

MICROCOPY

976

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93

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 93

1940-44

793.94/16500-16799
Jan.-July 1941



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

0001

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94.

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Report by the Shanghai representative of British
and Chinese Corporation on Far Eastern situation
in November, 1940.

Encloses copy of -, with comments concerning portions of same.

mn

793.94/16500

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See # 121
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Dec. 21, 1940 From Shanghai (Lockhart)
To _____

File No. 893.00/ 14634

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Relations between China and Japan.

Political report for December 1940 contains information
on military situation and,-

FLH

793.94 / 16FOI

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See desp # 307
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Jan. 7, 1941 From Tsinan (Hawthorne)
To

File No. 893.00- PR Tsinan/135

PS/DB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Japanese military operations during December were confined to intensified and widespread attacks by Japanese aircraft on trade routes in unoccupied China.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See #-
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Jan. 9, 1941 From Canton (Myers)
To

File No. 893.00 P.R. Canton/155

793.94/16402

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Sino-Japanese relations. According to a Japanese press report, the Japanese military carried out "mopping up" operations in December against the guerilla units in the lower Yantze Valley especially around the Shanghai and Nanking districts.

793.34/16503

fp

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See _____ Des. # _____
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated _____ Jan. 14, 1941 _____ From _____ Shanghai (Copy of Des. #185 to the
To _____ Embassy at Peiping)

File No. _____ 893.00 P. R. Shanghai/147 _____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Conclusion on November 30 of the treaty between Japan
and the "New Chinese National Government" at
Nanking: Report of press comment regarding --.

793.94 / 16505

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See #5321
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Jan. 23, 1941 From Japan (Grew)
To

File No. 894.00 P.R./156

0005
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Sino- Japanese relations. Report on large concentration of troops and supplies in Tongking. Much speculation as to this, and one source states that the Japanese may return in force to Langson and to Yunnan and Kwangsi frontiers.

fp

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. 15- 4pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb 6, 1941 From Saigon (Hanoi) (Reed)
To

File No. 751g.94/202

793.94 / 16506

0006

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Japan trying to arrange a peace with General
Chiang Kai Shek in preparation for southward
advance.

mr

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #53, 5 pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 6, 1941 From China (Smyth)
To

File No. 740.0011 P.W./79

793.94 / 16507

0007

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Appointment of Clarence E. Gauss as Ambassador to China:

Today's issue of NICHU NICHU discuss -; points out service
he rendered in establishment of fundamental American Pro-
Chiang and anti-Japanese policy; explanation.

db

755.94/16508

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #189.5pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 9, 1941 From Japan (Grew)
~~To~~

File No. 123 G 231/523

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

PLAIN

Tokyo via Shanghai & N. R.

Dated February 9, 1941

Rec'd 12:30 p.m., 12th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

189, February 9, 5 p.m.

Both today's NICHU NICHU editorial and column entitled "faces of the times" discuss appointment Gauss, Ambassador China, interpreting it strengthened American and Chiang Kai Shek. Since Tripartite Pact, increasingly complex close relations American-Chungking Governments seen demand man of action carry out clear American policy aid Chiang obstruct Japan's East Asia co-prosperity sphere. Johnson endeavored secure British-Soviet cooperation and total embargo American exports Japan, rendered important service establishment fundamental American pro-Chiang anti-Japanese policy. However question now one translating policy concrete action. That America will proceed carry out positive policy indicates visit Chungking economic specialist Currie contemplated despatch military advisers Chungking and appointment Gauss renowned for efficiency executive ability.

Sent Department via Shanghai.

HPD

GREW

0005
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Chinese-Japanese relations.

Information relative to statement of Japanese
Foreign Minister with respect to incident at
Liautiaokow.

M

lw

793.94/16509

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See REL. 4196, 7pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 10, 1941 From Japan (Grew)
To

File No. 711.94/1954

0010

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Relations between China and Japan.

Information regarding the Germans have persuaded the Japanese to agree to the cession of Sakhalin and that in consequence a Soviet-Japanese agreement was to be anticipated which would result in the release of the Japanese armies now in Manchukuo for use against Chiang Kaishek at the same time that the Japanese naval forces moved further south

FL

793.94/16510

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel # 255 9 PM
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 10, 1941 From USSR(Steinhardt)
To

File No. 761.94/1272

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunsaker NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Relations between China and Japan.

Transmits letter from Edwin O. Kennedy making
protest against alleged bombings in Canton
by aircraft stated to have been manufactured by
Ford Motor Company and used by Japanese.

FLH

793.94/16511

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See letter
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 13, 1941 From Wiley, Alexander USS
To

File No. 894.24/1249

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Relations between China and Japan.

Reports from Miras Bay area indicate that Chinese guerrillas continue to worry the Japanese but there has been no important fighting. Landing of troops and loading of supplies. Possibility of Japanese planning at least a temporary base in Bias Bay. Reports occasional arrival and departure of Japanese warships and transports.

FLH

793.94/16512

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel # 67 8 PM
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb 26, 1941 From Hong Kong (Southard)
To

File No. 894.33/37

001
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (Br)

Hong Kong via N. R.

FROM

Dated March 7, 1941

Rec'd 10:50 a.m.

COMMUNICATED ORALLY
TO ONE AND MID 3/8/41 SD

Secretary of State,

Washington.

84, March 7, 11 a.m.

In continuation of my 81, March 6, 11 a.m.

I have information from first-hand sources that the
French leased territory of Kwangchowwan has been effectively
although not nominally blockaded by the Japanese by land
as well as by sea. It is thought that American missionary
organizations which have depended a lot on that port for
their supplies will suffer considerable inconvenience.

Reasonably reliable reports indicate that the Japanese
are establishing governments at the places named in my
81 in contrast with their previous practice of placing the
Government of such (?) places in this general area under
control of Chinese puppets or of a Chinese "Peace Maintenance
Committee". Estimates reaching Hong Kong indicate that
about one thousand troops landed at each of the places
named in my 81 excepting at Pakhoi where it is estimated
that the number was at least 2000.

Sent to the Department; repeated to Chungking Canton
and Peiping for Tokyo.

SOUTHARD

HPD

793.94/16513

PS/DE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

^{CORRECTED COPY}
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JT

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated **FROM**
 to anyone. (br)

HONG KONG VIA N.R.

Dated March 10, 1941

Rec'd 8:10 a.m.

10' Jtd 16514
23 ST
 DISTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY
 TO CNI AND MID *3/10/41 SD*
 Secretary of State,

Washington.

88, March 10, 11 a.m.

In continuation of my 84, March 7, 11 a.m.

It is reliably reported in Hong Kong that the
 Japanese after destroying shipping facilities have with-
 drawn from the places on the Kwangtung coast listed in
 my 81, with the exception of Kwonghoi which is a possible
 base for the loading of materials being seized in the
 Toishan district. Reports current here indicate that there
 will be a more strict Japanese naval patrol along
 Kwangtung coast with a view to suppressing trade.

Various and contradictory reports have come to Hong
 Kong indicating pillaging by the Japanese in the Toishan
 district where reside many American-Chinese and American
 missionaries. Vice Consul Rinden having returned today
 to Hong Kong, I plan to send Consul Ward tomorrow or
 next day to Macao to learn what he can from possible
 Toishan refugees there.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking,
 Canton and Peiping for Tokyo.

RR

SOUTHARD

FW 793.94/16514

PS/FF

APR 2 1941

RECEIVED

RE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

See Corrected Copy

U-L

TELEGRAM RECEIVED HONG KONG VIA N.R.

PAW
 This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (Br)

Dated March 10, 1941

FROM

Rec'd 8:10 a.m.

ONI AND MID 3/10/41 3D
 Secretary of State

Washington

88, March 10, 11 a.m.

In continuation of my 84, March 7, 11 a.m.

It is reliably reported in Hong Kong that the Japanese after destroying shipping facilities have withdrawn from the places on the Kwangtung coast listed in my 81, with the exception of Kwonghoi which is a possible base for the loading of materials being seized in the Toishan district. Reports current here indicate that there will be a more strict Japanese naval patrol along Kwangtung coast with a view to suppressing trade.

Various and contradictory reports have come to Hong Kong indicating pillaging by the Japanese in the Toishan district where ^{reside} there is likely many American-Chinese and American missionaries. Vice Consul Rinden having returned today to Hong Kong, I plan to send Consul ^{Ward tomorrow or} Hemminger next day to Macao to learn what he can from possible Toishan refugees there.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking, Canton and Peiping for Tokyo.

SOUTHARD

RR

793:94/16514

REK

PS/JHS

REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JT **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**
 This telegram must be CANTON VIA N.R.
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated Dated March 10, 1941
 to anyone. (br) FROM Rec'd 3:14 p.m.

3/14/41 JD
 Secretary of State,
 Washington.



12, March 10, 5 p.m. 16496
 Reference my 11, March 6, 11 a.m.


According to an announcement issued yesterday by the Japanese South China Expeditionary forces Japanese detachments which landed at various points on the coast of south Kwangtung having accomplished their purpose have been withdrawn. As reported in the local press the booty confiscated by the Japanese detachments included such articles as rice, petroleum products, principally kerosene, arms and ammunition, cement, tung oil, sugar, et cetera.

Although it is likely that the main reason for the raids was to cut supply routes used by the Chungking Government, the list of articles suggests that foraging also might have been an objective. This withdrawal was not unexpected in view of the extensive coast line covered by these operations and the absence of important ports.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping, Chungking, Hong Kong.

CSB

MYERS



793.94/16515

PS/DB

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOR

Please Index and

Return to FE ()

File (✓)

0018

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STATE
RECEIVED
MAY 10 1941

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

March 10, 1941.

The following message was received from the Assistant
Naval Attache at Chungking under date of March 8, 1941:

THE HEAD OF THE CHINESE INTELLIGENCE STATES THAT THE
KWANGT TUNG COAST OPERATIONS OF THE JAPANESE INTENDS TO CUT
SMUGGLING ROUTES, DESTROY SALT FIELDS, AND FORCE THE CHINESE
INLAND. IT IS BELIEVED THERE ARE ONLY A FEW THOUSAND JAP
TROOPS BUT DETAILS ARE NOT YET AVAILABLE. THE CHINESE ARE
INTENSELY CONCERNED OVER THE FORTHCOMING JOURNEY OF MATSUOKA
TO KOSCOV AND BERLIN. NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE WITH THE RUSSIANS.
AN OPEN BREAK WOULD NOT BE DESIRABLE AND BOTH SIDES ARE ANXIOUS
TO AVOID IT.

793.94/16516

793.94
CC: Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. Hornbeck.

RECEIVED
MAY 3 1941
BY 87 3/20/73

FILED

MAR 13 1941

PS/DB

16576

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DCR

Please Index and

Return to FE ()

File (✓)

0020

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

A
File

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL PARAPHRASE March 10, 1941.

The following message was received from the Station Ship at Hongkong under date of March 9, 1941:

THERE WERE SIX SMALL LANDINGS BETWEEN PAKHOIY AND TOWSHAN BY TWO REGIMENTS OF JAPANESE TROOPS WHICH WERE IDENTIFIED AS BEING FROM ~~HAINAN~~ THE 38TH DIVISION AND SECOND GUARDS BRIGADE. FEW OF THE ABOVE WERE FROM HAINAN AND THE MAJORITY WERE FROM THE CANTON AREA. THE OBVIOUS PURPOSE IS THE CLOSING OF THE SMUGGLING ROUTES WHERE TRAFFIC HAS RECENTLY INCREASED AFTER THE CLOSURE OF BIAS BAY. JAPANESE NOW SELLING PASSES FOR COMMERCIAL SHIPMENTS. DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF MARCH TRANSPORTS OF VARIOUS SIZES UP TO 5,000 TONS WERE SEEN IN THE PEARL RIVER AREA, 17 GOING UP AND 14 GOING DOWN-STREAM. THE ABOVE IS FROM MCHUGH.

CC: Mr. Hamilton.✓
Mr. Hornbeck.

793.94/16517

FILED

MAR 13 1941

PS/DB

16517

0021

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GLW

GRAY

FROM Amoy via N. R.

Dated March 17, 1941

Rec'd 11:37 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

17, March 17, 9 a.m.

My telegram no. 8 February 11, 6 p.m.

193.14/16481

The Japanese Consul General's demand for the appointment of Japanese sergeants was rejected by the consular corps, the resigned members of the Municipal Council have now agreed to stand for reelection at the annual rate payers meeting to be held on March 24. It is believed therefore that the Council will be reconstituted as prior to the incident and that the situation will return to normal after the meeting.

793.94/16518

1941

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping and Chungking.

MERRELL

HSM

PS/DB

0022

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JT
This telegram must be **FROM**
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

HONG KONG VIA N.R.

Dated March 17, 1941

Rec'd 10:24 a.m.

3/20/41
Secretary of State,
Washington.



100, March 17, 11 a.m.

Reference second paragraph of my 88, March 10, 11 a.m.

Consul Ward has returned from a trip to Macao where
he found neither refugees nor first-hand information from
the ~~Japanese~~ landing at Kwonghoi and other places on the
Kwangtung coast. Macao people evidently knew very little
more of the event than they read in the Hong Kong
newspapers.

Rumors as to ~~Japanese~~ molestation of American-Chinese
in the Toishan district are no longer in circulation here
and presumably nothing very serious has happened there.
Mainly from maritime customs sources I have learned that
the Japanese may be expected to retain a landing hold
at Kwonghoi and depend upon increased naval patrols to
cut off trade through the other and now evacuated ports
named in my 81, March 6, 11 a.m. From various sources of
sometimes reliable information available to me I am of
the opinion that the Japanese will henceforth make a
much more determined effort to cut off all other than
purely local trade along the entire Kwangtung coast.

The



793.94/16513

RECEIVED
MAR 20 1941

PS/DP

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 100, March 17, 11 a.m., from Hong Kong

The numerous reports and rumors which daily reach Hong Kong, some from reasonably reliable sources, would indicate little doubt as to the substantially increased numbers of Japanese naval vessels now patrolling the sea off various ports from Amoy to Hainan Island.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking, Canton and Peiping for Tokyo.

SOUTHARD

WWC:HSM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 4, 1941

~~WWS:~~ ~~PMJ:~~
~~WES:~~ ~~CC:~~
~~WB:~~ ~~WMA:~~

793.94/16520

Tokyo's despatch no. 5398, February 27, 1941, subject "Transmitting a Translation of Excerpts from a Book by Admiral Suetsugu Entitled 'Japan and Nazi Germany'".

The enclosure is of interest because its author was a member of the Supreme War Council in 1937 at the time of his retirement, and he is now serving as Chairman of the Central Cooperative Conference of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

The Admiral states that hostilities in China have been protracted because of (a) the failure to declare war on China and to invoke belligerent rights, (b) failure of the nation to appreciate the true significance of the Sino-Japanese conflict, (c) the deep anti-Japanese sentiment in China, (d) foreign assistance to Chungking. The author does not reject the possibility of a negotiated settlement with Chiang. He states "If the settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict is an urgent necessity of the moment for cooperating with the international situation...careful consideration should certainly be given to the matter of direct negotiations with Chiang". Also "Economically, the importance of the Mandated Islands in the South Seas is negligible but their strategic value is enormous".

The

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-2-

The despatch states that the Admiral's views give the impression that the Government and people of Japan are wearied of the China venture and are seeking an escape, and are conscious of the prospect of immediate rewards in the South.

793.94/16520

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FE:Fales:HNS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1941 MAR 17 PM 3 36

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Tokyo, February 27, 1941.

No. 5398.

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTING A TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM
A BOOK BY ADMIRAL SUETSUGU ENTITLED "JAPAN
AND NAZI GERMANY".

7-78-18
C-78
File
Department of
WAG

Copy in 7E.

O.N.I. = M.I.D.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND
4/1/41 REIC

703.34/16520 PS/FF

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to our despatch no. 5385, February 21,
1941, commenting upon a magazine article by Admiral
Nobunasa Suetsugu in regard to various strategical and
diplomatic factors which relate to the question of a
possible American-Japanese conflict, I have the honor
to enclose, as of possible interest to the Department,

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APR 8 - 1941
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-2-

a translation, appearing in the February 20, 1941, issue of CONTEMPORARY OPINIONS, of excerpts from a book by the same author entitled "Japan and Nazi Germany". The present discussion is principally devoted to examining the causes of Japan's failure to bring the China conflict to a prompt and successful conclusion, but it also touches briefly on questions of Japanese defense strategy and the importance of establishing the "East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" as a means of freeing Japan from dependence on non- Asiatic sources for the supply of essential raw materials.

The following four reasons are advanced to explain the protraction of hostilities in China:

1. Failure to declare war on China and to invoke the advantages which belligerent rights would confer on Japan. As soon as hostilities spread to Shanghai it should have been realized that the conflict had passed beyond the "incident" stage. Acceptance of belligerent status would enable Japan to intercept war materials supplied to Chiang Kai-shek by third powers.
2. Failure of the nation to appreciate the true significance of the Sino-Japanese conflict. If it were generally recognized that the present Sino-Japanese hostilities are a "historical necessity" for the "creation of a new order", everyone "would be burning with grim determination to give up his life for the cause of the nation". (This argument admits that the China conflict is viewed with at least a certain degree of indifference or apathy in Japan).
3. "Anti-Japanese sentiment is widespread and deep rooted in China". (There appears in the text of the translation no attempt to explain the basis for this antipathy).
4. Assistance given to the Chungking regime by foreign powers. Unaided the Chiang regime is not strong enough to fight Japan but foreign support, material and morale, has bolstered its resistance.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

In order to bring the conflict to an end, the elimination of all or as many as possible of the foregoing factors is urged and the author mentions the following conditions as destined to contribute to the eventual collapse of Chinese resistance: poor military equipment, a shortage in Chungking of food and other basic materials, the effect of the European war in cutting off Britain and France from the Far East, the blockade of supply routes to Chungking by Japanese forces, and the telling effect of constant Japanese air raids on Chungking and other major cities under the influence of Chiang.

The author recommends that prompt and effective blows be dealt the tottering Chungking regime but at the same time he does not reject the possibility of negotiating directly with Chiang Kai-shek for a settlement of the conflict. That such negotiations, and any peace settlement evolved therefrom, would be looked upon, however, only as an unwelcome expedient is indicated by the following statement:

"If the settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict is an urgent necessity of the moment for coping with the international situation that is making kaleidoscopic changes, careful consideration should certainly be given to the matter of direct negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek."

The author's discussion of the Japanese defense system follows closely his exposition of that subject reviewed in the despatch under reference. His reference to the role of the mandated islands in the Japanese defense system appears of interest, however, as possibly throwing some

light

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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light on a subject which has long been shrouded in mystery:

"The chain of the Japanese islands extending over a length of 3,000 miles would be weak, were they a mere stretch of an island, but it consists of several links, including the seven islands of Izu and the Ogasawara (Bonin) group at the south of Tokyo Bay, and the mandated islands below the Equator. Economically, the importance of the mandated islands in the South Seas is negligible but their strategic value is enormous."

Japan is urged to proceed undeterred toward the realization of the "East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and the observation is made that oil, the only really vital material which Japan lacks, is found in the Netherlands East Indies. Admiral Suetsugu, although Chairman of the National Cooperative Council of the "Imperial Rule Assistance Association" is relatively indifferent to Japanese internal questions as can be inferred from the remark: "The domestic new structure is all very well and good, but.....can well afford to wait." Finally, Japan's determination to profit from the war prostration and preoccupation of potential opponents may be discerned in his warning, "The European war does not seem to become an enduring contest, and it is a foregone conclusion that when the European war is about finished, there will be a storm in East Asia".

From an examination of Admiral Suetsugu's views, one gains the distinct impression that the Government, leaders and people of Japan have long since wearied of the protracted and profitless China venture and that they have now turned to

a


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

a frantic search for an avenue of escape from this exhausting and inconclusive struggle. The prospect of richer immediate rewards appears to have diverted the focus of Japanese expansionist attention away from China to the mainland and islands of southeastern Asia. Moreover, it would be idle to expect Japan to overlook the advantage of prosecuting a vigorous policy in that region at a time when potential opponents of her program are engrossed with a European war. Viewed against this background, Japan's desire to terminate the war in China, and thus put an end to this source of drain on her resources and military strength, becomes at once understandable and significant.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph C. Grew.

710
CAC:C

Enclosure:

1/ As stated above.

Copy to Embassy, Peiping;
" " " Chungking;
" " Consulate General, Shanghai.

Original and 3 copies to Department.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch
 no. 5398 dated February 27, 1941,
 from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Extract translated from "Japan and Nazi Germany" by
 Admiral Nobumasa Suetsugu.

Japan is now faced with many important problems. The purpose of the present article is to present the writer's frank views centering around two important subjects, namely, how the Sino-Japanese conflict can be speedily settled and what is the actual strength of Japan.

Well over three years have elapsed since the Sino-Japanese crusade started. What is the cause of this protraction of the hostilities? We must probe into the root causes.

There are, at least, four reasons for this prolongation of the conflict. Firstly, not only was Japan unprepared but her mind was not made up. Although it is no use crying over spilt milk, Japan should have made up her mind at once when the conflict spread to Shanghai and Chiang Kai-shek began to assume an offensive against Japan. Certainly Japan should have declared war against China or invoked belligerent rights; whereas, despite the fact that the hostilities spread from North to Central China and then to South China, Japan still continued to treat the conflict as an "incident". In the face of the Japanese naval blockade of China costs, third Power vessels, fully loaded with war materials for Chiang Kai-shek, are passing within sight and sound of Japan warships. But Japan can do nothing. It is obvious that the foreign

settlements

-2-

settlements and concessions in Tientsin and Shanghai are the hotbeds of anti-Japanese movements of the Chiang regime, but so far Japan cannot touch them, simply because the conflict is an incident and not war.

Secondly, the serious nature of the Sino-Japanese conflict does not seem to have been fully grasped by the entire nation. Needless to say, the present Sino-Japanese hostilities are a historical inevitability. It is a war for the creation of a new order in place of the old order, Japan took the lead in this move, and similarly in Europe Germany is fighting for a new world order. If this is clearly realized - that this war is for securing a living space for his country - every soul and heart would be burning with grim determination to give up his life for the cause of the nation.

Thirdly, the anti-Japanese sentiment is widespread and deep rooted in China. Fourthly, the aid of third Powers to the Chungking regime. It is obvious that the Chiang regime is not strong enough to fight Japan alone, and it is only due to the material and moral support of third Powers that it has been able to continue its resistance against Japan.

If the aforementioned four causes are removed, the Sino-Japanese conflict can eventually be brought to an end. Even if one or two of these causes can be removed, the solution of the conflict will be very much accelerated since these four factors are closely interrelated.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The Sino-Japanese conflict, however, seems to be nearing its last stage. According to recent reports, the Chinese troops are now poorly equipped with practically no field guns, and rifles not being supplied to every soldier, though they still seem to be armed with some howitzers and machine-guns. On the other hand, Chungking is suffering from severe shortage of food and other basic materials. The withdrawal of Britain and France from the Far East on account of the European war, the thorough blockade of all supply routes to Chungking by Japanese forces, such as the Hongkong, French Indo-China and Burma roads, as well as China's coastal ports, and the constant Japanese air raids on Chungking and other major cities under the influence of Chiang have all served to deal a telling blow to the Chungking regime, as a result of which peace talks have now reportedly come to the fore among some of the Chungking leaders.

Although the Chiang regime has greatly weakened, the Sino-Japanese conflict will reach no solution, if we are to let things alone; we should take advantage of the weakening Chungking regime and deal a coup de grace. One of the methods would be, for instance, to launch a severe attack, and another would be to intercept more rigidly the supply of all materials by third Powers. Several other measures can be taken: the foreign concessions and settlements may be retroceded to China at the point of the bayonet; Hongkong being the

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

the base of anti-Japanese movements, Britain may be asked to evacuate the island; another would be to make an advance toward the South Seas region for the purpose of establishing an economic bloc in East Asia.

Fundamental improvement in international relations should be sought. By improvement in international relations, however, the writer does not mean that Japan should court the friendship of every and all countries indiscreetly. It would be difficult to overcome the present national crisis with the idea of trying to maneuver between the Anglo-American and Italo-German camps. Japan should make a frank and fearless proclamation of her true intentions and make it known to the world that she is unshakably determined to weather the present storm at any cost. It is only by so doing that the present stalemate in Japan's diplomacy can be broken.

Direct negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek is another way out of the impasse. Whatever agreement might have been concluded with the Wang regime, so long as the Chiang regime survives and keeps on its resistance campaign, solution of the Sino-Japanese conflict cannot be attained. In the Konoye proclamation of November 3, 1938, it was clearly stated that Japan would not reject the National Government, if it should renounce its past policy and participate in the construction of a new order in East Asia. Therefore, there is no reason why direct negotiations with Chiang should not be conducted. If settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict is an urgent necessity of the moment for coping with the international situation that is making kaleidoscopic changes, careful consideration should

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

should certainly be given to the matter of direct negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek.

Let me now survey the defense position of Japan. Geographically, the Empire extends over a coastal line of approximately 2,600 miles from Chishima in the north and down to Taiwan in the south, and today the line is extended to Hainan Island and the Spratley Islands, thereby flanking the coast of the Asiatic Continent from north to south. Not only that, we have the Korean Peninsula as a jumping off place and beyond that we have Manchukuo which is in inseparable relationship with Japan. Thus she has a most solid foothold on the Continent. Seeing this strategical position of Japan no nation with common sense would dare to take any selfish action toward the China Continent without the understanding of Japan. This is, indeed, Nature's gift to Japan. The chain of the Japanese islands extending over a length of 3,000 miles would be weak, were they a mere stretch of an island, but it consists of several links, including the seven islands of Izu and the Ogasawara (Bonin) group at the south of Tokyo Bay, and the mandated islands below the Equator. Economically, the importance of the mandated Islands in the South Seas is negligible, but their strategic value is enormous.

Suppose the United States attempts to send a large fleet to the Orient. The best course for the U.S. fleet would be to come out to the Philippine Islands via Hawaii through the mid-Pacific. There is another course and that is via the Aleutian Archipelago in the north, but
this

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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this is not suitable for the movement of a large fleet owing to the heavy fog. Making a large detour south of the Equator would be still another way, but the distance is tremendous. Therefore, the network of Japanese islands, including the South Seas islands and the various groups on the western Pacific, will serve a useful purpose in the country's defense against an attack from the eastern Pacific. Another course in the southwest Pacific may be considered, but this is very complicated and fraught with danger in view of the progress attained in warplanes and submarines, and it would require Herculean courage for an enemy fleet to approach the mainland of Japan looking askance at Taiwan, Hainan and the Spratley Islands.

Now on the question of resources, people are getting querulous about shortage of materials and commodities, but that is because they want to have everything one hundred percent. There is no nation on earth, which is self-sufficient in everything. Japan is not short of foodstuffs. If her people experience shortage of food, it is because there is something wrong in production and distribution. It is true that there are various things Japan is short of, but if matters are thoroughly probed into, oil is about the only material that Japan really lacks. Must Japan kow-tow forever to America for her oil? Isn't she able to stand on her own feet? And construct the proposed new order in East Asia? Without solving these problems the talk of settlement of the Sino-Japanese hostilities is sheer nonsense.

What

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-7-

What is to be done then? There is no other alternative but to realize the establishment of the East Asia co-prosperity sphere at all cost. If the United States does not want to sell oil, we have to get it by some means and at any cost from somewhere for the sake of our existence. That oil is in the Netherlands East Indies.

It is well understood that America does not want to permit Japan to have a free hand in China and the South Seas. Mobilizing her entire fleet and air forces on a wartime footing, the United States is trying to threaten Japan. But Japan's naval strength is not in any way inferior, if not greater, to that of the United States. By concentrating her entire fleet and air forces on the Pacific, the United States is leaving her front door wide open, leaving France to sing her own requiem and has no time to come to the rescue of Britain in her hour of need.

In short, the world is now passing through an age of war. In an age of war, there is wartime morality and this is fully admitted by Westerners. That is why they have the wartime international law. The world situation is undergoing hourly changes. The European war does not seem to become an enduring contest, and it is a foregone conclusion that when the European war is about finished, there will be a storm in East Asia. The domestic new structure is all very well and good, but one should not lose sight of the fact that the present international situation calls for immediate and prompt action. Speeding up of the diplomatic volte-face should be given priority over the internal new structure which can well afford to wait.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 20.

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Amoy, China, January 31, 1941.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Request that the Chinese Suicide Squad's Incursions be Diverted from the International Settlement.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit, for the information of the Department, a copy of my despatch to the Embassy at Peiping, dated January 31, 1941, Subject: "Request that the Chinese Suicide Squad's Incursions be Diverted from the International Settlement."

Respectfully yours,

George R. Merrell
American Consul

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch to Embassy at Peiping dated January 31, 1941.

810.2
GRM/O

Transmitted in quintuplicate (one copy marked "For the files of the Commercial Office").

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
Department of State

MAR 23 1941

DIVISION OF

793.94/16521

IS/DP

APR 1 - 1941

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 13.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Amoy, China, January 31, 1941.

Subject: Request that the Chinese Suicide Squad's
Incursions be Diverted from the Inter-
national Settlement.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the last paragraph of my despatch No. 12 of January 30, 1941, regarding substantial reports from two reliable foreign sources of the existence of a Chinese suicide squad which has orders to make incursions on Amoy and Kulangsu from the mainland for the purpose of terrorizing Chinese and Formosans in the employ of the Japanese.

These reports include the assertion that by the end of the war no Japanese puppet in this vicinity will remain alive.

It is respectfully submitted that if the Embassy considers such action practicable and appropriate it would be most helpful if the authorities at Chungking could be persuaded to have the activities of such a suicide squad diverted from the International Settlement. The Third Power Consuls and Members of the Municipal Council here are doing everything in their power to prevent Japanese

encroachment

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

encroachment and to maintain the neutrality of the Settlement. Any terrorist acts committed on Kulangsu by the Chinese are merely calculated to increase the possibilities of the Island's becoming a base for Japanese military operations.

Respectfully yours,

George R. Merrell
American Consul

810.2
GRM/O

Original to Embassy, Peking.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.
Copy to Commander South China Petrol.
Five copies to Department of State, with despatch No. 20 of January 31, 1941.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JT

This telegram must be HANKOW VIA N.R.
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated FROM Dated March 18, 1941
to anyone. (br) Rec'd 2 p.m.

3/20/41 TO

Secretary of State,
Washington.

March 18, 9 a.m.

Reference my telegram of February 28, 2 p.m.,
military situation.

Japanese announce that within the past ten days their
forces in the Wuning Kiangsi and Tungcheng Hupeh areas
have "voluntarily withdrawn to more favorable positions"
after occupying the mentioned areas for two years or more.
At the same time, Japanese announce ^{OFFENSIVE} from their Nanchang
Kiangsi base against Chinese forces in the Fengsin and
Kaoan areas. Such moves appear to support Chinese
claims of their increased activities in northern Kiangsi
and southern Hupeh.

Japanese announce that on March 6 they crossed the
Yangtze River at Ichang and attacked Chinese forces
pressing upon the city. Reports indicate that severe
fighting continues with heavy losses on both sides.
On March 12 Chinese floating mines sank two large British
owned lighters at Ichang with the loss of nine lives.

Sent to Chungking, repeated to the Department,
Peiping, Shanghai.

CSB

SPIKER

793.94/16522

PC/JP

MR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (Br)

FROM

HONG KONG VIA N. R.

Dated March 18, 1941

Rec'd 1:55 p.m.


COMMUNICATED ORALLY
TO ONI AND MID 3/20/41 JD
Secretary of State,

Washington.

101, March 18, 11 a.m.

There has been for many days an unusual amount
of Japanese military movement throughout the Hong
Kong hinterland both ways between the Pearl River
and the East River--Bias Bay area. Apparently troops
landed at Bias Bay move across to the Poon District
on the Pearl River and vice versa. Total number of
troops concerned is estimated at not more than 10,000
at any one period and the movements indicated have
usually been carried on by bodies estimated as small
as 300 in some instances and as large as 2,000 in
others. There has been some fighting with Chinese
irregulars but no important engagements here.

Most of the various and usually reliable sources
in which I have sought, appear to be puzzled as to the
purpose of these criss-cross movements and doubt whether
they have any great military importance locally. Some
road building and other temporary building construction
has



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 101, March 18, 1941, 11 a.m. from Hong Kong.

has been noted in the areas indicated but forced local labor appears to have been mainly used for this. It would seem reasonable to infer that these movements may be primarily for drill and practice (as a way point between Formosa and Hainan and vice versa) as the Japanese troops involved appear to be often replaced by new arrivals both via the Pearl River and via Bias Bay.

Sent to the Department repeated to Chungking, Canton and Peiping for Tokyo.

SOUTHARD

WWC

0044

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE OF THE ADVISER ON
 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
 MAR 24 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LS
 This telegram must be _____ HONG KONG VIA N. R.
 closely paraphrased
 before being communicated Dated March 19, 1941
 to anyone. (Br.)

FROM

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

Secretary of State
 Washington.

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
 MR. HUNTER
 MAR 21 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

URGENT
 MAR 21 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Telegram to
 Hong Kong
 drafted 3-20-41
 GA:HES

103, March 19, 11 a.m.

According to the best reports available in Hong
 Kong the Japanese have now evacuated Kwanghoi after
 removing considerable quantities of wood oil and wolfram
 and bristles which have been collected there for ship-
 ment to the United States via Hong Kong.

I have quite reliable information that trade be-
 tween Hong Kong and free China is now reaching consider-
 able volume via the ~~port~~ ^{PORT} of Swabue on Honghai Bay which
 is the first bay east of Bias Bay. During the past few
 days at least six small steamers heavily laden have
 left Hong Kong for that port. The Japanese should know
 of this but there is no information available to me to
 indicate that they do. They could easily occupy Swabue
 with forces available in Bias Bay. Numerous junks which
 were formerly employed between Hong Kong and Miao Bay
 are now using this new trade route to Swabue with so
 far no reported serious molestation by the Japanese.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking,
 Canton and Peiping for Tokyo.

SOUTHARD

XLP

793.94/16524

FILED

PS/JHS

MAR 22 1941

793.94

0045

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN
 "BR"

Department of State

Collect ☐ Full rate
☐ Day letter
☐ Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

21
 March 20, 1941. ✓

6 p m
 Naval Record

AMERICAN CONSUL,

HONG KONG. *via HK.*

INFO: AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING (CHINA).
 AMEMBASSY, PEIPING (CHINA).

61

Your 103, March 19, 11 a.m. ✓

The Department believes that some of the statements ✓
 and information contained in the second substantive ✓
 paragraph of your telegram under reference are of a ✓
 type which should not repeat not be communicated by ✓
 radio. ✓✓

Sent to Hong Kong. Repeated to Chungking ✓
 Peiping. ✓

W. Allen
 Acting

SICK

793.94/16524

FE:GA:HES

FE

PA/H

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.,

19

793.94/16524

PS/JHS

0048
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

GMW

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Hong Kong via N. R.

Dated March 20, 1941

Rec'd 10:26 a.m.

3/21/41 30
Secretary of State,

Washington.

104, March 20, 9 p.m.


Reference last paragraph of my 67/ February 26, Noon.

79394
The Chinese agent of a (?) official who has just returned to Hong Kong after a tour of observation of the shore area of Bias Bay reports that the only Japanese construction of a possible military character which he saw there was a temporary bamboo jetty and a roughly constructed air field intended apparently only for emergency use.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking, Canton, and Peiping for Tokyo.

SOUTHARD

HSW



793.94/16525

PS/DF


APR 1 - 1941

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM



GMW

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Hong Kong via N. R.

Dated March 21, 1941

SECRET COMMUNICATED ORALLY
TO CNI AND MID 3/21/41 7D

Rec'd 10:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

108, March 21, 12 Noon.

I have been informed from a usually reliable French source in Hong Kong that the Japanese have just landed at air fields in Tongking, Indochina, 300 heavy bombers presumably for a mass attack on the Burma Road.

Sent to Department, repeated to Hanoi to Chungking and Peiping for Tokyo.

SOUTHARD


WSB

APR 1 - 1941

FILED

793.94/16526

PS/DB



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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED BROWNY

KD _____ Hong Kong via N. R.
FROM _____ Dated March 22, 1941
Rec'd. 5:25 a. m.

Brown
SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY
TO ONI AND MID 3/24/41 TD
Secretary of State,
Washington.

109, March 22, 10 a. m.
Reference my 103, March 19, 11 a. m.



Information from reasonably reliable sources indicates that Japanese bombers are now becoming active in the Swabue area. One aircraft carrier is reported to have been seen three or four days ago in Honghai Bay. These and other circumstances indicate possibility of early Japanese landing to cut the Swabue trade route.

Sent to Department, repeated to Chungking, Canton and Peiping for Tokyo.

SOUTHARD.

WWC

793 .94 / 16527


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APR 1 - 1941
FILED


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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Handed to me by Mr. Butler of
 the British Embassy, Febr. 17, 1941.



RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE



On February 7th, the British Military Attache

at Chungking reported to the War Office as follows:-

Japanese action on the Kwangtung Coast makes the Burma Road all the more important for the continuance of Chinese resistance. The lack of anti-aircraft guns on the Mekong and other river crossings enables the Japanese to bomb the bridges at will and from a low altitude. Recent Japanese attack damaged both the Mekong bridges. One may take months and the other weeks to repair. Meanwhile, the make-shift ferry arrangements are entirely inadequate. I have impressed on the Chinese that unless adequate anti-aircraft defence of the bridges is inaugurated, the Japanese are capable of destroying them at will.

793.94/16528

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.,

February 17th, 1941.

FILED
 MAR 29 1941

PS/DB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

KD

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)



Hanoi via N. R.

Dated March 21, 1941

Rec'd. 4:30 a.m., 22nd

3/24/41 JD
Secretary of State,

Washington.



44, March 21, 7 a. m.

Hong Kong's telegram No. 108, March 21, noon,
and my telegram No. 43, March 19, 1 p. m.

Military sources of information confirm that there were 91 Japanese airplanes (*60 bombers) in Tongking on March 19th and state that there have been few if any new arrivals subsequent to that date. I have noticed no great increase in activity at Gialiam during the last few days and that base and Haiphong are understood to be the only airports now in use by the Japanese. The Japanese have requested permission to install at once, but for a period of from one month to six weeks, meteorological stations at Lokey and Hagiang a request presaging increased activity against South China and Yunnan and which will probably be granted. At the same time however within the last two days the Japanese have made it known THAT THE work in progress at Gialiam will be completed, other proposed

793.94/16529

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APR 7 - 1941

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #44, March 21, 7 a. m., from Hanoi via N. R.

proposed construction at that place will not be undertaken
which may mean that the Japanese will transfer at least a
part of their aerial activities to bases in Thailand.

Sent to Cavite for repetition to the Department,
Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong, Shanghai Canton.

REED.

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

~~RB~~
~~JMJ~~
~~JD~~

~~GA~~
~~WMA~~

~~MATH~~
~~PA/H~~

March 31, 1941

Chungking's despatch no. 793, February 25, 1941, "Military Situation in Yunnan".

In an interview on February 17 General Ho Ying-chin, Chief of the Chinese General Staff, informed Dr. Lauchlin Currie that four army corps comprising twelve divisions of National Government troops have been transferred to southern Yunnan.

Military dispositions in southern Yunnan appear to confirm that the National Government and Yunnan Provincial authorities are cooperating closely in plans for the defense of Yunnan and that the National Government is taking pains to check any possible Japanese advance into the province.

The feeling remains prevalent in Chungking that the Japanese are not at this time prepared to risk a military invasion of Yunnan.

793.94/16530

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 793 Chungking, February 25, 1941.
 SUBJECT: MILITARY SITUATION IN YUNNAN.

AIR MAIL

CONFIDENTIAL

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 WAX

Approved	For Distribution	For Filing	For	Ne
ONE FILED				

793.94/16530

CONFIDENTIAL
 in confidence 3/2/41 REK

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to Kunming's despatches no. 156, December 27, 1940 and no. 186, February 15, 1940, both addressed to the Department, and to the Embassy's telegram no. 643, December 30, 3 p.m., 1940, to the Department, all of which dealt with phases of the military situation in Yunnan.

The Department may be interested to learn that General Ho Ying-chin, Chief of the Chinese General Staff and concurrently Minister of Military Administration, who returned to Chungking on February 15, 1941 from an inspection of about a month's duration in Yunnan, invited Dr. Lauchlin Currie to call on him. In the course of the call, which took place on February 17, 1941, General Ho indicated on his own staff map the Chinese military dispositions of that province. He explained to Dr. Currie that three lines of defense have been prepared in southeast Yunnan against a possible invasion from French Indochina; that four army corps comprising a total of twelve divisions of troops of the National Government have been transferred to southern Yunnan; and that General Kuan Lien-chung, who played a

prominent

APR 9 1941
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

prominent part in throwing back the Japanese attack on Changsha, Hunan, in September and October 1939, has been placed in command of Chinese military operations in southern Yunnan.

National Government military dispositions in the southern Yunnan area, as related above, appear to confirm 1) that the National Government and Yunnan Provincial authorities are cooperating closely in plans for the defense of Yunnan, and 2) that the National Government is taking pains to check any possible Japanese advance into Yunnan, the object of which doubtless would be to cut the strategic Burma highway. Although the Chinese are making thorough preparations to resist a Japanese incursion into Yunnan, the feeling remains prevalent in Chungking that the Japanese are not at this time prepared to risk a military invasion of any proportions into a province as difficult as Yunnan is to operate in. And with the approach of the rainy season the possibilities of such an attack are appreciably diminished. The consensus in Chungking is that the Japanese will continue for the time being to rely on their air power to harass and disrupt traffic on the Burma road. Thus far, as the Department is aware, they have been rather successful in damaging the bridges spanning the Mekong river owing chiefly to the lack of defenses in the vicinity of the bridges. Of course, with the advent of the rainy season in June Japanese aerial attacks may be expected to lessen in intensity and perhaps in results obtained.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Original and four copies to the Department by air mail.
 Copy to Peiping (By safe hand from Hong Kong).

800
 EFD/wr

4

[Handwritten signature]

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 5, 1941

~~WMB~~
~~FAC~~
~~GC~~

~~JD~~
~~SA~~

Hong Kong's despatch no. 848, March 11, 1941.

The points along the Kwangtung coast at which the Japanese landed March 3 were, with the exception of Kwonghoi, evacuated after less than a week's occupation; supplies were captured and facilities for handling cargo destroyed.

An interesting feature of the brief occupation was the proclamation of martial law rather than the usual procedure of establishing "peace maintenance committees" for the administration of civil government.

A Japanese statement set forth: That the first military rule since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict has been proclaimed; while the protection of Chinese and third-power nationals is assured, those desiring protection are requested to report to the military administration and to fly the "National Government" emblem at all times; all acts hostile to the Japanese or tending to aid the Chiang Kai-shek regime shall be "meted out capital punishment" irrespective of the nationality of the offenders.

793.94/16531

FE:Faies:MHP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 848

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hong Kong, March 11, 1941.

SUBJECT: Japanese Landing at Points on South Kwangtung
 Coast on March Third - Proclamation of Military Rule.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to the Consulate General's telegrams of recent date reporting Japanese landings on March third at Kwonghoi, Yeungkong, Tinpak, Shuitong, Luichow and Pakhoi on the South Kwangtung Coast. After less than a week of occupation these ports and places, with the exception of Kwonghoi, have been evacuated by the Japanese who first confiscated considerable quantities of both import and export merchandise (the latter allegedly including more than ten thousand barrels of wood oil destined for the United States) and destroyed facilities for the loading, unloading and storage of cargo.

The following is the gist of a Japanese official statement commenting on the importance of the occupied places as trade routes for the use of the Chinese Government at Chungking:

The simultaneous invasion of various Chinese coastal bases in southwestern Kwangtung Province by the Japanese Army forces on March 3 is described by military experts as "without precedent in the annals of warfare" in that it has been extended over 400 kilometres of the Southwest China coast with the occupied ports including Pakhoi in the Gulf of Tonkin,

Luichow

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
 Department of State

DIVISION OF
 APR 12 1941

793.94/16531

PS/JHS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Duichow Peninsula, Shuitung, Tinpak, Yeungkong and Kwonghoi on the southern coast of Kwangtung west of Macao.

Stressing the political, economic and military significance of the new operation, notably its economic significance, military observers point out that after the Indo-China and Hong Kong-Shiukwan routes have been disrupted by the entry of Japanese troops in Indo-China and the recent Japanese military operation in the Tamshui area the supply route from Burma for the Chiang Kai-shek regime has also been paralyzed by the incessant bombings by Japanese air forces.

Perturbed by the reduction of these supply routes, the Chungking authorities following the voluntary withdrawal of Japanese forces from the Nanning area have strenuously endeavored to revive the Yamhsien-Nanning route while efforts have been made by the Chinese to organize a new system of transportation through the Japanese coastal blockade by linking the 400-kilometre coast from Kwonghoi to Pakhoi and the Kwangtung-Kwangsi route leading from Pakhoi through Lingshan in western Kwangsi and Henghsien in southern Kwangsi to Kweihsien in central Kwangsi Province.

Recently, the Chinese authorities have specially permitted transport of Japanese goods and with Hong Kong, Macao, Kwangchowwan as the relaying points endeavored to ship to the interior an extensive list of commodities including arms, machinery, gasoline, oil, matches, wheat, salt, cotton, medicals and foodstuffs.

With all these bases for supplies reduced simultaneously by the present operation, the Chungking regime's supply routes in Southwest China have effectively been interrupted and the Chungking policy for the campaign of resistance depending upon the economic aid of European and American Powers has suffered heavy blows, Japanese observers further declared.

An interesting feature of the brief occupation by the Japanese of the above named places was the proclamation of martial law for their government in place of the procedure usually followed of the establishing of "peace maintenance committees" for the administration of civil government. The following is a condensation

of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

of a Japanese statement on this feature of the recent activities:

The first military rule since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict, has been proclaimed in the Pakhoi area by the Japanese Commander following complete occupation of the area by Japanese troops on March 3.

A military administrative office has been set up and a proclamation has been issued announcing the enforcement of the military rule on the city of Pakhoi, Kaotakhu and other outlying districts and the subjection of all administrative affairs to the Japanese military control.

By the proclamation all Chinese judicial and administrative autonomous organs as well as political organizations have been placed under the control of the Japanese Army and all Chinese and foreign residents in the area have been ordered to report to the military administrative office and fly the emblems of the National Government at all houses as the tokens of allegiance to the Japanese rule.

The proclamation places under the control of the Japanese Army all Chinese judicial and administrative autonomous organs as well as political organizations. While the protection of the lives of Chinese and third-Power nationals as well as the property innocent of profiting the Japanese enemy or aiding the Chiang Kai-shek regime in the city is assured under the proclamation, those desiring protection under the Japanese military rule, whether Chinese or third-Power nationals, are requested to report to the military administrative office and fly the emblems of the National Government at all houses as the tokens of bona fides.

The proclamation also warns that all acts in opposition to the Japanese Army, hostile to the Japanese or tending to aid the Chiang Kai-shek regime shall be meted out capital punishment irrespective of the nationality of the offenders.

This being the first military administration that has been enforced by the Japanese Army since the outbreak of the China campaign, it may be recalled that hitherto peace maintenance organizations have been introduced following military occupation with the co-operation of native citizens. The new system is described as being powerful and simple.

With

0059

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

With peace and order being strictly guarded by the Japanese forces enforcing military rule, the Chinese inhabitants are returning in increasing numbers to their abandoned homes in Pakhoi, key port city in the Gulf of Tonkin, from the outlying districts where they had fled upon hearing of the Japanese invasion.

Life is fast returning to the port city as popular activities in rehabilitation are beginning under Japanese military control.

Especially interesting parts of the above statement are, in the opinion of this office, the underscored portions requiring even citizens of third powers to fly the "National flag" as evidence of their goodwill, and warning that any anti-Japanese activity (which could presumably be rather broadly interpreted by the Japanese military) would make such third power citizens subject, as are the natives, to "capital punishment." This new system of military rule is described in the above statement as "powerful and simple." Some local observers consider that this departure from previous practice in the government of occupied places in China is a definite Japanese endeavor to imitate the harshness of Nazi methods in Europe and may be expected to grow.

As one result of the proclaimed system of military government, reports have reached Hong Kong that the many American-Chinese in the Toishan District, which apparently has not yet been evacuated by the Japanese, are terrified as to what the Japanese may do to them. These reports have not yet come to us from firsthand sources, and are contradictory. They may have very little substance of fact. However, as reported

by

0060

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

by radio yesterday, I am sending a member of my
staff to Macau where he possibly may be able to meet
and talk to refugees from the Toishan District.

Very respectfully,



Addison E. Southard
American Consul General

800
AES:EM

In quintuplicate to the
Department; (Original by airmail, others by steamer mail)
Copy to American Embassy,
Chungking,
Peking;
Copy to American Consulate,
Canton.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FROM

GRAY

Amoy via N. R.

Dated March 25, 1941

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 3/26/41 REX

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

20, March 25, 8 p.m.

My telegram no. 17, March 17, 9 a.m.

The annual ratepayers meeting was held this
 afternoon without incident. The members of the
 Municipal Council in office prior to the resignation of
 the three non Japanese members were reelected and the
 Consular Body has automatically relinquished charge of
 the Council's functions.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping,
 Chungking, Shanghai and Hong Kong, for the Commander of
 the South China patrol.

MERRELL

CSB

793.94/16532

MAR 28 1941

FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (Br)

HONG KONG VIA N. R.

FROM Dated March 25, 1941

Rec'd 1:50 p.m.

3/26/41 JD

Secretary of State,

Washington.

112, March 25, 10 a.m.

Reference my 109 March 22, 11 a.m.

Reliable sources in Hong Kong confirm that the expected
occupation of Honghai Bay and landing at Swabue has now
occurred. The next Bay to the east of Honghai, called
Kit Shak, has also been occupied by the Japanese. The
landing party at Swabue is estimated to number 300 and
several small transports are reported to be standing by
to load considerable captured merchandise. This prompt
action by the Japanese, and reasonably reliable reports
which continue to come in daily as to increased numbers
of Japanese naval vessels seen patrolling the Kwangtung
coast, appear further to confirm the opinion of experienced
observers given in my 88 March 10 11 a.m. to the effect
that the Japanese trade suppression blockade in this area
will become more and more strict.

Sent to the Department repeated to Chungking, Canton
and Peiping for Tokyo.

SOUTHARD

CSB

793.94/16533

PS/JHS

FILED

MAR 29 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM

HONG KONG VIA N.R.

Dated March 25, 1941

Rec'd 1:52 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

113, March 25, 2 p.m.

Reference is made to my number 108, March 21, noon.

From a usually reliable source in Hong Kong which has direct communication with the Government of Indochina I have again been informed that three hundred bombers have been landed at air fields in Tongking, also that a considerable number of tanks and armored cars are being moved from ^{Hainan} ~~(?)~~ to Indochina. My source of information thinks that the cars and tanks are coming from South China to Hainan.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Hanoi, Canton, Chungking and Peiping for Tokyo.

SOUTHARD

OSB

793.94/16534

PS/JHS

MAR 26 1941
 FILED

Corrected
 12/27/41
 N.E.A.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (Br.)
SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY
TO SECRETARY OF STATE, 3/26/41
Secretary of State,
Washington.

HONG KONG VIA N. R.
Dated March 25, 1941
Rec'd 1:50 p.m.

FROM

A
2.2.6
DMA

114, March 25, 4 p.m.

Direct and probably reliable information brought
in every two or three days by people going to and from
the Kowloon hinterland indicates that the Japanese are
developing a renewed and more determined military
advance towards Waichow on the East River. Troops are
reported moving from both Bias Bay and from the Pearl
River to join in this advance. Estimates indicate that
not more than 10,000 troops are involved and probably
less in this particular movement.

There also appears to continue systematic and per-
sistent Japanese looting and foraging in this area for
foodstuffs which are shipped out both to Canton and to
the South. The Japanese continue regularly to uncover
and export stores of gasoline and kerosene, salt, wolfram,
wood oil, and miscellaneous commodities which had accumu-
lated in considerable quantity at various towns with the
development of the Shayu Chung and Swabue trade routes.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Canton
and Peiping for Tokyo.

SOUTHARD

CSB

U. S. LIAISON OFFICE
MAR 29 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94/16535

PS/JHS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LS

GRAY

FROM

TOKYO VIA SHANGHAI
& N. R.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 3/26/41 REK

Dated March 22, 1941

Rec'd 3 p.m. 25th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

447, March 22, 5 p.m.

Since the ceremonious entry into Tokyo on March 17 of General Toshizo Nishio, until recently Commander-in-Chief of Japanese forces in China, the Japanese vernacular press has been inspired editorially to urge prompt settlement of the China incident. General Nishio stated to reporters that the present was the most important moment in the China affair, that "one more push" was needed to effect settlement. He appealed for unity and concentration of the people's energies to conclude the incident.

The unanimity of editorial comment is believed significant in indicating a strong sentiment in Japan favoring subordination of all foreign problems to settlement of the China incident, suggesting a desire that all decisions in foreign policy be considered in the light of their relationship to the China problem.

It is pointed out that undue attention has been given to Pacific problems to the negligence of a settlement in China. One vernacular states: "If China, which is the pivot

793.94/16536

PS/JHS

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 447, March 22, 5 p.m. from Tokyo.

pivot of all policy, cannot be stabilized, then the greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere becomes a castle built on sand."

While Chungking's position is admitted to be affected by American aid, its power of resistance is belittled and much is made of the Communist-Kuomintang controversy as indicating the break-up of Chiang's Government. There is a persistent interpretation of Currie's report to the President as unfavorable to Chungking.

Although not clearly outlined, editorial publicity on the policy to be followed by Japan may be summarized as follows:

- (1) Japan should concentrate on "one more push";
- (2) Soviet motions should be watched closely as the Sovietization of areas in China will have an important bearing on settlement of the incident;
- (3) American action should be carefully watched and aid to Chungking should be nullified (concrete measures are not suggested);
- (4) Increased efforts should be made to support Wang Ching Wei, especially to follow his suggestion that the Japanese should abandon their "traditional attitude of despising the Chinese".

Sent to the Department via air mail to Shanghai.

GREW

PEG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LS

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased
 before being communicated
 to anyone. (Br.)

FROM CANTON VIA N. R.

Dated March 25, 1941

Rec'd. 1:20 a.m. 26th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

15, March 25, 1 p.m.

According to a statement issued yesterday by the
 press section of the local Japanese military headquarters
 Japanese forces made surprise landing on the morning of
 March 23 on the northern shores of Honghai Bay east of
 Bias Bay. A Japanese officer is reported by the local
 press to have stated that operations on the peninsula
 between the bays named have been in progress since
 March 16 and that the above-mentioned landing forces have
 seized considerable quantities of Tungsten as well as
 gasoline, ammunition, salt, clothing, et cetera.

It would appear that these operations are similar
 to those conducted early in the month along the southwest
 coast of Kwangtung and are designed primarily to cut the
 Swabue trade route. The operations along the southwestern
 coast were according to available information accompanied
 by extensive looting of the inhabitants and the commis-
 sion of the usual excesses.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking,
 Peiping, Hong Kong, Swatow.

MEYERS

WWC

793.94/16537

FILED

PS/AD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be SWATOW VIA N. R.
 closely paraphrased
 before being communicated Dated March 26, 1941
 to anyone. (Br.)

FROM

Rec'd 1:40 p.m.

3/28/41 TO
 Secretary of State, U - LIAISON OFFICE

Washington.

APR - 3 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

8
 8, March 26, 11 a.m.

Japanese Consul here has informed me that in operations begun late last Sunday Japanese forces said to have been assisted by Chinese Puppet troops occupied Chaoyang about 8 miles south, southwest of Swatow strategically located on southern waterways of Swatow delta. He declared that the city was not bombed or damaged and that the sole purpose of the operations was to cut the routes by which supplies were reaching the unoccupied interior.

One family of Americans comprising two adults and two children attached to American Baptist Foreign Mission Society resides in Chaoyang. No report has so far been received regarding welfare and it is assumed that the family is safe.

Chinese reaching Swatow report that the Japanese continued some 7 miles west from Chaoyang and took a junction point on the Swatow-Canton highway which if held with Chaoyang will give the Japanese complete control of all important water routes in this neighborhood

and

793.94/16538

FILED

APR 7 - 1941

PS/DB

0069

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 7, March 26, 11 a.m. from Swatow.

and seriously impede the flow of supplies which have been entering through small ports a short distance down the coast from Swatow. It is also reported that Japanese naval vessels attacked the port on the coast just outside Chaoyang and captured several junks loaded with supplies from Hong Kong.

Resistance to the Japanese activities appears not to have been serious and by locally trained soldiers only.

The local press reports that Swabue seaport at the extreme western edge of this consular district was also seized. This place has been attacked before but never permanently occupied by the Japanese and has been a fairly important port of entry ever since the occupation of Swatow.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong, Canton.

FORNES

CSB

0070

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FT-
b-c

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (Br.)
FROM HONG KONG VIA N.R.
Dated March 27, 1941
Rec'd 7:10 a.m.
SECRET NOT COMMUNICATED ORALLY
TO CHIEF AND 3/28/41 7D
Secretary of State,

Washington.

115, March 27, 10 a.m.

In continuation of my 112, March 25, 10 a.m.

In averaging the most reliable information from
various sources here it is reasonably certain that the
Japanese in continuing their Swabue campaign have occu-
pied Hoifung Inland to the north, and various coastal
points to the east including Hoimun and Shuihsingshan
and Chaoyang; thus establishing a fairly effective
blockade of the coast from Swatow to within 50 miles of
Hong Kong. There is little doubt that the Japanese have
taken important and valuable quantities of both import
and export merchandise which the Chinese in apparent
overconfidence in the situation neglected to (*) far
enought inland to take it out of reach of this inevitable
Japanese advance in the coastal zone.

The Japanese Consulate General here indicates that
considerable American missionary interests at Chaoyang,
near Swatow, have been "specially protected from all
harm" by the Japanese forces; that the Chinese in that
district

U - LIAISON OFFICE
APR - 2 1941
33
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94/16539

APR 7 - 1941
FILM

PS/DB

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0071
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 115, March 27, 10 a.m. from Hong Kong.

district have in many instances greeted the arriving
Japanese with Rising Sun flags with latter reciprocating
by selling rice to the populace!

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking,
Canton, Swatow and Peiping for Tokyo.

SOUTHARD

RR

(*) Apparent omission.

0072

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EM
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore communicating to
anyone. (Br)

Tsingtao via N.R.
Dated March 27, 1941
FROM Rec'd 7:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

20, March 27, 3 p.m.

It is reported in pro Chungking circles here that Chinese forces in this area have recently received orders to intensify their guerrilla activities. It is not clear whether this is to be the much heralded Chinese offensive but indications are that it is not as the order is reported to state that there is to be a lull in May and that activity is to commence again in August when the millet and Kaoliang crops are fairly well advanced.

Communications have been sent by Admiral Shen, former Mayor of Tsingtao and refugee Governor of Shantung, many Chinese firms and prominent individuals in Tsingtao announcing the establishment of a branch office of his former Municipal Administration to handle all matters both military and political in this area such as plans for military activity, reorganization of fighting units, promotion of political authority and organization of a people's movement. The people are

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File
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1/27/41

793.94/16540

PS/DB

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 20 March 27, 3 p.m. From Tsingtao via N.R.

are urged to cooperate in observing the regulations for homes and national reconstruction with a view to the early restoration of this area to national authority. They are admonished to cooperate lest they suffer regrets and mistreatment afterwards. Posters to approximately the same effect have appeared on walls and buildings in Tsingtao.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping, Chungkin.

MEYER

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

KD

PLAIN

234

7
A

TELEGRAM RECEIVED via N. R.

Dated March 27, 1941

FROM Rec'd. 9:30 a.m., 29th

Secretary of State, **COPIES SENT TO**
Washington. **ONE AND MLD**
3/31/41 *REK*

K
file
MA

25, March 27, 10 a. m.

The Japanese Navy and Army spokesman here told the press on March 26 that for military reasons the Yangtze River will be closed to travel by foreigners between Hankow and Shanghai in both directions for a period of from four to six weeks or more. The KOKOKU MARU which left for Shanghai this morning and the HSINYO MARU, due from Shanghai April 3rd are to be the last vessels carrying foreign passengers until the end of this closed period. Eight Americans left by the KOKOKU. Applications for passage of six others are pending.

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U.S.
100

Two. There remains in this Consular District 145 Americans, of whom 20 are merchants (18 men and 2 children), 68 Protestant missionaries (23 men, 31 women and 14 children) and 57 Roman Catholic missionaries (22 men and 35 women).

793.94/16341

APR 2 - 1941

DIVISION OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
APR 1 - 1941
Copy to me
4/2/41
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sent

PS/DP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 25, March 27, 10 a.m., from Hankow via N. R.

Sent to the Department, Repeated to Peiping,
Chungking and Shanghai.

SPIKER.

ALC

0076

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LS

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased
 before being communicated
 to anyone. (Br.)

FROM

HONG KONG VIA N. R.

Dated March 29, 1941

Rec'd 8:50 a.m.

TO GEN AND MID 3/31/41
 Secretary of State, U - LIAISON OFFICE

Washington.

APR - 2 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

118, March 29, 11 a.m.

Latest reliable reports in Hong Kong indicate that the Japanese have now landed in Kitchioh Bay, about one hundred miles east of Hong Kong, and have occupied Lukfung which is the principal town in that (?) (?). Reliable information indicates that the Japanese are making moderate efforts to advance inland, probably with the main purpose of looting, from the various coastal points between here and Swatow which they earlier occupied. According to best available information landing parties in no instance exceed a thousand and in most instances number only a few hundred.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking, Canton, Swatow and Peiping for Tokyo.

SOUTHERD

HPD

793.94/16542

PS/JHS


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APR 3 - 1941

0077

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



March 27, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING SECRETARY SUMNER WELLES:

The attached draft of a telegram to the President from Chiang Kai-shek, dated March 18, was given to me by T. V. Soong last Friday afternoon. I sent it over to Mr. Forster. Upon my return from a short vacation this morning I found the attached message from the President. I regret the delay.

I think it might be helpful if Chiang's message could be released, and if any questions were raised the delay could be ascribed to the President's trip.

703.94/16543



Lauchlin Currie
Lauchlin Currie

A

MAR 31 1941

FILED

PC/MB

FE memo 3274
Dix telegram to
General Chiang

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 27, 1941.

U
Mr. Welles ✓

Reference Mr. Currie's memorandum of March 27, 1941, and FE's memorandum of the same date in regard to General Chiang Kai-shek's telegraphic message of March 18 to the President.

It is suggested that, if the President makes reply to General Chiang's message, such reply be not released to the press in view of the length of time which has elapsed since the receipt and release of General Chiang's message. As regards the wording of a possible reply by the President, a draft is attached for consideration.

GA
FE:Atcheson:HES

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 27, 1941.

I telephoned Mr. Currie in reference to his memorandum of March 27 to Mr. Welles and told Mr. Currie that the Department had on March 22 released to the press the text of the message of March 18 from Chiang Kai-shek.

FE:MMH:HES

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

237

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

MARCH 22, 1941.
No. 123

The following is the text of a message from
Chiang Kai-shek to the President, dated March 18, 1941:

"The people of China, whether engaged
in fighting the aggressor or toiling in the
fields and workshops in the rear in support
of the defenders, will be immeasurably
heartened by your impressive reaffirmation
of the will of the American people to assist
them in their struggle for freedom from
foreign domination, and in the resumption of
their march towards democracy and social
justice for all."

773.94

0081

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER
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 Charge Department:
 Full rate
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TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

March 28, 1941

GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHEK,
 PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE YUAN
 OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA,
 CHUNGKING, CHINA.

I wish to express my appreciation of your telegram
 of March 18 which contains an inspiring expression of
 the splendid morale and confidence of the Chinese people.
 Their unimpaired spirit, notwithstanding their burdens
 and sacrifices, stimulates and reinforces the confidence
 of free peoples everywhere that with resolute determination
 and cooperation on the part of those who are committed
 to it the cause of freedom and justice will unquestionably
 prevail.

793.94/16543

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

CR
 MAR 28 1941 PM

FE:GA:FRE

FE

PA/H

U

COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS

MAR 28 PM 4 46

PS/R B

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(e) and 5(D) or (2)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-15-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL

PLAIN

Collect (Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter)

Charge Department:

Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Charge to

Department of State

Washington

March 28, 1943

GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHEK

PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE YUAN

OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA

CHUNGKING, CHINA

I wish to express my appreciation of your telegram of March 18 which contains an inspiring expression of the splendid morale and confidence of the Chinese people. Their unimpaired spirit, notwithstanding their burdens and sacrifices, stimulates and reinforces the confidence of free peoples everywhere that with absolute determination and cooperation on the part of those who are committed to it the cause of freedom and justice will unquestionably prevail.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

FE:GA:PRE

TE

PL/1

793.94/16543

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

FROM

SWATOW VIA N. R.

Dated March 28, 1941

Rec'd 3:21 a.m. 29th

3/31/41 JD
 Secretary of State,

Washington.

U - LIAISON OFFICE
 APR - 2 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

9. March 28, 2 p.m.

Reference is made to my telegram no. 8, March 26, 11 a.m. and to Hong Kong's 115, March 27, 11 a.m.

The representative of the American Baptist Mission and his family at Chaoyang have reported themselves safe. Their letter indicated that there was scarcely any resistance to the Japanese occupation of Chaoyang; only two or three bombs were dropped in the city itself with very little damage and few casualties; there was some pillaging and looting but apparently only by disorderly Chinese elements; and local rumors of Japanese excesses there are unfounded.

Mission property in Chaoyang consists chiefly of a compound containing hospital, church and school and a residence compound with two houses. The mission representative there did not mention any property damage in his report.

The press today confirmed the capture of Haimun on the coast 5 miles south of Chaoyang and claimed the

seizure

793.94/16544

FILED

PC/JHS

APR 3 - 1941

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- March 28, 2 p.m. from Swatow.

seizure of war materials and merchandise valued at fifty million Chinese dollars. While this figure may be excessive there is some confirmation of Japanese claims in the fact that a destroyer was yesterday observed in the harbor unloading a considerable quantity of goods including flour.

Hong Kong's observation regarding evident Chinese trust in the continuance of the situation is supported by a report here that the Chinese had actually built warehouses at Haimun which is open to practically direct attack from the sea.

Reports on the progress of operations around Swabue are sparse and so far limited to announcements that Hoifung inland from Swabue and Honghai Bay and Lukfung inland from Kitchieh Bay (both cities located on the Swatow-Canton Highway and therefore important for interrupting communications between ports and the interior) have been attacked.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Hongkong, Canton.

FORNES

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LS
 This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased **FROM**
 before being communicated
 to anyone. (Br.)

HANKOW

Dated March 31, 1941

Rec'd 11:15 April 1

4/2/41 30
 Secretary of State,

Washington.

March 31, 3 p.m.

Reference my telegram March 18, 9 a.m.

Military operation in Kiangsi.

Japanese spokesman reports the capture of Kaonan
 on March 18 and Shangkao on the 24th; that the
 Japanese burned the latter and started preparations
 for withdrawal to base at Nanchung--when Chinese
 attacks in force on the 26th compelled the Japanese
 to turn back to Shangkao where heavy fighting continues.
 Other Japanese forces withdrawing eastward from Wuning
 and Tsingan areas have also been heavily engaged by
 Chinese forces. Japanese announce that reinforcements
 are being brought up river to assist in Kiangsi oper-
 ations. These circumstances are believed chiefly
 responsible for the closing of the river to foreign
 travel as reported in my March 28, 10 a.m. to the
 Department.

Aside from Kiangsi operations, chief military
 activity

793.94/16545

PS/AD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- March 31, 3 p.m. from Hankow.

activity now centers in Ichang area and eastward from
the railway between Wuchang and Kichow. The local
situation remains quiet.

Sent to Chungking, repeated to Department,
Peiping, Shanghai.

SPIKER

WSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 7, 1941

JD
JA

WAA

Nanking's despatch 144, February 20, 1941.

Announces the formation in Nanking of another club for the "promotion of the New Order in East Asia". True amity among members of the club is to be attained by "cultivating others as you do yourself", & Asia is in the future to take her place alongside Europe, America and the Soviet Union.

793.94/16546

HA
FE:Fales:MHP

0088

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 Nanking, China, February 20, 1941.


No. 144

Subject: Asia Rehabilitation Club.

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 APR 3 AM 9 03

DIVISION OF
 COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS



For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Copy	Misc		
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		ON 1	MID

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

COPIES SENT TO
 4/8/41 AND MID
 REL

Sir:

793.

893.

I have the honor to refer to this office's telegram no. 34 of February 3, 6 p.m. and its despatch no. 138 of February 10 on the general subject of Sino-Japanese political associations in Nanking.

- 1/ In this connection there is enclosed a translation of an item which appeared in the local Chinese newspaper, the NANKING SING PAO, on February 17, 1941 regarding the formation of another organization of this type.

The purpose of the club appears to be "to unite the more important elements of the nations of East Asia for the purpose of assisting in the promotion of the New Order in East Asia".

There

793.94/16546

PS/DP

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
 Department of State

APR 10 1941

DIVISION OF

FILED
 APR 11 1941

0089

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 2 -

2/ There is also enclosed a translation of a declaration of the new association as published in the same issue of the paper.

This declaration advocates the attainment of the two essentials to progress, first true social intercourse by "cultivating others as you do yourself" and, second, rehabilitation of Asia by its renaissance as one of the four "world groups", the others being Europe, America and Soviet Russia.

Respectfully yours,

For the Consul General
at Shanghai:


J. Hall Paxton
American Consul

Enclosures:

- 1/ English translation of an item appeared in the NANKING SING PAO regarding the organization of the Asia Rehabilitation Club.
- 2/ English translation of a declaration of the new association published in the same issue of the paper.

800
JHP:T

Original and four copies to the Department
Copy to the Embassy, Peiping
Copy to the Embassy, Chungking
Copy to the Embassy, Tokyo
Copy to the Consulate General, Shanghai

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch
no. 144 of J. Hall Paxton,
American Consul at Nanking,
China, dated February 20, 1941.

SOURCE: NANKING SING PAO,
Nanking, China,
February 17, 1941.

TRANSLATION

Asia Rehabilitation Club

A new organization known as the Asia Rehabilitation Club founded by a group of Chinese and Japanese officials in Nanking, was formally inaugurated yesterday afternoon at 3:30 p.m. at the East Asia Club. The purpose of the Club is to unite the more important elements of the nations of East Asia for the purpose of assisting in the promotion of the new order in East Asia. There were about one hundred people present among whom were Mr. Kiang Kan-hu, Acting President of the Examination Yuan, Mr. Su Cheng-teh, Commissioner of Police, Colonel Mori, and others.

Translated: WST
Checked: JHP
Typed: T

0091

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 2 to despatch
no.144 of J. Hall Paxton,
American Consul at Nanking,
China, dated February 17, 1941.

SOURCE: NANKING SING PAO
Nanking, China,
February 20, 1941.

Translation of a declaration.

There is an ancient saying that every object and every event has its beginning and termination, and when one knows how events proceed he is nearing accomplishment. This means that success can only be achieved by working from the very beginning. Thinking of Sino-Japanese amity we recall that despite the struggle on the part of the peoples of the two nations no great result has yet been attained. The term amity fell into disuse after the outbreak of the hostilities, though it was actually promoted before that. But why could hostilities still not be avoided? Recalling this point, we, for the sake of the entire plan, have resolutely decided to start from the very beginning by promoting the "Asia Rehabilitation Club".

The purpose of the Club is to promote the friendly relationship of the nations in East Asia for the establishment of a new order. In order to enable the nationals of the two countries, who are in favor of this idea and who have a desire to advance it, to meet and exchange their knowledge and harmonize their sentiments, we now use term social intercourse in place of amity so as to prevent a repetition of the former error. From now on we must revive our spirit and discuss together from time to time in order to reach a solution on the reasons preventing the attainment of peace between the two countries, and then present it to our respective governments and societies. Those who belong to the Club should

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 2 to despatch
 no. 144 of J. Hall Paxton,
 American Consul at Nanking,
 China, dated February 17, 1941.

SOURCE: NANKING SING PAO
 Nanking, China,
 February 20, 1941.

Translation of a declaration.

There is an ancient saying that every object and every event has its beginning and termination, and when one knows how events proceed he is nearing accomplishment. This means that success can only be achieved by working from the very beginning. Thinking of Sino-Japanese amity we recall that despite the struggle on the part of the peoples of the two nations no great result has yet been attained. The term amity fell into disuse after the outbreak of the hostilities, though it was actually promoted before that. But why could hostilities still not be avoided? Recalling this point, we, for the sake of the entire plan, have resolutely decided to start from the very beginning by promoting the "Asia Rehabilitation Club".

The purpose of the Club is to promote the friendly relationship of the nations in East Asia for the establishment of a new order. In order to enable the nationals of the two countries, who are in favor of this idea and who have a desire to advance it, to meet and exchange their knowledge and harmonize their sentiments, we now use term social intercourse in place of amity so as to prevent a repetition of the former error. From now on we must revive our spirit and discuss together from time to time in order to reach a solution on the reasons preventing the attainment of peace between the two countries, and then present it to our respective governments and societies. Those who belong to the Club should

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

should act as if they were of one family and let this Club set an example for others. We will naturally attain true amity if we will do what the ancients called "cultivating others as you do yourself". This is the primary idea in the organization of this Club.

Secondly, in the future the world will be divided into three groups: namely, Europe, America and Soviet Russia; and our Asia will not be an exception. We must recognize the situation that has been brought about by the present tendency. The responsibility of rehabilitating Asia has been entrusted to us, and we are to bring about a renaissance of Asia by means of social intercourse. This follows out Prince Konoye's statement as well as Chairman Wang's telegram of the 29th which form the center of the famous new order in East Asia. Based on this theory and by means of social intercourse we will create a reality. This is the secondary idea in the organization of this Club.

Having these two ideas in mind we do not need to boast, nor observe any formality. We will be able to reach our goal as though led by a compass.

Translated: WST
Checked: JHP
Typed: T

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 7, 1941

RB:
 JMS:
 MS:

WA:
 WAA:

Peiping's despatch no. 304 of March 6, 1941 encloses a memorandum prepared by Dr. J. Leighton Stuart, President of Yenching University, regarding a conversation which he had with the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy at Peiping and other officials of the Japanese Embassy.

Dr. Stuart stated that the Japanese officials expressed considerable concern over the recent visit of Mr. Lauchlin Currie to Chungking, expressing the wish that someone had been selected more familiar with conditions in the Far East and more "actively interested in the promotion of better understanding".

The Japanese officials were said to have been much perturbed over "a provocative American attitude". Dr. Stuart attempted to interpret the American and Chinese position in terms with which the Department is familiar, having received reports of previous conversations between Dr. Stuart and high Japanese officials.

Dr. Stuart concluded that "there is a very real danger of being misled by such amicable conversations as to conceal the

intention

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-2-

intention to drive southward and gain new advantages while harmless diplomatic conferences are in progress or influences exerted which tend to neutralize American fears".

793.94/16547

JD

FE:Davies:FRE

0096

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 3044

Peiping, China, March 6, 1941.

Subject: Conversation between Dr. J. L. Stuart
and Japanese Embassy officials on
Sino-Japanese-American relations.

CONFIDENTIAL

79394

A 1/3
File
RB
JMA




RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 2 5 38

ONI M.D.

793.94/16547

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

COPIED
CONFIDENTIAL
4/4/41 RSK



Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Embassy's des-
patch no. 3025 of February 4, 1941 in regard to the
above-mentioned subject, and to enclose a copy of a
memorandum prepared today by Dr. Stuart in regard to
a further conversation had by him yesterday with
Counselor Tsuchida, in charge of the Japanese Embassy
here, and several members of his staff. The conver-
sation took place at Mr. Tsuchida's request.

It will be noted from the enclosed memorandum
that Mr. Tsuchida appeared to be concerned over Dr.

APR 28 1941
FILED
Curran's

PS/DB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Currie's recent visit to Chungking in particular, and Japanese-American tension in general. The Embassy respectfully commends the memorandum to the attention of the Department. As the memorandum has just been received and as the pouch is now being closed, the Embassy regrets that time does not permit of the preparation of a summary.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Robert L. Smyth

Robert L. Smyth
 First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

No. 1. Memorandum to Mr. R. L. Smyth
 dated March 6, 1941.

Original and 4 copies to Department.
 Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
 Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
 Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.

RLS/es
 710-Sino-Jap/710-U.S.-Jap/800 Peiping.

4
copy 2
4/2/41

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(TRUE COPY - es)

Enclosure No. 1 to
 Despatch No. 3044, March 6, 1941,
 from Embassy, Peiping

MEMORANDUM TO MR. R. L. SMYTH

On March 5 I had lunch with Mr. Tsuchida who is in charge of the Japanese Embassy here, together with three members of his staff.

After the meal they drew me into serious discussion of current issues which continued for nearly two hours. The more relevant topics may be summarized as follows.

I was asked as to the purpose of the recent visit of Dr. Currie to Chungking and replied that, although I had no special sources of information, yet I assumed that he had been sent to study monetary and other economic matters for guidance in further American aid to China. Mr. T. and his associates commented vigorously on the concern in Japan over this rather unusual procedure and expressed the wish that someone had been selected more familiar with conditions in this part of the world and more actively interested in the promotion of better understanding. I replied that the American Government had its established sources of information but evidently felt the need of expert advice on this particular aspect.

They then passed on to the more general tension between the two countries and seemed much perturbed over what they felt to be a provocative American attitude beginning especially with the abrogation of the commercial treaty. They pointed out that those on diplomatic service were all trying to allay the popular resentment in their country which was becoming more difficult to accomplish with each new manifestation of American war-like preparations, that it was the danger of losing supplies from America which was driving them southward in the desperate need for such materials, and that the disastrous consequences of armed conflict could apparently be avoided if there were not so much mutual misunderstanding. I expressed my sympathy in desiring the avoidance of any such danger and undertook to interpret the position of the American Government and people as I have frequently done before in talking with Japanese.

The substance of this is that we are interested in a stable peace in the Pacific area, that fundamental to any such peace is the integrity and independence of China, that further armed aggression southward would also make impossible any lasting peace, and that we heartily desired the utmost friendliness between Japan and China, close economic relations with the natural advantages that Japan would have, together with cultural and all other relationships, that a strong and unified China on friendly terms with Japan would be the surest guarantee against Communism whether this was thought of in terms of Russia as a military force or as a social philosophy, that the same held true of any other forms of Western imperialism or exploitation in Eastern Asia, and that in all such peaceful and progressive developments there would be cordial American good-will regardless of any losses our people might suffer other than the privileges we would have a right to expect in dealing with China on equal terms.

I also called attention to the series of actions taken in China by Japan which were impossible to reconcile with such a concept and described the effect on American opinion when Japan joined the Axis powers. They more or less tacitly

agreed

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

agreed in all of this but urged the necessity of efforts to arrest this impending clash. I remarked that a solution which might sound idealistic would be for authorized delegates of the three countries to confer together with frank description of the real objectives of each and the terms on which agreement might be reached, beginning with certain elemental conditions primary among which would be the independence of China which could only be by the withdrawal of all Japanese armed forces. I added that there seemed no reason to doubt American readiness to assist in such a settlement and that while I had no right to speak for General Chiang Kai-shek yet I ventured the hope from what I knew of his views that he would readily endorse such a proposal. These men realize the difficulties and are not in themselves important enough to have any large influence in Japanese policy.

There is a very real danger of being misled by such amicable conversations as to conceal the intention to drive southward and gain new advantages while harmless diplomatic conferences are in progress or influences exerted which tend to neutralize American fears. On the other hand, I feel convinced that these men themselves were quite sincere and that they represent a growing element among Japanese leaders including some among the army officers.

J.L.S.

March 6, 1941.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Sino- Japanese relations. Conclusion of Japanese offensive in areas east and west of the Han River. Japanese casualties totalled 20,000 and the Japanese claim that the Chinese casualties totalled 50,000 including 10,000 dead left on the field.

753.94/16543

fp

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Des. #267
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Jan. 10, 1941 From Hankow (Spiker)
 To

File No. 893. 00 P. R. Hankow/162

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Japanese troops were more active than usual in
various Chinese provinces during the month.

793.94/16549

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See #314
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 3, 1941 From Tsinan (Hawthorne)
To

File No. 893.00 P.R. Tsinan/136

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1-1540

hr

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Sino-Japanese situation: Military - Political developments.

893.94/16560

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See #-
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Dec 11, 1940 From Canton (Myers)
To

File No. 893.00 P.R. Canton/154

FRG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

released on the same day.* He stated that he was well treated while under detention.

The Japanese Consulate General admitted having received on November 2nd information concerning the detention of Mr. Ray, but failed to inform this office. A written protest against the detention of Mr. Ray, as well as the failure of the Japanese authorities to notify this office was addressed to the Japanese Consul General on November 5th.

5. Evacuation of American Citizens:

Replies to circulars from the Consulate General have indicated that American residents have given serious thought to the Department's suggestion concerning withdrawal from the Far East. At the end of November eighteen American citizens, mostly women and children, had returned to the United States. It is understood that others will evacuate early in 1941.

The majority of American residents in this consular district are evangelical missionaries or are engaged in the operation of educational institutions, a number of whom have indicated an intention to carry on their work in occupied areas as long as possible and in the event of a serious crisis to withdraw to points in unoccupied areas where their organizations have establishments. Those already in unoccupied areas have in general indicated that they do not intend to withdraw.

B. Relations with Japan

1. Evacuation of Yenchow (欽州):

The withdrawal of Japanese forces from Yenchow on November 14th has added boost to Chinese morale in South China. The news was accepted by the local Chinese population

ES

Telegram No. 82, November 5, 9 a.m. to Department and repeated to Peking, Chungking, Hong Kong.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

as a further indication of Japanese weakness. Repeated Japanese protestations that the withdrawal was voluntary and carried out without losses failed to dispel the general belief that the withdrawal, following closely upon that from Nanking in October, constituted an important Chinese victory. Various rumors, including those concerning the withdrawal of Japanese forces from other points in south China, were current but appeared to be without foundation.

The troops withdrawn from Kwangsi were dispatched for the most part to Hainan Island where it is reported that there are no excessive concentrations of Japanese forces. At least a portion of the troops withdrawn from Kwangsi via Haichow came to Canton. It is believed that these forces are replacements for troops withdrawn from this area several months ago for use in Kwangsi and Indo-China. The local garrison situation was not changed materially by these new arrivals.

A Japanese source at Canton indicated in casual conversation that the Japanese suffered heavy losses in the retreat to Yenchow. He mentioned 3,500 Japanese casualties which appears excessive, but the admission of any casualties is partial confirmation of Chinese reports that the Japanese retreat was constantly harried by pursuing Chinese troops.

At the close of the month Japanese aircraft were continuing to bomb Chinese forces which had recaptured Nanning and Yenchow. The roads between Nanning and Chen Wen Yuan (鎮南關) on the Indo-China border and between Nanning and Yenchow were also subjected to aerial bombardment. Chinese

reports

Telegram no. 102, November 19, 3 p.m. to Department and repeated to Tientsin, Chungking, Hong Kong.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

reports stated that reconstruction work in the reoccupied cities was proceeding apace and that civilian populations were returning in large numbers.

2. Disturbances at Canton:

Active insurgency at Canton, dormant in recent months, recurred during November, possibly as a result of news of the withdrawal from Yenchow. On at least three occasions hand grenades were thrown at Japanese military establishments in the city and it was reported that several Japanese gendarmes had been killed. Criminals appeared to have been invoked with greater frequency than for several months past.

3. Naval Operations on the South-eastern Kwangtung Coast:

On November 19th the Japanese Consul General addressed a note to the Senior Consul informing him that naval operations against the port of Shantung (水東), east of the Hanchow Peninsula (雷州半島), would commence on that date and third power shipping was warned to avoid the area.*

During the month Japanese press reports recounted the carrying out of numerous air raids on towns along the south-eastern coast of Kwangtung in the vicinity of the Hanchow Peninsula. These raids and the proposed naval action against the port of Shantung were indicative of the difficulty of maintaining an effective blockade of the long coast of Kwangtung.

4. Other Military Operations:

Japanese efforts to close an important trade route over which goods in large quantities pass from occupied to unoccupied territory resulted during November in desultory

fighting

*Telegram no. 128, November 20, 6 p.m. to Department and repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

to Luchuan (蘆苞), north east of Canton. The fighting would seem to have been indecisive and at the close of the month postal couriers were proceeding to and from Luchuan without difficulty.

Japanese naval aircraft carried out raids near Shataokok (沙頭角), on Pils Bay, during November. This town has long been an important shipping point for merchandise destined for unoccupied areas along the East River and the present provincial capital at Shikuan (韶關). It is believed that shipments from Hong Kong via this route have increased in recent months.

5. Puppet Officials Brought to Canton:

According to local press accounts puppet officials (members of Peace Reservation Committees and other minor officials) from Haining and Yashow, numbering approximately four hundred, have been brought to Canton. They are quartered in confiscated buildings and are receiving Japanese relief.

6. Japanese Recognition of Song Ching-wei Regime:

The "Provincial Government" announced on November 30th that commencing on that date Japanese and Chinese flags could be displayed for a period of three days in celebration of the conclusion of the treaty of recognition between Japan and the "National Government" at Nanking. Local reaction to the treaty could not be ascertained at the close of the month.

0107

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Kuomintang-Communist Party relationships: conflict between re-
spective military forces.

Report on-, with reference to advantage thus offered and taken
by Japanese.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See #229
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb 6, 1941 From Shanghai (Lockhart)
To

893.00/14664
File No. _____

793.94 / 10561

1651

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Sino-Japanese hostilities. The month of January witnessed increased military activity in all zones. Persistent reports continue to crop up that the Chinese have been planning an offensive in the Wuhan area to begin in the early spring, the attack to come from three directions as stated.

rp

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Des. #282
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 8, 1941 From Hankow (Spiker)
 To

File No. 893.00 F. R. Hankow/163

793.94 / 116552

PS/JHS

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Relations between China and Japan.

Political report for January 1941 contains information on,-

793.94/16553

FLH

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See desp # 145
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 14, 1941 From Shanghai (Lockhart)
 To

File No. 893.00-PR Shanghai/148

0 1 1 0

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Facsimile of Central Bank of China \$1.00 note.

Encloses -, which contains anti-Japanese propaganda on reverse side.

lw

793.94/16554

16554

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Desp. #142
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 17, 1941 From China (Nanking)
To Paxton

File No. 893.515/1521

0111

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Relations between China and Japan.

Information concerning two Japanese aircraft carriers
three cruisers and more than ten medium and small
transports in Bias Bay. Comments on exchange of
troops. Departure of one aircraft carrier, three
cruisers and several of the transports for south.
States mass of reports in circulation state
Japanese troops in Mirs Bay area are not active
in a military way. States Chinese guerrilla activities
have worried troops.

FLH

793.94 / 10555

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See _____ Tel # 64 11 am
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated _____ Feb 19, 1941 _____ From _____ Hong Kong (Southard)
To _____

File No. _____ 894.33/34 _____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Reported peace overtures by Japan to China:
Comment regarding -.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 20, 1941 From State Department
To FE (Davies)

File No. 740.0011 P. W./147

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1-1640

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793.94/16566

16557

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Relations between China and Japan.

Transmits copy of memorandum containing representations to Foreign Office regarding the terrorism in the International Settlement, Kulangsu, Amoy, resulting from Japanese demands that non-Japanese members of the Municipal Council should resign and that Consular Body had temporarily taken over the functions of the Council.

FLH

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See # 790
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 22, 1941 From China (Chungking)
To

File No. 893.102 Kulangsu/317

793.94/16557


16557

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

79394
 RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 1941 APR 2 PM 4 44
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS

GERARD KEVIL
 7514 BYRON PLACE
 SAINT LOUIS, MO.

March 21, 1941



Secretary of State Hull

Washington D.C.

Dear Sir:

In the book "The Battle for Asia"
 by Edgar Snow, the last two chapters
 have some ideas that I feel will be
 of great interest to you as Sec. of State.

Yours truly

Gerard Kevil.

793.94/16558
 FILED
 APR 8 - 1941

PS/DB
 559

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DES

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (Br)

TSINGTAO VIA N. R.

Dated April 3, 1941

FROM

Rec'd 2:05 p.m.

4/5/41
 Secretary of State,
 Washington.

U - LIAISON OFFICE

APR 10 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



22, April 3, 4 p.m.

One. My 20, March 27, 3 p.m.

Chinese guerilla forces dynamited bridge on rail-
 way about ten miles this side of Kiaschau on the
 night of April 1st as the Tsingtao-Peiping Express was
 passing over the bridge. Locomotive and four third class
 cars were reported derailed and bridge seriously damaged.
 Casualties are believed to have been light. Through traffic
 is to be resumed tonight.

793.94
 Two. Another report states that a train load of
 Japanese wounded recently arrived in Tsingtao, but they
 are believed to have been engaged in another sector.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping, Chung-
 king.

MEYER

WWC

APR 14 1941

FILED


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793.94/16559

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


No. 293
NO. 1239 Embassy, Peiping.



AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Shanghai, China

February 27, 1941.



SUBJECT: Dropping of bombs in the vicinity of the
U.S.S. TUTUILA and the American Embassy
at Chungking in the course of Japanese
air raid of October 25, 1940.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor, with reference to my despatch
No. 28 (No. 18 to Embassy), November 5, 1940, on the
1/ above subject, to enclose a copy of a letter that the
Japanese Consul General addressed to me on February
24, 1941.

It will be noted that the Japanese Consul General
stated that an investigation has revealed that "as
there was something wrong with the apparatus for hold-
ing and releasing bombs, they fell wide of the target
in the vicinity of the American Embassy and the Amer-
ican gunboat, unfortunately". The Japanese Consul Gen-
eral also stated that he had been informed by the Jap-
anese naval authorities that the Commander of the air
force concerned had been advised "to take necessary
steps to prevent the recurrence of similar accidents".

Respectfully yours,

Frank P. Lockhart
Frank P. Lockhart
American Consul General.

Enclosure: As stated.

350. LH.EA

Copies to Peiping, Chungking, Tokyo, Hankow and Kunming.
Copy also to Commander Yangtze Patrol, U.S. Asiatic Fleet.

793.34/15860

APR 23 1941

FILED

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16 560

0117

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to Despatch No. 293, February 27, 1941,
from the American Consul General at Shanghai, on the
subject: "Dropping of bombs in the vicinity of the U.S.S.
TUPUILLA and the American Embassy at Chungking in the
course of Japanese air raid of October 25, 1940."

JAPANESE CONSULATE GENERAL

Shanghai.

No. 13.

February 24, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

With reference to your letter of October 29, 1940,
concerning a telegraphic report received by your Consu-
late General to the effect that during the Japanese air
raid on Chungking on October 25, 1940 bombs fell in the
vicinity of the American Embassy and the U.S.S. TUPUILLA,
I have the honour to inform you that as a result of an
investigation it has been found that as there was some-
thing wrong with the apparatus for holding and releas-
ing bombs they fell, wide of the target, in the vicin-
ity of the American Embassy and the American gunboat un-
fortunately. If some bombs had fallen within the safe-
ty zone proposed by the Japanese fighting force, it
simply so happened owing to the reason given above.

The Japanese naval authorities have reported to me
that they have duly advised the Commander of the air
force concerned to take necessary steps to prevent the
recurrence of similar accidents.

I understand that communications to the above ef-
fect were exchanged at the time between Commanders of
the both countries.

I have the honour to be,
Sir and dear Colleague,
Your obedient servant,

(Signed) T. HORIUCHI

Consul General.

Frank P. Lockhart, Esquire,
American Consul General,
Shanghai.

(A true copy EA)

793.94/6360

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 10, 1941

Chungking's despatch no. 809, March 13, 1941.

There is set forth in the despatch an estimate of the strength and disposition of Japanese troops in China as of February 13, 1941.

These data were obtained from the Military Affairs Commission of the Chinese Government and are summarized on page 4 of the despatch.

793.94/16561

RCS
FE:Ludden:MHP

0119

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 809 Chungking, China, March 13, 1941.

Subject: Estimate of Strength and Dispositions
of Japanese Troops in China as of
February 13, 1941.

Airmail



CONFIDENTIAL

Grade	For	ONI	MID
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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence 4/13/44 RSK

Sir:

I have the honor to report below, for the Department's confidential information, certain data in relation to an estimate of the strength and dispositions of Japanese troops in China as of February 13, 1941. These data were obtained from the Military Affairs Commission of the Chinese Government and are believed to be of a fairly reliable nature.

As the Department is aware, the China Expeditionary Force of the Japanese Imperial Army has its headquarters at Nanking. Until very recently General Nishio has been commanding general; according to press reports he has now been succeeded by General Hata. General Itigaki is Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Force. The China Expeditionary Force comprises the North China Force, with headquarters at Peiping; the Central China Force, with headquarters at Nanking; and the South China Force, with headquarters at Canton.

The China

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

AIR MAIL

The China Expeditionary Force, according to the estimate, is made up as follows:

1. North China Force

(Strength 15 divisions, General Tada Commanding, headquarters at Peiping)

a) Suiyuan- Inner Mongolia

(Strength 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ divisions, headquarters at Kalgan)

Designation	Headquarters	Areas stationed
26th Division	Tatung	Tatung, Paotou
2nd Independent Mixed Brigade	Kalgan	Kalgan

b) Shansi

(Strength 5 divisions, headquarters at Taiyuan)

36th Division	Changchih	S.E. Shansi
37th Division	Yuncheng	S. Shansi
41st Division	Linfen	S.C. Shansi
3rd Independent Mixed Brigade	Yuanping	N.C. Shansi
4th Ind. Mixed Brigade	Pingting	E.C. Shansi
9th Ind. Mixed Brigade	Yangchu	N.E. Shansi
16th Ind. Mixed Brigade	Fenyang	S.W. Shansi

c) Hopei and North Honan

(Strength 5 divisions, headquarters at Peiping)

27th Division	Tientsin	Tientsin
35th Division	Sinsiang	N. Honan
110th Division	Shihkiachwang	S.W. Hopei
1st Ind. Mixed Brigade	Hantan	S. Hopei
7th Ind. Mixed Brigade	Tsanghsien	S.E. Hopei
8th Ind. Mixed Brigade	Shihkiachwang	S.W. Hopei
15th Ind. Mixed Brigade	Peiping	Peiping

d) Shantung, Southeast Honan, North Kiangsu and North Anhwei

(Strength 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ divisions, headquarters at Tsinan)

21st Division	Hsuechow	N. Kiangsu
32nd Division	Tzuyang	S.E. Honan
5th Ind. Mixed Brigade	Tsingtao	Kiaotung Peninsula
6th Ind. Mixed Brigade	Luhien	S.E. Shantung
10th Ind. Mixed Brigade	Taian	S. Shantung

2. Central

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

AIR MAIL

2. Central China Force
 (Strength 15 divisions, General Hata commanding,
 headquarters at Nanking)

- a) North Hunan, Hupeh, North Kiangsi, Anhwei,
South Honan
 (Strength 11½ divisions, headquarters at Hankow)

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Areas stationed</u>
3rd Division	-	S. Honan, N. Hupeh
4th Division	Yingcheng	C.N. Hupeh, S. Honan
6th Division	Puchi	N. Hunan, S. Hupeh
13th Division	Ichang	Ichang
15th Division	-	S. Honan, N. Hupeh
(part)	-	-
17th Division	-	S. Honan, N. Hupeh
(bulk)	-	-
33rd Division	Yungshiu	Wuhan, S.E. Hupeh
34th Division	Nanchang	Nanchang
39th Division	Chingmen	N.C. Hupeh
40th Division	-	S. Honan, N. Hupeh, S. Hupeh
116th Division	Anking	S. Anhwei
13th Ind. Mixed	-	-
Brigade	Pengpu	C. Anhwei.
14th Ind. Mixed	-	N.C. Hupeh,
Brigade	Kiukiang	N. Kiangsi,
18th Ind. Mixed	-	-
Brigade	Tangyang	N. C. Hupeh

- b) Central-South Kiangsu, Chekiang, Southwest Anhwei
 (Strength 3½ divisions, headquarters at Shanghai)

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Areas stationed</u>
15th Division	-	Nanking,
(bulk)	Nanking	S.W. Anhwei
17th Division	-	-
(part)	Soochow	Soochow, Wusih
22nd Division	Hangchow	Hangchow, Wuhing
11th Ind. Mixed	-	-
Brigade	Kiahsing	Kiahsing
12th Ind. Mixed	-	-
Brigade	Chinkiang	C. Kiangsu
17th Ind. Mixed	-	Shanghai,
Brigade	Shanghai	Kunshan

3. South China Force
 (Strength 6½ divisions, headquarters at Canton)

- a) Kwangtung
 (Strength 4 divisions, headquarters at Canton)

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Areas stationed</u>
18th Division	Yentang	N.E. Canton, Shumchun
28th Division	-	-
(part)	Kiungshan	Kiungshan
38th Division	Fatshan	West of Canton
104th Division	Canton	North of Canton
General Endo's	-	-
Ind. Mixed	-	-
Brigade	Swatow	Swatow, Chaoan

b) French

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AIR MAIL

-4-

- b) French Indochina
 (Strength $2\frac{1}{2}$ divisions, headquarters, Hanoi)

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Areas stationed</u>
Konoye Division	Peining	Peining
5th Division	-	Probably Haiphong- Langson area
28th Division (bulk)	Hanoi	Hanoi

The foregoing estimate, it is stated, does not include two cavalry brigades directly under Army command. Nor is it said to include the following divisions of Japanese troops said to be in the areas mentioned:

- a) Manchuria: The 1st, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 14th, 23rd and 24th; and the 1st to 6th (inclusive) Independent Garrison Forces and the 1st to 8th (inclusive) Border Defense Forces.

- b) Jehol: 25th.

The foregoing estimate does not, of course, include forces of the Japanese Navy, including Japanese blue-jackets, which are stationed in certain areas of China.

SUMMARY

According to an estimate prepared by the Military Affairs Commission, as of February 13, 1941, the China Expeditionary Force of the Japanese Army comprised $36\frac{1}{2}$ divisions divided into 15 divisions in the North China Force, 15 divisions in the Central China Force, and $6\frac{1}{2}$ divisions in the South China Force. Of the latter force $2\frac{1}{2}$ divisions were said to be stationed in French Indochina.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
 Nelson Trusler Johnson

Original and four copies by airmail to Department.
 Copy by safe hand to Embassy Peiping.

710
 EFD/skl

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Japanese air attacks on Yunnan Province
during January.

Summary of -.

lw

793.94/16562

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Desp. #190
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 19, 1941 From Kunming (Perkins)
To

File No. 893.00 P.R. Yunnan/145

16561

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KD

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
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 to anyone. (br)

ESSENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS ONLY
 TO ONI AND MID ^{4/7/41} **3D**
 Secretary of State,

Washington.


129, April 5, 10 a. m.

An American traveler just arrived from

Shanghai reports that three days ago he saw a fleet
 of one old Japanese battleship, six cruisers and
 three destroyers off Amoy.

An American traveler just arrived from Indochina,
 who periodically makes this sea trip, reports that
 he observed considerably less than the usual amount
 of Japanese naval shipping in and around Hainan and
 Hoihow.

Local Chinese newspapers persistently report
 that the Chinese are seriously resisting the
 Japanese in the Chaoyang and Swabue-Lukfung areas.
 But that the Japanese continue their looting,
 particularly of foodstuffs, and have destroyed many
 buildings as well as hundreds of trading junks.
 The military resistance by the Chinese is not
 confirmed in other sources and I have not during
 recent



793.94/16663

APR 10 1941
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 PS/DP

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #129, April 5, 10 a.m., from Hong Kong via N. R.

recent days been able to get in touch with travelers from those areas who usually provide the most reliable first hand information. Past experience has indicated that the local Chinese press is often not reliable but there is little doubt that some Japanese looting and destruction continues in the areas indicated.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Canton and Peiping for Tokyo.

LOCKHART.

CSB

0126

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Friction between Central Government troops and those
of Eighth Route Army.

Report on -.

lw

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See TEL. #96, 1pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Apr. 3, 1941 From China (Peiping)
To

File No. 893.00/14696

793.94/16564

0127

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

U- LIAISON OFFICE

APR 11 1941

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MMM

HONG KONG VIA N.R.

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
FROM

Dated April 8, 1941

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

SECRETANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY
 TO ONI AND MID 4/1/41 50
 Secretary of State,

Washington.



132, April 8, 12 noon.

According to the more reliable reports current in
 Hong Kong from numerous sources there continues to be
 a considerable amount of Japanese military movement in
 this general area.

An estimated 5,000 troops are reported to have
 arrived by transport assembled at Whampoa in the Pearl
 River during the past week with about an equal number
 departing. Some reports indicate that the arriving
 troops are from Hainan and others that they are from
 Central China. Both groups of reports are probably
 accurate to some extent. Departing troops are reported
 to be going to Hainan and Formosa.

Reports indicate continuation of the general
 shuffling about of Japanese troops in the Kowloon
 hinterland, in the manner reported in my number 101,
 March 18, 11 a.m.

The best information available recently from the
 coast area between here and Swatow suggests the Japanese
 landing

793.94/16565

PS/FR

793.94

APR 11 1941

FILED

16523

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #132, April 8, noon, from Hong Kong via N.R.

landing parties there may be preparing to withdraw after having pretty thoroughly looted the stores of merchandise and foodstuffs they have been able to locate.

Local Chinese newspapers insist that 50 or more new Japanese airplanes have recently arrived in Canton together with about 300 aviators. I have so far found no confirmation of this in authoritative sources in Hong Kong.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Canton and Peiping for Tokyo.

SOUTHARD

WVC

0129

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Collect (Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter)

Charge Department:

Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Charge to AMEMBASSY,
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

April 12, 1941.

TOKYO (JAPAN) VIA SHANGHAI AND NAVAL RADIO. 2PM

INFO: AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING (CHINA).
 AMEMBASSY, PEIPING (CHINA).

227 / 703.94/16566
 Kunming's 8, April 9, 10 a.m.

Please bring emphatically to the attention of the Japanese Foreign Office in such manner as you may deem appropriate the endangering of American lives by this indiscriminate bombing of Kunming. In so doing you may wish to point out that American citizens, including American officials, reside in that city for the purpose of carrying on legitimate activities and are entitled to reside there without danger of attack by Japanese air forces. You may care also to refer to the fact that the lives of American citizens continue to be jeopardized and American citizens continue to suffer loss from such bombings notwithstanding the fact that in most cases the Japanese authorities have been given detailed information with regard to the location of American property and the residences of American citizens.

1.
 Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Chungking, Peiping.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____ 19 _____

FE:MMH/GA:HES

1-1402

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

FE

PA/H

703.94/16566

PS/L3

0130

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEGAL ADVISER
 APR 13 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FOREIGN
 SERVICE ADMINISTRATION
 APR 15 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (Br)

KUNMING VI. HONG KONG & N.R.

FROM Dated April 9, 1941

Rec'd 1:20 p.m. 10th

Tel to Tokyo

Secretary of State,

Washington.

8, April 9, 10 a.m.

Heavy damage was caused yesterday by 27 Japanese
 planes in an indiscriminate area bombing attack on the
 center of Kunming west and south of Provincial Government
 Hill, chiefly along Wuchenglu in the direction of the
 West Gate. Several large fires were started, probably
 by incendiary bombs, and two or three blocks were burned
 out, with fires under control this morning. Two bombs
 fell beside the British Consulate General, damaging its
 street wall and causing breakage of glass and woodwork
 inside. China Inland Mission, where 7 Americans including
 3 children are living, was badly damaged and just missed
 the conflagration. Bombs were also dropped near Hailungtan
 northeast of the city.

House of clerk Stanley A. McGeary adjacent to China
 Inland Mission suffered concussion damage from bombs
 as near as thirty yards away and was endangered by fire.
 Glass was broken, plaster and tiles fell and light fixtures
 were

793.94/16566

MAY 15 1941

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PS/LE

also 16620

19394

110's
 123456789
 Stanley A.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 8, April 9, 1941 from Kunming via Hong Kong and N. R.

were blown from ceiling".

Sent to Hong Kong only. Please repeat to Chungking,
Peiping, Tokyo, and Shanghai.

PERKINS

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Japanese aims in China.

Report on conversation between the Pope and
 Matsuoka.

lw

793.94 / 16567

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See TEL. 6pm, 1941
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Apr. 5, 1941 From Italy (Phillips)
 To

File No. 765.94/152

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Relations between China and Japan.

Information concerning differences between Chinese and Japanese troops. States it is believed that Chinese forces are believed to outnumber Japanese. No Chinese are being permitted passage through the city gates.

793.94 / 16568

FLH

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel # 39 1 PM
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated April 7, 1941 From China (Nanking)
 To

File No. 893.00/14701

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

KD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Swatow via N. R.


COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 4/15/41 REK

FROM

Dated April 14, 1941

Rec'd. 9:46 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



12, April 14, 9 a. m.

A hand grenade was thrown in a local theatre Saturday night during the showing of Japanese film and it is reported that three Japanese soldiers and several Chinese were killed while a number of others were wounded. Martial law was proclaimed several hours before the usual 11 p. m. curfew and all those in the theatre were arrested. The local press makes no comment but it is reported that many Chinese are still being detained. Meanwhile military authorities are taking precautionary measures and travel between Swatow and the unoccupied territory will be prohibited for one week during which time a complete census will be taken. This incident is the first of its kind since the Japanese occupation in June 1939.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping, Chungking, Shanghai.

YEARNES.

HPD

703.94/16566

PC/ELR

FILED
 APR 16 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 197

AIR MAIL

DEA

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Kunming (Yunnanfu), China, March 6, 1941.

79394

SUBJECT: Behavior of Japanese Troops at
Junan, Honan.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 APR 15 AM 9 00

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FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 11 1941
Department of State

For Distribution-Check			
Grade	For	To be in U.S.A.	Yes No
	Misc		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
		ONI MID	

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
4/14/41 R&K

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
Department of State
APR 18 1941
DIVISION OF

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit to the Department information supplied the Consulate by the Reverend Kristofer H. Tvedt of the Lutheran United Mission now at Siksien (息縣), Honan, concerning the behavior of Japanese troops at Junan (汝南), Honan, during their recent campaign in southern Honan. The following excerpt is quoted from a letter dated February 10, 1941, from the Reverend Tvedt which describes his observations while he was at Junan:

"I happened to be here when the Imperial Army started their raid from Sinyang over the southern Honan plain. After this City of Junan was taken or invaded they stayed on for ten days looting all they were good for and burning and what not. Terrorism reigned among the people left here. When they finally left they systematically set fire to the governmental buildings and offices and we had an awful time fighting fire besides other things. The Catholic Mission as well as we had a great number of refugees to house and care for. The soldiers did not bother us so much, still I think a little easier for the other Mission which hoisted the German flag. We did not

hoist

793.94/16570

PS/JHS

APR 18 1941

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

hoist any flag but they scraped off one of the American flags which formerly had been pasted on one of our Gates which did not look so good to us. At least 3/4 of the population (40,000) escaped including all officials, police and soldiers and walking along the streets we found them empty and the City desolate looking."

Respectfully yours,

Troy L. Perkins

Troy L. Perkins
American Consul

In quintuplicate to the Department.
Copy to Embassy at Peiping.
Copy to Embassy at Chungking.
Copy to Consulate General at Hankow.

800
TLP:epy

0137

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



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
DES

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated ^{FROM}
to anyone. (Br)

TOKYO VIA SHANGHAI & N.R.

Dated April 16, 1941

Rec'd 4:30 p.m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

563, April 16, 8 p.m.

Department's 227, April 12, 2 p.m., bombing of
Yunnanfu.

A first person note along the lines indicated was
delivered to the Foreign Office today. Reference was
made to similar representations reported in the Embassy's
171, February 6, 8 p.m. ^{125.99141/57}

Sent to the Department via Shanghai. Shanghai please
repeat to Chungking and Peiping.

GREW

LMS

793.94/16371

PC/LB

FILED
APR 24 1941

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 M.I.D. IN CONFIDENCE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LS

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 to anyone. (Br.)

HONG KONG VIA N.R.

Dated April 16, 1941

7/15/41 J.D.
 Secretary of State,
 Washington.


139, April 16, 2 p.m.

During the week since my 132, April 8, noon,
 reports from many and various sources reaching
 Hong Kong indicate that apparently minor Japanese
 military and naval movements continue along the
 coast from Bias Bay to Swatow; in the Kowloon hinter-
 land; and in and about Bocca Tigris and the Chungshan
 District.

7-9-41
 Available information indicates that these move-
 ments are probably more general than for concentra-
 tion on any important single objective. An authorita-
 tive military observer here remarked informally to
 me that the Japanese in the Kowloon hinterland at
 least appear "to be doing little more than mill
 about" and this seems to me to be the general im-
 pression.

Chinese reports in Hong Kong repeatedly refer
 to the concentration of fleet of three Japanese
 battleships, three aircraft carriers, and nine

heavy



7-5-41/16572
 PG/AD

FILED
 APR 23 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 139, April 16, 2 p.m. from Hong Kong.

heavy cruisers in the Hainan Island and Luichow Peninsula Area. Similar sources also insist that important quantities of military supplies including several long-range guns have during the past week been landed at Bocca Tigris, and that airdrome construction on the Sprattley Islands continues with German technical assistance. Qualified local observers say that they are unable to confirm these various reports but are willing to concede that there may be some basis of fact for all of them.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking, Canton and Peiping for Tokyo.

SOUTHARD

RR

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

(CONFIDENTIAL)

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 139) of April 16, 1941 from the American Consul General, Hong Kong, reads substantially as follows:

Apparently minor Japanese naval and military movements continue in the Chungshan District; in the Kowloon hinterland; and along the coast from Bias Bay to Swatow, according to reports reaching Hong Kong during the past week from many different persons. This information indicates it is likely these movements are more general than for concentration on any one objective of importance. The general impression, which is also the opinion of an authoritative military observer in Tokyo, seems to be that apparently the Japanese, at least in the hinterland of Kowloon, are doing little more than milling around. The concentration in the vicinity of the Luichow Peninsula ~~xxxxx~~ and Hainan Island of a Japanese fleet composed of nine heavy cruisers, three aircraft carriers, and three battleships ^{was} referred to again and again in Chinese reports in Hong Kong. These Chinese reports insist also that with German technical assistance the construction of an airdrome continues on the Sprattley Islands and that during the last week there were landed at Bocca Tigris military supplies

in

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

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in important quantities which included several long range guns. Although observers in Hong Kong qualified to know are unable to confirm these different reports, they are willing to admit that all the reports may have some basis of fact.

83.9,
FE:EGC:OJL

FE 4-18

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Japanese military operations in China.
 Report for month of February.

1w

793.94/16573

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Despatch, 1941
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Mar. 2, 1941 From State Dept.
 To State Dept.

File No. 894.00 F. 2./154

0143

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Relations between China and Japan.

Quotes observations of Chinese Ambassador's conversation
with Molotov concerning effect of USSR-Japanese
agreement on, -

FLH

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel # 786 7 PM
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated April 16, 1941 From USSR(Steinhardt)
To

File No. 761.9411/101 Confidential file

763.94/10174


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 March 21, 1941
 3/25/41
 Mr. Hackworth
 Mr. Hamilton
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

We would welcome your comments in regard to the question raised in the enclosure to the attached letter which Dr. Laughlin Currie, the President's assistant, brought back with him from Chungking and handed to Mr. Welles.

FE:MMH:HES



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
 March 22, 1941.

In the memorandum under reference and attached below, the Chinese author thereof discusses both legal and political considerations. He makes a statement at one point to the effect that the matter should be treated as a political question more than a question of international law. He is, I think, right.

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Handed to Mr. Wells by
 Mrs. Currie*

121 CHUNG HWA ROAD
 CHUNGKING, CHINA

February 21, 1941

Dr. Laughlin Currie,
 3 Chialing Village,
 Chungking

*Mr. Currie says
 us to keep this*

FILE
IV-2-41

Dear Dr. Currie:

As I promised you this morning, I am sending you herewith a written copy of the views expressed to you by Dr. C. F. Chang and myself in connection with the possibility of Japan's declaration of war upon China. I trust that after you return to Washington your Government leaders will agree with us that this is a very important issue deserving thorough consideration.

With best regards

Yours sincerely,

Wang Shih-chieh

Wang Shih-chieh

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APR 24 1941

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHINA'S POSITION IN THE EVENT OF A DECLARATION
 OF WAR UPON HER BY JAPAN

On the 4th of February last, Japan's Foreign Minister, Mr. Matsuo, replying to Mr. Shinzo Imai's interpellation in the House Budgetary Committee, said that the "Government have already invoked belligerent rights wherever necessary." He added that the invocation of full belligerent rights in the near future is under the Government's consideration. In other words, Japan is contemplating a declaration of war upon China.

I. The Sino-Japanese Conflict and International Law up to the Present

Hitherto the Sino-Japanese conflict has been an un-declared war, and on account of this fact Japan has not been able to fully invoke the rights of a belligerent. To be sure, Japan frequently interfered with third-Power nationals and properties in the occupied areas. But this invariably brought protests from the Powers affected. Thus Japan often found it more expedient to encroach upon foreign interests through the medium of the puppet regimes. Japan also blockaded a number of Chinese seaports. But when the blockade applied at first only to Chinese vessels, it amounted to little more than what is called in international law a "pacific blockade." It is true that the scope of such blockade has been extended more recently to apply to third-Power vessels. But up to the present Japan has not been able to interfere on the high seas with neutral ships carrying supplies to China because of the absence of a formal declaration of war. This is the reason why China is still able to import war materials from abroad, especially via Rangoon.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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II. The Increasing Possibility of a Declaration
 of War by Japan

The question naturally arises: Why did not Japan declare war upon China? There were several reasons. Firstly, Japan at first under-estimated China's strength of resistance. Secondly, in the early stages of the hostilities a formally declared war with China would scarcely meet with the approval of the Japanese Emperor or the civilian elements of his entourage. Thirdly, Japan feared the United States' application of the Neutrality Act and thus an embargo on vital war materials to Japan. Fourthly, as long as the northwest land route was kept open for the influx of large quantities of Soviet materials into China, a formal declaration of war by Japan could not produce very effective results. Fifthly, in the early stages of the conflict, even Germany supplied China with war materials. If at that time Japan declared war upon China, she would not only antagonize America and Great Britain, but she would also have to face the opposition of all neutrals, including Germany. In short, under the circumstances existing then, a declaration of war by Japan would involve complications with nearly all foreign Powers, especially as both Germany and Soviet Russia were then supplying China with war materials by their own vessels. Japan did not feel strong enough that she could afford to antagonize all the Powers.

The present situation, however, has changed considerably. China's strength of resistance has far surpassed the expectation of the Japanese militarists. Meantime, the latter have increased their domination over Japan's politics; neither the Emperor nor

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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any other body is strong enough to stop them to renounce the so-called China Incident a state of war. As to Japan's relations with third-Powers, the United States and Great Britain have already put many articles of export on their embargo lists, and Germany is now her ally. Japan even believes that her relations with Soviet Russia can be improved or are improving. Moreover, the recent acquisition of new bases in French Indo-China and the possible acquisition of more bases in Thailand in the near future have assured the Japanese of new facilities for interfering with neutral shipping in the south Pacific if the necessity should arise. As a result of the aforesaid considerations, there is an appreciably greater possibility today than before of a formal declaration of war upon China by Japan.

III. Legal Consequences of Japan's Declaration of War upon China

In case Japan declares war upon China, its effects upon the latter's strength of resistance would be very great. Japan would then not only tighten her blockade of the Chinese coast, but she would, in accordance with international practice, exercise the belligerent right of visit and search against neutral vessels on the high seas. This will vitally affect the supplies coming to China via Rangoon. By applying the "Doctrine of Continuous Voyage," she will almost certainly seize as contraband all ammunition and war materials aboard neutral vessels sailing toward Rangoon.

IV. Possible Reactions from the United States and Great Britain to a Japanese Declaration of War upon China

As the right of visit and search of a belligerent is

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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generally recognized by international usage, political observers may tend to expect that the United States and Great Britain would have to acquiesce in the exercise of such a right by Japan following her declaration of war upon China. This is especially true of Great Britain as she herself has been insisting on the exercise of such rights against Germany.

However, Japan's war against China is a direct violation of the Anti-War Pact of Paris and of the Nine-Power Treaty. For over three years, throughout which period the war has never been declared, she has also been illegally violating American and British interests in China. In view of these facts, the American and British Governments certainly have good reason to oppose Japan's exercise of the right of visit and search as normally granted to a belligerent.

In this connection, we may recall President Roosevelt's attitude toward Germany as made known to Congress in January last. The President held that since international law has not been observed by Hitler, there is no reason why the United States should be bound by it unilaterally. The same argument certainly can be fully applied to Japan in the Far Eastern conflict.

V. Suggestions as to What Measures Should Be Taken to Enable China to Cope with the Situation

In view of what has been said above, China wishes that the American and British Governments would give this important question thorough consideration with a view toward exploring all possible means whereby they might effectively aid China in such an eventuality. It should be evident that this should be treated as a political question more than a question of

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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international law. The European war and the war in Asia are but two fronts of the same war in which the aggressors are being checked by similarly-minded democracies. The break-down of any wing in this struggle is bound to upset the whole anti-aggression front. As to what measures should be taken to enable China to cope with the situation following Japan's declaration of war upon her, the following suggestions are hereby offered as bases for consideration:

(1) In the event of Japan's declaration of war upon China with a clear intention to exercise full belligerent rights toward neutrals, the American and British Governments will make a formal declaration to the effect that as Japan has not observed her obligations under the aforementioned treaties, neither the United States nor Great Britain would consider herself bound unilaterally by international usage in matters concerning neutral shipping.

(2) If, in spite of such a declaration, Japan insists on exercising the right of visit and search, it is hoped that the American and British Governments will adopt the following measures:

- (a) Complete embargo on all exports to, and imports from, Japan.
- (b) Convoy: The convoy system hereby recommended is in the nature of a reprisal. It is to insure protection for all Anglo-American trade with China, in contraband as well as non-contraband.

(3) To forestall the disruption of ocean traffic following Japan's declaration of war, China should be enabled by the United States Government to procure immediately the maximum possible

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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amount of ammunition and war materials (trucks, airplanes, gasoline, etc.) either on the basis of credit loans or in accordance with the provisions of the Lend-Lease Bill (if enacted). The amount thus rushed in may temporarily be fixed at least for one year's requirement for China's war against Japan; and all facilities will be accorded so that such shipments may reach Rangoon within about two months. So long as the Burma road is maintained, the stored materials will reach China in course of time.

"We are all confident that the extent of American aid to China will grow in future. But the urgency of China's need of immediate large supply of war materials is unique in that unless the convoy system materializes when Japan declares war, China will be cut off from all possible Anglo-American aid. Like Great Britain, therefore, China must also fight for time.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(COPY:FE:HES)

[COPY - CONT. 4]

[FE]

121 Chung Hwa Road
Chungking, China
February 21, 1941

Dr. Lauphlin Currie,
3 Chialing Village,
Chungking

Dear Dr. Currie:

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With best regards

Yours sincerely,

Wang Shih-chieh

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(COPY:FE:HES)

CHINA'S POSITION IN THE EVENT OF A DECLARATION
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I. The Sino-Japanese Conflict and International Law up to the Present

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to

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to Japan. Fourthly, as long as the northwest land route was kept open for the influx of large quantities of Soviet materials into China, a formal declaration of war by Japan could not produce very effective results. Fifthly, in the early stages of the conflict, even Germany supplied China with war materials. If at that time Japan declared war upon China, she would not only antagonize America and Great Britain, but she would also have to face the opposition of all neutrals, including Germany. In short, under the circumstances existing then, a declaration of war by Japan would involve complications with nearly all foreign Powers, especially as both Germany and Soviet Russia were then supplying China with war materials by their own vessels. Japan did not feel strong enough that she could afford to antagonize all the Powers.

The present situation, however, has changed considerably. China's strength of resistance has far surpassed the expectation of the Japanese militarists. Meantime, the latter have increased their domination over Japan's politics: neither the Emperor nor any other body is strong enough to stop them to rename the so-called China Incident a state of war. As to Japan's relations with third-Powers, the United States and Great Britain have already put many articles of export on their embargo lists, and Germany is now her ally. Japan even believes that her relations with Soviet Russia can be improved or are improving. Moreover, the recent acquisition of new bases in French Indo-China and the possible acquisition of more bases in Thailand in the near future have assured the Japanese of new facilities for interfering with neutral shipping in the south Pacific if the necessity should arise. As a result of the aforesaid considerations, there is an appreciably greater possibility today than before of a formal declaration of war upon China by Japan.

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In case Japan declares war upon China, its effects upon the latter's strength of resistance would be very great. Japan would then not only tighten her blockade of the Chinese coast, but she would, in accordance with international practice, exercise the belligerent right of visit and search against neutral vessels on the high seas. This will vitally affect the supplies coming to China via Rangoon. By applying the "Doctrine of Continuous Voyage," she will almost certainly seize as contraband all ammunition and war materials aboard neutral vessels sailing toward Rangoon.

IV.

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IV. Possible Reactions from the United States
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 of War upon China

As the right of visit and search of a belligerent is generally recognized by international usage, political observers may tend to expect that the United States and Great Britain would have to acquiesce in the exercise of such a right by Japan following her declaration of war upon China. This is especially true of Great Britain as she herself has been insisting on the exercise of such rights against Germany.

However, Japan's war against China is a direct violation of the Anti-War Pact of Paris and of the Nine-Power Treaty. For over three years, throughout which period the war has never been declared, she has also been illegally violating American and British interests in China. In view of these facts, the American and British Governments certainly have good reason to oppose Japan's exercise of the right of visit and search as normally granted to a belligerent.

In this connection, we may recall President Roosevelt's attitude toward Germany as made known to Congress in January last. The President held that since international law has not been observed by Hitler, there is no reason why the United States should be bound by it unilaterally. The same argument certainly can be fully applied to Japan in the Far Eastern conflict.

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Japan's

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Japan's declaration of war upon her, the following suggestions are hereby offered as bases for consideration:

(1) In the event of Japan's declaration of war upon China with a clear intention to exercise full belligerent rights toward neutrals, the American and British Governments will make a formal declaration to the effect that as Japan has not observed her obligations under the aforementioned treaties, neither the United States nor Great Britain would consider herself bound unilaterally by international usage in matters concerning neutral shipping.

(2) If, in spite of such a declaration, Japan insists on exercising the right of visit and search, it is hoped that the American and British Governments will adopt the following measures:

- (a) Complete embargo on all exports to, and imports from, Japan.
- (b) Convoy: The convoy system hereby recommended is in the nature of a reprisal. It is to insure protection for all Anglo-American trade with China, in contraband as well as non-contraband.

(3) To forestall the disruption of ocean traffic following Japan's declaration of war, China should be enabled by the United States Government to procure immediately the maximum possible amount of ammunition and war materials (trucks, airplanes, gasoline, etc.) either on the basis of credit loans or in accordance with the provisions of the Lend-Lease Bill (if enacted). The amount thus rushed in may temporarily be fixed at least for one year's requirement for China's war against Japan; and all facilities will be accorded so that such shipments may reach Rangoon within about two months. So long as the Burma road is maintained, the stored materials will reach China in course of time.

We are all confident that the extent of American aid to China will grow in future. But the urgency of China's need of immediate large supply of war materials is unique in that unless the convoy system materializes when Japan declares war, China will be cut off from all possible Anglo-American aid. Like Great Britain, therefore, China must also fight for time.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 25, 1941

Reference is made to the copy of a letter from Wang Shih-chieh (Secretary of the People's Political Council and Director of the Central Publicity Department at Chungking) to Dr. Laughlin Currie, in an annex to which are set forth certain views expressed to Dr. Currie at Chungking by Dr. C. F. Chang and Mr. Wang. Mr. Wang and Dr. Chang stated their belief that Japan was contemplating a declaration of war upon China and they suggested for consideration certain lines of action which the United States and Great Britain might take in such a contingency, including one or more of the following steps: (1) A declaration of intention not to observe "international usage in matters concerning neutral shipping"; (2) application of a complete export and import embargo against Japan; and (3) use of a convoy system for sending supplies to China. It was also suggested that aid equivalent to one year's requirement be immediately rushed to China in anticipation of a declaration of war. The following comment and suggestions are offered:

I Possibility of a Japanese Declaration of War.

It has been evident since the commencement of hostilities in China in 1937 that from many points of view Japan would

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would have stood to gain by a declaration of war against China which would have given Japan belligerent rights. The question of the desirability of a declaration of war by Japan against China has been raised at intervals in the Japanese Diet but the Japanese Government hitherto has declined to take this step. On March 22 of this year the Chief of the Japanese Naval Affairs Bureau was quoted by the press as having said in the Diet that while Japan was not invoking belligerent rights against China intensification of the Japanese blockade assured results tantamount to such an invocation.

The recent enactment by this Government of the Lend-Lease Bill, however, would seem to bring added considerations in favor of such a declaration of war: (1) If a state of war were declared to exist between Japan and China Japan as a belligerent would be in a position under international law to attempt to intercept shipments by this Government intended for the Chinese Government under the Lease-Lend Bill; and (2) Japan as a member of the Axis may have been urged by Germany to take such a step as a rejoinder to the passage of the Lend-Lease Bill and also because involvement by the United States in the Far East would, in the German point of view, tend to decrease American aid to Great Britain.

On the

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On the other hand, considerations which might serve to prevent Japan from taking such a step include (a) legal difficulties and implications* and loss of prestige at home and abroad which would be involved in declaring war against a government which Japan no longer officially considers to be in existence; (b) dangers of involvement with third countries, especially the United States and Great Britain, which would be likely to result from the exercise of belligerent rights by Japan upon the high seas; and (c) loss of prestige which would follow from declaring after three and one-half years of fighting that hostilities which the Japanese people had been led to believe would be of short duration now in fact constitute formal war.

It is believed that Japan, despite possible Axis pressure, would not take the risks involved in the exercise of belligerent rights against the United States upon the high seas unless (a) Japan were convinced that such risks must inevitably be taken, (b) Japan were to believe that American aid to China will increase very materially in amount over that previously given, and (c) Japan shall have reached an understanding with the U.S.S.R.

Instead

* A Japanese declaration of war would imply, for example, recognition of the Chinese Government. Japan, however, on November 30, 1940, recognized the Wang Ching-wei regime.

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Japan would also by a declaration of war acquire belligerent rights in land warfare. The presence in China of foreign troops stationed there under international conventional arrangements and the existence of international settlements raise questions in regard to the nature and extent of the rights which Japan as a belligerent might exercise in China which are believed to be in many respects sui generis. It has been suggested (with particular reference to the status of third power troops in China) that, from the legal point of view, "The rights exercised by the several treaty powers are for all practical purposes sovereign rights which became fixed before the possible assumption by Japan of the status of a belligerent occupant of enemy territory and therefore take precedence over any right which Japan might acquire by virtue of her status as a belligerent occupant".* From a practical point of view, however, Japan's position in China as regards third powers following a Japanese declaration of war would be strengthened and the legal basis for American interposition with the Japanese authorities

*Le memorandum of December 15, 1937, entitled "Status of our Military Forces in Peiping, Tientsin and Shanghai".

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Instead of a formal declaration of war Japan of course might adopt other expedients, such as a declaration of an intention to exercise belligerent rights on the high seas upon the basis of military necessity (a declaration which would be without legal basis) or the affording of bases of supply to German vessels which might intercept American or British shipments intended for China through British territory.

Although there are strong reasons militating against a Japanese declaration of war against China the possibility that Japan might take this step is one that should be considered.

II. Effect Under Previously Existing International Law of a Japanese Declaration of War Against China.

Under international law as previously observed Japan by declaring war against China would acquire belligerent rights upon the high seas, including the rights of visit and search and of confiscating a wide category of articles of military use consigned to the Chinese Government. Under international law as previously observed, Japan could, following a declaration of war, regard the extension of aid by this Government (as distinguished from private individuals) to the Chinese Government as unneutral and a matter for retaliation.

Japan

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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authorities for the protection of American rights and interests in China would be restricted.

Under these circumstances questions would arise as to whether this Government should invoke the Neutrality Act and as to what other steps might be taken in furtherance of this Government's policy of protecting American rights and interests and of extending aid to China.

III. Possible Invocation of the Neutrality Act.

Following a Japanese declaration of war against China the United States might invoke the Neutrality Act. Discretion in the matter of invoking the Act rests under the Act with the President or the Congress. Unless there is a concurrent resolution of the Congress, the President apparently may refrain from invoking the Neutrality Act, even though there may have been a declaration of war between foreign states, if in his opinion invocation of the Act is not essential to the security or peace of the United States or the protection of American citizens.*

(A) General

* The Act provides "That whenever the President, or the Congress by concurrent resolution, shall find that there exists a state of war between foreign states, and that it is necessary to promote the security or preserve the peace of the United States or to protect the lives of citizens of the United States, the President shall issue a proclamation naming the states involved".

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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A. General Effect of the Invocation of the Neutrality Act.

Invocation of the Neutrality Act, if not accompanied by a proclamation of a combat zone, would apparently produce but slight change from the practical point of view in the existing situation in regard to the shipment of goods from the United States consigned to China or Japan. The Neutrality Act excepts from the application of certain of its provisions transportation by American or neutral vessels to ports on the Pacific or Indian Oceans of articles or materials other than those listed in a proclamation of May 1, 1937. At the present time, therefore, as a consequence of the invocation of the Neutrality Act with respect to the war in Europe, transportation by American vessels to British or French ports on the Pacific, for example, (including Rangoon, the main port of entry for the Burma road) of arms, ammunition, airplanes, airplane parts, and other supplies mentioned in that proclamation is understood to be not permitted. Such articles may be transported to such ports in non-American vessels on the "cash and carry basis" (subject, of course, to export licensing restrictions). Shipments to such ports of goods other than those mentioned in the proclamation of May 1, 1937 may legally be made apparently under the provisions of the Neutrality

Act

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Act in American or other neutral vessels (and also in belligerent vessels on a "cash and carry" basis). If the Neutrality Act should be invoked with regard to China and Japan, shipments of arms, et cetera, in American vessels destined for Chinese or Japanese ports would apparently, from the legal point of view, be no longer permitted.* At the present time, however, in practice shipments from the United States of arms, et cetera, consigned to the Chinese Government through Chinese ports are not feasible because of Japanese occupation of practically all of the China coast, while shipments of such articles to Japanese ports have been cut off through the operation of the export licensing system.

In as much as one of the objects of the Neutrality Act is understood to have been the avoidance of incidents which might arise from the exercise of belligerent rights in regard to American ships or cargoes, the sending of American ships or American-owned cargoes of contraband to Pacific or Indian Ocean ports by routes which would make interception by belligerent war vessels comparatively likely might be regarded as contrary to the spirit of the

Neutrality

* See the Annex to this memorandum entitled "Effect of Invocation of Neutrality Act in the Far East upon Transport of Goods". See also Le memorandum of March 25, 1941.

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Neutrality Act. The route to Rangoon via the Indian Ocean, however, now understood to be in use by certain shipping services would not seem to be open to such possible objection.

In connection with the question of avoiding, so far as possible, the seizure or sinking of American ships or cargoes, consideration should be given to the proclamation of a combat area under section 3(a) of the Neutrality Act. The principal effects of the proclamation of a combat area are (1) to make it unlawful for any American citizen or American vessel to proceed into or through such an area (except subject to such regulations as may be prescribed); and (2) to make it unlawful for other vessels to transport goods from the United States to any port within such area except on a "cash and carry" basis. With respect to the war in Europe, combat areas have been proclaimed by the President which include not only the waters around the territories in Europe of the belligerent states but also the waters around contiguous neutral territory.*

The situation in regard to the proclamation of a combat area in the Far East differs from that existing in Europe in that (1) China has no Navy with which to exercise

* Department of State Bulletin, November 4, 1939, p. 454; id., June 15, 1940, p. 641.

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exercise belligerent rights against American vessels;
 (2) with practically all of the China coast under Japanese occupation and with shipments of military supplies to China over the Yunnan Railroad from Indochina cut off, it would seem that but slight basis could be found for a Japanese claim that American vessels bound across the Pacific for Hong Kong or Shanghai or French Indochina (and not proceeding to Burma) might be carrying goods for the Chinese Government. (The Japanese might, of course, assert that cargoes bound for such ports were later to be transshipped to Rangoon and hence claim a right to intercept such cargoes on the basis of the doctrine of continuous voyage.) The chance that Chinese-owned cargoes destined for the United States might be picked up at Chinese or Indochinese ports by American vessels would seem to be negligible. The United States possesses special rights and obligations in the Far East (as, for example, at Shanghai and Amoy), the practical continuance of which are dependent in large degree upon the maintenance by the United States of independent means of ingress and egress to certain areas of China. With the assumption of belligerent rights by Japan following a declaration of war, the situation in regard to the maintenance of such rights in China would probably be greatly changed from a practical point of view (as has previously been noted), but the United States would

probably

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probably not wish to take a step which would hasten such a change except in conjunction with a general plan for the future protection of American rights and interests in the Far East.

In reaching a decision in regard to the proclamation of a combat area the following main considerations are suggested:

(a) In keeping with the spirit of the Neutrality Act and with the practice followed in respect to the war in Europe, a combat area might be proclaimed to include the Japanese islands, the Japanese-occupied coast of China, Hong Kong, Macao, Indochina, and possibly other points. The proclamation of such a combat area would not interrupt American aid to China via the Indian Ocean to Rangoon but would prevent American vessels or American-owned cargo which might be subject to interception by Japanese vessels from coming within the radius of operation of Japanese naval vessels. On the other hand, under existing conditions in the Far East, the occasion for the seizure or sinking of American vessels in the areas in question would be far less than in comparable areas in Europe and the necessity for the proclamation of such a combat area would not exist to the same degree. Moreover, the effect which the immediate proclamation of such an area might have

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have upon the status of American nationals, rights and interests in China would have to be kept in view.*

(b) A combat area might be proclaimed merely about the Japanese islands. The effect of such a proclamation would be to prevent visits to Japan by American vessels and would thus effect a reduction -- probably not a very large reduction -- in the tonnage available for use by Japan. It would be evident that such a measure was being applied more with a view to its effect upon Japan than for the protection of American vessels. As such, it might be regarded as a reply to the Japanese act in declaring war upon China with the evident intent of cutting off American shipments to China. Japan might ^{however} regard such an act as discriminatory and might proceed to exercise in an unfriendly manner the belligerent right of visit and search in regard to American vessels on their way to other Far Eastern ports. If such should be the case, the United States could of course take counter measures such as the visiting and searching of Japanese vessels.

(c) No combat area in the Far East might be proclaimed unless American vessels were subjected unnecessarily or in an arbitrary manner to visit and search by Japanese vessels or until other untoward incidents developed. It

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*Regulations e.g., might be issued exempting American naval vessels from the provisions relating to combat areas proclaimed along the China coast.

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is possible that the invocation of the Neutrality Act without the proclamation of a combat area about the Japanese islands might be regarded in this country and possibly also in Japan and China as a weakening of American policy toward Japan. This impression might be offset to a degree by a statement of this Government's intention to continue to aid China.

Aside from its effects upon the transport of goods to the Far East, invocation of the Neutrality Act would also bring certain prohibitions now in effect with respect to the belligerents

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belligerents in the war in Europe into effect for China and Japan. Among these prohibitions would be (1) prohibition against travel by American nationals on belligerent vessels (except in accordance with such regulations as might be prescribed); (2) prohibition upon the purchase or sale of bonds of belligerent governments issued after the date of the invocation of the Act, or the extension of credit, by any person within the United States to any belligerent government;* and (3) prohibition upon the solicitation by any person in the United States of contributions for a belligerent government.

B. Principal Consequences for Japan of an Invocation of the Neutrality Act and a Proclamation of a Combat Area.

Considering the export licensing system which is now in effect and the restrictions now applied in the United States in regard to the issuance of passports to American nationals for travel in the Far East, it is believed that an invocation of the Neutrality Act, unaccompanied by a proclamation

* The Secretary in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in regard to the Lend-Lease Bill on January 15, 1941 said that this provision "is not by its terms made applicable to this Government but it does apply to a corporation such as the Export-Import Bank. In any event the prohibition would be superseded by the new Act [Lend-Lease Act] in so far as transactions by this Government are concerned."

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proclamation of a combat zone, would, in the case of Japan, produce but slight change in the existing situation. Some contraction in the private credit now available in the United States to the Japanese Government would probably result but it is understood that in fact very little such credit is now being extended to the Japanese Government.

Certain of the permissive (as distinguished from mandatory) provisions of the Act might be applied to Japan, such as the provision relating to the giving of bond by the master or owner of a vessel that no alien seaman of such vessel shall remain illegally in the United States.

Invocation of the Neutrality Act might be accompanied by the proclamation of a combat zone around the Japanese islands under section 3(a) of the Act. The effect of such a proclamation would be to prohibit visits by American vessels to Japanese ports and would result in a reduction -- probably not, however, a very large reduction -- in the tonnage available for use by Japan.

C. General Effect Upon Extension of American Aid to China of an Invocation of the Neutrality Act.

In the situation which would exist following a

Japanese

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Japanese declaration of war against China (that is, with Japan in possession of belligerent rights), it is believed that an invocation of the Neutrality Act would produce but slight change in regard to aid for China. The extension of private credit in this country to the Chinese Government would be shut off but aid by this Government under the Lend-Lease Act would be available to the Chinese Government in quantities potentially far larger than could reasonably be expected to be obtained from private sources.

Following an invocation of the Neutrality Act aid to China by this Government would be placed upon the same basis from the legal point of view as aid to Great Britain and every assistance which this Government is now giving to Great Britain could legally be given to China.

From the practical point of view the situation with regard to aid to China would differ from the situation relating to aid to Great Britain: (1) China has neither ships nor navy to convoy ships; (2) China's requirements are smaller; and (3) under existing conditions China can obtain material assistance from contiguous territory.*

Shipments

* Precise reports upon the extent of Soviet aid to China are not available, and it is probable that such aid may vary in quantity from time to time to a large degree.

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Shipments to China from the United States, moreover, could go forward to Rangoon via the Indian Ocean. (Certain shipping services are understood to be so operating at present.) Because of the distance of this route from the bases of operation of Japanese naval vessels (and of German and Italian naval vessels also which might assert a right to intercept such shipments bound for a British port), such shipments could probably be made with relatively slight prospect of interception. If a lessening of aid from the United States should result as a consequence of a Japanese declaration of war upon China the political effect would have to be considered. It is also to be remembered, however, that a lessening of such aid might equally result if Japan should succeed in cutting the Burma Road.

In order to make clear the policy of this Government with respect to the extension of aid to China, this Government, if it should invoke the Neutrality Act and proclaim a combat area, might also make a statement expressing its intention to continue to extend aid to China as to Great Britain under the Lease-Lend Act, in as large a measure as possible.

IV. Possible

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IV. Possible Steps Which This Government Might Take Other Than an Invocation of the Neutrality Act.

Following a Japanese declaration of war against China this Government might refrain from invoking the Neutrality Act. In order to avoid uncertainty both on the part of American nationals and on the part of the Chinese Government it would probably be desirable to indicate by a statement the policy which this Government intends to follow with respect to the question of the exercise of belligerent rights by Japan.

A. Possible Announcement by the United States of Its Intention Not To Allow the Exercise of Belligerent Rights by Japan With Respect to American Aid to China.

Mr. Wang and Dr. Chang (in an annex to Mr. Wang's letter under reference) suggest that the United States and Great Britain might make a formal declaration that as Japan has not observed its obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine Power Treaty the United States and Great Britain would not consider themselves bound unilaterally by international usage in matters concerning neutral shipping. Several other nations have not observed their obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact but it is understood that the United States has not objected to the exercise of belligerent rights upon the high

seas

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seas by those nations. A better basis for such a declaration in the case of Japan would seem to be something to the following effect: That in as much as hostilities have been in progress for three and one-half years between China and Japan, which Japan did not regard as war, and although the Japanese Government after disregarding international law in many ways in the past now seeks to gain by a belated declaration of war the advantages which that law offers, with the evident intent of preventing American aid from reaching China, the United States does not consider that international law can be regarded as operating in such a unilateral manner and for that reason the United States intends to continue its aid to China. Such a declaration would be in line with the policy of this Government as indicated by the Secretary in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in regard to the Lend-Lease Bill on January 15, 1941. At that time he said with especial reference to the activities of Germany and Italy:

"Having in mind what has taken place and is taking place under our very eyes, it is idle for us to rely on the rules of neutrality or to feel that they afford us the slightest degree of security or protection. Nothing but a realistic view of current developments can be regarded as a sane view. . . . We are amply warranted, as a measure of self-defense and in the protection of our security, to allow supplies to go to countries who are directly defending themselves and indirectly defending us against the ownership of this unholy

determination

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determination to conquer and dominate by force of arms."

In considering the adoption of measures with respect to the Far East which involve a turning away by the United States from established usage under international law, consideration should be given to the fact that the exercise by Japan of belligerent rights upon the high seas is only one aspect of the situation. As has already been seen, Japan, after a declaration of war, would acquire belligerent rights on land. The effect which the adoption of new norms of international conduct might have upon the exercise by Japan of belligerent rights on land as well as on the sea should be kept in view.

A declaration such as that suggested above would be likely to have a beneficial effect upon China. It is suggested that the United States should not make such a declaration unless this Government were willing to take steps in support of the declaration. Such steps might include the use of a convoy system, the application of an export and import embargo, the interception of Japanese vessels by American naval vessels, etc.

B. Use of a Convoy System for Sending Supplies to China.

If cargoes were to be sent forward, ~~however~~, via the
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Indian Ocean as suggested above, there would probably be little need for the use of a convoy system. If cargoes are to be sent forward across the Pacific the use of a convoy system as suggested by Mr. Wang and Dr. Chang might be considered. The use of such a system would involve major questions of policy such as whether in view of the situation in Europe the risk of war in the Far East over the issue of the use of convoys should be taken and whether in view of discussions in Congress and statements by officials in regard to the use of convoys for the protection of supplies bound for England, the use of convoys could be considered.

With regard to the risks which might be involved, it is suggested that in view of Japan's great pride in its navy, the use of convoys, within the radius of operations of the Japanese fleet, to protect American or other vessels carrying cargoes for China would constitute a situation in which the Japanese navy might well feel bound to take action.

If direct measures to protect American cargoes intended for China are to be taken it would probably be preferable to send cargoes forward without convoy, and if the vessels are stopped to take counter-measures such as the intercepting of Japanese vessels bound to or from

American

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American ports or the withholding of clearances in American ports for vessels destined for Japan. Such acts would of course be in the nature of retaliation and as such would be open to the objections to which retaliation is open.

C. Imposition of Complete Export and Import Embargoes Against Japan.

The arguments in general in regard to the imposition of such embargoes as suggested by Mr. Wang and Dr. Chang are well known. As applied to this particular case the imposition of such embargoes would probably have a beneficial psychological effect upon China but would not solve the problem of getting supplies to China and might impel Japan to take, or furnish an excuse for Japan's taking, aggressive steps in line with its southward advance policy.

The United States might announce that in as much as Japan by a declaration of war made after three and one-half years of undeclared hostilities has sought to prevent shipments from reaching China, the United States, in order to prevent American shipments in like manner from reaching Japan or Japanese shipments from reaching the United States, is imposing an embargo. It is suggested, however,

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however, that the intercepting of Japanese vessels by American naval vessels near the American coast, as suggested in (B) above, would be preferable in that it would make possible a certain elasticity in application. Thus if Japanese vessels desisted from intercepting American cargoes bound for China, American naval vessels could likewise allow Japanese vessels freely to pass. Moreover, such intercepting would constitute retaliation in kind. If retaliation is to be used, retaliation in kind would seem to be preferable.

The steps suggested above -- the use of convoys, the application of an export and import embargo, or the intercepting of Japanese vessels by American naval vessels -- are here considered as measures to be taken in support of a statement of the intention of this Government not to concede the right of Japan to exercise belligerent rights against American vessels or cargoes destined for China. There are certain measures which might be taken independently of such a statement, such as, for example, the extension of American credits to China for the purchase of supplies by China in contiguous territory.

D. Extension

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D. Extension of American Credits to China for Purchase of Supplies in Contiguous Territory.

The United States might work out some arrangement with China by which credits would be made available for the purchase by China of supplies in the U.S.S.R., such purchases possibly to be offset by shipments from the United States to the U.S.S.R. Shipments destined to the U.S.S.R. under such an arrangement might be liable to detention by Japan under the doctrine of contiguous territory but Japan would probably be reluctant to run the risk of involvement with both the United States and the Soviet Union.

It is possible that under certain conditions some supplies might be made available to China in Burma or British India through American credits.

V. Conclusions.

In the event of a Japanese declaration of war against China this Government might follow one of two main courses of action:

- (1) This Government might invoke the Neutrality Act in regard to China and Japan and might state the intention of this Government to continue to extend aid to China as to Great Britain under the Lease-Lend Act in as large a measure as possible. This Government might also proclaim a combat zone

Conclusions,
Miss Bacon's
memorandum,
March 25, 1941

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zone about the Japanese islands (and possibly along the coasts of China and northern Indo-China with exceptions made to allow visits by American naval vessels). Aid to China and aid to Britain would then rest upon the same legal basis. From the practical point of view material aid to China could be sent forward to Rangoon via the Indian Ocean in American or foreign vessels (depending upon the category of goods involved), thus obviating in large degree under existing conditions the likelihood of the interception of such vessels or cargoes by belligerent naval vessels. In addition to the transport of American aid to China by vessels, airplanes could apparently be flown into China in accordance with American law as a consequence of the Lend-Lease Act. Credit might also be extended by this Government to China for the obtaining of supplies in so far as available in contiguous territory (the U.S.S.R. and possibly Burma or India).

(2) This Government might refrain from invoking the ^{not} Neutrality Act and might make known that it does concede that Japan, by declaring war against China after three and one-half years of undeclared hostilities, has a right to intercept shipments of material aid from this country destined for China. The methods of extending aid to China which would be open under the first course of action would
 equally

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equally be open under the second course. If Japan should in fact intercept American vessels or American-owned cargoes destined for China, this Government might adopt counter measures such as the intercepting by American naval vessels near the American coast of Japanese vessels coming to or from American ports, or the withholding of clearances in American ports for vessels destined for Japan.

These two courses of action are of course not necessarily mutually exclusive. This Government would probably, however, not wish to invoke the Neutrality Act, thus officially taking cognizance of a Japanese declaration of war and at the same time issue a statement declining to recognize the consequences of such a declaration. If this Government should invoke the Neutrality Act and American shipments to China should later be intercepted, the United States could of course from a practical point of view take counter measures. These counter measures would then, however, be taken against Japanese acts, the legality of which this Government would not previously have contested. The justification for the taking of such counter measures which a statement of intention not to concede belligerent rights to Japan would supply would thus be lacking.

Under both courses of action aid to China would go forward subject to the maintenance of transit facilities via the Burma route. Under both courses the intention of this Government to continue to aid China would be evident.

Under

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Under the first course of action American policy would be within the framework of existing American law and of American practice in regard to the war in Europe. The second course would result in a turning away from established usage in regard to belligerent rights upon the high seas which the United States as a naval power might not wish to do. The second course would also involve the setting up of separate standards for American policy towards the wars in Europe and in the Far East and this course would rest for its execution upon the force, or the threat, of retaliation. If the United States were to adopt such a policy the difficulties in the way of the diplomatic protection of American rights and interests in Japanese-occupied China would probably be greatly increased.

In as much as the shipment of American aid to China under existing conditions would be expected to go forward to Rangoon via the Indian Ocean, outside the area of operations of Japanese naval vessels, there would seem to be some question whether the taking of direct issue with Japan upon the matter of the exercise of belligerent rights on the high seas at present would be either needful or desirable. If aid to China can go forward within the framework of existing American law and usage and if this Government's intention to continue to aid China and to protect

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protect American rights and interests in the Far East is made evident, the second course of action would appear to offer few advantages sufficiently strong to offset the disadvantages likely to follow from such a course.

* * * * *

No consideration has been given here to the question of the rushing of immediate aid to China as suggested by Dr. Chang and Mr. Wang.

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ANNEX

EFFECT OF INVOCATION OF NEUTRALITY
 ACT IN THE FAR EAST UPON TRANSPORT
 OF GOODS TO FAR EASTERN PORTS*

1. Transport to belligerent ports:
 - by American vessels of arms, ammunition, et cetera: not permitted;
 - by American vessels of goods other than arms, ammunition, et cetera: permitted without restriction;
 - by other neutral vessels of arms, ammunition, et cetera: permitted on "cash-and-carry" basis only;
 - by other neutral vessels of goods other than arms, ammunition, et cetera: permitted without restriction;
 - by belligerent vessels of all goods: permitted on "cash-and-carry" basis only.
2. Transport to non-belligerent ports (if not in area proclaimed to be a combat area):
 - by American and other neutral or belligerent vessels of arms, ammunition, et cetera, and all other goods: permitted without restriction;
3. Effect of proclamation of combat zone in the Far East:
 - Transport by American vessels of any goods into or through combat zone: not permitted;
 - Transport by other neutral or belligerent vessels of any goods into or through combat zone: permitted on "cash-and-carry" basis only.

COMMENT: At present British and other belligerent ports in the Far East fall under heading (1), and Chinese and Japanese

* No account is here taken of measures other than the Neutrality Act affecting transport of goods to the Far East, such as export licensing restrictions.

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Japanese ports under heading (2). Invocation of the Neutrality Act would move Chinese and Japanese ports into heading (1); proclamation of a combat area would move ports of the area affected into category (3). In addition to the legal effect of an invocation of the Neutrality Act, however, account should be taken of (a) the export licensing system now in effect in the United States, and (b) Japanese military occupation of practically all of the China coast.

RB
FE:Bacon:MHP;MBW;FRE

0187

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be FOOCHOW VIA N. R.
 closely paraphrased before
 being communicated to anyone. (BR)

Dated April 21, 1941

FROM

Rec'd 12:50 a.m.

SUBSTANCE COMMUN.
 TO ONI AND MID 4/22/41 50
 Secretary of State

Washington.

PRIORITY

6. April 21, 10 p.m.

My telegram No. 5, April 20, noon.



703.64/16576

Foochow was shaken intermittently throughout the day as Japanese planes bombed Chinese forces in this vicinity. Heaviest fighting is reported to be occurring down stream near the tip of Nantai Island and at a point just below Mamoi. The outcome remains uncertain.

The city has no electricity and but limited telephone service. Some police remain on duty and it is not planned to withdraw them unless and until an order for retreat is given by General Ch'en Ch'i, Commander-in-chief of the 100th Army.

Many local Americans have been unwilling to leave mission institutions located elsewhere in or near the city but the rest are concentrated on Nantai near the Consulate.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping, Chungking and Shanghai.

RICE

EMB

FILED
 APR 29 1941

PS/LB

0188

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JT

FOOCHOW VIA N.R.


This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated FROM
 to anyone. (br)

Dated April 19, 1941

Rec'd 7:05 a.m., 20th

SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY
 TO ONI AND MID 4/22/41 7D
 Secretary of State,

Washington.



4, April 19, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE) D

893.5018/16

Referring to the Consulate's telegram dated March 24,
 6 p.m., sent to Peiping and Chungking and repeated
 to the Department.

The Consulate has been informed by Chinese military
 and naval officials that beginning at 3 a.m. today about
 591 Japanese and other troops landed at various points
 in Lieukong District about thirty miles northeast of
 Foochow and in Diongloh District twenty miles east of
 this city where they have occupied the town of the same
 name, that the invading forces northeast of Foochow are
 supported by twenty Japanese planes which have bombed
 Changmen forts and the naval headquarters at Mamoi that
 sharp fighting is going on between them and the seventy-
 fifth and eightieth Chinese divisions and that the Japan-
 ese have off the coast twenty-one warships, several trawlers
 and about one hundred small boats.

Japanese planes this morning dropped pamphlets on
 Foochow stating that they have decided to facilitate the

rule

792.04/16577

PS/LB

FILED

APR 29 1941

792.14

2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 4, April 19, 6 p.m., from Foochow (SECTION ONE)

rule of Fukien by Fukienese and that all provincial
officials should continue peacefully to carry on their
duties and await arrival of the Japanese army.

RICE

WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JT

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

FROM

FOOCHOW VIA N.R.

Dated April 19, 1941

Rec'd 6:45 a.m., 20th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

4, April 19, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Immediately following the landings referred to above
 large numbers of armed Chinese in the invaded districts
 rose up to support the invaders. Although they plan
 counter attacking tonight there is danger that the
 defending forces, the morale and equipment of which is
 not good, may be overcome and that Foochow may soon be
 occupied. The populace of this city, probably in part
 because of the situation outlined in my telegram under
 reference and their dislike of the Chekiang clique which
 is predominant in the Government of this province, appears
 to be apathetic.

Government banks are prepared to go up river tonight
 and military headquarters have suggested that I advise
 Americans here to withdraw into the interior. This is
 not practicable but I have suggested that all such
 Americans, and especially women and children, move to
 the

FW 793.94/16577 (SECTION 2)

PS/LB

FW
 715.94/16577

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 4, April 19, 6 p.m. (SEC TWO) from Foochow

the Consular or nearby mission compounds on Nant'ai
Island and have requested that the rest keep in touch
with me.

(END OF MESSAGE)

Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping,
Chungking, Amoy and Shanghai.

RICE

WWC

0192

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GMW


This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be- FROM
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

Foochow via N. R.
 Dated April 20, 1941.
 Rec'd 9:35 a.m.

TO ONE AND TWO 4/22/41 JD
 Secretary of State,
 Washington.

5, April 20, Noon.

My telegram no. 4, April 19, 6 p.m.



Japanese planes this morning bombed a suburb of
 Foochow and are now flying over this city the fall of
 which seems probable. A small number of Japanese troops
 were seen by Customs employees early this morning at a
 point down river less than ten miles from here where
 fighting is rumored to be going on. According to an
 official source reinforcements are being sent to the
 vicinity of the Changmen forts northeast of Foochow at
 least some of which are admitted to have been captured.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping, Chung
 king, Shanghai and Amoy.

RICE

RR

793.94/15573

APR 25 1941
 RECORDED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

GMW

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


Dated April 20, 1941

FROM Rec'd 10:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

April 20, 4 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO
 4/21/41 REX

At about one o'clock today Japanese planes flying over this neighborhood released about twelve bombs, probably (?) (?) landing in the water front. One landed and several others near the compound of the Anglo Chinese College of the American Methodist Mission and two in the compound of property rented by the mission to the Imperial Chemical Industries each about two hundred fifty yards from the Consulate. One building of the college as well as the rented building suffered substantial damage while the private water works and nearby structures also belonging to the mission were slightly damaged by concussion and bomb splinters.

China civilian casualties in the vicinity, where I saw about a hundred corpses and many injured, were numerous. However, all the American members as well as the Chinese staff of the mission are unhurt (repeat unhurt). Shanghai please inform Bishop Carleton Lacy, 15 Avenue

705.04/18370

PC/AB

APR 21 1941
 15 Avenue

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- April 20, 4 p.m. from Foochow via N. R.

Avenue Petain.

Shanghai and Tokyo please make suitable representations to the Japanese authorities pointing out that bombing of this part of Nantai Island where many foreign missions and residences are concentrated gravely endangers American lives.

Sent to Shanghai and Tokyo, repeated to the Department, Peiping, and Chungking.

RICE

CSB


0195

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GMW

GRAY



FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated April 21, 1941

Rec'd 4:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.B.
4/24/41 RCK

451, April 21, 1 p.m.

Japanese announce that their forces on April 20 occupied Haimen, Ningpo and Wenchow in Chekiang Province after making surprise landings early Saturday morning. The operation is described as a successful move to strangle Chungking's smuggling of war materials along the Chekiang coast.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking and Paiping; by air mail to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

GW

703.24/16560

PS/LB

FILED
APR 23 1941

793.94

0196

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

GRAY


FROM

FOOCHOW VIA N. R.

Dated April 21, 1941.

Rec'd 4:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



RECEIVED TO
 4/22/41 M.L.D.
 REL

April 21, 11 a.m.

Referring to the telegrams April 21 and number 6,
 April 20, 10 p.m.

Japanese troops this morning at about 9:30 entered
 this part of Foochow. There has been no (repeat no)
 fighting within the city and everything at present is
 quiet except that Chinese are looting a few abandoned
 government offices and that some fires are reported
 were started on boats on the river.

Japanese troops are now stationed at important
 points along the city's main thoroughfare.

I have communicated with the principal mission
 compounds and believe all Americans in the city to be safe.
 Shanghai please so inform Bishop Lacy.

Sent to Shanghai, repeated to the Department, Peiping
 Chungking and Amoy.

RICE

CSB

793.94/16331

24 LB

793.14

APR 23 1941
 DEPT OF STATE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT General relations between China and Japan:
 Submits report concerning -.

CC

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See # 332
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated March 8, 1941 From Shanghai (Lockhart)
~~for~~

File No. 893.00 P. R. Shanghai/149

793.94/16582

PS/BAS 16512

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Sino-Japanese hostilities. Latest developments in regard to -.

rp

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated March 13, 1941 From State Department
 To FE (Davies)

File No. 894.00/1231

797.04/16583

16583

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED *JKB*

GMW

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM

Foochow via N. R.

Dated April 22, 1941

Rec'd 6:30 a.m., 23rd

TO ONI AND MID 4/25/41 30
 Secretary of State,

Washington.

7, April 22, 4 p.m.



Reference is made to my telegram dated April 21, 11 a.m.

Since the occupation of this city by Japanese forces yesterday morning the Consulate has had communication with all Americans in Foochow and its suburbs, including Pagoda anchorage, either directly or through responsible persons, and found them all to be unharmed.

No additional American property in the neighborhood of Foochow is known to have suffered damage except that one building of the Union High School (of the American Board and Methodist Missions) was somewhat damaged yesterday at about 1 p.m. when retreating Chinese forces blew up sections of the road running in front of the school. Arthur G. Billing, who was on the property at the time, was not (repeat not) hurt.

There are perhaps one or two thousand Japanese troops in and near the city who with few exceptions have thus far

FILED
 MAY 2 1941
 been

793.54/16584

PS/BAS

793.94
 165
 345:1163

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 7, April 22, 4 p.m. from Foochow via N. R.

been well behaved. Virtually all Chinese troops appear now to have left the environs.


Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping, Chungking, Shanghai and Amoy; Peiping please repeat to Tokyo.

RICE

GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

N E T C
 EASTERN STATE TEACHERS COLLEGE




April 22, 1941

MAY 19, 1941

State Department

Washington D. C.



Dear Sirs -

I am writing to you to secure some information. I would like to know some of the facts of the Japanese-Chinese war. I would like to know the type of Government that was operating in China before the war began, and the type that is now in operation. I would like to know the type of government the Japanese have set up in conquered territory. What were the conditions in China before the war? How has the war affected these conditions, and has Japan improved or made the conditions worse? What type of government was in operation in Manchuria before the Japanese gained control? What type of government have the Japanese set up there? Any information that could be supplied would be sincerely appreciated and most helpful.

793:94/10585

793:94/10585

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

W **E** **T** **E**
ESTERN TATE EACHERS COLLEGE

*to me in my studies along this
line.*

Respectfully yours,

*Alvin R. Sinclair
1636 Henderson Drive
Kalamazoo, Mich.*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Aug 10, 1972

In reply refer to
RP 793.94/16585

My dear Mr. Sinclair:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of recent date in which you request certain information regarding China and Manchuria.

There are enclosed copies of several information sheets and pamphlets which contain information that may be of assistance to you. Reference may also be made to some of the publications enumerated in the enclosed copies of the pamphlet entitled Publications of the Department of State and price list 65, Foreign Relations of the United States. Remittances for publications named in the pamphlet and price list should be sent to the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, this city, who is the authorized distributor of Government publications.

While the Department can assume no responsibility
for

Mr. Alvin R. Sinclair,
1636 Henderson Drive,
Kalamazoo, Michigan.

793.94/16586

PS/HH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

for the accuracy of statements contained in publications which are not official, it is suggested that you may care to consult the Political Handbook of the World, some of the books mentioned in the enclosed typewritten list, and similar books and treatises which are available in the larger public libraries.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

E. Wilder Spaulding (ws)
 Chief, Division of
 Research and Publication

Enclosures:


1. Information sheets.
2. Conditions in Manchuria.
3. Conference Series 37.
4. Press Releases (Publication 811).
5. Unofficial list of books regarding the Far East.
6. Publications of the Department of State.
7. Price list 65.

MAY 19 1941

RP:MNG:JCE:SS

5/16/41

ID
 FE
 GA



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GAW

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Foochow via N. R.

Dated April 23, 1941


Rec'd 4:45 a.m., 24th

SUBMITTED OR COMMUNICATED ORALLY
 TO ONI AND MID 4/25/41 70

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

April 23, 10 p.m.

Yesterday at 11 a.m. my British colleague and I called by arrangement made by him as Senior Consul upon Major General Hiroshi Takumi Japanese commanding officer at Foochow. In the course of our conversation he stated that he was anxious to protect American and British rights and interests but that American and British flags were being used to protect property of the Chiang Kai Shek Government. We said that we have not sanctioned use of our respective flags for such purpose and that should specific cases be called to our attention we would give them consideration. He then asked me a number of questions relative to the purported American status of property in Foochow, alleged to belong to William Hunt and Company, on which American flags had been painted but which he believed to be Chinese Government owned. To all such questions I replied in substance that I was not in a position to state either that such property is or is not American



733.94/16536

PS/AD

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 793.115

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- April 23, 10 p.m. from Foochow via N. R.

American and entitled to American protection. I was asked to refer the matter to my Government, which I agreed to do and informed that the Japanese military wish to occupy the company's wharf. CONFIDENTIAL. Hunt's Foochow representative was also the director of an office maintained on his property by the navigation bureau of the Ministry Communications. He and his staff are believed to have left this city. END OF CONFIDENTIAL.

The Embassy's instructions are requested.

Sent to Peiping. Repeated to the Department, Chungking and Shanghai.

RICE

RR

0207

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 28, 1941.

Chungking's despatch no. 829, April 8, 1941.

There is enclosed with the despatch the text in translation of a radio address delivered by General Ho Ying-chin on April 6, 1941.

The address is summarized in the second paragraph of the despatch.

It is pointed out in the despatch that General Ho's only allusion to recent difficulties with the Chinese Communists is in the statement that "our people are one in their purpose to maintain unity and to liberate our nation, despite the necessity of having at one time to apply disciplinary measures over a small number of unruly soldiers."

793.94/16587

RPL
FE:Ludden:OJL

0208

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 820.

Chungking, April 8, 1941

Subject: Transmittin Translation of General HO
Yin-chin's Radio Address.

Air mail

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	For	In U.S.A.	✓
		ONLY MID	

7-2.04/1637

4/29/41
REF

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose, as of probable interest to the Department, the text in translation of a radio address delivered at Chungking by General HO Ying-chin, Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese Army and concurrently Minister of War, on the evening of April 8, 1941. The translation was obtained from a release of the semi-official Central News Agency.

General Ho, in summary, expresses appreciation of the understanding, sympathy and aid of the United States and Great Britain; points out that China in her struggle against Japanese aggression is participating in a common cause; declares that by virtue of the immobilization of more than one million Japanese soldiers China is holding up Japanese plans of expansion in the Pacific and rendering ineffective Japan's value to the Axis Powers; states

that

MAY 8 1941

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AIR MAIL

- 2 -

that China is determined not to yield, compromise or consider peace until the Japanese armies are withdrawn from Chinese soil; makes reference to the numerical strength of the Chinese army and to the inability of the Japanese army to penetrate further into the interior of China; gives assurances that when China accumulates sufficient munitions and equipment--including airplanes, artillery, medical supplies, et cetera--a counteroffensive will be launched; and declares that far from becoming a "militaristic nation under a dictatorship" effort will be directed in China toward "the development of constitutional representative government and the advancement of democracy."

The Department will doubtless be aware of the fact that General Ho Ying-chin is one of the chief targets of verbal attack by the Chinese communists and their sympathizers who are wont to label him variously as "fascist", "appeaser", "pro-Japanese", et cetera. In this relation it is interesting to note in General Ho's address only one possible allusion to recent difficulties with the Chinese communists, namely: "our people are one in their purpose to maintain unity and to liberate our nation, despite the necessity of having at one time to apply disciplinary measures over a small number of unruly soldiers."

The Embassy, on the basis of its contact with General Ho Ying-chin over a period of some years, has no reason to doubt his patriotism, his loyalty, his desire to see China free and independent. It seems likely that he spoke from the experiences and convictions gained from nearly four years of long and bitter resistance accompanied by great sacrifices against a strong and ruthless foe.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson

✓
 Enclosure:

1/ Text in translation of speech

Original and two copies by air mail to the Department
 Two copies via Hong Kong.
 Copy to Peiping

500

ETD:ACL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 829 dated April 8, 1941,
 from American Embassy at Chungking on the subject "Trans-
 mitting Translation of General Ho Ying-chin's Radio
 Address".

SOURCE: CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY

Chungking, April 6, 1941

(C O P Y)

The full text of General Ho's speech is as follows:

I welcome this opportunity to broadcast to our friends--the people of the United States and Great Britain. We are grateful for the increasing understanding, sympathy and material aid that you and your governments are giving us in our struggle against aggression.

Ours is a common cause, the preservation of justice and freedom against tyranny and oppression, and the building of a better international order in which nations can work freely together and solve their mutual problems by lawful and peaceful methods.

For nearly four years China has resisted a ruthless invader, better organized and armed than we were. Today we are stronger than when the war began. Japan is weaker. China's unexpected defense has not only checked Japanese designs upon our country; it is holding up Japan's scheme of expansion in the Pacific, and is strengthening the world-wide defense against the evil forces that threaten modern civilization.

Our resources have been strained in the fight and we are making untold sacrifices to carry on. But we are resolutely determined not to yield, not to compromise, not to consider peace, until the invading armies are withdrawn from our soil and Japan respects our rights as an independent and sovereign nation. We are against any kind of appeasement such as Wang Ching-wei attempted. We will not stop short of our goal--a free China and a just peace in the Pacific.

A country with the size and population of China, in the process of evolution into a modern state, faces many and varied difficulties in carrying on simultaneous war and reconstruction. And yet we have over three hundred divisions with five million soldiers in the field, and ten million men in reserve or in training behind the lines. Over eight hundred thousand guerrillas are harassing enemy garrison and threatening enemy lines of communication, while more than six hundred thousand regular troops are operating behind the enemy lines. We hold a fighting line from north to south of two thousand and eight hundred miles and hold it so well that every attempt of the enemy

to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

to break through in recent months has failed. Take, for instance, the recent enemy offensives in southern Honan, western Hupeh and northern Kiangsi where the invading forces which made three attacks were thoroughly defeated and routed. When we have sufficient munitions and equipment, we shall at once launch large-scale counter-attacks and deal still harder blows to the enemy.

We need a stronger air force--both for defense and offense--more artillery, improved communications in the rear, medical supplies and much else. But meanwhile we are successfully immobilizing more than one million Japanese soldiers in China and causing them losses of some two thousand men a day. Japan cannot penetrate further into Chinese territory. Nor can she become an effective partner of the Axis Powers, as long as China resists. Our people are one in their purpose to maintain unity and to liberate our nation, despite the necessity of having at one time to apply disciplinary measures over a very small number of unruly soldiers.

Will this war make China a militaristic nation under a dictatorship? No! China will need an army for national defense, but our main energies will be directed towards the building of industries, the improvement of land and water communications, the increase of agricultural production, the extension of education, the betterment of social and economic life for all the people, the development of constitutional representative government and the advancement of democracy. When peace comes our disbanded soldiers will return to their farms and businesses or be employed in large public works. China will work for peace, within her own borders and in the world. China will make her contribution to a richer and freer international life, as a self-governing and progressive republic.

The victory that we seek will be your victory, and your victory will be our victory. Until that victory is won and all peoples are free from the fear of violent attack and free to develop their own national life under their own chosen government in a world commonwealth of nations, we--like you--will not rest.

MB

0212

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

Collect ☐ Full rate
☐ Day letter
☐ Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

1941 APR 9 PM 2 40

April 9, 1941.

AMEMBASSY,

CHUNGKING (CHINA) VIA NAVAL RADIO.

781

893.00 P.R./189

The final sentence of paragraph two of your 124,
April 4, ~~twelve~~ noon, mentions a Japanese air attack
at Chengtu on March 14, in which seventeen Russian-type
planes were QUOTE/reliaibly reported UNQUOTE to have
been shot down. The Department would appreciate
receiving ^{soon by air mail} fuller and as well authenticated details as
it is practicable to obtain in regard to this engage-
ment.

Hull

skt

793.94

893.00 P.R./189

FE:JD:HES

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

793.94/16587A

893.00 P.R./189

PS/BAS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 28, 1941.

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PA/H

Chungking's despatch no. 832, April 10, 1941, Aerial Encounter at Chengtu on March 14, 1941.

This despatch encloses an illuminating and discouraging memorandum in regard to the Chinese air force, prepared by the Assistant Naval Attaché at Chungking. The first two pages of the memorandum discuss the bad defeat which Chinese fighter planes (Russian E-15-3 types) suffered at the hands of a smaller Japanese force on March 14, 1941 at Chengtu. The Chinese defeat was attributed to (1) poor tactics; (2) inferior planes; and (3) faulty performance of the Russian-made machine guns installed in the aircraft.

The memorandum then discusses the training given Chinese pilots. The weaknesses in the system of training were stated to lie in (1) insufficient flying time; (2) poor instruction technique; (3) generally inefficient administration; and (4) wholly inadequate instruction in aerial strategy and tactics.

The

97394/16-86

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-2-

The memorandum concluded with the following comment: "As a result, the Chinese aviator has no conception of team work in the air.... The foreign instructors I have talked with at Kunming also commented on the inability of the Chinese to hold formation in the face of the enemy.... Even with equal or superior planes, the Chinese are yet bound to be at a disadvantage when facing the Japanese; to whom team work is second nature, and whose air discipline is of the best."

793.94/16588

^{SD}
FE: Davies: OJL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



No. 832

Chungking, China, April 10, 1941.

Subject: Aerial Encounter at Chengtu on
March 14, 1941.

Air Mail

CONFIDENTIAL



The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Department's telegram no. 78, April 9, 3 p. m., requesting details in regard to an aerial encounter which took place between Japanese and Chinese planes over and near Chengtu, Szechuan, on March 14, 1941, and to submit herewith a copy of a memorandum on this subject prepared by Major F. J. McQuillen, U. S. M. C., Assistant Naval Attache to this Mission.

Major McQuillen's memorandum is believed to supply a full and reliable account of the aerial encounter in question. Although informed Chinese are naturally reticent to disclose the details or even talk about this apparent aerial debacle, yet enough has been said by reliable Chinese informants during the past two weeks to indicate that Chinese aviation suffered a decisive defeat at Chengtu. For example, on April 2, 1941, the Director of the Department of American Affairs of the Foreign Office, in a casual conversation with an officer

of the

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 FILED
 MAY 1 1941

021F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

AIR MAIL

of the Embassy expressed the hope that the United States would see fit to send a number of up-to-date planes to China in the near future, remarking in this connection that the Russian-type planes recently supplied to China had proved to be of inferior quality and performance in the recent air battle at Chengtu when a disproportionate number of Chinese planes had been lost and some of China's best pilots killed.

It would appear from Major McQuillen's memorandum and from such other information as has recently reached the Embassy that the Chinese defeat at Chengtu may be attributed in the main 1) to the inferior performance of the Russian-type planes, especially of machine guns; and 2) to the inadequate training and lack of aptitude on the part of the average Chinese combat pilot.

Captain Horace Greeley, U. S. A., Assistant Military Attaché for Air, is now in Chengtu. In the event that Captain Greeley is able to obtain additional details, the Embassy will expect to communicate them to the Department at the first available opportunity.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Enclosure:

- 1/ Memorandum on Chinese Aviation
Prepared by Major F.J. McQuillen.

Original and two copies by air mail to Department.
No copy to Peiping.

879.6
EFD:skl

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

EO 1.1 (a) and 5(D) or (E)
 3/20/13

Enclosure no. 1 to
 despatch no. 832 of
 April 10, 1941, from
 American Embassy,
 Chungking, China.

NOTES ON CHINESE AVIATION

On 14 March, 1941, the Chinese press reported that their planes had engaged a formation of Japanese raiders at Chengtu. Four Japanese planes were supposed to have been shot down at Chengtu, and two more were said to have been forced down on their return trip to Ichang. Nothing was said as to Chinese losses. A few days later our Army colleagues here received a letter from an Army Language Officer in Chengtu that stated the only Japanese plane accounted for at Chengtu was one that figured in a collision, that nine or more Chinese planes were shot down, and that Chinese tactics on that occasion had been deplorable.

But it was not till the first week in April that I learned just how bad the showing the Chinese had been. An American-born Chinese who has been in training with the Chinese Airforce for the past three years came to the Embassy with a letter of introduction to me from another officer in the Airforce on some matter connected with his citizenship. I had a long talk with him that ranged over his experiences in the training centers of Luchow, Kwangsi; Kunming, Yunnan; Lanchow, Kansu; Ining, Sinkiang; and lately at Chengtu.

On the day of the air-fight referred to, he was at the field ten miles south of Chengtu where the pursuit squadrons are stationed, and to which he is assigned. He has not yet "checked out" in the new E-15-3 so when the air alarm sounded he was sent to take cover in the surrounding countryside. There were thirty-one of the new E-15s at the field and these took off in units of three when it became apparent that the Japanese planes were coming to Chengtu. The last Chinese fighters cleared the field about twenty minutes before the Japanese arrived. Some planes under repair were camouflaged among trees bordering the field. The Japanese flight consisted of twelve type Zero pursuits accompanied by a reconnaissance plane that also appeared to serve as a command plane. The Japanese first formed a "Lufberry Circle", then, in turn, strafed the borders of the field with machine gun and cannon fire. Two older planes of those hidden in the margin of the field were set afire. A shack housing the radio for air-ground communications was also fired, and the operator killed. The Japanese had ceased strafing and reformed over the field at a considerable altitude when the first of the Chinese units began to return. In the absence of radio communication, they were looking for panel signals on the airfield, hence were much lower than the Japanese. The latter immediately engaged the incoming Chinese units. The Chinese scattered as soon as they were attacked. It

was then

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

was then easy for the Japanese to concentrate two planes on individual Chinese. In this, one Japanese plane followed behind, and above or below, the other. This enabled them to overcome the superior maneuverability of the Chinese planes in the same way that two greyhounds run down a rabbit. Chinese planes began dropping from the sky in quick succession, followed in some cases by parachuting pilots. By hunting in pairs, the Japanese were successful in avoiding individual dogfights. Although the Chinese planes outnumbered those of the Japanese more than two to one, their failure to rendezvous after taking off, and their returning at intervals in units of three, enabled the Japanese to deal separately, and disastrously, with the Chinese units in turn. The combat lasted more than a half-hour, by which time the remaining Chinese planes had fled the scene, and the Japanese gasoline supply was probably down to the point where they had to turn back to Ichang.

At the end, fifteen of the new Chinese planes had been lost, in addition to the two old machines destroyed on the ground, and eight pilots had been killed, including two American-Chinese who were classed as among the best of the Chinese pilots. No Japanese planes had been shot down, but one was said to have been brought down in a collision with a Chinese plane. However, the wreckage of that plane has not yet been discovered. The Chinese commander, General P. H. Whang, in charge of aerial operations in the Chengtu area, was summarily relieved as a result of this combat and is now under arrest awaiting "investigation and punishment".

Of the pilots who survived, most blamed their troubles on their machine guns. I gather that the Russian "Scudta?" machine gun, with its cyclic rate of 1800 shots per minute, and its method of feeding the cartridge through a tortuous cylindrical path, is chronically subject to stoppages, in target practice as well as in combat. One pilot, for example, reported that only one of his four guns was in working order. He was told to take the air anyway. He later related that when he had a good opportunity to shoot a Japanese, that one gun also jammed. On the theory that he would be shot down if he stayed on in his unarmed plane, he then bailed out and made a safe landing. Other pilots related similar troubles with their guns just when they were in position to do some damage to their enemy.

Other than its machine guns, the E-15-3 is said to be a fairly satisfactory airplane, though in the hands of Chinese mechanics it falls far short of the claimed speed of 320 miles per hour, making instead only about 250 miles per hour maximum. The engine is a radial of 1000 horsepower. The ship is a biplane with retractable landing gear. The gear is retracted and extended by compressed air, and operates quickly. A small tank provides the compressed air for this operation. When the tank is exhausted the pilot has to manipulate the gear by hand until the tank can be recharged. The top wing is a "gull-wing", in that

it drops

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

it drops down to join the fuselage. A single large strut, one lift, and one landing wire provide the exterior bracing for each wing. Wings and most of the fuselage are fabric covered. The plane is relatively quite heavy and has a landing speed of 105 miles per hour. Landings are followed by a very long roll in spite of the air brakes with which the machine is fitted.

I then went on to discuss various features of training with my informant. When he came to China he had fifty hours of flying time, with accompanying student's permit, obtained at a field near San Francisco. In more than three years he has only added some 200 additional hours of flying. After four months, and a few hours of flying in Fleet trainers at Luchow, he was transferred to the Basic School at Kunming. At both Luchow and Kunming the instruction was directed by Americans and followed methods long in vogue in American air schools. After finishing the basic and pursuit course at Kunming, which required something more than nine months because the students were too numerous for the facilities, the young man was transferred to Lanchow, Kansu, for schooling in Russian pursuit ships. After a couple of months in Lanchow, the school was transferred to Ining (Kuldja), Sinkiang. The class at Ining consisted of 80 pursuit students, 30 light-bomber pilots, 20 student bombardiers, and 20 heavy-bomber pilots. The pursuit pilots were further divided into two groups of 40 each, one to fly E-15s and one to fly E-16s. About 40 Russian instructors in the various categories were present on the field.

During a year and a half at Ining this student accumulated a total flying time of 34 hours! And of those 34 hours, only 10 were in service-type E-15s, the rest were in advanced training planes, nor was his an unusual case. Poor organization and shortage of equipment caused great delays. When the class first arrived at Ining there were no planes available. Some planes were delivered from Russia; then there was no gasoline or oil. The Soviet said that gasoline and oil were not included in the agreement to furnish the planes. It was then necessary for the Chinese to despatch a mission to Moscow to engage in lengthy negotiations on the matter of aviation supplies. Thus, for several months, despite their proximity to the Russian border, and the railhead at Alma Ata, it was necessary for the Chinese to bring in their gasoline and oil from Lanchow, hundreds of miles away. Naturally, under these conditions, operations were practically nil.

Nor is the Russian method of training such that students can quickly accumulate flying time and gain experience. Whenever one of a group of students made a flagrant error, all operations were immediately suspended for the entire group. The members were assembled in a classroom and harangued for hours on flying mistakes in general and this one mistake in particular. The offender would probably be suspended from flying for a few days. If he was flying a service-type ship, he would be sent back to "check out" again in the trainer. Since mistakes

were

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

were common, the students spent more time listening to harangues than they did on the flying field. The Russian method was described in short as the "nagging method". No effort was made to give students of greater ability any additional opportunity. On the contrary, the better students found their flying time cut and given to others of less ability. Much stress was laid on the watching of instruments, particularly the air speed meter, on take off and landing; and the students went through their evolutions by rote. No students were dropped from this advance class for inaptitude. It appears that the effort of the Russian instructors is directed toward turning out uniform groups of mechanical flyers. But their method does have one thing to commend it. Of this class of students none were killed in training and there were only two minor accidents. Half of the pursuit class of which the subject pilot was a member was dismissed at the beginning of 1941 as having completed its work. The rest remained behind to await the arrival of type E-16s, so they could complete their training in the service-type ship they were supposed to fly. This was the first class sent to Ining for training. That field has now been designated the "Air College", and another class will be sent there from Kunming shortly. After nearly six weeks of mid-winter travel over/long road from Ining, the class arrived in Chengtu in late February. It was assigned to pursuit groups and is now being "checked out" in E-15-3s.

During all his period of training, my informant stated that he had been taught virtually nothing of aerial strategy or tactics. Some formation flying was included, but only as a mechanical evolution. The whys and wherefores were omitted. Supposedly, tactics are to be taught in the squadrons, but planes are so few that in the squadrons also the flying is practically all individual. As a result, the Chinese aviator has no conception of teamwork in the air. In a fight it is "every man for himself". The foreign instructors I have talked with at Kunming also commented on the inability of the Chinese to hold formation in the face of the enemy. Cooperative action is foreign to the Chinese nature anyway, and it seems to require more training than any of them are likely to receive to overcome their natural individualism and achieve a satisfactory cooperative attitude. Even with equal or superior planes, the Chinese are yet bound to be at a disadvantage when facing the Japanese; to whom teamwork is second nature, and whose air discipline is of the best.

F. J. McQuillen,
 Major, U. S. Marine Corps,
 Assistant Naval Attache.

True copy
 of signed ori.
 115

0221

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

May 6, 1941

SKH:

Reference Chungking's despatch 832, April 10, 1941.

The whole of Major McQuillen's memorandum is of interest.

The actual engagement over Chengtu is described at pages one and two of the memorandum (blue marker). From this account (received from an American born Chinese pilot who was on the ground at the air field) it would appear that the Chinese planes fled from the field in order to avoid a fight (probably for the reason that it was recognized that ^{their pilots} they were insufficiently trained) and that they were caught unawares (due to destruction of the field's one radio) as they returned to their field at different times and at low altitudes in small groups. Each group scattered when attacked and was dealt with separately by the Japanese who outnumbered each individual group by four to one, who were in the tactically superior position of having greater altitude and who avoided individual combat.

The above factors would seem adequately to account for the disaster although most of the surviving pilots are said to have blamed their troubles on their machine guns -- understood by Major McQuillen to be subject to stoppages. The Embassy, apparently primarily on the basis of "other information", attributes the debacle in the first instance

to

May 7 Mr. Currie told me that his Chinese contacts had told him that the planes took off with unloaded machine guns & that this was reason for the loss of Gen. Whang.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

to inferior performance of the Russian planes (however, Major McQuillen's memorandum speaks of the "superior maneuverability of the Chinese planes").

Regardless of the defects of the Russian planes, if Major McQuillen's informant is at all credible it would seem that even our own best planes would be tremendously handicapped if they were to be up against such a situation. The incident is important to us as indicating how pitifully inadequate the Chinese air training program must have been during the past 3 3/4 years (Major McQuillen's memo speaks of two of the pilots who were killed as being "among the best of the Chinese pilots" and the last two pages of Major McQuillen's memo add further details as to this inadequacy). I suggest that with the War Department's approval we request a full report from the Military Attaché at Chungking of means of promptly improving Chinese air training ^{+ ground organization} with American technical aid. We can not now send the Chinese as many planes as they need but if this despatch is of any value it would appear that technical air training is needed quite as much as planes.

PA/H:AHiss:FLB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

LS

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased
 before being communicated
 to anyone. (Br.)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FOOCHOW VIA N.R.

Dated April 24, 1941

Rec'd 9:20 a.m. 25th


SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY

TO ONI AND MID 4/24/41 SD
 Secretary of State,

FROM

Washington.

April 24, 11 p.m.



Additional contingent Japanese troops have continued to arrive in Foochow since its occupation April 21. Some are engaged in building of defense works and others including cavalry have passed on northwestward along the Min River. It is now extremely difficult to obtain trustworthy news of hostilities and confirmation of the reported occupying on April 20 of Futsing (25 miles southeast) was only obtained yesterday.

Today Japanese motor powered barges transported to Foochow presumably from transports in Min estuary quantities of supplies and equipment including automobiles and motorcycles and therefore it would appear that mines have been swept from at least part of the mouth of the river.

Japanese soldiers have taken foodstuffs and money from numerous Chinese and entered without permission a number of American properties.

Sent to Peiping. Repeated to the Department, Chungking and Shanghai. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo.

HPD

RICE

793.94/16539

PS/FLR

FILED
 MAY 1 1941

0224

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 26, 1941


Reference Shanghai's telegram 480,
April 25, 1941.

The location given would place the mine
roughly some 40 or 50 miles off Swatow.

It seems unlikely that the Japanese would
be mining the waters about Swatow as the
Japanese have been in occupation of that port
since June 1939.

The Japanese were reported to have been
sweeping the harbor of Foochow following
their occupation of that town on April 21.
This mine, however, could hardly have drifted
from Foochow in the brief period which has
elapsed. (The geographer's office has readily
available no specific information upon the
direction of ocean currents off Swatow.)

It is believed that no special significance
can be attached to the ^{sighting} of just one mine.
It seems probable that the mine in question
may be one which has broken loose from its
moorings -- quite possibly an old Chinese mine.



RB
FE:Bacon:MHP

793.94/16590

FW. 793.94/16590


0225

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FROM



PLAIN

SHANGHAI VIA N.R.

Dated April 25, 1941

Rec'd 1 p.m.

Copies sent Center of Division & Hydrographic Office, Navy

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

480, April 25, 1941

Radio has just been received by the President Lines from the S.S. PRESIDENT PIERCE dated 9:50 a.m., April 25th, as follows:

"At naught one two naught GMT passed floating mine at latitude twenty three naught seven north longitude one hundred seventeen nineteen thirty east. This position is approximate due to fog, will notify San Francisco."

Foregoing information has been communicated to Admiral Glassford.

Sent to Department, repeated to Chungking, Peiping and Tokyo.

LOCKHART

HPD

See's office (Mr. MacLennan) stated he would have message telegraphed Navy 4/25

793 94/16590

PS/LOC

FILED

1 1941

223.14

0226

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EH

GRAY

Kunming via Hong Kong & N.R.


DIVISION OF FOREIGN
 SERVICE ADMINISTRATION
 MAY 7 1941

Dated April 29, 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Rec'd 3:40 a.m., 30th.

Secretary of State,
 Washington,



Telegram
 to Tokyo, and
 Shanghai.

URGENT.

10, April 29, 6 p.m.

FOR THE DEPARTMENT.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 4/30/41 REK

793.94/16592

Twenty-seven Japanese planes bombed the center of
 Kunming at 1:45 this afternoon. At least one bomb fell
 within about 50 yards from the Consulate, causing damage
 comparable to October 13 attack. Window glass and screens
 were blown out, plaster, a large memorial tablet and part
 of a wall were knocked down, shrapnel and dirt were blown
 into the compound. Repairs will again be necessary.
 Please repeat to Tokyo, Chungking, Peiping and Shanghai.

Sent to Department, repeated to Tokyo, Chungking,
 Peiping, Shanghai.

NEVER Peiping

C

PS/FLR

FILED

MAY 8 1941

0227

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect { Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Charge to

\$

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN) VIA SHANGHAI. *NR*

INFO: AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING (CHINA).
 AMEMBASSY, PEIPING (CHINA).

259

Kunming's 10, April 29, 6 p.m., also your 563, April 16,
 8 p.m. in regard to previous bombing of Kunming.

793.94/16592 ✓ Department assumes that you have made or will soon make
 to the Japanese Foreign Office emphatic representations in
 regard to this latest instance in which, as a result of
 Japanese bombing, American lives were seriously endangered and
 damage was caused to the American Consulate at Kunming. You
 may also care to express to the appropriate Japanese authorities
 the view that only by chance have the continuing bombings of
 American properties at Kunming and elsewhere in China not
 recently resulted in death or injury to American citizens and
 that the American Government looks to the Japanese Government
 to take such steps as may be required to prevent ~~any~~ further
 endangering of American lives and property.

Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Chungking, Peiping.
 Chungking repeat to Kunming.

rcu
 FE:RCM:OJL
 Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,
 May 2, 1941.
8pm

TO BE TRANSMITTED

X CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

"Br"

PARTIAL
 PLAIN

NAVAL RADIO

This cable is sent in confidential Code.
 It should be so marked in all communications.
Br.

0228

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

✓
 U L

CMV

TELEGRAM RECEIVED.

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

Yunnanfu via Chungking
 & N. R.

FROM

Dated April 24, 1941

Rec'd 1:15 a.m., 30th

No action required


DISTANCE COMMUNICATED 1000
 5/1/41 7D

Secretary of State,

Washington.

28, 9am

54, April 24, noon.



793.94/16593

Japanese planes raided Yunnan Province on April 26, by nines and in smaller groups. Lufeng and the salt center of Iping ~~let~~, both on the Burma Road were attacked, these places usually having truck concentrations. Kochin and Yenshan in the southeast were also bombed. Nine planes bombed the cotton mills on the southern outskirts of Kunming, the press reporting heavy damage. Some hits were made inside the southeast part of the city. *Recent* ~~let~~ bombs dropped here have been smaller with apparently much higher fragmentation.

793.14

During the above attack bombs fell within 150 yards of the residence of R.D. Arnold, American citizen, on Shulinkai, shrapnel knocking holes in the woodwork and covering living room with bricks, plaster and glass. residence was one notified to Hong Kong and Peiping on October 22, 1938 on a general map."

MAILED
 MAY 8 1941

PS/CAS
 16593

Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping, Shanghai, Hankow.

JOHNSON

NPL

0229

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GMW

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM Foochow via N. R.

Dated April 29, 1941

Rec'd 7:15 a.m., 30th

TO ONI AND MID 5/1/41 3D

Secretary of State,
 Washington.


April 29, 7 p.m.

Reference my telegrams dated March 24, 6 p.m., and April 23, 10 p.m.

According to Japanese sources mopping up operations have been taking place along the Min River northwest of here and in the vicinity of Futsing, 25 miles to the south-east. However, mail, telegraph and long distance telephone services have not been resumed and trustworthy reports relative to military activities continue to be difficult to obtain.

There are now in this city such a large number of Japanese troops that it seems not unlikely that approximately one division or more is in this part of Fukien. According to official Japanese sources the present Commander in Chief is a General Ushiroku, under whom are Lieutenant General Nakagawa, described as a Division Commander, and Major General Hiroshi Takumi (referred to in my telegram dated April 23, 10 p.m.). In addition General

Kanzu



793.94/15594

FILED

MAY 8 1941

PS/DAS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- April 29, 7 p.m. from Foochow via N. R.

Kanzu Yazaki has come here from Canton to establish an army Special Service Section headquarters.

The Japanese Navy has cleared sufficient passage through a barrier at the mouth of the Min River to enable about a dozen small warships and transports to reach Pagoda Anchorage. Launches and motor barges probably numbering several hundred have continued to ferry supplies, and equipment (including trucks) to the city. The populace which had suffered from the conditions described in my telegram of March 24, 6 p.m., has been placed in a still worse position by the exactions of Japanese soldiers (who are on short rations), the cutting off of this area from outside food supplies and the sudden flight of the banks. Foreign doctors report numbers of people including those in government maintained institutions to be starving. They also report some cases of rape and wanton brutality by Japanese soldiers.

A Peace Maintenance Commission preparatory office has been formed in Foochow composed of several former naval officers and two officials who had gained notoriety during the past few months in connection with official rice sales. According to information received from reliable sources banditry is rife in neighboring areas from which the Chinese authorities have withdrawn.

Sent

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3- April 29, 7 p.m. from Foochow via N. R.

Sent to Peiping, repeated to the Department,
Chungking and Shanghai. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo.

RICE

HTM

0232

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL.

For Department

No. 324.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Tsinan, China, March 28, 1941.


793.94/16595

SUBJECT: MAJOR GENERAL K. TOBASHI ASSUMES
COMMAND OF SHANTUNG-HONAN-KIANGSU
AREA. WITHDRAWAL OF JAPANESE FORCES
FROM SHANTUNG REPORTED BY THREE IN-
DEPENDENT SOURCES.

RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAY 6 1941

1941 APR 30 PM 1 07

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATION
AND RECORDS



Wood
Hawthorne
6/1 MID

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
5/2/41
CONFERENCE
REK

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Ambassador,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that, according to
reliable information, Major General K. TOBASHI (土橋一次)
arrived in Tsinan from Hangohow, Chekiang, on March 21,

1941

MAY 7 1941

PS/PJ
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -


1941, to relieve Lieutenant General YIYIDA, who has returned to Japan, as Commander of Japanese forces in the Kiaotsi and Tsinpu Railway zones and part of the Lunghai Railway area.

The same source also reports that the majority of Japanese garrison troops in the interior of Shantung have recently been withdrawn southward. At certain stations along the Tsinpu line it is said that only one or two Japanese guards are now on duty; even in the larger towns only from three to five Japanese soldiers, in addition to puppet Chinese guards, now remain, informant states.

Information from other sources would seem to confirm the fact that unusual Japanese troop movements are taking place. The lack of rolling stock for the transportation of tobacco leaf and other goods is openly admitted by the railway authorities to be due to heavy military transportation requirements, while a foreign contact in Taian, Shantung, wrote the Consulate on March 23, 1941, as follows:

"There has been a great exodus from here-- whether replacements are coming or not I don't know--conflicting rumors".

Respectfully yours,



Carl O. Hawthorne,
 American Vice Consul.

800
 COH:HTC/kcc

Original to Embassy, Peiping.
 5 copies to Department,
 Copy to Embassy, Chungking,
 Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LD
 This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased
 before being communicated
 to anyone. (Br.)
 DISSEMINATED ORALLY
 TO ONE AND MID 5/1/41 JB
 Secretary of State

FROM

HONG KONG VIA N.R.

Dated April 30, 1941

Rec'd 10:27 a.m.

Washington


157, April 30, 2 p.m.

Conversations during past few days with several high
 British officials in Hong Kong indicate general opinion
 among them that recent Japanese occupation of Foochow,
 Wenchow, et cetera, was simply a part of the larger plan
 for closing all Chinese coastal points to reduce infiltra-
 tion of supplies from unoccupied China, and that the rela-
 tion of this move to the Japanese-Soviet pact of April 13
 was remote. However, these officials admit having no
 direct information.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking, Canton,
 and Peiping for Tokyo.

BRUINS

PEG



793.94/16596


PS/PJ

FILED

MAY 8 1941

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75



JT

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

KUNMING VIA CHUNGKING & N.R.

Dated April 30, 1941

FROM Rec'd 9:45 a.m., May 1

5/3/41
 SECRETARY OF STATE
 WASHINGTON, D.C.



April 30, 11 a.m.

Yesterday's air raid caused heavy property damage
 in center of town from east to west and the number of
 casualties is high. The Foreign Office branch was struck
 and partly demolished. Fires did not take hold.

In addition to damage to Consulate, clerk ~~McGeary~~
 house was again badly shaken up, much glass being broken
 and plaster shaken down. China Inland Mission suffered a
 direct hit, but Americans there report no personal property
 losses.

It is now learned that Assemblies of God Mission near
 big gate was demolished on April 8. Property loss of H.
 C. Osgood, American national, estimated at United States
 dollars 500. Osgood had previously removed from Kunming.
 This compound was one notified to Hong Kong and Peiping
 on October 22, 1938 on a general map.

As in all instances of attacks causing damage to
 American property here, weather and visibility have been
 excellent, there has been no fighting, the objective
 apparently

790.94/16597

FILED
 PS/LB
 MAY 19 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- April 30, 11 a.m., from Kunming

apparently has been the city in general. The Consulate
always has three largest size flags flat on buildings and
one flying from flag pole.

Sent to Department, repeated to Peiping, Shanghai,
Hong Kong.


JOHNSON

HTM

0237

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



WT

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be- **FROM**
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

TOKYO VIA SHANGHAI & N. R.

Dated May 7, 1941

Rec'd 5:50 a.m., 8th.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

647, May 7, 11 a.m.

Department's 259, May 2, 8 p.m., bombing of Kunming.

A first person note, dated May 6, prepared along
 the lines of the Department's telegram and referring to
 previous representations, was personally handed to the
 Director of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office
 yesterday. This morning I made strong oral representations
 to the Vice Minister and handed him a statement marked
 "oral" calling attention to the fact that the Embassy
 has sent to the Foreign Office five notes in seven months
 concerning the bombing of Kunming, that the attacks are
 indiscriminate and apparently aimed at terrorizing
 helpless noncombatants, and that although Americans
 have not been killed or injured recently such an occur-
 rence would have serious repercussions especially at the
 present juncture.

The Vice Minister expressed regret and said that
 he would take up this matter with the competent auth-
 orities.

793.94/16598

FILED

MAY 17 1941

PS/BE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1278

* -2- #647, May 7, 11 a.m. from Tokyo.

orities. He added that the bombing of Kunming was necessary to stop the shipment of American military supplies to Chungking.

Sent to the Department via Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Peiping and Chungking for Kunming.

GREW

EMB


0239

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

PLAIN



TOKYO VIA SHANGHAI &
 NAVAL RADIO

Dated May 8, 1941.

Rec'd 7:25 p.m. 9th.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
 C.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 5/14/41 TEK

654, May 8, 5 p.m.

All vernaculars today attach importance Ambassador Honda's coming visit here to discuss with Tokyo Government question of strengthening Nanking regime and reaching China incident settlement. Honda is stated know views Japanese military authorities in China and is expected make important recommendations here. ASAHI reporting Honda's press interview Shanghai quote him as expressing dissatisfaction achievements Nanking Government and recommending strengthening Nanking's economic power as basis political strength. Honda said advocate making life masses under Nanking regime more peaceful, comfortable, than that under Chungking thereby achieving short cut settlement China incident.

Prominence also given today's vernaculars despatch Nanking reporting general Hata's press interview warning against over optimism over dependence temporarily improved diplomatic situation and stating military operations to

continue

790.94/10669

PO/LE

MAK 12 941

FILED 5/12/41

713.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 654, May 8, 1941 from Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R.

continue in China in effort deal enemy crushing blow,
Chiang regime's fighting power stated markedly weakened
but necessity urged defeat resisting Chiang forces and
Chinese Communist army.

Today's CHUGAI editorials state American committed
aid Chungking means that Japan cannot settle China inci-
dent without adjusting relations Britain United States.
Although strengthening Nanking regime considered im-
portant no hope seen China incident settlement unless
direct measures taken deal with Chungking and obtain
change American policy aid Chungking. Hope expressed
Government has concrete policy in mind and greater
efforts achieve such policy urged.

Sent Department via Shanghai.

GREW

HPD

0241

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RDS

PLAIN

FROM

TOKYO

Dated May 10, 1941

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 5/10/41 REK

662, May 10, 4 p.m.

Today's NICHU NICHU reports exclusive interview given Shanghai May eight by Ambassador Honda on eve his departure Japan in which he stated supreme national policy Japan for settlement China incident was strengthening solidification Nanking Government. He stated he was firmly convinced China incident could be settled only through strengthening Wang regime, that it was foolish consider direct negotiations Chungking since Chiang would negotiate with Japan only on condition wholesale withdrawal Japanese troops from China. Certain third power nationals having recently visited Chiang stated if Japan wants peace she must make proposal Chungking through United States. Evidently Chiang Kai Shek in view present international developments has no desire discuss peace. Friction between Kuomintang Communist party said overestimated especially as following from warning from American Ambassador Johnson policy stated changed favoring compromise Communists. Recent American loan Chungking following conclusion Japanese Soviet

793.94/10000

FILED
 MAY 1 1941

REC'D

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RDS -2- #662, May 10, 4 p.m. from Tokyo.

Soviet pact stated to have reduced adverse effect pact
Chungking.

Ambassador Honda drew following conclusions: (one)
direct negotiations Chungking would be tantamount reducing
Japan China treaty of last November to scrap paper.
Opportunity for such negotiations has long past especially
since Japan recognized Nanking National Government.
(two) Chungking has no desire peace but will attempt
prolong war to exploit situation Chiang's advantage.
(three) No peace possible by mediation third nation either
by Germany or United States. (four) Strengthening Nanking
Government is only policy which can effect settlement
China incident. To carry out this policy stabilization
betterment lives masses will be necessary. As restored
National Government becomes more powerful matter of
absorbing Chungking may develop later date. Officials
Army Navy Foreign Service stated completely agreed con-
crete policy measures which Honda will take up Tokyo
Government.

GREW

CSB

0243

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

1249

U.S. LIAISON OFFICE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LS

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated **FROM**
to anyone. (Br.)

TOKYO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Dated May 10, 1941

Rec'd 8:30 a.m.

5/12/41 30
Secretary of State

Washington

663, May 10, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Since the return to Japan of Foreign Minister
Matsuoka the political atmosphere has been charged with
expectancy. Cold examination of the Soviet-Japanese
neutrality pact did not reassure the nation that
Matsuoka's diplomacy was nearing a solution of Japan's
major problem--settlement of the China incident--since
cessation of Soviet aid to Chungking was not guaranteed.
Furthermore, there were indications of increased American
aid to Chungking. The press has almost daily repeated
the theme that the focal point of Japan's diplomacy must
be a settlement in China, and a step in that direction
has been awaited anxiously. In the meantime there have
been murmurs of growing dissatisfaction at the continued
stalemate in China and at the failure of the Government
to take positive measures, especially in the face of the
quickened tempo of European developments. While praising
Matsuoka's recent diplomatic successes, the press has
warned the people against developing a dangerous sense

of

783.94/16501

FILED

MAY 19 1941

PC/HH

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1250

-2- 663, May 10, 5 p.m. (Section One) from Tokyo.

of security. The need for some sort of action toward fortifying China policy is reflected in a recent statement made by Colonel Kenry Osato, the Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry: "After five years of warfare we can in no way perceive on the continent or in Tokyo evidence of the concentrated power of a total war."

GREW

RR

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

251

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GMW

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated **FROM**
 to anyone. (br)

Tokyo

Dated May 10, 1941

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

663, May 10, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

It is in the light of these circumstances that the
 recent statements by Ambassador Honda and General Hata
 are believed significant (Embassy's 654, May 8, 5 p.m.
 and 662, May 10, 4 p.m.).

They answer the demand for clarification of policy
 and for action by affirming the existence of "a concrete
 plan", proposing an intensified military campaign and
 indicating that a settlement through direct or indirect
 negotiations with Chiang Kai Shek is not to be expected.
 Ambassador Honda's statement that the Nanking Govern-
 ment must be strengthened through increase of its
 economic power and betterment of the conditions of the
 masses beyond that prevailing under Chungking's juris-
 diction has to the nation the ring of reason. Further-
 more General Hata's promise of efforts to deal the enemy
 a crushing blow and the reappearance in the press of
 long absent reports of military successes may serve as

the awaited

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 663, May 10, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Tokyo

the awaited evidence that effort is to be made to break the stalemate.

There is therefore likelihood of intensification of blockade operations and consolidation of control within restricted occupied areas. It seems doubtful that extensive campaigns in new areas will be undertaken. The JAPAN TIMES and ADVERTISER in an editorial, probably of official inspiration, stated yesterday that military conquest of Chungking would not (repeat not) be commensurate with the cost involved and that a desired reduction of hostilities might be favored by a "shrinkage fronts." Maintenance of garrisons over an extended area was judged to be of doubtful value.

GREW

RR

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1253

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GMW

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be- Tokyo
 fore being communicated **FROM**
 to anyone. (br) Dated May 10, 1941

Rec'd 12:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

663, May 10, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

The failure of both the Nanking Government and the Japanese occupying army to establish strong and efficient control in China has been repeatedly emphasized in the press and of late increasing stress has been placed upon the need for winning the basic confidence and cooperation of the Chinese people as means to effective control. This has developed concurrently with the conviction that as long as British and American aid to Chungking and the European hostilities continue, Chiang Kai Shek will not come to terms with Japan. Ambassador Honda emphasizes that Japan's only hope lies in the strengthening of Wang Ching Wei's Government, although Chungking may be "absorbed" later. General Hata states that Japan must not depend on diplomacy for settlement of the China incident.

These statements, coming at a time when a newly implemented policy toward China had of necessity to be indicated,

FR 700.94/10501 SECTION 3

PS/HH

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 7/3/44/16601

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 663, May 10, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Tokyo

indicated, suggest that the direction of that policy will be the intensification of efforts to consolidate the position of the Nanking Government by the unilateral action of the Japanese army. The aim may be to create a regime resembling that of Manchukuo perhaps strong enough to maintain order in fact (repeat in fact) over the population within its jurisdiction. Thus, a "settlement" of the China incident, involving neither the capitulation nor the consent of Chungking, might be presented to the people of Japan.

Over and above speculation over the practical results of action apparently favored by the Japanese civil and military authorities there still remains to be satisfactorily answered the question why these authorities promulgated statements so obviously designed to invite the support of the people.

END MESSAGE.

GREW

RR

0249

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

PLAIN

SHANGHAI VIA N. R.

FROM

Dated May 10, 1941.

Rec'd 2:17 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

542, Tenth.

SENT TO
 G. AND M. D.
 5/12/41

According to the TAIRIKU SHIMPO a local Japanese daily, Ambassador Honda made the following statements during the course of an interview granted to Japanese reporters at Shanghai on May seventh:

"I am going to Tokyo to discuss affairs of considerable importance with the Government. I will consult with them in order to expedite the definite policy of fostering and strengthening the Nanking Government. Therefore I will see Foreign Minister Matsuoka and other leading officialswhen I was appointed Ambassador to China I was instructed to do my best to foster and strengthen the National Government and its political influence. This is a very difficult task but I can say it is being carried out rather satisfactorily.....to foster and strengthen the National Government means to increase the political power of that Government, but no increase of political power can be expected unless there be economic developmentAlthough I am in favor of an amalgamation of the

Nanking

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MAILED
 MAY 14 1941

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 542, May 10, 1941 from Shanghai

Nanking and Chungking regimes it is obviously impracticable for the Japanese Government to open direct negotiations with the Chungking Government thereby putting aside the Nanking regime. I cannot believe that such direct negotiations will take place. Foreign Minister Matsuoka has also strongly denied such negotiations. The proper time for Japan to open direct negotiations with Chungking has already passed. Now that Japan has concluded a treaty with the Nanking Government and has officially recognized it how can Japan discard this treaty as if it were a scrap of paper? Japan cannot do this".

Sent to Department, repeated to Chungking, Peiping, by airmail to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

HPD

0251

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


(COPIED:U-L:EMA) (Copies to S, PA/H, U, U-L; original to FE)

Copy of Radiogram
 Received in Clear
 at 11:15, May 3, 1941.

Chungking, filed May 3, 1941, No. 62.

Southwestern part of Chungking bombed at 11:20 P.M.
 today by sixty-one two-engine bombers probably navy.
 Three separate formations of twenty-seven, twenty-five,
 and nine flying in Vee of elements, elements in Vee es-
 timated at eight thousand feet. Weather, ceiling un-
 limited, visibility hazy. Few bombs fell on south bank
 of Yangtze near Standard Oil installation. Opposed only
 by active antiaircraft but no results observed. Damage
 to city unknown.

MAYER



790.94/16603

PC/LE

JAN 24 1944

and 5(D) or (E)
 August 10, 1972
 3, 201 73

0252

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

JT

This telegram **TELEGRAM RECEIVED** CANTON VIA N.R.
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated Dated May 10, 1941
to anyone. (br)

SECRETARY OF STATE
TO ONI AND MID 9/13/41 JD
FROM Liaison Office
Washington.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Rec'd 5:04 p.m.

21, May 10, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Reference my 18, April 12, noon.

Information believed trustworthy is to the effect
that the Japanese have since May 6 commandeered between
three hundred and four hundred native cargo boats at
Canton and last night began moving them up the East River.
It is said that five hundred boats are wanted and that
they are to be used for making pontoon bridges presumably
at Sheklung where the main railway bridge was seriously
damaged by Chinese forces prior to their evacuation in
1938. If this is true it would seem to indicate that the
Japanese are planning to reopen the Canton-Kowloon
railway from Shektan, its present eastern terminus, on the
East River, in the direction of the Hong Kong border with
a view to possible military use.

Other alleged developments which might throw some
light on the above are the following: a few weeks ago
about five thousand coolies were, it was learned, recruited
locally

793.94/16604 SECTION ONE 1 AND 2

PO/EE

16604

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 21, May 10, 5 p.m. (SEC ONE) from Canton

locally for alleged railway construction work around
Tamshui near Bias Bay but except for Hong Kong press
reports stating that road construction work had been
started in that area.

MYERS

KLP

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

CANTON VIA N.R.

FROM

Dated May 10, 1941

Rec'd 5:12 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

21, May 10, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

No other information has been obtainable.

A recent unconfirmable report which emanated from a Chinese source is to the effect that Japanese troops at Suntong (about ten miles east of Whampoa) one of the chief garrison points in this area, have heavy artillery and have been undergoing specialized training for attacking Hong Kong.

It is, of course, not unlikely that the above-mentioned extensive commandeering of boats is designed primarily to facilitate Japanese military operations against Chinese forces said to be between the East River and the Hong Kong border.

This office will endeavor to keep the Department informed of developments.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong.

MEYERS

KLP

0255

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF FOREIGN
 AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATION

MAY 16 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 KUNMING VIA CHUNGKING
 AND N.R.

LS
 This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased
 before being communicated
 to anyone. (Br.)

Dated May 9, 1941

SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY
 TO ONI AND MID 12/5/41 3D
 Secretary of State

Rec'd 6:10 a.m. 12th

Washington

May 9, 9 a.m.

Yesterday 18 Japanese bombers in formation bombed
 Kunming through an almost solid overcast, most of
 their load falling in the fields north of the city,
 where about 80 persons taking refuge were killed or
 wounded. Yuan Tung Park just east of the Consulate
 had hits around and in it. Raid apparently caused little
 damage except casualties. Several handfuls of bomb
 fragments have been picked up in the Consulate compound;
 some tiles were knocked down from office eaves. Nine
 planes also raided Mengtsze.

On May 7, 27 planes in two groups bombed Mengtsze
 and Chienshui (?), no damage being mentioned.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping,
 Shanghai.

PERKINS

NPL

U - EIAISON OFFICE
 MAY 17 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94/16605

PC/EE
 FILED

MAY 19 1941

16605

0256

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WT

PLAIN

TOKYO VIA SHANGHAI & N. R.

FROM

Dated May 12, 1941

A

Rec'd 5:45 a.m., 13th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

666, twelfth, 5 p.m.

Summary vernacular press comment:

Special despatch Nanking today's NICHU NICHU describes establishment "local purification committees" to carry out first step Nanking Government's policy of intensified pacification stabilization of restricted areas. Operation directly under Wang Ching Wei committee will endeavor rehabilitate economy agriculture communications within specified restricted area to serve as model for other areas in which similar measures to be taken subsequently.

CHUGAI editorial endorse Ambassador Honda's recent statement that direct negotiations by Japan with Chungking are foolish and that concentrated effort strengthen Nanking Government should be made, but doubts every consolidation Nanking's authority in China. Resent prevention complete break between

Kumointang

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
5/13/41 REK

793.94/16606

PO/BE

FILED

MAY 15 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #666 May 12, 5 p.m., from Tokyo via Shanghai & N. R.

Kumointang and Communists attributed American good offices expected further delay extension Nanking influence. Since settlement China incident still seems a distant effort should be made discover some other method which might encourage speedier conclusion.

Tokutomi-soho NICHI NICHI columnist terming American war entry certain states American spear pointed at Germany over Atlantic, at Japan over Pacific. Chinang said fighting Japan on American first line of defense and since to kill snake one must crush its head "Japan must Anglo-Saxon influence from Asia in order settle China incident". Japan admonished for inaction while America prepares for war and advised proceed positive execution southward advance policy.

Tei Chi Muto HOCHI columnist discussing German Soviet relations and their effect Japan warns against potential danger that German Soviet rapprochement might mean attempt by Russia secure safety valve or outlet through Far East.

Sent Department via Shanghai.

GREW

CSB

0258

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (A)

FROM

PEIPING VIA N. R.

Dated May 12, 1941.

Rec'd. 10:05 a.m.

SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY

TO ONI AND MID 5/13/41 JD

Secretary of State, LIAISON OFFICE

Washington.

118, May 12, 2 p.m.

Peiping's 97, April 3, 1 p.m.

From reports received from various reliable sources
 it seems apparent that during the past few months, due
 largely to dissension between the National Government
 and the Chinese "communists", Chinese military and guerilla
 activity has practically come to a standstill in North China between
 the Yellow River and the Great Wall. This has permitted
 the Japanese relief from fighting, privileged them to with-
 draw troops for use elsewhere, and made it possible for
 them to use Chinese mercenaries to guard railways, etc.
 (which would never be possible if any vigorous fighting
 were involved); in addition, this cannot but have had an
 unfortunate effect on the morale of the Chinese civilian
 population in the area. Previously the Japanese in this
 territory were harassed and their communications frequently
 cut but with the present lack of Chinese activity the

Japanese

COPIES IN PARAPHRASE
 SENT TO N. R. AND
 M. I. D. BY CONFIDENCE
 7/14/41 REX

793.94/16607

PC/SE
 FILED
 Confidential File

MAY 23 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 118, May 12, 1941 from Peiping

Japanese are being made a gift of the area. As the Japanese forces, however, are fairly thinly scattered in North China, the Chinese are presented with a golden opportunity to harass the Japanese if they would only settle their internal differences and take determined and coordinated action.

Although the Embassy here is not in the best position to observe Chinese actions and trends of thought, it is difficult to escape the feeling that, during the last few months (in which period there has been considerable talk and some evidence that the United States intends seriously to assist China, and also increased speculation in regard to a possible Japanese-American clash in the south), the Chinese have decreased their own efforts in resisting Japan, possibly with the idea that the United States will now do the work. If true, this appears to be a dangerous state of affairs. It seems to the Embassy here that, if the United States ^{intends} ~~(?)~~ employ vigorously to support or assist the Chinese in their resistance, we should call the attention of the Chinese Government to this matter and with suggestion that they should not be content merely to rest on their laurels. The Chinese have done remarkably well so far, considering their inferior equipment, but if the morale of the Chinese Army and people deteriorates from a belief that

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3- 118, May 12, 1941 from Peiping

the United States will fight their war from now on, the results may well be unfortunate.

It should be added that there are persistent, but so far entirely unconfirmed rumors here, that the Japanese are negotiating or endeavoring to negotiate with the Chinese Communists; the consensus of informed local opinion on this subject is "possible but not probable".

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Shanghai, code text by air mail to Tokyo.

SMYTH

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

(CONFIDENTIAL)

PARAPHRASE

A telegram of May 12, 1941 from the American Embassy at Peiping reads substantially as follows:

It appears from reports received from several reliable persons that largely as a result of discord between the Chinese Communists and the National Government, Chinese guerilla and military activity has during recent months been practically at a standstill between the Yellow River and the Great Wall in north China. This inactivity on the part of the Chinese guerilla and military forces has made it possible for the Japanese to make use of Chinese mercenaries to guard railways, et cetera, which they could never do if any vigorous fighting were involved; has enabled the Japanese to withdraw troops from this area for use elsewhere; and has afforded the Japanese relief from fighting. Besides, this inactivity has had an unfortunate effect on the morale of Chinese civilians in the above-mentioned region. Due to the lack of Chinese activity at the present time, the Japanese are being made a gift of the area between the Yellow River and the Great Wall, whereas heretofore the Japanese in this section of China were harassed and their communications were often cut. If the Chinese

193.74/16647

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Chinese would only come to an agreement in regard to their internal differences and act in a determined and coordinated fashion, they have a golden opportunity to cause the Japanese trouble as Japanese forces in north China are rather thinly scattered.

The Embassy in Peiping is not placed to the best advantage to observe trends of thought and actions of the Chinese. However, it is almost impossible not to feel that during recent months when there has been a great deal of talk and some sign that the United States has a serious intention of assisting China and, when there has been growing speculation concerning a possible clash in the south between the United States and Japan, the Chinese have lessened their own attempts to resist Japan possibly thinking that now the work will be done by the United States. This seems to be a dangerous state of affairs if it exists. The Embassy is of the opinion that if it is the intention of our Government to assist or support China vigorously in its resistance, the attention of the Chinese Government should be called to the matter and the suggestion should be made that the Chinese should not be willing to rest on their laurels merely. Although so far the Chinese have done extremely well considering their meager equipment,

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

the results are likely to be unfortunate if due to a belief that the United States will fight the war from now on the Chinese people and the Chinese army deteriorates. Rumors persist in Peking, entirely unconfirmed, so far, that the Japanese are trying to negotiate or are negotiating with the Chinese Communists. That this is possible but not probable is the belief of most informed persons in Peiping.

TD 89C.
FE:EGC:OJL

FE

5-14-41

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

(CONFIDENTIAL)

REFERENCE

A telegram of May 12, 1941 from the American Embassy at Tsiping reads substantially as follows:

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

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FE:EGC:JSL

FE

5-14-41

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JT
 This telegram must be CANTON VIA N.R.
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated FROM Dated May 13, 1941
 to anyone. (br) Rec'd 1:15 p.m.
 SUBSTANCE BEING TALKED ORALLY
 TO ONE AND MID 5/14/41 SD
 Secretary of State,

Washington.

23
 23, May 13, 5 p.m.

Reference my 21, May 10, 5 p.m.


According to local press reports Japanese army headquarters has announced that Japanese armed forces which have been moving eastward along the East River during past few days occupied Waichow city yesterday afternoon. The announcement indicated that Chinese troop concentrations along the upper reaches of the East River were aimed at regaining control of the Hong Kong-Shiuchow supply route which passes through the above-mentioned city.

Whether this operation was designed to remove a possible Chinese menace to Japanese garrison forces in adjacent areas for the present is the beginning of a move to extend Japanese control between the East River and the Hong Kong border is not as yet apparent.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong.

MYERS

RR



793.94/16608

PS/EWS/16608

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JT

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Dated May 13, 1941

SUB-TARGET COMMUNICATED ORALLY
 TO ONI AND MID 5/14/41 JD

FROM

Rec'd 1:15

U.S. LIAISON OFFICE

MAY 17 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,

Washington.

177, May 13, 2 p.m.

Canton's 21, May 10, 5 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

British military authorities here confirm today's Reuter report of the Japanese capture of Waichow and Poklo both southeast of Canton for which operation about one-half of the 8,000 Japanese troops stationed on the Hong Kong border were withdrawn. Three or four truck loads of dead and wounded have returned to border base indicating at least some fighting. Rails have been removed from Chinese section of Kowloon-Taiwan Railway adjoining Hong Kong colony and roadbed used as motor road. British authorities while feeling no unusual apprehension at present the Legation guard regarded the capture of Waichow as a prerequisite to any operations against Hong Kong.

Usually well-informed local opinion regards the capture of Waichow primarily as one of the periodic moves to close trade routes and to secure loot in which city with a population of 60,000 is believed fairly rich.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Canton.

BRUINS

WSB

793.34/18609

PC/CE

0269

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WT

PLAIN

FROM

TOKYO VIA SHANGHAI & N. R.

Dated May 13, 1941

Rec'd 6 a.m., 14th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

670, thirteenth.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND A.I.D.
 MAY 14 1941

All vernaculars today continue play up prominently news China military campaign.

Four editorials discussing Nanking Government's plan of local purification or peace preservation commissions praise it as practical step toward settlement China incident. KOKUMIN states plan is closely related Ambassador Honda's coming report to Tokyo. NICHI NICHI states Nanking Government must possess independent political economic power which it has lacked due to presence Japanese army occupation. Setting up of "vacuum" zones will permit strengthened authority of Wang Government without interfering Japanese military. Soldiers released from these districts can be transferred elsewhere thus contributing settlement China incident. Establishment sectional peace under this plan will favorably influence Wang regime and create foundation for establishment solid relations Japan and China. Sent Department via Shanghai.

GREW

CSB

790.94/15610

PS/BE

0270

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

U - LIAISON OFFICE
 MAY 23 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LS
 This telegram must be KUNMING VIA HONG HONG & N.R.
 closely paraphrased
 before being communicated FROM Dated May 13, 1941
 to anyone. (Br.)
 SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY Rec'd 9:23 a.m. 14th
 TO ONI AND MID 5/15/41 JD
 Secretary of State

Washington

11, May 13, 9 a.m.

FOR LIAISON DIVISION OF FOREIGN
 SERVICE ADMINISTRATION
 MAY 27 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Japanese bombers (fifteen in number) yesterday
 raided the north central section of Kunming, causing
 extensive property losses. Severe damage was done to
 two buildings of Yunnan University while women's
 dormitory of Southwest University was hit. For third
 time recently China Inland Mission was damaged, residence
 of E. L. Crapuchettes, American, being partly demolished.
 Larger part of compound occupied by clerk Stanley
 McGeary was destroyed and his residence is now barely
 habitable. Bomb fragments were again scattered in the
 Consulate compound, one piece breaking through a window
 into residence bedroom.

On May 11 six light bombers attacked this city near
 the south gate, damaging two large new buildings and
 other structures. Three planes also attacked Koshiu.

It is now understood that casualties from the
 May 8 blind bombing of Kunming were heavier than first
 reported, something over 200 persons being killed,

mostly

733.94/16011

PS/H

193.94
 132-447-117
 5-15-41

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 11, May 13, 9 a.m. from Kunming.

mostly in the fields.

Please repeat to Chungking, Peiping, Tokyo,
Shanghai.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Tokyo, Chungking,
Peiping and Shanghai.

BRUINS

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 21, 1941

~~MWS~~
~~PAS~~
~~JD~~
~~CA~~

Tsinan's despatch no. 332, April 10, 1941.

The Consulate reports:

In pursuance of the Japanese policy of substituting Chinese puppet troops for Japanese forces, the garrison at Mingsui near Tsinan was entrusted to one Kao, a former guerrilla leader, who having declared allegiance to the Japanese-sponsored regime, has been allowed to increase his followers to 8,000 men armed and equipped by the Japanese.

Kao is now reported to have arrested all (other) puppet officials in Mingsui, but has not molested the small Japanese detachment at the railroad. He is said to have proclaimed the Chinese national currency the only legal tender and is thus proving momentarily embarrassing to the Japanese.

Uneasiness is felt in the mixed Japanese-Chinese garrison in Tsinan and also among civilian Japanese.

793.94/16612


FE:Fales:MBW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 332.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



AMERICAN CONSULATE

Tsinan, China, April 10, 1941.

SUBJECT: DEFECTION OF CHINESE PUPPET
GARRISON AT MINCHISUI, SHANTUNG.
JAPANESE TROOPS IN TSINAN UN-
EASY AND JAPANESE CIVILIANS
PREPARE AGAINST EMERGENCY.

793.94/16612

Grade	Good	In U.S.A.	✓
Per	HRWTHORNE	ONI / MID	

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
5/27/41

The Honorable
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that, in pursuance of

the

FB/PJ

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the Japanese policy of substituting in so far as possible Chinese puppet troops for Japanese forces in this area, the garrisoning of the city of Mingsui (明水), about 30 miles east of Tainan on the Kinatsi line, was recently turned over to one KAO (高).

According to reports from commercial sources, Kao, formerly a guerrilla leader with about 1,000 poorly armed followers, surrendered to the Japanese some time ago. Having declared allegiance to the Japanese-sponsored regime, he was allowed to "cooperate" with the Japanese forces, with whom he succeeded in ingratiating himself. The fact that he has been allowed to increase his followers to about 8,000 men, armed and equipped by the Japanese, is proof that he had gained Japanese confidence.

It is now reliably reported that Kao has recently made himself the absolute master of Mingsui, where he has arrested all puppet officials, though he has not as yet molested the small Japanese detachment which continues to control the railway station and yards. He is said to have proclaimed Chinese national currency the only legal tender and to be buying up at par all "Federal Reserve Bank" notes in the city.

While Kao may be actuated by purely personal motives, in as much as the large sums of "Federal Reserve Bank" notes he is obtaining for national currency at par are actually worth at least 40% more than the latter outside of Mingsui, his little coup is nevertheless proving momentarily embarrassing to the invaders. Furthermore,

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

the Japanese apparently fear that his action may not be without influence upon other Chinese military units now "cooperating" with the Japanese army.


It is possibly for these reasons that the mixed Japanese and Chinese garrison in Tsinan has recently displayed signs of uneasiness and civilian Japanese residents have, the Consulate has learned from reliable quarters, received special instructions as to how to conduct themselves "should Tsinan be temporarily occupied by guerrillas". That the instructions in question involve more than routine precautions is evident from the information furnished the Consulate. They provide for the packing of valuables and the storing of water in all available containers, probably against the possibility that the water works might be destroyed or damaged.

Respectfully yours,

Carl O. Hawthorne,
 American Vice Consul.

800
 COH/keo

Original to Embassy, Peiping,
 5 copies to Department,
 Copy to Embassy, Chungking.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

IS

PLAIN

FROM

TOKYO VIA SHANGHAI
& N.R.

Dated May 14, 1941

Rec'd 9:15 a.m. 15th

Secretary of State

Washington

676, fourteenth.

Ambassador Honda expected arrive Tokyo today

repeated in press interview Kyoto yesterday his conviction that Nanking Government must be strengthened and policy direct negotiations Chungking rejected. Additional points not brought out his previous interview summarized as follows:

(one) Activities Nanking Government have been impeded by control Japanese military forces necessitated strategical reasons. Under dependence on Japanese in economic matters may have dampened Chinese enthusiasm peace construction. Unfortunate that Chinese have felt Japanese policy to be vague.

(two) Economic financial issues of utmost importance. Standard of living Kiangsu, Anhwei, Chekiang Provinces reduced to one-third or one-fourth pre-incident level, that of Chungking controlled area reduced to one-seventh. Acute shortages rice, fish, other commodities in areas

under

790.94/16613

ES/DM

793.94

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 676, fourteenth from Tokyo.

under control Nanking Government likely be utilized as anti-Japanese propaganda. Japanese forces attempting remedy conditions necessitated largely by economic blockade. Restrictions transportation of commodities and curtailment Chinese industrial activities should be alleviated.

(three) Germany, Italy should recognize Nanking Government in view provisions Tripartite Pact.

(four) Statement that Kuomintang Communist friction has weakened anti-Japanese resistance unjustified optimism since resistance Japan will still continue even though Kuomintang Communist sever relations. Japan's policy should aim strengthen Nanking Government until Chungking leaders realize advantages merger with Nanking. Certain elements Chungking especially youth now closely American Ambassadors China attributed fact Johnson failed keep peace Washington positive policy toward Chungking. Statement Currie findings were unfavorable to Chungking completely false. American policy committed toward increased aid China. United States also influenced Chungking to resolve Kuomintang Communists quarrel. For these reasons impossible Japan negotiate peace through America.

GREW

WSB

0278

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

GMW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

Hong Kong via N. R.


FROM

Dated May 15, 1941

Rec'd 9:22 a.m.

RESPONSE COMMUNICATED ORAL
 TO ONE AND MR. 5/14/41 30

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



179, May 15, 3 p.m.

Continuing my telegram no. 177, May 13, 2 p.m.

Japanese Consul General stated to me today in
 informal conversation that 3,000 Chinese "regulars" had
 been found in vicinity of Waichow against whom an
 encircling movement had been undertaken resulting in
 capture of 1,000 prisoners.

Recheck with British military authorities here
 indicates action still going on, heavy firing having been
 heard this morning 5 miles north of Hong Kong border.
 They estimate two divisions of Cantonese provincial (?)
 troops namely 18,000 engaged in the enclosure of Waichow.

Informed opinion in Hong Kong regarding significance
 of these operations agrees in the main with that expressed
 in Canton's 23 of May 13, 5 p.m., no unusual apprehension
 existing here.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking
 Peiping, Canton.

BRUINS

RR

793.94/16614

PS/PJ

0275

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 841.

Chungking, April 18, 1941

Subject: Portion of China Occupied by
Japanese Forces.

Air mail



For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	To field		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
For	In U.S.A.		
		To ONI & MID.	
		when surface mail copies are received	

733.94/16615

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit, as of probable interest to the Department, copies of an article appearing in the April 9, 1941 issue of "China Air Mail", a fortnightly news letter published by the German-Jewish refugee, Guenther Stein, entitled "How Much of China is Occupied by Japan?" Although Mr. Stein's articles are generally regarded as reflecting an anti-Japanese and, as a corollary, a pro-Chinese National Government, bias, the data contained in the enclosed article are believed to have come from reliable sources and to be substantially correct.

In summary, the article states that not more than 10 to 12 per cent of "China Proper" is within the Japanese-occupied areas, that 925 of a total of 1500 "districts" of "China Proper" are under the

control

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

AIR MAIL

control of the National Government of China, that at least 108,000,000 Chinese are living in completely unoccupied provinces, that between 138,000,000 and 143,000,000 Chinese are residing in unoccupied areas of other provinces which are relatively free of Japanese occupation and control, that between 132,000,000 and 142,000,000 Chinese while free from Japanese or "puppet" control reside in nominally occupied areas, and that between 37,000,000 and 42,000,000 Chinese are residing in areas under effective Japanese or "puppet" control.

In the absence of comment by Mr. Stein, it may be well to add that a very appreciable share of the Chinese residing in the areas under effective Japanese or "puppet" control are to be found in the large cities of China such as Shanghai, Peiping, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Tsinan, Taiyuan, Soochow, Hangchow, Nanking, Wuhan, Amoy, Swatow, Chaochow, Canton, et cetera.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Enclosure:

1/ Copy of China Mail, April 9, 1941

Original (by air mail) and
 four copies to the Department
 Copy to Peiping

710 Sino-Japanese

EFD:MCL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 841 dated April 18, 1941, from American Embassy at Chungking on the subject "Portion of China Occupied by Japanese Forces."

SOURCE: CHINA AIR MAIL

No. 43 Hong Kong, April 9, 1941

(C O R R)

HOW MUCH OF CHINA IS OCCUPIED BY JAPAN?

The important question how much of China is actually under Japanese occupation cannot be answered as easily as might be thought.

Expressed in terms of territory, it would seem that no more than 10 to 12% of "China proper" (i.e., of China without Manchuria and the vast territories of Outer Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan, and Tibet) is within the zone of Japanese occupation, while an additional 4 to 5% of the country is still more loosely under Japanese control.

But this reply to the question is incomplete or even meaningless because it ignores the facts that much of this occupation is no more than nominal and that the different parts of "China proper" vary greatly in their economic importance and in their respective density of population. The war areas, as a whole, are among the most densely inhabited and economically most valuable parts of the country; while much of the large area of "Free China" is very little developed and sparsely populated. It is therefore more important to find out how great a part of the Chinese people are now living in territories more or less occupied by the Japanese.

The population of "Free" and "Occupied" provinces

The Ministry of the Interior, in its last estimate for 1936, gives the total number of the Chinese population as 473,944,260. Of this total, there are 7,032,000 "Overseas Chinese" permanently living outside the country; 11,511,000 in the Northeastern provinces (at present Manchukuo); 5,110,000 in Soviet-controlled Outer Mongolia; and 1,351,000 and 5,757,000 persons respectively in the semi-autonomous, buffer territories of Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang) and Tibet.

The total population of the remaining twenty-two provinces of "China proper" is therefore estimated at 453,700,000.

Of this number, 137,890,000 were living in the nine provinces which remain completely free from Japanese occupation, i.e.:

Szechuan	52,700,000
Sikong (bordering on Tibet)	900,000
Yunnan	12,042,000
Chweichow	9,919,000
Shensi	9,985,000
Kansu	6,710,000
Chinghai (bordering on Tibet)	1,190,000
Ninghsia (bordering on Outer Mongolia)	973,000
Shansi	13,503,000

Another

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Another 139,233,000 Chinese were living in the eight provinces of which only relatively small parts are occupied by the Japanese, i.e.:

Chekiang	21,230,000
Anhui	23,554,000
Kiangsi	15,004,000
Hunan	20,294,000
Honan	24,209,000
Fukien	11,755,000
Kwantung	58,453,000
Suiyuan	2,034,000

143,581,000 Chinese were living in the remaining five provinces of which considerable sections are under Japanese occupation and in the main occupied municipalities figuring separately in the Chinese population statistics, i.e.:

Kiangsu	33,431,000
Hopei	20,841,000
Shantung	33,099,000
Hubei	25,510,000
Shansi	11,301,000
Beiping	1,351,000
Tientsin	1,211,000
Tsingtao	510,000
Nanking	1,210,000
Shanghai	3,747,000
Weihaiwei	222,000

From these figures it would seem that no more than about 33.1% of the people of "China proper" were living in provinces entirely free from Japanese occupation, while 39.8% were living in provinces of which only a small part is occupied, and 27.0% in predominantly occupied provinces. Migration from the war areas into different parts of unoccupied China has taken place on a large scale, so that the population of "Free China" may in fact be nearer to 50% while that remaining in the predominantly occupied provinces may actually be below 50% of the total.

But this calculation is extremely rough because it does not take into consideration to what extent the different "occupied" provinces are under effective enemy control.

The Number of "Free" And "Occupied" Counties

A more precise picture can be drawn by means of an analysis of the state of affairs in the different counties of "China proper" which number about 1,500.

Of the 1,500 counties of China, 448 are situated in entirely unoccupied provinces.

According to reports from twelve of the thirteen more or less occupied provinces, referring to conditions in February 1941, a further 477 counties were completely free from any enemy occupation, i.e., in

Kiangsu

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

Kiangsu	6	out of	61	counties,	or	9.8%
Chekiang	60	" "	73	" "	"	80.0%
Anhui	33	" "	62	" "	"	53.2%
Kiangsi	69	" "	83	" "	"	83.1%
Hupoh	31	" "	70	" "	"	44.3%
Hunan	73	" "	75	" "	"	97.5%
Shantung	3	" "	107	" "	"	2.8%
Shansi	8	" "	105	" "	"	7.6%
Honan	63	" "	111	" "	"	59.5%
Fukien	61	" "	62	" "	"	98.4%
Kwangtung	64	" "	97	" "	"	65.9%
Suiyuan	3	" "	16	" "	"	18.7%

Hopoh with its 132 counties is the only province from which no recent data are available. Since it has been in Hopoh that the Japanese have made the greatest effort to spread their loose network of military occupation and of "puppet" regimes into almost every county, it may be assumed that few if any counties in that province have remained entirely free.

Even under that assumption, however, it appears that at least 925 out of the 1,500 counties of "China proper", or 61.7% of the total, are completely under the direct or indirect control of the National Government of China.

Conditions in the remaining 447 more or less occupied counties of all the occupied provinces (without Hopoh) are as follows:

(1) In 35 of these counties (7.8% of the total) only a small part is occupied and the original magistrates are still residing in their old county seats from which they exert effective control over most of the respective counties.

(2) In 574 counties (74.1% of the total) the original seat of the magistrate and a varying number of the other towns are occupied by the Japanese or their "puppets", but the lawful magistrates are able to continue their administration of all unoccupied parts of their counties from the countryside. Such counties are most numerous in Honan (39 out of 45 more or less occupied counties); Kiangsu (31 out of 55); Kwangtung (25 out of 55); Hupoh (25 out of 39); and Anhwei (21 out of 39). It would seem that the greater part of the 132 counties of Hopoh from where no reports are available, belong in this category.

(3) In 23 counties (6.2% of the total) the magistrates had to remove into neighbouring areas but they are still retaining administrative control over considerable parts of their counties. These cases are most numerous in Shansi (13 counties out of a total of 97 that are more or less occupied). Similar conditions would seem to exist in many counties of Hopoh.

(4) In no more than 50 counties (i.e., 11.2% of all the counties affected by Japanese occupation; or 5.4% of all counties in the twelve "occupied" provinces; or 3.3% of all the counties of "China proper") have the rightful magistrates lost all control to the Japanese or their "puppets".

This is the case in 16 counties in Kiangsu; 7 in Hupoh; 17 in Shantung; 1 each in Honan and Kwangtung; and

in

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

in half of the 10 counties of the northeastern province Suiyuan. It would seem that there are only comparatively few of such "lost counties" in Hopeh, where Red and other guerilla forces have penetrated almost everywhere, challenging the authorities of occupation even under the very gates of Beijing and Tientsin.

The Total Number Of Chinese Under Japanese
and "Puppet" Rule

The following rough estimate of the incidence of Japanese occupation and/or "puppet" rule is based upon the above data. It includes the province of Hopeh and all the large cities and towns.

(1) At least 106,000,000 Chinese, or 25.4% of the total population of "China proper", are living in the nine completely intact provinces that make up the core of "Free China". Their number may be by several million higher on account of immigration from occupied areas.

(2) Between 133,000,000 and 145,000,000 Chinese, say, 140,000,000 or 33.0% of the total population are living in other completely unoccupied territories which are either directly adjoining the bloc of the nine free provinces or are at least sufficiently wide and self-sufficient in themselves to be immune from such more indirect effect of Japanese occupation and Japanese-sponsored "puppet" rule than the bulk of "Free China".

(3) Between 133,000,000 and 142,000,000 Chinese, say, 137,000,000 or 33.2% of the total population are free from direct Japanese or "puppet" rule but living in nominally occupied territories which are somewhat hampered in their normal contacts with the main body of Free China, by intervening positions of Japanese occupation, but by no means effectively separated from it.

(4) Only between 37,000,000 and 40,000,000 Chinese, say, 40,000,000 or 9.3% of the total population are living under moderately effective enemy and/or "puppet" control. This estimate includes the remaining population of all the big cities and larger towns under Japanese occupation.

These figures show clearly how little the Japanese have achieved in 44 months of war, loss of almost 3,000,000 casualties, and how small a part of China their present army of occupation with its 600,000 to 1,000,000 men is actually controlling.

0285

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


No. 847

Chungking, April 23, 1941

SUBJECT: AERIAL ENCOUNTER AT CHENG TU ON MARCH 14, 1941.


AIR MAIL

CONFIDENTIAL



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793.94/16616

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch no. 832, dated April 10, 1941, on the subject above mentioned, and to report that Captain Horace Greeley, U.S. Army Air Corps, Assistant Military Attache for Air, who has now returned to Chungking from a two-weeks' trip of inspection to Chengtu, has reported to me that the information contained in the enclosure to my despatch under reference is corroborated by such information as he was able to gather in conversations with Chinese combat pilots and other informed persons in Chengtu. Captain Greeley reported that one of the pilots with whom he conversed, a squadron commander, had expressed dissatisfaction over the poor quality of the Russian materiel and also over the lack of cooperation exhibited by the newer pilots during the course of the combat.

Captain Greeley also reported that the organization and personnel of the Chinese Air Force have undergone some

change

PS/CMR

6616-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

change since the debacle of March 14, 1941. General P. H. Hwang has been relieved of the post of Air Defense Commander, being replaced by General C. C. Hwang. General Chou Chih-jou has been appointed special adviser to the Commission on Aeronautical Affairs, and General F. T. Mao, who was recently in the United States on behalf of the Chinese Government, has been placed in charge of the operations of the Air Force. It thus appears that General Chou Chih-jou has been given a nominal promotion and that General P. T. Mao has been installed as the actual head of the Chinese Air Force.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
 Nelson Trusler Johnson

Original and two copies by air mail to the Department.
 No copy to Peiping.

879.6/710
 EFD/wr

6/16/41
 5/16/41

0287

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 847

Chungking, April 23, 1941

SUBJECT: AERIAL ENCOUNTER AT CHENG TU ON MARCH 14, 1941.

AIR MAIL

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

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Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Original and two copies by air mail to the Department.
 No copy to Peiping.

879.6/710

ETD/wr

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1233

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated **FROM**
 to anyone. (A)


CHUNGKING VIA N. R.

Dated May 15, 1941.

SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY
 TO ONI AND MID 5/16/41 **JD**
 Secretary of State,

Rec'd 12:55 p.m.

Washington.



190, May 15, 9 a.m.

One. The information contained in Peiping's 97,
89300/14676 April 3, 1 p.m.; and 118, 16657 May 12, 2 p.m. concerning the
 absence of Chinese military activity in the areas of
 North China garrisoned by Chinese Communist forces
 appears to substantiate the oft repeated understanding
 and complaint of the Chungking authorities that the
 Chinese Communists have been and still are shirking their
 military responsibilities vis a vis the Japanese.

In fact in recent weeks several high Chinese officials
 including the Vice Chief of the General Staff have
 asserted that the Chinese Communists have reached an
 agreement with the Japanese to refrain from attacking
 each other. The Embassy is of course unable to confirm
 these assertions.

Two. When Mr. Johnson went to take his leave of
 General Chiang on the afternoon of May 13, the latter
 referred briefly to the Communist problem. He said that
 many Americans and other Occidentals appeared to entertain
 the

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PS/CMR

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 190, May 15, 1941 from Chungking

the notion that the Chinese Communists espouse not (repeat not) the tenets of Marxism but those of socialism and to admit obviously such a view he asserted is erroneous, for the Chinese Communists constitute nothing more than the "Fifth Columnists" of the Comintern accomplices of the Soviet.

Three. I was informed yesterday by a Chinese military officer who is very close to the Generalissimo that the Communist forces in Shansi have recently been instructed to attack the Japanese in connection with the large offshore battle now raging in the Chungtiao Mountains of South Shansi, but he added that it remained to be seen whether the Communists would comply with orders. In this relation apparently some concern is felt here regarding the South Shansi operations where units of seven Japanese divisions are said to be engaged in an endeavor to clear the mountains of strongly entrenched Chinese troops and sever Chinese communications across the Yellow River. Although not wholly ruled out, it is generally felt that the Japanese are not yet present in sufficient strength to attempt the reduction of Loyang and Sian.

Sent to the Department; repeated to Peiping, Peiping please air mail code text to Tokyo.

HPD

DRUMRIGHT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JEANNETTE RANKIN
 1ST DIST. MONTANA

COMMITTEES:
 PUBLIC LANDS
 INSULAR AFFAIRS


Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

May 13,

1941.

*Reply drafted May 17 1941
 by MWS*



Honorable Cordell Hull,
 Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

May 21, 1941

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have received an inquiry as to whether the President has issued any proclamation recognizing that a state of war exists between China and Japan.

The letter further requests full information on what action has been taken by our government regarding the shipment of scrap iron and new steel to Japan.

I shall appreciate very much a statement from you on this question.

Yours respectfully,

Jeannette Rankin

735.94/16618

PS/LB

RECEIVED
 MAY 22 1941

0292

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 21, 1941

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/16618

My dear Miss Rankin:

The Department has received your letter of May 13, 1941 in which you state that you have received an inquiry whether the President has issued any proclamation in regard to the question of the existence of a state of war between China and Japan. It is presumed that this inquiry relates to the "Neutrality Act of 1939", section 1, paragraph (a) of which provides:

"That whenever the President, or the Congress by concurrent resolution, shall find that there exists a state of war between foreign states, and that it is necessary to promote the security or preserve the peace of the United States or to protect the lives of citizens of the United States, the President shall issue a proclamation naming the states involved; and he shall, from time to time, by proclamation, name other states as and when they may become involved in the war."

There has been issued under the above provisions no proclamation with regard to China and Japan.

You also request information as to what action the American Government has taken in regard to the exportation of scrap iron and new steel. Pursuant to the authority vested in

The Honorable

Jeannette Rankin,

House of Representatives

793.94/16618

PS/HH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

in him by the provisions of Section 6 of the Act of Congress, approved July 2, 1940, entitled "An Act to Expedite the Strengthening of the National Defense", the President issued a proclamation on July 26, 1940 restricting the export of iron and steel scrap and requiring licenses for certain shipments. On September 30, 1940 the President issued certain regulations governing the exportation of articles and materials designated in his proclamation of July 26, 1940. The term "iron and steel scrap" was amended to read "Iron and Steel Scrap.-- All iron and steel scrap of every kind and description, classified and unclassified." On October 16, 1940 the exportation of all grades of iron and steel scrap were placed under the licensing system and effective that date exports were restricted to countries of the Western Hemispheres and Great Britain.

On December 10 the White House, upon direction of the President, made the following statement:

"The President announced today that national defense requirements for iron and steel have increased to such extent that it has become necessary to subject, as of December 30, 1940, iron ore, pig iron, ferro alloys, and certain iron and steel manufactures and semimanufactures to the licensing requirement. Licenses will be granted for exports to the British Empire and the Western Hemisphere; and for the present, so far as the interests of the national defense permit, for exports to other destinations in quantities approximating usual or pre-war exports."

In

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

In order that you may have complete information regarding the iron and steel commodities which have been placed under the licensing system, there are enclosed various press releases by the White House and the Department of State giving those details.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

Press releases of the
 White House and
 Department of State.

MAY 20 1941 PM
 MAY 21 1941 PM

FE:MWS:LJH/HNS
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
 OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1941 MAY 16 PM 12 07


AMERICAN EMBASSY

Tokyo, April 17, 1941.

No. 5516.

SUBJECT: BOMBING OF KUNMING BY JAPANESE AIRCRAFT ON
 APRIL 8, 1941.

793.94



For Distribution Check	
Grade	In U.S.A.
Per	

793.94/16619



PS/LB

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

With reference to the Embassy's telegram no. 563 dated April 16, 8 p.m., concerning the bombing of Kunming, China, by Japanese aircraft on April 8, 1941, I have the honor to enclose a copy of the Embassy's first person note to the Foreign Office, which was prepared along the lines indicated in the

1/

FILE
 4 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

the Department's telegram no. 227 of April 12,
2 p.m.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

350
HMB:C

Joseph C. Grew.

Enclosure ✓
1/ As stated.

Copy to Embassy, Peiping;
Copy to Embassy, Chungking;
Copy to Consulate General Shanghai,
Copy to Consulate, Kunming.

Original and 2 copies to Department.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch
 no. 5516 dated April 17, 1941,
 from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the Acting Minister
 for Foreign Affairs, Prince Konoye.

EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, April 14, 1941.

No. 1779.

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to my note to the Minister
 for Foreign Affairs, no. 1738 of February 4, 1941, with
 reference to the aerial bombardment of Kunming, China, by
 Japanese aircraft on January 29, 1941, at which time the
 American Consulate at that place was seriously endangered, and
 to inform Your Excellency that American lives and property
 were again endangered at Kunming on April 8 by a wanton
 and indiscriminate bombing attack by Japanese airplanes.

On this occasion, according to the American Consul
 at Kunming, the China Inland Mission, where seven American
 citizens including three children were residing, was badly
 damaged by explosions and barely escaped destruction by
 fire. At the same time, the house occupied by the American-
 citizen clerk of the Consulate, adjacent to the Mission,
 suffered concussion and damage in the form of broken glass,
 fallen plaster and tiles, and demolished electric light
 fixtures.

In bringing this matter to Your Excellency's attention,
 I wish to emphasize the unfortunate effect on public opinion
 in the United States of such indiscriminate attacks, not only
 because

His Excellency
 Prince Fumimaro Konoye,
 His Imperial Japanese Majesty's
 Prime Minister and Acting Minister
 for Foreign Affairs,
 Tokyo.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

because of the jeopardy in which American lives and property are placed, but also because of the great abhorrence on broad humanitarian grounds held by the American people toward acts of wanton violence against non-combatant and defenceless populations.

In conclusion, I am further instructed by my Government to point out that American officials and citizens reside in Kunming and other localities for legitimate purposes, and they are entitled to continue their activities without danger or loss from the attacks of Japanese aircraft. Despite the fact that the Japanese authorities in a great many of the cases have previously been supplied with detailed information concerning the location of the residences of American citizens and of American property, the lives of American citizens continue to be placed in jeopardy and they continue to suffer losses, in various parts of China.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.


JOSEPH C. GREW.

0299

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
 OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA




No. 3074

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Peiping, China, April 14, 1941.

Subject: Japanese aerial attack on Kunming -
 damage to Mr. McGeary's residence.



Good					
For					

703.04/16620

PS/LB

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to telegram no. 134,
 April 10, 1941, addressed to the Department by the
 Consulate General at Hong Kong, transmitting telegram
 no. 8, April 9, 10 a.m., from the Consulate at Kunming
 (Yunnanfu), in regard to the Japanese aerial attack of
 April 8 on the city of Kunming and the damaging of the
residence

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

residence of Clerk Stanley A. McGeary, and to transmit herewith, as a matter of record, a copy of a communication on the subject, under date April 14, 1941, addressed by this Embassy to the Japanese Embassy at Peiping.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Robert L. Smyth

Robert L. Smyth
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

No. 1. Copy of note to Japanese
Embassy, Peiping, April
14, 1941.

Original and 2 copies to Department.
Copy to Consulate, Kunming.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.
Copy to Consulate General, Hong Kong.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

350 McGeary/ 710 U.S.-Japan.

ARR/sc

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to Peiping Embassy's
 despatch no. 3074, April 14, 1941 to
 Department: "Japanese aerial attack
 on Kunming - damage to Mr. McGeary's
 residence".

Peiping, April 14, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

I have the honor to inform you of the receipt of a report from the American Consulate at Kunming (Yunnanfu) to the effect that on April 8, 1941, Japanese planes engaged in the indiscriminate bombing on the center of Kunming, causing heavy damage and several large fires; that bombs fell within thirty yards of the residence of Mr. Stanley A. McGeary, clerk in the American Consulate, the resultant concussion blowing electric light fixtures from the ceiling, breaking glass, and causing tiles and plaster to be dislodged; and that the adjacent China Inland Mission (内地會), where seven American citizens including three children are living, was badly damaged and narrowly missed being burned.

It

Y. Tsuchida, Esquire,
 Counselor of Embassy,
 Embassy of Japan,
 Peiping.

0302

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

It is requested that the substance of this communication be brought to the attention of the Japanese authorities concerned, that an immediate investigation be instituted, and that strict instructions be issued to prevent further indiscriminate attacks of this nature. Experience has shown that, notwithstanding the fact that in the majority of instances detailed information has been made available to the Japanese authorities concerned in regard to the location of American residences and property, the lives of American citizens continue to be jeopardized and American property continues to suffer loss. It should be emphasized in this connection that substantial numbers of American citizens including American officials are resident in Kunming for the purpose of engaging in legitimate activities, and that these American citizens are quite within their rights in residing there and should not be subjected to danger from Japanese aerial attacks.

All rights are reserved in respect of losses and damages suffered by Mr. McGeary and the Americans resident in the China Inland Mission as a result of this attack.

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to

you.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 3 -

you, Sir and dear Colleague, the renewed assurances
of my highest consideration.

For the Ambassador:

Robert L. Smyth
First Secretary of Embassy

ARR/sc




0304

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED THE FOREIGN SERVICE
 NO. 65 DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1941 MAY 11 PM 2 43



AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
 Harbin, Manchuria,
 March 27, 1941.

SUBJECT: Seemingly Endless Shipments of Ashes
 of Japanese Soldiers Southward through
 Harbin.

COPIES SENT TO
 OMI AND MID

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of my despatch
 No. 46, dated March 27, 1941, addressed to the American
 Embassy at Peiping, entitled "Seemingly Endless Ship-
 ments of Ashes of Japanese Soldiers Southward through
 Harbin."

Respectfully yours,

L. M. Gourley
 L. M. Gourley
 American Consul

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
 Department of State

MAY 21 1941

DIVISION OF

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 46,
 March 27, 1941, to the Embassy
 at Peiping.

In quintuplicate.

800
 LHG:JNO

793.94/16621

PS/BAS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 46
THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Consulate General
Harbin, Manchuria,
March 27, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Seemingly Endless Shipments of Ashes
of Japanese Soldiers Southward through
Harbin.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to give the following information
about shipments of ashes of Japanese soldiers through
Harbin.

Summary.

On the 13th and 14th of every month many boxes
of ashes of Japanese soldiers pass through Harbin on
three different trains.

Every month ashes of soldiers arrive at Harbin by
two different trains on the 13th and a third train on
the 14th from North Manchuria areas en route southward.
Those arriving on the 13th are kept all night in the
local Chamber of Commerce where they are watched over
by Japanese residents but those arriving on the 14th
remain in Harbin in a special room in the railway
station for only two hours.

Foreign observers state that in the monthly pro-
cessions from the railway station to the Chamber of

Commerce

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Commerce on the 13th scores of boxes are carried in busses. It is difficult to count the exact numbers, as Japanese accompanying the processions have angrily resented curiosity on the part of foreigners who have tried to watch the processions from balconies of buildings or even from the street level.

The Japanese language press describes the ashes as those of soldiers who have sacrificed their lives for the country in North Manchuria. Japanese who have been questioned believe that the ashes are those of soldiers who have died in hospitals and in fights with bandits. They doubt whether the boxes contain ashes of soldiers who lost their lives in the fighting with the Soviets at Nomonhan, although the Japanese Government never appeared to desire that large shipments of ashes at any one time or shrine ceremonies in Tokyo should reveal too clearly the Nomonhan losses.

Beginning in March the Harbin police set aside the times of arrival and departure of the boxes of ashes for a modified form of air defense drill with siren and radio alarms and traffic control. The purpose is "to heighten defense-mindedness and at the same time gratitude for the services rendered by the dead".

Respectfully yours,

L. H. Gourley
 American Consul

Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
 Five copies to Department by
 despatch No. 65, March 27, 1941.
 Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
 Copy to Consulate General, Mukden.
 Copy to Consulate, Dairen.

800
 LHG:JNO

0307

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.

FROM

Dated May 15, 1941

SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY

Rec'd 10:31 a.m., 16th.

TO ONI AND MID 5/14/41

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,

Washington!

684, May 15, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Embassy's 663, May 10, 5 p.m.

The arrival of Ambassador Honda in Tokyo yesterday
 and the conference he is to hold in the next few days
 with high government officials may well determine the
 beginning of a new phase in Japan's policy toward
 the China incident. It may be of value to examine
 the reasons for this policy and the direction it may
 take.

The increasingly onerous restrictions on China
 life of the people might be cheerfully borne as patriotic
 sacrifices could the man in the street see that Japan's
 great strength was overpowering her enemies, or that the
 enunciated objectives of the China incident were nearing
 achievement. However, for many months there has been
 no news from China. Matsuoka's diplomatic successes
 have been encouraging, but they have not blinded the
 nation to the fact that Japan's war remains unsettled.
 The nation had been prepared by delicate changes in the
 expression of war aims for a possible peace with

Chungking

793.94/16622

PS/BAS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

182

"2" #684, May 15, 9 p.m., from Tokyo. (SECTION ONE)

Chungking. Ambassador Honda now refers with contempt to the "the German brokers" motivated only by prospects of personal profit who he states made efforts in Shanghai to arrange peace with Chungking. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that when negotiations with Chungking and a resultant settlement of the China incident were found to be impossible some new step in the formation of policy toward China was inevitable. The morale

GREW

NPL

0309

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


This telegram must be Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.
 closely paraphrased before
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (Br)

Dated May 15, 1941

FROM

Rec'd. 8 p. m., 16th

Secretary of State,
 Washington



684, May 15, 9 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

of the nation required the administration of a powerful
 drug in the form of a plan for settlement of the incident.

Public statements reiterating the thesis that the
 Nanking Government must be strengthened and military
 operations against Chungking intensified appear therefore
 designed to prepare the nation for this new policy.

Following the statements of Ambassador Honda and General
 Hata, previously reported, War Minister ^{Hideki} Tojo and Colonel
 Mabuchi, Chief of the Information Department of Imperial
 Headquarters, have issued statements urging the nation to
 support continued military operations in China. Tojo
 stated to a conference of army chiefs of staff that the
 fighting power of the army must be increased, that Japan's
 only hope in solving the current situation lay in an
 invincible army. Mabuchi reminded the nation that
 Chiang Kai Shek was far from defeat, that renewed activity
 to crush the enemy was required. He urged the nation to
 be aware of the great enterprise in

LOCKHART

NPL

FW 793.94/16622

(SEC. 2)

PS/AD

FW 793.94/16622
 RB

0 3 1 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GMW

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

•
Tokyo via Shanghai & N. R.
FROM

Dated May 15, 1941

Rec'd 10:30 a.m., 16th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

684, May 15, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

which Japan was engaged. We are informed that the press
has been instructed to play up news of military operations
in China and leading articles on the front pages of the
vernaculars have recently been (*) accounts of the
exploits of the Japanese forces in China.

Therefore if the authorities in Tokyo are in accord
with the plan which Ambassador Honda has suggested in his
interviews, Japanese policy toward China may be directed
toward an attempt to create a condition in areas under
the control of the Nanking Government which can be charac-
terized to the people of the nation as a "settlement" of
the China incident.

The wide publicity given to Ambassador Honda's views
on his return from China and his public recommendation
with regard to a new trend in Japan's China policy which
one would suppose should more properly issue from the
Prime Minister or the Minister for Foreign Affairs have

given

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 684, May 15, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Tokyo via
Shanghai & N. R.

given rise to much discussion in foreign diplomatic
circles which was therein a significant indication of
divided councils within Japanese officialdom.

Sent to the Department via Shanghai.

(END OF MESSAGE)

Repeated to Chungking

GREW

RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Japan wants peace with China: Ambassador Nomura in a
private conversation with Admiral Pratt informed
him that -.

793.94/16623

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Letter
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated May 5, 1941 From Navy Department
To

File No. 740.0011 European War, 1939/10942

16623

0313

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

IS

PLAIN

FROM

TOKYO VIA SHANGHAI
& N.R.

Dated May 10, 1941

Rec'd 8:30 a.m. 17th

Secretary of State

Washington

690, sixteenth, 7 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO

O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

5/11/41

REK

Today's vernaculars state Ambassador Honda conferred yesterday Foreign Minister for two hours, that he will hold conference War-Navy Minister today. It is conjectured that large joint conference Japanese Government officials from China Central Government authorities here will be held near future to consider Ambassador's proposals.

77-94/166 24
 ASAHI editorial today discusses intensified military operations in China, states China incident can be settled only by complete military defeat Chungking or natural disintegration Chiang's Government through strengthened Nanking regime. Japanese policy said now directed toward latter method as only possible one to effect settlement. Rumors of attempted negotiations with Chiang harmful since they indicate disunity Japanese Government and lack faith toward Nanking. Unified policy demands complete cessation any such maneuvers. Future policy for settlement

755.94/1666

Rb/PJ

66

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 690, sixteenth, 7 p.m. from Tokyo.

settlement incident will be based spirit Kooze state-
ment but drastic revisions policy will meet new start
toward incident settlement.

Commentation today's ASAHI quotes stating that
American (*) and would be refused if Chungking were
undertaking secret negotiations with Nanking looking
toward merger two governments.

Repeat Department Shanghai.

GREW

(*) Apparent omission.

ALC

031

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED MAY 27 1941

DIVISION OF FOREIGN
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RS

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- FROM Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.
fore being communicated Dated May 17, 1941
to anyone. (br)

Rec'd 5:30 a.m., 18th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

699, May 17, 2 p.m.

Kunming's number 11, May 13, 9 a.m., bombing of Kunming.
Representations made today in first person note.

Sent to the Department via Shanghai. Shanghai please
repeat to Chungking and Peiping.

GREW

GW

793.94/16625

PS/PJ

0316

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

/ PLAIN

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Shanghai & N. R.

Dated May 17, 1941

FROM Rec'd 8:35 a.m., 18th.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

700, May 17, 5 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO

G.R.I. AND M.I.D.

5/17/41

PEK

NICHI NICHI reports conference yesterday between

Ambassador Honda and War Minister Tojo. Lamer quoted as expressing complete concurrence Honda's recommendation that in seeking settlement China incident Japanese central authorities and authorities in China should unitedly give positive support Wang regime.

KOKUMIN comments editorially that although statement tone Honda's remarks to press have created impression difference of opinion between authorities in China and in Tokyo, no fundamental difference exists. Admitting possibility some laxness in execution, basic policy of supporting Wang always unchanged. Recent operations Chekiang, Fukien and Kwangtung described as undertaken in pursuance this policy. Measures for supporting Wang expected receive powerful impetus as result Honda visit here.

HOCHI editorial credits Matsuoka recent interviews with Axis and Soviet leaders with original impetus for recent Soviet German rapprochement, manifested Soviet recognition

703.94/16626

PS/LB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #700, May 17, 5 p.m., from Tokyo.

recognition Iraq Government fighting Britain, withdrawal
recognition Belgian, Norwegian and Yugoslav Governments
and Stalin's assumption chairmanship Council of
Commissar's (interpreted as presaging Soviet recognition
German new order in Europe). These developments in
turn credited with encouraging Turkish rapprochement
with Axis and facilitating Franco German agreement
for joint action against Britain. Hope expressed that
in return both German and Soviet will make special
efforts adjust problems pending between them and Japan
in order render impregnable anti-Anglo American Axis.

Sent Department via air mail to Shanghai.

GREW

ALC

0318

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 374
 NO. _____, Embassy, China.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL DIVISION OF FOREIGN
 SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

Shanghai, China

MAY 23 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 April 15, 1941.

Grade	Pay	Rate	No
		In U.S.A.	

SUBJECT: Japanese bombing of Kunming, Yunnan Province, on April 8, 1941, which damaged the house of Clerk Stanley A. McGeary of the American Consulate.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to telegram No. 134, April 10, 4 p.m., from the Consul General at Hongkong, quoting telegram No. 8, April 9, 10 a.m., from the Consul at Kunming on the above subject, and to enclose 1/ a copy of a communication in regard to this bombing that this office addressed to-day to the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai.

In that communication it was pointed out that on February 1, 1941, I addressed a letter to the Japanese Consul General transmitting a report received from the American Consul at Kunming in regard to the bombing by Japanese airplanes of that city on January 21, 1941, which endangered American citizens and slightly damaged the American Consulate. It was also mentioned that in my letter of February 1, 1941, the Japanese Consul General was requested to have stringent instructions issued to prevent attacks similar to that of

January

793.34/16627

MAY 27 1941

FILED

PS/LC

0319


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

January 21, 1941, that might endanger American lives and property.

The Japanese Consul General was also informed of the damage to Mr. McGeary's house as set forth in the telegram from the Consul General at Hongkong mentioned above. All rights on behalf of the American Government and Mr. McGeary were reserved, and the Japanese Consul General was requested to bring this new bombing to the attention of the Japanese authorities concerned, with the request that it be thoroughly investigated without delay and that I be informed of the results of the investigation. It was also requested that stringent instructions be issued to prevent further attacks on American property.

Respectfully yours,


Frank P. Lockhart
American Consul General

Enclosure:
Copy of letter to Japanese
Consul General, April 15.

350
MH:EA

In triplicate to the Department.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Hankow.
Copy to Consulate, Kunming.

0320

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to Despatch No. 7921, April 15, 1941, from
 the American Consul General at Shanghai, on the subject:
 "Japanese bombing of Kunming, Yunnan Province, on April
 8, 1941, which damaged the house of Clerk Stanley A.
 McGeary of the American Consulate".

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Shanghai, China

April 15, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

I have the honor to inform you that according to
 a report from the American Consul at Kunming, Yunnan
 Province (雲南省昆明), twenty-seven Japanese air-
 planes indiscriminately bombed that city on April 8
 and endangered the lives of American citizens. Accord-
 ing to the report of the Consul, the house of Stanley
 A. McGeary, an American citizen employed in the Amer-
 ican Consulate in Kunming, was damaged by the bombing
 by Japanese airplanes mentioned above. Glass in the
 house was broken, plaster and tiles fell, and the light-
 ing fixtures were blown from the ceiling.

It will be recalled that on February 1, 1941, I
 addressed a letter to you in regard to the indiscrim-
 inate bombing of Kunming on January 21, 1941, by Japa-
 nese airplanes which endangered the lives of American
 citizens. In that letter it was mentioned that the
 American Consulate was slightly damaged by a bomb that
 landed approximately two hundred yards from it.

Moreover, in my letter of February 1, 1941, it was
 requested that the endangering of American Government
 property at Kunming by Japanese aerial bombardment be
 brought to the attention of the Japanese authorities con-
 cerned and that stringent instructions be issued to pre-
 vent similar attacks that might endanger American lives
 and property.

I now have to request you to bring the report of
 the bombing of April 8, 1941, as set forth above, to
 the attention of the Japanese authorities concerned,
 with the request that this matter be thoroughly investi-
 gated without delay and that I be informed of the re-
 sults of the investigation. It is also requested that
 stringent instructions be issued to prevent further at-
 tacks on American property.

On behalf of the American Government and of Mr.
 McGeary, I reserve all rights in respect of losses or
 damages sustained as a result of action by Japanese
 armed forces.

I have the honor to be, Sir and dear Colleague,
 Your obedient servant,
 (Signed) FRANK P. LOCKHART
 American Consul General

T. Horiuchi, Esquire,
 Consul General for Japan,
 Shanghai.

(A true copy EA)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 3067

Peiping, China, April 8, 1941.

Subject: Failure of Japanese Offensive
in Honan in January.



Grade		To Hold		Yes	No
For		In U.S.A.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

ONI MID

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
5/19/41 REK

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, as a matter of record, a copy of despatch no. 66, dated March 31, 1941, addressed to this Embassy by the American Consulate at Tsingtao, containing the substance of a report of an American witness to the Japanese offensive in Honan in January and early February.

It will be noted that according to this witness the operation proved to be a complete failure, and that the Japanese lost at least a fourth of their troops, over a thousand trucks, and many tanks. The informant also reported fighting between Central Government and

Communist

700-371 16623

2015

FIELD

16628

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Communist troops in Central China; he stated that the former were winning the ascendancy throughout the Honan-Anhwei area.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Robert L. Smyth
Robert L. Smyth
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

No. 1. Despatch no. 66 from Tsingtao Consulate dated March 31, 1941.

Original and 4 copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking (enclosure sent direct).
Copy to Consulate, Tsinan (enclosure sent direct).
Copy to Consulate, Tsingtao (without enclosure).

710 Sino-Jap./800 Communism/800 Tsingtao.

ARR/jk

4 231

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 66

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Tsingtao, China, March 31, 1941.

Subject: Failure of Japanese Offensive in Honan
in January.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to state that an American who witnessed the Japanese offensive in Honan in January and early February has arrived in Tsingtao from the interior and reports that the entire operation was a failure from the Japanese point of view. He states that three divisions of Japanese troops participated and that they used 4,000 trucks and 200 tanks. He estimates that at least a fourth of the troops, over a thousand trucks and many of the tanks were lost, although he admits that Chinese claims of much higher Japanese losses might be justified. He states that 20 divisions of Chinese troops were used against the Japanese. According to his report the thing that really defeated the Japanese was a snowstorm that made the use of the trucks and tanks almost impossible at a time when the advance Japanese units were surrounded by the Chinese forces. The retreat was apparently something in the nature of

a

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

a rout as Japanese soldiers returning to Sinyang were described as being in rags, and many no longer had shoes. Although the Japanese are still reported to be holding Sinyang, the troops who participated in this offensive were immediately withdrawn to Hankow.


The informant also reports fighting between national Government troops and communists in the area between Yingshang and Mengcheng in western Anhui. He states that generally the National Government troops are winning ascendancy over the communists throughout the Honan-Anhui area. In some places he states that there were National Government troops, communists, guerrillas, bandits and puppet troops all contesting for the possession of certain villages. This is particularly true in the "no-man's-land" between the regular Japanese held positions and Chinese lines. He describes the smuggling of goods in both directions through these areas as "big business" with intensive activity especially at night. Villages are crowded with carts and pack animals during the day but at night they disappear into the country.

Respectfully yours,

Paul W. Meyer
 American Consul

800
 PVM:ad

Original and five copies to Embassy, Peiping,
 Copy to Embassy, Chungking,
 Copy to Consulate, Tsinan.



0325

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LS
 This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased
 before being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY
 TO ONI AND MID 5/23/41 30
 Secretary of State

Washington

24, May 21, 4 p.m.


My telegram no. 23, May 13, 5 p.m. in regard to
 military operations in Waichow area.

A report or rumor in circulation among local boat-
 ing people is that many commandeered cargo boats which
 the Japanese had sent up the East River were burnt to
 the water's edge by Chinese guerrillas and that some
 Japanese troops have been cut off by Chinese forces and
 are receiving food by airplane. Another report is that
 Japanese troops who had encircled the Chinese forces have
 themselves been surrounded and that Japanese planes can-
 not engage in bombing operations because of danger to
 their own troops. Other reports current in the city are
 that the fighting in that area continues. None of these
 reports can of course be confirmed due to the absence of
 detailed reports from the local Information Bureau in
 regard to operations in that area which had been issued
 almost daily prior to May 16--a report on that date was to
 the effect that the cordon around the Chinese forces was
 being

CANTON VIA N.R.

Dated May 21, 1941

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.



795.94/16629

PS/CMR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 24, May 21, 4 p.m. from Canton.

being drawn tighter--would seem to indicate that ordinary operations are not progressing favorably. According to a previous Chinese press report considerable Chinese forces were moving southward toward Waichow.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping, Chungking.

MYERS

RR

0327

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


DES

PLAIN

FROM CHUNGKING VIA N. R.

Dated May 21, 1941.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



Rec'd 3:22 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
5-22 HES

198, May 21, 6 p.m.

743-74

Independent Chinese newspaper TA KUNG PAO in leading article in today's issue referring to decisive battle now being waged for control of strategic Chung Tiao mountains range of South Shansi and persistent reports of failure of Eighteenth Group Army (communism) to assist government forces in beating back Japanese thrust calls upon Eighteenth Group Army to give the lie to such reports by attacking the Japanese in concert with government forces in order to retain the mountain stronghold, breakup Japanese mopping operations and maintain the past glory of the Eighteenth Group Army. Fuller report will follow by airmail.

Sent to Department, repeated to Peiping.

DRUMRIGHT

KLP

795.94/16650

PS/CMR

0328

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
 PLAIN

JT

TOKYO VIA SHANGHAI VIA N.R.

FROM

Dated May 20, 1941

Rec'd 9:23 a.m., 22d

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 5/23/41 RSK

712, twentieth, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

According to the vernacular press Ambassador Honda yesterday completed his conversations with Government leaders regarding a plan for settlement of the China Incident. Conversations were to have been carried out in a satisfactory atmosphere with only details remaining to be discussed among representatives of the Central Government and the Army in China. The Ambassador is expected to remain in Tokyo another month.

The HOCHI states today that authorities of the Central Government and Japanese officials in China have agreed that efforts should be made to obtain recognition of the Nanking Government by Japan's allies and Italy and that the Foreign Minister has already made a diplomatic demarche to secure this recognition.

Today's CHUGAI editorial, discussing Japanese policy toward China, states that the Chungking Regime is nearing collapse,

793.94/16631
 SECTIONS 1 AND 2
 PS/BE

713-4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 712, May 20, 7 p.m., (SECTION ONE) from Tokyo

collapse, that the Communists and Kuomintang are far from an agreement. HOWEVER, Chungking cannot be expected to capitulate to Japan or join the Nanking Government since, as Ambassador Honda has stated, Chungking peace terms include unconditional withdrawal of the Japanese army from China. Japan's policy must be the strengthening of the Nanking Government and extension of its authority throughout China until Chungking becomes merely a local regime to merge with Nanking or disappear. Even though Chiang desires a long term war, Japan must be prepared for this.

GREW

HTM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LS

PLAIN

TOKYO VIA SHANGHAI & N.R.

FROM

Dated May 20, 1941

Rec'd 12:58 p.m. 22d

Secretary of State

Washington

712, twentieth, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

and must not change her fundamental policy. Germany and Italy should be induced to recognize Nanking and Japan's exercise of belligerent rights, if not outright declaration of war, and the placing of occupied areas under civil administration should be considered.

Today's KOKUMIN editorial states that certain rumors have placed mistaken interpretation on Honda's conversations which have credited the erroneous impression that Japan's policy for settlement of the China incident has changed. The Government intends to suppress such rumors and to execute the basic policy without change. The army is convinced that strengthening of the Nanking Government is the shortcut to settlement of the incident and is carrying out military operations with this end in view. Authorities in China and in the Central Government are agreed on policy for settlement of the incident. Attainment of favorable results will depend on the determination of officials and the people.

Sent Department via air mail to Shanghai.

GREW

HTM

0331

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GMW

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

FROM Canton

Dated May 22, 1941

Rec'd 10:50 a.m.

SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED GRADUALLY

TO ONE AND MID 5/23/43 TD

Secretary of State, -

LIASON OFFICE

Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

26, May 22, 10 a.m.

Reference my 24, May 21, 4 p.m.

The local Japanese Information Bureau has announced
 that the Japanese forces sent to the Waichow area had
 achieved their objectives, namely the annihilation of
 the Chinese forces there and frustration of any attempt
 to reopen the Hong Kong Shiuchow trade route, and have
 withdrawn to an undisclosed destination.

Since yesterday pack animals in considerable numbers
 and some Japanese troops, apparently returning from the
 fighting area, have been seen passing through Canton.


Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping, Chungking,
 Hong Kong.

MYERS

WSB

793.94/16632

PS/BE



0332

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

LS

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased
 before being communicated
 to anyone. (A)

Peiping via N.R.

Dated May 22, 1941

SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY

Rec'd 8:35 P.M.

TO ONE AND MID 5/24/41 JD
 Secretary of State

Washington

119, May 22, 2 p.m.

Peiping's 118, May 12, 2 p.m. and Chungking's 190,
 May 15, 9 a.m.

There are further and somewhat more definite rumors
 and reports here of negotiations or discussions between
 the Japanese military and the Chinese Communists. Most
 of these are unconfirmed but one usually reliable informant
 states that a Japanese Colonel known to be a follower of
 General Doihara has been in Peiping recently and has
 talked with private individuals or persons connected
 with the Eighth Route Army; the informant has no knowledge
 of the nature or outcome of these conversations.

While encompassing and reliable information in regard
 to a possible rapprochement between the Japanese military
 and the Chinese Communists is lacking, it seems well
 founded that during the past few months the Eighth Route
 Army has been used against the Japanese, and, furthermore,
 that during the past few weeks the local Japanese-controlled
 vernacular press, which previously bitterly attacked the
 Communists,

793.94/16633

PS/FLR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 119, May 22, 2 p.m. from Peiping.

Communists, has refrained from anti-Communist editorials and propaganda. Foreign correspondents here also comment that the local Japanese Army press spokesman has been almost too emphatic in his denials of Japanese-Communist negotiations.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Shanghai, code text by air mail to Tokyo.

SMYTH

HTM

0334

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CARTER GLASS, VA., CHAIRMAN
 KENNETH MCKELLAR, TENN.
 CARL HAYDEN, ARIZ.
 ELMER THOMAS, OKLA.
 JAMES F. BYRNES, S. C.
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 RICHARD B. RUSSELL, GA.
 ALVA B. ADAMS, COLO.
 PATRICK MCCARRAN, NEV.
 JOHN H. OVERTON, LA.
 JOHN H. BANKHEAD, ALA.
 JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, WYO.
 HARRY S. TRUMAN, MO.
 THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN, R. I.
 FRANCIS MALONEY, CONN.
 DENNIS CHAVEZ, N. MEX.

GERALD P. NYE, N. DAK.
 STYLES BRIDGES, N. H.
 HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR., MASS.
 RUFUS C. HOLMAN, OREG.
 WALLACE H. WHITE, JR., MAINE
 CHAN GURNEY, S. DAK.
 C. WAYLAND BROOKS, ILL.

United States Senate
 COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

1941 MAY 22 AM 10 PM May 22, 1941.

May 27, 1941

EVERARD H. SMITH, CLERK
 JOHN W. R. SMITH, ASST. CLERK

DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND TRAFFIC

RECEIVED
 DIVISION OF POLITICAL RELATIONS
 MR. HORNBECK
 MAY 26 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
 DIVISION OF POLITICAL RELATIONS
 MR. HORNBECK
 MAY 26 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Honorable Cordell Hull
 Secretary of State
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am enclosing to you a letter I have
 received from Mr. Clarence Poe, who is the President
 and Editor of the Progressive Farmer, together with
 an article written by DeWitt Mackenzie, which are
 self-explanatory.

Yours very truly,

James F. Byrnes
 JAMES F. BYRNES.

Back

793.94/16634

PS/HH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY:FE:MBW

THE PROGRESSIVE FARMER

Raleigh, N.C.,
May 21, 1941.

Senator James F. Byrnes
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Byrnes:

Since neither of our North Carolina Senators is very close to the White House, I am passing on to you the enclosed thoughtful article by Dewitt Mackenzie.

It seems to me well worth while to inquire whether some fairly moderate concessions to Japan might not bring about results of far-reaching importance in their effect on the present struggle of Hitler and his allies.

I rejoice in the ever-increasing national recognition of your ability and leadership.

Sincerely yours,

CLARENCE POE

Clarence Poe:r

President and Editor

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY:FE:MBW

RUSSIAN PEACE HINT SEEN AS RIGHT MOVE
 By Dewitt Mackenzie

What might have been the big news of the day, but didn't so develop, was the report published in the Russian press Monday to the effect that the United States had taken the initiative in seeking a Far Eastern accord with Japan, this to include American mediation of the Chino-Japanese war.

Maybe the story was a trial balloon flown by somebody; perhaps it was another of those things which grow out of wishful thinking somewhere. In any event it is without confirmation.

It would be difficult, as it strikes me, to figure out an event within the realm of likelihood which would have a greater effect of the European conflict--and consequently on the destiny of our own country--than a rapprochement between the United States and Japan.

Time to Settle

This being so, it certainly merits consideration. As a matter of fact, the Russian item impels me to report in this column a thought which has been running through my mind insistently for days, to wit:

This is the appointed hour for the United States and Japan to settle their differences, if they are going to.

Study of the complicated Far Eastern situation over a long period leads me to feel that events now have rounded into such a position that the two countries could find a basis for agreement. What is needed is for an understanding diplomacy to provide an opening for a conference.

World shorten war

Success not only would unravel the tangle in the Orient and wind up the bloody business in China but must inevitably shorten the European war, or so it seems to me.

That is the theme of today's column--not only the ending of the Chino-Japanese strife, but the shortening of that other terrible conflict which threatens to engulf the whole world and plunge it into utter chaos.

In saying this I have the feeling that many writers on military affairs--certainly this one--have devoted most of their energy to pointing out ways to wage wars with death-dealing arms, and have paid little attention to the constructive though that battles can be won by diplomacy as well

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

as with guns.

As I see it, any agreement that the United States could make with Japan would have the support of Britain. The terms which must be the inevitable outcome of any American-Japanese settlement would immediately remove Nippon from the German sphere of influence--insofar as concerned Japanese participation in the war on the side of the Axis.

Such a development would have the effect of swinging Russia away from the Nazis, at least far enough to insure that the Soviet wouldn't give active support to Hitler.

It needs only half an eye to see that this enforcement of Japanese and Russian neutrality would be a terrific blow to the Axis powers. Apart from other aspects it would release strong British naval, military and air forces in the Far East for use in Europe and Africa.

By the same token, if the Axis operations should force the United States into the war, we also should be able to employ units from our Pacific fleet in the European theatre. It would be a godsend to be able to get ahead with the big show and not have to worry about the Orient.

World of difference

And the alternative of an agreement with Japanese. Well, it would mean the difference between a short war in Europe, and a conflict of attrition which would leave the world flat on its back, no matter who "won".

And what is the basis for believing that Japan is ready to do business? For one thing she is making no bones of her desire to liquidate the China affair, as she calls it. She is in a bad way economically, and finally recognizes that it would take many years more to conquer China, if it could be done at all. A large proportion of her essential supplies come from America, and her sale of products here is vast.

Well informed sources close to this situation tell me that they believe Japan would agree to withdraw from China militarily in exchange for full economic cooperation by the Chinese.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY:FE:MEW

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FW

In reply refer to
 F 793.94/16634

My dear Senator Byrnes:

I have received your letter of May 22, 1941 enclosing a letter from Mr. Clarence Poe, President and Editor of the Progressive Farmer, together with an article written by Dewitt Mackenzie, in regard to the possible conclusion of an agreement between the United States and Japan in regard to the Far Eastern situation.

I thank you for your courtesy in forwarding this material and assure you that constant attention is being given by officers of the Department to the problem of our relations with Japan in all its various phases. Mr. Poe's letter, a copy of which has been made for the Department's files, together with its clipping enclosure, is returned herewith.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosure:

From Mr. Poe, May 21, 1941.

ca The Honorable
 27 1941

James F. Byrnes,

United States Senate.

FE:FAS:FRE/MBW
 5/26

PS/FLR

0341

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (Br)

HONG KONG VIA N.R.

Dated May 23, 1941.

Rec'd 4 p.m.

SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY

TO ONI AND MID 5/24/41 SD
Secretary of State,

Washington.

192, May 23, 10 a.m.

Continuing my telegram no. 179, May 15, 3 p.m.,
and referring to Canton's no. 26, May 22, 10 a.m.

Based on border contacts and some air reconnaissance,
British military (?) are now reasonably certain that one:
Japanese have withdrawn from Waichow, (?) : action of the
past fortnight has been between local Japanese garrison
and third rate Cantonese Provincial levy troops creditab-
ility neither side having brought in any appreciable
outside reenforcement: action is now nearing an end
without any important advantage having been gained by the
Japanese.

(?) Naval authorities report recent presence near
here of more than the usual number of small Japanese
naval vessels and consequent increase in depredation
among junks.

All of the foregoing has resulted in cessation for the
present of traffic on the devious trade routes between
Hong Kong and unoccupied China, a situation which the local
business

793.94/15635

PC/CAR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 192, May 23, 1941 from Hong Kong

business community as usual regards as temporary.

Sent to Department, repeated to Chungking, Peiping,
Canton.

BRUINS

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Relations between China and Japan.

Call of Japanese representatives to discuss
 section of proposed agreement referring
 to -.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated May 20, 1941 From State Dept.
 To FE - Balantine

File No. 711.94/2133-5/18

793.94 / 16635-1/2
 Confidential File
 16635-1/2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Further developments in the relations between China
 and Japan;

Reports concerning -.

GC

793.94/10000

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. # 174, Sections 1 and 2
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated May 10, 1941 From China (Chungking)
 To XXX (Johnson)

File No. 761.9411/132

16634

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Sino- Japanese relations. Military operations during the month included a surprise landing by Japanese troops on the southern coast of Kwangtung, two major clearing operations and the usual small-scale mopping up campaigns in occupied territory.

fp

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Des. #5531
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated April 23, 1941 From Japan (Grew)
 To _____

File No. 894.00, P. R./159

793.94/1597 P

166 117

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Relations between Japan and China.

Call of Japanese Ambassador and his associates to
discuss portion of proposal under consideration
dealing with -.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated May 21, 1941 From State Dept.
To FE - Ballantine

File No. 711.94/2133-7/18

793.94/16637-1/2

793.94/16637-1/2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Sino-Japanese hostilities. The Consul General at Hong Kong reported on March 29 that Japanese units of several hundred men each landed in Kitchich Bay about 100 miles east of Hong Kong and advanced inland probably for main purpose of capturing Chinese supplies and looting.

fp

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated April 3, 1941 From State Department
 To FE (Davies)

File No. 893.00/14728

793.94/11000 P

16638
793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Relations between China and Japan.

Comments on U.S. assistance to China as means
 of rendering Japan incapable or ineffectual as
 an Axis partner.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Letter
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated May 26, 1941 From Japanese Embassy
 To

File No. 762.9411/261¹₂

793.94/10030-1/2

CONFIDENTIAL
 PC/IN
 166382

0349

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
PLAIN

GMW

Tokyo via Shanghai

FROM
Dated May 24, 1941

Rec'd 12:40 p.m., 25th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

730, May 24, 6 p.m.

According tonight's vernacular press Mabuchi, Chief Army Information Board, Imperial Headquarters, in statement issued today said that solution Japan China problems can't be expected through peaceful means or change in international situation. As prerequisites China incident settlement Japan must break completely enemy power resistance by military force, must speedily perfect a national defense state and must possess actual power to control East Asia.

GREW

KLP

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
5/24/41 RSK

793.94/16089

PC/CNK

793.94

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Relations between Chinese and Japanese Governments.

Memorandum of conversation with Japanese Ambassador
 relative to section of Joint Declaration concern-
 ing negotiations between Chinese and Japanese
 Governments.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated May 28, 1941 From State Dept.
 To FE - Ballantine

File No. 711.94/ 2133-15/18 Use 1540

703.04/15033-1/2


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CONFIDENTIAL FILE

166392

0351

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FROM


IS
 This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased
 before being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

HANKOW VIA N.R.

Dated May 16, 1941

Rec'd 9:57 p.m. 17th

ATTACH COMMUNICATIONS
 SECRETARY OF STATE



Washington

May 16, noon.

According to the Japanese military spokesman, Japanese operations northward from Tangyang, Kingmen and Chungsiang in western Hupeh, begun May 8, have been concluded with the return of troops to their bases. (It is not clear, however, who holds Kingmen and Chungsiang.) North of the Tahung mountains Japanese troops are still engaged northwest of Suhsien.

Sent to Peiping. Repeated to the Department, Chungking.

SPIKER

PEG

793.94/16640

FS/LB

16640


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0352

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM



GMW

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Chungking via N. R.

Dated May 29, 1941

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DIVISION OF CONSUL
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION
JUN 6 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

208, May 29, 11 a.m.

note
5-6/4

While there has so far been no deliberate bombing of the south bank at Chungking in the vicinity of the Embassy, the bombs that have fallen here probably having overcarried, there can be no assurance that this relatively satisfactory situation will continue, especially if American-Japanese relations deteriorate. I have therefore requested the Military Attache to survey the air raid protection available to the Embassy staff and on basis of his findings am making recommendations in my 209 May 29, noon.

GAUSS

CSB

793.94/16641

PS/CMR

193.94
note
int. 93

FILED
JUN 19 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Cooperative defense of Chinese and Japanese against
 communistic activities.

Memorandum of conversation with Colonel Iwakuro re -.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated May 30, 1941 From State Department
 To FE - Ballantine

File No. 711.94/2133-16/18
 Confidentiality

793.94/10041-1/2

1641/2
PS/IN

0354

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE ATTACHED IS A COPY OF THE FINAL
DRAFT OF MAY 29 OF MR. HACKWORTH'S MEMORANDUM
WHICH WAS SHOWN TO FATHER DROUGHT.

793.94/16641-1/4

FILED
JUN 28 1943

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

UNOFFICIAL, EXPLORATORY
AND WITHOUT COMMITMENT

SECRET
Confidential
file

ORAL STATEMENT

COMMENT ON SECTION III
OF THE JAPANESE DRAFT
AND THE ANNEX AND
SUPPLEMENT
THERE TO

The United States realizes that the establishment of an amicable and satisfactory adjustment of the present difficulties between China and Japan is a most important element in the establishment of peace in the Pacific area. The United States is desirous of being of all help that it appropriately can. It is in this spirit that the Government of the United States offers the following observations.

743.98
 The United States sees in the proposal of the Japanese Government with respect to cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities a possible obstacle to such an adjustment, particularly if the proposed arrangement should envision the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.

It is stated in the Japanese proposal that the proposed adjustment of general relations between China and Japan is to be based upon neighborly friendship, mutual respect of sovereignty and territories, et

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

cetera.

The Government of the United States therefore suggests for consideration by the Government of Japan the possibility of a substitute formula which would do full justice to the dignity and sensibilities of the Chinese Government and people and at the same time safeguard the rights and interests of Japan and Japanese nationals as well as the rights and interests of other countries and their nationals in China. This formula might be somewhat as follows:

1. The Chinese Government would undertake to establish and maintain a national standing army of sufficient strength to assure a reasonable degree of order throughout China and to afford reasonable protection to the lives and property of foreigners in China, for which purposes portions of the army would be stationed at strategic points throughout the territory of China.

2. Japan on her part would agree to remove her military and naval forces from Chinese territory as promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.

3. The United States and Japan would cooperate in all appropriate ways toward assisting China during China's period of reconstruction in realizing the purposes stated in paragraph one.

- 4.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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4. Upon the establishment of peace between China and Japan the United States and Japan would withdraw the small detachments of armed forces and naval units which they now maintain in China or in Chinese waters in accordance with existing agreements and practice.

5. The United States and Japan will as soon as opportunity presents itself enter into negotiations with the Chinese Government looking to the relinquishment by the American and the Japanese Governments of extraterritorial and other special rights in China. The two Governments further undertake to use their influence with the Governments of the other nations concerned with a view to the taking by those nations of similar action under this paragraph and paragraph four in regard to armed forces and naval units.

6. In the light of the undertaking by China in paragraph one, the United States and Japan might each enter into bilateral agreements with China providing that, in the event that difficulties should arise between the United States and China on the one hand or between Japan and China on the other hand with respect to the protection of their respective nationals and interests in the territories of the other which are not adjusted by local officials or tribunals and which it

has

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

has not been found possible to adjust through the diplomatic channel, such difficulties shall, if of a justiciable character, be referred to an international commission to be created by the two Governments concerned, whose decision in each case shall be regarded as final.

An arrangement of the character outlined above would show to the world that Japan and the United States are desirous of assisting China to the greatest possible extent and that they are willing to treat with China as a full-fledged sovereign state. Such a manifestation would undoubtedly meet with general approbation. It would encourage China in the development of her national aspirations, and by placing China on such a footing would, in the opinion of this Government, offer more of promise than any other course toward making realizable the undertakings and objectives in paragraph one. It certainly would have the effect of disarming critics who might otherwise be inclined to view the proposed settlement between China and Japan as being equivocal with respect to the important matters of withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and respect for China's sovereignty.

Furthermore,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

Furthermore, it would be difficult to explain an arrangement which would permit for the purpose of combating communistic activities the stationing of foreign troops in Chinese territory, for the world would undoubtedly regard such an arrangement as inconsistent with the principle of respecting the sovereign dignity of China, which it is the declared purpose of the United States and Japan to support.

A plan of the character suggested in this statement would be in harmony with the proposed pronouncements by the United States and Japan with respect to peace in the Pacific area. It would likewise be an example to the rest of the world of the application of enlightened and progressive principles in adjustment of international difficulties.

Such a program by contributing to the strengthening and stabilizing of conditions in China offers, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, the best chance of creating an effective bulwark in China against the penetration of inimical foreign ideologies, including injurious communistic activities. It is the feeling of the Government of the United States that if the livelihood of the people is assured through stabilized

conditions

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-6-

conditions there is little room for the infiltration of such inimical foreign ideas or activities.

The Government of the United States wishes to repeat its desire to cooperate with the Government of Japan in bringing about a solution of the problems which are presented and expresses the hope that the suggestions herein briefly outlined will receive most thoughtful consideration.

It is believed that both the United States and Japan recognize the necessity in the maintenance of law and order of a unified governmental organization and that they would be in agreement that stipulations herein set forth visualize a strong central government of China and the recognition by foreign governments of that central Chinese government. It is understood that the National Government of China having its temporary capital at Chungking is the Government of China referred to in the proposed understanding between Japan and the United States.

0361

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


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DOCUMENT RECEIVED FROM FATHER DROUGHT ON
May 30, 1941.

FILED
JUN 28 1943

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Received May 30, 1941



Having reviewed carefully the "Brace Statement", it is my opinion that happier results would be obtained by submitting, instead of the "Brace Statement", a counter-claim, as follows:

"The Government of China and the Government of Japan will enter into an alliance to combat, singly and cooperatively, if the need arises, Communist activities within their respective sovereign territories."

The 'Brace Statement'

1. is constructed on a false premise. The Japanese do not intend to station troops in China, by virtue of this, or any other, clause. They will gladly say so.
2. The 'Statement' lays the issue by assuming that the 'undertaking' of China to produce an effective 'standing army' is tantamount to China's accomplishing such a result.
3. a standing army that will "stabilize conditions" in China is the desideratum, the goal of Japan as much, if not more than, China. The 'Brace Statement' assumes its creation as a basis for other suggestions. If, and when, there is a standing Chinese army capable of maintaining order and representing an anti-Communist government, the 'cooperative defense' of Japan will never be needed.

193.94

The Japanese intend that Chiang brace himself, and his government, against Communism — and they, in turn, will pledge themselves to assist him in resisting it.

This is a most critical issue. They maintain that such an alliance would not violate the sovereignty of China — any more than the United States violates the sovereignty of England and the Western Hemisphere, including Canada. By announcing that we will jointly resist any Nazi invasion of this Hemisphere (or extended to Dakar & the Cape Verde Islands.)

The Japanese consider that a refuge for China
rouses to Japan's greater calamity. They wish to
~~redress~~ redress their pain: but they do not wish to
have their magnanimity seem to be imposed by the
United States.

The establishment of an "international Commission"

1. is, in itself, a violation of Chinese sovereignty,
of deeper significance than would be an alliance
against Communism.
2. it is predicated on the theoretical existence of
an adequate 'standing army' - which no
'China-hand' expects, particularly after the
introduction of the Japanese and the conclusion
of peace. When the 'national emergency'

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3.

is over, Chiang's Chinese allies will surely attempt to undermine him — particularly Li Chai-Son and Pan Song-Hsi. On the conclusion of peace, the Japanese will be of greater assistance to Chiang — than will his own generals.

The Japanese want a foreign, independent, stabilized, non-communistic China. They favor anything that will help to attain it. But, if they assume the present existence of such a China, they will be held responsible for future misunderstandings with the United States as well as China.


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DOCUMENT RECEIVED FROM FATHER DROUGHT ON
MAY 31, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Received May 31

In the Annex and Explanation of the Government of the United States, it is suggested that our Government submit for official acceptance by Japan the following interpretations.

1. "Withdrawal of Troops" etc (as specified in the Japanese Annex)

It is understood by the Government of the United States that the evacuation of Japanese troops from China shall be effected as soon as possible and within a definite time limit to be agreed upon between the Government of Japan and the Government of China; it being provided, moreover, that any stationing of armed forces for the purpose of cooperating against injurious communistic activities shall be arranged by mutual agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of China and shall be confined to inner Mongolia and North China (limits to be specified).

2. "Cooperation of both Governments to resist the extension of Communistic activities". (This phrase to be substituted for 'Joint Defense Against Communism')


It is understood by the Government of the United States that the Government of Japan does not intend to request the right to station troops in China for the attainment of aforementioned purpose except as may be provided under the clause 'Withdrawal of Troops'. Nor, it is understood, does the Government of Japan intend that this clause shall be construed as conferring a right to station armed forces to influence the internal political affairs of China.

With respect to the aforementioned cooperation against Communistic activities, and also conceiving a more general application, it is respectfully suggested by the Government of the United States that the Government of Japan and the Government of China might cooperate in a manner comparable to the procedure adopted by the United States and the American Republics for consultative action directed toward Continental defense.

P. S. Cable received from Matsuoaka informs that his statement re: Axis Alliance appearing in today's papers is a necessary response to the A. P. report which as cabled to Tokyo associated Senator George with the statement that Japan's position in the Axis was weakening. Domestically, it was absolutely necessary.

P.B. S. The Japanese maintain that reports from Japan or the United States discrediting their good intention are completely refuted by the actual fact that the understanding has been formally, legally approved by the whole Japanese Government and transmitted to our Government through official channels.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 84

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Tsingtao, China, April 23, 1941.

Subject: Intensification of Guerrilla Activity.



RECEIVED OF STATE
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 1941 JUN 2 AM 9 37

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
 Department of State

DIVISION OF
 JUN 4 - 1941

X. Description on Check		Yes	No
Grade	Good		
For	Meyer		
	Field	✓	✓
	In U.S.A.		
	O.N.I. M.I.D.		

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 6/9/41 REK

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose copies in quintuplicate of my despatch no. 77 of April 23, 1941 to the Embassy at Peiping, subject: Intensification of Guerrilla Activity.

Respectfully yours,

Paul W. Meyer
 Paul W. Meyer
 American Consul

800
 PWM:ad

793.94/16642

PS/HH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quigley NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 77

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Tsingtao, China, April 23, 1941.

Subject: Intensification of Guerrilla Activity.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Consulate's telegram no. 22, April 3, 4 P.M. to the Department in which it was stated that an intensification of guerrilla activity in this area had been ordered by the Chungking authorities, and to state that there is evidence that since that time there has been a slight intensification of such activity. Additional minor breaks on the railway have been reported but they

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -


they have not been of sufficient intensity or on a large enough scale to seriously interfere with the operation of the railway. Simultaneously there has been increased Japanese military action against the guerrillas. Japanese forces attacked guerrillas at Chaochuang and Chushan in the Kiaochow bay area and at Pingtu. For the first time in many months Japanese forces have ventured into the area around Laoshan where guerrillas are reported to be numerous. Thus far neither the guerrilla activity nor the efforts at their suppression by the Japanese military have resulted in any perceptible change in the situation.

Respectfully yours,

Paul W. Meyer
American Consul

800
PWM:ad

Original to the Embassy at Peiping,
Copy to Embassy at Chungking,
Five copies to the Department.



0371

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 98

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
 OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Consulate

Swatow, China, April 17, 1941.

Subject: Incident at Grand Theater, Swatow,
 China; Restrictions on Movements
 of Chinese.

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 JUN 6 1941


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 JUN 6 1941

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 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 JUN 6 1941

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JUN 7 1941

DIVISION OF



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COPIES SENT TO
 GNL AND M.I.D.
 6/15/41

792.94/10043

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 12,
 April 14, 9 a.m. to the Department, repeated to the
 Embassy, concerning an incident which occurred at the
 Grand Theater in Swatow on the night of April 12 when
 an

PS/HH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

an unidentified person threw a hand grenade during the showing of a Japanese film.

The incident caused something of a sensation in Swatow because it was the first of its kind since the Japanese occupation of the city in June, 1939. It was also the first indication that there were active "anti-Japanese elements" in Swatow.

So many rumors and exaggerated versions concerning the incident have circulated that it has been impossible to determine whether or not many people were wounded, or killed. Meanwhile the local Japanese controlled press remains silent on the whole affair. The Japanese Consul informed me that he was at the theater that night and that only one Chinese had been killed. Other reports were to the effect that at least three Japanese soldiers were killed. On the night of the incident one rumor was that the Japanese Consul had been killed or wounded.

A very large crowd, including many Japanese soldiers, attended the showing of a popular Japanese film. The grenade was thrown at about 8:30 p.m.; the doors were closed immediately and all those in the theater were detained. Martial law was declared and the Japanese authorities and Chinese police raided gambling establishments, restaurants, opium dens and houses of prostitution during the night in search of other suspects. House to house searches have also been made and many persons are still under arrest. The Japanese Consul has stated that the culprit will likely be found among those under detention but that the outrage was undoubtedly planned by an organized gang.

On the following day it was reported, although it

was

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

was never officially announced, that no one would be allowed to enter or leave the city until after the guilty person or persons had been found and a complete census had been taken.

An immediate result of this regulation was that the operations of ^{the} drawnwork and embroidery industry were hampered. The hundreds of workers (chiefly women and young girls) employed locally live in small villages outside the city and come to their work early each morning, returning to their homes at night. When the restrictions on the movements of Chinese were enforced they found that they could not return to their homes while those outside were unable to enter the city. The restrictions also prevented Chinese contractors from taking unfinished material to the country districts for manufacture and from bringing finished materials to the foreign firms in Swatow.

This matter was discussed with the Japanese Consul and it now seems that a responsible Chinese representative of a firm will be issued a form of pass by the Japanese Consulate. A list of all the employees of a particular firm will be prepared and the representative, accompanied by the employees, will present this list to the sentry each morning when the employees arrive at the barrier and each evening when they return to their homes. If adequate instructions are given the sentries by the authorities concerning this plan the drawnwork industry should be able to carry on under the new restrictions.

The period during which these restrictions on the
 movements

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

movements of Chinese will be in effect has not been announced.

Respectfully yours,

Kenneth J. Yearns
Kenneth J. Yearns,
American Consul.

Original and 4 copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.

800
LJY/ght

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 28, 1941

~~FAS~~
~~OC~~
~~JD~~

~~SA~~
~~WAA~~

Peiping's despatch no. 3068, April 8, 1941.

In regard to a report that the Chinese forces in the Tsingtao area have recently received orders to intensify their guerrilla activities, the Consul at Tsingtao offers the following opinion:

The mere intensification of guerrilla activities will have little effect in north China. What the situation definitely calls for is a large-scale military offensive, which, in view of the very radical reduction in Japanese garrisons, would cause the entire Japanese military structure in north China to collapse. In one district north of Tsingtao there were recently reported 30,000 well-equipped Chinese Government troops and only between four and five hundred Japanese troops. The Chinese will never execute their much-talked-about future offensive unless someone prods them into action. It might not be inappropriate to make inquiries at Chungking as to when the offensive is to be undertaken. The Chinese forces in Tsingtao are suffering from inaction; they are well equipped and apparently prepared to fight but are constantly being restrained by orders from Chungking.

The Embassy comments that the tendency on the part of the Chinese to rest on their laurels

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-2-

laurels, expecting foreign countries to take over their burden, was recently noted in an editorial in the (American) Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury; however, superiority in numbers is poor compensation for inferiority in equipment, and that until this disparity has been made less glaring a general offensive might be suicidal.

1477
FE:Fales:LJH/MBW

0377

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 3068

Peiping, China, April 8, 1941.

Subject: Communication from Admiral Shen to the
 People of Tsingtao and Comments on the
 Military Situation in North China.

CONFIDENTIAL



For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	Good		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Per	MEYER.	In U.S.A.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		Q.N.I. 2 M.I.D.	

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
Department of State

JUN 4 - 1941

DIVISION OF

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND T.I.D. 4/24/41
in confidence

700.94.16644

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to telegram no. 20,
 dated March 27, 3 p.m., addressed to the Department
 by the American Consulate at Tsingtao, in regard to
 the receipt by a number of Chinese firms and resi-
 dents of Tsingtao of a communication from Admiral
 SHEN Hung-lieh, former Mayor of Tsingtao and now
 Governor of Shantung under the National Government
 at Chungking, announcing the establishment of a
 branch office of his former municipal administration,

and

PS/HH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

and urging popular cooperation in resistance and national reconstruction; and to transmit herewith, as a matter of record, a copy of despatch no. 68, dated March 31, 1941, addressed to this Embassy by the Consulate at Tsingtao, enclosing the Consulate's translation of the former Mayor's communication.

In the Consulate's telegram under reference, mention was also made of a report that the Chungking Government had recently ordered an intensification of guerrilla activity in the Tsingtao area. In commenting on this report, Consul Meyer (in the enclosed despatch) ventures the opinion that a mere intensification of guerrilla activity can have little if any appreciable effect on the situation in North China, and that what the situation definitely calls for at this time is a large-scale military offensive; he feels that, in view of the very radical reduction in Japanese garrisons, such an offensive would cause the entire Japanese military structure in North China to collapse; and he suggests that, because of the obvious hesitation on the part of the Chinese Government to embark on a general offensive, pertinent inquiries might be made in Chungking "as to just when such an offensive is to be undertaken".

This tendency on the part of the Chinese Government to rest on its laurels in the expectation that foreign countries will take over its burden has not passed unnoticed elsewhere. According to an editorial in the March 5, 1941 issue of the (American) Shanghai Evening Post & Mercury, a copy of which is enclosed,

such

0379

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

such an attitude is based both on wishful thinking and on incorrect judgment; the paper believes that Great Britain and the United States have no intention of saving China but rather hope to make available to China the means of saving itself.

In justice to China, however, it should be added that a mere overwhelming superiority in numbers is but poor compensation for an equally overwhelming inferiority in equipment, and that until or unless such an inferiority has been made a little less glaring a general offensive might prove not only abortive but even suicidal.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Robert L. Smyth

Robert L. Smyth
First Secretary of Embassy

List of enclosures:

- No. 1. Despatch no. 68 from
American Consulate,
Tsingtao, dated
March 31, 1941.
- No. 2. Copy of editorial from
Shanghai Evening Post
& Mercury, dated
March 5, 1941.

Original and 3 copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking (enclosure no. 1 sent direct).
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate, Tsingtao (without enclosure no. 1).

710 Sino-Jap/800 Tsingtao/710 Sino-American.

ARR/sc

3 *[Signature]*

0381

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1
3068

No. 68

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Tsingtao, China, March 31, 1941.

Subject: Communication from Admiral Shen to the
People of Tsingtao and Comments on the
Military Situation in North China.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Consulate's telegram no. 20, March 27, 3 P.M. in which mention was made of a communication received by many Chinese firms and residents of Tsingtao from Admiral Shen Hung-lieh, former Mayor of Tsingtao and now Governor of Shantung under the Chungking Government, and to enclose this Consulate's translation of the full text of the communication. Perhaps the most important item in the communication is the plan for the establishment of a branch office of the former municipal government and the appointment of persons to administer it.

In the aforementioned telegram mention was also made of a report that the Chungking Government had recently ordered an intensification of guerrilla activity in this area. The view was expressed that this was probably not a part of the long-heralded Chinese offensive. In this connection I wish to state that

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

that it is difficult to see how a mere intensification of guerrilla activity can have any appreciable effect upon the situation in North China. Unless such activity is comprehensive in extent and synchronized throughout the country it will merely result in reprisals on the part of the Japanese against innocent civilians. What the situation definitely calls for at this time is a large-scale military offensive and not just an intensification of guerrilla activity. From reports received from travelers in the interior I gather the impression that Japanese military strength has been so weakened during recent months by the withdrawal of troops that a concerted offensive by the Chinese forces would cause the entire Japanese military structure in this area to collapse. This view is subject to check by military experts but the preponderance of Chinese forces over Japanese forces is so great that no other conclusion would appear possible. For example, in one county (district) north of Tsingtao there were recently reported to be approximately 30,000 well-equipped Chinese Government troops and only between four and five hundred Japanese troops. Even if these figures are off by 50% it is still incomprehensible that the Chinese should refrain from attacking on the grounds that they are no match as yet for the Japanese. I am not unsympathetic with the Chinese cause and the Embassy will therefore not misinterpret my views when I express the belief that the Chinese will never execute their much-talked-about future offensive unless someone prods them into action. If we are to continue to render assistance to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

China and if it would be to our interest to have China launch her offensive at this time, then I respectfully venture the suggestion that it would not be inappropriate for us to make some very pertinent inquiries at Chungking (if they have not already been made) as to just when said offensive is to be undertaken. The Chinese have been preparing for this offensive for the past three years and they are probably as well prepared now from a military point of view as they ever will be.

There are certain other elements in the situation which make it imperative that the Chinese launch an offensive at an early date if they are to bring the "incident" to a successful conclusion.

1. Reports from the interior indicate that the country cannot much longer support two separate military regimes (i.e. Chinese and Japanese) in the same areas. This state of affairs is having a decidedly deleterious effect upon the economic life of the country districts and upon the morale of the people.
2. The Chinese forces are suffering from inaction just as would the military organization of any other country under similar circumstances. The Chinese troops in this area are well-equipped and apparently prepared to fight but are constantly being restrained by orders from Chungking. Serious deterioration is bound to set in shortly unless these troops are put to work on some major military project.

The above views are respectfully submitted for what they may be worth.

Respectfully yours,

Paul W. Meyer
 American Consul

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Qualen NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -


Enclosure:

1. Translation of communication from Admiral Shen.

800

PWM:ad

Original and five copies to Embassy, Peiping,
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TSINGTAO MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

Proclamation No. 1

Since the outbreak of the war of resistance and the subsequent fall of Tsingtao, the people of this city have been under the tyranny of the enemy and have been living in adversity for three long years. This fact has caused my heart and soul to ache and I have not been able to sleep or eat with a peaceful mind. Not for a moment have I forgotten my solemn duty of rescuing our people and restoring our territory.

Previously, the municipal affairs of Tsingtao were handled as a part of the work of the Provincial Government, so that co-ordinated plans might be made for and equal attention paid to both spheres of operation and that the work might be promoted by separate coordinating departments.

The date of the final victory of our war of resistance has now drawn near, and accordingly for the purpose of pushing forward in a more direct way the municipal affairs of this city and of increasing the efficiency of administrative operation, there has been established a Branch Office of the Tsingtao Municipal Government with Ting Teh-hsien as Head of the Office, and Li Hsien-liang concurrently acting as Secretary General of the Municipal Government. All matters in Tsingtao, whether of a military or political nature, such as the planning of military affairs, the re-organization of the fighting units, the promotion of political authority, and the organization of the People's Movement, will be handled by Director Ting in consultation with Secretary General Li along the lines of my instructions. It is urged that the people of Tsingtao, whether they be armed forces or civilians, abide by the Outlines of Resistance and National Reconstruction and cooperate in full measure so that this part of our national territory may be restored at an early date and so that we may again enjoy peace together. You should not take a lukewarm attitude and entertain the slightest doubt in your minds, lest you be rewarded with regrets and sorrow afterwards.

Shen Hung-lich,
 Mayor

March 1941.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CORRECT COPY - SC)

Enclosure no. 2 to Peiping
 Embassy's 3068, April 8, 1941,
 to Department: "Communication
 from Admiral Shen to the People
 of Tsingtao and Comments on the
Military Situation in North China."

THE SHANGHAI EVENING POST AND MERCURY, MARCH 5, 1941.

NO LIFEGUARD AVAILABLE

Formation of an over-all American committee to co-ordinate the work of separate groups in the raising of funds for China will, naturally, be welcome news to those in Chungking as well as to other friends of this country. The action, however, may well prove a serious burden to China in the long run unless she is able to keep her head.

For almost four years now the Government of the Chinese Republic has fought a courageous and, in many respects, effective fight against an invader better equipped and prepared. She has worn her foe down near to the point of exhaustion, at the same time suffering wounds that will leave scars for generations to come. She's naturally weary, battered and at the same time justifiably proud of the resistance she has put and the blows she has landed. Unfortunately, there are growing indications that because of these factors she is willing to rest on her laurels, draw her breath and let others carry on the work she has started. Such would be a serious mistake and one to bring her nearer to defeat than she has yet been.

It would be a glaring error on the part of loyal Chinese to assume because America and Britain continue to give her private and public aid and because their peoples and governments are sympathetic and helpful toward her cause that the time has come to let them take over where she leaves off. There is no doubt that those two nations do wish China well and in some measure have aided her and will continue to aid her. But they have no intention of plunging into the military sea in which China is swimming unless they are tossed overboard by factors beyond their control.

Nobody can save China but China herself. Cracking of the front that has held the nation together for 44 months in the expectation that foreign countries will fill the gaps is not only wishful thinking but incorrect judgment. Signs that America and Britain are giving her aid are not signs that they are poised on the edge of the wharf ready to dive in and pull her to shore but rather that they are throwing further lifebelts to her in the hope and confident expectation that she can reach a haven under her own power.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Sino-Japanese relations.

"Oral Statement" marked "Informal and Unofficial" stating U. S. Govt. will talk over in strict confidence with Chinese Government the general subject matter involved in discussions with Japanese as relates to -, prior to further discussions with Japanese.

793.94 / 10044-1/2

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See _____ Letter.
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated May 31, 1941 ~~From~~ To _____
Japanese Embassy

File No. 711.94/133-16/18 a

793.94 / 10044-1/2

0387

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




THE FOREIGN SERVICE
 OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1941. 2 71 9 27

AMERICAN EMBASSY
 Tokyo, May 2, 1941.

No. 5559.

SUBJECT: DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OF R. D. ARNOLD AT KUNMING
 BY JAPANESE AIRCRAFT ON APRIL 26, 1941.



File	Index	Yes	No
			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

793.94/16645

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to Chungking's telegram
 of April 29, noon, quoting a telegram (the date of which
 was garbled) from the American Consul at Kunming on the
 above subject, and to enclose a copy of the Embassy's
 representations to the Foreign Office thereanent.

1/

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew.

350
 HMB:C

Enclosure:

1/ As stated above.

Copy to Embassies, Chungking and Peiping;
 Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai;
 Copy to Consulate, Kunming.

Original and 2 copies to Department.

PC/CMK

RECEIVED

JUN 11 1941

16/10

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch
no. 5559 dated May 2, 1941,
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1791.

The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Imperial Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and has the honor to state that according to information received from the American Consul at Kunming, Yunnan, China, the residence of Mr. R. L. Arnold, an American citizen, was damaged by bombs dropped from Japanese aircraft on Kunming on April 26, 1941. No estimate of damage has yet been received by the American Embassy.

In bringing this matter to the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the American Embassy has the honor to request that instructions be issued to prevent a recurrence of similar incidents, and that an immediate investigation be made of the circumstances of the damage to American property; all rights are reserved in respect of losses incurred by the American citizen mentioned.

Tokyo, May 2, 1941.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~PA~~
~~CC~~
~~J.D.~~ W.F.R.
~~C.F.~~
~~W.F.A.~~

6/9/41

Enclosed with the despatch
 are copies of the Embassy's
 note to the Foreign Office,
 & the "Oral Statement", covered
 by Tokyoos # 647, May 7, 1941

It appears no action is
 required.

H71

0391

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
 OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DIVISION OF PERSON
 SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

JUN 11 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Tokyo, May 7, 1941.

No. 5571.

SUBJECT: BOMBING OF KUNMING: DAMAGE TO AMERICAN CONSULATE.

AC
7
7/25

copy on 7.C.

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade			
Per	✓		✓
To Field In U.S.A.			✓

793.94/15646

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

With reference to the Embassy's telegram to the Department no. 647 dated May 7, 11 a.m., concerning representations to the Foreign Office regarding the bombing of Kunming on April 29, 1941, I have the honor to enclose a copy of the Embassy's first person note, no. 1793 of May 6, 1941, mentioned therein. This note was handed to Mr. T. Terasaki, Director of the American

Bureau

1/

PC/UM

16646

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Bureau of the Foreign Office, by a member of my staff, with suitable oral remarks. The following day, May 7, 1941, I called on Mr. Chuichi Ohashi, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, and left with him a statement marked 2/ "oral", a copy of which is enclosed, in which the Vice Minister's attention was emphatically called, inter alia, to the serious effect the death or injury of the American Consul at Kunming would have on American public opinion especially at this particular juncture. I reminded Mr. Ohashi of my former representations on this same subject made to him on October 15, 1940, in relation to the bombing of Kunming on October 13, and the damaging of our consulate and the endangering of its personnel on that occasion (see Embassy's 997, October 15, 10 p.m., and 1000, October 15, 5 p.m.). The Vice Minister said that he remembered my former representations.


Mr. Ohashi replied that it was necessary for the Japanese to bomb Kunming as it was a concentration point for American military supplies en route to Chungking and elsewhere in China. I thereupon showed him a list which I had compiled of the respective value of such shipments from the United States to Japan and to China during 1939 and 1940, in which it is clearly demonstrated that shipments of military value were far greater to Japan than to China. Mr. Ohashi expressed regret that the Consulate was

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

was damaged and promised to institute an investigation immediately.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph C. Grew.

350
LEMB:C

Enclosures:
1/2 As stated above.

Copy to Embassy, Peiping;
Copy to Embassy, Chungking;
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai;
Copy to Consulate, Kunming.

Original and 2 copies to Department.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quatefin NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch
 no. 5571 dated May 7, 1941,
 from the Embassy at Tokyo.

EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, May 6, 1941.

No. 1793

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to my note no. 1779 of April 14, 1941, addressed to Prince Konoye during Your Excellency's absence from Japan, concerning the repeated indiscriminate bombing of Kunming by Japanese aircraft, and the danger to American lives and damage to American property caused thereby, and to inform Your Excellency that according to information received from the American Consul at that city, the Consulate was again seriously damaged during an air raid on April 29, 1941. Window glass and screens were blown out; plaster, a large memorial tablet, and part of a wall were knocked down; and dirt and debris were blown into the Compound. Fortunately, there appear to have been no casualties.

As stated in my note no. 1779 referred to above, American officials and citizens reside in Kunming and other localities in China for legitimate reasons, and they have every right to continue their activities without danger to themselves or loss to their property from the attacks of Japanese aircraft. It is hardly necessary to point out to Your Excellency the unfortunate effect of these attacks upon public opinion in the United States, and it is difficult to estimate

His Excellency

Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka,

His Imperial Japanese Majesty's

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

etc., etc., etc.,

Tokyo.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

estimate what the reaction would be if the Consul or one of his staff were killed or injured. It is only by chance that the continued bombings of Kunming and elsewhere in China have not recently resulted in death or injury to American citizens.

I have accordingly been instructed by my Government to inform Your Excellency that the American Government looks to the Japanese Government to take such steps as may be required to prevent further endangering of American lives and property.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) JOSEPH C. GREW.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch
 No. 5571 dated May 7, 1941,
 from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Oral statement left by the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ohashi.

Oral

During the past seven months the American Embassy has addressed five separate notes to the Foreign Office with regard to damage to American property by Japanese bombings of Kunming:

1. No. 1655, October 15, 1940.
2. No. 1668, October 26, 1940.
3. No. 1738, February 4, 1941.
4. No. 1779, April 14, 1941.
5. No. 1793, May 6, 1941.

On each of these occasions, substantial damage was done to American property, including the American Consulate, and the lives of American citizens and officials were put in jeopardy.

The American Consul General at Hongkong, on October 28, 1938, handed his Japanese colleague a map showing clearly the location of all American property in Kunming.


It is pointed out that according to the American Consul at Kunming, the localities attacked during the raids were largely commercial, residential, or otherwise of a non-combatant character. In fact, the raids were carried out in such manner that it is difficult to escape the conclusion that they were designed more to terrorize a helpless population rather than to demolish military works. Although fortunately and completely by chance, no American citizens have been killed or injured of recent months as a result of Japanese military activities, it is hardly necessary to point out that especially at the present juncture an American death or injury might have repercussions of a serious character. The American Government looks to the Japanese Government to take appropriate measures to prevent such an occurrence, and earnestly requests that express instructions be issued to the military authorities in that regard.

Tokyo, May 7, 1941.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 255 RECEIVED THE FOREIGN SERVICE
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1941 JUN 2 AM 9 55
CONFIDENTIAL



DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Canton, China, April 30, 1941.

SUBJECT: Japanese Invasion of Southwest Coast
of Kwangtung.

COPIES SENT TO

ONE AND M.I.D.
 in confidence 6/4/41 AGC

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Circle	Good		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
File	Smith	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
		ONE M.I.D.	

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to my telegrams no. 11,
 March 6, 11 a.m. and no. 12, March 10, 5 p.m. in
 regard to the landing on March 3, 1941 of Japanese
 troops at various points along the southwestern
 coast of Kwangtung and their withdrawal a few days
 later, and to report further details concerning the
 temporary occupation which have come to the attention
 of this office.

There is enclosed a copy of an article appear-
 ing in the SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST of April 21,
 1941, relative to the invasion of Pakhoi, according
 to which the Japanese "indulged in an orgy of the
 most shocking, unprecedented and indescribable murder,
 rape and pillage" during the six days of occupation.
 Looting commenced as soon as the Japanese landed
 and continued night and day. Foodstuffs from shops
 and livestock from the surrounding country were
 seized and carried away. In many cases things not
desired

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
 Department of State

DIRECTOR
 JUN 7 1941

793.44/16416

793.00/10630

793.00/10630

1664

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

desired by the Japanese looters were destroyed by burning or otherwise. Many nearby farmers had their homes burned and their possessions ransacked. The article continues "the Customs were not exempt from the atrocious pillaging. Most of the staff, including the Commissioner, were robbed of their belongings.....nearly all books and records were taken away from the Customs by the Japanese" and concludes that "the town presents the appearance of having just been visited by an unusually violent typhoon, with forlorn sights of desolation and wreckage everywhere".

Comments similar to those in the above mentioned article, which it is believed was written by a missionary, have been received by the Consulate General from other observers at points invaded by the Japanese. A correspondent from Yeungkong writes "the city was completely looted, every house entered. Over two hundred civilians lost their lives. The sea of human need with which we are surrounded is appalling. It is unthinkable." Another correspondent from Yeungkong states that the invasion was so well planned that not until two and a half hours before the city fell were any of the citizens aware that the invasion was on. "Apparently the Government was unaware of the threat because the Magistrate attended the usual Monday Memorial Ceremony. The meeting broke up while he was delivering the third point


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

point of a five-point address on why the Japanese would not invade Yeungkong. So he still has two more points to give." A correspondent from Toishan District has reported the assaulting of women of all ages and the systematic looting of all supplies of grain, rice, sugar, oil, cement, lumber, cattle, poultry and money, and states that as a result of the invasion thousands have been reduced to eating grass.

From these and other reports, which it is believed are reasonably reliable, it would appear that although the stated purpose of the raids was the cutting of supply routes to the interior they were also carried out to a considerable extent for purposes of foraging and terrorizing the populace.

Respectfully yours,


M. S. Myers
American Consul General

✓
Enclosure:

1/- Copy of an article in the
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
of April 21, 1941.

Original and four copies to the Department.
One copy to Embassy, Peiping.
One Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
One copy to Consulate General, Hong Kong.

800
WS/dts://

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 1 TO DESPATCH NO. 255 DATED APRIL 30, 1941,
 FROM M. S. MYERS, AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL, CANTON, CHINA,
 ON THE SUBJECT: "JAPANESE INVASION OF SOUTHWEST COAST
 OF KWANGTUNG".

C O P Y

(Copy of an article which appeared in the
 SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST of April 21, 1941.)

PAKHOI'S ORDEAL

BRIEF REIGN OF TERROR LASTS SIX DAYS

JAPANESE INVASION

Pakhoi, March 9th.

Like a bolt from the blue, Japanese troops on the early morning of March 3 landed at Pakhoi. For six hectic days people of the district had an experience of the so-called New Order of the Far East; an experience that will be unforgettable because during these six days the invaders indulged in an orgy of the most shocking, unprecedented and indescribable murder, rape, and pillage.

The suddenness of the attack was made all the more surprising by the total absence of resistance on the part of the local militia, an absence which gave local residents not a moment's warning of the impending reign of terror. In fact, local residents were completely unaware of the landing till Japanese reached their doorsteps. The ease with which the Japanese landed certainly indicated the utter unpreparedness of the local military, despite all the elaborate contrivances to successfully resist attacks.

The Japanese invading force numbered about a thousand men, including a detachment of cavalry. The invaders, in several parties, landed from three armed transports before daybreak. The first party landed near Kotak, on the Pakhoi-Limchow highway, thus effectively shutting off the retreat of the handful of local Self-Defence Corps and preventing the movements of refugees who attempted to evacuate and flee into the interior. Other parties landed at Pakhoi and points between the town and Teikok, a fishing village on the west. The operations of the Japanese extended only to Lingtai, a village some six miles north-east of Pakhoi.

Assaults on Women

The occupation was brief. It lasted only for six days. But for the fear-stricken populace, particularly those of the weaker sex, it was an eternity

of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

of horrible suspense or horrible sufferings. In truth, the outrages perpetrated by the invaders during their occupation were of such a type and magnitude that no living local resident had witnessed the like before. There were reports of indecent assaults on women of all ages by several soldiers. Acts that have been reported in other parts of China were, no doubt, committed by men ignorant of and lacking the standards of normally civilised human beings, not only in Japan but in other countries. It is to be regretted that officers and men of higher standards should have failed to control such men.

From the moment the Japanese landed, looting commenced. Scenes of greed and rapacity met the eye everywhere and, at all hours of day and night, the sacking was unrestricted and uninterrupted. Doors of most buildings were smashed open and under the excuse of searchings, small parties of Japanese entered and relieved the occupants of valuables. In many cases what was not desired was broken up or burnt. All food-stuffs in shops and livestock in the town and surrounding country were seized and removed to lighters for transshipment to the transports anchored in the harbour. It is impossible to describe the plight of the village folks, many of whom had their homes reduced to ashes; their cattle, poultry and pigs taken away.

Customs Pillaged

The Customs were not exempted from the atrocious pillaging. Most of the staff, including the Commissioner, were robbed of their belongings in varying degrees up to total loss. It is learned that nearly all books and records were taken away from the Customs by the Japanese. The Commissioner and his staff will have an arduous time in getting the Customs' machinery working again.

Due in a great degree to the tact, patience and ability in facing a very difficult situation with calmness of the foreign missionaries, none of the Missions, including the French Catholic Convent, suffered molestation. But pleas for the maintaining of a refugee centre were completely disregarded by the Japanese. Their orders that all except actual staff and employees and patients in hospitals must be in their own homes were stressed.

It is yet difficult to compute the amount of loss and casualties in lives. A reasonable estimate would be about a hundred of the local residents either killed or seriously wounded. Business in Pakhoi is at a total standstill. Only the shell of Pakhoi remains after the brief reign of terror. Outwardly, to the casual observer the town presents the appearance of having just been visited by an unusually violent typhoon, with forlorn sights of desolation and wreckage everywhere.

After exactly six days, the Japanese,

with

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

with the same unexpected suddenness of their arrival, took their departure. By midnight last night the evacuation was complete, thus ending one of life's nightmares.

Today after fully six days of damp, cold and gloomy weather the sun has come out with all its brilliance and warmth. A climatic condition which strangely coincided with the Japanese occupation constitutes a current topic much commented on by local weather observers. Somehow, one cannot help feeling that there is some connection between depressing darkness and the New Order of the Far East. - OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.

-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-

Copied by dts

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Relations between China and Japan.

Memorandum of comment on statements made
by Postmaster General on proposals by John Doe.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated June 11, 1941 From State Dept.
To FE - (Unsigned)

File No. 711.94/2162-6/14

793.94 / 10040-1/2
Confidential File
166482
PS/KN

0403

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 444

NO. _____ Embassy, China.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Shanghai, China.

LEGAL ADVISER
JUN 19 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

May 3, 1941.

For the President and the Vice President	Yes	No
To be held in U.S.A.		

SUBJECT: Bombing of Kunming on April 8, 1941, which demolished the property of Assemblies of God Mission and caused property losses to Mr. H. C. Osgood.

1941 JUN 3 06
THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.
SIR:

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 4 1941
Department of State

193.94/16597

703.94/16649

not
393.1163

I have the honor to refer to the telegram of May 1, 1 p.m., from the American Ambassador at Chungking, in which is quoted the telegram of April 30, 11 a.m., from the American Consul at Kunming on the above subject, and to transmit herewith a copy of a letter on the subject which this office addressed today to the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai.

The Japanese Consul General was notified of the damage to the property of the Assemblies of God Mission, and of the property loss of Mr. H. C. Osgood, an American citizen. His attention was invited to the two letters addressed to him on May 1, and to previous correspondence in regard to the endangering of American lives and damage to American property in Kunming by Japanese aerial attacks. The request was reiterated that instructions be issued to prevent further attacks

PS/CMR


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

attacks in future. He was also requested to have the matter investigated.

All rights were reserved on behalf of the Assemblies of God Mission and of Mr. Osgood.

Respectfully yours,


Frank P. Lockhart
American Consul General

Enclosure:

Copy of letter to Japanese Consul
General, dated May 3rd.

350
EA

In triplicate to the Department.
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Hankow.
Copy to Consulate, Kunming.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to Despatch No. 444, May 3, 1941 from
 the American Consul General at Shanghai on the
 subject: "Bombing of Kunming on April 8, 1941,
 which demolished the property of Assemblies of God
 Mission and caused property losses to Mr. H. C.
 Osgood".

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
 Shanghai, China.

May 3, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

I have the honor to inform you that, according to
 a report from the American Consul at Kunming, Yunnan
 Province, the property of the Assemblies of God Mis-
 sion, an American organization, in that city was dam-
 aged by bombs dropped from Japanese airplanes during
 a raid on Kunming on April 8, 1941.

You attention is invited to the two letters I
 addressed to you on May 1, 1941, and to previous let-
 ters in regard to the endangering of American lives
 and damage to American property by Japanese aerial at-
 tacks on such property in Kunming.

In view of this report of further damage to Amer-
 ican property, I urgently reiterate my previous re-
 quests that stringent instructions be issued to the
 Japanese authorities concerned to prevent further at-
 tacks that might endanger American lives and property.

It will be appreciated if you will have this re-
 ported attack on the property of the Assemblies of God
 Mission investigated at your earliest convenience and
 inform me without delay of the results thereof.

According to the information available at pres-
 ent, in addition to the damage to the Assemblies of
 God Mission during the attack on April 8, property of
 Mr. H. C. Osgood, an American citizen, valued at U.S.
 \$500, was destroyed.

On behalf of the Assemblies of God Mission and
 Mr. Osgood, all rights are reserved in respect of
 losses or damages sustained as a result of the bombing
 by Japanese planes mentioned above.

I may communicate with you again on this subject
 when further information becomes available.

I have the honor to be,
 Sir and dear Colleague,
 Your obedient servant,

Frank P. Lockhart
 American Consul General.

T. Horiuchi, Esquire,
 Consul General for Japan,
 Shanghai.

350
 MH:EA

A true copy.

BA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Peaceful settlement of relations between China and Japan.

Memorandum of conversation with Japanese representatives relative to section of proposed agreement referring to --.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated June 16, 1941 From State Dept.
 To FE - Ballantine

File No. 711.94/2182-9/14

708.04/10049-1/2

166492
 PS/KN
 Confidential file

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 446

NO. _____ Embassy, China.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
 Shanghai, China.

May 1, 1941.

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	To Field		
Per	In U.S.A.		

SUBJECT: Damage to American Consulate at Kunming as
a result of Japanese bombing of that city
on April 29, 1941.


RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 1941

PM 3 06

HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.



SIR:

I have the honor to refer to telegram No. 10 of April 29, 6 p.m. on the above subject addressed by the American Consul at Kunming to the Department via Hongkong (Hongkong Consulate General's telegram of April 30).

The damage to the American Consulate at Kunming resulting from bombs dropped about fifty yards from the premises by Japanese airplanes in the course of an air raid on that city on April 29 was brought to the attention of the Japanese Consulate General by telephone upon receipt by this office on April 30 of the above-mentioned telegram from Hongkong; and on May 1 a member of the staff of the Japanese Consulate General informed this office by telephone that the matter had been taken up with the Japanese authorities directly concerned.

1/

There is enclosed a copy of a communication

that

793.94/16650

PS/CMR

JUL 1 1941


RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

that this office addressed to-day to the Japanese Consul General itemizing the damage sustained by the Consulate premises, and reminding him that on two previous occasions, February 1 and April 15, 1941, written representations were made by this office in regard to similar bombings of Kunming which endangered the lives of the American Consul and his staff and damaged the Consular premises and the house of Mr. McGeary, an employee of the Consulate. The Japanese Consul General has also been requested to have the matter investigated without delay, and he has been urged again to issue stringent instructions to prevent renewed attacks of this sort. All rights on behalf of the American Government have been reserved.

Respectfully yours,


Frank P. Lockhart
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosure:

Copy of letter to Japanese
Consul General, May 1st.

350
EA

In triplicate to the Department.
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Hankow.
Copy to Consulate, Kunming.

0 4 0 9

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to Despatch No. 446, May 1, 1941, from
the American Consul General at Shanghai, on the subject:
"Damage to American Consulate at Kunming as a result of
Japanese bombing of that city on April 29".

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Shanghai, China,
May 1, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

I have the honor to inform you that, according to a report from the American Consul at Kunming, the American Consulate in that city was damaged by bombs dropped by Japanese airplanes at approximately 1.45 p.m. on April 29. This bombing, resulting in damage to the American Consulate, was brought to the attention of Vice Consul Uyama of your staff yesterday afternoon by Mr. Hall of this office in a telephone conversation. Mr. Uyama's courtesy in telephoning Mr. Hall this morning to inform him that your office had taken the matter up with the Japanese authorities directly concerned is appreciated.

According to the report by the American Consul at Kunming, at least one bomb fell within fifty yards of the American Consulate, breaking window glass and blowing out screens; knocking plaster off the walls and ceiling, and knocking down a large memorial tablet; shrapnel and dirt were blown into the compound of the Consulate.

It will be recalled that I addressed a letter to you on February 1, 1941, in regard to the bombing by Japanese airplanes of Kunming on January 29, 1941, which endangered the life of the American Consul at Kunming, his staff, and the property of the American Government. It will also be recalled that in a letter dated April 15, 1941, I informed you that, according to a report from the American Consul at Kunming, twenty-seven Japanese airplanes bombed that city on April 8 endangering the lives of American citizens and damaging the house of Stanley A. McGeary, an American citizen employed in the American Consulate at Kunming. In the letters of February 1 and April 15, 1941, mentioned above, it was requested that the bombing attacks mentioned in these letters be brought to the attention of the Japanese authorities directly concerned, and that stringent instructions be issued to prevent further attacks that might endanger American lives and property.

I now have urgently to request again that stringent instructions be issued to prevent further attacks that might endanger American lives and property.

T. Horiuchi, Esquire,

It

Consul General for Japan,
Shanghai.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

It is also requested that the bombing on April 29 mentioned above be investigated without delay, and that I be informed promptly of the results of the investigation.

On behalf of the American Government I reserve all rights in respect of losses or damages sustained as a result of action of the Japanese armed forces. I may communicate with you again in regard to this matter when further information becomes available.

I have the honor to be,
Sir and dear Colleague,
Your obedient servant,

Frank P. Lockhart
American Consul General

350
MH.EA

A true copy.
BA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KD Peiping via N. R.
 This telegram must be _____
 closely paraphrased be- Dated June 4, 1941
 fore being communicated to anyone. (br) FROM Rec'd. 5:09 p. m.
 SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY
 TO ONI AND MID 6/6/41 JD
 Secretary of State,

Washington.

129, June 4, 4 p. m. (SECTION ONE

Peiping's 118, May 12, 2 p.m.; and 119 May
 22, 2 p. m.

According to reliable foreign reports a
 passenger train was wrecked by a mine during daylight
 May 31 north of Paotingfu; about 100 casualties
 resulted from the wreck and subsequent guerrilla
 rifle fire into the wreck.

The local press carries reports of a Japanese
 campaign against "bandits" in east Hopei; the reports
 admit that the Japanese have met with stubborn
 resistance in various districts north and northeast
 of Peiping. It is not definitely known what Chinese
 forces are involved in this fighting; some sources
 believe that Eighth Route Army troops are engaged but
 other sources state that a number of regiments of
 Chinese troops belonging to the Japanese sponsored
 "peace preservation corps" (to whom the Japanese
 sometime ago handed over with much publicity the
 garrison

793.94/16651

PS/CMR

FILED

JUN 5 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #129, June 4, 4 p. m., from Paiping via N. R.

garrison duty in East Hopei) have revolted and are
now fighting the Japanese.

SMYTH.

WVC

0 4 1 3

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KD _____
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated FROM
to anyone. (br)

Peiping via N. R.

Dated June 4, 1941

Rec'd. 8:05 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

129, June 4, 4 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

There is no definite evidence here that the Eighth Route Army has abandoned its policy of inaction vis a vis the Japanese but on the other hand the local Japanese controlled press has commenced again to inveigh against the Communists which may perhaps indicate that the reported discussions or negotiations with the Communists have not proceeded smoothly.

A reliable informant who recently talked with several members of the Eighth Route Army states that they appeared to be taken over the alleged failure of the National Government to remit funds claimed to be due them; the informant gained the impression that an advance of funds by Chungking might assist in spurring the Eighth Route Army to action. As pointed out in previous telegrams the Japanese lines of communication in North China are lightly guarded at present and highly vulnerable to determined action.

(END)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #129, June 4, 4 p. m., from Peiping via N. R.

(END OF MESSAGE).

Sent to Department. Repeated to Chungking,
Shanghai. Code text by air mail to Tokyo.

SMYTH.

EMB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Japanese proposal for peace with China.

Memo. of conversation with Japanese Ambassador re --.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Sept. Oct. 9, 1941 From State Dept.
 To FE-Ballantine

File No. 711.94/2406-4/11 Confidential File

793.94/10051-1/2

711.94/2406-4/11

166512

041F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JM

PLAIN

Tokyo via Shanghai and N.R.

FROM Dated June 5, 1941

Rec'd 7 a.m., 6th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

768, June 5, 6 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
7/4/41 REK

All vernaculars today feature prominently statement
MABUCHI, Chief Army Information Section, reporting
results Japanese Army's Chungyuan campaign, characteriz-
ing it greatest in scale since Soochow. General re-
sults achieved stated to have been: Marked improvement
peace and order North China, aggravation friction be-
tween Kuomintang Communists, strategic gains bringing
Japanese forces near Lunghai Railway, and display great
strength Japanese Army which will stimulate future
activity.

Sent Department via Shanghai.

GREW.

ALC

793.94/16652

PS/HH

0417

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect ☐ Full rate
☐ Day letter
☐ Night letter
Charge Department: ☒ X
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Gray
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,

June 9, 1941.
5pm

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO, (JAPAN).

317

Your 768, June 5, 6 p. m.

Chinese accounts of this campaign differ greatly/
from Japanese accounts. /

H-ee

5/24

733.94/16652

PS/LB

PA/H:SKH:FLB

JD
GF E
my m/f

CR

JUN 9 1941

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

0418


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHINESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR

RECEIVED
DEPT. OF STATE

APR 17 PM 12 09



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

An address by
 His Excellency Dr. Hu Shih
 Chinese Ambassador to the United States
 before
 The China Society of America
 New York City
 Thursday, January 23, 1941 PM 12 08

Almost 15 months ago I was honored by the China Society at dinner. On that occasion I spoke under the title "We Are Still Fighting". Tonight I am again asked to speak a few minutes. If I should adopt a title for this short talk, it would be the same, "We Are Still Fighting".

It is not necessary to remind our friends here that the last 15 months have been very hard times for China. The sudden Japanese invasion and occupation of Nanning, Kwangsi, in November, 1939, cut the shortest of our transportation lines through Indo-China. The collapse of France last June and the subsequent invasion and occupation of the northern portion of Indo-China by the Japanese army and air forces last September permanently disabled French Indo-China as the most convenient and the most effective backdoor of China. In the meantime, the Battle of Britain was at its most critical stage; and Soviet Russia seemed to be on the verge of being involved by the crisis in the Balkan States. So Great Britain closed the Burma Road to Chinese military supplies for three months, - from the middle of July to the middle of October; and practically no supplies came over the overland highway during the same period. So last summer China was almost completely cut off from all access to the sea. And you can imagine how disheartened and depressed my people became during those most trying months.

735. 14/16653

PS/LB

APR 19 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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It has been from the United States that China has received effective assistance and moral encouragement every time when we have been at our lowest ebb in the fortunes of war or in the moral of the people.

The Export and Import Bank gave China the second commercial credit of \$20,000,000 shortly after the fall of Nanning. Aviation gasoline and scrap iron and steel of the first grade were placed under the licensing system after the closing of the Burma Road. The day after the Japanese invasion into French Indo-China, the United States Government gave us the third loan to the amount of \$25,000,000, and a day later all grades of scraps were placed under license.

All these, as you and I well understand, were done in the interest of the American policy of national defense. But my Government and my people are, nevertheless, deeply appreciative and grateful for the moral effect on our war of resistance to aggression.

But the aggressor states, both in the East and in the West, wanted to threaten America into inaction. The day after the American Government had placed all grades of scrap steel and iron under embargo, - September 27, - Germany, Italy, and Japan signed in Berlin the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance openly threatening to attack with their joint forces any power which may interfere with their aggressive wars in Europe or Asia. Since that date, Japanese leaders, political, naval and military, have repeatedly declared that the Berlin Treaty of Alliance should and must remain the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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It was evident to the whole world that Japan was most anxious to wind up the war in China by a dictated peace supported by her European partners of aggression. It was hinted that failure of the Chinese Government to accept such a peace would result in recognition of the puppet régime in Nanking by Japan and her allies.

China ignored all such peace overtures and determined to fight on. On November 30, Japan actually recognized the puppet Wang Ching-wei régime in Nanking. On the same day President Roosevelt announced from the White House a new loan of \$100,000,000 to China. And on the same day the Chinese Government declared that the recognition of the puppet régime by any Government would be considered as an unfriendly act to China. So far my former friend Wang Ching-wei's puppet régime has not yet received the recognition of even Japan's dear allies.

In the meantime, as you all know, Great Britain has reopened her Burma Road to all Chinese traffic. This famous road, I am happy to report, stands unimpaired and in full operation in spite of Japanese reports to the contrary. And shortly after the announcement of the American loan of \$100,000,000, Great Britain also announced new financial assistance to China to the amount of £10,000,000. And supplies are now continuing to come from Soviet Russia by the overland route.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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With American moral and economic assistance, and with the international situation changing in China's favor, my Government and my people are now as determined as ever before to fight on, possibly for many more months to come and possibly for many years to come, until a just and durable peace can be obtained.

Before I sit down, I want to say a few words about a sinister report that has been spread in recent weeks to the effect that American and British assistance to China in recent months has so greatly strengthened the Chinese Government that it is now turning its strong hand to fight the Chinese Communist armies and thereby destroy the national unity necessary for the prosecution of the war against Japan. These reports were sent out by well-meaning but ill-formed friends of China.

The facts of the case are these. As early as last July and August, a plan of rearrangement of the Communist forces was worked out and agreed upon by General Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War, and General Pai Chung-hsi, Chief of the General Staff, representing the Government, and Messrs. Chou En-lai and Yeh Chien-ying, representing the Communists; and Mr. Chou En-lai took the plan to Yen-an to consult the Communist leaders there. The Communist military commanders, however, refused to move their forces to the regions north of the Yellow River. In the meantime, friction increased. The Government troops under Provincial Chairman Shen Hung-lien in Shantung and those under Provincial Chairman

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Han Teh-chin in Kiangsu were attacked by the Communist forces. Generals Ho and Pai found it necessary to issue an order to General Chu Teh and other Communist commanders to carry out the provisions in the plan already agreed to by the representatives of the Communists, including (1) the moving of the Communist forces out of Kiangsu and Anhwei. (2) The permission of the Government for the Communist army to expand to 100,000 soldiers, and (3) legalizing the position of the special Border District of 18 hsien. This order was issued on October 19. In a joint telegram to the Government dated November 9, the four commanders of the Communist forces promised that their troops south of the Yangtze River would be persuaded to move north in accordance with the Government order. The Government repeated the order in December, but extended the time of transfer for one more month, that is, the moving to be completed before January 31.

All these negotiations and orders took place long before the American and British financial aid. What happened during the first days of the new year was that the new Fourth Army, instead of moving northward, marched south and southeastward and spread out in three forces to encircle the 40th Division of the Government army. Whereupon General Ku-Chu-tung, Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd War Zone, ordered that disciplinary measures be taken. By January 12, the entire New Fourth Army was disarmed and disbanded and its Commander, General Yeh Ting, was placed under arrest. According to the spokesman of the Military Council,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the speedy liquidation of the revolt was largely due to the fact that many officers of the New Fourth Army refused to join the revolt.

Such friction between the Communist and the Government forces is naturally to be regretted. Practically all the friction which has existed all these years has been due to the over-anxiety of the Communist leaders to expand without authorization their man-power far out of proportion to the Government financial allowance and material equipment. In their official telegram of November 9, the four Communist military commanders said that their 500,000 soldiers were still receiving the pay of 45,000 men. That one sentence sums up the root of all trouble. The Government undertook to pay and equip four divisions of the Communist troops and has carried out the undertaking. It even offered on October 19 to increase the quota to 100,000 men. But whose responsibility was it to use the pay for 45,000 men to expand the numerical strength to 500,000? The Government order to transfer these troops was actuated by a genuine fear that such over-expanded and poorly equipped units were an impediment to the effective prosecution of the war against the mechanized armies of the enemy.

It is to be hoped that this latest outbreak of the worst form of friction will be the last. It is to be hoped that our Communist leaders might learn from this recent unfortunate event that the nation and the world expect them and their followers

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to remain loyal to the principles of national unity and resistance to aggression, - principles which they have been professing these four years. And it is to be hoped that friends of China who are ever anxious about our national unity might realize that no Government can effectively carry on a war against a first-class military power if its entreaties are not heeded and its orders not obeyed by its own armies.

With this newly reconsolidated unity and with your help, China can now fight on with greater confidence for ultimate victory. I cannot find better and more fitting concluding words than these inspiring sentences of your great President:

"I believe that the Axis Powers are not going to win this war. We have no excuse for defeatism. We have every good reason for hope - hope for peace, yes, and hope for the defense of our civilization and for the building of a better civilization in the future."

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

CHUNGKING, JANUARY 19, 1941

"For defiance of military orders and plot to stage a revolt the New Fourth Army has been disarmed and Commander Yeh Ting (葉挺) has been placed under arrest to face court martial", announced a spokesman of the Military Council. This was entirely a question of military discipline, it was emphasized. The High Command was compelled to take action, because of the refusal of the New Fourth Army to move into the designated areas as ordered.

Early last December the High Command ordered the New Fourth Army south of the Yangtse River to move northward until it crossed the Yellow River by January 31st for operations against the Japanese. The region between Fan-chang (繁昌) and Tung-ling (銅陵) south of Wuhu (蕪湖), Anhwei, was designated as the route for the Army to cross the Yangtse. To the contrary, the New Fourth Army at King-hsien (涇縣), sixty kilometers south of Wuhu, started moving in a southerly direction toward Tai-ping (太平), the objective being to press an attack on General Shangkwun Yun-hsiang's (上官雲相) headquarters.

It happened that the Fortieth Division transferred from southern Kiang-su was on its way northward for reorganization. Having learned the route taken by the Fortieth Division and its arrival at San-chi (三溪), thirty kilometers south of King-hsien, on New Year's day, the entire New Fourth Army slipped through to Maolin (茂林), forty kilometers south of King-hsien on the night of January fourth. It spread out in three forces to waylay the Fortieth Division. Taken completely unawares, the Fortieth Division fought in self-defense whereupon General Ku Chu-tung, Commander-in-Chief of the Third War Area, ordered disciplinary measures to be taken.

By January twelfth, the entire New Fourth Army was disbanded and Yeh Ting arrested. Furthermore, by order of the Military Council, the said Army as a unit has been abolished. The Chief of Staff of the New Fourth Army, Chao Ling-po, was among those arrested. According to his statement, as soon as order for the New Fourth Army's removal was received, Yeh Ting decided to ignore it. While demanding a million dollars from the Government, the New Fourth Army collected its main force at King-hsien and Fan-Chang. Then on pretext of the Japanese blockade, they decided not to cross the Yangtse as ordered, but to penetrate into south Kiang-su.

The plan was to move into Kin-tan (金壇), Tan-yang (丹陽), Ku-yung (句容), Leng-chi (郎溪) and Li-yang (溧陽) to create a special area there with the ultimate objective of setting up a base at Nanking, Shanghai, and Hangchow, thus forming a triangular area to defy the Government. On January 3rd they decided to attack the Fortieth Division, and planned to destroy it first and then attack points in the vicinity of Ning-kuo (寧國) in southern Anhwei, raid the military store there and assault General Shangkwun Yun-hsiang's headquarters. Later the left wing would advance to Leng-chi towards Li-yang and attack other Chinese units. When such a situation was created, the New Fourth Army hoped to coerce the Government into accepting their demands.

The speedy liquidation of the crisis, according to the spokesman was largely due to the fact that officers of the New Fourth Army decided not to side with the rebels but to join the loyal Government troops.

Waichiaopu

Chinese Embassy.

Washington, January 21, 1941

0427

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

79394

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
Memorandum of Conversation
DIVISION OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
MAR 13 1941

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten initials]

DATE: February 6, 1941.

SUBJECT: Possibility of extension of Japan's claims to belligerent rights. *ZCN*

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Liu Chieh, Counselor of Chinese Embassy.
Mr. Adams.

COPIES TO:

[Circular stamp: DEPARTMENT OF STATE]

[Rectangular stamp: FEB 13 1941 Department of State]

735.94/16654

PS/LB

Mr. Liu said that the Chinese Government was viewing with much concern newspaper statements to the effect that the Japanese Government had under consideration the question of undertaking to exercise belligerent rights upon the high seas in connection with the hostilities between China and Japan. Mr. Liu wondered what the United States Government would do if the Japanese undertook to search American ships and to take off any cargo which the Japanese might have listed as contraband. Mr. Adams replied that while such an undertaking on the part of the Japanese would undoubtedly give rise to complications, he felt sure that Mr. Liu

was
MAR 3 1941

FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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was aware that he could not undertake to say what the
action of the American Government would be in regard
to ~~the~~ a hypothetical case.

Mr. Liu replied that he realized this.

m. m. l.

VAA
FE:Adams:OJL FE

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL PARAPHRASE

February 17, 1941.

The following message was received from the Naval Attache
 at Tokyo under date of February 15, 1941:

OUR CONSUL IN OSAKA RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION
 FROM AN OFFICER OF THE PRESIDENT CLEVELAND:

ENROUTE FROM SHANGHAI TO KOBE ON FEBRUARY 11 THEY
 SIGHTED A LARGE CONVOY TOTALLING ABOUT 25 VESSELS, AND
 COMPRISED OF ~~XXXXXX~~ JAP ARMY TRANSPORTS ESCORTED BY
 DESTROYERS. THE CONVOY WAS STEAMING SOUTH WHEN SIGHTED.




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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL



PARAPHRASE

NOTED

March 5, 1941.

The following message was received from the Naval
 Attache at Chungking under date of March 4, 1941:

IN NORTH ANHWEI, SOUTH HOPEI AND CENTRAL SHENSI NEW FIGHTING
 HAS BROKEN OUT RECENTLY BETWEEN CHINGKING TROOPS AND THE
 EIGHTH ROUTE ARMY.

IT IS CHANGS DETERMINATION TO FORCE THE COMMUNISTS NORTH OF
 THE YELLOW RIVER.

FROM MCQUILLEN.

THE OPPORTUNITY TO ELIMINATE RED OPPOSITION AND TO CONSOLIDATE
 HIS POSITION AFFORDED BY THE CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE JAP RELAXATION
 OF PRESSURE IS BEING USED APPARENTLY BY KUOMINTANG.

THE RESISTANCE OF THE CHINESE IS EXPECTED TO BE APPRECIABLY
 WEAKENED BY NEW DEVELOPMENTS.

CC: Mr. Hamilton. ✓
 Mr. Hornbeck.

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FILED
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 793.94/16657
 Date MAR 7, 1941
 From T. V. SOONG
 To STANLEY HORNBECK - DEPT. OF STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

R. E. Har
 Authority

5-22-73
 Date


GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 7117 (2-72)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

0432

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(Enclosure 1) 201/

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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE


March 24, 1941.

The following message was received from the Assistant Naval Attache at Shanghai under date of March 23, 1941:

FOR THE LAST 2 DAYS 4 OFFICIALS OF THE CHINESE 4TH ROUTE ARMY HAVE BEEN HERE IN SECRET CONFERENCE WITH ORANGE OFFICERS. 5000 NIP INFANTRY ARRIVED AT SHANGHAI ON THE 19TH BY RAIL FROM NANKING ENROUTE TAKAO FORMOSA. FROM A SOURCE BELIEVED TO BE RELIABLE THERE IS AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT ORDERS TRANSFER UNSTATED NUMBER JAP TROOPS FROM MANCHURIA TO SOUTH IS BEING OBJECTED TO BY KWANTUNG LEADERS.

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EO. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Clerk
By kg 3/20/73



PS/LB
MAR 26 1941
RECORDED

Mr. Hamilton

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 3, 1941.


PA/H
 Mr. Hornbeck

U
 Mr. Welles

Referring to the paper left with Mr. Welles by Mr. Currie in regard to the possibility of Japan's declaring war upon China, there is attached a memorandum of March 25 from Mr. Hackworth. In addition there is attached a memorandum of the same date prepared by Miss Bacon of FE.

It is suggested that Mr. Welles read Mr. Hackworth's memorandum and the conclusions set forth in Miss Bacon's memorandum beginning on page 19 thereof.

FE:MMH:HES



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE LEGAL ADVISER

March 25, 1941.

FE:

Mr. Hamilton:

It is undoubtedly true that a declaration of war by Japan against China would give the former many more belligerent rights on the high seas than she is now exercising, including the right of visit and search.

It is my understanding that American vessels are not now carrying arms, ammunition and implements of war to Rangoon for transshipment over the Burma Road because of prohibitions in the Neutrality Act making it unlawful for them to carry such articles to a belligerent port. China and Japan not having been declared to be belligerents under the Neutrality Act, the carriage of such articles in American vessels directly to China is not unlawful. If there were a declaration of war by Japan, the President would undoubtedly be under the necessity of issuing a proclamation under section 1 of the Neutrality Act if he should find that such action "is necessary to promote the security or preserve the peace of the United States or to protect the lives of citizens of the United States". Sections 2(a) and (c) of the Neutrality Act prohibiting

American

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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American vessels from going to belligerent ports and requiring the passage of title to goods destined to belligerent countries would not be applicable under section 2(g) of the act to ports "on the Pacific or Indian Oceans, including the China Sea, the Tasman Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and the Arabian Sea, and any other dependent waters of either of such oceans, seas, or bays" but American vessels could not carry arms, ammunition and implements of war to China after the issuance of a proclamation by the President.

The Lend-Lease Bill does not modify the Neutrality Act as far as these provisions of that act are concerned. The only way to avoid the consequences of a declaration of war, so far as the Neutrality Act is concerned, would be for the President to decline to issue a proclamation. He has the authority to do this by failing to find that it is necessary to accomplish the purposes stated in section 1 of the act.



Green H. Hackworth.

Le GHH:AD

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ID

Tokyo

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (SC)


Dated June 6, 1941

FROM

Rec'd. 1:33 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.



776, June 6, 3 p. m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

In connection with rumors that Wang Ching Wei is to visit Tokyo, the following unconfirmed information has been received from two separate trustworthy Japanese contacts:

One. Wang has reminded the Japanese Government that he has consistently combatted Communism and that he strongly objects to being associated in any policy of reconciliation with either Soviet Russia, as manifested by the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty or with the Chinese Communists with whom the Japanese are said to be trying to come to terms. He expressed desire to discuss the matter directly with the Central Japanese authorities. He has accordingly been invited to pay an official visit to Tokyo. It has been tentatively arranged for him to arrive in Tokyo on June 16 or 17.

GREW.

PEG

793.94/16661

Confidential PS/HH

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (SC)

FROM

TOKYO

Dated June 6, 1941

Rec'd 3:42 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

776, June 6, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Two. Wang is to arrive in the capacity of "chairman
 of the Nationalist Government," but the proposal has been
 put forward by those associated with the Japanese Amba-
 sador in China in the view that the Nanking regime
 should be supported at all costs and to the bitter end,
 that Wang during his stay in Tokyo should assume the title
 of "President of China" and that the Japanese Government
 should so recognize him. This question is now under
 debate, however, and there is no indication as to the
 nature of the decision which is to be taken.

(END OF MESSAGE)

Sent to the Department, repeated to Shanghai.
 Shanghai please repeat to Chungking.

GREW

GW

0438

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RESTRICTED

Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 10:30, March 26, 1941.

Chungking, filed 05:40, March 26, 1941.

1. In air raid on Chengtu March 14th Chinese lost six pursuits
forced down and destroyed on the ground and eight shot down. Japanese
lost six shot down. Generalissimo displeased with air force showing
relieved officer in charge air defense of Chengtu.

2. Reliably reported that although Major Gen. Chow Chin-Jou
continues as titular chief air force Major Gen. Peter Mao now real head.

BARRETT

Distribution:
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence
State Department

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

April 24, 1941

Reference FE's memorandum of April 14 entitled
Appraisal of the Situation in China.

The memorandum under reference gives a very interesting résumé of United States policy and specific acts in the field of relations with Japan and China during the period of the current Japanese-Chinese hostilities.

It is the belief of the undersigned that, taken by itself and as it stands, the content of this memorandum puts the course followed by the American Government in altogether too favorable a light. It is indicative of an impression on the part of its authors that American assistance to China has been large in amount and has had a very substantial effect, favorable to China, upon the course of developments in the Japanese-Chinese hostilities; also, that the course followed by the United States in regard to Japan has had a substantially restraining influence upon Japan and the course followed by Japanese leaders.

Unquestionably, the policy and acts of the United States have contributed to the continuance of China's resistance to Japan and have been a factor among the handicaps which have affected Japan's operations. But to say that "the policy of this Government so far would appear

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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appear to have been substantially effective in sustaining China and in impeding Japan's course of action" is to give far too much credit--for something that isn't.

This Government has in fact extended to China in a period of almost four years credits and loans to the amount of \$175,000,000 and it has expended approximately \$220,000,000 for purchase of Chinese silver. Most of the credits have been connected with transactions commercial in character, involving purchase and sale (exchange) of commodities. Of the total amount, \$50,000,000 has to do with the problem of support of Chinese currency and related matters, and has not yet been effectively applied. In the field of purchasing of Chinese silver, the first effects of this Government's silver purchase program were disadvantageous to China (that program had not been evolved and adopted with any view to helping China) and the fact that the program ultimately operated to China's advantage was essentially accidental to the turn of world events.

In comparison with the amount and the type of aid which the United States has given to Great Britain during recent months and to the vast program upon which this country is now embarked for the giving of aid to Great

Britain,

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Britain, the amount and the types of aid which we have given to China over a period of four years appear insignificant in proportions. Looking at the amount and the character of the aid which we have given to China and at the situation which prevails in China today, one may well propound this speculative query: Suppose the United States had in 1937 or 1938 embarked upon a wholehearted program of "all-out" aid to China, how different might be the situation with regard to China (and Japan and our problems in the Pacific and in the world) now.

Comment will be made: "The Government of the United States was not at that time in position to embark upon such a program". True. But, the memorandum now under reference is devoted to an appraisal of what the Government of the United States has done, not to an analysis of the reasons why in regard to what it has and what it has not done; and an objective appraisal of any phenomenon stands separate from and independent of an analysis and appraisal, if offered, of the forces and circumstances which have made the said phenomenon what it is.

The affirmation that the policy of this Government has been substantially effective in impeding Japan's course of action is especially open to doubt in its relation to Japanese action vis-à-vis China. The statement is perhaps
 less

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less questionable in its relation to Japan's southward movement, although even there it seems likely that such caution as Japan has shown because of the United States has been due much more to a fear of possible forceful action that the United States might in fact take in response to a major Japanese threat to British communications and to American sources of supply than to any positive action taken by the United States over the past few years. However, the immediate context and preceding statements in the memorandum* make the assertion under reference seem to apply particularly to the effect of the policy of this Government upon Japan's course of action in China; and in that respect the assertion, it is believed, is unwarranted.

* On page 2 the statement is made that this Government has "considerably hindered the development of Japan's military program in China" by a policy of holding Japan responsible for personal and property damage to American nationals. We have not "held Japan responsible"; we have merely declared that we will hold her responsible.

On page 3 the statement is made that "American opposition and disapprobation" and the necessity (sic) that Japan take care lest Japanese activities in China involve Japan with the United States have "been steadily restraining influences upon the progress and development of Japan's program." Query: How far is this true as regards "progress and development of Japan's program" in China?

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Protests by the Government of the United States against Japan's aggression in China and wide-spread disapprobation by the American public of that aggression, have had little discernible effect upon Japan's course of action vis-à-vis China. We have, it is true, also informally discouraged private financial assistance to Japan, but actions of the Ford Company and more recently our experience with the Paramount Company indicate that our advice may have been less a controlling factor than has been the economic unattractiveness of Japanese securities. Our economic measures (imposed, beginning with July, 1940, partly to restrain Japan's inclination to move southward and in greater part for urgent reasons of domestic rearmament rather than to "impede" Japan in China) have been much too recently put in force to have had any substantial effect as yet. Indeed, on net balance there can be no question but that since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict the increases which we have permitted to develop in our exports to Japan of petroleum products, iron and steel products, other metals, machine tools and a long list of miscellaneous materials essential for war have far outweighed the advice which we have given against loans or credits being made available to Japan and the belated and incomplete restrictions which we have imposed

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imposed against Japan. We have taken against imports from Japan, the major source of Japan's foreign exchange, no action whatsoever.*

Without laboring these points by a more detailed reviewing of the history of our recent economic relations with Japan and with China, it is believed warrantable to call attention to the fact that a considerable and readily available literature has been produced on this subject and that in the said literature there appears a good deal more as data material on which to base an evaluation of our Far Eastern policy than a listing of our credits and loans to China, of our Red Cross and unofficial relief contributions to China, of our exports of arms and ammunition to China, and of the figures which show the decline in our general exports to Japan in (very) recent months.

The United States Commercial Attaché at Tokyo has estimated that in January 1940 we were supplying about 40 percent of Japan's imports of metals, of raw cotton and of wood pulp, about 50 percent of the imports of petroleum products, 70 percent of imports of scrap iron and 95 percent of imports of automobile parts. There is attached hereto a
 table

* United States imports of raw silk from Japan

<u>1936</u>	<u>1937</u>	<u>1938</u>	<u>1939</u>	<u>1940</u>
\$94,967,422	\$99,572,976	\$83,644,281	\$106,951,000	\$105,311,000

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table of our exports to Japan that throws a somewhat different light upon the question of our having hindered or aided Japan's program in regard to China than does the table marked Annex IV which is appended to the memorandum now under reference.

It seems to me that a thoroughly objective appraisal of the effects of American policy (in terms of action and non-action) toward the Sino-Japanese conflict would arrive at and set forth a conclusion that we have helped China somewhat and that we have hindered Japan somewhat; that the difficulties that Japan has encountered in her attempt to subjugate China and China's successes in resisting that attempt have, in both cases, been due only in small part to the action taken, positive and negative, by the American Government; and that Japan's present ability to continue her efforts in China and to give thought now to possible "bigger and better" aggressions and even to "war with the United States" is a consequence in no small part of the practically unrestricted access which Japan enjoyed for more than three long years to the rich and most helpful markets of the United States.

Were I writing at this moment an appraisal of the situation in the Far East, and especially of the policy and operations of the United States during the last

several

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several years as a factor therein, I would be inclined to say regarding our policy and operations that, as between good or bad, the principle of "praise the day when it is done" applies. And, I would be inclined to raise this question: In a situation wherein two nations are engaged in armed conflict over a fundamental issue, is a procedure on the part of a third nation which expresses itself in the giving of a little help to one and in the giving of a little hindrance to another a sound procedure? Is such a procedure likely to win and hold the good will of the nation helped and to avoid the enmity of the nation hindered; is it not likely to gain for the country which engages in it the substantial ill will of both; does it produce for the country which follows it a net gain; what problems does it solve; and to what does it lead?

Comparative figures for the years 1936 to 1940, inclusive, covering
certain specific exports from the United States to Japan
(NOTE: 1936 was the last full year before the outbreak of
the current Sino-Japanese hostilities)

	<u>1936</u>	<u>1937</u>	<u>1938</u>	<u>1939</u>	<u>1940</u>
Petroleum products	\$28,589,000 :	\$43,733,000	\$51,191,000	\$45,290,000	\$54,600,000
Crude petroleum	14,194,000 :	22,103,000	29,858,000	20,924,000	15,875,000
Gasoline (excluding natural gasoline)	2,367,000 :	3,683,000	7,713,000	7,352,000	16,231,000
Lubricating oil	2,765,000 :	5,518,000	2,789,000	5,184,000	9,551,000
Iron and steel scrap	14,177,000 :	39,386,000	22,061,000	32,732,000	17,082,000
Pig iron*	45,000 :	9,672,000	4,886,000	146,000	163,000
Steel ingots, billets, etc.*	123,000 :	8,754,000	3,085,000	5,639,000	8,763,000
Iron and steel bars and rods*	749,000 :	2,996,000	2,718,000	4,415,000	10,066,000
Steel sheets*	81,000 :	1,694,000	367,000	233,000	1,436,000
Tin plate, terne plate, etc.*	1,700,000 :	4,484,000	1,649,000	29,000	1,112,000
Structural shapes*	65,000 :	964,000	217,000	147,000	1,125,000
Strips, hoops, bands, etc.*	----- :	-----	-----	114,000	1,058,000
Tubular products and fittings*	----- :	-----	-----	180,000	915,000
Refined copper*	7,293,000 :	17,997,000	21,813,000	27,567,000	24,621,000
Power-driven metal work- ing machinery*	3,331,000 :	11,904,000	23,627,000	24,578,000	23,321,000
Raw cotton* ϕ	88,338,000 :	61,724,000	52,850,000	42,498,000	29,566,000

* The

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* The items thus marked are not included in the table marked Annex IV attached to FE memorandum of April 14.

Ø Raw cotton, as to which there have, of course, been no export restrictions, is included as indicating that some of the declines in Japan's current purchases in the United States are due more to the natural results of war-time economic strains, including shortage of foreign exchange and shipping, than to our restrictions. Such factors would appear to be controlling also in the case of crude petroleum (as to which only minor restrictions have been imposed) and in the case of pig iron (as to which no export restrictions were applied in 1939 when a sharp decline in exports to Japan occurred).

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
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DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS


May 9, 1941.

Mr. Welles

Mr. Secretary:



Herewith two memoranda: First, a memorandum of April 14 by FE entitled Appraisal of the Situation in the Far East--which is in substance a review and appraisal of the course pursued by this Government in regard to the Far East since the commencement of hostilities in the Far East on July 1, 1937, and, second, (superimposed) a memorandum of April 24 by PA/H in review and in appraisal of the FE memorandum.




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
April 17, 1941.

PA/H, Mr. Hornbeck

U, Mr. Welles

S, Mr. Secretary

Several officers of FE have collaborated in preparing the attached memorandum entitled "Appraisal of the Situation in the Far East". While there is nothing especially new in the memorandum, it is believed that there are set forth in the memorandum a compilation of facts and statements which you will find of interest.



FE:MMH:HES

MAY 15 1941
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

April 14, 1941.

APPRAISAL OF THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

Since October 1940 when this Government suggested that certain categories of American nationals in China, Japan, Hong Kong and Indochina return to the United States if their continued presence in those areas was not urgently required, this Government has, it is believed, had the diplomatic initiative in the situation in the Far East.*

Since the commencement of hostilities in the Far East in July 1937, it has been the policy of this Government to protect American rights and interests and to avoid so far as possible involvement by this country in the hostilities. It has likewise been the policy of this Government to discourage and deter Japan's program by non-cooperation, by clearly-expressed disapprobation and by acts which have had the effect of rendering Japan unsure of the future course of American policy. In regard to Japan, this Government has sought to avoid adopting an unreasoning attitude which would be likely to impel Japan to take further aggressive action in the Far East. It has also been the policy of this Government to encourage

and

*The Department's suggestion was in line with the policy followed by the Department in regard to American nationals in disturbed areas of Europe and was warranted by the dangers to which American nationals were exposed in the areas specified in the Far East. The step was, however, interpreted generally in Japan as indicating a clearing of the decks by the United States for possible action.

793.94/16663

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and assist China by financial, material, technical and moral aid, and by psychologically-timed diplomatic steps.

By asserting the right of American nationals under treaties and international law to live, to trade, and to carry on other legitimate activities in China, and by upholding the principle of the Open Door, this Government has considerably hindered the development of Japan's economic and political program in China. By holding Japan responsible for the internationally illegal acts of Japan's forces in China which have resulted in loss of life or injury to American nationals or damage to American property, this Government has considerably hindered the development of Japan's military program in China. American protests against indiscriminate bombings of American property and civilian populations in China by Japanese forces have been reinforced by making applicable to Japan "moral embargoes" first upon aircraft and parts and later upon materials essential for the manufacture of airplanes and upon plans or technical information required for the production of high-quality aviation gasoline. This Government has also informally discouraged the rendering to Japan by American nationals of special or unusual services such as the extension of credit, which, if given, would facilitate Japan's course of action. Despite Japanese military occupation of territory surrounding Shanghai, this

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this Government through asserting its interest in the maintenance of the international character of the Settlement there and through the continued presence in China of small detachments of armed forces has helped to prevent Japan from gaining control over that Settlement where important Chinese, American and other foreign interests are centered. The action of the United States in July 1939 in giving notice of an intention to terminate the Japanese-American Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911 -- and the termination of that treaty without replacement in January 1940 -- tended to increase Japan's awareness of the potential effects of Japanese policy in the Far East upon Japanese-American relations.

Since the commencement of hostilities in the Far East the dragging weight of American opposition and disapprobation, the necessity on the part of Japan of taking care lest Japan's military, economic or political activities in China should by affecting adversely American rights and interests involve Japan with the United States, have, it is believed, been steadily restraining influences upon the progress and development of Japan's program. In applying its policy, the United States has sought to avoid adopting an unreasoning or unreasonable attitude and has made consistent and earnest efforts to cause

Japan

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Japan to perceive that its own best interests lay in pursuit of policies similar to those followed by the United States.

With regard to China it has been the policy of this Government to extend financial, material and technical aid in such manner that Chinese resources will be supplemented and Chinese initiative and efforts strengthened but not supplanted. This Government has also sought to encourage the Chinese Government and people by diplomatic steps taken at critical moments in the developing situation in the Far East. A credit of \$25,000,000, for example, was extended by this Government for the use of China in December 1933 during the period of Chinese discouragement following the fall of Canton and Hankow. This credit was made to China when such credits were being extended to but few countries outside of the Americas (not including Great Britain and France). An additional credit of \$20,000,000 was extended to China in March 1940. The effect of this Government's silver purchase program has been to give valued and extensive financial assistance to the Chinese Government.* In March 1940, following the setting up under Japanese auspices of a regime at Nanking, this Government publicly stated that the United States

* Confidential: Approximately \$220,000,000 has been spent by this Government for the purchase of Chinese silver.

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States would, of course, continue to recognize the National Government of the Republic of China as the Government of China. In the spring and early summer of 1940, following the German military occupation of the Netherlands and France, this Government made known by public statements its support of the principle of the maintenance of the status quo in the Pacific area with special reference to the Netherlands East Indies and French Indochina. This Government also opposed the closing of the Burma Road by Great Britain.

With the collapse of French resistance in Europe in June 1940 the situation in the Far East entered upon a more acute phase. British, French and Netherlands resistance to Japan's program in the Far East necessarily weakened, while Japan's ambitions expanded as Japanese attention was directed increasingly toward the rich Far Eastern possessions of these European countries. Following the signature by Japan of the Three Power Pact in September 1940, American public opinion hardened in its attitude toward Japan. American determination to aid countries resisting armed attack, including China, increased and found expression in the Lend-Lease Act.

During this period aid to China by the United States has been continued and increased. Additional loans totaling

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totaling \$75,000,000 have been extended and a Chinese currency stabilization arrangement involving \$50,000,000 more is now in process of conclusion. This Government has also made available arms and materials for the strengthening of the defenses of Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies and British possessions in the Far East, as well as for China's defense. In the total value of arms and ammunition actually exported from the United States during the year 1940 Great Britain and the British Empire ranked first, China (after the collapse of France) ranked second (with the total value of exports for the year amounting to more than \$9,000,000), and the Netherlands East Indies third (with exports to the value of more than \$7,250,000). Similar exports to Japan in 1940 totaled just over \$4,000. The growth of this country's own defense program and needs led to the imposition of restrictions upon the export to many countries (including Japan) of many commodities essential to Japan and other countries in the carrying on of hostilities. In October 1940 this Government suggested to certain categories of American nationals whose continued presence in various areas of the Far East was not essential that they return to the United States--a step which appeared to have a notably restraining effect upon the Japanese. Defense measures have been taken which have influenced the Far Eastern situation, such as vastly increased naval appropriations

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appropriations, including appropriations for the expansion of naval facilities at Guam and Samoa, the announcement that the United States fleet would remain indefinitely in Pacific waters, the reorganization of the United States fleet, the strengthening of defenses in the Philippines, and the withdrawal of American naval and some army dependents from the Philippines. Visits have recently been made by American naval vessels to Australia, New Zealand, Tahiti and Suva. (Confidential: Steps have been taken to facilitate the securing by China of American aviation mechanics and instructors.) An Administrative Assistant of the President, with special knowledge of monetary and financial questions, visited Chungking in February 1941. An experienced American has recently been appointed director of transportation over the Burma Road, thus placing at the disposal of the Chinese Government his knowledge of transport problems. Large financial contributions, and contributions of medical supplies, clothing, et cetera, have been made by unofficial American organizations. Finally, there has been the passage of the Lend-Lease Act and the clearly expressed determination of this Government to extend all possible aid to China under this Act. Although American supplies are not unlimited and priority in obtaining many commodities is being given to shipments to Great Britain, active consideration

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sideration is now being directed to meeting the needs of the Chinese Government. Prior to passage of the Act, 100 military airplanes were allotted to China and are now in process of being exported to that country.

The measures taken by this Government have had substantial and far-reaching consequences in Japan. The effects of the restrictions upon exports from the United States to Japan are indicated by the trade figures for January 1941 which show a decline of 40 percent as compared with December 1940 in the value of American exports to Japan. Exports of iron and steel semi-manufactures, including scrap iron, amounted to \$110,000 in January 1941 as compared with nearly \$4,000,000 in January 1940 and more than \$3,250,000 in December 1940. Exports of certain types of machinery dropped to \$268,000 in January 1941 as compared with more than \$3,250,000 in January 1940 and more than \$1,500,000 in December 1940.

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The policy of this Government so far would appear to have been substantially effective in sustaining China and in impeding Japan's course of action. This policy so far has been followed without involvement by this country in the hostilities in the Far East.

The present is of course no time for a relaxation of effort on the part of the United States with reference to the situation in the Far East. This Government should continue to extend aid -- financial, material, technical, moral -- to China to the fullest extent possible. This aid should be given in such manner as to encourage the Chinese to exert their greatest efforts to aid themselves. At the same time, this Government should maintain a firm policy with regard to Japan. To meet the needs of this country's defense program, some additional restrictions may reasonably be imposed upon exports to Japan (and other countries) of certain commodities of interest to Japan. Steps may also reasonably be taken to ensure that Japan shall not become a way station for the forwarding of American supplies to Germany. The imposition of full embargoes upon the export of commodities which Japan regards as essential to its existence as a power in the Far East and of which this Government is known to have an ample stock

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stock -- such as petroleum -- would not appear to be to the best interests of this country. It is believed that for many and sound reasons Japan does not desire war with the United States. The placing of sweeping and evidently discriminatory restrictions by this country upon trade with Japan would, however, demonstrate to all elements in Japan that the only way of assuring Japan's future as a power with independence of action is to establish control through seizure or other means over an area which will be self-sustaining. Convinced that its future is at stake, Japan might well choose to take the risks of a military campaign southward rather than submit to an arbitrary cutting off of essential supplies or of essential markets. It is suggested that this Government should not therefore impose such restrictions unless it is prepared to accept the consequences of such action -- increasing likelihood of involvement by the United States in hostilities in the Far East and probable partial diversion of American energies and of American supplies from aid to Great Britain.

No assurance, of course, exists that with the progress of developments in the European war Japan may not decide to enter upon a military campaign directed against British and Netherlands possessions in the Far East

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East in concert with Axis moves in Europe. That the possibility of such a step exists, however, is no reason why this Government should by its policy give support to those elements in Japan -- as yet in the minority -- who are now understood to favor such a course of action.

The present year will be a critical period in the war in Europe. If this year can be passed with this country continuing to assist China and to deter Japan firmly but judiciously, with Japan still hesitating to break over into a campaign of military conquest against British and Netherlands possessions in the Far East, and if British resistance in Europe can be sustained with American assistance, then there is a distinct possibility that the present balance of Japanese opinion in regard to Japan's future course of action may be decisively turned. This Government's policy has had as one of its effective purposes the attrition of Japan's energies and resources by steps undertaken gradually on a basis designed to obviate creating the impression that they were in the nature of overt acts directed primarily at Japan. At the end of this year, with the prospect of a quick German victory gone, and with the practical certainty that an attack in the Far East would involve Japan in a lengthy and probably disastrous war, Japan is likely to realize the magnitude

of

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of the difficulties in the way of the accomplishment of its program in the Far East. At that time Japan may well come to see that a solution of Japan's problems is not to be found within the Axis and may of its own accord turn away from association with Germany.

On the other hand, with events in Europe transpiring with kaleidoscopic rapidity, repercussions of those events are bound to be felt in the Far East. Japan's best interests, in the eyes of its Government and people, lie in a change in the status quo. Japan may be expected to continue its careful opportunistic policy pari passu with developments in Europe until such time as a more attractive alternative is presented. If Japan can be led to believe without question that the United States is able to resist and will resist by active intervention with its armed forces any aggression against British or Netherlands possessions in the Far East, Japan would hesitate to attack those areas.

Japan, Russia, Germany and Italy are grimly determined to improve their respective positions during and by means of the present world upheaval. There are only two factors which in final analysis are capable of altering the course followed by any one of those countries--first, effective
 force

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force coupled with a determination to employ that force if necessary, and second, the offer of alternatives of sufficiently attractive economic or political value.

It is believed this Government's best interests will be served by continuing to confront Japan now with determination, without element of bluff, and to continue with greater clarity to present to Japan at the same time a willingness to give honest and sympathetic consideration now to Japan's legitimate desires for changes in the economic status quo if Japan will abandon entirely its resort to and threat of armed force and aggression.

m. n. l.

- ANNEX I -- Loans or Credits Extended by the United States to or for the Use of China since July 7, 1937
- ANNEX II -- Contributions to China by Unofficial Organizations in the United States
- ANNEX III -- Exports of Arms and Ammunition from the United States to China and the Netherlands Indies since 1937
- ANNEX IV -- Total Exports from the United States to Japan (Including Taiwan and Chosen)

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gas
 6A :Atcheson:
 FE:Bacon :HNS
 :Schmidt :FRE
Wally

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ANNEX I

Loans or Credits Extended by the United States to
or for the Use of China since July 7, 1937

December 15, 1938 -- \$25,000,000 credit
March 7, 1940 -- 20,000,000 credit
September 25, 1940 - 25,000,000 loan
November 30, 1940 -- 50,000,000 loan
November 30, 1940 -- Announcement that an allocation
of \$50,000,000 was in process
of being made for a Chinese
currency stabilization arrange-
ment.

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ANNEX II

Contributions to China by Unofficial Organizations in the United States*

American Red Cross

June 1937 - June 30, 1940 -- Contributions to the
amount of approximately
\$1,000,000

July 1, 1940 - April 4, 1941 -- Supplies to the value
of approximately
\$2,000,000 shipped
to east and west
China

Contributions by Other Unofficial Organizations During the Year 1940

American Bureau for Medical Aid to China	\$450,000
American Committee for Chinese War Orphans	10,000
Church Committee for China Relief	375,000
American Committee for Chinese Industrial Coops.	100,000
China Aid Council	20,000
Assoc. Bds. for Christian Colleges in China	<u>140,000</u>
	\$1,095,000

* Confidential information supplied by the American
Red Cross

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ANNEX III

Exports of Arms and Ammunition from the United States to China and the Netherlands Indies since 1937*

	<u>Licenses Issued</u>		<u>Actual Exports</u>	
	<u>CHINA</u>	<u>N.E.I.</u>	<u>CHINA</u>	<u>N.E.I.</u>
			(May 1 to December 31, 1938)	
1937	\$6,399,000	\$3,703,000		
1938	7,948,000	10,044,000	\$4,769,000	\$5,102,000
1939	2,943,000	2,410,000	2,715,000	6,070,000
1940	10,894,000 ^{1/}	32,381,000 ^{2/}	9,157,000	7,338,000
1941				
Jan.	253,000	2,549,000	634,000	607,000
Feb.	6,310,000	7,565,000	2,673,000	879,000
March	1,005,000	1,225,000		
	<u>\$25,752,000</u>	<u>\$59,887,000</u>	<u>\$19,948,000</u>	<u>\$19,996,000</u>

1/ Made up of the following categories:

Aircraft, etc.	\$2,529,000
Aircraft parts, etc.	2,716,000
Aircraft engines, etc.	3,374,000
All other	<u>2,275,000</u>
Total	\$10,894,000

2/ Made up of the following categories:

Machine guns, etc.	\$3,510,000
Ammunition, bombs, torpedoes, etc.	6,973,000
Tanks, etc.	8,890,000
Aircraft, etc.	8,909,000
All other	<u>4,099,000</u>
Total	\$32,381,000

* Information obtained from Co (in round figures).

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ANNEX IV

Total Exports from the United States to Japan
(Including Taiwan and Chosen)*


December 1939	\$27,563,000
January 1940	29,707,000
December 1940	19,343,000
January 1941	11,588,000

Comparative figures for December 1940 and January 1941 covering certain specific exports from the United States to Japan

	<u>December</u> <u>1940</u>	<u>January</u> <u>1941</u>
Petroleum and products		
Total	\$6,510,000	\$5,584,000
Crude petroleum	863,000	753,000
Gasoline	3,189,000	898,000
Lubricating oil	1,641,000	944,000
Iron and steel semi-manufactures	3,381,000	110,000
Iron and steel scrap (including tinplate scrap and waste-waste tinplate)	14,000	5,000
Ferro-alloys	28,000	1,000
Carbon black or gas black	47,000	1,000
Phosphate rock	87,000	57,000
Ammonium sulphate	18,000	---


* Information obtained from Department of Commerce reports

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE



The following messages were received from the Assistant Naval Attache at Chungking under date of April 27, 1941:

THE JAPANESE HAVING TRANSFERRED THEIR 5TH, 18TH, AND 28TH HAND GUARD DIVISIONS FROM HAINAN, CANTON, AND FORMOSA, FOR THE PURPOSE

OF CLOSING COASTAL PORTS, WHICH HAS BEEN EFFECTED; AND AS THESE PARTICULAR TROOPS ARE SPECIALLY TRAINED LANDING FORCES AND HAVE

THUS FAR IN THE WAR BEEN THE ONLY TROOPS EMPLOYED FOR SUCH A PURPOSE; IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE ANY MOVE SOUTHWARD AS LONG AS

THESE DIVISIONS ARE SO LOCATED AND ENGAGED. THE CHINESE DO NOT HAVE ANY POSITIVE INFORMATION ON THE SUBJECT, BUT THEY ASSUME THAT THESE

DIVISIONS WERE REPLACED WITH OTHERS IN THE AREAS FROM WHICH THEY WERE WITHDRAWN.

DECLASSIFIED

APR 28 1941
 3/22/3

CHINESE REACTED CALMLY TO RECENT COASTAL LANDINGS AND SOVIET JAP PACT. SOME OBSERVERS PREDICT RENEWED PEACE EFFORTS BY NIP

BUT QUESTION IS SCORNE BY HIGH OFFICIALS. RUMORS OF A GROUP OF PRO JAPANESE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT OR AN ATMOSPHERE OF

DEFEATISM ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY TANGIBLE EVIDENCE IN SPITE OF A GREAT DEAL OF COMMUNISTIC PROPAGANDA HERE AND ABROAD

RECENTLY. AS PRICE LEVELS READJUST BETWEEN RURAL URBAN DISTRICTS SHORTAGE OF RICE IS NOW ACUTE BUT NEW GOVERNMENT

CONTROL MEASURES AND PROBABLE RAIN SHOULD EASE TENSION. AS IT IS THE DETERMINATION OF THE GOVERNMENT TO ENFORCE DISCIPLINE THERE IS A

POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER MINOR CLASHES BUT CIVIL WAR ON A WIDESPREAD SCALE IS UNLIKELY. NO SIGN OF COLLAPSE IS SHOWN BY SINOS BUT A

VITAL FACTOR TO THEIR MORALE IS TIMELY ARRIVAL OF AID FROM AMERICA.

CC: Mr. Hamilton
 Mr. Hornbeck.

793.94/16664

PS/LB

MAY 2 - 1941

FILED

0465

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(copy to PA/1)

FE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

May 7, 1941.

11511

The following message was received from the assistant Naval
 Attache at Chungking under date of May 6, 1941:

INDICATIONS ARE THAT A JAPANESE ATTACK FROM INDO-CHINA IN THE
 NEAR FUTURE IS UNLIKELY, BASED ON A CLOSE CHECK HERE. IN
 REGARD TO PREVIOUS MESSAGE THE PRESENT FORCE THERE IS ONLY
 ONE BRIGADE OF GUARDS DIVISION. THE HEAT, APPROACHING RAINS,
 AND MALARIA IN THE SOUTH MAKE ANY EARLY SUMMER CAMPAIGN THERE
 VERY DOUBTFUL. A BRIGADE OF THE 5TH DIVISION JUST EVACUATED
 TEN CHOW BUT THE ENTIRE 6TH DIVISION IS IN CENTRAL CHINA AND THE
 2ND DIVISION IS STILL IN MANCHURIA WHERE IT IS CLAIMED THE JAPS
 ARE STILL MAINTAINING FULL STRENGTH.

732.34/16665

CC: Mr. Hamilton.
 Mr. Hornbeck.



PS/LB

793 94

28

3/20/23

17

16665

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

271

GMW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Chungking via N. R.

FROM dated June 6, 1941

Rec'd 12:01 a.m., 7th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

224, June 6, noon.

During air raid on Chungking between hours of seven and eleven on evening of June 5th Japanese planes also dropped bombs on south bank, one or more of which landed about four hundred yards behind chancery while others hit sand bar on foreshore about four hundred yards from residence occupied by members of Embassy staff causing slight damage from fallen plaster.

Sent to Department. Repeated to Shanghai, Peiping, Hankow, Shanghai. Please repeat to Tokyo.

GAUSS

EMB

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 6/9/41 25K

793.94/16670

PS/HH

793.94
 6/11
 124.931

0 4 7 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge Department:
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Gray
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
X NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE X
"Gr" PARTAIR
PLAIN
NAVAL RADIO

Washington,

June 9, 1941

8 pm

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN) VIA SHANGHAI.

INFO: AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING (CHINA).
AMEMBASSY, PEIPING (CHINA).
AMERICAN CONSUL, HANKOW (CHINA).

318

Chungking's 224, June 6, noon.

The Department assumes that you will supplement
your recent representations (your 771, June 5, 9 p.m.)
with a further emphatic protest against this endangering
of personnel and premises of the American Embassy. You
may wish to point out that any further recurrence will
not repeat not comport with the assurances of the War
Minister mentioned by Mr. Matsuoka in your 781, June 6,
8 p.m.

Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Chungking,
Peiping, Hankow.

793.94/16670

GA
FE:GA:OJL/FRE

FE

PA/H

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/16670

PS/LB

16670

0472

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

KD
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)
SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY
TO ONI AND MID 6/13/41 JD
Secretary of State,

Nanking via N. R.
Dated June 11, 1941
Rec'd. 4:58 p. m.

Washington.

This office is reliably informed that Wang Ching
Wei plans leaving shortly for Tokyo, probably the 13th.
He is said to fear for his personal position in the
event either of a general Sino-Japanese peace or the
serious enlargement of hostilities in the Pacific.

I am advised orally that Kung Po is to be "acting
president".

Ott, German Ambassador to Tokyo, and Abe, latterly
Japanese Ambassador to Nanking, are rumored to have
been recent visitors to this city.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking,
Peiping and Shanghai; code text by mail to Tokyo.

PAXTON.

KLP

Handwritten notes and stamps: "A", "K", "1941", "DEPARTMENT OF STATE", "JUN 17 1941", "RECEIVED", "DWA", "u-2".

735.54/16671

PJ/LB

166

0 4 7 3

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


KD FROM Kunming via Chungking & N.R.
 This telegram must be Dated June 10, 1941
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated Rec'd. 7:35 p. m., 11th
 to anyone. (A)

SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY

TO ONLAND MID 4/1/41 7D
 Secretary of State, 7D

Washington.

June 10, 3 p. m.



We understand here on good authority that Japanese
 planes on June 8 hit and badly damaged the Pan River
 bridge in Kweichow on the Chungking highway. Reliable
 Chinese sources state that in the raid on Chaotung,
 Yunnan, on June 1st Chinese bomber type planes,
 numbering five or more, were destroyed on the ground.
 It is not known whether they were training or combat
 planes.

Sent to the Department only.

PERKINS.

EMB

JUN 24 1941
 FILED

793.94/16672

PS/BAS

793.14

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

JT

GRAY

Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.

Dated June 11, 1941

Rec'd 10:30 a.m., 12th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

809, June 11, 7 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 6/13/41 REK

793.94
 Tonight's KOKUMIN in a leading article states Japanese bombing of Chungking has been so effective that the capital is expected to be moved shortly to some place in Sikang or Chinghai. Many important government officials are said to have been killed and to foreign sources are attributed reports that appeals to Chiang to move the capital increase daily.

Sent to the Department via Shanghai. Please repeat to Chungking.

GREW

WSB

793.94/16673

PC/EB

0475

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chaitin NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 10, 1941

In reply refer to
IN 793.94/16673


F.W.793.94/16673

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chairman of the United States Maritime Commission, and encloses for his information, a copy of a telegram received from the American Consul at Shanghai, China, regarding passage of President Lines vessels through Nantao boom.

Enclosure:

Copy of a telegram
dated June 11, 1941
from Shanghai.

PS/DM



10 1941

7/9

IN: EAG

0476

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



TELEGRAM RECEIVED
 GRAY


Shanghai via N. R.
 FROM Dated June 11, 1941
 Rec'd 10:15 a.m., 12th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

679, June 11, noon.

Shanghai's 389, May 4, 4 p.m., 1940 regarding passage
 of President Lines vessels through Nantao boom.

During the past twelve months this office has made repeated oral and written representations to the Japanese Consulate General here regarding this matter. The Japanese naval authorities have taken the position that the channel through the boom is not sufficiently wide or deep to permit the passage of American President liners. Actually this is not the case because officials of the American President Lines and Conservancy (*) is large enough to allow passage of American liners without danger. For several months the Japanese naval authorities have reiterated their intention to widen and deepen the channel, but this work has not been undertaken and it has become increasingly clear that they have no intention of permitting American President liners to pass through the boom. This is a further instance of the complete disregard displayed by the Japanese



1273

JUL 10 1941

793.94/16673-1/2

PS/EE

net
 894.001

FILED
 JUN 11 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 679, June 11, noon from Shanghai via N. R.

Japanese authorities of American rights and interests.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking and
Peiping by airmail to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

(*) Apparent omission.

NPL

0478

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RS
 This telegram must be **FROM** Yunnanfu via Chungking & N.R.
 closely paraphrased be- Dated June 2, 1941
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br) Rec'd 11:45 a.m; 12th

SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY

TO ONI AND MID 4/13/41 3D

Secretary of State,


Washington.

June 2.

Chinese highway officials now state that with loss
 of bridge a pontoon ferry is being achieved across
 Pan River in Kweichow with passage restricted to night
 time. Through traffic is still continuing they state.
 Government trucks are being routed so far as possible
 over Kunming-Luchow highway.

UNSIGNED

NPL



793.94/16674

PS/BE

JUN 21 1941
 FILED

793.94

0479

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MD

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Foochow via N.R.


Dated June 10, 1941

STATEMENT COMMUNICATED ORALLY
 TO ONI AND MID (1/3/41) TO
 Secretary of State,

Rec'd 10:10 a.m., 12th

Washington.

June 10, 7 p.m.



Since the occupation of Foochow April 21st there have been opened in this city no (repeat no) Japanese banks, shipping offices, or commercial firms. No definite plans have been made for the reopening of the Japanese Consulate and Mr. H. Terajima, the only English speaking member of the Japanese Army Special Service Section, was on June 7th recalled to Canton. The Japanese appear to have virtually completed shipment from Foochow of lumber, tea and other commodities belonging to Chinese Government organs and merchants (conservatively estimated to be worth Chinese national currency dollars 20,000,000) which they seized soon after this city was occupied.

I am informed by the Associate District Director of Salt Administration that Japanese authorities here are now attempting to arrange through him for regular shipments from the Chinese-controlled interior of Fukien of timber,

said

793.94/16675

PS/HH

793.94

FILED
 JUN 24 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- June 10, 7 p.m., from Foochow

said to be badly needed in Japan, in exchange for salt which they would allow to be shipped up the Min River from salt fields on the coast south of this city.

Foochow now contains little Chinese national currency of which the Japanese could avail themselves and there appears to be a surplus of no (repeat no)(*) produced nearby other than salt the flow of which they might control. They are believed not to have any alternative plan for the economic exploitation of this area and it seems not improbable in the light of the facts outlined in the first paragraph of this telegram that the Japanese contemplate withdrawing from Foochow should the above mentioned negotiations fail.

Sent to Peiping. Repeated to the Department and Chungking. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo.

RICE

NPL

(*) apparent omission

0481

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

KD

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (C)

Dated June 12, 1941

FROM Rec'd. 3:07 a.m., 13th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
 MR. HORNBECK
 JUN 17 1941

OFFICE OF THE ADVISER ON
 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
 JUN 24 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF
 EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 JUN 14 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, June 12, 7 p. m.

My 272 of March 19, 6 p. m.

The informant referred to in the above telegram
 has apprised me that military circles in Germany are
 greatly interested in the continuation of the Sino-
 Japanese war. They are indirectly encouraging China
 to resist and have also permitted various countries to
 send additional war material to China.

While the Germans are using Japan as a threat
 against the United States, my informant said that the
 former have made a secret economic treaty with the Dutch
 authorities in occupied Holland which will become
 effective immediately after the end of the war. This
 treaty secures for Germany large concessions in Java,
 Sumatra, Celebes, Borneo and the Dutch part of New
 Guinea. These concessions cover large areas and include
 the Banka and Billiton tin mines as well as some oil
 properties. The price for these concessions has been
 fixed and will be met in part by reducing the cost

assessed

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
 Department of State

DIVISION OF
 JUN 21 1941

2R correction
 6/14/41
 JAL

Set to Tokyo
 6/14/41
 JPS

793.94/16676

PS/HH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #530, June 12, 7 p. m., from Bucharest.

assessed the Dutch for the upkeep of the German army of occupation. In the event that Japan attacks the Dutch East Indies and succeeds in gaining foothold there, Germany will immediately claim her rights.

My informant also said that German raiders and submarines are being refueled in a former German East African port and that in spite of all precautions taken, there still exists a strong Nazi organization in the territory and further that both in German civilian and higher army circles considerable discomfiture is felt as a result of the heavy losses of men and material in the Crete campaign and that during the last ten days uncertainty with respect to the future is steadily gaining ground in Germany.

GUNTHER.

KLP

740 0011 European
US 2-14-39

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GMW


This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated **FROM**
 to anyone. (br)

Tokyo via Shanghai & N. R.

Dated June 12, 1941

Rec'd 3 a.m., 13th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



813, June 12, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Embassy's 768, June 5, 6 p.m., and Department's
 317, July 9, 5 p.m.

One. The Department's attention is respectfully
 invited to the Embassy's 663, May 10, 5 p.m., and 684,
 May 15, 9 a.m., which were despatched before the Chungyuan
 campaign was well under way. It was pointed therein that
 the Japanese military and civil authorities in China had
 sensed the growing dissatisfaction of the Japanese people
 at the continued stalemate in China, and that the public
 statements of General Hata, proposing an intensified
 military campaign and promising China a crushing blow,
 and of Ambassador Honda demanding continued support of
 the Nanking regime, were intended to suggest ways of
 reviving waning interest at home in the conflict and pos-
 sibly to open a way for the settlement of the conflict.
 Having put forward that analysis it was our thought that
 the Department

GREW

HTM

753.54/10677

PS/HH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GMW

This telegram must be **FROM** Tokyo via Shanghai via N. R.
 closely paraphrased before being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

Dated June 12, 1941

Rec'd 2 a.m., 13th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

813, June 12, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Interested in learning that the War Office had presented to the Japanese people the results of the campaign precisely along the lines which he had anticipated, thus substantially confirming the accuracy of our analysis of indications of disagreements among the Japanese themselves with regard to major policies.

Two. We have realized since the beginning of the conflict that military reports from either side have not coincided with those from the other side. It has seemed to us that it would be unprofitable for us in Tokyo to take the Japanese reports at face value or to attempt to balance them with Chinese reports, a function which would appear to devolve to most advantage on our military representatives in China and on the Department. I shall, however, continue to analyze trends in Japanese opinion with regard to policies and attitude and to indicate the

reasons

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 813, June 12, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Shanghai

reasons for the taking of Japanese military initiatives
rather than to estimate the military consequences thereof.

Sent to the Department via Shanghai.

(END OF MESSAGE)


GREW

RR

0486

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



GMW

FROM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated June 13, 1941

SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY
TO ONI AND MID 6/14/41 JD

Rec'd 12:11 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

688, June 13, 3 p.m.

16671

Reference Nanking's 45, June 11, 5 p.m.

It is learned from the Japanese Consulate General
that Wang Ching Wei will arrive in Shanghai this afternoon
and board a vessel for Yokohama tonight. Chen Kung-po,
Mayor of Shanghai and President of the Legislative Yuan,
left for Nanking June 10, and is expected to be absent
for about 10 days.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping, Chung-
king, Tokyo and Nanking.

LOCKHART

RR

793.94/16678

PS/HIT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KD FROM Chungking via N. R.
 This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)
 SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY
 TO ONI AND MID 6/17/41 J.D.
 Secretary of State,
 Washington.


235, June 13, 2 p. m. (SECTION ONE)

One. With reference to the report contained in
 Tokyo's 809, June 11, 7 p. m., the Embassy here is
 in possession of no (repeat no) information suggesting
 that the Chinese authorities are considering the
 removal of the capital to a point farther west. In
 the opinion of the Embassy the Tokyo report is wholly
 false and may be dismissed as another Japanese canard.
 Reference to the Embassy's despatches 878, May 19 and
 (*)23, June 12 (going forward by air mail today) will
 show that Japanese air raids on Chungking to date in
 1941 have been on a smaller scale than in 1939 or 1940
 and that property damage has not (repeat not) been
 extensive. It would appear that withdrawal of the
 capital from Chungking would emanate only in case the
 city is seriously menaced by land invasion.

GAUSS.

RR

(*) Apparent omission.



TT
 02

100.94/10070

100.94/10070

FILED

JUN 1941

7721

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JT

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

FROM

CHUNGKING VIA N.R.

Dated June 13, 1941

Rec'd 9:50 a.m., 14th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

235, June 13, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Two. During the raid occurring on the evening of
 June 5, inhabitants of the city were forced to remain
 in shelters for a period exceeding five hours, with the
 lamentable result that more than 4000 persons are
 estimated to have perished of suffocation in the city's
 largest dugout. It would appear that the dugout was
 overcrowded and that the ventilation system was not in
 operation. This tragedy has resulted in considerable
 public criticism and General Chiang Kai Shek, in addition
 to relieving certain responsible officials of their
 posts, has set up a committee of seven to investigate
 the causes of the tragedy and to fix responsibility.
 Strict censorship on this incident was enforced and effort
 is being made to minimize losses. (END OF MESSAGE)

Sent to the Department, repeated to Shanghai; Shang-
 hai please air mail code text to Tokyo.

GAUSS

NPL

FM 793.34/16679 SECTION 2

PC/HH

7.0.
 793.94/16679
 Section 2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RS


PLAIN

Chungking via N.R.

FROM

Dated June 15, 1941

REC'd 12:45 p.m.



Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

INFO: AMEMBASSY PEIPING, AMCONSULS SHANGHAI
 240, June 15, 3 p.m.

During air raid early this afternoon twenty-seven Japanese planes flying high bombed Chungking and also dropped several--about five--bombs within area of one to three hundred yards of the Embassy Chancery and the American gunboat TUTUILA. One bomb which dropped within fifty yards of entrance to Embassy dugout hit alongside of and heavily damaged offices of Assistant Military Attache about half way between Chungking and gunboat. Concussion and flying debris damaged Chancery--windows, transoms, tile roof, screens and shutters. Some damage also at Ambassador's residence half mile away and at Standard Oil offices near Chancery. No casualties amongst personnel of Embassy or gunboat. Number of Chinese dead and wounded in the vicinity.

Sent to Department. Repeated to Peiping, Shanghai, Hankow. Shanghai repeat to Tokyo.

GAUSS

RR

793.94/16680

PS/DE

743.94
note
124.93

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Plans of Japanese Government regarding possible
 removal of Japanese troops from China.
 Conversation between Sec. Hull and the Japanese
 Ambassador regarding --.

wha

793.94 / 16331

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memo
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated May 11, 1941 From State Dept.
 To Secretary (Hull)

File No. 711.94/2086

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KD

GRAY



Tokyo

FROM

Dated June 16, 1941

Rec'd. 9:55 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 4/7/41

RUSH

830, June 16, 9 p. m.

Chungking's 240, June 15, 3 p. m.

Without delay I immediately sought an appointment with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and delivered to him in person a signed note quoted below. I made the most emphatic representations and pointed out the grave danger to American-Japanese relations involved in recent bombing attacks on Chungking which have now resulted in heavy damage to our Embassy property including the residence of the Ambassador and seriously jeopardizing both the lives of the Ambassador and other American nationals and the USS TUTUILA. I reminded the Minister of the PANAY incident and its aftermath and expressed the personal opinion that under present circumstances I personally questioned whether the relations between the United States and Japan could now stand a similar strain.

If

793.94/16682

PS/BMR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #830, June 16, 9 p. m., from Tokyo.

If these indiscriminate and wanton attacks should continue the risks of fatal results must be reckoned with. I said that seldom if ever during my nine years in Japan had I felt greater anxiety than at the present moment. I added that while aware that the Minister was faced with many problems at the present moment, I believed that the issue of these bombing attacks was of more far-reaching importance and gravity than any other issues.

Mr. Matsuoka, who had come out of an official conference to receive me briefly, merely said "I agree with you." He indicated that he had not yet heard of this recent attack and did not know whether military or naval planes were involved but that he would take up the matter immediately and personally with both the War and Navy Ministers.

GREW.

WSB

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


GMW

FROM PLAIN

Tokyo

Dated June 16, 1941

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.




Secretary of State,
 Washington.

RUSH.

830. June 16, 9 p.m.

URGENT.



COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 4/7/41 REX

"Excellency: I have the honor to inform your Excellency

that, according to information just received from the American Ambassador at Chungking, during an air raid early on the afternoon of June 15, 1941, twenty-seven Japanese airplanes flying high bombed Chungking and also dropped several, about five, bombs within areas of one to three hundred yards of the Embassy Chancery and the United States Ship TUTUILA. A bomb which dropped within fifty yards of the entrance to the Embassy dugout hit alongside of and heavily damaged the offices of the Assistant Military Attache, about half way between the Chancery and the United States Ship TUTUILA. The concussion and flying debris damaged the Chancery, including the windows, transoms, tile roof, screens and shutters. Some damage was also caused at the Ambassador's residence a half mile away

FW.
 793.94/16682

FW 793.94/16682

PS/HH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 830 from Tokyo June 16, 9 p.m.

away and at the Standard Oil offices near the Chancery.

Fortunately, there were no casualties amongst the personnel of the Embassy or the United States Ship TUTUILA. There were a number of Chinese dead and wounded in the vicinity.

Acting under instructions from my government, I must again emphatically protest against this endangering by Japanese military airplanes of the personnel and premises of the American Embassy in Chungking. I cannot sufficiently stress and I am, therefore, constrained to reiterate my anxiety concerning the inevitable effect upon American public opinion of such wanton and random bombardment.

Your Excellency will, I am sure, agree that such recurrence as has been described above does not comport with the assurances given to Your Excellency by the Imperial Japanese Minister of War, as conveyed to me on June 6 last through Your Excellency's personal message.

I avail, etc."

Sent to the Department and to Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Chungking, Peiping and Hankow.

GREW

ALC

0495

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

To the American Consular Officer in charge,
Hong Kong.

In his discretion, the Consular Officer in charge
is requested, without further report to the Department,
to make appropriate acknowledgment of the publication
described below, received on May 21, 1941
addressed to: The Secretary of State,

from: The China Publishing Company, Morning Post
Building, Hong Kong; with the compliments of the
translator of the book, Mr. Frank Wilson Price.


Publication :

China Fights On. War messages of Chiang Kai-
shek. Volume I, October, 1938-January, 1940.
Translated by Frank Wilson Price.

Comment:

2130
Li:ABD:MPM
6-10-41

FE
GA



793.94/10032

PS/PU

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

With Compliments of the Translator

0 4 9 7

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHINA
FIGHTS
ON

CHINA FIGHTS ON
WAR MESSAGES OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK

I



THE CHINA
PUBLISHING
COMPANY

FRANK WILSON, EDITOR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

About Translator of
 CHINA FIGHTS ON

FRANK WILSON PRICE

Born in Kashing, Chekiang Province, China. Educated as boy partly in Chinese schools, speaks and writes Chinese. Parents American missionaries over fifty years in China.

College and post-graduate education in U.S.A. Ph.D. from Yale University. B.A. from Davidson College, N.C.

Now professor and Head of Rural Training and Rural Extension Department of Nanking Theological Seminary. Formerly located in Nanking; Rural Department now in Chengtu working in cooperation with West China Union University and Theological College.

Author of English translation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's *Sun Min Chu I: Three Principles of the People* (Commercial Press 1927). Editor of *China Rediscovered Her West*, a symposium, (New York 1940).

Founder and now China editor of China Information Service, Washington, D.C. Writer of weekly news letter, *New China*, and of various articles on China situation.

Translation of *China Fights On* done as voluntary service to China's cause.

Special interests: Rural Reconstruction of China and the Christian contribution to rural reconstruction; interpreting China to the people of America and other friendly nations through speaking and writing; training students for service in rural communities; friendship with government, educational and social leaders in China.

THE CHINA PUBLISHING
 COMPANY

CHUNGKING HONG KONG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EXTRACTS FROM CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S MESSAGES

China has from the very beginning believed that her armed resistance, while aimed directly at the preservation of her own freedom, independence, and national existence, is also indirectly helping to protect the rights, interests, and future security of other countries in the Pacific Basin. We are fighting that our 450,000,000 people may escape slavery, and also that other countries may be freed from the necessity of defending their life and security by war with Japan.

We firmly believe that if friendly countries will help China and cut off war supplies from Japan, Japanese aggression will be quickly halted and the Japanese military leaders will have no alternative but to withdraw their armies from Chinese soil. The peace and security in Asia for which we yearn lies in the hands of friendly and wealthy nations.

I am confident that our wartime economy will encounter no serious difficulty in this second period of our resistance. In the Southwest and Northwest, bases of our resistance, we are rapidly introducing national defense industries and light industries, and are developing our mineral and lumber resources. We are mobilizing the nation's technical skill and capital, and are laying a sound and permanent foundation for our national economic life. Neither our military forces nor our people will be in want. Our enemy has not reckoned with our endurance as an agricultural nation, which will be a prime factor contributing to his defeat. Economically, China is capable of protracted resistance and cannot be conquered.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHINA FIGHTS ON

War Messages of Chiang Kai-shek

VOLUME I

Not all Westerners realize that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is a brilliant statesman, orator, and writer as well as a great soldier. He has led China in her tremendous struggle for freedom by his clear and forceful exposition of China's cause as well as by his military genius and his ability for organization and administration. His official speeches and writings during the war period should be in suitable form for Occidental readers, especially since the relation between China's war of independence and the world-wide defense against totalitarian aggression has become more apparent and significant.

At the request of Chinese friends, Dr. Frank Wilson Price has rendered into English all Generalissimo Chiang's public statements from October 10, 1938 to January 23, 1940. This is the period, often called the "second stage of the war," between the fall of Hankow and the full exposure of Wang Ching-wei's traitorous negotiations with Japan. During these fifteen critical months China consolidated her lines of resistance, established a firm military, political, and economic base in West China, launched her wartime program of industrialization and reconstruction, strengthened her position in international affairs, and successfully withstood the effects of Wang Ching-wei's defection. The outbreak of war in Europe did not change China's policy.

Through all the vicissitudes of the war, Generalissimo Chiang's confidence in China's ultimate victory and freedom has remained unshaken, and he has been able to communicate his faith and courage to the people of China through his speeches, writings, and actions. *China Fights On* is, therefore, an appropriate title for the present collection of the Generalissimo's messages.

Dr. Price is well-known as the translator of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's *Sun Min Chu I: Three Principles of the People*, published in 1927 under the auspices of the China Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. His work of translating Generalissimo Chiang's war messages into English is another outstanding contribution to international understanding.

THE CHINA PUBLISHING COMPANY
 CHUNGKING HONG KONG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE CHINA PUBLISHING COMPANY
THE CHINA INFORMATION PUBLISHING Co.
Morning Post Building, Hong Kong
P.O. Box 513

793.94 / 1669.6

Secretary of State Cordell Hull
Washington, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF RESEARCH & PUBLICATION
PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTION UNIT
MAY 20 1941

U. S. A.

Li

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

This telegram must be Chungking via N. R.
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated **FROM** Dated June 16, 1941
 to anyone. (Br)

Rec'd. 12:02 p. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington

RUSH.

241, June 16, 9 a. m.


Reference my No. 240, June 15, 3 p. m.

Military Attache in report to War Department has
 asserted that bombing was either criminal carelessness
 or deliberate attempt to bomb Embassy and gunboat. Naval
 Attache concurs in this view. Planes were Japanese Navy
 (repeat Navy) planes.

Sent to Department. Repeated to Peiping, Hankow,
 and Shanghai for Tokyo which offices, however, are re-
 requested not to use this information unless so instructed
 by the Department.

GAUSS

NPL



793.94/16683

PS/CMR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 20, 1941

~~FAS~~
~~SD~~
~~CC~~

~~CA~~
~~WAA~~

Despatch
 Hong Kong's No. 906, May 10, 1941.

According to the Consulate General's informant, who is believed to be a councillor under the Military Affairs Commission in Chungking:

The Japanese Army in South China consists of three divisions (20,000 men each) in Kwangtung, one division in Formosa, one division divided between Indochina and Fukien, and also a "Brigade" of approximately 10,000 men in each of Indochina, Hainan and Swatow, making a total of approximately 130,000 men.

Seven new Japanese Army divisions of fresh troops were being formed last month (April ?) to be numbered 51 to 57; there had been no increase in forces on Hainan or in Indochina in March or April.

793.94/16684

H77
 FE:Fales:MHP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 906

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HONG KONG, May 10, 1941.

Subject: Enclosing list purporting to
show Japanese army divisions
in South China.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

COPIES SENT TO
 C.N.I. AND M.I.D. 6/2/41
 in strict confidence R.F.K.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose, as being possibly
 of some slight value as a check against more de-
 tailed information of the same type from other
 1/ sources, a short list purporting to name the Japanese
 divisional units now in South China as of May 5, 1941.

The informant is nominally a broker in Hong
 Kong, but is believed actually to hold the rank of
 a councillor under the Military Affairs Commission
 in Chungking and serves as an intelligence officer
 under Admiral Chan Chak, who is stated to be the
 Chief of the Kuomintang Information Bureau in this
 city. The latter organization is mainly interested,
 it has been stated, in watching the activities of
 persons suspected of Communist or Trotskyite sym-
 pathies, and in keeping a close check on the poli-
 tical tendencies and thinking of members of the
 Kuomintang organization. The informant's status
 was verified by reference to the Hong Kong police.

The

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JUN 16 1941

DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS

WARD

C.N.I. & M.I.D.

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
 Department of State

JUN 23 1941

DIVISION OF

703.94/10884

PS/HH

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The Consulate General is submitting a statement of the information which he gave to a member of its staff only for what it may be worth.

Describing the list, the informant stated that each of the divisions listed were of approximately twenty thousand men, while the "independent brigades" each numbered between eight thousand and ten thousand men, usually the latter.

He asserted that the dispositions of the units listed had undergone no change in either March or April, with the possible exception of those in Formosa, to which island he believed one more division may have been sent during April.

According to his information, seven new divisions had been formed in the Japanese Army in the last month, to be numbered from 51 to 57. He stated that these divisions represent fresh troops, and not a partial re-organization of existing units. Their formation has not yet been completed, although it is believed possible, he stated, that the new division which is reported to have been sent to Formosa is either the 54th or the 55th.

Two new independent mixed brigades had also been formed in April, he stated, bringing the total number of such units up to twenty.

The informant asserted that there had been no increase in the Japanese forces stationed on Hainan during either March or April, nor in those stationed in French Indo-China. He added that to the best of his information there had been no changes in the

positions

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

positions of Japanese divisions anywhere in either
North or South China during April.

Respectfully yours,

John H. Bruins
John H. Bruins
American Consul

Enclosure:
1/ List, as stated.

In quintuplicate to Department;
Copy to Embassy, Chungking;
Copy to Embassy, Peiping;
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

800
RSW/g

✓ Carbon copies
Received

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 906, dated May 10, 1941, from John H. Bruins, American Consul at Hong Kong, on subject of "Enclosing list purporting to show Japanese army divisions in South China."

JAPANESE ARMY IN SOUTH CHINA

11th Division Formosa
18th Division Kwangtung
28th Division part Indo-China, part Fukien
38th Division Kwangtung
104th Division Kwangtung
1st Guards Independent Mixed Brigade Indo-China
2nd Guards Independent Mixed Brigade Hainan
14th Independent Mixed Brigade Swatow

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 19, 1941

JD:
 GA:
 WA:

Chungking's despatch 878, May 19, 1941.

The Embassy reports the resumption of serial attacks on Chungking, approximately 55 planes participating in each of the four raids from May 3 to May 16. Damage has been inconsiderable.

American property destroyed or damaged includes the American Methodist Mission, the American Church Mission, the number one plant of the Chungking Ice Company, and a motor car owned by the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company.

It appears that for the most part the Japanese have refrained from attacking industrial establishments on the Kialing and Yangtze Rivers, as well as the arsenals and airfields near Chungking.

Casualties have probably not exceeded 200 in killed and wounded. Progress has been made during the winter on air raid shelters which can now accommodate 380,000 persons. Fire hazards have been reduced and a repetition of previous conflagrations is not expected. No Chinese fighter planes have been observed, and anti-aircraft fire is negligible.

FE:Fales:FRE

793.94/16685

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 878.

Chungking, May 19, 1941

Subject: Resumption of Japanese Aerial
Attacks on Chungking.

Air mail

Confidential

7 A
 File
 [Signature]

For Disposition Check		Yes	No
Grade			
For	✓		
To field			
In U.S.A.		✓	
ONI : MID			

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence
 4/20/41 RCR

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that commencing on May 3, 1941, the second anniversary of the disastrous aerial bombardment of May 3, 1939, the Japanese air force resumed its large-scale aerial attacks on Chungking. According to information available to the Embassy, heavy military bombers based on air fields in the vicinity of Hankow are being utilized. As far as can be ascertained those planes have not been accompanied by fighter escorts. Two earlier small-scale attacks participated in by light bombers were made on Chungking and vicinity in January and March of this year.

Altogether four intensive attacks have been made on Chungking thus far in May, that is, on May 3, May 9, May 10 and May 16. Embassy observers counted 61 planes in the May 3 raid, 42 on May 9, 56 on May 10 and 63 on

FILED
 May 1941

793.04/18635

AS/HH

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AIR MAIL

- 2 -

May 16. These raids have been concentrated for the most part on the central-western district of the city and on the banking area on the narrow promontory between the Kialing and Yangtze rivers. In general, the attacks do not appear to have been as intensive as the bombardments of 1940. The invading planes are estimated to have generally flown at a height of about 10,000 feet, dropping their bombs over a wide area. As in 1939 and 1940 the attacks may be termed indiscriminate in character, although it must be said in all justification that the Japanese appear to have taken care so far to avoid attacks on the British and Soviet Embassies and on the south bank of the Yangtze where this mission is situated. It is difficult to perceive what particular objectives the Japanese may have had in mind with respect to the attacks that have thus far been carried out. Certainly they cannot have been military in nature because there are no purely military objectives to be attacked in the areas that have been bombed unless government offices and residences of officials and the electric power plant and the waterworks are regarded as military objectives.

The Embassy is glad to report that the damage inflicted by these 1941 raids has been inconsiderable, being confined in the main to destruction or partial destruction of government offices, residential structures and shop buildings. The waterworks and the power plant have suffered very slight damage, although the severance of power lines has rendered sections of the city lightless for several nights. Among the damaged buildings are those of the Chungking Municipal Government, the Garrison Commander's Headquarters, the Ministry of Education, the broadcasting studio and the Central Publicity Board. The residences of Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan, and Mr. Chang Kia-ngau, Minister of Communications, were completely destroyed, and many others damaged in varying degree. The Kialing House, the only hostel suitable for foreign guests in Chungking, was rendered temporarily uninhabitable as a result of the roof being blown off. The residence of the British Ambassador suffered extensive damage in one of the attacks, and a motor car belonging to the British Embassy was destroyed.

American property destroyed or damaged in the May raids included buildings of the American Methodist Mission and the American Church Mission located on the campus of the Chungking High School, the Number One Plant of the Chungking Ice Company, Inc., and a motor car owned by the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company. A direct hit was made on the large building of the Szechuan Salt Bank in the raid of May 16 but only slight damage was caused.

Insofar as the Embassy has been able to observe, the Japanese have refrained for the most part from attacks on industrial establishments located along the Kialing and Yangtze rivers, as well as the arsenals and air fields situated in the vicinity of Chungking.

Casualties

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AIR MAIL

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Casualties have not been heavy in the raids of this year. Altogether, the killed and wounded probably do not exceed 200 persons in number and the majority of these constitute police, firefighters and boatmen who feel obliged to remain on their boats in the rivers. The construction of dugouts was continued throughout the winter and, according to the Mayor of the Municipality of Chungking, 380,000 residents can now be accommodated in safety. In addition, several hundred motor vehicles, supplies, valuable equipment and records are stored in underground shelters. Efforts are being made again this year to reduce the population of Chungking to those actually needed; but experience has taught that it is difficult to persuade any appreciable number of people to leave the city.


Throughout the past winter the municipal authorities labored energetically in reducing fire hazards, establishing firelanes and widening the main thoroughfares. It seems unlikely that the disastrous conflagrations of 1939 and 1940 are likely to be repeated this summer.

The populace has by now come to take the summer aerial raids as a matter of course. There is no panic and anti-raid preparations have been perfected to a high degree. It is doubtful if the raids of the summer of 1941, which are expected to be intensive and sustained, will have any marked effect on a populace that has already had two years of actual experience with such attacks and has come to expect them.

It is regrettable, of course, that the weapons of retaliation against the invaders are not more numerous and effective. Thus far this year not a single Chinese fighter plane has been seen in the air to oppose the Japanese bombers. And while there is a small amount of anti-aircraft fire, it is far from sufficient in volume or accuracy to interfere seriously with the action of the invading bombers.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:


 Everett F. Drumright
 Second Secretary of Embassy

Original and two copies by air mail to the Department
 Two copies to the Department by air mail to Hong Kong
 Copy to Peiping by safe hand
 Copy to Tokyo by safe hand.

711.6

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MD TELEGRAM RECEIVED PLAIN
 DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 JUN 19 1941
 FROM Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.
 Dated June 16, 1941
 Rec'd 6:30 a.m., 17th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

831, 16th, 6 p.m.

Admiral Suetsugu, Chairman Cooperative Council

Imperial Rule Assistance Association, speaking before first of series meeting this body stated today issued soon demanding Japan's final decision are: settlement China incident, Southern problem and approaching American participation war. Referring to Tripartite Alliance as union powers aiming construct new world order and based upon imperial will, Suetsugu said, "If United States enters war Japan must be resolved take up arms for sake faith honor. Southern issue is turning point fate Great East Asia; Japan must not be satisfied present situation. Japan holds final key to world war; her task is not easy demands. Resolve through preparation."

Sent Department via Shanghai.

GREW

WSB

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 1107
 NO. Embassy China.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
 Shanghai, China, May 21, 1941.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

SUBJECT: Statement Made by Ambassador Honda at
Shanghai Advocating Extension of In-
creased Japanese Support to the Wang
Regime.

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 JUN 16 1941

THE HONORABLE
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
 WASHINGTON.

WASHINGTON.

Good
 STANTON
 QN.1 & MID

793.94/15687

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 542
 of May 10, giving the substance of a statement made by
 Ambassador Honda to Japanese press representatives when
 he passed through this city en route from Nanking to
 Tokyo. A translation of the statement, in full, as it
 1/ appears in the SHANGHAI EVENING POST AND MERCURY is en-
 closed.

It is believed that the statement will be of inter-
 est to the Department inasmuch as it sets forth the
 ideas and policies which Ambassador Honda since his re-
 turn to Tokyo has been urging upon various members of the
 Japanese Cabinet with a view to bringing about a settle-
 ment of the "China incident".

SUMMARY:

During the course of an interview granted by Ambassa-
 dor Honda to Japanese press representatives at Shanghai
 he declared that he was proceeding to Tokyo to discuss
 with government leaders the question of extending greater
 Japanese assistance to the Wang regime and of giving it
increased

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
 Department of State

DIVISION OF
 JUN 2 1941

PS/HH

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

increased political and economic authority. He rejected the idea of direct negotiation with General Chiang Kai-shek in an endeavor to bring about a settlement of the present "emergency". He declared that General Chiang, relying on British and American support, was in no mood to negotiate with Japan and believed in the efficacy of prolonged resistance. Mr. Honda also rejected possible mediation by the United States and indicated that mediation by Germany or any other country would be ineffectual. Ambassador Honda therefore, concluded that the only solution is to foster the Wang regime and give it wider powers and authority. He stated that representatives in China of the Japanese army, navy and Foreign Office were in agreement on this point. The Ambassador's views appear to have met with a favorable reception in Japan but locally have occasioned some surprise and are believed by some observers to indicate a new phase of Japan's China policy. Perhaps the explanation is simply that Japanese policy is variable rather than "immutable".

Mr. Honda opened the interview granted to Japanese press representatives at Shanghai by pointing out that the Japanese Government had instructed him to assist the healthy growth of the "National Government of reborn China" in accordance with the Sino-Nippon basic treaty concluded between General Nobuyuki Abe and Mr. Wang Ching-wei. Mr. Honda stated that he had received no instructions from the Japanese Government indicating any change in this policy. He declared, however, that unless this policy is carried out both "in letter and spirit" the results will prove contrary to the original purpose of strengthening "the Government of reborn China".

The Ambassador turned to a consideration of the question of "direct negotiation with Chungking" advocated by some, according to Mr. Honda, in their eagerness to settle the present emergency; such people are "fools" he declared. He then undertook to reveal the psychology of General Chiang Kai-shek or his supposed trend of thought in connection with the present Sino-Japanese conflict. General Chiang, he said, reasons that there is no necessity

for

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

for China to seek peace with Japan or to hasten the conclusion of the present hostilities. General Chiang is strengthened in this belief, according to Mr. Honda, by the support he is receiving from Great Britain and the United States. In this connection he mentioned the recent currency loan granted by the United States to support "fapi" and made the interesting statement that the granting of this loan had completely offset the effect of the recently concluded Russo-Japanese neutrality pact. He also referred to the existing schism between the Kuomintang and the Chinese communists and made particular reference to the attitude of the United States Government towards this matter. He informed his interviewers that the American Ambassador in March of this year had intimated to General Chiang that the differences between the Kuomintang and the communists were no concern of the United States. Furthermore, declared Mr. Honda, when President Roosevelt states that China is fighting for democracy and advises General Chiang to depend upon American support in his war of resistance against Japan, General Chiang is naturally encouraged to believe that he can not only fight the Japanese but can also suppress the communists.

Ambassador Honda also discussed the question of mediation by third powers in the Sino-Japanese conflict. He rejected the idea of mediation by the United States and expressed the opinion that such mediation would merely delay a settlement of the "emergency" and would encourage General Chiang to resist Japan. With reference to possible

mediation

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By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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mediation by Germany he said he feared that the Reich Government's influence in East Asia was not as great as it is in Europe and that whereas Chungking does not feel the direct pressure of Germany it does feel the influence exerted by the United States. As indicative of the "controlling power" of the United States, Mr. Honda asserted that a large part of the fortunes of the Soong family, including that of General Chiang, is deposited in banks in the United States and that the ability of the latter to freeze such funds constituted an important factor in the control exercised by the United States over the Chungking Government.

Mr. Honda summarized his views for the benefit of the Japanese representatives as follows: that direct negotiations with Chungking would invalidate the treaty concluded with Nanking and would constitute a breach of trust; that although the Chungking Government may be tired of war it has no intention at the present time of concluding peace with Japan but believes that a conclusion favorable to her will result from a prolongation of the conflict in China and developments in Europe; that the Chungking Government is willing to conclude peace only through the good offices of the United States, which would be a peace that Japan does not want; and finally that there is no possibility of the attainment of real peace through the mediation of any other power or powers. Mr. Honda concludes, therefore, that the only policy to pursue with a view to bringing about a settlement of the present "emergency", is to strengthen the "Wang Ching-wei government"

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ment". Of particular interest and significance is Ambassador Honda's statement that this policy has been agreed upon by representatives in China of the Japanese Army, Navy and Foreign Office. Ambassador Honda's purpose in visiting Tokyo was apparently to convince Japanese Government leaders of the efficacy of the views held by senior Japanese officials in central China and to urge their speedy adoption and implementation.

News reports emanating from Japan appear to indicate that Mr. Honda has met with some success and the Japanese press, in general, seems to have chorused approval of his views. Locally, this development has occasioned some surprise inasmuch as it was generally believed that following the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese neutrality pact, Japanese policy would be directed toward the early establishment of political and economic hegemony in the South Seas and that while a settlement of the "China incident" would naturally contribute greatly toward the consummation of these plans it was hardly to be expected that such settlement could be effected by the dissipation of Japan's strength in further large scale military operations in China and in an attempt to build up the economic and political strength of the Wang regime. Furthermore, according to reports current in Shanghai, Germany has been most anxious that Japan should terminate hostilities in China to free her strength for utilization against Singapore and the Dutch East Indies but has stressed that this end can only be achieved by the early

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 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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early conclusion of peace with General Chiang Kai-shek. It is conjectured by some observers that this development indicated the abandonment, perhaps only temporarily, of the much publicized "southward movement". Perhaps the explanation is simply that Japanese policies are variable rather than "immutable".

Respectfully yours,

Frank P. Lockhart
 Frank P. Lockhart
 American Consul General

Enclosure:

- 1/- Ambassador Honda's statement as quoted in translation, by SHANGHAI EVENING POST AND MERCURY.

800
 EFS.BA

In Quintuplicate to the Department.
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Embassy, Nanking.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to Despatch No. _____ of May 21, 1941,
from the American Consul General at Shanghai on the
subject: "Statement made by Ambassador Honda at
Shanghai advocating extension of increased Japanese
support to the Wang regime".

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Shanghai, China.

The Honda Interview

TOKYO'S REPRESENTATIVE TO NANKING ASKS THAT JAPAN FORGET PEACE WITH CHIANG AND STRENGTHEN THE WANG REGIME

By KUMATARO HONDA
(Osaka Mainichi)

(There follows in full the statement of Mr. Honda given here in Shanghai on May 14 to Mr. Nobukazu Tachibana, bureau manager of the Osaka Mainichi and Tokyo Nichi, in an exclusive interview. Mr. Honda is now in Tokyo conferring with Japanese Government leaders. It has been stated that Foreign Minister Matsuoka, following talks with Mr. Honda, agrees with him that peace with Chiang Kai-shek is impossible and not to be considered.—Ed. note)

I AM a veteran war horse whose heart and soul are devoted to the cause. I do not care a whit what will become of me. Nor do I consider my personal interests or safety. My sole concern is to forge straight ahead for the settlement of the emergency.

The Government has instructed me to help the National Government of re-born China make healthy growth in accordance with the Sino-Nippon basic treaty concluded between General Nobuyuki Abe, my predecessor, and President Wang Ching-wei, based on the Cabinet decision reached in November last year.

By so doing Nippon, of course, wants to expedite the settlement of the emergency.

The situation since has not warranted any change in our Government's policy. Nor can there be any necessity. As long as I receive no instructions regarding the change of policy, I am determined to continue my efforts to help the Nanking Government grow.

The matter of helping the National Government of re-born China has been one of the outstanding national policies. Unless this policy is carried out in letter and spirit, the results will prove contrary to the original purpose of strengthening the Government of re-born China.

Diplomacy can never achieve results overnight. All the high-sounding treaties would be worth nil unless they produced the desired results. The Sino-Nippon basic treaty concluded on November 30 consists of plans and specifications for new Sino-Nippon relations on the basis of the East Asia new order.

Unless the foundation is secured with reinforced concrete, all plans and specifications, no matter how well laid out they may be, are merely scraps of paper and castles in the air. It is up to Architect Nippon to construct and complete a large modern building called the "National Government of Re-born China."

Those who discuss the prospects of the National Government without taking the execution of plans and specifications for construction into consideration do not know what they are talking about. I am convinced that only by helping the Wang regime with this innate conviction can we settle the China Emergency.

In case there are any people who in their over-eagerness to settle the emergency seek so-called direct negotiations with Chungking, it is difficult to conceive of greater fools. Such a conception naturally undermines our basic principle.

I may as well present to my compatriots some information I have on hand.

Chungking demands as a prerequisite for peace restoration the complete withdrawal of Nippon forces from China.

A man from a third power who met Chiang Kai-shek several times in his recent visit to Chungking was quoted as saying that Chiang told him that if Japan desires peace, she should negotiate with the United States, declaring that he has no idea of even considering a direct proposal from Nippon.

BELOW is the psychology Chiang Kai-shek undoubtedly entertains at present:

"As long as the war in Europe shows growing indications of developing into a world conflict, it is best for China to watch developments. What necessity is there of expediting peace negotiations? At worst, the Kono statement will not impose severe terms on us. Why not continue a united front against Japan with the Anglo-American democracies?"

Some people at home are inclined to over-rate the Chungking-Red schism. I assure you Chiang is not in a position to bring this schism to a showdown.

I understand that Nelson T. Johnson, American Ambassador, told Chiang on March 18 that there is no concern of the United States whether Chungking collaborates or splits with the Chinese Reds, and that in either case the United States will continue to uphold the anti-Japanese Chungking regime.

This assurance from the United States made Chiang decide on a compromise with the Reds.

Of course, Chungking and the Chinese Reds will not mix at heart; but when Chiang is assured by America that he is fighting for democracy and advised by President Roosevelt to depend on American aid, Chiang believes he can continue his anti-Nippon resistance and the suppression of the Chinese Reds at the same time.

The construction of American airdromes in Burma, the shipment of airplanes, and the granting of \$50-million for stabilizing the fapi have stiffened the attitude of Chungking toward Nippon.

Because the credit was granted immediately after Nippon and the U.S.S.R. concluded the Pact of Neutrality, it completely offsets the adverse effect of the pact.

Chungking's reliance on the United States for peace negotiations indicates that Chiang believes in the ultimate reverse of Nippon.

Chungking's intention of opening negotiations with Nippon

The Honda Interview

(Concluded from Page 3)

strong an influence in East Asia as in Europe.

As it is, Chungking does not feel the direct pressure of the Reich in East Asia whereas the controlling influence of the United States and Britain on Chungking is firmly established.

If some elements in Chungking seek peace with Nippon in a form contrary to the intention of the United States, their efforts will be actually subjected to the approval of the United States. Not only that, but a large part of the fortunes of the Sung family, including that of Chiang Kai-shek, H. H. Kung, and T. V. Suifu, is deposited in banks in the United States.

At this time when the United States Government is reported to be considering the freezing of foreign property in the United States, it is unthinkable that Chungking will act against the intention of the United States.

We must know the extent of the United States' controlling power on Chiang Kai-shek and his Chungking regime.

IN this connection, we must also bear in mind the following considerations:

1. Direct negotiations with Chungking will result in invalidating the Nippon-Chinese fundamental treaty adopted in the Cabinet meeting in November, 1940, and sanctioned by H.M. the Emperor.

2. The time to open direct negotiations with Chungking has already passed. Moreover, for Nippon, which has recognized the National Government at Nanking in accordance with the basic pact, it constitutes a breach of international trust to enter into direct negotiations.

3. Chungking at present has no intention of concluding peace with Nippon although being tired of resistance against Nippon. Chungking apparently expects that conditions for the solution of the China Emergency will become favorable to Chungking by merely protracting the emergency. Chungking takes into account the future development of the European war.

4. Chungking is willing to conclude peace with Nippon only through the good offices of the United States. Such peace, needless to say, is the peace we do not want.

5. There is no possibility of real peace between Nippon and China arranged by a third power or powers.

The above considerations lead us to conclude that our sole policy for the settlement of the emergency is to strengthen the Wang Ching-wei Government.

This measure enables us to materialize the contents of the basic treaty in detail and at the same time contributes to the National Government's cause of the reconstruction of China as its principal objective. To that end, it is necessary for the Government to gain the people's sympathy with its political aim and seek the people's understanding of the Government's enthusiastic aspiration concerning the reconstruction of China.

The National Government at present faces a difficult political question as a result of the depression of the people's living due to the rise of the rice price in Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Chekiang provinces.

Ernest efforts are being made to stabilize the people's living in the regions. Similar endeavors in other fields are indispensable to the development of the National Government.

The march of the Wang Ching-wei Government on the road to

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ing the Wang regime with this innate conviction can we settle the China Emergency.

In case there are any people who in their over-eagerness to settle the emergency seek so-called direct negotiations with Chungking, it is difficult to conceive of greater fools. Such a conception naturally undermines our basic principle.

I may as well present to my compatriots some information I have on hand.

assured by America that he is fighting for democracy and advised by President Roosevelt to depend on American aid, Chiang believes he can continue his anti-Nippon resistance and the suppression of the Chinese Reds at the same time.

The construction of American airdromes in Burma, the shipment of airplanes, and the granting of \$50-million for stabilizing the fapi have stiffened the attitude of Chungking toward Nippon.

Because the credit was granted immediately after Nippon and the U.S.S.R. concluded the Pact of Neutrality, it completely offset the adverse effect of the pact.

Chungking's reliance on the United States for peace negotiations indicates that Chiang believes in the ultimate reverse of Nippon.

Chungking's intention of opening negotiations with Nippon through the medium of the United States will result not only in delaying the settlement of the China Emergency but also in strengthening Chungking's resistance to Nippon.

Some circles in this connection advocate the restoration of peace between Nippon and Chungking through the good offices of a third power other than the United States. The possibility of Germany is mentioned. However, even if Germany undertakes to mediate between Nippon and Chungking, it is doubted whether she will be able to exercise as

(Please Turn to Page 10)

basic treaty in detail and at the same time contributes to the National Government's cause of the reconstruction of China as its principal objective. To that end, it is necessary for the Government to gain the people's sympathy with its political aim and seek the people's understanding of the Government's enthusiastic aspiration concerning the reconstruction of China.

The National Government at present faces a difficult political question as a result of the depression of the people's living due to the rise of the rice price in Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Chekiang provinces.

Ernest efforts are being made to stabilize the people's living in the regions. Similar endeavors in other fields are indispensable to the development of the National Government.

The march of the Wang Ching-wei Government on the road to total peace in China will be guaranteed only by stabilizing the people's living and strengthening the foundation of the regime.

It is expected that the strengthening of the National Government will eventually bring about a situation stimulating the amalgamation of the Chungking regime with the Wang Ching-wei Government.

Such being the circumstances in China, Nippon should redouble her efforts in supporting the National Government in sympathy with its enthusiastic aspiration for the reconstruction of China.

The agreement of opinion has been reached on that point among the representations of the Nippon Army, Navy, and Foreign Office in China. The three authorities have also agreed on the principle of concrete measures for the increased support of the National Government.

The purpose of my return to Tokyo is to confer with the authorities of the Nippon Government regarding the principle.

I earnestly desire that the settlement of the China Emergency will be further promoted by the adoption of the principle. Supporting the common opinion of the representations of the Army, Navy, and Foreign Office, other Nippon officials and private persons in China expect much from the result of my conversations in Tokyo.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

May 12. One fragment broke a window in the bedroom of the consular residence.

Please bring the information in this letter to the immediate attention of the Japanese authorities concerned, with the urgent request that stringent instructions be issued to prevent further attacks by members of the Japanese armed forces that may endanger American lives and property.

It is requested that the attack on May 12 be investigated without delay and that I be informed of the results of the investigation.

On behalf of the American Government, the American Consul at Kunming, Mr. Crapuchettes and Mr. McGeary I reserve all rights in respect of losses or damages sustained as a result of action by the Japanese armed forces.

I have the honor to be,

Sir and dear Colleague,

Your obedient servant,

Frank P. Lockhart
American Consul General

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MH.BA

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


No. 101NO. Embassy, China.DIVISION OF FOREIGN
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, JUN 24 1941

Shanghai, China

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

May 20, 1941.



May 20, 1941.

SUBJECT: Damage to residences of the American Consul,
Clerk Stanley A. McGeary of the Consulate,
and Mr. Crapuchettes, American citizen, dur-
ing Japanese air raid on Kunming on May 12,
1941.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to the telegram of May 14, 3 p.m. from the American Consulate General at Hongkong transmitting telegram no. 11 of May 13, 9 a.m. from the Consul at Kunming on the above subject, and 1/ to enclose a copy of the letter in regard to the matter which this office addressed on May 16 to the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai.

Reference was made to the Consulate General's previous letter of April 15 reporting damage to the residence of Clerk Stanley A. McGeary during the bombing of Kunming on April 8. It was pointed out that during the bombing on May 12 Mr. McGeary's residence was again hit, the greater part of the compound being destroyed and his residence being rendered barely habitable; that the residence of Mr. Crapuchettes, an American citizen, was partly demolished; and that a bomb fragment broke through a window into the bedroom of the Consul's residence.

703.94/16688

PS/HH


JUN 27 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

idence. It was requested that the matter be investigated and instructions issued to prevent further attacks that might endanger American lives and property. All rights were reserved on behalf of the American Government, the American Consul, Mr. Crapuchettes and Mr. McGeary.

Respectfully yours,


Frank P. Lockhart
American Consul General

Enclosure:

Copy of letter to Japanese Consul
General dated May 16.

350
EA

In triplicate to the Department.
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Hankow.
Copy to Consulate, Kunming.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to Despatch No. 111, May 20, 1941, from the American Consul General at Shanghai, on the subject: "Damage to residences of the American Consul, Clerk Stanley A. McGeary of the Consulate, and Mr. Crapuchettes, American citizen, during Japanese air raid on Kunming on May 12, 1941".

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Shanghai, China

May 16, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

I have the honor to inform you that according to information from the American Consul at Kunming (昆明) the properties of Mr. E. L. Crapuchettes and Mr. Stanley McGeary, American citizens, were damaged during the Japanese aerial bombardment of Kunming on May 12.

It will be recalled that in the letter I addressed to you on April 15 I said that Mr. McGeary's residence had been damaged during a Japanese air raid on April 8. It was also pointed out that Mr. McGeary is a clerk in the American Consulate at Kunming. The attack on May 12 was therefore the second on Mr. McGeary's residence. It is understood that in the second attack the greater part of the compound in which Mr. McGeary lives was destroyed and that his residence is now barely habitable.

Furthermore, according to the report by the Consul at Kunming, bomb fragments again struck the compound of the American Consulate in that city during the attack on

May

T. Horiuchi, Esquire,
 Consul General for Japan,
 Shanghai.

0525

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
 OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY
 Tokyo, May 21, 1941.


No. 5605.

SUBJECT: BOMBING OF KUNMING ON MAY 12, 1941.

793.94/16689

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 MAY 21 11 17 AM



For Distribution Check	
Grade	Initials
✓	✓

793.94/16689

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

With reference to the Embassy's telegram no. 699,
 May 17, 2 p.m., reporting that a first person note had
 been addressed to the Japanese Foreign Minister on the
 subject of the Japanese air raid on Kunming of May 12, 1941,
 1/ I have the honor to transmit, as a matter of record, a copy
 of my communication to the Foreign Minister of May 17, 1941.

PS/CMR


FILED
 JUN 30 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

My note stressed the unfortunate effect upon American public opinion of these repeated bombings of the American Consulate in Kunming and other American properties in that city, with consequent danger to American lives, and reminded the Foreign Minister that the American Government looks to the Japanese Government to take such steps as may be required to prevent further endangering of American lives and American property in China.

Respectfully yours,



350
CAC:C

Joseph C. Grew.,

Enclosure:

1/ As stated above.

Copy to Embassy, Peiping;
Copy to Embassy, Chungking;
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai;
Copy to Consulate, Kunming.

Original and 2 copies to Department.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch
 no. 5605 dated May 21, 1941,
 from the Embassy at Tokyo.

EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, May 17, 1941.

No. 1802.

Excellency:

With reference to my note no. 1793 of May 6, 1941, concerning repeated indiscriminate bombing of Kunming by Japanese aircraft, and the consequent danger to American lives and damage to American property, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the American Consul at Kunming has reported that the Consulate was again damaged during a Japanese air raid on May 12, 1941. Fragments of bombs were scattered in the Consulate compound and one piece broke through a window into a residence bedroom.

Moreover, during this same raid, the larger part of the compound occupied by Mr. Stanley McGeary, an American clerk of the Consulate, was destroyed and his residence so damaged as to render it barely habitable, and for the third time recently the China Inland Mission, where a number of Americans live, was damaged and the residence there of Mr. E. L. Crapuchettes, an American citizen, was partly demolished.

I find it most regrettable that, although every effort has been made to impress upon the Japanese Government and officials the importance attached by my Government to the safety of American officials and citizens residing for legitimate reasons in Kunming and other localities in China and to the security of American property in that country, the activities of the Japanese air forces continue to endanger American

lives

His Excellency
 Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka,
 His Imperial Japanese Majesty's
 Minister for Foreign Affairs,
 etc., etc., etc.,
 Tokyo.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

lives and to inflict serious damage upon American property. Your Excellency must realize that the cumulative effect upon American public opinion of these repeated bombings of the American Consulate at Kunming and other American properties in that city cannot be otherwise than most unfortunate.

In view of the foregoing, I am obliged to remind Your Excellency that the American Government looks to the Japanese Government to take such steps as may be required to prevent further endangering of American lives and property in China.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

JOSEPH C. GREW.

0529

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1277
A 207-124
H file P FT
7
MMA
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GMW

GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated June 17, 1941

Rec'd 10:24 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

June 17, 7 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
4/1/41 8510

Rear Admiral Risaburo Fujita, Japanese Naval officer at Shanghai, called, in uniform and accompanied by an aide, on the American Assistant Naval Attache, Major Williams, and read to him, on behalf of Admiral Shimada, Japanese Commander-in-Chief of the China Seas fleet, the following statement:

73.94
"It has been reported that two bombs were dropped near the American Embassy by mistake during the aerial bombardment on Chungking on 15th June and, according to the newspapers, that accordingly Military Attache's office was damaged.

I am instructed by Admiral Shimada to state that it is highly regrettable that such an incident took place and asks you to convey to your Ambassador that the action was wholly unintentional." Admiral Fujita stated that he wished to emphasize Admiral Shimada's

regret

733.94/16690

PS/CAR

166

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1278

-2- June 17, 7 p.m. from Shanghai via N. R.

regret that the incident took place and asked especially that the American Ambassador be informed that the action was wholly unintentional.

Major Williams made no comment except to say that he would report the matter to me and furnish a copy of the statement for transmission to Ambassador Gauss.

Sent to Chungking. Repeated to Department, Peiping and Tokyo.

LOCKHART

RR

0531

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 3102 Peiping, China, May 2, 1941.



Subject: Bombing of the Assemblies of God
Mission - Damage caused the resi-
dence of Mr. McGeary.

Copy in FE (396)

DIVISION OF FOREIGN
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION
JUN 30 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE



For Discontinuation Check		Yes	No
Grade	To be held in U.S.A.		



The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the telegram dated
May 1, 1 p.m., addressed to the Department by the
Embassy at Chungking, transmitting a telegram of April
30, 11 a.m., from the Consulate at Kunming (Yunnanfu),
in regard to the demolition of the Assemblies of God
Mission and the loss to the property of Mr. H. C. Osgood
during the Japanese air raid over Kunming on April 8,
1941, and the damage suffered by the residence of Clerk
Stanley A. McGeary of the Consulate during the Japanese

air

JUL 2 1941

FILED

PS/DM

793.94/16691

793.94/16592

793.94/16597

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 2 -

air raid of April 29, 1941, and to transmit herewith as a matter of record a copy of a communication on the subject, under date May 2, 1941, addressed by this Embassy to the Japanese Embassy at Peiping.

In the above-mentioned communication it was urgently requested that the Japanese Embassy apprise the military authorities concerned as soon as possible that any indiscriminate bombing of Kunming inevitably endangers American interests.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:


Robert L. Smyth
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

No. 1. Note to Japanese Embassy,
Peiping, dated May 2, 1941.

Original and 2 copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.
Copy to Consulate, Kunming (Yunnanfu).

350 McGeary/350 Osgood/360-Assemblies
of God-Kunming.

ARR/es

0533

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no.
3102, May 2, 1941, from Embassy,
Peiping, - "Bombing of the Assemblies
of God Mission - Damage caused the
residence of Mr. McGeary".

Peiping, May 2, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

I have the honor to inform you of the receipt of
a message from the American Consulate at Kunming
(Yunnanfu) to the effect that during the Japanese aerial
bombardment of Kunming on April 8, 1941, the (American)
Assemblies of God Mission, near the Great East Gate, was
demolished, resulting in a property loss of \$500 United
States currency to Mr. H. C. Osgood, an American citizen.
This Mission compound was plainly marked on the map of
American property in Kunming forwarded to your Embassy
on November 2, 1938.

The message from the Consulate at Kunming also
states that the China Inland Mission property suffered
a direct hit during the Japanese air raid of April 29,
1941, but fortunately American citizens resident in the
compound have not reported any property losses. During
this

Y. Tsuchida, Esquire,
Counselor of Embassy,
Embassy of Japan,
Peiping.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

this same air raid, the residence of Mr. Stanley A. McGeary, a clerk in the Consulate, was again badly shaken up, causing plaster to fall and breaking much window glass. It will be recalled in this connection that, in this Embassy's communication of April 14, 1941, you were informed of the damage done to the China Inland Mission and the residence of Mr. McGeary during the Japanese air raid of April 6, 1941.

It is urgently requested that the Japanese military authorities be apprised as soon as possible of the substance of the above, and that they again be cautioned that any indiscriminate bombing of Nanking inevitably endangers American interests.


All rights are reserved in respect of losses and damages suffered by American interests mentioned in this communication.

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to you, Sir and dear colleague, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Ambassador:

Robert L. Smyth
First Secretary of Embassy

ARR/es



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 3102 Peiping, China, May 2, 1941.

Subject: Bombing of the Assemblies of God
Mission - Damage caused the resi-
dence of Mr. McGeary.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the telegram dated May 1, 1 p.m., addressed to the Department by the Embassy at Chungking, transmitting a telegram of April 30, 11 a.m., from the Consulate at Kunming (Yunnanfu), in regard to the demolition of the Assemblies of God Mission and the loss to the property of Mr. H. C. Osgood during the Japanese air raid over Kunming on April 8, 1941, and the damage suffered by the residence of Clerk Stanley A. McGeary of the Consulate during the Japanese

air

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

air raid of April 29, 1941, and to transmit herewith as a matter of record a copy of a communication on the subject, under date May 2, 1941, addressed by this Embassy to the Japanese Embassy at Peiping.

In the above-mentioned communication it was urgently requested that the Japanese Embassy apprise the military authorities concerned as soon as possible that any indiscriminate bombing of Kunming inevitably endangers American interests.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Robert L. Smyth
 First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

No. 1. Note to Japanese Embassy,
 Peiping, dated May 2, 1941.

Original and 2 copies to Department.
 Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
 Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
 Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai
 Copy to Consulate, Kunming (Yunnanfu).

350 McGeary/350 Osgood/360-Assemblies
 of God-Kunming

ARR/es

es

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no.
 3102, May 2, 1941, from Embassy,
 Peiping, - "Bombing of the Assembly
 of God Mission - Damage caused the
 residence of Mr. McTeary".

Peiping, May 2, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

I have the honor to inform you of the receipt of a message from the American Consulate at Kunming (Yunnanfu) to the effect that during the Japanese aerial bombardment of Kunming on April 8, 1941, the (American) Assembly of God Mission, near the Great East Gate, was demolished, resulting in a property loss of 1500 United States currency to Mr. H. C. Good, an American citizen. This Mission compound was plainly marked on the map of American property in Kunming forwarded to your Embassy on November 9, 1938.

The message from the Consulate at Kunming also states that the China Inland Mission property suffered a direct hit during the Japanese air raid of April 29, 1941, but fortunately American citizens resident in the compound have not reported any property losses. During

this

Y. Tsuchida, Esquire,

Counselor of Embassy,

Embassy of Japan,

Peiping.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

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It is urgently requested that the Japanese military authorities be apprised as soon as possible of the substance of the above, and that they again be cautioned that any indiscriminate bombing of Kunming inevitably endangers American interests.

All rights are reserved in respect of losses and damages suffered by American interests mentioned in this communication.

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to you, Sir and dear Colleague, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Ambassador:

Robert L. Smyth
First Secretary of Embassy

ARR/es

22

0539

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RS Hong Kong via N.R.
 This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be- Dated June 17, 1941
 fore being communicated FROM
 to anyone. (br) Rec'd 12:27 p.m., 18th

SUBJECT: COMMUNICATED ORALLY

TO ONI AND MDD 6/19/41 JD

Secretary of State, U.S. Liaison Office

Washington.

COPIES IN PARAPHRASE
 SENT TO O.N.I. AND
 M.I.D. IN CONFIDENCE
 6/21/41 REK

209, June 17, 10 p.m.

British naval intelligence after checking with
 their Shanghai office and with Chinese sources are
 reasonably certain that a Japanese force of 27 transports
 and 21 destroyers was off Chekiang Coast about 28 de-
 grees north and 122 degrees east at 10 p.m., June 12.
 Since then British have been trying with limited des-
 troyer and air reconnaissance to determine later where-
 abouts and destination of this force. They are fairly
 sure that it has not gone southward anywhere near Hong
 Kong and are inclined to believe that about one division
 is being transported either to Formosa or to Hainan by
 a circuitous route. They are also inclined to (?) the
 large destroyer convoy is one of the pointless maneuvers
 in which the Japanese occasionally indulge.

American motorship POTTER had strong searchlights
 turned on her by four unidentified vessels at 11 p.m.,
 June 16 about 50 miles northeast of Hong Kong but was
 not stopped.

Local

793.94/16692

PS/CMR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-, #209, from Hong Kong, via N.R., June 17, 1941; rec'd
12:27 p.m., 18th

Local authorities believe these vessels were not a part
of the larger force above mentioned.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking,
Peiping, Shanghai and Manila.

BRUINS

JRL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 209) of June 17, 1941 from the American Consulate General at Hong Kong reads substantially as follows:

After checking with Chinese sources and with the Shanghai office of the British naval intelligence, the British naval intelligence authorities at Hong Kong feel reasonably sure that at 8 o'clock on the evening of June 12 a Japanese force consisting of 21 destroyers and 27 transports was off the coast of Chekiang Province about 28 degrees north and 122 degrees east. With limited air and destroyer reconnaissance the British have since that time been attempting to learn the later location of this force and its destination. The British naval intelligence feels fairly certain that the Japanese force has not proceeded toward the south anywhere near Hong Kong and is inclined to the opinion that approximately one division is being carried by round-about route either to Hainan or Formosa. The British naval intelligence are inclined also to (?) the large convoy of destroyers is one of the pointless maneuvers which the Japanese carry on from time to time. It is believed by authorities in Hong Kong that four unidentified ships, which at 11 o'clock on the evening of June 16 turned strong search lights on the American motorship Potter about 50 miles to the northeast of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. H. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

of Hong Kong, were not a part of the abovementioned larger
Japanese force.

The motorship Potter was not stopped.

29C
FE:ESC:LJH
6-20-41.

10
FE

054

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WT

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased ^{FROM} FOOCHOW VIA N. R.
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

Dated June 18, 1941

URGENT COMMUNICATION
 6/19/41 30
 Secretary of State,

Washington,

June 18, 6 p.m.

Reference is made to my telegram dated June 10,

7 p.m.

I have just been informed by Mr. C. G. G. Pearson,
 the Local Associate District Director of Salt Admini-
 stration, that he has received from the Chinese
 Government instructions to break off negotiations
 with the Japanese authorities who wish to arrange
 through him for the movement of salt from the vicinity
 of Foochow to the Chinese controlled interior of this
 province. He states that despite an earlier informal
 intimation to the contrary the Japanese appear not to
 expect him to arrange for shipment to Foochow from the
 unoccupied interior of timber for which the salt was
 to be exchanged.

As Mr. Pearson also has been ordered to proceed
 to Chinese controlled territory it would appear that
 the Japanese plan for exploitation of this area,

referred

JUN 27 1941

JUN 27 1941

COPY TO D. O. A.

793.94
 note
 793.51 Salt
 Funds

793.94/16675

PS/L-2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- From Foochow via N. R. June 18, 1941, 6 p.m.

referred to in my telegram under reference, is not likely to prove possible of fulfillment.

Sent to Peiping. Repeated to the Department and Chungking. Peiping, please repeat to Tokyo.

RICE

EMB

0545

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

GMW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY
 Tokyo
 Dated June 19, 1941
 Rec'd 4:23 a.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
 MR. HORNBECK
 JUN 21 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

842, June 19, 1 p.m.

Embassy's 830, June 16, 9 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 7/29/41

Bombing of American Embassy Chungking.

The Foreign Minister's reply to my representations, dated June 18, was transmitted this morning. After acknowledging receipt of my note of June 16, he states that "stray bombs" were dropped, on signal from the squadron leader, from a plane which had straggled out of formation, and he surmises that these bombs were those which caused the "accident". He states, "The Imperial Government consider the matter as extremely regrettable." In closing, he states that Japanese officers and men always take great precautions not to damage American property, that he has again urged them to take added precautions, and he requests that consideration again be given to moving the U.S.S. TUTUILA to a safety zone as has been requested on several occasions.

A full translation of the note will be forwarded via Shanghai.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Chungking and Peiping.

PEG

GREW

793.94

703.04/10682

FILED
 JUL 1 1941

0546

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTIAL PLAIN

Department of State

"Br"

Washington, NAVAL RADIO

June 29, 1941.

Charge to

\$

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN) VIA SHANGHAI.

INFO: AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING.
 AMEMBASSY, PEIPING.

350

Your 842, June 19, 1 p.m.

If suitable occasion arises the Department desires that the Minister for Foreign Affairs be informed that the American naval vessel at Chungking is there in the service of the United States, that it has full right repeat right and ample reason for being there, that it is of special service to the American Embassy, and that your Government has no repeat no intention of removing it. Incidentally, it is in a place declared by responsible Japanese authorities immune from bombings. The Department must, therefore, reiterate the expectation set forth in its telegram 271 of July 16, 1940, 6 p.m., that the Japanese Government will issue sufficiently strict and effective instructions to insure that the Embassy office and the vessel may not repeat not again be endangered by Japanese aerial operations.

Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Chungking and Peiping.

793.94/16694

FE:WRP:OJL

Enciphered by

PA/H:SKH

Sent by operator

M.,

19

793.94/16694

PS/AD

PA/H

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ml

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased before
 being communicated to anyone
 (SC)

Tokyo


Dated June 18, 1941

Rec'd 4:53 p.m. 19th

Secretary of State

Washington

840, June 18, 8 p.m.



793.94/16695
 With reference to paragraph number two of Embassy's
 793.94/16661
 776, June 6, 3 p.m., the debate over the question of the
 treatment to be accorded Wang Ching Wei has apparently
 ended in a compromise. Wang was received upon his arrival
 in Tokyo yesterday morning as "Chairman of the Nationalist
 Government", but yesterday afternoon he assumed for a
 period of 24 hours the status of "Chief of State of China"
 and moved from the Chinese Embassy to one of the detached
 palaces. He will be received this morning by the Emperor
 and entertained at a state luncheon at the Imperial Palace.
 This afternoon he will revert to the status of "chairman"
 and will return from the detached palace to reside at the
 Chinese Embassy.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Shanghai;
 Shanghai please repeat to Chungking.

GREW

KLP

HNS

JUN 24 1941

FILED

Confidential File
 PS/HH

0548

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 X CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Department of State

Collect { Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

June 17, 1941

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
 It should be carefully preserved before
 being communicated to anyone. *Br.*

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO.

336

One. Your 830, June 16, 9 p.m. We appreciate
 your prompt representations to the Minister for
 Foreign Affairs which have the hearty approval of
 this Government.

Two. You are authorized in your discretion to
 mention orally and informally to Mr. Matsuoka or
 other appropriate Japanese officials the opinions
 of the Naval and Military Attachés contained in
 Chungking's 241, June 16, 9 a.m.

JUN 23 1941

FILED

PS/PJ

Enciphered by FE:WRP:LJH

Sent by operator M., 19 41

CR
 JUN 17 1941 PM

0549

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1281

RS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (A)

Tokyo

Dated May 16, 1941

FROM

Rec'd 1:00 p.m.

SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY

TO ONI AND MID

Secretary of State, LIAISON OFFICE

Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

689, May 16, 6 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Embassy's 663, May 10, 5 p.m. and 684 May 15, 9 a.m.

The French ambassador who called on the Foreign


Minister on May 14 informs me in strict confidence that Mr.

Matsuoka made the following statement in connection with

the several interviews which have been given out recently

by the Japanese Ambassador to China:

Mr. Matsuoka claimed that he had been largely in-
 strumental in bringing about the flight of Wang Ching Wai
 from Chungking. He therefore felt that he had been under
 obligation to support in every way possible Wang's efforts
 to establish and strengthen his regime in Nanking. However,
 in view of Wang's attitude toward Japan he believed that
 Wang had now no further claim on Mr. Matsuoka for support.
 It was now his opinion that General Chiang Kai Shek was the
 only person in China with sufficient influence to carry out
 any arrangement which might be made with Japan toward ter-
 minating the present conflict. Although there were a large
 number



790.94/16537

PC/ST/PU

0550

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-, #689, from Tokyo, May 16, 1941; 1:00 p.m.

number of persons both Chinese and nationals of third countries in touch with the Japanese authorities as well as with the Chinese authorities in Chungking none of these well meaning persons had been authorized to make any proposition on behalf of Japan. Nevertheless he was prepared at some opportune moment to entrust some one who enjoys the confidence of both sides to approach the Chinese with some proposal satisfactory to Japan.

Sent to Department; repeated to Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Chungking.

GREW

HPD

0551

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6/24
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 1941
 Department of State

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AF

PLAIN

FROM Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.

Dated June 19, 1941

Rec'd 9:25 a.m.; 21st

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

851, nineteenth, 9 p.m.

Embassy's 842, nineteenth, 1 p.m.

Bombing of American Embassy Chungking.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 6/23/41 TEK

793.94/16608

PC/L

793.94

The Embassy's translation of note no. 69/American, dated June 18 received today from the Foreign Office follows: "Excellency: I have the honor to state that I have carefully perused the contents of Your Excellency's note, dated June 16, 1941, stating that according to a report from the American Ambassador at Chungking, about five bombs were dropped at points within a distance of from one hundred to three hundred yards from the American Embassy at Chungking and the American Man-of-War TUTUILA during the bombing of Chungking by Japanese aircraft on the afternoon of June 15; that the office of the American Assistant Military Attache and the Embassy Chancery were damaged; and that the office of the Standard Oil Company near the Ambassador's residence and Chancery

was

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 851, nineteenth, 9 p.m. from Tokyo

was also damaged slightly. Your Excellency's note also contained a protest, in accordance with instructions from Your Excellency's Government, with respect to the endangering of the personnel and property of the American Embassy at Chungking by Japanese aircraft.

LOCKHART

ALC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AF

PLAIN

FROM

Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.

Dated June 19, 1941

Rec'd 9:29 a.m.; 21st

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

851, nineteenth, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

Your Excellency's apprehensions concerning the effect of such indiscriminate bombing upon American public opinion were also stated. As the result of a prompt inquiry made of the Japanese forces in the area concerned regarding the circumstances of the case, it was ascertained that a unit of the Japanese Naval Air forces which took off to bomb the Chungking area on June 15 attacked military establishments of the Chinese Army in the city of Chungking at about 3 o'clock on that afternoon. It happened that just as the Commander gave the order to release bombs, one plane on the outside of the formation, failing to maintain its correct position, fell behind and the bombs dropped by that plane alone thus became uncontrolled stray bombs. It is believed that the accident mentioned in Your Excellency's note was due to these stray bombs which fell on the Eastern Bank of the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 851, June 19, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Tokyo.

of the Yangtze River near the Kwanyin Temple, and it is a matter of extreme regret to the Imperial Government.

As stated in our note dated June 14, 1940, the Imperial Army and Navy are taking every precaution, even at the cost of strategic inconvenience, not to bomb the vicinity of the American Embassy, and officers and men at the front have been strictly warned to that effect. I have, however, lost no time in urging the Army and Navy authorities to take further precautions to prevent the recurrence of accidents of this nature. At the same time, however, I wish to take this opportunity to request that the American Government give consideration to the matter of cooperation toward the prevention of unfortunate and unforeseen accidents by transferring, if possible, the TUTULA to a zone of safety as informally suggested on many occasions by the Japanese Naval authorities in China to the American Naval authorities stated there.

I avail myself etc. etc."

Sent to the Department via Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Chungking and Peiping. (END OF MESSAGE.)

GREW

Sent Department.
 Repeated to Chungking
 and Peiping.

Lockhart

ALC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DES

This telegram **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**
 closely paraphrased be- CHUNGKING
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (Br)

Dated June 21, 1941

FROM Rec'd 7 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

251, June 21, 1 p.m. / 160

Tokyo's 842, June 19, 1 p.m. and 851, June 19,


9 p.m. to Department with reference to the request for
 the transfer of the TUTUILA "to a zone of safety" (?)
 the circumstances set forth in Chungking's telegram of
 July 6, 7 p.m., 1940, to Shanghai remain precisely as
 they were at that time and that the Japanese authorities
 should be so informed.

Sent to the Department; repeated to Peiping and

Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo.

GAUSS

HPD



793.94/10039

PS/L

793.94
 note
 211 30 Asiatic
 Fleet

JUL 1 1941
 RECORDED

0556

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1283

FL
4-L

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be _____ NANKING Via N. R.
 closely paraphrased before
 being communicated to _____ Dated June 20, 1941.
 anyone. (BR). FROM

Rec'd 9 p.m.

TO ONI AND MID 4/23/41 50

Secretary of State-

Washington.

June 20, 4 p.m.

Information obtained from various sources suggests
 the following analysis of the underlying reasons for
 Wang Ching Wei's mission to Tokyo.

That Chinese politician has exercised nominal
 authority as head of a new government and a new
 Kuomintang for more than a year without contributing
 substantially to political rehabilitation in China.
 The opposition of Japanese army and Navy groups in the
 field has prevented him from obtaining for his Government
 basic administrative powers, and the machinations of
 certain Chinese cliques abetted by Japanese elements
 have kept him from consolidating under one regime
 the several parts of occupied China; finally, he has
 failed in his original primary function of effecting
 peace between Chungking and Tokyo. Hampered by political
 factors, Wang is also confronted by a growth of economic
 distress in the area under his control which increases
 popular resentment against both him and the invaders.

The Invitation

7-13.94
note
193.00

793.94/16701

PS/CM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- June 20, 4 p.m. from Nanking

The invitation to Wang to proceed to Tokyo therefore came when both partners were dissatisfied with the existing state of Sino-Japanese cooperation. An informed political personage states that Wang is determined to obtain substantial concessions in some respects (there were mentioned specifically the problems of military notes, transportation of commercial goods by railway, the Nanking army, the position of Wang Yi T'ang); and the informant suggested that if Wang fails he may feel compelled to resign. Although such an eventuality is possible it would seem probable only if either Wang or the Japanese could discern a better alternative to the present arrangement. There are obvious political disadvantages which would derive from such a radical change at this time, Wang is reported to be supported by Abe, Honda and even Matsuo, and new minor compromises and additional temporizing would appear to be more likely.

Wang is scheduled to begin his return journey June 28.

Sent to Peiping. Repeated to the Department, Chungking, Shanghai. Code text by airmail to Tokyo.

CLUBB

EMB

0 5 5 8

PLAIN

Dated June 21, 1941

REC'd. 8:20 a.m., 23d

Secretary of State,
Washington.

8402, 21, 10 p. n.

Today's KOKUMIN editorial states that the Japanese people now face three important facts: the meeting of the Central Cooperative Council of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the visit of Wang Ching Wei, and the breakdown of Japanese-Netherlands Indies negotiations. The mission of the Cooperative Council is the expression to those in authority of popular opinion concerning all issues facing Japan, especially those concerned with settlement of the China incident and construction of the East Asia co-prosperity sphere. Wang Ching Wei's visit and the rupture of the Netherlands Indies negotiations respectively constructive and destructive in nature, are closely related to Japan's destiny in Asia. Wang's visit and his discussions with Japanese leaders are epochal in Japanese-Chinese diplomatic relations. It is hoped that the Japanese Government and people can give up to Wang's expectations.

Rupture of the negotiations with the Dutch and failure to achieve

135.34/16702

Record Copy

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #856, 21, 6 p. m., from Tokyo.

to achieve any material or spiritual result is extremely disappointing and regrettable. Opinions among members of the Cooperative Council were united that Japan should take a strong attitude. Japan has permitted negotiations to drag for nine months without result and has now obtained only the Dutch guarantee that no change will occur in normal relations between Japan and the Netherlands Indies. Can anyone guarantee that such an insolent and unreasonable attitude will not affect the attitude of Thailand and French Indochina? The impression it may make upon Wang Ching Wei and the Peking Government is also a source of anxiety. Determination is united upon the Government and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. Otherwise Wang's visit will be devoid of significance and the rupture of negotiations will achieve nothing.

Sent Department via airmail to Shanghai.


GREW.

HTM

0561

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



1236 Wildwood Avenue,
 Columbus, Georgia,

June 21, 1941. **July 2, 1941**

The Department of State,
 Washington, D.C.

Sir:

In a recent communication with the American Embassy in Peiping, China I was referred to the Department of State with my problem.

I am interested in collecting information concerning the losses of warships suffered by the Chinese navy in the war with Japan which began in 1937.

However, I wish it understood that I do not desire secret information, only that which has been disclosed by Chinese or American authorities.

In several old magazines I have seen references to Chinese naval losses but the names of the warships have never been given. I have heard that the losses were once given in JAMES FIGHTING SHIPS, a British publication, but I have been unable to obtain access to a copy.

If you could give me this information, or inform me where it could be obtained, it would help my collection greatly and would be much appreciated.

Thank you very much.

Very truly yours,

Richard Whistler

Richard Whistler

JUL 3 1941

FILED

793.94/16703

PS / TM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 2, 1941

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/16703

My dear Mr. Whistler:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of June 21, 1941 in which you state that you are collecting information in regard to the losses of warships suffered by the Chinese Navy in the hostilities with Japan which began in 1937, and request that you be supplied with such information as the Department has made public on this subject.

The Department has no complete information on the subject in which you are interested and has made public no information on this subject. It is suggested that you may wish to address an inquiry to the Chinese Ambassador, Washington, D. C.

In connection with your reference to the British publication, Jane's Fighting Ships, there is enclosed a copy of an article appearing on page 138 of the 1940 edition

Mr. Richard Whistler,
1236 Wildwood Avenue,
Columbus, Georgia.

793.94/16703

35/LDP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

edition of this publication. It should be understood,
 of course, that the Department takes no responsibility
 for statements contained in unofficial publications.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

G.A.
 George Acheson, Jr.
 Assistant Chief
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Enclosure:

Excerpt from Jane's
Fighting Ships, 1940.

EGC
 FE:EGC:FRE FE
 6-30

CR

JUL 2 1974



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Ry

From Jane's Fighting Ships 1940
 page 138

Pending the termination of hostilities between China and Japan, it has proved impossible to obtain a reliable list of the ships of the Chinese Navy that remain in service. But it is believed that the following have been destroyed or otherwise lost:

Cruisers: Ning Hai, Ping Hai, Hai Chi, Hai Chou, Hai Shen, Hai Yung, Chao Ho, Ying Swei, Tung Chi.

Sloops: Yat Sen, Hai Chao.

Gunboats: Hsien Ning, Yung Chien, Yung Hsiang, Yung Chi, Chu Tai, Chu Yiu, Chu Yu, Kiang Li, Ta Tung, Tze Chion.

Torpedo Boats: Chien Kang, Tung An, Hu Ying, and about 6 of motor type.

Patrol Boats: Kiang Ning, Wei Ning, Suh Ning, Wu Ning, Chang Ning, Cheng Ning, Chung Ning.

Seaplane Carriers: Teh Sheng, Wei Sheng.

Surveying Vessels: Chiao Jih, Chin Tien.

In addition, the following are reported to have been more or less seriously damaged:

Gunboats: Ming Chun, Ming Sen, Kiang Chen, Chu Kuan.

Torpedo Boats: Hu Chun, Hu Peng.

Patrol Boats: Yi Sheng, Sui Ning.

It is quite likely that there have been other losses, unrecorded.

0565

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 X CONFIDENTIAL CODE X
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Collect ☐ Full rate
☐ Day letter
☐ Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,
 June 1, 1941
 It should be carefully selected and being communicated to anyone.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO.

342

One. The American Legation at Bucharest has received information from a reliable source as follows:
 QUOTE . . . military circles in Germany are greatly interested in the continuation of the Sino-Japanese war. They are indirectly encouraging China to resist and have also permitted various countries to send additional war material to China. While the Germans are using Japan as a threat against the United States, . . . the former have made a secret economic treaty with the Dutch authorities in occupied Holland which will become effective immediately after the end of the war. This treaty secures for Germany large concessions in Java, Sumatra, Celebes, Borneo and the Dutch part of New Guinea. These concessions cover large areas and include the Banka and Billiton tin mines as well as some oil properties. The price for these concessions has been fixed and will be met in part by reducing the cost assessed the Dutch for the upkeep of the German army

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/16703A

PS/CMR
Confidential File

0566

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect { Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

286

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

-2-

of occupation. In the event that Japan attacks the
 Dutch East Indies and succeeds in gaining foothold
 there, Germany will immediately claim her rights.
 UNQUOTE./

Two./ ~~The Department suggests that~~ you may
 wish to make discreet use of the foregoing in any
 conversations you may have with influential Japanese
 without revealing the source of your information.

Hull
 S. H.

✓
 20 1947

FE:RAS:LJH

AAA
 CC
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OK
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Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


1287

ft

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KD

PLAIN



Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.
FROM Dated June 24, 1941
Rec'd. 9:50 a.m., 25th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
4/24/41 REX

872, June 24, 4 p. m. (SECTION ONE)

Wang Ching Wei and Konoye issued a joint statement
last night translated as follows:

"With a view to speedily settling the present affair
and, with this as a turning point, to establish a
permanent relationship between Japan and China and march
forward toward the common goal of co-existence and co-
prosperity, as well as the reconstruction of East Asia,
we respectively, made declarations some time ago concerning
the establishment of the new order in East Asia con-
sisting of good neighborly and amicable relations, common
defense against Communism and economic cooperation. The
purposes of the basic treaty between Japan and China and
the joint declaration of Japan, Manchukuo and China
concluded on the 30th of November last year are no other
than this.

"The meaning to the establishment of the New Order
in East Asia lies in the eradication of the evils of
aggression

793.94/16704

PS/DM

793.94

FILED
JUN 24 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

1288

-2- #872, June 24, 4 p. m., (SECTION ONE), from Tokyo.

aggression and Communism in East Asia and establishment
of states of mutual cooperation, co-existence and co-
prosperity on the basis of morality inherent in East
Asia. There seem to be not few among

LOCKHART.

ALC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1284

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AF

PLAIN

FROM

Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.

Dated June 24, 1941

Rec'd 9:45 am; 25th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

872, June 24, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

the people of China who, though being desirous of reconstruction of East Asia through Japanese Chinese cooperation, have not confidence as to whether such an undertaking will be realized and continue to take an attitude of hesitation and facilitation. But, the great task of reconstructing East Asia can only be accomplished by revealing as much as possible the dawn of its completion even at the present stage, thereby winning the confidence of the majority of the people and striving forward for the realization of general peace.

As the result of our conversation, the Governments of Japan and China have pledged to put forth increasing efforts toward the above mentioned, goal. The National Government of China will endeavor to make their people understand that Japanese Chinese collaboration

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 872, June 24, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Tokyo.

collaboration and reconstruction of East Asia are the common mission of the peoples of Japan and China by presenting concrete facts of Japanese Chinese cooperation in political, military, economic and cultural spheres; and the Japanese Government will exert themselves, by extending increasing assistance therefor and enabling the National Government fully to demonstrate their independent and free authority and power, and thereby share the responsibility of constructing the New Order of East Asia.

The 23d of June, the sixteenth year of Showa 1941 Fumimaro Konoye, Wang Ching Wei."

Sent Department via Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Chungking Nanking and Peiping.

(END OF MESSAGE)

GREW

AIC

0571

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

WT

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

PEIPING VIA N. R.

Dated June 25, 1941

Rec'd 7:38 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

June 25, 11 a.m. (SECTION ONE)

Please refer to Peiping's 129, June 4, 4 p.m.

In a recent periodic report to his superiors, person
mentioned in Peiping's despatch 3075, April 16 states that
Japanese have suffered defeat with heavy casualties in
southern Shansi due largely to belated but active cooperation
of Communist Eighteenth Route army with Chinese regulars.
Communists lost 8000 of their best trained soldiers in
the severe fighting.

He reports Communist leaders as seeing these
possible developments in China: (one) General Chiang
through the mounting hardships of continued resistance
and the pressure of his own associates will be forced
to a compromise with the Japanese,

BUTRICK

EME

793.94
note
793.00

JUN 30 1941

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1292

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

MD

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

Peiping via N.R.

Dated June 25, 1941

Rec'd 10:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

June 25, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

(two) General Chiang through accepting aid of America and Britain will be dominated by those powers with the net result of a China divided into three parts; namely pro-American--British, pro-Communist and pro-Japanese (i.e. Wang Ching Wei regime); and (three) strengthened resistance against Japan through the close cooperation of the Chinese Government and the Communists (i.e. a revival of the "united front"), with aid coming from the friendly countries.

He advocates on our part continued aid to Chungking, tactful pressure on Chinese Government to come to an agreement with Communists and avoidance of any appearance of an A.B.C. (American-Britannic-Chinese alliance.)

BUTRICK

EMB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

1298

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

AF
 This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

Peiping via N.R.
 Dated June 25, 1941
 Rec'd 10:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

June 25, 11 a.m. (SECTION THREE)

He repeats substantially what Chou-en-Lai
 told Drumright, Service and me at Chungking on May
 30 that the Chinese Government is withholding finan-
 cial, military and even medical aid to the Communists.

It occurs to me that it might assist in attain-
 ing the third possible development if even at the ex-
 pense of reiteration the Department at an opportune
 time would issue a statement referring to our announ-
 ced engagement to end extraterritoriality and adding
 that the United States (and Great Britain) seek no
 territorial gains in China but only the establishment
 of a free and united China governed by its people and
 actuated by the four essential freedoms. (END OF
 MESSAGE)

Sent to Chungking. Repeated to the Department
 and Shanghai. Code text by air mail to Tokyo.

BUTRICK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Sino-Japanese relations. Editorials in all vernaculars today discuss Wang Ching Wei's visit to Japan, turning it highly significant as step toward strengthening Nanking Government, closer Nanking and Japan cooperation and eventual settlement of China incident.

fp

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. 826-1pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated June 15, 1941 From Japan (Grew)
 To

File No. 893.01/879

793.94/16706

793.94/16706

057

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Sino-Japanese relations. All evening papers carry information announcement that Wang Ching Wei left Shanghai today for Japan and will arrive at Tokyo June 17 and after reception by the Emperor will hold conversations with Premier, Foreign, War, Navy Finance and other Ministers.

fp

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tai. 823-6pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated June 14, 1941 From Japan (Grew)
To

File No. 893.01/158

793.94 / 16707

793.94 / 16707

057F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE



July 2, 1941

1941 JUN 25

1350 Franklin St.

San Francisco Cal.

June 23, 1941

Remail
 Register

To the Secretary to

The Honorable Mr. Cordell E. Hull,
 United States Secretary of State,
 State Department,
 Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

893,24/1049

Having some time ago learned
 of your acknowledgment of letter signed
 by my intimate associate, Mr. Richard A.
 Donovan, and recently of other developments
 followed by his letter last week to you for
 the Secretary of State, I thought it desirable
 to put you also on the fact of my register's
 arrival letter to Her Excellency Madame
 Chiang Kai Shek, Minister of Aviation, dated
 May 30, 1941, by enclosing herewith a copy
 thereof for Mr. Hull, in case knowledge of its
 trail-blazing or of its content might possibly
 be of assistance in event of favorable action

793.94/16708

PS/DE

16708

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

John A. Sec. C.E.H. Jones

on Mr. Duval's project.

As evidence I am enclosing
 Register Receipt # 56945, San Francisco
 where you can return to me as much as
 sufficient time has not yet elapsed for receipt
 of return receipt as proof of delivery.

I have not yet apprised Mr. Duval
 of the fact that I sent the letter to Madame. Per-
 haps I shall not apprise him for some time
 but he might be unnecessarily concerned about
 its effect.

By way of explanation, - I sent it to
 Madame when it seemed ^{at that time} that effective action
 was not being taken on this project, and when Mr.
 Duval, ^{had} sent ~~you~~ his intercepting letter "to take
 no action", by reason of which I had thought
 that some possible harm was influencing
 him to give up this important project of long
 standing, and that extraordinary measures
 or action were necessary to re-interest him
 in his mission.

Thanking you to give this matter your
 attention, I am,

Yours sincerely,
 Julius G. White

P.S. - I don't find it. I may
 send you copy of another letter recently written
 re this matter.

0578

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- COPY -

JGW-t

Airmail
Register &
Return Rq. Rec.

San Francisco, California, U.S.A.,

May 30, 1941.

P E R S O N A L

Her Excellency, Madame Chiang Kai Shek,

Minister of Aviation,

National Government of China,

Chungking,

Republic of China.

Dear Madam:

A personal friend of mine -- brilliant, original, practical, versatily schooled and experienced in military science and other sciences, and particularly able as a strategist, secondly as a tactician -- years ago had evolved military plans for emancipation of China from Japanese incursions, improving them since; and I personally spent much time simultaneously in writing to and contacting various Chinese gentlemen here and in China, including Consular and Ambassadorial representatives, as well as some ^{occidental} industrial and political men of affairs, in attempted furtherance thereof -- doing so at first, because of admiring and pitying interest in and ~~for~~ the Chinese people, and latterly now additionally, because I see a further adaptation of his plan internationally, as being the only ~~plausibly~~ peaceful solution for U.S. of American-Japanese difficulties, and the only alternative to possible involvement of U.S. in Asiatic Wars, and the feeling is common that it would be pathetically dangerous ^{due to} ~~in~~ America's military unpreparedness

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JGW - MCKS - May 30/31 -2-

^{the} and popular involvement-reluctance, for U.S. to attempt to fight with divided forces on a two-ocean twain-continental front, in case American participation in Europe should be made inevitable by the international situation and governmental policy, hence the need for an easier solution.

I am not mentioning here, the party's name, lest this letter by some remote chance might be intercepted, but Your Excellency can find it out, (if indeed not already informed), from a personal friend of Your Excellencies, (your husband and yourself), namely Mr. Fitch, chief of the National Chinese Y.M.C.A., whom I heard at lectures here, met, and then arranged for the military authority to meet; and also from His Excellency Major-General ^{Wen} ~~Wen~~ of the Generalissimo's Military Mission of 1939-40 to America and Europe who was impressed and eager to engage his services despite absence of arrangement for the equipmental and other conditions deemed necessary for campaign success; and also from His Excellency, the present Foreign Minister of China, recently Ambassador to England; -- for on learning through the press, of the latter two gentlemen's visits to San Francisco, I had suggested that the military expert contact them, which he did. Incidentally, Maj.-Gen. ^{Wen} ~~Wen~~ by mistake took his military credentials instead of certified copies, to China to show to His Excellency the Generalissimo, and they must be still accessible to you inasmuch as the Major-General has not yet returned the much-prized documents. In addition we also wrote to His Excellency the Generalissimo and received reply from one of his eminent staff, declining the offer for the time being then -- that was long before the Major-General's visit here.

It has seemed quite evident to both of us: --

(1) that it is not only pathetic but positively ridiculous that a na-

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JGW * MCKS - May 30/31 -3-

tion of harmless and internationally peaceable people with brave and competent soldiers, many times out-numbering the Japanese, as the Chinese do, should lie grovelling seemingly helplessly at the feet of the Japanese jingoist clique (in opposition I am told, to the desire of many Japanese people), and in danger of being partitioned in several directions and wiped off the map as a national entity;

(2) that, what China needs for her emancipation, is a very small group of hard-boiled go-getting dare-devil officer-soldiers of fortune who know their business -- not the common mediocre variety -- but men who are near-geniuses in their respective strategic, tactical, and other military technical fields, assembled by and under the military technician referred to, who personally knows them or knows of them as previous co-campaigners, as being of marked ability, (two being of international renown), together constituting^{firstly} a G.H.Q. or advisory staff to His Excellency the Generalissimo, and^{constituting} secondly a commanding official staff of a speedy field-army corps of several divisions, long ago modelled by him on modern blitzkrieg principles^{that} only recently elsewhere^{were} brought to light, and adapted by him to that semi-primitive war-far^{and} condition inescapable at present in far-flung industrially-undevelopped China with her dearth of plentiful^{rapid}-transportation facilities; the same to act as an aerial and aerially-supportive military-unit, solely under Your Excellency's personal direction supervision or control, as Minister of Aviation, coupled with the advantage of your flair and ability in and for aerial strategy, to constitute the mobile spearhead of an aggressive offensive movement of National China's military forces, under the leadership of His Excellency the Generalissimo, after one of several tenta-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JGW - MCKS - May 30/31 -4-

tive strategic plans ~~submitted~~ submitted by the corps/staff to the Generalissimo, shall have been selected by him as likeliest for successful emancipation of China and shall accordingly have been finally incorporated into the National Chinese Government's war-policy, with agreed adherence to the military rule by all the military personnel concerned, that the strategic plan adopted shall be prosecuted for the one object of its victorious achievement, and that neither the plan nor its logical tactical applications shall be changed, except by majority consent of the Generalissimo, Madame, and the spearhead-corps' staff, all being predicated upon the understanding that Chinese aerial activity shall be almost exclusively confined to light interceptors of small fuel-consumptive capacity and of restricted activity, rather than to bombers, due to China's limited gasoline supplies via lengthy Burma Road, for many military purposes, ^{due to} and the disproportionate fuel-consumption of bombers, resulting in grounding and their consequent military futility ~~constituting~~ ^{contrary to} a liability not a military asset for China's defence ^{European experience and to Japan's success due to river road transport}

(3) that, if this Chinese emancipation-plan should appear feasible to Your Excellencies, (yourself, Madame, and the Generalissimo), then you Madame as minister of Aviation should, in his estimation, make another wartime visit to America via Clipper, for the express purpose of entering into such understanding with this military expert, and of contracting for the manufacture and purchase of the desired military equipment necessary to the success of the plan, unless, in event that you should find it impossible or inconvenient to so arrange such trip, he might possibly be prevailed upon, in view of the emergency, should you so desire, to go himself instead to Chungking for such consultation ^{even} though he had rejected previous invitations due to uncertain inauspicious set-up as to required equipment and ^{as} to some specific delegated manoeuvring freedom

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JGW * MCKS - May 30/31 -5-

action (without which two conditions he had regarded that it would be merely failure, disgrace, and uselessness, to attempt to put the plan into action);-- in which event he would probably wish me to accompany him, inasmuch as I have been valuable to him, perhaps almost indispensable, in various phases of assistance that I have afforded him. Frankly, I do not know -- I did not mention such alternative to him -- in fact I did not even consult him in the matter of writing this letter to you personally, just as I have acted on my own initiative in contacting many others previously ~~on my own initiative~~, in attempting to promote this idea. Finally, I might add that I am keenly aware that America too, had once been hard-pressed by the aggressiveness of the democratically-fallacious autocratic "Divine Right of Kings", despite the sympathetic liberalism of many democratic Englishmen of that day, and that America too, had her foreign soldiers of fortune, Lafayette, Von Steuben, and later John Paul Jones, and had a crying need for them at that!-- but they did not just crash in on the Thirteen Colonies and force their rare highly-specialized talents, education, and experience, upon the embattled Colonists -- they were invited in, by a wise Washington, a wise Franklin, and others, who, themselves, not possessing certain phases or the requisite degree of these military attributes, gave them certain limited military authority to proceed and do those things that ~~these~~ attributes qualified them above ^{General} Washington and Franklin to do, and which they saw must be done; their suggestions and recommendations were discerningly and gratefully accepted and acted upon, with consequent result that subsequent unscientific military disaster and/dissent were ruled out and America's War of Independence and other wars, were won, incidentally, producing a corresponding change in nations' general policy of colonial treatment. Am I presumptuous in inferring or prophesying an analogy, while not intending any egotistic implication by such grand

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JGW - MCKS - May 30/31 -6-

comparisons?

I mentioned democracy, partially because I have read some of your magazine articles in U.S., Madame, and I was, (answering a question in my mind), particularly pleased to read references to your hope for the continuation of the democratic way of life in China after the war's termination, as well as elsewhere. However, judging from the lightning rapidity of international developments, if China is going to make a final bid for freedom, it must be soon, and if China through failure to utilize the best strategy and means available, and promptly, for her emancipation, should go down in defeat, like all the other 18 nations in the last year or so that deludedly followed the mirage of pledged help and security, to their doom, yes, even since Manchuria, under the League of Nations, (meaning that fortune helps those who help themselves by relying implicitly only on their own resources and resourcefulness rather than on any earthly Santa Claus), and should become a victim of foreign conscription of China's vast manpower and resources, militarily ruining China, then the rest of the world too, may as well decide to kiss democracy a fond farewell. Hence I am at last, calling the plan to your personal attention, in the hope that you may be able to realize its dual importance. There must be some discernment, some courageous determination and initiative, manifested and asserted somewhere in some quarter of the globe, among those in the seat of power and authority, to do something sensible for the world and for China included, and commencing in China, to stem the engulfing cosmic tide, and soon, before it is too late, not meaning axial aggression only by the tide, but more largely world militarism, world dictatorship, and worldwide war, proceeding from the collective ignorance and/or cupidity of the nations of the globe, including Russia; there must be some sanh sensible action, in contradistinction to the unfor-

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JGW - MCKB - May 30/81 -7.

...soporific world's incompetent international-and-national politically-complacent muddling-along, as of the past several decades to this moment, (startlingly comparable to the unforeseeing uppercrust of France when Louis le Grand alone cannily ^{fore-} said; "Après nous, le dénouement!")-- else the whole world is eventually foredoomed to another prolonged lapse into the "Dark Ages" through the destructive holocaust of world war-fareas stated, of whose awfulness the present in China and particularly in Europe, is but a glimpse, in view of man's potentialities in invention, cupidity, ruthlessness, and ambition.

There are many other novel and original ramifications and details of the plan, not stated in this letter, that logically augur for its success, ^{and} some of which were not mentioned to their Excellencies the Major-General and the Foreign Minister, partially on my insistence, for it must be evident to Your Excellency ^{war-} from experience, that the success of strategic plans hinges mainly upon surprise, ^{before} ^{enemy} ^{office} sets can be prepared, and surprise therefore depends upon secrecy, in contrast to publicity or leaks, occurring through too naïve or too general a discussion before possible eavesdroppers, or by attempted amateurish military rehearsal of the partial plan in absence of full knowledge of all the necessary elements of the plan, to tip off your enemy aforetime. Hence Madame, you can realize the desirability of keeping this letter confidential to yourself and to the few others ^{whom} you deem it

desirable to entrust it to and to consult with. I shall be pleased either to hear from you or to have you communicate with the party direct.

Thanking Your Excellency for perusal of this letter and hoping that it may be deemed worthy of being acted upon, I remain, with all best wishes to Your Excellencies, and for the independence of China,

Yours Sincerely,

1350 Franklin Street,
 San Francisco, California, USA.

Julius G. White

* * * * *

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 2, 1941

In reply refer to
 FE 793.94/16708

My dear Mr. White:

In accordance with your request there is returned
 herewith Registry Receipt (no. 56945) which was enclosed
 with your letter of June 23, 1941.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

GA
 George Atcheson, Jr.
 Assistant Chief
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Enclosure:

Registry Receipt
 (no. 56945) returned.

Ch Mr. Julius G. White,
 1350 Franklin Street,
 San Francisco, California.

JUL 2 1941

89C
 FE:HC:LJH
 6-30-41.

FE



FE 793.94/16708

GA/AFR


FE 793.94/16708

0586

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

KD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
PLAIN



Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.

FROM

Dated June 25, 1941

Rec'd. 10:05 a.m., 26th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

876, June 25, 7 p. m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
6/27/41 R.F.S.

793.94/16709

In radio address by Premier and Wang Ching Wei last night, eve departure Wang Ching, Premier stressed need for collaboration Japan-China and belief true will independent China being brought into existence by President Wang to whom Japan will render whole-hearted support and cooperation. Following summary main features Wang address:

Construction new order Japan's drive out and purge East Asia foreign economic aggression and check surging tide communism. Konoye statement meant Japan would help China in order latter might become modern state on basis participation new order with Japan Manchukuo. China now recognizes that construction new order is identical Sun Yat Sen's doctrine and should keep pace with construction republic of China. This coincided with fundamental spirit Chinese movement for political independence, military alliance, economic cooperation and cultural collaboration. Sino-Japanese treaty concluded on basis these ideas "has to be translated

FILED
JUN 30 1941

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793.94
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #876, June 25, 7 p. m., from Tokyo.

be translated into action this year."

Two evils economic aggression and communism block realization of peace and while not congenial are working together under slogan of war of resistance to safeguard old order. They are more strongly entrenched than generally supposed being not only united but in league with foreign influences. Strengthened national government could destroy these forces which cause delay establishment general peace in China although during large scale Japanese military operations against Chungking Government National Government cannot easily substantially strengthen its position, such must be done in order achieve cooperation with Japan. I ask Japan render maximum political economic aid to National Government in interest Japan as well China. We must show fact of peace to people in order gain their confidence and cooperation. National Government has been and will continue make efforts induct Chungking regime participate in peace movement.

Sent Department via Shanghai.

GREW.

RR

0588

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 1, 1941


~~AT~~
~~AS~~
~~PS~~

~~CC~~
~~CA~~
~~WRL~~

~~WMA~~
~~WMA~~
~~PA/H~~

Chungking's despatch no. 13 contains its own summary, which is adequate. Enclosure no. 2 is interesting as showing the distribution of Japanese aircraft by types. A surprisingly heavy concentration of bombers (470 light and heavy) is shown on the Paracel Islands, between Indochina and the Philippines.

70
 FE:Davies:LJH




0589

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



No. 14911 JUN 26 PM 2 51

Chungking, June 6, 1941.

Subject: Estimate of Strength of Japanese Air Force:
 Distribution of Japanese Military and Naval
 Aircraft in China.

Air Mail

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Grade		To be held		Yes	No
For		In U.S.A.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		ONI M.I.D.			

Copy to Currier 7/5/41

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 7/7/41

793.94/16710

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

As of probable interest to the Department, I have the honor to enclose the following data which have been obtained from official Chinese sources:

- 1) Copy in translation of document entitled "Estimate of Strength of Japanese Air Force";
- 2) Copy in translation of a document entitled "Distribution of Japanese Aircraft in China, as of 31 March, 1941".

Enclosure no. 1 bears no date mark but it is believed to have been prepared in May 1941.

Enclosures nos. 1 and 2 represent Chinese estimates of Japanese army and naval air strength and distribution; Chinese intelligence sources do not regard these estimates as completely accurate but assert that they are as precise as can be prepared in the circumstances.

SUMMARY

JUL 10 1941

FILED

Confidential File

PS/FLR

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -


SUMMARY:

The air force of the Japanese army comprises about 40 squadrons of about 2500 planes, the Japanese navy about 30 squadrons of approximately 2,000 planes. There are about 2000 Japanese planes in Japan, 500 in "Manchoukuo", 1000 in China and 100 in French Indochina. The estimates of distribution of Japanese aircraft in China vary from 150 to 234 planes in north China, 400 to 531 in central China and 250 to 516 in south China. There are about 100 Japanese aircraft in Indochina. It would seem that the figures for the Paracel Islands are a rough estimate at best. It will be observed that the two estimates do not coincide in respect of Japanese air distribution in China.

It will be observed that there is some discrepancy in the estimates respecting the distribution of Japanese aircraft in China. This may be attributable to a difference of dates, for the Japanese are known to be constantly moving aircraft about in China owing to changes in atmospheric conditions, strategic considerations, maintenance, et cetera. Or the discrepancy may result from inaccurate observation, omissions, et cetera. For example, squadrons in movement may be subject to a double count or may not be counted at all.

Although it should be borne in mind that the enclosures to this despatch represent estimates, and estimates only, of Japanese aerial strength and distribution, yet it is believed, on the basis of reports and information hitherto available to this Embassy, that they have some basis in accuracy and may be of value in endeavoring to analyze Japanese air strength.


Respectfully yours,


 C. E. Gauss

Enclosures:
 As stated above.

Original and four copies to Department by air mail.
 No copy to Peiping.

BFD/wr
 710


 Four copies
 Received

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no.1 to despatch no.
 13 dated June 6, 1941, from the
 Embassy at Chungking.

(TRANSLATION)

ESTIMATE OF STRENGTH OF JAPANESE AIR FORCE

Source: (Second Section, Staff Division,
 Air Force Commander in Chief's
 Headquarters)

<u>Subject</u>	<u>General Conditions</u>
Strength	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The air force of the Japanese army consists of about 40 fighting squadrons or about 2,000 planes - 30% bombers, 25% reconnaissance and 45% pursuits. 2. The air force of the Japanese navy consists of about 30 squadrons, 7 aircraft carriers, 5 seaplane carriers and 3 seaplane transports with a total of approximately 2,000 planes - 39% bombers, 30% reconnaissance and 31% pursuits.
Location	There are about 2,000 planes in Japan, about 500 planes in "Manchukuo", about 1,000 planes operating in China and about 100 planes in Indochina. Whether the remaining planes are in Japan or in the Paracel Islands awaiting the opportunity for southward expansion is under investigation.
Estimate	<p>On the basis of the latest distribution of Japanese planes, apart from a majority in Japan and "Manchukuo" for defensive purposes, another part is on the sea off Kwangtung (80% naval planes) awaiting the opportunity for southward expansion. An estimate of the latest movement of Japanese planes in China follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Aside from Peiping and Tientsin where old-type pursuit planes are being used for air-defense purposes, there are at Linfen, Yuncheng, Sinsiang and Changteh about 4 army air squadrons with about 150 planes of different kinds recently attempting to assist the Japanese land forces in operations at places along the Yellow River and the Lunghei Railway. 2. Japanese planes in the Yangtze valley: 4 naval air squadrons and 4 army air squadrons with a total of about 400 planes. Judging from their recent movements, a part of them assisted in the blockade of the Kiangsu and Chekiang coast and in the fighting of Japanese land forces, while the naval heavy bombers are concentrated at Hankow attempting to disturb our interior places continuously. 3. On the sea off Kwangtung (including Indochina), there are about 250 Japanese planes. Most of them are on aircraft carriers. Recently, these planes have been used for assisting in the blockade of our sea ports. The land planes are being used to help the land forces and to continue to bomb the Yunnan-Burma road.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 2 to despatch
 no. 13 dated June 6, 1941,
 from the Embassy at Chungking.

(TRANSLATION)

CONFIDENTIAL

Source: (Chinese Official Intelligence)

DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE AIRCRAFT IN CHINA, AS OF 31 MARCH, 1941

	P	L	H	R	S	T	U	T
	U	I	E	E	E	R	N	O
	R	G	A	C	A	A	K	T
	S	H	V	C	N	N	N	A
	U	T	Y	N	P	S	O	L
	I			N	L	P	N	
	T	B	B	T	A	O		
		O	O	S	N	R		
		M	M	S	E	T		
		B	B	S	S			
		E	E	N		P		
		R	R	C		L		
		S	S	E				
				F				
				L				
NORTH CHINA								
Peiping		60	18					78
Tungchow	12							12
Tientsin	14							14
Tatung	12	12	6	8				38
Yuncheng		8						8
Linren	5			4				9
Tsinch'eng, Shansi							3	3
Tsinan				18				18
Mukukou, Shantung							30	30
Tsingtao		12		3	9			24
TOTAL NORTH CHINA	43	92	24	33	9		33	234

CONFIDENTIAL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

	P	L	H	R	S	T	U	T
	U	I	E	E	E	R	N	A
	S	C	A	C	A	A	K	L
	U	T	V	C	P	N	N	
	I	B	B	N	L	S	O	
	T	O	O	A	A	P	N	
		M	M	I	N	O		
		B	B	S	E	R		
		E	E	A		T		
		R	R	N		P		
		S	S	C		L		
				E				
				P				
				L				
CENTRAL CHINA CONT'D								
Wenchow							15	15
TOTAL CENTRAL CHINA	62	80	141	26	5	35	182	531
SOUTH CHINA								
Canton (Tienho)	45	25	15				35	120
Canton, (Paiyun)		15						15
Canton, (Shusishato)					32			32
Poon, Kwang tung	4	6		2				12
Nantuntao							20	20
Amoy							50	50
Swatow							50	50
Haifung, Kwang tung	12	26						38
Lotung				14				14
Teiya					15			15
Kingtingyang	12	24					14	50
Hoihow, Hainan							10	10
Sanya							30	30
Sanya Harbor							60	60
TOTAL SOUTH CHINA	73	96	15	16	47		269	516
OUTSIDE CHINA								
Parscel Islands	110	230	240	70			121	771
North Formosa	20	50	30			20		120
Hanoi	16	11	24			4		55
Haiphong	30		20					50
Tonkin Bay	12	24	27	12	16			91
Saigon					18			18
TOTAL	188	315	341	82	34	24	121	1105
GRAND TOTAL	566	583	521	157	95	59	605	2386

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 17

Chungking, China, June 9, 1941.

Subject: Memorandum of Conversation between
Madame Chiang Kai-shek and Counselor
Butrick with Regard to the International
Situation.

Air Mail.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	For		
	In U.S.A.		

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUN 26 PM 2 54
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit as an interesting
side light on Chinese thought, a memorandum of a
conversation between Madame Chiang Kai-shek and
Counselor Butrick of my staff.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]
C. E. Gauss

Enclosure:

1/ Memorandum of conversation.

Original and one copy to Department by airmail.

710
RPB/skl

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
Department of State

DIVISION OF
JUL 2 1941

793.94/16711

FILED

PC/CMR

1 Carbon copies
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1 Carbon copies
destroyed

[Handwritten notes and signatures]

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to
 despatch no. 17 of
 June 9, 1941, from
 American Embassy,
 Chungking, China.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Chungking, June 9, 1941.

PARTICIPANTS: Madame Chiang Kai-shek
 Counselor Richard P. Butrick

After the dinner given by the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek for Ambassador Gauss on the night of June 7, 1941, in Chungking, I chatted for a few minutes with Madame Chiang. Following light talk she spoke for several minutes on the "world war" which she stated she had predicted.

Attitude She stated that Germany is a nation whose
 Toward present predatory attitude is due to the
 Germany unfortunate leadership of Hitler whom she
 condemned. She stated that the German
 people have many admirable qualities, especially their
 will to work, their coordinating ability and their
 obedience to authority. She said she has many intelligent
 and likeable German friends. When I suggested that Hitler
 is perhaps merely a modern personification of Kaiser
 Wilhelm and that the Germans are essentially a war-like
 people she attributed the present German aggression to
 the Versailles treaty, which had failed to recognize the
 legitimate aspirations of the German people.

Attitude Madame Chiang expressed sympathy for the
 Toward common people of Japan who are unfortunately
 Japan under the control of the war-like elements.
 She said China wanted a just peace. I asked
 "no indemnities"? She made no direct reply to my question
 but said that some thirty million Chinese had been driven
 from their homes by Japan's action in China. I then sug-
 gested that perhaps what China wanted was "peace without
 victory". She replied in the negative, stating that China
 wants peace with victory but with justice, tempered by mercy.

Attitude She said that the democracies are to blame
 Toward for the present world war and that if "America
 Democracies and Great Britain" had taken a strong stand
 against Japan at the outset in 1931 or in 1937,
 the struggle in the Far East and the world war would have
 been avoided. She said the democracies were hesitant and
 lacked the power of decision. (This is probably a reiteration
 of her views expressed in an article in Liberty, which I
 have not read but which I believe has brought her from
 Americans many letters of agreement with those views.) At
 this point the Ambassador took his departure.

Comment

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quateff NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Comment While it would be inadvisable to draw definite conclusions from an after-dinner chat, it would appear that Madame Chiang is perhaps prone to see the good in Germany and the bad in America, to admire those racial characteristics which have thus far brought success to the ally of China's enemy and to berate the shortcomings of those whose aid, though perhaps tardy, may prove decisive in China's struggle. (Perhaps it is well here to remember that China has a party government, in some respects not unlike the original party governments of the dictatorships of Germany, Italy and Russia.)

It would seem that China's peace terms, if Madame Chiang may influence them, will not be harsh.

Richard P. Butrick
 Richard P. Butrick

RPB/skl

These copies
 of signed copy
 dated 5/1/76

0598

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KD


GRAY

Chungking via N. R.

FROM Dated June 30, 1941

RECD, 9:37 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 7/1/41 REX

263, June 30, 10 a. m.

During heavy Japanese air raid Sunday the British Embassy was badly damaged, one building being completely demolished. Sir A. D. Blackburn Counselor of Embassy was injured and Embassy Secretary Allen and his wife and clerk Burgoyne received slight injuries.

Planes flew at very high altitude making accurate bombing difficult. Concussion from bombs dropped near terminus motor road on south bank caused some slight damage our Embassy staff residence.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping, Shanghai, and Hankow. Shanghai repeat to Tokyo.

GAUSS.

NPL

793.94/10712

PS/CWR

JUL 10 1941

ETAD

793.94
 note
 701.4193

124.941

0599

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER
 Collect { Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter
 Charge Department:
 Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter
 Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 XCONFIDENTIAL CODE X
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Washington, "Brown" NAVAL RADIO

July 1, 1941

2 pm

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN). VIA SHANGHAI (CHINA).

INFO: AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING (CHINA).
 AMEMBASSY, PEIPING (CHINA).

371

Chungking's 263, June 30, 10 a.m.

The Department desires that if this has not already been done there be filed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a strong protest against this latest reported instance of the imperiling of the American Embassy through bombing operations at Chungking.

The Department regards this renewed bombing in a place so near to the Embassy premises as to cause damage to the staff residence as the more reprehensible following so soon after the assurances given in the Foreign Office note of June 18 (see your 851, June 19, 9 p.m.).

Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Chungking, Peiping.

793.94/16712

FE:WRP:MHP

FE

PA/H

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/16712

PS/CMR

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 371) of July 4, 1941 to the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

Unless such action has already been taken it is the Department's wish that a strong protest against the latest reported case of the endangering of the American Embassy at Chungking through bombing operations there be filed with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Following so quickly after the assurances given in the note of June 18 from the Foreign Office this renewed bombing so near to the premises of the American Embassy as to damage the staff residence is the more reprehensible in the Department's opinion.

g.c.
 FE:EGC:LJH
 7-11-41.

FE

103.47/11-2

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GMW

PLAIN

FROM

Nanking via N. R.

Dated June 30, 1941

Rec'd 7:05 a.m. July 1st

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND W.J.D.
 7-2-41 HES

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



June 30, 7 p.m.

Wang Ching Wei on return from Japan 28th made
 statement, summary of which follows:

Courtesies shown by Japanese Imperial household,
 frank discussion by Premier Konoye and other Government
 officials, resulting in solution all important problems,
 and hearty popular welcome all indicate great Japanese
 hopes for China.

As Premier Konoye declared November 3, 1938, Japan
 seeks China's well-being rather than destruction in
 order for latter to share responsibility, as modern
 nation, in construction of New Order in East Asia and,
 therefore, Japan is prepared to be generous in assist-
 ance. This spirit has been further amplified in state-
 ment December 22nd, basic Sino-Japanese treaty (of last
 November) and recent joint statement.

Japan helped to establish National Government and
 is now assisting it to strengthen its political,
 military

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 note
 893.00

793.94/16713

PS/DE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- June 30, 7 p.m. from Nanking via N. R.

military, economic and cultural authority so that strife may soon cease and complete peace may be established, permitting both nations to concentrate their mental and material efforts on construction of New Order providing mutual existence and mutual prosperity.

Formation of a Sino-Japanese Axis is only means of preservation of East Asia in present changing international situation and is worthy of greatest wholehearted efforts of all people of both nations in mutual trust and confidence.


Sent to Peiping. Repeated to Department, Chungking and Shanghai. By mail to Tokyo.

PAXTON

ALC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



AF

FROM PLAIN

Tokyo via Shanghai
& N.R.

Dated July 4, 1941

Rec'd 2:34 pm; 6th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 7-7-41 NES

929, July 4, noon

793.94
 ASAHI editorial today warns against British attempts to increase the usefulness of the Burma route and characterizes recent American moves to increase aid to Chungking as retaliatory against recognition of Nanking by the Axis powers.

According to the KOKUMIN editorial, recognition of the Nanking Government by the Axis nations and the German-Soviet war both contribute toward giving the China incident world wide implications. British and the United States now face the Axis in East Asia. Japan is reminded of the Foreign Minister's remark that a super emergency is impending.

Sent to Department via air mail Shanghai.

GREW

EMB

FILED
 JUL 14 1941

793.94/16714

PS/CMR

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Willingness of Japan to withdraw all troops
 from China within two years.

Memo. of conversation with Japanese Ambassador
 relative to -.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated July 5, 1941 From State Dept.
 To FE - Ballantine

File No. fw 711.94/2100-2/18 Confidential

793.94/16714-L/2

PS/KN
 Confidential File
 16714 1/2

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 9, 1941.

~~HP~~
~~FAS~~
~~FB~~
~~WHL~~
~~WAL~~

Tokyo's despatch no. 5661, June 13, 1941,
 "Japanese Press Reports of the Establishment
 of Peace Preservation Zones in China".

There are noted in this despatch various reports concerning the movement for the strengthening of the Wang Ching-wei regime through the establishment of Peace Preservation Zones. The Embassy does not undertake to evaluate the reports and transmits them merely as illustrations, attempting to convince the Japanese people of the gradual strengthening of the Nanking regime and a progressive approach of the settlement of the China Incident.

793.94/16715

Schmidt
 FE:Schmidt:OJL

0606

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
 RECEIVED OF THE
 DEPARTMENT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1941 JUL 5 PM 12 13


AMERICAN EMBASSY
 Tokyo, June 13, 1941.

DIVISION OF
 No. 5661 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS

SUBJECT: JAPANESE PRESS REPORTS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
 PEACE PRESERVATION ZONES IN CHINA.

Copy in 72

For Distribution in Chief	Yes	No
Grade	For Field	✓
Per	In U.S.A.	✓



793.94/16715

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's telegrams
 nos. 666, May 12, 5 p.m., and 670, May 13, summarizing
 press reports and editorials concerning the Peace Preserva-
 tion Zones (Sei-go or Ching-Hsiang 清鄉), the estab-
 lishment of which in China was proposed as a concrete
 method for strengthening the Nanking Government by effect-
 ing

PS/CMR

16.715

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

ing the pacification of local, restricted areas, and to report that recent press despatches from Nanking announce progress toward the actual setting up of these zones.

A despatch in the ASAHI of June 11 states that the Peace Preservation Zone Committee, under the chairmanship of Wang Ching-wei, has completed detailed preparations for the establishment of a "peace district" in Central China along the lower reaches of the Yangtze River. The article explains that improvement of the economic life of the people is one of the great policies of the Nanking Government and that in such districts military, political, and economic power will be united to achieve such an objective.

A Nanking despatch in the NICHI NICHI of June 13 states that the Association for Administration of Peace Preservation Zones, meeting in Nanking June 10 and 11 decided upon a concrete policy and as a first step will send four representatives to Japan. These emissaries (周學昌 of Nanking, 林汝珩 of Canton, 張君衡 of Peiping, and 羅君強) are expected to depart in the near future.

The Embassy is of course unable to evaluate these reports and transmits them merely as possible illustrations of the attempt now being made in Japan to present evidence to the Japanese people that the Nanking Government is becoming progressively stronger and a settlement of the China Incident nearer. That such a policy would be followed seemed indicated by the statements and discussions which appeared in the press


at

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

at the time of Ambassador Honda's arrival in Tokyo in
May and which were reported by the Embassy.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph C. Grew.

710
JKE:C

Copy to Embassy, Peiping;
Copy to Embassy, Nanking;
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.

Original and 3 copies to Department.

✓

0609

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Nanking, China, May 19, 1941.

No.167

Strictly confidential

Subject: Military Conference
at Nanking.



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 M.I.D. IN CONFIDENCE
 7-23-41

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	Good		✓
For	Paxton	✓	
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Department of State

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 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 JUL 8 PM 30 NO. 167

DIVISION OF
 COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
 AND CONSULAR

793.94/16716

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to give below an outline of significant information available on the subject of the Conference of Nanking Military leaders held in March. Many of the items reported in this despatch have been supplied in the strictest confidence by personal contacts and have not been published.

SUMMARY

Carbon copies

destroyed...*fl*...

PS/DM
 Confidential F.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

SUMMARY Considerable publicity was given to the fact that a military conference was in session towards the end of March but almost none to the subjects discussed or the resolutions passed. All but five of the 124 proposals presented were approved but implementation in practice of any of them seems unlikely to occur in the near future. Most of them expressed the wishes of the warlords, now again resuscitated, for an increase in personal power. Complaints were registered against Japanese military restrictions on the free movement of Chinese "Government" troops and supplies; military training for students was recommended; detailed projects were suggested for winning over to Nanking of Chungking troops; withdrawal of Japanese troops was half-heartedly urged; reorganization of the local "army" was proposed; and plans were announced for a revival of the "new Chinese navy". So far no appreciable action has eventuated from any of these discussions.

The only result of the conference which may be expected to come into effect at any foreseeable future time is the announced plan for trips to Japan for "inspection" by a party of eleven Chinese military men and for "advanced study" by twenty military cadets to be selected by examination.

It appears that the Japanese are reluctant, for military reasons, to withdraw troops from areas in which the ill-equipped and poorly-officered puppet forces are willing to assume responsibility for "defense against Chungking forces". No confidence is placed in these mercenaries whose use is almost entirely limited to policing under the careful control of the Japanese.

With the announced desire "of maintaining an adequate military force to support the Government", the Japanese sponsored Wang Ching-wei regime in Nanking convened a military conference in March to devise means for the reconstruction of its army, navy and air force. The conference lasted five days, from March 25th to the 29th.

Those who participated were about 50 military commanders, representing the various military units in the area under the control of the local regime, a number of

high

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

high civil officials, including "President" Wang Ching-wei, who is concurrently chairman of the "Military Commission"; Mr. Chen Kung-po, "Mayor of Shanghai"; Mr. Chou Fu-hai, "Finance Minister"; Mr. Chen Chun, "Minister of the Interior"; Mr. Lin Pai-sheng, "Minister of Publicity", and others who served on the subcommittees of the conference. There were also present at the conference Japanese military and naval officers and attachés, and Japanese advisors to the "Military Commission".

PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE

At the press conference held on the eve of the opening of the conference, Mr. Yang Kuei-i (楊揆一), Chief of the General Staff and concurrently Secretary-General of the Conference, announced that the reason for calling the conference was to discuss problems pertaining to national military reconstruction. Mr. Yang stated that the purpose of military reconstruction was, externally, to defend East Asia in cooperation with Japan and, internally, to maintain public safety and protect the people in accordance with the principles provided in the "Treaty concerning the Basic Relations between China and Japan".

DECLARATION

On the opening day a declaration was issued to the effect that the "National Government" has been leading the people on the way to "Peace, Anti-Communism and National Reconstruction" and that military reconstruction ^{being} is now/undertaken with a view to defending East Asia in cooperation

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

cooperation with Japan so that the task of establishing co-prosperity in East Asia may be completed. An English translation of the full text of the declaration follows:

"Since its return to the Capital, the National Government of China has been leading its people on the way to Peace, Anti-Communism and National Reconstruction. It is with this aim in view that the foundation of a National Army will be laid. Special attention will be paid to invigorating the army's spirit and to the strict observance of discipline.

"With the development, expansion and strengthening of the army, we hope to be able, externally, to defend East Asia in co-operation with Japan, and, internally, to insure peace and order for the protection of the people.

"During the past year, the army's foundation having been established and its good reputation having been spread abroad, the soldiers who have come to join us and the troops which have surrendered themselves are daily increasing in number. It is gratifying to be able to look forward to a bright future.

"For the purpose of gathering and discussing opinions and ideas on the subject, we have called a National Military Conference on March 25 in Nanking to which the leading military officials of the various military organs and the commanders of military units have been invited.

"We are to discuss questions pertaining to military reconstruction, the maintenance of order through the eradication of evil elements, and other problems of importance. With a single-minded and single-hearted spirit, we shall reap the fruit of our concerted efforts and cooperation, while the true principles of Peace may thus become more widely recognized, strength for Anti-Communism may be further increased, plans for the organization of our National Army may be established, and the task of completing the work of Co-prosperity in East Asia may be realized. Our mission is great and our duty heavy, so let this be understood by all of our comrades."

SUBCOMMITTEE FORMED

At the first session held on the 25th, four subcommittees were formed to examine the proposals submitted

to

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to the conference. They were: (1) the Subcommittee for Military Orders, headed by General Chi Hsieh-yuan, a former warlord and Tuchun of Kiangsu, now in charge of the military forces in North China; (2) the Subcommittee for Military Administration, headed by General Jen Yuan-tao, previously "Commander-in-Chief of the Pacification Army in Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Anhwei", now "Commander-in-Chief of the First Area Army"; (3) the Subcommittee for Military Training, headed by General Yeh Peng; and (4) the Subcommittee for Special Affairs, headed by General Liu Yu-feng.

Proposals Submitted.

It is reported that 124 proposals were brought up for discussion at the conference by the various naval and military leaders. One hundred and nineteen are said to have been adopted, one to have been withdrawn and four rejected. The resolutions passed were referred to the "Military Commission" and the "Executive Yuan" for enforcement, while many of those passed were only adopted in principle. Whether they will ever be put into practice, remains to be seen. Several proposals asking for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from their respective areas were made by the military commanders present. Though resolutions on these proposals were passed, their enforcement is likely to be postponed indefinitely since the question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops is regarded as a matter of utmost importance requiring careful deliberation before it is carried out.

It is interesting to note that a majority of the proposals submitted were intended to enlarge the sphere
of

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

of influence of individual units, or to increase the strength of individual proposers. Some military commanders asked for the resumption of the operations of arsenals in their respective areas, some requested funds to put up work-shops for the repair of rifles and other arms, some desired the supply of ammunitions and arms, medical supplies, radio equipment, motor trucks and passenger cars, while about fifteen of them wanted an increase in their own appropriations. Others asked for an increase in the pay of soldiers and in rice allowance.

A few of the proposals which may be of interest to the Department are mentioned below:

Free Movement of Chinese Troops and Supplies.

In a proposal submitted by General Hsieh Wen-tah, "Commander of the Tenth Division", dissatisfaction was expressed in regard to restrictions placed by the Japanese on the movement of Chinese troops and the transportation of military supplies. He remarked that, according to the "Treaty Concerning the Basic Relations Between China and Japan" concluded last November, Chinese troops ought to have full liberty in their movement and in the transportation of military supplies. However, at present even when a Japanese military pass is obtained, considerable difficulty is encountered and sometimes the facilities of the "Government owned" railways are denied them. "Under such conditions, how can bandits be suppressed and military reconstruction be carried out?" he asked. He suggested that the matter be taken up with the Japanese military authorities with a view to modifying these restrictions.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

restrictions, and that the "Chinese army" be allowed to make use of all "government communication lines" whenever considered necessary.

Military Training for Students.

General Li Ou-i, Canton representative of Wang Ching-wei, as "Chairman of the Military Commission", proposed that military training for students in colleges and middle schools be restored in order to enable the younger generation to acquire the necessary military education. He emphasized that, at the present juncture when the international crisis is developing, each individual should assume his responsibility and work to safeguard the nation.

Winning Over of Troops from Chungking Forces.

Mr. Chang Chuh (臧卓), Chief of the First Department of the "Military Commission" mapped out a scheme for winning over guerrillas and regular Chungking troops and presented it to the conference. It provides the following steps: (1) Analyse the history and relationship of the units concerned, the surroundings of their garrison posts, their financial conditions, and the true inclination of their commanding officers; (2) Study their relations with Chungking and the way they have been treated by Chiang Kai-shek; (3) Take advantage of every opportunity provided by dissension arising between Chungking and Communist troops; (4) Establish offices for negotiating the surrender of troops at Taiyuan (太原), Ichang (宜昌), Nanchang (南昌), Canton (廣州), and Hanoi (河内); (5) Appoint, in charge at these stations, officers of high standing in the army, with good records and sympathetic dispositions.

Withdrawal

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Withdrawal of Japanese Troops.

Proposals were made by various commanders for the withdrawal of Japanese forces in order to enable Chinese troops to take over the garrison posts left vacant by the Japanese. The proposal submitted jointly by General Hsieh Wen-tah (謝文達) and Lin Chih-kiang (林之江), "Commander and Vice-Commander of the 10th Division" respectively, is considered most significant. It is strongly worded, and frank and straightforward in tone.

Reference is made to the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Annexed Protocol of the "Treaty Concerning the Basic Relations Between China and Japan" which states that: "Even during the continuation of the said warlike operations, the special state of affairs referred to in the preceding paragraph shall, in so far as there is no obstacle to the attainment of the object of the operations, be adjusted in accordance with the changing circumstances and in conformity with the Treaty and its annexed documents."

In referring to this paragraph the proposal states that since the peace area under the control of the "National Government" is now far from the scene of hostilities, the "war-like operations" are not, in fact, in existence. The only problem to be solved in the peace area is that of public order which is purely a matter of domestic administration of the "National Government", having no bearing whatsoever on the military activities of the Japanese troops, the proposal avers.

Pointing

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Pointing out the undesirability of stationing Japanese forces in the peace area, the proposal says that the presence of Japanese troops in such territory will only serve to irritate the mind of the Chinese populace and to occasion suspicion in regard to Japan's sincerity in respecting China's independence and sovereign rights.

The proposal goes on to say that a careful analysis of the "Treaty" and its annexed protocol does not reveal any provision which restricts China's military reconstruction. It may be argued, the proposal continues, that, according to Article 3 of the "Annexed Protocol", Japanese forces shall commence evacuation and shall complete it within two years after the establishment of peace and order. It is explained that this provision refers to a complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China, while the withdrawal referred to in the present proposal applies to partial withdrawal in the areas where there is no military necessity for stationing Japanese troops, and that the suggestions made in this proposal are in no way contradictory to the stipulations of the "Treaty".

The above proposal is reported to have been unanimously passed at the conference, but it is not believed that it will receive early attention from the "Military Commission".

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

A short time after the inauguration of the Wang Ching-wei regime the puppet military forces began to undergo general reorganization. The "Pacification Forces"

of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

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of the defunct "Reformed Government" have been reorganized into the First Area Army which consists of seven divisions (1st to 7th), three independent brigades and two independent regiments. All these units are stationed in the provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Anhwei. The troops in other areas under the peace banner have been reorganized into ten divisions, three independent brigades and one independent regiment. Besides, there are in Nanjing one brigade of Wang's personal bodyguard and two companies of gendarmes.

According to a statement made by Mr. Yang Kuei-i, there are at present already over 400,000 local "Government" soldiers in addition to 200,000 armed police. However, other authoritative information places the number at around 150,000 men. Each division is said to consist of from four to five thousand men as against the normal ten thousand.

Army Commanders and Location of Their Troops.

The names of division commanders and commanders of independent units as well as the localities where the various units are stationed are given below:

<u>Division</u>	<u>Commander</u>	<u>Locality</u>
1st.Division	Hsu Pu-chen (徐撲誠)	Hangchow (杭州)
2nd. "	Hsu Feng-tsao (徐鳳藻)	" "
3rd. "	Kung Kuo-liang (龔國樑)	Soochow (蘇州)
4th. "	Yung Yueh-heng (熊育衡)	" "
5th. "	Chen Wan-chun (程萬軍)	Wukiang (吳江)
6th. "	Shen Hsi-ju (沈席儒)	Pengpu (蚌埠)
7th. "	Wang Chan-lin (王占林)	Luchow (廬州)

10th

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Division	Commander	Locality
10th. Division	Hsieh Wen-tah (謝文達)	Nanking-Shanghai Line
11th. "	Li Pao-lien (李寶璉)	Kwangsui (廣水), Suihsien (隨縣), etc. (Hupei)
12th. "	Chang Chi-huang (張啟黃)	Singyang (信陽), Hunan
13th. "	Ting Hsih-san (丁錫三)	Footung (浦東), Shanghai.
14th. "	Chang Feng-feng (張鳳峰)	East Honan
15th. "	Tou Kwang-tien (竇光電)	" "
16th. "	Wang Hsin-ming (王新民)	Suhsien (宿縣) Anhui
17th. "	Tang Mou-lin (湯茂林)	" "
18th. "	Pan Pai-hou (潘伯豪)	" "
19th. "	Tsai Hsin-yuen (蔡鑫元)	Taisning (泰興)
Independent brigade	Liu Fu-yung (劉福雲)	Kunshan (昆山)
2nd. "	" Peng Tsi-hua (彭濟華)	Canton (廣州)
3rd.3 "	" Li Tsung-sheng (李宗盛)	Fengyang (鳳陽) Kiangsu
8th. "	" Shen Yu-chao (沈玉朝)	Nanking (南京) and Wuhu (蕪湖)
9th. "	" Chen Yien-seng (陳炎生)	" "

NAVY'S FIVE-YEAR PLAN

At the conference the "Ministry of Navy" submitted a five-year plan for the construction of a new Chinese "navy". It seems to be a modification of the ten-year plan mapped out by the Japanese for the defunct "Reformed Government" a year ago before the inauguration of Wang Ching-wei's "National Government", which was reported in this office's despatch no. 154 of March 22, 1941 on the subject: "The Nanking Plan for a New Navy".

The

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The present plan is scheduled to be completed in two periods, the first of three years and the second of two years.

Construction and Repair of War Vessels.

In the first period of three years, the plan provides for the construction of 88 gunboats for river patrol to cost Ch\$29,760,000, the repair of the war vessels returned by the Japanese at an expenditure of CN\$12,000,000 and an additional expenditure of CN\$6,080,000 for the establishment of strategic harbor offices and the organization of naval land forces. The second period of two years calls for the construction of 57 small gunboats for river patrol at an expenditure of \$23,700,000, and the repair of the two ships, LINGSENG and YUNGCHIEN, at a total cost of CN\$1,000,000. It is claimed that some thirty-six ten to seventeen-ton gunboats for river patrol have already been constructed and put in service.

Organization of Land Forces and Strategic Harbor Offices.

The plan also provides for the organization of land forces and the establishment of strategic harbor offices at various points. This program is to be completed in the first three years. A list of the places where improvements are to be made is shown below:

1st. Year District land forces at Hangchow (杭州), Wuhu (芜湖), Tsingtao (青岛), Chefoo (烟台) and Lienyung (连云港).

2nd. Year Naval base detachments at Tinghai (定海) and Woosung (吴淞); district land forces at Chapoo (乍浦) and Shihtao (石岛); and strategic harbor offices at Hankow (汉口) and Anking (安庆).

3rd Year

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3rd. Year Districtland forces at Tiensungkiang (天生港), Wukiang (吳江), Huchow (湖州), Lungkow (龍口), naval base detachments at Hoihow (海口) and Shasi (沙市). District detachments at Kiukiang (九江), Yochow (岳州) and Ichang (宜昌).

So far the naval base detachments at Nanking (南京) and Kiangying (江陰); district detachments at Minghong (閔行), Wuhu (蕪湖) and Weihaiwei (威海衛), and the premises for the River Defense Commissioner's Headquarters at Canton are claimed to have already been established.

Expenditure.

The expenses to be incurred in connection with the establishment of strategic naval harbor offices, naval base detachments and district land forces during the five years of its program are estimated hereunder:

1st. year	CN\$1,670,000
2nd. year	1,850,000
3rd. year	2,560,000
4th. year	19,070,950
5th. year	11,350,950
	<u>CN\$36,501,900</u>

Naval Officers and Men.

The number of officers and men required to be stationed at the various strategic harbor offices during the first and second periods are as follows:

	<u>First Period</u>		<u>Second Period</u>	
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>
Nanking	246	1950	164	1300
Weihaiwei	126	1002	84	668
Hankow	219	1749	146	1166
Canton	114	870	76	580
War vessels	<u>57</u>	<u>510</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>340</u>
	762	6081	508	4054

The

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 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The amount to be expended on the pay of officers and men during the five years is estimated at approximately CN\$10,000,000.

There are at present in the Nanking "Navy" 149 officers and 1357 men, of whom 30 officers and 285 men are attached to the "Ministry of the Navy" and the various strategic harbor officers, 11 officers and 566 men, including 210 students, at the "Central Naval College", and the rest on board war vessels and river patrol gunboats.

TWO-YEAR PLAN FOR THE NANKING STRATEGIC HARBOR OFFICE

The Strategic Harbor Office of Nanking has drawn up a two-year plan which calls for a total expenditure of CN\$1,034,000. Items included in the program are a naval hospital, a dormitory for marines, a pontoon, a and dry dock, a ceremonial hall, among others.

A detailed list of the amounts to be expended on the various structures is as follows:

First Year

- | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| 1. Construction of a dock for the repair of small river patrol gunboats | CN\$75,000 |
| 2. Construction of a workshop for miscellaneous repairs | 93,000 |
| 3. A naval hospital | 292,000 |

Second Year

- | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Dormitory for marines to accommodate 400 men | 122,000 |
| 2. Two drill grounds | 135,000 |
| 3. A ceremonial hall and a lecture hall | 144,000 |
| 4. A pontoon of 50 feet in length, 15 feet in width and 6 feet in depth | 157,000 |
| 5. A naval prison | 16,000 |
| | <u>CN\$1,034,000</u> |

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ACTIVITIES IN WANG'S ARMY FOLLOWING THE MILITARY CONFERENCE

Military Cadets Sent to Japan for Further Studies.

An examination was held on April 12th and 13th, under the auspices of the Military Commission, for the selection of twenty military cadets to be sent to Japan to receive advanced training. An Examination Committee was formed by the Directorate of Military Training to conduct the examination. It is reported that over 40 graduates of military academies in Nanking, Hankow, and Canton, as well as candidates recommended by the various armies, participated in the examination.

High Military Officers Make Tour of Japan.

A party of four high military officers and seven attachés has been organized to make an inspection tour of Japan in company with Captain Kokuchi. The party includes Lieutenant-General Hsu Pu-cheng (徐模誠), "Commander of the First Division"; Lieutenant-General Kung Ko-liang (韓國樑), "Commander of the Third Division"; Lieutenant-General Shen Hsi-ju (沈席儒), "Commander of the Sixth Division"; and Lieutenant-General Wang Chan-lin (王占林), "Commander of the Seventh Division".

It is interesting to note that all of these officers belong to the First Area Army which is under the command of Jen Yuan-tao (任遠達), who was previously Commander-in-Chief of the "Pacification Army" of the "Reformed Government" and seems to be gathering considerable power.

The party left for Japan on April 24 and is expected to remain there for about one month.

Training

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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Training Class for Army Officers.

As another "step forward in the work of military reconstruction", the "Military Commission" has decided to establish a "Central Army Officers' Training Class" to be placed under the control of the "Directorate of Military Training" in Nanning. The cadets to be trained in this class will be selected from among the lower commissioned officers of the various military units. The total number of students to be enrolled for the first term is fixed at 324, and each term is to last three months. Mr. Hsiao Shu-hsuan (蕭叔萱), "Director-General of Military Training", has been appointed to take charge of the Training Class.

CONCLUSION

The conference would appear to have little significant accomplishment to its credit. Most of the military leaders are of the old war-lord type, and are continuing their typical policy of endeavoring to obtain personal power and prestige without regard to their potential value to the new regime, but there is no evidence that the Japanese military authorities are giving away any real power or permitting the distribution of sufficient ammunition or equipment to endanger the control exercised over this territory by the reportedly inferior number of Japanese troops in the area. However, the latter appear safe from danger of serious attack not only owing to their monopoly of air forces and artillery, but also to their far more efficient leadership.


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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leadership. The Japanese seem to be always on their guard against the threat of attack by the local Chinese forces, perhaps with good reason.

Respectfully yours,

For the Consul General
at Shanghai:


J. Hall Paxton
American Consul

800
JHP:M


Original and four copies to the Department
Copy to the Embassy, Peiping
Copy to the Embassy, Chungking
Copy to the Embassy, Tokyo
Copy to the Consulate General, Shanghai

4 Carbon Copies
Received

OK
7/7

0626

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

PEIPING VIA N.R.

Dated July 7, 1941

FROM

Rec'd 2:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 7-5-41 RES

159, July 7, 5 p.m.

The Peiping HSIN PAO the Peiping SHEN PAO and the
 TIENTSIN YUAG PAO, all under Japanese control, publish
 today identic editorials headed "The Fourth Anniversary
 of the Incident: A Stock Taking" of which the following
 are abridged excerpts in translation:

Chiang Kai Shek's regime exists only as a puppet of
 Great Britain the United States and the Communists.
 Materially and spiritually, who are better off, residents
 of Occupied or Unoccupied China? Which side is treading
 the path of reconstruction and peace? Who can help us?
 Not Great Britain and the United States for they have hood-
 winked us since the time of the opium wars. They mouth
 honeyed-words but their hearts contain daggers. We must
 not forget what the Westerners have spoken about the
 Yellow Peril and about the Yellow Race being the rival
 of the White. To invite the assistance of these two
 countries is to invite destruction. It is equally cer-
 tain that we cannot invite the Communists for they have
 caused widespread destruction wherever they have fled.

The Chinese

793.94/16717

PS/CMR

793.94

7/11/41

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 159, July 7, 1941 from Peiping via N. R.

The Chinese Northwest has become a Soviet Province.
On this the fourth anniversary of the Incident we should
follow Japan in the task of establishing a New Order
in East Asia.

Following are translations of some of the slogans
in Chinese now posted in Peiping:

"Germany and Italy have already obtained absolute
superiority. It would be tantamount to suicide for the
United States to participate in the War", Great Britain
has been disastrously defeated, the United States is
panicky and vacillating. We should give up our dependence
on Great Britain and the United States." "Only righteous-
ness upholding Japan hopes for the Renaissance of China."
"China and Japan must cooperate and be friendly with
each other".

Sent to the Department.

Repeated to Chungking and Shanghai.

By air mail to Tokyo.

BUTRICK

ALC

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1300

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JUL 5 1941
 Department of State

RS

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be- FROM
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

Peiping

Dated July 5, 1941

Rec'd 6:56 p.m., 6th

COMMUNICATED ORALLY
 7/9/41 JD
 Secretary of State,

Washington.

157, July 5, 5 a.m. (SECTION ONE)

Two observers one quoting a Chinese source close
 to the Japanese, have expressed opinion that the en
 bloc recognition of Nanking was engineered by Govern-
 ment to the embarrassment of Japan while (*) now have
 (?) freedom of action in seeking any desired peace
 negotiations with Chungking. Germany by this action
 shortly after Wang's visit to Tokyo showed to the world
 (particularly the United States) the solidarity and
 strength of the Axis.

The same Chinese source informed one observer
 that Wang's Tokyo reception did not meet his expecta-
 tions and that of the three things he sought, namely,
 control of North China, a loan to offset the American
 loan to Chungking, and more power in China affairs,
 the first was denied him.

BUTRICK

HPD

(*) Apparent omission

793.94/16718

PS /CMR

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Husted NARS, Date 12-18-75

1301

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DES

This telegram must be
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 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (Br)

FROM PEIPING VIA N.R.

Dated July 5, 1941

Rec'd 2:13 a.m. 7th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

157, July 5, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

This source predicts that the Japanese are now
 convinced that the United States will have to be con-
 sidered in any peace moves in China; that Japan will
 continue offensives against the Chinese Government during
 the summer and will consider new peace moves in the
 autumn through the medium of the Kuomintang (both Chung-
 king and Nanking profess Kuomintang membership); in the
 meantime Japan will be guided entirely by expediency
 and European developments in the carrying out of her
 southward advance and possible action against Soviet
 Russia. (END OF MESSAGE).

Sent to the Department; repeated to Chungking,
 Nanking, Shanghai. Code text by airmail to Tokyo.

BUTRICK

HPD

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MD

PLAIN

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
Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.

Dated July 6, 1941

FROM

Rec'd 5:35 a.m., 7th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



COPIES SENT TO

D.N.I. AND M.I.D. Currie
7-8-41 HES

940, sixth, 3 p.m.

Colonel Mabuchi, Chief Army Information Section
 Imperial Headquarters, yesterday issued statement which
 appears all vernaculars today. Summary follows.

793.94
 Having suffered no enemy bombing Japanese people prone
 forget nation is at war and pay too much attention
 European hostilities, believing China incident will
 settle itself. HOWEVER, Japan's concluding incident
 and establishment coprosperity sphere increases pro-
 portionately with expansion European War. Through
 continued use superlatives, adjectives in war reports,
 nation has become indifferent situation Chinese continent
 and forgets repeated battles being waged (twelve
 thousand since January 1941). Japanese forces though
 smaller in number cover wider area than Germans in Europe.
 Japan stands now at cross roads of destiny. If people
 become inspired same spirit impelling soldiers at front,
 new structure, production expansion and replication national
 defense be accomplished.

Send Department via Shanghai.

GREW

ALC

793.94/16719

PS / CMR

FILED
JUL 14 1941

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 7-9-71 NES

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RS

PLAIN

Chungking via N.R.

FROM

Dated July 7, 1941

Rec'd 2:35 p.m., 8th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



276, July 7, 5 p.m.

The following are noteworthy extracts from Generalissimo Chiang's address to the friendly nations on the fourth anniversary of the commencement of Sino-Japanese hostilities: From the very beginning we were prepared to fight alone to the end. We were and are confident that China is strong enough to master Japan; but if countries friendly to our cause will but assist us to the best of their ability in our military and economic necessities, the progress of our arms will be accelerated and the world be the sooner rid of the greatest dangers to its welfare.

As things stand today, the war in the Far East is no longer to be viewed as merely a conflict between two nations, for the European and Asiatic wars have now become closely interrelated.

The nations friendly to her (China) should regard it as imperative--that a term be put to the outrageous depredations

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708.04/10720

JUL 11 1941

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-, #276 to Chungking via N.R., July 7, 1941.

depredations of Japan. That done, Asia, America, Australia, and Africa can bring their combined weight to bear in the enterprise of imposing a settlement of the European hostilities. If they wishfully think the Japanese may experience a change of heart and suppose it safe to let them have their way for the time being they will find their errors as disastrous as the policy of appeasement pursued until recently by European countries towards Germany (the Chinese Government and people will certainly act up to the trust put in them, for not to do so would be to fail the ideals animating their own strivings and sacrifices. Now we hope and believe that there will be more effective collaboration between China and her friends."

Sent to Department. Repeated to Peiping.

GAUSS

LMS

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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EH

PLAIN
 FROM
 Shanghai via N. R.


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 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 7-9-41 HES

Dated July 8, 1941

Rec'd 9:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

815, Eighth.



Following is summary of editorial comment on the fifth anniversary of the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities.

NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS after reviewing progress of hostilities during past four years comments that neither country appears to be in a position to force a decision militarily; that the Japanese have won victories but they have not won this undeclared war with China; and that the probabilities are that the situation in the Far East will not be adjusted until the democracies have beaten Hitler.

The SHANGHAI EVENING POST AND MERCURY is of the opinion that the holocaust of today is direct outgrowth of the war which has been raging in China for the past four years. China has suffered immeasurably but her spirit and her faith in the righteousness of her cause remain undiminished, declares this journal, and it is this spirit which enables her to fight more effectively with

733.24/10721

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EH -2- 815, July 8 from Shanghai.

with each passing week.

The SHANGHAI TIMES attributes continued Chinese resistance to the vast size of the country, to the want of political organization among the masses which makes it possible for Chungking to maintain that it represents the people of China, and to the support being received from certain foreign powers. This journal finds it strange that China should be included in the democratic front. It does not see any early prospect of peace but adds that it hopes peace will enable the two neighbor nations, China and Japan, to cooperate for the mutual advancement of Far Eastern civilization.

Local pro-Chungking Chinese language papers point out that the international situation today is more favorable to China than it has ever been and that she must take advantage of the situation and strive for victory.

Japanese Nanking-controlled papers stress the need for cooperation between Japan and the Nanking regime and emphasize the urgent necessity of concluding hostilities and implementing the co-prosperity policy in greater East Asia.

Sent to Department. Repeated to Chungking and Peiping. Air mail to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

EMB

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

FROM


Foochow via N. R.

Dated July 7, 1941

Rec'd. 9:58 a. m., 8th

SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY
 TO ONI AND MID 7/11/41 JD

Secretary of State,
 Washington



July 7, 7 p. m.

Reference telegrams my dated June 10, 7 p. m. and
 June 18, 6 p. m. ¹⁶⁶⁹²

The sound of heavy gunfire was audible in Foochow throughout the day as Japanese forces shelled Chinese guerrillas near this city.

Yesterday and last night Japanese troops estimated at between one and two thousand and constituting a substantial portion of those remaining in the immediate vicinity of Foochow passed down the Min River in the direction of Pagoda anchorage where a large Japanese transport is anchored.

These troop movements growing out of unofficial Japanese statements relative to the possibility of total Japanese withdrawal and other factors including those outlined in the first paragraph of my telegram dated June 10, 7 p. m., have given rise to widespread local rumors that the Japanese soon will completely evacuate this port.

Sent

793.04/16722

PS/LDP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP -2- July 7, 7 p. m. from Foochow

Sent to Peiping, repeated to the Department and
Chungking. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo.

PRICE


KLP

0637

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

1302

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



DES


This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM TOKYO

Dated July 8, 1941

Rec'd 12:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



957, July 8, 7 p.m.

Department's 342, June 20, 4 p.m.

File
16703a conf

I have already made discreet use in conversations with influential Japanese, without revealing the source of my information, of the report concerning Germany's attitude to the Sino-Japanese war and the reported German treaty with the Dutch authorities in occupied Holland concerning the Netherlands East Indies. Today I had occasion to bring the report directly to the attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He did not attempt to deny the credibility of these reports and merely said that as a loyal ally of Germany, Japan would go along with Germany "as far as possible".

GREW

LMS

JUL 17 1941

FILED

793.74/16722

DS/LTP

Confidential File

793-94

286

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 14, 1941.

~~MMS~~
~~PAS~~
~~JD~~

~~WRL~~
~~GA~~
 WAA

Canton's despatch no. 260, June 3, 1941.

The Consulate General summarizes the military activity reported in previous telegrams by saying: "this latest 'Spring Offensive' appears to have ended as most of the other offensives carried out by the Japanese from Canton in the past two years: the Japanese forces after a considerable expenditure of men and material have accomplished nothing of a decisive nature and have returned to the bases from which they set out."

793.94/16724

H7

FE:Fales:OJL

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 260 RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 7-13-41 HKS

1941 JUL 6 AM 9 41

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

DIVISION
 COMMUNICATIONS

Canton, China, June 3, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Recent Japanese Military Operations
in Waichow Area.

Drawn	Good	In U.S.A.	Y	No
SMITH				

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to my telegrams no. 23, May 13, 5 p.m., no. 24, May 21, 4 p.m. and no. 26, May 22, 10 a.m. in regard to the Japanese invasion of the Waichow area which began on May 10, and their withdrawal about ten days later, and to report additional details concerning the temporary occupation which have come to the attention of this office.

It will be recalled that the Japanese military authorities announced after their withdrawal from Waichow that they had achieved their objectives, namely the routing of Chinese forces in that area and the frustration of Chinese attempts to reopen the Hong Kong-Shiuchow trade route. They claimed that they had completely shattered the morale of the Chinese troops, many of whom had been surrounded and annihilated, and that their operations had met with very little resistance.

It

793.94/16724

PS/LR

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
 Department of State

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

It now appears that although Japanese forces captured Poklo on May 11 and Waichow on May 12 with little difficulty and carried out with some success "mopping up" operations in the Waichow-Tamshui (惠州淡水)-Pingshan (平山) triangle, in which area there are believed to have been few regular Chinese troops, the Japanese subsequently got into difficulties as a result of pressure from Chinese troops north of Waichow. The valley in the vicinity of Waichow being difficult to defend, the Chinese troop headquarters are, it is reported, at Paitang (柏塘), in the mountains some forty miles north of Waichow. Here the Chinese troops were less vulnerable to attacks from the air and from mechanized units, and because of their strategic position they were able more easily to defend territory to the north against invading forces. Heaviest fighting is stated to have occurred near Hsiangshui (响水), about ten miles north of Poklo, and although no estimate can be made as to the number of casualties sustained, the fact that some of the wounded Japanese had to be taken as far as Fatshan, ten miles west of Canton, indicates that hospitals in Canton, Sheklung and other points to the east must have been well filled and that casualties were fairly heavy. One source reported having seen a trainload of wounded estimated at 1,200 entering Canton on May 17. In an effort to harass Chinese reinforcements coming down from northern Kwangtung, the Japanese are reported

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

reported to have carried out intensive bombing operations, particularly at Hoyuen (河源) and Lungmoon (龍門).

According to Chinese reports, approximately 20,000 Japanese were engaged in the drive; however this claim is thought to be excessive - probably 10,000 is nearer the correct figure. Japanese news reports stated that the 160th and 253rd Divisions of the Chinese Army were engaged, but no figures were mentioned.

Although these operations may have been instituted mainly as a result of the menacing pressure of Chinese troops in the Waichow area, I am inclined to believe that this offensive action was undertaken at least partly for its political effect in Japan and China. The apparent absence of any unusual concentration of Japanese forces in this area would seem to indicate that no extension of the occupied zone was intended. In any event, this latest "Spring Offensive" appears to have ended as most of the other offensives carried out by the Japanese from Canton in the past two years: the Japanese forces after a considerable expenditure of men and material have accomplished nothing of a decisive nature and have returned to the bases from which they set out.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
 M. S. Myers
 American Consul General

Original and four copies to the Department.
 One copy to Embassy, Peiping.
 One copy to Embassy, Chungking.
 One copy to Consulate General, Hong Kong.

800
 WS/dts

14 Carbon Copies
 Received

0642

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 577
 NO. 577 Embassy, China.

RECEIVED
 AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Shanghai, China.

1941 JUL 7 PM 2 59

DIVISION OF FOREIGN
 SERVICE ADMINISTRATION
 JUL 28 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 9, 1941.


Per Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	To Field		
Per	In U.S.A.		

SUBJECT: Dropping of bombs near American Embassy and
near residence of staff members during
Japanese air raid on Chungking on June 5,
1941.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.



SIR:

793.94/16725

I have the honor to refer to telegram No. 224,

of June 6, 12 noon, from the American Embassy at

1/ Chungking on the above subject, and to enclose a copy
 of the written representations in regard to the mat-
 ter which this office has addressed to-day to the Jap-
 anese Consul General.

He was reminded that maps showing the location
 of the American Embassy were sent to the Japanese Con-
 sulate General on November 25, 1938. It was pointed
 out that on October 25, 1940, bombs were dropped in
 the immediate vicinity of the American Embassy and of
 the American gunboat, as stated in the letter this of-
 fice addressed to the Japanese Consul General on Octo-
 ber 29, 1940. The request was urgently reiterated
 that instructions be issued to prevent attacks endanger-
 ing American lives and property. All rights were re-
served


PS/LR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

served on behalf of the American Government and of
officers and employees of that Government.

Respectfully yours,


Frank F. Lockhart
American Consul General

✓
Enclosure:

Copy of letter to Japanese
Consul General, June 9th.

350
EA

In triplicate to the Department.
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Hankow.
Copy to Consulate, Kunming.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to Despatch No. 5, June 9, 1941, from
 the American Consul General at Shanghai, on the subject:
 "Dropping of bombs near American Embassy and near res-
 idence of staff members during Japanese air raid on
 Chungking on June 5, 1941".

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Shanghai, June 9, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

I have the honor to inform you that, according
 to a telegram from the American Ambassador at Chung-
 king, during the Japanese air raid on Chungking on
 June 5 between 7 and 11 p.m. Japanese planes also
 dropped bombs on the south bank of the Yangtze River,
 one or more of which landed about four hundred yards
 behind the Chancery of the American Embassy, while
 others hit the sand bar on the foreshore about four
 hundred yards from the residence occupied by members
 of the Embassy staff. Slight damage was caused from
 falling plaster.

It will be recalled that maps showing the loca-
 tion of the American Embassy at Chungking were sent to
 your office by this Consulate General on November 25,
 1938. It will also be recalled that in my letter of
 October 29, 1940, I informed you that during the Japa-
 nese air raid on Chungking on October 25, 1940, heavy
 bombers followed a course immediately over the Amer-
 ican Embassy and over the S.S. TUTUILA and dropped
 bombs, the nearest of which fell about three hundred

yards

T. Horiuchi, Esquire,
 Consul General for Japan,
 Shanghai.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

yards north of the Embassy and the American gunboat.

I urgently reiterate my numerous previous requests that stringent instructions be issued by the Japanese authorities to prevent attacks endangering American lives and property. It is requested that the information in this letter be brought to the attention of the Japanese authorities concerned without delay; that an investigation of the attack mentioned above be made; and that I be informed as soon as possible of the results of the investigation.

On behalf of the American Government and officers and employees of that Government, all rights are reserved in respect of losses and damages sustained as a result of action by the Japanese armed forces.

I have the honor to be,

Sir and dear Colleague,

Your obedient servant,

Frank P. Lookhart
American Consul General

350
MH.EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 14, 1941

~~HF~~
~~MWS~~
~~EAB~~
~~ECR~~
~~RB~~

~~WRL~~
~~GA~~
~~WAA~~
~~MMH~~

PA/H

Chungking's despatch no. 31 encloses a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Drumright and the Director of Intelligence and Publicity of the Foreign Office, Mr. Shao Yu-lin.

While the conversation took place before Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, Mr. Shao's comments are nevertheless of considerable interest.

Mr. Shao, who was said to be a specialist in Japanese affairs and former Chinese Consul General at Yokohama, was quoted by Mr. Drumright as having stated that Japan fears only the United States and that Japan is constantly testing the American attitude to endeavor to ascertain what the United States would do in a given case; that "give the Japanese one foot and he will take two, retreat one step and the Japanese go forward two"; that the Japanese by their present maneuvers are seeking to ascertain the American attitude and policy toward the Netherlands East Indies; that if they feel the United States will not resort to resolute action, the Japanese will attack;

that

113,941/1670

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-2-

that if the United States manifests a determined attitude, the Japanese will refrain from attacking the Indies; that if the United States adopts a policy of conciliation toward Japan in the hope of separating her from the Axis, the United States will come ultimately to regret such a policy.

Mr. Drumright's observations on the foregoing are set forth in paragraph 5 of the attached despatch.

Handwritten:
 Summary
 of
 Drumright's
 observations
 on the
 foregoing
 are set forth
 in paragraph 5
 of the
 attached
 despatch.

793.94/16726

FE:Davies:LJH

0648

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 1941 JUL 7 AM 11 57

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 31

Chungking, June 16, 1941.

Subject: Far Eastern Relations: Transmitting Memorandum
 and Attached Document.

Air Mail

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	SA-14		
In U.S.A.			
ONI after MID			

COPIES IN PARAPHRASE
 SENT TO O.N.I. after
 M.I.D. IN CONFIDENCE
 7-15-41

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 1941
 Department of State

735.94/16726

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose, as of possible interest to the Department, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation held by an officer of the Embassy with Mr. Shao Yu-lin, Director of the Department of Intelligence and Publicity of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 13, 1941. There is also enclosed copy of a document supplied by Mr. Shao during the course of the conversation, the nature of which was not made clear; it would appear, however, to constitute a Chinese estimate of certain factors in the Far Eastern situation based on information gathered from undisclosed official and unofficial sources.

2. In brief, there appears to be a feeling in official Chinese quarters that British appeasement of Japan is still an active possibility to be reckoned with in the Far East; that Japan has embarked on a campaign of "testing" the American attitude and policy, particularly with respect to Japanese pressure on the Netherlands Indies; and that Japan is endeavoring at the same time to come to an understanding with the United States and Great Britain which might prove mutually profitable to the Powers concerned -- to the United

States

PS/LR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

States and Great Britain in Europe and to Japan in the Far East -- at the expense of China and Germany.

3. Chinese distrust of Great Britain appears to remain as deep-seated as ever notwithstanding the statement issued by the British Ambassador to China at Chungking on May 9, 1941 to the effect that British policy toward China remained unchanged. It does not seem likely that this want of confidence is likely to disappear so long as the possibility exists of Japan's being divorced from its commitments under the Tripartite Pact.

4. The nature of the conversation in question and of the material contained in the attached document seems also to indicate that a certain apprehension is entertained in some Chinese circles with regard to news reports of alleged American-Japanese discussions looking to the settlement of Far Eastern problems. As was reported in my telegram no. 218, May 31, 1 p.m., this apprehension seems to have prevailed in certain Chinese quarters since the latter part of May 1941; but there is no evidence yet that it is giving Chinese leaders serious concern, especially in the light of concrete manifestations of American assistance to China and of the recent statements of the Secretary of State in regard to American policy toward Japan.

5. It seems likely that reports of American-Japanese negotiations are being deliberately spread by agents of the Axis Powers with a view to sowing doubts in the minds of China's leaders of the good faith of the Anglo-Saxon Powers, to suggesting that the actions of those Powers are characterized by duplicity. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that the Japanese Government might attempt to enter into conversations with the American Government not only with this object in mind but also with a view to clarifying to such an extent as may be possible the precise attitude and policy of the American Government toward present and future Far Eastern developments.

Respectfully yours,


 C. E. Gauss


Enclosure:

1/ Memorandum of conversation with attached document

Original and two copies to Department by air mail
 Two copies by pouch via Hong Kong
 Copies by safe hand to Peiping, Tokyo

EPD/wr
 710

* Embassy's telegrams nos. 175, May 10, noon and 177, May 10, 2 p.m.

815.154/327 1330
 Carbon copies
 Received 

0650

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no.1 to despatch no.
31 dated June 16, 1941, from
the Embassy at Chungking.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION June 14, 1941.

Subject: Far Eastern Relations.

Participants: Mr. Shao Yu-lin
Mr. Drumright

I called on Mr. Shao Yu-lin at the Foreign Office yesterday afternoon at his request. (Mr. Shao, who recently succeeded Major General CHU Shih-ming as Director of the Department of Intelligence and Publicity of the Foreign Office, is reputed to be a "Japanese expert", speaking the language fluently and having once served as Chinese Consul General at Yokohama.) He handed me the attached translation of a document in Chinese, the contents of which he termed "very reliable", and asked me to read it.

When I had finished reading the document Mr. Shao said he wished to know my reaction thereto. I replied that I found the material contained therein to be interesting but rather speculative in nature. Mr. Shao inquired if I knew what proposals and counterproposals had been exchanged in the Batavia parleys. I replied that I had no information on that subject. He then inquired whether I had any information to the effect that following the reply of the Netherlands Indies to the Japanese proposals the Japanese had presented a set of demands to the Government of the Netherlands Indies. I replied that I had no information to that effect, adding that on the basis of news reports it seemed highly improbable that the Japanese authorities have as yet decided just what attitude they will adopt in respect to the reply of the Netherlands Indies.

Mr. Shao then asked me whether I thought the Japanese would soon launch an attack on the Netherlands Indies. I replied that it was my personal view that the Japanese could not be expected to launch a military attack on the Netherlands Indies so long as world conditions remain as they are at present. He inquired what action I thought the United States would adopt in case of a Japanese armed invasion of the Netherlands Indies. I responded that I could not undertake to say just what action the United States might take in that event, but I added that I thought that the world was very well informed of the American attitude toward aggression wherever it occurred.

Mr. Shao then said that I, of course, knew that the Chinese felt that no reliance could be placed in Great Britain not to make a "deal" with Japan provided that such action might be regarded as serving British interests in the Far East, and asked if I thought there is a probability of Great Britain's reaching an agreement with Japan at the expense of China. I replied that it was my own private opinion that it is now too late for Great Britain to embark upon such a policy, that Britain's future policy with respect to the Far East will in all probability coincide with that of the United States. Mr. Shao appeared to appreciate this point of view and launched into a discussion of United States Far Eastern policy.

In

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

In this latter connection he made reference to a despatch attributed to Hallett Abena which was published in The New York Times to the effect that Japan is endeavoring to reach an agreement with the United States in regard to the Far East, and asked me whether I had information confirming the correctness of Abena's report. I replied that I had heard of no American-Japanese negotiations on that subject and that I therefore could not confirm the correctness of the report. Mr. Shao then sought my opinion as to whether the United States would be willing to enter into negotiations with Japan in an endeavor to settle the differences which exist between the two Powers. I said that I assumed the American Government would not turn a completely deaf ear to Japanese proposals looking to a settlement of the Far Eastern impasse and that it was possible that conversations relating thereto might be conducted. Mr. Shao interposed with a query as to the conditions under which I thought the United States would be willing to enter into discussions with Japan. I replied that I had no definite or precise information concerning the terms which the United States might advance for the settlement of Far Eastern problems, but that it was my personal opinion that the United States would wish Japan to take concrete action to honor her pledges under the provisions of the Nine Power Pact, to give up plans for a southward advance, to withdraw from China, and to retire from the commitments which she gave under the Tripartite Pact before the United States would or could give serious consideration to Japanese protestations of good faith, justice, honor and peace. I said that the United States had entered on a policy of assistance to nations resisting aggression and that it would not retire lightly therefrom; the United States, once embarked on a definite policy, was not inclined to deviate from that policy. China, I explained, has received open assurances of support from the United States and that support is likely to continue so long as Japan adheres to her present policy and China maintains her resistance. Mr. Shao assured me that China has faith and confidence in the United States alone of all the great Powers.

Mr. Shao then went into an extended discussion of Japanese methods and policies: the Japanese approach basically is to "cheat the weak" and "respect the strong". He explained that of all the great Powers, Japan fears only the United States and that Japan is constantly testing the American attitude to endeavor to ascertain what the United States would do in a given case. He emphasized the view that "give the Japanese one foot and he will take two, retreat one step and the Japanese will go forward two". He went on to explain that in his view the Japanese by their present manoeuvres are seeking to ascertain the American attitude and policy toward the Netherlands Indies. If they feel that the United States will not resort to resolute action, the Japanese will attack; if the United States manifests a determined attitude, the Japanese will refrain from attacking the Netherlands Indies. He expressed the hope that the United States will maintain a very firm and determined attitude and policy toward Japan; if the United States adopts a policy of conciliation toward Japan in the hope of separating her from the Axis, he said he believed that the United States would come ultimately to regret it, to find that it was a mistaken policy. I replied that I certainly felt that the United States is bearing these considerations in mind as much in regard to its policy vis-a-vis Japan as toward Germany.

Attachment: Document, as stated.

True copy
 of signed original

EFD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

(Copy of document handed by Mr. Shao Yu-lin to Mr.
 Drumright at Foreign Office on June 13, 1941.)

(1) Within the next two or three weeks, the Japanese Government contemplate making further effective demands on the Netherlands East Indies. Although the nature of the demand may not be a final representation, it will nevertheless be of a threatening nature as its main desire is to make a demand for an increase of the export of Gasoline including high grade oil, from the Dutch East Indies, to Japan. The Japanese Government are using such tactics in order to decide the attitude of the United States toward the Netherlands East Indies. It recognises that if the United States gives in to Japan in regard to the Netherlands East Indies question on this occasion, there will also be the possibility of the United States acting in a similar manner toward the China question at a later date. Under these circumstances, the Japanese Foreign Minister as well as the Japanese diplomatic representative in Britain hope that in connection with the Netherlands East Indies and the Pacific questions, England will act alone in yielding to Japan so as to upset the solidarity of the England, American and other Pacific democratic countries cooperating in the defence of the Pacific. Furthermore, Japan believes that there is a possible chance of a complete defeat of England in view of the reverses of the British Navy and military forces in the oil fields of Iraq as well as the Mediterranean. Therefore, in regard to the oil question in the Netherlands East Indies, Britain will no doubt be more cautious in order to prevent an enemy from attacking and the ultimate destruction of the source of supply of Petroleum.

Japan is of the opinion that in connection with the oil question of the Netherlands East Indies, there is every possibility of England entering into an agreement with Japan so as to allow the British fleet in the Mediterranean to make use of the Petroleum produced in the Dutch East Indies.

(2) Japan's action in confiscating American goods at Haiphong is due to the sole decision of the Chief Japanese Naval Commander. He wishes to test the attitude of the United States toward this affair. Seeing that up to the present, the United States Government have not made a strong protest or have taken any other counter actions, Japan thinks that the United States does not wish to create bad feeling in the relationship between the two countries. Under such condition, Japan will take further action to apply more pressure on the Netherlands East Indies.

(3) According to observers in authoritative circles, there will be something important attached to the Japanese Ambassador's departure from London for Japan via the United States, in June. They believe that the Japanese Ambassador's return is because of the fact that the Japanese Government wish to promote better American and British feeling toward Japan.

In connection with the China and Pacific questions, Japan's ultimate desire is to endeavour to come to a better understanding with England and the United States first and then she will alter her relations with the Axis Powers.

The Japanese Foreign Ministry believes that the British military affairs are now placed in a very difficult situation and that the United States will take immediate steps to decide the question of entering the war.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

The Japanese Foreign Ministry is therefore taking advantage of these opportunities to place the above stated terms before the United States Government through Shigemitsu and Nomura. Japan predicts that the British Ambassador at Washington, Lord Halifax will also give Shigemitsu his support with a view to permitting the United States to give its entire support to Britain as well as to alter the tense situation prevailing in the Pacific.

True copy
of signed original
ginal *mk*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 33

EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 Chungking, June 18, 1941.

Subject: Japanese Air Raid of June 15 on
Chungking: Damage to Office of
Military Attaché and Endangering
of Embassy Chancery and U.S.S.
TUTUILA.

AIR MAIL

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	To be held		
For	In U.S.A.		

RECEIVED
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JUL 28 1941
 Department of State
 Copy in File (376)



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegrams
 nos. 240, June 15, 3 p.m., and 241, June 16, 9 a.m.,
 regarding the bombing by Japanese planes on June 15,
 1941 near the Embassy and the U.S.S. TUTUILA.

SUMMARY: During a daylight raid by Japanese
 Navy planes on Chungking on June 15 a number
 of bombs fell on the South Bank of the Yangtze
 in the immediate vicinity of the Embassy
 Chancery, the U.S.S. TUTUILA and the office
 of the Military Attaché. Although the main
 target of the bombing squadron was the section

of

793.94/16727

PS/LR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AIR MAIL

- 2 -

of the city immediately across the river from the Chancery, the likelihood that the bombing of the Chancery area was done by a plane out of formation has led the Military and Naval Attachés to believe that it was either criminal carelessness or deliberate intent.

At about 1:00 p.m. on Sunday, June 15, after the air raid alarms had been sounded, a group of 27 Japanese planes was seen to be approaching Chungking. Weather conditions were perfect: the sky was cloudless, the sun straight overhead and there was no breeze. Visibility could not have been better.

In accordance with invariable practice, the largest American flag in the possession of the Embassy, 18 by 30 feet, had already been laid out horizontally on the ground beside the Chancery. In addition a smaller flag was flying from the Chancery flagstaff.

As soon as it appeared that the planes were headed in the general direction of the Chancery, Mr. Lafoon and myself, together with the naval radiomen attached to the Embassy station and Chinese staff members, who were present at the Chancery, entered the Chancery dugout. Other members of the Embassy staff at their residences along the South Bank likewise entered dugouts. The Military and Naval Attachés and several other staff officers were, however, on the top of the first range of hills overlooking the city, out of the line of flight and in excellent positions to see all that happened. This report is based on their personal observations.

1/

The bombing planes flew over the city in a straight line course from about 15 degrees east of south at an altitude estimated to be over 15,000 feet. In their approach they passed directly over the Embassy (No. 6 on diagram) and the residence occupied by Second Secretary MacDonald, the Military Attaché, and six other members of the Embassy staff (no. 7). Although there were 27 planes - the same number employed in most of the recent raids on Chungking - it was noted that the formation differed from the usually used conventional "V" formation of three groups of nine, by being a very much flattened "V" of 25 planes with one plane trailing some distance behind the outer plane on each wing of the "V". The approximate formation of the planes in the position they occupied as they neared the city is shown at the bottom of the enclosed diagram. It will be seen that the trailing plane on the right wing, which must have passed over the Chancery, was considerably behind the main squadron and also behind the plane trailing the left wing.

Despite their altitude, observers are agreed in identifying the planes as being of the Japanese Naval air force.

The

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AIR MAIL

- 3 -

The squadron released its bombs in a single salvo. Its target appeared to be the section of Chungking city between T'ai-p'ing Men and Tung Shui Men (city gates) sloping toward the river and immediately opposite the Chancery (on the south bank). The great majority of the bombs landed in the Chungking city area described, where considerable damage was done and several small fires started. Several bombs, however, landed in the river, apparently short of the target (see diagram), and it is believed that it was these bombs which shook the Ambassador's residence (no. 6) and staff residence (no. 7), breaking glass in a few skylights and windows.

About ten or fifteen seconds after the bombs had landed in the city, the explosions of at least four bombs on the south bank in the vicinity of the Chancery and U.S.S. TUTUILA were seen. This fact has convinced the Military and Naval Attaches that these bombs were dropped by the plane trailing behind the right wing of the formation. Whether the pilot of this plane was thus out of formation and dropped his bombs where he did as a result of inexperience and lack of skill - which must be termed criminal negligence - or whether his action was deliberate and intentional, can only be a matter of conjecture.

It will be seen from the diagram that at least five bombs fell in a line which indicates that the plane dropping them must have passed almost directly over the Chancery (no. 1 on the diagram). When it is borne in mind that the Chancery stands on the summit of a small hill, from which the ground slopes away steeply to the river - and is hence a rather difficult target to hit - it must be considered that the pilot, if it was actually his intent to bomb the Chancery, did not make a bad attempt. If the Chancery had stood on level ground and the nearest bombs had fallen level to, instead of considerably below it, the damage suffered would undoubtedly have been considerably greater.

Bomb a, the first dropped, fell on a Chinese-style wooden building immediately adjacent to the two storey building of which the upper floor had only recently been rented and furnished as an office by the Military Attaché. This bomb was not more than 20 yards from the office building, 50 yards from the entrance (A on diagram) of the Chancery dugout, and 100 yards from both the Chancery and the TUTUILA. Apparently a medium sized demolition bomb, it completely destroyed the building which it hit and wrecked or rendered untenable all surrounding buildings except that housing the Military Attaché's office, which remained standing only because of its substantial brick construction. Nonetheless this building suffered considerable damage: most of the wall toward the blast was blown in, and doors, windows and woodwork smashed. The important repairs necessary will require, according to the landlord (Greek), at least 3 weeks. The furniture and

fixtures

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AIR MAIL

- 4 -

fixtures of the Military Attaché luckily suffered only minor damage and have been moved either to the Chancery or the U. S. Naval Canteen in the nearby office building of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company.

The explosion littered the surrounding area with debris. A large piece of wood, at least three feet long and a foot in diameter, landed near the dugout entrance. Fragments hit the Chancery roof, and shrapnel and several small pieces of wood landed on the deck of the TUTUILA. The concussion shook plaster, broke glass, and tore doors and shutters from their hinges in the Chancery (no. 1), Italian Embassy (no. 2) and the offices of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company (no. 4).

It is reported that 37 Chinese who had taken refuge in a dugout in the hillside immediately behind the building demolished by this bomb were killed, and that no persons came out of this dugout alive. This dugout, it should be mentioned, was poorly planned, being only about 8 yards deep, dug straight into the hill, with only one entrance and no baffle wall to break the force of the concussion or stop shrapnel. Although the force of the concussion was noticeably violent in the Chancery dugout, it is believed that it is reasonably safe in these respects and that such a tragedy would be unlikely even if a bomb were to hit it or fall near the entrance.

Bomb b, likewise a demolition bomb, landed near the shore of the river about 60 yards from the TUTUILA. It failed to explode and still remains buried there. Since it fell on a pile of slag from a nearby coal mine, the damage to the ship and personnel from flying rocks if it had exploded would probably have been serious.

Bomb c landed in the water about 100 yards astern of the TUTUILA and caused no damage. It may have been an incendiary.

In addition, at least two more bombs fell on a reef of rocks about 200-300 yards from the TUTUILA. These were apparently smaller incendiary bombs and this may account for the lack of damage from flying rock fragments.

There was fortunately no damage to American government-owned property. The Embassy, Chancery and Military Attaché's office are all rented from non-American owners who are responsible for repairs. The staff residence is owned by an American citizen, Mrs. Saddle K. McCartney, but the damage done was slight and it is believed that she will not submit a formal claim for pecuniary damages. The TUTUILA escaped damage as did the furniture and personal effects of American personnel in the various buildings affected.

In


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AIR MAIL

- 5 -

In view of all the circumstances, however, it can only be regarded as extremely fortunate that greater loss was not experienced and that no member of the personnel of the Embassy and U.S.S. TUTUILA suffered personal injury.

Respectfully yours,


C. E. Gauss.

Enclosure:

1/ Diagram, as stated.


Original and four copies to Department by air mail.
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.

711.6
JSS:HHK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 33 dated June 18, 1941, from
 American Embassy at Chungking.

Source: Map of Chungking prepared by Office of Military
 Attache, 1939.



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.C.
 7-10-41

AF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


Tokyo via Shanghai
 & N. R.

FROM

Dated July 7, 1941

Rec'd 11:15 am; 9th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



946, seventh, 6 p.m.

793.94

In connection with the fourth anniversary of the beginning of the China Incident today, the Japanese press has during the past few days devoted a large proportion of space to announcements from the Imperial Army headquarters, statement by Army officials and editorials discussing the status of the China Incident. The results of the China campaign are tabulated, the present weakness of the Chungking Government and the developing strength of Nanking are emphasized, the nation is warned against increasing British and American aid to Chiang Kai-Shek, and an appeal is made to the people to cooperate in perfecting national defense that the incident may be successfully concluded and any emergency met.

The Imperial Army headquarters announced enemy and Japanese casualties for the total four year period of the Incident and for the first six months of 1941.

During

793.94/16723

PC/AD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 946, July 7, 6 p.m. - from Tokyo.

During the former period enemy losses, including killed, wounded and prisoners are computed at 3,800,000 or approximately 540 divisions; those killed at 2,015,000. Japanese losses during the four year period are reported as 109,250 killed. During the period January to June 1941, 191,700 Chinese are reported killed in contrast to 5,119 Japanese.

War Minister Tojo today issued a statement in which he expressed gratitude for the efforts of men at the front and lauded the construction work being undertaken by Japan in China, "in spite of outside interference in the form of assistance to Chungking." He said that Japan now faces an unprecedentedly serious condition in view of the spread of European hostilities and that an invincible national structure must be built. He asked the people to realize more deeply the actual conditions facing Japan and to place full confidence in the Army's determination and power.

Sent Department via air mail to Shanghai.

GREW

ALC

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
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 7-10-41 HE3

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RS

GRAY

FROM

Yokohama via Shanghai & N.R.

Dated July 7, 1941

Rec'd 11:45 a.m., 9th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



July 7, 2 p.m.

On July 5 posters were affixed to posts before the American Consulate, the British Consulate and the Yokohama United Club stating in English and Japanese "Down with Pro-Chiang Kai Shek Powers." They were dated from 7-7 for the anniversary of the beginning of the China incident and signed Kanagawa (?) Peoples Imperial Rule Assistance Association Movement Federation.

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NPL

793.94/16729

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 JUL 14 1941

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EH

This telegram must be _____ Tokyo via Shanghai & N. R.
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated Dated July 8, 1941
 to anyone. (br)

FROM

Rec'd 11:26 a.m., 9th.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

COPIES IN PARAPHRASE

SENT TO O.N.I. AND

IN CONFIDENCE

7-12-41 HES

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 10 1941

Department of State

961, July 8, 11 p.m.

Department's 350, June 24, 8 p.m. I conveyed to
 the Minister for Foreign Affairs today substance of the
 Department's telegram concerning the USS TUTUILA at
 Chungking.

Sent to Department via Shanghai, Shanghai please
 repeat to Chungking, Peiping. Repeated to Chungking,
 Peiping.

GREW

MR. HORNBECK

JUL 17 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WWC

793.94/16730

PS/LR

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Blue NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (no. 961) of July 8, 1941 from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

On July 8 the Ambassador brought to the attention of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs the substance of the Department's telegram (no. 350) on June 24 in regard to the U.S.S. Tutuila at Chungking.

89C.
FE:EGC:LJH
7-11-41.


FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*This blue
should be attached
to green copy
of telegram*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)



PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 350) of June 24, 1941 to the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

The Ambassador is instructed, when an appropriate occasion arises, to inform the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs that the American naval vessel is stationed at Chungking in the service of this Government, that it has ample reason and full right for being there, that it is of special use to the American Embassy at Chungking, and that the American Government does not intend to remove this vessel. It may be mentioned incidentally that the vessel is in a location which responsible Japanese authorities have declared immune from bombings. Therefore the Department must repeat the expectation which it has set forth previously, namely, that the Japanese Government will give instructions sufficiently strict and effective to ensure that Japanese aerial operations will not again place in danger the American vessel and the office of the American Embassy.

EGC
 FE:EGC:MHP
 7/11/41

FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be _____ Tokyo via Shanghai & N. R.
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated Dated July 8, 1941
 to anyone. (br)

FROM
 Rec'd 11:30 a.m., 9th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

962, July 8, noon.

Department's 371, July 4, 3 p.m.


I lodged a strong protest personally with the
 Minister for Foreign Affairs today regarding the latest
 reported instance of the imperiling of the American
 Embassy through bombing operations at Chungking and left
 with the Minister a strongly worded first person note.
 I repeated the observations made to the Minister on
 June 16 pointing out the extreme gravity of the risks
 involved in these indiscriminate bombings and of the
 potentially farreaching results which might accrue
 therefrom. The Minister replied that once again he
 would make every effort to have proper control exerted
 over the Japanese aviators.

Sent to Department via Shanghai, Shanghai please
 repeat Chungking, Peiping.


Sent to the Department repeated Chungking, Peiping.

GREW

VWC



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 SENT TO O.N.I. AND
 IN CONFIDENCE
 7-12-41 HES



793.94/16731

PS/LR

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (no. 962) of July 8, 1941 from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

On July 8 the American Ambassador personally made a strong protest to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and left a strongly worded first person note with the Minister in regard to the latest reported case of the endangering of the American Embassy at Chungking through bombing operations at that place. The Ambassador repeated remarks which he had made previously to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and pointed out how very grave were the risks involved in these indiscriminate bombings and how far reaching potentially were the results which might result from such action. Once again the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he would do everything possible to the end that the Japanese aviators might be properly controlled.

e.g.C. 3D
 FE:EDC:LJH FE
 7-11-41.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 23

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
 OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 7-11-91

AMERICAN CONSULATE
 Foochow, China, May 7, 1941.

SUBJECT: Circumstances Which Facilitated Japanese
Occupation of the Foochow Area.

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	Very Good		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
For	In U.S.A.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
	Rice	ONI	MID

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram to the Department no. 4/ of April 19, 1941, as well as to subsequent telegrams reporting the occupation between April 19 and 21 by Japanese forces of the Foochow area, and to report as follows on certain factors which facilitated such occupation.

inhabitants of the coastal areas of Fukien, possibly because of poverty, ignorance and their isolation from the interior by mountain masses, display but slightly developed national consciousness. The penetration of Japanese influence has been facilitated by this relative lack of patriotism and by proximity to Formosa, the Chinese inhabitants of which originally came principally from Fukien. After the commencement of Sino-Japanese hostilities, occupation of islands off the Fukien coast facilitated Japanese control of pirates, employment of secret agents and recruiting of puppet troops drawn from among riff-raff and draft evaders of the coastal area. These elements engaged in espionage and sabotage, helping pave the way for Japanese invasion of the nearby mainland.

The Fukien Provincial Government and the Chinese military authorities in this province had incurred widespread popular enmity. Fukienese of the official class felt animosity because of the dominance

793.94
 COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
 Department of State

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 MAY 11 1941

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 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JUL 10 1941
 Department of State

793.94/16577

793.94/16732

PS/LR

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

dominance in provincial affairs of a tight clique of Chekiang officials. The merchants disliked the provincial government because of its growing tendency to control and monopolize to their detriment manufacturing, transportation and trade. The lower classes were angered by the official monopoly of the transport and sale of rice which they blamed for the forty-fold rise in its price which had occurred since the beginning of Sino-Japanese hostilities.

Because of the above-mentioned factors, many people in the Foochow area helped or welcomed the invaders instead of aiding the Chinese forces charged with the area's defense. These Chinese forces consisted of the seventy-fifth and eightieth divisions of the 100th Army under the command of General Ch'en Ch'i (陳琪). Units of these divisions were scattered throughout northern Fukien and when the invasion came they could not be concentrated quickly because the roads of the region had been destroyed as a defense measure and because launches for their transport by water were not available. Their morale was not good and their equipment was poor; all available evidence indicates that they had in the Foochow area no trucks, anti-tank guns, or anti-aircraft guns, little artillery and few machine guns. Indeed, the men and equipment of one of the two divisions, the seventy-fifth, are the poorest of any I have seen in China.

In these circumstances the Chinese troops were not in a position successfully to oppose invasion and they fell back for the most part without coming into contact with enemy units which, according to Japanese sources, encountered effective resistance only from the Changmen (長門) forts, which were manned by Chinese naval forces.

Respectfully yours,

Edward E. Rice

Edward E. Rice
 American Consul

800
 EER:hcy

In quintuplicate.
 Copy to Embassy Peiping.
 Copy to Embassy Chungking.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 325.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hankow, China, June 9, 1941.

DIVISION OF FOREIGN
 SERVICE ADMINISTRATION
 JUL 15 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject: Endangerment of the Embassy's staff
 and buildings during the Japanese
 air raid on Chungking, Szechuan, on
 June 5, 1941.

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	For A-14		
For	In U.S.A.		
Misc			/

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1941 JUL 9 AM 9 17

COMMUNICATIONS
 SECTION

Copy in FE (396)

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JUL 11 1941
 Department of State

793.94/16733

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the telegram No. 224/
 sent to the Department by the Embassy at Chungking on
 June 6, 1941, regarding endangerment of the Embassy
 staff and buildings during the Japanese air raid on
 Chungking, Szechuan, on June 5, 1941, and to enclose,
 in duplicate, copies of my representations made today

793.94/16670

to
 JUL 10 1941


PS/LR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

to the Japanese Consulate General at Hankow.

Respectfully yours,


C. J. Spiker
American Consul General

Enclosure:

1. To Japanese Consulate General,
Hankow, June 9, 1941.

Original and 1 copy to the Department;
Copies to Embassy, Chungking;
Embassy, Peiping;
Embassy, Tokyo;
Consulate General, Shanghai;
Consulate, Kunming.

350

RYJ/MYH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 325 of June 9, 1941,
from Consul General C. J. Spiker, Hankow, China, to
the Department of State on the subject: "Endangerment
of the Embassy's staff and buildings during the Japanese
air raid on Chungking, Szechuan, on June 5, 1941."

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hankow, China, June 9, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

I have the honor to inform you that the American
Ambassador has informed this Consulate General that
during an air raid on Chungking by Japanese planes on
June 5, 1941, bombs were dropped on the south bank of
the river one or more of which landed about 400 yards
behind the Chancery while others hit a sand bar on the
foreshore about 400 yards from residence occupied by
members of the Embassy staff causing slight damage from
fallen plaster.

It is urgently requested that the foregoing informa-
tion be at once communicated to the responsible Japanese
authorities and that stringent instructions be issued by
them to prevent a repetition of such bombing with con-
sequent endangerment of the American Embassy staff and
buildings at Chungking.

Reservation

H. Tanaka, Esquire,
Consul General for Japan,
Hankow.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Reservation is made of all rights in connection
with damages sustained as a result of this bombing
by Japanese planes.

I have the honor to be,

Sir and dear Colleague,


Your obedient servant,

C. J. Spiker
American Consul General

Original to the Consul General for Japan, Hankow;
2 copies to the Department of State;
Copies to Embassy, Chungking;
Embassy, Peiping;
Embassy, Tokyo;
Consulate General, Shanghai;
Consulate, Kunming.

350

RYJ/MYH



0675

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

1308

U - LIAISON OFFICE
 JUL 18 1941
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MD

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

Peiping via N.R.

FROM

Dated July 9, 1941

SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY

Rec'd 3:50 p.m.

TO ONI AND MID 7/9/41 JD

Secretary of State,

Washington.

July 9, 2 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.



The same source mentioned in my June 25, 11 a.m.,
 to Chungking, reports that Mao Tse Tung, the titular
 and actual head of the Chinese Communists, has issued
 an order to all his supporters subsequently as follows.

One. In order to recover a united front against
 Japan and other aggressor nations during the world crisis,
 avoid all conversations with (*) of Kuomintang persons
 or policies and cease promoting further antagonism
 against the Kuomintang.

Two. The German-Soviet war shows that the Soviet
 stands for the democratic way of living against all
 forms of Fascism. Unless Russia is betrayed by England
 and America which is not likely we can count on continued
 Russian resistance. We must therefore support England,
 America and Russia in fighting our common enemy.

Three.

793.94/16734

PS/FP

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

308

-2- July 9, 2 p.m. from Peiping via N.R.

Three. Discredit anti-Communist slogans and propaganda. Demonstrate our genuine desire to establish real democracy in China. Under present conditions this is more important than any of the internal issues dividing us from the Kuomintang or other parties.

BUTRICK

KLP

0677

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75


FL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RS This telegram must be _____
 closely paraphrased before being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

Peiping via N.R.
 Dated July 9, 1941
 FROM Rec'd 2:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



July 9, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The above is probably authentic and may be expected to have an excellent effect on Chungking's efforts to restore the so called united front. The North China Japanese controlled press, after a period of comparative silence has recently begun a virulent campaign against the Communists' influences and this seems to indicate that the Japanese now realize that their efforts to break the united front are on the point of failure.

While guerrilla warfare continues sporadically in North China it is no longer very effective. The Chinese people prefer the continued security afforded them by the Japanese to the temporary successes of the guerrillas who thereafter retreat and leave them to be the victims of severe Japanese reprisals.

END MESSAGE.

Sent to Chungking, repeated the Department and Shanghai

BUTRICK

BRK

FW 793.94/16734
 Section Two

FW 793.94/16734 SECTION TWO
 PE/SAS

0678

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 7-11-41 HES

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TK

PLAIN & GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated July 10, 1941

Rec'd 9:30 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

162, July 10, 1 p.m.

Tokyo's 842, June 19, 1 p.m. to the Department
 regarding bombing of Embassy Chungking.



Commenting editorially on recent Japanese
 aerial attacks on Chungking resulting in damage to
 foreigners and their properties at that place today's
 Japanese controlled TEIPING CHRONICLE states interalia
 that:

"The repeated raids on Chungking and the certainty
 of others should bear home to all nationals resident
 there that they are in an unduly exposed military posi-
 tion. The obligation must rest upon foreign governments
 to take precautions for the removal of their offices
 and representatives. In no country under war condi-
 tions today can it be expected that the attacking
 forces will be able to protect institutions in bombed
 zones." As a state of war exists in China there should
 be recognition of the normal effects of war wherever
 they

793.94/16735

PS/LR

793.94

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #162, July 10, 1 p.m., from Peiping.

they occur in China.

"Whoever remains in Chungking today must do so at his own risk for despite every precaution to confine attacks to military objectives the whole city is a military objective and it is unreasonable to expect that noncombatants there will be immune from the destructive effects of general bombing."

"Perhaps the Chungking Chinese prefer to have foreign missions among them in the hope that the planes will keep away rather than risk foreign complications. This interpretation is too much to ask the attacking force to respect."

The foregoing statement that the bombing of Chungking will continue; that the whole city is considered a military objective; and that the Japanese are under no obligation to exempt foreigners and their properties from the destructive effects of general bombing may well represent the realistic view of those who control Japanese military operations.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking. By air mail to Tokyo.

BUTRICK

WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Walter
 c/o Chinese People's Foreign Relations Association,
 7 Chiu Tao Men,
 Chungking, China,
 June 12, 1941.

His Excellency,
 President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
 White House,
 Washington, D. C.,
 U. S. A.

Dear President,

We apologize for the liberty of writing to Your Excellency. As heretofore, the Japanese air force has again started to ruthlessly bomb the city of Chungking with no other intention than that of slaughtering the Chinese civilians and of destroying their homes. Numerous open towns in the interior of China have also been subjected to relentless bombardment by the Japanese air raiders.

773.94
 On the 2nd instant Japanese airplanes attacked Chungking, raining tons of high explosives on the various densely-populated parts of Chungking without least regard for discrimination. Consequently, bombs hit the British Embassy, the French Consulate and other foreign residences at the Consular Lane. As it is well known that there is at the Consular Lane no military objective that can be spoken of, so the attempt to shower projectiles over that place can be only considered as one of intention and deliberation.

Furthermore, the frequent and extensive use of incendiary bombs well bespeaks the pernicious intention of the air raiders to make a hell out of China's wartime capital. All over Chungking there are grisly marks of bombing destruction, but the sight, as a matter of fact, makes us feel all the more proud of this remaining powerful "fortress of freedom and democracy" on the Asiatic mainland. We are not afraid of brute force which we are most resolute to resist to the bitter end. A new spirit of greater determination has grown and will continue to grow over the heaps of ashes and debris caused by our enemy's barbarous bombings.

773.94
 RESPECTFULLY REFERRED
 TO THE
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

M. M. Dwyer
 Secretary to the President

en
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JUL 12 1941
 Department of State

Instruction to Chungking

773.94/16736

25/1001

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

The Japanese invaders have wrecked our happiness to such an extent that the Chinese people can never forget it for generations to come. Human beings are the most intelligent creature in the universe, and they should show wisdom by seeking to solve their problems through peaceful means, but the Japanese militarists have thought and acted otherwise. They always regard war as a profitable gamble; they aim at conquering not only China but also other countries in the Pacific, so as to proceed to establish her hegemony in the Eastern Hemisphere. Hence war fever is fast spreading from East Asia to the southern Pacific.

The role most recently played by Your Excellency in relation to Far Eastern affairs demonstrates the far-sightedness of your policy. Militarist Japan is most unreliable and most ungrateful too. Not only she will never sincerely thank our American friends for any aid given her but also she may turn round at any moment to give a deadly bite as a return of kindness. The present treatment which the Tokyo militarists have extended to the British is a good example of showing that the former return ingratitude for help.

By signing a pact with the Soviet Union recently militarist Japan has exposed all the more clearly the kind of intention she has been harbouring towards America. We venture to say that the signing of the pact only signifies militarist Japan's intensified preparation for a major war with the U.S.A. in the near future. A review of the unruly actions which the Japanese have taken in the Far East during the past ten years should suffice to dispel all skepticism that may have been entertained towards this saying. With no little encouragement we Chinese have observed the large-scale movement of self-defence which Your Excellency has staged in the Pacific. It is only concrete action that can bring the Tokyo "die-hards" to their senses.

We observe that the Japanese militarists desire to endeavour to threaten away our American friends by taking advantage of the latter's much-talked motto "short of war," and, if successful, the so-called "sons of the Rising Sun" would then attempt to knock out the British in the southern Pacific. After reinforcing themselves with the rich natural resources to be seized in the South Seas, the Nipponese would not hesitate to step forward to challenge America with their faces fully unmasked. It is, in fact,

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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almost needless for us to say all that has been said in the above, because there is no least doubt that Your Excellency has already known all about it.

Before concluding, we wish to say a few more words. Under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek we Chinese have fought for national freedom and international justice for nearly four years, and with the receipt of increased and continuous aid from your country as a result of your sympathetic advocacy and action we will most certainly fight on with firmer determination and greater courage. To defeat aggressive Japan, China will have to secure America's positive support and help: the more America helps China the earlier China will defeat Japan. The earlier aggressive Japan is to be crippled the better it will be for the democratic world. It is earnestly hoped that, among other things, oil which forms a vital supply to Japan's system of life-lines will be entirely stopped from exporting to the aggressor. The world situation has been developing to such a stage that time must not be lost to deal with Japan once for all. Your Excellency is a champion of law, justice and humanity, and we firmly believe that no matter how the world may change you, sir, will, with as much determination as ever, carry on your historical mission to mankind and to the world. Finally, let us thank Your Excellency and your fellow-countrymen for all the aid rendered to China in the present struggle as well as wish you, sir, in the best of your health and every success in your historical mission.

Respectfully submitted by --



Chinese People's Foreign Relations Association,



China Branch, International Peace Campaign,



Chinese League of Nations' Union,

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Far Eastern Cultural Association,

Chinese Moslems' National Salvation Association,

CHINESE AMERICAN INSTITUTE
 OF CULTURAL RELATIONS.
 中美文化協會

Sino-American Cultural Association,



Sino-British Cultural Association,



Sino-Soviet Cultural Association,



Sino-French-Belgian-Swiss Cultural Association,

Sino-Burmese Cultural Association,
 and

Labour Union of China.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 34


Chungking, June 18, 1941.

Subject: Kuomintang-Communist Relations.

Air Mail

CONFIDENTIAL

Grade		In U.S.A.	
For			



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7-26-41 HES

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 JUL 14 AM 10 28

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

733.94/16737

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

1. With reference to this Embassy's telegram no. 198, May 21, 1941, reporting the publication in the Ta Kung Pao, an influential local daily of independent persuasions, of a leading article appealing to the Chinese communist armies to cooperate with forces of the National Government in combatting the large-scale Japanese offensive in the Chung-tiao mountain range of south Shansi, I have now the honor to enclose copies in translation of the following:

- 1) Editorial, Ta Kung Pao, May 21, 1941;
- 2) Letter, CHOU En-lai to Editor, Ta Kung Pao, May 23, 1941;
- 3) Editorial, Ta Kung Pao, May 23, 1941.

2. The persistent circulation of reports in Chungking during recent weeks of the alleged inaction of the Chinese communist-controlled armies against Japanese forces doubtless resulted in the "appeal" published by the Ta Kung Pao (enclosure no. 1) which, however, might be also accurately described as an "accusation" leveled at the Chinese communists. That it was so interpreted in communist circles is clearly indicated by the prompt action of Mr. Chou En-lai, local communist liaison agent; in attempting to rebut the

implications

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

implications of the editorial in question by way of a detailed letter which was published in the May 23, 1941 issue of the Ta Kung Pao. As will be observed, Mr. Chou undertakes in his reply (enclosure no. 2) to point out that charges of inactivity on the part of the Eighteenth Group Army are based on unconfirmed press reports; to assert that the Eighteenth Group Army has in fact been active against Japanese forces though it is difficult to obtain up-to-date military reports which, in any event, cannot be made available for publication for strategic reasons; and to give assurances that the Eighteenth Group Army will, so long as China resists Japan, cooperate with the National Government in the struggle against Japanese aggression.

3. In the same issue of the Ta Kung Pao the editors replied to Mr. Chou's letter in the form of a leading article (enclosure no. 3) which deals bluntly with the Kuomintang-communist problem. The article points out that the Chinese Communist Party possesses an international character, makes inquiry whether the policy of that party might be affected by the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact, and seeks confirmation that the Chinese Communist Party will remain a part of the "national self-defense front". It is asserted in the article that the Chinese Communist Party needs to give consideration to "a basic understanding regarding national reconstruction", pointing out that since 1927 the Chinese Communist Party has contributed to the destruction rather than to the building up of those values which are required to create a strong, unified, independent China. The article then proceeds to a discussion of what is considered to be the crux of the problem of the reconstruction of China: namely, that under present conditions, the presently existing "center" (the Chinese National Government) must be maintained if China is to emerge triumphant, that all Chinese, including the Chinese communists, are responsible for the support of the National Government, and that it is impossible to replace the existing Government with another which can "reorganize and reunite the nation". The article concludes with a plea for "affirmative contributions (by the Chinese communists) to the nation", and with a suggestion that it would be highly desirable for MAO Tse-tung to proceed to Chungking to hold discussions with General CHIANG Kai-shek.

4. The last-mentioned article has been as warmly praised by adherents of the National Government, the Kuomintang and General Chiang Kai-shek as it has been bitterly criticized by the adherents and supporters of the Chinese communists who have now begun, for the first time, to label the Ta Kung Pao as a reactionary organ of the Kuomintang. In this relation, it is interesting to recall that at a recent ceremony at which the editor of the Ta Kung Pao was presented with a medal given by the School of Journalism of the University of Missouri in token of the outstanding quality of the editorial comment of that journal during the year 1940, Dr. WANG Shih-chieh, Minister of Publicity, announced that the Ta Kung Pao would in the future be subjected to no censorship restrictions in the way of editorial comment. It may be assumed that the two

editorials

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 3 -

editorials published in that journal concerning Kuomintang-communist cooperation represent the independent, considered views of the editors. It seems likely that the publication of these editorials has had a marked influence on the readers of the Ta Kung Pao, many of whom are educators, students, liberals, et cetera. As has been remarked in other communications from this Embassy, there seems to have been a diminution in recent weeks in the attitude of friendliness and sympathy displayed by the Chinese "intelligentsia" toward the Soviet Union. It is not unlikely that the action of the Ta Kung Pao in speaking out bluntly and fearlessly to the Chinese communists is but another manifestation of that tendency.

5. It is the observation of this Embassy that there has been no significant change in the Kuomintang-communist relationship since the preparation of my despatch to the Department no. 9, of June 2, 1941. It is now confirmed in National Government circles that forces of the Eighteenth Group Army have recently become relatively active against Japanese troops in north China, but it is pointed out that the Eighteenth Group Army acted too late to influence the course of the battle in the Chungtiao mountain range and that the scope of their present operations is very much restricted and cannot be expected to achieve important results. In this general relation it may be of interest to report that on the evening of June 7, 1941, the Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese Army told an Embassy officer that irrespective of whether Chinese communist forces cooperated with those of the National Government their fighting strength would be too little to make any appreciable difference in the outcome of the battle for south Shansi.

6. Reports of military activity on the part of Chinese communist forces in Shansi and Hopeh after months of apparent inaction lend credence to the suggestion that the future trend of Kuomintang-communist relations will be for the better, at least in the sphere of military operations against the Japanese. If these operations of the communist armies are sustained to any extent and if the National Government will as a result resume the supply of funds and supplies to the communist armies, the prospects for a settlement of political differences will of course be improved although by no means assured.


Respectfully yours,


 C. E. Gauss

3 ✓
 enclosures:
 as above.

Original and two copies to the Department by air mail
 Two copies by pouch
 Copy to Peiping by safe hand
 Copy to Tokyo by safe hand

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 34 dated June 18, 1941
 from the Embassy at Chungking.

Editorial TA KUNG PAO, Chungking, May 21, 1941.

(Translation)

AN APPEAL REGARDING THE SOUTH SHANSI BATTLE

In discussing general conditions of armed resistance yesterday, we considered that the present marks the real beginning of the struggle between China and Japan. Regardless of whether the enemy's military attempt is to launch an offensive on all or on some fronts, military considerations should take precedence and we should exhaust every effort in order to frustrate all military attempts of the enemy. While the enemy is of late attacking on four fronts, the main objective is south Shansi. The enemy first attacked the Yellow River ferry-crossing, blockaded places along the river, severed communications between Shansi and Honan, and then used a large force to "mop up" our troops in the Chungtiaoshan. This is a great battle and is very significant. Shansi forms the plateau of north China. With Shansi, we can control several northern provinces. The Chungtiaoshan is the key to Shansi and so long as the mountain remains in our hands Shansi will not be lost. Following the outbreak of the armed resistance and the fall of Hopei and Chahar, the enemy also entered Shansi. The fact that Taiyuan and Linfen fell one after the other might have led ordinary observers to think that the enemy had already captured Shansi. But our Generalissimo issued strict orders to the troops then in Shansi not to cross the river. During the past three or four years, our troops have always remained in the Chungtiaoshan area. Thus, we and the enemy have shared control of Shansi. Such a state of affairs not only constitutes a constant threat to the enemy in Hopei and Chahar and protects the northwest, but also makes it impossible for the enemy to invade Tungwan and Shensi. Although the Chungtiaoshan is small in area, it has been our most important strategic base during the last three or four years. Now that the enemy has concentrated seven or eight divisions to fight for the possession of the Chungtiaoshan, we should naturally give serious heed, gather large forces and in closest cooperation fight a desperate battle to frustrate the hitherto unsuccessful enemy attempts.

In south Shansi, the enemy has thus far made some military gains, but has exaggerated our casualties and falsely broadcast that certain military officials have been taken prisoner. These reports have been refuted by our military spokesman. The enemy allegations regarding our 18th Group Army have been especially peculiar. (1) One enemy broadcast said "When our (Japanese) forces attacked Chungking troops, the main body of the 18th Group Army based in southeastern Shansi not only remained indifferent, but also detached guerrilla units to threaten the flanks of the Chungking troops and seized the opportunity to disarm the latter's remnants." (2) A United Press telegram from Shanghai dated the 16th (May) quoted a statement by Colonel Akiyama, Japanese army spokesman, which exaggerated

the

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the results obtained by Japanese forces in south Shansi and said: "Japanese and Communist forces have never attacked each other". (3) A Domei despatch from Washington on the 18th quoted an editorial in the Washington Star as saying: "The Chinese Communist Party may desert Chairman Chiang and transfer their support to Wang Ching-wei". These allegations are of course mostly fabricated by the enemy. Since they have been broadcast to the world, however, all Chinese and foreigners, and especially our loyal soldiers and civilians, are anxious to know what the facts are. We therefore earnestly hope that the 18th Group Army will make an emphatic denial. The most effective way to do so is through cooperation with the Central units in defending the Chungtiaoshan and frustrating the enemy's "mopping-up" campaign.

In the present south Shansi battle, the enemy is using a large force in the hope of capturing (the Chungtiaoshan) anyhow. The enemy has during the past three or four years tried to attain this goal but has always failed. The gains thus far made by the enemy are mainly due to our failure to cooperate. We do not wish to believe in the enemy allegations. The south Shansi battle has so far lasted half a month and our troops have been fighting bitterly. The entire nation is seriously concerned. But it is a fact that the 18th Group Army which is concentrated in north Shansi has not yet lent the friendly troops a hand. We believe that the Generalissimo's headquarters must have issued orders to the 18th Group Army to participate in the battle. We strongly appeal to all national forces in Shansi to cooperate in putting up a joint resistance and in annihilating the enemy. This is the most important battle during these four years for the defense of north China. The enemy is devoting every effort to this offensive and we must make a common defence effort. We must not allow any laxity of effort. Like water, the dykes must have no holes or breaches, otherwise the water will overrun the region. If we want north China, we must absolutely not give up Shansi; and if we want Shansi, we must not abandon the Chungtiaoshan. This is why we must exert every effort and must be sure to win the present battle. Furthermore, Shansi is the battleground where the 18th Group Army has fought gloriously since its participation in the war. After the battle of Pinghsingkwan the 18th Group Army has always been a headache to the enemy. Now that the enemy is spending the last ounce of energy fighting for Shansi, the 18th Group Army should uphold its consistent spirit and cooperate meritoriously with friendly troops to resist the invader. The 18th Group Army advocates unity and resistance and has often made its stand known to the people. The entire nation knows that the 18th Group Army is anti-Japanese and well versed in guerrilla warfare. Now that the enemy is threatening Shansi, will the 18th Group Army, stationed in close proximity to the scene, sit idly by and offer no resistance? Will it remain indifferent and send no reinforcements when other national troops are engaging in a bitter struggle? From the standpoint of national interest, the 18th Group Army should at once take part in the south Shansi battle;

and

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By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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and in the spirit of abiding by the principles of unity and resistance, it should come to the assistance of other national troops in the Chungtiaoshan. By so doing, the 18th Group Army will not only dispel all enemy allegations and make widely known its loyalty and bravery, but also live up to its pledge of unity and resistance. On behalf of public opinion, we hereby make this warm and strong appeal.

(True copy)
(Signature)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 2 to despatch no. 34 dated June 18, 1941
 from the Embassy at Chungking.

(Translation)

TA KUNG PAO

Chungking,
 May 23, 1941

(Letter from Chou En-lai to Chang Chi-luan and Wang Yun-sheng, General Editor-in-Chief and Chungking Editor-in-Chief of the Ta Kung Pao, respectively.)

Having read your editorial of today's date entitled "An Appeal Regarding the South Shansi Battle", I, as a party concerned, greatly appreciate your patriotic intent. However, the reports referred to therein are mostly enemy fabrications while the remaining one constitutes the unfounded editorial of the Washington Star. Not only you "do not wish to believe" but also the entire nation can not believe in them. Although the United States is giving us aid, it does not mean that the comments of the American press and the reports of American news agencies can without exception be considered accurate. For example, a United Press message from Washington dated May 19 has it that "Senator Thomas, a strong supporter of the Government, when interviewed by the United Press correspondent, stated that he has always advocated mediation of the Sino-Japanese war by gradual means". Can we not then believe that the American Government has accepted Japanese proposals for peace? Furthermore, relations between the Chinese Communist Party and Wang Ching-wei have long been such that "patriots and traitors never co-exist". It may be possible for a small group of people in our country to discuss with Wang Ching-wei the question of cooperation. But I am confident that the Chinese Communist Party and an absolute majority of Chinese military and people will not become his evil companions and surrender to the Japanese even if they may have to lay down their lives during the war. As regards the enemy's rumors, they are of different kinds. Among those concerning the south Shansi battle, a Domei message from Nanking dated May 20 also stated "when hostilities broke out in southern Shansi and northern Honan, Hu Tsung-nan was under instructions to encircle the Red (?) army and transferred five of his divisions from southern Shansi to Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia, ... thus reducing the strength of the Chungking troops in southern Shansi." I think that your paper will similarly "not wish to believe" in this report.

In your paper, reference was also made to the allegations that 1) "the 18th Group Army which is concentrated in north Shansi has not yet engaged in fighting in conjunction with friendly troops" and 2) "we believe that the Generalissimo's Headquarters must have ordered the 18th Group Army to participate in the war". I may authoritatively say that the "facts" on which your comment is based are not facts. A week before your editorial in question

was

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 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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was released, the 18th Group Army made a surprise attack and occupied a section of the Paichengchen-Tsincheng road in southern Shansi; traffic was suspended, and operations are also in progress in other areas. Being remote in the enemy's rear where telegraphic connections are difficult, these reports can not be received expeditiously. Furthermore, military consultations between the Central and front authorities and the plans concerning cooperation in fighting are military secrets and it is inconvenient and impossible to publish them in the press. Similarly, I have to omit them here in this letter. The propagandists have thus openly asserted that the 18th Group Army has refused to fight in conjunction with friendly troops, and I have on this account repeatedly requested the Central Authorities to make a correction. Unexpectedly, such rumors have also affected your paper. I admit that it is due to the negligence in contract between newspapers. Restricted by environment, I hope you will understand our difficult conditions.

Finally, you entertained the hope that "for the sake of national interests the 18th Group Army would immediately take part in the south Shansi battle and with the spirit of always abiding by the principles of unity and resistance, the 18th Group Army would more especially assist other troops in the Chungtiaoshan". We are impressed by your enthusiasm and we will never fail to satisfy your earnest hopes. We have been advocating unity and resistance and will do so at all times. In the 100-regiment battle in north China last year, no assistance was received during the battle and no replenishments were received after its conclusion. While our victories were circulated by news agencies in China and abroad and were highly commended by your paper, there were still accusations that we were making false reports. However, we harbor no hatred on this account. Following the southern Anhwei incident this year, and when the enemy from Sinyang attacked the flanks and rear of friendly troops advancing eastwards and when Li Chang-kiang revolted in northern Kiangsu, the Communist units in northern Kiangsu and northern Anhwei lost no chance to attack the enemy in conjunction with friendly troops and had pursued and defeated the traitorous army of Li Chang-kiang. This is also illustrative of the fact that we are not grumblers. During the enemy's "mopping up" campaigns in various areas, north China last February and March, the enemy from Wutai attacked the Taihang Mountains, southern Hopei and then Shantung. We did not give up the bases for resistance in north China. In spite of the fact that the 18th Group Army was out of food, ammunition and supplies, that it could not enlist the assistance of friendly troops, and that propagandists alleged that the 18th Group Army had been withdrawn to northern Shensi, facts told us that the 18th Group Army succeeded in frustrating the enemy's "mopping up" campaign. Although we were running short of ammunition as the fighting continued, we did not bear any grudge against others. Contrary to the enemy rumor that the main body of the 18th Group Army was concentrated in the Chungtiaoshan (since the demarcation of areas of operations at the Chang River last year, we have been strictly abiding by military orders and not a single soldier of the 18th Group Army is to be found in the Chungtiaoshan), the Army was subject to enemy encirclements at distant places. But we can authoritatively declare to your paper and to all soldiers and the people of the country that only if China resists Japan, the 18th Group Army will never fail to cooperate with friendly troops to give the enemy a

fatal

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

fatal blow. In the meantime, the 18th Group Army is under instructions to confine itself to the area of operations assigned to it and not to clash with friendly troops in order to avoid misunderstanding. We are still defending the Chang River line and have not intruded a step into Linhsien. Even thus, the enemy has intentionally alleged that the 18th Group Army has attacked a certain Commander in Chief's units at Linhsien. Locally, some people have said the same thing. It may be seen that conditions are very complicated.

Indeed, "Shansi is a plateau in the north; with Shansi the northern provinces can be brought under control; and the Chungtiaoshan is the key to Shansi.....". But the Chungtiaoshan is not the only plateau in Shansi. The Kuanchenshan has a bird's eye view of the area outside of the Great Wall; the Wutaishan connects with Hopei and Chahar; from the Taihangshan eastward lies the plain of Hopei; and the Luliangshan not only protects the west of the Yellow River but also controls the Fen River valley in conjunction with the Taiyoshan. Subsequent to the fall of Linfen, a large number of Central Government troops remained in the Chungtiaoshan to hold this key base. Besides, all the plateaux of Shansi have been in Chinese hands, thus resulting in repeated failures of the enemy in attempting to cross the Yellow River. Especially the anti-mopping-up campaign in southeastern Shansi in the spring of 1938, laid a foundation for this key base - the Chungtiaoshan. Recalling the then active cooperation between the various troops, we sincerely hope that such may again be the case today.

What the enemy desires we will not do; and what the enemy dislikes we will do. We have been encouraging ourselves and others in this way during the last four or five years. Now, the enemy wishes to deal us a severe blow when he is positively preparing for southward expansion by blockading us from all sides and by creating rumors and a peace atmosphere for stirring up differences among us. Fearing that the friendly powers, unaware of the facts, may be easily deceived, I made a responsible statement to an American news agency who was good enough to broadcast this statement at Shanghai on May 19. Unexpectedly, I have to make a similar statement today. I believe that your paper comments with good intent. But the facts must not be overlooked. You will, I am sure, with your spirit of impartiality, bring this letter to the knowledge of your readers as a reaction to your hopes whereby the deceit of enemy rumors may be disclosed. While I have wished to say much more than this, I rather omit the details in order to avoid providing the enemy with material for sowing dissension. I believe that the war situation will be known before long and the reports of victories will constitute much more effective evidence than thousands of words here.

With compliments,

Chou En-lai, on the evening
 of May 21, (1941).

cc: [unclear]
 [unclear]



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 3 to despatch no. 34 dated June 18, 1941
 from the Embassy at Chungking.

Editorial TA KUNG PAO, Chungking, May 23, 1941

(Translation)

A READING OF CHOU EN-LAI'S LETTER

We are very glad to read Mr. Chou En-lai's letter; we have immediately published the full text. We wish to take this opportunity to give Mr. Chou some advice.

Any Chinese troops failing to attack the enemy at the present juncture, when we are bitterly fighting for existence, may be regarded as helping the enemy, especially those troops who enter into conspiracy with the latter. The enemy's rumors are an exceptional insult to the Chinese people and all Chinese naturally do not give credence to them. Fundamentally, no one believes that there can be traitors in the national front at this critical moment.

Our editorial of the other day had but one idea. That is, we expect the 18th Group Army to exhibit as soon as possible evidence that it will cooperate in the war. We wish to point out that we will be satisfied only if there is such evidence. We do not insist upon or extravagantly hope for any great result. We realize the difficulties of our troops and can absolutely not expect each unit to win every battle. Those with such expectations are too ignorant of the nature of the Sino-Japanese war and neglectful of the difficulties of our armed resistance.

We await realization of this fact not simply to frustrate enemy rumors which have always obtained contrary results. In the past few decades, the enemy has been trying to sow dissension and create disturbances in China. Since the Mukden incident, the enemy has intensified the separatist movement by resorting to most harmful plots. But the result is--contrary to the enemy hopes--that a sense of national self-defense has sprung up in China. Mr. Chou is right in saying in his letter that "what the enemy desires we will not do and what the enemy dislikes we will do". This is very accurate. This had been our basic policy for many years as a newspaper in north China; and this has been the motive power for the development of general conditions in China and for the awakening of the Chinese people to the sense of self-defense. We made the appeal the other day because, as a result of armed resistance during these four years, both China and Japan have come to a grave stage when the enemy is anxiously expecting dissension or civil war in China and when China is more in urgent need of consolidating its internal organization for self-defense purposes. Unlike other public bodies, the Chinese Communist Party is of an international character; its attitude towards a nation is different from that of the

common

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

common people; and it has a long history of struggle before armed resistance started. There were disputes even after the outbreak of resistance and up to the present. The Russo-Japanese Neutrality ^{act} was concluded during this very period. The Chinese Communist Party has always had confidence in Soviet Russia. Therefore, every one desires to know whether its policy will hereafter be affected to any extent by the Russo-Japanese rapprochement. While such an inference may be simple one, it is only natural that all our countrymen wish to ascertain whether the Chinese Communist Party will continue to remain a part of the national self-defense front. This is an important question concerning the future of China and consequently we expect that there will soon be forthcoming some evidence in regard to its cooperation in the war in order to satisfy the hopes of our countrymen.

Mr. Chou's letter has given a satisfactory reply on this point: i.e., the 18th Group Army will surely cooperate in the war. We know that Mr. Chou has done a great deal in the past few years toward unity and resistance and is at present the only effective liaison between the Government and Yen-an. We believe that his letter is well founded and authoritative, and that he is exerting efforts to attain the proper goal. We therefore wish to express our opinion and our hopes, besides publishing this letter. We are of the opinion that conditions in the last few months involve dangers that should be overcome. It is preferable that this opportunity for cooperation in Shansi be taken as a beginning, that all questions concerning relations between the Generalissimo's Headquarters and the 18th Group Army requiring satisfactory settlement be discussed and settled so as to build up a new wall of unity. We consider this to be not difficult. That which needs the consideration of the Chinese Communist Party is a basic understanding regarding national reconstruction. Should such understanding be identical, we believe that all questions can be easily solved. Recalling the history of the last ten or more years, how much has the Chinese Communist Party, as a political group of high talent and as a fighting force, contributed to the nation during the ten years following 1927? From our point of view, the answer is negative and not affirmative because the needs of national self-defense should move expeditiously from an unorganized to an organized state, from individualism to nationalism, from civil war and separatism to peace and unity, from ineffectiveness and lack of initiative and self-defense to effectiveness and the capacity for initiative and self-defense, and from inability to resist and quick defeat to the ability to resist and not be defeated. These are all very important and difficult goals and are what Chairman Chiang has been leading us toward. They are absolutely required for national independence and reconstruction. They are very powerful and nothing can be an obstacle to their progress. The Chinese Communist Party fought for many years before armed resistance started, but what it was striving for was unfortunately contrary to this need for national self-defense. The result was, in fact, negative. Today, we only hope that it will understand a particular point, that is, that under present conditions of war between China and Japan, with our national strength as it

is

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

is at present, and in view of world conditions as a whole, it is absolutely nonpermissible to consider that if the present national center fails it may be replaced by another which will reorganize and reunite the nation. This is impossible. We have now the only chance since the Mukden incident for national reconstruction. We have engaged in armed resistance for four years and, should the present national center fail, China will go out of existence. The basic understanding that all Chinese soldiers and people should have is that they must support this center, or the National Government, to attain the goal of self-defense through our own initiative. This is the only way; there is no other. Naturally, the Government should make improvements from time to time in political and personnel matters. The political system should be progressive. Under the Three People's Principles, all political parties should sincerely cooperate and must not suspect or take precautions against each other. The most important requirement for this is to arrive at a basic understanding, as related above, without which cooperation is of no use. We hope that it will be understood, also, that Chairman Chiang has been supporting this national center throughout these years not for his own interests or those of the Kuomintang, but for the laying of a foundation for national reconstruction. The present Government is the only possible center under enemy oppression in the present emergency. All our countrymen are responsible for its support. We think that the Chinese Communist Party has the same responsibility because everyone will suffer should this center collapse. We are confident that the Chinese Communist Party will agree with us on this fundamental point, thus enabling the Government and the Generalissimo's Headquarters to settle responsibly and satisfactorily all questions regarding that Party and the 18th Group Army. If this basic understanding is mutual and in case the civil and military officials at various places deliberately provoke conflicts or take precautions, we will criticize such acts of injustice on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party.

Since the outbreak of armed resistance, the Chinese Communist Party has actually exhibited its exceptional ability in resisting aggression in north China. The most obvious evidence is the fact that while other troops which have been withdrawn can not return to the north, units of the 18th Group Army have been able to penetrate into the enemy's rear and work. This is extremely difficult. That which requires most serious attention is that this useful organized strength must always make affirmative contributions to the nation and must refrain from committing mistakes regarding the above-stated basic understanding. This may not be agreeable to Mr. Chou; but we are sincere, we are not captious, and we are only expressing our hopes. Taking Shansi as an example, if the other national troops were defeated, the 18th Group Army in the Taihangshan and the Wutaishan would also be "mopped up" by the enemy. On the other hand, if all our troops cooperate in embarrassing the enemy, this would not only prevent the enemy from clearing that province of Chinese influence but would also afford strong protection to Honan and Shensi. All national troops in Shansi have been meritorious in checking the

enemy.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

enemy. If they are now defeated individually by the enemy, it will be tantamount to the forfeiting of the merit gained in the past. This is true in Shansi, and it is also true on all fronts. We earnestly hope that military operations in Shansi will be sustained on a cooperative basis. There will also be a new indication of unity and cooperation in all national affairs. It would be most preferable if Mr. Mao Tse-tung would come to Chungking and spend a few days in discussions with Generalissimo Chiang. If the basic understanding of the Chinese Communist Party is actually the same, all minor questions will not be harmful to cooperation. Such a demonstration of unity and resistance will more effectively deal the enemy a blow than anything else. We hope Mr. Chou will exert more efforts toward this end.

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100-100000-100000

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Department of State
By: M:K

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
7-16-41

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LET

GRAY


FROM

Tokyo via Shanghai
and N. R.

Dated July 11, 1941

Rec'd. 9 a.m., 14th

Secretary of State,
Washington.



979, July 11, 2 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Embassy's 978, July 11, 1 p.m.

The following is the substance of a telegram sent by my British colleague to London July 10 describing the interview with the Japanese Vice Foreign Minister at which he presented the note contained in our immediately preceding telegram.

(Begins) Being unable to see Minister for Foreign Affairs I delivered note to Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs who promised to communicate with the Minister. In this respect I abstained from addressing note earlier because I was awaiting certain technical details from Air Attache in Chungking which, however, latter has not yet been able to supply.

Two. In doing so I said that this action of the Japanese air force was both callous and provocative and, at a moment when relations between our two countries were already strained, it would leave memories not easy to efface. I was convinced in my own mind that the Japanese

712-1
W.B.
701-4193

732-14/16710 SECRET 10-1-41

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
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 7-16-41 HES

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
GRAY

FROM

Tokyo via Shanghai
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Japanese

798.04/16738 SECTIONS 1 AND 2

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 979, July 11, 2 p.m. (SECTION ONE), From Tokyo

Japanese aviators, far from following their instructions to avoid injury to foreign property as far as possible had deliberately concentrated their attention on the district in which the British Embassy stood.

Three. His Excellency expressed his great regret at learning of this further attack and promised that the circumstances would be carefully examined. He said that the important point was whether the damage had been done intentionally or not and he did not consider that we had produced any evidence of deliberation. On the contrary it was his firm conviction that at the height at which bombing had to be conducted in the face of strong anti-aircraft fire the evidence was all the other way. I pointed out that on each occasion I had immediately protested and it was to be presumed that the Ministry of Marine sent instructions to exercise greater care. Evidently no attention whatever had been paid to these instructions for the quarter in which the Embassy stood which contained no military objective other than a reservoir half a mile away had continued to be heavily bombed.

GREW

GW

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RS

FROM GRAY

TOKYO VIA N.R.

Dated July 11, 1941

Rec'd 8:55 a.m., 14th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

979, July 11, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Four. Vice Minister inquired whether I had information in regard to level at which bombing took place, visibility, other damage in the immediate neighborhood, et cetera and I promised to let him have these details as soon as I received them from His Majesty's Ambassador.

Five. Vice Minister then expressed the earnest hope that His Majesty's Ambassador would now see his way to transfer Embassy to the safety zone and on my suggesting that this was a misnomer he said that only on one occasion had bombs been dropped inadvertently in this area and that the strictest instructions had been sent to avoid it in future. Even allowing for occasional mistakes the relative degree of security on the south bank was far higher.

Six. In taking my leave I expressed the hope that careful inquiry would be made and that I might

RECEIVE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-, #979 from Tokyo, July 11, 1941 (SEC.2); rec'd
8:55 a.m., 14th

receive an explanation as to the obvious failure of
the local Japanese authorities to follow their in-
structions as regards avoidance of damage to foreign
property. Ends.

Sent to the Department via air mail to Shanghai.
(END OF MESSAGE).

GRW

GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RS

FROM GRAY

TOKYO VIA SHANGHAI & N.R.

Dated July 11, 1941

Rec'd 9 a.m., 15th

DIVISION OF
Secretary of State, NRS
Washington.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
978, July 11, 1 p.m., (SECTION ONE.)

Division of
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
A 1 1941
Department of State

793.94/16739

PS/LB

The following is a copy of a note dated July 9, addressed by the British Ambassador to the Japanese Foreign Minister protesting the recent bombings of the British Embassy at Chungking.

"Your Excellency, I have the honor, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to protest in the strongest and most formal manner against the repeated bombing of the British Embassy in Chungking.

Two.. On June 2nd., five bombs fell in the Embassy compounds and one in the roadway adjoining. There was considerable superficial damage, particularly to the house occupied by the Counselor. On June 29, the Embassy buildings were again bombed, the offices receiving considerable damage and the Counselor's home being completely destroyed. Sir Arthur Blackburn's jaw was broken, his temporal artery was cut and

recovery

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-, #978 from Tokyo, July 11, 1941; rec'd 9 a.m., 15th;
(SEC. ONE)

recovery is expected to be slow. The Secretary and his wife were both injured and there were 12 other casualties among the Chinese^{SE} personnel. Today I have received a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Chungking informing me that what remained of the Embassy buildings was completely wrecked in another attack made yesterday. The Military Attache's office was also damaged. Fortunately none of the staff were killed and they are moving for the time being into what is left of the Ambassador's house, which was also shattered yesterday.

GREW

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RS

GRAY

TOKYO VIA SHANGHAI & N.R.
FROM

Dated July 11, 1941

Rec'd 9:08 a.m., 15th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

978, July 11, 1 p.m., (SECTION TWO).

Three. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are particularly concerned on account of the injuries to the staff sent to carry out their duties in a foreign capital, and they are unable for a moment to accept the Japanese Government's view that a mere warning that indiscriminate bombing is to be undertaken against a foreign capital is a sufficient reason for His Majesty's Ambassador and his staff to desert what the Japanese Government know to be their duty. Moreover the fact that the Embassy buildings are conspicuous but have none the less been three times bombed in daylight within a short interval of time, entitles His Majesty's Government to the view that, even if the first bombing were accidental, due care could have been taken to prevent a recurrence of the damage to the Embassy.

Four. In conveying to Your Excellency this formal
protest

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-, #978 from Tokyo, July 11, 1941; rec'd 9:08 a.m.,
15th; (SEC. TWO)

protest against the action of the Japanese armed forces, I have the honor to reserve all the rights of His Majesty's Government in this matter and particularly the right to claim compensation when the extent of the damage has been properly assessed.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration. R. L. Craigie."

(END OF MESSAGE.)

Sent to the Department via airmail Shanghai.

GREW

CSB

0706

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation


DATE:

July 31, 1941

SUBJECT: Bombing of U.S.S. Tutuila

PARTICIPANTS: Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Welles

COPIES TO: S, A-B, PA/H, FE



793.94/1675-1/1

793.94

The Japanese Ambassador called to see me this evening at his urgent request.

As soon as he had entered the room, the Ambassador took out of his pocket a piece of paper and read to me a statement. Upon the conclusion of the reading of this paper, I asked the Ambassador if he would be good enough to let me have the statement he had read as an aide-mémoire of the declaration he had made. The Ambassador replied that he felt unable to give me this declaration in writing but nevertheless would be glad if I would take notes from the statement as he had read it to me. He thereupon handed it to me and I took notes therefrom.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The statement commenced to the effect that he was instructed by his Government to inform the President officially of the deep regret of the Japanese Government because of the bombing of the U.S.S. Tutuila at Chungking.

The Japanese Government desired to assure this Government that the bombing was an accident "pure and simple".

In order to make sure that no further incident of this kind would take place, the Japanese Government "has decided to suspend all bombing operations over the city area of Chungking".

The Japanese Government offers to pay full indemnity for any damage occasioned American properties immediately upon the completion of the necessary investigations.

The Japanese Government requested that its decision with regard to the suspension of bombing operations over the city area of Chungking be regarded as strictly confidential.

The statement likewise included the assertion in the name of the Ambassador himself that it was he himself who had recommended this procedure to the Japanese Government.

When I had completed making notes on this written declaration and had returned the paper to the Ambassador,


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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-3-

I stated to the Ambassador that I would, of course, immediately submit the declaration made to the President and that I wished to express to the Ambassador personally my appreciation of the position which he had taken in the matter and of the recommendations which he had made to his Government.

The Ambassador said that the situation was indeed difficult but that he wished to do everything within his power to prevent incidents between the two Governments and to make possible the preservation of friendly relations.



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 939

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
 OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COPIES ~~IN PARAGRAPH~~
 SENT TO O.N.I. AND
 M.I.D. IN CONFIDENCE
 7-18-41 HE2

Per Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	Good		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
For	Word	To Field In U.S.A.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
 Hong Kong, June 16, 1941


SUBJECT: Enclosing list purporting to show
Japanese army divisions in South
China.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.



I have the honor to refer to this Consulate General's despatch no. 906, dated May 10, 1941, enclosing a short list purporting to name the Japanese divisional units in South China as of May 5, 1941, and further in that connection, to forward herewith a second such list, based on information received up to June 5, 1941. The informant is the same as mentioned in despatch no. 906. Although it is not felt that these lists are of any especial value, they will be forwarded monthly as they are supplied.

Discussing this particular list, the informant stated that the 5th, 18th, and 28th Divisions of the Japanese Army were known as landing divisions, and that wherever they appeared there was bound to be trouble. As an instance of this, he cited the attack on Foochow, which he alleged had followed the

despatch

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
 Department of State

DIVISION OF
 JUL 23 1941

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

despatch of the 28th Division to Northern Fukien, part of it having been removed from French Indo-China to take part in that action. The so-called Guards Division was also one of the landing divisions, he asserted, its 1st Independent Mixed Brigade being now in and around Haiphong. The Chinese Military Intelligence had not been able, the informant stated, to locate the 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade of the Guards Division.

So far as the informant knew, there had been during the past month no considerable Japanese naval movements along the South China coast, and he was not aware of any considerable change in the situation on Hainan Island, where, he asserted, Chinese armed forces continue to hold out against the Japanese troops which control the larger cities of the Island.

The informant stated that his direct superior, Admiral Chan Chak, now stated to be the Chief of the Kuomintang Information Bureau in Hong Kong, is soon to become the representative of the Generalissimo in this city in place of General Wu Tieh-ch'en.

Respectfully yours,

John H. Bruins
 John H. Bruins
 American Consul

Enclosure:

List as stated above.

In quintuplicate to Department:
 Copy to Embassy, Chungking:
 Copy to Embassy, Peiping:
 Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

800
 RSW/jp

4
 4-10-72
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

SOUTH CHINA

18th D.....East River area, HongKong
 border.

28th D.....Foochow area.

38th D.....North and West River area,
 Kwangtung.

104th D.....North and West River area

1st Guards, Ind. mixed Bde....Indo China
 Haiphong

14th Ind. mixed Bde.....West River
 and Swatow.

Based on information received up to June 5th,
 1941.

0712

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


Shanghai via N.R.

FROM Dated July 16, 1941

Rec'd 3:50 a.m., 17th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

865, sixteenth.



copy to Currier
7/18/41

Following is summary of article in July 14th issue
of KUOMIN SENWEN, Shanghai daily newspaper fostered by
Nanking regime: if Japan regards China as a defeated
nation, at least Japan should accord China certain minimum
requirements as a basis for economic reconstruction but
if Japan regards China as a friend then more than minimum
requirements should be accorded. British exploitation
of China is contrasted with Japanese methods and it is
argued that if the conditions of the Wang party treaty
are to be lived up to Japanese collaboration should permit
of wider circulation areas for the new Central Reserve
Bank currency, the relationship between that bank and
other Japanese sponsored banks should be adjusted to give
the Central Reserve Bank directional powers, foreign
exchange management should be handed over to the CRB,
China must be permitted to plan its own program of foreign
trade

793.64/16741

PS/LE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 865, July 16, 1941 from Shanghai via N.R.

trade and economic development, and China must regain operation of its railways and control of the movement of goods and transfer of wealth in the interior. Pending complete peace a provisional agreement is suggested for a transitional period during which Japanese requirements may be considered without conflicting with the independent rights of China. The term "transitional period" should not be interpreted to mean extension of the military occupational period and various anomalies should be corrected immediately in order to build a sound foundation.

Sent to Department, repeated to Chungking.

LOCKHART

DJD

0714

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Mexico, July 11, 1941
DIVISION OF
12 1941
AMERICAN REPUBLICS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 13241

SUBJECT: Statement regarding the Sino-Japanese War
made by the new Chinese Minister

Grade	Examination	Check	Yes	No

	in U.S.A.			

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 18 1941
Department of State

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 JUL 16 PM 2 07

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

793.94/16742

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the new Minister to Mexico from China, Mr. T. K. Ching, who has made a favorable impression here, in a broadcast to his countrymen residing in Mexico said that China's resistance to Japan is "playing a vital role in the defense of democracy, including the Americas."

Speaking in Chinese, on the fourth anniversary of Tokyo's undeclared war against China, he asserted: "The heroic and gallant resistance against our enemy has proven China cannot be conquered. Our day of reckoning with our enemy is not far distant. With manpower crippled and resources exhausted, Japan cannot

79394

PS/LB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

cannot carry on the fight without outside aid."

Respectfully yours,

Josephus Daniels
Josephus Daniels.

Embassy file 710-China-Japan
JD:KCT
In triplicate to the Department of State

0716

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TEM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Foochow via N. R.

Dated July 16, 1941


SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY TO ONI AND MID 7/16/41, ED

Rec'd 12:57 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

July 16, 11 a.m.



Yesterday there was published by the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese army in Foochow, a proclamation prohibiting after July 20, both travel of persons and transport of goods across a line connecting certain named points and enclosing what at present comprises the occupied portion of this consular district. It was proclaimed that persons violating this prohibition will be executed and their goods confiscated.

The declared purpose of the prohibition includes the prevention of commodities reaching unoccupied territories and the control of hostile elements which might engage in espionage or guerrilla activities.

It might be remarked in this latter connection that numbers of Japanese troops with their equipment have, in the last few days, been transported from Tsingtao and all available information indicates that the force now holding this area is a relatively weak one.

The Commissioner

793.94/16743

PS/L3

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- July 16, 11 a.m. from Foochow via N. R.

The Commissioner of Posts for Fukien informs me that he has been told at the local Japanese gendarmerie headquarters that the prohibition extends to foreigners as well as Chinese but that mails to and from the unoccupied area will be allowed to pass through the lines at one designated point. Even should no effort be made to restrict the movement of foreigners the enforcement of the terms of the proclamation against Chinese would render travel of foreigners between Japanese and Chinese controlled portions of this consular district very difficult because Chinese boatmen and coolies presumably would be unable to accompany them.

Sent to Peiping. Repeated to the Department, Chungking, Shanghai and Amoy. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo.

RICE

HSM

0718

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten initials]

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LET
This telegram must be ^{FROM}
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Peiping
Dated July 17, 1941
Rec'd. 8:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.
177, July 17, 3 a.m.
CONFIDENTIAL

[Handwritten signature]
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 18 1941
Department of State
[Handwritten 'D']

793.94

So far as I have been able to ascertain there
has been no unusual movement of Japanese troops in
Peiping area recently. A press source informs me
that a number of railway employees have left the Peiping
area. While no large number of planes have been in-
volved there has been unusual air activity for the
past two weeks including much night flying and bomb
sighting practice often over this Embassy.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking and
Shanghai.

BUTRICK

BRK

[Handwritten 'VA']

793.94/16744
PS/LJP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Sino-Japanese war.

Call of Chinese Ambassador to inform of interest
 of Dr. Quo in having proposed exchange of notes
 between Secretary of State and newly appointed
 Chinese Foreign Minister be expedited.

lw

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memo
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated May 14, 1941 From } State Department
 To } Far Eastern Affairs
 (Acheson)

File No. 711.93/477

792.54/ 16745

FP

16745-

0720

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LET

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.


Dated July 17, 1941

Rec'd. 8:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

878, July 17, 4 p.m.



One. Nanking's Central News Agency reports in press article of July 15 that Wang Ching Wei has instructed Propaganda Personnel to exercise greater caution, emphasizing the importance of thinking in terms of the common good of East Asia and forbidding one-sided expressions.

Two. It seems probable that this instruction may be due to Japanese pressure as a result of the recent outburst in Nanking controlled publications of expressions of the nature outlined in my 952, July 12, 3 p.m., concerning devaluation of military yen, and in my 865 July 16 summarizing article advocating of financial and economic controls in Nanking's favor.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking.

LOCKHART

CSB

793.94/16746


793.94/16746

0721

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 1220

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
 OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Singapore, S.S., June 11, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Telegram addressed to the President
 by Mr. Tan Kah Kee.

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JUL 17 AM 11
 1941

DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department's instruction of April 18, 1941 enclosing a copy of a telegram addressed to the President by the Chairman of the Federation of China Relief Funds of Southeastern Asia, in which the writer of the telegram expressed his gratitude and satisfaction for the action taken by the United States Government in connection with the international situation. The Consulate General was requested, in its discretion, to make appropriate acknowledgment of the telegram in question.

The Consulate General believes that there are certain political factors which counsel against the suggested acknowledgment at this time. While Mr. Tan Kah Kee has in the past played a prominent role in various Chinese patriotic organizations, it is not known at present whether his sympathies still remain with the Chungking Government. As it cannot be foreseen with any degree of certainty what use Mr. Tan Kah Kee might make of an acknowledgment of this kind emanating from the American Government, the

Consulate

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
 Department of State

JUL 23 1941

DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS

793.94/16747


PS/MUL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Consulate General has availed itself of the discretion granted to it
and refrained from taking any action in the matter.


Respectfully yours,


K. S. Patton
American Consul General

Original and 4 copies to the Department.
One copy to the Embassy, London.

File no. 914 (a)

CWA/emn


H. S. Patton
K. S. Patton

0723

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Bombing of British Embassy in Chungking, China.

Quotes substance of a telegram sent by British Ambassador to London, July 10, describing interview with the Japanese Vice Foreign Minister which includes information on protest against, - Vice Minister expressed hope that His Majesty's Ambassador would not see his way to transfer Embassy to safety.

FLH

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel # 979 2 PM SECTIONS 1 and 2
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated July 11, 1941 From Japan (Grew)
To

File No. 793.94/16738

793.94/16748

F P 200

0724

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

August 9, 1941.

The Associated Press states in dispatches from
Chungking of August 8 that:

793.94
"About 140 Japanese planes, coming over in two
waves, smashed at Chungking and ^{its} suburbs again
today. ...

"Some of the eight raiding formations flew
directly over the safety zone on the south bank of
the Yangtze River, but no bombs were dropped there."

On July 31, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador called on
Mr. Welles. In his memorandum of conversation, Mr. Welles
states:

"As soon as he had entered the room, the Ambassador
took out of his pocket a piece of paper and read to
me a statement. Upon the conclusion of the reading of
this paper, I asked the Ambassador if he would be good
enough to let me have the statement he had read as an
aide-mémoire of the declaration he had made. The
Ambassador replied that he felt unable to give me this
declaration in writing but nevertheless would be glad
if I would take notes from the statement as he had

read

793.94/16743 1/3
P. 10/13
JAN 24 1944

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

read it to me. He thereupon handed it to me and I took notes therefrom.

"The statement commenced to the effect that he was instructed by his Government to inform the President officially of the deep regret of the Japanese Government because of the bombing of the U.S.S. Tutuila at Chungking.

"The Japanese Government desired to assure this Government that the bombing was an accident 'pure and simple'.

"In order to make sure that no further incident of this kind would take place, the Japanese Government 'has decided to suspend all bombing operations over the city area of Chungking'.

"The Japanese Government offers to pay full indemnity for any damage occasioned American properties immediately upon the completion of the necessary investigations.

"The Japanese Government requested that its decision with regard to the suspension of bombing operations over the city area of Chungking be regarded as strictly confidential.

"The statement likewise included the assertion in the name of the Ambassador himself that it was he himself

Nothing here
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

himself who had recommended this procedure to the Japanese Government."

Immediately after this conversation, Mr. Welles called me and Mr. Bucknell to his office and gave us orally a full account of what had transpired. Next, with me still present, Mr. Welles called the President on the telephone and gave him the same account and discussed with him action to be taken. Next, Mr. Welles asked me to prepare a telegram informing Tokyo of what Admiral Nomura had delivered and adding that, in the light of this and with express authorization of the President he had informed the press of three points and in lieu of informing them of the pledge that the Japanese would discontinue bombing the city area of Chungking, he stated that the Japanese Government had informed us in detail and concretely of the action which it was taking toward preventing recurrence of such an incident; and it stated that this Government considered the incident closed.

Before that telegram was dispatched, I asked Mr. Welles whether the Japanese Ambassador had given him anything in writing, and Mr. Welles, replying in the negative, stated that the Japanese Ambassador had brought notes and had let him read the notes and make memoranda therefrom. I made the comment that in a matter as serious as this ^{there} it would seem to me to be advantage in having the terms of what

was

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

was promised and what was accepted exchanged in writing. I called attention to the fact that the Japanese had asked that their pledge be kept confidential and I suggested that such a pledge, given orally and kept secret is not too greatly to be relied upon. Mr. Welles remarked that if the Japanese fail to keep this pledge we could give publicity to the fact ^{which} ~~it~~ having been made. [Note: In the light of all that is stated above, an item of negative evidence becomes interesting: from no other source than Admiral Nomura have we had any information that the Japanese Government instructed Admiral Nomura to give the pledge which he gave orally and with injunction of secrecy to Mr. Welles that the Japanese would henceforth refrain from bombing the city area of Chungking; and, by Admiral Nomura's own statement, the suggestion to his Government that it give that pledge originated with Admiral Nomura. Query: Assuming that Admiral Nomura made that suggestion to his Government, did his Government ever instruct him to give that pledge to the American Government? It will be recalled that the whole transaction took place with extraordinary speed; also, that Ambassador Grew, when informed of the pledge under reference, telegraphed declaring it "significant" as being the first manifestation of any concession on the part of the Japanese Army and Navy from the position which they had

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

^Whad assumed that they possess and they will in their discretion exercise the right to engage in whatever military operations they deem expedient in China.]

In the light of the above, it is believed that, if and as soon as we receive official reports substantiating the Associated Press news report, the Secretary call upon Admiral Nomura for an explanation.

PA/H:SKH:FLB


0729

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

August 12, 1941

Mr. Secretary:



In the light of this report from Chungking, I suggest that action be taken immediately in the sense of the recommendation made in the last paragraph of my memorandum of August 9.

793.94
The Japanese Government's pledge, as given by Admiral Nomura, who stated that he was acting under instruction from his Government, was that Japan would refrain from bombing the "city area" of Chungking. This was the central feature of the response given on Japan's behalf to the demand made by Mr. Welles that the Japanese Government inform us of measures which it was taking toward effectively preventing the recurrence of endangering of our Embassy and our gunboat at Chungking. It was in reliance upon this pledge that Mr. Welles, under express instruction from the President, announced that this Government considered the incident closed.

793.94/1674 2/3

Both AP and UP reports have indicated that Chungking has repeatedly been bombed during the past three or four days. The UP report of August 10 states that in the course of these bombings an American Mission property was demolished

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and
JAN 2 1944

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

and the residence of the British Ambassador was again
 damaged. The UP report of August 11 mentions "ten raids
 of the last four days". Gause's report of August 11 <sup>(changing being
 at 338, 1943/44)</sup>
 states that the "outlying districts and the city area
 (repeat city area) have been repeatedly bombed. ..."

My recommendation was and is that "the Secretary
 call upon Admiral Nomura for an explanation".) ^{void}

*and that this must be an, now, an
 urgent matter.*

SKH

FE
5.4.4

PA/H:SKH:FLB

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AUG 11 1941

NEW YORK TIMES

**TWO JAPANESE RAIDS
 BLAST AT CHUNGKING**

**American Methodist Mission
 Building Damaged by Bomb**

CHUNGKING, China, Aug. 10 (UP).
 —Japanese naval planes bombed this provisional Chinese capital today for the sixth time since Friday and caused widespread damage.

One big bomb penetrated a three-story residence of the American Methodist Mission and demolished the entire central section of the building. All near-by mission establishments were damaged. Plaster was stripped from walls, windows broken and some walls cracked.

There were two separate attacks today. In the first, the mission building was struck. In the second, nine planes concentrated upon an area around the residence of the British Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, which again was damaged.

The increased tempo and ferocity of the attacks led some observers to believe that the bombing was part of a "softening-up" effort preliminary to new Japanese land drives, possibly into Yunnan Province from Japan's bases in northern Indo-China.

HONG KONG, Monday, Aug. 11 (AP).—Twenty-six Japanese planes dropped more than 100 bombs and killed or wounded ten Chinese yesterday in a raid on Kunming, terminus of the Burma Road, the Central [Chinese] News Agency reported today.

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12/11

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NEW YORK TIMES

August 12, 1941

Chungking Again Under Air
Attack for 9½ Hours—Rain
Halts Japanese Bombers

CHUNGKING, Aug. 11 (UP)—
 Japanese naval planes raided this
 Chinese capital for nine and one-
half hours today, but caused only
 minor damage.

The attacks stopped in mid-
 afternoon, and a heavy downpour
 definitely removed the aerial
 threat. Thousands of people, who
 had remained in caves and dug-
 outs much of the time for four
 days, came into the open.

Military authorities described
 the ten raids of the last four days
 as "nuisance" attacks and sug-
 gested they were designed largely
 to harass the population. Many
 people, it was said, have spent for-
 ty-six or more of the last ninety-
 six hours in shelters.

Air raid alarms were sounded
 four times yesterday, and the city
 was attacked six times. This cor-
 respondent and others remained
 for fifteen hours in dugouts,
 emerging only for a few minutes
 at a time for food and drink.

0733

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 23.

Chungking, June 12, 1941

Subject: Continuance of Japanese Aerial
Attacks on Chungking.


Air mail

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	1, 4, 5, 6		✓
Ex	In U.S.A.	✓	
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RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 JUL 13 PM 12 29

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



COPIES SENT TO
CND AND MID
7-19-41 HES

700.07/10740

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to Ambassador Johnson's despatch no. 878 of May 19, 1941, on the subject "Resumption of Japanese Aerial Attacks on Chungking", and to report four further raids during the first days of June.

SUMMARY: The Japanese intention to continue their systematic bombing of Chungking, whenever favorable conditions permit, was evidenced by raids on June 1, 2, 5 and 7. American property sustained considerable damage on June 1 and 2. The raid on June 5, which occurred at night, resulted in the death by suffocation of a large number of persons in a public dugout. The number of planes participating was noticeably reduced but, as in the past, bombing was indiscriminate and damage

to

PS/LR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AIR MAIL

- 2 -

to military objectives seems to have been slight.

A period of unfavorable weather in the vicinity of Chungking after the last previously reported raid on May 16 apparently discouraged the Japanese from attempting renewed large-scale bombing of Chungking until June 1. This interval, however, was used by the Japanese air force to carry out a number of raids on other parts of the province. These raids were for the most part executed by groups of light bomber and pursuit planes and may have constituted attempts to locate any active remnants of the Chinese airforce, to search out the Russian planes reported to have arrived this spring, or to find whether any American aircraft had yet reached this part of China.

As a result of these raids, Chungking was placed under alarm on May 20, 21, 22 and 26. During the raids on May 20, a passenger carrying plane of the China National Aviation Corporation was attacked while on the ground at Ipin (Suifu)*.

On May 22, pilots of the Chinese air force flying Russian planes engaged the Japanese near Chengtu. The Chinese claim to have shot down one Japanese pursuit plane was verified by Captain Horace Greeley, Assistant Military Attache for Air of this Embassy, who was in Chengtu and observed the fight. The Chinese apparently suffered no losses in this encounter but it is believed that a number of Chinese planes were destroyed on the ground at another field near Chengtu. During the alarm on May 26, several Japanese pursuit planes appeared for a few minutes over Chungking at a low altitude and directed machine gun fire at unknown objectives on the ground.

The bombings on June 1, 2 and 7 may be described as "routine", since they were carried out in the manner now familiar to residents of Chungking. All took place in the middle of the day. Weather conditions were as nearly perfect as could be desired and the planes, all bi-motored bombers in close formation, passed once over the city in level flight at an altitude estimated by American military observers as being at least 15,000 feet, and discharged their bomb load in a single salvo over the central part of the city.

The raid on June 5 occurred in the evening under a half-full moon. Commencing soon after dusk, Japanese bombers at intervals dropped flares and bombs over the city until about 11 p.m. It is reported that the raid was carried out by at least four groups of eight planes each. The plan of operation apparently was for two planes of each group to precede it and drop flares. The remainder of the group divided into two sections of three planes each. The first of these came over and

dropped

*Telegram no. 196 to Department, May 20, 5 p.m.,
 Despatch no. 6, May 30, 1941.

0735

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AIR MAIL

- 3 -

dropped its bombs a few minutes after the flares, while the second waited for a somewhat longer interval. A few bombs landed on the south, or right, bank of the Yangtze where this Embassy is situated and most foreigners in Chungking reside*. The length of this raid - the urgent alarm was in force for almost five hours - resulted in a deplorable tragedy: a large number of persons (probably over four thousand) were suffocated in one of the large public dugouts.

In view of the present inability of the Chinese to put up any active resistance to any aerial attacks, there appears to be no logical reason for such night raids except a Japanese hope of more effectively wearing down the morale of the civilian population. Even during the day attacks, no Chinese planes have taken to the air to engage the bombers over Chungking and the anti-aircraft fire is weak and appears ineffectual: despite Chinese claims of one or more Japanese planes having been damaged by it, there has been no indication to observers that this is true. Whatever the Japanese hopes, and despite the suffocation incident of June 5, the news of which is well-known to the general public, the population reacted in a normal way during the raid on the 7th and took to the dugouts. It is expected, however, that night raids will be continued during the present full moon period, and an alarm was actually given on the evening of June 7 but was later canceled when it was learned that the Japanese planes which had left their base at Hankow had turned back after meeting with unfavorable weather in the eastern part of the province. It is obvious that the bombing, which appears to be rather well directed at certain sections of the city during the day raids, must be considerably more random and indiscriminate at night.

1/ The military accomplishments of these raids can only be regarded as slight. The areas bombed have been chiefly the business and poorer residential sections in the center of the city where no military establishments exist. The main sufferers have been small Chinese shopkeepers, many of whose shops and homes have already been destroyed during the raids of the past three years. Several fires have been started during each raid but all have been quickly extinguished before reaching important size. Public utilities have continued to function well except for brief periods while raids are actually going on. With the exception of the dugout accident referred to above, and another incident on June 2 when about 30 persons who had taken refuge in a large-mouth, comparatively shallow motor car dugout were killed by a bomb falling near the entrance, the loss of life has not been great. An enclosed article from CHINA AIR MAIL, of May 21, 1941, very well describes the way in which the city of Chungking has prepared for and adjusts itself to these attacks.

American

*Telegram no. 224 June 6, noon, to Department.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AIR MAIL


- 4 -

American property suffered considerable damage but there were no casualties. During the raid on June 1, the Women's Section of the hospital operated by the American Episcopal Mission received a direct hit, the home of the Reverend W. A. McCurdy, an American member of the Mission, was damaged by concussion and stones through the roof, and the dormitory of the Mission's institutional church was demolished by a second direct hit*. On June 2, one of the ice plants of the Chungking Ice Company, Inc., an American firm, was hit and destroyed**.

Other non-military establishments hit were the British Embassy Chancery and the residence of the Counselor, Sir Arthur Blackburn, which were badly shaken by three of the raids, the residence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the offices of the International Publicity Board and the Press Hostel, operated by the Board for foreign newspapermen.

Despite the seeming failure to achieve any important military objective or to impair the morale of the civilian population, it is expected that these raids will continue. It has been noted, however, that they are being carried out on a greatly reduced scale. Whereas the Japanese usually employed over one hundred planes in 1940 and from fifty to sixty in their raids in May, 1941, these most recent raids have generally used only twenty-seven planes and only once as many as thirty-two. It is not clear whether this is due to a Japanese desire to conserve their supplies of aviation fuel and save their machines, whether aircraft from Hankow, which is the base for raids on Chungking, have been transferred to other stations such as Hainan Island or Formosa, or whether their planes are at presently engaged in other operations such as those in North Hupeh or South Shansi.

Respectfully yours,



C. E. Gauss

Enclosure ✓

- 1/ Article entitled: "Opening of Chungking's Bombing Season" from CHINA AIR MAIL, Hongkong, May 21, 1941.

Original and four copies to Department
 by air mail to Hong Kong
 Copy to Embassy, Peiping
 Copy to Embassy, Tokyo

711.6
 JSS:MCL

*Telegram no. 220, June 2, 9 a.m. to the Department.
 **Telegram no. 221, June 3, noon to the Department.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 23 dated June 12, 1941,
 from American Embassy at Chungking on the subject
 "Continuance of Japanese Aerial Attacks on Chungking".

(C O P Y)

SOURCE: CHINA AIR MAIL
 Hongkong, May 21, 1941

The Opening Of Chungking's "Bombing Season"

Chungking, during the first half of May, experienced the first four heavy raids of the year. The "season" has thus been opened at the same time as it was in 1939 and 1940, and it is expected that the Japanese will again use every day of clear weather to bomb the capital. The characteristics and the results of the raids have not changed in any way. The bombings were as indiscriminate as before. An average of some sixty planes again came over the city in rigid formation, concentrating their attacks on certain areas, and evidently made little if any effort at hitting definite objectives.

Damage was heavy as far as the individual losses of small shopkeepers and poor people in general were concerned, for most of the destruction affected the shops and dwellings of this part of the population. But the loss of life was very small indeed and the damage done to government offices and private residences of officials did not cause any interruption of administration work.

Chungking is prepared better than ever to stand the heaviest attacks with a minimum of loss of life and without any serious harm to government and general activities. The organisation of first aid, street clearance, removal of debris, repairs to telegraph and telephone lines and the light and water supply services and general reconstruction has been still more improved and is truly admirable.

New records of efficiency and speed in all these respects have been achieved this year, and this fact is making a much deeper impression upon the public mind than the inconveniences, dangers and losses caused by the raids themselves.

The spirit of the population and the optimism with which the work of clearing away the debris and rebuilding the damaged houses is taken in hand is as good as ever. Chungking is now deriving much benefit from the fact that temporary structures of light timber, bamboo and mud have replaced most of the former, more substantial buildings which were destroyed during the past two years and that the new structures are much more easily repaired and substituted. The winter and early spring have been used not only to construct more shelters, especially for motor cars and trucks, to rebuild most of the devastated areas and to repair the greater part of all damaged houses, but also to accumulate large quantities of light building materials which are thus at hand for immediate reconstruction work.

This

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huebner NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

This is a typical example of how Chungking takes its losses: two particular rows of small shop-residences in different areas which had been destroyed and rebuilt three times during the past two years, again suffered severe damage or almost complete destruction in the first heavy raid of this year. They were reconstructed during the quiet, rainy week that followed. In one of the next raids they were shattered once more, and rebuilding, for the fifth time, was again in full swing the same afternoon or a day later: the owners, together with a few carpenters and masons were repairing the damage, using every bit of material that was salvaged from the debris, in addition to some new bamboo poles, lettuce timber and tiles; the mud for covering the bamboo lettuce was mixed across the street where repair gangs were unravelling telephone wires and electric light cables; and members of the afflicted families were meanwhile selling in the street the goods which had been taken to the dugouts during the raid.

Another typical case: one of the few substantial office-cum-residence buildings of a government organisation suffered a direct hit which completely smashed one half, and almost shattered the other, while staff members and documents were safely underground in a rock shelter beneath the house. The afternoon after the event was used to find bed-space in the neighbourhood for everybody who had been bombed out of his sleeping quarters, to decide on plans for the temporary reconstruction of the offices and, with the help of a large gang of coolies, to begin the clearing away of debris and salvaging from it what might still be of use. The next day saw most of the staff doing their routine work in the few rooms that had retained their floors, two or three persons working at quickly repaired or borrowed desks, always in readiness for another raid, but without misgivings. Meanwhile, a few matsheds are being added to the phantastic-looking shell of half a brick house in which new window frames, covered with paper, are being fixed and gaping holes in walls and ceilings plastered over. Two further raids once more slightly shook the building, but repair work is being carried on according to plan, and office routine continues undisturbed.

The people of Chungking are certainly grateful for every rainy or foggy day at which the Japanese bombers cannot come and they are longing for the arrival of modern, American-made pursuit planes of which a relatively small number would give fair protection against the raiders because the Japanese cannot afford any serious losses. But the prospect of a long bombing season does not scare either the population or the Government. They have seen so much of the battered city rebuilt one time after another and loss of life is so small that the raids are not regarded as any more than a nuisance. In fact, the authorities have the greatest difficulty in enforcing some measure of evacuation, because the people do not seem to regard the city as unsafe.

(100-100000)
 (100-100000)

0739

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1314

~~11~~
~~11~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

AF
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Foochow via N. R.
Dated July 18, 1941
Rec'd 9:07 am; 19th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

July 18, 6 p.m.

Reference is made to my telegram dated July 16,
11 a.m.

Yesterday during an interview with Colonel Ikuta,
head of the Japanese Army special service section at
Foochow, I referred to the proclamation which was the
subject of my telegram under reference, stated that
several Americans were en route to Foochow from the
interior and asked what treatment the Japanese pro-
posed to accord to foreigners who might be encountered
attempting to pass through the Japanese lines. Colonel
Ikuta replied that in the absence of prior arrange-
ments they should not be permitted to proceed and
stated that he would like in specific cases to be
given the names of the persons and a statement of the
place and date of their proposed passage through the
lines. I told him that because of inadequate communi-
cation facilities and other considerations, this might
not always

793.94/16750

PS/MFM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1315

-2- July 18, 6 p.m. - from Foochow

not always be possible, that the Japanese authorities would be held responsible for the lives of Americans coming into areas under their control and that I should appreciate his arranging to have orders issued which would ensure their safety. He agreed to do so.

Sent to Peiping. Repeated to the Department, Chungking, Shanghai and Amoy. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo.

RICE

NK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Japanese military operations against
 China are to be intensified in the
 hope of giving China a ~~knock~~-out blow
 in the near future: Comments concerning
 the report that -.

793.94/16751

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Telegram #1015 3am
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated July 17, 1941 From Japan (Grew)
 To

File No. 740.0011 European War 1939/13231

16751

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TEM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

How via N. R.

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

Dated July 22, 1941


FROM

Rec'd 12:10 p.m. 23rd

Secretary of State,

Washington.

July 22, 7 p.m.



Despite the passage of three months since their occupation of this city the Japanese as yet have established here no Consulate, commercial firms, shipping offices or banks. Japanese military and naval units and persons connected with their activities appear to have derived considerable (?) from sale of imported rice and flour but this source of income is now restricted to an acute shortage of currency and the marketing of this year's first local rice crop. These circumstances and the fact of continued outward movements of small contingents of Japanese troops serve to keep alive rumors that a complete Japanese evacuation of this area is soon to occur.

(?), (?) distrust of their Chinese puppets as well as lack of cooperation in at least some non-military matters between units of the regular army, special service section, gendarmerie and navy are increasingly evident and may be partly responsible for the apparent absence of accomplishment. As

evidence

753.34/16702

PS/FLR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- July 22, 7 p.m. from Foochow via N. R.

of the former it might be mentioned that according to an official source the chairman, vice chairman and seven of the Foochow Special Service Maintenance Commission together with about fifty of their subordinates have within the past few days been arrested and are undergoing questioning in connection with charges of having connection with the Chungking Government. According to H. S. Kierkegaard, the Director of Posts for Fukien, lack of cooperation between the Japanese authorities here and in Amoy and Formosa are responsible for the fact that despite many promises the Japanese in three months have made possible (?) in of only two shipments of mail from other ports and from abroad. The special service section has appeared for some time to desire the early reopening at least for the transaction of business in which it is interested of the Bank of Taiwan at Foochow but its manager yesterday explained to me the repeated postponement of such reopening by saying that he has been unable heretofore to arrange passage to Foochow for his staff.

Sent to Peiping. Repeated to the Department and Chungking; Peiping. Please repeat to Tokyo.

RICE

HPD

0742

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 60.

Chungking, July 10, 1941

Subject: Transmitting text, in translation,
of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's
message to friendly nations on the
occasion of the 4th anniversary of
commencement of Sino-Japanese Hos-
tilities (July 7, 1941)

Air mail



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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

793.94/16753

Sir:

793.94/16720

1/ I have the honor to refer to my telegram no. 276,
 July 7, 5 p.m. quoting extracts from Generalissimo
 Chiang Kai-shek's address to the friendly nations on
 the fourth anniversary of the commencement of Sino-
 Japanese hostilities, and to enclose the full text,
 in translation, of his speech as released by the
Central News Agency on July 6.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. Gauss
 C. E. Gauss

Enclosure:

1/ As stated.

Original and two copies by airmail to Department
 Two copies to Department by pouch
 Copy to Peiping

800/710
 SKL:MCL

PS/FLR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 60 dated July 10,
 1941 from American Embassy at Chungking, China

(C O P Y)

(Translation of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's
 message to friendly nations on the occasion of
 the 4th anniversary of the commencement of Sino-
 Japanese Hostilities as quoted by the Central
News Agency English Service on July 6, 1941)

"Our war of resistance has now reached the fourth anniversary of its outbreak. Then we realized that if Japanese aggression went unchecked it would threaten more than the existence of China; it would prove calamitous for the whole world. We rose up accordingly with fearless resolution to wrestle with this formidable enemy. We thought it no time to count the cost. These four years of war have seen Japanese military strength immensely reduced and the full enormity of Japanese ambitions made clear to the world.

From the very beginning we were prepared to fight alone to the end. We were, and are, confident that China is strong enough to master Japan; but if countries friendly to our cause will but assist us to the best of their ability in our military and economic necessities the progress of our arms will be accelerated and the world be the sooner rid of one of the greatest dangers to its welfare. The Chinese people are supremely aware of the cruelties of warfare and they are second to none in their reluctance to see any nation undergo the sufferings that war entails. The Chinese army and people will consider their sacrifices adequately rewarded if the cause of justice triumphs and humanity is spared, at least from one quarter, the terrible experiences we have to endure. I have frequently made this statement and the truth of it is evident to all observers from countries friendly to China.

During the past twelve months violent changes have taken place in both the Far Eastern and world situations. The last few weeks have been particularly crowded with developments following one another in rapid succession. The manner in which the Axis Powers have emulated and seconded the lead of Japan has resulted in the division of the world into two great domains, that on the one hand of the bloc of nations the instrument of whose policy is aggression, and that, on the other hand, of a bloc of nations resolved to oppose aggression. As things stand today the war in the Far East is no longer to be viewed as merely a conflict between two nations, for the European and Asiatic wars have now become closely interrelated. Scarcely a single country remains unaffected because this predatory group of powers excludes no country from the scope of its design to dominate the world by force. So much has become quite clear. A mighty conflagration is sweeping the world, and after the nature of fire it will continue to burn up all in its path until and unless it is extinguished. To control this ghastly evil the only course is to strike down the foe while there is yet time. As to how this is effectively to be done I have three points to make.

Firstly,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Firstly, every fire has a starting point and the historical source of this present worldwide war was undoubtedly Japan's on our northeastern provinces launched in total disregard of all treaty obligations. By that act of aggression a decade ago Japan displayed the course upon which she was bent. Later in 1936 she lent fresh impetus to the forces of aggression with the Anti-Comintern Pact she was then foremost in promoting. She was obviously resolved to see the world plunged into chaos. Within the past year she has entered into a tripartite alliance with Germany and Italy and subsequently announced her conception of an "Order for Greater East Asia" under her hegemony, formally declaring the term to embrace Oceania. As steps to the expansion of her power southward she has established naval bases on Hainan Island and in Indochina. Japan has thus been outstandingly instrumental in magnifying the scale of the war, in financing the flames she was the first to light. She is to be regarded as more than the villainous originator of the Far Eastern War; she is responsible for the universal character of the strife we now see spreading over the earth. Until this primal spring of the evil is stopped up there can be no hope of permanent peace for mankind at large.

Secondly, the issue of the conflict will depend upon the efficiency with which the forces working against aggression can make themselves felt. Asia is the centre of the globe's greatest masses of population and of its richest resources. If therefore the democracies of Asia, America and Europe can truly concentrate their energies in the pursuit of their common endeavour against the aggressors their cooperation can ensure victory and the destruction of the powers devoted to the rule of force. Let the nations concerned with the various territories that compose the Pacific land areas make a revolutionary change in their attitude, and view the importance of the Pacific with fresh insight. Then they will realize that the ocean and the continent of Asia weigh at least in equal importance with the Atlantic and Europe and the urgency of the task of crushing the power of Japan will appear to them proportional to the gravity of the situation in Europe. China has fought four years of gruelling war as much for the good of the world as for her own. The nations friendly to her should regard it as imperative both for the protection of their own interests and for the sake of the world's future that a term be put to the outrageous depredations of Japan. That done, Asia, America, Australia and Africa can bring their combined weight to bear in the enterprise of imposing a settlement of the European hostilities. If they wishfully think the Japanese may experience a change of heart and suppose it safe to let them have their way for the time being they will find their error as disastrous as the policy of appeasement pursued until recently by European countries towards Germany. If they conceive it possible to distinguish between the Axis Powers and Japan, striking at the former and letting the latter have rein, the consequences are likely to be shocking. I am convinced that no democratic country can afford to view with the unconcern of a spectator the fierce flames of war in Asia until they find their own territory ablaze.

Thirdly,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Thirdly, the present division of the world into two camps is perfectly clear. Japan, Germany and Italy compose a bloc, the sole policy and purpose of which is aggrandizement at the expense of the rest of the world. As a result all peoples loving peace and freedom have drawn themselves up in an opposing front. We Chinese finally held that that front is potentially far stronger than the aggressors. In order to insure victory is strength must however be developed to the utmost by close cooperation with one another in the course of the life-and-death contest that has now begun. Their vision must not be narrowed by attention to trivial and merely immediate features of the situation. Indecision and a vacillation must be eliminated. They must make up for lost time and wrest the initiative from the aggressors. They must not allow the latter enough time to consolidate their gains and strike with strategic advantage. It is now widely argued whether Japan would move southward or northward. Some people seem to assume that she is not in a position to strike in either or both directions and will possibly devote her further effort of aggression to attacking China alone. To my mind, we must carefully guard ourselves against making any calculation based upon such argument of assumption, because the aggressors are both opportunists and adventurers, and therefore are capable of all sudden and unpredictable actions. Any miscalculation on our part may entail grave consequences.

I would conclude by expressing a certain point of view in respect to the assistance rendered China by her friends among the nations. The Chinese people will ever remember it with gratitude. Our neighbour Soviet Russia, America of the Western Hemisphere, and England, contending herself with the greatest adversity of circumstances, have all contributed generously to our support in resistance, thus encouraging and inspiring us. The Chinese Government and people will certainly act up to the trust put in them, for not to do so would be to fail the ideals animating their own strivings and sacrifices. At the time when resistance began I said that we were engaged in a conflict of good with evil, or equity and justice with brute force. Now we hope and believe that there will be more effective collaboration between China and her friends. The aim is the same for all of us: President Roosevelt expressed it in terms of four freedoms which all humanity has the right to enjoy. It is my privilege to declare that the Chinese people is combating Japanese not only for the negative purpose of putting an end to Japanese aggression but also as their means of contributing to a free world order of the future, to the civilization and prosperity of mankind. That is their great determination."

0748

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 AUG 15 1941
 ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

August 13, 1941.

Mr. Secretary:

(See clipping attached).

Concerning the recent Japanese bombings at Chungking, we have had various reports that indicate that most of the said bombing was done by Japanese navy planes but that some of it has been done by Japanese army planes.

The story here attached, by the New York Times special man at Chungking, gives a detailed account of the constantly increasing ferocity of these bombing raids. Significant is the sentence "The raids have almost isolated Chungking from the outside world. Nearly all passenger plane services have stopped. Radio and telegraph operations are difficult..." [You will recall that practically all passengers communication between Chungking and the outside world is by plane. Some people who have plenty of time go in or out over the Burma Road.] The story goes on to say that the American Ambassador and most of the staffs of the United States and the British Embassies were over the week-end isolated from their offices. Note also the statement that "The final raid was the fourteenth

7 93.94/16753-1/2

PC/DAB

RECEIVED
 JAN 1941

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

in five days." Note further the bombings of Kunming and of Chengtu.

Whatever may have been the authoritativeness, and whatever the letter, of the pledge which the Japanese Ambassador gave Mr. Welles on behalf of the Japanese Government, the bombings of Chungking since the date of that pledge, with the frequency and the intensity reported, render their pledge and our assumption that our acceptance of it mark the scoring of a point to our credit altogether farcical. Silence on our part at this moment, were it maintained, in these premises, would, in my opinion, encourage the Japanese to believe ~~that~~ ^{what} they all too much wish to believe, namely, that all that they need to do at any time to keep our action limited to words is to be ready with excuses, apologies and pledges/ not to repeat "unfortunate mistakes".

SKH

PA/H:SKH:BGT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AUG 13 1941

CHUNGKING RAIDS WEAR OUT CITIZENS

New York Times

All Residents Forced to Remain
in Shelters 22 Hours During
the Sunday-Monday Attack

By F. TILLMAN DURDIN

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

CHUNGKING, China, Aug. 12—

A thunderstorm yesterday afternoon ended the worst ordeal by air bombardment Chungking has ever endured. Japanese raids had gone on with only short intervals between them since Friday afternoon.

From Sunday morning to Monday afternoon Japanese planes bombed Chungking eight times. These raids came on top of six separate attacks from Friday afternoon to Saturday night.

The Japanese squadrons were small, ranging from three planes to twenty-seven, but following the recent change in the manner of the Chungking attacks they spaced their arrival to keep the city under almost perpetual alarm and inhabitants constantly in dugouts.

Up to 4 o'clock yesterday afternoon Chungking residents had been squeezed in bomb shelters for twenty-two hours out of the preceding twenty-four. When yesterday's final squadron of twenty-seven Japanese bombers wheeled back eastward in the thick of a sudden storm without dropping bombs the residents were nearing collapse from fatigue and hunger.

Many had eaten nothing except perhaps a piece of fruit and a few peanuts purchased from peddlers at dugout entrances and had had no sleep while sitting in the crowded bomb tunnels.

The Japanese raided the city three times Sunday night by moonlight. There were only three planes in each squadron but they prevented a lifting of the alarm and a return from dugouts to homes.

The week-end raids did little material destruction. One bomb badly damaged the Methodist Mission residence and salvos caused limited wreckage in the Western and Kiangpei districts.

The attacks were clearly staged with the aim of wearing down Chungking's inhabitants and causing a dislocation of normal life. Chinese suspect the new tactics were suggested to the Japanese by members of the German diplomatic and commercial groups that left Chungking last month following the breaking off of Chinese-German relations.

The new Japanese tactics are especially efficacious because of Chungking's safety precautions which require all persons to be in dugouts when raiding planes are about 150 miles from the city to remain hidden until the

are 150 miles away on their way home. Successive waves of attacks, properly spaced, can effectively keep residents from their work and homes.

No Chinese pursuit planes have appeared to fight the Japanese and anti-aircraft defenses are weak.

The raids have almost isolated Chungking from the outside world. Nearly all passenger plane services have stopped. Radio and telegraph operations are difficult, so they are cut off most of the time.

United States Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss spent the week-end at his bungalow outside Chungking and was unable to return to the embassy yesterday. Most of the staffs of the United States and British Embassies were similarly isolated from their offices.

Late yesterday the capital fast returned to normal. After satisfying their appetites most of the weary citizens promptly took to their beds.

Villages Near Capital Raided

CHUNGKING, China, Aug. 12 (U.P.)—Japanese naval planes today raided Chungking for the fifth successive day, centering their attack

on villages twelve miles west of the city.

More than fifty planes took part in four successive raids. It was feared there was heavy loss of life in the villages, most of which are without air raid shelters.

The final raid was the fourteenth in five days.

Chinese Planes Attacked

SHANGHAI, Aug. 12 (U.P.)—Indicating that the Japanese air force is seeking to blast the efforts of the United States to build up the Chinese air force, Domei, the Japanese news agency, reported today that Japanese planes had bombed Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province and a key station on the Burma Road, and the cities of Taipingtzu, Wenkiang, Chengtu and Shwangliu, all in Szechwan Province.

Twenty-one Chinese planes were destroyed in air combats and on the ground at Chengtu, the Szechwan provincial capital, Domei said. A number of Chinese planes took to the air at Kunming but the pilots refused to fight.

"After bombing military objectives all our planes returned safely to their bases," Domei asserted.

0751

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GS

From Naval Attache, Chungking

ACTION: CINCAF



INFO: CINCFAC COMYANGPAT COMSOPAT CHIEF OF NAVAL
 OPERATIONS COMDT. SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

74574

About 0855 twenty six Japanese heavy bombers approaching from northwest flying about fifteen thousand feet ideal weather conditions changed course toward east upon reaching city to line crossing directly over TUTUILA and Embassy. Withheld fire until across city then dropped main load on foreshore directly across river opposite gunboat. Bombs from left center of formation dropping last swept across river passing directly overhead. One bomb struck close aboard stern of TUTUILA shattering one outboard motor boat casting it on top motor pan which sank by stern but was saved by bow line. Superstructure of stern of gunboat bent inward by blast also swept by huge wave collapsing fantail awning washing away gasoline containers and ships gear. Lack of injuries to personnel from fragments miraculous apparently due to funneling of bombs in water. Last bomb dropped behind Embassy about four hundred yards to eastward. Above action witnessed from Embassy hill immediately overlooking ship by Mayer,

Barrett

Aug 5 1941



700.04/13704

206.0

11111

0752

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- from Naval Attache, Chungking

Barrett and McHugh. Our unanimous opinion is that bombing was doliberate attack on gunboat and Embassy area which missed only by split second.

KLP

0753

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department:

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

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PARTIAL

PLAIN

Washington, Gay

July 30, 1941.

1 Pm

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

TRIPLE PRIORITY 443

1. Report was received from Attaché at Chungking July 30 giving account of operations by twenty-six Japanese heavy bombers. In paraphrase: These bombers approached from northwest at height about fifteen thousand feet in ideal weather conditions. Upon reaching city they changed course to the line crossing directly over the Tutula and the Embassy. Having crossed the city without firing, they dropped bombload on foreshore across river opposite Tutula. Left center of formation dropping last bombs swept across river and passed directly overhead. One bomb struck near stern Tutula, shattered an outboard motor boat and threw it upon motor sandpan which, sinking by stern, was saved by bowline. Gunboat's stern superstructure was bent inward by blast and swept by a huge wave which collapsed awning and washed away ship's gear and gasoline containers. Personnel escaped injuries from fragments only by miracle

Enciphered by _____ which

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/16754

PC/RB

793.94
116754

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

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-2-

which apparently was due to funneling of bombs in water. Last bomb was dropped about four hundred yards eastward of and behind Embassy. All this was witnessed by ^{three} ~~four~~ U.S. officials ~~[Army, Navy and Foreign Service]~~ from Embassy hill immediately overlooking ship. Unanimous opinion of these officials is that the bombing was a deliberate attack on Embassy area and Tutuila which missed its targets only by a fraction of a second.

2. I ~~am~~ ^{ed} calling the Japanese Ambassador in this morning. I ~~shall~~ hand him a copy of the report and ~~shall~~ ask him for answers to questions as follows: One, did this take place upon instruction by or knowledge of ^{responsible} authorities in Tokyo; two, what responsibility, if any, does the Japanese Government assume for it; three, what ^{precise} measures ^{in detail} does the Japanese Government intend to take toward effectively preventing recurrence of any such action. I ~~shall~~ reminded him of the pledge solemnly given by the Japanese Government, with, I understand, ^{the} knowledge and approval of the Emperor, at the time of the sinking of the Panay, that such action ^{would}

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

0755

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
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PARTAIR
PLAIN

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Night letter

Department of State

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Day letter
Night letter

Washington,

Charge to
\$

-3-

would not be repeated; also, of the fact that similar
pledges have repeatedly been given since then and have
repeatedly been disregarded.

3. I desire that you also take this matter up urgently
and with great emphasis with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Acting

JUL 30 1941 PM

PA/H:SKH:FLB

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

743.94/16754

TELEGRAM SENT

EJ

GRAY

July 30, 1941

1 p.m.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

TRIPLE PRIORITY 443

1. Report was received from Attache at Chungking July 30, giving account of operations by twenty-six Japanese heavy bombers. In paraphrase: These bombers approached from northwest at height about fifteen thousand feet in ideal weather conditions. Upon reaching city they changed course to the line crossing directly over the Tutuila and the Embassy. Having crossed the city without firing, they dropped bombload on foreshore across river opposite Tutuila. Left center of formation dropping last bombs swept across river and passed directly overhead. One bomb struck near stern Tutuila, shattered an outboard motor boat and threw it upon motor sandpan which, sinking by stern, was saved by bowline. Gunboat's stern superstructure was bent inward by blast and swept by a huge wave which collapsed awning and washed away ship's gear and gasoline containers

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 443 July 30, 1 p.m. to Tokyo

containers. Personnel escaped injuries from fragments only by miracle which apparently was due to funneling of bombs in water. Last bomb was dropped about four hundred yards eastward of and behind Embassy. All this was witnessed by three U.S. officials from Embassy hill immediately overlooking ship. Unanimous opinion of these officials is that the bombing was a deliberate attack on Embassy area and Tutuila which missed its targets only by a fraction of a second.

2. I called the Japanese Ambassador in this morning. I handed him a copy of the report and asked him for answers to questions as follows: One, did this take place upon instruction by or knowledge of responsible authorities; two, what responsibility, if any, does the Japanese Government assume for it; three, what precise measures in detail does the Japanese Government intend to take toward effectively preventing recurrence of any such action. I reminded him of the pledge solemnly given by the Japanese Government, with, I understand, the knowledge and approval of the Emperor, at the time of the sinking of the Panay, that such action would not be repeated; also, of the fact similar pledges

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3- 443, July 30, 1 p.m., to Tokyo

pledges have repeatedly been given since then and have repeatedly been disregarded.

3. I desire that you also take this matter up urgently and with great emphasis with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

WELLES, Acting

PA/H:SKH:FLB

0755

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
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Charge Department:
Full rate
Day letter
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Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT
Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
X CONFIDENTIAL CODE X
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
"SC" PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,
August 15, 1941.

10 PM
via Mail

AMEMBASSY,
CHUNGKING.

193

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY.

Department's 182, August 6/6 p.m.

The following telegram has been sent to Tokyo:

QUOTE During the call of the Japanese Ambassador at my request on August 13, 1941 I reiterated in substance the Department's telegram to you under reference and pointed out that according to a report from our authorities in Chungking that city had in the four days before August 11 been subjected to exceptionally heavy and prolonged air raids including not only districts outside the city proper, but also the city area itself. I said that press despatches indicated that bombs had demolished at least one American residence and had endangered another; and I requested an explanation and a definitive indication by the Japanese Government of its intention and attitude in regard to the pledge given on July 31 not repeat not to bomb the city

Enciphered by _____

area

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

This cable was sent in confidential Code. It should be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. SC

793.94/16755

PS/AC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
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☐ Night letter

Charge Department:

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☐ Night letter

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Page (2)

area of Chungking.

The Japanese Ambassador immediately replied that the Japanese Government had promised merely to cease SUBQUOTE temporarily END SUBQUOTE and not repeat not indefinitely bombing the city area. He said that he believed he had made this fact clear to Mr. Welles, but that he might have failed so to do. END QUOTE

The Department's telegram referred to in the first sentence of the above quoted telegram to Tokyo was repeated to you in the Department's telegram under reference.

FE:MWS:NHS

FE

PA/H

AUG 15 1941PM

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

0761

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
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☐ Night letter

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☐ Night letter

Charge to

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AMEMBASSY,

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED

☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL

PLAIN

"SC"

Washington,

August 6, 1941.

6 P.M.

CHUNGKING (CHINA) VIA NAVAL RADIO.

182

Refer to

#319-16755

Department's 448, July 31, 6 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY.

Under date August 1 the Department telegraphed the Embassy at Tokyo as follows:

QUOTE The Japanese Ambassador called late yesterday afternoon. He said that he was instructed by his Government to state: (1) That his Government greatly regretted the endangering of the Tutuila and the American Embassy at Chungking; (2) that his Government was sure that the bombing was accidental; (3) that, toward affording this Government assurance that no such endangering will occur again, Japanese bombing of the city area of Chungking will be discontinued; (4) that his Government is prepared to make indemnification for any and all damage done as soon as the facts and the amounts thereof are ascertained. He added that his Government would request one thing: namely, that we keep strictly confidential its promise to discontinue

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

This cable was sent in confidential Code. It should be carefully protected before being communicated to anyone. SC

793.94/16755

Confidential File

PS/HS

0762

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Collect { Full rate
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 Night letter

Department of State

Charge Department:

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 Day letter
 Night letter

Washington,

-2-

Charge to
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the bombing of Chungking.

In the light of this approach I have, with the express authorization of the President, informed the press of points one, two and four as above and have informed them in lieu of point three above that the Japanese Government has informed us in detail and concretely of the action which it is taking toward preventing recurrence of such an incident; and I have stated that this Government considered the incident closed. UNQUOTE.

Hull
 P.H.

100 JUN
 AUG 6 1972

FE:MMH:HES

FE

PA/H

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

August 6, 1941.

FE: *[initials]*
 Mr. Hamilton.

44

U.
 Mr. Welles:

So far as I can ascertain, no step has thus far been taken toward sending on its way to Chungking, other than the most meager information regarding steps taken and settlement arrived at, in regard to the *recent* incident of the Tutuila. The settlement was effected on July 31. I recommend and urge that action be taken immediately toward seeing that full information regarding this matter reach Ambassador Gauss at the earliest practicable date.



PA/H:SKH:ZMK

0764

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1316

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
7-30-41 HES

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TK

PLAIN

Chungking

FROM

Dated July 30, 1941

Rec'd 5:20 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 3 1941
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

Secretary of State

Washington

319, July 30, 9:30 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 30 1941
Department of State

During air raid this morning Japanese planes
dropped bomb eight yards directly astern of TUTUILA.
No casualties to personnel. Ship's power boats
badly damaged. Motor sampan cut loose from moorings
and drifting down river. Apparently no underwater
damage to ship.

During same raid some damage done to Embassy
staff residence.

Sent to Department, repeated to Peiping, Shanghai,
Hankow, Shanghai repeat urgently to Tokyo.

GAUSS

KLP

FILED
AUG 4 1941

793.94
11.25 Asiatic
Fleet
124.931

793.94/16755

PO/1.1

0765

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 TO BE TRANSMITTED
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☒ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒

"Gr" PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Department of State

NAVAL RADIO

Washington,

July 31, 1941

6 P.M.

Collect ☐ Full rate
☐ Day letter
☐ Night letter

Charge Department:
☐ Full rate
☐ Day letter
☐ Night letter

Charge to

\$

AMEMBASSY,

CHUNGKING (CHINA).

INFO: AMEMBASSY, PEIPING
 AMERICAN CONSUL, SHANGHAI
 AMERICAN CONSUL, HANKOW

174 *Confidential*
 Your 319, July 30, 9:30 a.m.

In paragraph one of its 443, July 30, 1 p.m. to

Tokyo the Department communicated to Ambassador Grew the substance of the Naval Attache's report of the bombing of the Tutuilis. For your information paragraphs two and three of the Department's telegram to Tokyo read as follows: QUOTE 2. I called the Japanese Ambassador in this morning. I handed him a copy of the report and asked him for answers to questions as follows: One, did this take place upon instruction by or knowledge of responsible authorities; two, what responsibility, if any, does the Japanese Government assume for it; three, what precise measures in detail does the Japanese Government intend to take toward effectively preventing recurrence of any such action. I reminded him of the pledge solemnly given by the Japanese Government, with, I understand, the knowledge and approval of the Emperor,

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/16755

PS/HS

16755

0766

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
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Collect { Full rate
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Department of State

Charge Department:
 Full rate
 Day letter
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-2-

Washington,

Charge to

\$ at the time of the sinking of the Panay, that such action would not be repeated; also, of the fact similar pledges have repeatedly been given since then and have repeatedly been disregarded.

3. I desire that you also take this matter up urgently and with great emphasis with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. /
 UNQUOTE.

Sent to Chungking. Repeated to Peiping, Shanghai, ~~Hankow~~

Wally
 Acting

GA
 FE:GA:FRE

FE

PA/H

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

0767

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Hankow via N. R.

FROM Dated July 30, 1941

Rec'd 9:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

57, July 30, 4 p.m.

Reference Chungking priority 347, July 30,
9:30 a.m., concerning Chungking bombing.


Have made emphatic protest to Japanese Consul
General with request that prompt and effective mea-
sures be taken to prevent further endangerment of
American lives and property by repeated bombings at
Chungking. Consul General stated that he would im-
mediately make appropriate representation to Japanese
military headquarters here.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking,
Peiping and Shanghai. Please air mail to Tokyo.

SPIKER

HSM

AUG 8 1941



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AF

Canton via N. R.

This telegram must be _____
 closely paraphrased before being communicated
 to anyone. (br) Dated July 30, 1941
 FROM Rec'd 5:35 a.m.

SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY

TO ONI AND MID 8/2/41 JD

Secretary of State,

Washington.

41, July 30, 9 a.m. 894-22/119

My 39, July 25, 5 p.m.



It has been noted that Japanese troops have in the past few days come to Canton from the interior. This indicates, it is believed, that the Japanese are shortening their lines north of Canton or reducing garrisons or both.

Report has recently been received to the effect that between 20 and 30 miles northwest of Canton the Japanese have been clearing a belt approximately five miles wide and ten miles long intersecting the trade route to Lupao on the North River for the alleged purpose of enforcing a blockade against unoccupied territory. All residents of the belt are being forced to leave and some houses have been destroyed it is claimed. It is reported that anyone attempting to cross the belt on or after August 1 will be shot. Until recently this trade route had been used considerably for goods smuggled out of Canton. Reports have

750.34/10707

PS/AD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 41, July 30, 9 a.m. - from Canton.

have indicated that somewhat similar steps are being taken near Sheklung on the East River and possibly at several points north and northeast of Canton.

Although these measures may be designed to put a stop to traffic moving between Japanese and Chinese occupied territory it seems likely that they are also intended to afford protection to the reduced Japanese garrison of this area. During the past ten days there have been reports of encounters between Japanese and Chinese forces northwest of Canton and it is not unlikely that the Japanese fear Chinese pressure from the north. The effectiveness of these measures is open to question particularly in respect of movements at night.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping, Chungking, Hong Kong.

MYERS

HSM

0770

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
PLAIN

LET

Peiping via N.R.

FROM Dated July 30, 1941.

Rec'd. 8:45 p.m.

RECEIVED
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION
AUG 4 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 6 1941
Department of State

Secretary of State,
Washington.

192, Thirtieth.

Chungking's 319, July 30, 9 a.m. to the Department,
Bombing of TUTUILA and Embassy staff residence.

Emphatic protest lodged with Japanese Embassy
here today.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking,
Tokyo, Shanghai, Hankow.

BUTRICK.

JRL

793.94/16753

PS/RB

FILED
AUG 6 1941

79394

0771

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PM

GRAY

Tokyo

FROM

Dated July 31, 1941.

Rec'd 3:10 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
8-2-41 HES

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

1134, July 31, 1 p.m.


Department's 443, July 30, 1 p.m.

The Acting Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs

Mr. Yamamoto called on me at the chancery in the Embassy at 11 o'clock this morning and said that they had just received word of damage caused to USS TUTVILA during a bombing attack on Chungkiang by Japanese naval planes and that he had come on behalf of the Foreign Minister Admiral Toyoda who was absent from the Foreign Office, to express the deep regret of the Japanese Government at this incident. Up to the present, Mr. Yamamoto said, they had received no details.

I said to the Acting Vice Minister that I had just received instructions to see the Foreign Minister himself on this matter and that as soon as my instructions were ready I would ask for an appointment. In the

meantime



793.94/16759

PS/RB

FILED
AUG 5 1941

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #1134, July 31, 1941, from Tokyo.

meantime I said that I would withhold any comment
but I expressed to him my appreciation of the courtesy
of his call and expressions of regret. Sent to Department.
Repeated to Shanghai for Chungking.

GREW.

WWC

077
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

743.94/16759

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated July 31, 1941

Rec'd 3:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

1134, July 31, 1 p.m.

Department's 413, July 30, 1 p. m.

The Acting Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs

Mr. Yamamoto called on me at the chancery in the Embassy at 11 o'clock this morning and said that they had just received word of damage caused to USS TUTUILA during a bombing attack on Chungking by Japanese naval planes and that he had come on behalf of the Foreign Minister Admiral Toyoda who was absent from the Foreign Office, to express the deep regret of the Japanese Government at this incident. Up to the present, Mr. Yamamoto said, they had received no details.

I said to the Acting Vice Minister that I had just received instructions to see the Foreign Minister himself on this matter and that as soon as my instructions were ready I would ask for an appointment. In the

meantime

0774
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- # 1134, July 31, 1941 From Tokyo.

meantime I said that I would withhold any comment
but I expressed to him my appreciation of the courtesy
of his call and expressions of regret. Sent to Department.
repeated to Shanghai for Chungking.

GREW

WWC

077

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
2-2-41 RES

CORRECTED COPY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AF


GRAY

Tokyo


FROM

Dated July 31, 1941

Rec'd 5 a.m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.



1136, July 31, 3 p.m.

American correspondents have informed me that they are not permitted to telephone despatches to the United States on the TUTUILA bombing. They therefore assume that cablegrams on that subject are being suppressed. They understand that the Japanese press will make no reference to the bombing.

I have communicated to the Foreign Office the suggestion that it endeavor to cause the release of press despatches to the United States reporting developments here that are purely factual in nature.

GREW

WWC

AUG 7 1941

733.04/10750

PC/MCL

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0776

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


COPIES SENT TO
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM

BS



GRAY

Tokyo

Dated July 31, 1941

Rec'd. 5 a.m.

7-31-41/15730

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1136, July 31, 3 p.m.

American correspondents have informed me that they are not permitted to telephone despatches to the United States on the TUTUILA bombing. They therefore assume that cablegrams.

I have communicated to the Foreign Office the suggestion that it endeavor to cause the release of press despatches to the United States reporting developments here that are purely factual in nature.

GREW

ENC

79-44

7-31-41

0777

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
TELEGRAM RECEIVED AND M.I.D.

AF

GRAY 7-31-41

Tokyo

FROM Dated July 31, 1941

Rec'd 9:34 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH


1138, July 31, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Department's 243, July 30, 1 p.m.; Embassy's
1134, July 31, 1 p.m.

One. Following the call of the Acting Vice
Minister for Foreign Affairs on me this morning I
asked for an appointment with the Minister for Foreign
Affairs himself. After some delay the Minister's
secretary informed me that Admiral Toyoda desired
to call on me at the Embassy at 2 o'clock later chang-
ing the appointment to 2:30. At 2:30 I was informed
that the Foreign Minister was then with the Prime
Minister and that Admiral Toyoda would be glad to
have me come to see him at 2:45 which I did. I am
unaware of the reason for the Minister's change of
plans.

Two. I read to the Minister my signed note
setting forth the details of the bombing of the

TUTUILA



FILED

AUG 5 1941

7-31-41/16751

PC/NE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 1138, July 31, 6 p.m., (SECTION ONE) from Tokyo.

TUTUILA including the unanimous opinion of three American officials who had observed the bombing from the hill immediately overlooking the ship that the attack was deliberate; also that the weather conditions were ideal. I thereupon made the most

GREW

WSB

0779

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quelefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TEM

GRAY

Tokyo

FROM

Dated July 31, 1941

Rec'd 9:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1135, July 31, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

emphatic representations and to indicate the very grave nature of the incident I read to the Minister the observations which I had made to his predecessors Mr. Matsuoka on June 16, (see Embassy's 830, June 16, ¹⁶⁶⁸² 9 p.m.). I also read to him the oral statement made to Mr. Matsuoka on July 8 regarding the attitude of the Government of the United States toward the Japanese request that consideration again be given to the moving of the U.S.S. TUTUILA as set forth in the Department's telegram no. 350, June ¹⁶⁶⁹⁴ 24, 8 p.m. (see Embassy's 961, July ¹⁶⁷³⁰ 8, 11 p.m.)

Three. The Minister said that he had sent the Acting Vice Minister to see me this morning to convey his regrets at the incident and he repeated on behalf of the Japanese Government and himself expressions of sincere regret. He said that so far as he could remember

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 1138, July 31, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Tokyo

remember a new instruction had been sent only recently
to naval aviation officers carefully to avoid jeopard-
izing the American Embassy and the U.S.S. TUTUILA in
their bombing operations

GREW

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

KD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Tokyo

Dated July 31, 1941

FROM

Rec'd. 9 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

RUSH

1138, July 31, 6 p. m. (SECTION THREE)

~~FOR CHUNGKING AND PEIPING.~~

over Chungking and as a naval officer formerly in control of aviation he could assure me that these young aviation officers were strictly obedient to orders from their superiors. He could therefore only assume that in proceeding to its military objective the bombing gear of the plane in question had loosened during flight and that the bomb had dropped without any intention on the part of the pilot. The Minister several times repeated his conviction that the incident was purely and simply an accident but he recognized the potential gravity of the results of such accidents and said that once again he would have the most explicit instructions sent out to the Navy's air arm to avoid such risks. Four. I repeated to the Minister my own conviction that the incident could not possibly

have

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #1138, July 31, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE), from Tokyo.

have been accidental especially in the light of the evidence of the several attacks on our Embassy and ship during the last several weeks. I once again pointed out the deplorable effect which this new incident would have on American public opinion and that in the present tenseness of our relations it seemed to me questionable whether these relations could stand the strain of an American fatality or the sinking of the TUSCALOOSA in the course of further bombing operations.

Five. In closing the conversation I said that my Government must reserve a further expression of its views which I assumed would be communicated through Admiral Nomura in Washington.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Shanghai for Chungking, Peiping.

(END OF MESSAGE).

GREW.

WSB

0783

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
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TO BE TRANSMITTED

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✓ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓

PARTIAL

PLAIN

Department of State

Collect ☐ Full rate
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☐ Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
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Charge to

\$ AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

Washington,

July 31, 1941

7 P.M.

449

Your 1138, July 31, 6 p.m., and 1141, July 31, 9 p.m.

One. On July 31 the Acting Secretary at his conference with the press said in reply to an inquiry by a press correspondent that as the Acting Secretary indicated on the previous day the American Ambassador at Tokyo was instructed to make immediately to the Foreign Minister the same representations that the Acting Secretary had made to the Japanese Ambassador here in the morning; that before the American Ambassador had an opportunity to carry out those instructions he received a visit on the morning of July 30 from the Acting Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs who informed Ambassador Grew that the Japanese Government had as yet no details with regard to the bombing ^{but desired} ~~and went on~~ to express nevertheless the deep regret of the Japanese Government over the incident; that ~~at the same time on~~ a little earlier a representative of the Minister of the Navy called on the Naval Attaché of the American Embassy at Tokyo and expressed the regret of the Japanese Navy for the damage done; that the Ambassador subsequently carried out his instructions and received merely a preliminary reply

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/16761

PS/H

16761

0784

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER
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TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

-2-

which was in the nature of the same expression of regret as had been indicated by the Acting Secretary to the correspondents; and that until a definite reply is received to the representations made there was nothing further which the Acting Secretary could add in regard to the incident. A correspondent said he gathered that we do not consider satisfactory the preliminary reply that was made and asked whether we expect a fuller reply to our representations. The Acting Secretary replied that he thought that the correspondent's impression was quite justified.

Two. The substance of the Embassy's 1136, July 31, 3 p.m., has been communicated to the principals of American press correspondents ~~[in Tokyo]~~ as requested in your 1140, July 31, 8 p.m.

[Signature]
 Acting

CR
 31 1941

FE:GWB:HNS

FE

C1
[Signature]

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

993.04/10761

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated July 31, 1941

Rec'd 9:34 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

1138, July 31, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Department's 243, July 30, 1 p.m.; Embassy's
 1134, July 31, 1 p.m.

One. Following the call of the Acting Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on me this morning I asked for an appointment with the Minister for Foreign Affairs himself. After some delay the Minister's secretary informed me that Admiral Toyoda desired to call on me at the Embassy at 2 o'clock later changing the appointment to 2:30. At 2:30 I was informed that the Foreign Minister was then with the Prime Minister and that Admiral Toyoda would be glad to have me come to see him at 2:45 which I did. I am unaware of the reason for the Minister's change of plans.

Two. I read to the Minister my signed note setting forth the details of the bombing of the

TUTUILA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 1138, July 31, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Tokyo.

TUTUILA including the unanimous opinion of three American officials who had observed the bombing from the hill immediately overlooking the ship that the attack was deliberate; also that the weather conditions were ideal. I thereupon made the most.

GREW

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated July 31, 1941

Rec'd 9:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

1138, July 31, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #1138, July 31, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Tokyo

remember a new instruction had been sent only recently
to naval aviation officers carefully to avoid jeopard-
izing the American Embassy and the U.S.S. TUTUILA in
their bombing operations

GREW

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated July 31, 1941

Rec'd 9 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

1138, July 31, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #1138, July 31, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE), from Tokyo.

have been accidental especially in the light of the evidence of the several attacks on our Embassy and ship during the last several weeks. I once again pointed out the deplorable effect which this new incident would have on American public opinion and that in the present tenseness of our relations it seemed to me questionable whether these relations could stand the strain of an American fatality or the sinking of the TUSCALOOSA in the course of further bombing operations.

Five. In closing the conversation I said that my Government must reserve a further expression of its views which I assumed would be communicated through Admiral Nomura in Washington.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Shanghai for Chungking, Peiping.

(END OF MESSAGE).

GREW


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

KD

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone: (br)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED




Dated July 31, 1941

FROM Rec'd, 9:37 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

AUG 2 4 1941



Tel to Tokyo
 449, July 31
 Last par.

1140, July 31, 8 p. m.

American correspondents would appreciate the
 Department's urgently communicating the substance of
 the Embassy's 1136, ¹¹⁴⁰ July 31, 3 p.m. to their respective
 principals, namely, Associated Press, United Press,
 International News Service, NEW YORK TIMES, NEW YORK
 HERALD TRIBUNE.

The Department may wish to consider the helpfulness
 of releasing to the press the fact that the Vice Minister
 for Foreign Affairs called on me in the temporary
 absence of the Minister and expressed regrets.

GREW.

HPD

735.34/10762

FC/AL

AUG 2 8 1941

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
7-31-41
RES

AF TELEGRAM RECEIVED GRAY

Tokyo

FROM Dated July 31, 1941

Rec'd 9:19 a.m.

RECEIVED
MR. HUNDECK
JUL 31 - 1941
DEPT. OF STATE

Secretary of State, STATE
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 31 1941
Department of State

1141, July 31, 9 p.m.

At 9:30 this morning the Senior Aide to the Minister of the Navy called on the Naval Attache and under instructions from the Minister of the Navy orally expressed the regret of the navy for the damage done to the United States Ship TUTUILA by the Japanese naval air forces in raid on Chungking on July 30, and after giving assurances that the bombing was accidental stated that the Japanese navy is prepared to make full reparations for any damage. As he was leaving the Aide stated that the Minister of the Navy was very much worried over this latest bombing incident and had told the Aide that the Japanese navy would do everything possible to prevent a war between the United States and Japan.

Please inform Navy Department.

GREW

HPD

7-31-41/10732

PC/AT

AUG 5 1941
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792-94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ This telegram must be transmitted via Chungking
& N. R.
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated Dated July 26, 1941
to anyone. (A) FROM
Rec'd 4:55 a.m., 31st

SUBSTANCE COMMUNICATED ORALLY

TO ONE AND MID 8/4/41 7D

Secretary of State,

Washington.

July 26, 11 a.m.,

Several American travelers arriving over Burma Road recently report noting large numbers of fully equipped troupes both in trucks and on foot moving westward on highway at points east of Paoshan. This may be connected with decision of provincial government on July 22nd to establish a field headquarters of Yunnan-Kweichow Pacification Commission in Paoshan district.

Sent to the Department via Chungking.

Repeated to Paiping.

PERKINS

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HSL

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FC/LTP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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C-2-41 RES

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KD

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
1941
Department of State

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated July 31, 1941

Rec'd. 6 a.m., Aug. 1st

ADVISOR ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
AUG 5 - 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,
Washington.

990, July 31, 4 p. m.

Chungking's 319, July 30, 9:30 a.m.

On receipt yesterday afternoon of reference telegram, most emphatic oral representations were made to local Japanese consular authorities. The matter, at my request, was brought immediately by them to attention of Japanese naval authorities. I endeavored to impress upon the Japanese authorities the seriousness of the risks involved in such activities on the part of the Japanese air force.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking and Peiping. Code text by air mail to Tokyo.

LOCKHART.

NPL

FILED
AUG 6 1941

793.94/16765

PS/HS

16765

0795

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
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TELEGRAM SENT

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Washington, SC

August 1, 1941.

// a.m.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

451- Strictly Confidential. Priority

One. The Japanese Ambassador called late yesterday afternoon. He said that he was instructed by his Government to state: (1) That his Government greatly regretted the endangering of the Tutuila and the American Embassy at Chungking; (2) that his Government was sure that the bombing was accidental; (3) that, toward affording this Government assurance that no such endangering will occur again, Japanese bombing of ^{the city area of} Chungking will be discontinued; (4) that his Government is prepared to make indemnification for any and all damage done as soon as the facts and the amounts thereof are ascertained. He added that his Government would request one thing: namely, that we keep strictly confidential its promise to discontinue the bombing of Chungking.

Two. In the light of this approach I have, with the express authorization of the President, informed the press of points one, two and four as above and have informed them

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator M., _____, 19____

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C 190661 File

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Charge Department:

Washington.

☐ Full rate
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them in lieu of point three above that the Japanese
 Government has informed us in detail and concretely of
 the action which it is taking toward preventing recurrence
 of such an incident; and I have stated that this Government
 considered the incident closed.

[Signature]
 Acting

PA/H:SKH:FLB

[Signature]
 FE

1 1941

Enciphered by SKH

Sent by operator M., 19

0797

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
X CONFIDENTIAL CODE X
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington.

August 14, 1941

6 PM

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO.

502

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Department's 451, August 1, 11 a.m.

During the call of the Japanese Ambassador at my request on August 13, 1941 I reiterated in substance the Department's telegram to you under reference and pointed out that according to a report from our authorities in Chungking that city had in the four days before August 11 been subjected to exceptionally heavy and prolonged air raids including not only districts outside the city proper, but also the city area itself. I said that press despatches indicated that bombs had demolished at least one American residence and had endangered another; and I requested an explanation and a definitive indication by the Japanese Government of its intention and attitude in regard to the pledge given on July 31 not repeat not to bomb the city area of Chungking. ~~I gave the Ambassador a memorandum as a record of my oral statement.~~

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/16765A

PS / AC

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Department of State

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Charge Department:

Full rate
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The Japanese Ambassador immediately replied that the Japanese Government had promised merely to cease "temporarily" and not repeat not indefinitely bombing the city area. He said that he believed he had made this fact clear to Mr. Welles, but that he might have failed so to do.

Hull

mt

(Telegraph Section: Please report to Chungking by naval radio as Department's no. _____)

FE:MWS:MJK/LJH

FE

PA/H

Enciphered by _____


Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHUNGKING BOMBING

713 94/16765a


TELEGRAM SENT



August 1, 1941

11 a.m.

TRB
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)



AMERICAN EMBASSY,
TOKYO (JAPAN).

451, Strictly confidential. Priority.

One. The Japanese Ambassador called late yesterday afternoon. He said that he was instructed by his Government to state: (1) That his Government greatly regretted the endangering of the Tutuila and the American Embassy at Chungking; (2) that his Government was sure that the bombing was accidental; (3) that, toward affording this Government assurance that no such endangering will occur again, Japanese bombing of the city area of Chungking will be discontinued; (4) that his Government is prepared to make indemnification for any and all damage done as soon as the facts and the amounts thereof are ascertained. He added that his Government would request one thing: namely, that we keep strictly confidential its promise to discontinue the bombing of Chungking.

Two. In the light of this approach I have, with the express authorization of the President, informed
the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #451, Strictly Confidential. Priority,
to Tokyo, Japan.

the press of points one, two and four as above and have informed them in lieu of point three above that the Japanese Government has informed us in detail and concretely of the action which it is taking toward preventing recurrence of such an incident; and I have stated that this Government considered the incident closed.

WELLES, ACTING

M/H:SMH:FLB

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

DES

GRAY

July 31, 1941

6 p.m.

AMEMBASSY,

CHUNGKING (CHINA) VIA NAVAL RADIO

INFO: AMEMBASSY, PEIPING
 AMERICAN CONSUL, SHANGHAI

448.


CONFIDENTIAL. 16755

Your 319, July 30, 9:30 a.m.

In paragraph one of its 443, July 30, 1 p.m. to
 Tokyo the Department communicated to Ambassador Grew the
 substance of the Naval Attache's report of the bombing
 of the Tutuila.

For your information paragraphs two and three
 of the Department's telegram to Tokyo read as follows:
 QUOTE 2. I called the Japanese Ambassador in this morning.
 I handed him a copy of the report and asked him for answer
 to questions as follows: One, did this take place upon
 instruction by or knowledge of responsible authorities;
 two, what responsibility, if any, does the Japanese
 Government assume for it; three, what precise measures in
 detail does the Japanese Government intend to take toward
 effectively preventing recurrence of any such action.

I reminded



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 448, July 31, 1941 to Chungking via N. R.

I reminded him of the pledge solemnly given by the Japanese Government, with, I understand, the knowledge and approval of the Emperor, at the time of the sinking of the Panay, that such action would not be repeated; also, of the fact similar pledges have repeatedly been given since then and have repeatedly been disregarded.

3. I desire that you also take this matter up urgently and with great emphasis with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. UNQUOTE.

Sent to Chungking. Repeated to Peiping and Shanghai.

WELLES
ACTING
()

FE:GA:FRE

FE PA/H

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

318

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AF

Tokyo

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (SC)

Dated August 2, 1941

Rec'd 12:23 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



1159, August 2, 9 p.m.

Department's 451, August 1, 11 a.m.

Although the successive bombings of Chungking have been carried out by Japanese Naval planes, the unqualified character of the expression conveyed to you by Admiral Nomura of Japan's readiness to discontinue bombing of the Chungking area would indicate that such decision was participated in by the Army. I do not wish to exaggerate the importance of this matter, but having regard to the persistence with which the Japanese fighting services have exercised their claim to a right to carry on whatever military operations they see fit, this present recession (the first on record) from that position; admittedly involving no great sacrifice from the military point of view, would seem to be a significant indication of the present attitude of mind of Japanese military.

GREW

ALC

793.94/16766

PS/RB

Confidential File
 FILED
 JUN 30 1943

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quelefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TK

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (A).

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 1, 1941

FROM Rec'd 10:18 a.m., 2nd.


COMMUNICATED ORALLY

TO ONI AND MID 8/8/41 TD
 Secretary of State

Washington

55, August 1, 4 p.m.

Peiping's July 31.



It is reported that in one day recently about

6,000 Japanese troops debarked from up river at
 Pukow and proceeded north by rail.

Two daily express trains from Nanking to (#)
 have been canceled.

At least two locomotives have been taken across
 the river this week.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking,
 Peiping and Shanghai. Code text by mail to Tokyo.

PAXTON

NK

(#) Apparent omission.

AUG 12 1941

FILED

100-3410707

100-3410707

793 14

0805

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TK

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Swatow via N. R.

FROM Dated August 3, 1941

Rec'd 3:10 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

RECEIVED
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
1941
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N. 8/5/41 W.L.D.
R.E.K.

August 3, 3 p.m.

The local vernacular press reports regulations made by the Japanese military effective August 1st summarized as follows:

- (1) Movement of all goods, currency persons between the occupied and unoccupied areas is prohibited.
- (2) Permits issued prior to July 31 are cancelled.
- (3) Regulations are applicable to all persons regardless of nationality.
- (4) Violators shall be executed.

The paper states that the regulations were made to strengthen the blockade. No information on the subject has been received.

Sent to Peiping, repeated to Chungking, Department.

YEARNs

KLP

773-94

773-94/16700

10/100

0806

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


No. 31

Peiping, China, June 9, 1941.

Subject: Representations in regard to bombing
 near Embassy at Chungking on June 5,
 1941.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 JUN 12 PM 12 08



Per	Initials	Grade	Vis	No
Grade				
For		In U.S.A.		

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to Chungking's telegram to the Department no. 224 of June 6, noon reporting that Japanese planes dropped bombs near the Embassy at that city on June 5, 1941.

There is enclosed for the Department's records a copy of a note addressed to the Japanese Embassy at Peiping on June 9, 1941 making representations in regard to this bombing.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Robert L. Smyth
 Robert L. Smyth
 First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

793.94/16769

PS/RE

FILED
AUG 19 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Enclosure:

No. 1. Embassy's note to Japanese
Embassy, Peiping, June 9, 1941.

Original and 2 copies to the Department.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Hankow.
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.

710 U.S.-Japan.

BRJ/sc

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to Peiping's
 no. 31, June 9, 1941 to Department:
 "Representations in regard to bombing
 near Embassy at Chungking on June 5,
 1941".

Peiping, June 9, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleagues:

I have the honor to inform you of the receipt of a telegram from the American Embassy at Chungking stating that during an air raid on Chungking between the hours of seven and eleven on the evening of June 5, 1941, Japanese planes also dropped bombs on the south bank, one or more of which landed about 400 yards behind the Chancery while others hit a sand bar on the foreshore about 400 yards from the residence occupied by members of the Embassy staff, causing slight damage from fallen plaster.

This Embassy has already brought to your attention numerous instances of danger to American lives and damage to American property resulting
from

Y. Tsuchida, Esquire,
 Counselor of Embassy,
 Embassy of Japan,
 Peiping.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

from the indiscriminate bombing of Chungking by Japanese planes. In the present case, the indiscriminate Japanese bombing has endangered even the official establishment of the United States Government in Chungking as well as the lives of the American Ambassador and other American personnel of the Embassy. I wish to protest in the most emphatic manner against this Japanese action and must request that urgent and effective measures be taken by the responsible Japanese authorities to prevent a repetition thereof.


All rights are reserved in respect of losses or damages suffered by the Embassy.

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to you, Sir and dear Colleague, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Ambassador:

Robert L. Smyth
First Secretary of Embassy

BRJ/sc




0810

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 108 RECEIVED THE FOREIGN SERVICE
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1941 AUG 2 PM 12 22



AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
 Harbin, Manchuria, June 19, 1941.

DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Military Activities in Harbin Area

COPIES SENT TO
 ONI AND M.I.D.
in strict confidence HSK 8/4/41

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

Mr.	Good	Mr. A	No
Gourley		ONI	M.I.D.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of my despatch
 No. 74, dated June 19, 1941, addressed to the Embassy
 at Peiping, entitled "Military Activities in Harbin
 Area."

Respectfully yours

L. H. Gourley
 L. H. Gourley
 American Consul

DIVISION OF
 COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
 AUG 7 - 1941
 Department of State

733.94/16770

✓ Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 74, June 19,
 1941, to the Embassy at Peiping.

In quintuplicate.

800
 LHG:av

4 Carbon Copies
 Received *[Signature]*

PS/RS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 74

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
 OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Consulate General,
 Harbin, Manchuria, June 19, 1941.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Military Activities in Harbin Area.

The Honorable

Clarence E. Gauss,
 American Ambassador,
 Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that there is still* no clear evidence that there have been any important withdrawals of Japanese troops from North Manchuria following the signing of the neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan.

On the contrary, in Harbin** there have recently been impressive manoeuvres of tanks, cavalry, airplanes and the Sungari river fleet and also experiments with making smoke screens. The general impression can be obtained from such manoeuvres and newspaper editorials that the Japanese still consider it advisable to be on the alert for the defense of "Manchukuo" instead of trusting

*Harbin's despatch No. 65 (No. 89 to the Department), of April 29, 1941, entitled: "Rumors of withdrawals of Japanese troops from 'Manchukuo' after signing of Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact." Mukden's despatch No. 5 of May 19, 1941, to the Embassy, entitled: "Rumors of withdrawal of Japanese troops from Manchuria."

**One of the few places in eastern Asia besides Dairen where there is a Soviet official representative.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

trusting the Soviet Union and releasing Japanese soldiers
from Manchuria for action in the south as rumored some
weeks ago in Chungking and elsewhere.

Respectfully yours,

L. H. Gourley
American Consul

Copy to Chungking.
Five copies to the Department by
despatch No. 108, June 19, 1941.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Mukden.
Copy to Consulate, Dairen.

EOO
LHG:av

gno

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 6, 1941

Reference Peiping's despatch no. 48,
June 25, 1941.

While the attached despatch summarizes
its enclosure - a copy of a letter from
Dr. J. Leighton Stuart to his Board of
Trustees - you will probably find a reading
of the first four pages of Dr. Stuart's
letter well worth the time spent. Dr. Stuart
surveys Japan's present quandary with ex-
ceptional clarity and understanding.

793.94/16771

70
FE:Davies:MHP

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 48


Peiping, China, June 25, 1941.

Subject: Further Views of Dr. J. Leighton Stuart
on the Far Eastern Situation.

CONFIDENTIAL

For Distribution	Yes	No
Grade		
For		
In U.S.A.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CNI MID		

Copy to Mr. Curran sent 8/6/41



Copy to FE

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 JUN 2 PM 12 08

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

COPIES SENT TO
in confidence 8/7/41

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose as of possible interest a copy of a letter dated June 21, 1941, addressed by Dr. J. Leighton Stuart, President of Yenching University, to his Board of Trustees in the United States. This is another of Dr. Stuart's periodic reports to his Board on conditions at the University and in the Far East. Copies or summaries of some of his previous reports have been forwarded to the Department in telegrams and despatches from this office.

Statement of the American Government in regard to the future abolition of extraterritoriality. Dr. Stuart feels that the recent statement of the American Government that it will renounce extraterritoriality in China when conditions permit will be immensely cheering to the

Chinese

700.34/15771

PC/RE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Chinese people.

Japanese Policy. Dr. Stuart characterizes Japanese policy as vacillating and indecisive. Because of fear of the United States, he feels that the Japanese will not make a "southward" move. In China the Japanese have failed to undermine Chinese endurance and consequently feel frustrated.

Dr. Stuart advocates firm, convincing, but courteous condemnation of Japanese aggression as the surest method of avoiding an American-Japanese clash.

The Communist Issue. Dr. Stuart's comments on this subject were summarized in Peiping's telegram to Chungking dated June 25, 11:00 a.m., which was repeated to the Department and Shanghai. In brief, Dr. Stuart advocates tactful pressure by the American Government upon the Chinese Government to accomplish close co-operation between the Chinese regular troops and the communist troops against the Japanese invader.

Manchuria. Dr. Stuart feels that the Japanese through arrogant and rapacious behavior toward the Chinese in Manchuria have failed to take advantage of an excellent opportunity to consolidate the Japanese position there. To protect against possible insurrection in Manchuria, the Japanese will now feel the need of a north China buffer state.

This office feels that Dr. Stuart's views are essentially sound and commends his report to the

Department's

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Department's consideration.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Richard P. Butrick
Richard P. Butrick
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure:

Copy of letter from Dr. J. Leighton
Stuart, dated June 21, 1941.

Original and 4 copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.

710-Sino-Jap/710-US-Jap/800 Peiping.

RPB/es

4 71

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 48,
 June 25, 1941, from Embassy, Peiping,
 "Further Views of Dr. J. Leighton
 Stuart on the Far Eastern Situation".

(TRUE COPY - es)

Confidential

June 21, 1941.

To the Board of Trustees:

There is an opportunity to mail a letter to you by a method that will be safe from Japanese censorship. I shall therefore make a few rather hurried jottings under the topics which have been so frequently commented on in my previous reports. These will do little more than to record recent trends. The main factor of China's continued resistance was dealt with in the report sent you from Chungking at the end of April. I want also to express my delighted approval of the position which seems to have been taken by the American Government that it is ready to renounce extraterritoriality when conditions permit, which can be taken to mean when China is again at peace and independent. This is a statesmanlike decision and will be immensely cheering to the Chinese people in the brave struggle to win their freedom.

Japanese Policy. This remains vacillating and indecisive. The urge to drive southwards is very persistent and is being vigorously stimulated by Germany. The only serious deterrent is fear of America, especially among naval officers and in financier-industrialist circles. A majority of the former were perhaps against this dangerous risk last winter, a minority through the spring months as they watched German gains in the eastern mediterranean, with a still larger majority opposing the move at this writing. I still hold to the opinion that they will not take this desperate chance. Their naval strategists are quoted as saying they really fear that we shall declare or make war against them without bringing our ships into action, confining ourselves to a long distance blockade against which they are helpless, or to aiding Chinese military operations especially in the air, or even to bombing their three or four great industrial centres. Such considerations in addition to the inconclusive fighting in China and the futility of their political manoeuvres, their own acute economic exhaustion and popular discontent, and the lack of conviction as to an Axis victory in Europe, will combine to keep them cautious and confused. If they really thought themselves to be fighting for national defense or if they felt more confidence as to the outcome they might as a purely economic issue carry on for two or three years longer by totalitarian devices. But this psychological factor must be increasingly reckoned with.

Having made repeated efforts to negotiate peace with Chiang Kai-shek and having at last realized that these were futile on any such terms as they could then have accepted, they have been trying force and frightfulness again in what seems like a fit of frustration. This has added no little to Chinese suffering, notably in the war-capital as was intended, but there is no indication of the weakening of Chinese endurance. Meanwhile those among Japanese leaders

who

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

who have been zealously working for a rational peace have been compelled to admit that the present mood must pass and probably more hard facts be faced before they can make much progress. One of their difficulties is the lack of a single leader whose opinions carry weight and whose personality gives authority. As it is no one would dare to advocate the seemingly unpatriotic and defeatist course of ending the China War through the good offices of the American Government and by withdrawing their armed forces from all of China, which they now know to be required.

Our Government seems to have been dealing admirably with this situation. For, as I have long argued, a firm determination to oppose further Japanese aggression, convincingly but courteously brought to their attention, would be sobering rather than provocative, the surest procedure for avoiding war now or later. This seems to be what is happening. The intensification of measures for aiding China and for restricting exports to Japan could even be regarded as a kindness in the sense of helping toward the decision they some day must make.

Sympathy with them is permissible in so far as it leads to friendly helpfulness. But the controlling attitude must be one of stern condemnation. They began and have continued this unprovoked war for motives of territorial conquest and economic exploitation with no intelligible explanation despite all of their specious attempts. There is something grimly comical about these monotonously repeated cliches. They have conducted it with a brutality which has been more inhumane as they became aware how completely they were failing to win either through violence or propaganda. Their deceitful insincerity is disclosed in the fact that for months they have been trying to come to terms with Chiang Kai-shek, in which case they would - on the frank admission of leaders whose names I could quote - at once discard Wang Ching-wei and all their other puppets, while flagrantly supporting these latter with all the meretricious travesties of the real government of the country. Similarly they have within the past few weeks been vainly intriguing to reach a non-aggression pact with Chinese Communists, as they have succeeded after a fashion in doing with Soviet Russia, while proclaiming that this war is for the altruistic purpose of destroying the communist menace! That General Chiang is justified in his contention that they are not to be trusted is a conclusion forced upon any one who has been at all in touch with their behavior as a nation in this whole adventure. Nazi Germany employs fraud as a highly developed technique of statecraft. But with the Japanese it seems to be something much more elemental in their racial tradition.

The Communist Issue. As I have emphasized in previous reports this is extremely unfortunate and it has been further exacerbated on both sides by suspicions, prejudices and constant local clashes. It derives from a long history. But it is after all in the nature of a family quarrel and will not, in my opinion, lead to civil war nor to any too serious weakening of resistance against Japan. The Communist leaders can be counted on to support the Generalissimo in principle and to carry on guerrilla tactics and the organizing of the

peasant

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

peasant masses against their common enemy, as well as to strive toward real democracy. The simplest and most recent evidence of this which has come to my knowledge is the attempt of the Japanese last month to seduce the Eighteenth Route Army (popularly known as the Eighth Route or Communist Army) to form an agreement with themselves for mutual non-aggression by which each would cease to interfere with the other's aims. This dastardly intrigue was unequivocally rejected although it could have been utilized to great advantage had the communist leaders really wished to embarrass the Chiang Kai-shek government. The episode is of significance, however, as revealing Japanese duplicity. Their only remaining argument for remaining in North China is to fight communism whereas they have been secretly trying to bargain with this avowed menace in a desperate effort to conquer the man whose record is the best guarantee that any such threat to Chinese unity would be effectively dealt with as an internal problem. The recent defeat with heavy casualties in Southern Shansi after the most serious military advance they have attempted in many months was due in part to the active cooperation of the Eighteenth Route Army toward the end of the drive although this cost them 8000 of their best trained soldiers.

As the Communist leaders view the outlook there are three possibilities:

(1) General Chiang because of pressure from his own associates and the mounting hardships of continued resistance will be forced to some sort of compromise settlement with Japan. This would lead to the amalgamation of the Chungking and puppet governments, but to the establishment of another government in the northwest in which they would continue the struggle against Japan with such help as they could get from Russia.

(2) General Chiang will depend so completely upon Anglo-American aid and political guidance that for practical purposes these countries would dominate. This would result in three governments as long as Japan could protect Wang Ching-wei in the occupied areas, respectively pro-Anglo-Saxon, pro-Japanese and pro-Russian.

(3) The Kuomintang-Communist feud will be resolved into a revival of the united front, with strengthened resistance, and such help from all friendly countries as did not impair their national independence. The Japanese and their meaningless marionettes will then in time be successfully eliminated. They insist that they themselves stand wholeheartedly for this third course and I believe that this is true of their responsible leadership, though they have been seriously at fault in not demonstrating this more convincingly and in allowing subordinates and pretenders to come into conflict with units of the Central Army and to disobey orders. On the other hand they have for many months received no remittances for paying troops, no munitions, not even medical supplies especially designated for them and held up at the border.

I should hope that American policy will include continued aid to the Chungking Government up to the limit of our ability in proportion to other claims, together with tactful pressure upon them to come to a working agreement with the Communists in the interest of national solidarity. We ought sedulously to avoid any appearance even of an "A.B.C." (American-British-Chinese) alliance.

Manchuria.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

Manchuria. A brief summary of news which trickles through despite the rigid censorship may be pertinent as demonstrating what would happen here or wherever the Japanese succeed in enforcing military domination. Except in so far as they have exploited this territory to their own economic benefit - which has been by no means satisfactory even to themselves - it is proving to be a calamitous failure. The misrule for many years of Chang Tso-lin and his son and successor had given the Japanese a superb opportunity to win the populace to welcome their more efficient government with all of its material benefits, the more so since the great majority were ignorant settlers indifferent as to who ruled over them if they were not too severely oppressed. But they have ignominiously and irretrievably failed and are hated with a sullen intensity which even with improved administration it would take long to obliterate. The somewhat higher quality of Japanese officials who have been taking the places of the vicious crowd who came first realize this and are said to be much depressed. For there is something pathetic about the obvious eagerness of Japanese for friendship and appreciation in the light of their own consistently arrogant and rapacious behavior in dealing with subjugated peoples. I could document these assertions with harrowing details learned from reliable observers and am keeping a record of some of these for reference. But they warrant the conclusion that in this region where they had their chance to make of it the Paradise they promised they have shown themselves morally and otherwise unfit to govern a subject people. They are incapable of anything in the nature of big brotherly or neighborly cooperation. They know only how to rule and because of their methods and manners this can only be by savage terrorization. To protect Manchuria from the insurrections they know will break out as soon as the suffering inhabitants dare make the attempt they must maintain North China as a buffer state. But the same conditions will develop here - have been doing so indeed with an uncanny similarity of pattern - and they would be forced for the same reason to annex another strip of territory further south. And so on, as always with imperialistic aims, especially when thus bungled. We in North China have realized more clearly what our fate would be because of the bordering Manchuria experience and its inevitable corollary. It is only the steadfast Chinese resistance and the hope of more active American succor that have kept us from this dreaded enslavement. This would of course mean the destruction of Yenching University and of all else that thwarts the Japanese aims.

June 23.

Yenching ends another war-time session. It is in pleasing contrast to close with a brief reference to the affairs of the University itself. Tomorrow is Commencement Day as well as my sixty-fifth birthday. The personal anniversary fades into unimportance amid these much more significant events. We shall give degrees to 195 Bachelors (of whom 28 really finished their work last winter) and to 18 recipients of the Master's degree. An especial interest attaches to this year's senior class because its members entered here as freshmen at the outbreak of the present hostilities which began, as you will recall, in and around Peking in the summer of 1937. Their college course has therefore synchronized with the four years through which this war has been dragging drearily on. I am vividly reminded of the

anxieties

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

anxieties with which we then determined to carry on in the face of the dread unknown. Yesterday we had our Baccalaureate Service when Dean Chao presided, two of the College Deans took part and I tried to give a Christian message suited to these stirring times. This morning I had to alternate between the closing exercises of our School of Religion and our Elementary and Secondary Schools.

Interspersed with academic business there have been many social functions. Last week there were two engagement parties and one wedding in my home, all being of our own students. Yesterday afternoon I performed the wedding ceremony of two more of our graduates at the P.U.M.C. where they are now both doctors on the staff. But the wedding which has created the greatest sensation on our campus since the engagement was announced three weeks ago is that of Mr. Michael Lindsay to one of his own students graduating this year. He is the son of the distinguished Master of Balliol College and is here by an arrangement with Oxford University by which we are experimenting in the tutorial method with a selected group of promising students in what is known there as the honors course of "Modern Greats". The wedding will be in the Minde Chapel the day after Commencement followed by a reception in our home - for he has lived with me during the three years since he came.

Stephen Tsai arrived late last night but spent the night in the city. I have only been able as yet to greet him and am eager to hear him tell of his experiences and impressions during his latest trip to the States.

The Board of Managers will meet tomorrow afternoon, or those of their number who are still in the North. They will attend the exercises in the morning and be in the academic procession. This year again as hitherto since the war began we shall carry out the entire ceremonial of our stately and colorful graduation exercises. The only difference from normal times is that we issue no formal invitations and refrain from public notices, thus avoiding the embarrassment of either inviting or ignoring officials of the local government the authority of which we have never recognised. Students are free to invite their relatives or friends, and all who would be welcomed understand. But the auditorium will be packed to capacity.

As I write, however, there is the sound of firing in one of the recurrent battles which the Japanese carry on with the guerrillas in the hills around us, we are meeting with serious obstacles in endeavoring to secure permits for our students to travel, and the attempt to force Japanese teachers upon us has again been pressed.

When tomorrow it is at last all over I am to slip off with a small group of faculty intimates for a picnic supper on the Summer Palace Lake nearby in this perfect June weather as their charming scheme for celebrating the sixty-fifth anniversary of an event quite important to me.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) J.L.S.

0822

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Justen NARS, Date 12-18-75





EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 34

Peiping, China, June 17, 1941.

Subject: Representations in regard to bombing near Embassy at Chungking on June 15, 1941 resulting in damage to official American property and offices of the Standard Oil Company.



RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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793.94/16772

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to Chungking's telegram to the Department no. 240 of June 15, 3 p.m., reporting that Japanese planes had just dropped bombs near the American Embassy and the American gunboat Tutuila at that city, resulting in damage to official American property as well as to the offices of the Standard Oil Company. Reference is made also to my despatch no. 31 dated June 9, 1941 in which was reported representations made to the Japanese Embassy at Peiping in respect to

a

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

a similar bombing on June 5, 1941.

There is enclosed for the Department's records
a copy of the emphatic protest addressed today to the
Japanese Embassy in regard to the bombing on June 15,
1941.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Robert L. Smyth

Robert L. Smyth
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

No. 1. Note to Japanese Embassy,
Peiping, dated June 17, 1941.

Original and 2 copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.
Copy to Consulate General, Hankow.

710-US-Jap/350 Amer. Embassy-Chungking/
350-SVOC-Chungking.

BRJ/es

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 34,
 June 17, 1941, from Embassy, Peiping,
 "Representations in regard to bombing
 near Embassy at Chungking on June 15,
 1941, resulting in damage to official
 American property and offices of the
 Standard Oil Company".

Peiping, June 17, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

I have the honor to invite your attention to my
 note of June 9, 1941 informing you that the American
 Embassy at Chungking together with the lives of the
 American Ambassador and other American personnel of
 the Embassy had been endangered by bombs dropped by
 Japanese planes at Chungking on June 5, 1941. I re-
 gret that it is now necessary to inform you of a still
 more serious bombing.

The American Embassy at Chungking has reported
 that early on the afternoon of June 15, 1941, twenty-
 seven Japanese planes flying high bombed Chungking.
 During the course of the raid about five bombs fell
 within areas of one to three hundred yards of the Embassy
 Chancery and the American gunboat Tutuila. One bomb,
which

Y. Tsuchida, Esquire,
 Counselor of Embassy,
 Embassy of Japan,
 Peiping.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

which dropped within fifty yards of the entrance to the Embassy dugout, hit alongside of and heavily damaged the offices of the Assistant Military Attaché. These offices are about half way between the Chancery and the gunboat. The Chancery was damaged by concussion and flying debris. In addition to the foregoing, some damage was done to the Ambassador's residence, about half a mile away, and to offices of the (American) Standard Oil Company, located near the Chancery. Fortunately there were no casualties among the personnel of the Embassy or the gunboat. However, the great danger to which they were subjected is emphasized by the fact that a number of Chinese were killed and wounded in the vicinity by the bombs.

In conveying my emphatic protest to the appropriate Japanese authorities, it is requested that your Embassy remind them again of the numerous instances of danger to American lives and damage to American property resulting from the indiscriminate bombing of Chungking by Japanese planes, and also inform them that the American Ambassador at Tokyo has reported that as recently as June 6 he received a message from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that the Japanese War Minister had given assurances that special care would be taken in the future

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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future to avoid endangering American lives and property
in the course of aerial bombing in China.


All rights are reserved in respect of losses or
damages suffered by the official American property
mentioned above and by the Standard Oil Company.

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to
you, Sir and dear Colleague, the renewed assurances of
my highest consideration.

For the Ambassador:

Robert L. Smyth
First Secretary of Embassy

BRJ/es



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




No. 3120

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, China, May 16, 1941.

Subject: Further Indiscriminate Bombing at Kunming
 (Yunnanfu) with resultant damage to American
 Official and Private Property.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 AUG 2 PM 12 18

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

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793	94	16		

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to Chungking's telegram to the Department dated May 12, 12 noon, transmitting a telegram of May 9, 9 a.m. from the Consulate at Kunming (Yunnanfu) in regard to an indiscriminate bombing at that city by Japanese air forces on May 8, 1941, and to Hong Kong's telegram to the Department of May 14, 3 p.m. transmitting Kunming's telegram of May 13, 9 a.m. describing a similar attack which took place on May 12, 1941. American official and private

property

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

property was damaged during both raids.

There is transmitted herewith, as a matter of record, a copy of a communication on the subject, under date of May 16, 1941, addressed by this Embassy to the Japanese Embassy at Peiping.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Robert L. Smyth

Robert L. Smyth
 First Secretary of Embassy

✓
 Enclosure:

No.1. Note to the Japanese Embassy,
 May 16, 1941.

Original and two copies to Department.
 Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
 Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
 Copy to Consulate General, Hong Kong.
 Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.
 Copy to Consulate, Kunming (Yunnanfu).

350 Czapuchettes/350 McGeary/350 Am. Consul.-Kunming.

BRJ/js.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
 No. 3120 May 16, 1941, from
 American Embassy, Peiping,
 re Further indiscriminate
 bombing of Kunming (Yunnanfu)
 with resultant damage to American of-
 ficial and private property.

Peiping, China, May 16, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

I have the honor to refer to several communi-
 cations addressed to you during recent weeks in
 regard to damages to American property, suffered
 in the course of indiscriminate bombing attacks at
 Kunming (Yunnanfu), and to inform you that the
 American Consulate at that city has reported that
 similar attacks took place on May 8 and May 12,
 1941.

In both of the raids under reference property
 in the Consulate's compound was struck by bomb
 fragments. During the second raid the residence of
 Mr. Stanley A. McGeary, a clerk of the Consulate,
 was damaged, and the residence of Mr. E. L. Crapuchettes,
 an American citizen living in the compound of the
 China Inland Mission, was partly demolished. As you
have

Y. Tsuchida, Esquire,
 Counselor of Embassy,
 Embassy of Japan,
 Peiping.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

have been informed, Mr. McGeary's residence was
 burned also in previous raids. It is now barely
 habitable.

Since there has been ample time for the Japanese
 military authorities to have been informed, it is dif-
 ficult to understand these further indiscriminate at-
 tacks with their resultant damage to American official
 and private property. It is urgently requested that
 these authorities be informed without delay of these
 latest attacks and once more cautioned that bombing
 attacks of the nature described inevitably imperil
 American lives and interests.

All rights are reserved in respect of losses
 and damages suffered by American interests mentioned
 herein.

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to
 you, Sir and your colleagues, the renewed assurances
 of my highest consideration.

For the Ambassador:

Robert F. Smyth
 First Secretary of Embassy

350 Crapuchettes/350 McGeary/350 Am.Consul.-Kunming.

DRJ/js.

File No. ..

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 326.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hankow, China, June 16, 1941.

Subject: Endangerment of the Embassy's staff
 and buildings during the Japanese
 air raid on Chungking, Szechuan, on
 June 15, 1941.



793.94/16774

Grade	For	Date	Signature	Yes	No
For					
			In U.S.A.		

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

LDH

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 325 dated June 9, 1941, and to the telegram No. 240, sent to the Department by the Embassy at Chungking on June 15, 1941, regarding endangerment of the Embassy staff and buildings during the Japanese air raid on Chungking, Szechuan, on June 15, 1941, and to enclose, in


RECORDED
 AUG 19 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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in duplicate, copies of my representations made today
to the Japanese Consulate General at Hankow.

Respectfully yours,


C. J. Spiker
American Consul General

Enclosure:

1. To Japanese Consulate General,
Hankow, June 15, 1941.

Original and 1 copy to the Department;
Copies to Embassy, Chungking;
Embassy, Peiping;
Embassy, Tokyo;
Consulate General, Shanghai;
Consulate, Kunming.

350

RYJ/MYH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 326 of June 16, 1941, from Consul General C. J. Spiker, Hankow, China, to the Department of State on the subject: "Endangerment of the Embassy's staff and buildings during the Japanese air raid on Chungking, Szechuan, on June 15, 1941."

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hankow, China, June 16, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

In continuation of my communication dated June 9, 1941, concerning the jeopardizing of the American Embassy personnel and buildings at Chungking, Szechuan, during a Japanese air raid on June 5, 1941, I regret to inform you that, despite the fact that the Japanese authorities are fully aware of its location and the repeated assurances that Japanese aviators have been given strict instructions to avoid damage to foreign property, the American Embassy was again seriously endangered when several bombs were dropped on the south bank during the Japanese aerial bombardment of Chungking on June 15, 1941. The report gives the following details:

Five bombs were dropped within areas of 100 to 300 yards of the Chancery and the U.S.C. TUTUILA. One bomb which dropped within 50 yards of entrance to Embassy dugout hit alongside of and heavily damaged the offices of the Assistant Military Attache about half way between the Chancery and the U.S.C. TUTUILA. Concussion and flying debris damaged the Chancery windows, transoms, tile roof, screens and shutters. There was also some damage at the Ambassador's residence half a mile away and at the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company offices located near the Chancery.

I

H. Tanaka, Esquire,
 Consul General for Japan,
 Hankow.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

I protest most strongly against this further instance of the disregard by Japanese aviators for the safety of the American Embassy staff and buildings at Chungking. Your attention is invited to the serious repercussions likely to ensue from indiscriminate attacks of this character and the importance of causing urgent and effective instructions to be issued to the responsible Japanese authorities to prevent a recurrence of such dangerous activities.

On behalf of the American Government, I reserve all rights in respect of losses or damages sustained as a result of actions of the Japanese armed forces.

I have the honor to be,

Sir and dear Colleague,


Your obedient servant,

C. J. Spiker
American Consul General

Original to the Consul General for Japan, Hankow;
2 copies to the Department of State;
Copies to Embassy, Chungking;
Embassy, Tokyo;
Embassy, Peiping;
Consulate General, Shanghai;
Consulate, Kunming.

350

RYJ/MYH



0836

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TEM

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated August 5, 1941

Rec'd 9 a.m.

FROM

Telegram to Tokyo

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1173, August 5, 5 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 8/4/41 K&K

The following is a translation of a statement which was handed today to the Naval Attache at the Navy Department:

"Concerning the incident of the U.S.S. TUTUULA being damaged during our air raid of Chungking on July 30 the following conclusion was drawn upon the basis of report by commander at the front line, detailed explanations by a staff officer specially despatched to the front, and repeated and minute investigations:

The bomb which fell in the vicinity of the TUTUULA was dropped from a plane in a formation that participated in the air raid in following a course the formation was compelled to take, and the bomb went wide of its mark on account of an infinitesimal delay in releasing it. The incident was caused by a pure accident. (We wish to emphatically deny a rumor

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 1173, August 5, 5 p.m. from Tokyo.

rumor reported to be current in certain quarters that we intentionally bombed American interests at the time of the air raid, and hope very much that no such misunderstanding exists).

Our air forces are under strict orders to exercise utmost caution during operations in China lest American interests, particularly American men-of-war, should be damaged and heretofore the orders were well observed. However, the attention of the commander at the front was called immediately to the regrettable incident.

In informing you results of our investigation we wish to express our profound gratitude and respect towards the American Government for the measures it took in connection with the incident."

GREW

HSM

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER
 Collect ☐ Full rate
☐ Day letter
☐ Night letter
 Charge Department:
☐ Full rate
☐ Day letter
☐ Night letter
 Charge to \$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTIAL
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,
 August 7, 1941.

Naval Radio
 7 P.M.

AMEMBASSY,

CHUNGKING (CHINA).

INFO: AMEMBASSY, PEIPING (CHINA).
 AMERICAN CONSUL, SHANGHAI (CHINA).

185

Following from Tokyo:

(TELEGRAPH SECTION: Here insert full text of

Tokyo's 1173, August 5, 5 p.m., attached.)

Sent to Chungking. Repeated to Peiping, Shanghai.

Full
 (7.7/1)

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793.94/16775

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 FE:GA:REK

FE
 7.7/1

GA
 PA/1
 7.7/1

PS/AC

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

0839

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~GA~~
~~EAT~~
~~FOR~~
~~RB~~

To note conclusions
on page 6

JD

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 346.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
 OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Tsinan, China, June 19, 1941.

SUBJECT: KUOMINTANG AND JAPANESE FORCES
 VERSUS CHINESE COMMUNIST TROOPS,
 OR VICE VERSA.

RECEIVED
 AUG 14 1941
 COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
 Department of State

Handwritten: RB, T, File

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	Good		
F.	100%		
Approved			

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
initials 8/24/41
Confdone

The Honorable
 Clarence E. Gauss,
 American Ambassador,
 Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Consulate's
 Monthly Political Reports for the months of July,
 August and September 1940, excerpts from which, on

the

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AUG 19 1941

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the above subject, are given below for convenient reference:

"According to Japanese reports fighting between National Government troops and the 8th Route Army occurred in central and southern Shantung during July. Heavy casualties on both sides allegedly were the result. A foreign source confirms that the 8th Route Army clashed with other armed Chinese of unknown identity (and possibly pro-Japanese) in the vicinity of Kwancheng, on the Hopeh border, during the month".--Tsinan's Political Report for July 1940, page 3.

"From all parts of this consular district come reports of the presence of the 8th Route Army, which seems to be spreading its influence and propagating the Communist doctrine among the people, often cruelly torturing the leaders of villages which appear reluctant to embrace the new tenets, it is said. In as much as the Japanese have apparently never had a serious clash with the 8th Route Army in Shantung, it can only be inferred that these Communist encroachments have at least the tacit approval of the Japanese, notwithstanding the latter's avowed concern lest China become 'tainted'. But this aloofness will probably be maintained by the Japanese Army only so long as the 8th Route Army continues to fight Japan's battles by opposing the other armed Chinese forces in this district.

"In this relation, the 8th Route Army during August clashed with National Government troops (under Yu Hsueh-chung?) northeast of Feih sien, in southern Shantung, with Liu Kuei-t'ang's followers, northwest of the same town, and with Shih Yu-san's troops in southwestern Shantung, according to reports.

"That the Japanese are prepared to play one Chinese faction off against the other, however, is indicated by the fact that the Chinese troops mentioned in the Consulate's telegram to the Embassy of August 5, 1 p.m.¹ have so far not been molested by the Japanese military. According to Chinese sources, this is accounted for by the fact that the troops in question have as their immediate objective the overthrow of the Communists, which intelligence has reportedly been duly communicated to the Japanese. In any case, continued dissension in the Chinese ranks can only be looked upon as most unfortunate, as a suitable opportunity may thereby be afforded the Japanese Army to eradicate all important potential opposition in this part

of
 1. Kuomintang troops under General Sun T'ung-hsuan, which came into Shantung at the time Sun was scheduled to replace Shen Hung-lich as Chungking appointee as Governor. Order subsequently countermanded.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

of China. At best, it will enable Japan to continue to sit astride Shantung's communication system and to control the important economic resources with the use of a relatively small number of troops".--Tsinan's Political Report for August 1940, pages 3 and 4.

"According to Japanese reports, a large-scale campaign was for the first time carried out by Japanese forces against 'Communist bandits', presumably 8th Route Army units, infesting the region north of Ichowfu, allegedly forcing them to retire toward Ishui. The Japanese appear to have avoided contact with National Government troops and followers of Liu Kuei-t'ang in the same region, which forces, it will be recalled, engaged the Communist troops north of Feih sien during August".--Tsinan's Political Report for September 1940, page 5.

In further connection with the Communist-Kuomintang friction of last summer and autumn in this consular district, there is quoted below an excerpt from an article entitled "Inside China" by Anna Louise Strong, published in the March 1941 issue of AMERASIA:

"Similar charges of treason were made against General Miao Chen-liu (i.e., charges similar to those made against General Shih Yu-san), commander of the Fifty-seventh Army in South Shantung. Chu Teh sent a telegram to the Generalissimo in July, giving an exhaustive list of Miao's alleged dealings with the Japanese, as revealed to Chu Teh by Miao's subordinates. These included the exchange of signals, exchange of emissaries, joint banquets--in fact, a fully worked out system of combined attack against the Eighth Route. No answer came from Chiang Kai-shek but Ho Ying-ch'ing telegraphed back: 'Don't slander your fellow generals'. Telegrams from division commanders under General Miao next went to Chungking revealing more conferences with the Japanese and appealing over the head of their commander to the Generalissimo. On October 9, the entire staff of the Fifty-seventh Army signed a joint telegram to Chiang Kai-shek declaring their general a traitor and demanding his execution. None of these telegrams was answered, but word was spread in Chungking that 'the Eight Route is stirring up trouble in other Chinese armies'. Finally Miao's staff arrested him and sent him under guard to the commander-in-chief of the war zone who forwarded him to Chungking, where he is now busily circulating his version of the affair. Meanwhile his troops, like those of General Shih's, have augmented the forces of the Eighth Route--an indication of what may happen if civil war begins...

-
1. Following his assassination, allegedly under orders from Chungking, in December 1940.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

"We interpret these incident", said a representative of the Eighth Route to me, 'as meaning that General Ho Ying-chin is ready to cooperate even with Japanese against the Communists'".

While Miss Strong is undoubtedly pro-Communist, that portion of her article reproduced above is of interest in as much as it would seem to corroborate previous reports from this office (cf. excerpts on pages 2 and 3 above) to the effect that the Japanese and Kuomintang troops in Shantung were, during the summer of 1940, apparently cooperating against the Chinese Communist troops. The reported removal of General Miao Chen-liu from command of the Chinese 57th Army and the alleged incorporation of his troops, together with those of the late General Shih Yu-san, into the ranks of the 8th Route Army are also matters of interest. Certain it is that the 8th Route (18th Group) Army forces in this region have been greatly augmented during recent months. For example, the Japanese Army Headquarters in Tsinan announced on June 9, 1941, according to Domei, that during May and the first week of June Japanese troops in Shantung and north Kiangsu fought 508 engagements against 109,000 Chinese Communist troops. Furthermore, nothing has been heard of the 57th Army, as such, since last autumn, nor has any mention ever been made by either Kuomintang or Japanese sources as to the disposition of General Shih's former troops, estimated to number 30,000 men.

More recent Chinese-Japanese collaboration against the 8th Route Army in Shantung and future plans in that direction are indicated to some extent by information

just

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

just obtained confidentially by this Consulate from a reliable Chinese source, the substance of which is set forth below:

"It is reliably reported by one of the district magistrates that Li Shu-ch'un, for pecuniary reasons, severed relations with Chen Hung-lich and has thrown in his lot with the new regime. He has changed his name to Li Chi-sheng (李寄生) and is at present in Peiping. While originally slated as candidate for the Governorship of Shantung, he has instead been chosen for a different post, namely, as High Commissioner of Pacification in Shantung and will be given the task of pacifying the guerrillas. The Commissioner will be placed in command of four divisions of troops to be stationed in northern, southern, eastern and western Shantung. All the guerrillas who have surrendered to the Japanese have been designated the Allied Chinese Troops of the Imperial Japanese Army (皇協軍) and will be organized into the above-mentioned divisions. One of Li's subordinates is now in Tsinan to make contact with the local authorities in this connection.

"It is also reported that guerrilla forces in quite a number of districts are now on good terms with the Japanese troops, and that when the two sides have occasion to meet, they try, as a rule, to avoid an open encounter. In referring to each other both sides sometimes use the expression 'friendly army' and each side refrains from making trouble to the other in the matters of taxation or the purchase of commodities. Their common aim is to carry out a combined attack against the 8th Route.

"It is also reported that Chen Hung-lich has recently been exchanging emissaries with the Shantung authorities but what discussion is proceeding is not revealed."

The statements made in the penultimate paragraph quoted above are confirmed in Tsingtao's despatch to Peiping no. 59 of June 18, 1941, file 800, subject: "Some Recent Political and Military Developments in Eastern Shantung" (a copy of which was received by this office after the present despatch had been drafted). Concerning the last paragraph quoted, it will be recalled that, reportedly, Chen Hung-lich has previously been

reprimanded

1. Cf. Consulate's Monthly Political Report for May 1941, page 6.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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reprimanded by the Central Government for his "inactivity".¹

CONCLUSIONS.

That notwithstanding the statements repeatedly made in Chungking that Kuomintang-Communist differences are not serious or have been adjusted, friction between the 8th Route Army and Kuomintang forces has undermined Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression in this part of China for the past year. The Kuomintang and Japanese troops have collaborated against the Chinese Communist forces in the past and recent developments point to closer Chinese-Japanese cooperation against the 8th Route Army in the future. The 8th Route Army troops, which have been greatly augmented during recent months at the expense of Kuomintang forces, are now believed to constitute the only serious obstacle yet to be overcome by the Japanese in Shantung and southeastern Honan. The alleged fears which have been expressed by certain pro-Communist writers that General Ho Ying-chin's anti-Communist attitude may precipitate serious civil strife and thus pave the way for a Tokyo-Chungking peace treaty which would leave Japan or Japanese puppets in control of North China--in so far as they could drive out the Communists, who would then receive no Chungking support--and of China's ports, does not, therefore, appear so far-fetched after all.

Respectfully yours,

the
 seal

[Signature]

Carbon Copy

Carl O. Hawthorne,
 American Vice Consul.

Received

800
 COM/kco

Original

1. Cf. Consulate's Monthly Political Report for November 1940, page 6.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

Original to Embassy, Peiping,
5 copies to Department,
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai,
Copy to Consulate, Tsingtao,
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Consultation by
 Appointment Only

FE 793. 94
 Q 893. 24

Telephone 35

Mrs. Rosetta Sherwood Hall, M. D.
 Liberty, N. Y.

7/27/41
 2/27/41, Aug. 4/71

Hon. Cordell Hull,
 Dept. State, U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Hull,

Glad to learn over the Radio that you have
 just recovered your health and returned to Washington, D.C.;
 and, I hope you will continue well - and, may God guide
 you in your very difficult task!

You may recall we had some correspondence in
 November and December 1940? - The Mission Board
 transferred my son & family to to work at Madar
 Union Sanitarium, Ajmer, India; and it was six
 months before I could hear from him from the time he
 left Korea; and, now it takes as many months as it
 did weeks to hear from him in Korea!

I hope you kept that Report of the Presb. mis-
 sions on file; also, Dr. Tuttle's "How help China"
 and that you will refer to them now after study-
 ing the enclosed clipping? Brooke Carters urgent plan!

And, please look over the whole S.A.R. for July 26th
 which I sent a few days ago - especially about the new
 Cabinet in Japan, how it is moderate, friendly to both U.S. &
 & Britain - even hoped rapprochement might be possible!
 How disappointed they must be that U.S.A. has so misinterpreted
 and misunderstood them; but, as Brooke Carters point out, it

753.94/1677

25/11/71

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

is not too late yet; and this is to plead with you to
 prayerfully consider it! And, I trust it may become?

On the radio to-night I heard some wild tale
 of "interning the Japanese"! I want to tell you
 that during these 4 yrs of conflict b/w China and
 Japan, the Chinese have lived peacefully in both
 Korea & Japan, and go about their work unmolested;
 and, I believe unless you begin it on this side, there
 would be no trouble there?

I wish you might read, at this time,
 Ralph Townsend's "Seeking Foreign Trouble". The
 author was long a U.S.A. Consul in China; and gives
 facts you should know, in an easy way. Also
 wish you could read "The Battle Earth" by James T. Hayes.
 I'd gladly send you these to read, if you can't secure
 them there? I have been sending you a copy of
 the J.A.R. frequently, and trust it is used?

I have mentioned it in my card, but in case you
 didn't get to see them, I want to mention that Siam is an official
 ally of Japan - they have long been good friends; and, if Japan
 goes then it will not be an "invasion" but because Siam wishes to
 Faithfully yours, Rosalind Herriot Hall.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Dr. Rosetta S. Hall To Mark 50 Years of Medical Practice

Self-Reliant Native of Liberty Passed Long Period in Missions.

With the motto "Go where no one else will go and do what no one else will do" before her, Dr. Rosetta Sherwood Hall, one of Liberty's most distinguished residents, will mark her first half-hundred years of practicing medicine Tuesday.

Perhaps not as spry as the girl graduate of 23, but indefinitely wiser, the doctor's self-reliance is best characterized by her own description: "I traveled Mott street (New York city's Chinatown district) both night and day to perform errands of mercy while still in my twenties, and yet people think that I should be shown home from church today."

Though able to look back on a full life well-spent and unselfishly dedicated, Dr. Hall still seeks services to render, goals to reach. "Most anyone else would be glad to rest on their achievements, rest awhile and relive some of their past glories."

Right now she is busy planning a golden reunion of the dozen surviving women who graduated with her from the Women's Medical College of Pennsylvania. The reunion will be held in Philadelphia in June and each will be accorded a gold medal by their alma mater in recognition of a life richly spent. Dr. Hall was the youngest of the class of 1889; it numbered 41.

Her alma mater is the oldest of its kind, having been founded 89 years ago. Since graduating its first class of eight, the institution has turned out over 1,700 embryo women doctors. She is justly proud of the foundation.

Is Native of Liberty

Born in Liberty on September 19, 1865, Dr. Hall was a daughter of R. R. and Phebe Gildersteeve Sherwood. She received her primary education in the Liberty schools and then went on to the state normal school at Oswego. At 16 she was back in Sullivan County to teach school and serve the community for about five years.

It was then that she dedicated her life to medicine and missionary work, starting her career by enrolling in the Philadelphia medical school. Graduating in 1889, she served her internship in Nursery and Children's hospital on Staten Island. After missionary and medical background in New York she was appointed to serve Korea by the New York branch of the Women's Foreign Missionary Society. Newburgh district largely supported her work.

She worked in the Far East for 45 years, under Methodist auspices, establishing four women's hospitals



Photo by Hillig
DR. ROSETTA SHERWOOD HALL

and educational work for the blind and deaf. Upon completion of her first 25 years of medical practice there she was awarded a certificate of merit and silver cups by the government of Korea.

One of the institutions that she founded was the Women's Medical College of Korea. This work started out with five girls. Today it is as large as many schools in this country and as modern as any American foundation.

One of this institution's alumnae, Dr. Ester K. Pak, will be remembered by the older inhabitants of this village, for Mrs. Pak came to the United States with Dr. Hall, while on furlough, and attended the Liberty high school. She later became Dr. Hall's assistant and not only the first woman doctor in Korea, but the first native doctor, male or female, to practice western medicine in her country.

Despite what appears to be an overwhelming schedule, Dr. Hall still had time for her private life. She married Rev. W. J. Hall, M.D., at Seoul, Korea, on June 27, 1892. Of this union two children were born: a son, Sherwood, a medical missionary who is practicing in the Far East and who spoke recently of his works at the Liberty Methodist church; and a daughter, Edith Margaret, now deceased.

Opposed by Hostile Natives

While all her days in Korea were not as filled with danger as a certain one, a description of that day will

show some of the obstacles that she faced while performing her errands of mercy.

When the doctor and her husband were sent as pioneers into Pyong Yang the superstitious natives stoned them and practically held them prisoners in their house. Meanwhile the city government sentenced all Christian natives to death. There were no embassies to appeal to in that interior region.

But at last the capitol authorities ordered the release of the Koreans and the crisis had been passed. The missionaries stayed on for a month, ministering to sick. But the stay exacted its price, for while there Dr. Hall's husband contracted a fever and died a few months later.

He wrote before his death his impressions of those anxious moments. "It seemed to us that the time had come for religious toleration for Korea, and God would require the lives of some of his children to secure it. We were ready to die for this cause," he said.

As has already been told, the Korean government later came to honor and revere the doctor that it first welcomed with stones.

The societies in which she holds membership are legion. Among them are life memberships in the Korea Medical Missionary Association; B. & P. Bible Society; Korean Y.W.C.A.; Japanese Red Cross; the Royal Asiatic Society, Korean branch; American Medical Women's Association; Medical Women's International Association; and the Medical Society of the State of New York.

Now Practices in Liberty

After serving Korea for 45 years, Dr. Hall automatically retired from active missionary service and upon terminating her eastern services she set up a practice in Gloversville, but is now actively engaged in her home town, Liberty.

Countless tributes have been dedicated to the doctor but perhaps the one most fitting is that penned by a Korean teacher who never studied in a western school. It runs in part:

Her rising spirit crumbling years denies,

Work upon work begins and executes,

Fearing no clouds that threaten future skies,

And calmly, bravely forges, nor disputes,

There is an ever-working God!

With steady hands, upon her stooping back

She puts the burden of a new-born school,

Turning out angels to save man from the rack

Of pain. Thus of all cares her hands are full.

There is an ever-working God.

Reprinted from *The Liberty Register*, Liberty, N.Y., Thursday, March 9, 1939.

See pg. 47 in last edition of Who's Who? in New York

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply refer to
 FE 793.94/16777

My dear Dr. Hall:

The Secretary of State has asked me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of August 4, 1941, in regard to matters relating to the situation in the Far East, and to assure you that the contents of your letter have been carefully noted and that the spirit which prompted you to write is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

G.A.

George Atcheson, Jr.
 Assistant Chief
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Rosetta Sherwood Hall, M.D.,

Liberty, New York.

FE:DOC:MHP FE
 8/12/41

FE 793.94/16777

PJ/HFM

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in 1937. Soon after the- the Secretary of State on July 16 of that year made a comprehensive statement of the position of the U. S. Government in regard to international problems and situations in various parts of the world to which this Government felt deep concern.

33.34/16778

16778

fp

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. ltr Circular
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated July 18, 1941 From
 To Chiefs of Missions in the other Republics.

File No. 840.51 Frozen Credits/2804a

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 793.94/16779
 Date Aug. 5, 1941
 From FBI (HOOVER)
 To BURLE (ASST. SEC. STATE)

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- ☐ Security-Classified Information
☒ Otherwise Restricted Information

B. E. Hear
 Authority

5-22-73
 Date

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 7117 (2-72)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RS

This telegram must be FROM
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

CHUNGKING VIA N.R.

Dated August 10, 1941

Rec'd 3:20 p.m., 11th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

*Telegram to
 Chungking
 11/11/41*

339, August 10, 7 a.m., (SECTION ONE.)

In a conversation Saturday afternoon the Generalissimo stated that Chinese political commentators are remarking that with the various warnings by the democracies enjoining Japan against aggression toward Thailand, Singapore, Netherlands East Indies, et cetera and no such injunction against an attack on Yunnan and the Burma Road it would almost seem that the democracies had pointed out to Japan what she might make as her military objective.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs who was interpreting, then enlarged upon the point and said he had telegrams prepared to the Ambassadors at Washington and London to raise the subject at their next conference with American and British Governments. He commented that there is an Anglo-Russian pact, and apparently various agreements and undertakings amongst all the democracies except China.

The British Ambassador, who was present, voiced
 his

793.94/10730

PS/MS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-, No. 339 from Chungking, August 10, 1941; rec'd
3:20 p.m., 11th.

his cordial agreement with the point made by the
Generalissimo and stated that he would immediately
report the matter to London.

I refrained from making any comment except that
when reference was made to Chinese defense I did not
(*) to refer to American practical aid to China.

GAUSS

GW

(*) Apparent omission

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (Br)

FROM

CHUNGKING VIA N.R.

Dated August 10, 1941

Rec'd 2:50 p.m. 11th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

339, August 10, 7 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

It seems to me that an official injunction of
 warning addressed to Japan in regard to Yunnan and the
 Burma Road would be neither practicable nor logical at
 this time. Japan has been so far restrained from military
 action against Yunnan by physical difficulties. An of-
 ficial pronouncement in the form of a warning, limited in
 scope to Yunnan, could have little if any effect upon
 Japanese plans on the course of events unless, of course,
 it were forcefully and unmistakably indicated that such
 an attack would be the signal for offensive action on
 our part. I do not consider the time or the circumstances
 appropriate to our assuming such a position.

(END OF MESSAGE)

Sent to Department, repeated to Paiping.

GAUSS

GW

0856

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 Night letter)

Charge Department:

Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 X CONFIDENTIAL CODE X
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 "Brown" PLAIN

Washington,

August 19, 1941

TWENTY SECOND
 6 PM

AMEMBASSY,

CHUNGKING (CHINA) VIA NAVAL RADIO.

200

Your 339, August 10, 7 a.m.

This cable was sent in Confidential Code.
 It should be encrypted before being communicated to the public. **BR**

We have been giving sympathetic study to the points raised in your conversation with General Chiang and the Foreign Minister and it is suggested that you take occasion to point this out orally to them, or to other appropriate Chinese officials, and to mention some of the considerations which have occurred to us in this connection as follows:

Declarations by officials of this Government in regard to Thailand and neighboring areas have not repeat not, of course, in any way indicated a shifting of our sympathies and support from China to other parts of the Far East or any change in emphasis as regards particular sections of the Far East. This has seemed to us to be obvious, and there have been no repeat no indications in the American press, which is usually very sensitive to currents and directions of official interest and concern in matters affecting and comprising our foreign relations, that this Government's ~~policy of aiding~~ ^{policy of aiding} ~~unqualified support to~~ China

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

795.34/16780

795.34/16780

16780

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Collect { Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Department of State

-2-

Washington,

Charge to
 \$

in every way that is practicable and appropriate has either lessened or experienced any deviation from that objective. Recent declarations have, on the other hand, served to include specifically within the scope of this Government's repeatedly expressed and energetically implemented policy of extending aid to China, Great Britain and other countries resisting aggression, areas of the Far East whose proximity to China make their inclusion in our policy a matter of vital importance to China as well as to themselves. Reasons for the concern of the Government and the people of the United States in regard to Thailand clearly spring from a recognition of both the specific problem and the broad general problem presented by developments in the region of Thailand. It was not considered in that connection that any specific mention of Yunnan or other part of China would contribute to a clarification of this Government's attitude - which in respect to all parts of China has repeatedly and abundantly been made clear - nor was it considered that absence of mention of China in the declarations in question would result in any misunderstanding anywhere of this Government's attitude and policy toward China or toward any other country.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

0858

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

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 Day letter
 Night letter

-3-

Washington.

Charge to

\$

Certainly no clearer expression of our purpose to assist China could be uttered than that of the President of the United States in his address of March 15 in which he referred to our policy as one of QUOTE unqualified, immediate, all-out aid UNQUOTE for China and other countries resisting aggression.

In the light of all pertinent aspects of the situation in the Far East, it seems to us to be self-evident that specific inclusion of Thailand and neighboring areas in declarations of American policy at this time are in themselves further indication of American support for China and of American interest in protection of the approaches of the Burma Road.

On August 19, the Secretary of State, in a conversation with the Chinese Ambassador, stated to the Ambassador that we have under consideration various possible methods of giving augmented emphasis to the fact that China is playing a valiant and valued part among the powers that are actively resisting aggression.

FE:GA:MHP
 EOR:

FE

PA/H

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.,

19

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM CHUNGKING VIA N.R.

Dated August 11, 1941

Rec'd 2:51 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.


338, August 11, 6 p.m.

Your 182, August 6, 6 p.m.

Chungking has been subjected to unusually heavy and prolonged air raids during the past four days. Outlying districts and the city area (repeat city area) have been repeatedly bombed but there has been no bombing of the city area immediately opposite the Chancery and the gunboat.

GAUSS

LMS



DEC 20 1941

733.94/15781 Confidential HJ:PS/MS
 (FILED)

0860

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D)

FCC letter 1/19/73

Date 3/27/73

CONFIDENTIAL

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

DIVISION OF
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 28, 1941

Spot Bulletin #7

CHUNGKING RADIO REPORTS ON JAPANESE MILITARY REORGANIZATION

Information on Japanese military reorganization is contained in an interview given by Admiral Yan Hsuan-Chieng, head of the intelligence section of the Chinese National Military Council, the full report of which appears on the Chungking radio on July 23.

This material supplements information in the same interview reported in the American press, July 24, on Japanese naval and transport movements prior to the move into Indo-China.

"Admiral Yang Hsuan-Chieng revealed that since the inception of this month, the Japanese have withdrawn one division from North China to Japan Proper but that was for reorganization purpose. In this regard the Spokesman explained that since 1939 the Tokyo War Office has started a plan to improve the equipment and fire power of Japanese divisions while at the same time reduce the four infantry regiments in each division to three.

"While Japanese divisions below one hundred--one hundred as an identification mark--are composed of regular troops, those above the divisional number of one hundred consist mainly of reserves. There were eight divisions belonging to the latter category in China before; but since the latter part of 1939 to the end of last year, five such divisions had been withdrawn to Japan to undergo reorganization under the new plan. The division which was transferred back to Japan early this month belonged to the "Reserve" class also.

"The Military Spokesman said that no new division has come from Japan to replace the six of such "Reserve" divisions which was first concentrated at Shihchiachung, then shifted to Taoting and finally to Japan Proper. This division was replaced by a division composed of troops formerly stationed at a Yellow River crossing. Later, concentrated at Shuchow and finally moved up to (Hsirjagong).

753.94/16752

AUG 14 1941

FILED

PS/AC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

"The National Military Council Spokesman said that the new Japanese divisions have greater fire power; whereas each company had only nine machine guns before, he said it now possesses sixteen. He added the Japanese now have three divisions and one mixed brigade in the Chungtiaoshan area in Shansi Province. "

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ALJ

Tokyo

Dated August 12, 1941

TELEGRAM RECEIVED 8:35 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

FROM

1221, August 12, 3 p. m.

8/13/41 REC

The Japanese press reports that the first bombing of Chungking to be carried out this year by army planes was successfully executed yesterday and that a number of military establishments were destroyed, the planes returning safely to their bases.

The Foreign Office, in reply to an oral and informal inquiry made this morning, state that the bombing was not of Chungking but of suburbs at a distance some nine kilometers from the city itself. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Shanghai for repetition to Chungking and Peiping.

GREW.

PEG

703.94/10733

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 AUG 14 1941

PC/AC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KD

GRAY

Tokyo

FROM

Dated August 12, 1941

Rec'd. 10:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

1224, August 12, 6 p. m.

In Newman's telephoned despatch to the NEW YORK
 HERALD TRIBUNE today, reporting Wakasugi's telephoned
 interview with NICHI NICHI, certain passages were cut
 out by the censor:

"Wakasugi said 'America seems to be anxious to
 maintain traditional friendly relations with Japan'.
 (The rest of this paragraph reading as follows was
 deleted by the censor). But he hinted that these
 were impossible as long as Japan continued her present
 foreign policy, thereby indicating that the Japanese
 Government must consider some changes before it can
 hope for better relations with America."

The following last paragraph was deleted in its
 entirety by the censor:

"Views of those interested in averting war with
 America were reflected in the suggestion that many
 Japan's recent difficulties with America were caused by

Tokyo's

795.94/16784

FILED
 AUG 14 1941

PS/AC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #1224, August 12, 6 p. m., from Tokyo.

Tokyo's alliance with the Axis powers, which must be severed before any improvement can be expected in Japanese-American relations. It is this growing realization here that is responsible for the recently accelerated efforts by the German Ambassador to keep Berlin's bonds with Tokyo from slipping".

GREW.

PEG

0865

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LET

This telegram was closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CANTON VIA N.R.

Dated August 12, 1941

Rec'd. 10:05 a.m., 13t

FROM

8/15/41 JD
Secretary of State,
Washington.

46, August 12, 2 p.m.

A report has been received that more Japanese troops have in the past few days left Canton. Although confirmation of this movement is lacking (?) noted that trains of heavy covered trucks believed to have been loaded with dismantled artillery and a number of small steamers carrying anti-aircraft and other artillery proceeding in the general direction of Whampoa or Bocca (?) the usual embarkation points. Five Japanese transports were reported last week anchored near the latter point.

10751
With reference to my 41, July 30, 9 a.m. reliable reports indicate the extension of blockade and/or defense measures both north and west of (?) (?).

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping, Chungking, Hong Kong.

MEYERS

PEG

FILED
AUG 19 1941

797.94/16785

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LET

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

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Dated August 12, 1941

Rec'd. 10:05 a.m., 13t

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

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 and/or defense measures both north and west of (?)
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Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping,
 Chungking, Hong Kong.

MEYERS

PEG

0867

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE

X NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE X

"Gr" PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Department of State

Naval Radio Washington,

August 11, 1941

Charge to
 \$ AMEMBASSY,

CHUNGKING (CHINA).

INFO: AMEMBASSY, PEIPING.

PRIORITY.

The press has reported Japanese air attacks upon Chungking subsequent to the bombing of July 30 which damaged the Tutuila and the Embassy. According to an Associated Press despatch dated Chungking, August 8, ^{Chungking, and} the suburbs of the city were bombed on that day by about 140 Japanese planes. According to a United Press despatch dated Chungking, August 10, Japanese naval planes bombed Chungking on that day for the sixth time since August 8.

The Department desires that you inform the Department by radio of the pertinent details of these reported bombings. ~~and of any subsequent bombings which may occur~~ It is requested that your reports include ~~precise information in regard to the~~ ^{indicating in general} areas bombed and their geographic relationship to the ~~general~~ ^{"city" and} to the area occupied by the Tutuila and the Embassy, the approximate number of planes and of bombs dropped, the character of the bombing (whether general, indiscriminate, concentrated as to objectives, et cetera), damage ^{to American property} caused, and additional information that may be material and of interest ~~such as weather conditions,~~

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

702.04/167051

1941

0868

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect { Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Charge Department:
 Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Charge to

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Department of State

-2-

Washington,

\$ approximate altitude of planes, et cetera.

Please ~~send your telegrams in regard to the reported~~
~~bombings of August 8 and 10 priority~~ *rush reply!*

Sent to 'Chungking'. Repeated to 'Peiping'. Peiping repeat
 to 'Tokyo'.

Hull

SKH

GA
 FE:GA:FRE

FE

PA/17

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M.,

19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

August 11, 1941.

RE:

Please prepare telegram,
to go this afternoon, asking
Gauss to report on all bombings
of Chungking since the recent
endangering of the Tutuila and
the Embassy premises. *Areas etc.*

immediately *5141*

PA/H:SKH:FLB

Tel. to Chungking

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

New York Times

TWO JAPANESE RAIDS BLAST AT CHUNGKING

American Methodist Mission Building Damaged by Bomb

CHUNGKING, China, Aug. 10 (UP) — Japanese naval planes bombed this provisional Chinese capital today for the sixth time since Friday and caused widespread damage.

One big bomb penetrated a three-story residence of the American Methodist Mission and demolished the entire central section of the building. All near-by mission establishments were damaged. Plaster was stripped from walls, windows broken and some walls cracked.

There were two separate attacks today. In the first, the mission building was struck. In the second, nine planes concentrated upon an area around the residence of the British Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, which again was damaged.

The increased tempo and ferocity of the attacks led some observers to believe that the bombing was part of a "softening-up" effort preliminary to new Japanese land drives, possibly into Yunnan Province from Japan's bases in northern Indo-China.

HONG KONG, Monday, Aug. 11 (AP) — Twenty-six Japanese planes dropped more than 100 bombs and killed or wounded ten Chinese yesterday in a raid on Kunming, terminus of the Burma Road, the Central [Chinese] News Agency reported today.

FE
GA
A
VA
Department of State
Tel. to Chungking

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Bombing

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

**Chungking Is Bombed,
 American Zone Spared**

**First Attack Since U. S. Gun-
 boat Was Hit; Shelter Is Hit**

CHUNGKING, Aug. 8 (AP).—About 140 Japanese planes, coming over in two waves, smashed at Chungking and its suburbs again today. A bomb explosion near a waterfront dugout caved in the shelter and killed more than fifteen Chinese and injured at least as many more. Air raid wardens dug to rescue the survivors.

Some of the eight raiding formations flew directly over the safety zone on the south bank of the Yangtse River, but no bombs were dropped there.

It was the first air attack here since the near-miss July 30, which damaged the United States gunboat Tutuila in the Yangtse and the residence building of the American Embassy, within the safety zone on the opposite shore of Chungking.

Chinese troops were reported in news dispatches today to have reached the outskirts of Shasi, Yangtse River treaty port between here and Hankow. These advisers said that Chinese forces pushed the Japanese defenders back to the edge of the city Wednesday and that the battle still was continuing.

A

WA

Tok. B. Chungking

0872

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AUG 9 1941

NEW YORK TIMES

CHUNGKING POUNDED BY 140 AIR RAIDERS

Attack Is Climax of 5-Province
Bombing Drive by Japanese

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

CHUNGKING, China, Aug. 8—As a climax to four days of sweeping air attacks on cities in Hunan, Kwangsi, Kiangsi, Shensi and Kansu Provinces, Japanese planes subjected Chungking to a short but intensive bombing today.

Eight squadrons totaling 140 planes that swarmed over early in the afternoon and loosed hundreds of small incendiaries and a lesser number of heavy explosives, chiefly in suburban districts. Several fires were started, but the damage was not great. The casualties totaled a few score.

Since early this week Japanese based at Yuncheng in Shansi and Hankow have made daily raids on important cities along the main lines of communication to the southwest and northwest. Among the cities bombed, some of them several times, are Henyang, Changsha, Changteh and Hsiangtan in Hunan; Kweilin in Kwangsi; Feni, Kian, Changshu and Taiho in Kiangsi; Paoki and Yen-an, the Communist capital, in Shensi, and Tientshui in Kansu.

The Chinese believe that one reason for the extensive bombings at present is to achieve the utmost destruction before the Chinese Air Force is strengthened by new planes and American, Russian and British pilots can become serious obstacles to the Japanese. The raiders now encounter no fighter opposition—aside from a single instance two weeks ago—and they carry out their attacks from such great heights as to be beyond the reach of accurate anti-aircraft fire.

5-2/6A
PA/H

A
1A

T. L. to C. H. H.

0873

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DES **TELEGRAM RECEIVED** GRAY

CHUNGKING VIA N.R.

FROM

Dated August 13, 1941

Rec'd 12:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

344, August 13, 1 p.m.

Your No. 188, June 11, 7 p.m.

From August ⁸(7), 2 p.m. to the hour of this message, Chungking has sustained a total of over thirty successive raids by Japanese navy bombers. Eight of these raids have occurred at night. Total number of bombers involved over 500 by personal observation; official count will probably be larger. All planes fly high beyond anti-aircraft fire at approximately 20 to 25 thousand feet. Each raid apparently has had definite objective, including industrial areas along both banks of the Yangtze River above and below Chungking and both banks of the Chialing River. The area of the old walled city, that is, the area immediately opposite the Embassy and the paddock has not been bombed and there has been no bombing in the so-called safety zone on the south bank, but the city area to the west of the officially walled city has been included repeatedly among objectives.

Spacing

COPIES SENT TO
 ON LAND M.I.D.
 8/13/41 254

793.04/16787

PS/AC
 AUG 15 1941
 1120

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 344, August 13, 1941 from Chungking via N.R.

Spacing of the raids has been such as practically to immobilize all activity in and around Chungking since Friday afternoon. Embassy radio station can operate only during brief all clear intervals thus delaying receipt and despatch of all messages as well as code messages of the Navy. Details as to damage and casualties cannot be obtained at this time because of disruption of communications. So far only damage to American property is brief report just received that American Methodist Mission at Dzen(?)ngai in area west of the old city was damaged during raid at one o'clock on the morning of the 11th.

Sent to the Department, Repeated to Peiping.
 Shanghai repeat to Tokyo.

GAUSS

LMS

(*) Apparent omission

0875

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

GRAY

CHUNGKING VIA N.R..

FROM Dated August 15, 1941

Rec'd 4:50 p.m., 17th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO

ONLINE AND D. 8/15/41 RSK

347, August 15, 9 a.m.

Continuing my 344, August 13, 1 p.m.

The western extremural area of Catelan was raided by about 20 planes on afternoon of August 13. There was no raid during succeeding night presumably because of waning moon. On August 14th four waves of about 25 planes each dropped bombs on same western area, on industrial suburb across Chialing River and on highway terminus on south bank outside safety zone. The two flights which bombed western area approached city from east passing over chancery and U.S.S. TUTUILA.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping, Shanghai, Shanghai repeat to Tokyo.

GAUSS

CSB

FW 733.94/10767

PS/LE

AUG 21 1941

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


~~FOR~~
WMA

To glance through
this Dispatch.

0.877

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 963



AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL OF STATE

Hong Kong, July 10, 1941.

Division of
Far Eastern Affairs
1941
Department of State
SWAA

Confidential

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence 8/14/41

Subject: List purporting to show Japanese
Army divisions in South China;
Comparative statement of Russo-
Japanese forces on the Manchurian
Border; comment on situation in
South China and Hainan.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1941
DIVISION OF
COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Grade	Cond	In U.S.A.	✓	✓
	Word	ONI	MID	

793.94/16783

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Consulate General's despatch no. 939, dated June 16, 1941, enclosing a short list purporting to name the Japanese divisional units in South China as of June 5, 1941, and further in that connection, to forward another of these lists, based on information available up to July 5, 1941. A comparison of this list with the one for the previous month will reveal the fact that there has been only one change in it, but it is submitted as received for ready reference.

The informant, who is the same as the one mentioned in this Consulate General's despatch no. 906, dated May 10, asserted that the military position along the South China coast remained almost exactly what it had been a month ago. He

also

SEP 3 - 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
Department of State

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SEP 3 1941

PS/AC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

also asserted that there were no significant changes in the situation on Hainan, where, despite other statements to the contrary, a Chinese Government continued to function in what the informant appears to believe are the considerable areas of the Island not under Japanese control. As evidence of the truth of this statement he asserted - in strict confidence - that the Chinese Government has radio stations both in Hong Kong and Macao which are in daily contact with Chinese Government stations on Hainan. In correction of former statements which he had made as to the ranking Chinese on the Island, he gave the name of the head of the Chinese Government there as WANG I (王毅).

Alluding to the general international situation, the informant gave it as his opinion that the Russian forces would be able successfully to repel the attempted German invasion. He also said that he regarded Japanese intervention in Siberia as very unlikely, and supported this opinion by producing a set of figures which he asserted represented the comparative strengths of Japanese and Russian forces along the Russo-Manchurian border.

According to these figures, the Japanese have ten infantry divisions, four cavalry brigades, and no tank brigades in Manchuria; the military headquarters of this command is in Hsinking, the commander being General Umezu. Against this force the Russians have, the informant alleges, thirty-nine infantry divisions, ten cavalry divisions, and

fourteen

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

fourteen tank brigades, divided between three districts. The headquarters of the first of these districts is at Chita, and to it are assigned fourteen infantry divisions, seven cavalry divisions, and five tank brigades. The headquarters of the second district the informant gave as Voroshilov(?); to it he stated there are assigned twelve infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions, and five tank brigades. The third district has Khabarovsk as its headquarters, and is assigned thirteen infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and four tank brigades. The commander of all these forces is one General Stern. The informant asserted that Chinese military intelligence regards it as very unlikely that any of this numerically very superior Russian force will be withdrawn.

As has been indicated in previous despatches, this Consulate General is extremely doubtful whether any of the data furnished by this informant is worth transmitting. Most of it is either generally known or of little value, nearly all of it probably representing officially approved "handouts". The data about Hainan Island certainly disagrees with the statement of Mr. E. Groff-Smith, Commissioner of Chinese Maritime Customs in Hainan (Despatch no. 949 of June 23, 1941) who says that the Chungking Government exercises no effective control in

any

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

any part of the Island.

Respectfully yours,

John H. Bruins

John H. Bruins
American Consul

✓
Enclosure:

List, as stated.

800
RSW/g

Distribution:

In quintuplicate to Department;
Copies to Embassy, Chungking;
Embassy, Peiping;
Embassy, Tokyo;
Consulate General, Canton.

4-711-11

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

SOUTH CHINA

18th D..... East River area and
Hong Kong border

28th D..... Foochow area

38th D..... West River area

104th D..... North and West River Area

1st General Mixed Brigade.. Haiphong

14th Independent Mixed Brigade ... West River and Swatow

19th Independent Mixed Brigade ... Swatow

0882

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KD

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo

Dated August 14, 1941

FROM Rec'd. 9:11 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

AUG 14 1941

Department of State

Telegram to Tokyo Aug 16
1238, August 14, 6 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE
UNDER SECRETARY.

The Counselor was called to the Foreign Office this
afternoon by the Director of the American Bureau who
said that he had been instructed by the Foreign Minister
to make a statement for communication to me substantially
as follows:

One. It is unthinkable that the American Government
would inform the Chungking Government of the assurance
conveyed to the American Government through Admiral
Nomura that Japanese forces would "suspend (repeat
suspend) bombing of the area of the City of Chungking,
which of course does not include its suburbs". If, how-
ever, such information should be conveyed to Chungking
by any third party, and if the fact of the conveying of
such information should become known in Japan, a "very
dangerous situation would arise."

Two. Mr. Terasaki declined to enlarge on the
statement

793.94/16789

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CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #1238, August 14, 6 p. m., from Tokyo.

statement, except to say that we must be aware of the Japanese doctrine of the Imperial Command and that it is a serious thing for the Japanese Government to give to any foreign government an undertaking which would restrict freedom of operation of the Japanese armed forces.

Three. Mr. Torasaki requested with great emphasis that his statement be regarded as being of the most confidential character.

GREW.

ALC

0884

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 X CONFIDENTIAL CODE X
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 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Collect { Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Charge to

\$

Department of State

Washington, D.C.
 August 18, 1941

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

509

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR AND THE
 COUNSELOR ONLY.

Your 1238, August 14, 6 p.m.

The Department has not communicated to anyone except
~~you and the Ambassador~~
 to ~~the Embassy~~ at Chungking in strict confidence the
 assurance of the Japanese Ambassador set forth in item 3
 of paragraph one of the Department's 451 of August 1,
 11 a.m.

The foregoing is for your information but if you
 feel that any useful purpose ~~might~~ ^{would} be served thereby

you may ~~when an appropriate occasion presents itself,~~

inform the Foreign Office, ~~saying in addition that~~

you and your Government deprecate and deplore the apparently
 complete disregard by the Japanese armed forces of the
 spirit if not the letter of the promise by the Japanese
 Government.

FE:JWB:MHP

FE

PA/H

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

19

793.94/16789

PS/AC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

SEP 9 - 1941

1941 SEP 24 PM 2 September 8, 1941.

TW
 In a telegram which the Tokyo Embassy sent us on August 14, 1941, the Embassy reported that the Chief of the American Section of the Japanese Foreign Office had stated to Mr. Dooman that we [the American Government] "must be aware of the Japanese doctrine of the Imperial Command and that it is a serious thing for the Japanese Government to give any foreign government an undertaking which would restrict freedom of operation of the Japanese armed forces."

In context, the implication of that statement is that, an implied promise having been given to us by Admiral Nomura on behalf of the Foreign Office that Japanese armed forces would desist from bombing some part of Chungking for some time, which assurance, if observed, would restrict the freedom of operation of the Japanese armed forces, the Japanese Army or Navy had taken offense and had called the Japanese Foreign Office to account, and that the Japanese Foreign Office felt compelled to call our attention to "the Japanese doctrine of the Imperial Command". This indicates that we need to be guard against placing any too great confidence in any pledges

FW793.94/16789

PS/H

SEP 22 1941
 TELM
 pledges

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

pledges that may be made by the Japanese Foreign Office
or even by the Premier himself regarding courses to be
pursued or not to be pursued by the Japanese armed forces
unless the Japanese Army and Navy associate themselves
expressly and to our certain knowledge with the said
pledges.

SKH
Z


PA/H:SKH:ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LET

PLAIN



FROM SHANGHAI VIA N.R.

Dated August 14, 1941

Rec'd. 3:29 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 8/15/41 RER

1081, Fourteenth.

Japanese naval spokesman in a statement issued yesterday on the fourth anniversary of the outbreak of hostilities in Shanghai stated that the Chungking Regime is falling back on the Burma route and is frantically attempting to encircle Japan in cooperation with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. He declared "not only must the projected formation of the ABCD encirclement be shattered, but the older order in China must be replaced by a new one so as to enable China to shake off her semicolonial status". He said Japan was grimly resolved to overcome all obstacles and asserted that the Imperial Navy was fully confident of its ability to surmount all difficulties.

Sent to Department, repeated to Chungking and Peiping, by airmail to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

CSB

Aug 15 1941
 FILED


793.94/16790

PS/AC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KD



FROM

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated August 14, 1941

Rec'd. 9:05 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

1239, August 14, 7 p. m.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 8/15/41 R.E.K.

All evening papers under large headlines print
 despatches from China announcing that since August 8
 Japanese navy planes have bombed Chungking forty times,
 that until 10 a.m. today raids took place at intervals
 of three to four hours during a period of one hundred
 and fifty hours and that 1,000 planes were employed.
 The Chungking Government is described as on the "eve
 of collapse".

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Shanghai for
 repetition to Chungking, Peiping.

GREW.

RR

793.94/16791

PS/AC


FILED
 AUG 15 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AF

GRAY




FROM

Tokyo via Shanghai
& N. R.

Dated August 14, 1941

Rec'd 11:22 p.m.; 15th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



1239, August 14, 7 p.m.

All evening papers under large headlines print
 despatches from China announcing that since August 8
 Japanese navy planes have bombed Chungking 49 times,
 that until 10 a.m. today raids took place at inter-
 vals of two to five hours during a period of 150
 hours and that 1000 planes were employed. The Chung-
 king Government is described as on the "eve of col-
 lapse."

Sent to Department. Repeated to Shanghai for
 repetition to Chungking, Peiping.

GREW

EMB

FW 793.94/16791

AUG 20 1941

FILED

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT The Secretary would favor giving the same aid to Siam
 that we give to China provided it could be shown
 the Siamese would stand up to the Japanese.

793.94 / 16792

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
 (Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated July 31, 1941 From State Department
 To Secretary (Gray)

File No. 740.0011 P. W./426

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1-1540

PS/HS

hr

10772

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

8/20/41 JD
 Secretary of State,

Washington.

17, August 14, 5 p.m.

Both yesterday and today 27 Japanese aircraft raided the city of Kunming in perfect weather. In yesterday's attack bombs were dropped in the vicinity of West Gate station with little observable damage, but middle section of city was severely hit in spots.

In today's raid several buildings of southwest (?) University were badly damaged in an apparently deliberate attack thereon. A dump southeast of town was also hit, a fire following the bombing.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Shanghai and Peiping, by air mail to Tokyo.

PERKINS

CSB

KUNMING VIA HONG KONG & N.R.
 FROM

Dated August 14, 1941

Rec'd 11:10 a.m., 17th.

File
JMS

735.94/16733

25/42A

FILED

AUG 25 1941

19374

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
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FROM RANGOON


Dated August 17, 1941

Rec'd 6 p.m.

8/16/41, 70
 Secretary of State,

Washington.

August 17, 3 p.m.



Eighteen Japanese planes bombed Hsiakwan a point on
 the Burma road 343 miles from the border and 257 from
 Kunming on August 15, some Government cargo and workshops
 were damaged and a number of persons injured, no serious
 damage to road is reported.

Traffic control officer at Lashio has prohibited until
 further notice departure of any truck carrying a pay load
 in excess of three tons on the ground that the condition
 of Burma road in China is very bad and that the surface
 must be protected by load limitation to prevent complete
 stoppage of traffic. Recent flood damage to bridges near
 Chafang and landslides closed highway for several days but
 it is again open.

Copies code text sent to Kunming and Chungking.

BRADY

CSB

AUG 25 1941

733.94/16794

25/ADA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Copies code text sent to Kunming and Chungking.

BRADY

CSB

0895

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TK

PLAIN

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Shipping via N. R.

Dated August 15, 1941

FROM Rec'd 9:18 p.m., 16th.

Secretary of State

Washington

August fifteenth.

Domel yesterday quoted Japanese fleet communique stating Chungking other Chinese cities bombed forty times in one hundred fifty hours participating planes numbered one thousand. Twenty-one Chinese planes destroyed at Chengtu on eleventh due insistent raids past six days Chinese Chungking must be near collapse from fatigue. "The Japanese feel sincerely sorry for them as they are just misled by their ill informed leaders". All antiaircraft Chungking silenced, no Chinese aircraft challenged Japanese raiders no Japanese planes lost.

Sent to Chungking, repeated to Department.

EUTRICK

CSB

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 8/19/41 REC

753.54/10750

AUG 21 1941

FILED

FO/mla

793.94

0896

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ED **TELEGRAM RECEIVED** via N. R.

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (br)

Dated August 16, 1941

FROM Rec'd, 11:50 a. m.

8/20/41 30
 Secretary of State,

Washington.

48, August 16, noon.

Reference my 46, August 12, 2 p. m.

Information unconfirmable but believed to be
 reliable is that a detachment of Japanese troops
 numbering about 8,000 embarked for Indochina a few
 days ago. In this connection it has been learned
 that during the past few days eighteen transports
 came up the Pearl river and thirteen moved down the
 river. In the light of the above information it
 would seem that during the past four weeks in the
 neighborhood of 18,000 troops have been withdrawn from
 this area.

Sent to the Department repeated to Peiping,
 Chungking, Hong Kong.

MYERS.

BB

AUG 25 1941

FILED


733.54/10/96

PS/LB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TEM



FROM

GRAY

Kunming via Hong Kong
and N. R.

Dated August 17, 1941

Rec'd 9:10 a.m. 18th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RECEIVED
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.
8/19/41

19, August 17, 10 a.m.

According to the press, eighteen Japanese aircraft raided Hsiakuan, highway point, August 16. Attacking in two waves, fires were started which burned for two hours, Southwest Transportation Company buildings and trucks being hit.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Peiping.

HPD

AUG 21 1941

733.94/10797

PS/3M

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM KUNMING VIA N.R.

Dated August 16, 1941

Rec'd 9:50 a.m., 18th.

8/20/41 3P
 Secretary of State,

Washington.


18, August 16, Noon.

Recent Japanese bombings of Kunming on five successive days appear to show a more determined effort than previously exhibited. Raids of 27 bombers each showed thorough information of objectives, with generally high degree of accuracy. Bomb loads were poured squarely into Copper Refinery and Central Machine Works, while at least two gasoline dumps were directly hit and burned. Two bombings of the city were more indiscriminate but in one the Southwest Associated University was accurately struck, zif(?) buildings being destroyed. Qualified observers here feel methodical nature of attacks and improved style show foreign influence. Chinese are exhibiting unusual degree of anxiety regarding ground assistance to subvert, foreigners coming in for particular suspicion.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking and Peiping.

PERKINS

WSB



735.94/16738

PS/AC

FILED

AUG 25 1941

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

BOAKE CARTER URGES U. S. TOKYO TIE

Stresses Need To Guard Peace In The Pacific

NEW YORK—Boake Carter, popular commentator for the Hearst chain of newspapers, advocated Japanese-American rapprochement in a recent column. He wrote:

"Right now, it seems, is the time as opportune as ever to seek a rapprochement with Japan as a matter of pure common sense."

"Who is the best equipped as far as an industrial nation goes, as far as fighting goes, as far as a sea power goes, as far as an air power goes, to stand between the United States and either a German or a Russian or a combination menace on the Pacific? Is it not Japan?"

Japan as an Outpost

"If our policy is to keep war away from America by turning ourselves into a supply arsenal for 'outpost' nations, then I see no reason why Japan should not be our outpost in the Pacific area, as Britain is our outpost in the European area."

"Illogical, you say, in view of all that has gone before between Japan and the United States?"

"Certainly no, more illogical than the United States and Britain suddenly rushing to embrace a Soviet Russia, whose Communist agents only yesterday were fomenting strikes in the United States and establishing their 'cells' ready to undermine every preparation this Nation is making to defend itself."

Would Be High Diplomacy

"On the contrary, to negotiate our differences with Japan would be a thousand per cent more logical than almost anything else we could do in the diplomatic field. Japan may have been waging a long war with China. But, primarily, Japan's greatest fear from time immemorial has been Russia—especially a Communistic Red Russia. And it is no more illogical for Japan to entertain such a fear than it is for us to entertain a fear of Nazism and make alliances to protect ourselves against it—and even prepare to go to war to protect ourselves against that menace."

Russo-German Menace

"Now Russia and Germany are locked in combat. The menace of the winner will stretch from the Atlantic shores to the Pacific. In Europe, there stand the British. In the Orient—who? China? It is foolish to think of her in such a role, regardless of the tug of sentimentality. It should be Japan, a tough nation, which doesn't like Germany at heart, prefers the United States, and certainly has not destroyed the principles of life that God-fearing people desire."

Great Bulwark Possible

"There is still time. The opportunity to negotiate our disagreements has not entirely gone. We need only to drop the scales of blindness to realize where our ultimate menace lies."

"A long, powerful line—another Axis if you will—Japan in the Orient, the United States in the center, and Great Britain in Europe, with their fleets and air forces combined would be a tremendous combination of strength against Russia and Germany."

Japanese Donate To Canada Army

VANCOUVER, B. C.—Japanese communities of British Columbia recently presented a check for \$2,043.45, the result of voluntary contributions, for use in sending articles of comfort for the Can-

Equality Will Link Japan Christians To Those in U. S.

TOKYO—Dr. William Axling, honorary adviser of the Christian Federation of Japan, today said here in a press interview that co-operation between American and Japanese Christians henceforth will be on an equal and sharing basis, rather than on a spending-receiving basis.

Describing the series of conferences held between the Japanese delegates and Christian leaders in the United States as "wonderful, successful and extremely meaningful," Dr. Axling said that many misunderstandings and misapprehensions held by American Christians regarding the United Church movement in Japan were satisfactorily explained away by emphasizing the fact that the movement was spontaneous and not forced by outside pressure.

"The proposal to establish a Christian Institute of Pacific Relations with permanent office and staff to keep contact among the Pacific nations," he said, "has

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Canada Chinese Turn to Nanking


YOKOHAMA — Contrary to
 their fellow countrymen in the
 United States, Chinese residents
 in Canada are gradually shifting
 their sympathies toward the Chi-
 nese National Government at
 Nanking.

This was the view expressed
 here by Ippei Nishio, old-time
 Japanese resident of Vancouver,
 upon his arrival on the Heian
 Maru after an absence of 26
 years. He is a Vancouver busi-
 ness man.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Mrs. Rosetta S. Hall, M.D.
 Liberty, New York

50693.24
 058743.94



Mrs. Rosetta S. Hall, ...
 Liberty, New York



*For Cordell Hall,
 Department of State, U.S.A.
 Washington, D.C.*

Personal

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~EOR~~
~~GA~~

To glance through

TD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ASSOCIATION OF CHINESE GENTRY OF FREE CHINA
 34 Ho Teh Kai, Chengtu, Szechwan, China
 Monday 21 July 1941
 The Honorable Cordell Hull
 Secretary of State
 Washington, DC, USA
 Dear Mr. Secretary:

GR
 AIR MAIL
 File

793.94/16799

May we send, with this brief statement upon the
 fourth anniversary of the Sino-Japanese conflict, a
 warm expression of our appreciation for all that you
 are accomplishing towards an equitable and enduring
 peace in the Far East?

With sincere respect

Yen-chi

D. K. Chao
 S. C. Liao
 PS/AC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OPEN LETTER FROM THE ASSOCIATION OF GENTRY
 of
 FREE CHINA
 on the
 FOURTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR WITH JAPAN

July 7th, that date will ever live in Chinese memories. It stands with Sept. 18th (1931) as a witness of unprovoked Japanese aggression. Linked with Sept. 3rd (1939) it also marks the full unmasking of the Axis plot against world freedom. Four years have passed. The hope of a quick victory for Japan was soon dispelled. The subjugation of China and the setting-up of Japan's "new order" have failed before the resolute resistance of the Chinese people. But victory is not yet won for China. The enemy still blockade our coast; they occupy large areas of our land; they bomb our cities and towns. Life everywhere is threatened and imperilled by this mad lust for conquest.

How then do we stand as compared with former anniversaries? What is our hope of victory, whence will it come? Without question the situation is much more favorable than on July 7th, 1940. China was then fighting very much a lone battle. Great Britain stood in great peril because of the collapse of France. The United States policy, in the face of an approaching Presidential election, was friendly but uncertain. French Indo-China had yielded to Japanese threats and pressure - the railway line was cut, and Indo-China became a new base for Japanese attacks on China. Britain, likewise under pressure and fighting for time, had ordered the closing of the Burma Road to transport of war materials to China.

What is the situation now? China is linked inseparably with America and Britain, the two great democracies of the West, in this mortal fight for world freedom. Under President Roosevelt, and with the active support of his presidential opponent, Mr. Wendell Willkie, America has pledged herself to full aid to beleaguered Britain and China. The Burma Road has been open for nine months - not to be closed again. America and Britain are standing behind China financially and with all possible military aid. This A B C combination for the defence of world democracy is stronger than ever before. Victory is ours in China, if we will seek unity of purpose and action, rather than personal, party or provincial advantage. THERE IS NO OTHER WAY. If this war has taught us anything, it is that individual liberty, national sovereignty and political and economic stability throughout the world can be had only by nation-wide and world-wide singleness of purpose to fight for this type of freedom against the Nazi-Fascist totalitarian conception of life.

This is a war of ideas. Everyone should try to realize the political under-currents of this life and death struggle. For what is at stake is not only our immediate future, but that of generations to come. Liberty, which has always carried the highest appeal to human enthusiasm and inspired men to the greatest deeds has once more become the dominant pre-occupation and the ultimate goal of our existence. It is to defend liberty that the peoples of the democracies are prepared to die, because without liberty, or freedom, life is not worth living.

While the idea of freedom is as old as civilization, political freedom only dates back about two centuries. Its growth has been a very slow process and like all great achievements and revolutionary changes, it found its origin in philosophic expression long before it became a fact. It was Spinoza who in 1670 said,

"The final end of the State consists not in domination over men, in restraining them by fear, or subjugating them to the will of others. Rather it has for its end so to act that its citizens shall in security develop soul and body and make free use of their reason; for the true end of the State is Liberty."

The basis of all true democracy is individual freedom. Wherever and whenever any theory of the State or Government renounces or denounces individual freedom or liberty and endeavours to stamp it out, such a State is the enemy of men, the enemy of democracy. The German writer, Nietzsche, spoke of liberty as "the morality of slaves." Hitler saw in human dignity and liberty his greatest potential enemies and the greatest obstacles to his aims of world dominion. So his first pre-occupation was to stifle them.

In one of his recent speeches President Roosevelt urged a re-assessment of this our freedom. He called America and Britain the refuge of all our liberties. He re-kindled in the older countries of Europe, where for many the hope had faded, a new hope that two mighty countries still believe in and practice the freedom that lives in men's hearts. When Roosevelt spoke of the four essential human freedoms, he mentioned in one breath with freedom of speech and freedom of worship, freedom from want and fear. Far from stating a commonplace he unfolded in these words a vast programme and carried the attack into the aggressors' camps.

In Great Britain the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, has again and again in the most positive language and glowing rhetoric pledged the whole might of the British Commonwealth of Nations and to fight till victory is won, not only for a world as it was before Sept. 3rd, 1939, but for a new and better world. He said, "We are determined that the cause of freedom shall not be trampled down nor the tide of world progress turned back by the criminal dictators."

Speaking for China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek has said,

"Resistance and Reconstruction are a single enterprise. They are two individual aspects of the same vast undertaking. The energy which progressive nations are putting into their schemes of national defence and economic reconstruction should rouse in us a spirit of emulation and the determination to advance no less rapidly than they. We have to make reconstruction itself the centre of our concern. The work of reconstruction will prove even more exacting and important than resistance. . . . In the midst of war we must push forward the reconstruction of the economic basis for military preparedness. At the same time there is reconstruction of the mind, of personal relationships, of society and of politics demanding equally close attention. Ultimately the goal is complete realization of the Three People's Principles and the establishment of the Five-Rights Constitution."

So we stand on the fourth anniversary of Japan's undeclared war of aggression upon our country - stronger, more united, regardless of position and wealth, than ever before. We feel assured that America, Britain and China cannot fail in this defence of the democracies. Right shall triumph over might. The liberty of the individual and the freedom of every nation to live in accordance with its national genius and heritage must be maintained. But this can only be accomplished by a deep spirit of sacrifice and by sound discipline. As the Generalissimo has said, "Each person must play the part of a new man living in a new age. Then shall we be able to create a new China."

Chengtzu, Szechuan
 West China.
 July 7th, 1941

D. K. CHOW, President

S. C. LIAO, Vice-President



MICROCOPY

976

ROLL

93

