest of Information  
Sino-Japanese Situation  
October 18-31, 1938

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1971

NARS Date

*Mac 19*  
*173*

MISCELLANEOUS

On October 17 the resignation of Yosuke Matsuoka from the presidency of the South Manchurian Railway was announced. There is a distinct possibility that his appointment to the vacant post of Foreign Minister in the Japanese Cabinet impends. Matsuoka has had virtually parallel careers in the Japanese Foreign Service and with the South Manchurian Railroad, having alternated in various capacities between the two spheres of activity for some thirty years. Although educated in this country, he is reported to be an Americanophobe.

Press and diplomatic reports indicate the conclusion of an agreement in Tokyo between Kasehoukue and Poland which, while it does not give de jure recognition, involves a measure of recognition of the former country by the latter. It is obvious that this action implies Japanese-German cohesion and a conciliatory attitude toward Germany on the part of Poland.

NORTH CHINA FRONT

On its face the situation in North China has been unusually quiet. There have been no reports concerning any important guerrilla activities by the Chinese and no information has been forthcoming as to developments in the Wutaishan area in Shansi.

Six hundred Japanese troops moved through Chingwangtao on hospital trains toward Tientsin in the week ending October 16.

YANOTZK FRONT

The week was marked by considerable progress in the Japanese operations against Hankow.

Of the five columns involved, that operating against the Ping-Han Railway definitely secured Haiyang and turned south and southwest thereafter. It has made limited progress in the new direction and has not yet reached the watershed between the great Northern Plain and the Han-Yangtze river system.

The column advancing with Macheng as an intermediate objective is making slow progress in the Tuipeh Mountains, to the northeast of that town.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The forces operating along the Yangtze River have made important and significant progress. Those on the north bank have kept abreast of the advance on the south bank with apparently little effort. On the south bank, land and amphibious operations have registered an advance of approximately 18 miles culminating in the capture of a strong position at Shihhsuiyao on October 18. Combat is continuing to the west of Shihhsuiyao, with heavy Japanese pressure apparent.

The column operating in the Fu River valley succeeded in capturing Yangsin on the 18th or 19th. This seems to have resulted in a local collapse of Chinese resistance with the Japanese entering on a well-defined exploitation of their success. The Chinese have withdrawn in two directions, toward Tayeh to the northwest and toward Tungshan to the west. In the direction of Tayeh coordinated operations are now possible between this Japanese column and the forces along the Yangtze River.

Heavy fighting has continued in the vicinity of Teian, with possession of that town claimed by both sides. It is possible that the Japanese have embarked on a local offensive here to forestall possible Chinese attacks on their flank in the direction Manchang-Kiukiang.

Reports from Hankow indicate great discouragement in Government circles. Apparently the chief preoccupation of the military authorities is the security of the 48-mile stretch of the Canton-Hankow Railway which runs parallel to the front from Huchang to Hsienming. Elements of the Chinese general staff are reliably reported as leaving Hankow for Hengyang or Changsha. While there is no panic reported as yet from Hankow a considerable exodus of civilians is in progress. It is also reported that some 12,000 wounded Chinese soldiers are coming into Hankow each week and are being evacuated therefrom systematically.

CANTON FRONT

The Japanese landing at Bias Bay scored a smashing initial success. Composed in part at least of seasoned units, the Japanese forces were provided with adequate artillery support and plentiful motor vehicles and mechanization. They received strong support from what is probably the largest aerial concentration of the war. The aggregate strength of the landing force is estimated at 80,000.

No effective resistance was made to the landing in the 30-mile strip of terrain between the East River and the coast, and Waichow on that stream was captured on the 16th or 17th. The Chinese made no coordinated defense of the East River line, and once across, the Japanese turned sharply to the west down the axis of the Waichow-Canton road, along which they continued to make rapid progress. Not until they reached the vicinity of Sheklung did their advance slow down. Here they encountered an organized defensive position, said to run approximately

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

north along the watershed between the East and Pearl River basins. At present the Japanese forces are developing this position, extending their right flank toward Lungmen. This maneuver incidentally is a threat to the Canton-Hankow Railroad and imposes on the Chinese the necessity of defending alternate objectives -- the railway and the city of Canton.

In the meantime a Japanese column was directed toward the Canton-Kowloon Railroad from Bias Bay via Tamshui. Even before it reached its objective the line had been cut by aerial attack and by the Chinese themselves who destroyed several bridges. Naval craft and landing parties also demonstrated against the east shore of the Pearl River estuary, but there are no indications of determined landings in that region. Press reports refer to the arrival in the Canton area of some 60 Japanese naval coastal motor boats. Logical uses for these craft would be the patrol of the tangled waterways of the Pearl River delta, the control of boat traffic in its waterways and the support of military operations on its islands.

Chinese forces estimated to number 120,000 now stand between the Japanese and Canton. How strong a resistance they can offer is at present problematical. A number of reasons may be suggested for the success of the initial Japanese attack: the devastating and unexpectedly violent nature of the attacks from the air, local incompetence and carelessness, the poor quality of the Cantonese troops and perhaps treachery in high quarters. The strength of the defense which may be expected in the future is thus problematical; it is possible quickly to inure troops to aerial attack and incompetent leaders can be replaced, but if the Cantonese divisions are far below Chinese standards of combat efficiency or if there is treason in the high command, a Japanese walkover is well within the realm of possibility.

American consular officials at Hankow and Canton have entered into negotiations with appropriate Japanese officials with a view to establishing safety zones in each city for American citizens in the event military operations render the provision of such zones desirable.

The interruption of the Canton-Kowloon Railway isolated in Hongkong munitions stocks of an estimated value of \$2,500,000. It is reported that the Chinese procurement agency in Hongkong is moving to Rangoon with a view to utilizing the Burma-Talifu-Yunnanfu route. Efforts may also be expected to ship munitions into China via Indo-China and Kwangsi or Yunnan, but it is obvious that such shipments will be complicated and precarious. However, it is estimated that reserve stockpiles already in China are sufficient to continue fighting on the present scale for about four months. Thus the anticipated capture of Canton, like the equally expected fall of Hankow, need have no immediate effect on Chinese resistance. If it flags in the near future, its weakening properly should be ascribed to losses in moral values, either wide popular discouragement or the undermining of Chiang Kai-shek's regime.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

It appears certain that the Canton expedition has committed the Japanese to a far flung extension of the theatre of operations and lines of communication unless the force of their impending blows is sufficient to bring about China's surrender.

SUPPLEMENTARY

An unconfirmed but circumstantial press dispatch which may be premature reports the fall of Canton and the entry of the Japanese Army into that city at 2:30 p.m., October 21. The dispatch indicates that no effective Chinese resistance was encountered in the prepared defenses of Canton. The U.S.S. Mindanao at Canton has not yet confirmed this report.

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-4-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



Hyde Park, N. Y.,  
October 17, 1938.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

October 25 1938

The enclosed was given  
me by Mr. Chen. Would you be  
good enough to prepare reply to  
Mr. Kung?



793.94/14212

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY:REK *b*

8153

THE EXECUTIVE YUAN

PERSONAL

Chungking, China.  
August 30, 1938

Dear Mr. President:

As Mr. K. P. Chen, Adviser of the Ministry of Finance, is coming to your country, I am pleased to take this opportunity to convey to you through him my best wishes and sincere greetings. I recall the great kindness you extended to me during my sojourn in Washington last year, and enjoyed the luncheon and talk with you.

On Mr. Chen's departure for America, we recall with renewed appreciation the kind reception which you extended to him and his colleagues during their monetary mission to Washington in 1936 and particularly the friendly cooperation of your Government which made his mission a success.

Mr. Chen is now coming to America on another mission. Your friendship towards our Government justifies my hope that Mr. Chen's mission will again receive the ready assistance of your Government.

Ever since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese hostilities, you and your Government and people have shown unmistakable signs of friendship towards China. Your sympathy and moral support of our national cause and the humanitarian services which your nation has rendered in the relief of our war refugees have won the deep gratitude of our Government and people. The timely and courageous utterances you have made in the interest of peace and justice, particularly, not only represent America's traditional policy in the Far East but ring through the world like clarion calls warning all peace-loving and democratic peoples against the grave dangers of the forces of aggression and lawlessness. Indeed, they symbolize America's moral leadership in world affairs, so ably strengthened by your statesmanship.

Much as we regret the interruptions to our financial and economic development that have been caused by Japan's armed aggression, we are nevertheless resolutely and courageously

President Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.,  
U. S. A.

NOV 1 1938  
F/EG

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- 2 -

5154

facing the urgent problems that confront us in the present crisis. I need hardly say that the continued friendship and assistance of America will not only be helpful in the successful prosecution of our war against Japan's aggression but will be even more valuable when we come to tackle the greater problems that will arise at the end of the hostilities. I have every confidence that, under your illustrious leadership, our two nations will cooperate closer than ever in protecting our common ideals of peace and democracy in the Pacific and in promoting your noble policy of "Good Neighborhood."

I am, Mr. President,

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) H. H. KUNG

H. H. Kung.

October 25 1938.

My dear Mr. President:

In response to the request made in your memorandum of October 17, there is enclosed for your consideration a draft of a letter which you may care to send to His Excellency, Dr. H. H. Kung, President of the Executive Yuan and concurrently Minister of Finance of China, in reply to his letter of August 30, 1938, conveyed to you by Mr. K. P. Chen, Adviser of the Chinese Ministry of Finance.

If you approve the draft letter, I would suggest that upon signature the letter be returned to this Department for forwarding to Dr. Kung through the Chinese Ambassador here.

Dr. Kung's letter is returned to you herewith.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. From His Excellency  
Dr. H. H. Kung,  
August 30, 1938.
2. To His Excellency  
Dr. H. H. Kung. (Draft).

The President,

The White House.

FE:ASC:REK  
10/24/38

FE  
m/d.

PAH  
HES

793.94/14212

OCT 24 1938 PM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5155

My dear Dr. Kung:

Mr. K. P. Chen has kindly delivered to me your letter of August 30 in which you inform me of the nature of his visit to this country and thoughtfully avail yourself of the occasion to convey cordial personal greetings to me. I recall with pleasure the call which you made upon me last year and appreciate very much your friendly message.

Since his arrival, Mr. Chen has been engaged in discussions with the Treasury Department and I am sure that the matters brought forward by him are receiving most careful and sympathetic consideration.

Your expression of gratitude for the humanitarian services which the American people have rendered Chinese who have suffered as a result of the unfortunate conflict in China is appreciated as are also your generous comments concerning our efforts to contribute toward the attainment of international peace. It is my hope and firm conviction that the friendly and mutually beneficial relations which have always existed between China and the United States will through cooperative endeavor continue to develop in strength.

With kind regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

His Excellency

Dr. H. H. Kung,  
President, The Executive Yuan,  
Chungking, China.

OCT 24 1938 PM

FE:ASC:REK  
10/24/38

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

October 24, 1938.

FE.  
Mr. ~~Hamilton~~:

I would recommend leaving  
off entirely the last paragraph  
of the proposed letter to Dr.  
Kung. If that recommendation is  
not acceptable, I would strongly  
recommend and urge that the last  
sentence be left off.

  
Stanley K. Hornbeck

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

*f*  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

My dear Dr. Kung:

Mr. K. P. Chen has kindly delivered to me your letter of August 30 in which you inform me of the nature of his visit to this country and thoughtfully avail yourself of the occasion to convey cordial personal greetings to me. I recall with pleasure the call which you made upon me last year and appreciate very much your friendly message.

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Your expression of gratitude for the humanitarian services which the American people have rendered Chinese who have suffered as a result of the unfortunate conflict in China is appreciated as are also your generous comments concerning our efforts to contribute toward the attainment of international peace. It is my hope and firm conviction that the friendly and mutually beneficial relations which have always existed between China and the United States will through cooperative endeavor continue to develop in strength. We are devoting constant and solicitous attention to the study of the situation in the Far East and I can assure you that the American Government will continue steadfastly to promote the principles of the Good Neighbor Policy as the basis of international relations.

With kind regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

His Excellency  
Dr. H. H. Kung,  
President, The Executive Yuan,  
Chungking, China.



5156

REB

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

A portion of  
this telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (br)

FROM CANTON VIA N.R.

Dated October 26, 1938

Rec'd 12:25 p. m. 27th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*alphanumeric*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in conference*

*✓*  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 27 1938  
Department of State  
*en*

743.94  
20, October 26, 5 p. m.

(GRAY) Fires are still burning in various sections of  
Canton particularly in the area around Silk Street and  
Blackwood Street, back of the French hospital, Y. M. C. A.  
and in several places on Honam Island. (END GRAY)

The Japanese have very few soldiers in Canton as yet,  
probably only one regiment and are making little attempt  
to patrol whole city and practically no attempt to put *out*  
fires ~~or~~ or stop looting. Last night they took over  
from British and French naval units the Shaker bund district  
and are today patrolling that. Observers report looting in  
that area greatly increased since Japanese took charge.  
Americans in Tungshan report that Japanese soldiers with  
Chinese coolies to carry burdens are systematically break-  
ing into houses in that part of the city and carrying off  
loot in carts and motor trucks.

It NOV 1 1938  
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793.94/14213

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REB

2-#20, From Canton, Oct. 26, 5p.m.

It is reported that there are many cases of rape by Japanese soldiers in the villages south of Canton and many women and girls are fleeing from those villages.

A few Chinese have been shot by Japanese soldiers for refusing to carry burdens and for not coming to shore in their boats when signalled.

(GRAY) The Japanese have sent a notice to Shameen that no cameras will be allowed to be used in the city after tomorrow morning and that foreigners should not go into the city before 7 a. m. and after 5 p. m./

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong. (END GRAY)

LINNELL

RGC

KLP

~~(//) Apparent omission~~

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 20) of October 26, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

As yet there is probably no more than one regiment of Japanese soldiers in Canton. They are making little effort to patrol the entire city and almost no effort to stop looting or to put out the fires which are still burning in various parts of Canton, especially in the area around Silk Street and Blackwood Street, back of the French Hospital, Y.M.C.A., and in several places on Honam Island. The Japanese are now patrolling the Shakes bund district which they took over from the French and British naval units on the night of October 25. Since they took charge of this area, looting there is said to have increased greatly. According to reports received from Americans in Tungshan, Japanese soldiers, accompanied by Chinese coolies to carry loads, are systematically breaking into houses in the Tungshan area and taking loot away in motor trucks and carts. Japanese soldiers have shot a few Chinese because they did not come ashore in their boats when signaled or because they refused to carry loads. Many girls and women are fleeing from the villages south of Canton where many cases of rape by Japanese soldiers have been reported.

The

793.94/14213

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

The Japanese have sent a notice to Shamsen that  
no cameras will be allowed to be used in the city after  
tomorrow morning and that foreigners should not go into  
the city before 7 a.m. and after 5 p.m.

793.94/14213.

298.  
FE:EC:JPS  
10-28

MRP.  
FE  
RUM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

5158

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

GRAY

PEIPING VIA N.R.

Dated October 27, 1938

Received 3:20 p.m.


FROM

Secretary of State  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
D

640, October 27, 1 p.m.  
14068

Embassy's 620, October 13, 1 p.m.



793.94

One. The Japanese claim to be completing a "mopping up" campaign in Shansi. Their claim to have again captured Yuanchu, is not contradicted. Their claim that, following the capture October 2 of Wutai town, North Shansi, the mountain of that name was captured about two weeks later and the Eighth Route Army headquarters in that vicinity was driven away with a loss to the Chinese of considerable amounts of ammunition and supplies appeared true.

Two. The Japanese forces in South Shansi have not yet, according to their latest statements, been able to effect a crossing of the Yellow River into Northern Honan or Eastern Shensi, although they have made repeated attempts since early September. Now that Canton and Hankow have fallen, and the route from Soviet Russia via Sinkiang and Sian, Shensi, is one of the few remaining channels of supplies for the National

Government

793.94/14214

FILED

F/FG

OCT 29 1938

u

5159

EDA - 2 - #640, October 27, 1 p.m. from Peiping

Government and the Chinese Communist forces, observers here generally expect that the Japanese will shortly make increased efforts to effect a crossing and drive against Sian.

Three. Repeated to Chungking. By mail to Shanghai, Tokyo.

LOCKHART

KLP:RGC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HRE

GRAY

5160

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HANKOW VIA N. R.

Dated October 27, 1938

FROM Rec'd 5:25 p.m.


Secretary of State

Washington

23

October 27, 7 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND V.I.D.



*WB  
11/1/38  
793.9  
with  
893.102 Hankow*

At a conference this morning between British and Japanese authorities it was agreed that British navy assisted by foreign volunteers and Chinese police would continue to police former British Concession except Bund to be policed by Japanese military representative. Japanese soldiers are forbidden to enter former British Concession. These measures to continue until arrival of adequate Japanese military police.

Japanese have evicted refugees from godowns, et cetera, in the former German Concession and have demanded that refugees be removed to the Chinese city.

Looting by Chinese reported from native city. Japanese soldiers are commandeering whatever they please from Chinese in ex-German Concession and probably in native city.

A so-called all Hupeh self-protection corps was yesterday established presumably to assume puppet government functions. The head of this organization is Hu Tsung Chun who claims to be a former divisional commander under Wu Pei Fu. He stated that he arrived Hankow one month ago.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Shanghai.

JOSSELYN

NPL:EMB

793.94/14215

0000000000

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*a*  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 24, 1938.

The Secretary suggested  
yesterday that we might care  
to consider the sending of a  
telegram along these lines.

*m. m. l.*

793.94/14 2/5A

FE:MMH:EJL



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

5161

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge

Charge

Charge

\$

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
✓ CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

A-1

Washington,

October 22, 1938.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan), via SHANGHAI.

INFO: AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING (China).

CONFIDENTIAL.

I should appreciate your estimate and that of Ambassador Johnson as to the question of the bearing of the Munich agreement and its aftermath upon the Japanese decision to invade south China and upon manifestation by the Japanese of an increasingly truculent attitude. As indicative of such attitude reference is made inter alia (a) to recent communications from the Japanese evidencing an intention to close the Yangtze and the Pearl Rivers to all shipping until Japanese interests have been served and (b) to press reports from Tokyo that the Yomiuri carried in its issue of October 23 a five-column advertisement by the Shiunso, a reactionary organization, appealing to the Japanese people to rise and QUOTE be prepared to chastise the British UNQUOTE. Please give outline of the reasoning upon which your estimate is based.

793.94/14215A

F/FC

OCT 25 1938.

FE:MMH:EJL

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

19

D. C. R.-No. 50


1-1482 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

October 24, 1938.

*Del. to Tokyo*



## Japanese Urged To Be Ready to Chastise British

Reactionary Group Places  
'Ad' Assailing Assistance  
by Britain to Chinese,  
and Demanding a Halt

By Wireless to the Herald Tribune  
Copyright, 1938, New York Tribune Inc.

TOKIO, Oct. 23.—An appeal to the Japanese people to rise and "be prepared to chastise the British" and put a stop to alleged British assistance to the Chinese central government was contained in a five-column advertisement by the Shiunso, a reactionary organization, in today's "Yomiuri."

"Now is the time for the Japanese people to come to a definite determination with regard to Great Britain," the statement read. "It is necessary for Japanese to come to know the real power of Japan and the reasons why they need no longer be afraid of Great Britain."

The appeal said the British fleet during the Ethiopian war was "less of a menace to Italy than a scare-

crow" and that in the recent Czechoslovak crisis Britain shrank from using force because she was not strong enough. "Britain cannot spare its fighting forces exclusively for the Orient," it added.

Charging that Britain had "consistently led world opinion against Japan in support of China," the advertisement warned that such a power, "which Japan regards as its enemy and has shown its anti-Japanese attitude must be prepared to abandon its vested rights and interests in China." "It is only too clear," it said, "that Japan cannot be in the position of respecting the rights and interests of such a power." After boasting of the strength of the Japanese army and navy and the country's economic resources, the Shiunso statement said: "If the Japanese people should unite under the august virtue of the Emperor and rise to the occasion with indomitable courage and determination, what nation, Britain or any other, could hope to check the just and righteous course of Japan's action? If Britain assumes too unbearable an attitude, the Japanese people should be prepared to chastise the British."

993.94/142154

5162

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

CORRECTED COPY  
FROM


This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (A)

CHUNGKING VIA N.R.

Dated October 27, 1938

Rec'd 1:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



515, October 27, 11 a. m.

Department's 360, October 25, noon, to Tokyo.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

It is my opinion that the Munich agreement came as a surprise to the Japanese who had long planned an invasion of South China for the purpose of putting an end to the stream of munitions that was flowing into China through Hong Kong and Canton. I do not believe that it precipitated that decision although Chinese reliance upon an assumed Japanese unwillingness to affront British at Hong Kong contributed doubtless to their failure to prepare for such an invasion and contributed to ease which attended Japanese military advance. Nor do I feel that Munich agreement has necessarily contributed to increasing truculency on the part of Japanese since this has existed from the first. A review of Japanese military activities since beginning of hostilities will I think justify one in believing

793.94/14216

FILED

OCT 1 - 1938

5163

REB

2-#515, From Chungking, Oct. 27, 11am

believing that invasion of mainland is outward manifestation of a revolt in Japan which has almost succeeded in placing the Japanese military in control of the Government or at least that part of government which functions in regard to China and the mainland. Resignation of Ugaki over proposed creation of China Bureau independent of Foreign Office and therefore presaging the establishment of Government for China independent of Japanese relations with other nations and whole set of treaties regulating those relations is measure of success of this revolt. Army's attitude from the beginning has been consistently opposed to existence of national government in China and continuance of third power rights, interest and influence in China. Japanese military have successfully prevented shipment of American owned goods caught by hostilities on the Yangtze between Nanking and Kiukiang (wood oil belonging to Werner G. Smith), Japanese prevented MONOCACY proceeding Kiukiang to Shanghai, arguing that this barrier was prize of war (see message 0019-0004 OAHU to Commander-in-Chief of August 19). Recent communication regarding Yangtze and Pearl Rivers was consistent with this earlier pronouncement which was addressed to the American Government concerning the movements of one of its national ships. Japanese army in  
China

5164

REB

3-#515, From Chungking, Oct. 27, 11a.m.

China and its leaders in Japan have not from the first, had any regard for treaties between Japan and other powers or between China and third powers and by setting up in Japan an independent bureau to deal with China affairs and governments in China subordinate to Japanese army control have consigned such questions to that other Government of Japan with which we have ordinary contact only through such recognized channels as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Munich agreement was I have no doubt greeted by Japanese military party with relief as an indication that at least from Great Britain and France it would meet with little or no opposition, but it did not give rise to this policy.

Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo. Repeated to Shanghai.

JOHNSON

CSB

*b*  
*Corrected Copy*  
*MR. HORNBECK*  
*OCT 31 1938*  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM

Chungking via N. R.

Dated October 27, 1938

Rec'd 1:20 p.m.

*SECRET*  
*OCT 28 1938*  
*NOTED*

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

515, October 27, 11 a.m.

Department's 360, October 25, noon to Tokyo.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

It is my opinion that the Munich agreement came as a surprise to the Japanese who had long planned an invasion of South China for the purpose of putting an end to the stream of munitions that was flowing into China through Hong Kong and Canton. I do not believe that it precipitated that decision although Chinese reliance upon an assumed Japanese unwillingness to affront British at Hong Kong contributed doubtless to their failure to prepare for such an invasion and contributed to ease which attended Japanese military advance. Nor do I feel that Munich agreement has necessarily contributed to increasing truculency on the part of Japanese since this has existed from the first. A review of Japanese military activities since beginning of hostilities will I think justify one in believing that invasion of mainland is outward manifestation

*PAH*  
*FE*  
*14215a*  
**UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE**  
*OCT 29 1938*  
*MR. WELLES*

793.94/14216

**FILED**

OCT 1 1938

**F/FG**

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #515, October 27, 11 a.m., from Chungking via N. B.

manifestation of a revolt in Japan which has almost succeeded in placing the Japanese military in control of the Government or at least that part of government which functions in regard to China and the mainland. Resignation of Ugaki over proposed creation of China Bureau independent of Foreign Office and therefore presaging the establishment of Government for China independent of Japanese relations with other nations. Whole set of treaties beside each those relations (?) measure of temperate this revolt. Army attitude from the beginning has been notorious opposed to existence of funds (?) in China and last seen third power rights (?) and influence in China. (?) military have successfully prevented shipment of American owned goods caught by hostilities on the Yangtze between the authority of (?) Kinkiang (butterwick oil belonging to Werner G. Smith), Japanese prevented (?) proceeding Kinkiang to (?) (?) (?) barrier was prize of war (see message 0019-0004 Oahu to Commander-in-Chief of August 19 (?)). Recent communication regarding Yangtze and (?) earliest possible was consistent with this earlier pronouncement which was addressed to the American Government concerning (?) one of its national ships. Japanese army in China and its leaders in Japan have not (?) had any regard for  
treaties

-3- #515, October 27, 11 a.m., from Chungking via N. R.

treaties between Japan and other powers or between (?)  
and third powers and by setting up in (?) an  
independent bureau to deal with (?) affairs and governments  
in China subordinate to Japanese army control (?)  
consigned such questions to that other Government of  
Japan with which we have ordinary overwhelmed only  
through such recognized (?) as the Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs. Munich (?) (?) I have no doubt (?) by  
Japanese military party with relief as an indication  
that at least from Great Britain and France it would  
confident of little or no opposition, but it did not  
give rise to this policy.

Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo. Repeated to  
Shanghai.

JOHNSON

CSB



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Dunster NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA gpo

FROM

COMYANGPAT

October 28, 1938

Received 7 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.L. AND M.I.D.

Action: CINCAF  
Opnav  
Info: YANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA



743.94

0528. Japanese posting notices on foreign property  
in ex-foreign concessions forbidding entry Japanese troops.  
Chinese owned building being assigned for billeting. LUZON  
moved to former berth N D L pontoon at noon airfield west  
city reconditioned and being used bombing and other air  
activities. 1240.

DDM

793.94/14217

FILED  
OCT 31 1938

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA apo

FROM

COMSOPAT

October 28, 1938

Received 7:30 a.m.

ACTION CINCAF  
OPNAV  
INFO

RUSNOS  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS ASHEVILLE  
USS SACRAMENTO  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
USS TULSA  
COMDESDIV FIFTEEN  
FOURTH MARINES  
ALUSNA PEIPING

COPIES SENT TO  
GEN. L. AND ALD.

✓  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 28 1938  
Department of State

0027. Canton quiet, general situation improved.

2300.

DDM

793.94/14218

F/FG

FILED  
OCT 31 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

FROM

COMYANGPAT

October 28, 1938

Received 7:30 a.m.

ACTION CINCAF  
OPNAV  
INFO AMAMBASSADOR CHINA

0028. Incident involving our landing force and Japanese troops as reported by United Press was not at all serious caused by misunderstanding and language difficulties negotiations perfectly amicable matter adjusted to mutual satisfaction on arrival senior officers with interpreters. 1305.

DDM

793.94  
note  
811.30 AF  
893.0146

OCT 31 1938

FILED

793.94/14219

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

a  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 1, 1938.

It is doubted whether any useful purpose would be served by taking up the subject matter of Hankow's 24, October 28, 9 a.m., with the Japanese authorities, for any representations would undoubtedly be met by denial that the Japanese Army spokesman at Hankow had ever made the statement quoted. The telegram under reference has been repeated to Tokyo and if Mr. Grew feels that it would be useful for him to approach the Foreign Office he will probably do so without express instruction from the Department.

793.94/14320  
00011/46.86L

*Jim*  
FE:Ballantine:HES

*M.M.H*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5165

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be \_\_\_\_\_ Hankow via N. R.  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (br)

FROM

Dated October 28, 1938

Rec'd 10:29 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence*

*file eu B*  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 28 1938  
*m*

24, October 28, 9 a.m.

Robert Horiguchi, press liaison officer for the  
Japanese army, denied last evening in conversation with  
a member of my staff the local rumor that Kuling has  
been occupied by the Japanese.

He remarked that blockading the people on Kuling  
was "as good a method of killing them off as any  
other." When asked whether he meant the Chinese or  
the missionaries, he replied "both". Questioned as  
to the basis of the animosity against missionaries he  
answered "they report bombing adjacent to their  
property as being directed at them and they maintain  
schools which teach anti-Japanese propaganda. This  
however does not apply to the Catholics."

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Shanghai. Shanghai  
please repeat to Tokyo.

RR:RGC

JOSELYN

793.94/14220

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

C  
CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 24) of October 28, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

There is a report current in Hankow to the effect that the Japanese have occupied Kuling. During the course of a conversation on October 27 with a member of the staff of the American Consulate General the Japanese Army press liaison officer (Robert Horiguchi) denied this report. He said that as good a way as any of killing off the people of Kuling was to blockade them and, in reply to an inquiry, he said that he meant both the missionaries and the Chinese. In reply to a further inquiry as to the reason for his dislike of the missionaries, he said that the missionaries, with the exception of the Catholics, conduct schools which teach propaganda against the Japanese and they report that bombing next to their property is directed at them.

793.94/14220.

29C.  
FE:ECJ:JPS  
10-29

HCP  
FE  
run

793.94/14220

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

166

EDA

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone (BR)

CANTON VIA N.R.

FROM Dated October 26, 1938


Received 6 a.m., 28th

Secretary of State

Washington

19, October 26, 11 a.m.

Department's October 24, 7 p.m.



There are persistent rumors that the Japanese troops were able to get through to Canton in the short time it took them to do so by reason of the treachery of some commanders of sections of the Chinese army who did not place their forces as ordered or did not make as strong a defense of their positions as they might have done. Chinese officers attached to headquarters admitted to me that several such officers were shot by order of General Yu Han Mou during the fighting around Tamshin and Waichow.

In my opinion a large factor in the defeat was the terrific bombardment of the Chinese troops, heavy artillery, bombardment from the air and machine gunning from armored tanks all at the same time. It appears that most of the Kwangtung troops had had little or no experience under fire and that their leadership was weak. I talked with the major in command of a Chinese battalion which was on October 20 attacked by airplanes and tanks simultaneously about 20 miles from Canton. He says the battalion was almost

793.94/14221

F/FG

NOV 8 1938  
RECEIVED

5167

EDA - 2 - #19, October 26, 11 a.m. from Canton

almost completely wiped out in a short time and the  
remnants scattered throughout the countryside the <sup>tanks</sup> ~~unit~~  
unit involved came in Canton the next day <sup>as reported in my telegram</sup> ~~the next day~~ October  
21, 6 p.m. Only a few troops have as yet come to  
Canton, <sup>Lieutenant General Kurihiko is still in</sup> the commanding officer ~~is in~~ Tseng  
Cheng. no news has reached Canton as to present disposition  
of either Chinese or Japanese troops but it is believed  
that the former have fallen back across Canton Hankow  
railway and gone toward northern Kwangtung.

The manner in which Canton was evacuated en masse in  
about twenty-four hours together with statements made this  
office by Chinese leads me to believe that this evacuation  
was decided upon some time before as a policy to be  
carried out if the Japanese came near the city and un-  
doubtedly the police went from house to house telling  
all the people that they must get out at once as the  
town would be blown up and burned by the Chinese.

10/12/38  
There is no indication whatever that the higher  
Chinese officials civil or military <sup>went</sup> ~~are~~ out: on the  
contrary all indications are that they are loyal to  
China and ordered scorched earth policy to be carried  
out on Canton to prevent the Japanese from getting any  
good out of their occupation of city. Repeated to  
Chungking.

LINNELL

CSB



Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 19) of October 26, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

Although no news has come to Canton with regard to the present location either of Japanese or Chinese troops it is thought that the latter have retreated across the Canton-Hankow Railway and proceeded in the direction of northern Kwangtung Province.

An important reason for the defeat of the Chinese in South China was, in the opinion of the Consul General, the terrific bombardment to which the Chinese troops were subjected from various sources at the same time - bombardment from the air, machine-gunning from armored tanks, and heavy artillery fire. Apparently the majority of the troops from Kwangtung was under weak leadership and had had practically no experience under fire. The major commanding a Chinese battalion which was attacked by tanks and airplanes at the same time about twenty miles from Canton on October 20 told the American Consul General that in a short time his battalion was almost entirely destroyed. Those remaining were scattered about through the country. The next day (October 21) the tanks involved arrived in Canton (see the Consul General's telegram of October 21, 6 p.m.). Lieutenant General

793.94/14221

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

General Furusho, Japanese Commanding Officer, is still in Tseng Cheng and as yet only a small number of troops have arrived in Canton.

The Consul General is of the opinion that the evacuation of Canton had been decided upon for some time as a policy to be followed if the Japanese came near Canton. He is led to this belief by statements made to the Consulate General by Chinese and by the way in which the city was evacuated en masse in a period of about twenty-four hours. The police undoubtedly informed the populace by means of house to house calls that the city would be burned and blown up by Chinese and that they must leave at once. Not only is there nothing to show that the higher Chinese military or civil officials (sold?) out but everything points to their loyalty to their country and everything indicates that they gave orders for the scorched earth policy to be followed in Canton in order to prevent the city from being of any good to the Japanese. Reports persist to the effect that treachery of some commanders of sections of the Chinese army was responsible for the rapidity with which the Japanese got through to Canton. This treachery took the form of failure on the part of the Chinese commanders to defend their positions as strongly as they might have or to place their troops in the positions in which they were ordered to place

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quateman NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

CONFIDENTIAL

place them. By order of General Yu Han-mou several such commanders were shot during the fighting around Waichow and Tamshui, according to information received by the Consul General from Chinese officers connected with headquarters.

793.94/14221.

egc.  
FE:EGG:JPS  
11-2

HKP  
FE  
RMW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Canton/127 FOR Despatch #109 to Embassy, Chungking.

FROM Canton ( Linnell ) DATED Sept. 12, 1938.  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations: Report concerning-, for month  
of August in Canton Consular district.

aa

793.94/14222

14222

793.94  
4-1  
12-13

B. Relations with Japan.

1. JAPANESE AIR RAIDS ON South China:

After a lapse of one week at the end of July, Japanese air raids were again renewed on August 3rd and were carried on intensively throughout the rest of the month. The main force of the attacks was again directed at the Canton-Hankow and Canton-Kowloon railways and by concentrated and constant bombing the attacks at last succeeded in attaining one of their objectives in disrupting the service on the Canton-Hankow line from August 11th to 29th. Raids, however, were also made on the

principal

- 5 -

principal villages along the railways, on the highways, on the center and suburbs of Canton and on Wushow, Kwangai. The central part of Canton city was subjected to two days of ruthless bombing on August 8th and 9th while Wushow was also raided several times during the month.

On August 29th Japanese raiding planes were attacked by sixteen Chinese fighting planes at Haamhung, northern Kwangtung, and five of the former were shot down while the Chinese reported two of their planes were lost.

#### 2. Raids on the Railway Lines\*

The air raids along the Canton-Hankow and Canton-Kowloon railways were perhaps the most intensive that have been staged on those lines during the hostilities. While still continuing bombing along the Canton-Hankow line and at the principal stations and villages from Canton to Lokohong, a concentration of attack was made on Ngan Chuan Lau, Yuen Tan and Pakanghow, places from 40 to 55 miles north of Canton, where the bridges were damaged on and after August 11th and where by constant bombing the Japanese were able to keep the line from being repaired, so that through service could be resumed, until August 29th. As many as fifty planes often in two or three flights a day raided these places. Wongsha station in Canton was bombed on two days with some rolling stock destroyed. On the Canton-Kowloon line almost daily raids were made and during one week over 100 bombs were dropped along the line. But the line was kept open by quick repairs to the tracks.

#### 3. Attack

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\*See Telegrams of August 15, 2 p.m., August 17, 3 p.m., August 24, 3 p.m., August 31, 3 p.m.

- 6 -

### 3. Attack on Canton on 8th and 9th\*

On the afternoon of August 8th, 18 Japanese bombers flew directly over Canton and loosed some 30 bombs which cut a swath of destruction across the center of the city. The objectives may have been the electric light plant, the Pearl River bridge and the government center but none of these was hit. Two bombs exploded in the French Cathedral Compound killing 80 people and wounding 100 others. The bombs did not hit the Cathedral itself but damaged buildings alongside and destroyed many windows in the Cathedral. The French Consul General estimated the damage done to this property at 480,000 Hong Kong currency. Bombs also fell besides the church of the American Cumberland Mission causing damage to it beyond that done during the bombing of May 28th. Approximately one hundred buildings in the city were destroyed, including the demolishing of two interior blocks of buildings composing the fish market.

On August 9th another raid was made on the center of the city and bombs were dropped near the Pearl River bridge and about one-half mile north of Shamsen, demolishing many houses and killing many people.

The official figures for the casualties in Canton for these two days are 296 killed and 397 injured.

On August 10th and on several subsequent occasions the suburbs of Canton, particularly the industrial suburb, Saichuen, were bombed but without material damage.

### 4. Statistics

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\*See telegrams of August 9, 3 p.m. and August 12, 5 p.m.

- 7 -

**4. Statistics of the Air Raids on Kwangtung during August:**

The following statistics of the air raids on Kwangtung during August were published by a semi-official organ of the Kwangtung Government:

Number of raids .....	55
" " planes .....	870
" " bombs dropped .....	1,306
" " buildings destroyed .....	895
" " deaths .....	380
" " wounded .....	547

**5. Air Raids on Nuchow, Kwangsi:**

On August 11th and again on August 25th Japanese bombers raided Nuchow, Kwangsi. It is reported that on the first date damage was done to buildings of the Sulphuric Acid Plant but the factory itself was not hit and on the second date the Kwangsi University was heavily bombed with a number of its buildings damaged or destroyed and some 30 people killed, while other places in the city also were bombed.

**6. Japanese Naval Activities along the Kwangtung Coast:**

On some fifteen occasions during the month Japanese naval units shelled and attacked with small landing parties the Kwangtung coast. The main points attacked were the Chungshan district near Macao, Toishan District, west of the Pearl River delta, and in the neighborhood of the Bocca Tigris Ports. Apparently the reasons for these attacks were to test the Chinese defence and harass the local populace. Between 20 and 30 Japanese warships are supposed to have been patrolling the Kwangtung coast during the month.

**7. Japanese Aeroplanes Base Off Kwangtung Coast:**

The aeroplanes that have been attacking Kwangtung have been in a large part landplanes and reliable reports are to the effect that permanent land bases have now been completed at San Cho Island and Wang Shan (or Ladrone) Islands, off the mouth of the Pearl River, from one or both of which the

planes



- 12 -

4. War Preparations in South China:

War preparations and military training were continued unabated during the month in Kwangtung and Kwangsi. Neither province, it is understood, sent new contingents of troops to the front in Central China except for replacements for their divisions there.

(a) Conference of General Yu Han Mou with the Generalissimo:

At the end of the month General Yu Han Mou returned to Canton from Hankow where he had conferred with General Chiang Kai-shek concerning the situation in South China. General Yu expressed his conviction that Hankow would be successfully defended and also stated that a Chinese air force is stationed within a short distance from Kwangtung which can help to defend the railways from attack. It is said to be this force that brought down the five Japanese planes at Nanchung.

(b) Furtherance of Measures for Effective General Conscription:

Further measures have been taken by the provincial authorities to obtain effective general conscription in Kwangtung among which are the setting up of conscription offices in all the districts. However, much still remains to be done toward this end and Kwangtung is still far behind Kwangsi, where conscription is effectively enforced with one out of every ten men on call. Sons of rich families in Kwangtung may be exempted from conscription by the payment of \$100 National currency which gives them exemption for one year.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Qualen NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Nanking via N, R.

Dated October 28, 1938

Rec'd 1:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

172, October 28, 10 a.m.

As of possible interest, Consul General Hanawa

and Vice Consul Kasuya of Japanese Consulate General  
here flew to Kiukiang two days ago reportedly to join  
Japanese forces in formal entry into Hankow. Consul  
Tanaka left same day by steamer with archives of  
former Consulate General at Hankow. All three speak  
some English, Kasuya being most fluent.

Sent to Hankow, Peiping and Shanghai.

SMYTH

CSB

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
DT

RECEIVED  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 28 1938  
Department of State  
13

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NOV 1 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMYANGPAT

FROM October 28, 1938

Rec'd 1:20 p.m.


ACTION: CINCAF

INFO: YANGPAT  
FOURTH MARINES

PASSED BY CINCAF TO OPNAV FOR INFO.

0527. Japanese ships present Hankow three  
destroyers three minelayer fire river gunboats  
four torpedoboats two minesweepers two auxiliaries  
ten transports four tugs three hundred eleven launches  
and small craft. 2242.

CSB



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NOV 1 1938

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Qualen NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMYANGPAT

FROM October 28, 1938

Rec'd 3 p.m.

ACTION: CINCAF

INFO: YANGTZE PATROL  
FOURTH MARINES

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
D-1

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 29 1938  
Department of State

0028. All British landing force will be withdrawn  
Saturday forenoon turning over policing Sad three to Japs.  
City quiet orderly. 2019.

CSB

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

A portion of  
this telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (C)

FROM

CANTON VIA N.R.

Dated October 27, 1938

Rec'd 2:02 p. m. 28th

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

23, October 27, 4 p. m.

(GRAY) The fires in Canton have died down and will probably end soon unless further fires are started. Last night the Fati terminal of the Sanshui Railway was burned. The Japanese forces are patrolling only a few sections of the city including that adjoining Shameen. In some largely residential sections such as Saikwan the Chinese residents remaining have organized self-defense corps, are blocking off certain streets and trying to stop looting.

The Japanese have scattered leaflets today stating that their troops are maintaining peace and order and requesting the residents of Canton to return as quickly as possible to resume business and to cooperate with the Japanese troops in maintaining local peace and order. Other leaflets offer inducements of high posts and high salaries to people who read the Japanese language

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NOV 1 1938

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REB

2-#23, From Canton, Oct. 27, 4p.m.

language, to technical experts in printing and orthography,  
and ask representatives of self-defense guards organized  
to prevent looting and setting fires to call at head-  
quarters. (EID GRAY)

Japanese soldiers are visiting the villages near  
Canton and frequent shots are heard from the vicinities  
visited.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong.

LINNELL

CSB

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 23) of October 27, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

Shots are heard often from the villages in the vicinity of Canton which are being visited by Japanese troops.

The fires in Canton have died down and will probably end soon unless further fires are started. Last night the Fati terminal of the Sanshui Railway was burned. The Japanese forces are patrolling only a few sections of the city including that adjoining Shameen. In some largely residential sections such as Saikwan the Chinese residents remaining have organized self-defense corps, are blocking off certain streets and trying to stop looting.

The Japanese have scattered leaflets today stating that their troops are maintaining peace and order and requesting the residents of Canton to return as quickly as possible to resume business and to cooperate with the Japanese troops in maintaining local peace and order. Other leaflets offer inducements of high posts and high salaries to people who read the Japanese language, to technical experts in printing and orthography, and ask representatives of self-defense guards organized to prevent looting and setting fires to call at headquarters.

E.g.c.  
FE:EGC:JPS  
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H.M.  
FE  
RMW

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

# DOCUMENT FILE

## NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Amoy/131 FOR #171-

FROM Amoy ( Altaffer ) DATED Sept 12, 1938  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict; developments of the month of August, 1938.

FRG.

793.94/14227

14227-



- 3 -

Section

2. Foreign Relations.

(a) Relations with the United States.

Nothing to report.

(b) Relations with Japan.

1. Affecting the United States.

793.94

Previous political reports from this office have informed the Department that representatives of The Texas Company (China), Ltd., in Amoy, were not allowed to visit the premises of the Company in Amoykong, Amoy, where stocks are stored, from May 10th, the date of the Japanese occupation of Amoy, to June 24th, in spite of repeated protests by this office. The local representatives of this Company resumed business in Amoy on the latter date, but have found that sales of their products on Amoy Island were negligible because of the general evacuation of the Island by Chinese business and industrial undertakings, and by a large part of the population. Since permits must be issued by the Japanese Naval Authorities, for the removal of any goods from Amoy Island, the Consulate, on July 18th, transmitted to the Japanese Consul General in Amoy the requests of the local agent for the Texas Company for permits for the removal of 80 tins of kerosene from Amoy to Kulangsu, and for the removal of 100 units (200 5-gallon tins) of kerosene and 2 55-gallon drums of lubricating oil from Amoy for shipment to Quanschow (泉州). The Consulate received no replies to these

- 4 -

these requests, and a personal call was made on this official in regard to the matter on September 3rd. He informed the writer that the Japanese Naval Authorities in Amoy had been addressed in regard to the matter, but no word had been received from them. However, the Japanese Vice Consul called on this office on September 10th and informed the Consulate that permits would be granted for the removal of all the goods, except 2 55-gallon drums of lubricating oil. Permit for the removal of the latter was withheld on the grounds that it is considered to be war material. The Consulate did not take up this matter with the Embassy, since the Hongkong representative of the Texas Company thought that removal of the goods might be facilitated by private negotiation. It is apparent that the Japanese Naval Authorities will hopelessly delay the removal of petroleum products from Amoy Island, and the Japanese Consulate General has informed the Consulate that permission will not be given for the removal, under any circumstances, of gasoline and lubricating oil.

**2. The Situation in the International Settlement at Kiangsu.**

In a communication dated August 10, 1938, the Chairman of the Kiangsu Municipal Council requested this office to ask the American Consul in Foochow, in conjunction with all other Consular representatives resident in Foochow, to make the strongest representations to the Fukien Provincial Government in regard to obtaining food supplies from the

- 3 -

the Fukien mainland for some 18,000 Chinese refugees still remaining in Kulangsu. The lack of local food supplies is described as serious, and the Chairman states that unless full and real assistance is forthcoming, all the efforts of the Council and the International Relief Committee to assuage the suffering of the Chinese residents of Kulangsu must fail. Firewood is now imported from Foochow at three times the cost of importation from local areas, while the price of pork is also triple that of former levels, and now almost unobtainable. The importation of cows has been stopped and this important item of food is now unobtainable. Vegetables, chickens, poultry and eggs are priced so high as to be above average purchasing power.

The Chairman's request was passed on to the American Consul at Foochow, in conjunction with similar communications forwarded by the British, French and Dutch Consuls in Amoy, to representatives in Foochow, requesting that the matter be taken up with the Fukien Provincial Authorities.

**3. The Situation in Amoy.**

Deprived of its trade with the surrounding Fukien mainland and with most of its substantial Chinese citizens departed, Amoy City still presents a lifeless aspect after four months of Japanese occupation. With city administration expenses running well ahead of receipts in taxes, the Japanese Naval Authorities have issued the following proclamations in an attempt to get residents and shopkeepers to return

to

- 6 -

to their previous activities in the city:

"This proclamation is issued to state that due to the good cooperation works by His Imperial Japanese Navy, the Japanese Consul General in Amoy, the Reconstruction Committee and other offices, Amoy has restored its normal condition. The market restoration work is now in progress. Shops in the city have gradually opened. For the protection of property rights, a House Custodian Office has been established for a month to take care of the houses. At the same time the public in general has been so notified so as to avoid any trouble.

While not a small number of the refugees have returned to Amoy recently yet the majority of them still hesitate to do so. In order to improve the appearance of the city, measures must be taken by this Society. All the residents and shop keepers are hereby notified that they must return to the city within the time limit of August 31 and their hesitancy will oblige this office to take the action as it is deemed necessary. Measures will then be taken in accordance with the regulations of the House Custodian Office.

Owners of houses are hereby warned to make no more mistakes on their part but to return to Amoy in an early date. In the case of the absence of the owners in Amoy, the notice should be immediately communicated to the owners by their relatives. There are some houses in Amoy with notices posted on their doors to say that business will be resumed immediately by the owners but the doors remain closed. Such houses will be treated just the same as those whose business has suspended.

The parties concerned having been notified, the proclamation is now issued for the general information of the public."

"In order to expedite the restoration of Amoy, buildings left vacant therein until August 31st or those without proper custodians will be rented by the Navy to good citizens or will be disposed of in some other appropriate manner. Persons using flags of a third power falsely will be punished in accordance with military laws.

This 10th day of the 8th moon of the 15th year of His Majesty the Japanese Emperor Showa."

These measures have succeeded to the extent that about one shop in twenty is open in Amoy. Similar  
proclamations

- 7 -

proclamations were also published in Taiwan newspapers dated August 22, 1936, to induce the return to Amoy of those Formosan Chinese who have fled to Taiwan since the outbreak of the China incident.

4. The Military Situation in Amoy.

The South China Morning Post dated August 15th, reported a large scale withdrawal of Japanese troops from Quemoy and Amoy, and Japanese warships from the Northern Fukien Coast. A later report stated that 2,000 Japanese troops arrived in Amoy on August 10th. These troops are said to be largely made up of Japanese, but there are Koreans and Formosans among them. Mainland positions were shelled for brief periods almost daily during August by Japanese guns on Amoy. Heavy firing was heard for longer periods on August 4, 12, 15, 23, 24 and 27, while machine gun firing was heard throughout the night of August 22nd. There were unconfirmed rumors that the Japanese had tried to land on the mainland several times during August, and another that the Chinese had attempted to take Amoy. It seems apparent that the Japanese in Amoy are not now intent on occupying any part of the Fukien mainland, but are bent on creating more or less of a no man's land on the fringe of the mainland all around Amoy. Missionaries from the interior report, however, that large numbers of Chinese troops are concentrated at Chongchew (漳州) and other places near Amoy.

- 8 -

5. Marine Guard around Japanese Consulate General Amoy - Japanese Consul General Takes up Residence in Amoy.

Kulangou residents were surprised to find that 80 Japanese marines which had been guarding the premises and vicinity of the Japanese Consulate General since the first part of June, had been removed on August 3rd. At the same time it was learned that the Japanese Consul General had taken up residence and business quarters at the Kashiawara Hotel, No. 64, Su-ming West Road, Amoy. Up until the arrival of Vice Consul Okamoto in the last part of July, the Japanese Consul General had spent the forenoon of each day in Amoy assisting in the organization of the puppet Amoy City government, and devoting his afternoons to work in the Consulate General in Kulangou. Since the first part of August, however, the Consul General spends all his time in Amoy, while the Japanese Vice Consul takes care of the work in Kulangou.

6. Japanese Consul General Reports Unannounced Trip to Japan.

The Japanese Consul General and Senior Consul in Amoy departed unannounced for Formosa near the end of July, returning to Amoy on August 17th. Upon his return, the Consul General informed the writer that he had also made a brief trip to Tokyo.

7. Chinese Fishing Junks Burnt by Japanese.


During August, it was reported that several Chinese fishing junks which had ventured beyond the confines of Amoy harbor, were seized and burnt. The personal effects of the fishermen were confiscated and they and their families were left to drift to Kulangou.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quacken NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 9 -

Kulangm. A passenger on one of the Douglas ships plying between Amoy and Foochow recently informed the Consulate that he had personally witnessed the blowing up of Chinese fishing junks at sea near Foochow, by the Japanese.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Copy of Radiogram  
Received at the War Department  
at 10:00 A. M.,  
October 26, 1938.



Peiping, No. 120, October 25th, 1938.

From press:

Peking Chronicle ready issue extra announcing fall Hankow.

Domei says tank unit entered Chinkou 5 miles north of Hankow and Japanese have cut Kinham at Hengtien seventh station north. Japanese announce capture Yingshan northwest of Hankow 25 miles inside Hupeh border and claim Chinese have begun general retreat from Wushengkuan. Japanese column following north shore Yangtze after capture Oohong has taken Sinchow Lichiatse and Hwangpei. Occupation Boca Tigris forts announced as of 23d. Japanese say only small force holding Canton while main body moved up Yuehhan railway. Japanese claim capture Lungmoon and Yungfa northeast Canton. British gunboat Sandpiper bombed at Changsha yesterday with small damage and no casualties. Japanese reported investigating incident due to mistake.

Whereabouts Chiang Kai-shek and Madame unknown but presence in Hongkong denied authoritative quarters. Reuter, Chungking, reports Wang Ching Wei there 23d. Generally believed Wang Chung Sui, Chinese Foreign Minister in Hongkong. Sudden departure British Ambassador by gunboat for Haiphong to take plane for Chungking has given rise rumors his mission connection with peace negotiations. Chinese press, Chungking, blames England for South China debacle on grounds statements Japanese invasion South China would cause England adopt strong attitude resulted in neglect adequate measures.

Tokyo reports capture Boca Tigris forts and imminent fall Hankow have not bolstered stock market which has fallen following

793.94/14228

14228



reports impending invocation national mobilization law, prospects further heavy taxation and probability long continual hostilities in China. In Peking, Chinese dollar in unexpected rally gained thirty points since yesterday.

Domei, Tokyo, predicts Japanese Government after capture Hankow will issue important statement emphasizing necessity for mutual respect sovereignty and territorial integrity among China, Manchukuo and Japan and guarantee for prevention recurrence of China incident. Same source: Japanese Government considers fall Hankow will mark beginning final stage of present conflict but will stick to policy of nonrecognition Chiang Kai-shek regime. Same further predicts prolonged stationing (anti-?) Japanese troops in China for suppression and Japanese and pro-communist activities and maintenance peace and order.

BARRETT

5168

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HRE

This message should be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone (br)

FROM HANKOW VIA N. R.

Dated October 28, 1938

Rec'd 9:30 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

28, October 28, 9 p.m.

The British Consulate General attempted through the  
*Admiral's office*  
British ~~the~~ governing board to secure permission from  
the Japanese authorities to visit Wuchang to inspect British  
properties. Permission was refused. It may be granted however,  
the Japanese declared, in three or four days.

The Japanese occupation continues to be comparatively  
orderly. Father Jacquinet reports only one case in the  
former German Concession involving the killing by Japanese  
troops of a Chinese man unsuccessfully defending his  
daughter against rape and several rapings outside of the  
safety zone.

The Japanese Consul General Yoshiyuki Hanawa has arrived.  
General Hata is said to be due here tomorrow.

Repeated to Chungking and Peiping.

JOSSELYN

NPL:EMB

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence*

*file ok*  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 29 1938  
Department of State

793.94  
*note*  
893.102 *Hankow*  
*WS*  
*11.1.38*

793.94/14229

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FILED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 28) of October 28, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

Yoshiyuki Hanawa, Japanese Consul General, has arrived in Hankow and it is said that General Hata will arrive on October 29. The occupation of Hankow by the Japanese is still being carried on in a comparatively orderly manner. Only one case in the ex-German Concession and a few cases of rape outside the safety zone are reported by Father Jacquinet. The case in the ex-German Concession was that of a Chinese slain by Japanese soldiers while defending his daughter unsuccessfully against rape. An effort was made by the British Consulate General through the British Admiral's Governing Board to obtain from the Japanese permission to enter Wuchang for the purpose of looking over British properties. Although the Japanese refused to allow this visit to be made, they said that within three or four days such permission might be granted.

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New

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5169

REB

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

A portion of  
this telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (br)

FROM CANTON VIA N.R.

Dated October 28, 1938

Rec'd 5:40 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

26, October 28, 4 p. m.

(GRAY) The number of refugees is increasing rapidly.

At Lingnan there are now about 2000, at Pakhoktung between  
3 and 4000, at Mingsum School for the Blind, Fongchuen  
about 600 and at Holy Trinity School about 400. Food  
available is sufficient for a short time but will become  
a serious problem in a few weeks. The new rice crop will  
soon be reaped and if possible to arrange the purchase  
and delivery of some of this it may save the situation  
for a few months.

The Japanese have verified the positions of foreign  
troops here pending the arrival of Japanese naval vessels.  
(END GRAY) They are now patrolling the city more thorough-  
ly trying to stop looting and shooting some looters. They  
themselves are entering Chinese property and taking out  
bedding, furniture and other things; they have in general  
respected American property which has been properly marked.

The

*al paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence*

NOV 2 1938  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
RECEIVED

*154H*  
*Ch sent to*  
*Mr. Swift*  
*Red Cross*  
*10/29/38*

*793.94*  
*note*  
*893.48*  
*393.1115*

793.94/14230

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NOV 2 1938

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REB

2-#26, From Canton, Oct. 28, 4p.m.-

The British gunboat ROBIN which set out from Canton yesterday for Wuchow reported that small Japanese vessels are scattered throughout the delta and with the planes are mopping up in the villages. Fatshan is reported to be almost entirely destroyed.

(GRAY) Dr. William L. Wallace returned to Wuchow on the ROBIN.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping and Hong Kong. (END  
GRAY)

LINNELL

EDA

EMB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 25) of October 28, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

According to reports received from the Robin, a British gunboat which left Canton for Wuchow on October 27, Japanese airplanes and small Japanese ships which are scattered about in the delta are mopping up in the villages in that vicinity. The almost complete destruction of Fatsan is reported. The Japanese have verified the positions of foreign troops in Canton pending the arrival of Japanese naval vessels. In an effort to stop looting Japanese troops are patrolling Canton more thoroughly now and some of the looters are being shot. The Japanese themselves are going into the premises of Chinese and removing various articles, including furniture and bedding. For the most part the Japanese have respected the property of Americans which has been marked in a proper manner.

The number of refugees is increasing rapidly. At Lingnan there are now about 2000, at Pakhoktung between 3000 and 4000, at Mingsum School for the Blind, Fongchuen, about 600 and at Holy Trinity School about 400. Food available is sufficient for a short time but will become a serious problem in a few weeks. The new rice crop will soon

793.94/14230

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

soon be reaped and if possible to arrange the purchase  
and delivery of some of this it may save the situation  
for a few months.

793.94/14230.

29C.  
FE:ECC:JPS  
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HP  
FE  
10-29

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Sent to Sfr  
Swift y Red  
Cms 10/29/58*

A telegram dated October 28, 1938, from the  
American Consul General at Canton reads in part as  
follows:

The number of refugees is increasing rapidly.  
At Lingnan there are now about 2000, at Pakhoktung between  
3 and 4000, at Mingsum School for the Blind, Fongohuen  
about 600 and at Holy Trinity School about 400. Food  
available is sufficient for a short time but will become  
a serious problem in a few weeks. The new rice crop will  
soon be reaped and if possible to arrange the purchase  
and delivery of some of this it may save the situation  
for a few months.

FE:RCM:REK



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

OPD



FROM COMSOPAT

October 29, 1938

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

793.94

ACTION: CINCAF  
OPNAV  
RUSNOS  
INFO: COMSUBRON FIVE  
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS SACRAMENTO  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
USS TULSA  
COMDESDIV FIFTEEN  
FOURTH MARINES  
ALUSNA PEIPING



0028. Canton quiet. About seven thousand refugees being cared for. Japanese field headquarters moved to Thungfa for operations to the North. Chinese in force at Yingtak. Naval and troop activities at Boca Tigris have been extended through delta area to west river. Sanshui occupied by troops after bombing air raids Fatshan and other towns of delta. Wuchow bombed on twenty-sixth. 2330.

RR

NOV 1 1938  
FILED

793.94/14231

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM Paris

Dated October 29, 1938


Rec'd 10:44 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1841, October 29, 1 p.m.

The chief of the Far Eastern division of the Foreign Office expressed the opinion to me yesterday that the fall of Canton and Hankow will fail to have decisive effect upon the outcome of the war. Chiang Kai Shek will carry out the plan which he had evolved at the beginning of hostilities for such a contingency as the present and withdraw into Szechwan. He will of course be greatly handicapped in obtaining supplies and will have to look to the overland route from Russia. He is supposed however to have a considerable stock of munitions in Szechwan.

Hoppenot states that if the Japanese were intelligent enough they might now be able to bring about peace by offering such reasonable terms that the Chinese could accept them without loss of face. However he believes that the Japanese will not (repeat not) be intelligent enough to do this and that their terms will continue to be so harsh that even if Chiang Kai Shek should remove himself



793.94/14232

NOV 1 1938  
FILED

F / FG

5172

FS 2-No. 1841, October 29, 1 p.m. from Paris

himself from the picture no Chinese leader could  
possibly accept them.

(END SECTION ONE).

CSB

WILSON

5173

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (C)

FROM

Paris


Dated October 29, 1938

Rec'd 11 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1841, October 29, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO)



Hoppenot was much interested in our note to the Japanese Government of October 6. I gave him the full text as received by the Department's 583 inasmuch as he had seen excerpts in the press. He said that the French had encountered the same types of discrimination in their trade in North China and that the operation of exchange control in that area made it impossible for the French to carry on business there. He said that while our note was an able document he felt that the objective which we had in mind might be achieved more effectively if we would act in concert with the French and British in the Far East. He said that in his judgment the only way that the Japanese can be brought to behave more reasonably will be for the three great western powers to set up something in the nature of a common front, not necessarily by acting jointly but by concerting their action in such fashion as to impress the Japanese with the fact that they are taking a common stand in the protection of their interests.

CSB

WILSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5174

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD


Paris

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone. (C)

FROM Dated October 29, 1938.

Rec'd. 11:58 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



1841, October 29, 1 p. m. (SECTION THREE)

He said that two days ago the Japanese Government through the Foreign Office in Tokyo and the Embassy at Paris had repeated its protest against the alleged continued passage of munitions over the railway in Indo-China. See my 1751, October 13, 7 p. m. He said that the note of the Japanese Embassy had been impertinent to the point of insolence. The French reply must await Bonnet's return from Marseilles but it will be in strong terms stating that the Japanese charges do not merit consideration in view of the formal French assurances that the railway has been closed to munitions traffic and due to the fact that the Japanese fail to adduce a single concrete case supporting their charges. Hoppenot said that the railway had been completely closed to the passage of munitions for over two months and that even material ordered by China before the outbreak of hostilities was not allowed passage. For instance, ten airplanes ordered in

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5175

MJD -2- No. 1841, October 29, 1 p. m., from Paris

in May 1937 had arrived in Indo-China recently; the French  
authorities had seized the planes and cabled Paris that  
they were needed for the defense of the Protectorate.  
Paris had approved. (END SECTION THREE)

WILSON

PEG  
CSB

5176

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (C)


FROM

PARIS

Dated October 29, 1938

Rec'd Noon

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



1341, October 29, 1 p. m. (SECTION FOUR)

Hoppenot stated that the Japanese through their spies knew very well what the true situation was and he believes that the renewed protests in this particular were made merely to hasten justification for military action which the Japanese will take against either Hainan or the French railway in Yunnan.


I asked if the Russians were increasing arms shipments to China. Hoppenot said that his information was that they were not (repeat not) increasing such shipments. He said that there had been reports from Hankow some days before the capture of the city that the Russian mission there was not on very cordial terms with the Chinese authorities.

(END MESSAGE)

WILSON

PEG

CSB



(NOT FOR PUBLICATION) FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOTES ON A VISIT TO JAPAN - AUGUST 1933

M. S. Bates

Three summer resorts and two larger cities gave opportunities for speaking in small groups to more than 300 missionaries and to a fair number of Japanese. The purpose of such contacts was to give needed information and answer eager enquiries which poured in from every corner; likewise to learn as much as possible about the attitudes and problems of the Christian movement, particularly in relation to the war and the intensification of military nationalism. It was not so easy as formerly to get in touch with Japanese or to have them speak freely. Nevertheless old friends and a few new ones made through trusted intermediaries, were willing to say exactly what they thought and felt.

The general sentiment of the people is that of willingness to follow the Government's program, but with less enthusiasm than in earlier months. The original slogan, "Hail to the Punitive Expedition!", has given way to the widespread army advertisement, "Support the New Military Enterprise for the Long Struggle". In general the people are the creatures of nationalist education and of comprehensive propaganda. They believe that their army is performing a necessary task and that proper effort and sacrifice will secure a result beneficial not only to Japan but to the Chinese people and even to the world.

Some groups even in Christian circles go much beyond this position and warmly cherish an ideal of a holy war by a righteous nation against evil influences. They are generally thinking of Communism and white man's Imperialism as greater enemies in China than is anything specifically Chinese. On the other hand, there is a considerable minority of the people who feel that something is wrong but are not very clear as to what it is and certainly see no way to remedy the difficulty. Within Christian circles there are some finely sensitive spirits who are greatly distressed for the evil that has been done and for the consequences to China and to their own nation. These persons are under great strain and often are unable to work out a steady philosophy of expression or of action.

Missionary attitudes have developed very well by comparison with those of 1931 and 1932. Although some are influenced by incessant propaganda and all are rightly trying to maintain sympathy with the best elements in Japanese life past and present, the missionaries in Japan are practically unanimous in their opposition to the present war. Indeed, three or four leading missionaries informed me that they could name at most two missionaries who supported the war in any considerable degree. Although the reports I had given were extremely painful to those who have made the love of the Japanese people the major interest of their lives, I was nevertheless received with hearty interest and was given active cooperation in every place. Missionaries have helped a great deal in the circulating of information received either directly from China or through foreign countries. Many of the best Japanese depend upon them for facts and for spiritual support in their own tribulation.



Now let us insert a few factual items regarding the general conditions in Japan as they relate to the war and to our expectations for the coming years. In the first place I find no indications of a shortage of man-power. The experience of the world war should enable us to realize that the nation of nearly eighty million people must experience prolonged and intensive military losses in order to feel any real shortage of men. As a matter of fact the unemployment of large numbers of able-bodied men is characteristic of the present situation. (Most of these have been displaced from ordinary industries closed because of the diversion of materials and foreign exchange to war purposes). Further-more, a number of divisions have recently been returned to Japan and set free for civil life. I was able to trace four of these in detail. The program seems to be to give field experience to as many of the soldiers and reservists as possible by putting them through the China experience in series. Only within the last two months has there been a noticeable direction of new calls to the army toward young men, say 18-25.

Again, if we consider the probable casualties in China, we confirm the impression that there is no shortage of material for soldiers. If we assume that the total casualties were about 500,000, that might mean 300,000 killed and seriously wounded. Each year the surplus of births over deaths in Japan is 950,000. If we eliminate females and those males who do not live till military age, we would have a figure not greatly different from the 300,000 put out of action. In other words, military man-power stands today at about the same point as at the beginning of the war.

On the economic side my information is not secured from inside sources, but rather from a careful reading of financial and industrial passages of the newspapers checked by enquiries among foreign friends of many types. On the whole there has been no serious economic pressure up to the present time. Just now shortages in coal, cotton, leather, some types of metal goods, paper, etc., are touching the general life of the people. The stores and warehouses seem as full of goods as usual and irritations arise rather from the bureaucratic control and the methods of its exercise than from actual want of necessities. Sharp actions were taken this summer by government authorities to reduce the use of cotton and of leather, but within a short time most of the restrictions were removed or modified because of popular protests on the one hand, and on the other hand the bringing forth of evidence that supplies were greater than at first estimated. There is a special economic police which is already encountering many difficulties in enforcing the regulations. The newspapers admitted that in Osaka one ring of cotton operators alone diverted fifty million yen of cotton goods to uses contrary to their licenses and to the public regulations. All in all the economic problem cannot be considered critical at this stage.

Despite minor leaks through travellers, the Government has been able to maintain its official exchange rates between the yen and western currencies. Internal bonds are reported as selling above par, which is of course in a market maintained by government pressure upon banks, insurance companies and industrial corporations. Japanese bonds in New York and London yield from 11 per cent. upwards on the basis of current prices at half their par value or less. Even this low valuation of Japanese credit is higher than it should be because the Japanese Government has mobilised the foreign securities held by Japanese

interests abroad and has used them to buy in London and New York all types of Japanese bonds. This procedure has supported the price of the bonds and at the same time has reduced the foreign-held obligations of the Japanese Government and of semi-official industrial concerns. The common currency shows war-time changes of minor importance. The 50 sen paper note is being extended and new coins apparently without nickel are replacing the familiar 10 sen and 5 sen pieces.

Special mention should be made of the intensification and speeding up of a Japanisation program in Korea and Formosa. In the latter the changes of recent months are so rapid as to be startling. No publication in the Chinese language is permitted. All Chinese teachers have been forced out from middle schools and higher schools. In the primary schools Japanese applicants for teaching positions are given such preference that they are swiftly displacing the former Chinese teachers. In the two large normal schools of the northern part of Formosa only five Chinese students were admitted in this year's entering class as against more than a hundred Japanese. Local police are required to report on the language used in every home. Those families which are listed as using Japanese only, receive preference in the granting of business licenses and in educational opportunities for their children. School administrators and teachers are held responsible for the displacing of Chinese idols from the pupils' homes and for the introduction of Shinto god-shelves. The wearing of Chinese costume has been forbidden, but this decree is not yet enforced. The churches are being pressed to use the Japanese language and a first definite step is made this autumn with the requirement that on one Sunday of each month everything read, spoken and sung in the church service must be in the Japanese language. The Government radio has repeatedly broadcast the statement that all foreigners are spies, especially missionaries. At one time the radio announced that two missionaries had been imprisoned and one missionary executed for espionage, reports which of course were false.

The many forms of nationalist pressure upon Japanese Christians and upon missionaries in Japan cannot be detailed here. No missionary group has succeeded to the many requests that they issue statements supporting the Japanese Government and Japanese Cause. Missionaries are therefore subject to suspicion as an alien element unsympathetic in time of crisis. Some of the nationalistic Christian leaders oppose and criticise the missionaries very severely for their quiet but steady witness against the war. Among the Japanese, responses to the pressure are mixed. Some submit because they do not know any effective way to resist. Some are led to take a strongly nationalistic stand in order to demonstrate that Christianity is compatible with the national spirit in time of emergency and also to lessen distrust of themselves and of the Christian organizations in which they work. The methods of the police at times are seriously embarrassing and even oppressive upon pastors and active Christian workers. In scores of cases Christians have been required to declare inner beliefs and attitudes upon crucial questions such as the relative status of God and the Emperor, the attitude of Christianity toward the mythical divine spirits from which Japan is supposed to have sprung, the relations of Christianity with Shinto as the national religion of Japan, etc. There are tragic cases of conformity and surrender to the demands of absolute nationalism. There are also examples of earnest heroism in maintaining Christian attitudes and in presenting a genuine Christian message in the midst of this situation.

A word must be said about the efforts of Japanese Christians to do something in China at this time. Here the persons, their information and their attitudes vary widely. Not a few are fully sincere in their intention to do some good as an offset to the suffering resulting from the war. They find themselves unable to do much in Japan itself and they hope that they will be able to make some atonement or some contribution in Christian service in China. Others are more politically inclined and wish to see the displacement of a Christianity having western connections by the introduction of Christianity under Japanese auspices in direct fellowship with the Chinese. Many specific enterprises or visits that are undertaken are based upon inadequate information or even upon serious misinformation. In general I recommend that Japanese Christians concerned with such enterprises be met with frank friendliness, accepting their motives as good but helping them to see the actual facts and the tremendous spiritual difficulties in their way. Already a number of important contributions to Japanese facing of the problem have been made by such visitors to China who have been fairly received among missionaries and Chinese Christians. Our motto should be, "Speaking the Truth in Love" and we should be sure that we honestly fulfil the last term of that motto. Japan so desperately needs right Christian attitudes and the Christian appreciation of the situation in China that we must not throw away any opportunity for genuine fellowship with Japanese of good intentions, even though they are imperfect like ourselves and are often misled or put in a false position by their military.

Finally it must be said that present conditions and present attitudes in Japan as a whole do not provide hope for an early change of policy or for the consideration of a fair and reasonable peace. That day seems far off, yet may come a little nearer and a little sooner if there are persons ready in knowledge and in attitudes and convictions to take advantage of all opportunities which may come from military or economic difficulties. The direct relations with China may possibly be affected by the obvious Japanese determination to fight Russia at some time. However the summer's experience seems to indicate the desire of Japanese military leaders for more time to solve the Chinese problem as completely as they can and likewise to prepare more specifically in transportation and other technical lines for the struggle with Russia.

For obvious reasons the real life behind this report, that is, the names of persons and the details of difficult stands made by heroic spirits, cannot be presented here. The facts justify the use of sympathetic imagination to fill in this dry outline.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

FROM COMSOPAT

October 30, 1938

Rec'd 5 a. m.

COPY SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

ACTION: CINCAF, OPNAV

INFO: RUSNUS  
COMSUBRON FIVE  
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI  
COMDESRON FIVE  
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA  
USS SACRAMENTO  
USS MARBLEHEAD  
USS TULSA  
COMDESDIV FIFTEEN  
FOURTH MARINES  
ALUSNA PEIPING

793.94

0029. At nine thirty A. M. Japanese naval vessels arrived Canton, four minelayers nasamie class, twelve armed launches two trawlers with troops and a number of motor boats. Canton quiet. Conditions Wuchow unsettled after continued bombing twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth and entry Chinese troops. Foreign residents urged leave on three British steamers going down West River under escort H. M. S. ROBIN. Indications are Japanese activities extending towards Wuchow. 2310.

EMB

793.94/14233

F/A

NOV 1 1938

RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

FROM COMYANGPAT

October 30, 1938

Rec'd 8:20 a. m.

ACTION: CINCAF, OPNAV

INFO: YANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
AMEMBASSADOR CHINA  
FOURTH MARINES

793.94  
0029. Policing of S A D two and three formally turned  
over to Japanese at Eleven hundred Vice Admiral Oikawa  
expected Hankow in Okinoshima two November city quiet.  
2235

RGC

NOV 1 1938  
FILED

F/A

793.94/14234

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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REB



FROM COMYANGPAT

October 30, 1938

Rec'd 8:20 a. m.

ACTION: CINCAF, OPNAV

INFO: YANGPAT  
CONSOPAT  
FOURTH MARINES



793.94  
2029. Japanese ships present, one destroyer, two minelayers, three river gunboats, three torpedo boats, two minesweepers, two auxiliaries, sixteen transports, eight tugs, one ~~taker~~, fourteen supply ships, one hospital ship and four hundred twenty-six small craft. 2252.

RGC

793.94/14235

NOV 1 1938  
RECEIVED

F/A

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB


FROM COMYANGPAT

October 30, 1938

Rec'd 1:45 p. m.

ACTION: CINCAF, OPNAV

INFO: YANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
FOURTH MARINES



793.94

0530. Several fires in Chinese city. Otherwise  
Hankow quiet. Troops entering from north. 2153.

EMB

793.94/14236

NOV 1 1938

FILED

E/FG

HRE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

A portion of this telegram  
must be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated to **FROM**  
anyone (Part br)

CANTON VIA N. R. 10/31/38

Dated October 30, 1938

Rec'd 1:45 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

34, October 30, 4 p.m.

(GRAY) Japanese Rear Admiral T. ~~Ikara~~ <sup>Sugihara</sup> arrived at

Canton today on mine sweeper 18 and sent an officer to call  
on Captain Stapler on the U.S.S. MINDANAO, on the British  
senior naval officer and the captain commanding the French  
gunboat ARGUS. The Japanese officer stated that no movements  
of vessels could be permitted at this time and the British  
gunboat CICALA was specifically refused permission to proceed  
to Kongmoon.


The new Japanese commander of gendarmerie for Canton,  
Colonel Hayashi today informed the Consul General of Great  
Britain that the refugee committee would not be permitted to  
take from godowns at <sup>Fati</sup> ~~(2)~~ any more of the rice which the  
bishopric of Hong Kong had purchased on October 18th from  
Chinese merchants. Colonel Hayashi said that the question of  
the ownership of this rice had been referred to Tokyo and if  
it was found that title was properly transferred to the bish-  
opric at Hong Kong it would be paid for but the rice was  
needed for the Japanese troops.

This decision makes the problem of obtaining food

the

5177  
Paraphrase (inter) of  
2nd & 3rd Hs sent  
The Suppl 7 Red Cross

of paraphrase  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
in confidence 31



793.94/14237

F/FG

793.94  
no 1  
893.48



5178

HRE

2-#34 From Canton October 30, 4 p.m.

the refugees more precarious and it is understood that there is rice in the hands of the committee to feed the present number of refugees only about two weeks. (END GRAY) The refugees are rapidly increasing in number as incidents of shooting and rape occur in the villages and the women and children come to the refugee camps.

(GRAY) It is believed that it will be necessary to buy rice in Hong Kong or elsewhere outside China and bring it here soon. Arrangements to safeguard the rice will of course have to be made with the Japanese and more funds will be needed by the refugee committee to pay for it.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong. (END GRAY)

LINNELL

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Huatleff NARS, Date 12-18-75

*b*  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

*sent to  
Red Cross  
(Mr. Sargent  
10/31/38  
RM)*

A telegram (No. 34) of October 30, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads in part as follows:

The new Japanese commander of gendarmerie for Canton, Colonel Hayashi today informed the Consul General of Great Britain that the refugee committee would not be permitted to take from godowns at (?) 1 any more of the rice which the bishopric of Hong Kong had purchased on October 18th from Chinese merchants. Colonel Hayashi said that the question of the ownership of this rice had been referred to Tokyo and if it was found that title was properly transferred to the bishopric at Hong Kong it would be paid for but the rice was needed for the Japanese troops.

This decision makes the problem of obtaining food for the refugees more precarious and it is understood that there is rice in the hands of the committee to feed the present number of refugees only about two weeks. As incidents of rape and of shooting continue to occur in the villages, women and children are coming to refugee camps in increasing numbers.

*793.94/14237*

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram (No. 34) of October 30, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

Japanese Rear Admiral T. Sugikara arrived at Canton today on mine sweeper 18 and sent an officer to call on Captain Stapler on the U.S.S. MINDANAO, on the British senior naval officer and the captain commanding the French gunboat ARGUS. The Japanese officer stated that no movements of vessels could be permitted at this time and the British gunboat GICALA was specifically refused permission to proceed to Kongmoon.

The new Japanese commander of gendarmerie for Canton, Colonel Hayashi today informed the Consul General of Great Britain that the refugee committee would not be permitted to take from godowns at Fatia any more of the rice which the bishopric of Hong Kong had purchased on October 18th from Chinese merchants. Colonel Hayasi said that the question of the ownership of this rice had been referred to Tokyo and if it was found that title was properly transferred to the bishopric at Hong Kong it would be paid for but the rice was needed for the Japanese troops.

This decision makes more precarious the problem of obtaining food for the refugees whose numbers are increasing

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

creasing rapidly as incidents of rape and shooting take place in the villages and the women and children come to the refugee camps. It is understood that the committee has on hand enough rice to feed the present number of refugees only about two weeks.

It is believed that it will be necessary to buy rice in Hong Kong or elsewhere outside China and bring it to Canton soon. Arrangements to safeguard the rice will of course have to be made with the Japanese and more funds will be needed by the refugee committee to pay for it.

793.94/14237.

*E.G.S.*  
FE:ECC:JPS  
10-1

*HEP*  
FE  
*plw*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

GRAY

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 29, 1938

Rec'd 12:29 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

647, October 29, 7 p. m.

Following from Harbin:

"49, October 28, noon. News extras this morning state that a large fire broke out in Blagoveschensk yesterday evening and suggest an outbreak of mob violence of insurrection following receipt of news of the fall of Hankow.

The Foreign Office delegate confirmed the fact of the fire and said that gunfire could be heard from Heihok. Accurate information was otherwise lacking."

Repeated to Chungking, Tokyo.

LOCKHART

CSB

NOV 2 1938

793.94/14238

F/A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

5179

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM Tokyo via Shanghai & N. R.

Dated October 28, 1938

Rec'd 10:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

688, October 28, 9 a.m.

Telegrams of this general nature should always be made available to the Commander-in-Chief. Department's 360,  
October 25, 12 noon. 793 94/14215a

One. As having direct applicability to the question of the bearing of the Munich agreement and its aftermath on recent developments in the Far East, please review our 655, October 10, midnight. Subsequent developments in Europe have not borne out the hope which was current when our telegram was sent, that stabilization of Europe was within close reach; yet it was precisely that possibility which aroused apprehension in this country lest the Munich agreement powers eventually intervene in the Far East. In fact it was suggested by the Japanese press that the Hankow offensive was being prosecuted with increased vigor in anticipation of such possible intervention. This connection between the Munich agreement and

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
in strict confidence

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 31 1938

793.94/14239

FILED  
NOV 2 1938

F/F G

5180

-2- #688, October 28, 9 a.m., from Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.

and events in the Far East was the only one which was given any notice whatever in Japan. The suggestion that the Munich agreement had repercussions on Japanese policy the reverse of that above mentioned would be purely speculative.

Two. We believe that the Munich agreement had no direct <sup>bearing on</sup> (A) the attack on Canton. By reference to our 793.94/13999 643, October 4, 4 p.m., paragraph four, it will be observed that my British colleague had already obtained knowledge of the preparations then being made for this attack, and, considering the elaborate precautions taken to preserve Japanese military secrets, it is highly probable that these preparations had been in hand for a substantial period of time (certainly not less than two weeks) before Craigie got wind of them--and therefore before the Munich Conference was talked of. That the attack on Canton was a sound strategic move was so obvious that it had been expected for the past 12 months. An appraisal of the reasons for making the attack at the time actually chosen will be found in our 665, October 13, 14058 5 p.m. However, we do not at all exclude as an additional reason for making the attack at this time the lack of British resoluteness <sup>disclosed</sup> (A) during the protracted discussions prior to the Munich Conference.

Three.

5181

-3- #688, October 28, 9 a.m., from Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.

Three. We are not in a position to appraise, in relation to the Munich agreement, recent expressions of Japanese intention to preempt prior position for their shipping on Chinese rivers. Such expressions are of course completely contradictory of previous declarations that the Yangtze River would be thrown open to international commercial navigation upon the capture of Hankow. Although we have not as yet done so, we intend shortly to invite the Foreign Office to comment in the light of its previous declarations on the statement recently made in this connection by Minister Tani to Gauss.

(END SECTION ONE).

GREW

RR:CSB

(\*) Apparent omission.



5182

REB

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

TOKYO VIA SHANGHAI & NR.

FROM Dated October 28, 1938

Rec'd 10:40 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

688, October 28, 9 a. m. (SECTION TWO)

Four. The advertisement of the SHIUNSO is only *the most* (A)

*WB*  
*11/13/38*  
recent in a series directed against Great Britain during the past year by this organization. Two years ago the organization was preoccupied with Soviet Russia, and previously with American policy during the Manchurian conflict. The fact that its former threats have not been fulfilled should serve to place the fulminations of this organization in accurate perspective. Nevertheless, the extent and depth of the anger and resentment of the Japanese public against Great Britain should not be minimized. This feeling is no new development but has been vigorously manifested during the past year or more, as reported in several of our telegrams and despatches. Its existence has been frankly admitted to my British colleague on several occasions by the Minister for Foreign Affairs (please see, among other reports, our 543, August 18, 2 p.m., paragraphs two and three,

Five.

5183

REB

2-#688, From Tokyo, Oct. 28, 9a.m.

Five. As the Department is aware, my British colleague is convinced that the Germans are inciting the Japanese to take an increasingly uncompromising attitude vis-a-vis the British. Information which Japan derives from Germany with regard to British difficulties and involvements in Europe might, and probably does affect the timing and extent of Japanese actions in China, but we do not believe that potential objectives of Japanese policy in China are capable of change one way or another by whatever advice or information Germany might give.

Six. Our 670, October 15, 11 a. m. may be found to throw considerable light on this general subject.

Seven. Finally, in our analysis of the attitude of Japan towards foreign interests and foreign commercial activities in China, we should constantly bear in mind the fact that there exist marked discrepancies between the views of the Home Government and of the military authorities in the field. We can hardly reject as diplomatic persiflage the assurances given us by such substantial statesmen as Prince Konoye (see our 640, October 3, 4 p. m., paragraph three) who himself is a thorough nationalist, even though these assurances are being daily belied in practice. The  
increasingly

5184

REB

3-#688, From Tokyo, Oct. 28, 9a.m.

increasingly truculent attitude" of the Japanese, mentioned by the Department, is of the Japanese military in the field, not of the Home Government. In dealing with Japan we are, in effect, dealing with two distinct authorities who are sometimes very far apart in their respective conceptions of foreign policy. To us who live in Japan, this is a trite statement. Ironically, the military and <sup>naval</sup> (A) authorities are having their day. Their obvious aim is to drive all commercial interests out of China and to make of China an exclusively Japanese mart. Into such vacuum as they are able to create, Japanese commercial and industrial interests will inevitably and progressively crowd. The Home Government, which alone is able to appraise the international aspects of this situation, is for the moment very nearly powerless to compel the military authorities in the field to implement its assurances.

Eight. The foregoing observations are presented merely as facts. It would be futile to attempt to predict the eventual outcome.

(END OF MESSAGE)

GREW

PEG

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton C. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 688) of October 28, 1938, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

The Ambassador asks that his telegram No. 655 of October 10 be read again as applying directly to the question mentioned in a recent telegram from the Department -- the bearing of the agreement reached at Munich and the results arising therefrom on the display by the Japanese of an increasingly truculent attitude and upon their decision to invade south China. Although the hope which was current in the early part of October that stabilization of Europe was near at hand has not been borne out by recent European developments, it was just the possibility that the powers party to the Munich agreement might intervene in the Far East eventually which caused the Japanese to be apprehensive. Japanese newspapers suggested, as a matter of fact, that the attack on Hankow was being carried on more vigorously because such intervention was expected. No attention whatever was paid in Japan to any other connection between events in the Far East and the agreement reached at Munich. It would be entirely in the realm of speculation to intimate that Japanese policy was affected by the Munich agreement in a manner opposite to that outlined above.

793.94/14239

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

The depth and extent of the Japanese public's feeling of resentment and anger against Great Britain which is not a new development should not be belittled. This feeling of anger and resentment has been displayed vigorously for a year or more and several times the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs has frankly admitted to the British Ambassador that this feeling existed (see telegram No. 543 of August 18 from the Embassy). However, the advertisement of the Shiunso organization carried in the October 23 issue of Yomiuri appealing to the Japanese people to rise and be ready to punish the British is only one of a series during the past year directed by this organization against the British. During the conflict in Manchuria this organization was occupied with American policy and two years ago it was preoccupied with Soviet Russia. The fact that the threats which the organization has made in the past have not materialized should afford an accurate perspective for its explosive utterances. The British Ambassador feels certain that the Japanese are being urged by Germany to assume, vis-a-vis Great Britain, a more and more uncompromising attitude. The Embassy is not of the opinion that any information or advice which Germany might give could alter the potential objectives of Japanese policy in connection with China although the extent and timing of Japanese actions in China

-3-

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

China might be and probably are affected by information which Japan obtains from Germany concerning involvements and difficulties of the British in Europe.

The Embassy is not in position to evaluate, in relation to the agreement reached at Munich, statements made recently of intention on the part of the Japanese to preempt prior position on Chinese rivers for Japanese shipping. These statements contradict entirely, of course, declarations made previously to the effect that after the capture of Hankow the Yangtze River would be opened to commercial navigation by vessels of <sup>other</sup> nations. The Ambassador plans very soon to ask the Japanese Foreign Office to comment, in the light of declarations which it has made previously, on the statement made to the American Consul General in Shanghai about a week ago by Tani.

The Ambassador remarks that it should always be remembered when analyzing Japan's attitude toward foreign commercial activities and foreign interests in China that noticeable discrepancies exist between the opinions held by the Government in Tokyo and the military authorities in the field and he points out that in dealing with Japan we are dealing in effect with two separate authorities who sometimes differ very greatly in ideas of foreign policy. This is a trite statement to persons living in Japan. The (?) and military authorities are, ironically speaking, having their day. The increasingly truculent attitude

-4-

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

attitude of the Japanese is not the attitude of the Government in Tokyo but of the Japanese military in the field whose apparent aim is to drive out of China all commercial interests and make a Japanese market exclusively out of that country. Inevitably, Japanese industrial and commercial interests will push progressively into such a vacuum as the military can create. The Government in Tokyo alone is able to estimate the international aspects of this state of affairs and for the time being it is almost devoid of power to force the military authorities in the field to fulfill the Government's assurances. Although every day assurances given by such substantial statesmen as Prince Konoye who is himself a thorough nationalist are being falsified in practice, such assurances can hardly be discarded as diplomatic persiflage. The Ambassador submits the above observations merely as facts and remarks that it would be useless to try to predict what the eventual outcome will be.

With regard to reasons for making the drive on Canton at the particular time chosen see telegram No. 665 of October 13 from the Embassy. Although the Ambassador does not exclude the lack of British resoluteness (?) during the lengthy discussions which took place before the conference at Munich as an added reason for making the

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

the drive on Canton at this time, he is of the opinion that the agreement reached at Munich had no direct connection with the drive. Before October 4 the British Ambassador had obtained information in regard to the arrangements which were being made then for this offensive and in view of the fact that extreme precautions are taken to guard Japanese military secrets it is quite probable that these preparations had been going on for at least two weeks or longer before the Ambassador heard of them. This would have been, of course, before there was any talk of the conference at Munich. A drive on Canton had been looked for for the last year as it was so clearly a sound strategic move.

793.94/14239.

29c.  
FE:EGC:JPS  
11-2

FE  
10/11



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

October 29, 1938.

5125  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

This cable was sent in confidential code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.

✓ 371

RUSH.

793.94/14239

Your 688, October 28, 9 a.m., paragraph three, third sentence.

In as much as the Department is giving current consideration to <sup>a/closely</sup> ~~this and~~ related matters, please <sup>with hold</sup> ~~take no~~ ~~report of~~ action pending further instruction from the Department.

OCT 29 1938 PM

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

PA/H

NOV 01 1938

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_\_

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1602 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/14239

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5186

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

PLAIN

Chungking via N.R.


FROM

Dated October 29, 1938

Rec'd 12:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



519, October 29, 10 a.m.

793.94

Central news carries account opening Peoples Political Council October 28 and digest of message from Chiang Kai Shek in which he made deductions encouraging to China from the Japanese drive into South China which he asserted evidenced increasing exhaustion and gave China military advantages. He said Chinese Government policy had always been to reconstruct West China into base for consolidation of national strength and that "the war has been going as China had previously planned--not only have military plans been completed but also political organizations have been established in the areas under Japanese occupation". He concluded by hoping that members of the Council would effectively build up political and economic bases in the rear and stimulate populace in occupied areas and expressed confidence that thus "the materialization of China's plans to crush the enemy will come to pass in the near future."

Repeated to Peiping.

CSB

JOHNSON

793.94/14240

F/FG

FILED

NOV 3 1938

5187

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (br)

FROM

CANTON VIA N.R.

Dated October 29, 1938

Rec'd 11 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence*

DEPARTMENT OF  
EAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 31 1938  
Department of State

28, October 29, noon.

Further reference is made to the Department's No. 4  
of October 24, 7 p. m. and to my 19 of October 26. In  
possible explanation of the seeming complete collapse of  
the Chinese defense in and around Canton when the Japanese  
soldiers were still at a considerable distance from the  
city, I would point out the essential indefensibility of  
assistance solely by land forces against an enemy having  
in addition to strong land forces and mechanized armament  
complete command of the air and water.

The Chinese always realized that the Japanese could  
by combined land, air and naval attack reduce the fortifica-  
tions at Bocca Tigris and that when this was accomplished  
Canton could be attacked by naval vessels and guns from the  
Pearl River.

I believe therefore the complete abandonment of Canton  
being a part of the general policy of withdrawing to  
interior provinces at this time and preparing to wage a  
long

793.94/14241

F/FG

5188

REB

2-#28, From Canton, Oct.29,noon.

long contest on guerrilla lines and pursue the policy of forcing the Japanese to extend greatly their lines of communication and wear themselves out financially and in man power, was also decided upon to save Canton from an intensive combined attack by land, water and air, which would have cost countless lives if the people remained in the city.

Complete abandonment of the city and the great destruction wrought by the Chinese on leaving was also a gesture of defiance and determination to continue the struggle elsewhere. It was certainly not a signal of surrender.

Repeated to Peiping, Chungking, Hong Kong.

LINNELL

RR

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 28) of October 29, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

The Consul General is of the opinion that the abandonment of Canton was decided upon to save the city from a very severe attack by air, water, and land, which would have meant the loss of a great many lives if the inhabitants had stayed in the city. Complete abandonment was also a part of the general plan of retreating at this time to the interior of China and of making ready to carry on a long struggle on guerrilla lines and to follow the plan of forcing the Japanese to expand their communication lines greatly and spend themselves both in man power and financially. The Consul General considers that the Chinese, far from giving a sign of surrender, made a gesture of defiance and signified their intention of keeping up the struggle somewhere else when they abandoned the city entirely and wrought great destruction on leaving.

The Consul General points out, as possibly explaining the apparent failure of the Chinese to defend Canton and its environs when the Japanese were as yet quite a distance from the city, the essential indefensibility of (?) by land forces only against an enemy which controls the

79394/14241

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

the air and water completely as well as possesses  
mechanized armament and strong land forces. The Chinese  
have known always that when the Japanese captured the  
Booca Tigris forts, which they could do by a combined  
assault from the water, land and air, they could attack  
Canton by guns and naval vessels from the Pearl River.  
(In connection with the above the Consul General refers  
to his telegram No. 19 of October 26.)

793.94/14241.

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*HKS*  
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*new*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

GRAY

GPO


FROM Canton via N.R.

Dated October 29, 1938

Rec'd 11:09 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



30, October 29, 1 p.m.

Japanese naval vessels came to Canton at 9 a.m.

793.94  
today. Only two minesweepers, about ten motor launches  
and two air propelled launches have come as yet. The  
city is now more fully patrolled and the fires are  
practically all out. It is expected that Japanese  
consular officers will open their Consulate soon and  
that it will then be easier to make necessary representa-  
tions to the Japanese authorities.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping and Hongkong.

CEB

LINNELL

793.94/14242

F/FG

NOV 1 1938  
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Glusker NARS, Date 12-18-75

5189

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM

CANTON VIA N.R.

Dated October 29, 1938

Rec'd 7 a. m. 30th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

32, October 29, 6 p. m.

The British Consul General at Canton has just informed

me that a message from the British gunboat ROBIN now at Wuchow says that the Chinese are planning to place a boom at Dosing thus blocking the river approach to Wuchow. In Wuchow the people are panicky and fear the city will be burned. They also fear the retreating Chinese Army.

The British Consul General and I have sent identic messages to our respective nationals urging the women and children and all men who can be spared to come to Canton on three river boats now at Wuchow, the voyage to Canton to be under the convoy of the ROBIN, if there is in fact any danger of their being bottled up at Wuchow. Those who remain do so at their own risk.

The Japanese Navy today took over control of Canton harbor including the buoy office.

Repeated to Peiping, Chungking, Hong Kong.

EMB-RGC

LINNELL

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
D.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 31 1938  
Department of State

143.94  
note  
393.1113

793.94/14243

F/FG



Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 32) of October 29, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

On October 29 the Japanese Navy assumed control of the harbor of Canton including the <sup>office in control of the</sup> buoys. According to information received from the British Consul General at Canton the British gunboat Robin which is at Wuchow reports that plans are being made by the Chinese to block the approach to Wuchow from the river by placing a boom at Dosing. The people of Wuchow fear the retreating Chinese Army and they are in a panic and fear that the city may be burned. In identic messages to their respective nationals, the American Consul General and the British Consul General have urged that all of the men who can be spared and the women and children come to Canton, if there really is any danger of their being trapped at Wuchow. They were warned that those who remain do so at their own risk. There are now three river boats at Wuchow and the trip is to be made on these boats under the convoy of the gunboat Robin.

793.94/14243.

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FE:ECG:JPS  
10-31

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NEW

793.94/14243

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Blustein NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

GRAY

FROM

Hong Kong via N. R.

Dated October 29, 1938



Rec'd 7:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

PRIORITY.

29, October 29, 8 a. m.

Referring further to the Department's telegram of October 24, 7 p. m. there has been a remarkable subsidence of interest here and of both oral and printed discussion of the factors which contributed to the ease and rapidity of the Japanese invasion and occupation of Canton. There appears to be developing a unique indifference as to what factors were responsible although the average man in the street is now inclined to credit mainly the bribery and military ineptitude factors. The only newspaper comment of interchanges during recent days is a display article in the "HONG KONG TELEGRAPH" further developing the line of thought reported in our telegram No. 18 of October 27, 9 a.m. and which announced in bold type that "Evacuation of Canton was personally ordered by Generalissimo Chiang on October 18th when he visited Kwangtung defense headquarters" but no factual material in support of its statements. The most



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FILED

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

REB

2-#29, From Hong Kong, Oct, 29, 8a.m.

most detailed newspaper article on the bribery factor which  
has so far appeared here is being sent to the Department  
by the airmail leaving Hong Kong November 2nd.

Repeated to Canton, Chungking, Peiping.

SOUTHARD

RR

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED


REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM HONG KONG VIA N.R.

Dated October 29, 1938

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



32, October 29, 3 p. m.

With further reference to the Department's telegram of October 24, 7 p. m., I have just had a long conversation with my Japanese colleague in which he gave me details of the landing at Bias Bay obtained from military officers who participated. These details are unimportant but in connection with them he said that it is now (repeat now) his opinion that the ease and rapidity of the Japanese invasion was primarily because of the great efficiency of the expeditionary force and the cowardice of the Chinese military who ran away at all places along the line and that the expedition did not have to depend for its success on Chinese officials subsidized by the Japanese. He did not deny that subsidized officials or, to use his exact expression, "pro-Japanese officials" were available but evidently desired to convince me (perhaps he has been inspired) that such officials did not prove necessary to this Japanese success.

4

793.94/14245

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REB

2-#32, From Hong Kong, Oct. 29, 3p.m.

success. In reply to my specific question he said that Yu Han Mou and Wu Te Chen had not been subsidized for the purpose of this invasion but that the former had been counted on for inaction because of his dissatisfaction with the Generalissimo.

Repeated to Canton, Chungking, Peiping.

SOUTHARD

RR

CSB

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 32) of October 29, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hong Kong reads substantially as follows:

During the course of a long conversation, Nakamura (Japanese Consul General) gave the American Consul General unimportant details, based upon accounts of officers who took part in the operation, in regard to the Japanese landing at Bias Bay in connection with which he remarked that he now believes that the lack of courage on the part of the Chinese military who retreated at all points along the line and the great efficiency of the Japanese invading force were primarily responsible for the rapidity and ease of the Japanese advance. He did not think that the Japanese expeditionary force had to rely on Chinese officials in Japanese pay for their success. In response to the American Consul General's explicit question Nakamura declared that although Wu Te-chen and Yu Han-mou had not been subsidized in connection with the invasion of South China, the Japanese had counted on inaction on the part of Yu Han-mou due to his dissatisfaction with General Chiang Kai-shek. Apparently Nakamura, who may have been inspired, wanted to convince the American Consul General that the Japanese did not find subsidized Chinese officials necessary for a successful invasion although he did not deny that subsidized or pro-Japanese officials were there

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

there to be used if necessary.

793.94/14245

*egc.*  
FE:EGC:JPS  
11-1

*HP*  
FE  
*raw*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CA

FROM

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (Br)

HANKOW VIA N R


Dated October 29, 1938

Rec'd 12:35 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

of paraphrase  
COPIES SENT TO  
J. I. AND M.I.D.



30, October 29, 3 p.m. Confidence 31

The British Navy turned over policing of the former British concession to the Japanese military at 11:00 this morning in a military ceremony. A small American naval force participated. (END GRAY) I did not know of this American participation until I saw the American seamen drawn up with the British to receive the Japanese.

A British Consular officer confidentially states that the agreement for turning over the policing of the former British concession to the Japanese army was reached between the British Admiral here and the Japanese military without previous notice to either the director of special administrative district three or the British Consulate General.

Difficulty is being experienced in getting refugees to move to the new refugee zone designated by the Japanese from the streets of the former concessions where they have been camping despite three days of rain.

Repeated to Chungking, Paiping.

JOSSELYN

793.94/i4246

F/FG



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 30) of October 29, 1938, from the American Consul General at Hankow reads substantially as follows:

It is proving difficult to get the refugees who, in spite of three days of rain, have been camping in the streets of the former concessions, to move to the new refugee zone set apart by the Japanese.

At eleven o'clock on the morning of October 29 in a military ceremony the British Navy turned over to the Japanese military the policing of the ex-British Concession. A small American naval force participated. The American Consul General was not aware that the American seamen were to participate until he saw them lined up with the British to receive the Japanese military. According to confidential information received from a British consular officer neither the British Consulate General nor the Director of Special Administrative District Number 3 received previous notice of the agreement reached between the British Admiral in Hankow and the Japanese military authorities providing for the turning over to the Japanese military of the policing of the ex-British Concession.

793.94/14246.

pgc.  
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10-31

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RALL

793.94/14246

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (br)


FROM CANTON VIA N.R.

Dated October 30, 1938

Rec'd 7 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence*



33, October 30, 2 p. m.

British gunboat ROBIN reports that the closing of the  
boom at Dosing is imminent and that she is today leaving  
Wuchow for Canton accompanying the three river steamships  
referred to in my No. 32, October 29, 6 p. m. carrying  
foreign refugees including American women and children.

Hong Kong please inform Japanese Consul General that  
these vessels are coming down West River and are carrying  
American citizens.

Repeated to Peiping, Chungking, Hong Kong.

LINNELL

RGC

EMB

793.94/14247

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 33) of October 30, 1938, from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

Reference is made to a telegram (No. 32) of October 29 from the American Consul General at Canton. The closing of the boom at Dosing is about to take place, according to reports from the British gunboat Robin which is leaving Wuchow on October 30 as a convoy to the three river boats which are carrying American women and children and other foreign refugees to Canton. The Consul General at Hong Kong is asked to inform the Japanese Consul General there that these boats, having on board American citizens, are coming down the West River.

793.94/14247.

EJC.  
FE:EJC:JPS  
10-31

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

PLAIN

FROM Canton via N. R.

Dated October 30, 1938

Rec'd 1:45 p. m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

34, October 30, 11 p. m.


The British Consul General has just informed me that

all the Americans finally decided to remain at Wuchow.  
The ROBIN started for Canton but the Japanese authorities  
have just notified the British Consul General that Japanese  
advance forces have seized Samshui in order to cut off all  
communication between Canton and Wuchow and they feared an  
incident if the ROBIN insisted on passing Samshui. The  
ROBIN has been instructed to await instructions at least  
five miles above Samshui.

Repeated to Chungking, Peiping, and Hong Kong.

LINNELL

EMB



793.94 / 14248

F / FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

GRAY

FROM Hong Kong via N. R.

Dated October 30, 1938

Rec'd 5 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

33, October 30, 9 a. m.


793.94/14098a

Referring to Department's telegram of October 15,  
3 p. m., Chungking has now asked this Consulate General,  
because of desire to conserve heavily taxed radio  
facilities, not to repeat by radio our reports containing  
general information without immediate bearing on action  
by the Embassy. Code texts of such other reports will  
go to Chungking by air mail.

Repeated to Peiping. By mail to Chungking.

SOUTHARD

EMB



793.94/14249

NOV 2 1938  
FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Hankow/134 FOR #492-

FROM Hankow (Josselyn) DATED Sept 7, 1938.  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict: developments of the month of August, 1938.

FRG.

793.94 / 14250

14250-

**B. Relations with Other Countries:**

**1. Japan.**

**(a) Military Operations.**

793.74  
Throughout August the chief theatre of Sino-Japanese hostilities was along the middle Yangtze with sectors both north and south of the river within a radius of about 30 miles from Kiukiang.

South of the river the Japanese captured Singtze (星子), on the east shore of Poyang Lake, on August 24, Juichang (瑞昌), on the highway southwest of Chih Lake, on August 24, and fought their way southward along the Kiukiang-Nanchang Railway to a point half way between Shaho (沙河) and Mahuiling (馬廸嶺). Strategic heights around Juichang and Mahuiling were the scenes of much bitter fighting with resulting heavy casualties on both sides.

North of the Yangtze the Japanese left wing driving southwest from Taihu (太湖) occupied Suzung (宿松) on the night of August 1, while the right wing crossed the Anhwei border and captured Hwangwei (黃梅) the following

Political report  
August 1938  
Hankow, China

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following evening. The Japanese offensive in this sector was soon brought to a standstill by flood waters from the Yangtze which the defenders had released at a point about 5 miles above Wusueh (武穴).

Scoring the first signal victory since the outbreak of hostilities on the Yangtze front the Chinese cut in behind Hwangmei on August 27 and recaptured both Susung and Taihu.

Chinese shore artillery along the Yangtze was unusually active and effective in shelling Japanese naval vessels and transports which had steamed up-river as far as Lungping (龍坪).

A concentration of 30,000 Japanese troops in the Hefei (合肥) area of western Anhwei began a westward drive during the last week of August which put them in possession of Liuan (六安) and points west of Liuan close to the Honan border. Here they are being opposed by more than 100,000 men under General Pai Chung-hai.

In southwest Shansi, the Japanese made rapid recovery of nearly all positions lost within the past few months, including Anyi, Yungtsi, Pinglu and Fenglingtu opposite Tungkwan. They also recovered Menghsien on the north bank of the Yellow River in Honan.

(b) Air Raids.

The Wuhan cities were raided eight times in August by the Japanese air force. The total number of civilian casualties resulting from the raids was in excess of 2,000. The severest raids occurred on August 11, 12, and 16. In Wushang and Hanyang on the 11th, 123 houses and shops were destroyed and 680 civilians were killed

or



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August 1938  
Hankow, China

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or wounded. About two-thirds of the casualties occurred in Hanyang where the bombs landed among a junk community and in other densely populated areas. Two hundred refugees were killed in Wuchang while waiting for a train at the East Station. The American Church Mission's Hwa Chung (Boone) College and St. Hilda's School for Girls were badly damaged. Several Chinese on the premises were killed.<sup>(a)</sup> The Right Reverend A. A. Gilman, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Hankow, and three other foreigners who were on the campus at the time narrowly escaped injury as two bombs landed within fifty yards of the Bishop's residence. The buildings of both institutions were conspicuously marked with American flags.

The raid on August 12 was almost as disastrous as that on the day before. Seventy-two planes participated in the attack. Some of the machines power-dived over the Hanchiapan Railway Station on the Wuchang side. Crossing the river they dropped bombs near the Liuchia-miao Railway Station east of the Hankow Japanese Concession. The civilian toll of dead and wounded was close to 500. Two direct hits were made on the Convent of St. Anne of the American Church Mission, Wuchang. The Wuchang clinic of the Seventh-Day Adventist Mission was completely demolished by the concussion from a bomb exploding next door. Twelve Chinese patients at the clinic were killed.<sup>(b)</sup>

There were 400 casualties and some 400 houses destroyed in the raid on August 16. Although all three cities were attacked, Wuchang suffered much more than  
either

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(a) Hankow's telegram, August 11, 4 p.m.  
(b) Hankow's telegram, August 12, 3 p.m.

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either Hanyang or Hankow. The Wuchang Art School, the Provincial Ninth Primary School, the Provincial High School, and the Post Office situated near the heart of the residential district were all hit and either badly damaged or destroyed.

So damaging were these raids to American missionary interests and so clearly did they point to insecurity in the future that the personnel of Hwa Chung College, Boone Middle School, and St. Hilda's School for Girls of the American Church Mission in Wuchang were moved to Kwangsi Province.

Japanese aerial activity in other parts of the District was wide-spread and particularly intense in Kiangsi, Hupeh, and Hunan. Unprecedented heavy losses were reported from Changsha and Nanchang, and from Yangsin (陽新) and Kingshan (京山) in Hupeh. At the latter place, on August 23, 200 bombs were dropped, destroying over 2,000 houses and exacting over 2,000 civilian casualties. In the raid on Yangsin on August 13, the American Franciscan Mission sustained property damage estimated at U.S.\$5,000.<sup>(a)</sup> Property of the American Evangelical Lutheran Mission at Ichang was also badly damaged during a Japanese air raid on that city on August 24.<sup>(b)</sup>

(c) British Customs Officer Machine-gunned by Japanese Airmen.

On August 2 Mr. J. T. C. Crawley, a Britisher in charge of a Chinese Customs vessel, and two Chinese members

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(a) Hankow's telegram, August 15, 12 noon.  
(b) Hankow's telegram, August 25, 12 noon.

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Hankow, China

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members of the crew, were machine-gunned and killed by Japanese airplanes at a point about 36 miles below Hankow.

Mr. Crawley had gone down river on the Customs light service ship KING HSING to remove beacons which might have aided Japanese vessels in approaching Hankow. When the ship was alongside one of the lights, six Japanese 'planes appeared and began dropping bombs. Seeing the danger, Mr. Crawley immediately crossed the river and beached his ship on the north bank, at the same time he gave orders to the crew to leave the ship and take cover ashore. The 'planes continued to drop bombs until one hit the KING HSING amidships setting the vessel on fire. Mr. Crawley was killed by machine-gun fire while struggling ashore.

(d) Attack on C.N.A.C. 'Plane Seen as Challenge to America.

The forcing down by Japanese pursuits on August 24 of the China National Aviation Corporation's passenger and mail 'plane KWEILIN and the subsequent machine-gunning of the inmates was unanimously interpreted by vernacular newspapers as "Japan's answer to recent American declarations of a stronger Far Eastern Policy."

The Wuhan press featured the story for several days in succession; and the marked similarity of the points emphasized made it appear likely that the Party Publicity Board had a hand in shaping their tenor. The central theme was that because the KWEILIN was operated by a Sino-American company and piloted by an American

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Hankow, China

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American citizen the attack, aside from its inhuman aspect, constituted an open challenge to the United States.

Dr. Chu Chia-hua, President of the Chinese League of Nations Union, reportedly sent a message to Senator Key Pittman explaining why "This shocking outrage caps the climax of Japan's violations of American prestige and interests in China."

A Foreign Office spokesman in Chungking described the KWEILIN disaster as "the darkest blot in world history, unparalleled in its savagery and illegality." The Japanese military, the spokesman said, have always been jealous of Third Power interests in China, and since August 13, 1937, have been doing everything possible to destroy such interests on the pretext of military necessity. They have taken a more provocative attitude toward the United States, due to the easy settlement of the PANAY Incident.

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END

