

MICROCOPY

976

ROLL

1

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 1

1930-39

793.94/1775-2120
Jan. 1930-Oct. 1931



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

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The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

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Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

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In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

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CONTENTS

The decimal file number span, the approximate date span, and a brief description of the subject content of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication are indicated below.

<u>Roll</u>	<u>File Number and Description</u>	<u>Inclusive Dates</u>
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1930-39

GENERAL

The documents reproduced on rolls 1-63 relate to the general topic of political relations between China and Japan, including the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, beginning with the Mukden incident, in 1931; military action at Shanghai in 1932; further Japanese political and economic penetration into China, 1935-36; and the course of the undeclared war between Japan and China, 1937-39. In some cases, documents of a recurring type or relating to special subjects have been placed in subcategories denoted by the use of a keyword; these files are reproduced on roll 64 through the first part of roll 83.

1	793.94/1775-2120	Jan. 1930- Oct. 1931
2	793.94/2121-2340	Oct. 1931
3	793.94/2341-2560	Oct.-Nov. 1931
4	793.94/2561-2770	Oct.-Nov. 1931
5	793.94/2771-2940	Oct.-Nov. 1931
6	793.94/2941-3080	Nov.-Dec. 1931
7	793.94/3081-3250	Nov.-Dec. 1931
8	793.94/3251-3410	Nov. 1931- Jan. 1932
9	793.94/3411-3609	Dec. 1931- Jan. 1932
10	793.94/3610-3900	Jan.-Feb. 1932
11	793.94/3901-4080	Jan.-Feb. 1932
12	793.94/4081-4270	Jan.-Feb. 1932
13	793.94/4271-4450	Feb. 1932
14	793.94/4451-4621	Feb.-Mar. 1932
15	793.94/4622-4830	Feb.-Mar. 1932
16	793.94/4831-4870	Mar. 1932
17	793.94/4871-5020	Mar.-Apr. 1932
18	793.94/5021-5175	Mar.-May 1932
19	793.94/5176-5310	Apr.-June 1932
20	793.94/5311-5500	May-Aug. 1932

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<u>Roll</u>	<u>File Number and Description</u>	<u>Inclusive Dates</u>
21	793.94/5501-5600	July-Oct. 1932
22	793.94/5601-5800	Oct. 1932- Jan. 1933
23	793.94/5801-6100	Jan.-Mar. 1933
24	793.94/6101-6350	Mar.-May 1933
25	793.94/6351-6520	May-Nov. 1933
26	793.94/6521-6680	Nov. 1933- May 1934
27	793.94/6681-6840	Apr. 1934- Jan. 1935
28	793.94/6841-7050	Jan.-June 1935
29	793.94/7051-7255	June-Aug. 1935
30	793.94/7256-7515	Aug.-Dec. 1935
31	793.94/7516-7780	Nov. 1935- Mar. 1936
32	793.94/7781-8000	Feb.-June 1936
33	793.94/8001-8280	June-Oct. 1936
34	793.94/8281-8500	Oct. 1936- Jan. 1937
35	793.94/8501-8757	Dec. 1936- July 1937
36	793.94/8758-9140	July-Aug. 1937
37	793.94/9141-9490	Aug. 1937
38	793.94/9491-9815	Aug. 1937
39	793.94/9816-10130	Aug.-Sept. 1937
40	793.94/10131-10430	Sept.-Oct. 1937
41	793.94/10431-10650	Oct. 1937
42	793.94/10651-10850	Oct. 1937
43	793.94/10851-11030	Oct. 1937
44	793.94/11031-11129	Oct.-Nov. 1937
45	793.94/11130-11350	Oct.-Nov. 1937
46	793.94/11351-11670	Nov.-Dec. 1937
47	793.94/11671-11850	Nov.-Dec. 1937
48	793.94/11851-12140	Dec. 1937- Jan. 1938
49	793.94/12141-12326	Dec. 1937- Feb. 1938
50	793.94/12327-12480	Jan.-Feb. 1938
51	793.94/12481-12690	Feb.-Mar. 1938
52	793.94/12691-12940	Feb.-Apr. 1938
53	793.94/12941-13070	Apr.-May 1938
54	793.94/13071-13450	Apr.-July 1938
55	793.94/13451-13740	June-Aug. 1938
56	793.94/13741-14000	July-Oct. 1938
57	793.94/14001-14250	Sept.-Oct. 1938
58	793.94/14251-14500	Oct.-Dec. 1938
59	793.94/14501-14710	Nov. 1938- Feb. 1939
60	793.94/14711-14924	Jan.-Apr. 1939
61	793.94/14925-15160	Mar.-July 1939

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<u>Roll</u>	<u>File Number and Description</u>	<u>Inclusive Dates</u>
62	793.94/15161-15350	June-Sept. 1939
63	793.94/15351-15561	Aug.-Dec. 1939
64	793.94 Advisory Committee/1-173 An advisory committee was appointed by the Special Assembly of the League of Nations on Feb. 24, 1933, to follow the situation in the Far East. Records relate to the establishment and work of the committee, export of arms, American cooperation, withdrawal of Japan from the League, and recognition of Manchukuo. Also included are reports and resolutions of the committee.	Feb. 1933- Nov. 1939
65(pt.)	793.94 Bulletin/1-11 News reports, prepared by diplomatic and military personnel in China, regarding movements of Americans in Pieping, Tientsin, and the zone of military operations.	July 29- Aug. 10, 1937
65(pt.)	793.94 Commission/1-220 The Lytton Commission was established to make an inquiry in Manchuria and China as proposed by the Council of the League of Nations on Dec. 10, 1931. Records relate to the establishment of the Commission, American participation, the appointment of members and their itinerary, investigations, and the Commission's preliminary report. Also included are records relating to the Shanghai Commission, which was composed of the consuls general in that city.	Dec. 1931- May 1932
66	793.94 Commission/221-360 Investigations by the Commission in China and Manchuria, the drafting of the Commission's report, and Chinese and Japanese reaction to the Commission's work.	Apr.-Sept. 1932
67	793.94 Commission/361-461 Preparation of and reaction to the Commission's report.	Sept.-Oct. 1932
68	793.94 Commission/462 Lytton Commission's report with maps, and State Department Publication No. 378 (reprint of the report).	Oct. 1932

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<u>Roll</u>	<u>File Number and Description</u>	<u>Inclusive Dates</u>
69	793.94 Commission/463-520 Press comments on the Commission's report; preparations for the League debate; positions to be taken by various countries, particularly China and Japan; and the League edition of the Lytton Commission's report (in French and English).	Oct.-Nov. 1932
70	793.94 Commission/521-660 Reactions to the Lytton Commission's report, proceedings of the League Council and Assembly on the Sino-Japanese question, the problem of recognizing Manchukuo, the Four Power draft resolution of December 7, and meetings of the Committee of Nineteen.	Oct.-Dec. 1932
71	793.94 Commission/661-760 Reactions to the Lytton Commission's report, League debate on the Sino-Japanese conflict, and the question of U.S. participation in the work of the Conciliation Committee and the Committee of Nineteen.	Nov. 1932- Jan. 1933
72	793.94 Commission/761-920 Meetings and recommendations of the Committee of Nineteen, the question of an embargo on arms to the Far East, annexes to the Lytton Commission's report, visit of Yosuko Matsuoka to the United States, and Japanese withdrawal from the League.	Jan.-Mar. 1933
73	793.94 Commission/921-944 Withdrawal of Japan from the League and the question of economic boycott. Included is a set of documents entitled "Military Narrative of the Travel and Work of the Far Eastern Commission of Inquiry," consisting of a report, extracts of interviews, and photographs compiled by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission.	Mar. 1933- Feb. 1939
74	793.94 Conference/1-280 The signatories of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 met in Brussels in November 1937 to discuss the Sino-Japanese dispute. Records relate to	Oct.-Nov. 1937

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<u>Roll</u>	<u>File Number and Description</u>	<u>Inclusive Dates</u>
	proposals for the conference, invitations to signatories, personnel of delegations, administrative arrangements, proceedings of the conference, and reactions of China and Japan.	
75	793.94 Conference/281-366(pt.) Offer of the good offices of Great Britain and the United States to China and Japan; press comments on the conference; proposals for reconvening the conference in February 1938; and miscellaneous conference documents, including minutes of meetings.	Nov. 1937- Dec. 1938
76(pt.)	793.94 Conference/366(pt.)-376 Copies of various conference documents.	Feb. 1938- July 1939
76(pt.)	793.94 Manchuria/63-78 Japanese policies and activities in Manchuria. Included are a pamphlet entitled "Japan's Positive Policy in Manchuria," which is a copy of the alleged 1927 Memorial of Premier Tanaka, and records relating to a treaty between Japan and Manchukuo concerning residence and taxation of Japanese residents in Manchuria.	Jan. 1930- July 1936
76(pt.)	793.94 M.I.D. Reports/29, 40-42, 360 Reports received from the Military Intelligence Division: on a con- versation with Gen. Shang Chen on Mar. 1, 1932; on Japanese aerial operations over Shanghai, Jan. 29- Mar. 3, 1932, from the Commander in Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet; on Sino-Japanese operations in the vicinity of Shanghai, January- March 1932, prepared by Capt. William Mayer in the Office of the Military Attache, U.S. Legation, China; on Sino-Japanese opera- tions in the vicinity of Shanghai, Jan. 28-Mar. 7, 1932, prepared by	1932; 1937-38

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<u>Roll</u>	<u>File Number and Description</u>	<u>Inclusive Dates</u>
	the Intelligence Office, 4th Marines, U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces; and on developments in the Sino-Japanese situation, Dec. 22, 1937-Jan. 3, 1938.	
77	793.94 News Items/1-70 Digests of news items and clippings from the <i>New York Times</i> , <i>New York Herald Tribune</i> , <i>Washington Post</i> , and English-language newspapers in China and Japan, and news despatches from Europe and Asia.	Nov. 7, 1931- Feb. 15, 1932
78	793.94 News Items/71-140 Same as for roll 77.	Feb. 8- May 7, 1932
79(pt.)	793.94 News Items/141-172 Same as for roll 77.	May 9- June 13, 1932
79(pt.)	793.94 O.N.I. Reports/1-60 Office of Naval Intelligence reports on Sino-Japanese relations.	Oct. 1931- Dec. 1935
80	793.94 O.N.I. Reports/61-480 Same as for latter part of roll 79.	Dec. 24, 1935- May 9, 1938
81(pt.)	793.94 O.N.I. Reports/481-853 Same as for latter part of roll 79.	May 11, 1938- Nov. 25, 1939
81(pt.)	793.94 P.C./1-40 Popular comment on the Sino-Japanese dispute by private individuals and groups, and members of Congress.	Oct.-Dec. 1931
82	793.94 P.C./41-189 Same as for latter part of roll 81.	Dec. 1931- June 1939
83(pt.)	793.94 Shanghai Round Table/1-54 Japanese proposal in May 1932 for a roundtable conference among Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States to settle the dispute involving Shanghai.	Feb.-Aug. 1932

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<u>Roll</u>	<u>File Number and Description</u>	<u>Inclusive Dates</u>
	POLITICAL	
83(pt.)	War. Peace. Friendship. Alliance. Nonaggression. 793.9411/2-6 Cross-references to documents in the 793.94 file relating to the outbreak of war between Japan and China in 1931 and 1938.	1931; 1938
83(pt.)	Neutrality. 793.94111/1-126 Neutrality and the duties of neutrals in the conflict between China and Japan; pilotage service for Japanese vessels and trans- ports at Shanghai; application of the U.S. Neutrality Act in the Sino-Japanese conflict; pro- tection of U.S. ships calling at Chinese ports; proposals of embargo on the shipment of arms and ammuni- tion to the Far East; and positions of France, U.S.S.R., and Great Britain.	Feb.-Mar. 1932; July 1937- Aug. 1938
83(pt.)	Neutral commerce. 793.94112/1-60 Blockade of shipping at Shanghai; proposal and proclamation of Japanese blockade along the Chinese coast; and the stopping and searching of U.S., British, and French merchant vessels by Japanese naval vessels.	Jan. 1932; Aug.-Sept. 1937
84(pt.)	793.94112/61-308 Dangers to merchant ships in Far Eastern waters; marking of merchant ships to avoid Japanese bombing; blockade of the Chinese coast and attitudes of the U.S., British, and French Governments toward the blockade; effect of the blockade on U.S. ship- ments of petroleum and other products; Japanese destruction of fishing junks; Japanese violation of British territorial waters of Hong Kong; Japanese restrictions on navigation and British shipping on the Yangtze River; and blockade of the Shantung- Hopei coast.	Sept. 1937- Dec. 1939

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<u>Roll</u>	<u>File Number and Description</u>	<u>Inclusive Dates</u>
	Prisoners of war.	
84(pt.)	793.94114/1-12 Inquiries concerning Japanese and Chinese prisoners and meetings of the Consular Body Committee at Shanghai regarding disposition of Chinese detained by the Japanese.	1932; 1938
84(pt.)	793.94114 Wang Keng/1-19 Japanese arrest, imprisonment, and release of Chinese Gen. Wang Keng.	Feb. 28-Aug. 12, 1932
	Civil prisoners. Enemy noncombatants.	
85(pt.)	793.94115/1-12 Meetings of the Consular Body Committee at Shanghai regarding Chinese detained by the Japanese and arrest and release of Dr. M. I. Ting by the Japanese.	Sept. 1937-Nov. 1939
	Illegal and inhumane warfare.	
85(pt.)	793.94116/1-134 Charges of inhumane warfare waged by the Japanese; Japanese bombing of camp of flood refugees near Shanghai in February 1932; use of chemical warfare; bombing of civilian populations, particularly in Canton in 1938; and pamphlet entitled "The Bombing of Canton," published by the Canton Committee for Justice to China (1938).	Jan. 18, 1932-Sept. 21, 1939
	Military observers.	
85(pt.)	793.94118/1-101 U.S. military observers in China.	Nov. 1931-May 1932; Sept. 1937-Sept. 1938
	Termination of war.	
86	793.94119/1-240 Proposed peace conferences and negotiations, Japanese peace proposals, offers of mediation by foreign powers, and the role of the League of Nations in the peace proposals. This file consists mainly of cross-references to documents in the 793.94 file interspersed with a few original documents. The cross-reference sheets are usually accompanied	Feb.-Apr. 1932

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<u>Roll</u>	<u>File Number and Description</u>	<u>Inclusive Dates</u>
	by a typed copy or abstract of the document.	
87	793.94119/241-550 Same as for roll 86.	Apr. 1932- June 1933; Aug. 1937- June 1939
88(pt.)	793.94119/551-618 Same as for roll 86.	June-Dec. 1939
	Arbitration.	
88(pt.)	793.9412/1-2 Report of possible negotiation of a treaty of arbitration between China and Japan.	Oct. 29, 1931
	Cession of Territory.	
88(pt.)	793.9414/5-12 Reports of the naval attache in Tokyo that the Japanese Government is negotiating with China in an effort to purchase Pratas Reef.	June-Aug. 1935
	COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION	
88(pt.)	793.94/42-43 Translation of a draft of a Sino- Japanese treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation proposed by China.	Jan. 8 and Feb. 7, 1930
88(pt.)	793.9427/1 Cross-reference to agreement between China and Japan for air route between North China and Japan.	Oct. 22, 1936
	EXTRATERRITORIALITY	
88(pt.)	793.943/5-18 Cross-references and documents relating to the position of Japan on the question of extraterritoriality in China.	Mar. 1830- July 1938
88(pt.)	793.943 Manchuria/1-60 Application of extraterritorial rights to Japanese nationals in Manchukuo and abolition of Japanese extraterritoriality in Manchuria.	April 1933- June 1938

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<u>Roll</u>	<u>File Number and Description</u>	<u>Inclusive Dates</u>
1940-44		
GENERAL		
The documents reproduced on roll 89 through the first part of roll 95 relate to the general topic of political relations between China and Japan and are a continuation of the documents in the 793.94 file reproduced on roll 1 through the first part of roll 83. The records concern mainly the undeclared war between China and Japan, 1940-41; Japanese military operations, particularly the bombing of the Yunnan Railway, Chungking, and other Chinese cities; Chinese resistance to the Japanese advance into southern China; efforts to bring about an agreement between China and Japan; and the reaction of the United States and other governments to the continuing war.		
89	793.94/15562-15659	Jan.-Feb. 1940
90	793.94/15660-15849	Feb.-May 1940
91	793.94/15850-16099	Apr.-Aug. 1940
92	793.94/16100-16499	Aug. 1940- Mar. 1941
93	793.94/16500-16799	Jan.-July 1941
94	793.94/16800-17100	July 1941- Oct. 1942
95(pt.)	793.94/17101-793.94/8-2144	Nov. 1942- Aug. 1944
95(pt.)	793.94 Conference/377-378 Alleged American policy of encirclement of Japan, and possible British-American fleet movements in the Far East.	Mar. 13, 1940; Sept. 18, 1942
95(pt.)	793.94 O.N.I./956 Office of Naval Intelligence digest of press information in China.	May 1, 1940

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<u>Roll</u>	<u>File Number and Description</u>	<u>Inclusive Dates</u>
	POLITICAL	
	War. Peace. Friendship. Alliance. Nonaggression.	
95(pt.)	793.9411/7 Cross-reference to war between China and Japan.	Jan. 18, 1940
	Neutrality.	
95(pt.)	793.94111/127 Japanese violation of Hong Kong neutrality.	May 31, 1940
	Neutral commerce.	
95(pt.)	793.94112/287-436 Neutral commerce, blockade, proposed reopening of the Yangtze River in 1940 from Shanghai to Nanking, reopening of the Pearl River to commercial traffic, proposed opening of the Port of Swatow, and reopening of Customs- houses at Chingkiang and Nanking.	Jan. 1940- Nov. 1941
	Prisoners of war.	
95(pt.)	793.94114/13 Cross-reference to the 793.94/16136 file relating to the capture of Japanese General Mishio. Illegal and inhumane warfare.	Aug. 16, 1940
95(pt.)	793.94116/124-147 Cross-references to and documents concerning Japanese bombing raids and alleged use of poison gas.	Jan. 1940- Feb. 1942
	Military observers.	
95(pt.)	793.94118/102-104 Visit of Brazilian Army Chief of Staff to Japan, 1940, and proposal for sending American aviation officer to China, 1941.	Feb. 1940- Mar. 1941
	Termination of war.	
96(pt.)	793.94119/619-775 Peace proposals, 1940-41, and reactions of China and Japan to various proposed settlements.	Jan. 1940- Oct. 1942

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<u>Roll</u>	<u>File Number and Description</u>	<u>Inclusive Dates</u>
96(pt.)	Cession of Territory. 793.9414/13 Japanese occupation of Pratas Island and Reef.	June 9, 1941
96(pt.)	EXTRATERRITORIALITY 793.943/19 Speech by Japanese Foreign Minister Arita on Japanese extraterritoriality in China.	Mar. 12, 1940

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

The red ink papers filed under this
number and dated prior to January 1, 1929
have been destroyed under authorization of
Congress (See House Report No. 1282, 73rd
Congress, 2nd Session, and other papers
File Nos. 116/231, 243, 256)

193.94

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

An Open Letter to the
 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
 INTO THE MANCHURIAN SITUATION

AT 1932

from the

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF SHANGHAI

accompanied by the article

A Refutal of Japanese Misrepresentations with Regard
 to the Causes Leading to the Sino-Japanese Crisis

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 APR 12 1932
 Department of State

Granted:

(1) that the question of proportion need not be taken into consideration in making reprisals: the slightest provocation on the part of a nation justifies the seizure of thousands of miles of her territory, the demolition of her administrations and the wholesale massacre of her civilians;

(2) that occasional obstruction to the monopolistic rights and privileges, obtained at the point of the bayonet, which are in direct contradiction with the principles of Open Door and Equal Opportunities guaranteed by international treaties, and which have been rendered null and void by the Nine-Power Treaty, justifies the scrapping of the Kellogg Pact, the Nine-Power Treaty and the League Covenant, all of which have been voluntarily signed by the nations concerned;

(3) that only encroachments upon legal rights, no matter how obtained, should be called "provocations", while a series of thefts, plunders and murders, provided they are carried out by a responsible, efficient and well organized nation and not by irresponsible bandits and provided they are sanctioned by an open declaration of war, are not provocations;

China still has a better case than Japan. Nobody has the right to take for granted Japan's allegation that China has provoked Japan (instead of the reverse) before the Manchurian coup, without first giving both sides a fair hearing.

Reprint welcome.

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Department of State letter
By Charles E. Lyons Jr.

c.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

August 10, 1972

NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF SHANGHAI

Shanghai, March 7, 1932.

The League of Nations Commission of Inquiry into the Manchurian Situation, Shanghai.

Your Excellencies,

At this stage it is quite futile to argue with Japan about right and wrong. But as the Japanese, while perpetrating every imaginable transgression and atrocity, moralizes at the same time on the righteousness of their course, something ought to be said. There is no lack of people in the world who are deceived by Japan's energetic and unscrupulous propaganda. Then there are also some self-styled China experts, accustomed to all sorts of unrestrained transgressions, but lately piqued by the slight check to their arrogance, who find this an opportunity to take side with Japan to defame China in the eyes of the world. For these reasons the true aspects of the present crisis have been hidden from the public abroad. Moreover, China has not been able to follow Japan's examples to demand satisfaction through destruction and massacre; therefore the world's attention has not been drawn to her grievances, though they are far more numerous and beyond comparison with those alleged by Japan. Even those who are most emphatic in their condemnation of the Japanese actions in Manchuria and Shanghai are under the impression that China is at least to be blamed for furnishing of excuses for these actions.

We beg to submit to you in the following a refutation of the Japanese misrepresentations with regard to the background of the Manchurian situation.

Accompanying this is also an article entitled "A Refutation of Japanese Misrepresentations with Regard to the Causes Leading to the Sino-Japanese Crisis." It is an attempt to deal more in detail and with indisputable proofs the matters outlined in this letter. The quotations therein are exclusively from materials of either Japanese or neutral foreign sources. Of course, it is impossible to give more than illustrative samples in the few pages, but a closer study of materials regarding Sino-Japanese relations will convince everyone of the authenticity and good faith of every word in the article, as well as in this letter.

No effort is being made in either this letter or the article to dwell on the events in Manchuria since September 18 and in Shanghai since January 28, for they are too self-speaking to need much comment.

Enough it is to state in passing that, owing to its remoteness from the center of foreign interest and on account of stringent Japanese

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censorship, little news other than Japanese propaganda has leaked out from Manchuria, but an examination of the present conditions in Shanghai will give an example of what tribulations the people in Manchuria have to subject to. Despite their recommendation for discretion prompted by the fear of incurring Japanese displeasure, a casual glance in the local foreign newspapers will discover not a few eye-witness reports of atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese in Shanghai towards Chinese civilians, including women and children.

PROVOCATIONS.

An intruder breaks into and occupies a house. The rightful owner is unable to eject him but is forced to make the best he can of the situation. Any show of lack of enthusiasm in carrying out the conditions imposed by the intruder calls forth severe blows and kicks for the owner. Now, to carry his abuse still further, the intruder throws the owner out of his own house, at the same time announcing publicly that repeated provocations on the part of the owner has compelled him to expel the latter as a measure of self-defence. The by-standers, cowed by the boldness of the intruder and disheartened by the owner's inability and unwillingness to retaliate, not only condones the former's actions, but also echoes his assertion that the latter should submit docilely to the ill-treatments, and that he has only himself to blame for his sufferings.

The above is an exact simile of the relation between China and Japan before the Shanghai affair began.

The Japanese have declared that the people in the West are unfamiliar with the historical background of the Sino-Japanese relations and have therefore misunderstood the situation. The history of the relations between China and Japan for the last half century has been nothing else but a record of despoilations through treachery or violence on the part of Japan. Anyone at all acquainted with the history of the East will recall how Japan alienated Formosa from China; how she annexed Korea and Riu Kiu; how she served on China the Twenty-One Demands; how she violated China's neutrality, both in the Russo-Japanese War and in her siege of Tsingtao; how she repeatedly supplied ammunition and funds to factions in rebellion against the Central Government; how she acquired concessions by trick or force, such as the mines of Yentai and Penhsihu; how she interrupted the victorious advance of the Nationalist army in Shantung, bombarding the city of Tsinan and brutally murdering Mr. Tsai Kung-se, the then Foreign Commissioner for Shantung; how she assassinated Marshal Chang Tso-lin; how she connived at the massacre of Chinese in Korea, lasting for over ten days and resulting in 143 deaths, 345 wounded and 72 missing for the Chinese.

Japan's encroachments on Chinese rights in Manchuria would make those she accuses China of entirely insignificant. The stationing of troops along the railway lines after Russia had withdrawn her railway guards; the establishment of police forces in the interior; the trespassing on territories beyond the limits of the railway areas to seize and kill Chinese nationals; all these have been continuously going on. On what agreements or treaties, however harsh or unreasonable, are these illegalities based?

The Japanese are prone to accuse us of encroachments on her rights and privileges and violations of treaties and agreements. What are these rights and privileges? What are these treaties and agreements? Are they anything better than thefts and plunders? Assuming that thefts and plunders are sacred possessions not to be returned to their original owners, assuming that rights and privileges acquired through the medium of treachery and force and treaties and agreements signed at the point of the bayonet have indisputed validity, the Japanese have even gone beyond the limits they themselves have fixed.

Whatever irregularities China may have been guilty of have been insignificant and in the nature of neglect and reluctance to carry out the undertakings she had been compelled to agree. Japan's provocations are by far the graver, anyone of her numerous aggressive actions will more than offset all the alleged provocations on the part of China. On the slightest excuse she sends her warships, occupies and bombards cities and massacres officials and civilians; and even after that China has to submit to all sorts of humiliations in the form of apologies and indemnities. While China's grievances go unnoticed, as all she can do is to utter expostulations and protests, invariably unheeded by Japan.

Take, for instance, the massacre of Chinese in Korea last year. Everyone is well acquainted with the iron grip which the Japanese police has on the Koreans. During the outbreak, the Chinese Consul appealed to the Japanese authorities for the protection of our nationals, yet the orgies lasted for more than ten days without anything being done by the Japanese to prevent them. To the Chinese protest and demand for indemnity and apology, Japan replied that this was an affair of the people and that the government could not hold itself responsible for it; of course, no atonement whatever was made, and the matter remains unsettled to this day.

Compare this with the incident of Shanghai. Five Japanese were attacked by a mob near the boundary line between the Chinese Municipality and the International Settlement, and one of them died. To retaliate, the Japanese "ronins" set fire to the San-Yu towel factory and killed a Chinese Settlement policeman. Yet the Japanese authorities sent an ultimatum demanding among others an apology from the Shanghai Mayor and the stopping of all boycott activities of the people;

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no mention was made of the actions of the "ronins". It was declared in the ultimatum that, unless satisfaction was given, the Japanese military would take whatever actions it considered necessary. In order to avert serious disaster to Shanghai, the Municipality of Greater Shanghai was compelled to accept everyone of these terms. Why could not the Chinese also reply that it was an affair of the people and that the government could not hold itself responsible for it? Even the Japanese Consul announced that the Chinese reply was "satisfactory for the time being," and everyone considered the episode as closed, at least for a while. But in the same night the Japanese forces invaded Chapei. The details of the affairs from then on are too fresh to need any reiteration here.

The immense disparity in importance between the killing of Captain Nakamura and the assassination of Marshal Chang Tso-lin is clear beyond doubt. No effort has been made by Japan to settle the case of the late Marshal's murder, not even was the report of the investigations published. The Tokyo police prohibited the presses from publishing reports and comments pertaining to Japan's complicity in this case. The government requested the members of the Diet to forego the parliamentary right of interrogation in this matter.

But how different was it in the case of Captain Nakamura! The suspect was arrested by the Chinese authorities of Manchuria in their bona fide intention to clear up the matter, although it was generally believed that the Captain was carrying on espionage during his travels in Mongolia before his death. According to Mr. Harry Paxton Howard in the China Weekly Review of October 17, Captain Nakamura was travelling on a passport representing him as a scholar making geographical studies; and the Japanese Consul in Mukden, Mr. Morishima, stated to Mr. Howard that the Captain was on military duty at that time, and not on vacation. The Japanese War Department made the utmost use of this affair to arouse the bitter feelings of both their military and general public against the Chinese to pave the way for an invasion into Manchuria. Alarmed at the prospect of a civil settlement through the arrest of the suspect and fully aware of the submissiveness of the Chinese authorities, the Japanese hastened to bring the matter to a crisis. Failing any other excuse, the wrecking of two meters of the track of the South Manchuria Railway was staged, and the projected invasion was inaugurated on September 18.

Cases such as the above give the Japanese, besides the satisfaction of apologies and indemnities, the excuse for occupation of cities and massacre of civilians, but the protests of the Chinese over their grievances, hundreds of times graver, are completely ignored. If the building of railways by China in her own territories constitutes an encroachment on Japanese rights and a violation of fictitious agreements

(Japan asserted that the construction of the Tachusan-Tungliao Line, supposedly parallel to the South Manchuria Railway, was contrary to the alleged "Secret Protocols" of 1905 which Japan herself had not produced even at the Washington Conference) and therefore sufficient excuse for the occupation of the whole of Manchuria; what will the case be of Japan's continual infringement of Chinese rights, as, for instance, the stationing of railway guards, the posting of police forces, the illegal appropriation of mines etc., as given in detail in the accompanying article. Since the alleged passive delinquencies on the part of the Chinese have been sufficient justification for the actions the Japanese have taken, then, had Japan suffered the wrongs she herself has inflicted on China, the occupation of the whole of our country and the wiping off of our entire population would not be considered by them as an adequate atonement.

PROTECTION OF NATIONALS.

On the pretence of protecting her nationals Japan sends fleets of warships, battalions of soldiers with every conceivable kind of machines of war to China. The result, aside from the destruction of lives and property to the Chinese, is the general crumbling of peace and order, the stoppage of all business, the endangering of lives of all nationals, including the Japanese. Shanghai, Manchuria and Tsinan are the examples.

Then there is the question of "potential menace," a term the Japanese are so prone to use, as in her justification for the extension of military activities in Manchuria and Shanghai. If potential menace justified the invasion of territories and massacre of civilians, what would the punishment be for accomplished crimes? Now, in the case of the massacre in Korea mentioned above, was China allowed to send her military forces to protect her nationals from actual—not potential—danger? No, the Japanese disclaimed all responsibilities and refused her any sort of satisfaction in either indemnity or apology!

There never has been any actual danger to Japanese lives and property in China. Japan's sending of troops and warships is merely an attempt to create the danger which otherwise would never exist. The provocations the Chinese have been subject to since the Manchurian crisis, not to mention those before, have been beyond endurance, yet is unbelievable how few cases of violence against the Japanese have been committed by the Chinese in territories under Chinese administration. Of deaths in Chinese controlled territories that the Japanese could possibly accuse us of, besides the one that led to the Shanghai crisis mentioned above, there is only that of a couple in a Japanese club in Foochow. Though the cause was not proven—suicide was suspected—the provincial government was subjected to the severest of humiliations.

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This shows how well we are able to protect foreign nationals. The restraint of the Chinese people is as unparalleled in the world as is the savagery of the Japanese. The Japanese population in Shanghai has been reduced from 25,000 to 14,000 within one month of January 28 as a creditable result of Their government's effort of protection.

SUPPRESSION OF BANDITS.

Another reason Japan gives for the expedition of military forces is that of suppressing bandits. It is well-known now that any troops that do not submit to Japanese control have been termed bandits by them. Japanese invasions into Manchuria has thrown the country into unprecedented chaos. The disruption of the Chinese administrations and the forcible disbandment of the Chinese soldiers by the Japanese army have greatly aggravated the bandit menace. From Viscount S. Goto's "Japanese Military Forces in Manchuria" and from the records of the Secret Conference for the Maintaining of Japanese Interests in Manchuria, held in December 1930, it can be seen that the Japanese have nurtured and assisted the bandits to create opportunities for intervention.

BOYCOTT.

Boycott is an expression of a people's freewill. It is only a mild form of resentment on the part of a weaker nation. If there have been any illegalities, they are solely the concern of the judicial courts, comparable to picketing in a strike. All the indiscretions in the boycott in China have been committed against Chinese nationals only. Should the moderate protest of a people in the form of boycott against another's invasion of territories and massacre of compatriots be termed as an act of provocation and justify intervention? If, to show resentment for grave grievances, the members of a family agree to refrain from making purchases from a certain shop, and if, to effect a strict observance of the agreement, the members use among themselves threat or even force, would that justify the shopkeeper to break into their house and intervene by force? Besides, economic Boycott is sanctioned by the Covenant, China has only done a duty in which the other nations have failed.

CHINA'S DISUNITY.

If China was disunited, as asserted by Japan, it was her own affair. As to how many years it is to take China to emerge from the period of transition, it is none of Japan's business. Whatever part another nation could take in China's affairs, should be that of assisting her in her effort to achieve unification. There is no excuse whatever for Japan to take advantage of China's inability to present a united front and to pursue her course of plunder and devastation. The Nine-Power Treaty has foreseen that by explicitly stipulating that the contracting powers were "to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights and privileges." Most nations, having only commercial

interests at heart, are anxious for a peaceful and consolidated China. But to Japan a united China would be in conflict with her unscrupulous schemings. Whenever there is a chance for China to unite, Japan finds some means of obstructing it. The assisting of the revolutionaries in the overthrow of Yuan Shih-kai; the checking of the Nationalists' victorious advance northwards through the bombardment of Tsinan and the cutting of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway; the assassination of Marshal Chang Tso-lin to create disturbances in Manchuria; the intimidation of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang against his allegiance to the Nationalist Government are notable instances.

SELF-DETERMINATION.

It has been alleged by Japan that the setting up of an independent government in Manchuria was a matter of self-determination and that her nationals were forbidden to take part in it. As a matter of fact, the movement for secession has been under the direct management and with the active support of the Japanese. Their army in Manchuria, after driving the provincial governments from Mukden, Kirin and Tsitsihar, has been rendering overt assistance to factions in revolt against them. This and the attack in league with its proteges on the troops loyal to the Central Government is still going on. As to the so-called "independence" government in Mukden, it consists of a few miscreants and puppets set up by the Japanese. First Pu-Yi (Ex-Emperor of the Ching Dynasty) was carried off to Mukden, and then pressure was brought on Yu Tsung-han, Hsi-ha, Yuan King-Kai, Tsang Shih-yi and others.

In the case of Tsang Shih-yi, it is interesting to note, according to reports of the Shanghai Evening Post, that he "had been kept in close confinement under the Japanese military guard for practically three months" and was "actually taken from jail and placed in the governor's chair."

The term "Manchurians" is only of historical significance. The bulk of the population of the Three Eastern Provinces consists of immigrants from China proper and of their descendents, and whatever there remained of the original Manchurians have been absorbed by these. It would be quite a task to find actual "Manchurians" in Manchuria. Therefore the term "self-determination," as used in this connection, is a misnomer. It is only a thinly veiled subterfuge, which is not even calculated to convince anybody. One has only to recall the successive stages of independence, protectorate and annexation Japan had enacted in Korea, contrary to her treaty commitments.

Moreover, Japan, in uprooting Chinese civil governments; in attacking troops loyal to the Central Government; in seizing bank deposits, the salt revenue and industrial and military supplies; in usurping the control of the railways, telegraph, telephone and postal services and in closing the Chinese American owned wireless station, does not even

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bother to act through the agency of her puppets. They are the direct actions of the Japanese army in open violation of the territorial and administrative integrity of China as guaranteed by numerous treaties and agreements culminating in the Nine-Power Treaty.

JAPAN'S OVER-POPULATION.

Japan's plea of over-population and the need of Manchuria for her surplus population may appear plausible superficially. Her policy, as outlined by the late Baron Tanaka, has been that of the emigration of Koreans to Manchuria to make room in Korea for the Japanese, and to create opportunities for intervention through the clashes between Koreans and Chinese. Her colonies, all except Korea, are thinly populated; and the large track of Hokkaido of Japan proper is yet barely populated. If there is any actual need for emigration, Japan should first make full use of her own territories.

According to the Jiji Yearbook for 1929, the annual per capita consumption of rice in Japan has been:

1896-19000.930 kokus;
1906-19101.022 " ;
1923-19271.123 " .

As rice is the most valued staple food in Japan, this plainly shows the progress of prosperity of her people. According to T. Chiba (Japanese), the annual cost of living per person of a Chinese farming family in South Manchuria is 62.45 yen, that of a person of a farming family in Japan proper 154.51 yen. Yet the Manchurian farmers are expected to make room for the by far more prosperous Japanese.

Japan's food production is practically self-supporting. The annual consumption of rice in Japan proper during 1923-1927 was 66,745,000 kokus. Her net import of rice from foreign countries is 3,270,000 kokus, less than 5 per cent of the total consumption (Jiji Yearbook, 1929). This percentage is quite negligible for so well industrialized a nation (Japan's agricultural population has been reduced to 48 per cent of the total in 1910) compared with the 80 per cent of England, 44 per cent of Germany, 30 per cent of Italy and 22 per cent of France in net wheat importation.

The density of population in Japan proper is 396 per square mile, that of Korea, 230; while in China it reaches up to 896, as in the case of Kiangsu Province. In Shantung and Hopei, the provinces which supply the bulk of the immigrants in Manchuria, the density of population is 614 and 335 respectively (statistics of the Postal Service, 1926). The immigration of Japanese nationals consists mainly of Koreans, the total of emigrants from Japan proper to Manchuria is only 15 per cent of the total for all Japanese subjects. Korea has an area equal to that of Shantung and Hopei together, but its population is only half that of Shantung alone.

Whatever opportunities there are in Manchuria, China should have at least the prior right of availing herself thereof. Only after the consideration of her own interests, should the land be open for the settlement of other nationals, strictly under Chinese laws and administration.

Japan has claimed credit for the encouragement of Chinese immigration in Manchuria on account of the South Manchuria Railway. But the major part of the Chinese immigration has been in the completely Chinese controlled North Manchuria. Mr. Walter Young estimated the Chinese immigration in Manchuria for the first half year of 1927 at 200,000 for South Manchuria and 432,000 for North Manchuria, 32 per cent and 68 per cent respectively of the total. Even in South Manchuria the settlement must necessarily be mainly in the Chinese administered territories, as the railway area is only a narrow track of the country. And even should the South Manchuria Railway be any inducement for settlement, it was not built by Japan, but was only wrested by her from Russia. Rather, Japan has always hindered the development of Manchuria through her creation of disturbances and her opposition to China's construction of new lines.

Manchuria is an integral part of China, and China, as its rightful owner, is entitled to make whatever use of it she sees fit. If the over-population of one country justifies its invasion into another, then the day will come when the under-populated America and the still less populated Australia shall be compelled to open for access of nationals of another country.

Ever since the precipitation of the Manchurian crisis and right until the undeclared war of Shanghai, the Japanese army never received a single check in its mad career. China persisted in her policy of non-resistance. The Japanese Government, awed by the successes of the militarists, followed meekly at their heels and busied itself solely with the explaining away the transgressions of its army. The League, disheartened by the defiance of the Japanese to all entreaties for moderation, avoided any commitment of an open condemnation of the Japanese actions. Most of the nations, fearful of involvement and courting the favour of the powerful, observed an unperturbed reticence in spite of their obligations in the Kellogg Pact and the League Covenant. A large portion of the public opinion, with its respect for might and contempt for weakness and its susceptibility to propaganda, even went so far as to echo the Japanese contention that provocative acts of the Chinese had been the cause of the catastrophe, as if Japan would need any excuse for her aggressions! Only when Shanghai became the field of her activities, when foreign interests were endangered, was a tame effort made to stay the Japanese impetus; and this only for as long as to ward off the danger from the Settlement.

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By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

If, at the beginning, the League had tried to do its duty by an outspoken censure of the Japanese actions, Japan may not have strictly conformed to its commands; but her aggressions, restrained by the moral pressure, would at least have stopped somewhere. If the League was doubtful about the carrying out of its resolutions, the least it could do would be to fearlessly assert its authority as a judge by passing an unequivocal sentence on the Manchurian crisis. The League, by thus exercising its judicial power, would have attempted to do its duty, to uphold its prestige and to justify its existence. "Deeds speak louder than words," to quote the Japanese themselves in their recent reply to the League. This is not the time to debate about the subtle niceties of the distinction between a war declared and one undeclared. Is there still a particle of doubt over the violation of the League Covenant?

Manchuria has been under Japanese military occupation for six months. This intolerable condition must cease at once. Japanese troops must be immediately withdrawn. The territories must be immediately handed back to the original Chinese authorities from whom they have been wrested. Then, and only then, should the unsettled issues be submitted to the World Court. China will welcome such an opportunity to clear up her case.

Respectfully,

THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF SHANGHAI
(Signed) WANG HSIAO-LAI
Chairman.

A REFUTAL OF JAPANESE MISREPRESENTATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE CAUSES LEADING TO THE SINO-JAPANESE CRISIS

This is an attempt to show in the proper perspective the different causes leading to the Sino-Japanese crisis in reply to Japanese misrepresentations abroad. No effort is being made to dwell on the Japanese aggressions and atrocities in Manchuria since September 13 and Shanghai since January 28, for they are too self-speaking to need much comment.

All the quotations here are from materials of either Japanese or neutral foreign sources. Of course, it is impossible to give more than illustrative samples in the few pages, but a closer study of materials concerning Sino-Japanese relations will convince everyone of the authenticity and good faith of every word here.

I. THE QUESTION OF "PARALLEL LINES."

Much publicity has been given by the Japanese about China's encroachments on Japanese rights, especially relative to the question of the "Parallel Lines." It has been claimed that China had agreed in the "Secret Protocols" of 1905 not to construct parallel lines in the neighborhood of the South Manchuria Railway. The existence of the said protocols was categorically denied by Dr. Wellington Koo, former Minister of the Chinese Foreign Affairs. It is therefore a one-sided allegation without basis of any treaty or agreement; though it has been surmised that the so-called "Secret Protocols" were only the minutes of the Conference prior to the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1905.

The Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peking, 1905, consists of the Formal Treaty and the Additional Agreement. It is evident that either there do not exist any "Secret Protocols," or that they are only some unreasonable demands by the Japanese not accepted by the Chinese; for otherwise why were they not included in either the Formal Treaty or the Additional Agreement? The alleged "Protocols" were not produced by the Japanese when they opposed the construction of the Hsinmingsun-Fakumen Line. And during the Washington Conference no attention was called on the existence of the protocols. The Resolution XI of the Washington Conference provided that:

"The several Powers other than China will at their earliest convenience file with the Secretariat General of the Conference for transmission to the participating Powers, a list of all treaties, conventions, exchanges of notes, or other international agreements which

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they may have with China, or with any other Power or Powers in relation to China, which they deem to be still in force and upon which they may desire to reply... *In any case in which the document may not have been published, a copy of the text (in its original language or languages) will be filed with the Secretariat General of the Conference.*

Even should the existence of the protocols be assumed they would be valueless on account of their incompatibility with the principles of Open Door and Equal Opportunities and the respect for China's sovereignty in Manchuria guaranteed by fully a dozen treaties, agreements, or declarations made by the Powers during the period of 1896-1905. Right before the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1905, Japan agreed by the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905), 'not to obstruct any general measure common to all countries, which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.' Then also any treaty or agreement which violates the principles of Open Door and Equal Opportunities and is injurious to China's territorial or administrative integrity in Manchuria is rendered obsolete by the Nine Power Treaty. To quote C. Walter Young (Young: The International Relations of Manchuria, P.265): "As for any practical and legal bearing that such would have upon the future in the international relations, of Manchuria, it seems apparent that, since the negotiations preceding the formation of the China Consortium Agreement of October, 1920, and especially since the Washington Conference they would be practically obsolete." So the alleged protocols are in conflict with the treaties and agreements both before and since 1905.

In a lecture given by Prof. Kisaburo Yokoda of the Tokyo Imperial University, on the 15th October last, he stated among others:

"The Japanese accusation of China's violation of treaty in constructing the Tsuchuan-Tungliao Line is quite ungrounded, as this line is quite a hundred miles from the South Manchuria Railway. If they could be called parallel, then the Tokaido and the Central Lines in Japan would be parallel too."

It has always been the policy of governments to build as many railways as practicable to facilitate communication. For example, the London-York and the Bristol-Liverpool Lines run parallel to each other at a distance of some seventy miles, yet there is also the London-Leeds Line between them, at a distance of less than 40 miles to either of the two lines. The Peiping-Hankow and the Tientsin-Pukow Lines are also parallel to each other. If Japan opposes to the construction of the Tsuchuan-Tungliao Line on account of its being parallel to the South Manchuria Line, then any line running between north and south

would be parallel to the South Manchuria and would call forth Japanese resentment.

II. THE QUESTION OF PROVOCATION.

Japanese propaganda abroad has repeatedly accused China of provocative actions; and it has been contended that she has, through the ignoring of the unsettled issues and the disregard of treaty obligations, incited the indignation of the Japanese people, and compelled them to seize Manchuria as a measure of effecting a prompt settlement of the outstanding issues.

Any one who is acquainted with the Sino-Japanese relations knows that any "provocations" China could be accused of would be in the nature of neglect or reluctance in complying with obligations of treaties and agreements signed at the point of the sword and under protest. It is the only attitude a weaker nation could take towards treaties which are no more sacred than the loot of a robber. How do they compare with Japan's deliberate and aggressive encroachments on Chinese rights and her violation of international laws and treaties? It would be futile to try to enumerate them all here, but a few examples should serve as illustrations. The bombardment of Tsinan; the assassination of Chang Tso-Lin; the massacre of over a hundred of Chinese nationals in Korea are the most flagrant cases in recent years. Her repeated attempts in obstructing China's unification, by assisting rebels with funds and ammunition, and by impeding the advance of government troops, even to the extent of actual military interference, are events too grave to be forgotten. Going further back, there are her violation of China's neutrality, by trespassing Chinese territories during her siege of Tsingtao and during the Russo-Japanese War; the forcing on China of the Twenty-one Demands when the Powers were occupied with the World War; the annexation of Formosa, Korea, and Riu Kiu. The illegal stationing of troops in the railway areas and the establishment of police posts in the interior of Manchuria have been responsible for numerous outrages and constant troubles.

Most of the misdeeds China has been accused of have been perpetrated by elements out of control, and Japan has always been able to extract, besides immediate retaliations, atonement in the form of apologies and indemnities out of all proportions to the offences. On the other hand, though Japanese outrages have nearly always been authorized and approved by their government, our protests go unheeded, because of our inability to back up our demands with the display of force.

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The following is a partial list compiled from the incomplete official archives rescued from Shenyang (Mukden) and other cities which, since September 18, have been occupied by Japanese troops. This list only covers a small fraction of what China had to suffer from her high-handed neighbor in recent years. As she is not able to follow Japan's example of military invasion and wholesale massacre on the slightest provocation, no attention has been drawn to her grievances, however grave they have been:

(1) The Illegal Stationing of Japanese Troops in Manchuria constitutes the most flagrant act of aggression, and from it has flowed innumerable lesser acts of aggression. Despite Japanese official pronouncements to the contrary, the stationing of Japanese railway guards in South Manchuria Railway area is devoid of legal basis or treaty sanction. This is conclusively proved by a careful reading of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peking, December 22, 1905, in which China only assented to the transfers and assignments made by Russia to Japan under Article V and VI of the Portsmouth Treaty, as well as the proceedings of the 1921-1922 Washington Conference. And it is interesting to recall that, unable to produce the promised necessary treaty citation, the Japanese delegate at the Washington Conference was driven to shift his ground and plead expediency.

Article II of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of December 22, 1905 reads in part: "... the Imperial Japanese Government, in the event of Russia agreeing to the withdrawal of her railway guards, or in case other proper measures are agreed to between China and Russia, consent to take similar steps ..." Whatever legal basis the Japanese may have for the stationing of troops has been rendered obsolete through the Sino-Russian Agreement of 1924, in which Russia restored to China the right of guarding the railways.

In September last the Japanese Minister for War, General Minami, contended that Japan was entitled to station 15 soldiers per kilometre of the South Manchuria Railway, or a total of 16,500, according to his reckoning. As a matter of fact, however, there are in the South Manchuria Railway area, excluding the fighting units which Japan despatched to Manchuria since September 18, no less than 14,760 railway guards, 5,400 military police, over 2,500 patrolmen, 52 aeroplanes manned by officers and men, 1,500 railway police and over 3,000 police constables attached to the various Japanese Consulates in Manchuria. Thus excluding the consular police and railway police, there are at least more than 22,000 men stationed more or less permanently in Manchuria and equipped for belligerent purposes.

(2) The Illegal Establishment of Japanese Police in the Interior of Manchuria inspite of China's repeated protests, and

which has been the source of numerous conflicts—notably the Chengchiatun Affair of August, 1916—between the Chinese and Japanese authorities. The following passage from China's reply to a demand made by Japan for the stationing of Japanese police officers in the course of the negotiations for the settlement of the above-mentioned Chengchiatun Affair, may still be said to represent the Chinese Government's attitude on this particular angle of Japan's aggressions:—

"In regard to the stationing of Japanese police officers the Agreement of May 25, 1915, provides that all Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and in Eastern Inner Mongolia referred to in the Agreement, shall submit to the police law ordinances and taxation of China. Questions arising from extra-territorial rights were thus provided for. Although the Japanese Minister may give an assurance that the Japanese police will not infringe the rights of the Chinese police and of the Chinese Local Administration, the stationing of Japanese Police (in Chinese territory) will impair the spirit and the form of Chinese sovereignty and provoke misunderstanding on the part of the Chinese people to the detriment of friendly relations.

"In regard to those Japanese police stations already established in Manchuria, the Chinese Government and Local Authorities have repeatedly protested against their presence. From investigations made by their delegates the Chinese Government are convinced that it was the Japanese police officers illegally stationed at Chengchiatun, despite the protests of the Chinese Government (Chengchiatun being Chinese territory far removed from the Railway Zone), whose action was the direct cause of the regrettable conflict. The Chinese Government can never consent to the establishment of Japanese police stations in South Manchuria. It again protests and asks for the removal of those police stations already established."

According to the Japanese contentions, China is guilty of treaty violations. This is not the time here to examine the validity of such an allegation, but it is pertinent to point out that while on the one hand, the Japanese Government would have China respect the treaty commitments of 1915, on the other hand, it would itself ignore the treaty provision ruling out of court any legal sanction for the stationing of such police.

Commenting on this matter, Professor M. Royama of the Tokyo Imperial University declared that "it must be admitted that the argument of the Chinese Government would be right if only the interpretation of international law mattered in this connection." (Pacific Affairs, November 1930.)

(3) Massacre of Chinese in Korea. On July 2, 1931 sensational extras were issued by the Korean newspapers regarding the

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Wanpaoshan Incident and these reports grossly exaggerated the affair. This resulted in the anti-Chinese riots in Korea. The riots spread all over Korea and lasted more than 10 days. It was estimated that among the Chinese casualties were: killed, 143 persons; wounded, 343 persons; missing, 72 persons.

Direct losses of the Chinese nationals in Korea totalled more than 3,000,000 yen, and the indirect losses suffered by the Chinese nationals must be even more. At the time of the riots, the Chinese Consul-General in Korea requested that due protection be given to Chinese nationals in Korea, but the local authorities did not take any effective measures to prevent this unfortunate occurrence. The Chinese Government lodged a strong protest to the Japanese Minister to China. Japan argued that the riots in Korea were the direct results of the Wanpaoshan Affair and that the Japanese Government therefore could not be held responsible for the ugly incidents in Korea. The Chinese Government demanded that Japan should express apology to China, punish the ringleaders, indemnify the persons killed and wounded and property destroyed, and guarantee that no similar incidents would take place in future. These demands, eight in all, were ignored by the Japanese Government.

(4) The Wanpaoshan Affair. In April, 1931, Mr. Ho Yung-teh, manager of a Chang Lung Company at Changchun, leased land near Wanpaoshan. He hired naturalized Koreans to farm his land. His lease was rejected by the local government. Mr. Ho, however, hired 180 Koreans to dig irrigation canals connecting the river with his land. This caused the serious apprehension of the neighboring farmers for fear that their land might be spoilt. Upon the receipt of a joint petition from these farmers, the local magistrate sent police to the district to disperse the Korean workers. The local Japanese consul sent 6 Japanese policemen to the place and interfered with the activities of the Chinese police. The Kirin Provincial Government took up this matter with the Japanese Consul-General at Kirin, and it was agreed that both sides should withdraw their police forces at Wanpaoshan and that negotiations would proceed upon the completion of the proposed withdrawal. The terms of settlement proposed by the Chinese local authorities were rejected by the Japanese Consul. A large body of Korean laborers escorted by 60 Japanese plain-clothes police with machine guns, proceeded with their work on the projected irrigation canals. On July 1, from 300 to 400 Chinese peasants went to the place with farm implements and started filling up the canals dug by the Koreans. The Japanese police opened fire, but after the intervention of the Chinese police, the situation was not aggravated.

Upon the petition of the Kirin Provincial Government the Chinese Foreign Office on July 22, 1931, sent a note to the Japanese Minister to China stating that Wanpaoshan was not a settlement district, Koreans

were not permitted to reside there. Mr. Ho's lease was stated to be illegal. Furthermore, it was pointed out in the Chinese note that Chinese police were responsible for the preservation of order in Chinese territory and that there was no justification for the presence of Japanese police at Wanpaoshan. Any loss suffered by Mr. Ho under the lease agreement would be duly compensated but the loss to the neighboring farmers, as a result of his projected irrigation canals would be duly compensated by the Korean laborers. On August 26, 1931, the Japanese Minister to China declared that the despatch of Japanese police to Wanpaoshan was a necessary measure and that the action of the Chinese police demonstrated the oppressive measures taken by the Chinese authorities in Manchuria against the Korean nationals there.

On September 15 the Chinese Foreign Office sent another note to the Japanese Minister to China in which the Chinese Government declared:

(1) The action of the Chinese police was merely to carry out their official duties and could not therefore be construed as oppressive measures taken by the Chinese authorities in Manchuria against the Korean nationals in Manchuria.

(2) The lease of Mr. Ho was illegal so his agreement with the Korean laborers could have no legal value. Furthermore, these canals penetrated into the land of neighboring farms. Not only the Korean laborers must compensate for the losses suffered by the neighboring farmers, they must also be punished in accordance with due process of law.

(3) Since the lease was illegal no question of the rights of the Korean nationals in Manchuria is involved.

(4) The Chinese Government was under obligation to suppress any activities for the gaining of unlawful privileges. Such steps could not be taken to mean that the Chinese Government was adopting any policy of oppression towards Korean nationals in Manchuria.

The note pointed out that the Korean laborers had not legal right to stay in Wanpaoshan and requested their immediate withdrawal.

This note of the Chinese Foreign Office to Japan remained unanswered.

(5) The Kidnapping and Murder of Chinese Officials, including: (a) The killing of Chinese policemen at Tiehling on September 23, 1929, by the Japanese military police who creating disorder in a local tea-shop resented the expostulations of Chinese guardians of peace—an incident culminating in the disarming of local police force; (b) The Kidnapping of the Magistrate of Penchihu on January 27, 1929, by the chief of the Japanese police—the local magistrate's yamen having been first invested.

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(6) **The Destruction of Local Government Offices.**
 At Yinghow in December, 1930, Korean traffickers in morphine and other narcotics under the protection of the Japanese police destroyed the local police station. And at Antung, Japanese subjects attacked and destroyed a Customs sub-station.

(7) **Conducting of Military Manoeuvres in Important Cities and Surrounding Countryside,** resulting in danger to Chinese lives as well as the destruction every year of considerable crops and agricultural produce.

(8) **Interference with China's Military Transportations.**
 as in the winter of 1925, when Chinese troop movements were prohibited within 20 li of the South Manchuria Railway.

(9) **Levying of Illegal Taxes along the South Manchuria Railway** and prejudicing China's right of taxations, especially in regard to the collection of the stamp tax, the business tax and the match monopoly tax.

(10) **Establishment of Post Offices along the South Manchuria Railway,** likewise the installation of commercial telegraph and telephone lines as well as wireless and long distance electric current systems, in utter disregard of Chinese protests.

(11) **Expropriation of Chinese Lands** and unauthorized excavation of irrigation canals to the jeopardy of local farmers' lands—for example, in Shenyang, Tungliao and most recently in Wanpaoshan.

(12) **Disrupting of Communications,** e.g., on June 27, 1923, the Peiping railway was cut by Japanese soldiers and military police. The South Manchuria Railway refused in 1927 to transport materials for the construction of the Kirin-Hailu Line, and again to connect the latter railway after its completion with Kirin-Changchun Line.

Granting that rights and privileges obtained by force, comparable to the plunder of a highwayman, should be valid, the passive neglect on the part of China dwindles into insignificance when compared with Japan's aggressive violations of treaties and international laws. China wishes for nothing better than to have all the cases brought to the World Court to be weighed and judged.

If Japan had any justifiable complaints against China, why has she not applied for the arbitration as prescribed by the League Covenant? Instead she had always taken the law into her own hands. It is because she, herself of all nations, knows well that her records will not bear the light of public examinations. Even, ever since September 18, with all the Powers' anxiety for the mitigation of the situation Japan has continued her high-handed policy and has obstinately opposed all attempts of neutral mediation and observation.

III. THE QUESTION OF BANDITS.

That Manchuria is infested with bandits, endangering Japanese lives and property, has been one of the main excuses Japan uses for the dispatch of troops. Mr. Yoshizawa at the League had obstinately insisted on the right of the suppression of bandits.

It is along the Japanese controlled South Manchuria Railway that banditry has been most prevalent. On the other hand, the Chinese controlled lines and the Chinese Eastern Railway have been comparatively little molested by bandits. Despite Japanese obstruction, the Chinese authorities in Manchuria had been fairly successful in dealing with bandits, but ever since the Japanese invasion the conditions have become more and more distressing. The disruption of Chinese administrations and the forcible disbandment of Chinese soldiers by the Japanese army have further increased the number of bandits.

No one is more to be blamed for the sorry plight of Manchuria on account of bandits than Japan herself. All that the Japanese have done has been to send troops to disrupt local administrations and incidentally increase the number of bandits as new excuses for dispatching additional forces, which in its turn still further increases the bandits; thus the vicious circle continues, until the whole of Manchuria shall be infested with bandits.

Japan has never had the intention of suppressing the bandits, rather she has used every means available to aggravate the situation. She had supplied them with arms and munition; she had instigated them, and even directed them to plunder and violence. A few quotations from Viscount S. Goto's "Japanese Military Forces in Manchuria" in an attack on Okuma, late Prime Minister of Japan, should be illuminating:— "... The loyalty of the bandits and coolies, who are paid with Japanese money, are questionable" ... "Japan intrigued with Bapuchapu (bandit chief of East Mongolia, since killed by the military, whose two sons are being brought up in Japan for future usefulness) on account of his previous services in the Russo-Japanese War. Assured of his willingness to start war-like actions, Japan supplied him with arms" ... "Owing to Japan's special relations with the Mongolian bandits, she was anxious to protect them, and therefore she negotiated with the Chinese authorities for their safe withdrawal. Fear for the devastation of his territories compelled Marshal Chang Tso-lin to consent" ... "Japanese officials have scattered money in various parts of Manchuria for the organization of the monarchist army in Dairer, the recruiting of Mongolian bandits and other similar plans. The most recent monarchist troops which joined the Mongolian bandits

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have also been supplied with funds. All these expenditures could not be from any sources other than that of the Government" . . . "Foreigners in Manchuria have always been aware of Japan's intriguing designs and her contrivance to profit by troubles in China, this affair (the monarchist rebellion) only tends to confirm their suspicions and increase their distrust" . . .

From the records of the Secret Conference for the Maintaining of Japanese interests in Manchuria, held in December 1930, the following may be quoted:

"There are over four thousand bandits and over eight thousand monarchists scattered in Manchuria and Mongolia who are dependent on our goodwill and who are willing to be of use to us . . . that the South Manchuria Railway spends over two hundred thousand yen and employs over eight hundred persons to compile the Manchuria and Mongolia Registry and to promote the goodwill of the bandit chiefs, is for the purpose of creating such opportunities for intervention."

IV. JAPAN'S OBSTRUCTION TO CHINA'S UNIFICATION.

Much use has been made by the Japanese propaganda of China's internal discord, and of the lack of authority of her Central Government over the provinces. The fact is, most of China's difficulties at unification have been created by Japan and yet she reproaches us for what she is herself mainly responsible.

In the Nine Power Treaty it had been explicitly agreed by the contracting Powers "to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights and privileges." If China was not united, it was her own affair and any part another nation should take in it would be that of assisting her in her task of unification. Most of the Powers have only commercial interests in China to heart and are anxious for a unified and peaceful China. But Japan hold quite a different view; she regards China's unification as detrimental to her interest. Whenever there is a chance for China, to be united, she finds some means of hinderance; the overthrow of Yuan Shi-Kai, the Tsinan Affair, the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the intimidation of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang against his allegiance to the Nationalist Government are glaring examples. The following lines will help to substantiate these assertions:

Assisting the Revolutionaries in the Overthrow of Yuan Shi-kai

Yuan Shi-Kai, with dictatorial authority and a powerful army, had a very bright prospect of an undisputed control over China. Despite his efforts to court Japanese favor and though he had done his best to give in to Japan's demands (the Twenty-one Demands for

example), however harsh they were; Japan, alarmed at the chance of a united China, had done her utmost for his overthrow. She took sides with the revolutionaries by supplying them with funds and arms.

In "Japan's Policy of assisting Tuan Chi-shui" by G. Hayashi, former Japanese Minister to China, it is stated under others: "The Okuma Cabinet, owing to its opposition to Yuan Shi-Kai, had given support to both the revolutionaries and monarchists at the same time . . . at that time arms were supplied to the revolutionaries for their activities in Shantung."

With the fall of Yuan Shi-Kai Japan transferred her support to Tuan Chi-shui. From the last mentioned article the following comment may be taken "Tuan Chi-shui's government has repeatedly requested for the termination of this matter (the assistance to the revolutionaries) and it is necessary for Japan to comply with this request. But the poor revolutionaries! First they receive arms for their activities, then they are driven away by the army of the nation which supplied them with the arms."

The Tsinan Affair.

The Nationalists' expedition in 1928 offered another opportunity for unity in China. Their leaders had gained control of all the southern provinces; of the remaining factions yet to be conquered Marshal Chang Tso-lin was the only one of any consequence. On June 27, 1928, a conference of military and diplomatic officials was called in Tokyo to discuss the policy of aggression in Manchuria, Mongolia and Shantung. And on August 15 of the same year the Dairen Conference was held to outline the steps towards the annexation of Manchuria and Mongolia. To this conference, the Japanese diplomatic officials and military advisers in China, as well as the military authorities of the Kwantung Garrison and the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs were called. The outcome of these conferences was that, during the Nationalists' victorious advance northwards, Japanese troops were dispatched to hinder their military operations through the bombardment of Tsinan and the cutting of Tientsin-Pukow Railway. Over three thousand Chinese civilians were killed and over a thousand wounded; and the loss of property was above twenty millions. Though Japan had in her reply to the League admitted her guilt of the brutal murder of Mr. Tsai Kung-se, the then Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in Shantung, no atonement whatever was made. The Nationalist Government had to exercise the utmost discretion to restrain its troops from retaliation, and the northward expedition had to be continued by a tortuous route.

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The Assassination of Marshal Chang Tso-lin.

The Nationalists' successful northern expedition had resulted in the withdrawal of the Manchurian chiefs with their troops to the other side of the Great Wall. The unity of China inside the Great Wall interfered with Japan's schemings in Shantung; and the additional troops in Manchuria embarrassed Japan's free operations. Ever since his entering this side of the Great Wall in 1916, Marshal Chang Tso-lin had set his mind to the development of Manchuria. His rejection of Japan's demand for building the Kirin-Huining Railway and his construction of the Tsuchuan-Tungliao line have created Japanese fear and hatred. Furthermore the Japanese believed that the death of the Manchurian lord would cause unrest and disorder, therefore further excuse for aggressive operations and opportunities for reaping fresh gains. So on June 6, 1928, Marshal Chang Tso-lin was bombed in his train at the crossing of the Peking-Mukden and the South Manchuria lines.

The following is a report by the Reuter's Service soon after the disaster:

"Mukden, June 7-As clearly proved by an inspection of the damage done by the explosion to the upper portion of the granite pillar, the destruction of the overlying steel structure and by the total wreckage of the roof and walls of the cars while the bottom of the cars was almost left intact, that explosion must have emanated from at least one, or possibly two mines which has been placed on top of the northern stone pillar underneath the steel structure of the South Manchuria Railway viaduct.

"Experts estimate the amount of high explosive necessary to have caused such destructive efforts at almost 200 pounds. For timing the explosion to occur at the moment the car containing Marshal Chang Tso-lin was passing, an accuracy of a small fraction of seconds was necessary. Therefore only an electric ignition was possible. For putting the mine in place ready for the blasting, about six hours of work probably was required and everything here shows the hand of a military "sapper."

"Witnesses declare that the place of the bombing outrage was closely guarded the previous night by the Japanese and all passers-by were kept at a distance, but at daybreak the Japanese guards retired to near-by bomb-proof log cabins reinforced by earthen ramparts affording complete shelter. There are three of these bomb-proofs within thirty yards of the spot, the one west of the South Manchuria Railway embankment affording an ideal

view of the approaching Peking-Mukden train carrying Marshal Chang Tso-lin.

"Between daybreak and the arrival of the train sufficient time apparently was not given for installing the mines. The lack of any authoritative investigation by competent bodies is regarded in some quarters as significant, while the fact innocent hand-grenades, incapable of doing any appreciable harm to train or track, have been made responsible for the terrible havoc wrought, is regarded with suspicion. The theory of bombs inside the train itself is untenable."

On July the 16th a fuller statement was published by Reuter's Service, some of its contents may be quoted here:

"The ignition of the blasting charges must have been done electrically from a safe distance from the bridge. This necessitates elaborate preparations with electric detonators and connecting wires. . . . The whole arrangement and its complete success unmistakably denotes the hands of trained and capable 'sappers' . . . must have taken four or five experienced men six hours to complete. The viaduct is of course situated within the South Manchuria Railway zone, which is protected and patrolled by the Japanese authorities only . . . The Chinese however claim that their guards were prevented from effectually guarding the spot because they were not allowed to come within two hundred yards of the viaduct."

Mr. Putnam Weale, (Lenox Simpson) who claimed to have made a close investigation on the spot, expressed his belief in an interview with the Reuter's representative, released on the 14th of August, "that the murder was committed by a Japanese secret society, whose work was facilitated by certain people in the Japanese army."

Up to the present no corrections have been made by the Japanese Government of the statements in Reuter's reports, and no publications have been made by her to disprove these statements.

If Japan had no hand in this crime, it should be expected that everything would be done to preserve all evidences for investigation in order to clear her guilt, but every trace had been hastily cleared by the Japanese soldiers.

The Tokyo police authorities prohibited the presses from publishing any reports and comments pertaining to Japan's complicity in Chang Tso-lin's murder. When pressed hard in the Diet, the Government flatly refused to answer question connected with this matter; and to the demand of the members to clear Japan's name by the publication of investigation reports it turned a deaf ear.

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Some extracts from Yamamichi's interrogations in the Lower House on 31st. January 1929, should be of interest here:

"... Before the session of the Diet the Government requested the members of both Houses to forego the parliamentary rights of interrogation on a certain serious affair, without stating what the affair was... that the serious affair is that of the bombing of Chang Tso-lin has been disclosed by the Government itself... This affair is already well known in China as well as in Europe and America. Various countries have sent experts and responsible officials to investigate into the matter. Some of their reports have appeared in foreign papers in Japan. It is regrettable how much harm this affair has done to the Empire's good name... All that the Government has done was to suppress its publication in the Hochi Shimbun (a Tokyo newspaper) and to take similar measures, but no effort has been made to clear itself of its complicity. The hint of a certain serious affair makes this matter still worse. This attitude only tends to increase suspicions and confirm accusations abroad... Eight months have already passed, yet the Government declares that this matter is still under investigation... the Government ought to hasten its investigations in this affair; but it is eight months now and none of the conditions at the time of the bombing and no trace of it has remained. This is only a simple matter, but eight months were not sufficient to complete the investigations; on what is the Government to base its investigations from now on?"

The Intimidation of Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang Against His Allegiance to the Nationalist Government.

After the bombing of his train, and while still in possession of his consciousness, Marshal Chang Tso-lin gave his verbal will which moved his subordinates to intensified consolidity, and Japan's expectations of a headless and disrupted Manchuria were doomed to disappointment.

The murder of his father has increased Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's hatred and fear of Japan. He placed all diplomatic matters in the hands of the Central Government and evaded all direct negotiations with Japan. His efforts at the development of Manchuria through the building of railways and the opening of the Hulutao Port in jeopardy to the commercial monopoly of the South Manchuria Railway also incurred Japan's displeasure.

The following is a part of the interview between Chang Hsueh-ling and Hayashi in connection with Manchuria's allegiance to the Nationalist Government reported by the Reuter's Service.

"Mukden, Aug. 10 (delayed by censor)... Baron Hayashi replied that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang already understood Japan's views regarding a reconciliation between Manchuria and the Nationalist Government. Japan, he declared, disapproved of the suggested reconciliation because the internal condition of the Nationalist Government was far from settled and because of its reddish taint. Japan opposed it particularly as such a move would jeopardize Japan's special privileges and acquired rights in the Three Eastern Provinces.

"Japan, he went on, made the request that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang should adopt a watchful waiting policy for the time being. Should the Marshal disdain Japan's wishes and hoist the Nationalist flag, Japan had decided to act on her own initiative with a free hand; therefore she hoped that Marshal Chang would act accordingly and not be influenced by any opposition, which he should suppress with force of arms, if necessary receiving Japan's full support.

"Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang replied that he could not receive in silence Baron Hayashi's repeated personal warnings, however deeply he appreciated them. Being a Chinese, he said his thoughts were those of a Chinese, and therefore he wished to see China unified by the conclusion of a peace with the Nationalist Government so that a policy of a peaceful and economic development might be inaugurated. Although he was well aware that the Nanking Government was not yet perfectly consolidated, he believed it to be, on the whole, effective. He had to adopt the will of the people as his will and, he said, he must not act contrary to that will. He trusted that Japan would not throw all caution to the winds and risk her good international relations just on account of the imagined fear of a situation which is perfectly peaceful.

"Baron Hayashi retorted that Japan has decided against the reconciliation and would prevent it even if she would interfere in China's internal affairs. Baron Tanaka, he remarked, had made his decision and he only wished to know that of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang.

"Marshal Chang repeated that the people's will was his will.

"At this point Saito closed the discussion by threatening serious consequences if Marshal Chang disregarded Baron Tanaka's will.

"Immediately Marshal Chang returned to his office, he called a meeting of the Committee of Peace and Order in order to debate upon the grave situation with which he was faced."

And for the purpose of creating opportunities, Japanese soldiers stationed at Mukden performed war manoeuvres around commercial cen-

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ters outside the city to incite the ill-feelings of the Chinese army; Japanese nationals were withdrawn to the railway areas of the South Manchurian Line to stimulate uneasiness among Chinese civilians and troops; bombs were thrown in the societies of Japanese residents and elsewhere to effect disturbances. With remarkable restraint and discretion the Chinese authorities in Manchuria eluded all clashes with the Japanese. The hoisting of the Nationalist flag, though delayed, took place. So another of the Japanese attempts at the disruption of China failed. Undiscouraged but enraged by the failure, the Japanese militarists waited only for the chance for a fresh venture; and so we have the invasion of Manchuria of last September.

V. JAPAN'S PROPAGANDA ABOUT THE ALLEGED SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE MANCHURIAN PEOPLE AND HER DENIAL OF THE VIOLATION OF CHINA'S ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

That Manchuria is an integral part of China has been recognised by the Powers including Japan in a number of treaties and agreements. The term "Manchurian Race" has only a historical significance. Practically the whole population of the Three Eastern Provinces comprises of emigrants from China proper, especially from the provinces of Shantung and Hopei and of their descendants. Whatever there remained of the original "Manchurians" have been absorbed by the Chinese population; and it would be quite a task to find actual "Manchurians" in Manchuria.

As soon as she has occupied Manchuria, Japan hastened to set up an independent administration and to start the restoration campaign of the monarchists as the first step towards annexation. First, Pu-yi (Ex-emperor of the Ching Dynasty) was carried off to Mukden and then pressure was brought to bear on Yu Tsung-han, Hsi-ha. Yuan King-kai, Tsang Shih-yi and others.

As Japan is a signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty and as it is avowed in the Treaty that the Powers must respect China's sovereignty and independence and the integrity of her administrations and territories, she is not in the position to openly swallow up Manchuria; instead, she employs more subtle means by first compelling Manchuria to declare independence, as the first step to the establishment of a protectorate and ultimately to annexation. Korea is a glaring example.

That Japan does not hesitate to break every one of her pledges on suitable occasions is manifest as in the case of Korea. In the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895 after the Sino-Japanese War, both countries recognised the complete independence of Korea; and in the Nishi-Rosen Protocol of 1898 Japan and Russia again recognised "the independence and perfect

sovereignty of Korea. Also in the Preamble to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 it reads: "the Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and general peace in the Extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree . . ."

Despite the pledges given in the aforementioned treaties, Korea was reduced to a protectorate in 1905. An account of the episode was given by Morse and MacNair, in their "Far Eastern International Relations" (pp. 773-4)

"On the night of November 17 the imperial palace was surrounded by Japanese police gendarmes. After using every agency of moral, if not physical, compulsion to gain the consent of the emperor and his ministers, Marquis Ito, aided by Marshal Viscount Hasegawa and Minister Hayashi, succeeded in getting the seal attached to the new agreement. To the end, the Prime Minister Han Kyu-Su refused to agree and was accordingly allowed to retire from office. Whether Emperor Yi Hyeung actually consented is doubtful. If he did so it must have been because of the memory of the murder of Queen Min ten years earlier, since, within less than ten days, he authorized the sending from China—to evade Japanese control of the wires—of a cable reading: I declare that the so-called Treaty of Protectorate recently concluded between Korea and Japan, was extorted at the point of the sword and under duress and therefore is null and void. I never consented to it and never will transmit to American Government."

And, in 1910, the program was completed by the annexation of Korea.

Japan's lack of faith in her international relations is also evident in her dealings with China. On August 24, 1914, Premier Okuma declared in his message to the people of America;

" . . . As Premier of Japan, I have stated and I now again state to the people of America and of the world that Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or other peoples of anything which they now possess. My government and my people have given their word and their pledge, which will be as honorably kept as Japan always keeps promises."

Yet, five months after that declaration, the notorious Twenty-One demands were served on China. Her program now in Manchuria is an exact duplicate of that in Korea.

That Japan has repeatedly broken her faith is well-known to the world now. Even right up to the present she is still continuously pro-

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missing not to do anything to aggravate the situation in Manchuria, while at the same time intensifying her military operations and extending her territorial occupation. While contending that the occupation was only a local incident, her troops are carrying out an undeclared war in Kirin, Hallungkiang, Yehol, and recently even in Shanghai. Japan's perfidy is unparalleled in the history of the world; and she seems to relish in it; it almost seems, as if she deliberately precede every one of her aggressive actions with the promise to the contrary, merely for the pleasure of breaking it. Let us see how far she can tax the credulity of the world in her assurance of the absence of her territorial ambitions in Manchuria! Had not Premier Tanaka outlined in his Memorial, that "to conquer China, it is necessary to first conquer Manchuria, and to conquer the world it is necessary to first conquer China?"

Japan declared that her military operations in Manchuria were not warlike actions, and that they were not in violation of the Kellogg Pact and the League Covenant. If the attack on non-resisting and continuously retreating troops and the occupation of thousands of miles of territory do not constitute an act of war, then nothing in the future will constitute the act of war and the Kellogg Pact should ever be immune from violation! Non-declaration does not remove the guilt of war, rather it adds to it the criminality of the violation of the International Law.

Japan has repeatedly denied, and she is still denying, her violation of the Nine-Power Treaty; she asserted that she had not infringed upon China's administrative and territorial integrity, and that the setting up of an independent government in Manchuria was a matter of self-determination, therefore it is not for her to interfere. She used armed force to overthrow the old government and to support a few miscreants and puppets to set up a new one; she gives actual military assistance to the troops of the new government against that of the old. These things have been openly admitted by the Japanese press and news agencies.

According to reports of the 17th and 18th December of the Shanghai Evening Post (an American owned paper in English) through their special service, Mr. Tsang Shih-yi, the new governor of Manchuria "had been kept in close confinement under Japanese military guard for practically three months," that he was "actually taken from jail and placed in the Governor's chair two days ago" and that he was "weak and nervous from his long confinement." He "was flanked on both sides during the interview by a large staff of Japanese advisers" and "was not permitted to see any newspapers or individuals except those passed to him by his captors."

The full texts of the two reports are given here as well as the sworn statement to the American Consulate-General in Tientsin by Mr. Sher-

wood Eddy, a member of the American Red Cross, who declared under oath that he "found no foreigner whom I interviewed and no Chinese in Southern Manchuria who doubt that there is convincing evidence that the capture of Mukden and the strategic points of Manchuria were a premeditated, carefully prepared, offensive plan of the Japanese army which is developing in the setting up of puppet so-called 'independence' government in the Manchurian provinces."

New Governor of Manchuria Still Under Japanese Guard.

(Shanghai Evening Post Special Service)

"Mukden, Dec. 17—Early this morning the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury correspondent called at Fengtien provincial headquarters, which are located within the Mukden walled city, with the object of interviewing the new governor Mr. Tsang Shih-yi.

"He presented his card to the doorman and asked to be conducted to Governor Tsang's private office.

"After some delay a Japanese wearing foreign clothes, and claiming to be Mr. Tsang's private secretary, appeared and stated that it was impossible for the new governor to see the correspondent, as 'the governor is very busy with official duties.'

"The Japanese secretary then suggested that the correspondent submit a list of written questions which would be answered in a few days.

"The Correspondent then explained that alleged interviews with Mr. Tsang Shih-yi had been appearing in the Japanese press, hence it was strange that the new Manchurian Chinese Governor was too busy to see American newspapermen.

"The Japanese secretary brusquely stated that it was impossible for American newspapermen to interview Mr. Tsang at the present time but that if the correspondent would leave his telephone number he would advise him later regarding the interview.

"The correspondent then demanded to know whether there were any Chinese on the premises who might conduct him to Mr. Tsang's office, which the Japanese indefinitely stated was 'upstairs'. Following this the correspondent walked into an adjoining reception room and prepared to camp and watch developments.

"At this point a Chinese giving his name as Li Yi, and claiming to be a former magistrate in Mukden, appeared and stated apologetically that Mr. Tsang was 'very desirous of seeing American newspapermen but such was obviously impossible under present circumstances.'

"Mr. Li stated, however, that he was willing to answer questions on behalf of the governor. He said that Mr. Tsang had been kept in

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close confinement under Japanese military guard for practically three months, since the occupation of Mukden. He was not permitted to see any newspapers or individuals except those passed to him by his Japanese captors, hence Mr. Tsang was unfamiliar with the present situation.

"He also said that Mr. Tsang had agreed to accept the governorship because of appeals of the local merchants and property owners, who were dissatisfied with the administration of Mr. Yuan Chinkai and the so-called 'Peace Maintenance Committee' which was only local in nature.

"The merchants desired the services of Mr. Tsang as governor, hoping he might be able to restore order throughout the province.

"Mr. Li then stated it was impossible for Mr. Tsang to define his attitude toward Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang or the Central Government, as Mr. Tsang regarded his regime as only temporary in nature, hence questions pertaining to future Manchurian politics must be left to the future.

"When Mr. Li was asked regarding an alleged interview with Mr. Tsang appearing in Japanese papers, in which Mr. Tsang was portrayed as attacking Marshal Chang and General Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. Li leaned over confidentially and declared:

"I don't think that is correct, as Mr. Tsang Shih-yi and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang have long been friends."

"Regarding further allegations of Japanese newspapers alleging that Governor Tsang Shih-yi might request the Japanese army to drive on to Chinchow in order to drive out Marshal Chang's army, Mr. Li declared:

"It is impossible that Mr. Tsang would make such a request, but it is most likely that the Japanese army would announce that Mr. Tsang had made such a request in order to provide seeming justification for a Japanese military expedition toward Chinchow."

"The Chinese magistrate then explained confidentially that Mr. Tsang was completely surrounded by Japanese secret service men and was not a free agent, also that he was entirely unfamiliar with either local Manchurian or national Chinese politics, and that Mr. Tsang had agreed to accept that governorship only due to the beseeching of local property holders who were fearful that they might lose their possessions in the event of continuation of the present deadlocked situation.

"When asked when the inaugural ceremonies were scheduled to take place, Mr. Li said that they might occur to-morrow or the next day—shortly, at any rate.

"Finally Mr. Li admitted that Mr. Tsang had not seen any local Chinese, either during his period of confinement or since his release but had seen only Japanese military men.

"At this point a servant entered the room in a state of considerable agitation and said:

"The governor doesn't want you to talk to American newspapermen."

"The interview was thus concluded.

"All efforts of American consular authorities to obtain an interview with Mr. Tsang have thus far been unavailing, except for a statement that a public declaration would be forthcoming shortly."

Japanese Part in Puppet Government at Mukden

(Special Dispatch to Shanghai Evening Post)

"Mukden, Dec. 18—Tsang Shih-yi, former Civil Governor of Fengtien Province under Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, who has been held in close confinement by the Japanese military since the occupation of Mukden last September and who actually was taken from jail and placed in the Governor's chair two days ago, issued an order yesterday jailing Kan Chiao-hsi, prominent member of the so-called Peace Maintenance Committee.

"The Committee has functioned here since the Japanese occupation. The reason for Governor Tsang's action has not been explained.

"Late last night, the Japanese issued an invitation to American, European, Chinese and Japanese newspaper men in Mukden to visit the Fengtien Provincial Headquarters and listen to an official statement from the new independent governor, Mr. Tsang. The correspondents gathered at the headquarters at 11 o'clock this morning and found Mr. Tsang weak and nervous from his long confinement. He nearly collapsed when Japanese news photographers exploded a flashlight, which ignited a lace curtain and started a large blaze that set fire to the woodwork and threatened to cause a serious conflagration. The fire finally was suppressed.

"Governor Tsang was flanked on both sides during the interview by a large staff of Japanese advisers. Only three or four Chinese were present although the audience consisted of more than 50 persons."

The Sworn Statement of Mr. Sherwood Eddy, Member of the American Red Cross, to the American Consul General in Tientsin.

"I was present at the capture of Mukden on September 18 and 19, and witnessed the Japanese occupation of the city. I proceeded

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to Korea when the three step of Japan's policy then were evident; first declare her 'independence' of China, second to announce a protectorate under Japan, third annexation and absorption. When I read in the Japanese controlled press in Korea that 'independence' governments were being set up in Kirin and in the northeastern provinces, I returned to Mukden. In the 'Manchurian Daily News' of October 3, 4 and 5, I read that a 'Chinese self-government system' had been set up in Mukden. Names were announced of men serving in the Local Administration Committee or Peace and Order Committee who were said to have consented 'to inaugurate a Chinese autonomic government.' Two of these men came to see me personally for two hours on October 5. They stated that they had repeatedly been approached by Japanese and urged for the last ten days to set up a puppet 'independence' government in that Province, but they had persistently refused to do so. They were leading citizens of Mukden. I do not wish to give their names for fear of danger to them. I found no foreigner whom I interviewed and no Chinese in Southern Manchuria who doubt that there is convincing evidence that the capture of Mukden and the strategic points of Manchuria were a premeditated, carefully prepared, offensive plan of the Japanese army which is developing in the setting up of puppet so-called 'independence' governments in the Manchurian provinces."

(signed) Sherwood Eddy.

"Subscribed and sworn to before me this ninth day of October. A. D. 1931."

(signed) George Atcheson, Jr.,

Consul of the United States of America at Tientsin, China.

The following, a report (Reuter's Pacific Service) on Manchuria status by Mr. Lewis, American Adviser to the Chinese Government, should also be of interest:

"Nanking, Oct. 18.—The foreign office has received from Mr. Robert Lewis, an American advisor to the National Government, a report concerning his trip of investigation in Manchuria, Mr. Lewis, who sent his report from Tsingtao, says.

"The Japanese Army in Manchuria is feverishly consolidating its hold on the principal towns in Manchuria outside the railway zone northward, including Kirin and Taonan, from Korea to Mongolia. The Mongolian princes are being urged to set up independent governments under Japanese protection.

"The Japanese Army is uprooting Chinese civil governments in all centers and seizing the major Chinese banks' reserve deposits,

corporation records and large industrial and military supplies. The Japanese telegraph and power plants have been extended to cut out the Chinese services. The Japanese control the Chinese telegraph and telephone systems and are opening mail at Chinese post offices. Japanese troops control the Peking-Mukden and other railways.

"The Japanese army on October 14 seized the Chinese Mining Administration, throwing 15,000 men out of employment. Before the invasion the Manchurian authorities were making great strides in modernization and industrialization. China is prepared within a few hours to send competent officials and well organized troops to take over the occupied territory."

And then, to give a few more instances, there are the illegal appropriation of the salt revenue deposited in the Bank of China in Newchuan, ignoring M. Briand's warning to Yoshizawa at the League Council; the lifting of the ban against gambling and opium smoking and the seizure of the wireless station at Mukden.

The wireless station at Mukden is a Sino-American enterprise with a daily income of about 300 dollars gold. The Japanese Foreign Ministry, the Japanese Minister for China and the Japanese Representatives at the League repeatedly declared at that time that the station would very soon be open for communication again, but there is still no prospect of the resumption of the service.

As to the opening of gambling houses and opium dens, the Shanghai Evening Post has published the following report by its special service:

"Mukden, Dec. 4.—Mukden's new Chinese mayor, Mr. Chao Ching-pao, who started life as an actor in Peiping but abandoned the footlights in order to obtain a legal education in Japan, has granted licenses opening 60 gambling houses and opium dens within the past few days to obtain revenue for the support of his administration, including a small army of Japanese advisers.

"The gambling houses cater chiefly to the lower coolie class. The license fee ranges from \$15 to \$25 daily. The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury correspondent, visited and photographed a number of these houses, each of which is decorated on the exterior with crossed flagpoles bearing Japanese flags. The interiors generally are decorated with paper replicas of the Kuomintang flag.

"The exterior of the buildings contained signs bearing the words 'Chinese-Japanese Business Club'. The interiors contain large halls where various forms of Chinese gambling, including fan-tan, are progressing while in small adjoining rooms, there are pipes, lamps and divans with supplies of opium.

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"No effort is made at concealment as large signs indicate the location of the opium divans. Prices of a single pipe or more are given.

"When Mayor Chao assumed office shortly after the Japanese occupation, he announced his intention of creating 'the first honest municipal administration in Manchuria.' Although opium is produced in many parts of Manchuria, no opium or gambling resorts were permitted in the Manchurian capital city during Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's regime."

These are some examples of Japan's observation of China's administrative and territorial integrity, yet her reply to the United States denied any guilt of violation.

VI. THE QUESTION OF OVER-POPULATION.

Strong pleas have been made for Japan's over-population and her need of emigration as the excuse for her aggressions, as if her territories would reach saturation point in the near future, and as if her produces would soon be insufficient to support her population. A perusal of the figures of Japan's population and production will convince any one that the increase of her production is quite in excess of that of her population. In spite of the rapid increase of her population (the Japanese Government is opposed to birth-control); in spite of her intensive industrialisation (her agricultural population had been reduced to 48% of the total in 1920); and in spite of the increase of consumption per capita, her food produce should make her practically self-supporting. The Jiji Yearbook for 1929 (a Japanese publication) gives the annual rice consumption from 1923 to 1927 in Japan proper as 66,745,000 kokus, and the net import of rice from foreign countries as 3,270,000 kokus, less than five percent of the total consumption.

According to the same publication, the average annual consumption of rice per capita have been:

1896 to 1900	0.930	kokus;
1906 to 1910	1.022	" ;
1923 to 1927	1.123	" ;

As rice is the most valued staple food in Japan, the increase in consumption plainly shows the progress made in prosperity by the Japanese people.

The rapid decrease of the agricultural population is the proof of her success in industrialisation; and every industrialised country has to rely on imports for its food. The following are some figures for 1927 taken from Europa Yearbook of 1929:

England:	total production of wheat	15,176,545	quintals
	net import	" "	56,070,296	"
	" "	" flour	3,440,523	"
Germany:	total production of wheat	32,801,040	"
	net import	" "	25,208,972	"
	" "	" flour	594,582	"
Italy:	total production of wheat	53,291,000	"
	net import	" "	23,050,890	"
	" "	" flour	169,475	"
France:	total production of wheat	77,390,000	"
	net import	" "	21,611,130	"
	" "	" flour	15,782	"

Compared with these figures Japan's importation of food produce is quite negligible.

According to T. Chiba (Japanese) in his "The Characteristics of Agriculture in Manchuria and the Comparison between Japanese and Manchurian Agriculture," the cost of living per person of a Chinese farming family in South Manchuria is 62.46 yen and that of a farming family in Japan proper is 154.51 yen. Yet the Manchurian farmers are expected to make room for their by far more prosperous Japanese neighbors.

The density of population in Japan proper is 396 per square mile, and that of Korea 230 (85%) of Japanese immigrants in Manchuria are from Korea, while that in China reaches up to 896 as in the case of Kiangsu Province. In the provinces of Shantung and Hopei where from the bulk of the Chinese immigration into Manchuria comes, it reaches 614 and 335 respectively. (Statistics of 1928 Postal Service) All the room that is available in Manchuria is necessary for our own emigration. Furthermore Japan has through aggression acquired large tracks of territories in Korea, Formosa, etc., all of which except Korea are yet very thinly populated. Even Hokkaido in Japan proper is scantily populated. If Japan has any need for emigration, why does she not first make full use of her own territories and colonies?

Japan's policy, as outlined by Premier Tanaka in his Memorial, is to colonize Manchuria with Koreans to make room in Korea for the Japanese and create opportunities in Manchuria for further aggressions through clashes between Koreans and Chinese. Korea has a territory equal to that of Shantung and Hopei together, but her population is only half of that of Shantung alone; now which has more need for emigration?

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By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Despite the encouragements of the government and the backing of armed force, the Japanese total oversea population is only a fraction of that of the Chinese. With her own needs so pressing, it is natural that China should turn first to her own territories for the outlet of her surplus population. If there are opportunities in Manchuria, it would be expected that we should have the prior, if not the sole, right of availing ourselves thereof. Only after China's own interests have been considered should the country be open for settlement of other nationals, strictly under Chinese laws and administration.

Japan has claimed credit for the encouragement for the settlement of Chinese immigrants in Manchuria; but the Chinese immigration has been mainly into the completely Chinese controlled North Manchuria. According to Mr. Walter C. Young's estimate for the first half year of 1927 the Chinese immigration in South Manchuria was 200,000, 32% of the total, while that in North Manchuria was 432,000, 68% of the total. Even in South Manchuria the settlement of immigrants must necessarily be mainly in the Chinese controlled territories, as the railway area is only a narrow track of the country. Besides, even if the South Manchuria Railway was any inducement for settlement, it was not built by Japan but only wrested by her from Russia. Rather, Japan has always hindered Manchuria's development through her creation of disturbances and her opposition to China's construction of new lines.

Manchuria is an integral part of China, as avowed in treaties and agreements by the Powers, including Japan herself; China, as its owner, is entitled to the right to make whatever use of it as she sees fit!

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence A. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date January 4, 1976

A MONTH OF REIGN OF TERROR IN SHANGHAI

What The Foreigners See, Say And Think
 From January 28 To February 27, 1932.



NOTE: All the contents herein are exactly reproduced from the North China Daily News (N.C.D.N.) and the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury (S.E.P.), the former is owned by the British and has the largest circulation among the English morning papers; the latter is an American owned paper and is the only English evening paper in Shanghai.



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Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By *Charles E. Lyman* NARS, Date *June 1, 1976*

TERROR REIGN IN HONGKEW

More Bombs and Stokes
Mortars

CHINESE POLICE ASSAULTED

The Hongkew district was in an absolute reign of terror last night. Bombs and shells kept the inhabitants on the jump during the morning and afternoon. Owing to militant civilian Japanese, the Chinese police were not on duty last night. During the afternoon Japanese assaulted one police constable and disarmed two others. Two British subjects were beaten and two Chinese were killed by sticks and other implements. The Japanese "reservists" are in complete control of the area, assisted by Japanese marine patrols. Chinese pedestrians are searched by these self-appointed guardians of peace and order.

At 177 Boone Road in a private nursing home a dud bomb from a Japanese plane fell, damaging a portion of the building, while at the corner of Woosung and Range Roads another similar missile landed. These two were taken off by the Japanese military. A Stokes mortar shell fell in an alleyway off Haining Road, killing one Chinese woman and injuring another. Another bomb burst opposite the Hongkew Fire station.

At 3.15 a.m. yesterday several high officials of the police department were stopped by more than 150 "reservists" in front of the Japanese Club on Boone Road some with very flushed faces. Only cooler counsels among the party prevented an assault on the officers. This group began functioning an hour after the Japanese attack on Chapel. Their number increased to more than 1,000, the majority of whom dominated the roads in Hongkew, Dixwell Road and East Kashing Road districts. They are armed with pistols, bayonets, daggers, baseball bats and other weapons. They stopped motor cars and searched Chinese pedestrians. The marine patrols functioned also. They were firm in their demands, but not rough or rude.

British Subjects Mobbed

A portion of these "reservists" mobbed two British subjects last evening. They were beating a Chinese near Haining and Chapoo Roads, whom they had accused of being a plainclothes soldier. The foreigners in a gentle manner remonstrated with them, whereupon the Japanese assaulted them, beat-

AIR RAID RUIN IN HONGKEW

Young Allen Court Hit:
Chinese Woman Killed

FRENCH CONCESSION CASUALTIES

As the result of three bombs being dropped into the Hongkew district yesterday afternoon, an unknown Chinese woman was killed, another Cantonese woman was seriously wounded and a number of injuries were made in the apex roof of No. 24 Young Allen Terrace, between Chapoo, Quinsan and Boone Roads. The wounded woman was removed to St. Luke's Hospital, where she now lies in a critical condition.

The first missile fell at 12.45 p.m. and dropped on the roof of 24 Young Allen Terrace, causing two large holes and a number of smaller ones. Mr. E. M. Oliveira, a Portuguese subject, who occupies the house, was lying in bed at the time and it was extremely fortunate that the place did not catch fire, otherwise he may have been caught inside. Hongkew Division of the Shanghai Fire Brigade were called out but it was found that there

was one badly with an iron bar and a baseball bat. Specialists happened along and rescued them. They had to remain at Hongkew station for over two hours until they could secure a Japanese escort to take them to their car which they had left on North Szechuen Road.

During the afternoon two C.P.C.'s attached to Hongkew station, were met by these Japanese and after an argument were disarmed. Another incident happened on Boone Road. A constable from Bubbling Well Road passed the Japanese Club. He was unarmed. Some of the guards beat him and took him into the Club. According to report, he was later taken to the military headquarters. During the incident one shot was fired.

Beaten To Death

Yesterday afternoon two Chinese were badly beaten in the Hongkew Market, one of them succumbing to the effects of his injuries. At 3 a.m. yesterday a patrol of four Japanese Marines, according to a report at Hongkew station, chased a pedestrian on Soochow Road, intending to search him. He jumped into Soochow Creek, his dead body being found at 11 a.m. yesterday.

(N. C. D. N., Jan. 30, 1932)

was no fire. The damage was confined to the roof and to the ceiling below. An officer and some men were left on duty at the house whilst the machines returned to the station.

Foreign Lad's Action

Another bomb which fortunately failed to explode, fell into the compounds of the Victoria Nursing Home, 117 Boone Road, and of No. 1 Aibury Road, shortly after two o'clock. This struck the roof and wall of the nurses' quarters and caused slight damage. No. 1 Aibury Road is a house occupied by Messrs. M. R. Pereira and Mr. E. Marques who fortunately escaped unscathed. With great presence of mind, a youth named Aurea Sullivan, whose father is a member of the S.M.P. Specials, picked it up and handed it to his father, who promptly placed it in a bucket of water and removed it to Hongkew Police Station. The police later handed it over to the Japanese Marine headquarters.

The third fell in the Teh-hsing Lee Alleyway, a thoroughfare between Haining and Boone Roads, killing an unknown Chinese woman and a dog and seriously wounding a Cantonese woman. The former was killed outright, the medical certificate showing that death was due to gunshot wounds in the skull and laceration of the brain. The other woman was taken to hospital.

At four o'clock in the afternoon, Hongkew Station was informed that a Chinese employed as a watchman in the Thrift & Saving Society (the Pantheon Theatre), Fusan Road, off Range Road, was lying in the street with a bullet wound in his chest and that it was impossible to remove him to hospital as he was between two fires.

The French Concession

The only exciting events of the day in the French Concession were concerned with the falling of shells of, it is believed, the anti-aircraft variety. The first to all and those which gave rise to the story of the Japanese having dropped a bomb near the Quai de France were at about 7.10 a.m. There were two of them and they fell near the China Merchants' Kin Lee Yuen Wharf and the Water Tower and by these no fewer than eight Chinese were wounded.

At 7.20 a.m. another fell at No. 10 Rue du Consulat wounding one Chinese.

At 1.40 p.m. another shell fell at the junction of Rue Formose and the Quai de France. Ten minutes later one dropped at the junction of Rue Pere Robert and Rue Lafayette, and at 2.20 p.m. one fell in Rue Lafayette. In these last two occasions two were injured.

(N.C.D.N. Jan. 30, 1932)

Volunteer Stabs Chinese Prisoner

Alleged Sniper Placed
In Truck, Bayoneted
By S.V.C. Member

A Japanese member of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, in full uniform, was the principal in a bayoneting affair staged at the corner of Range and North Szechuen Roads yesterday afternoon. Chinese snipers, hidden behind shop and residence windows and perched behind chimneys on roofs, were taking pot shots at the Japanese bluejackets and Japanese volunteers in the street below and this led to a series of raids in which scores of arrests were made.

The bayoneting was cold-blooded and brutal, according to Mr. N. S. Isaacs, a member of the Municipal Police Specials, who was an eyewitness. Three suspected snipers had been shot dead by Japanese bluejackets, aided in a raid by the volunteers. Four other men in the same house, all of them well dressed, were led out by the Japanese bluejackets. The prisoners had their hands knotted behind them with lengths of rope.

A Japanese truck pulled up when hailed and the Japanese volunteers commenced the task of hoisting the prisoners aboard. The four men were tossed in like so many sacks. As they lay on the floor of the vehicle, a Japanese volunteer, according to Mr. Isaacs, struck the man in the abdomen with his bayonet.

There was a groan from the Chinese, who was particularly well dressed, Mr. Isaacs stated. The volunteer and the other Japanese looked at him, pushed him closer to the other prisoners and then ordered the driver to proceed northwards along North Szechuen Road, presumably to the Japanese landing force headquarters on Kiangwan Road.

Mere Youths

Numerous batches of prisoners were removed in trucks which kept passing to and from headquarters, the men, many of them mere youths, being bundled in, either trussed together in pairs or singly. Many seemed bewildered and while some of the prisoners may have been guilty of sniping or have knowledge of such activities, it appeared to the many foreigners gathered at the intersection that the

majority of the prisoners were in a daze as to the reason for their arrest, Mr. Isaacs stated.

The Chinese arrested offered no resistance, apparently cowed by the determined, drastic action of the Japanese bluejackets and volunteers, all of whom had either pistols, rifles or swords in their hands. (S. E. F. Jan. 30, 1932)

AMERICAN LAD "ARRESTED"

Taken by Japanese as
Sniper

An American lad, named Johnson was arrested yesterday morning, at 2 Scott Road. A party of Japanese marines entered the house and seized the 15-year old boy and took him off to the marine landing party headquarters.

A foreigner who witnessed the whole affair stated yesterday that there had been some sniping in the vicinity. The Japanese appeared, and opened their rifles and a machine gun on an exchange shop next door. They riddled windows and doors. Inside was an elderly Chinese woman, who was not struck.

Then they entered the house, which was tenanted by the lad, his brother being in the Volunteer Corps and his father in the Central district. They searched the place and found a 45 Colt pistol and a large quantity of spent ammunition, which the boy said that he and his friends had picked up at the Rifle Range. These were being kept in an ordinary wash basin. The Japanese asserted, however, that they found four hot rounds. The pistol was under a mattress. In spite of the lad's protests he was taken away.

An American vice-consul called at the Japanese Consulate-General, demanding the release of the lad. He was informed that the Japanese would ascertain from the marines if they held the lad. If so, he would arrange for his release. This had not been done by 9.35 p.m. yesterday.

Another Case

William Chong, 15 years of age, whose Chinese name is Liang Wei-chih, was arrested between four and five o'clock on Friday afternoon. William Chong was born in Sydney, Australia, and he possesses his birth papers but his parents were not British subjects so, it is believed, he was not registered at H.B.M. Consulate-General.

According to a statement made

MISSION ENTERED BY TROOPS

Japanese Invade Methodist
School In Quinsan Road

A protest and an appeal for protection was filed by the Rev. J. C. Hawk, D. D., treasurer of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, Mission, 10 Young Allen Court, with the United States Consulate-General yesterday.

According to Dr. Hawk, shortly after 1 a.m. yesterday some 30 Japanese marines and plain clothes men entered the Soochow University Law School, a mission project located at 103 Quinsan Road, beat the cook, searched the dormitory rooms of the students and caused considerable damage. Broken windows, wooden doors slashed through with swords, damaged furniture, and students' rooms in great disarray are the aftermath of the incident.

For example, the glass of the bulletin boards in front of the university was smashed, the contents of fire extinguishers poured out on the floor, and personal possessions of the students, books, thermos bottles, lamps, destroyed.

Their object, according to the "searching party" was firearms. None were found and, before the frightened servants could summon any Mission authorities, the Japanese had vanished. This morning, however, the university was "sealed" by the Japanese.

Much the same thing occurred at the Soochow University Second Middle School, 146 Quinsan Road, also put under the Japanese seal yesterday morning. The damage in this case, however, was not so great, though workers' quarters in an adjacent alleyway also were entered and searched.

Washington Concerned

Washington, Jan. 29.—Officials here are very concerned at a report that Japanese soldiers have invaded the American Mission, South, at Shanghai.—Reuter.

(N.C.D.N., Jan. 13, 1932)

by his widowed mother, the lad was sitting in his home with a friend when suddenly the door was burst open and Japanese Marines, accompanied by civilians, entered the house at 29 Wen Hua Pih Hsu, Scott Road, where he lives, and, after giving Chong and his friend a severe beating, carried them off to headquarters.

(N.C.D.N. Jan. 31, 1932)

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By *Clarence E. Lyons* NARS, Date *June 1, 1976*

ODEON BLOCK IS GUTTED

Many Reported Shot by Japanese as Snipers

FLAMES TERRORISE HONGKEW AREA

With the charred ruins of the Railway Station and Commercial Press still smouldering, another blaze started yesterday afternoon behind the Odeon Theatre and in several hours turned the entire block on North Szechuen Road, Haskell Road, to the railway line and further down the North Szechuen Road, into ashes. Another blaze was also reported in Chin-yuan Road in Chapel near the railway line, where more than 100 houses were razed.

With the entire area of the North Szechuen Road and Range Road in the control of the Japanese marines, fire engines of the Settlement Brigade made vain efforts to reach the scene to combat the fire. As the flames were sweeping down to the south side of Jukong Road, menacing the Range Road block in the Settlement the engines were allowed to pass to Range Road. Firemen are still standing by early this morning to keep the blaze from touching the houses in the Settlement, in Haskell Road.

According to Chinese eye witnesses, the fire was started by Japanese marines with tins of kerosene, determined to wipe out the entire block. Should this action have been taken by the marines, the Japanese Consul-General said, it was intended to wipe out the snipers who have proved such a deadly menace to the soldiers.

Many viewed the flames in roof tops in the Settlement, leaping from house to house in quick succession. Many refugees residing in the block flew for their lives in all directions. It was reported that some were shot dead by the Japanese as snipers.

Residences Destroyed

Including the Odeon Theatre which was entirely gutted to the ground with numbers of houses, shops and godowns, was a Kuang-tung Theatre and residences of several wealthy Chinese. The property of the entire block was owned by Chinese.

At about 2 p.m., huge volumes of smoke and flames were visible in the Central district. These were swept by a high wind and soon spread southward to the Range Road and westward to the railway line. The Odeon Theatre was the first that burned down, fire being still visible in the vicinity this morning.

The Isis Theatre on the opposite

JAPANESE IN OTHER SECTORS

During the day there were several instances of Japanese activity in other parts of Shanghai. The American Marines detained a total of 14 Japanese armed civilians who were found acting in the American sector and who stated, on detention, that they had been ordered by their own authorities to proceed to that district. At 8.15 p.m. the Marines in Halphong Road encountered two groups of armed Japanese who fired over the head of a Marine sentry into Chinese territory. The sentry detained nine of the men.

At 8.25 p.m., two Chinese were shot and killed by Japanese in front of the Japanese marine barracks at 102 Gordon Road which is inside the American defence area. At 8.45 p.m. four more Japanese were detained by U. S. Marines in the same district.

Japanese were also found in charge of a police sub-station at the corner of Robison and Penang Roads and were evicted by British troops after considerable difficulty.

The situation in Hongkew last night was serious up to a late hour. Gradually during the day, large numbers of Japanese reservists in plain clothes extended their control from Haining Road up to Soochow Creek and by 7 p.m., they were in practically full control of the whole of Hongkew area dispossessing the Municipal Police of whom five patrols, comprising foreigners, Sikhs and Japanese, were withdrawn from the streets by headquarters' orders. In the meantime, the reservists had assumed police powers and were stopping traffic from all sides and searching motor cars and civilians, while Chinese came in for rough treatment.

Hold Bridgeheads

From Garden Bridge to Honan Road the Japanese reservists were in control of all the bridgeheads and exercising their authority. Shortly before 10 o'clock one party of Japanese who were patrolling the North Soochow Road corner of the Garden bridge stopped a Chinese who ran away over the bridge. He was immediately pursued by the Japanese who opened fire on him with pistols and wounded him. The man was brought down and was taken off to the Japanese Club but the reason of his arrest could not

side of the street and other houses on this side of Szechuen Road were not touched.

Firemen of the Settlement Brigade answered more than 30 ambulance calls yesterday. Two foreigners were conveyed to the General Hospital yesterday afternoon as the result of the assault by the Japanese.

(N.C.D.N., Jan. 31, 1932)

be established.

The greater part of Hongkew was in complete darkness, Japanese naval patrols early in the evening having gone up and down the streets shooting out the overhead electric lights. Lights which were not put out by bullets were put out by sticks. The reason was given that the step was necessary so that the patrols could operate without being seen by snipers who were reported to be infesting the district.

Considerable confusion was created and there were several shooting incidents. A foreign police sergeant saw a Japanese patrol shoot at a crowd of Chinese on Woosung Road but there were no casualties. The body of a male Chinese was found on Broadway with knife and bayonet wounds in his body. Two Sikh policemen going on duty were searched by reservists. Japanese action also occurred against isolated incidents of sniping.

Starting at 5 p.m., the Indian police hospital on Woosung Road was evacuated of its patients who were removed to other quarters, and it is reported that patients of the Isolation Hospital may be evacuated to-day. Members of the Indian hospital staff were subjected to search as they left the institution.

Fire Brigade ambulances came in for attention by the Japanese, who declared that their trips into the district were attracting the attention of snipers and after 11 p.m., the ambulances ceased to visit the district.

By 1.15 o'clock this morning the district was quiet, Japanese operations having apparently ceased, although there was sniping beyond Range Road. The Municipal Police functions were resumed and a party of foreigners were on duty at the Chinese Post office.

Bringing 1,000 more marines as reinforcements H.I.J.M.S. Tatsuta, accompanied by three other cruisers of the same class, and four destroyers, arrived in Shanghai harbour yesterday from the Sasebo Naval Base. The marines, constituting two battalions, were landed immediately and dispatched to the positions held by the Japanese in Chapel to relieve the troops who have been fighting there since the inception of the occupation.

Early to-day the naval aeroplane carriers Kaga and Hosho, together with a number of other units of the Imperial Navy, are expected to arrive with more reinforcements. The two aeroplane carriers, both of which are comparatively new, modern craft, are said to have aboard 75 aircraft, including big, powerful bombers of the latest type.

(N.C.D.N., Jan. 31, 1932)

Dangerous Misrepresentations

If the world believed Japanese official statements concerning the Shanghai crisis it would certainly have difficulty in believing its own Shanghai Officials and press correspondents.

Dispatches from interested capitals have brought surprising tidings of misrepresentations by Japan's spokesmen.

From the official Japanese explanation of Japan's sudden military action after satisfactory Chinese assurances had been received, on through a long list of detailed statements and assurances, there has been no indication that facts known to everyone here have been admitted.

Consider the single incident of the last London Foreign Office communiqué, one paragraph of which said:

"The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in reply, gave assurances that he fully appreciated the anxiety felt by the British Government and said that everything possible would be done not to endanger British lives and property, and that the International Settlement would not be used as a base for attack."

The actuality is that lives, property and ordinary rights of foreign residents have been endangered by the Japanese forces; more, there has been wanton destruction of foreign and Chinese property by Japanese within the International Settlement areas which they professed to guard, while the International Settlement has been used as a base of attack from the very beginning of the whole mishandled affair.

Japanese authorities have done their best to convince the world that their actions were previously known to the Shanghai representatives of other foreign Powers, and that there was full approval and agreement of these actions—that Japan, in fact, had actually borne the brunt of a necessary fight for the common cause.

The truth is that Japan's naval authorities here acted wilfully, without due consultation with their associates or warning to Chinese civilians; that far from moving on behalf of others, they went out of their way to start a fight which they couldn't handle and which has provoked the gravest of possible consequences for us all.

Not only has Chinese fighting spirit and conviction of military potency received the greatest brace in years; the Japanese misuse of International Settlement soil, and apparent acquiescence in such misuse by the other Powers, has aroused a growing Chinese feeling that other foreigners must be lump-

ed in with the Japanese as targets for national resentment. A dynamic situation has been created in which Japan's military are moral and physical liabilities to other foreigners.

Sanctimonious Japanese declarations regarding what is termed "the true position"—apparently in contrast to the allegedly false reports of everyone but the Japanese—cannot alter one fact which the world increasingly realizes:

Association with the Japanese acts or program against China is morally impossible for any other nation either neutral or friendly toward China.

(S.E.P., Feb. 2, 1932)

SCHOOL PRINCIPAL MISSING

Second Protest Lodged With Japanese Authorities

A second protest against Japanese activities in the Hongkew District was made yesterday morning to the American Consulate-General by the Rev. J. C. Hawk, treasurer and board of missions representative of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, Mission, 10 Young Allen Court.

Shortly after 8 on Sunday morning, Mr. Dzau Dih-tsz, principal of the Soochow University Second Middle School, 146 Quinsan Road, attempted to enter the building, which had been sealed by the Japanese following a raid early Saturday morning. Mr. Dzau had been on holiday since that time.

According to the protest made by Mr. Hawk, the principal was seized by a party of Japanese, composed of both marines and volunteers, and taken off to landing party headquarters. He has not been heard of since that time.

The first appeal from the representative of the mission was made following a "searching party" incident at the same school and also at the Soochow University Law School, 103 Quinsan Road, early Saturday morning. The Japanese marines and plain clothes men, on the pretext of looking for arms, sacked the dormitories, destroying furniture and personal property and smashing windows. Both schools then were "sealed" by order of the Japanese authorities.

These schools are mission projects and the property is owned by the mission.

(N.C.D.N., Feb. 2, 1932)

GUNBOAT FIRES ON TEXAS OIL

Japanese Machine Guns From Vessel

BULLETS RAIN ON INSTALLATION

A number of Americans were in a precarious position shortly after 6 o'clock yesterday morning in their residences on the installation premises of the Texas Oil Co., down stream, when a Japanese destroyer opened fire on them with machine guns. With the first outburst foreigners in the houses and Chinese in offices and yards, ducked for cover at once. Not a few of them became familiar with the floors and earth. The bursts of fire were intermittent for a few minutes only. An American destroyer which had been ordered previously to take up a position at the wharf, steamed down and tied up. It is suggested that no further machine guns, whatever their source, will open up on the property.

Other than causing great consternation among those in the compound, little damage was done. As far as could be ascertained the spray of bullets did not penetrate any of the tanks. A few, however, went through windows and offices. The destroyer steamed by and continued her way towards Woosung.

Employees at the plant got into immediate communication with the Shanghai office, who took up the matter with Mr. E. S. Cunningham, U. S. Consul-General. It is understood that the attack on American property will become the subject of diplomatic negotiation.

Eyewitness Story

According to the account of an employee of the company, an eyewitness to the firing, he was in his quarters, when the firing began.

"At first I thought it was someone firing crackers. I looked from the window and saw the bullets spreading on the foreshore. I ducked at once, avoiding several which came through the window. The dust rising from the contact in the yard and foreshore recalled memories of previous incidents elsewhere. I shouted to those inside to make for cover as I did likewise."

Then according to his account, the firing continued for a matter of two or three minutes in intermittent bursts, the destroyer steaming outward all the while. An American destroyer, upstream near the Power station, heard the firing but had no information regarding it until after the Japanese had gone on its way.

When the firing had ceased and those inside got into full possession

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of their wits, an estimate of the damage was made. There were no casualties on the premises, but a female in a village nearby was found to have been shot through the shoulder, while another Chinese had a bullet through his sleeve. In the compound employees picked up numerous bullets, which had glanced off buildings, while others were picked up in the offices and rooms of houses having come through windows. A considerable spread of lead was found on the foreshore.

It is understood that the destroyer opened fire on some villagers behind the premises who had lighted a bunch of firecrackers. (N.C.D.N., Feb. 2, 1932)

POLICE PATROL FIRED ON

Other Foreigners Also by Japanese Marines

According to the eye-witness reports of foreign police on duty in the vicinity of the shooting, a police van loaded with duty details from the telephone exchange on Haining Road, was fired on by Japanese Marines near Tiendong and North Szechuen Roads intersection at 3 a.m. yesterday. None of the occupants of the van was struck by bullets, although a survey made later in the day indicated 15 machine bullets in the wall of a garage opposite.

Another similar incident was witnessed by the same persons half an hour later. A foreign couple were engaged in an altercation with their chauffeur, near the Tiendong Road corner. The chauffeur drove off and the couple eventually made their way out. Still later a British subject was fired on.

These same observers also reported that Japanese Marines were firing from a sandbag post in front of the General Hospital.

In order to avoid any such incidents, last night, details on guard at the exchange and at the Power Company sub-office were sent out at 6 p.m. with provisions to last until morning and blankets as well. (N.C.D.N., Feb. 2, 1932)

MORE FIRES IN CHAPEI

Commercial Press Library Burnt

Several new fires were reported from the Chapei district yesterday, one of the buildings burnt being the Commercial Press Library in Paoshan Road, opposite the main section of the printing concern.

In each instance, the flames were accompanied by fairly heavy rifle and machine gun fire.

Smoke was noticed coming from beneath the eaves of the main building of the Commercial Press which, it may be recalled, was one of the first buildings to go up in flames several days ago and a couple of large and spreading fires were seen between Tientungan and Kiangwan shortly before four o'clock. The belief was expressed that, in the case of the latter, the buildings involved were a couple of universities in that vicinity. The library fire broke out at about 12 o'clock.

As the Hongkew area has been evacuated, all the Hongkew fire engines, with the exception of two, have been moved to this side of the Soochow Creek. On Sunday afternoon, the Japanese reservists assaulted a foreign member of the Fire Brigade, after threatening him with pistols.

The Commercial Press Library is known as the National Eastern Library and it is said to be the largest institution of its kind in this country. It was housed in a large, three-story concrete building in Paoshan Road, opposite the main plant of the Commercial Press. (N.C.D.N., Feb. 2, 1932)

POLICE SEARCH OF HOSPITAL

Report of Snipers in Premises

A party of Hongkew police in charge of Chief Insp. Ring made a search of the compound and buildings yesterday of the Isolation Hospital, subsequent to a report from Japanese naval sources that snipers had been firing from the roof.

About 3 p.m., the party consisting of foreigners, Japanese and Specials, with a supporting force of Sikhs, armed themselves with Thompson subs, 45 Colts and rifles, and having donned steel waistcoats, marched from Hongkew station to Fearon Road. Det.-Sub-Insp. Hill was hoisted over the gate and drew back the iron lockbar, whereupon the party entered and made for the main door.

They made a thorough and complete search of the rooms and buildings which had been evacuated on Sunday morning. They found that many of the windows had been broken and the furniture in disorder, but no suspicious persons were within. Inquiries at the Chinese section, which still was occupied, were fruitless.

In spite of the Japanese request that the Municipal police should make this search, it was later ascertained that a party of 25 Marines had gone into the premises at 1.30 p.m., two hours previously. (N.C.D.N. Feb. 2, 1932)

CULTURAL LOSS TO NATION

National Eastern Library Burned

UNIQUE EDITION OF ENCYCLOPAEDIA

Chapei can be rebuilt, but the books destroyed in this conflagration, described by Chinese as a cultural catastrophe to the nation, can never be replaced. No similar literary disaster has overtaken this country since the Boxers set fire to the famous Hanlin library in Peking during the attack on the Legation Quarter there in the rising of 1900.

Escape First Fire

The library building stood immediately opposite the Commercial Press plant, on the other side of the road. During the fire which, as a result of bombs dropped by Japanese planes, completely destroyed that printing plant, the library escaped unscathed, though other buildings in the neighbourhood were licked up by the flames.

Built to house thousands of books, many of which were unique examples of old China's learning and civilisation, the National Eastern Library rose four stories above the surrounding houses, every known device to ensure that it was fire-proof having been employed to safeguard its valuable contents. Its destruction, therefore, lands currency to the claim that the blaze was started by incendiaries.

Among its most precious contents was a complete original set of the Chinese encyclopaedia, the "Shih Koo Chuan Hsu," of which there are now only two complete sets left in the country. Though the Commercial Press has printed modern editions of the "Shih Koo Chuan Hsu"—which numbers itself in thousands of books—the old originals have lost none of their value. The two other complete sets are housed one in Peking, the other in Hangchow.

Many other ancient manuscripts, dating back to remote periods and treasured as priceless relics, were also destroyed in the fire. These included more than one thousand books of the various *hsien* of China, records and historical tales relating to the districts which are now lost for ever.

Valuable Foreign Books

In addition to Chinese books, the Library housed a valuable collection of books in foreign languages, which have likewise been destroyed. This collection had taken many years to get together and represented one of the foundation stones of modern Chinese learning.

A cable has been despatched to

Tales Of Horror Are Told By Residents Trapped In Hongkew

Streets Strewn With Bloody Corpses, Women And Children Cruelly Shot Down, Says Witness

Women and children killed as they fled from burning houses.

Nights of terror, filled with the moans of wounded and dying. The roar of death-dealing implements of warfare.

These horrors were seen, felt and heard by three foreign families who lived through five days of a veritable nightmare in the Lincoln Terrace, across from Hongkew Park. Only yesterday, they escaped from the scene of battle and made their way back to safety.

Trapped In Homes

Two German families, Mr. and Mrs. H. Becker, and Mr. Hans Krenn, and an English family, Mr. and Mrs. T. J. Ellis and their two children, were the only foreigners in the Lincoln terrace.

Trapped in the center of the war zone, these seven foreigners were forced to stay in their homes from Friday until Tuesday, while death and destruction hovered near and threatened their lives at every minute.

Attempted Escapes Frustrated

Japanese launched their attack on the region so suddenly that they were caught before they had a chance to leave. Appeals to the Japanese authorities availed them nothing. Many attempts to leave the district, they said, were frustrated by unruly mobs of Japanese in plain clothes. Marines stopped them at the points of bayonets.

When incendiaries started burning the houses in the neighborhood, the three families took all precautions to protect their property. Chinese servants in the 35 houses in Lincoln Terrace placed white bands on their arms to identify them from looters and fire bugs, and the families prepared to make armed resistance to attacks on their property.

Several gangs of supposed looters and incendiaries were driven from the place with shots from the foreigners' pistols. Japanese pro-

the League of Nations by a group of Chinese educational leaders protesting against the destruction of the Library and charging that the Japanese authorities are responsible for the disaster. The League is urged to take steps to check Japanese "aggression" in Shanghai, the loss of the marvellous collection of books being directly attributed to the Japanese action. (N.C.D.N., Feb. 3, 1932)

mised them protection, and Chinese told them they would spare their homes.

Looters Driven Away

But Tuesday, fires were started in the houses next to theirs, and they were forced to snatch up what personal belongings they could carry, and leave amid smoke and confusion.

When they reached the Japanese lines, they threw up their arms and walked across, not knowing whether or not they would escape with their lives.

Tragic Tales Unravelled

They made good their escape, which they attribute, to the fact that a Japanese friend saw their plight and helped them get across.

Mr. Becker, who had been asked by his consul to make no statements to the newspapers, followed the wishes of the German office and refused to divulge the many tragic scenes he witnessed from the windows of his home.

Mr. Krenn, who had not communicated with consular authorities Wednesday morning, told many tragic tales of the five nights of terror.

Bloody Corpses

"The streets were strewn with dead bodies," he said. "Yelping, hungry dogs were tearing them apart. We could not see the bodies, there were so many dogs. We shot to scare them out, but the dogs did not stay away."

"We saw dark figures creep up to a house and set fire to it. When the Chinese who lived there ran from the smoking houses, they were shot down in their tracks. I saw four bodies slump to the ground as they left the doors. There were men, women and children."

Women Shot Down

"A Chinese shopwoman who lives across the street started to leave her shop, her baby in her arms when she was shot down. The next day she was still alive, her baby clinging to her. Chinese servants in one of the houses in the Terrace ran out and picked her up."

"She was carried into one of the houses and given attention. When we left, both she and the baby still were alive."

"When Chinese attempted to remove the bodies of the dead, they were assailed with rifle and machine gun fire from the Japanese. They were forced to leave the bodies to rot in the street and

be torn apart by the dogs.

Servants Loyal

"Chinese servants remained loyal to the foreign families. When fire bugs, who threatened to burn the houses, came near the place, the servant captured one, a Chinese boy, and tied him to a stake, threatening to burn him. They told them that they had three of their number imprisoned in the houses, and that they would burn them if the houses were set on fire. This complicated matters for us for we wanted to anger neither side."

The servants were in a state of panic when the foreigners left. They did not want them to go, they said, and implored them to remain with them. The servants were those of the 35 houses in the terrace, most of them occupied by Japanese, who had fled.

Mobs Are Cruel

Japanese mobs were extremely cruel, the foreigners said. Chinese were beaten, stabbed and shot. None were spared, neither men, women nor children.

One of the foreigners said that he recognized several of the Japanese members of Japanese volunteer forces. They had been employees of banks and other business houses with whom he had done business in the past.

Japanese Make Jokes

"The Japanese who recognized me," he said, "laughed at me and made jokes about my plight as I struggled under a load of belongings, to get out of the danger area."

The foreigners said that, during the many years they had lived in this area, they had never had the least trouble with the Chinese.

Chinese Bring Food

"When the trouble came," he said, "and we ran short of food, Chinese families and servants in the neighborhood braved the danger that always lurked there, and brought us rice and mutton and other foods, and charcoal for our stoves."

They said that the Chinese soldiers never had crossed into the settlement. It was their opinion that the Japanese were trying to tempt Chinese militia into the settlement. But, they said, the Chinese forces did not move an inch into the foreign zone, but merely protected their own property.

Homes Believed Gone

When the seven foreigners left their homes, they were enveloped in smoke from the surrounding houses, and they believe that by now all of their property is destroyed.

Mr. Krenn's house fortunately was surrounded by other buildings in the colony, so it was not exposed so much to rifle and machine gun fire as the other homes. Because Mr. Ellis' house was exposed on one side, his family moved in Mr. Krenn's home. Mr. and Mrs. Becker remained in their own home until the time of departure. (S. E. P. Feb. 3, 1932)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By *Chambers & Jones* NARS, Date *June 1, 1976*

BLAZES SEEN IN ALL AREAS

Barricades Broken In Hongkew

Fires were reported practically from all parts of Shanghai yesterday but perhaps the biggest were outbreaks on the north side of Soochow Creek in the Jessfield District, at 2.43 p.m.; in Woosung, at 9.30 p.m. and at Pootung, near Kaochiao, at 8.30 p.m. A large number of reports came from the Chapel District but it was impossible to ascertain the whereabouts of these or to get near them because they were outside of the jurisdiction of the Shanghai Municipal Fire Brigade. However, it is known definitely that one of them involved the well-known Japanese geisha gardens, known as Rokkusan, at the northern end of Paoshan Road.

While there was no possibility of ascertaining the origins of the outbreaks, it was thought that most of them were caused as a result of the Japanese aerial bombardment or falling shells.

Outbreaks in Hongkew

Eight houses were burnt in a fire in the Hongkew District, at the corner of North Szechuen and Tien-dong Roads (behind the Post Office), at 11.30 a.m. The machine turned out from Central Station and it was found that the roads had been barricaded by the Japanese marines. When work was commenced on the tearing down of these, it was thought that there would be objections from the Japanese but there was none and the operations were carried out as usual.

Just as this fire had ended and the Brigade was preparing to return to headquarters, another call was received at 12 o'clock from the corner of North Szechuen and Boone Roads, about 200 yards away. Fire fighting work was started and, by the time it was over, four houses had been damaged.

At 8.30 p.m., a report came to Shanghai of a huge fire in the Pootung District, near Kaochiao. This, it was learned, took place in the Kuang Hua Oil Company's tanks and the oil involved was imported by the Soviet Naptha Trust. The glare from this could be seen from the "North-China Daily News" roof until shortly before ten o'clock.

An hour later, what appeared to be a disastrous fire was reported from the Woosung area. No details of this were available.

With reference to the question of fighting the flames, the "North-

WELCOME ENDORSEMENT

To the Editor:

We, the undersigned residents of the foreign Settlement in Shanghai, wish to commend you for the frank and courageous Editorial "To Those Who Have Abused a Trust" which appeared on the front page of your issue of February 1, touching the present aggression of Japan against China.

We feel that it is time some public words were spoken that would show the amazement and indignation with which foreign residents in Shanghai have witnessed the trampling under foot of human justice and righteousness in the tragic events of the past two weeks. And we believe we speak for the conscience of the whole civilized world.

With International law disregarded, the blood of innocent men, women, and children calling for justice, and a torn and struggling people patiently waiting for the verdict of humanity, we add our voices to yours in calling for the cessation of this "undeclared war" and withdrawal of the invading forces. We believe, firmly, that we speak for lovers of righteousness in Japan, as well as for the suffering people of this land.

Signed:

WILBER JUDD.

M. W. ROSS.

H. K. KING.

PAUL B. KERN.

JNO. C. HAWK.

S. R. ANDERSON.

OLIVE L. ANDERSON.

LUCY J. WEBB.

IDA BELLE LEWIS.

NINA M. STRETHENGE.

CARLETON LACY.

T. L. LEE.

ELANE J. ANDERSON.

EGBERT M. HAYES.

H. C. HAMLIN.

O. R. MAGILL.

N. L. PEACOCK.

CLAIRE CHAPMAN.

Shanghai, February 3, 1932.

(N. C. D. N., Feb. 5, 1932)

"China Daily News" was informed by a member of the Third Division of the Chapel Fire Brigade yesterday that the Cantonese members of that division were anxious to resume their duties but, of course, this was impossible at present. When the Japanese occupation began, he alleged, the Japanese ordered the firemen out of their building and damaged their machines and equipment.

(N. C. D. N., Feb. 4, 1932)

CONDITIONS IN HONGKEW

Council Supports Defence Committee's Protest

REPRESENTATIONS URGED

Urging immediate representations to the Japanese authorities in regard to conditions in the Hongkew District, Brigadier-General E. B. Macnaghten, chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council, has addressed a letter to the Senior Consul, Mr. E. S. Cunningham, drawing attention to the grave repercussion of certain activities of the Japanese Naval Landing Party in sectors other than their own upon the peace and order of the Settlement and strongly supporting the protest of the Defence Committee.

Brig-General Macnaghten also directs Mr. Cunningham's attention to the grave situation which has arisen through the activities of Japanese armed forces and armed civilians in the northern and eastern areas of the disruption of the public services and frightened the inhabitants. Particular reference is made to the fact that members of the Municipal Police and Police Watchmen have been forcibly deprived of their arms and ammunition and prevented from executing their duty: members of the Fire Brigade, whilst on duty and in uniform, have been obstructed and assaulted, and the utmost difficulty experienced in the conduct of food and hospital services on account of the obstruction of Japanese naval and civilian patrols and pickets. Immediate representations to the Japanese Authorities are urged.

(N. C. D. N., Feb. 5, 1932)

RED CROSS WORKERS WOUNDED

While picking up wounded and dead soldiers behind the Chinese lines at the corner of Chunhsing and Hunghsing roads in Chapel, three members of the Chinese Red Cross Hospital staff were wounded yesterday morning by machine gun fire from a Japanese aeroplane.

The workers arrived at the place at 7 a.m., when fighting was resumed by the two sides, with the Japanese aeroplanes threatening the Chinese lines. Flying low, a Japanese aeroplane swooped over the Chapel front, operating a machine gun. The wounded workers include Messrs. Wang Tung-fu, Kee Wen-han, and Miss Wong Tse-fang. Mr. Wang was seriously wounded in the head, while Mr. Kee and Miss Wong were hit in the thigh and arm respectively.

(N. C. D. N., Feb. 4, 1932)

JAPANESE FREE PRISONERS

117 Handed Over To The Municipal Police

CONSULAR BOARD APPOINTED

The Consular Body have appointed a committee of three under the chairmanship of Mr. N. Aall, Consul-General for Norway, to superintend, in co-operation with the Japanese authorities, the handing to the Shanghai Municipal Council of Chinese, whom the Japanese Naval Forces took into custody as hostages or for other reason, during the recent operations. This Committee will exercise no judicial authority. It will act purely in a benevolent capacity.

Last night 117 Chinese arrested in Hongkew and elsewhere, were handed over to the Settlement police. The latter at once brought them food and drink and cigarettes in the temporary barracks.

They were a pitiful sight. According to police officers, the first question of the majority was, "Are you going to shoot us? If so, do it at once and put us out of our misery."

Many of them had not eaten for three days. They were in such a nervous condition that they could not eat the congee, which had been obtained from the gaol. They lolled about in their quarters, jumping nervously whenever the door opened.

Rushed To Hospital

A police doctor attended at once. His examination proved that one man was so critically ill that he had to be rushed to the operating table at St. Luke's Hospital. Three others, suffering from bullet wounds and stabs, were taken care of according to the degree of their wounds.

The police reported last night that they were still detaining 10 or 12 others, who, although badly injured from bayonet wounds, had to await medical attention this morning. Most of them have been stabbed in the sides or buttocks. One little child of three screamed in terror as a kindly police officer put iodine into a raw wound.

The No. 1 boy in the Palace Hotel snack room was among the released. He was captured eight days ago while wearing hotel uniform. For six of the eight days he was bound hand and foot. His wrists are a mass to wounds caused by penetrating twine, with which he was bound. He was a most happy mortal when tendered a whisky soda.

Another Chinese, an accountant in a foreign firm, arrested six days

Chinese Rush Reinforcements To War Zones; Train Blown Up

Post And Mercury Representatives Find Chinese Lines Bustling With War Activity

Courtesy.

Order.

Extremely good morale.

Complete lack of hysteria.

Those are the chief impressions of Chinese soldiers and their commanders gained by two representatives of The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury who made a complete circuit of the troop positions in the Municipality of Greater Shanghai Sunday.

The tour was not a "personally conducted" one. The two men were possessed of military passes which gave free access to any part of the lines which they desired to visit, and beyond showing them at the point of entry, no escorts were provided, and few commanders visited.

In Search Of News

The troops themselves was the quest of the reporters.

From Chenju, where at present the Commander of the 19th Route Army has his headquarters, to Lunghwa, where additional troops are concentrated and where the chief arsenal is located; around through the Native City, Nantao, the areas over which 45,000 Chinese troops are quartered were visited freely.

Nowhere in that area was there the slightest hostility toward foreigners as such manifest.

At Chenfu, 200 yards away from the railway line, is the spot where the giant Japanese bombing plane crashed, killing the pilots. At no spot could the crash have heightened the morale of the Chinese troops more. Additional bombers meant nothing more—no hysteria nor fear, merely a desire to attempt to bring down another.

(S. E. P., Feb. 8, 1932)

Fresh Outrage Against American Property

For the second time since Hongkew became an outlying bit of Japanese soil, American mission property has suffered forcible entry and wanton destruction.

The first instance was that of the law school operated by the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, at Young Allen Court. One of the first of many acts of unwarranted and inexcusable violence by armed Japanese in and out of uniform was a midnight raid on this property. We have already commented on this disgraceful affair.

In the latest instance the Presbyterian Mission Press was the suffer. This property is on North

ago in Quinsan Road, because he had a volunteer uniform in his house, was equally happy to realise that his doom no longer existed. Others showed equal signs of relief.

According to their story, the majority of them had been confined in the Japanese Club. From here they were taken to either of the Japanese schools. Three nights ago, they were piled into a junk and massed together in a bound condition, with a few rinds and crusts thrown to them. Last night the police party removed them from the Whangpoo Wharf.

(N.-C. D. News, Feb. 7, 1932.)

Szechuen Road, immediately beside a school in which Japanese marines are quartered, and separated from them only by a low wall.

Through days of sniping, shelling and arson nearby, the Presbyterian Mission Press had been unmolested. Last week two notices by the American Consul-General, bearing the Consular seal, were affixed in front as a means of affording special warning and protection.

Within a matter of hours after posting of the notices, the premises had been entered by force and subjected to a wide variety of malicious mischief. Door panels were stove in, glass shattered, typewriters and other articles thrown on floors, desks opened and drawers pulled out, type in the composing-room "piled," and the Compradore's quarters ransacked and damaged.

The vandals operated unseen and at night. Considering the location of and control over this area, it seems amply plain both who could not have done the deed, and who must have done it.

Of Japanese responsibility there cannot be question and we trust that the most vigorous representations are being made concerning this newest outrage—relatively minor in itself, tremendously important in its implications.

(S. E. P., Feb. 8, 1932)

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By *Clarence J. Lyons* NARS, Date *June 1, 1976*

Newsman Lose Credulity As Reports Belie Chapei Scene

Life is like that!

On Saturday, January 30, a party of newspaper men set out in an open car along North Szechuen Road and halted at Range Road corner to watch Japanese blue-jackets clean out the district of snipers who had played havoc with their plans for the capture of Chapei.

A large truck whirled from Range Road and sped up North Szechuen toward the Odeon Theater. The vehicle, manned by Japanese blue-jackets and ronins, was full of fire-wood, bundle upon bundle of it. Another truck whizzed by. It was full of cans of kerosene. More vehicles followed, similarly laden, and all going in the same direction.

The party moved along, following the trucks. Foreigners, friends, jailed them. The Japanese, these foreigners reported, were hunting gasoline and asking all pedestrians they knew where supplies were available in the neighborhood. A stage just beyond the Odeon had been raided.

The party returned to Range Road, boarded the press car and started up North Szechuen Road, determined to see what it could. Their passes got them past Japanese sentries. Three shops adjoining the Odeon were burning at a terrific rate, dooming the Odeon. The nature of the flames, which were scorching all within a range of 50

or 60 feet, indicated that oil had been used when the fires were set.

Japanese bluejackets and ronins stood by and watched. Later firemen of the Shanghai Fire Brigade came along, but were allowed to start their impossible task only after a long palaver, and then they were restricted to confining the flames so the Settlement proper would not be endangered. And on Saturday, February 6, a well of fire still was to be seen in the ruins of one of the buildings adjoining the Odeon. That looked like oil.

It seemed as plain as day that the Japanese forces had set fire to the buildings in an attempt to rid themselves of the sniper menace from Tientsin, however, there comes the "true" explanation of what happened. The Japanese Information Bureau, of 22 Akebono Road, Tientsin, in a circular under date of February 1, tells it all, thus:

"On January 30, a big fire broke out in the neighborhood of the Odeon Theater, believed to be the work of the Chinese plainclothesmen. The Japanese Fire Brigade rushed to the spot as well as the International Fire Brigade. Efforts are still being made to extinguish the fire, but so far, it is still blazing."

Life is like that, these days in Shanghai!

(S. E. P., Feb. 9, 1932)

PROTECTION

The No. 1 Boy of the Palace hotel snack room, dressed, in his uniform, and a bayonet-wounded three-year-old child proved to be among the 117 "dangerous" Chinese arrested in Hongkew by the Japanese Naval Force and handed over to municipal authorities Saturday night after eight days of illegal captivity and mistreatment.

One critically ill prisoner was at once rushed to the operating room; three others, suffering from bullet wounds and stabs, received police medical attention, while about a dozen others had to wait overnight for dressings on bayonet wounds on sides or buttocks.

Several had been tightly bound hand and foot during most of their period of captivity, with resultant wounds of wrists and ankles. Many had not eaten for three days. Treatment of the lot had been such that they were in a condition of nervous breakdown.

All this within the International Settlement; all this by their "protectors," whose protection was of such description that the captives greeted Settlement police with dazed looks and the words:

"Are you going to shoot us? Do it quickly so our suffering will end!"

(S. E. P., Feb. 8, 1932)

LEAGUE'S REPORT ON SHANGHAI

The trio of Consular officials—with their trusty colleague and observer by their side—have sent the League of Nations an admirably concise report on events leading up to the incidents of January 28 and the happenings on the subsequent days of January. In the main the narrative—it avoids comment and opinion with excellent discretion—confirms the impressions given in the columns of this journal. It appears, from comments received from Europe, to add little to information already available there. Detailed examination of it may well be deferred at the moment. It may be sufficient to remark that it in no way confirms the claims put forward by the Japanese Government regarding the intentions of Admiral Shiosawa on the fateful night. It will be noted that if the Japanese troops were merely following the example of the troops of the other foreign nations, they displayed originality in at least one respect: their commander issued a minatory proclamation to the Chinese troops. There is no record that Brigadier Fleming or Colonel R. S. Hooker felt impelled to adopt that course. The Consuls-General make it very clear that the Council's Proclamation of a State of Emergency was mainly inspired by the warning given to the British and other foreign Commanders by the Japanese Naval authorities on the morning of January 28. *Post hoc* is not always *propter hoc* it is true but it will be seen that the Consuls-General, who had special opportunities for sensing the situation, are in no doubt. Logically, too, it seems difficult to maintain the view that Japanese action was merely part of a concerted defence action called into being to deal with the possible consequences of Japanese action as generally and not specifically indicated on the morning in question in official form and as trumpeted abroad in advance by Japanese propagandists. General E. B. Macnaghten's letter to the Chinese Ratepayers' Association definitely assigns the responsibility to the Japanese Government. His appreciation of the position is strengthened by the Ciano Report. For the rest it would be impossible for any resident of Shanghai to read the document without coming to the conclusion that, had the Settlement been under other than international control, its integrity would have been certainly and, perhaps, irrevocably impaired.—(N.C.D.N., Feb. 10, 1932.)

FIRE BRIGADE'S PART 130 Calls Answered In 13 Days Of Settlement's Emergency

The Shanghai Fire Brigade's part in the anxious times Shanghai has experienced since January 29 is simply but eloquently told in the daily bulletins posted up at the Central fire station in Foochow Road.

Picking up wounded, turning out to fires some of which could not be attended to owing to political conditions and evacuation of hospital patients from Hongkew all fell within the Brigade's duties and a total of 130 calls was answered in 13 days, the majority being ambulance calls.

Heralding a return to normal conditions, firemen of the Hongkew division responded to an alarm at Jukong Road, at 7 a.m. yesterday. Only a few days ago, Jukong Road was impossible for anyone to pass, except for the Japanese marines and plainclothes Japanese. Four Chinese houses were destroyed and four others damaged as the result of the fire, the origin of which was not revealed. The houses had been evacuated.

Of the 130 calls, the Brigade attended many fires that were started by shells, and sent many times ambulances in picking up those wounded by bullets and bayonets. Regarded as the greatest conflagration in the Shanghai history, the flames in the Commercial Press and North Railway Station were not attended by the Settlement firemen. These alarms would be responded in times of peace. The firemen attempted to reach the Odeon blaze in North-Szechuen Road, but were stopped by the Japanese.

It was not 11 hours after the first shot fired in Chapei that the Settlement firemen felt the effect of the warfare. The first call was rushed to the Hongkew Fire Station at shortly after 10 a.m., when an ambulance was sent to Kashing Road in picking up a Chinese male, suffering from a bullet wound. The call was quickly followed by another ambulance call to North Haining and Honan Roads, and a fire alarm in Chapei, near the boundary of North Thibet Road and Haining Road. A shell dropped at 25 Young Allen Court, near Boone Road, also brought out the firemen to the scene.

From that day onward, numerous but similar calls were turned into the Settlement fire stations. On January 30, more than eight am-

bulance calls and a similar number of fire alarms were received. The ambulance calls were confined to districts north of the Soochow Creek, especially in the district controlled by the Hongkew and West Hongkew Police Stations.

Removal of Wounded

Though the Japanese have been in control of the Hongkew area prior and after the opening of warfare, the reign of terror was not brought to the attention of the Brigade in the morning of January 30, when a ricksha coolie with a knife wound inflicted by a Japanese plainclothes man was picked up in west Soochow Road. Few minutes later a Chinese with a bayonet wound was conveyed from North Szechuen Road to a nearby hospital. Similar calls for ambulances continued for the following several days and at a time the congestion was so great that an acute shortage for ambulances to meet the emergency was felt. In Yangtsepoo and Harbin Road districts, the calls were also received. At 8.49 a.m. on January 30, a Chinese boy bayoneted in the left shoulder was picked up by officers of the West Hongkew Police Station and sent to a hospital by ambulance.

At 10 a.m., a fireman ascended to the top floor of the Shanse Theatre in North Shanse Road. No sooner had he faced the street through a window, than a Japanese marine, patrolling the street, opened fire. The bullet struck his neck and the fireman was rushed to the Lester Chinese Hospital for treatment. Several hours later a fire was started in the alleyway of the theatre, this was, however, shortly afterwards put out by the Settlement Brigade.

The activities of the Chinese plainclothes men in Hongkew were further accounted for the action of arson, as the result of which many houses were burned down. One of the most serious incidents happened on January 30, when the Odeon block was deliberately destroyed. Firemen of the Hongkew Station rushed to the scene upon the receipt of the alarm from a watch tower. Their duties were hampered as traffic on North Szechuen Road was blocked by the marines and plainclothes men in that area.—(N. C. D. N., Feb. 11, 1932.)

REFUGEE CAMP BOMBED

50 Persons Killed in Yiu Ying Road, Chapei

PROTESTS MADE TO AUTHORITIES

Declaring that the flood refugee camp in Yiu Ying Road, Chapei, was bombed several times by Japanese aeroplanes, and that over 50 innocent lives were lost, Sir John Hope Simpson, Director-General of the National Flood Relief Commission, has addressed the following letter to Mr. T. V. Soong, who is chairman of the Commission:—

"I have to report to you that a camp of flood refugees on the Yiu Ying Road, two miles northwest of the North Station, and on the border of Chapei, contained, on January 26, 10,399 refugees, and a staff of 49 members. After the first Japanese bombardment of Chapei on January 29, about 2,000 of these refugees fled, but over 8,000 remained in the camp, and were, as usual, fed and sheltered.

"On February 5, the camp was bombed by Japanese planes about noon. A woman and a boy were killed on the spot, four persons were wounded, and some of the patients in the hospital died of fright. Most of the refugees fled, and there remained in the camp only a few hundred persons, the majority of whom were sick in hospital or aged people who found it difficult to get away.

"Unnecessary and Inhuman
 "The following day Japanese planes again bombed the camp, and, after the bombardment, 48 dead were found in the camp, most of whom had been patients in the hospital. With the exception of about 20 people, the occupants of the camp were removed and it was again bombed the following day, February 7. It was then entirely evacuated, and, as the relieving party was about to leave the camp, the planes returned and dropped a bomb which damaged a house beside the camp.

"I have protested against this action in a letter to the Japanese Consul-General, pointing out that the action appears to have been unnecessary, and was certainly inhuman. I said that no military advantage whatever can have been gained by these attacks on a camp occupied by homeless refugees from the flooded areas, the only result has been the sacrifice of over 50 perfectly innocent lives.

"I sent a copy of my letter to the senior member of the Consular Body, with a request that its contents be conveyed to the members of that Body, and another copy to the Mayor of Greater Shanghai Municipality.—(N. C. D. N., Feb. 12, 1932.)

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By *Clarence S. Lyman* NARS, Date *June 1, 1976*

Japanese Bomber Ignored Red Cross Flag, Simpson Declares

Murai's Reply Regarding Bombing Of Refugee Camp Draws Pointed Answer From Chairman

The bombing of the Liu Ying Road flood refugee camp on February 5 by Japanese airplanes can not be blamed on military contingency, is the gist of a reply sent by Sir John Hope Simpson, director general of the National Flood Relief Commission, to Mr. K. Murai, consul general for Japan.

In the letter, which was written in reply to one sent by the Japanese consul general expressing the regret of the naval authorities for the bombing incident, Sir John points out that the refugee camp is about two miles from the North Station and at least a mile from the nearest point on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway line.

Mr. Murai's Letter

Mr. Murai's letter, which was dated February 15 and addressed to the director general of the flood relief commission, follows:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 15, 1932, calling my attention to the bombing by Japanese planes of a matshed of flood relief refugees on Liu Ying Road.

I lost no time in transmitting the contents of your letter to the Japanese Naval Authorities, who in reply have notified me to the effect that in those days when the unhappy incidents of bombing occurred, the Japanese naval landing forces were busily engaged in bombing the Chinese troops who were incessantly directing their bombardment at the Japanese forces from their defence lines constructed all over the Chapei district and that the spot in question where bombs were dropped, unfortunately not only happened to be located quite adjacent to the Chinese position but was protected with barbed wire.

However, the Naval Authorities asked me to express their deepest regret that so many flood refugees have been subjected to a serious disaster by the bombing.

Letter Not Received

In this connection, perhaps I may call your attention to the fact that if you had been good enough to notify me of the incident of February 5, immediately after its happening, the calamitous fate which befell the unfortunate refugees after February 6, might have averted or at least lessened to a great extent.

I might add that according to a circular from the senior consul, you wrote to Mr. T. V. Soong stating that you addressed me another let-

ter dated February 12, asking for my reply. But I regret to inform you that I have not yet received your letter dated February 12 and will appreciate if you make investigations into the matter.

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

Sir John Replies

Sir John Hope Simpson's reply is dated February 17 and reads as follows:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 15, 1932, which was delivered to me personally by your messenger at 12:30 p.m. today, February 17.

In your letter you acknowledge receipt of my letter of February 15, which I think must be a mistake for February 10, the date on which I sent my original letter.

With reference to your last paragraph, I beg to enclose a copy of my letter addressed to you on February 12 and of the enclosure which was a copy of a telegram which I forwarded to the League of Nations on the evening of February 11. The receipt of my letter of February 12 is acknowledged in the chit book by the seal of your consulate-general.

Position of Camp Detailed

With reference to the contents of your letter under reply, I note that the Naval Authorities have asked you to express their deepest regret that many flood refugees have been subjected to a serious disaster by bombing. This expression of regret I shall have pleasure in forwarding to the Chairman of the Commission for notification to its members.

With regard to the suggestion that the camp was located adjacent to the Chinese position and was protected by barbed wire, I have the honor to repeat the statement contained in my letter of the 10th inst., that the camp lay two miles northwest of the North Railway station and one mile from the nearest point on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, and it cannot, therefore, be described as adjacent to the Chinese position. The statement that the camp was protected with barbed wire is mistaken.

I have caused an enquiry to be made into the whole occurrence,

and from that enquiry it appears that on February 2, before the camp was bombed, a Japanese aviator flew close over the camp and waved his hand to the occupants. As there were 3,000 children in the camp at the time, he could not well have mistaken it for a military encampment.

Airman Used Machine Gun

In addition, the bombardment of February 5 was preceded by machine gunning which injured a Mr. Ma, who was present in the camp. As in order to machine gun the camp, the aviator concerned had to descend to a low altitude, the suggestion that the camp was considered to be a military encampment would seem to be inexplicable.

Had I been informed of the bombing on February 5 at once, I would of course have protested on that day. In fact, however, the report on the subject only reached me after the bombing on February 7; which explains my failure to address you earlier.

Finally I would draw your attention to the fact that a Red Cross flag was flying at the gate of the camp, and a Blue Cross Flag over the hospital.

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

J. HOPE SIMPSON.

A Distressing Occurrence

Sir John Hope-Simpson's restrained protest to the Japanese Consul-General on the bombing of the flood refugee camp on three successive occasions by Japanese aeroplanes will cause a very painful impression. It will be seen from the location of the camp and from its nature and composition that no military reasons appear to be applicable to an action of this kind. The camp of some 10,000 refugees was reduced to 8,000 as the result of the panic created by the bombardment of Chapei on January 29. Exactly a week later the calm of the camp restored by the devoted labours of the helpers, was rudely broken by Japanese bombs from the air, two refugees being killed, four wounded and some of the invalids in the hospital died of fright. The population of the camp was further reduced to a few hundred persons—mainly sick and aged. They were not left alone, the next day the air-bombing was resumed and 48 refugees, mainly patients in the hospital, were killed. The occupants of the camp were then all removed with the exception of 20, who on the next day, again experienced the visitation from the air. Even in the process of complete evacuation the relieving party was bombed. Considering that these events occurred long after the first reaction of world-opinion to the air-bombing of Chapei was known, explanation of this apparently wanton piece of cruelty will, on the face of it, present considerable difficulties.—(N. C. D. N., Feb. 12, 1932.)

BOMB FALLS ON COTTON MILL

Six Killed, 15 Injured
In Markham Road

EXTENSIVE DAMAGE

Six Chinese were killed and 15 injured at the Wing On Cotton Mill, 55 Markham Road, yesterday morning when a bomb from a Japanese aeroplane crashed through the roof of the reeling room doing extensive damage. The bomb, which was explosive, wrecked the reeling room, blowing some of the workers to pieces. An incendiary bomb also dropped but fell about 45 feet away and although it sprayed the area with sulphur and picric acid it caused no casualties although 240 Chinese were working in the building.

Lieut. J. S. Cook and 18 men of the United States Marines were in the mill at the time but none of them was injured. The bombing caused such a commotion that the 2,000 Chinese working in the building immediately stampeded, dashing for safety.

The Wing On mill, which is within Settlement limits, is about a mile from Markham Road station and several hundred yards from Markham Road bridge. The Japanese plane, which had been bombing Chinese positions on the other side of Soochow Creek, appeared over the mill about 10.30 a.m. The bomb struck the roof and exploded within a few feet and as it dropped among the workers in the reeling room the blast shattered every window in the vicinity and wrecked about 80 machines. So terrific was the explosion that pieces of mangled flesh were scattered all over the room. A panic started among the other workers who immediately dashed for the doors while the U.S. Marines, instantly realising what had happened, worked their way towards the affected area to rescue the injured.

Reeling Room Wrecked

An investigation revealed the horror of the catastrophe. Of 90 people normally working in the room, about 60 had left for food and the bomb dropped just over the only exit. Two sides of the room were enclosed with fireproof glass but not a pane was intact. The third wall, of substantial construction was standing, but the fourth wall, originally built to contain glass, was shattered, all the temporary bricks being out. In the far corner half the wall was blown out while another corner was wrecked, bricks and mortar scattering the compound and many casualties were

Only Ghosts Of Ruined City Remain Where Chapei Stood

Deserted Streets, Grey Specters Greet Eyes Of Visiting Newsmen In Devastated Areas

By L. Z. YUAN and LOUIS A. BLACKBURN

Only the ghosts of Chapei, once a large, throbbing industrial center, remain to tell a funereal tale of the passing of the "Four Horsemen."

Ghostly piles of grey ashes and debris, greeted the lonely wanderers in the Chapei district this morning as a short, truce, broken but a truce on paper nevertheless, stilled big guns of the opposing armies and deathlike quiet hung like a shroud over the ruined and deserted city.

Only Waste Remains

Except for a few blocks of deserted houses in the western and northern parts of Chapei, where once the wheels of industry were the pulse of a busy and prosperous industrial section, the district is completely deserted. Only the blackened and jagged walls of ruined buildings remain as grim reminders of the days before the forces of conquest, death, disease and famine came to lay waste to Chapei.

Despite the fact that a short truce, signed to allow Red Cross workers to remove the dead and wounded, and refugees, from the scenes of battle, was pierced by intermittent firing, members of The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury editorial staff took advantage of the lull in fighting, to survey on their own, the scenes of the past week's carnage.

Few Routes Open

Only a few routes were open into

caused by bricks and flying glass. Iron beams of 12 inches were bent by the force of the blast.

Immediately the Marines got to work removing the dead and the injured who were rushed to the nearest hospitals and the Shanghai Fire Brigade turned out to assist in removing the injured and attending to any incipient outbreak of fire.

The Wing On mill at the outbreak of the Shanghai troubles employed 3,800 workers on the day and night shifts but closed three days ago. At the urgent request of the workers the mill was reopened and restarted operations with a staff of 2,322 workers.—(N. C. D. N., Feb. 12, 1932.)

Chapei, and it was not without difficulty that this newspaper's representatives made their way into the war-torn district.

Hundreds of refugees, hoping to cross into Chapei, lined Chungshan and Soochow Roads, waiting in vain for an opportunity to return to the ashes of their homes to remove what personal belongings they could recover. Myriad boats jammed the creek with loads of wheat, rice, and other supplies, and it was nearly impossible to cross.

Tragic Scene Witnessed

Immediately behind the railway bridge, the scene of extensive Japanese aerial bombardment. Chinese soldiers were entrenched. There the visitors were warned to proceed no farther by a Chinese officer, who explained that it would be dangerous, indeed. A guide was furnished, and the railroad tracks were crossed to Chungshan Road.

There the most tragic picture of war and destruction was seen. What once was a densely populated area was an open field, the streets hardly discernible because of the great piles of debris. Tall buildings had been leveled to within a few feet of the ground, and streets were impassable.

Monument To Destruction

Towering above the rest of the debris was the skeleton of the Oriental Library, the charred walls standing like a grim monument to wanton destruction. The picture recalled the thousands of priceless pieces of literature that have been sacrificed to the gods of war at the expense of culture.

Although all was quiet, the visitors were not allowed to proceed beyond Tsing Yuen Road, where the guide saluted and departed.

Missions Of Mercy

On Chungshan Road where, two days ago, great machines of war sped like juggernauts to the scenes of battle, Red Cross trucks and ambulances went careening through the piles of waste on their missions of mercy.

The newsmen boarded one of the Red Cross trucks and returned to the Settlement, an unpleasant picture of the ravages of warfare imprinted indelibly on their memories. (S.E.P. February 12, 1932)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By *Chambers & Lyons* NARS, Date *June 1, 1976*

POLICE OFFICER ASSAULTED

Prevented from Going to
His Station

RONIN'S UNCALLED FOR ATTACK

Sergeant G. W. Robinson, of Harbin Road Police Station, was the victim of an assault which was perpetrated in North Szechuen Road yesterday afternoon by a Japanese "ronin" (reservist) after an attempt had been made to prevent him from proceeding to his station to report for duty. The affair was witnessed by Dr. H. Pedersen, veterinary surgeon of the Public Health Department, and by Mr. E. Kilner, Senior Chief Health Inspector.

At about four o'clock yesterday afternoon, Sergeant Robinson was going in a private motor car along North Szechuen Road when he was stopped at a spot about 15 or 20 yards to the south of Range Road by a Japanese in plain clothes. The latter demanded to know where he was going and the officer replied that he was on his way to duty at the Harbin Road Police Station.

The ronin, who spoke English fairly well, said "You cannot go there," so Sergeant Robinson demanded to know the reason. The reply was that he was not on duty, whereupon the foreign officer replied that, under the present state of emergency, he was always on duty. His uniform, he stated, denoted that.

However, the ronin was firm in his decision that neither officer nor the car could not go forward, so Sergeant Robinson got out of the car and walked northwards. He was followed by the reservist, who struck him a blow in the back. As he turned, the ronin again struck him, this time in the face. The officer, unable to control himself then retaliated. At this juncture, a Japanese Marine sentry intervened, placing his rifle against the sergeant's body cross-wise and prevented him from going further.

A report of the affair was made to Hongkew Station and shortly afterwards a Japanese naval officer, who stood near by at the time of the assault, visited the police station and apologized.

(N.C.D.N. February 13, 1932)

PASTOR CARRIED OFF

Alleged Acts of Japanese Marines: Open
Letter to Admiral Nomura

Alleging that various members of their church, including the pastor, the Rev. Tsiang Z-zu, and his family, had been carried off after being severely beaten by a squad of Japanese Marines, members of the Governing Board of the Fitch Memorial Church in Darroch Road have addressed an open letter to Vice-Admiral Nomura, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Naval Forces in Shanghai. The writers allege that, in spite of all efforts, they have been unable to learn the whereabouts of Mr. Tsiang and ask the Admiral to take steps to restore him to them. The letter follows:—

Dear Sir,—The Fitch Memorial Church of Christ in China is located in Darroch Road, Hongkew. It is one of the largest churches in Shanghai. Among the membership of this church are the families of the founders and executive heads of the Commercial Press which has, as you are aware, been completely destroyed, as well as many other Chinese holding positions of high responsibility.

On the afternoon of January 29, there was assembled a group of 30 in the manse adjoining the church. They were mostly women and children. They were there because they thought it was a safe place for refuge. While squads of His Imperial Majesty's marines were engaged in rifle and machine gun firing in front of the church and the neighbourhood, they sought comfort and peace of heart in prayer.

About four o'clock in the afternoon, a marine patrol, numbering about 50, rattled the iron gates at the front of the church courtyard, demanding admission. Naturally, there was immediately much fear among the small group, and a few minutes elapsed before one of them, a young lad of 20, whose father and mother and younger sister were also in the group in the manse mustered sufficient courage to unlock the iron gate. As soon as he had opened the gate, without any further ado he was seized and his hands bound behind his back and carried away; he has not been seen or heard from since.

Search for Bombs

Immediately upon entering the manse, where the small group of 30 were, the officer in charge of the squad demanded to be told where the teachers and students of the

school conducted in the church adjoining were. He was informed that the students and teachers had gone to their homes, as the school was a day school and closed for the winter vacation. When asked who was in charge of the property our pastor, the Rev. Tsiang Z-zu, immediately stepped forward and stated that he was the pastor and therefore the person in charge.

The marine officer then insisted that there were bombs hidden on the property. Our pastor replied that this was a church and that he was quite sure there were no bombs or any other military equipment on the place; but he invited the officer to make a search of the premises so as to assure himself of this fact. All of the 30 who had come to the church for refuge and prayer had their persons searched. No bombs or weapons of any description were found either on the property or on the persons of the group.

Your officer then separated from the rest of the group our pastor and his wife and son, his nephew and his secretary and two servants, comprising his entire family, excepting his little daughter of nine, who was playing in the kindergarten adjoining, entirely unconscious of the tragedy enacted in the manse.

Pastor Marched Off

The remaining twenty-two were then commanded to confine themselves to the manse and under no circumstances were to look out of the window or attempt to leave the property. Your marines then turned their attention to our pastor, Mr. Tsiang, beating him in the face and prodding him with the bayonet. Then they turned toward his wife and beat her repeatedly over the thighs with the butt of their rifles until she collapsed on the floor. They then bound the hands of all seven behind their backs and marched them off.

Since then all efforts on our part and on the part of our western friends have failed to secure any information from the Japanese Consulate or through any other agency as to their whereabouts or fate, though more than two weeks have past.

Our pastor was a man who was rich in love and compassion. Almost the last sermon that he preach-

ed was an appeal to us to forgive the injustices of your country, not to hate, but to forgive and to love as Christ taught us and showed us to forgive and love.

An Appeal

With our church members widely scattered, all in need of comfort and spiritual guidance and help, we greatly long for the wise guidance and the spiritual help of our Pastor. Surely a man like our pastor, Mr. Tsiang, whose heart bore no hatred but only love, and who besought others to forgive and practise love, has done nothing, or his family, to be carried off as prisoners.

The hearts of the men and women of our Church who all loved him, cry out in sorrow and bereavement; and so we, who are the governing body of the church, cannot refrain from writing this letter to you to ask you to restore to us and to our church our pastor and his family. For this act of mercy and compassion, we will be always very grateful.

(N.C.D.N. February 14, 1932)

REFUGEE CAMP BOMBED

Sir John Hope Simpson's
Telegram to League

"WANTON & INHUMAN ACTION"

Geneva, Feb. 13.

The Secretariat-General of the League of Nations today circulated the telegram it has received from Sir John Hope Simpson, the Director of the Chinese Flood Relief Commission, protesting against the bombardment by the Japanese of a flood refugee camp.

The telegram states: "I protest the Japanese air bombardment of a flood refugee camp containing over 8,000 refugees on February 5 when a woman and a boy were killed and four people wounded while several hospital patients died from fright. The same camp was bombed again on February 6 when it contained a few hundred refugees only, the majority being sick in hospital or aged and infirm people. Forty-eight were found dead after this bombardment. The camp was then evacuated but it was bombed again the next day. This action by the Japanese was wanton and inhuman and from a military standpoint useless."—(N. C. D. N., Feb. 15, 1932.)

JAPANESE ACTS IN HONGKEW

British Subjects' Home
Invaded

MARINES RAID SHOP OF CHINESE

Yesterday a number of unwarranted actions were reported by Hongkew residents as having been perpetrated either by Japanese Marines or "ronins." In one case, a British house was entered by uniformed marines. In another, their intended action was frustrated when the occupants told them that the owner was an American.

One case was reported by Mr. Biggs, residing at 707 Dixwell Road. Mr. Biggs is an employee of the Shanghai Power Co., and a British subject. At 2 p.m. he entered the front door of his house and proceeded through the first room, he saw two Japanese Marines in the back. He challenged them, but they ran out of the back door, making for a Japanese machine gun post not far distant. He called on them to stop, but, as he was confronted by the armed men he did not follow further. Instead he reported the matter, adding at the police station, that when he last was in his house on Thursday, he was still in possession of a loud speaker, valued at \$130. This was missing yesterday.

Books On Manchuria?

An hour earlier, two Japanese marines and a Japanese Special brought a Chinese of British registration to Hongkew station. They stated that they had found him at 1259 Dixwell Road (his residence) and on the premises they picked up a Chinese volunteer cap, and two books on the Manchurian issue. The marines were satisfied at the station with accused's statement that he was a British subject and were handed a receipt for the cap and books. The Chinese was released.

Two Chinese women were arrested during the morning by several Japanese marine officers on Seward Road near the intersection with Woochang Road. Two Specials alleged that the women had in their possession maps of Japanese positions. Where the women were taken is not known.

A Chinese storekeeper at 43 Broadway reported to the police station at 9.35 a.m., that an hour

JAPANESE ASSAULT BRITON

Mr. Parkes Manhandled:
Passes Destroyed

Mr. G. H. Parkes, formerly boxing instructor at the Public School for Boys, was severely manhandled yesterday at noon by a gang of some 50 Japanese reservists at the corner of North Szechuen and Dixwell Roads.

Mr. Parkes, who is a British subject, had driven his car to this spot, which is only a stone's throw away from the Dixwell Road Police Station, when he was held up. He exhibited two passes which had been issued to him by the Shanghai Municipal Police, one being his current pass and the other an emergency pass, bearing the seal of Rear-Admiral Shiosawa, to enter and leave the Settlement during a state of emergency, but these were snatched from his hand and torn up.

Two foreign police sergeants were standing near by at the time but they were unable to render any assistance.

When Mr. Parkes remonstrated against the destruction of his passes, he was assaulted and his car detained. Nevertheless, he decided that resistance was useless so eventually he made his way to the Japanese Naval Headquarters and obtained assistance from a naval officer who provided him with an escort and issued an order for the release of the car, the latter being returned.

The "North-China Daily News" understands that the matter is being referred to H. M. Consul-General for action.

(N.C.D.N. February 15, 1932)

previously, 30 Japanese marines had entered his shop and caused considerable damage. A similar occurrence took place at 9.40 a.m., soon after which a shopkeeper informed the police that "ronins" had removed a quantity of coal and wood from his premises. The fuel was valued at \$60. The police are in possession of the lorry number.

A foreigner challenged a Japanese "ronin" with the theft of several beds from his house which had been shelled. It was resented hotly with the remark, "No stolen, only borrowed for our hospital."

(N.C.D.N. February 15, 1932)

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By *Clayton L. Lyon* NARS, Date *June 1, 1976*

Eye-Witness Stories Of War Pass From Shanghai Horizon

There will be no more eye-witness stories concerning Japanese army actions in the front line, if Japanese authorities can help it.

From Saturday morn of last week until yesterday, all was well on the Kiangwan front for the numerous newspaper reporters and foreign correspondents whose duty it was to "cover" the war. With passes, and in some cases without, the reporters and photographers rummaged through the Japanese lines, often right into the zone of actual hostilities.

Guards or sentries there were none to check the news hunters and they wandered far afield, getting close-up shots of the strife and methods employed.

All Went Well Until—

Then someone spilled the beans. Charges of atrocities flew, but were given little credence.

Then came a single eye-witness account of ruthless slaughter on the green grass of Kiangwan Race Course,—and the bars were put up.

From the Japanese Consulate-General on Tuesday afternoon there was forthcoming a disclaimer. It is inconceivable, it was pointed out, that any Chinese civilians could have remained in the Kiangwan zone on Monday, Consul General K. Mural urging the evacuation of all non-combatants from the zone of hostilities.

"Last Man Evacuated"

In the same statement is the allegation that the only Chinese civilian seen in the Kiangwan area on Monday had been evacuated by a foreign newspaper correspondent. His name was withheld, it was explained at the consulate, to avoid causing the gentleman embarrassment. He had brought into the Settlement and turned the lone civilian over to the Municipal Police, safe, alive and well.

There was no direct refutation attempted in regard to the specific charges of slaughter of civilians, whether guerillas or not. Nor was information forthcoming as to what procedure customary to organized armies had been followed in the arrest, trial and punishment of suspected soldiers, civilians, spies or snipers.

Passes Into Limbo Of Past

Reaction No. 2 came with announcement by the Japanese Consulate General that all military passes or courtesy slips, some of which had been issued a matter of hours before, no longer were valid and had been suspended until further notice. The announcement explained that owing to the "danger and confusion" it was necessary to suspend the privileges theretofore enjoyed by members of the Fourth reach the Japanese military headquarters.

The move made it impossible to quarters at Tienlohsze, where it was customary for Major Miyawaki, intelligence officer on the staff of Lieutenant General K. Uyeda, to issue communiques on the latest developments in the Kiangwan sector. Likewise it has become impossible for foreign newspaper men, other than Japanese press representatives, to proceed to the front lines.

The freedom enjoyed previously by the Japanese war correspondents, however, also has been restricted to some extent and they are required to gather in a tent set aside for them at headquarters to await the appearance of the officials appointed to broadcast what news is released.

Explanation Offered

Japanese diplomatic officials explain that there is no connection with the two developments,—the publication of eye-witness atrocity stories and the voiding of the consular passes to the war zone. They state that hereafter news of war developments will be available at the offices of the Japanese Consulate General, which has been issuing communiques daily for the last three weeks.

The communiques cover a variety of subjects, all of them linked with the present Sino-Japanese situation. A liaison officer has been appointed by the consulate and military news, relayed from the Tienlohsze headquarters, will be forthcoming in due course. Customary courteous consideration of newspaper deadlines will be extended, it was explained.

Text Of Statements

Text of the Japanese announcement suspending all passes, issued Tuesday night, follows:

"Due to danger and confusion, the validity of the press passes or courtesy slips to the Japanese Army Headquarters and the front lines issued by the Japanese Consulate-General or Army Headquarters is suspended until further notice."

The Japanese statement issued in regard to atrocities charged to the Japanese Army reads:

"A rumor of alleged Japanese atrocities on civilians at the Kiangwan Race Course has reached this office, much to our surprise. On February 20th, Mr. Mural sent to Mayor Wu a Note, the special purpose of which was to advise him to take necessary precautions for the safeguarding of the Chinese public at large, causing them either to take refuge in a safer zone or by some other appropriate means."

"After the exchange of fire in and around the Kiangwan Race Course of two days, it is inconceivable that any civilian could have been staying in that neighborhood, especially in the open, where it is alleged that the incident took place."

"One foreign correspondent whose identity and standing are well known to the office states that he brought back the only Chinese in sight from this same neighborhood, to the Settlement, giving him \$5 and handing him over to Deputy Superintendent Robertson of the Shanghai Municipal Police."

Women As Snipers

"Therefore, if there should happen to be any others remaining in the same neighborhood in any number as has been stated by the alleged accusation, they were no other than those who were engaged in sniping or otherwise in some form of military activities. It is not surprising if there were some women among the victims in view of the fact that some had been actually found sniping."

"In this connection, it may be added that although peaceful residents of Kiangwan have already evacuated, a great number of Chinese plain-clothes snipers, most of whom are the regulars of the Chinese army, are still entrenched in some of the study buildings of the village and are offering a violent resistance, causing considerable casualties to Japanese forces."

(S.E.P. February 15, 1932)

U.S. Vice-Consul Ringwalt Roughly Handled By Ronins

The American Consulate-General is awaiting answer to a protest filed February 11 with the Japanese Consul-General regarding rough handling accorded Vice-Consul Arthur R. Ringwalt and Mrs. L. Young, an American citizen, on February 10, at the hands of Japanese ronins and naval guards.

About noon of February 10, Vice-Consul Ringwalt and Mrs. Young, well supplied with identification documents, were proceeding to Mrs. Young's former residence at 129 Barchet Road to search for Mrs. Young's daughter Peggy, 7 years old, lost there at the time of the general evacuation of that area.

Japanese naval guards and volunteer civilians were patrolling Szechuen Road, and after examining the documents permitted Vice-Consul Ringwalt and Mrs. Young to

proceed in company with two Japanese volunteer civilians. They proceeded a short distance and were again halted by Japanese volunteer civilians, who stopped Mrs. Young, searched her clothing, and attacked Vice-Consul Ringwalt when he forcibly protested at their rough treatment of the woman in his care.

Both were cuffed and kicked, searched, but after Vice-Consul Ringwalt demanded that his mission in behalf of his government be not interfered with, they proceeded to the house, at 129 Barchet Road, only to find that it had been broken into, and was deserted.

Both the vice-consul and Mrs. Young returned to the consulate-general, and reported their treatment, which was not sufficiently severe however to require medical attention, although very painful. The American Consulate-General then made representations to the Japanese Consul-General, which have not yet been answered, time being allowed for a thorough investigation.

(S.E.P. February 15, 1932)

LEAGUE REPORT ON SHANGHAI

"Defensive Entirely on the Japanese

Geneva, Feb. 14.

"A reign of terror resulted in Hongkew following the Japanese occupation and a state of open war exists," says a report to the League of Nations by the Shanghai Commission, cabled this afternoon and signed by Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires and chairman of the commission.

He adds that the offensive is entirely in the hands of the Japanese whose declared object is to capture the Woosung forts and drive all Chinese troops a considerable distance from Shanghai.

The report goes on to say that almost the entire non-Japanese population of Hongkew has fled from that area.

The Japanese consul has admitted that excesses were committed by his nationals when feeling was running high and chaotic conditions prevailed but that the situation is now greatly improved and a number of undesirable Japanese have been deported to Japan.—Reuter.

(N.C.D.N. February 15, 1932)

THE RINGWALT INCIDENT

America Lodges Protest With Mr. Mural

WASHINGTON TAKES SERIOUS VIEW

Washington, Feb. 14.

A complete report on the case involving an alleged Japanese assault on Mr. A. R. Ringwalt, American vice-consul in Shanghai, on Wednesday of last week was ordered by Colonel Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of State.

It is stated that Secretary Stimson regards the Ringwalt case as the "gravest incident yet" of the Sino-Japanese crisis at Shanghai.

Mr. Ringwalt, whose American residence is at Omaha, while on an official mission in the Japanese defence area at Shanghai was assaulted by armed Japanese civilians. Mrs. L. Young, a Chinese woman holding American citizenship and whom Mr. Ringwalt was endeavouring to assist, was also assaulted. A protest on the Ringwalt case has been lodged with Mr. K. Mural, the Japanese Consul-General in Shanghai, by Mr. Edwin S. Cunningham, the American Consul-General at Shanghai.

The State Department understands that as yet Mr. Cunningham has not received a reply to his protest from Mr. Mural.

Assaulted by Armed Reservists

The assault on Mr. Arthur Ringwalt, American Vice-Consul, occurred last Wednesday who in company with Mrs. L. Young, of Chinese descent born in California and therefore an American citizen, went to Barchet Road, inside the Japanese defence area to search for Mrs. Young's baby. Although accompanied by two Japanese, Mrs. Young and Mr. Ringwalt were set upon by half a dozen armed Japanese reservists, who refused to believe that Mrs. Young was an American. She was seized and assaulted and when Mr. Ringwalt intervened he too was assaulted, being kicked and beaten. Eventually, Mr. Ringwalt was able to bring Mrs. Young back into the safety zone but they were unable to find Mrs. Young's baby, which was said to be in a house in Barchet Road. A report of the incident was compiled and Mr. Edwin S. Cunningham, U. S. Consul-General, registered a protest with Mr. Mural, the Japanese Consul-General.

(N. C. D. N. Feb. 16, 1932)

THE RINGWALT CASE NOT CONCLUDED

The Arrest of Japanese Marine Required

Washington, Feb. 17.

The Secretary of State, Col. Henry L. Stimson, does not consider that the case in which Japanese Marines assaulted Mr. Arthur Ringwalt, American vice-consul in Shanghai, has yet been settled, although he has received an apology from the Japanese authorities forwarded through Mr. Edwin L. Cunningham, the American Consul-General in Shanghai.

The case will not be closed, Mr. Stimson believes, until the Japanese authorities have arrested the marines responsible for the assault, and according to his information this has not yet been done.—United Press.

(N.C.D.N., Feb. 18, 1932)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By *Charles S. Lyman* NARS, Date *June 1, 1976*

ACTIVITIES IN HONGKEW

Marines, Roughs, and
Reservists

DOORS, FURNITURE SMASHED

Several outrages on private foreign property in Hongkew and Dixwell Road districts came to light yesterday. In the first, Mr. Biggs, employed by the Shanghai Power Company and residing at 707 Dixwell Road, reported to Hongkew police station that his house had been entered and windows, furniture and fittings ruined. Other than a radio loudspeaker, which he noticed was stolen last week, his premises were intact when he last left them. Unknown persons had entered over the weekend after smashing the rear gate and door and damaged his property to an extent which he was unable to estimate at noon yesterday.

Supplementary to this incident another foreign resident in the same district informed the police that Japanese had arrested his cook, but they released him some time later.

Information is also at hand that Japanese machine gunners have taken up positions in foreign houses along the Kiangwan Road, which, although evacuated, still fly American and British flags. These posts are said to bear on positions to cover a possible Japanese retreat should the Chinese attack with the reinforcements which are said to have come into the Chinese front line.

Chinese Civilians Arrested

On Monday afternoon, the No. 1 boy of the Hongkew police canteen was arrested by Japanese Marines, while within a few hundred feet of the station gate. Unfortunately for him, he had in his possession the visiting cards of several medical non-coms, stationed in Hangchow. The age of the cards bore out the statement that he received them several years ago. Nevertheless the Marines marched him off to the Japanese Telegraph Building. Capt. Kennedy, Assistant Commissioner of Police in charge of the area, witnessed the incident and, appealing to the officer in charge, obtained the release of the boy.

According to the account of a Chinese police watchman, he witnessed the arrest on Monday afternoon by Japanese roughs of three Chinese shop assistants from the drug store at 537 Woosung Road. The victims were taken to the Japanese Club.

Yesterday two Sikh constables saw Japanese arrest the manager of a hardware shop at 1299 Broadway. They escorted him to the telegraph office. Another S.P.C.

SEVEN SCHOOLS DESTROYED

Many Students Reported
Missing at Woosung

Through the Japanese naval and army operations against the Woosung Forts and the Woosung city, seven institutions of higher learning situated near the city have been destroyed by bombs and gun fire. Besides the heavy losses in the properties, a number of students are reported missing.

The institutions destroyed are: the Tung Chi Medical University, Commercial Navigation College, School of Sea Products, University of China, Medical College of the Central University, College of Agriculture of the University of Labour and College of Manual Training of the University of Labour.

The Tung Chi Medical University was founded by German medical and business men, who have supplied the institution with excellent equipment. The institution is situated two miles north to the Woosung city, and of 620 students, only a few more than 200 have reported to the registrar in his office in Shanghai. It is also reported that only half of the 60 coles employed in the institution have so far gathered in Shanghai. The remainder are missing.

What remains of the Commercial Navigation College is a heap of ruins. The college, established by the Ministry of Communications, is situated near the Woosung Forts. The buildings, together with the equipment, were demolished by bombs and gun fire. About half of the 350 students are reported missing. The School of Sea Products situated near the Woosung Forts were likewise destroyed by gun fire. The factory and research laboratories of the institution were blown up by bombs, while many of its students are also missing.

The dormitories of the University of China were shelled while they were fully occupied by students, it was reported. The Medical College of the Central University, College of Agriculture and the College of Manual Training of the University of Labour near Kiangwan also incurred heavy damage by bombs and gun fire.

(N. C. D. N. Feb. 17, 1932)

saw two Chinese taken to the Japanese school on Range Road.

In justice to the Japanese occupants of Hongkew, it must be stated that a representative of this journal traversed Hongkew and Dixwell Road districts twice yesterday and noticed that the only active civilian Japanese were attached to Marines on point duty. They were acting as interpreters and as soon as he presented his pass he was waved on with a smile.

(N. C. D. N. Feb. 18, 1932)

German Doctor Relates Case Of Dum-Dum Bullets

Physician Testifies On
Evidence In Hospital

In a recent issue of the China Press a report was published stating that dum-dum bullets were being used by the Japanese forces against the Chinese in certain instances. This notice was circulated by the Chinese Medical Association of this city.

The following day the report, as stated in this paper, was denied by the consular authorities of the Japanese Legation. Yesterday Dr. G. F. Burne who received his M. D. in Vienna and is now connected with the Chinese Red Cross General Hospital of this city addressed a letter to Dr. F. C. Yen, superintendent of the Chinese Red Cross Hospital, giving a detailed account of finding dum-dum bullets in patients who have come under his care. The letter which was dated February 16, follows:

Writes To Dr. Yen

Dear Dr. Yen:—Having gained experience in minor war surgery during the Great European War, I wish to put before you two particular cases of rifle shot-wounds, one in a Chinese soldier, the other in a Chinese civilian, a woman.

Case No. 1—A projectile, or better, a part of one, was found in the intestine of a soldier by Dr. Samuel Lowe who showed me the projectile. It is a piece of lead, 2.4 cm. long with an average width of 0.7 cm. in one, and 0.4 cm. in the other direction. Its end is very much deformed. The body which shows an approximately triangular cross-section is quite irregular in one of the three sides; there is no steel-mantle. From the experience that the lead nucleus of a projectile can only emerge from the steel-mantle if the tip has been sawn or broken off, moreover from the very deformed shape of the projectile and lastly from the certainty that the piece of lead before me is not from any kind of artillery-projectile known to me. I am of the opinion that the part of the projectile in question is from a dum-dum bullet.

Called In Consultation

Case No. 2—On February 12, 1932 I was called in consultation by the department of the surgery of this hospital to see Mrs. Nien who had been wounded by a rifle shot Feb. 12, 1932. I saw a small practically closed entrance wound at the left posterior chest. The exit wound

presented a defect of the size of a man's palm of the left upper anterior chest wall. One rib was seen apparently unbroken, the one right below this showed a defect of about two inches through which the collapsed lung could perfectly well be discerned. It is a well known fact that rifle shots with the normal small entrance wound and big defects at the place of exit are caused only by dum-dum bullet.

Apart from the possibility that dum-dum action is also found in bullets deflected from their course by first hitting a stone, I herewith definitely state that the two above-mentioned instances are cases of dum-dum bullet shots.

Sincerely yours,
(Sgd.) G. F. Burne, M. D. (Vienna).
(S. E. P. Feb. 18, 1932)

MORE "ARRESTS" IN HONGKEW

Chinese Civilians in
Custody

Additional "arrests" and brutality were alleged against the Japanese marines in Hongkew yesterday. A senior Municipal police described an incident which he witnessed. After searching a Chinese pedestrian on Seward Road, a Japanese marine brutally butted him with his rifle and kicked him on his way, after striking him with his fists.

At 11 a.m., a party of Japanese marines searched three or four houses on Miller Road, without awaiting the arrival of a police party, whose assistance they had requested. They suggested that snipers were functioning on the premises, but a thorough search by the police failed to reveal any arms. The marines escorted four of the inmates to the headquarters, two of whom were released during the afternoon. At 2 p.m., police officers witnessed marines "arrest" a Chinese civilian on the Szechuen Road Bridge. Several similar incidents were reported as well.

Yesterday morning, two police patrols were interfered with by Japanese marines while they were searching Chinese pedestrians, the latter insisting that this was their prerogative. Police officials also had difficulty in convincing Japanese that one of their Chinese detectives was a bona fide representative of the Municipality.

(N. C. D. N. Feb. 19, 1932)

MISSIONARIES' APPEAL

Methods of Japanese
Criticised

The "North-China Sunday News" has received a copy of a statement, which has just been issued. This statement was signed by 105 missionaries, British and American, resident in Shanghai, and it was first made public on February 12. It reads:—

We, a group of Christian missionaries in Shanghai, deeply deplore the present position in which Japanese direct military action is inflicting unspeakable misery and destruction in thousands of homes. An unknown number of civilian lives have already been lost. The mode of this action rudely assails the new international standards of morality so laboriously constructed since the Great War. Attack upon these is an attack upon every nation and upon the foundations of civilisation.

Advancing into purely Chinese territory, a thickly populated city area, at midnight on January 28, with a few minutes' warning to the Chinese Mayor and none to the civilian population, the Japanese armed forces, aided by aerial bombing and artillery, have wrought ruin and destruction for twelve days and are still continuing. Houses and property of innocent men, women and children over a large area have been razed to the ground and burned. Public property and factories have been destroyed and tens of thousands deprived of their livelihood. The great Commercial Press, on which all educators depend, was bombed and its library with its priceless treasures has later suffered destruction.

Privileged Position

The privileged position of the Japanese in the International Settlement is being abused as a base of operations, putting Britain, America and other peoples interested in the Municipal Council of the International Settlement in a false and embarrassing position. In the area under Japanese control, even within the Settlement, there has been a reign of terror in which hundreds of innocent people, many of whom we know personally, have been arrested, maltreated or summarily shot on suspicion without trial. All this has taken place in time of peace against a people with whom Japan had not even broken off diplomatic relations, still less declared war, a people who had submitted the dispute to the League of Nations.

Even now further armed forces are being brought to the scene of conflict. We appeal to all Chris-

tians and to the conscience of the world to condemn this madness and cruelty of war and urge our own and every peace loving nation, including the friendly Japanese people themselves, to insist that their government dissociate themselves from the action of the Japanese armed forces, take every possible measure calculated to end fighting and make use of available instruments for a peaceful settlement.
(N. C. D. N. Feb. 21, 1932)

Gruesome Sights Mark Race Track

Corpses Sweeten Ground
Where Children Once
Romped At Play

By T. O. T.

I visited Kiangwan Race Course today. I shall never be able to return without a shudder. My previous visits were to see the crowds of happy Shanghaianders on a Race Day outing, betting on their favorite horses; gentlemen-jockeys coursing under a brilliant sun.

This morning is just such a day overhead; but underneath,—nothing but horror.

The entrances to my favorite stand are blocked with corpses, fresh corpses, newly made before my eyes.

Women Shot In Back

Perhaps, as the official military communiques from Japanese headquarters say, these corpses once had been snipers, or even perhaps spies, I make no challenge, I just detail what I see.

There are women and children among them; women shot through the back, their padded coats run through with military sabres; children whose bodies are riddled with bullets; men garbed as peasant farmers heaped grotesquely about, their wounds soaking the ground.

They are not garbed as soldiers—not even the women and the children—so I suppose they must have been snipers—officially. I suppose so because my very dear friends at headquarters and the Japanese legation assure me—are at pains to point out to me—that the Japanese army and navy are not making war on civilians, nor upon Chinese peasants—or upon the Chinese government, nor upon Government troops—but merely the 18th Route Army from Canton.

Bodies Strewn On Playground

So I suppose that these people who seemed so innocent to the casual eye must have been machine gunners and rifle-men from the

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 4, 1976

19th Route Army, disguised as simple peasants.

It is difficult to ask them now.

The houses are burned; I saw them burned, with neat precision; not a wasted match, nor an extra piece of kindling.

And they? Their corpses sweeten the ground beneath the judges stand; one whose body was soaked in oil and now lies charred beneath the officials' tower will fill no crops again; they lie in little heaps along the grass before the stands, where, on that Race Day recently, the children played and chased elusive butterflies.

"Tragedy Of Peace"

And as I walk the top rail, scuffling through the glass which crashed from rifle-butt attacks upon the office tier, a tragedy of Peace—for remember this is not a war—unfolds beneath my eyes.

An Infantry company, just preparing for its duty in the hand-to-hand fighting on ahead in Kiangwan, pauses to watch the drama with me; I above and they below. The flames from burning farmhuts throw a curtain of red behind new captive groups of those who fled the fire.

An officer turns one of the peasant-garbed group away, to face the sun. His shining sabre flashes, up to its hilt in the human sheath; the body falls; a second takes its place, and once again the sabre finds its pulsing scabbard.

"Death By Proxy"

And now, a diversion; the next, a tall and likely lad, is flung unbound face down, upon the two who clutch the panting earth in death; and as he falls, a volley from six officers' revolvers makes a minor outline on his back and courses up his spine. The volley dies, the pistols now are empty, the jerking figure on the ground now is still and another takes his turn. I leave, for fear is on me now; the sunshine gone; my feet are lead.

The company of infantry is tasting death by proxy; and it is ready for the front.

(S. E. P. Feb. 22, 1932)

DETENTION IN HONGKEW

Illegal "Arrests" By Japanese

Seven "arrests" by Japanese marines of Chinese pedestrians in the Hongkew district were witnessed by foreign police yesterday, the authorities believing that as many more unwitnessed. One of those to have been taken into custody, was severely man-handled by his captors. About 4 p.m., an employee of the Standard Oil Company lost his liberty, being taken to places

Countryside Ablaze As Farm Homes Are Fired By Japanese

Incendiarism Termed "Necessary Precaution" At Headquarters; Uyeda Before "Peace" Plaque

Motor cars used no lights north of Kiangwan last night, but there was light enough and to spare.

While tanks, staff cars, motorcycles, cavalry and infantry milled along the spongy roads, the homes of peasants burst into flame one by one. They furnished tragic beacons lighting the background of combat.

For days there had been fires in and about Kiangwan, but it was not until last night that efforts became organized with the apparent aim of burning every structure in or about the Japanese line of attack.

Fires Dot Countryside

From Japanese headquarters, at a temple perhaps a mile north of Kiangwan race course, fires specked the countryside everywhere to the east, north and south. They flamed along the road; skirmishers brought brush, piled it against the windward side of each dwelling, and the lazy early-spring breeze soon fanned it high.

"A necessary precaution," explained headquarters. Snipers had been in some of these buildings and they might be in some others or they might get in some time in future; burning them was a simple military safeguard, it developed.

Parachute Flares

There were few country folk to watch, and none to interfere. That was a thing of the past. The peasants had not abandoned their homes and poor treasures without a gesture, but there were no gestures last night.

Overhead were Japanese airplanes, passing to and fro on mysterious affairs. Occasionally, as dusk descended a parachute bearing a flare would be detached high in air. At other times the passage of a plane

unknown. Another case concerns a father and son, both of whom were removed from the roads.

In one instance a Japanese constable searched a Chinese and then handed him over to a Marine patrol. A foreign police officer was appealed to by a Chinese who was being searched by a marine, the latter appearing to have pocketed some papers. The foreigner protested and a Japanese constable informed the former that he would report his (the foreigner's) action to the military authorities.

(N. C. D. N. Feb. 24, 1932)

over the Chinese lines would be marked with the heavy boom of an air bomb.

Over near the former Japanese headquarters at Fuh Tan University near Kiangwan there were several large guns, moved up during the day. One would hear first the bang of the gun, then the whistle of the shell overhead. Apparently the parachute flares aided in correcting the ranges.

Constant Rifle Fire

But smaller pellets were flying closer at hand. The rat-tat-tat of machine guns, the crackling of rifle fire, was constant. Occasionally a nearer bang and the rising of a cloud of black smoke would show where a shell from some point unknown had landed.

Within the temple headquarters there were Japanese officers, reserved but affable buttoned warmly into their military greatcoats and strolling about as though in a pleasure park.

General Uyeda sat back within the building having his dinner. Behind one shoulder could be seen one character of a carved temple inscription—the character "ping," or "peace."

The grounds outside were full of equipment and covered with the recumbent bodies of Japanese infantrymen, snatching a moment of respite from the burden of their heavy packs. Occasionally an officer would gather his group together and they would start forward.

Sounded Like War

Back along the road there had been ammunition and other supplies, sometimes only a matter of feet away from a burning farmhouse. Ahead of the temple, however, it was quiet.

Walking forward an eighth of a mile, one crossed the track of the Shanghai-Woosung railway. A few straggling soldiers moved back across the track from time to time, drawing carts with obscure cargo. Off to the right a half-dozen yards lay a white horse with hindquarters paralyzed by a bullet which had passed through his hips. Of other signs of life there were none.

But ahead in the dusk, out of range of burning homes, the rat-tat-tat continued. It may have been peace but it sounded like war.

(S. E. P. Feb. 23, 1932)

IN BLUNDERLAND

If the Japanese Government's reply to the appeal of the Council of the League of Nations were taken at its face value, the only possible conclusion would be that Tokyo had failed to grasp the essentials of the problem created by the action of Japanese naval, air and military forces here. The alternative suggestion that Japan refuses to take the League, of which she is a member, seriously might be in consonance with some aspects of Japanese policy but it can hardly be accepted in justice to Japan's international reputation. It was to be expected that every effort would be made to present Japanese actions in the best possible light. It was not expected that so much reliance would be placed on the dubious qualities of special pleading and frivolous misinterpretation. Fundamentally the weakness of Japan's case lies in the fact that, in deciding to take "drastic measures"—the quotation of the language of her agent must be used to rebut the specious pretence that defensive action only was intended—she had no clear-cut issue. Allegations of boycotting, anti-Japanese activities, the murder of the Buddhist monks, and the rest, could not stand alone. They had to be considered in their relation to the effect on Chinese opinion of Japanese aggression in Manchuria and, moreover, the adoption by the Japanese in Shanghai of an exceedingly provocative attitude which, for the three months preceding the outbreak had caused considerable anxiety. The concentration of Chinese troops within close proximity of Shanghai was directly due to the movement of menacing Japanese naval forces with declared hostile—or punitive—intent to Chinese Shanghai. Punishment for the boycott, for anti-Japanese activities was the object as first announced. Now it is claimed, with effrontery rather than logic, that the defence of the International Settlement was the recipient of Japanese solicitude.

China may have been—indeed was—a transgressor. Japan was the aggressor, the mere chronological evidence of the source of the first shot being immaterial. The world has come to learn the futility of assigning "war guilt." This should make Japan all the more diffident in replying to the League's dispassionate appeal with fustian instead of sound argument. It seems now painfully ironical for Japan to wax eloquent over China's breach of treaty engagements, or to moralise on China's lack of status

as an "organised state." Japan, as a Member of the League, made no attempt to bring before the League the grievances on account of which she took summary action in Manchuria last September and in Shanghai last month. To support the contention that the League was a useless bulwark it surely was first necessary to put the League to the test. Instead of that, Japan hamstrung the League and then complained that it was incapable of bearing her. It has been wisely stated that, where breaches of treaty engagements are concerned, the precipitate movement of troops is the ultimate folly. *Beside China's broken pledges there now stand Japan's engagements under the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty—and the ruins of Chapei. Confronting the intangible, shadowy, disorganised Government of China is a Government of Japan, completely at the mercy of the very militarism with which China is reproached.*

Japan's reply to the League makes much capital of Chinese misdeeds and aggressiveness. They call for correction. The question arises whether the process of correction should be undertaken with complete disregard for other interests equally—perhaps more extensively—affected. It may also be asked whether correction should take the form of reprisals and whether Japan, either by the actual performance of the last four weeks or by her moral and material ascendancy, was authorised to inflict it. Nor is Japan's insistence on Chinese unwillingness to resort to peaceful means of settlement impressive to those who realise the extremely provocative tone, manner and presentation of the terms which Lieutenant-General K. Uyeda laid down last week. The ingenuity of anticipating Chinese methods of evasion and shifting responsibility is heavily discounted by constantly accumulating evidence of the technique of the agent provocateur and the coincident occurrence of events to fit certain lines of Japanese action. The suggestion, in the Japanese note, that the League should have definitely proposed the creation of a "safety zone" indicates a pathetic blindness. As a "safety zone" the whole Shanghai area at the present moment looks a trifle awry. Japan, indeed, seems to have turned it into a Blunderland, from which it is to be hoped she will soon be able to extricate herself and others by the exercise of a clearer perception of the realities so

Poison Gas

A Japanese military spokesman in the Woosung sector indignantly declared, a fortnight ago, that Japan had no poison gas shells.

News from Europe indicates that this omission is now being repaired through purchase of 2,000 such aids to pacification, along with 18,000 high explosive shells, from the Skoda Works of Czechoslovakia.

That international sentiment toward poison gas is not precisely hospitable would not seem an important detail from the Tokyo viewpoint, since a great and increasing hostility by the entire world toward Japan's private war on China has not as yet had noticeable effect on Japanese sensibilities or policies.

In fact, the whole attitude of the Japanese military machine is such that we would hardly commend such measures as are proposed by Miss Maude Royden and other British pacifists.

The Royden group wants to come to Shanghai and take up a position in "no man's land" between the Chinese and Japanese armies to prevent them from shooting.

Quite a number of innocent Chinese civilians have tried that. The shooting is still going strong but the civilians aren't.

We would like to believe we lived in a world where poison gas shells weren't bought, because they seem not quite sporting; where idealistic third parties could halt a war by getting into its line of march; but Japan has been giving us an education in hard realities.

The Japanese military machine will quit grinding against China when the home folk quit buying oil for it. Not sentiment, but financial loss and an inevitable realization of defeat in the vital issues, will provide the eventual check for Japanese aggression.

(S. E. P. Feb. 27, 1932.)

blandly commended to the League's attention. There is little disposition in Shanghai to overlook them; they starkly glower in the complete stagnation and possible ruin of the trade of this great port; in the grave accentuation of political dangers of the first magnitude and in the peril of Japan victimised by overweening militarist ambition. "Deeds are louder than words;" in the light of that Japanese retort to the League let judgment be passed.

(N. C. D. N. Feb. 26, 1932.)

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Conflict in the Far East provoked by Japan in China.

Comments on -.

793.94/96

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum

(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated October 11, 1937

From } State Department
 To } A-M
 (Messersmith)

File No. 740.00/217 $\frac{1}{2}$

PS/DAB

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94

793.94/1775

SEE 701.9493/39 FOR Tel. #54

FROM China (Perkins) DATED January 16, 1930

TO NAME 1-1127 o.p.o.

REGARDING:

Appointment of Consul General Shigemitsu as Charge d'Affaires.
Authorization granted for him to proceed to Nanking on 15th for discussions on treaty revisions, and tariff questions.

M

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

JHB.

GRAY

Peiping, Via Naval Radio,

Dated Jan. 16, 1930,

Rec'd Jan. 17, 9 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

54, January 16, 5 p. m.

My 39, January 11, 6 p. m.


Japanese Legation confirms the correctness of recent Shanghai news despatches to the effect that Consul General Shigemitsu has been appointed a Charge d'Affaires and that he was authorized to proceed to Nanking on the 15th to begin discussions with the Chinese authorities on treaty revision, tariff questions and other matters pending between the two Governments. Notwithstanding the above Charge d'Affaires ad interim Horinouchi (who is to be transferred to Washington as Counselor of Embassy) will for the time being continue in Peiping as head of the Japanese Legation.

PERKINS

KLP

JHB

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976



OFFICE OF DISTRICT ATTORNEY



RAYMOND O. MCINTOSH
COUNTY DETECTIVE

FEB 4 30

OF CRAWFORD COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

MEADVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA

February 7 1930-
February 3, 1930

Department of State,
Washington, D.C.



*Aug'd
file
E.G.C.*

793.94/1776

Gentlemen:

I have been greatly interested to find out whether or not Japan has completely relinquished her political sovereignty over the province of Shantung over which she was given sovereignty in the Versailles treaty? — (Oct. 1918-1919)

There has been considerable discussion here lately concerning whether or not Japan has done what she agreed to do and has relinquished complete political sovereignty and all her rights in Shantung to China.

I would appreciate this information as soon as it is convenient.

Yours very truly,

Stuart A. Culbertson

*per
Ann Virginia Caddahens.*

DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF
CRAWFORD COUNTY

SAC/AVC

See
793.94/1300
1300A
1357
1383

763.72119/5240

FEB 8 - 1930

FILED

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By William A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

In reply refer to
 FE 793.94/1776

February 7 1936

Mr. Stuart A. Culbertson,
 District Attorney of Crawford County,
 Meadville, Pennsylvania.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of February 3, inquiring whether or not Japan has relinquished the political rights in Shantung granted to Japan by the Versailles treaty.

Reference to a pamphlet (No. 50) published in 1929 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D. C., entitled "Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919-1929", will disclose (pp. 80-85) the text of a treaty between China and Japan, signed at Washington on February 4, 1922, by the terms of which Japan engaged, among other things, to restore to China the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochoo, together with its administration and public properties, not later than six months from the date of the coming into force of the treaty; to withdraw the

Japanese

793.94/1776

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 By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date January 1, 1976

- 2 -

Japanese troops stationed along the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway; to surrender the Customs House of Tsingtao to the Chinese Maritime Customs; and to transfer to China the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway and its branches, as well as the wireless stations at Tsingtao and Tsinanfu.

By a subsequent agreement signed on December 1, 1922, by the Commissioners of China and of Japan (see p. 114 ff. of the pamphlet above referred to) it was stipulated that the date for the transfer to China of the administration and public properties of the former Leased Territory should be December 10, 1922, and that the Japanese troops should be withdrawn within twenty days thereafter. By a similar agreement signed on December 5, 1922, (see 127 ff.) the date for the transfer to China of the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway and its branches was set at January 1, 1923.

The above statements are intended merely as a summary, in general terms, of the principal provisions of the agreements mentioned which relate to the question raised in your letter under reply; for precise and full information on the subject reference should of course

be

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

be made to the actual texts of the agreements cited.

Very truly yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:


Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

GR
Feb. 7. 1930

FE: RSM: ZMF

2/6/30

FE



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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Szymanski NARS, Date June 1, 1976



No. 303

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
 Mukden, China,

March 8, 1930.

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 ON LAND MAIL

SUBJECT: Resolutions of Japanese Society relating to China.



The Honorable
 Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping, China.

Sir:

As of possible interest, I have the honor to enclose herewith a newspaper report of the resolutions adopted by The Council of Inquiry into Far Eastern Affairs (To-A Chosakai) at its general meeting at Tokyo on February 8, 1930. This society is described as a voluntary organization composed of influential Japanese. It was reported that Dr. Minoru Oka, Vice President of the Osaka Mainichi, and a member of the board of counsellors, opened the meeting and Count Kiyoura occupied the chair. The resolutions represent the aims of the society respecting China which it "expects to carry out in the hope of bringing peace and happiness to the Far East". They relate to the guaranteeing of land and sea communications in time of civil war, to the abolition of extraterritoriality and to the anti-foreign movement.

These resolutions have attracted considerable attention among the Japanese press of Manchuria as the following

Dairen

793.94

793.94/1777

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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Dairen report to the Osaka Mainichi indicates:

"Such Japanese dailies as the Manshu Nippo and Dairen Shinbun, playing the topic up in three-column size, have drawn the readers' attention to the importance of the question. Suggestions within the realm of feasibility are what made the resolutions appeal to all here, whereas heretofore any and all contentions in Japan regarding Manchuria and Mongolia were purely abstract.

Men like Mr. Okura, director of the South Manchuria Railway Company, Mr. Sata, head of the reference section of the South Manchuria Railway, President Takayanagi of the Manshu Nippo, President Hosoi, of the Dairen Shinbun and others, told the Mainichi that they consider the resolutions as epoch-making in every respect.

To the Japanese community in general the resolutions are exceptionally welcome, for the reason that they look upon the resolutions as the beacon - showing the way for ultimate solution of the enigma on Manchuria and Mongolia questions, which too often betrayed the sign of limitation.

Furthermore, such resident Japanese who find the so-called retrogressive Manchuria and Mongolia policy distasteful, regard the resolutions as an eye-opener for the negative element, as well as giving the Chinese an opportunity for casting an introspective glance."

Although the above comment may be somewhat exaggerated in tone, it is believed that it is of interest as throwing some light on Japanese opinion in Manchuria on these subjects.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosure:
As stated.

Original and one copy to Legation
Five copies to Department
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo

800
MSM:HTW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 307 of M. S. Myers,
 American Consul General at Mukden, China, dated March 8,
 1930, on the subject "Resolutions of Japanese Society
 relating to China."

RESOLUTIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF INQUIRY INTO FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS.

Preamble.

Notwithstanding the fact that the situation in the Far East in recent years has been gradually assuming a pacific aspect in comparison with that of some years ago, in China alone the political disturbances and the general unrest show no indication of immediate stabilization. Not only is the situation hampering the normal growth of industries in China but the other nations concerned are deprived of sharing the benefit of the mutual prosperity accruing from trade and commerce.

This unsettled condition in China is not the concern of China alone: it involves the whole Far East. Especially does the fact that the military cliques in China are contesting for supremacy by armed force and creating ceaseless interior disturbances, run directly counter to the spirit in which China joined the signatories of the Kellogg anti-war Treaty.

We urgently hope to see the Chinese Government and its people make a united effort for the peaceful unification of the country and for its economic construction. The Council of Inquiry Into Far Eastern Affairs, conscious of the present situation in China, has resolved on the following problems and expects to carry them out in the hope of bringing peace and happiness to the Far East.

Resolution No. 1

(a) On Guaranteeing Land and Sea Communications at the Time of Civil Turmoils in China.

Enormous losses are being suffered not only by the Chinese themselves but also by the foreign residents in China from the almost continued internal disturbances in China of late years. In order to eradicate the cause of such losses and to develop industrial activities in China, we believe that the establishment of guaranteeing the land and sea communications is a most effective policy. The Council hereby urges the authorities at home and abroad to formulate a definite plan to assure the safe maintenance of such communications at the time of civil warfare.

(b)

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By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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(b) On the Abolition of Extraterritoriality.

We endorse in principle the abolition of extraterritoriality which China has been aspiring to effect for many years. As to the Chinese plan of carrying out the abolition by China's own will, we regard the step as still premature in view of the present conditions in China. The Council proposes therefore that China, basing her action upon international justice and faith, should carry out a plan for the gradual solution of the problem, and the Council declares its aim to be to the realization of that end.

(c) On the Anti-Foreign Movement in China.

The Chinese boycott of foreign goods and the anti-foreign movement have overstepped the sphere of an economic issue and are being kept up politically, causing a standing menace and material loss to the foreign industrialists in China as well as to the Chinese merchants and industrialists themselves.

Means to meet the anti-foreign movement has been studied by different parties, but so far no thoroughgoing policy has been offered. In view of the serious nature of the Sino-Japanese economic relations, the Council declares the urgent need for a speedy and definite solution of the problem.

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 861.77 Chinese Eastern/907 FOR #48

FROM Japan (Castle) DATED Feb. 27, 1930
 TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 o.p.

REGARDING: Chinese-Russian-Japanese relations.
 Comments upon editorial published in SWODNIA in Dec. 1929
 which hints of a secret agreement between Japan and Russia
 made during time of Russian-Chinese dispute over Chinese
 Eastern Railway.
 Reviews attitude which Japan has taken since Washington
 Conference in connection with Russian plan whereby Japan
 and Russia should not construct railways north or south of
 Chinese Eastern Railway without consent of the other -- Japan
 insisted that only China had right to give permission for such
 railways.
 Comments upon unwillingness of Japan to have Chinese
 Eastern Railway fall into hands of China and reasons therefor.

leb

793.94/1798

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Mukden/34 FOR #304 to Legation

FROM Mukden (..... Myers) DATED Mar. 8, 1930
 TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:
 Sino-Japanese relations.

Uncertain political situation in Japan since rise of the
 Minseito Party to power has had a quiescent effect on Japanese
 activities in Manchuria and has been responsible for delay
 of South Manchuria Railway Company in reaching a decision
 in regard to various projected enterprises. Discussion
 (copy attached).

pra

793.94 / 1779

0050

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

The uncertain political situation in Japan since the rise of the Minseito Party to power has had a quiescent effect on Japanese activities in Manchuria and has no doubt been mainly responsible for the delay of the South Manchuria Railway Company in reaching a decision in regard to various projected enterprises. The sweeping victory of this party in the recent elections and the consequent stabilization in the political sphere give a totally different aspect to the situation and may be expected, it is thought, to result in a re-animation of Japanese activities both in the political and economic fields. As is well known, there are many outstanding Sino-Japanese questions, of which a great deal has been heard in the past. It will be interesting to note whether the present Government will endeavor to adjust such important questions as railway construction, land leasing and Korean immigration or will let sleeping dogs lie. According to reliable information, the policy of Dr. Sengoku, the new President of the South Manchuria Railway Company, in regard to the construction of the Kirin-Kainei Railway - extension of Kirin-Tunhua - is to let the matter rest where it is until the Chinese assume a more conciliatory attitude. Obviously it is

still

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By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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still a cardinal point in Japanese policy but for
political reasons its solution may be deferred.

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P.R./27 FOR #66

FROM Japan (Castle) DATED Mar. 11, 1930
TO NAME 1-1127 000

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese Relations.

Second general meeting of the Tao Chosakai (Council of Inquiry into Far Eastern Affairs) took place, Feb. 8th. Questions discussed were questions pertaining to--, and to Russia, such as: 1. Maintenance of land and water communications; 2. Abolition of extrality; 3. Anti-foreign agitations; etc. (copy attached).

pra

0841/46.56L
793.94/1780

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence J. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

713,94

The Toa
Chosakai
I. China.

There did occur, however, on February eighth, a matter of minor interest. The Toa Chosakai (Council of

*There is some dispute as to whether it is located in the vicinity of Tokyo or of Atami. As Atami is a celebrated winter resort its claims are regarded by certain competent observers to have been put forward for purposes of advertisement.

**Despatches No. 45 of February 24th and No. 58 of March 10th.

***Despatches No. 26 of February 10th and No. 42 of February 24th.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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of Inquiry into Far Eastern Affairs), which was organized late last year, held its second general meeting. Count Miyoura, former Prime Minister, was in the chair, while others present included Baron Gonsuke Hayashi, former Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, Count Uchida, former Privy Councillor, and Prince Kono and Marquis Hasekawa of the House of Peers. Finding that despite the general improvement of conditions in the Far East the situation in China is so disturbed as to be disadvantageous to foreign powers, they decided upon the following resolutions:

1. Maintenance of land and water communications: The best means of ending the disastrous internal disturbances of China are so to develop trade and industry there that safety of land and water communications may be attained. The Council therefore advised the Japanese authorities to devise an appropriate plan in this respect.

2. Abolition of extraterritoriality: As the Council, although approving abolition of extraterritoriality in principle, regards it as premature because of unsettled conditions, it expressed the hope that China would take measures for gradual rather than immediate attainment.

3. Anti-foreign agitations: In view of the fact that such agitations have passed from economic to political aspects, causing suffering to all interests, the Council urged the Japanese authorities to take proper measures for a solution of the problem.

The importance of the resolutions lies chiefly in

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
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the prominence of the men involved. During the month under review these resolutions had no visible effect. Unsettled conditions continued to retard the progress of Sino-Japanese negotiations, although at the close of the month observers had become slightly more optimistic.

2. Russia. An additional resolution followed. This dealt with the Japanese fishery industry in Soviet waters and was in brief as follows: Between the Soviet desire to expel Japanese interests from Soviet waters and the internal strife existing among the Japanese themselves, the latter are gradually losing their rights. The industry faces a crisis. The Council therefore urged the adoption of measures necessary to protect Japanese interests.

The situation with regard to the fishery industry was reported in Despatch No. 31 of February 20th, and subsequent developments are the subject of a despatch now in preparation.

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 741.94/195a FOR Instruction #59

FROM (-) DATED April 2, 1930
 TO China NAME 1-1127 000

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan. Extract from the
 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES in British House of Commons on
 February 26, 1930 dealing chiefly with Anglo-Japanese
 relations regarding China.

793.94/1781

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Index Bureau
 RECEIVED

--- (Kuo Min News-Agency) April 10, 1930. ~~##~~

MAY 21 1930

-- 9 --

79394/1782 IB

Dept. of State, April 9.-- With reference to Rengo's report that the Stimson-Matsudaira conversations at the London Naval Conference indicate that the American Government intends to recognize Japan's predominant position in the Far East, it is learned on high authority that the report is unfounded.

Authoritative quarters in London assert that Japan had neither asked for nor had America offered such recognition during the conversations which were confined strictly to the question of Naval Disarmament.

"America does not desire," it is declared, "to discuss here any political question or any question affecting China, nor would America discuss China without the presence of China."--Kuo Min.

793.94

79394/1782

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976



AM RECD

EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, May 14, 1950.

No. 130

FE

793.94

JUN 5 1950



Copy in FE

793.94/1783

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a translation of a
 1/. statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in
 the House of Peers on May 6th, in reply to an inter-
 pellation on Japanese relations with China.

Baron Shidehara prefaced his remarks by making
 clear that the present Japanese Government is refraining
 from interference not only in Chinese domestic "troubles"
 but in domestic "affairs" as well; that Japan "does not
 take the part of A who is trying to overturn B." In the
 specific

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0059

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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specific instance of the Nationalist Government attempting by unilateral action to abrogate existing treaties with Japan, however, it would be his policy, as it had been the policy of his predecessor, to insist upon the Nationalist Government first securing the assent of the Japanese Government.

After touching upon the boycott by the Chinese of Japanese merchandise, Baron Shidehara took occasion to characterize as groundless the charges brought against Mr. Obata, who is under consideration for appointment as Minister to China, of improper behavior during the 1915 negotiations.

I venture to invite the Department's particular attention to Baron Shidehara's views with regard to cooperation between the Powers interested in China. He concurs in the view that cooperation should be maintained, but it must not be in fact joint opposition against China. The Powers, he believes, should seek common points of interest with the view to promoting the welfare of China as well as of their own. "If by cooperation", he concluded, "is meant maintaining a common firing line against China, then I am of the opinion that such cooperation should not be carried out".

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

W. R. Castle, Jr.
W. R. Castle, Jr.

✓
Enclosure:
Translation of address.

Copy to Peking.

0060

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Enclosure No. 1
Despatch No. 130
From American Embassy
Tokyo.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS ON

MAY 5, 1930.

Tokyo OFFICIAL GAZETTE
May 6, 1930.

Baron Shidehara (Minister of Foreign Affairs):

I shall now proceed to reply to the questions just put by Mr. Shimidzu. His first question was whether or not I am still pursuing my policy of non-interference with the domestic affairs of China, and of protecting our rights in that country. Before answering this question, I should like to make the following observation: during the Kato and Wakatsuki Cabinets, I emphasized the use of the words "non-interference in the domestic troubles in China". This has necessarily a more limited significance, but I thereafter began to use the words "domestic affairs" and I have subsequently used nothing but the latter phrase. It goes without saying that the Japanese Government does not interfere in purely domestic Chinese political disputes. We do not take the part of A. who is trying to overturn B. Thus, my policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of China and of protecting our interests in that country has not been changed; nor, indeed, do I see any necessity for deviating from this policy. The second point

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 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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point touches upon the fact that in Chiang Kai-shek's political platform there is some reference to the abolition of unilateral treaties. Chiang Kai-shek suggests two methods by which this aim may be attained: one is by negotiation with the interested Powers and the second is by the abolition of the treaties without the consent of the interested Powers. Mr. Shimidzu asks whether or not the Japanese Government would recognize a declaration by China unilaterally abolishing a treaty with Japan. It goes without saying that the Japanese Government would not recognize the abolition of a treaty in this manner. As members are aware, China declared during the previous Cabinet that the Treaty of Commerce with Japan was no longer effective and that, after protracted negotiations, it was decided that the question of revising this Treaty should be brought about after due consultation between the two Governments. As I stated in the House a few days ago, after this understanding was reached, an agreement was established regarding the tariff question. With respect to the other questions which are covered by the Treaty of Commerce, it is now proposed to proceed to their settlement by further negotiations.

The next question referred to the boycott by Chinese of Japanese goods. It was unfortunately true that the Chinese were boycotting Japanese products, but since last year the movement has gradually subsided and today it may be said that the boycott has virtually disappeared. It is spasmodically reported that newspapers and other irresponsible bodies are attempting to apply the boycott but as a matter of fact these reports are largely groundless.

There

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By Clarence S. Long NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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There was, then, a question raised regarding the status of Ambassador Obata. It goes without saying that when a Minister or Ambassador is about to be appointed, it is the usual practice to obtain the consent of the other government to the proposed appointment. This practice has been followed during the past few years with regard to appointments to China; that is to say, whenever we have considered the appointment of a Japanese Minister to China, we have previously sought and secured the consent of the Chinese Government. It is unnecessary to state that the procedure necessary in securing the agreement of a foreign government is always carried out with the utmost secrecy and no government ever divulges the name of the person for whom an agreement has been sought. However, in this particular instance, the facts leaked out into the press. Nevertheless, I cannot feel that it should be publicly discussed. I may state, however, that this is a question which is now pending. I deeply regret that, in my opinion, it would be unprofitable to disclose what has hitherto passed. You may perhaps have observed in the Chinese press that Mr. Obata is supposed to have joined in the negotiations with the Chinese delegates in 1915 when he was Counselor of Legation and that he is supposed to have pounded the table with anger and to have shown a menacing attitude towards the Chinese representatives. The opinion is expressed in the Chinese papers that such a person is not suitable as Minister to China. These reports are all entirely untrue. Mr. Obata served for a long time in China and he understands the new China as well as he does the old China. It is my opinion that, in point of experience, intelligence, and character, he is eminently fit to assume the

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By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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the heavy task of improving the relations which exist between the two countries. It is true that he attended the negotiations in 1915 when he was Counselor of the Legation, but he was entrusted only with the duty of preparing the minutes of the Conference, the Minister at the time, Mr. Mioki, undertaking the negotiations himself. The facts are that Mr. Obata himself did not participate in the negotiations in a single instance. I do not understand how these rumors ever arose, but the fact remains, nevertheless, that they are entirely without foundation. The delegates representing the Chinese Government at those negotiations are alive today and I have every confidence, that if these rumors form an excuse for the Chinese Government refusing to give an agreement for Mr. Obata, they can be corrected.

The opinion was expressed that cooperation between the Powers was absolutely necessary in dealing with China, as it might be possible for China otherwise to follow the policy of "setting the barbarians against each other". I am entirely in accord with the view that the Powers interested in China should always maintain the closest cooperation, with this proviso, however: that the cooperation should not be of such a nature as to be joint opposition to China. It is my belief that the Powers must maintain cooperation with a view to seeking common points of interest, not only of the Powers themselves but of China as well, and remembering always the necessity of maintaining perfect fairness. If, by cooperation is meant maintaining a common firing line against China, then I am of the opinion that such cooperation

between

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 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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between the Powers should not be carried out.

The next point referred to the question of railways in Manchuria. Mr. Shimidzu remarked that there was some infringement of the previously acquired rights of Japan. I do not know to what Mr. Shimidzu refers but I may say that the rights which Japan has already acquired will be protected. So far as I know, we have no rights which we have not already exercised to lay new railway lines in Manchuria.

Mr. Shimidzu then expressed the opinion that the Chinese were extremely quarrelsome and he asks what the Japanese Government proposes to do about it. It goes without saying that we look forward to cooperation between the two countries. We have frequently had unfortunate incidents arising, but it seems to me that the relations between the two countries recently have been most satisfactory. As I observed in the Diet a few days ago, the settlement of the customs tariff question is one example of how we are proceeding towards cooperation with each other. It is my opinion that both countries must hereafter put forward their best efforts to proceed further along this path.

I was then asked whether the Government proposed to do anything towards unifying the conflicting opinions in Japan about what our policy with respect to China should be. To unify public opinion is, to my belief, a most difficult task. If it can be done, so much the better, of course. We have frequently expressed our opinions with regard to what should be our position with respect to China, in the hope that they may receive the support and approbation of the people.

....

0065

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.94/4 FOR Tel.#405-7 pm.

FROM China (Perkins) DATED June 4, 1930.
TO --- NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Discussion in Japanese Cabinet of China situation, especially Shantung. Strict neutrality and non-interference decided upon. Japanese at Tsinanfu have appealed for military protection but neither the Foreign Office nor the War Office is considering a new Shantung expedition. According to Reuter despatch dated Tokyo, June 3, 1930. (COPY ATTACHED)

fpg

793.94/1784

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

RR

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated June 4, 1930.

Recd. 2:50 P. M.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

405, June 4, 7 P. M.

Legation's 401, June 4, 3 P. M.

Following from Reuter Tokyo June 3rd:

"It is authoritatively stated that the Japanese Cabinet at its regular session today discussed the China situation, especially Shantung, decided upon strict neutrality and non-interference.

It is understood that the commanders of both Chinese factions in the civil war have given assurance that Japanese residents will be protected.

In spite of appeals from the Japanese at Tsinanfu for military protection neither the Foreign Office nor the War Office is even considering a new Shantung expedition".

FOR THE MINISTER

WSB

PERKINS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Ryan Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.94/6 FOR Tel.#414-7 am.

FROM China (Perkins) DATED June 6, 1930.

-TO- NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Japanese policy in regard to the situation at Tsinan: Reuter despatch of June 6, states Japanese Foreign Office is watching the situation but has decided on a "hands off" policy. Compares the Shidehara policy with the Tanaka policy, in regard to protection of Japanese in China. (COPY ATTACHED)

fpg

793.94/1785

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

JHR

PLAIN

Peiping, via W.R.

Dated June 5, 1930

Rec'd 10.55 a.m.

note 703.94

Secretary of State,
 Washington

414, June 6, 7 a.m.

Legation's 405, June 4, 7 p.m.

Following from Reuter Tokyo June 6:

"The Japanese Foreign Office is anxiously watching the situation at Tsinan but has determined in to maintain a hands' off policy.

Tsinanfu is regarded as an acid test of the Shidehara policy of reliance on the Chinese authorities assurances of protection of Japanese residents as opposed to the Tanaka policy of the military expeditions of 1927 and 1928. Hence another Tsinan incident would be a serious blow to the Hamaguachi Cabinet.

Few Japanese are leaving Tsinan and almost the entire colony of twenty three hundred is remaining.

Owing to the development of the military situation the Tokyo war office has suspended the arrangement to send military ^{ORS} instructions to the Nanking War College.

For the Minister,

PERKINS

WSB

302.94/6

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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NOTE

SEE 123 Castle, William R./48 FOR Memorandum
FROM State Dept. FE (Hornbeck) DATED June 10, 1950
TO NAME 1-1127

INDEX BUREAU
793.94/1786

REGARDING:

Conversation with Chinese Minister who called to inquire about the question of affirmations in the press that certain utterances of Ambassador Castle were definite and officially inspired utterances indicative of a change of policy on the part of the American Government in regard to Japan and China.

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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NOTE

SEE 701.9492/50 FOR #571

FROM China (Perkins) DATED Nov. 5, 1930.
 TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Question of raising the Japanese Legation in China
 to an embassy.

Reference to - .
 (See ATTACHED).

793.94 / 1737

INDEX BUREAU

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Peipin, November 5, 1930.

No. 544

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's despatch No. 234,
of September 5, 1930, concerning Japanese diplomatic
representation in China, I have the honor to inform
the Department that a Reuter news despatch from Tokyo,
dated October 31st, states that Mr. Kuramatsu Murai,
formerly First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy at
Rio de Janeiro, has been appointed Consul General at
Shanghai to succeed Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu, who will
henceforth act only as Chargé d'Affaires. Mr. Shige-
mitsu has acted for some time concurrently as Consul

General

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General at Shanghai and Japanese Charge d'Affaires to China.

A news despatch dated October 18th from Nanking states that upon the previous day Dr. S. S. Wang granted an interview to Mr. Ryutaro Nagai, the Japanese Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, at which time reference was made to China's refusal to accept Mr. Obata as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. The report goes on to say that Dr. Wang indicated his willingness to accept Mr. Obata in the event that Japan would raise the rank of its Mission in China to that of an Embassy, and that Mr. Nagai replied that the proposal must be referred to Tokyo before really could be made.

A Nanking news despatch of October 21st states that in his interview with President Chiang Kai-shek on October 18th Mr. Nagai referred to the question of Japanese diplomatic representation in China and expressed regret that China had refused to accept the representative appointed by Japan "disregarding her sincerity of having taken the steps that she takes towards a first class power".

At the weekly memorial service held at Nanking upon October 28th, General Chiang Kai-shek is reported to have said that "Yen Hsi-shan and Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang having been suppressed, China must now defend herself against the encroachment of imperialism by all means" and declared that a diplomatic official of a certain country had insulted China by saying that his country is treating China as a first class state.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

A Rengo report from Nanking dated October 21st states that Mr. Nagai is at a loss to know why the President made this request of the memorial service on the previous day inasmuch as his interview with General Chiang Kai-shek was marked by evidences of extreme affability on both sides. The Rengo Agency intimates that Mr. Chigamitsu will call upon President Chiang with a view to explaining away any statements made by the Japanese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs which may have been offensive to China.

The Japanese Ambassador, Financial, Naval and Military Attaches are now stationed at Shanghai, their assistants, however, continue to reside permanently at Peking. As of possible interest to the Department a copy of the most recent published list of the personnel of the Japanese Legation is transmitted herewith.

1/

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

MAHLON W. BRIDGINS,
 Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure:

1. List of the personnel of the Japanese Legation.

LHE/GL

List of Personnel of the
Japanese Legation.

At Shanghai:

Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu, Chargé d'Affaires.
Mr. Waro Moriya, First Secretary.
Mr. Tateki Horiuchi, Second Secretary.
Mr. Kenjiro Hayashide,
Mr. Kazuo Okazaki, Third Secretary.
Major General Saburo Sato, Military Attaché.
Captain Haruo Kitaoka, Naval Attaché.
Mr. Heitaro Yokotake, Commercial Counselor.
Mr. Taro Kimimori, Financial Attaché.

At Peiping:

Mr. Makoto Yano, First Secretary.
Mr. Chuichi Ohashi, Second Secretary.
Mr. Yutaka Tsuchida, Third Secretary.
Mr. Nagao Kita, Third Secretary.
Mr. Ryuichi Harada, Second Secretary-Interpreter.
Mr. Hirokichi Nemichi, Attaché.
Mr. Kota Hoketsu, Attaché.
Mr. Takeshi Takagi, Chancellor.
Mr. Kwoio Yokogawa, Chancellor.
Mr. Motoichi Akiyama, Chancellor.
Mr. Chikata Ikeda, Chancellor.
Mr. Isamu Nishikawa, Chancellor.
Mr. Shizuo Kanaya, Chancellor.
Mr. Shinjin Takano, Chancellor.
Lieut. Colonel
Tei-ichi Suzuki, Asst. Military Attaché.
Commandant Kiichi Tomita, Asst. Naval Attaché.
Lieut. Colonel Ryuen Kitao, Commandant Legation Guard.
Doctor Tsunenori Iijima, Medical Doctor.

At Nanking: Mr. Shinichi Uemura, Consul and Third Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Zgoni NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Feb. 5, 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE HISTORICAL ADVISER

Library

F.E.

Mr. Hamilton:

I believe that F.E. would prefer to answer this letter of Mr. Tsui. The Library has tried to find some information, as you will see by Mr. Kendall's note. Mr. Tsui would find the publications referred to in the first part of Mr. Kendall's note, at the Library of Congress. There appear to be documents in I.B., however, which Mr. Schuman sent to the Department, and which might be of interest to Tsui. You will be able to determine how much and what he should be told of this.

It would be appreciated if a carbon copy of the reply to Mr. Tsui could be sent to the, so that we might also benefit by the information which you give him.

M. L. G.

0076

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Please return to
 M. L. Gericke
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Room 308

OFFICE OF THE HISTORICAL ADVISER

P.S. The detailed reports of
 the proceedings of the Commission,
 sent in by Mr. Schumann, the
 U.S. Minister, are in I.R. files.

These were probably furnished
 to the Minister by the Com-
 mission and may be pre-
 sumed to be official records,
 but are not specifically named
 as the minutes -

F.A.K.

Miss Christensen F.E. asked
 Mr. Drivall, I.R. gave this
 information. H.A. is now
 using some of the material.

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Please return to
 M. L. Gervick
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Room 308

OFFICE OF THE HISTORICAL ADVISER

To: Mr. Gervick
 June, 1922. This was known as
 the "Shantung Conference".
 The North China Herald
 vol. 145
 contains more or
 less detailed accounts of
 the proceedings, but I do not
 find in it the official
 minutes of the commission.
 Nor do I find anything about
 it except its reports in the
 North China Herald above
 mentioned, and the China Year
 Book, 1923, which contains a summary
 of the proceedings of the Conference.
 p. 1156 -
 Feb. 2, 1931, FAK.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles D. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE HISTORICAL ADVISER

Mr. Kendall

Please investigate
this for me. "Tsu"
is not an official of
the L.C. and I can
not understand why
he should use the
paper with their letter-
head.

Mhly

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Correspondence should be addressed
"LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS
CHINESE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, D. C."

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
CHINESE DIVISION
WASHINGTON

CABLE ADDRESS
LIBCON, WASHINGTON
USE "ADAMS CABLE CODEX," 10TH ED.

Index Bureau
RECEIVED

FEB 3 1931 Librarian
State Department
Washington, D. C.
Dept. of State

LIBRARY
JAN 28 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 28, 1931. February 9 1931.
Ans'd Feb 5 1931
EGG

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 5 1931
Department of State

793.94/1788

Dear Sir:

I shall appreciate the courtesy if you would
tell me whether the State Department has the minutes of the
Sino-Japanese Joint Commission, which met at Peking in the
summer of 1922 shortly after the Washington Conference, on
the return of Shantung to China. Please also indicate if
you have other official papers in reference to this nego-
tiation.

I am a graduate student in the Political Science
Department of the Johns Hopkins University and am preparing
to write on the rendition of Shantung and Weihaiwei to China
after the Washington Conference.

Very sincerely yours,

K. M. Tsu
K. M. Tsu.

FILED
FEB 14 1931

008.0

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

February 9 1931.

In reply refer to
FE

Mr. K. M. Tsu,
Chinese Division,
Library of Congress,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of January 28, 1931, addressed to the Librarian, Department of State, with regard to official records of the Sino-Japanese Joint Commission which met at Peiping in the summer of 1922.

The records of the Department do not appear to contain a copy of the minutes of the meetings of the Joint Commission and the Department does not have, available for dissemination, copies of other official papers of the Joint Commission.

It is suggested that you may be interested in the summary of the proceedings of the above-mentioned Sino-Japanese Joint Commission given on pages 1156 to 1195 of THE CHINA YEAR BOOK, 1923. The Department can,
of

793.94/1783

008.1

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lippert NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

of course, assume no responsibility with regard to
statements made in that summary.

It is suggested, further, that the Chinese Lega-
tion or the Japanese Embassy may be able to furnish
information on the subject of your inquiry.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Statt
Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.


CR
Feb. 9, 1981

Correct
FE: WAA/ZMF

2/7/31

m.m.H.
FE

HA
ECW



0082

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11582 FOR #215, 1931.

FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED July 27, 1931.
TO NAME 1-1172 o r o

REGARDING: the efforts of the Cantonese regime to enlist
Japanese sympathy and support. Canton's #61
to Legation.

mb/

793.94/ 1739

1789

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

No. 215

Canton, China, July 27, 1931.

SUBJECT: Efforts of the Canton Regime to En-
list Japanese Sympathy and Support.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

1/- I have the honor to enclose herewith copies
 of my despatch No. 61 (file No. 800), dated July
 27, 1931, to the American Legation at Peiping on
 the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

J. W. Ballantine,
 American Consul General.


In quintuplet.

Enclosure:

1/- Despatch No. 61 to Legation.

800

JWB:CCW



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

01

Canton, China, July 27, 1931.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Efforts of the Canton Regime to At-
tract Japanese Sympathy and Support.

The Honorable

Wilson Franklin Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peking.

Sir:

I have the honor to inform the Legation that recent developments at Canton indicate a definite effort is being made by the local regime to enlist Japanese sympathy and support in behalf of the Cantonese movement.

Canton and the Korean Crisis.

Observers regard as significant the fact that there have been no public anti-Japanese demonstrations at Canton in connection with the recent riots in Korea directed against Chinese residents, it being pointed out that the Cantonese are more prone than people elsewhere in China to foment agitation in such circumstances. According to the press, although the Canton Chamber of Commerce did organize a public meeting to discuss the Korean situation, the Chamber was instructed by the Kuomintang headquarters to move carefully since it appeared that the situation had

WFSM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter

August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

been made capital of by Chiang Kai-shek in order to divert the attention of the nation from the movement against himself.

On the occasion of the 21st anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China, Chiang Kai-shek delivered a public address in which he declared that Japan which is hated by the Chinese people is the enemy of the Chinese people:

It was on November 20, 1944, that Mr. Chiang Kai-shek delivered a lengthy speech in which he stressed the importance of friendly Sino-Japanese relations. This was probably his last speech. A week after he arrived in Nanking from Japan, Mr. Sun Yat-sen died and a few months afterwards, Mr. Chiang Kai-shek delivered his last speech in which he constituted his last suggestion for Sino-Japanese cooperation. In this speech Mr. Chiang Kai-shek stressed the importance of China and Japan standing together for their integrity and glory. This was his last public address.

The Chinese people in supporting the Korean War are not attempting to exploit the Korean War for the purpose of attempting to exploit the Korean War by stirring up hatred in order to maintain the Sino-Japanese cooperation. It points out that while redress should be required for the Chinese involved as well as guarantees for their future security, "this should be done by diplomatic negotiations instead of by stirring racial animosity and debased economic methods".

On the other hand, it is even more plain that the Government of Canton has made capital of the Korean War for the purpose of discrediting Chiang Kai-shek with Japan and of gaining Japanese sympathy and support on behalf of their own cause. This is revealed not only in the tenor of the Canton Government's comments above noted and in similar public utterances by leaders here, but also in a report which has been widely circulated to the

effect

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

effect that the Government has also interrupted a telegram sent by Chiang Kai-shek to Chiang Hsueh-liang outlining a proposal for settlement with China. The alleged proposal suggests five conditions for settlement, namely: (1) Chiang Kai-shek to retain command of the army and navy and to retire from all his other positions; (2) Chiang Kai-shek to become chairman of the Central Executive; (3) Yang Chung-sui to accept the chairmanship of the Government; (4) a council of elders to be organized with equal sit of Chiang and (5) an army of 500,000 men to be mobilized on the Taiwan Islands. The report is that the Government was unable to entertain such a proposal primarily because of the improbability of the fifth condition in view of the desire of the leaders to develop friendly relations with Japan.

Japan's Reaction to the News.

Such interest attached to the secret departure on July 18th of Yagao Chen for Japan, in company with his wife and child, a member of the Political Committee of the "National Government" here, which was not publicly announced until July 23rd. According to the Japanese Consul General here, when the authorities here approached him in regard to the proposed visit he told them, after having referred the matter to his Government, that while there was no objection to Yagao Chen's visiting Japan as a private citizen of a friendly country the Minister for Foreign Affairs could not undertake to receive him in view of Japan's relations with the mainland Government.

Disappointment

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 4 -

Disappointment was expressed at this reply, but Mr. Chen explained that in view of his wife's health he desired to go to Japan in any case. It should be noted in regard to this visit that in 1948-49, when accompanied Chen, was observed in Japan.

It has been suggested by the Hongkong press that Kato's Chen's purpose in visiting Japan was to discuss the Korean matter with the Japanese authorities, but this seems unlikely, as it is not clear what the Government at Canton has to do with the matter. It is more probable that what the leaders here have in mind is to make a bid for Japanese sympathy with their movement and possibly for assistance in the way of military supplies which they are encountering difficulty in obtaining from outside sources. It is, of course, not known what promises they are prepared to make to Japan, but in view of the difficulties which the Japanese Government is understood to be encountering in the settlement of pending questions with China they may have hopes that by giving assurances of a more conciliatory policy in case the Canton regime is recognized and taken over control at Hankow the Japanese Government may be tempted to accede to their overtures.

The recent appointment of a Japanese political adviser to the Canton Government is another evidence of the desire here to cultivate Japan. The appointee is a Yanda Sunaburo, a younger brother of Yanda Tsoei who took part in the Chinese Revolution and who

END

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lynn, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 5 -

was killed in the attack on Haidow. The younger brother was an intimate friend of the Hsi-son. Curiously enough, when the appointment was announced the word spread through some confusion regarding the facts reported that the Japanese Consul General here had been offered the position of adviser, but at his instance a denial was subsequently published.

Source of Information

The information contained in the foregoing report was obtained through conversations with Chinese and foreign officials, American and other residents, and from the local press.

Respectfully yours,

J. W. Ballentine,
 American Consul General.

Copies sent:
 5 to Department
 2 to Legation
 1 to Hankow
 2 to Files.

800

RM:CCW

[Handwritten signature]

0085

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.C.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

FROM

GRAY

PEIPING

Dated September 12, 1931

793.24

Secretary of State

Washington

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
1 SEP 14 1931
Department of State

Rec'd 11:40 a.m.

File
890

F/

578, September 12, 5 p.m.

Referring to Mukden's despatch 440, August 20 re
Nakamura, Agent and Consul General, the following is
essential portion of a further report dated September 10th:

793.34/1790

"There is good reason to believe that internal Ja-
panese politics are more responsible for the present
threatening aspect of Sino-Japanese relations than any-
thing that the Chinese have done or left undone with
respect to the case. It is my opinion that relations
between Japanese Army and the Japanese Foreign Office
(representing non-army elements in the Government) are
as much strained just now as relations between China
and Japan, and that the Army authorities are quite as
willing to have the negotiations fail as the Foreign
Office is anxious to have them succeed. The report of
the first Chinese group of investigators having been
wholly

15 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

2- #578, from Peiping,
 September 14, 1931

wholly unsatisfactory, a second and more capable group was sent out on September 6th. That group simply reported that their investigations failed to disclose any evidence to support of the Japanese statement. It was shown, however, that their investigations were anything but thorough. Despite insistence from Japanese army quarters for a prompt settlement, Consul General Hayashi informs me that no definite time limit has been set with respect to a reply from the Chinese. The situation is not believed to be as critical as intimated in the press, although further evidence of procrastination or insincerity on the part of the Chinese will make it extremely difficult to avoid a Japanese military display in Manchuria. It has been impossible to obtain information concerning the sanction or sanctions which might be applied in the event of a break down of negotiations".

The Nakamura case has for several weeks been causing much excitement and while the Legation does not share the alarmist views of many of the newspapers it must be remembered the Sino-Japanese relations since the Korean riots have been anything but friendly. Any incident

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

3- #578, from Peiping,
September 12, 1931

incident if not carefully handled by both parties may therefore produce a serious crisis. The Legation believes that the Manchurian authorities and probably also Japanese would prefer to settle the case locally through the Japanese Consul General in Mukden rather than through protracted negotiations between Nanking and Tokyo. Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang is said to be personally sincerely desirous of effecting such local settlement and to that end has designated his adviser Tang Erhho to represent him in the negotiations. But if current reports be true that the Japanese military are impatient and are urging the occupation of large portion of Manchuria pending settlement of the case it may prove extremely difficult to restrain existing anti-Japanese feeling.

Tokyo informed.

JOHNSON

WSB

0092

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 14, 1931

Rec'd 4:05 a. m.

MMP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 14 1931
 Department of State

FE
 file
 e.g.c.

793.94

Secretary of State,
 Washington

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.I.

579, September 14, noon. /1790

Legation's 578, September 12, 8 p. m.

Following from American Consul General at

Mukden:

"September 13, 11 a. m.

No important developments in the Nakamura affair since my political report of 10th. Japanese Consul General, without making a specific threat, seems to have convinced Mukden authorities of Japanese determination to secure satisfaction and of the critical consequence of unsatisfactory reply. After a conversation on the 10th between the Chinese and the Japanese, the chief of the Chinese military police left immediately to join the group of investigators who were sent out on the 6th".

JOHNSON

WSB

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1937 148256

793.94/1791

SEP 15 1931

0093

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

No. 29

AMERICAN CONSULATE.

COM. GENERAL,
Mukden, China, August 20, 1931.

SEP 14 31

SUBJECT: Execution of Japanese Military Officer
and Party by Chinese Soldiers.

SEP 14 31
THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy
in quintuplicate of my despatch No. 440 of August 20,
1931 to the Legation, Peiping, on the above subject.


Respectfully yours,

John Carter Vincent
John Carter Vincent
American Consul.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 440.

800
JGV:HTW



700.94/1730

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles S. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

No. 440

AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL,
Mukden, China, August 20, 1931.

SUBJECT: Execution of Japanese Military Officer
and Party by Chinese Soldiers.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honour to submit for the information of the Legation a brief account of the execution of the Japanese army captain, Nakamura, and his party between Taonan and Solun (洮南, 索倫), by Chinese soldiers. The details of the incident were given me by Mr. Hayashi, Japanese Consul General at Mukden.

Early in June Captain Nakamura obtained from the Mukden Special Delegate of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs a "hushao" for travel in Manchuria. This "hushao" excluded the territory between Taonan and Solun (Hsing-an (興安) Colonization Area) from travel by the Captain. At Harbin, however, a second "hushao" was secured which, according to the Japanese Consul General, gave the desired permission to travel in the Taonan-Solun area.

Captain Nakamura conducted "investigations" along

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Syme NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-2-

the Chinese Eastern Railway at Manchuli, Tsitsihar, Angangchi, and Hailar. He secured the services of a Mongolian and a Russian interpreter, and also that of a Japanese named Isugi, a retired Japanese army sergeant who kept an inn at Angangchi. This party of four left Pokotu (博克圖) on the Chinese Eastern Railway about the middle of June, their immediate destination being Taonan. On June 27th the party were arrested by Chinese troops at a place called Suokungfu (蘇鄂公府), a small place east of Solun between that town and Chalait Wangfu (札賚特王府). Although the place and manner of execution have not yet been fully established, it is believed that the party were taken to Solun where they were shot on July 1st and subsequently burned. The execution was carried out by order and in the presence of Kuan Yu-heng (關玉衡), commanding the 3rd Regiment of the Heilong Reclamation Army during the absence in Mukden of Colonel Chao Kuan-wu (趙冠吾), the regular commander.

Japanese suspicions were aroused when the party failed to appear at Taonan at the scheduled time. Japanese newspapers in Manchuria were the first to secure rumours of the fate of the party. After the appearance of a news report about July 15th, the Japanese took steps to suppress all accounts of the incident pending a thorough investigation. For this reason it was not until August 17th that the first

newspaper

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles R. Lyman NARS, Date June 4, 1976

1

newspaper account of the execution appeared in the Manchurian papers.

Consul General Hayashi has within the past few days taken up the case with General Tsang Shih-yi, Chairman of the Liaoning Provincial Government. He is demanding an indemnity, apology, punishment of the responsible Chinese army officers, and assurance of future protection. General Tsang Shih-yi has expressed a readiness to comply with these demands. Mr. Hayashi has confidence in his sincerity but very little in his ability to enforce execution of his orders.

Mr. Hayashi assured me that the negotiations were entirely in his hands in spite of rumours to the effect that the Japanese military authorities were to interfere in securing a settlement. He deplored the attitude of military officials, mentioning a call which Major Mori, a Japanese army officer, had made upon General Tsang Shih-yi on July 17th. Major Mori is of the Japanese General Staff Office and was sent to Mukden by the Japanese Army apparently to investigate the case. He informed General Tsang Shih-yi of how seriously the Japanese Army viewed the incident and gave out the following report:

"In dealing with so serious a case, nice diplomatic courtesies could not satisfy the Japanese Army, and I am here to see for myself what amount of sincerity is shown by the Chinese side handling the case. It goes without saying that, once we are satisfied of lack of sincerity on the Chinese side, the Japanese side might enforce its demand".

0097

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles A. Loomis NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-4-

This incident is believed to be the first in the history of Sino-Japanese relations where a Japanese army officer has been arrested and executed by the order of Chinese military authorities. The Japanese press in Manchuria is making much of the incident and Mr. Hayashi tells me that the outspoken indignation of the military authorities in Japan is exciting the Japanese populace. He did not indicate what action might be taken in the event the Chinese did not meet the demands he has presented but I was lead to believe that he is seriously concerned over the effect which protracted negotiations might have on Japanese feelings.

In discussing the general Sino-Japanese situation in Manchuria, Mr. Hayashi did not try to minimize its seriousness. He stated that while that portion of Japanese public opinion which was demanding a "strong policy" in Manchuria did not represent a majority of the people, nevertheless irritation with Chinese tactics and Foreign Office policy was growing, particularly among the members of the military party and the Japanese residents in Manchuria. The Japanese authorities in Manchuria were taking every precaution to avoid a conflict in Manchuria but the possibility of some unexpected Sino-Japanese conflict developing into an incident of major importance forced them to view the situation with grave concern.

Very


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 4, 1976

Very respectfully yours,

John Carter Vincent
American Consul.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.

800
JCV:HTW




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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP



FROM


PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 17, 1931

Rec'd 10 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



file
E-g.C.

594, September 17, 6 p. m.

Reuter reports Nanking sixteenth:

"C. T. Wang, Chinese Foreign Minister, interviewed today with regard to alleged murder of Japanese Captain Nakamura in Manchuria declared that Foreign Office was awaiting report from Mukden on the matter. He said that National Government had always been a champion of spirit of fairplay and as soon as facts were known he promised speedy and just settlement of case."

KLP
WSB

JOHNSON

F/ 793.94/1793

FILED

SEP 19 1931

V

0100

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Zygmunt NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

GRAY

FROM

PEIPING

Dated September 19, 1931

Received 7:10 p.m., 18th.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 19 1931

Secretary of State

Washington

599, September 19, 2:30 a.m.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

Donald, adviser to Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang, has just informed me of the receipt here by Chang Hsueh Liang of a telegram from Mukden to the effect that at 10 p.m., on evening of September 18th a squad of Japanese soldiers, having left Japanese barracks and gone southeast of Mukden City, were firing with rifles at the east camp, arsenal and city and with artillery at the rate of one shell a minute. Statement is that some 70 soldiers at east camp had been injured. No knowledge of amount of damage or number of casualties in city. Donald stated that Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang had ordered all Chinese soldiers within barracks, depoted all arms, and forbade retaliation, adding that Japanese soldiers had apparently run amuck, Japanese consular authorities being powerless. Firing reported to be

File 793.94/1794

OCT 12 1931

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

2- #599, September 19, 1931,
from Peiping.

to be still going on at 1 o'clock this morning, Japanese
soldiers then at west gate apparently surrounding city.

Please inform War and Navy Department. Nanking
Commander-in-Chief and Tokyo informed.

JOHNSON

OX

0102

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Syme NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MMP

1-1838

FROM GREEN

Tokyo

Dated September 19, 1931

Rec'd 2:31 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SEP 9 1931

Department of State

150, September 19, noon.

Peiping's 599, September 19th, 2:30 a. m.

Japanese newspapers today published extras indicating a state of war between Japan and China. The Foreign Office stated to a member of the staff that the facts seem to be a minor clash between Japanese South Manchurian railway guards and Chinese soldiers growing out of damage to a section of railway track just north of Mukden, which the Japanese army has since occupied. The Japanese assures us they are determined upon a peaceful settlement of whatever controversy arises.

Under the circumstances I think it would be unwise to cancel voyage home and stay here as such action might be misconstrued so I shall sail on EMPRESS OF JAPAN this afternoon.

Repeated to Peiping.

FORBES

RR
KLP

793.94/1795

FILED

OCT 12 1931

note
123-Forbes, W.C.

0103

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MMP

GREEN

1-1330
RECEIVED
SEP 19 1931
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM Tokyo

Dated September 19, 1931

Rec'd 7:33 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 19 1931
Department of State

153, September 19, 1931, 7:33 a.m.
Embassy's 150, September 19, noon.

Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me
that according to information at hand the South
Manchuria Railway guards at Mukden discovered last
night about 10 o'clock that part of the track north
of Mukden was being torn up. They called assistance
and proceeded to break up the interference when they
were confronted by several hundred Chinese soldiers in
uniform coming out of the north camp. The Japanese
military authorities thereupon sent out a force
sufficient to drive off the Chinese and by 10 o'clock
this morning had occupied the whole of Mukden and its
environment. I am now informed that a special Cabinet
meeting was held today and orders have been dispatched
to the Japanese

793.94/1796

FILED
OCT 12 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MMP

2, #153 from Tokyo, 9/19/31.

to the Japanese Commander-in-Chief of the army in Manchuria to stop all further aggressive military operations. The Foreign Office has promised to keep me advised.

Copy to Peiping.

NEVILLE

RR
KLP

0105

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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 O.N.I. AND A.L.I.

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING via N.R.

FROM

Dated September 19, 1931

Rec'd. 5:58 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 19 1931
 Department of State

lib
 29.C.

793.94/1797

PRIORITY.

600, September 19, noon.

My September 19, 2:30 p.m.

11794

Same source informs me that two train loads of Japanese soldiers arrived Yingkou this morning proceeding thence to Kaopangtzu where they disarmed railway police and all others occupying town. Japanese war ship is reported to have arrived at Yingkou this morning. Communication from Mukden ceased at 3 a.m. at which time Japanese soldiers reported entered city.

Mayer, Military Attache's office, is proceeding Mukden to ascertain facts.

Please inform War and Navy. Repeated to Command in-chief and Tokio.

JOHNSON

SEP 12 1931

FILED

RR

CSB

0106

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 4, 1976

CJH

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ON LARDE
GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING VIA N. R.

1-1326

FROM

Dated September 19, 1931

Rec'd. 7 a.m.

793.94

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 19 1931
Department of State

file
E.g.

PRIORITY.

605, September 19, 5 p.m.

Military Attache's office informs me as follows:

"Japanese Military Attache and Naval Attache state that three-four days ago several Japanese pickets were ambushed and killed by Chinese soldiers on South Manchuria Railway, that South Manchuria Railway was cut north of Mukden and that due to these events and Nakamura case they have seized Mukden, Changchun, Yingkou and Kaopangtzu and railway connecting with last two places. That arsenals in Mukden have been seized and that fighting has occurred there and at Changchun. Chinese troops in neighborhood of Mukden have been disarmed. Further state that occupation of territory laterally from South Manchuria Railway will only be in depth to guard their flanks".

F/ 793.94/1793

FILED

OCT 12 1931

JOHNSON

CSB

5

0107

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Thomas S. Lyon NARS, Date June 4, 1976

CJH

31 WOOD ST
CLINTON ST
GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING via N. R.

Dated September 19, 1931

Rec'd. 10:18 a.m.

1-1336

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 19 1931
Department of State

fig.
29.C.

PRIORITY.

606, September 19, 8 p.m.

Following telegram has been received from Langdon
at Dairen.

"September 19, 2 p.m. Consul at Mukden telephones
for repetition to you that Japanese took over whole of
Mukden at 1 a.m., this morning, they have also occupied
Changchun, Antung and Newchwang and are running public
services at all these places. Foreigners are all safe".

JOHNSON

RR

OSB

F/ 793.94/1799

OCT 12 1931

FILED

0108

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lynn NARS, Date June 4, 1976

CJH(

TELEGRAM RECEIVED VIA N.R.

GRAY

FROM

Dated September 19, 1931

Rec'd. 10:25 a.m.

793-4
Secretary of State,
Washington.



file
E.G.L.

PRIORITY.

607, September 19, 9 p.m.

Following undated from American Consul General at
Mukden, repeated by Naval radio from Shanghai:

"September 19. 4 p.m. Please forward to Legation
at Peiping. Sano Japanese Consulate reports South
Manchuria Railway cut about twenty miles north of Mukden
by 400 Chinese troops from Peitaiyin garrison, 150
Japanese troops engaging Chinese. Desultory artillery
fire can be heard from Mukden. Obviously not a severe
engagement. Chinese Foreign Office telephoned 1:45.
Chinese had requested Japanese cease firing but without
avail. Japanese have blocked railway settlement to all
including foreigners. No danger to foreigners anticipated
although serious political complications will very likely
arise. Lynch".
KLP CSB

JOHNSON

FILED
793.94/1800

OCT 12 1931

0109

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Clarence E. Lynch NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MMP

GRAY

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated September 19, 1931

Rec'd 10:20 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington



PRIORITY.

September 19, 9 p. m.

Following telegram just received in plain
language from American Consul at Mukden: "Japanese
troops occupied Mukden, Newchwang, Antung 1 a. m., 19th.
All government services taken over. Foreigners safe at
present. Inform the Embassy and the Legation at Peiping.
Signed Lynch."

Repeated to Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

CSB

793.94/1801

FILED

OCT 12 1931

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MMP

1-1886

RECEIVED
SEP 19 1931
DIVISION OF

GRAY


FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated September 19, 1931

Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington



September 19, noon

The following telegram has been sent the
Legation:

"This Consulate General has received a report from the Bank of China based upon a Reuter ticker to the effect that last night the Japanese troops attacked the Chinese garrison at the North gate at Mukden, killing eighty Chinese soldiers. The Chinese troops informed Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang at Peiping who ordered them not to retaliate. The bank has been unable today to get telegraphic communications with its Mukden branch".

NOT SIGNED

KLP
CSB

FILED
793.94/1802

FILED
OCT 12 1931

0111

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 17, 1931

Rec'd 19th, 5 a. m.

793.94
Secretary of State,


Washington.

597, September 10, 9 p. m. *1790*

Legation's 578, September 12, 5 p. m.

Consul General Nanking reports by mail that on
September tenth an official of Foreign Office called on
him and handed him aide memoire of the same date which
opens with the follow^{ing} paragraph:

"The military clique in Japan has of late been
clamoring for a drastic policy towards China particularly
in regard to Manchuria and Mongolia. At the military
commanders conference the Minister of War publicly drew
attention to the possibility of what he termed grave develop-
ments in Manchuria and Mongolia and urged the necessity of
preparedness. Such preparedness as interpreted in the
light of recent events seems to consist of repeated pro-
vocations in Manchuria in order to provide excuses for the
use of



*Fig.
E.g.c.*

F/ 793.94/1803

FILED
OCT 12 1931

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Thomas S. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #597, from Peiping, Sept.17, 1931,
Rec'd 19th, 5 a. m.

use of force as well as an intensive propaganda campaign
designed to blind the eyes of the world to the facts
of the situation".

The aide memoire then briefly enumerates a number
of specific instances of alleged recent Japanese acts of
aggression or provocation. Similar statements are said to
have been supplied to the British Legation and League of
Nations.

Copies by mail to the Department and Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

0113

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

1-1338

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 19, 1931

Rec'd 7 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



PRIORITY.

602, September 19, 8 p. m. /1797

My 599, September 19 and 600, September 19, 11 a. m.

Wellington Koo has just come to me from Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang to confirm reports contained in my two telegrams above referred to and to say that Japanese military forces were in occupation of the city of Mukden and that they had placed troops at all administrative offices including the Marshal's headquarters. Occupation of Kaopangtzu cuts Manchuria off completely from China. Koo stated that Marshal Chang had reported matter to Nanking. In the course of conversation Koo brought up League possible action on the part of China or powers either under the Covenant of the League, the Kelllogg Pact or Article 7 of the Nine Power Treaty regarding principles and policies. With reference to the treaty regarding principles

793.94/1804

FILE

V

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #602, from Peiping, Sept. 19, 1931
7 a. m.

Polis
principles and he suggested possibility of the United States starting a discussion among interested powers.

I told Koo that I had informed Department of incidents thus far reported to me, that I was not in a position to know what attitude my Government would take as to the basis for the dispute and that I thought it would take a little time to learn what it was about and what should be done. Koo departed asking me to inform him of any views that Washington might have in regard to this matter.

In a separate telegram I am communicating substance of conversation member of staff had with Counselor of Japanese Legation at noon today regarding Japanese version of last night's events at Mukden.

(#) Omission
CSB
RR

JOHNSON

0115

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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REP

1-1338



FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 19, 1931

Rec'd 7 a. m.



File
reg. c.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY

603, September 19, 3 p. m. / 1804

Legation's 602, September 19, 2 p. m.

Member of my staff called on Counselor of Japanese Legation in the absence of the Japanese Minister who is in Shanghai. He was informed that the Mukden incident appears to have been caused by an attempt on the part of some three or four hundred Chinese soldiers to blow up the line of the South Manchuria Railway immediately to the north of Mukden. A Japanese force was sent to investigate and prevent further damage to the line but when they arrived they were opposed by the Chinese soldiers and a brief engagement ensued. The Japanese thereupon decided as a precautionary measure to occupy certain parts of the city. In reply to a question he stated there may be no connection between the events of last night and the representations the Japanese Government

F/ 793.94/1805

OCT 12 1931

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #603, from Peiping, Sept. 19, 1931,
7 a. m.

ment had made regarding other incidents and that, on the contrary, they had been encouraged by the conciliatory attitude the Chinese had recently shown in connection with the Nakamura. When asked whether it was true that Japanese troops had occupied Kaopangtzu he replied he did not know but doubted it very much.

JOHNSON

CSB

0117

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clayton L. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

JS

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Gray

793.94
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FROM
Dated September 20, 1931
DIVISION OF
Rec'd 10 p.m., 19th

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

Priority

608 September 20, 2 a.m.

Following from Mukden via Shanghai:

"September 19, 8 a.m. All Americans safe although statement in my earlier telegram regarding safety of foreigners was somewhat premature. Japanese machine guns opened (#) motor car carrying Chinese in International Settlement killing chauffeur, wounding occupant, bullets passing over Mukden Club window and automobiles of Americans standing in compound. Japanese troops now control International Settlement and surround native city. At five p.m. yesterday Japanese Consulate General assured me that chance of immediate trouble had practically passed due to conciliatory attitude of Chinese. Believe whole episode complete surprise to Japanese Consulate General. International Settlement now quiet. LYNCH."

JOHNSON

JS

(#) Apparent omission.

F/1
793.94/1806

FILED
OCT 12 1931

0118

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clayton S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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1-1838
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
SEP 21 1931
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 20, 1931

Rec'd 3 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

609, September 20, 11 p. m.

Commandant of American Guard who is Senior
Commandant informs me that Commandant of Japanese
Legation Guard came to him this morning and after
informing him of happenings in Manchuria along the
lines reported in Tokyo's 153, ¹¹⁷⁹⁶September 19, 5 p. m.,
referred to possibility of attacks upon Japanese
Nationals resident in Peiping. He asked concerning
attitude of the Senior Commandant in such eventuality
with special reference to general plan of defense of
foreigners and Legation quarter in case of attack.
Commandant of American Guard replied with my approval
that present situation involving as it does only
Japanese would not warrant invoking of general plan.
Senior Commandant suggested that if Japanese citizens are
threatened outside Legation quarter obvious step would
be for Japanese authorities to bring them into their
own Legation. Repeated to Commander-in-Chief.

JOHNSON

THP

F/for
793.94/1807

OCT 12 1931
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0119

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Syme NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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F/E

JS
793.94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
SEP 21 1931
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM Plain
PEIPING (Via naval radio)
Dated September 20, 1931

Rec'd 1:00 P.M.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 21 1931
Department of State

file
eg.c.

F/p

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

610, September 20, noon

Reuter report from Nanking nineteen.

"With reference to Japanese military action in Manchuria Reuter learns that Chinese Foreign Ministry lodged strong protest today with Japanese Minister Shigemitsu demanding immediate cessation of hostile agitation on the part of Japanese forces and their immediate withdrawal to their original posts.

Foreign Ministry has also ordered Chinese Charge d'Affaires at Tokio to lodge similar protest with Japanese Government."

JOHNSON

OX

793.94/1808

OCT 12 1931

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
0120

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Long NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS



FROM

Gray

HARBIN


Dated September 19, 1931

Rec'd 20th 12:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

September 19, 10 a.m.



Rec
294

Local Japanese Consulate General informs me that
clashes took place between Chinese and Japanese soldiers
at Mukden, Seupingkai and possibly at Changohun on the
evening of September 18th.

Standard Oil Company informs me Japanese stating
he represented Japanese General inquired what stocks
of gasoline at Harbin. Legation informed

HANSON

JHR OX

F
793.94/1809

FILED
OCT 12 1931

0121

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


REP

1-1330

FROM

Washington, D. C.


September 20, 1931

Rec'd September 21, 1931
12:19 a. m.

His Excellency Mr. Henry L. Stimson,

State Department,

Washington, D. C.



Oct 10/1931
File E.F.C.

The Chinese Students Club in the District of Columbia has the honor to call Your Excellency's attention to the fact that according to the press reports Japan has landed her troops in Mukden and Tsingtao, all being Chinese territory. The Japanese Cabinet has authorized its Minister of War to despatch more military forces to the strategic points of China with the deliberate intention to provoke an incident in order to provide a pretext for occupation of Chinese territory. A state of war is therefore in existence at least laterally throughout Manchuria and Shantung without any cause of provocation on the part of China. Japan being a nation ruled by militarists is apparently taking advantage of the national calamity of China in order to seek more special privileges and preferential rights which if left unchecked would be detrimental

E/ps
793.94/1810

UET 24-1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- to His Excellency Mr. Henry L.
 Stimson, Sept. 21, 1931, 12:19 a.

detrimental to China's sovereignty, her territorial and administrative integrity, and also constitute a violation of the Nine Power Treaty concluded at Washington in 1922. Moreover both China and Japan are signatories to the Paris Pact of 1928, outlawing war as an instrument of national policy. The action of Japan in attacking China under distress should be condemned by all signatories to the same pact. China, confident of world opinion, is refraining at least temporarily from undertaking any act of retaliation although she has the perfect right to do so in this case of bona fide self defense. The Chinese students club shall appreciate it very much if Your Excellency will take the initiative as you did in July, 1929, regarding the Sino-Russian Railway controversy in enlisting the cooperation of some major signatories to the Kellogg-Briand Pact in an effort to prevent hostilities between China and Japan through calling the attention of China and Japan to the application in principle as well as in spirit the Pact of Paris.

CHINESE STUDENTS CLUB,

District of Columbia,

Two thousand four G Street

HPD

0123

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Chambers & Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

RECEIVED
SEP 21 1931
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Postal Telegraph

WORLD WIDE TELEGRAPH SYSTEM



ALL AMERICA
CABLES

COMMERCIAL
CABLES

This is a full rate Telegram or Cablegram unless otherwise indicated by signal in the check or in the address.

DL	DAY LETTER
NL	NIGHT LETTER
NM	NIGHT MESSAGE
LCO	DEFERRED CABLE
NLT	NIGHT CABLE LETTER
NLT	WEEK END CABLE LETTER

Form 161

IF 7 319 PL 5 EXTRA

HF WASHINGTON DC SEP 21 1931

HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT HERBERT HOOVER
WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 21 1931
Department of State

SEP 20 PM 4 14

October 10 1931

743.94
THE CHINESE STUDENTS CLUB IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HAS THE HONOR TO CALL YOUR EXCELLENCYS ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT ACCORDING TO THE PRESS REPORTS JAPAN HAS LANDED HER TROOPS IN MUKDEN AND TSINGTAO ALL BEING CHINESE TERRITORY THE JAPANESE CABINET HAS AUTHORIZED ITS MINISTER OF WAR TO DISPATCH MORE MILITARY FORCES TO THE STRATEGIC POINTS OF CHINA WITH THE DELIBERATE INTENTION TO PROVOKE AND INCIDENT IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A PRETEXT FOR OCCUPATION OF CHINESE TERRITORY A STATE OF WAR IS THEREFORE IN EXISTENCE AT LEAST MATERIALLY THROUGHOUT MANCHURIA AND SHANTUNG WITHOUT ANY CAUSE OF PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF CHINA JAPAN BEING A NATION RULED BY MILITARISTS IS APPARENTLY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE NATIONAL CALAMITY OF CHINA IN ORDER TO SEEK MORE SPECIAL PRIVILEGES AND PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS WHICH IF LEFT UNCHECKED WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO CHINAS SOVEREIGNTY HER TERRITORIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INTEGRITY AND ALSO CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE NINE POWER TREATY CONCLUDED AT WASHINGTON IN 1922 HOWEVER BOTH CHINA AND JAPAN ARE SIGNATRIES TO THE PARIS PACT OF 1923 OUTLAWING WAR AS

FILED

SEP 28 1931

0124

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Postal Telegraph

RECEIVED AT

STANDARD TIME
INDICATED ON THIS MESSAGEALL AMERICA
CABLESCOMMERCIAL
CABLESThis is a full rate Telegram or Cablegram unless otherwise
indicated by signal in the check or in the address.

DL	DAY LETTER
NL	NIGHT LETTER
NM	NIGHT MESSAGE
LCO	DEFERRED CABLE
NLT	NIGHT CABLE LETTER
WLT	WEEK END CABLE LETTER

Form 161

SEP 20 PM 4 14

INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY THE ACTION OF JAPAN IN ATTACKING
 CHINA UNDER DISTRESS SHOULD BE CONDEMNED BY ALL SIGNATORIES TO
 THE SAME PACT CHINA CONFIDENT OF WORLD OPINION IS REFRAINING AT
 LEAST TEMPORARILY FROM UNDERTAKING ANY ACT OF RETALIATION
 ALTHOUGH SHE HAS THE PERFECT RIGHT TO DO SO IN THIS CASE OF
 BONIFIDE SELFDEFENCE THE CHINESE STUDENTS CLUB SHALL APPRECIATE
 IT VERY MUCH IF YOUR EXCELLENCYS GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE THE
 INITIATIVE AS IT DID IN JULY 19 1929 REGARDING THE SINORUSSIAN
 RAILWAY CONTROVERSY IN ENLISTING THE COOPERATION OF SOME MAJOR
 SIGNATORIES TO THE KELLOGG BRIAND PACT IN AN EFFORT TO PREVENT
 HOSTILITIES BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN THROUGH CALLING THE
 ATTENTION OF CHINA AND JAPAN TO THE APPLICATION IN PRINCIPLE AS
 WELL AS IN SPIRIT THE PACT OF PARIS=

CHINESE STUDENTS CLUB DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TWO THOUSAND FOUR G ST=

0125

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/1810

October 10 1931.

Chinese Students Club,
District of Columbia,
2004 G Street, Northwest,
Washington, D. C.

Sirs:

The receipt is acknowledged, by reference from
the White House, of your telegram of September 20,
1931, addressed to the President, in regard to the
Manchuria situation.

The contents of this communication have been
noted.


Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

SKP
Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

CR
FE:GBC/VDM
10/8/31

Oct. 10, 1931.



FEW. 793.94/1810

0126

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clayton S. Lipp NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

1-1338

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 21, 1931

Rec'd 12:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

611, September 21, 9 a. m.

Legation's 597, September 17, 9 p. m.

Following from Consul General, Nanking:

"Dr. Wang asked me to inform you that he was

preparing a communication to the American Government
invoking the Kellogg Pact as he did in 1929. A simul-
taneous appeal will be made to the League of Nations
for friendly assistance in settling the controversy
between China and Japan".

HPD

JOHNSON

FILED
OCT 12 1931

793.94/1811

793.94
note

711.9312-Ant War
711.9312-Ant War

500.1c

0127

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPIES SENT TO
 CAN. AND IA *egc*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FE

REF

1-1236

FROM

GREEN

Tokio

Dated September 21, 1931

Rec'd 3:33 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 SEP 21 1931
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS

Secretary of State,

Washington

Division of
 NEASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 21 1931
 Department of State

*file
egc.*

155, September 21, 10 a. m.

Embassy's 150, September 19, noon.

1795-

795.94/1812

I have since learned by telegram from the Consul at Dairen that the Japanese have occupied Antung, Newchang and Changchun. This was confirmed from Japanese sources and by the Chinese Charge.

The Chinese Charge told me that he had presented a note by instruction from Nanking asking the Japanese (one) to refrain from further military operations and (two) to withdraw their armed forces. He said that the Foreign Office had informed him that orders had already been issued to stop military operations; that in regard to two, the Japanese Government was deliberating but they were determined to safeguard the lives and property of the civilian population, Japanese and foreign as well as Chinese.

FILED

SEP 21 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #155, from Tokio, Sept. 21, 1931
3:33 a. m.

as Chinese. I understand that the Japanese authorities
are operating all public services at the occupied areas.

Recent reports indicate consistent unrest in the
Chientao region on the Korean border. I have been unable
as yet to ascertain just what is taking place there..

Repeated to Peiping.

NEVILLE

CSB

0129

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND *EGS*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336

FROM

MMP

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 21, 1931

Rec'd 9:20 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
SEP 21 1931
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT

Secretary of State,
Washington

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 21 1931
Department of State

file
EGS

616, September 21, 3 p. m.

Reuter report from Nanking twentieth:

"A second note was handed to Mr. Shingemitsu this afternoon demanding immediate withdrawal of Japanese troops from territories forcibly occupied and the restoring of normal conditions. Note says that Chinese Government also reserves all rights to adopt future appropriate action."

Central executive committee held five hours session today to consider the position and decide to declare September twenty-third as a national humiliation day in connection with recent events, when all flags will be flown at half mast, places of amusement closed and social functions suspended".

JOHNSON

CSB

793.94

793.94/1813

FILED
OCT 12 1931

0130

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
 U.N.I. AND M.I.P.

MMP

RECEIVED
 SEP 21 1931
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 21, 1931

Rec'd 2:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 21 1931
 Department of State

f.e.c.

613, September 21, 11 a. m.

In reply to Legation's inquiry Consul at
 Tsingtau telegraphs as follows:

"September 20, 8 p. m. No Japanese troops
 here. Cruiser KUMA in port but no bluejackets landed.
 Understand Japanese Consul General has arranged with
 Chinese authorities to maintain order but that cruiser
 TSUSHIMA being held for despatch to Tsingtau should
 Japanese lives and property be endangered. Up to the
 present time all tranquil".

JOHNSON

KLP
 CSB

793.94/1814

OCT 12 1931

FILED

0131

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

September 19, 1931.

SEP 19 31

AMLEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA).

330 Department's No. 328, September 18, 2 p.m.,
paragraphs 8 and 9 and your 599, September 19, 2:30 a.m.

One. In view of developments in Sino-Japanese
relations, please telegraph your opinion whether it will
be more advantageous for you to remain in Peiping for
the time being than to proceed to Nanking.

Two. Please telegraph your comments on the
incident and situation at Mukden.

Thurston

~~FE:JEL:EJL~~ FE

CR
Sep. 19, 1931.

MA

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/1814A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Thomas D. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

793.94/1814A

COPY OF THIS ENCLOSURE ATTACHED TO 793.003/774

0133

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

with appropriate deletions on first page

REP

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 21, 1931

Rec'd 9:30 a. m.

793.94
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 21 1931
Department of State

Tel. to Peiping
SEP 24 1931
file E.G.C.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RECEIVED
SEP 21 1931
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND
TRANSPORTATION

614, September 21, noon. /15112

Your 330, September 19, 3 p. m. received September 21, 9 a. m.

One. In my 604, September 19, 4 p. m. I suggested that it seemed to me wise that I be in Peiping for the present to watch the situation. It seems also wise to be here where I can consult with my British-colleague about local matters. I suggest that I be authorized to inform Dr. Wang in reply to his letter that my Government is also anxious to bring negotiations to a conclusion but that certain points remain to be cleared up between myself and the Department and that in addition in view of recent events, my Government desires me to remain for the present in Peiping for the purpose of watching developments.

Two.

793.94/1815

Oct 12 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #614, from Peiping, Sept. 21, 1931,
9:30 a. m.

Two. My telegrams sent on the nineteenth and twentieth will have given Department all of the factual information which has come to my knowledge. No one appears to be able to give satisfactory reason for chain of incidents which began about ten o'clock on the evening of September 18th and which by steady progress have resulted in putting all of Manchuria south of Changchun.

(END PART ONE).

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MMP

1-1330

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 21, 1931

Rec'd 9:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

614, September 21, noon.

PART TWO.

and east of the Peking-Mukden Railway line under Japanese military control. Legation has endeavored to keep Department informed of details of Nakamura case. It is my belief that it was this incident which precipitated the chain of events above referred to. Travellers and visitors in Manchuria have informed me that for some two or three weeks past Japanese soldiers have been carrying out daily and nightly maneuvers and sham fights in and around the railway settlements along the line of the South Manchuria Railway from Changchun to Liaoning using blank cartridges. British Minister, who was in Changchun the other day, described to me such a sham fight which occurred in and about the railway station while he was having money changed and which created a tremendous disturbance.

(END PART TWO).

JOHNSON

HPD - CSB

0136


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1330

FROM

MMP



GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 21, 1931

Rec'd 9:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

614

(PART THREE).

Guests in hotels state that during such sham fighting Japanese soldiers would enter hotels seek out vacant rooms, plant machine guns in windows and on roofs and immediately commence firing to the disturbance of every one. It is my present belief that much of this was deliberately staged for the purpose of accustoming the populace to the maneuvering of Japanese soldiery day and night and to the sound of machine and other guns.

Three. Japanese statement contained in my 603, September 19, 3 p. m., Tilson's telegrams September 19, 1 p. m., and September 19, 6 p. m. is to the effect that this chain of incidents was not precipitated by Nakamura affair but was started because of clash between Japanese guards

0137

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MMP

2, #614 from Peiping, 9/21/31
(Part 3).

Japanese guards and armed Chinese soldiers attempting
to break South Manchuria Railway tracks.

END PART THREE.

JOHNSON


WWC
KLP

0138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MMP



GRAY
FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 21, 1931

Rec'd 9:50 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

614, September 21, noon.

PART FOUR.

It seems to me absurd to believe that mere destruction of railway tracks would warrant occupation of Manchuria, and to imply that chain of events above mentioned was accidental or occurred on the spur of the moment leaves out of consideration the fact that whole series of incidents involving military occupation of places as far apart as Changchun, Newchwang, Antung, Kaopangtzu and Hulutao implies a degree of staff work which could not (#) improvised. Furthermore it is our understanding here that Japanese military headquarters were transferred almost immediately from Port Arthur to Mukden.

Four. There has been ample indication in the situation arising out of Nakamura affair of indignation on the part of the

0139

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MMP

2, #614 from Peiping, 9/21/31
(Part 4).

on the part of the Japanese military over the whole situation in Manchuria and a desire to avenge Japan for indignities due to unsettled cases and in particular the alleged execution of a Japanese military officer upon active duty.

END PART FOUR.

JOHNSON

RR
HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1339

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 21, 1931

Rec'd 10 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

614, September 21, noon. (PART FIVE)

I understand that Japanese military believe this necessary to restoration of their popularity. Some ten days ago I was informed by Dr. J. C. Ferguson of his belief that Japan intended to occupy Manchuria within three months. There have been other statements of this kind although I have been unwilling to put too much faith or credence in them but now that the event has transpired I cannot escape the feeling that it is the result of careful planning. I am without any information as to what Japan next proposes to do but I imagine that before Japan retires from points now in occupation she will demand and receive satisfactory settlement of all points at issue at least in regard to Manchuria.

Five.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #614, from Peiping, Sept. 21, 1931,
10 a. m.

Five. It will be interesting to see what bearing
all this will have upon extraterritorial negotiations
between Japan and China.

Six. The situation today is that Japan is in ✓
possession of south Manchuria. Train service between
Peiping and Mukden is open but I understand that entry
into Manchuria along usual lines of communication is
only accomplished with the permission of Japanese
authorities.

Repeated to Tokyo.

(END MESSAGE).

JOHNSON

RR

KLP

0142

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Dated September 21, 1931

SEP 22 1931

Rec'd 11:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

148, September 21, 2 p. m.

Strictly confidential for the Secretary.

With reference to the armed clash between Chinese and Japanese in Manchuria, Drummond stated that he had no unbiased reports as to facts and asked me to ascertain from you whether you would be willing to give him for his personal and confidential guidance the facts which you have at your disposal.

He further asked whether you would be willing to state to him also confidentially your views as to whether the Kellogg Pact is involved and your reasons for such views.

WILSON

CSB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 SEP 21 1931

50.94/1816

0143

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

September 22, 1931.

This cable was sent in Confidential Code.
 It should be carefully ~~checked~~ before
 being communicated to anyone.

WILSON,

BERGUES (Geneva).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

You may tell Drummond confidentially that I am also embarrassed by lack of sufficiently complete information as to the facts of the situation; but that it seems clear that an aggressive movement of wide extent involving careful planning and strategic aim seems to have been made by the military forces of Japan. It seems also clear that there is a sharp cleavage of opinion and intention between the military chiefs and the Foreign Office and that the part of wisdom would seem to be, while preparing to support and strengthen treaty obligations, to avoid methods which may excite nationalistic feeling in Japan in support of the army and against the Foreign Office. We are following closely and anxiously the developments in this situation and the relation of such developments and situation to treaty obligations, particularly those of the nine power Treaty of February 6 1922 and the Kellogg Briand Pact

STIMSON.

S HLS:HHR

CR

Enciphered by _____

Sep. 22 1931.

Sent by operator _____ M., _____ 19 1931

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-138

793.94/1816

0144

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 21, 1931.

MUKDEN INCIDENT - VII. SEP 24 1931

Mr. Secretary:

The Secretary General of the League of Nations asks whether you would be willing to give him for his personal and confidential guidance the facts which you have at your disposal with regard to the clash in Manchuria and your views, with reasons, as to whether the Kellogg Pact is involved.

It would be a simple matter to give him a brief statement regarding the actual situation (without attempting to explain the antecedents). The question of views with regard to the Kellogg Pact is more difficult.

The question arises: Do you wish to comply with the request of the Secretary General; and, if so, on one point or on both.

May I have your instruction?

SKH/ZMF

743.94/18/6

SKH

OCT 17 1931

FILED

743.94/18/6

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated September 21, 1931

Rec'd 11:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

148, September 21, 2 p. m.

Strictly confidential for the Secretary.

With reference to the armed clash between Chinese and Japanese in Manchuria, Drummond stated that he had no unbiased reports as to facts and asked me to ascertain from you whether you would be willing to give him for his personal and confidential guidance the facts which you have at your disposal.

He further asked whether you would be willing to state to him also confidentially your views as to whether the Kellogg Pact is involved and your reasons for such views.

WILSON

CSB

0146

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

793
 DIVISION OF
 EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 OCT 9 1931
 RPA
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 MMF

COPIES SENT TO
 M. I. D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 21, 1931

DCR

Rec'd 11:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 21 1931
 Department of State

617, September 21, 5 p. m.

Assistant Military Attache of this Legation
 called on Japanese Military Attache this afternoon
 and obtained from him following information:

"Japanese subjects in Harbin and Kirin are in
 a dangerous position. In Kirin they have all been
 collected in the Japanese Consulate and have sent an
 appeal to the military authorities in Mukden for
 protection. Chang Tso Hsuiang, Governor of Kirin,
 is apparently away and his second in command says that
 he is unable to protect Japanese subjects. In Harbin
 the situation is also grave, accordingly General Honjo
 has ordered the second Japanese division to proceed
 to Kirin and Harbin from the neighborhood of Mukden.
 This movement as I understand it has not begun as yet.
 Japanese Military Attache said that Chinese troops were
 gathering for an attack on Szepingkai, the Fushun coal
 mines, and

79364/1817

OCT 9 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By William S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MMP

2, #617 from Peiping. 9/21/31.

mines, and implied that they were also about to attack Japanese in Kirin.

When asked as to what Soviet Russia would say to the occupation of Harbin he replied that he did not think they would actually fight or move any troops but that Japanese would be exposed to all kinds of subversive tactics.

He further stated that a mixed brigade was being held on the Yalu River under readiness for duty in Manchuria and that he considered that reenforcements of the Manchurian garrison were absolutely necessary although he claims that he does not know that these reenforcements will take place.

Japanese Military Attache denies that Kaopangtzu and Hulutao have been occupied."

Repeated to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

WSB
HPD


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1330

MMP




FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 21, 1931

Rec'd 11:50 a. m.



Secretary of State,
 Washington

615, September 21, 2 p. m.

Consul General at Nanking reports September 20, 7 p. m., that Foreign Office has communicated to him text of a note which has been sent to the Department through the Chinese Legation in Washington appealing to the signatories of the Kellogg Pact "to take such steps as will ensure the preservation of peace in the Far East and the upholding of the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes."

The text as received by the Legation is garbled in places but I assume the Department has by now obtained it from the Chinese Legation. If not, this Legation will telegraph it to you.

The official who handed Peck the document for transmission to me said that the Foreign Minister hoped

that I

75004/1018

FILED

OCT 12 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MMP

2, #615 from Peiping, 9/21/31.

that I "would recommend this appeal to the favorable consideration of the Department of State".

For the present I can only refer the Department to my 614, September 21, noon which represents my views based on such information as is accessible to me at this time.

JOHNSON

CSB

0150

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

RECEIVED AT		<h1>Postal Telegraph</h1> <p>(THE MACKAY SYSTEM)</p>  <p>ALL AMERICA CABLES COMMERCIAL CABLES</p>	<p>This is a full rate Telegram or Cablegram unless otherwise indicated by signal in the check or in the address.</p> <table border="1"> <tr><td>DL</td><td>DAY LETTER</td></tr> <tr><td>NL</td><td>NIGHT LETTER</td></tr> <tr><td>NM</td><td>NIGHT MESSAGE</td></tr> <tr><td>LCO</td><td>DEFERRED CABLE</td></tr> <tr><td>NLT</td><td>NIGHT CABLE LETTER</td></tr> <tr><td>WLT</td><td>WEEK END CABLE LETTER</td></tr> </table>	DL	DAY LETTER	NL	NIGHT LETTER	NM	NIGHT MESSAGE	LCO	DEFERRED CABLE	NLT	NIGHT CABLE LETTER	WLT	WEEK END CABLE LETTER
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STANDARD TIME INDICATED ON THIS MESSAGE															

NA93 117 CABLE
 SEP 22 1931
 DIVISION OF
 RECORDS
 MONITORING AND RECORDS
 NLT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

SEP 21 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

WASHINGTON (DC)

WHEREAS ALTHOUGH CHINAS SOVEREIGNTY IN MANCHURIA HAS BEEN
 OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED BY JAPAN IN HER DECLARATION OF WAR ON
 RUSSIA IN 1904 AND BY THE SIGNATORIES OF THE NINE-POWER PACT OF
 WHICH JAPAN IS ONE SHE HAS NEVERTHELESS ON SEPTEMBER 18TH
 WITHOUT CAUSE FORCIBLY OCCUPIED MUKDEN AND OTHER IMPORTANT
 POINTS AT MANCHURIA THEREBY INFRINGING UPON CHINAS SOVEREIGNTY

1931 SEP 21 AM 6 40

Division of
 EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 22 1931
 Department of State

FILED

SEP 24 1931

793.941319

793.44

0151

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

RECEIVED AT		<h1>Postal telegraph</h1> <p>(THE MARKS SYSTEM)</p>  <p>ALL AMERICA CABLES COMMERCIAL CABLES</p>		<small>This is a full rate Telegram or Cablegram unless otherwise indicated by signal in the check or in the address.</small>											
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LOO	DEFERRED CABLE														
NLT	NIGHT CABLE LETTER														
WLT	WEEK END CABLE LETTER														

NA93/2 CABLE HONOLULU THE PRESIDENT OF US WASHINGTON (DC) 1931 SEP 21 AM 6 40
 AND VIOLATING THE KELLOGG ANTI-WAR PACT THE KUOMINTANG IN HAWAII
 DO HEREBY APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
 AMERICA WHOSE RELATION WITH CHINA HAS ALWAYS BEEN ONE OF
 FRIENDSHIP TO USE ITS GOOD INFLUENCE TO PROTEST AGAINST JAPANS
 AGGRESSION ON CHINESE TERRITORY AND RIGHTS
 THE KUOMINTANG IN HAWAII.

0152

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clayton & Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

1-1336

FROM

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEP 23 1931
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Dated September 20, 1931

Rec'd 2:15 p.m. 21st.

Secretary of State

RECEIVED

Washington

21 1931

DIVISION OF

116, September 20, 4 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 22 1931

Department of State

VERY URGENT

(GREEN) Late Saturday afternoon, following a private session of the Council in which the affair was presumably discussed, the Japanese delegate, at the request of the President of the Council, made a brief statement concerning the Mukden incident.

This statement was to the effect that the information received by him was meager and that he had requested further details from his Government and would keep the Council informed of developments. He added that the Japanese Government would doubtless take measures to attempt to insure that this local incident should not lead to more serious complications, and to effect an appeasement of the situation.

Dr. Sze, the Chinese delegate, took the occasion to speak immediately afterwards expressing deep concern in regard to this "highly regrettable incident". He added that the information thus far at hand seemed to indicate that

793.94/1820

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 4, 1976

MAM

2- #116, from Geneva, September 20,
 1931

that the Chinese were not responsible for the incident.
 He stated that he would not fail to communicate to the
 Council any authentic information which he obtained.

The President of the Council, Mr. Leroux of Spain,
 noted the statements and said that the Council had heard
 with satisfaction that the Japanese Government would take
 the necessary measures to bring about an appeasement of
 the situation and expressed the hope for a prompt settle-
 ment of the question.

No other member of the Council spoke on the subject.
 It was evidently the intention of the President to attempt
 to allay apprehension by the public declarations referred
 to above. (END GREEN)

Dr. Sze called on me this morning saying that as
 he was aware that I was in a strategical way following
 the proceedings of the Council, he thought it might inter-
 est me to learn the Chinese position in this matter.

He stated that in a private informal meeting which
 took place between the chief delegates of certain powers
 preceding that Council meeting on Saturday, it was more
 or less decided to try to keep the question from being
 brought

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

3- #116, from Geneva,
 September 20, 1931

brought before the Council. He attributed this attitude to Japanese influence. After this meeting certain delegates approached him to learn whether he would present the question. For reasons which will be brought out later in this telegram, Sze would not say what course he would follow, giving as his excuse that messages were coming to him from Nanking which might control his action. As a result of his reply the same delegates met again. This was followed (apparently as a result in this event) by the Japanese delegate presenting the question to the Council. Incidentally this action on the part of the Japanese is interpreted here as a desire of the Japanese (not knowing what Sze might do) to prevent the aspect of good faith by taking the initiative. The result, however, was that it permitted the Chinese delegate to make his without taking an initiative in what might be interpreted as tantamount to "appealing to the Council".

Sze informed me that he was unable and probably would be unable during the present Council to communicate to the Council any further authentic information, on the Mukden situation, ^{inasmuch as} ~~(?)~~ he had learned from Nanking that the Japanese had cut the communications to Mukden and Peiping

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

4- #116, from Geneva, September 20,
 1931

Peiping and Nanking and thus no information could come through to him. He attributed this cutting of communications as an act of the Japanese to prevent the true situation from becoming known until the conclusion of the Council meetings. He also informed me confidentially that he had not yet received instructions from his Government as to what position he should take in Geneva, that such instructions would of course govern his action but that even if he were directed to present the question to the League he would delay this action as long as ^{possible} ~~(#)~~.

Following the foregoing statements the reason for his coming to see me became apparent. The European press has been carrying articles under a Washington date line that the United States was considering the relationship of the present situation to the provisions of the Four ^{Vine?} Power Pacific Treaty. He said that he felt that action under the Four Power Treaty or under the Kellogg Pact ^{Vine?} would be better for China than action by the League as Japan's stronger position in the League of Nations (according to Sze she can use this position by employing her relations to European questions as trading points ~~(#)~~ would militate

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

5- #116, from Geneva, September 20,
1931

militate against the Chinese). He does not wish to fall between two stools, but he does wish to avoid appealing to the League if there is a possibility of Washington taking the action which has been discussed, particularly as he feels that prior (*) by the League might be prejudicial to possible American action. It will be noted from the foregoing that neither party has yet requested the Council to act in this matter.

I listened what Sze had to say to me, but naturally made no comments. I would appreciate being informed of their substance should the Department make any public statements, or statements to the press in the premises. Nothing will probably happen on Monday but the matter may come to a head in the Assembly meeting at present scheduled for Tuesday.

GILBERT

HPD
CSB

~~(*)~~ omission

0157

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Chambers & Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

4-122 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

September 22, 1931.

6P

793.94/1820

This code was sent in confidential code.
 It should be carefully paraphrased before
 being communicated to anyone.

GILBERT,

BERGUES (Geneva).

120 58

Your 116, September 20, 4 p.m., last paragraph.

For your information, no statement has been given
 to the press on this subject except the following, dated
 September 19, 1931: (Ency)

QUOTE The Department is informed from American official
 sources that Japanese troops have occupied Mukden,
 Newchang, Changchun, Antung and Kaopangtzu and have taken
 over all Government services. The reports state that all
 foreigners are safe UNQUOTE. (end Ency)

The question of the applicability of the Kellogg-Briand
 Pact and the Nine (not QUOTE Four UNQUOTE) Power Treaty has
 been raised by the correspondents at the daily press
 conferences but the Department's attitude has been
 non-committal. For the Department's position see
 No. 119, one h.m.,
 Department's telegram of today to Wilson.

793.94/1820

FE: RSM: EJJ

Stinson

Sep. 22 1931

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

0158

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lynn NARS, Date June 4, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

GREEN

FROM

GENEVA

Dated September 21, 1931

Rec'd 7 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

118, September 21, 5 p.m.

Consulate's number 118, September 20, 4 p.m.

The Secretary General circulated to the Council late this afternoon a note which he had just received from a representative of China on the Council. The Secretary General in agreement with the President of the Council has convoked the Council to meet tomorrow morning to take up this matter.




The Chinese note dated today is as follows:

"I am instructed by the National Government of China to bring to your attention the facts stated below and to request that in virtue of Article 11 of the covenant of the League of Nations you forthwith summon a meeting of the Council of the League in order that it may take such action as it may deem wise and effectual so that the peace of nations may be safeguarded.

Through

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793.94/1821

SEP 22 1931

0159

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

2- #118, from Geneva,
September 21, 1931

Through statements made to it at its meeting on September 19 by the representatives of China and Japan, the Council was advised of the fact that a serious situation had been created in Manchuria. In his statement at that meeting the representative of China declared that the information which he then had indicated that the situation had been created through no fault on the part of the Chinese. Since September 19 the undersigned has received from his government information which discloses a situation of greater gravity than had appeared by the first report and which revealed that beginning from ten o'clock of the night of September 18th regular troops of Japanese soldiers without provocation of any kind opened rifle and artillery fire upon Chinese soldiers at or near the City of Mukden, bombarded the arsenal and barracks of the Chinese soldiers, set fire to the ammunition depot, disarmed the Chinese troops in Changchun, Kwangchengtse and other places, and later took military occupation of the cities of Mukden and Antung and other places and of public buildings therein, and are now in such occupation. Lines of communication have also been seized by Japanese troops.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

3- #118, from Geneva,
 September 21, 1931

troops.

To these acts of violence the Chinese soldiers and populace acting under instructions from the Chinese Government have made no resistance and have refrained from conduct which might in any way aggravate the situation.

In view of the foregoing facts the Republic of China, a member of the League of Nations, asserts that a situation has arisen which calls for action under the terms of Article 11 of the covenant. I am therefore instructed by my government to request that, in pursuance of authority given to it by Article 11 of the covenant, the Council take immediate steps: to prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations; to reestablish the status quo ante; and to determine the amounts and character of such reparations as may be found due to the Republic of China.

I will add that the Government of China is fully prepared to act in conformity with whatever recommendations it may receive from the Council, and to abide by whatever decisions the League of Nations may adopt in the premises".

OX
 FW

GILBERT

0161

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence A. Syme NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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 fee
 E.G.C.

REP

1-1336

FROM

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 22 1931
 GREEN
 Department of State

Tokio

Dated September 22, 1931

Rec'd 10 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 SEP 22 1931
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT

793.94

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

157, September 22, 5 p. m. /1812

My 155, September 21, 10 a. m.

I am informed that (one) four thousand troops from
 Chosen have been sent to Mukden and (two) one brigade
 has been sent from Changchun to Kirin at the request of
 the Japanese residents there. The Government states
 orally that there have been no disturbances in any of
 the occupied areas in the past two days. The Chientao
 region is not occupied by Japanese troops, I understand.

The occupation of so large an area seems out of
 proportion to the alleged cause. The military undoubtedly
 had detailed plans like ~~every~~ army for every contingency
 they could think of. It seems probable that the incident
 referred to was seized upon by the army authorities and
 and the whole

793.94/1322

1322

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #157, from Tokio, Sept. 22, 1931,
10 a.m.

and the whole area occupied as a military measure to force
a general liquidation of outstanding issues.

I am inclined to think that the Foreign Office and
perhaps other branches of the Government here have been
genuinely surprised by the action of the army at this
time.

Repeated to Peiping.

NEVILLE

KLP

CSB

016

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Chambers & Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 22, 1931

Rec'd 10 a. m.



file
egc.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

621, September 22, noon.

Reuter report from Nanking twenty-first:

"Feeling is running high here. Students wearing mourning bands and carrying banners inscribed 'Death before surrender' have been marching in processions and many mass meetings have been held.

Foreign Minister C. T. Wang today declared we may lose our lives, we may lose our homes, but we cannot give up any part of our country inherited through centuries from our forefathers.

JOHNSON

WSB

793.94/1823

FILED

OCT 12 1931

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1-1336

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 22 1931
Department of State

Dated September 22, 1931

F/12
793.94/1824

Washington.

Following from Consul General at Shanghai:

Japanese incidents have yet taken place in Shanghai.

A meeting of the prominent Japanese officials and others

was held at the Japanese Consulate General yesterday.

The local Chinese press is bitter against Japan. The

SHUN PAO states editorially that Japanese action is a challenge for war against Soviet Russia and the United

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05, 12, 1931

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

Z- #522, Peiping, Sept. 22, 1931,
10:05 a. m.

more bloodshed and that the worst is yet to come.

There were sharp declines in Chinese Japanese bonds
both on Saturday and again today. Gold bars have also
declined sharply".

JOHNSON

CSB

WSB

016F

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 22, 1931

Rec'd 9:55 a. m.

1-1336

DEPARTMENT OF FROM
 RECEIVED

22 SEP 1931

DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SEP 22 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

6201, September 22, 11 a. m.

Following from Mukden:

"September 21, 8 p. m. Japanese military occupation is being extended to Kirin for the purpose of maintaining order in that city. Heavy movement of troops and artillery north from Mukden yesterday. Main body of Japanese troops now at Changchun. Practically all Chinese forces have been brought down the Peiping-Mukden Railway to Chingchow and Shanhaikwan. Japanese have taken no point west of Mukden on the Peiping-Mukden Railway. It is estimated that over 20,000 panic stricken Chinese have already fled on trains towards Shanhaikwan. A provisional administration of Chinese has been appointed in Mukden walled city under the direction of the Japanese in an attempt to reassure Chinese and stop the exodus. Chinese

banks

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793.94/1825

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 OCT 12 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #620, from Peiping, Sept. 22, 1931,
9:55 a. m.

banks have been taken by the Japanese and reports are
that they are removing stocks of silver. A request from
the Japanese authorities for information concerning Chang
Shueh Liang bank account was refused politely today by
the National City Bank. Mukden has been quiet today".

JOHNSON

WSB

CSB

0168

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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 DIVISION OF
 M.I.D.

EGC

793.94

DEPARTMENT OF
 STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND
 TRANSPORTATION

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 22, 1931

Rec'd 9:50 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 22 1931
 Department of State

file EGC

F 793.94/1826

619, September 22, 10 a. m.

Following from Consul General Harbin:

"September 21, 5 p. m. Tien Cheng Wen, chief engineer Harbin Telephone Administration, informed me today that he has received a message from Tsingtau stating that Japanese troops were marching on Taonanfu and that he had received a communication from Kirin stating that Japanese planes were flying over that city. He added that the local telephone office was heavily guarded by Chinese police to prevent an attack on the same by local unruly elements. The situation in Harbin has been and is quiet".

JOHNSON

CSB

FILED

SEP 12 1931

0169

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 22, 1931

Rec'd 10:25 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 SEP 22 1931
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

DIVISION OF
 U.S. EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 22 1931
 Department of State

793.94
 Tel. to Nanking
 SEP 22 1931

F
 793.94/1827

624, September 22, 3 p. m.

Following from Consul General Nanking:

"September 21, 4 p. m. One. In conversations with Hsu Mo and Tyau of the Foreign Office September 21, 5 p. m., I have learned following interesting rumors: reported from the United States that the Secretary of State has been following Manchurian situation closely and has stated that at time of speaking Kellogg Pact was not involved. This report was given me by a Chinese as being refusal of the United States to intervene against Japan. Second rumor is that at least 24 hours before Japanese action at Mukden the Japanese Government inquired of important governments, notably Great Britain and the United States, whether they would consent to such action by Japan, the answer being in the affirmative, but that Japan must not push action too far. Third rumor is that Russia has concentrated 30,000 troops near Manchouli.

Two.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #624, from Peiping, Sept. 22, 1931
10:25 a. m.

Two. I urged on Hsu Mo the desirability of my being kept fully informed so that I might in turn keep the Department of State fully cognizant of the changing situation. Apparently in response to this Hsu Mo told me Karakhan had inquired of Mo Te Hui in Moscow regarding course of controversy with Japan and the Chinese Foreign Office had replied giving desired information. Answering my question Hsu said that Karakhan indicated no sympathy for China in the dispute nor any intention of safeguarding by military force Russian interests in Manchuria if or when threatened by Japan.

Three. Central Party Headquarters of the Nationalist Party has declared September 23rd day of humiliation for Japan's recent actions. There is a feeling here that if the western powers maintain an attitude of detachment in this controversy the Nationalist Party, the Chinese Government, and the people of China may seek Russian alliance with far reaching results".

JOHNSON

KLP

WSB

0171

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department

Charge to
\$

PM RECD
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

September 22, 1931.

SEP 22 31

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

AMERICAN CONSUL,

NANKING (China).

75 Your 624, September 22, 3 p.m.

First, the Secretary of State has not made the statement attributed to him; second, the American Government was in no way consulted or informed in advance. You may so inform your interlocutors.

Stimson

DISTRIBUTED

✓
CR
SEP. 22 1931

793.94/

FE:SKH/ZMF

RAM
FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

793.94/1827


0172

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP



COPIES SENT FROM U.N.I. AND M.I. *egp.*

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 22, 1931

Rec'd 10:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



file egp.

795.94/1828

623, September 22, 2 p. m.

Following from American Consul at Chefoo:

"September 21, 11 a. m. Situation quiet. Chinese people uneasy on account of numerous rumors current. Two Japanese war ships arrived here Saturday evening and are to remain here. According to reliable Chinese, the Japanese senior naval officer here insisted upon the Chinese gunboat, WEIHAI, which is in port, temporarily taking down her wireless apparatus and sending operators ashore. Japanese Consul called on local military authorities yesterday and requested, received assurance of protection for his nationals. General Liu Chen ^{General} is returning to Chefoo from Ninghai today and is to have a conference with civic leaders. Boycott against the Japanese merchandise continues. At Lungkow situation quiet;

138124-130
SEP 22 1931

0173

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #623, from Peiping, Sept. 22, 1931
10:10 a. m.

quiet; reliably informed that 15 Japanese plain clothes
men arrived there yesterday from Dairen presumably
reserve men engaged in intelligence work".

JOHNSON

WWC


CSB

0174

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP



FROM

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.E.


GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 22, 1931

Rec'd 9:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



file
egc

618, September 22, 8 a. m.

Following from Harbin:

"September 19, 1 p. m. Chinese Eastern Railway officials have informed me that the passenger train which left Harbin on September 18th at 3 p. m. to connect with the Transsiberian express and wrecked by explosives this morning at 6 o'clock near station Irekte".

JOHNSON

OSB
WSB

FILED

OCT 14 1931

793.94/1829

0175

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

1-1830

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated September 22, 1931

Rec'd 12:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

120, September 22, 4 p.m. /1821
Consulate's 118, September 21, 5 p.m.

The Sino-Japanese conflict was taken up by Council this morning. After a lengthy debate between the Chinese and Japanese representatives Lord Cecil made a statement in regard to the procedure which the Council should follow and closed his remarks in the following words:

"One other matter I think I ought to mention. We (there?) are all aware that are certain treaty obligations - or international instruments let me call them - which affect this dispute beyond the League of Nations. There is, of course, the Briand - Kellogg Pact - the Pact of Paris, and there is also the treaty relative to the principle and policy concerning China signed by the United States and other powers. In both these instruments the United States of America are very closely interested, in the first place as one

793.94/1830

FILED
SEP 1 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

2- #120, from Geneva, Sept. 22, 1961,
 12:40 p. m.

as one of the promoters of the Pact of Paris and in the second as one of the signatories of the latter treaty. It seems to me that we should do well in these circumstances to communicate to the United States a statement of all the proceedings of this Council and of all the discussions which have taken place within it. The United States Government will then be fully informed of what we are doing and they will be able to take any action they think right in connection with the subject".

This suggestion has not yet been formally approved by the Council but there is a strong probability that it will be adopted.

Upon the termination of the discussion the Council was adjourned for fifteen minutes to enable the President to draft a resolution dealing with the Sino-Japanese conflict but at the end of one-half hour he announced that the question was not yet in a position in which he could put the resolution before the Council and in order to allow further time for consideration adjourned the meeting until 3:30 this afternoon.

The Consulate will submit a report of the day's proceedings in a later report.

GILBERT

WWC
 CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clayton S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Geneva

Dated September 22, 1931

Rec'd 9:52 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.



156, September 22, 11 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

See Consulate's telegrams concerning Sino-Japanese matter numbers 126 and 127.

At the close of meeting of small council committee, Drummond asked me to call and stated that he was authorized by committee to tell me that it was contemplating the despatch of an investigating body to Manchuria composed of (?) military and/or civilian observers. Chinese representative has consented; Japanese representative has raised objections but will ask his government urgently for instructions. Drummond states investigation will be made in any case, if necessary under authorization of China only as sovereign of Manchuria.

There



OCT 3 1931
6
X-3-31

793.94/1831

0178

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

#156, September 22, 1931, 11 p. m., from Geneva

-2-

There was also discussion in small committee of
(?) by means of similar or identic notes but it was
felt that this was perhaps premature owing to imperfect
knowledge of facts and uncertainty as to whether United
States would cooperate.

Drummond earnestly desired any expression of opinion
you can give me as urgently as possible by telephone or
cable as to whether the United States can consider
cooperation if invited in action contemplated in either
of foregoing paragraphs.

The Council is profoundly impressed with seriousness
and urgency of situation. I have never seen a situation
here so tense nor one in which our cooperation is so
earnestly desired.

WILSON

FW

0179

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

PM 11
Gray CIPHER
TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

SEP 22 31 September 23, 1931

/am

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA.

122
PRIORITY.

Your telegram 156, September 22, 11 p. m.,
under consideration. Reply will be made as
soon as possible.

Stinson
(SR)

Initialed for:

W.T.B.
W.T.B.
T.A.
T.A.
T.A.-L.
C.-A.

WE

793.94/1831

SEP 22 31

D.C. [Nothing but address and text of message to be written within the marginal lines. All stamps and numbers to be placed in space below.]

Enciphered by

Sent by operator *M.* 191

Index Bu.—No. 60.

1-813

793.94/1831

0180

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

September 23, 1931,

793.94/1831

WILSON,

BERGUES, GENEVA.

123 Very urgent - Triple Priority
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Referring to Consulates 120, September 22, 4 p.m.;
 and 123, September 22, 6 p.m.; and your 156, September 22, 11 p.m.

In response to the inquiries which have been made
 formally and informally as to our attitude in this matter /
 you may deliver first the following note to the President
 of the Council:

(Non-confidential code) QUOTE. I have received from the American Minister at
 Berne the copy of the resolution of the Council of the
 League of Nations which you transmitted to him. /

I have noted the two parts of this resolution and the
 fact that they have been embodied in a note which you have
 addressed to the Governments of Japan and China. /

I assure you that the Government of the United States
 is in whole-hearted sympathy with the attitude of the League
 of Nations as expressed in the Council's resolution and
 will dispatch to Japan and China notes along similar lines. /

I have already urged cessation of hostilities and a

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 20.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928

793.94/1831

0181

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington.

- 2 -

128 to Wilson
withdrawal from the present situation of danger and will
continue earnestly to work for the restoration of peace. UNQUOTE.

Confidentially and for the reasons which I expressed
to you over the telephone, I am much troubled over the
proposition for a committee of inquiry so far as I understand
it from your 156 and 128. The proposition to create from outside
a committee of investigation which shall proceed to Manchuria
and investigate the situation between China and Japan will
not, in my opinion, conduce towards the acceptance by Japan
of our efforts towards a peaceful solution of this situation.
On the contrary, I very much fear that it will, by inflaming
the nationalistic spirit of Japan behind the present leaders
of the militaristic movement in Manchuria, make more difficult
the efforts of the Foreign Minister and the other peacefully
disposed members of the Japanese Government towards a restoring
of peace and a withdrawal from the present untenable position.
The committee of inquiry as thus proposed, differs radically
and widely from an impartial commission chosen by the two
parties to a controversy according to the methods which
have been adopted in many well known treaties of conciliation.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0182

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to

Washington,

\$ 123 to Wilson - 3 -

The latter form of inquiry was the one which I myself suggested two years ago in the case of Russia and China, but even that, although much less offensive to ^{national} ~~oriental~~ pride than the present suggestion, was opposed by Japan ^{and was not} ~~adopted by China and Russia~~. We have every desire to work along harmonious lines with those which are being followed by the League of Nations in our efforts to solve this difficulty. We do not differ from your view of the facts so far as they have been communicated to us, but we feel that the Foreign Minister of Japan together probably with the civilian members of the government, are earnestly working to accomplish a peaceful solution and we are anxious not to make their task more difficult by arousing false national pride. We appreciate thoroughly the invitation to sit on the Council and on the special committee but we think that our assistance in the solution will probably be more effective if we work along the line to which we have already committed ourselves. ^{of independent conversations} Beginning with Sunday morning, we have had repeated conversations with the Japanese Ambassador and with the Chinese Chargé. In view of the possibility of divergence of views as to methods, such as for example in respect

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.-No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

0183

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

1237 Wilson

Washington.

- 4 -

to an investigating committee, I feel that I must retain /
 a degree of independence of action for our government.
 In short, the policy which I believe will be most effective,
 for this Government under the difficult conditions of this
 case is, first, by diplomatic methods and acting in
 accordance with any similar methods employed by the League
 of Nations to urge a settlement by the Japanese and
 Chinese themselves through direct negotiation; second,
 if this method is not effective and outside ^{action} ~~intervention~~ *14x*
 becomes necessary to ~~throw the support of this Government~~ *14x5*
~~in favor of~~ the submission by China and Japan to the use
 of machinery set up in the Covenant of the League of Nations
 to which they are both parties and which has already been
 appealed to by China and which already has begun action.
 Finally if for any reason it should develop that this line
 is not practicable to consider the machinery of Article 7
 of the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922 or such
 action as may be practicable under the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

SEP 22 1972

Stimson

S HLS.HMR
 Enciphered by .GAM

Sent by operator

M.

19

Index Bu.—Nov. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1972 1-138

0184

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

FE
WE
A

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

RECEIVED
1-1238
23 1931
FROM
GREEN
GENEVA

Dated September 22, 1931

Secretary of State
Washington

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 23 1931
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEP 26 1931
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

123, September 22, 6 p.m.
Consulate's 120, September 22, 4 p.m.

Mr. Wilson was formally handed a resolution presented by the President of the Council and passed by the Council at its session this afternoon, together with a covering letter enclosing also the minutes of the Council meetings held today relating to the appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the covenant, together with other documents relating to this question. These papers are being forwarded to the Department.

The resolution referred to above reads:

"My colleagues and I have listened this morning with the closest attention to the statements of the representatives of China and Japan. We take due note of the request of the representative of Japan to adjourn the discussion of the question until the next meeting.

I request the Council to authorize me:

First, to address an urgent appeal to the Governments of China and Japan to abstain from any act which might

FILED
OCT 12 1931

F/p
793.94/1832

0185

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

2- #123, from Geneva,
September 22, 1931

might aggravate the situation or prejudice the peaceful settlement of the problem;

Second, to seek in consultation with the representatives of China and Japan, adequate means whereby the two countries may proceed immediately to the withdrawal of their respective troops without compromising the security of life of their nationals or the protection of the property belonging to them.

- I ask the Council to decide to forward for information the minutes of all the meetings of the Council together with the documents relating to this question to the Government of the United States of America".

GILBERT

CSB

018F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Chambers & Lyman NARS, Date June 4, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

GREEN

FROM Geneva


Dated September 22, 1931

Rec'd 9:15 p. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



*file
HGC*



793.94/1835

127, September 22, 9 p. m. *11832*
 Consulate's 123, September 22, 6 p. m.

The text of identic telegrams despatched today
 by the President of the Council to the Governments of
 China and Japan is as follows:

"I have the honor to inform you that the Council
 of the League of Nations in its session today devoted
 the appeal of the Chinese Government based on article
 eleven of the Covenant with regard to the situation in
 Manchuria has authorized me unanimously,

One. To address an urgent appeal to the Governments
 of China and of Japan to abstain from any action calculated
 to endanger the situation or to prejudice the pacific
 settlement of the problem.

Two. To promulgate, in consultation with the Chinese
 and Japanese representatives, adequate means to commit

both

OCT 12 1931

0187

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By William J. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

#127, September 22, 9 p. m.

-2-

both countries to proceed immediately to the withdrawal of their respective forces without compromising the security of their nationals and the protection of their belongings.

Three. The Council has furthermore decided to transmit, for purposes of information, the minutes of all the meetings of the Council and the documents concerning this affair to the Government of the United States of America. I hold the firm conviction that in response to the appeal that the Council has authorized me to address to you, your Government will take all necessary measures in order that no action susceptible of endangering the situation or of prejudicing the pacific settlement thereof may be taken.

Furthermore, I shall begin the consultations from Asia with the representatives of Japan and China for the execution of paragraph two. I have consulted on the decision taken in paragraph three with the representatives of Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy."

GILBERT

FW

0188

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CORRECTED COPY

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated September 22, 1931

Rec'd DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 23 1931
Department of State

SEP 26 1931
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

127, September 22, 9 p. m.

Consulate's 123, September 22, 6 p. m.

The text of identic telegrams despatched today
by the President of the Council to the Governments of
China and Japan is as follows:

"I have the honor to inform you that the Council
of the League of Nations in its session today devoted to
the appeal of the Chinese Government based on article
eleven of the Covenant with regard to the situation in
Manchuria has authorized me unanimously,

One. To address an urgent appeal to the Govern-
ments of China and of Japan to abstain from any action
calculated to endanger the situation or to prejudice the
pacific settlement of the problem.

Two. To promulgate, in consultation with the
Chinese and Japanese representatives, adequate means to
compel

FILED
SEP 23 1931

F.V. 793.94/1833

793.94/1833

FE
WE
TC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #127, from Geneva, Sept. 22, 1931
 9:15 p. m.

compel both countries to proceed immediately to the withdrawal of their respective forces without compromising the security of their nationals and the protection of their belongings.

Three. The Council has furthermore decided to transmit, for purposes of information, the minutes of all the meetings of the Council and the documents concerning this affair to the Government of the United States of America. I hold the firm conviction that in response to the appeal that the Council has authorized me to address to you, your Government will take all necessary measures in order that no action susceptible of endangering the situation or of prejudicing the pacific settlement thereof may be taken.

Furthermore, I shall begin the consultations foreseen with the representatives of Japan and China for the execution of paragraph two. I have consulted on the decision taken in paragraph three with the representatives of Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy."

GILBERT

CSB

0190

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Long NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

SEP 25 1981

Mr. Secretary: *initials*
Would you wish to *He S.*
telephone Ambassador
Delucchi suggesting
that Mr. Matsudaira
come through Washington?
PTMone

Action cancelled in
view of *follow* succeeding
telegram.
P.M.

0191

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Mr. Ransford Miller:

With reference to inviting Matsudaira down to Washington:

If we send such a message to him via Dawes, as suggested in London's telegram, would we not run the risk of (1) hurting Debuchi's feelings and (2) exaggerating the import of what we may decide to say?

From a strictly disarmament viewpoint, it would undoubtedly be useful for the Secretary to have a talk with him, but I doubt if the conversation would be definite enough to warrant inviting him here for this purpose alone.

Would not the solution be for the Secretary one day to tell Debuchi that he heard that Matsudaira was on the Berengaria returning home, that there were so many problems of interest to both countries now under discussion that he felt a useful purpose could be served if Matsudaira came down here for a few talks. He would thus be able to take home with him a first-hand impression of our views. We could thus emphasize either disarmament or Manchuria as the situation next week demanded. Furthermore there could be no question of going over Debuchi's head.

Concur

WE:JPM:EFB

Concur
Skiff

P.M.

P.L.B.

0192

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Chambers & Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

LONDON
 Dated September 22, 1931
 Rec'd 3:50 p.m.

Secretary of State
 Washington

376, September 22, 6 p.m.

Matsudaira has just called to say that he is leaving for Tokyo on the BERENGARIA to New York on September 26. His Government has been pressing him to accept the chairmanship of the Japanese delegation to the Disarmament Conference in February. This he has reluctantly agreed to do and he is going home to prepare himself in that connection. He says the army and (*) are to be represented on the delegation. He expects to be absent from his post until the beginning of the Conference.

Matsudaira reported that the word he receives from his Government relative to the Manchurian trouble is somewhat disquieting. He estimates the Japanese forces in Manchuria at not over 10,400 while the Chinese forces in Manchuria he estimates at over 200,000 and near Mukden along the heavy guns of the Chinese are about twice the number possessed

WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 DIVISION OF STATE
 SEP 23 1931
 PM

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 23 1931
 Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 SEP 25 1931
 noted

F/ 793.94/1834

723.94

704.9441
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FILED
 SEP 29 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

2- #376, from London,
 September 22, 1931

possessed by the entire Japanese army. He says that his Government and he believes the Chinese Government as well are making every effort to stop the conflict. He has no information as to the massing of Soviet troops but is somewhat disquieted at press reports concerning the same.

British Foreign Office understands that action of Japanese commander in Mukden was taken without sanction of Japanese War Office and certainly without the knowledge of Japanese Government. In view of this Foreign Office considers Japanese will be more than ready to meet an early solution compatible with their national dignity since, in any case, Japanese industry will be most anxious to avoid the penalties of a Chinese boycott.

In reply to inquiry Foreign Office stated it does not consider it at all probable that Chinese could depend on any material support from Soviet sources.

Matsudaira states that it is necessary for him to get to Tokyo as soon as possible and at present is not planning to stop at Washington. If you desire to see him as he passes through the United States it would be best for you to cable me now so that he can alter his plans accordingly.

(*) apparent omission
 WCR

DAWES

0194

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

98 1001

September 22, 1931

1-1336

FROM Received

SECRETARY OF STATE STIMSON

U S DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON D C



China Institute in America has been requested to transmit to you the following cable from the undersigned, leaders in the fields of education, journalism and business, who are members of our committee in China.

"In the cause of peace and justice among nations, we, the undersigned, in all solemnity, direct the attention of the Government and the people of the United States to the flagrant violation of the Kellogg Peace Pact by the Imperial Government of Japan. Without any justification or provocation whatsoever the Japanese army attacked and occupied the city of Mukden on September nineteen. Since then they have bombarded and occupied cities and towns from Mukden to the Korean border visiting destruction upon the helpless and innocent civilian population. The extent of the havoc wrought upon the lives and property of the people of that region of China is as yet unknown and may remain so indefinitely since all communications have been cut by the Japanese armies of occupation. This wanton act of invasion and destruction was first excused by the Japanese on the flimsy ground that the Chinese soldiers tore up sections of the railroad tracks belonging to the Japanese controlled

South Manchurian

793.94/1336

SEP 12 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- From New York, Sept. 22, 1931,
 4 p. m.

South Manchurian Railway. Since then the Japanese have offered at least two other alleged causes of the initial clash which occurred in the northern suburb of Mukden. They changed the first cause from tearing up some tracks to the bombing of a railroad bridge by those soldiers. Now reports from Tokio report responsible Japanese officials saying that instead of any tracks or bridge being destroyed by Chinese troops the real cause leading to the invasion of China by the Japanese army was the fact that some Japanese 'hotheaded junior officers' acted on their own initiative and precipitated the clash because they took exception to the 'weekkneed' policy of their superior officers and their government vis the Northeastern Provinces of China. It is the firm conviction of the undersigned that Japan is trying today what it did in nineteen fifteen. When the nations of the west were struggling in the throes of the world war Japan imposed the infamous twenty one demands upon China. While the nations of the west today are confronting one of the serious problems affecting their economic stability and while China is preoccupied with the work

0196

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

3- from New York, September 22,
1931

work of providing relief for the millions of starving victims of the recent floods and with the conduction of campaigns toward suppression of communistic activities Japan again takes advantage of China's misfortune and preoccupation to attempt the annexation of long coveted territory of a friendly neighbor. The systematic and sudden attack upon and occupation of an extensive area of Chinese territory by Japan's armies are conclusive and irrefutable evidence of a premeditated plan of conquest by Japan which belies the Japanese excuse that their action was provoked. Such an outrage is a clear and unmistakable violation of the terms of the Kellogg Pact to which Japan is a signatory. Unless the provisions of this pact can curb the territorial ambitions of a powerful country against a weak neighbor it is impotent as an instrument to preserve peace among the nations of the world. This studied deliberate violation of the letter and spirit of the Kellogg Pact challenges the courage and honesty of the nations who signed the pact to outlaw war. We appeal to the Government and the people of the nation which sponsored this great proposal that has been endorsed by and is binding upon the most important nations

0197

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Thomas S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

4- from New York, September 22,
1931

nations of the world to exercise their influence and leadership in the cause of international peace.

(Signed) ~~WELLINGTON FOO~~ (Former Minister to United States)

HU SHIH WW YEN (Former Prime Minister)

P W KUO (Ministry of Industries)

HOLLINGTON TONG (Managing Editor the China Press)

T B CHANG (Publisher CHINA TIMES)

CHANG KIANGAU (Managing Director Bank of China)

CHANG POLING (President Nankai University)

HERMAN LIU (President Shanghai University)

DAVID YUI (Chairman China Council Institute Pacific

Relations)

JAMES YEN (Director Mass Education Movement)

SHIH LIANG TSAI (Managing Director Shun Pao)

E K MOY (Manager Foreign Service Department KUO MIN

NEWS) and

G S LIEU (Attorney)

PAUL MONROE, President and

CHIH MENG, Associate Director China Institute in America.

0198

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

743-94/1835
Mr. Chih Meng,

Associate Director, China Institute in America,
119 West 57th Street,
New York, New York.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of
September 22, 1931, and of the telegram of the same
date addressed to the Secretary of State, in regard to
the Manchurian situation.

The subject dealt with in these communications is
receiving the careful consideration of this Department.

Very truly yours,

StK


Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

RAM
FE:RSM:EJL

m.w.
FE

9/25/31

✓
SEP. 26. 1931.P4



F.W.793.94/1835

0195

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976



CHINA INSTITUTE IN AMERICA

Incorporated

119 West 57th Street, New York City

Cable Address "Huamei"

Telephone, Circle 7-3772

CHAO-CHU WU, *Honorary President*
 P. W. KUO, *Honorary Director*


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 H. C. ZEN

CHIH MENG, *Associate Director*



September 22, 1931.

September 25 1931.

Dr. Stanley K. Hornsbeck,
 Far Eastern Division,
 United States Department of State,
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Hornsbeck:

Enclosed you will please find a copy of
 a telegram which we have sent today to Secretary Stimson
 with the hope that it will receive his personal attention.

Both the Executive and China Committees
 of the China Institute in America would like to present the same
 appeal to you and to ask your kind consideration.

Yours very sincerely,

Chih Meng

Associate Director.

793 94 / 1835

OCT 12 1931

FILED

F.N. 1790.94/1835

0200

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 4, 1976

CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED	
DOMESTIC	CABLE
TELEGRAM	FULL RATE
DAY LETTER	DEFERRED
NIGHT MESSAGE	CABLE LETTER
NIGHT LETTER	WEEK END LETTER

Patrons should check class of service desired; otherwise message will be transmitted as a full-rate communication.

WESTERN UNION

NEWCOMB CARLTON, PRESIDENT

J. C. WILLEVER, FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

1211 A

NO.	CASH OR CHG.
CHECK	
TIME FILED	

Send the following message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

SEPT. 22, 1931.

THE CHINA INSTITUTE IN AMERICA HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT TO YOU THE FOLLOWING CABLE FROM THE UNDERSIGNED LEADERS IN THE FIELDS OF EDUCATION JOURNALISM AND BUSINESS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF OUR COMMITTEE IN CHINA QUOTE IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS WE THE UNDERSIGNED IN ALL SOLEMNITY DIRECT THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE KELLOGG PEACE PACT BY THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN STOP WITHOUT ANY JUSTIFICATION OR PROVOCATION WHATSOEVER THE JAPANESE ARMY ATTACKED AND OCCUPIED THE CITY OF MUKDEN ON SEPTEMBER NINETEENTH STOP SINCE THEN THEY HAVE BOMBARDED AND OCCUPIED CITIES AND TOWNS FROM MUKDEN TO THE KOREAN BORDER VISITING DESTRUCTION UPON THE HELPLESS AND INNOCENT CIVILIAN POPULATION STOP THE EXTENT OF THE HAVOC WROUGHT UPON THE LIVES AND PROPERTY OF THE PEOPLE OF THAT REGION OF CHINA IS AS YET UNKNOWN AND MAY REMAIN SO INDEFINITELY SINCE ALL COMMUNICATIONS HAVE BEEN CUT BY THE JAPANESE ARMIES OF OCCUPATION STOP THIS WANTON ACT OF INVASION AND DESTRUCTION WAS FIRST EXCUSED BY THE JAPANESE ON THE FLimsy GROUND THAT THE CHINESE SOLDIERS TORE UP SECTIONS OF THE RAILROAD TRACKS BELONGING TO THE JAPANESE CONTROLLED SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY STOP SINCE THEN THE JAPANESE HAVE OFFERED AT LEAST TWO OTHER ALLEGED CAUSES OF THE INITIAL CLASH WHICH OCCURRED IN THE SOUTHERN SUBURB OF MUKDEN STOP THEY CHANGED THE FIRST CAUSE FROM TEARING UP SOME TRACKS TO THE BOMBING OF A RAILROAD BRIDGE BY THOSE SOLDIERS STOP NOW REPORTS FROM TOKIO REPORT SUBQUOTE RESPONSIBLE JAPANESE OFFICIALS SAYING THAT INSTEAD OF ANY TRACKS OR BRIDGES BEING DESTROYED BY CHINESE TROOPS THE REAL CAUSE LEADING TO THE INVASION OF CHINA BY THE JAPANESE ARMY WAS THE FACT THAT SOME JAPANESE SUBQUOTE HOT HEADED JUNIOR OFFICERS

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE

0201

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED	
DOMESTIC	CABLE
TELEGRAM	FULL RATE
DAY LETTER	DEFERRED
NIGHT MESSAGE	CABLE LETTER
NIGHT LETTER	WEEK END LETTER

Patrons should check class of service desired; otherwise message will be transmitted as a full-rate communication.

WESTERN UNION

NEWCOMB CARLTON, PRESIDENT

J. C. WILLEVER, FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

1211 A

NO.	CASH OR CHG.
CHECK	
TIME FILED	

Send the following message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

ACTED ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE AND PRECIPITATED THE CLASH BECAUSE THEY TOOK EXCEPTION TO THE SUBQUOTE WEAK KNEED POLICY OF THEIR SUPERIOR OFFICERS AND THEIR GOVERNMENT VISAVIS THE NORTHEASTERN PROVINCES OF CHINA STOP IT IS THE FIRM CONVICTION OF THE UNDERSIGNED THAT JAPAN IS TRYING TODAY WHAT IT DID IN NINETEEN FIFTEEN STOP WHEN THE NATIONS OF THE WEST WERE STRUGGLING IN THE THROES OF THE WORLD WAR JAPAN IMPOSED THE INFAMOUS SUBQUOTE TWENTY ONE DEMANDS UPON CHINA STOP WHILE THE NATIONS OF THE WEST TODAY ARE CONFRONTING ONE OF THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS AFFECTING THEIR ECONOMIC STABILITY AND WHILE CHINA IS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE WORK OF PROVIDING RELIEF FOR THE MILLIONS OF STARVING VICTIMS OF THE RECENT FLOODS AND WITH THE CONDUCTION OF CAMPAIGNS TOWARD SUPPRESSION OF COMMUNISTIC ACTIVITIES JAPAN AGAIN TAKES ADVANTAGE OF CHINAS MISFORTUNE AND PREOCCUPATION TO ATTEMPT THE ANNEXATION OF LONG COVETED TERRITORY BELONGING TO A FRIENDLY NEIGHBOR STOP THE SYSTEMATIC AND SUDDEN ATTACK UPON AND OCCUPATION OF AN EXTENSIVE AREA OF CHINESE TERRITORY BY JAPANS ARMIES ARE CONCLUSIVE AND IRREFUTABLE EVIDENCE OF A PREMEDITATED PLAN OF CONQUEST BY JAPAN WHICH BELIES THE JAPANESE EXCUSE THAT THEIR ACTION WAS PROVOKED BY AN ALLEGED OFFENSE WHICH HAD TAKEN THREE FORMS IN TWO DAYS STOP THE PERPETRATION OF SUCH AN OUTRAGE UPON AN UNOFFENDING NATION BY JAPANS CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE VIOLATION OF THE TERMS OF THE KELLOGG PACT TO WHICH JAPAN IS A SIGNATORY STOP UNLESS THE PROVISIONS OF THIS PACT CAN CURB THE TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS OF A POWERFUL COUNTRY AGAINST A WEAK NEIGHBOR IT IS IMPOTENT AS AN INSTRUMENT TO PRESERVE PEACE AMONG THE NATIONS OF THE

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE

0202

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED	
DOMESTIC	CABLE
TELEGRAM	FULL RATE
DAY LETTER	DEFERRED
NIGHT MESSAGE	CABLE LETTER
NIGHT LETTER	WEEK END LETTER

Patrons should check class of service desired; otherwise message will be transmitted as a full-rate communication.

WESTERN UNION

NEWCOMB CARLTON, PRESIDENT

J. C. WILLEVER, FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

1211 A

NO.	CASH OR CHG.
CHECK	
TIME FILED	

Send the following message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

WORLD STOP WE APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF THE NATION WHICH SPONSORED
 THIS GREAT PROPOSAL THAT HAS BEEN ENDORSED BY AND IS BINDING UPON THE MOST IMPORTANT
 NATIONS OF THE WORLD TO EXERCISE THEIR INFLUENCE AND LEADERSHIP IN THE CAUSE OF
 INTERNATIONAL PEACE STOP SIGNED WELLINGTON KOO (FORMER MINISTER TO THE UNITED STATES
 AND ENGLAND) HU SHIH, WW YEN (FORMER PRIME MINISTER AND NEWLY APPOINTED MINISTER TO THE
 UNITED STATES) PW KUO (MINISTRY OF INDUSTRIES) HOLLINGTON TONG (MANAGING EDITOR CHINA
 PRESS) TB CHANG (PUBLISHER CHINA TIMES) CHANG KIANGAU (MANAGING DIRECTOR BANK OF CHINA)
 CHANG POLING (PRESIDENT NANKAI UNIVERSITY) HERMAN LIU (PRESIDENT SHANGHAI UNIVERSITY)
 DAVID YUI (CHAIRMAN CHINA COUNCIL INSTITUTE PACIFIC RELATIONS) JAMES YEN (DIRECTOR MASS
 EDUCATION MOVEMENT) SHIH LIANG TSAI (MANAGING DIRECTOR SHUH PAO) EK MOY (MANAGER FOREIGN
 STAFF KUO MIN NEWS) AND GS LIEU (ATTORNEY)

PAUL MONROE PRESIDENT AND CHIH MENG ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
 CHINA INSTITUTE IN AMERICA

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE

0203

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.A. AND M.I.W. *egc.*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GREEN

FROM

Tokio

Dated September 23, 1931

Rec'd 5:53 a. m.

743.24
Secretary of State,
Washington.



159, September 23, 5 p. m.

The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs told me today that the total of Japanese troops in Manchuria was less than fifteen thousand and within the number allowed as railway guards by treaty. The only places occupied outside the railway zone were Mukden and Kirin. In both places the object was to disarm Chinese who had assembled there. The troops have been withdrawn from Kirin and would be from Mukden as soon as the civil authorities were prepared to take it over.

It seems that T. V. Soong personally made a proposal to the Japanese Minister to suggest a joint Chinese-Japanese commission to investigate the points at issue. This was acceptable to Japan, but the Vice Minister told me that Soong had lost his early enthusiasm and was not supporting

F/10
793.9.21836

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

REP

2- #159, from Tokio, Sept. 23, 1931,
5:53 a. m.

supporting the plan with his colleagues at Nanking. He
added that the occupation in any case would not necessarily
depend upon a solution of all points at issue.

The British Ambassador tells me that Baron Shidepara
gave him the same information.

Repeated to Peiping.

NEVILLE

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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Q.N.I. AND M.I.D. *egc*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AT

REP

1-1330

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 23, 1931

Rec'd 9:05 a. m.

793.94

SEP 23 1931

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 23 1931
Department of State

*file
egc.*

Secretary of State,
Washington.

631, September 23, 1 p. m.

Consul General Harbin telegraphs:

"September 22, 1 p. m. Chinese authorities have informed me that the Chinese troops evacuated Kirin City night of September 21st and that Japanese troops entered city this morning at 8 o'clock."

JOHNSON

RR
WSB

F
793.94/1837

OCT 12 1931

FILED

0206

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

*My
FILE*

REP

1-1336

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 22, 1931

Rec'd 1:10 p. m.

F/

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 23 1931
 Department of State

*tel. to Peiping
 for 29.C.*

625, September 22, 8 p. m.

My 615, September 21, 2 p. m., referring to Nanking's
 appeal to us under the Kellogg Pact, also my 614, September
 21, noon.

793.94/1838

I desire to place on record the following as my
 personal reaction to events described in my telegram above
 referred to and to the responsibilities of powers signatory
 to Kellogg Pact in relation thereto.

One. According to all information available to me
 here I am driven to the conclusion that the forceful
 occupation of all strategic points in South Manchuria,
 including the taking over and operation of public
 utilities, banks, and in Mukden at least the functions
 of civil government, is an aggressive act by Japan apparently
 long planned and when decided upon most carefully and
 systematically

Oct 12 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #625, from Peiping, Sept. 22, 1931,
1:10 p. m.

systematically put into effect. I find no evidence that
these events were the result of accident nor were they
the acts of minor and irresponsible officials.
(END PART ONE).

JOHNSON

WSB

HPD

0208

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence A. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 22, 1931

Rec'd 23rd, 9:20 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

(PART TWO). 625, September 22, 8 p. m.

Two. By Article one of the Kellogg Treaty the high contracting parties among which is Japan renounce war "as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another". By Article two they agree "That the settlement or solution of all disputes, all conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means".

Three. It is my conviction that the steps taken by Japan in Manchuria must fall within any definition of war and certainly may not be considered as a pacific means of settling a dispute with China, a nation also adherent to the treaty.

Four.

0209

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 22, 1931

Rec'd 23rd, 9:20 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

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Four.

0210

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

FE

MAM

CORRECTED SECOND PAGE

2- #625, from Peiping via NR
September 22, 8 p.m.
Rec'd 23rd, 9:20 a.m.
1931

Four. The treaty providing for the renunciation of war as a national policy was a solemn undertaking on the part of the nations of the West and those nations now stand at the bar of the nations of the East to answer for their sincerity.

Five. It seems to me necessary that the powers signatory to the Kellogg Treaty owe it to themselves and to the world to pronounce themselves in regard to this Japanese act of aggression which I consider to have been deliberately accomplished in utter and cynical disregard of obligations which Japan as a nation shares with the other signatories of that Pact.

(END MESSAGE)

JOHNSON

WWC
WSB

793.94/1838

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #from Peiping via N. R., Sept.
22, 1931, Rec'd 23rd, 9:20 a. m.

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(END MESSAGE)

JOHNSON

WWC

WSB

0212

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Thomas S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138 PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER	TELEGRAM SENT	1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED CONFIDENTIAL CODE NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE PLAIN
Collect Charge Department	Department of State	
Charge to be sent in confidential code. It should be carefully paraphrased before it is released to anyone.	Washington, September 23, 1931.	

Amlegation,

Peiping (China) SEP 23 1931

338

Your 625, September 22, eight p.m., was received in
gray code by naval radio. Department assumes that this
was an inadvertence.

Stinson
Sick

793.94/1838

793.94/1838
29 C.
FE:EGC

m.w.w.
FE
key

CB ✓
SEP. 24. 1931.

R

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

0213

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

1-1386

FROM

A portion of this telegram
 must be closely paraphrased
 before being communicated
 to anyone.

Geneva

Dated September 22, 1931

Rec'd 9:45 p. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



126, September 22, 9 p. m. (GRAY)

At the end of the Council's session this afternoon
 the President of the Council, the representative of Spain,
 asked if some of his colleagues would meet with him to
 consider certain steps which might be taken in the present
 situation. In conformity with this request the President
 met with the representatives of Germany, Great Britain,
 France, Italy, Japan and China. While this group was
 not formally constituted as a council committee it is in
 effect a committee. (END GRAY).

From confidential sources it is learned that the
 principal discussion was as to the advisability of sending
 an investigating commission of military officers to the
 disturbed area to report on the factual situation; that the

Chinese

F/101 793.94/1839

FILED

OCT 12 1931

0214

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #126, from Geneva, Sept. 22, 1931,
9:45 p. m.

Chinese representative expressed himself as in agreement with this course; but that the Japanese representative asked for time to inquire of his Government. The Committee is now apparently awaiting a reply from the Japanese.

Rumors are current that the question of inviting the United States to participate in this investigating commission was also discussed and that the majority of the members of the Committee favored that course.

GILBERT

KLP

HPD

0215

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lynn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 23, 1931

Rec'd 10:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



file
 E.G.C.

File
 793.94/1840

634, September 23, 3 p. m.

Following from American Consul at Nanking:

"September 23, 5 p. m. Tyau of the Foreign Office has just called and confidentially inquired whether I have any intimation regarding the probable attitude of the Department of State with reference to requested enforcement of the Kellogg Pact. I told him I had no intimation and could venture no prophecy. For my information he handed me text of telegram just received from Yung Kwai:

"Pursuant to instructions formal appeal to American Government for application of Kellogg Pact to Japanese military occupation is made today. American Government is surprised and grieved at turn of affairs. While giving matter careful attention State Department is waiting more definite information before making decision as to course of action. More detailed information as to late developments of situation is desired."

KLP
 WSB


JOHNSON

FILED
 SEP 25 1931

0216

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Long NARS, Date June 4, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



REP

FROM

Geneva

Dated September 22, 1931

Rec'd 23rd, 9:25 a. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

125, September 22, 8 p. m.

Consulate's No. 124, September 22, 7 p. m.

The afternoon session of the Council was delayed one hour later than anticipated due to difficulty in arriving at previous agreement concerning the terms of the resolution quoted in the Consulate's No. 123, September 22, 6 p. m.

The Japanese delegate spoke first giving assurance of the purpose of Japan to remain faithful to the terms of its international engagements under the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact. He reiterated briefly the statements which he had made in the morning concerning the tense situation leading up to the conflict.

The Chinese

FILED
OCT 12 1931

793.94/1341

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #125, Geneva, Sept. 22, 1931,
 Rec'd 23rd, 9:25 a. m.

The Chinese delegate followed with a statement emphasizing China's peaceable intentions and referred to further telegrams which he had received from his Government indicating that the situation was becoming worse and worse every hour and that acts of a revolting character were being perpetrated by Japanese troops. He urged the Council to send a commission of inquiry to the spot at the earliest moment and insisted that the element of time was essential in a situation of this character especially in view of the information he had received to the effect that the extent of the occupation of Chinese territory had not diminished but was being extended.

The President of the Council then requested authorization to take the steps indicated in the Consulate's No. 123, September 22, 6 p. m. The delegates of Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Great Britain, Panama, and Norway then spoke expressing approval of the action suggested by the President but stressed the fact that it constitutes only a preliminary step which must be followed up by other measures

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

3- #125, from Geneva, Sept.22,1931,
 Rec'd 23rd, 9:25 a. m.

measures intended to achieve a final settlement. There is no difference of emphasis on the responsibility of the Council and the necessity of safeguarding its authority.

The Chinese delegate accepted this procedure as a provisional measure although it did not get as far as he desired and expressed the hope and expectation that this would be followed by such other acts of the Council as the circumstances demanded. He urged that the next meeting of the Council to consider further measures should take place as soon as possible and suggested an examination of the whole situation "Under the auspices of and the control of the League of Nations".

The Japanese delegate assented to the resolution and stated that with respect to the next meeting of the Council to consider this matter he could not indicate more fully than he had already done the attitude and policy of his Government until after he had received instructions from the latter.

GILBERT

KLP
 WSB

0219

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 23, 1931

Rec'd 9:10 AM

Secretary of State,

Washington.

630, September 23, noon.

Legation's 618, September 22, 8 a. m.

Consul General Hanson telegraphs from Harbin:

"September 21, noon. Railway officials now inform me three last cars of the train derailed due to accident and not explosives".

JOHNSON

RR

WSB

DIVISION OF
EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 23 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
No Copy
E.E.
E.C.

793.94/1842

OCT 12 1931

FILED


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0220

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Chambers & Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



September 22, 1931.

Conversation:

Mr. Henry, Counselor of the French Embassy;
 Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: The Manchurian situation.

Mr. Henry called without appointment. Before the conversation began Mr. Hornbeck said that he could not engage in a conversation at the moment but would be glad to see Mr. Henry later in the day. Mr. Henry said that that would be satisfactory, but he would like to ask one question at the moment: The French Foreign Office had reported to the Embassy that the French newspapers carried despatches to the effect that the American Government has stated that it does not feel that the Kellogg Pact applies to the situation in Manchuria; the Embassy and the Foreign Office sought information as to the truth of these reports.

Mr. Hornbeck replied that no announcement or statement had been made, so far as he was aware, indicating this Government's view as to the applicability of the Kellogg Pact; and he said that the Embassy might inform the French Government that this Government was studying the situation but had made no such pronouncements.

SKH:EJL

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 OCT 1 1931

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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FXE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 23, 1931

Rec'd 10 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 23 1931
Department of State

file
egc

633, September 23

Reuter reports from Nanking twenty-second:

"Japanese women and children are evacuating Nanking tomorrow, Wednesday, at eleven A. M. Japanese Consul has requested that due protection be afforded them when embarking.

General Chiang Kai Shek, addressing mass meeting of Kuomintang today, declared in course of his speech: 'For the moment we await judgment of the world and we must suppress our indignation and remain calm but if League of Nations and signatories of Kellogg Pact fail to uphold justice the National Government is prepared for a final and supreme struggle. I shall lead the army to fight for preservation of our race and to uphold dignity of our people. I shall go to the front and if need be fall with other patriots'.

JOHNSON

HPD
KLP

790.94/1344

FILED

OCT 12 1931

0222

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lynn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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FIE

rh

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

22 1931

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated Sept. 23, 1931

FROM

Received 10.50 am

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

639, September 23

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 23 1931
Department of State

file
Eg. 1

Reuter report from Mukden, 22nd, "Major Usuda,

Intelligence Officer of the Kwangtung Army, states that
strength of Japanese Army in Manchuria is now ten thousand
including the Kwangtung division and five battalions of
the Chosen division.

He said that troops were probably being sent to
Taonan to protect Japanese residents there."

JOHNSON

KLP:WSB

793.94/1345

OCT 12 1931

FILED

293.94

0226

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/1346

SEE 893.00/11594 FOR Tel.#593-5 pm.

FROM China (Johnson) DATED Sept.17,1931.
--TO-- NAME 1-1172 ***

REGARDING: Report that National Government suspected Japan of
aiding the Canton opposition government by sale
of arms and munitions: Quotes KUO WEN report
dated Nanking, Sept.15, in regard to -, and
stating that an officer of Japanese Legation
in Peiping, called on the Acting Minister of
Military Affairs, and denied this report.
(Copy attached).

fpg

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 17, 1931

Rec'd 10:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

593, September 17, 5 p. m.

Kuo Wen report from Nanking fifteenth:

"An officer of Japanese Legation in Peiping, who is stationed here, called on General Chen Yi, Acting Minister of Military Affairs, and made an important statement on behalf of War Department in Tokyo.

Officer said that judging from utterances of prominent Chinese leaders in recent weeks the National Government suspected Japan of aiding the Canton opposition government with arms and munitions. This suspicion is unfounded as Japanese Government has never supplied single rifle or round of cartridges to Canton."

JOHNSON

KLP

WSB

0225

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clayton S. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY


FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 23, 1931

Rec'd 10:20 a. m.

793.94
793.101
Secretary of State,
Washington.



file
S.G.C.

632, September 23, 2 p. m.

Following unsigned but apparently from American Consul at Mukden:

"September 22, 9 a. m. Civil government in Mukden in process of organization along the following lines: 'Mayor will be a Japanese; the principal municipal departments will be under the joint control of Japanese and Chinese chiefs; all subordinate positions will be filled by Chinese. Dosh-ihara, formerly in Kuangtung army, is to be Mayor of Mukden. Difficulty is being experienced in securing Chinese willing to participate. It is planned to have similar municipal governments in Antung, Naochwang, Changchun, Ssipingkai, and Kirin.

Occupation of Kirin City by Japanese was completed yesterday and the Chientao area is being similiarly occupied.

Japanese

793.94/1847

OCT 12 1931

FILED

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #632, from Peiping, Sept. 23, 1931,
10:20 a. m.

Japanese do not intend to send troops to Taonan and the
Hsingan area, at least for the time being.

As all Chinese soldiers have moved out, the
maintenance of order at Huangkatun, the present terminus of
the Peiping-Mukden railway, will probably necessitate
Japanese occupation today or tomorrow.

Regular Japanese troops in occupation of Manchuria
now number approximately 16,000, not including military
police, ^{train}guards and civilian reserves under arms."

JOHNSON

WSB:HPD

0227

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh
 This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated Sept. 23, 1931

FROM

Received 11.45 am

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

VERY URGENT September 23, 1 pm

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY

I delivered the message in your 119, September 23, 1 pm to Drummond.

He says morning reports still more serious and that rumors indicate occupation has been extended to the great wall. The urgent desire for American cooperation is increasing and members of the Council have been insistent that we be urged to cooperate actively in the deliberations. In the most tentative way Drummond conveyed the wish that you could be consulted as to what measure of cooperation might be possible. There are in his opinion two steps that we might consider adopting.

One. That an American should be invited to sit on the Council which he considers the boldest and probably the most effective step that could be taken for its effect on Japanese public opinion.

Two.

WE
 2/2/31
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 24 1931
 Department of State
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793.94/1843

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 4, 1976

rh #2 of Sept. 23, 11.45 from Geneva

Two. That the Council should definitely appoint the small committee, (Germany, Italy, Great Britain, France with Spain presiding) as a regular "Council committee", and ask the United States to appoint a representative.

The first step is, of course, subject to an invitation by the Council. and Drummond was of the opinion that a suggestion of American participation would be gratefully and eagerly accepted, except perhaps Japan, whose representative, however, would not dare to protest in public.

As to the second step, there is a precedent in the case of the Liberian Committee and Drummond thought that you might find it easier, though the first course suggested would be naturally more effective.

If you can adopt the bolder course relief and gratitude will be general on the continent, not the least in France, but of course I realize that the feasibility of such a step will have to be judged by the state of public opinion at home.

In regard to possible Japanese resistance to our participation, a suggestion of American participation in Council's deliberations might serve to strengthen the resistance of Shidehara to military influence.

WILSON

WSB

0229

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Long NARS, Date June 1, 1976

793.94
 note
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RH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

GENEVA

Dated Sept. 22, 1931

Received 12.10 pm Sept 23

FROM

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

124, September 22, 7 pm

Consulate's number 120, September 22, 4 pm

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 23 1931
 Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 SEP 26 1931
 DIVISION OF
 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

File
 1298

F/m

793.94/1849

The proceedings in the Council this morning with the exception of Lord Cecil's statement at the close, referred to in the Consulate's telegram under reference, were entirely confined to a series of statements on the part of the Chinese and the Japanese delegates on the Council. The Chinese delegate spoke first. The substance of these is as follows:

China. Sze read two telegrams which he had just received from Nanking. These telegrams outlined factual developments in the conflict area, giving towns occupied, etc. He then stated that the total area which had been occupied by the Japanese troops was as extensive as that of Great Britain and Ireland. He said that these messages gave a very gloomy picture but he was afraid that even so it was incomplete, as

the Japanese

FILED
 SEP 21 1931

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh #2, of No. 124 from Geneva

the Japanese had cut communication between that area and Nanking, and that he believed the situation to be more grave than at the time he despatched his note to the Secretary General (Consulate's 118, September 21, 5 pm).

His position was that it had become a question whether application of other articles than article eleven of Paris Covenant might not be required, although this might be prevented by prompt and effective action on the part of Japan. He then brought forward again the steps which he had requested the Council to take in his note to the Secretary General: (one), to prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations, (two), to reestablish the status quo ante, (three), to determine the reparations due to China.

Japan reported Yoshizawa expressed his intention of replying to the Chinese delegate's statement as soon as he had received instructions from his Government. In the meantime he wished to offer a few observations in an attempt to clear up the position and to determine the scope of the problem. He stated that in order to understand the situation, it was

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh #3 of No. 124 from Geneva

it was necessary to consider the nature of region where the incident occurred, and proceeded to lay stress upon the enormous Japanese interests there and rights guaranteed by treaties. He called attention to the great disproportion between the small garrison of soldiers maintained there by Japan and the very large Chinese army in that region. He declined to accept the Chinese affirmation that the incident took place without provocation on the part of Chinese troops and added that, according to official information in his possession, the incident was caused by the destruction by Chinese troops of part of the railway near Mukden, which necessitated the taking up of arms by the small Japanese garrison there. From this it became necessary to occupy important points in certain towns in order to prevent further incidents and to protect the railway and the life and property of Japanese nationals resident in the district. He then stated that this incident was not an isolated event but was rather an explosion due to a tension which had been created by a number of earlier occurrences such as the murder of Captain Nakamura by Chinese soldiers.

Referring to the

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh # 4, of No. 124 from Geneva

Referring to the Chinese demand for reparations, he considered it unjust to make any such claim until the Council had finished discussing the merits of the case. He contended that the settlement of the question of the reestablishment of the status quo ante could not be properly settled except on the spot and by taking into consideration the various factors in each locality.

He assured the Council that the incident was a local one and that immediately after its occurrence the Japanese Government had sent a formal order to the commander of the Japanese forces in Mukden to take the necessary steps to prevent an extension of the troubles. He added that his Government was far from the idea of making war on the Chinese Republic.

He asserted that, according to latest reports he had received, a proposal had been made by the Chinese that a solution should be sought by direct negotiations between the two governments. He implied that this proposal was welcomed by his Government and added that in his judgment premature intervention would only have the result of needlessly exciting Japanese public opinion and thus impede the pacific settlement of the situation. He expressed the conviction that a pacific

settlement

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh # 5, of No. 124 from Geneva

settlement could best be achieved by direct negotiations between the two Governments. Finally, in view of the fact that he had not yet received instructions, he requested the Council to postpone the matter until its next meeting.

China. Sze replied by noting that Yoshizawa's views were personal inasmuch as he had admitted that he had not yet received instructions from his Government. With respect to the accuracy of his own statements regarding the cause of the incidents as questioned by the representative of Japan, he declared that China was quite willing to submit to an inquiry to be carried out by a commission appointed by the League and to leave the entire matter in the hands of an impartial commission. In respect of the case of alleged murder of Nakamura and other cases as being brought forward by Japan as the causes leading to the present incident, he declared they were quite irrelevant, as there are diplomatic and juridical means provided for the settlement of such questions. As to the contention of the Japanese that their recent measures were defensive, he stated that that was not an excuse which could be accepted by the Council, as on previous occasions the Council had clearly specified that no nation could use defensive measures as excuses in such case and that this view had been indorsed by the representative of Japan

who was

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh #6, of No. 124 from Geneva
 who was on the Council at the time. In this he referred to
 the minutes of the thirty-sixth extraordinary session of the
 Council in October, 1925, pages 1699-1709.

With reference to the statement by the Japanese delegate
 that the Chinese had proposed direct negotiations, he denied
 this by implication declaring that China would not enter into
 diplomatic negotiations when a large portion of her territory
 was under military occupation by another country and further,
 when that very country had already resorted to means other
 than diplomatic measures. With reference to the Japanese
 delegate's question whether this matter was within the
 competence of the Council, he declared that he did not ~~think~~ *think*
 that there was the least doubt on that score, inasmuch as
 cases of a far less serious nature had previously been taken
 up, examined and adjusted by the Council.

Japan. Yoshizawa, referring to Sze's contention that he
 was not acting under instructions from his Government and the
 information which he furnished was his own, clarified this
 point by saying that he meant only that he had not received
 instructions from Tokyo as to the policy he was to follow but
 that the information he had submitted came from his
 Government. With reference to Sze's statement that

communications

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Long NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh #7 of No. 124, from Geneva

communications had been cut off from Manchuria, had asserted that the first news regarding the incidents in question had come from Peiping and that he inferred that the telegram from Peiping was based upon information transmitted from Manchuria. Later telegrams appearing day after day in the press he believed to have been supplied by Chinese reporters Manchuria. Thus, although he did not assert that communications in Manchuria were intact, he thought it incorrect to say that information from Manchuria was meager. He also, with reference to Sze's statement that the Japanese position was that the consideration of the question did not come within the competence of the Council, stated that what he had meant was that the incident was one which might be settled by means of direct negotiations between the two Governments. He added that he had reason to believe that the Chinese Government was also inclined to settle the question in that manner, inasmuch as he had received official information from his government that a high official of the National Government at Nanking had spoken to the Japanese Minister to that effect. He added that according to the latest telegrams received, his Government was ready to accept this proposal though he had not yet been informed whether the answer had yet been communicated to the Government of China in that sense. He declared to the Council,

however,

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh # 8, of No. 124, from Geneva.

however, that his Government ~~was~~ ready to accept this suggestion.

China. Sze, referring to statements which the Japanese representative had said were made by a Chinese official looking to Direct negotiations would point out that at the present moment no direct negotiations were in progress. He implied that if such statements were made on the part of a Chinese official, they were unfounded. He repeated that speaking for his Government the case was left to the Council.

Japan. The Japanese delegate contented himself by saying that the Chinese official to whom he referred as making suggestions to the Japanese Minister looking to direct negotiations, was one holding one of the most important portfolios in the Chinese Government and that after mature consideration the Japanese Government is inclined to express its agreement with the suggestions made by this very responsible official.

GILBERT

(#) ~~emission~~

OSB

0237

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clayton S. Lyon NARS, Date June 4, 1976

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O.N.I. AND M.I. *egc.*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

rh

GRAY

PEIPING VIA NR

FROM

Dated Sept. 23, 1931


Received 1.15 pm

793 94
note
SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

635, September 23, 4 pm

From Consul General at Harbin:



September 22, noon. Late last evening unknown person threw bombs into Japanese Consulate, Japanese military mission building, Chosen bank and Japanese newspaper office; but little damage was done. Chinese civil officials very much ~~disgusted~~ and have appealed to the British Consul General and myself for advice. Chinese police so far have the situation in hand.

Two. Reports concerning Kirin City conflicting, but it appears to be intention of the Japanese troops moving toward City to occupy same if they have not already done so.

761.93
Three. Soviet troops are no doubt gathering at frontier points especially near Manchuria Station, but no evidence that they have moved into Chinese territory."

Also September 22, 4 pm.

One. Local Chinese

793.94/1850

Oct 12 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh # 2 of No. 635 from Peiping

"One. Local Chinese troops, some of whom have deserted, have been transferred from barracks to outskirts of Harbin, some to the Heilun Zkiang Province side of Sungari River. This is in preparation for withdrawal in case Japanese troops come to Harbin.

Two. Chinese Officials at a meeting this morning decided to take stronger police measures to maintain order in the city.

761.93 Three. These officials and a portion of Chinese community becoming bitter against Soviet citizens and Soviet Government as they suspect an agreement between the latter and Japanese Government whereby Japan will receive Changchun-Harbin branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway and Soviet Government receive financial aid from Japan and compensation in North Manchuria. This may in part be true.

Four. CONFIDENTIAL. Russian eye witness states he saw young Chinese throw bomb into Japanese Consulate last night.

Five. A meeting of the interested consular service will be held this evening to discuss local situation."

JOHNSON

KLP:WEB

0235

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Thomas S. Ryan NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 23 1931
 Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 SEP 23 1931
 DIVISION OF
 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

ATDE MEMOIRE

The Chinese Government have appealed to

the League under Article 11 of the Covenant to intervene in the Mukden affair and the Council were to discuss the question on the morning of the 23rd of September.

His Majesty's Government and the French Government agree in favouring a proposal for the simultaneous withdrawal of troops and the despatch of the British and French Military Attachés from Tokio to Mukden, whither the Military Attachés from Peking have already proceeded. The Military Attachés would act as neutral observers on the spot to verify withdrawal, so that each side might have assurances that the other side were carrying out their part. The proposal for the withdrawal of troops and the despatch of neutral observers would have the object of preparing the ground for direct negotiations; if these failed or proved difficult, either side might then invoke outside intervention.

His Majesty's Government desire to inform the United States Government of the action they are taking and they would be glad to learn whether or not the latter contemplate urging moderation on both sides.

September 22nd, 1931.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D. C.

FILED

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

Geneva

Dated September 23, 1931

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SEP 23 1931

Department of State

Filed 2:25 p.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

131, September 23, 2p. m.

Consulate's 125, September 22, 8 p. m.

Telegrams referred to in statement of Chinese Dele-

gate before the Council yesterday afternoon have now been
 communicated together with additional messages received
 this morning. These telegrams declare Japanese are
 extending operations in Manchuria and give some details
 regarding casualties and extent of occupation. The situa-
 tion in Harbin is declared to be tense as Chinese soldiers
 are concentrating (?) after having evacuated other points
 in pursuance of Chang Hsu Liang's orders to avoid clash
 with Japanese. The text of a statement issued by Chiang
 Kai Shek declaring that China has asked League to obtain
 as a first step the immediate withdrawal of the invaders
 and to help in finding a peaceful solution of this con-
 flict, was included. He added that the National Army
 had received strictest orders to avoid clashes with
 Japanese.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 SEP 23 1931
 DIVISION OF
 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Tel to Geneva
 free E.S.

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793.94/1852

FILED

SEP 23 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #131, from Geneva, Sept. 23, 1931,
2:25 p. m.

Japanese.

The Chinese Government informs the Council that it is not conducting any direct negotiations with Japan since the case has already been laid before the League.

The telegrams received by Chinese delegates this morning report that relief authorities in China have refused foodstuffs and medicine offered by Japan for flood sufferers.

Does the Department wish the text of the Chinese telegrams referred to and those referred to and those referred to in Consulate's 124, September 22, 7 p. m? They comprise approximately 2500 words and will be probably followed by others.

Another Council meeting will be held at 6:45 this evening to consider the situation again.

GILBERT

HPD

CSB

0242

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

Washington,

September 24, 1931.

SEP 25 31

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

59 Your 131, September 23, 2 p.m., penultimate paragraph.

Please transmit texts of Chinese telegrams by mail.

Strinson
M

700.94/1852

sep. 25, 1931.

MW

FE:MFP:REK

M.F.P.

FE

9-25-31
W.E.
M

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

0243

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh

GREEN

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
 Dated Sept. 23, 1931
 Received 2.45 pm
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 23 1931

793.94
 SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

132, September 23, 3 pm
 Consulate's 129, September 23, 1 am

The following press telegram was handed me this morning
 by a French official who stated that it was being given some
 credence at the Quai d' Orsay. While there is no way here
 of checking this statement, the text of the telegram is
 possibly of interest.

761.93
 "According to a telegram from Riga the Soviet Vice
 Commissary for Foreign Affairs Karakhan has informed the
 Ambassadors of China and Japan that the Government of the
 Soviets could not remain indifferent to the conflict which
 is bringing into hostile action the armies of their respective
 countries. Consequently it has decided to send the Commissary
 for War, Vorochiloff immediately towards the frontiers
 nearest to the engagements.

It is believed, moreover, that the Soviet troops of the
 extreme Orient have received considerable reinforcements."

The French

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 SEP 24 1931

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FILED

SEP 12 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh #2 of No. 132 from Geneva

The French official expressed French apprehension of
arrangements between Russia and Japan for the partition of
Manchuria.

GILBERT

KLP:WSB

0245

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

September 23, 1931.
 11:20 a.m.

MEMORANDUM OF TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN
 SECRETARY STIMSON, NORMAN DAVIS AND HUGH WILSON. *at Stimson's*

793.94
file
all
 SECRETARY: Is this Mr. Davis?

not 500.5412
 DAVIS: Yes, Mr. Secretary. I have put in a call for the President. I called on the Chairman of the Council and talked with him. I prepared a cable to the President, promising to call him. I did finish my work on the Financial Committee Monday and he asked me to stay here yesterday and today on this Chinese-Japanese situation. I know a lot of these men and I want to speak to them about that.

SECRETARY: Tell me what the nature. I have not the slightest objection to your telling me what you find there.

DAVIS: I never in my entire life have seen a situation which I think is so loaded with dynamite and where there is such great opportunity to do something perfectly wonderful. These men here in the Council are trying to battle with the situation. The reports are most alarming. Japan has gone down to the wall and here they look upon it as a conflict between Shidehara and the military clique in Japan.

SECRETARY: I understand that.

DAVIS: I understand you have all the details of this thing. Massigli, who is representing France on the Council came to me and he said there is only one way that I can see to stop Japan now to help overcome the military clique and that would be for the United States to take a very dramatic step here and to come and sit on the Council of the League and help compose this thing. I have talked to Hugh Wilson and they all feel that it would really solve the situation. Here is what I want to do. In disarmament one of the difficulties is how to get a formula on trading with the aggressor which would satisfy us and satisfy the other people. This has been very difficult. In getting a

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Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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formula in the future, some sort of machinery is going to be necessary and I cannot imagine in a crisis of this kind where the Kellogg-Briand Pact has been violated and particularly where the Nine Power Treaty in China is involved (? a better opportunity than) for us to accept an invitation to work with a committee and sit at the Council. Of course, they are talking about your going on a committee. I think it would be the most dramatic thing. I think it would save disarmament and if you do not do it there is no use of holding the disarmament conference, in my judgment. I could not resist the temptation of doing anything I could to be helpful in any possible way.

SECRETARY: I appreciate the seriousness of the situation and I am now in conference on the telegrams coming in this morning, trying to work out the situation, but as you say it seems to be an issue between the peaceful civil elements of the government and the military, and one of the things that is to be avoided is the excitement of national feeling behind the military elements in Japan. We are trying to work out a way by which we can show our cooperation and sympathy with what the League is trying to do and yet not obscure*

DAVIS: It is a very old thing. It seems to me that it is an opportunity to solve this.

SECRETARY: I know something about this committee of investigation. They have suggested a committee of investigation. I think they have followed a false analogy there. I suggested two years ago a committee of investigation but of a different type. I think to try to impose a committee of investigation consisting of military officers upon Japan in the way that the telegram suggested would excite -

DAVIS: I think the United States should throw the weight

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Thomas E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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of its influence by joining the Council in proposing this investigation. That's what they all speak of. I talked to Grandi and last night. They say that Great Britain and France feel that the only way to combat it is to get the Japanese to agree to it.

SECRETARY: I was very much afraid of the kind of proposition they are submitting for an investigating committee by the outside nations to investigate Japan. What has become of that proposal?

DAVIS: It was a committee appointed by the Council that the United States would join.

SECRETARY: I think that would be a mistake. Two years ago I, in the case of China and Russia, suggested an investigating committee of neutrals appointed by the two parties involved. That is an entirely different situation. That avoids the danger of exciting resentment on the part of the two parties involved or either of them. I think this one is a mistake in the form that they have taken and I think it would do more harm than good. I think it would arouse all the national spirit of Japan behind their military people who have gone off on this expedition.

DAVIS: Hugh Wilson has just come in.

SECRETARY: I have been trying to get him all the morning.

DAVIS: I am doing a little irregular thing here. I started this by really putting in a call for the President.

SECRETARY: I have been at work on this here already under the treaties in which my country is a party and I am doing the best I can, but it is a ticklish situation on which I want all the light I can get.

DAVIS: I knew you were working with it and would understand the spirit under which I am calling.

SECRETARY: I have been in conference with my people here in the Department all morning to determine how to show our

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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sympathy with what the League is doing and carry on ourselves.

WILSON: Hello, Mr. Secretary. There are some further developments. The small committee of the big powers is meeting. (1) They have requested Drummond to notify me that they have determined to send a committee of investigation to Manchuria. (2) They have determined to send diplomatic notes to Japan and China.

SECRETARY: Are those notes to follow the form which the Council adopted last year?

WILSON: They have not determined the form yet. (3) They want to know whether you will name a representative to sit on the small committee.

SECRETARY: It sounds to me as if they have acted first and then ask us to sit and accept the responsibility for what they have already done.

WILSON: The only thing they will announce this afternoon is the committee of investigation.

SECRETARY: That is the one thing I am most disturbed about because I think they have gone off wrong on the character of the committee and the source of its powers. Two years ago in the China-Russia trouble I suggested a committee of investigation but I very carefully modeled it upon the forms of the committee which we were using in the treaties of conciliation all over the world, and that was a committee to be selected by the two powers involved in the controversy. It was not a committee from the outside imposed upon those two powers. The present committee, in my opinion, I am afraid will be resented by Japan as an attempt by the outside nations to impose an investigation from without and will ally all of the nationalistic elements in Japan against Shidehara in favor of the military elements which

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Zygon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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have done this. I think they have gone at it in the wrong way. For instance, they may be following the precedent set in the Greek-Bulgarian case, but that was an entirely different situation. In that case it was the determination of a geographical fact and they could send military officers on the subject to virtually draw a line. Here on the contrary it is a judicial ascertainment of a lot of political causes and I do not think either the method or the choice of the committee or the character of the personnel they suggest is appropriate and I think it would give Japan a very good reason for opposing it.

WILSON: I understand perfectly.

SECRETARY: Under those circumstances I do not think I could dream of authorizing a member to sit on that committee where we would be faced with a fait accompli in which we have had no voice or suggestion. It is contrary to the way in which I have been going at it here.

WILSON: The Council is meeting at 6:45. It is now 20 minutes to 6:00 o'clock. Can I tell your views to Drummond before that meeting.

SECRETARY: Yes, you can do that.

CASTLE: I think you ought to put up your idea very strongly to Drummond immediately on the chance that they might be willing to change the type of the committee.

SECRETARY: I am willing that you put up what I say very strongly and confidentially to Drummond so that he can put it before the committee. I have been at work all the morning here trying to work out a way by which we can assist you without running into your errors. I think they are making some mistakes that I do not want to run into.

WILSON: If it would seem to accord with your line of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 6 -

thought, they will probably call of the Council meeting this afternoon.

SECRETARY: What I was thinking of, subject to the approval of the President with whom I have not yet talked, was to send a cable to the effect that we were in accord with what you have done in the note that you sent me a copy of. That is the one addressed to both China and Japan yesterday, asking them to stop hostilities and as far as possible restore the status quo. This question of investigation in oriental matters is a very delicate one. People in the Orient like to work those things out by negotiation between the two parties and one of the things I noticed two years ago is being repeated here. The action by the outside powers has driven China and Japan together. The papers this morning report that Japan is now ready to negotiate with China. That will follow almost always when outside powers take a hand in the Orient, and you must bear that in mind and you do not want to commit yourselves so tight to a method of remedy to which they do not agree. You may end up by making the situation worse than it is now.

WILSON: I think that is sound.

SECRETARY: I am trying to back you up and yet I run into that mistake. Norman Davis asked me whether we could not have an American sit on the Council. That would have the same objection to which their offer to sit on the committee has. The Council has already acted. We would go into something in which we had no voice in the original statement and furthermore it would run into all of the other objections which exist in America about formal official action on the League. My idea is to cooperate in some wider action having its origin in some treaty provision with which we are associated, such as the

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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Kellogg Pact or the Nine Power Pact. In other words, it seems to me that probably the best thing I can do is to express sympathy and approval with their efforts in a form that can be used publicly, and to reserve my technical cooperation to pull them out of trouble if they got into trouble.

WILSON: I am going to see Drummond now. If he asks me to explain this to his colleagues is it all right to do so.

SECRETARY: I think you had better do it privately to Drummond. I do not think you had better speak before the committee. Your appearance there would be misinterpreted.

WILSON: But it is a private meeting.

CASTLE: Even from a private meeting it would leak.

SECRETARY: You better talk to the Secretary General or the leaders privately. I do not think we can accept service on that particular committee, nor can we accept service on the Council, but I am trying to think of a way, if the emergency arises, we can possibly accept on a broader basis. The thing most important, because I think it is a clear mistake, is the character of the investigation that that committee is apparently determined to make. I think that is going to make trouble. I do not want that to get to Japan but you can use it with Drummond.

WILSON: Would you like me to call you back tonight after I talk with Drummond and after the Council meeting.

SECRETARY: Yes. Let them understand you have talked with me about my views on which I have not yet talked to the President.

WILSON: I will call you within about three hours probably.

S HHR

0252

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Syme NARS, Date June 1, 1976

September 23, 1931.
 4:00 p.m.

793 94

File
ARL

MEMORANDUM OF TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
 BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND HUGH WILSON. *at Geneva.*

WILSON: Hello - Mr. Secretary. I told Drummond of my conversation with you. As a result, the public session of the Council this afternoon was called off and a private session was held. In that session it came to light that no Japanese reply has been received to the telegram sent yesterday regarding the investigation committee.

SECRETARY: Have they telegraphed to Japan about an investigation committee?

WILSON: A telegram was sent to Japan yesterday suggesting an investigation committee. The Japanese Delegate said that the Japanese Government will refuse all responsibility for this. Lord Cecil then suggested another form of commission - the Japanese to appoint two neutral members, the Chinese to appoint two neutral members, and the Council to appoint three neutral members. The Japanese Delegate will send a telegram suggesting this to his government.

SECRETARY: Is the Japanese Delegate in favor of it?

WILSON: He did not express any opinion concerning it. Drummond adds that the Council very earnestly hopes for our participation in the work of the special committee. A resolution along the following lines will be presented to the Council at tomorrow's session. The members of the special committee will have authority to seek the collaboration that may be helpful in their deliberation. Drummond says that the special committee will be glad to invite the United States in any form that may be agreeable to us. If you would like to have the invitation based on our interest as signatories either of the Nine Power Treaty

793.94/1853 3/4

Confidential file

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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or the Kellogg Pact or on the basis of general world interest it would be all right. The only other thing I have to add is this. The latest reports here from a Chinese source are that Japanese forces have gone south of the Great Wall.

I have made no press statement of any kind.

SECRETARY: In the first place, Japan I do not believe will ever accept any investigating committee.

WILSON: Do you think they may accept in the form of Cecil's suggestion?

SECRETARY: No, I do not. I think that is chimerical. I do not think that is open to question and I do not believe in imposing a committee from the outside on Japan for I think that would play right into the hands of the enemies of peace. I have sent you a telegram today. It is on the wires now and I want to give you the sense of it. In it I am sending an answer to the action of the Council yesterday in their resolution about a note to China and Japan, in which I say I am in hearty sympathy with their action and that we will send a similar note, not an identical note, but a similar note to both parties urging a cessation of the hostilities and a withdrawal from the dangerous position in which they are. The rest of my telegram explains my attitude on the rest of the matters about which you have asked me. In general, my feeling is that the surest road to peace is by diplomatic methods in which we will try to back up any action taken by the League in such matters, to urge a settlement by the Chinese and Japanese themselves through direct negotiation between them. The first road to peace is to urge them to settle it by direct negotiation between China and Japan. In doing that, we will urge

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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that method and cooperate with the League if they are urging it. Then if that method is not effective and if outside action becomes necessary why I think that in view of the fact that the League has the appropriate machinery under Article 11 and that it has already been invoked by China, the League ought to go ahead and that we will lend it all moral support that we can. We cannot participate, of course, in League action but we will make clear that it has our moral support. Then, and only in case that should prove ineffective for any reason, we would come to the other two treaties -- the Nine Power Treaty or the Kellogg Pact. In other words, if the action of outside parties is necessary, I think it should be done by the League which is in session and acting now and it has our earnest sympathy and support. But I have made clear in this telegram the reasons for my fear for this outside committee of investigation. That is a word to the wise. I know something about the attitude of mind of those peoples. I have lived among them, and I believe (I want this thoroughly understood) that the Japanese Government, the civilian government, probably - of course we are all embarrassed by lack of evidence - is sincerely trying to settle this matter. I believe they ought to have a chance to do so and I believe that outside action by a lot of attachés or a commission appointed by anybody else would make trouble. I think that ought to be a last resort. Of course if any one of the parties should prove intractable to settlement, then under the machinery of the League the League will have to go its own way in opposition to that party, but as long as there is any chance of the parties settling the matter between themselves I think outside interference will make it more difficult.

WILSON: You understood about the Cecil resolution?

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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SECRETARY: Yes. But they would prefer negotiation. That is the method of Oriental people. They are not accustomed to judicial inquiry and I would not use that until you were sure you were going to get their opposition anyhow.

WILSON: As long as they are in the state of mind where they will negotiate you want to give them all the opportunities possible and if that fails then the League can go ahead with its own machinery and you will give it moral support.

SECRETARY: Precisely. But I think they should be given every opportunity to do it by direct settlement first. That is for your knowledge. I am making public here the note which I am sending in answer to the President of the Council. I am giving it out this afternoon here, because the President's resolution has already been made public. The cable has gone to you already.

WILSON: Thank you very much.

SECRETARY: That is the situation. I am really afraid of the resolution of inquiry. I wish they would kill it for the present and not mention it.

WILSON: May be the Japanese will kill it themselves.

SECRETARY: I think they will, but it will make them feel badly to kill it. You can use your own discretion about telling confidentially the way I feel about this, but I do not want it made public because I think it is subject to misrepresentation. That is the best of my thought on the situation and I think that is the best way out of a very difficult position. Of course, do not have any misunderstanding; if either party proves recalcitrant and takes a position which is clearly in violation of the covenant of either of the two treaties to which America is a party we shall not flinch in our duty. But I very much hope that they will not do that.

WILSON: Thank you very much. That is clear.

S HHR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence A. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

RUSH.

129, September 23, 1 a. m.


STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Certain aspect of the Sino-Japanese question as it is seen in Geneva may be of assistance to the Department in understanding the situation here.

One. It is very apparent that the Japanese representative here is in a most difficult position and I have it on the best authority that what information he has received from his government on the present situation is meager and almost evasive.

Two. Sugimura informed me that for Japan he saw in this present situation a fight to the death between the civil and military authorities in Japan and that the apparent plight of the Japanese representative here is only a reflection of what is taking place in Tokio.

Three. I understand that the Japanese representative is pleading with his colleagues on the Council for more time, alleging as a reason that the repercussions of the present



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 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #129, from Geneva, Sept. 23, 1931,
 2:30 p. m.

the present situation present internal dangers Japan unless the civil authorities be given a reasonable period to prepare public opinion.

Four. The Council is at present taking into consideration two things, a reply from Japan on her "policy" and a reply from Japan respecting the proposed military commission of investigation.

Five. The Chinese representative has stated privately that China did not desire to invoke the Kellogg Pact because for technical reasons China did not wish by inference to admit the existence of a "state of war" which the provisions of the Kellogg Pact is understood to envisage.

Six. It has been commented on that Russia has at no time been mentioned in the discussion. It is rumored, however, that Russia has an understanding with Japan based upon the hostility of Russia to the present Chinese Government.

Seven. Lord Cecil, the British delegate, took the initiative in the Council proceedings and largely dominated the action.

Eight. "Constant appeals" are being made to me in the strongest and most serious terms on the part of representatives

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

3- from Geneva, Sept. 23, 1931
2:30 p. m.


representatives of the world powers here that their
governments are looking for action by the United States
as the chief hope in a situation whose gravity they
feel cannot be overstated.

GILBERT

CSB

0259

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Zygmunt NARS, Date June 1, 1976



DEPARTMENT OF STATE


SEP 25 1931 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DIVISION OF

COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

September 24, 1931.

MANCHURIAN SITUATION
In Regard to Question of
Kellogg Pact.



U:

S:

Paragraph five of this telegram is of importance.

It states: (Geneva 129 Sept. 23, 1 a.m.)

"The Chinese representative (at Geneva)

has stated privately that China did not desire to invoke the Kellogg Pact because for technical reasons China did not wish by inference to admit the existence of a 'state of war' which the provisions of the Kellogg Pact is understood to envisage."

Comment: It is believed that it is easy to understand the reluctance of China to establish or admit, whether by inference or otherwise, the existence of a "state of war". If the existence of a "state of war" is affirmed or admitted, it would follow that negotiations, if and when conducted, between China and Japan alone would be posited on the assumption that there had been war and the settlement must be based on the situation existing at the moment of termination or suspension of hostilities. The terms of peace then would be dictated by whichever power was in the stronger position and on the basis of that position.

SKH/ZMF

793.94/1854

FILED
 SEP 24 1931

SKH

0261

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

JS
 The portion of **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**
 in confidential code must be GENEVA
 closely paraphrased before
 being communicated to anyone. Dated September 23, 1931

FROM Rec'd 10:13 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

133, September 23, 8 p.m. 1185-20

Consulate's 131 September 23, 2 p.m.

At the very last moment the decision was taken to hold in private the Council meeting this evening. The following is the text of a letter addressed this afternoon by the Japanese representative on the Council to the Secretary General in explanation and defense of the Japanese position. He requested that this letter be communicated to the President and members of the Council and drew attention to the fact that the entire information covering the period from September 18 to 21 was derived from official sources.

On the night of September 18th, about 10:30 p.m., a Chinese detachment of some 350 men blew up part of the main line of the South Manchurian Railway North of Mukden at a point southwest of the Chinese barracks at Peitaying. This detachment led by its officers was proceeding in the direction of Lung-Kouchen, between Peitaying and Mukden, when it was discovered by a railway guard patrol which endeavored to stop it but failing, was obliged to open fire. A battle ensued in which a company of the Japanese garrison of Mukden took

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 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 24 1931
 Department of State
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 SEP 26 1931
 DIVISION OF
 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 1185-20
 F.P.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-2- from Geneva #135, sept 23.

took part.

In view of the gravity of the possible consequences of such an incident in present circumstances and the disproportion between the Chinese and Japanese forces, the Japanese headquarters at Mukden promptly took such steps as it considered indispensable. At 2:30 a.m. it had the Chinese barracks occupied and the troops who were stationed (#) disarmed; subsequently the open town, the official buildings and the arsenal were occupied.

Immediately upon receiving notice of the incident the troops stationed at Tiehling, Kaiyuang, Tsuwingkai and Liao Yang concentrated at Mukden; and the Kwangtung staff proceeded in haste to that town at noon on September 19th.

On receiving news of the clash the guards stationed along the South Manchurian Railway took the precautions to protect the track and the safety of Japanese Nationals and to deal with any possible attack by the large Chinese forces in Mukden.

At Changchun a Japanese was sent on September 19 to the Chinese troops stationed in the neighborhood of the town at Kwangchiongto and Nanking, to arrange for their disarmament, but the Chinese offered strong resistance to the Japanese troops who had 60 killed

and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-3 - from Geneva #133, Sept 23.

and 96 wounded. The garrison of Changchun however was disarmed without incident about noon on the same day.

On the 20th similar measures were taken at Antung, Fenghuang, Chong and Yingkow; various strategic points in the neighborhood of the railway zone were occupied. The customs offices at Antung, Yingkow, etc., were carefully respected.

In the places mentioned, order is being maintained in cooperation with the Chinese, and at Mukden the Chinese municipal police are continuing to discharge their duties under the direction of the Japanese authorities.

In places outside the railway zone the Japanese consuls have applied to the local authorities to provide for the protection of our nationals. As however Japanese subjects have suffered serious maltreatment at Korin the Japanese detachment has proceeded to that town but has to return to its garrison in a day or two as soon as calm has been restored.

We have been able so far to ensure the complete safety of foreigners resident in the area under Japanese control. In view, however, of the disquieting situation caused by the presence of undisciplined hands and the attitude of the population in looser areas,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lynn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-4- from Geneva #133 Sept 23.

areas, the small forces at our disposal have not been thought sufficient to provide effective protection for the railway lines and for Japanese and foreign residents and the Thirty Ninth Army Corps (4,000 men) was sent to Manchuria from Korea on September 21st. (End Green)

I have been confidentially informed that the members of the League not represented on the Council -are planning to pass a resolution probably at the next plenary session of the Assembly indorsing the action taken by the Council. This plan is intended as a gesture to support the Council and to emphasize that the present is of world^{wide} concern.

GILBERT

#-omission

FW

0264

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM


A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone.

Peiping

Dated September 24, 1931

Rec'd 8:10 a. m.

743.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.



file
S.G.C.

648, September 24, 4 p. m.

Following from Mukden:

"September 23, 3 p. m. A reliable report has been
heard that Japanese troops will occupy Hsinmin and that
Peiping-Mukden Railway authorities have been ordered to
move southward all extra locomotives at Huangkutun.

September 23, 4 p. m."

(GRAY). Hsinmin mentioned in telegram is first
large station west of Mukden.

JOHNSON

RR
WSB:

793.94/1856

0265

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By *Thomas R. Lynch* NARS, Date *June 1, 1976*

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

AE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 24, 1931

Rec'd 6:38 a. m.

*793.94
note*

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 24 1931
 Department of State

*file
89.C.*

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

640, September 24, 8 a. m.

Reuter report from Nanking twenty third:

"Government spokesman here characterizes as groundless reports from Tokyo that China had proposed a joint Sino-Japanese commission to investigate the Manchurian affair and Mr. Yoshizawa's similar allegation at Geneva.

This afternoon Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang telegraphed to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek denying reports of Soviet troop movements on the border but adding that Soviet Consul at Harbin had made representations to Japanese Consul there that Japanese military movements were hindering operation of Chinese Eastern Railway.

News of League's action regarding Manchuria was very welcome here and had calming effect where anti-Japanese feeling was threatening to get out of hand. Mass meeting here this

F/

793.94/1807

893.94

OCT 12 1931

FILED

v

0266

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Thomas S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #640, from Peiping, Sept. 24, 1931,
6:38 a. m.

here this morning of one hundred thousand people demanded
that Government should immediately mobilize.

Japanese community here was evacuated to Shanghai
this morning".

JOHNSON

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/1858

SEE 761.93/1413 FOR 761.7638-6pm
 FROM China (Johnson) DATED Sep.23,1931
 TO NAME 1-1127 o.p.o.

REGARDING: Conflict between Japan and China.
 Information furnished by Japanese Military Attache that Soviet-
 Siberian army is mobilizing near Manchouli.

tfv

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 23, 1931

Rec'd 9:05 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

638, September 23, 6 p. m.

Japanese Military Attache informs our Assistant
Military Attache that Soviet-Siberian army is mobilizing near
Manchouli. Please inform War and Navy.

JOHNSON

RR

KLP

761.93/1413

0269

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
 DANIEL AND M. L. D. K. E
 GRAY

Peiping via N. R. E

FROM

Dated September 24, 1931

Rec'd 6:35 a. m. AE

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 24 1931
 Department of State

DIVISION OF
 EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 SEP 26 1931
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

647, September 24, 3 p. m.

Following from Consul General Nanking

CONFIDENTIAL.

September 23, noon. My September 22, 5 p. m.

One. Dr. Tan, Acting Counselor and Secretary to
 the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has just called and given
 me an analysis of the situation which confronts the Chinese
 leaders. He told me he was not sent by the Minister but
 my opinion is he did not come without suggestion from the
 Minister. Tan says that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 has received report from its delegate in Moscow confirming
 the reports that the Soviet Government has issued official
 a statement that it can no longer remain a disinterested
 spectator of the serious situation developing in Manchuria.
 Chinese national leaders feel that through the League of
 Nations or the Kellogg Pact or friendly mediation by other
 powers

793.94
 note
 761.93

F 793.94/1859

FILED

SEP 28 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter

August 10, 1972

By Charles S. LymanNARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #647, from Peiping, Sept. 24, 1931
6:35 a. m.

powers there is a possibility of reaching a peaceable solution of the dispute with Japan. If, however, Soviet Russia becomes an active factor in the situation they feel that the ordinary methods of peaceable adjustment would have little hope of success, since the present Soviet mentality and methods are in a class by themselves. Soviet is rumored might take one of several forms. If the Soviet Government intervened on the side of Japan China would be faced with two adversaries in place of one. If the intervention is on behalf of China and against Japan the results would probably be even more dangerous. The Chinese public is already somewhat disheartened at the apparent reluctance of the League, and of the United States as a sponsor of the Kellogg Pact, to mediate promptly and if the Soviet Government were to issue

(END PARTS ONE AND TWO).

JOHNSON

KLP

WSB

0271

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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
FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 24, 1931

Secretary of State,
Washington.



PRIORITY.

647, September 24, 3 p. m. (SECTIONS THREE AND FOUR).

a communique warmly supporting the side of international justice and of China Chinese leaders anticipate that the present highly inflamed student movement may look to the Soviet Government as the outstanding friend of China and defender of international justice. The Chinese Government however much it might suspect the motive of the Soviet Government could hardly find a plausible pretext for rejecting Soviet assistance. In any case the subversive Communist elements in China would be powerfully strengthened.

Two. Semi-official news telegrams from Geneva are to the effect that a plan is under consideration by some member nations of the League to send a commission to Manchuria to adjudicate the dispute but that this plan is largely dependent upon willingness of the United States to participate.

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #647, from Peiping, Sept. 24, 1931,
 P. M.

to participate. For these and other reasons Chinese leaders are very anxious to know whether China may expect to derive any assistance from the Kellogg Pact or the League of Nations. I am reliably informed that public statements have been made by officers of the Chinese Government advocating recourse to war, even though it may be hopeless, if it becomes evident that the League and the signers of the Kellogg Pact will take no cognizance of China's case against Japan". End message.

JOHNSON

WSB

0273

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.


GENEVA

Dated September 24, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 11:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.




VERY URGENT.

159, September 24, 1 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

/1831

Your 123, September 23, 4 p. m.



793.94/1360

The message to the President of the Council caused great satisfaction.

I have talked to Drummond about your ideas. He particularly desires me to make clear to you that the contemplated commission proposed by Cecil in last night's secret Council Meeting which I mentioned to you last night by telephone (Japanese to name two neutrals, China to name two neutrals, the Council to name three) is intended only to be a fact finding body. Such contradictory reports as to the numbers of Japanese troops and their present location have been received that the Council feels it essential to know the actual facts in this connection. The Commission would receive most narrow terms of reference.

Drummond

7-25-31-44

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By William S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #159, from Geneva, Sept. 24, 1931,
1 p. m.

Drummond inquires whether in the event that Japan should accept this proposal you would agree to the nomination of an American member of the commission.

NEW YORK TIMES correspondent obtained somewhere fairly accurate summary regarding my discussion with Drummond last night. I cautioned Drummond this morning that such publicity might injure the confidential relations/you and him which are now so desirable in this crisis. Drummond will emphasize in small committee the necessity for preserving the confidential nature of any informal communication I may make to him representing your views.

WILSON

HPD
WSB

0275

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 19761-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

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1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

September 24, 1931.

WILSON,

BERGUES, GENEVA.

Rush - double - priority

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 159, September 24. /1860

The day's news tends to confirm our impression that the Japanese Government is honestly seeking to extricate itself from an impossible position and that it should not be pressed in that process. My chief fear of the suggestion of an investigating committee has been that it would play into the hands of the military element and obstruct the civil elements of the Japanese Government. These dangers seem to me to outweigh any good that its appointment would do in the immediate present although it may be useful later on. The original suggestion of a committee imposed entirely by outside nations seemed to me clearly impossible and dangerous. The present proposal is better. Personally, I think the least objectionable form to the Japanese and Chinese would be a commission entirely appointed by themselves. I should prefer not to decide whether we would permit American membership until some proposal had

793.94/1860

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1918 1-138

0276

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

• Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

been actually accepted by both China and Japan. Otherwise
 I fear the League will use American membership as a
 threat to Japan, which instead of producing the results
 the League anticipates would, in my opinion, do just the
 reverse and in addition would destroy our future usefulness
 as mediator in case the League fails. Tell Drummond
 confidentially that we think it best not to decide the
 question of American membership until Japan and China
 have agreed to the proposal.

Stimson
 STIMSON.

Wk

✓
 CR
hym
 Sep 21 1931 pm

S HLS:HHR

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1924 1-138

0277

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED DATE

REP

add 9/25/31
 58 SEP 20 1931
 FROM DIVISION OF *File*
 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Minn.

September 24, 1931

Rec'd 11:50 a. m.

Hon. Henry L. Stimson,
 Secretary of State,
 Washington.

I heartily congratulate you on steps you are taking to prevent war between China and Japan. I believe it is the duty of every country party to Paris Pact as well as Four Power Pacific Treaty to make representations to both countries. It would have great influence if other leading nations parties to Paris Pact and the other treaty would join you in such movement. I am sure your representations in ease of threatened conflict between Russia and China were very effective.

FRANK B. KELLOGG

CSB

FILED

SEP 28 1931

790.94/1861

0278

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

September 25, 1931

The Honorable

Frank B. Kellogg,

St. Paul, Minnesota.

I was greatly appreciative of your kind telegram of
congratulations regarding the measures I have adopted in
connection with the Manchurian crisis. The steps I am
now taking grow logically out of our traditional policy
of amicable settlement of international disputes of
which you ~~have so effectively~~ ^{so effectively} furthered.

Thank you again for your kind message.

Henry L. Stimson

CR
Sep. 25, 1931

1252010

793.94/1861

WE:SR
Enciphered by

Sent by operator

Index Bu.-No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

0275

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

RECEIVED
 CHINESE AND IN. *egc* *T/C*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 24, 1931

Rec'd 1:25 p. m.

793.94

Secretary of State
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 24 1931
 Department of State

file
egc

F/S

793.94/1862

651, September 24.

Reuter reports from Washington, 23rd:

"Colonel Stimson Secretary of State has communicated to Geneva assurances of America's support of attitude of League of Nations towards Sino-Japanese trouble in Manchuria.

Colonel Stimson in a note said that he had already urged cessation of hostilities and withdrawal from present danger point and would continue earnest to work for the restoration of peace.

He is dispatching similar notes to Japan and China".

JOHNSON

WSB

OCT 12 1931

FILED

0281

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

RECEIVED
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 292

11
 F/E

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 24, 1931

Rec'd 1:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 24 1931
 Department of State

file
 292

F/w
 795.94/1865

642, September 24, 10 a. m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"September 23, 2 p. m. Japanese reinforcements from Korea went through Mukden yesterday afternoon for Changchun where the chief concentration of reinforcements troops is taking place. A traveler reports seeing Japanese police at the first Chinese Eastern Railway station north of Changchun. It is believed that Japanese forces are preparing to move on Harbin. According to a report, reliable, Cheng-chiatun, Tungliao and Taonan have been occupied by Japanese forces. Japanese aircraft flew over Hsinmin and Taipingshan yesterday and it is reported dropped bombs on barracks at latter place. Also reliably informed that only one body of troops from Korea has been sent to Chientao region. On the Mukden-Kirin Railway only Japanese military trains are operating".

RECEIVED
 SEP 24 1931
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JOHNSON

KLP
 HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP



GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 24, 1931

Rec'd 1:35 p. m.



to Peiping

FILED
793.94/1864

Secretary of State,
Washington.

SEP 26 1931

643, September 24, 11 a. m.

Re 29.C.

In view of local rumors could Department repeat by telegraph to this Legation, for its confidential information, any information bearing on attitude of Soviet Russia toward recent Japanese occupation of Manchuria?

JOHNSON

RPF

CSB

OCT 12 1931

FILED

0282

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒ PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

September 26, 1931.

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

Your 643, September 24, 11 p. m.

NEW YORK TIMES carries a report, dated September 25, from Duranty, its correspondent in Moscow, that, according to his information QUOTE The Japanese will not interfere with or infringe the rights of the Chinese Eastern Railway, in which the Soviet Union has a half share... It is also said to be unlikely that they will occupy Harbin, although it is possible that the Japanese guards in the Japanese section of the city will be reinforced. Should circumstances make more extensive Japanese action in Harbin necessary, no interference with the Chinese Eastern would take place UNQUOTE.

Duranty also adds QUOTE Past years have shown since the signing of the Sino-Soviet convention in regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1924 that the Chinese militarists who have hitherto ruled Manchuria have been unsatisfactory neighbors from a Soviet point of view. This country has friendlier relations with Japan and has something to gain, both economically and politically, from order and stability in Manchuria under whatever flag. UNQUOTE.

FE:MFP:REK

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

19

Sep. 26, 1931. PM

Index Btt.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

0283

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 4, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
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1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

This cable was sent in Plain Code.
 It should be carefully reviewed before
 being communicated to agents.

Washington,

September 26, 1931.

4P

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

347
Your 643, September 24, 11 a.m.~~FOR YOUR STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.~~

stop use only. Use great discretion.

One. On September 22, the American Embassy in London was informed by the Japanese Ambassador that he had no information regarding the massing of Soviet troops, but that he was somewhat disquieted by press reports to that effect. On September 24, Lord Reading expressed the opinion to the American Ambassador that the Soviet Government probably regarded the situation as a local one since the Japanese forces, even with reinforcements, had a smaller number of troops than allowed by treaty. If continued activity, even by the smaller number, indicated to the Soviets that it was in pursuance of a plan of conquest, unquestionably the Soviets would be concerned. He regarded as unfounded the idea that there might be a secret understanding between the Soviets and the Japanese as to a joint occupation and division of Manchuria.

Two. On September 23, the American Consul at Geneva was handed a press telegram by a French official which

Enciphered by

stated

Sent by operator M., 19.....

700.64/1064

0284

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles D. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

- 2 -

stated that, according to a report from Riga, Karakhan had informed the Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors that the Soviet Government had decided to send the Commissary for War to the frontiers since it could not remain indifferent to a conflict which was bringing the armies of their respective countries into hostilities. The telegram also indicated that considerable reinforcements had been sent to the Soviet troops in the Far East. The French official stated that the French Foreign Office was giving some credence to this telegram and that there was apprehension lest there might be a mutual understanding for the division of Manchuria between Japan and Russia.

Three. Repeat to Tokyo.

Rogers, Acting,

SEP 26 31

SEP 26 1931.P.M.

SEP 26 31

793.94/1864

FE:MFP:REK

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1972 1-138

0285

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated

FROM

LONDON

Dated September 24, 1931

Rec'd: 12:35 p. m.

793
 EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 SEP 28 1931
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

to anyone
 Secretary of State,
 Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 29 1931
 DIVISION OF
 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 SEP 24 1931
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

385, September 24, 4 p. m.

Called on Lord Reading to get information for you on the Manchurian situation. Reading said that at telephonic suggestion of Cecil from Geneva he had cabled the Japanese Government a message supplementing that already sent by the League of Nations and that Germany, France and Italy, had done the same. He gives it as his own impression based upon official advices that situation is less disquieting and the disturbance at least is being kept local. He qualified this with the statement that the news he received was somewhat conflicting and could not be a basis for too firm opinions. As to the Soviet position he considered that they regarded the situation as a local one, which was natural inasmuch as Japan, even with the last four thousand reenforcement of its army, still has a less number

EE

WE

EE

793.94/1365

file E.G.C.

1365

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #385, from London, Sept. 24, 1931,
 4 p. m.

less number of troops in Manchuria than allowed by treaty. He stated further however that in his judgment if continued activities by even this smaller army, accompanied as they are by a reported movement to a strategic point of Japanese ships said by the Japanese to be merely coincidental, indicated to the Soviets that it was in pursuance of a plan of conquest, unquestionably the Soviets would be concerned. It had been intimated to him that possibly there might be a secret understanding between the Soviets and the Japanese as to a joint occupation and division of Manchuria, but he regarded the idea as unfounded. If the despatch published in the press this morning relative to the withdrawal Japanese troops and the reported attitude of Japan is correct, he is not especially apprehensive of the situation.

DAWES

WSB
 HPD

(#) Apparent omission.

0287

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

rh

GRAY

FROM PEIPING VIA NR

Dated Sept. 24, 1931

Rec'd. 1.40 pm

743.24
SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

644, September 24, noon

Following from American Consul General at Canton:


743.24
513.00
"September 23, 3 pm. Calm attitude has been adopted by
officially inspired CANTON GAZETTE and DAILY SUN regarding
Manchurian situation. Sun Fo holds Chiang's diplomatic
ineptitude responsible for crisis. According to the vernacular
press Canton regime has sent circular telegrams demanding
Chiang's resignation to Provincial Government and young
Marshal, official to dissolve local schismatic government
simultaneously and suggesting peace conference to compose
internal (#) as a means of meeting Manchurian crisis.

Foreign observers here believe troop readjustments veil
abandonment of northern government. Tension in East River
district easier as attack from Kiangsi and Fukien does not
appear to be developing. Canton quiet but political situation
remains obscure."

JOHNSON

(#) apparent omission

CSB:HPD



file
E.C.

NDM.T.C.

793.94/1866

OCT 12 1931

FILED

0288

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Szymanski NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Sept. 25

SKH

M
While the attached telegram is not entirely clear in all respects, its general purport appears satisfactory. I do not think any reply is called for at present.

MFP.

Garcia.

SKH

Attach this
to the yellow.

SKH

0285

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Thomas S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPIES
 11.2.1.1
 80C
 M
 FE

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 24, 1931

Rec'd 1:55 p. m.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 24 1931
 Department of State

FROM

file
 egc.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

645, September 24, 1 p. m.

My 609, September 20, 11 a. m.

Colonel Taylor of United States army forces in
 Tientsin called on me yesterday and stated that it was
 agreed in Tientsin that the present crisis should there
 be a general attack on foreign the whole plan for the
 defense of the foreign residential areas in Tientsin
 would be put into effect. Colonel Taylor stated that he
 and the American Consul General understood and had so
 informed the others that in such an event the American
 force at Tientsin would not (repeat not) be under the
 command of the Japanese; that the American force was
 prepared to cooperate with the British, French and other
 nationals having defense forces, it being understood also
 that the Japanese would be responsible for their own
 interests. Colonel Taylor asked me whether I considered
 his attitude

793.94/1867

FILED

OCT 15 1931

223.0146

9

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #645, from Peiping, Sept. 24, 1931,
 1 p. m.

his attitude in this matter correct and also whether I thought he should take the initiative in informing the Japanese commandant that the American force would not (repeat not) be responsible for the safety of Japanese mills in Chinese territory but within the sector assigned for American occupation in case of a general attack if those mills were to be attacked by Chinese on the ground that they were Japanese. I told Colonel Taylor that I approved of his attitude but that I did not think it was necessary for him to take the initiative in informing the Japanese of the attitude of the American defense forces. My reason for this latter opinion was that there is no present reason for making such a statement to the Japanese and it might merely result in giving the Japanese an excuse for stating that it was necessary for them to occupy the Chinese territory in question American forces having indicated their inability to protect Japanese nationals. I told Colonel Taylor that our preoccupation should be to keep from being involved in either side in this affair. Colonel Taylor asked me what attitude he should take should the Japanese military see fit to take control of all the areas included in the ex-Russian, French and Austrian

0291

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

3- #645, from Peiping, Sept. 24, 1931,
1 p. m.

and Austrian concessions, including Chinese territory, part of which areas, namely, the ex-German concession, was within the territory assigned to his command in the scheme for the defense of the foreign residential areas in Tientsin against general Chinese attack. I told Colonel Taylor that in such an event it was my opinion that American troops should be kept within barracks, that he should keep in touch with the American Consul General and the Legation for the purpose of maintaining contact with any Japanese authorities that might be available for the purpose of assuring ours that during such occupation American lives and property were not endangered.

JOHNSON

KLP

WSB

0292

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

SECRETARY OF STATE
 SEP 24 1931
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 SEP 24 1931
 DIVISION OF

CONFIDENTIAL
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY

September 22, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR,
 MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1931, AT 3:30.

Japanese Army in Manchuria.

I opened the conversation with the Japanese Ambassador by referring to our last talk on September 17th when we had both expressed our feeling that the relations of our two countries were in such a satisfactory condition. I said I had been profoundly surprised and concerned by what was taking place in Manchuria and that I had sent Dr. Hornbeck to see the Ambassador on Saturday and now as the matter had developed I wished to see him myself. He said yes, that he had seen Dr. Hornbeck and he had told him of how surprised he (the Ambassador) had been and how concerned he was and how impossible it was for him to understand the causes of what had taken place.

I explained that as he well knew, I had the utmost confidence in Baron Shidehara and his desire for peace and correct international relations. I told him that I had learned from Dr. Hornbeck's report of what Debuchi had said Sunday - that there was a sharp cleavage between Shidehara and some of the militaristic elements of his government. He said that that was so. I said that what I was now doing was seeking to strengthen Baron Shidehara's

hand

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 25 1931
 Department of State

793.94/1863

61100

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

hand and not to weaken it. The Ambassador said he understood that perfectly. I then took the memorandum which had been prepared (a copy of which is annexed) and read it very slowly to the Ambassador, paraphrasing the language into more simple words wherever it seemed at all necessary in order that he should fully understand it. He repeated many of the sentences, showing that he did understand. When I had finished I said that this was not to be taken as a formal note or an official action on the part of my government, but as the memorandum of a verbal statement given to the Ambassador for the purpose of enabling him to understand and report to his government how I, with my background of friendship towards Japan, felt towards this situation. I said that the Ambassador was at liberty to send it to Shidehara or not, as he saw fit. He said he understood perfectly and that the memorandum did not represent an official note but that if the situation was not remedied he understood that it might be followed by official action on our part later. *He said he would communicate its contents to his government that evening.*

I then told him that there was one thing however that I would like to ask of him and that was that he postpone his departure for Japan until this situation was in better shape. I told him I felt confidence in him from our long relations together and that it would be easier to handle the situation if he was here. He expressed himself as

very

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

very much touched by this and said that he was glad to be able to say that this morning he had, after having purchased his tickets and made all his plans, decided to postpone his departure and had told Madame Debuchi and his daughter to that effect, and had telegraphed out to the Japanese Consul in San Francisco to cancel the appointments he had made.

I spent quite a little time after reading the memorandum in pointing out what a serious impression it would make in this country if the situation of Manchuria is not restored to the status quo. He said he fully understood that and he had been surprised at the moderation of our American press thus far and attributed that to the care which I had taken in the press conferences. He begged me that if the time should ever come when I did wish to act officially in this matter I would first inform him. I said I would try to do so.

H.L.S.

[Copy of memorandum attached.]

S HLS:HHR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By William S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MEMORANDUM.

Without going into the background, either as to the immediate provocation or remote causes or motivation, it appears that there has developed within the past four days a situation in Manchuria which I find surprising and view with concern. Japanese military forces, with some opposition at some points by Chinese military forces, have occupied the principal strategic points in South Manchuria, including the principal administrative center, together with some at least of the public utilities. It appears that the highest Chinese authority ordered the Chinese military not to resist, and that, when news of the situation reached Tokyo, but after most of the acts of occupation had been consummated, the Japanese Government ordered cessation of military activities on the part of the Japanese forces. Nevertheless, it appears some military movements have been continuously and are even now in process. The actual situation is that an arm of the Japanese Government is in complete control of South Manchuria.

The League of Nations has given evidence of its concern. The Chinese Government has in various ways invoked action on the part of foreign governments, citing its reliance upon treaty obligations and inviting special reference to the Kellogg Pact.

This

790.94/1368

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

This situation is of concern, morally, legally and politically to a considerable number of nations. It is not exclusively a matter of concern to Japan and China. It brings into question at once the meaning of certain provisions of agreements, such as the Nine Powers Treaty of February 6, 1922, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

The American Government is confident that it has not been the intention of the Japanese Government to create or to be a party to the creation of a situation which brings the applicability of treaty provisions into consideration. The American Government does not wish to be hasty in formulating its conclusions or in taking a position. However, the American Government feels that a very unfortunate situation exists, which no doubt is embarrassing to the Japanese Government. It would seem that the responsibility for determining the course of events with regard to the liquidating of this situation rests largely upon Japan, for the simple reason that Japanese armed forces have seized and are exercising de facto control in South Manchuria.

It is alleged by the Chinese, and the allegation has the support of circumstantial evidence, that lines of communication outward from Manchuria have been cut or interfered with. If this is true, it is unfortunate.

It is the hope of the American Government that the orders which it understands have been given both by the Japanese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

Japanese and the Chinese Governments to their military forces to refrain from hostilities and further movements will be respected and that there will be no further application of force. It is also the hope of the American Government that the Japanese and the Chinese Governments will find it possible speedily to demonstrate to the world that neither has any intention to take advantage, in furtherance of its own peculiar interests, of the situation which has been brought about in connection with and in consequence of this use of force.

What has occurred has already shaken the confidence of the public with regard to the stability of conditions in Manchuria, and it is believed that the crystallizing of a situation suggesting the necessity for an indefinite continuance of military occupation would further undermine that confidence.

0298

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 22, 1931

Copy

For the Secretary:

For conversation with the
Japanese Ambassador.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Without going into the background, either as to the immediate provocation or remote causes or motivation, it appears that there has developed within the past four days a situation in Manchuria which I find surprising and view with concern. Japanese military forces, with some opposition at some points by Chinese military forces, have occupied the principal strategic points in South Manchuria, including the principal administrative center, together with some at least of the public utilities. It appears that the highest Chinese authority ordered the Chinese military not to resist, and that, when news of the situation reached Tokyo, but after most of the acts of occupation had been consummated, the Japanese Government ordered cessation of military activities on the part of the Japanese forces. Nevertheless, it appears some military movements have been continuously and are even now in process. The actual situation is that an arm of the Japanese Government is in complete control of South Manchuria.

The League of Nations has given evidence of its concern. The Chinese Government has in various ways invoked action on the part of foreign governments, citing its reliance upon treaty obligations and inviting special reference to the Kellogg Pact.

This

FW - 793.94/1868

793.94/

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

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The American Government is confident that it has not been the intention of the Japanese Government to create or to be a party to the creation of a situation which brings the applicability of treaty provisions into consideration. The American Government does not wish to be hasty in formulating its conclusions or in taking a position. However, the American Government feels that a very unfortunate situation exists, which no doubt is embarrassing to the Japanese Government. It would seem that the responsibility for determining the course of events with regard to the liquidating of this situation rests largely upon Japan, for the simple reason that Japanese armed forces have seized and are exercising de facto control in South Manchuria.

It is alleged by the Chinese, and the allegation has the support of circumstantial evidence, that lines of communication outward from Manchuria have been cut or interfered with. If this is true, it is unfortunate.

It is the hope of the American Government that the orders which it understands have been given both by the
Japanese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Long NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

Japanese and the Chinese Governments to their military forces to refrain from hostilities and further movements will be respected and that there will be no further application of force. It is also the hope of the American Government that the Japanese and the Chinese Governments will find it possible speedily to demonstrate to the world that neither has any intention to take advantage, in furtherance of its own peculiar interests, of the situation which has been brought about in connection with and in consequence of this use of force.

What has occurred has already shaken the confidence of the public with regard to the stability of conditions in Manchuria, and it is believed that the crystallizing of a situation suggesting the necessity for an indefinite continuance of military occupation would further undermine that confidence.

~~It is also believed that the repercussions in Chinese politics of this situation, particularly if they be continued, cannot but have an unfortunate effect in reference to the rights and interests of the various powers legitimately concerned.~~

0302

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER
 Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

September 26, 1931.

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN
Send by cable

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING⁸³⁵¹ (China).

343

CONFIDENTIAL.

Press despatches NEW YORK TIMES September 25 carry several paragraphs purporting to give substance of QUOTE remarks UNQUOTE made by Secretary of State to Japanese Ambassador.

The Secretary's statement to the Ambassador, on the afternoon of Tuesday, September 22, ¹⁸⁴⁸ consisted in part of impromptu remarks and in part of reading a prepared guidance memorandum, a copy of which was given to the Ambassador as an informal record, ^{with explanation that} the whole ^{was} to be considered not as a communication between governments but as an oral expression of views in the course of a friendly conversation. For your information, guidance and staff use, the text of the memorandum is as follows:

QUOTE Without going into the background, either as to the immediate provocation or remote causes or motivation, it appears that there has developed within the past four days a situation in Manchuria which I find surprising and view with concern. Japanese military forces, with some opposition at some points by Chinese military forces, have occupied

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

700.24/1568

Step

1848

0303

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

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The League of Nations has given evidence of its concern. The Chinese Government has in various ways invoked action on the part of foreign governments, citing its reliance upon treaty obligations and inviting special reference to the Kellogg Pact.

This situation is of concern, morally, legally and politically to a considerable number of nations. It is not exclusively a matter of concern to Japan and China. It brings into question at once the meaning of certain provisions of agreements, such as the Nine-Powers Treaty of February 6,

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0304

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER
 Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

- 3 -

1922, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

The American Government is confident that it has not been the intention of the Japanese Government to create or to be a party to the creation of a situation which brings the applicability of treaty provisions into consideration. The American Government does not wish to be hasty in formulating its conclusions or in taking a position. However, the American Government feels that a very unfortunate situation exists, which no doubt is embarrassing to the Japanese Government. It would seem that the responsibility for determining the course of events with regard to the liquidating of this situation rests largely upon Japan, for the simple reason that Japanese armed forces have seized and are exercising de facto control in South Manchuria.

It is alleged by the Chinese, and the allegation has the support of circumstantial evidence, that lines of communication outward from Manchuria have been cut or interfered with. If this is true, it is unfortunate.

It is the hope of the American Government that the orders which it understands have been given both by the

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

0305

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 or
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

- 4 -

Japanese and the Chinese Governments to their military forces to refrain from hostilities and further movements will be respected and that there will be no further application of force. It is also the hope of the American Government that the Japanese and the Chinese Governments will find it possible speedily to demonstrate to the world that neither has any intention to take advantage, in furtherance of its own peculiar interests, of the situation which has been brought about in connection with and in consequence of this use of force.

What has occurred has already shaken the confidence of the public with regard to the stability of conditions in Manchuria, and it is believed that the crystallizing of a situation suggesting the necessity for an indefinite continuance of military occupation would further undermine that confidence. UNQUOTE

Repeat to Tokyo and Nanking.

Authorized and
 instructed by Mr. Castle.
 FE:SKH/ZMF *WFP* *FE* *Relu*

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.,

19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

0306

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976



*Sent to
 Chinese Legation
 IX-24-31*

793.94

MEMORANDUM

The American Minister to China and the American Ambassador to Japan are being instructed this day to communicate to the Chinese and the Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs respectively identical notes, as follows:

"The Government and people of the United States have observed with regret and with great concern events of the past few days in Manchuria. In view of the sincere desire of the people of this country that principles and methods of peace shall prevail in international relations, and of the existence of treaties, to several of which the United States is a party, the provisions of which are intended to regulate the adjustment of controversies between nations without resort to use of force, the American Government feels warranted in expressing to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments its hope that they will cause their military

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793.94/1863 A

0307


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

forces to refrain from any further hostilities, will
so dispose respectively of their armed forces as to
satisfy the requirements of international law and inter-
national agreements, and will refrain from activities
which may prejudice the attainment by amicable methods
of an adjustment of their differences."

Department of State,

Washington. September 24, 1931.



FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

9/24/31

WREJ.

0308

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976



Sent to
Japanese Embassy
IX - 24 - 31

MEMORANDUM

The American Ambassador to Japan and the American Minister to China are being instructed this day to communicate to the Japanese and the Chinese Ministers for Foreign Affairs respectively identical notes, as follows:

"The Government and people of the United States have observed with regret and with great concern events of the past few days in Manchuria. In view of the sincere desire of the people of this country that principles and methods of peace shall prevail in international relations, and of the existence of treaties, to several of which the United States is a party, the provisions of which are intended to regulate the adjustment of controversies between nations without resort to use of force, the American Government feels warranted in expressing to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments its hope that they will cause their military forces to refrain from any further hostilities, will

793.94/1868 B

0309


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Thomas D. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

so dispose respectively of their armed forces as to satisfy
the requirements of international law and international
agreements, and will refrain from activities which may
prejudice the attainment by amicable methods of an adjust-
ment of their differences."

Department of State,

Washington, September 24 1951.



FE:SKH:REK
9/24/31

RSM
FE

WLG

0310

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

September 24, 1931.

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

340

Please communicate to the Minister of Foreign Affairs immediately as a note, the identical text of which will be communicated by the American Charge to Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, the following:

QUOTE The Government and people of the United States have observed with regret and with great concern events of the past few days in Manchuria. In view of the sincere desire of the people of this country that principles and methods of peace shall prevail in international relations, and of the existence of treaties, to several of which the United States is a party, the provisions of which are intended to regulate the adjustment of controversies between nations without resort to use of force, the American Government feels warranted in expressing to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments its hope that they will cause their military forces to refrain from any further hostilities, will so dispose respectively of their armed forces as to satisfy the requirements of international law and international agreements, and will refrain from activities

733.94/1868 C

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0311

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

which may prejudice the attainment by amicable methods
of an adjustment of their differences UNQUOTE.

Stinson
W4

SEP 24 31

FE:SKH/ZMF

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

REC'D

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-138

0312

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clayton S. Lynam NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

September 24, 1931.

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Gray

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

167

Please deliver as a note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs immediately, the identical text of which will be communicated by the American Minister to China to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, the following:

QUOTE The Government and people of the United States have observed with regret and with great concern events of the past few days in Manchuria. In view of the sincere desire of the people of this country that principles and methods of peace shall prevail in international relations, and of the existence of treaties, to several of which the United States is a party, the provisions of which are intended to regulate the adjustment of controversies between nations without resort to use of force, the American Government feels warranted in expressing to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments its hope that they will cause their military forces to refrain from any further hostilities, will so dispose respectively of their armed forces as to satisfy the requirements of international law and inter-

514
 793.94/1868 D

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

0313

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

- 2 -

national agreements, and will refrain from activities
which may prejudice the attainment by amicable methods
of an adjustment of their differences. UNQUOTE

Stinson
Wly

SEP 24 31

FE:SKH/ZMF

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Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 1-138

0314

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER
 Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

September 24, 1931.

WILSON

BERGUES

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

VERY URGENT. 126

Department's 123, September 23, 4 p.m. The following identic note has been telegraphed to the Embassy at Tokyo and to the Legation at Peiping for presentation to the Japanese and to the Chinese Governments respectively. The text has also been handed to the Japanese Ambassador and to the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in Washington.

QUOTE [Quote Text]

UNQUOTE

You may so inform the President of the Council.

793.94/1868 E

S. H. H. H.

SEP 24 31

FE:RSM:EJL

m.m.N.
 FE

S.K.H.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1925 1-138

0315

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence A. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MEMORANDUM

Text
 ✓
 The American Ambassador to Japan and the American Minister to China are being instructed this day to communicate to the Japanese and the Chinese Ministers for Foreign Affairs respectively identical notes, as follows:

"The Government and people of the United States have observed with regret and with great concern events of the past few days in Manchuria. In view of the sincere desire of the people of this country that principles and methods of peace shall prevail in international relations, and of the existence of treaties, to several of which the United States is a party, the provisions of which are intended to regulate the adjustment of controversies between nations without resort to use of force, the American Government feels warranted in expressing to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments its hope that they will cause their military forces to refrain from any further hostilities, will

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By William J. Lynn NARS, Date June 4, 1976

- 2 -

so dispose respectively of their armed forces as to satisfy
the requirements of international law and international
agreements, and will refrain from activities which may
prejudice the attainment by amicable methods of an adjust-
ment of their differences."

Department of State,

Washington,

FE: SKH: RJL FE

9/24/31

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles D. Lyman NARS, Date June 4, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

RECEIVED
 25 1931

FROM

GREEN

GENEVA

Dated September 24, 1931

Rec'd 9 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

VERY URGENT

161, September 24, 9 p.m.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 25 1931
 Department of State

Rec'd 9 p.m.

SEP 25

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 SEP 26 1931

Drummond has just handed me the answer of the President of the Council dated today in reply to your message contained in your 123, September 23, 4 p.m. The text was adopted at a full private meeting of the Council just terminated.

"My dear Mr. Wilson

On behalf of the President of the Council of the League of Nations I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th September enclosing a telegram addressed to (*) in regard to the appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. May I ask you transmit to the Secretary of State its appreciation of the friendly answer which he was good enough to make in regard to the situation which has unhappily arisen between two highly respected members of

FILED

OCT 12 1931

793.94/1869

0318

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence L. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

~~FE~~
 WE

rh

CORRECTED PAGE TWO 2-#161, from Geneva

of the family of nations, China and Japan. The Council is gratified to note that the Government of the United States is in whole-hearted sympathy with the attitude of the League of Nations as expressed in the Council resolution, and that it will despatch to Japan and China, in addition to previous communications, notes on lines similar to those followed by the Council.

The Council has no preconceived method for solving the difficulties which have arisen; no procedure or formula to which it is irrevocably attached other than its obligations to "take action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations."

To this end the Council will gladly continue to keep the United States Government informed of any action it may take or any information it may secure, and ventures to hope that that government will also be disposed to communicate with it. The Council feels confident that, irrespective of any individual effort which any government may deem it desirable to make, it is by the continuance of common endeavor that a successful result is most likely to be achieved. The efforts which are now being made here will

be

700.94/1009

1869

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Clarence S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

3- #161, from Geneva,
September 24, 1931

be continued by the Council in such form as circumstances
may require.

Believe me, my dear Mr. Wilson,

Yours very sincerely,

(signed) A. Lerroux, President of the Council of
the League of Nations.

WILSON

(*) omission

FW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter

August 10, 1972

By Charles S. Lyman

NARS, Date

June 1, 1976

MAM

2- #161, from Geneva,
September 24, 1931

of the family of nations, China and Japan. The Council is gratified to note that the Government of the United States is in whole-hearted sympathy with the attitude of the League of Nations as expressed in the Council resolution, and that it will despatch to Japan and China, in addition to previous communications, notes on lines similar to those followed by the Council.

The Council has no preconceived method for solving the difficulties which have arisen; no procedure or formula in the examination of irresponsibility there other than its obligations to "synoptical action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations".

To this end the Council will gladly continue to keep the United States Government informed of any action it may take or any information it may secure, and ventures to hope that that government will also be disposed to communicate with it. The Council feels confident that, irrespective of any individual effort which any government may deem it desirable to make, it is by the continuance of common endeavor that a successful result is most likely to be achieved. The efforts which are now being made here will be

0321

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

GREEN

GENEVA

FROM 794.C.

Dated September 24, 1931

Rec'd 4:47 p.m.

Secretary of State



Washington

138, September 24, 7 p.m.

Last paragraph Consulate's 133, September 23 p.m.

The following is the provisional translation obtained from the Secretariat of a communication made orally this morning before a plenary meeting of the Assembly by Leroux, President of the Council.

"As presidentia officer of the Council I desire to make a communication to the Assembly. The question of the difference between China and Japan is under consideration by the Council. Consultations with the representatives on the Council of China and Japan are taking place and we hope they will lead to a satisfactory conclusion. The Council hopes to be able to make a statement to the Assembly as soon as circumstances permit. Meanwhile, the Council has asked me to assure the Assembly that it is devoting to this question all the time and all the attention which is required in the interest of peace and the respect



755.04/1070

OCT 12 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 4, 1976

MAM

2- #138, from Geneva,
 September 24, 1931

respect that the Council owes to the two parties to the dispute."

Immediately afterwards Titulesco, the President of the Assembly, made a declaration of which the following is a provisional translation:

"I believe I can make a statement which for the present will enable us not to have a discussion. It is evident that as long as the dispute has not been brought before this Assembly, it is for the Council to discuss points of fact and endeavor to find the means for conciliation. However, in circumstances like these it is above all necessary that the League of Nations should be able to rely on the approval and help of public opinion in all countries. This approval and help will certainly be forthcoming if our action is in conformity with what is expected of us.

From this point of view it is not enough for the Council to sit permanently (as much as possible in public meetings) until the maintenance of peace is assured. The Assembly must also not finish its labors without having had an opportunity of showing the interest which
 all

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles S. Zgoni NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

3- #138, from Geneva,
September 24, 1931

all the members of our League feel for the success of an action so vital for our institution. We, therefore, hope that the Council will before the end of our session be good enough to make a new communication upon this affair so that the Assembly may express its opinion on the dispute".

I have learned on good authority above procedure was purposely adopted instead of passing a resolution as forecast in the Consulate's telegram referred to in order to avoid a discussion in the Assembly on the question at this juncture.

GILBERT

WSB

0324

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FE

WP

RECEIVED
 95 1931

Boston, Mass.

FROM September 24, 1931

Rec'd 11:00 p. m.
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 25 1931
 Department of State

ack'd by letter
 Re E.G.C.

793.94

The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

793.94/1871

The undersigned cordially endorse the statesmanship
 of your representations to China and Japan in regard to
 the Manchurian crisis, and of your wholehearted concurrence
 with the action of the available peace machinery at Geneva.
 We would respectfully urge that if opportunity offers ad
 hoc collaboration with the League of Nations be extended to
 include direct official consultation with the Council in
 its effort to uphold the principles of the Kellogg pact,
 and to prevent the Sino-Japanese crisis from jeopardizing
 the success of the proposed armament truce on which you
 are so wisely negotiating with the League already. (signed)

George H. Blakeslee,

President of the Board of Trustees World Peace
 Foundation Boston and Professor of International
 Relations Clark University Worcester Mass.

OCT 12 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 - from Boston

Harry A. Garfield President Williams College

Chairman Committee on Implementation of the
 Kellogg pact World Peace Foundation.

Raymond T. Rich Director World Peace Foundation
 40 Mount Vernon Street Boston.

Denys P. Myers Research Director World Peace
 Foundation.

George W. Anderson Judge of the United States
 Circuit Court of Appeals Boston.

Frank Aydelotte President of Swarthmore College
 Swarthmore Pa.

James P. Baxter, 3rd, Professor of History Harvard
 University.

Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt New Rochelle N.Y. Chair-
 man of the National Committee on the Cause and
 Cure of War.

John H. Clark, Cleveland Ohio former Associate
 Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Leonard W. Cronkhite, Jr., Boston Exporter and
 Importer, Trustee of World Peace Foundation.

Arthur N. Holcombe Chairman of the Department of
 Government Harvard University.

Manley O. Hudson Professor of International Law
 Harvard Law School.

0326

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Ligon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 - from Boston

Miss Ruth Morgan New York City Chairman of the
Department of International Cooperation to
Prevent War of the National League of Women
Voters.

Quincy Wright Professor of International Law
University of Chicago.

JS

0327

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

Boston, Massachusetts

September 25, 1931

Secretary of State

Washington

FROM
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 26 1931
 Department of State

Rec'd 8:52 p.m.

THE UNDER SECRETARY

SEP 28 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ack'd by letter

Messrs. Alanson B. Houghton, John W. Davis, Raymond

B. Fosdick, George A. Polympton, Roland W. Boyden and George

W. Wickersham have expressed today their desire to be associated with the fourteen signers of last evening's telegram which read as follows:

"The undersigned cordially endorse the statesmanship of your representations to China and Japan in regard to the Manchurian crisis and of your wholehearted concurrence with the action of the available peace machinery at Geneva. We would respectfully urge that if opportunity offers ad hoc collaboration with the League of Nations be extended to include direct official consultation with the Council in its effort to uphold the principles of the Kellogg Pact and to prevent the Sino-Japanese crisis from jeopardizing the success of the proposed armament truce on which you are so wisely negotiating with the League already".

RAYMOND T. RICH
 40 Mt. Vernon Street,
 Boston, Mass.

OX

AC

October 1, 1931

F.P. F.O. 793.94/1871

OCT 12 1931

FILED

0328

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Thomas E. Lynch NARS, Date June 1, 1976

October 3, 1931.

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/1871

Professor George H. Blakeslee,
President, Board of Trustees,
World Peace Foundation,
Boston, Massachusetts.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of the telegram dated
September 24, 1931, addressed to the Secretary of State
and signed by yourself and others who, like yourself, are
interested in the promotion of world peace.

Your cordial endorsement of the course which this
Department has followed in regard to the present
Manchurian situation is much appreciated and you are
assured that that situation is continuing to receive
this Department's solicitous consideration.

Please convey this acknowledgment to those associated
with you in sending the telegram under reference.

Very truly yours,


For the Secretary of State:

SKH
Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

FE:RSM:EJL

FE

9/28/31



0329

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

October 1 1931.

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/1871

Mr. Raymond T. Rich,
40 Mount Vernon Street,
Boston, Massachusetts.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your telegram dated September 25, 1931, addressed to the Secretary of State, in which you state that Messrs. Alanson B. Houghton, John W. Davis, Raymond B. Fosdick, George A. Polympton, Roland W. Boyden and George W. Wickersham have expressed their desire to be associated with the signers of the telegram sent to the Secretary on September 24 by Professor George H. Blakeslee and his associates.

These cordial endorsements of the course which this Department has followed in regard to the present Manchurian situation is much appreciated and you are assured that that situation is continuing to receive this Department's solicitous consideration.


Please convey this acknowledgment to those on whose behalf the telegram under reference was sent.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. H. CASTLE, JR.

Under Secretary



793.94/1871

Sep. 30 1931

FE 793.94/1871
SKH

0330

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

RECEIVED

25 1931

FROM

GRAY

Nanking

Dated September 25, 1931

Rec'd 3:30 a. m.

Tel. to Nanking

file
r.g.c.

DIVISION OF

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 25 1931

Secretary of State

Washington

68, September 25, 10 a. m.

A responsible official of the Chinese Foreign Office has inquired whether I have any confirmation of Associated Press despatch to the effect that the Secretary of State has told the Japanese Ambassador that, in the light of the information received by the State Department, serious responsibility must rest with Japan for the present developments in Manchuria. Please telegraph any details I may be authorized to communicate to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Legation informed.

PECK

RR
HPD

OCT 12 1931

FILED

790.04/1872

mm
FE

0331

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

September 25, 1931.

SEP 25 31

7P

793-94
AMERICAN CONSUL,

NANKING (China).

79 Your 68, September 25, 10 a.m.

What the Secretary said, on the afternoon of September '22, to the Japanese Ambassador in this connection was:

QUOTE It would seem that the responsibility for determining the course of events with regard to the liquidating of this situation rests largely upon Japan, for the simple reason that Japanese armed forces have seized and are exercising de facto control in South Manchuria UNQUOTE.

^{discreetly}
You may inform the inquirer by oral paraphrase.

Stinson
Wiley

Sep. 25. 1931.

793.94/1872

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/1872

0332

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976




AM RECD

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

London, September 11, 1931.



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WIE

SEP 24 31



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Eg.c.*

*793 af
note*

793.04/1573

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose, as of possible interest to the Department, the editorial comment of the London TIMES on the reported murder of Captain Nakamura of the Japanese General Staff, in Manchuria by Chinese soldiers. This editorial was apparently occasioned by a despatch to the TIMES from its Tokyo correspondent, who reported that an element within the Japanese Army is agitating for the adoption of positive measures for the protection of Japanese interests in Manchuria.

The TIMES appears to view this affair as merely the latest of a series of incidents in which foreigners in China have suffered at the hands of Chinese, and in which
the/

*FILED
OCT 13 1931*

0336

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-2-

the Nationalist Government has shown itself impotent, or unwilling, to afford foreigners adequate protection in the first instance or to bring the offenders to justice. "The Nakamura case", it concludes, "is a further warning of the necessity of caution in making concessions to Chinese national sentiment".

I venture to enclose another editorial from the TIMES, which takes advantage of the appearance in the current number of the ROUND TABLE analyzing Mr. Justice Feetham's report, to stress the unwisdom of withdrawing the protection which the Treaty Powers extend over their nationals in China until such time as the Nationalist Government shall be able to punish offenders and "until there is a reasonably adequate guarantee that individual liberty and the supremacy of the law will be respected".

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Ray Atherton

Ray Atherton
 Counselor of Embassy.

✓
 Enclosures:

"The Future of Shanghai", THE TIMES, September 1, 1931.
 "Japan and China", THE TIMES, September 9, 1931.

593.1025

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Clarence E. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

PAPER THE TIMES

NUMBER

CITY

LONDON

DATE Sept. 1, 1931.

THE FUTURE OF SHANGHAI

It is very much to be hoped that LORD READING, in spite of the many other calls upon him, will find time to relieve the anxiety which recent reports have created as to the future of Shanghai. The whole position and the dangers involved in it are set out in an article which appears in this month's number of the *Round Table* explaining the genesis of MR. JUSTICE FEETHAM'S inquiry and analysing his Report. That Report, the result of a laborious and unbiased investigation lasting over twelve months by an impartial and exceptionally well-qualified observer, was published in Shanghai in June last. By a strange coincidence just before its publication the negotiations between the British and Chinese Governments on the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, which had been proceeding in a leisurely fashion for over a year and which had reached a deadlock in May, were suddenly resumed and rushed to a conclusion. This was specially unfortunate, as the deadlock had occurred over the very question of Treaty Ports, on which the Report, in the all-important case of Shanghai, throws so much light. What was still more unfortunate was that, if current reports are to be believed, the proposed agreement is on a basis which, on very convincing grounds, MR. JUSTICE FEETHAM'S Report recommends should not be adopted and which, indeed, it is difficult to reconcile either with the principles laid down by the British Government when the negotiations were opened in 1929 or with MR. HENDERSON'S statement in the House of Commons on May 6, when the negotiations were suspended. Happily, contrary to earlier reports, it seems clear that any agreement which was reached in June between the negotiators was only tentative, for reference to the two Governments, so that there is yet time for HIS MAJESTY'S Ministers, before taking any irrevocable decision, to give the Report and the recommendations contained in it the full consideration they deserve. A wrong decision would not only be ruinous for Shanghai. It would—a point emphasized throughout the Report—be prejudicial to the whole future of China.

As the position stood in May, Great Britain was ready to agree to the abolition of extraterritoriality throughout the whole of China, with the exception of the four Treaty Ports of Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, and Canton. Furthermore the British Government suggested that they would be prepared, immediately on the conclusion of the treaty embodying this concession, to agree to the appointment of a Commission which would proceed to a study of the whole problem of the reserved areas with a view to finding a satisfactory solution. To that the Nanking Government refused to agree. They broke off negotiations and issued a unilateral mandate promulgating regulations under which they proposed to assume next year jurisdiction over all foreigners. This move was plainly intended by them partly to smooth their own path at the so-called People's Convention, which was about to be held under the auspices of the Kuomintang in Nanking, and partly to bring pressure upon the British Government. It seems to have succeeded even beyond expectation in both respects. According to what appear to be trustworthy accounts, in the tentative agreement reached in June it is proposed that even in the Treaty Ports, including Shanghai, extraterritorial jurisdiction should be abolished at the end of a short term of years. No one who has read the searching examination of the situation contained in the Feetham Report, or, for the matter of that, no one who has had any experience of conditions in China, can doubt that to abolish the security against arbitrary misrule now provided by the Consular Courts would undermine the very foundations of the system under which Shanghai has been transformed

House of Commons, has carefully refrained from giving the world any information as to its contents. The Foreign Settlement, in point of fact, is one of the most interesting examples of international cooperation, and those who see the future hope of the world in that cooperation should be particularly concerned to prevent it from being destroyed. The Council which administers its affairs consists of five British, five Chinese, two American, and two Japanese members. Its cosmopolitan character is clearly shown by the fact that at the special meeting of foreign ratepayers last year, at which, by an overwhelming majority, it was agreed to increase the number of Chinese members of the Council, there voted, in addition to British, Americans, and Japanese, a large number of Germans, Russians, Portuguese, and Frenchmen, as well as Danes, Swiss, Spaniards, Greeks, Austrians, and Italians. In these circumstances it seems clear that the future of the relations between the Settlement, the Chinese Government, and the Treaty Powers can in fairness only be decided at a conference at which all the interested parties are adequately represented. It seems equally clear that no such conference can safely disregard the Report of MR. JUSTICE FEETHAM, based as it is on over twelve months' dispassionate and impartial investigation on the spot and constituting as it does the only comprehensive and scientific study of an extremely complicated problem.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter

August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyman

NARS, Date

June 1, 1976

Kuomintang in Nanking, and partly to bring pressure upon the British Government. It seems to have succeeded even beyond expectation in both respects. According to what appear to be trustworthy accounts, in the tentative agreement reached in June it is proposed that even in the Treaty Ports, including Shanghai, extraterritorial jurisdiction should be abolished at the end of a short term of years. No one who has read the searching examination of the situation contained in the Feetham Report, or, for the matter of that, no one who has had any experience of conditions in China, can doubt that to abolish the security against arbitrary misrule now provided by the Consular Courts would undermine the very foundations of the system under which Shanghai has been transformed from a mudflat into one of the great cities of the world, the centre of Chinese trade, industry, and finance, a great source of revenue for the Chinese Government, and an island of safety in the chaos of contending factions. Its progress has been based on personal freedom and the rule of law. Until there is a reasonably adequate guarantee that individual liberty and the supremacy of the law will be respected under a Chinese Administration, it would be doing the greatest possible disservice to China herself to withdraw the guarantees which at present exist. The recent Thorburn case and other notorious cases have shown that there is not at present a Government in China able to prevent or to punish the most flagrant violations of law on the part of its own military authorities and the local party political associations. Nor is there any reason to expect that, within the next few years, there will be a Government to whom it would be safe to hand over the protection of those interests, moral as well as material, Chinese as well as foreign, for which in Shanghai the Treaty Powers are at present the trustees.

It is too often overlooked that other Powers as well as Great Britain are concerned in the future of Shanghai. It is not a matter which can be settled by a bargain between the British and the Chinese Governments, and it is unfortunate that any attempt should be made to prejudice the ultimate settlement by negotiations from which the other Powers affected are excluded and concerning which so much unnecessary secrecy has been observed. Even since the tentative agreement of June, Mr. HENDERSON, though repeatedly pressed in the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

APER THE TIMES

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE Sept. 9, 1931.

Japan and China

Events have a way of repeating themselves in China, and the tragic fate of CAPTAIN NAKAMURA, a promising Japanese staff officer, is, in essentials, a repetition of the Thorburn case. On August 17 the Japanese War Office issued a statement to the effect that this officer with his three companions had been arrested in Manchuria by soldiers of the Mukden Army on June 27, and had been marched into the nearest wood, where they were robbed and murdered. They were on their way from the Chinese Eastern Railway to Mongolia; they had secured the necessary permits from the local Chinese authorities and CAPTAIN NAKAMURA's passport was in order. On receiving news of the crime the Japanese Foreign Office instructed its Consul-General at Mukden to demand an apology, an indemnity, and the punishment of the murderers. The Chinese authorities went through motions similar to those which they had performed when MR. THORBURN disappeared. Officials were sent to investigate; they returned without information, reporting that, although they disguised themselves, the nearer they approached the scene of the crime the less they could learn of it. More officials have followed them. They may be equally unsuccessful. CHANG HSUEH-LIANG, the "young Marshal" who controls Manchuria from Peking, clearly understands the gravity of the incident. Otherwise he would not have summoned two of his generals to his headquarters. But even so he may be as powerless to fix the responsibility for this cold-blooded crime as PRESIDENT CHIANG KAI-SHEK has proved in the Thorburn case. That affair was bad enough; even if the allegations against the unfortunate young man could be substantiated, it was the duty of the Chinese Government to discover what had happened to him; to hand him over to the British Consular authorities if alive, and alternatively to punish any military officers who might have caused his death. The latest outrage is even worse. Its victim was travelling on a lawful occasion with the permission and under the protection of the Chinese military and civil authorities.

It is not surprising that Japanese military opinion is indignant at the failure of the Mukden Government to discover the criminals and at its delay in replying to the Japanese demands. The dropping of anti-Chinese pamphlets from the clouds by Japanese military airmen during a practice flight is, no doubt, the work of hot-heads; but such a demonstration on the part of officers of one of the best disciplined armies in the world illustrates the indignation which the crime has kindled. And behind this anger is the growing fear that Chinese nationalism takes no account of the vital interests of Japan in Manchuria and will sooner or later challenge Japanese treaty rights in that vast and rich land. The pamphlets dropped from Japanese aircraft emphasize these rights, the importance of Japanese investments in Manchuria, and the sacrifices of the Russo-Japanese War. The belief that the Chinese have planned new railway construction which must injure the Japanese-owned South Manchurian railway; bombastic threats in the Chinese Press; the tone of the Chinese Notes demanding satisfaction for the Chinese victims of the recent riots in Korea; the anti-Japanese boycott in the Yangtze valley—these and other factors have combined to give an impression of calculated ill will. The story that GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHEK has not forgiven the Japanese for the humiliating defeat of his turbulent troops at Tsinan in 1928 may have no foundation whatever; but a study of recent articles in Chinese reviews which are published in English at Shanghai, and of semi-official Chinese propaganda, does suggest that the Chinese censorship does not think it possible, or perhaps worth while, to check anti-Japanese outbursts. Another feature of Chinese propaganda—which presumably enjoys official support—is the continual Press agitation for the abolition of extraterritoriality. MR. THORBURN disappears in most suspicious circumstances; the Government of Nanking is not to blame: he should have had a passport. An American missionary shoots a burglar; the local Kuomintang demands his head and procures his imprisonment until the State Department intervenes; and the Chinese organs profess horror that a Christian missionary should defend his property. MR. JUSTICE FEETHAM'S Report on

0337

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

ever ; but a study of recent articles in Chinese reviews which are published in English at Shanghai, and of semi-official Chinese propaganda, does suggest that the Chinese censorship does not think it possible, or perhaps worth while, to check anti-Japanese outbursts. Another feature of Chinese propaganda—which presumably enjoys official support—is the continual Press agitation for the abolition of extraterritoriality. Mr. THORBURN disappears in most suspicious circumstances ; the Government of Nanking is not to blame : he should have had a passport. An American missionary shoots a burglar ; the local Kuomintang demands his head and procures his imprisonment until the State Department intervenes ; and the Chinese organs profess horror that a Christian missionary should defend his property. Mr. JUSTICE EATHAM's Report on Shanghai is dismissed with scorn, but no Chinese critic faces the fact that American, European, and Japanese subjects resident in many parts of China are liable to attack by soldiers as much as by brigands, and that the Chinese Central Government, however good its

intentions, cannot protect them effectively. The Nakamura case is a further warning of the necessity of caution in making concessions to Chinese national sentiment.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM


GREEN

Tokio

Dated September 25, 1931

Rec'd 9:35 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



*file
Eg.S.*

161, September 25, 7 p. m.

Department's 167, September 24, 4 p. m. / 1868D

I delivered the note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon. He read it and said that he supposed it was sent in support of the action of the Council of the League of Nations. I replied that presumably it was, judging from prior instructions which I had received. He then asked me if it had been published to which I replied that I did not know. He said that he would much prefer not to have it published as a certain section of the public might misunderstand. He said that he appreciated the very considerate and friendly attitude of the Secretary of State.

He then referred to the statement issued after the extraordinary Cabinet meeting of September 24, which he told me

793.94/1874

FILED
 SEP 12 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #161, from Tokio, Sept. 25, 1931,
 7 p. m.

told me had been sent to the Japanese Embassy in Washington and which the Department probably has received. He said that this statement summarized the situation and that he had nothing to add.

He said that he had replied to the League communication stating that Japan was refraining from any act which would tend to aggravate the situation or prejudice the peaceful settlement of it and that Japan was prepared to collaborate with the Chinese to seek adequate means whereby troops might be withdrawn. He said that there had been proposals for ~~an~~ independent commission^s to investigate the situation but that he did not see any need for it as he thought that Japan and China could settle amicably matters at issue between them.

I spoke to the British and the French Ambassadors today, the former stated that he had received instructions to support the League resolutions and that he would leave a memorandum to that effect with the Foreign Minister. The French Ambassador stated that he had received no special instructions to press the Japanese Government to abide by the League resolutions but that
 he was

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

3- #161, from Tokio, Sept. 25, 1931,
 7 p. m.

he was seeing the Foreign Minister and would "talk about them" by which I understood him to mean support them, as he was sure they were in accord with his Government's views.

I asked him whether the Chinese had approached him with any proposals. He said that they had not made any concrete proposal for settling the questions at issue; that the Soong proposal had been withdrawn before it would be formally made, and that as China had appealed to the League he was simply awaiting further developments.

I then asked him whether the Soviets had manifested any uneasiness in connection with the matter. He said that they had not, except to inquire about the Chinese Eastern Railway. He said that the telegraph service to Moscow was very bad and that telegrams sometimes took 48 hours. The Japanese Ambassador had been asked whether it was true that the Japanese had seized the southern terminus of the Chinese Eastern and were about to occupy Harbin. He had assured the Soviet authorities that the Japanese had no intention of doing either. The Commis^sar of Foreign Affairs had then said that he had no interest in the matter as

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

4- #161, from Tokio, Sept. 25, 1931,
7 p. m.

the matter as it seemed that the situation resembled the
Russo-Chinese situation of 1929, when Japan had maintained
a strictly neutral attitude.

NEVILLE

HPD

WSB

0342

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-122
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department

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Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

September 25, 1931.

SEP 25 31

CP

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

172 Your 161 September 25, 7 p.m.

In your discretion, communicate to Peiping (portions)
particularly substance of last paragraph.

Stinson

444

793.94/1574

FE:SKH/ZMF

RAM m.m.N
FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1926 1-122

0343

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

25 1931

FROM

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated September 24, 1931

Rec'd 5:40 p. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 25 1931
 Department of State

137, September 24, 6 p. m.

Consulate's No. 133, September 23, 8 p.

From a reliable source it is learned the following

developments took place at the private meeting of the

Council which was held at seven o'clock yesterday evening:

One. The Japanese representative was asked whether
 he had any information to give relative to the suggestion
 that observers be sent to Manchuria.

Two. The Japanese representative replied that he
 had not.

Three. The Chinese representative declared himself
 as disappointed at the Japanese reply. He put forward
 a new proposal to the effect that the Council should name
 certain states to whom the Chinese Government might apply
 to appoint observers to report to the League.

Four. The Japanese representative answered that his
 Government

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 SEP 26 1931
 DIVISION OF
 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

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OCT 12 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clayton E. Lynam NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #137, from Geneva, Sept. 24, 1931,
 6 p. m.

Government could take no responsibility for such a proposal.

Five. Cecil suggested an adjournment of the discussion in the hope of receiving a Japanese counter-proposal.

Six. The Japanese representative agreed to an adjournment.

Seven. The Chinese representative insisted that the question of sending observers be treated immediately.

Eight. Cecil made an appeal to the Japanese representative to telegraph his government saying that he ^{*Replied that*} ~~(#)~~ Japan would agree as the Council considered the question of the appointment of observers as most urgent.

Completed Nine. Cecil further suggested that perhaps such a mission could be delayed as two neutral members appointed by the Japanese, two by the Chinese, and three by the Council.

Ten. The Japanese representative asked if this proposal was the same as the "observer idea".

Eleven. Cecil replied that it was not "to observe" but "to report" to the League.

Twelve. The Japanese representative agreed to send a telegram in this sense (although he did not say that he would support the proposal).

THIRTEEN

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh 3 of #137, from Geneva,

Thirteen. This arrangement still remains open for discussion.

Fourteen. The Chinese representative stated that the Japanese had advanced south of the Great Wall.

Fifteen. The Japanese representative replied that certain strategic points had had to be occupied but that he had no information that any "military advances" had been made south of the Great Wall.

GILBERT

HED:WLB

(#) ~~apparent omission~~

0346

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

RECEIVED
 25 1931
 DIVISION OF
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

FROM

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 25 1931
 Department of State

Nanking
 Dated September 25, 1931

Rec'd 10:05 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 26 1931
 Department of State

69, September 25, 3 p. m.

I called with Lindbergh on the Minister of Foreign Affairs September 25, 10 a. m. The Minister of Foreign Affairs took occasion to tell me that he was greatly pleased by press report that the American Government had addressed communication to the League of Nations expressing sympathy with its action and announcing intention of addressing notes to the Chinese and Japanese Governments similar to the League's communications. The Minister of Foreign Affairs said he was momentarily expecting to receive the note from the American Government. In reply to inquiry I said I had no information on the subject and he asked that I inquire of the American Minister regarding the matter.

Repeated to Legation.

PECK

WSB
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790.64/1076

OCT 12 1931

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0347

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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OR

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

September 25, 1931.

SEP 25 31

AMERICAN CONSUL,

NANKING (China).

77 Your 69, September 25, 3 p.m.

Telegrams containing identical texts were despatched simultaneously to Tokyo and Peiping and copies of text were given immediately to Japanese Embassy and Chinese Legation here and to the Press.

Stinson

Stinson

SEP 25 1931 pm ✓

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1925 1-138

793.94/1876

0348

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SECRET

SEP 30 1931

September 30, 1931.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Castle:

OCT 1 - 1931

The Province of "Liaoning",

mentioned in the copy of the telegram
hereunder left at the Department by
Mr. Yung Kwai today, is the Province
of Fengtien in which Mukden is
situated.

8144

RECEIVED

OCT 1 - 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

RSM:EJL

0349

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 30 1931
JUN 12 1933
Department of State
TELEGRAM FROM THE CHINESE SPECIAL ENVOY AT MOSCOW
DATED SEPTEMBER 26, 1931.

It is reliably reported that the Japanese
arrested Mr. Tsang Shih-Yi, Governor of the Pro-
vince of Liaoning, and presented certain important
papers for him to sign, which he refused.

SECRETARY OF STATE
OCT 1 1931
1 - 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Chinese Legation,
Washington, September 30, 1931.

F/HS

793.94/1876-1/2

793.94

JUN 12 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

September 24, 1931.

2 P

AMLEGATION SEP 24 1931
 PEIPING (CHINA).

339

One. The Department has been giving the most careful consideration to the questions arising from the situation in Manchuria, and to the whole range of possibilities involved therein, as described in your reports and those from Tokyo. It has had three conversations with the Japanese Ambassador and three with the Chinese Chargé, in which the Department has urged the cessation of hostilities and withdrawal from the present situation of danger. The Department has received from the Chinese Chargé, and is now giving consideration to, the note referred to in your No. 615, September 21, 2 p.m.

Two. In response to a communication from the Council of the League of Nations received through the American ~~Ambassador~~ ^{Minister} at Berne, the Department has assured the Council that this Government is in whole-hearted sympathy with the attitude of the League of Nations as expressed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Council's

resolution

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

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0351

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
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resolution adopted on September 22 and that the
Department will despatch to Japan and China notes along
similar lines.

Inform Nanking.

Stinson
Wdy

N.F.P.
FE:MFP:EJL

Relly
FE
m.m.H.

SICK

U.V.
Sep. 24, 1951.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950 1-138

0352

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 4, 1976

1-128
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TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

September 24, 1931.

AMEMBASSY

TOKYO (JAPAN).

166 One. The Department has been giving the most careful consideration to the questions arising from the situation in Manchuria as described in your reports and those from Peiping and elsewhere.

Reports from other quarters, both official and unofficial, contain much more complete data than those emanating from Japan.

The Department has received from the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires, and is now giving consideration to, a note in which it is charged that QUOTE in this case of unprovoked and unwarranted attack and subsequent occupation of Chinese cities by Japanese troops UNQUOTE Japan has deliberately violated the Kellogg Pact. QUOTE The Chinese Government urgently appeals to the American Government to take such steps as will insure the preservation of peace in the Far East and the upholding of the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes. UNQUOTE

The

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1926 1-128

793.94/1876 B

0353

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence A. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-135
 PREPARING OFFICE
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1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Department of State

Charge to
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Washington,

- 2 -

The Department is giving the situation and the whole range of possibilities its most careful consideration. It has had three conversations with the Japanese Ambassador and three with the Chinese Chargé, in which the Department has urged cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal from the present situation of danger. It would welcome any comments and suggestions which you may care to make.

Two. In response to a communication from the Council of the League of Nations received through the ^{Minister} ~~American Ambassador~~ at Berne, the Department has assured the Council that this Government is in whole-hearted sympathy with the attitude of the League of Nations as expressed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Council's resolution adopted on September 22 and that the Department will despatch to Japan and China notes along similar lines.

FE:RSM:EJL

M. F. P.
 FE 7/24/72

SEP 24 1972
 Sep. 24, 1972

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Sent by operator M., 1972

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959 1-135

0354

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Collect
 Charge Department
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Department of State

Charge to
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Washington,

September 24, 1931.

bp

~~AMEMB TOSY~~, AM Legation

~~TOKYO (JAPAN)~~

Peking (China)

Skag

341

Referring to your various telegrams concerning the Manchurian trouble, I wish to give you, for your personal information, a picture of the Department's policy.

As already reported, the Department is fully in sympathy with the action already taken by the League of Nations in sending identic notes to China and Japan. We were, however, disturbed at the idea of sending to Manchuria a military commission to establish the facts. The League did this with success at the time of the dispute between Greece and Bulgaria, but in the Manchurian situation the conditions are entirely different. In the Greek-Bulgarian dispute it was a question of a line dividing the two countries. No such issue arises in Manchuria since the Japanese troops in that section of China are there under treaty provisions.

We

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

793.94/1876C

0355

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence A. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

~~Amlegation, Peiping~~, page 2.

We have felt very strongly, furthermore, that a commission sent to Manchuria without the consent of both the Japanese and Chinese could have little success even as a fact finding body. The principal fear we have as to such an imposed commission is that it would immensely strengthen the nationalist element in Japan and unite Japan behind the military element. We believe it immensely important in every way to support ~~rather~~ in Japan the civilian arm of the Government, which we believe to be opposed to the Manchurian adventure. We, therefore, suggested to Geneva that, if a commission was to be appointed, there was much more chance of getting Japanese consent if its composition was along the lines of our suggestion to Russia and China two years ago. That is, that it should be a commission appointed by the two parties ^{to the dispute.} This suggestion has been adopted by the League and their present purpose is, if Japan accepts, to constitute a commission made up of two members appointed by China and two by Japan and three by the Council of the League. It is understood that this commission would

have

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0356

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

AmLegation, Peiping, page 3.

have very narrow terms of reference and would be purely fact finding. ^{however,} The Department feels, considering the Oriental psychology, that there is far more chance of reaching a solution of this whole matter by direct consultation if this can be brought about between the Chinese and Japanese. On the other hand, we feel that the dispute is inevitably of interest to the world and that, to permit the occupation of the Manchurian cities to be consolidated, would be to make a travesty of the various treaties which have been signed by both China and Japan. On condition, therefore, that direct conversations between the two parties are unsuccessful, this Government would be inclined to favor action under Article ^{and subsequent articles} Eleven of the Covenant of the League, of which both nations are signatory, for the reason that the League has already taken action in the matter. ^{and for the reason that both parties as members of the League have agreed to submit to the League's action provided} If even this should be unsuccessful, there still remain the Treaties of 1922 and the Kellogg Pact, which might be invoked. In general, however, the above is the line which we now plan to take.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1913 1-138

0357

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department

Department of State

OR
Charge to
\$

AmLegation, Peking

Washington,

AmLegation, Peking, page 4.

We should welcome any comments you wish to
make or any further suggestions.


Repeat to ~~Peking~~ Tokyo. as No 169 SKH

Simson
4/4

U WRO/AB

✓
CR
Kurt
SEP 24 1931

SEP 24 31



Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

0022 WO

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-138

0358

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

rh

GRAY

RECEIVED

PEIPING VIA NR

25 1931

FROM

Dated Sept. 25, 1931

DIVISION OF

Rec'd. 10.05 am

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON



*file
r.g.c.*

653, September 25, 8 am

Legation has received from Nanking text of League of Nations' reply to Chinese Government regarding situation in Manchuria. I assume the Department has already obtained it from another source.

JOHNSON

RR:WSB

793.94/1577

OCT 12 1931

FILED

0359

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPIES SENT
 ON LAND *EJC*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

rh

PLAIN

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated Sept. 25, 1931

Rec'd. 10.05 am

RECEIVED

FROM

DIVISION OF

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 25 1931
 Department of State

File EJC

658, September 25 11 am

Reuter report from Mukden, 24th

"Mr. Tsang Shih Yi, Chairman of the Liaoning (Fengtien) provisional assembly has again been taken into custody by Japanese.

The Chinese Banker's Association has decided to open the banks here soon.

All students of Northeastern University and the Feng Yung University have left. Mr. Feng Yung, the founder of the latter, who is prominent man in Manchuria has been taken into custody by Japanese.

On the night of September 18th, when the trouble began, eighteen fifteen dash centimeters shells were fired against the arsenal but no hit was registered.

Looting in the eastern suburb of Mukden is increasing."

JOHNSON

WOB

793.94/1378

OCT 12 1931

FILED

0360

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RECEIVED

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated Sept. 25, 1931

FROM

Rec'd. 9.58 am

rh
SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

656, September 25



file
F.E.C.

Following are excerpts from speech delivered by President Chiang Kai Shek at mass-meeting of Kuomintang, Nanking, twenty two as reported in PEIPING LEADER today.

"Recent military actions of Japan in Manchuria come as shock to civilized world. It is the most unprecedented incident that has happened since beginning of international relations and grave insult to sovereignty of our nation. Our comrades and fellow countrymen should thoroughly understand origin and nature of case and rise up enmasse for the cause of national salvation.

We must immediately adjust thoughtful measures in dealing with the savage conduct of the invaders which is not only an indication of breach of harmonious relations of Far East, but also great menace to world peace. This will constitute testing stone for future of international relations and extent of patriotism of our people.

In first place, it will test whether there is such a thing as international morality or justice between and among nations, and whether the powers will sanction punishment of international commitments and to preserve the peace of the world.

However,

793.94/1879

SEP 12 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh # 2, of 656 from Peiping

However, I believe that League of Nations and signators of the Kellogg Anti-War Pact will take appropriate steps to bring justice to disgraceful conduct of Japanese which is obviously contradictory to Covenant of the League and spirit that animates the Pact.

Secondary, the Japanese invasion will test our patriotism. A book entitled COMPLICATIONS OF MANCHURIAN PROBLEM has been written by a Japanese, describing lack of group spirit and patriotism of the Chinese as evidenced by Sino-Japanese war of 1895 and Boxer rebellion of 1900, during which struggles our people, paid no attention to populace in war zones. This has therefore led to aggression of our unscrupulous neighbors into our territories. However, I still believe that my fellow countrymen will rise in one body and present united front against our aggressors so as to correct the wrong opinion of the Japanese writer.

Deliberation, due preparations, organization and obedience are what we need in dealing with situation. National Government is now making careful investigations on the case and awaiting fair judgment of the world. For the moment we must suppress our indignation and remain calm, submitting to whatever our neighbor will treat us. National Government is prepared for a final struggle and I will offer my life to lead the army to fight for the preservation of our race and to uphold the dignity of our people, should international law and promises fail to do justice".

End parts
 (one, two, three and four)

JOHNSON

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Zygmunt NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 25, 1931.

Mr. Secretary: SEP 25 1931

You need note only paragraph 5: the
 Consul General at Harbin (Mr. Hanson) reports
 "Telegraphic communication and radio both
 (at) Mukden still unrestored."

This fits in with my surmise, expressed
 last Monday, that communications out of Mukden
 had been cut shortly after the Mukden Consulate
 General got its messages out on the night of
 18/19; and with the Radio Corporation's account
 which I recorded yesterday of the destruction
 on that night of the Chinese Government's radio
 station at Mukden.

SKH

SKH/ZMF

036

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 25, 1931

Rec'd 10:30 a. m.

FROM

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 25 1931
Department of State

file
29.C.

THE UNDER SECRETARY

SEP 25 1931

Secretary of State,
Washington.

657, September 25, 11 a. m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"September 24, 11 a. m.

One. General Chang Ching Hui, civil administrator of special area, after an absence of many months returned to Harbin this morning.

Two. Chinese police patrols at Harbin have been strengthened and here quiet although business has been worse and some banks are having difficulty in paying out deposits which are being placed in National City Banks.

Three. Conditions quiet at Taonanfu and Tsitsihar.

Four. Local Japanese Consul General Ohase returned yesterday morning via Chita and Manchuria Station from Eastern Siberia where he has been touring last three weeks.

Five. Telegraphic communication and radio both Mukden still unrestored".

JOHNSON

WSB
CSB

793.94/1230

FILED

OCT 15 1931

0364

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh
 This telegram must be closely
 paraphrased before being
 communicated to the public.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GENEVA

Dated Sept. 25, 1931

Rec'd. 11.45 am

SECRETARY OF STATE

FROM

WASHINGTON

165, September 25, 4 pm

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL



Chinese Minister Sze called this afternoon

what I could tell him regarding your attitude on Manchurian
 problem. I replied that if Yoshizawa put the same question
 to me I should have to reply in the same way, namely, that I
 feared that any attempt on my part to interpret your views
 either to the Chinese or the Japanese might create confusion;
 that I was discussing this matter with Drummond alone and
 not even with any other member of the Council.

In the confused and conflicting reports in Geneva I feel
 that any other attitude on my part would be dangerous. Unless
 you have contrary views I shall hold this course.

WILSON

WSB:HPD



793 94/1831

SEP 29 1931

FILED

0365

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

This cable was transmitted in Code.
It should be carefully checked for
any communications.

Washington,

September 28, 1931.

793.94
WILSON

SEP 29 31

BERGUES

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

131
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 165, ¹⁸⁸¹September 25, 4 p.m., last paragraph,
last sentence. Your course is approved. If occasion
should arise you might inform Minister Sze that our
diplomatic representatives at both Peiping and Tokyo
are being fully and currently informed in regard to
the Department's attitude on the Manchurian situation.

793.94/1381

Strinson
WY

RAM
FE: RSM: EUL

FE

Sep. 28. 1931.
MVA

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

0366

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

Geneva

RECEIVED
 25 1931

FROM

Dated September 25, 1931

Rec'd 11:50 a. m.

593.94

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 25 1931
 Department of State

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Tel. 8
 SEP 26 1931
 DIVISION OF
 WESTERN HIRLAN AFFAIRS

139, September 25, 11 a. m.

Consulate's number 111, September 23, 8 p.

The following is a summary of two telegrams dated
 September 23 and 24 received from Tokyo by the Japanese
 delegation here and transmitted by the latter to the
 Council;

One. The Chinese Nationalist Party and other
 organizations are organizing a strong anti-Japanese
 campaign and issuing propaganda of a sensational nature,
 thus distorting the true situation.

Two. No marines have been landed in China proper
 as these reports would indicate.

Three. The Japanese commanding officer has been
 instructed to make every effort to limit the extent of
 the incident and no forces have advanced north of Chang-
 chun.

Four.

793.94/1822

OCT 12 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By William J. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #139, from Geneva, Sept. 25, 1931,
 11:50 a. m.

Four. Forces sent to Kirin have returned to Chang-chun leaving behind only a few.

Five. Japanese forces in Manchuria are concentrated in the railway zone. Including four thousand men from Korea, Koonze these forces are below the figures allowed by treaty.

Six. Japanese control of Mukden municipality is only temporary. In other places Chinese authorities are at their posts working in concert with Japanese officers.

Seven. Nowhere has military government been established. The Chinese and Japanese are daily communicating telegrams to the Secretary General purporting to give the factual situation in respect to the occupation of cities, troop movements, and other developments in Manchuria. These messages from either side are sharply conflicting. Does the Department desire summary in relative detail of these telegrams to check with information being received in Washington.

GILBERT

HPD
 CSB

0368

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clayton E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

September 25, 1931.

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Gray

SEP 26 1931

NOON

AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

60

Your 139, September 25, 11 a.m., paragraph seven.

The Department would like to receive this information
by mail.

Shirley Rogers
ACTING

793.94/1882

793.94/1882

RAM
FE:RSM:EJL

FE

WE

CE
Sep. 26 1931.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

0365

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPIES SENT TO
CAN I AND A. L. D. *NE*

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
GRAY

RECEIVED
25 SEP

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 25, 1931

Rec'd 10:15 a. m.

793.94

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 25 1931
Department of State

*File
Eg.C.*

655, September 25, 10 a. m.

Following from representatives military Naval Attache
in Mukden.

September 24, 6 p. m.

"Japanese armored train and two companies posted just
east of Hsinmintun. Japanese intelligence office states
that second division concentrating Changchuan with
detached brigade at Kirin with battalion at Tunhua:
Chen Chia Tun one battalion: Picraledge one company:
troops in Manchuria second division 7,000 men, independent
Korean brigade 3,000, railway guard 5,000 total 15,000.
Officially deny use of reserves now. All quiet here.
Situation apparently stationary".

JOHNSON

WSB
HPD

793.94/1885

OCT 12 1931

FILED

0371

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

Geneva

FROM EGC Dated September 25, 1931

Rec'd 2 p. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

140, September 25, 3 p. m. / 1183
 Consulate's 127, September 22, 9 p. m.

The following is the translation of a letter dated
 September 24 addressed to the Japanese representative on
 the Council to the President of the Council:

"By order of my Government I have the honor to bring
 to the knowledge of Your Excellency my Government's reply
 to the telegram of September 22 which Your Excellency was
 good enough to send to it.

One. In regard to the first point mentioned in the
 message, Japanese troops, since the beginning of the present
 events have taken care to act only within the limits necessary
 to insure their own security, the protection of the railway
 and the security of Japanese nationals. The Government of
 Japan has firmly pursued the aim of preventing the exten-
 sion of the incident and the aggravation of the situation;
 it is profoundly

~~FE~~
~~WE~~
~~FE~~

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 25 1931
 Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 SEP 28 1931
 DIVISION OF
 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

703.94/1004

OCT 12 1931

FILED

S

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clayton E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #140, from Geneva, Sept. 25, 1931,
 3 p. m.

it is profoundly anxious to settle this affair by pacific means, through negotiations between the two countries, as rapidly as possible and it has the definite intention of not abandoning this line of conduct.

Two. As to the second point of the message the Government of Japan wishes to declare that it has withdrawn most of its forces into the railway zone and that they are concentrated. Outside of the said zone some few troops only remain quartered as a measure of precaution in the city of Mukden as well as at Kirin and a small number of soldiers have been stationed at certain points, these measures not constituting military occupation. The withdrawal of its forces is being carried out to the greatest extent which the maintenance of the security of Japanese nationals and the protection of the railway at present permit. The Government of Japan in proposing to withdraw its troops into the railway zone in proportion as the situation ameliorates, confidently hopes that the Council will trust in the sincerity of its attitude in this matter."

GILBERT

WSB
 CSB

0372

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clayton S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Handwritten mark resembling a stylized 'A' or '7'.

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM Peiping via N. R.
Dated September 25, 1931
Rec'd 3:06 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 25 1931
Department of State

RECEIVED
O.N. L. AND M. I. C.

Handwritten signature: J. E. G. C.

793.94

660, September 25, 7 p. m.
Following from American Consul General at Mukden:
"September 24, 4 p. m.

The South bound (*) for Shanhaikuan loaded with
refugees was held up by bandits between Chiuluiho and
Hsinmin at 7:15 this morning reaching Hsinmin without
passengers.

About two hundred troops with guns were despatched
to Hsinmin late yesterday afternoon by South Manchuria
Railway trains. The Peiping-Mukden passenger service
between Mukden and Hsinmin has not been interrupted.
Signs of panic are becoming less apparent, the banks are
still closed and business is at a standstill. However,
it is understood the Chinese banks are ready to reopen
as soon as adequate police protection is afforded".

JOHNSON

WTC
HPD

(#) Omission

793.94/1885

OCT 12 1931

FILED

0373

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 30, 1931.

Subject: Foreign Observers in Manchuria.

79394 -
 121.54
 The Peiping Legation informed us more than a week ago
 that an officer from the Military Attaché's office at Peiping
 had been sent to Manchuria. Tokyo's 165, September 29, 4 p.m.,
 informs us that Lieutenant Cranford (who is an officer attached
 to the office of the Military Attaché at Tokyo) has reported
 from Mukden.

We thus know that there are in Manchuria an American Army
 officer from the Peiping Legation and an American Army officer
 from the Tokyo Embassy.

(Note: We have also had information originating from an
 unidentified "American Naval officer", dated Harbin.)

793.94/1926
 The British Embassy sent us on September 24 an aide
 memoire from which it appears that officers from both the
 French and the British Military Attachés' offices at Peiping
 had already gone to Manchuria and that the French and British
 Governments were conferring with regard to sending similar
 officers from their establishments in Tokyo.

We thus ^{understand} ~~know~~ that there are in Manchuria a British Army
 officer and a French Army officer from Peiping and that there
 are perhaps British and French officers from Tokyo.

SKH/ZMF

MAR 22 1933

FILED

F/HS

793.94/1885-1/2

SKH

0374

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated September 25, 1931

Rec'd 2:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

661, September 25, 3 p. m.

Following from Consul General at Nanking:

"September 24, noon. The following is summary of information given by T. V. Soong to Abend September 23, 11 p. m. as reliable and already telegraphed by Abend:

Japanese military authorities at Mukden are planning to set up government of South Manchuria and Kirin headed either by Manchurian Prince Ling or by Chang Tsung Chang. Japan will immediately accord recognition to the new government and settle Manchurian dispute by treaty. Abend also telegraphed that high officials deny truth of report that Chiang Kai Shek has offered to transfer civil posts to Hu Han Min; also high officials deny rumors that the government is considering asking Russian aid to eject Japan from Manchuria. Three party leaders who arrived

Nanking



F/p

703.94/1886

OCT 12 1931

FILED

703.94
note
893.0144

5

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clayton S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #661, from Peiping, Sept.25,1931,
3 p. m.

Nanking September 23, 2 p. m. from Peiping have sailed on Dutch steamer for Canton to discuss arrangement. (This ends summary).

I have had apparently reliable information that Chiang did actually offer to yield his civil posts to Hu Han Min but that latter refused to accept pointing out that he was still a prisoner. I also have good reason to believe that request for Russian aid against Japan has been given serious thought with divided counsels. I conjecture that owing to position taken by Hu Han Min and mediation undertaken by the League Soong finds it desirable to contradict both reports".

JOHNSON

WSB

0376

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 29, 1931



Subject: Estimates of Numbers and Location of Japanese Armed Forces in Manchuria.

793.94
 note
 893 01 46

The Tokyo Embassy estimates that Japanese troops with colors now in Manchuria total 15,500; and that these are distributed at the following points: Tunhua, Kirin, Changchun, Sauping kai, Chengchiatun, Mukden, Hsinmintun, Yinkow, Antung, and Tashichiao. They say that two armored trains reported sent to Taonan "returned" on the 26th.

The Peiping Legation estimates that the Japanese forces in Manchuria include one division of 7,000 to 8,432 men, two air squadrons (strength unknown), a brigade of 3,000 men and railway guards of 5,000 men, together with some reservists (number in use unknown, number available 30,000) on active duty; and that these are distributed at the following points: Changchun, Kirin, Tunhua, Chenchiatun, Yinglingkan and Mukden. (Note: It would appear that in preparing this telegram the Legation started but forgot to finish its estimate of location.)

Comparing the two estimates and making a composite, it would appear that the Japanese troops number something over 15,000 regulars and some reservists; and that these are located variously at Tunhua, Kirin, Changchun, Sauping kai, Chengchiatun, Mukden, Hsinmintun, Yinkow, Antung, Tashichiao, and Yinglingkan (all of these locations except the last being mentioned in the Tokyo Embassy's estimate).

SKH/ZMF

F/HS


793.94/1886-1/2

FILED
 MAR 21 1933
 DEPT. OF STATE

RAILWAYS OF MANCHURIA AND KOREA

September 24, 1931

Areas indicated 15,200 sq. miles
2 Aviation squadrons
(location unknown)
15,500 sq. miles
Remnants of
Asian duty: Nanking
not known.



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Department of State Letter August 10, 1972
By *William A. Bryant* NARS, Date *June 1, 1976*

0378

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 26, 1931

Rec'd 3 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 26 1931
Department of State

664, September 26, 10 a. m.

DIVISION OF
EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
SEP 26 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Following from American Consul Harbin:

"September 25, 10 p. m. Three bombs were thrown
into local Japanese establishments one hour ago. No
casualties. Chinese authorities are much disturbed.

There appears to be no necessity for Japanese
forces to come to Harbin and the Chinese would appre-
ciate any action that could be taken to prevent their
coming".

JOHNSON

WSB

793.94/1887

793.94

SEP 12 1931

FILED

0379

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 20, 1931. *he 29.8*793.94
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET

SEP 25 1931

MUKDEN INCIDENT - V.SECRETARY OF STATE
SEP 24 1931Confidential for the Secretary.

I had a long conversation with the Japanese Ambassador today.

The conversation began with apologies on the part of the Ambassador for the bare aspect of his drawing-room, his statement being that he was more or less in process of moving. This being an opportunity for some talk with regard to the new Japanese Embassy premises.

At an opportune moment, I said that I had no doubt he had surmises with regard to the special reason for my call; that the newspapers were full of accounts of an encounter at Mukden; that we had very meager information with regard to the matter, and that the Secretary, on the eve of leaving for the week-end, had asked me to ask the Ambassador what news he had with regard to what had happened.

Thereafter, the conversation became almost a monologue on the Ambassador's part. The Ambassador stated that he had from his Government very little with regard to the incident, but that he had read the lengthy news despatches of this morning in the NEW YORK TIMES and the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

and

793.94/1888

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

and that he was ready to assume that Mr. Byas' and Mr. Fleisher's accounts were substantially accurate. He said that he doubted very much whether any Japanese armed forces had been landed at Tsingtao. He said that he was greatly surprised and concerned if it be true that the Japanese military had seized Kaopangtzu. (Note: This town is on the Peiping-Mukden Railway line, which is Chinese, and is outside of the South Manchuria Railway zone.)

The Ambassador said that the whole incident was a great surprise to him and that he had no doubt that it was a surprise to the Japanese Foreign Office. He then went on to explain, stating that he was doing so for my confidential information and with the request that I would consider it unofficial and keep it off the record, the contest between and among various elements in the Japanese Government. In the course of that account, he remarked two or three times that he assumed that I was already cognizant of that situation.

The Ambassador continued to the effect that, immediately on receipt of news with regard to the incident at Mukden, the Cabinet had gone into special session and the Government had taken every possible step to "isolate" (he also used the term "localize") the trouble and to bring to an end military activity. He said that troops in Korea which had been ordered up as reinforcements had been ordered to halt.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

The Ambassador stated repeatedly that he considered the whole incident most unfortunate and that the Japanese Government would take every possible step to "alleviate" the situation.

At two or three points, the Ambassador made statements of fact which I believe to be in error. For instance, he said that Japan had only one thousand soldiers at Mukden.

These statements I attribute to lack of complete information on his part or inadvertence. But from the whole of his statement I got the impression that he has not been following developments in Manchuria with intensive attention and that he has not yet been supplied by his Government with any detailed account of this latest development. I also got the impression that he has either been instructed to follow the line taken by Japan's representative at the League of Nations (Mr. Yashizawa) as per that representative's statement quoted in the NEW YORK TIMES this morning or that he has on his own initiative taken his cue from that statement. The Ambassador actually stated that he had been telegraphed the text of Mr. Yashizawa's statement and that the Japanese text corresponds with the English text as quoted in the news despatch.

The Ambassador said that he hoped to have information on the subject by Monday; that he would be very happy to inform the Department with regard to anything he received; and that, if it seemed of sufficient importance, he would wish to call and talk with the Secretary.

SKH/ZMF

0382

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 SEP 25 1931
 DIVISION OF
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

file 29-C
 September 20, 1931

DER
FE
 CONFIDENTIAL

MUKDEN INCIDENT. IV.

SECRETARY OF STATE
 SEP 24 1931

Mr. Secretary:

As set forth in the memorandum hereunder, I believe that:

1. The action of the Japanese military forces in Manchuria constitutes a violation of the Kellogg Pact;
2. It should be our policy to strengthen the hands of the civil element in the Japanese Government in the contest between it and the military element -- pursuance of which policy will call for delicacy of handling;
3. We should not permit attitude or action of the American Government in relation to this problem to be featured as a manifestation of American far Eastern policy; it should be made to appear a part of the international peace movement; and
4. The case, as between China and Japan, is one which, if not promptly and satisfactorily settled by diplomatic processes, might properly be made a subject for consideration by the World Court. *The League of Nations is already giving the incident its attention.*

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793.94/1889

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sept. 20, 1930

Mr. Secretary:

I regret to have to report that in my opinion the action of the Japanese military forces in Manchuria constitutes a violation of the Kellogg Pact. The evidence (not proof) points to deliberate action authorized and ordered by the highest military authorities in Manchuria; it is scarcely conceivable that they would have acted with the orderliness, precision, time-coordination and all comprehensiveness involved in seizing all of the strategic points in South Manchuria, including public service, without direction from the high military command in Tokio; and that command would not have acted without the approval of the Minister of War (himself an officer of the army).

Although such action may have been taken without the approval, and perhaps without the cognizance, of other departments of the Japanese Government, I doubt whether it will be denied that the coup was ~~was~~ officially authorized.

I do not often venture to predict. In this case, however, it is my estimate that the Japanese Government will find it difficult, assuming that it so desires, to bring about

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Department of State letter

August 10, 1972

By

Charles E. Lyon Jr.

NARS, Date

June 1, 1976

- 2 -

about the withdrawal of its military forces from the cities which those forces have seized. It may disclaim responsibility for the action taken by those forces, but those forces have presented it and the world with a fait accompli and those forces will be disposed to proceed on the principle of j'y suis, j'y reste. If the thing works out that way, there will accrue the advantages and the disadvantages which must naturally flow from the military occupation under consideration. To the efforts of the Japanese Foreign Office in dealing with China, the occupation will be both a help and a hindrance. For Japan as a whole, the thing means a step forward in Manchuria, use, whether so intended or not, of military force and means (at several points the Chinese resisted and there were numerous casualties) for the attainment of a political objective.

It may reasonably be assumed that this occurrence will intensify the struggle between the civil and the military elements in the Japanese Government, particularly between the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In such a contest, it is difficult if not impossible to say which side is likely to win. That question will be affected in some measure by what occurs from outside of Japan. In a contest strictly between themselves, it would be my estimate that the advantage is with the Ministry of War. If other Powers intrude their influence, discreetly, the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may be strengthened. In the

course

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

course of the contest it is no means impossible that the present Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baron Shidehara, may be forced to resign. If that occurs, the possibility is that he will be succeeded by a Minister less firm in opposition to policies involving use of force than he has been. ¶ In the light of the above considerations, it is not easy to suggest what course should be followed by the American Government. It is my belief that, first of all, our decision should be made promptly; that it should be such as to permit of modification of the position taken, whether by way of advance or by way of retreat, as the situation develops; and that it should be calculated with a view to strengthening the hand of Baron Shidehara. For that reason, I believe that we should not permit the concern of the United States to be featured as an isolated phenomenon based on a conception of special American interest in and influence with regard to Manchuria. There is a tendency in many quarters to assume that the American Government is particularly sensitive with regard to Manchuria. This conception is more deep-seated in Japan than elsewhere, and it arouses in Japan suspicion, resentment and opposition. At the same time, in regard to attitude and action, we should avoid letting it appear that we are indifferent and intend to assume a purely negative attitude with regard to the question.

With these considerations in mind, it is my feeling
 that

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 4 -

that we should not, as on our initiative, invoke or refer to the Kellogg Pact. We should avoid expression of opinion, as that of the American Government, as to whether the Kellogg Pact applies. We might to advantage express the view that until knowledge of the facts has been further developed the formulating of a conclusion on that point is not war-rantable.

The question whether further hostilities between the Japanese and the Chinese military are likely to occur must be kept in mind but need hardly be considered at this time. In other words, as regards the Kellogg Pact, the question whether it is about to be violated need not concern us. The real question is whether it has been violated.

That question, whether the Kellogg Pact has or has not been violated, is one which might, it seems to me, very well be brought to the World Court. China and Japan are both parties to the World Court arrangements. If the course followed by the Japanese Government in the handling of the situation which has arisen in consequence of the action of its agents proves unsatisfactory to the Chinese (or to the world) the case might well, it seems to me, be carried by the Chinese Government to the Court. At any rate, at this stage, it would be my suggestion that the course to be followed by us during the next few days be based on that assumption.

The League of Nations, with both China and Japan represented, has already actively manifested its concern with regard to the incident.

S&H

0387

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDERSECRETARY

RECEIVED SEP 26 1931

SEP 26 1931

MR. KLOTS

DIVISION OF

SEP 26 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

September 25, 1931.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SEP 28 1931

Department of State

Memorandum of conversation with Mr. Osborne, British
Charge, September 24, 1931.

Mr. Osborne came to the Department at my request so that I could tell him our attitude toward the Manchurian situation. He told me that he had been instructed by his Government to call and ask about it in any case.

I told him that, of course, we wanted to be of any possible assistance to the League of Nations and certainly did not want to interfere with anything they were doing. I pointed out, however, that it was possible that Lord Robert Cecil, who seemed to be representing Great Britain, being a man who was always in favor of international action, might have neglected to consider oriental psychology in his proposal of a commission of investigation. I told him that we felt that such a commission might be of great importance at the proper time, but that we were very much opposed to any move which might inflame the nationalistic spirit of Japan and unite the people of the country behind the

militaristic

793.94/1890

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDERSECRETARY

2

militaristic element rather than the civilian element. I told him that I thought we ought all of us to support Baron Shidehara to the limit. Mr. Osborne said that he quite understood this and that it seemed to him that our attitude was entirely wise. I told him also that we felt, knowing the attitude of the Japanese and Chinese, that if there could be direct conversations this would be undoubtedly the wisest method of settlement, but if this were not possible or if these conversations amounted to nothing we should hope that the matter might be arranged under the terms of Article Eleven and later articles of the Covenant of the League since both Japan and China, in signing the Covenant, had agreed to accept the jurisdiction implied. I told Mr. Osborne that we also felt that the matter should be continued by the League since the League had begun already, but that even if this were not successful there remained the specific treaties of 1923 and the Kellogg Pact. I told him, however, that we hoped and believed that the Japanese were already trying to get themselves out of an uncomfortable position.

U WRC/AB

WRC

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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 SEP 26 1931
 SECRETARY'S OFFICE
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 SEP 28 1931
 DIVISION OF
 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 September 25, 1931.

Memorandum of conversation with the Czech Minister,
 September 24.

793.94
 with

The Czech Minister came in to report his return
 to Washington after a summer in Maine, where
 he said it had been delightful.

He then asked me about the Manchurian situation,
 beginning with the statement that probably the League
 could settle it in the same manner as it had settled
 the Greeko-Bulgarian dispute. I pointed out to Mr.
 Veverka that the circumstances in the two cases were
 entirely different, that in the case of Greece and
 Bulgaria it was merely a question as to whether the
 Greek Army had gone across the line of demarkation
 and that a military commission was sent to determine
 the line. In Manchuria, on the other hand, there was
 no question of crossing a certain line since the Japanese
 troops were legally in Manchuria in any case and that,
 therefore, it seemed to me a military commission would
 hardly be as useful. The Minister seemed not to

have

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 OCT 3 - 1931

793.94/1891

1891

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE UNDERSECRETARY

2

have grasped this point and added that, of course, in any case it was easier to deal with two small nations than it was to deal with two large and important nations.

811.911

The only matter which Mr. Veverka touched on concerning his own country was one which he brought up in relation to papers published in the Czech or Slovak languages in this country. (Of course he spoke of them as papers published in the Czechoslovak language, but I have noted that the Czech and Slovak papers in this country are quite different and that the Czechs are unable to read Slovak papers unless, of course, they speak the Slovak language.) The Minister said that some of these Slovak papers attacked the Government of his country with the greatest violence. I told him that, of course, this was unfortunate, but that since we have a free press I did not see what could be done about it. Mr. Veverka said he had some ideas as to what could be done and if the campaign of vilification became any worse, he would send a note of suggestion.

U WRC/AB

WRC

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDERSECRETARY

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SEP 26 1931

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DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEP 28 1931
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SECRETARY'S OFFICE DIVISION OF September 25, 1931.

file 29.c

793.94

Memorandum of conversation with M. Henry, Counselor of the French Embassy, September 24.

793.94/1892

M. Henry came to see me at my request. I merely wanted to inform him as to our attitude toward the Manchurian situation. After I had talked with him for about five minutes and had merely explained our friendly interest in what the League was doing, our fears as to the effectiveness in the field and the effect in Japan of a committee composed from outside, the Secretary came in and we moved to his office so that he could complete the picture.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 30 1931
Department of State

U WRC/AB

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OCT 19 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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FROM

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 26, 1931

Rec'd 3 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

662, September 26, 8 a. m.

From Consul General Harbin:

"September 25, 5 p. m.

Local Chinese radio station has informed me that Taonanfu was occupied by Japanese troops at 6 a. m. today. Japanese bi-plane at present circling over Harbin dropping leaflets in Russian and Chinese giving Japanese version of the conflict. My Japanese colleague has just informed me he does not know why aircraft is here and that the contents of the leaflets are unknown to him. Presence of the aircraft is causing intense excitement among Chinese and Russian local inhabitants."

JOHNSON

JHR
 WSB



790.04/1893

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OCT 12 1931

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

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REP

FROM

PLATIN

LEGAL ADVISER
 SEP 28 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 26, 1931

Rec'd 10:40 a. m.



Secretary of State,
 Washington.

669. September 26.

Fouter report from Nanking today:

"Referring to Japanese War Minister's statement that Japan is entitled to maintain fifteen soldiers per kilometer along South Manchuria Railway or total of sixteen thousand five hundred in Manchuria whereas actual number is only fourteen thousand, a foreign office spokesman here today asserted that Japanese troops already in Manchuria are reported to be in excess of two divisions excluding those from Korea and Japanese volunteers, the whole aggregating at least fifty thousand.

Foreign office spokesman pointed out that Japan's title to number claimed is apparently based on article one of the additional articles of treaty of Portsmouth of 1905 in which Japan and Russia reserve rights to maintain railway guards

F/m
 793.94/1894

OCT 12 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #619, from Peiping, Sept. 26, 1931,

guards not exceeding fifteen per kilometer. Spokesman reported out that while China acquiesced in certain provisions of the Portsmouth Treaty she has never recognized treaty as such for its additional articles. Moreover articles two of Annex to Peiping Treaty of 1905 stipulates that in event of Russia withdrawing her railway guard Japan consents to do the same. Therefore since Russian guard have all been withdrawn and Chinese troops have undertaken the protection of Chinese Eastern Railway, continuance of Japanese troops in Manchuria is absolutely without legal basis or treaty sanction".

JOHNSON

WSB

0395

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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REP

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 26, 1931

Rec'd 10:30 a. m.

793-44

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 28 1931
 Department of State

*file
 29C*

Secretary of State
 Washington.

667, September 26, 3 p. m.

Following is excerpt from a letter from Captain Nimmer
 at Harbin to the Naval Attache, dated September 21st:

"The Japanese demonstration was of course not un-
 expected and I don't think that they will consider going
 beyond their railway interests in seizing Chinese terri-
 tory and holding same until the Chinese stop quibbling
 and show some degree of earnestness in their actions.
 The Japanese are scrupulously avoiding interference at
 the moment in Chinese Eastern Railway jurisdiction."

The feeling of the people of Manchuria - Russian
 and Chinese alike - is pro - Japanese. They would be
 delighted to have the Japanese in control (?) which is
 their opinion would assure them protection and, last but
 not least, just and reasonable taxation".

JOHNSON

WSB
 HPD

793-44/1395

OCT 12 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zygon NARS, Date June 4, 1976

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REP

FROM


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GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 26, 1931

Rec'd 10:35 a. m.



Secretary of State,
 Washington.

668, September 26, 4 p. m.

J. D. Thomson, manager and chief accountant of the
 Peiping-Mukden Railway reports that he and his family and
 two foreign women, one Italian and one German, left
 Huangkutung on Thursday morning of the 24th and that a
 few kilometers west of Huangkutung saw a Japanese aero-
 plane overhead and heard rattling which he did not
 associate with aeroplane at the time. At the next
 station two passengers were reported dead, one of whom
 he saw. Marks of bullets on train showed that they had
 been fired from above, presumably from Japanese aeroplane.
 Train was unarmed and filled with passengers and refugees
 at the time.

JOHNSON

WSB

793.94/1396

FILED

OCT 12 1931

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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MAM

GRAY

FROM

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated September 27, 1931

Rec'd 5:08 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

671, September 27, 8 a.m.

From Consul General at Harbin:

"Japanese aeroplane again flying over Harbin, other-
 wise situation here and elsewhere in north Manchuria quiet".

JOHNSON

WSB

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 28 1931
 Department of State

file
 Egc

793.94/1897

FILED
 OCT 12 1931

0398

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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MAM

PLAIN

FROM

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated September 27, 1931

Rec'd 5:08 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington


672, September 27, 9 a.m.

Reuter report from Nanking twenty-six.

"Capital is very depressed at news of decision of
League of Nations not to take further action regarding
Manchurian situation".

JOHNSON

WSB



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OCT 12 1931

0399

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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MA

PLAIN

FROM

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated September 26, 1931

Rec'd 6:30 a.m. 27th.

Secretary of State

Washington

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 28 1931
Department of State

670, September 26.

Following are excerpts from recent editorials com-
ments on Manchurian situation in English language papers:

PEIPING LEADER twenty-two. "What is reason for this
savage action on the part of Japan? There cannot be slight-
est doubt that the militarist got out of control and took
matter into their own hands in spite of persuasions of the
Manseito Government. In other words, conciliatory policy
practiced by Baron Shidehara is considered too weak to
suit militarists who are always on lookout for some excuse
to justify their existence and huge taxes levied upon heav-
ily burdened people for their upkeep. It is known for some
time that militarist have been doing considerable sword
battling during last few months and it was felt instinctive-
ly by observers that something was bound to happen. But
magnitude and ferocity of Japanese invasion is becoming an
exception.

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703.04/1399

FILED

SEP 12 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

2- #670, from Peiping,
 September 26, 1931

exception. In my opinion that even if Nakamura case had not turned up, Japanese militarists would have found some other excuse for their invasion of South Manchuria in order to show their people at home that they are doing something to vindicate the Japanese Empire".

Twenty-third. "Japan has violated law of nations by invading Chinese territory without previous warning, and has committed acts of barbarity which should brand her as a criminal in eyes of world. Who is aggressor is only too self evident - when Japan slapped one cheek, China turned the other. Will signatories of anti-war Kellogg Pact who attached their signatures to high sounding phrases putting aggression upon weak and unoffending states continue to fold their hands while Chinese people are being massacred by the thousands and their land forcibly taken from them by Japanese military brigands? Will League of Nations do nothing and advance a few technical excuses for inactions? How long will these treaties respecting integrity of China be treated as mere scraps of papers by Japan? These are questions which every intelligent Chinese and foreigners in this country are asking themselves".

Twenty-four.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

3- #670, from Peiping,
 September 26, 1931

Twenty-four. "Our efforts against war have brought us no good but further aggression. Our neighbors will not take any notice of a bully who chose to occupy our hearth and home because we have not created a rumpus by making no attempts at resistance. The signatories of the Kellogg Peace Pact are indifferent because war has not been created by Japan unwarranted invasion of Chinese territory. Public sentiment is being worked up and sooner or later Chinese nations, if it is going to remain one at all, will have to rise and create a rumpus to turn this internal aggression into an international war - to conform to requirements of anti-war Kellogg Pact.

We had hoped Japanese Government would disown misdeeds of its troops, but since its post facto recognition of further dispatch of troops into Chinese territory from Korea we are compelled to hold whole Japanese nation responsible for starting war against this country. Under the circumstances and if Japan refuses to give a satisfactory reply to our protests, China should at once declare existence war between the two countries a result of Japanese invasion of Chinese territory. She should sever all treaty and diplomatic

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diplomatic relations with Japan and treat her people in China as enemy subject according to international law and usage".

PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES. Twenty-one. "Inability to understand the regard in which human life is held by others has always characterized Chinese statesmen and has given rise to resignation very justly felt not only by Japanese in connection with disappearance of Nakamura ^{but} by British Communists in China and at home over apparent lack of official cooperation in arriving at any solution of Thorburn mystery. Japanese nationals have suffered on more than one occasion and fact that large interest in Manchuria would be almost certain to sustain considerable losses in event of still further unrestrained anti-Japanese sentiments being given expression by these uncontrollable exponents of lawlessness and disorder, constitute a long series of irritations which have reached a culminating point in Nakamura incident. Chinese attitude of nonresistance is one adopted for the occasion and one which will enable her to obscure under dying issues and appear blameless before League of Nations. Degree and quality of that blamelessness, however, should

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should not be judged on merits of this lack of resistance at a crucial moment. First causes of Manchurian clash would seem to be best discovery, not on the spot, but in study of events of last few years".

Twenty-three. "Action of Kwantung military command is definitely both protective, and is so defined in official proclamation: protection rights and punishment of outrage. Its punitive aspects orders action different from any form of intervention since revolutionary disorders command and renders it akin to Boxer expedition.

Real cause of this action was steadily increased exacerbation of Sino-Japanese relations in Manchuria by course of policy destitute of all foresight, statesmanship, or elementary prudence. We have commented again and again in past few months on profound consequences certain to result from abandonment of prudent methods characteristic of pre-nationalist regime in Mukden. We are not so immodest as to suppose that any notice would be taken of such warnings in a foreign paper. But there ought to have been reason to assume that ultimate consequences of policy of irritation would be realized before it was too late, either by a sudden inspiration

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inspiration of sanity or by representations of those who, having been panicked into taking notice of terrific emotional agitation directed by the military party in Japan, and into belated effort to secure personal contact with responsible Japanese in Tokyo and elsewhere, knew that message had been written on wall as dire in its portent as anything seen in Babylon.

Prudence is necessary to great powers, even when strength might tempt imprudence. But to the peak prudence is essential of self preservation. And we say deliberately that if those who run affairs of this country today had sought in malice and madness to consequences of misbegotten policy to pitiless onslaughts of nature, they could hardly have gone about it in more diabolically effective way".

Twenty-four. "A modern state demanding modern sojourn rights must exercise sovereign responsibilities in a manner calculated to earn respect. If this affair in Manchuria hammers Chinese officialdom out of old, discredited, hateful, traditional ways it will have furnished a turning point in the world's much harassed relations with this country.

There is no danger, we are convinced, of Soviet complications

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complications at present. But ~~after~~ this crisis an upheaval inside the Wall is inevitable. A new and more extreme government will emerge. If a settlement of the whole thing is arranged before this comes about, well and good, If not, China may turn to Moscow once more.

We have seen with our own eyes the great constructive work done by Japanese in this territory. The arm that has now struck so deadly a blow at her has, after all, much more often shielded her from terrors of revolutionary disorders and wars in China proper. Neither Nakamura case nor blowing up a bit of railway track, repaired in a few hours, is real issue.

If settlement of all outstanding issues is arrived at on fair basis - and we shall expect it to be on no less basis - we are confident that Japanese forces will be withdrawn to their previous positions. That demonstration of good faith, following as it would the complete possession of the territory and its arteries, ought to be sufficient to clear away miasma of suspicion and make it plain that annexationist ambitions are not entertained. If new and healthier relationship thus arose we should be among first to

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to welcome it".

Twenty-six. "Chinese authorities are already talking of refusing to negotiate until troops have returned to their original locations, though the most elementary sense of realities and of responsibility demonstrated purely folly of such policy. The position, is immensely improved. Question now is of negotiations, and on this we shall make very long line. Realities in Manchuria have got to be faced. There must be settlement of these problems, and on fair basis. Methods of Gandhi's cohorts will be now here. And open conference, with fullest possible publicity, and with both sides getting right down to brass tacks, is indispensable. And the sooner, the better".

SHANGHAI POST AND MERCURY. Twenty-one. "China's weakness in Manchuria stands today as China's only hope of retaining any vestige of power in three eastern provinces.

In that weakness lies China's only strength; only by paradox of laying down arms peacefully in face of military invasion has China played trump in the Manchurian war game.

By refusing to be drawn into hopeless military war, China today is taking only possible steps to ward regaining

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regaining her former position, on plea that she refused to engage in any warlike demonstrations, even though threatened with war.

If the truth were known it would seem quite likely that the reason for the intensive drive at this time in Manchuria lies first in Japan's determination not to be outmaneuvered once more by China in diplomatic negotiations over 'unsettled incidents', and also in the fact that both Europe and American seem too fully occupied with affairs at home to take more than an academic interest in violations of the open door policy, the Kellogg-Briand Anti-Aggression Pact, and the Nine Power Treaty.

From Japan nationalistic point of view domination of Manchuria may be justifiable, justifiable, that is, just as was acquisition of Formosa, annexation of Korea, and many similar adventures by Western Nations, there is talk that world has advanced and such things are no longer done. May be so. But time has been so short, that we may be mistaken.

One thing we do hope is however, that is, that world is not so easily fooled as it once was. We hold that one of the

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of the few benefits of the world war was to open our eyes
 to the ways of diplomats and generals".

Same paper and date article by Woodhead. "Swiftness
 and military efficiency with which Japan's forces have oc-
 cupied strategic centers in South Manchuria leave little
 doubt that events have proceeded accordance with carefully
 arranged plans.

Whether this plan was to ^{be} put into effect any how, or
 whether it was to operate only if valid pretext arose, is
 not yet clear. There have been scores of occasions on which
 Japan might have advanced good reasons for recourse to force
 in Manchuria, during past few years. And particular inci-
 dent that was seized upon to justify military action, but
 fact that Japan appears have substituted policy of realism
 for one of make believe, that is really important.

For years, now, powers with most substantial interests
 in this country (Japan included) have followed policy of
 make believe, which is synonymous with 'patience and concil-
 iation'. They have allowed indident after incident to pass
 with ~~nothing~~ more serious than protests from Waichiaopus
 pigeon holes. They have tolerated evasion, procrastination
 and

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and deliberate violation of treaty rights.

American and British and interests in China, though substantial, are not vital. Japanese interests in China and especially in Manchuria, are, and she has left the world and China under no illusions on this point. Her leading statesmen have made it clear again and again that her policy of patience and conciliation was not to be interpreted as indicating willingness to sacrifice those vital interests.

These warnings, however, have passed. On no issue in Manchuria, could Japanese Government obtain a clearcut settlement. Whenever any particular point was pressed, Mukden 'passed the buck' to Nanking. Whenever Nanking was approached, it procrastinated on pretext that Mukden must be consulted. Under such conditions all negotiations ended in vicious circle. Japan could get neither Nanking nor Mukden to shoulder any definite responsibility.

Realistic policy, may, in end produce results beneficial not only to Japan, but to all powers in treaty relations with China. It is not, of course, to be supposed, that

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that Japanese motives will prove to be altruistic. She is not concerned at all to pull chestnuts out fire for other nations. But she cannot pursue realistic policy without producing reaction favorable to other nations. If she exploits this opportunity to obtain reasonable settlement of all outstanding issues with China - including extraterritoriality - she will automatically halt landslide which has been in progress during current year, and indirectly render service to civilization.

There is every reason to believe that the Japanese Government is anxious to localize the present conflict. Whether it is able to do so must depend upon the restraint now exercised by the Chinese authorities in other parts of the country. A revival, or intensification of the lawless activities of the boycott committees, or any anti-Japanese excesses, would probably, in the present state of Japanese public opinion arise uncontrollable indignation and necessitate far more extensive military and naval action than is at present contemplated".

(26th)
SHANGHAI CHINA PRESS today. "Since appointment of
 Count Yaiuyai Uchida as President of South Manchuria Rail-
 way

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Railway and of General Ugaki as Governor General of Korea a few months ago, rumors have been persistently circulated of Japanese intentions to carry out her so-called positive policy in regards to Manchuria. For the only time in history of South Manchuria Railway appointee for the presidency was hereby welcomed by Japanese military party. And why?

Count Uchida, though diplomat of longstanding, is known to have favored strong policy in Manchuria. In that respect he differs from other Japanese diplomats. Policy of Japanese military party toward Manchuria is too well known to need repetition here. Japanese military leaders therefore consider Count Uchida one of few diplomats who understand their ambition, in understanding it, are willing to work for its realization.

It is certain that effect of most unfortunate occurrence in Manchuria will be national and even international. Marshal. Chang Hsueh Liang hitherto has been able preserve peace in Northern China, and after this blow to his prestige, whether he will continue to be able play role as preserver of order in regions north of Yellow River remains to be

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be seen.

Internationally, the present action of the Japanese militarists in Manchuria affords a strong incentive to Chinese and Russian communists to create in Three Eastern Provinces strong foothold for their movement. Many thinking men believe that day on which Japanese militarists consider their positive policy in regard to Manchuria and Mongolia realized is day when second Russo-Japanese war will be provoked. Hitherto Manchuria has served as buffer state between these two powers, and once, Japanese predominance is well established in region, Soviet Russia is likely to dispute it".

Twenty-two. "Great misfortune in Manchuria may become blessing in disguise if leaders of China could be awakened to necessity of composing their political differences and presenting united front. It is extremely doubtful that Japanese militarists would have dared to invade Chinese territory at this particular moment if there had been no split in rank and file of Kuomintang and Bolshevik menace did not exist.

Here is where Japanese militarists have miscalculated their preconceived plan of seizing important Chinese cities in

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in Manchuria. They think that political difference between Canton and Nanking are so great that even in presence of foreign invasion they can not call halt in struggle for supremacy.

Well informed people in Shanghai believe that China is united as one man in opposing Japan's aggression in Manchuria on this occasion and that no leader of any importance can remain in power if he does not join the movement to clear Chinese territory of Japanese invading troops".

Twenty-three. "Some peoples hold view that in regard to renunciation of war for furthering national policy, Kellogg Pact is even more emphatic and positive than Covenant of League of Nations, because it allows no war at all. League of Nations however has taken up the matter seriously. But what is America, the sponsor of the Pact, going to do?

It would mean very severe shock to China if signatory powers refuse to support Kellogg Peace Pact simply because China is too weak in military sense and Japan is too bellicose listen to their counsel. This is time to test validity of all peace Covenants and to ascertain whether they are capable of two applications, one for weak country and other

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other for strong.

Upon unequivocal answer to this question depends
 future peace of world. If Japan can make off with peace
 of Chinese territory and other international conventions
 without signal protest from signatory powers, then all
 panaceas for war prevention will lose their intrinsic
 value and world will be sadly disillusioned."

JOHNSON

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Long NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM

Geneva

Dated September 26, 1931

Recd 3:50 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

142, September 26, 10 a.m.

In the Council yesterday afternoon the Chinese and Japanese submitted the replies from their respective governments to the Council's telegram of September 22 and their representatives made certain additional assertions.

These were characterized by conflicting statements regarding recent happenings in Manchuria bearing on responsibility for the origin of the conflict and on the present location of troops, many of these being repetitions of previous statements.

The Japanese assertions respecting the position of their troops were substantially those reported in Department's telegram 133, September 23, 8 p.m. and 140, September 25, 3 pm with the following additions. Japanese soldiers have now been mostly withdrawn within the railway zone. There still remain some detachments in Mukden and Kirin and "small number of men in a few other places", but it is denied that Japanese troops have been sent north of Changchun or into Chientou or have taken control of Chinese railways between Mukden and Sineun

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SEP 30 1931
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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-2- # 142 from Geneva.

Sineun or between Supingsi and Chenchitun. Troops will be withdrawn from Kirin as soon as the menace to the South Manchuria Railway is removed.

The Chinese assertions were principally that Japanese forces now occupied important points in Manchuria, that Japanese soldiers examine travelers on Peking Mukden trains and that press correspondents are subject to interference. She also asked the Japanese representative to explain exactly what was meant by a "small number of men in a few other places."

With respect to policy Japanese position was reported that Japan has had no territorial designs in Manchuria but wishes to protect its rights and interests and the measures that have been taken are only to that end. The General commanding the troops has received orders not to extend operations and the number of soldiers now in Manchuria is not in excess of treaty stipulations. It is the intention of the Japanese Government to withdraw the troops as calm is restored and as promptly as possible do so without danger to its nationals. Japan reiterated a desire to find a pacific settlement by direct negotiations between the two governments. In view of the present amelioration the Japanese Government considers that this plan of direct negotiations shall be taken up again and it believes that the Council should not risk a premature intervention, but having initiated a pacific settlement should respect the wishes of one of the parties as to the method.

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-3- #142 from Geneva

With respect to policy the Chinese position was: China denied the Japanese statement that a Chinese Minister of State had suggested direct negotiations and read a telegram in support of this contention stating that the Chinese Minister in question T. V. Soong had replied to the Japanese Consul General on September 22nd that the invasion of Chinese territory "made absolutely impossible any direct negotiations." The Chinese representative insisted this position is maintained. He declared that China places herself without reserve in the hands of the Council, will follow its recommendations and is ready to assume full responsibility for the protection of life and property in the territory now occupied by Japanese troops. China renewed her request for the appointment of a commission composed of neutrals designated by the Council to report upon the withdrawal of the troops to the Council; China suggests that the Council should inform the Japanese Government that unless it proceeds immediately to this withdrawal it will violate obligations contracted under paragraph 1 Article 11 of the covenant. The possibility of evoking Article 15 of the covenant was also mentioned.

When the Chinese and Japanese representatives had concluded Cecil spoke in substance as follows: So far the Council has taken up the matter under Article 11 under which the Council is directed to take measures to safeguard peace. The settlement of

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of the question or judgment upon the action of either party is under Article 11 not the duty of the Council. The Japanese have declared that the troops are being withdrawn and the Chinese representative has not questioned their declaration. This withdrawal as soon as possible is an indispensable provision for preserving peace. The primary duty of the Council was to preserve peace and it has done it.

The President of the Council then read a statement declaring in substance that in view of the withdrawal of Japanese troops and if efforts are continued to effect an appeasement the Council can hope for a satisfactory settlement. Meanwhile the Council counts upon the firm willingness of both parties not to aggravate the situation and appeals to the Japanese Government to withdraw as rapidly as possible the troops to within the railroad zone. It notes the assurance of China regarding the protection of Japanese life and property. The Council desires to be kept informed of the measures taken by both parties responsive to this appeal which has just been addressed to them.

GILBERT

OX

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By William E. Lynn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated ~~FROM~~ anyone.

GENEVA

Dated September 26, 1931

Rec'd 4:50 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

141, September 26, 9 a.m.

The following are certain aspects of the picture respecting the Sino-Japanese question which may be of interest in evaluating the situation in Geneva.

One. In line with a traditional Geneva attitude there is a strong feeling on the part of the small states that this question is a test of League efficacy in dealing with a great power and that a failure in this instance would be setting a precedent which would substantially weaken the League's influence in the future and discredit conciliatory and security measures in general with a concomitant effect on disarmament. This is responsible for much of the agitation in Geneva that "something be done" To prevent a discussion in the Assembly which would have had this sentiment as a background recourse was had to a restriction of Assembly action as reported in Consulate's 790.94/1870
138, September 24, 7 p.m. The possibility still remains however

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SEP 29 1931

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 By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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however that it might be brought into the Assembly under Article 11, paragraph 2 of the Covenant or under paragraph 9 of Article 15 although the legal status of such action is not entirely clear.

Two. While in the Council proceedings discussion for obvious reasons concerns itself with happenings in Manchuria, in the background and in corridor conversations the core of the problem is seen as lying in Tokyo. As to the situation in Tokyo there are two theses both evidently without a basis of definite information:

894.00

(a) That Japanese action in Manchuria is the result of considered Japanese policy modified only perhaps by the military party precipitating the issue, and that thus a failure to bring Japan to terms as stated above endangers all future international conciliatory action.

(b) That this is a military coup to which the Japanese Foreign Office is opposed. (END GREEN)

(A contention which the Japanese privately put forward here (GREEN) and that to bring too much pressure on Japan at this juncture might only serve to increase the power of the military party with perhaps disastrous results.
 Three.

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 By Thomas A. Ryan NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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Three. It is obvious that in the formal proceedings no opinion on these points can be brought forward by any power in Geneva, if indeed there is sufficient information at the disposal of any power to give an opinion. Thus the present treatment of the problem here is felt by many to be fundamentally unsatisfactory.

Four. Of the great powers on the Council only Italy is at the present moment represented by a Minister of State, which results in a hesitancy on the part of most representatives to take a position. (END GREEN)

Five. The Japanese are privately intimating that the position of the United States is based on two (b) above. Kroada has said as much to me (?).

Six. Chinese action is tacitly based on thesis two (a) above. The Chinese are however beginning to show concern that if general action is tacitly based on thesis two (b) or if for reasons of policy Japan is being favored, whether they may not be drifting into a position of isolation. Meeting him in the Secretariat corridor, Sze also directly intimated the foregoing to me.

(GREEN) Seven. Should pressure be put on Japan and
 should

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should she prove recalcitrant, the question is gravely discussed as to what the powers could do impressed by the present world situation. It is felt that military pressure is out of the question and that there would be great reluctance to exert economic pressure which would further dislocate world trade. This anxiety appears also to influence action here.

GILBERT

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking

Dated September 27, 1931
 FROM
 Rec'd 3:20 p. m.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 28 1931
 Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 SEP 28 1931
 DIVISION OF
 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

73, September 27, 5 p. m.

One. Dr. Lee, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs,

called this morning to tell me that reports from Chinese official sources at Geneva were to the effect that the wording of the communications of the American Government to the Japanese and Chinese Governments came as a surprise to some members of the League Council and that whereas there had been marked enthusiasm for an attempted adjustment of the Sino-Japanese controversy through League agency this enthusiasm noticeably waned when the attitude taken by the United States became known.

Two. Lee also said that Chinese leaders have been taken aback by lack of any specific reference in the partial note to the Washington Conference treaties of the Kellogg Pact.

Three. Lee referred to Japanese official assurances published in the press that Japanese troops were being withdrawn and military offensives had ended. He said that official

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

- 2 - No. 73 from Nanking

FROM

official Chinese reports from Manchuria were that the
scope of Japanese military occupation was being extended
and that activities such as the bombing of trains were
being continued if not intensified.


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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



Mr. Secretary:

I note that the Chinese Government's note referred to hereunder mentions the Kellogg Pact but, while appealing to the American Government "to take such steps as will insure the preservation of peace in the Far East and the upholding of the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes", does not expressly ask you to invoke the terms of the Kellogg Pact.

SKH

SKH/ZMF

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 21, 1931.

MUKDEN INCIDENT - VI.

Mr. Secretary:

The Chargé d'Affaires of the Chinese Legation submits a note, under instruction of his Government, "to bring to your attention the occupation of Chinese territory by Japanese troops in Manchuria".


The statement of facts contained in this note may be disregarded, as it was evidently compiled shortly after the coup in Manchuria began.

The concluding paragraph contains a request for action by the American Government. It read:

"As the United States, China and Japan are all signatory powers of the Kellogg Pact, and as the United States is the sponsor of the sacred engagements contained in this Treaty, the American Government must be deeply interested in this case of unprovoked and unwarranted attack and subsequent occupation of Chinese cities by Japanese troops, which constitutes a deliberate violation of the Pact. The Chinese Government urgently appeals to the American Government to take such steps as will insure the preservation of peace in the Far East and the upholding of the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes."

SKH/ZMF

SKH



7-3-94/1110

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 By Charles E. Zgon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

CHINESE LEGATION
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Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 21 1931
 Department of State

September 21, 1931.

Ack'd
Reg.
 September 25, 1931.

I have the honor to inform you that I am instructed by
 my Government to bring to your attention the occupation of
 Chinese territory by Japanese troops in Manchuria.

Japanese troops near Shenyang (Mukden), without the
 slightest provocation, opened an attack on the Chinese
 barracks on September 18, at 10 P.M. and continued bombard-
 ing the Chinese camps and arsenal, killing a large number
 of Chinese people in spite of the complete nonresistance of
 the Chinese troops. The whole city of Shenyang and its vicinity
 were occupied by Japanese troops by September 19, at 6:30 A.M.
 The occupation of Antung is already confirmed, and possibly
 other places also are now under Japanese military control.

As the United States, China and Japan are all signatory
 powers of the Kellogg Pact, and as the United States is the
 sponsor of the sacred engagements contained in this Treaty,
 the American Government must be deeply interested in this case

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,
 Secretary of State.

FILED
 DEC 24 1931

793-94
 note
 593.0146
 711.5012-anti-war
 006.88146

0428

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

of unprovoked and unwarranted attack and subsequent occupation of Chinese cities by Japanese troops, which constitutes a deliberate violation of the Pact. The Chinese Government urgently appeals to the American Government to take such steps as will insure the preservation of peace in the Far East and the upholding of the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.


Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your note of September 21, 1931, in regard to events of the past few days in Manchuria.

You have been informed of the steps already taken by this Government in this matter and I assure you that this subject is continuing to receive most careful consideration.


Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.]

Mr. Yung Kwai,

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of China.



Sep. 25, 1931. P.J.

FE:MMH:REK

9/25/31

FE

REK

700.04/1905

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 28, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 7 a. m.

793.94
 Secretary of State,
 Washington.



675, September 28, 4 p. m.

Following two telegrams have just been received from
 American Consul General at Nanking:

"September 28, 10 a. m.

I have received ^{eye witness} (?) report that crowd of students
 from Shanghai and Nanking aggregating more than two thousand
 are mobbing the Foreign Office demanding resignation of the
 Minister of Foreign Affairs because of alleged friendship
 for Japan, end of policy of non-resistance, and war with
 Japan".

"September 28, 11 a. m.

My September 28, 10 a. m. Reliable report that the
 Minister for Foreign Affairs has been so beaten by students
 and cut with broken glass that he may not live. Presumed
 to be now with President Chiang. C. T. Wang ignored
 warning of danger and insisted on remaining at his duty

JOHNSON

RR
 GSB

700.64/1904

007-12 1931

0431

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Gray

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

September 28, 1931.

SEP 28 31

bp

AMERICAN CONSUL,

NANKING (China).

so

Please deliver to Minister for Foreign Affairs
as from me the following message:

QUOTE ~~News~~ Reports of attack on you have ~~greatly~~
shocked me and I hasten to express my ^{earnest} ~~sincere~~ hope
for your speedy recovery UNQUOTE.

Slavin
WY

793.94/1904

OK

Sep. 28. 1931. PM

mm

FE:MMH/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by *mm*

SKH

Sent by operator *M.*, 19

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

0432

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Gray

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

September 28, 1951

793.94
AMERICAN CONSUL,

NANKING (China).

81 Your September 28, 11 a.m., to Peiping.

FOR PECK FROM HORNBECK.

Please convey to Minister for Foreign Affairs
appropriate ^{personal} message of sympathy from ^{Hornbeck} in regard to
attack on him.

Stinson

SKH.

793.94/1904

W
mmh
FE:MMB/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950 1-128

0 4 3 3

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DA FE

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Tokio

September 28, 1931

Rec'd 9:15 a. m.

FROM
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 28 1931
Department of State

Secretary of State
Washington

fig

700.00/1000

163, September 28, 5 p. m. /1874

My telegram No. 161, September 25, 7 p. m.

I have just received the following note from the
Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note
of September 25 in which you were so good as to convey to
me the views of the American Government on the subject of
the actual condition of affairs in Manchuria.

The Japanese Government is deeply sensible of the
friendly concern and the fairness of views with which
the American Government has observed the recent course
of events in Manchuria. In common with the hope expressed
by the American Government, it has already caused the
Japanese military forces in Manchuria to refrain from any
further acts of hostility, unless their own safety, as well
as the

12/13/31
100

0434

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence A. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #163, from Tokio, Sept. 28, 1931,
9:15 a. m.

as the security of the South Manchuria Railway
and of Japanese lives and property within that railway
zone is jeopardized by the aggression of Chinese troops
or armed bands. Every care has been, and will continue
to be, exercised by the Japanese forces to observe all
the requirements of international law and international
agreements, and to avoid any action that is calculated to
prejudice an amicable settlement of the differences
between Japan and China.

The Japanese Government is confident, ^{that} by frank and
unimpassioned discussions between the two parties in
conflict, in the light of their true and lasting interests,
an adjustment will be found to set at rest the existing
situation of tension in Manchuria".

The Foreign Office told me that they had communicated
it to the Japanese Minister at Washington. It has also
been released to the press. Repeated to Peiping.

NEVILLE

C88


0435

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOROTHY DETZER
 Executive Secretary
 WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE
 FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM

Telephone
 Metropolitan 3807

Headquarters U. S. Section
 1805 H Street
 WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Mr. Secretary's Office

September 23, 1931

MANCHURIAN SITUATION.

Mr. Secretary:

Having this evening studied with great care the incoming telegrams of September 23, especially those from Geneva, and having reviewed those of earlier recent dates, together with other incoming official documents, I find that:

(1) (a) China apparently desires action on the part of any or all of the powers and (b) has definitely asked the League to act on the basis of Article 11 of the Covenant and (c) has definitely asked the American Government to act (in words referring to but not expressly invoking the Kellogg Pact).

(2) Japan's diplomatic effort so far has been directed to delaying any action by the powers and particularly to opposing proposals for action by the League. Her representatives have apparently endeavored to create the impression that China and Japan would prefer that the matter be left to be dealt with by and between themselves, that if left to themselves they will be able to handle the matter by diplomatic processes, and that there is therefore no ground for or need of action by the League or by other powers. Their representative at Geneva states that his Government is willing to deal with the matter by Sino-Japanese negotiations and has "alleged" (I quote from the report telegraphed us) that the Chinese Government has intimated that it is willing -- which the Chinese representative has (according to

Gilbert's

700.4/1006

1906

SEP 25 1931

043F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

Gilbert's reports of the proceedings) three times denied.

It is my estimate that in any settlement which might be arrived at between China and Japan alone, the present military situation would not be liquidated and sources of irritation which would tend to lead sooner or later to a real war on a large scale would be left inherent in the situation.

424

SKH/ZMF

0437

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 23, 1931.

MANCHURIAN SITUATION.

Mr. Secretary:

793.94
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SKH/EGC

~~SECRET~~
FE

0438

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

KE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

TOKIO

Dated September 28, 1931

Rec'd 12 noon.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 28 1931
 Department of State
file
79.C.

162, September 28, 3 p. m.
 Department's 169. *1776a*

One. The Japanese Government are not likely to consent now to a commission of investigation by any third party. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said as much to me when I delivered the note. They are I believe ready to negotiate directly with the Chinese at any time.

Two. What the Japanese, or at least those who have control in Manchuria, have in mind seems to be a settlement of a number of outstanding issues there. Some of these are claims like the Nakamura case; others are broader questions such as the position of Koreans in Manchuria, the building of Railways, land rights and taxation, and still others border line questions between the two such as alleged boycotting, interference with legitimate Japanese business and the like. The claim is made that the Japanese have seldom been able to reach

definite

792.94/1907

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #162, from Tokio, Sept. 28, 1931,
 3 p. m.

definite understandings on any of these points and that in many cases the Chinese are unwilling or unable to carry out the agreements they do make.

Three. Many Japanese believe that the South Manchuria Railway requires extraordinary protection and that the property and even the lives of their people are in danger at times. The recent action of Chinese in destroying or attempting to destroy a portion of the South Manchuria Railway is they think a sample of what is to be expected in that region. The military authorities and a portion at least of the Japanese public are convinced that a demonstration of Japan's will and ability to protect her rights was needed at this time.

Four. The Japanese are determined to have no contending Chinese factions in Manchuria. A great many believe that without their own forces the region would be given over to banditry as the Chinese have little public spirit or military discipline. This is somewhat borne out by the fact that a small Japanese force was able to take charge over Mukden and the famous arsenal/a few hours despite the alleged presence of twenty odd thousand crack Chinese troops. In the Changchun-Kirin region there were supposed to be over sixty thousand Chinese soldiers,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

3- #162, from Tokio, Sept. 28, 1931,
 3 p. m.

yet the Japanese occupied both places with less than five thousand men. At both Mukden and Kirin the Chinese had many more men than the whole Japanese contingent in Manchuria. The best military information I have bears out the Japanese statement that they have not exceeded the fifteen thousand men allowed as railway guards. This incident indicates many Japanese feel a degree of indiscipline which is dangerous if it had to be relied upon for others. They intend to impress upon the Chinese that they cannot interfere with legitimate Japanese interests with impunity. They wish to obtain assurance, by fear if no other way is open, that their rights will be respected.

Five. I do not know to what extent this attitude is shared by the conservative elements in Japan. I know that Shidehara was dreading the present incident. I do not believe that the Foreign Office approves the use of force at the moment and I think that the big business men feel that it is a mistake. I have been informed that Japanese business in other parts of China has already been affected through cancellation of contracts. This may also be due to fear of war and to the fact that

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

4- #162, from Tokio, Sept. 28, 1931,
 3 p. m.

fact that many lines of goods can be purchased in England
 since the fall of the pound.

Six. I am inclined to think that if a joint Sino-
 Japanese conference can be arranged the Japanese delegates
 would be conciliatory, especially if directed by the Foreign
 Office. In any case so far as I can see there is little
 chance of getting any other arrangement out of Japan for
 the time being.

Repeated to Peiping.

NEVILLE

CSB

0442

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

gray
1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

September 28, 1931.

lla

SEP 29 31

AMLEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA).

349

URGENT.

The Department desires that you prepare and send
within the next few hours the best possible estimate
the Legation can make of the ^{present} number and disposition of ^{ARM.}
Japanese troops in Manchuria.

Sturges

SKH

700.94/1507A

RAM
FE: RSM: EJJL

24
FE

ONE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

1907a

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE

JS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RECEIVED
SEP 29 1931
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

PEIPING

Dated September 29, 1931
FROM

Rec'd 11:40 p.m. 28th

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 29 1931
Department of State

Telephoned
to Chinese
Charge.
Sept. 29, 1931.
M.M.H.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

676, September 29, 8 a.m.

Legation's 675, September 28, 4 p.m.

Following from Consul General at Nanking,

September 28, 6 p.m.:

"I am informed that the Minister for Foreign
Affairs although he has three wounds on the head
is not in serious danger."

JOHNSON

JS

793.94

FILED

OCT 12 1931

793.94/1.00

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

THE UNDER SECRETARY
SEP 26 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 25, 1931

U
FE
7.9.C

S.M.

793.94
note
393.1123

Mr. Midzusawa telephoned that the Embassy had noticed in the press a report that three Americans had been killed in Mukden by the Japanese Army. Mr. Midzusawa said that the Embassy had made inquiry of the Foreign Office in Tokyo and had received a reply to the effect that the report had been investigated by the Commander of the Japanese Garrison at Mukden and that the report was declared to be unfounded.

793.94/1909

RAM
RSM:EJL

FILED

OCT 12 1931

6041

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS




SEP 28 1931 September 22, 1931.

Conversation.

Mrs. Dorothy Detzer, Executive Secretary,
Women's International League for Peace
and Freedom, Headquarters U. S. Section,
1805 H Street, Washington, D. C.

and Mr. Hamilton.

Subject: The Mukden Incident.



Mrs. Detzer called by appointment and stated that her organization was very much stirred up over the Mukden incident and that she wished to be informed of the attitude of the Department toward the matter so that replies might be sent to numerous inquiries which the organization was receiving from its members. She referred particularly to the headlines in THE NEW YORK TIMES article of September 22 reading as follows: "Washington Wary in Conflict in China - State Department Plans No Move on the Trouble in Manchuria - May Invoke 9-Power Pact- But Officials Appear to Believe Resort to Kellogg Peace Treaty Might Offend Japan". Mrs. Detzer stated that in her opinion the Mukden incident was a clear-cut case of aggressive warfare and that she saw no reason why the American Government should not take immediate action under the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact. She stated that she had written a letter to the President on the matter expressing her views.

Mr. Hamilton discussed with her certain articles of the treaties to which she referred and stated that all that he could

793.94

793.94/1310

FILED

0446

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

could tell her was that, as stated in the first sentence of THE NEW YORK TIMES article of September 22, "The State Department is following the Manchurian situation closely and with concern". Mr. Hamilton stated that thought and concern directed toward a particular problem sometimes led to action and sometimes did not and that he could make no prediction with regard to that particular point. He assured Mrs. Detzer however that the Department was carefully and thoughtfully following developments.

Mr. Hamilton invited Mrs. Detzer to call again and she stated that she would do so, ~~but~~ particularly if no action by the American Government were forthcoming.

MMH/REK

H.W.W.

SKH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lynch NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 811.7693/11 FOR letter

FROM Radio Corp. of America) DATED Sept. 25, 1931
TO: NAME 1-1172 470

REGARDING: the disabling of the Radio telegraph station at Mukden,
due to military operations.

dew

793.74/1911

1911

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 125.6331/132 FOR Tel. #346.2

FROM China (Johnson) DATED Sept. 24, 1931
 TO: NAME 1-1172 ...

REGARDING: City Government at Mukden is now headed by a Japanese military officer.

✓
 emc

793.94/1312

1912

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 24, 1931

Rec'd 2 p. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

646, September 24, 2 p. m.

The Consul General at Mukden has requested the Legation to forward the following to the Department:

"September 23, 10 a. m. Referring to rent agreement for Consular premises, the repairs provided for therein were being carried out when occupation of Mukden by Japanese troops brought work to a standstill. Contractor has received over one-third of cost of repairs, has purchased all materials and is ready to complete work if Consulate make payments. Residence now uninhabitable. With Department's sanction I propose to complete work contracted for and make balance of payments out of rent, submitting receipts therefor in lieu of rent receipt of Chinese authorities.

The City Government is now headed by Japanese military officer".

JOHNSON

KLP
 WSB

0450

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11602 FOR tel #636 5pm

FROM China (Johnson) DATED Sept. 23, 1931
TO NAME 1-1172 ...

REGARDING: Movement in party circles to hold Chiang Kai Shek responsible for national disunity and Japanese attack. Demands that he resign. Soong conducting movement for reconciliation with Canton. Probable reinstatement of Hu Han Min and elimination of Chiang Kai Shek.

dg

793.94/115

1913

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

GRAY

Poiping via N. R.

Dated September 23, 1931

Rec'd 1:50 p. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

636, September 23, 5 p. m.

From American Consul General at Nanking.

September 22, 3 p. m.

"One. Although reported bombing of train north of Changchun has occasioned conjectures in Nanking regarding possibility that Russia is seeking pretext for military action on the Chinese Eastern Railway, greatest interests centers in Chinese internal politics. Please treat following as confidential:

Following Japanese action in Manchuria a strong movement developed in party circles to hold Chiang Kai Shek responsible for national disunity and Japanese attack and there were demands that he resign. Soong returned from Shanghai September 21, 8 a. m. and Chiang returned from Kiangsi by naval vessel September 21, 3 p. m. Soong is conducting energetic movement for reconciliation with Canton. It is reported that Canton still insists

893.00/11602

761.93

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #636, from Peiping, Sept. 23,
 1931, 1:50 p. m.

still insists on reinstatement Hu Han Min and elimination of Chiang Kai Shek either of which it is felt here would involve retirement of T. V. Soong.

At secret meeting at party headquarters on the morning of September 22 Chiang Kai Chek made impassioned plea for unity against Japanese aggression and a party member accused him of extravagant language whereupon Chiang became wildly hysterical offering to sacrifice everything and die at the head of Chinese forces fighting Japan. Apparently Chiang restored himself to popularity. Various resolutions were passed, one of which threatened death to any one revealing the proceedings at the meeting. It is now anticipated that Chiang will resign civil offices, retaining military power only, and that Hu Han Min will be actively reinstated but it is not known how Soong will be affected if this happens".

JOHNSON

KLP

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

U
 DCR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

193-24
 FOR THE PRESS

SEPTEMBER 24, 1931.

The Secretary of State has sent, through the American diplomatic missions in China and in Japan, identical notes to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments, the texts of which are as follows:

"The Government and people of the United States have observed with regret and with great concern events of the past few days in Manchuria. In view of the sincere desire of the people of this country that principles and methods of peace shall prevail in international relations, and of the existence of treaties, to several of which the United States is a party, the provisions of which are intended to regulate the adjustment of controversies between nations without resort to use of force, the American Government feels warranted in expressing to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments its hope that they will cause their military forces to refrain from any further hostilities, will so dispose respectively of their armed forces as to satisfy the requirements of international law and international agreements, and will refrain from activities which may prejudice the attainment by amicable methods of an adjustment of their differences."

790.66/1914

MMH/REK
 m.m.H.

0454

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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REP


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY


Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 29, 1931


Rec'd 3:30 a. m.



FROM



Secretary of State,
 Washington.



TRIPLE PRIORITY.

677, September 29, 10 a. m. /1907a

Your 349, September 28, 11 a. m. received September 29, 9 a. m.

One. Best available estimate Japanese troops in Manchuria as follows:

Regular troops second division one brigade at Changchun, one brigade at Kirin, one battalion at Tunhua, one battalion at Chenchiatun, one company at Yinglingkan, total of second division seven thousand men (Japanese figures) two air squadrons, strength unknown. Independent Korean brigade of three thousand stationed at and near Mukden. Railway guards of five thousand men (six battalions) Japanese claim above units on peace footing and figures as above but Legation's advice is that 8,432 men and officers form peace strength division.

It is

793.94
 note
 893.0146

793.94/1016

148 6 1931

FILED

V

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #677, from Peiping, Sept. 29, 1931,
 10 a. m.

It is generally believed that the headquarters of the heavy artillery brigade at Port Arthur and eight guns entrained for Mukden. Total number of guns not known. Heavy artillery personnel figures not included in above estimate.

Two. With reference to reservists please see Military Attache's report dated June 22, 1931, number 8048 which is believed to be substantially correct. Military Attache's estimate is that Japanese reserve-ists in Manchuria number approximately thirty thousand. It is now impossible to estimate number of reserveists being used. They were used in the beginning and it is believed that they are still being used although/as ^(?) they are ^{not (?)} now in regular uniform.

JOHNSON

KLP
 HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Riga, Latvia.

FE
FE
FE

September 18, 1931.

793.94
note
861.911

SEP 28 31

Copy in FE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 29 1931
Department of State

DIVISION OF
EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OCT 6 1931
COPY IN EE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 27 1931
SECRETARY OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY
OCT 6 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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No. 8064

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

OCT 29 1931

Sir:

I have the honor to report that, after having given the subject of Japanese-Chinese relations, especially the agitation in Japan in connection with the killing of Captain Nakamura, an officer of the Japanese General Staff in June last while proceeding towards Taonan, Mongolia, the closest attention for two days, the Soviet press dropped the matter, at least

FILED

NOV 5 1931

793.94/1616

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Tyson NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-2-

least temporarily. The communications on this subject were credited to the official Telegram Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS), and were dated from Tokyo and Shanghai.

In their issues of September 8 and 9* appeared telegrams dated September 5 - 8. From Tokyo on September 5 it was stated that the Japanese newspapers in Mongolia had been recently raising a clamor about the murder of Captain Nakamura in Inner Mongolia while surveying in the Khinghan Mountains, allegedly by Chinese soldiers, although the Chinese press denied the fact of the killing. It was added that the circles of the Japanese War Ministry were talking openly of the necessity of occupying a part of Manchuria, and that the Japanese Foreign Office had agreed to the necessity of energetic action in the event that the Mukden authorities should undertake to evade their responsibilities in the matter.

From Shanghai on September 6 it was reported that the Nanking Government circles credited the Japanese Military Circles with a desire to exploit the embarrassments of China, arising from the flood and the dissensions between Nanking and Canton, and that this explained the heat of the Japanese discussion of the Nakamura case. In the same telegram it was added that the Japanese Consul General at Mukden had on
 September

* e.g. Moscow IZVESTIA, Nos. 248 and 249.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-3-

September 5 made a second energetic demand for immediate satisfaction for the murder.

Also from Shanghai on September 7 came the report that the Chinese press had become nervous over the case, and that the Japanese had moved a division into Chosen and * Manchuria and created an air base near Dairen for the occupation of Manchuria.

From Tokyo on September 8 it was reported that the Japanese War Minister Minami had made a report on the Japanese policy in China to a meeting of business men at Osaka, and that Koiso, another military figure, had reported on the same subject on September 7 to a meeting of Right groups of the Upper House. Furthermore, military war planes had thrown incendiary sheets into many towns. Finally, the Cabinet had decided to await a second investigation before permitting the Foreign Office and the War Ministry to proceed to take the necessary measures in concert.

1/

These telegrams appeared under the unchanging headlines, "Sharpening of Japanese-Chinese relations," and were given editorial comment in the PRAVDA. That newspaper began by stating that "the strenuous efforts of British and American capitalism to penetrate into Manchuria" were moving "the Japanese imperialists" to speed up the strengthening of the position of Japan in Manchuria, then proceeded to try to link certain events in Chosen as well as the Nakamura case with this policy.

* My underlining.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-4-

policy.

Respectfully yours,

F. W. B. Coleman

F. W. B. COLEMAN.

Enclosure:

1. Sharpening of Japanese-Chinese Relations.
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 249, September 9, 1931).

(In quintuplicate).

Copy to E.I.C.Paris.

Copy to E.I.C.Paris for Peiping.

Copy to American Consul, Harbin, via Dept.

800 R

DEM/hs

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

ENCLOSURE NO. 1 TO DESPATCH NO. 8064 OF SEP 18 1931
 FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
 No. 249,
 September 9, 1931.

SHARPENING OF JAPANESE-CHINESE RELATIONS.

(Translation of editorial comment on a telegram
 from Tokyo).

The strenuous efforts on the part of American and English capitalism to penetrate into Manchuria compel the Japanese imperialists to make haste with the materialization of their plans concerning the strengthening and the expansion of their economic and political supremacy in Manchuria. The Japanese bourgeois press is in every way preparing the soil for this by supporting the aggressive tendencies of the militaristic circles in Japan. The Japanese press tried to represent the clashes between Chinese and Koreans in Vanbaoshan, which were caused by the actions of the Japanese authorities, as attacks upon Japanese subjects (Koreans).

Immediately after the events in Vanbaoshan, there was a wave of anti-Chinese pogroms throughout the whole of Korea, not without the connivance of the Japanese authorities. By way of reply to this, the movement in favor of the boycott of Japanese merchandise increased in China.

For the purpose of preparing their further advance into Manchuria, the Japanese militarists, on the one hand, transfer betimes whole divisions to Kwantung province, to the alienated zone* of the Southern Manchurian Railway,
 and

* polossa otchuzhdeniya

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-2-

and to Korea, while on the other hand they promote by every possible means the scramble of the generals in the north of China. The recent uprising of one of the northern generals, Shi Yui-hsiang, against Chang Hsüeh-liang; the trip of the Canton Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chen, to Tokyo; the flight, in a Japanese aeroplane, of the former adversary of the Mukden clique, Yen Hsi-shan, back to "his" province, Shensi — all these facts have taken place with the overt cooperation of the Japanese General Staff and the Japanese diplomats.

Just now a new pretext has been found for open advance into Manchuria, a pretext that is very much boomed by the entire Japanese press. That pretext is the murder of the captain of the Japanese General Staff, Nakamura, in Inner Mongolia. Nakamura, accompanied by some assistants among whom there were also Russian white guards, had been "traveling" as a "private person" in a strategically important district in the ~~Binghan~~ mountains, and was killed, it is not known whether by Chinese soldiers or by bandits, about six weeks ago. In other conditions this fact would have been allowed to pass without much notice, but in connection with the Japanese plans for an advance into Manchuria, the murder of Nakamura has become the basis for agitation on the part of those circles in Japan, that advocate ^{the} military the occupation of Manchuria. Some of them want to seize the whole of Manchuria, while others recommend to be satisfied with the seizure of the railways — more especially of those that ^{the} are competing with/Southern Manchurian Railway which belongs to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-3-

to Japan.

The events which are developing in Manchuria thus reflect the intensification of the Japanese predatory tendencies, while on the other hand they also exemplify the sharpening of the imperialistic conflicts of interest.

js/hs

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P.R./45 FOR #324

FROM Japan (Neville) DATED Sept. 12, 1931
 TO NAME 1-1172 ...

REGARDING:

The Nakamura Case.

Tense relations between Japan and China over Manchuria have been further strained by the—, which occurred on June 27th, 1931, which was the murder of a Japanese staff officer in Mongolia by Chinese soldiers, Captain Nakamura, and his two companions. Details.

793.94/1917

1917

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence D. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 7 -

Captain Nakamura was carrying one hundred thousand yen at the time of the attack. If this is correct the only conclusion that can be drawn is that he was making a trip to Mongolia for the purpose of spying and propaganda. The Japanese and especially the military authorities are very much incensed over the affair which is likely to have a very bad effect upon Sino-Japanese relations.

The Nakamura Case:

The already tense relations between Japan and China over Manchuria have been further strained by an affair which is believed to have occurred on June 27th last, but news of which has only recently been made public. This was the alleged murder in Mongolia by Chinese soldiers of a Japanese staff officer, Captain Nakamura, and his two companions. The situation was further complicated by the fact that Captain Nakamura was traveling on a passport of a civilian student; the fact of his military status would not have been made public except through the insistence of the military authorities who have again embarrassed the Foreign Office in its handling of foreign affairs. Another suspicious circumstance in the case appears in the report that

Captain


046

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zagon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY



September 23, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR,
MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1931, 3:30.

Japanese troops in Manchuria.

I sent for the Japanese Ambassador and told him that I had received from the Council of the League of Nations, through the American Minister, a copy of the resolution which the Council had adopted in regard to Japan and China yesterday. I told him that I was sending a reply to this resolution and I handed him a copy of it in the form annexed. I said I had just sent it to Geneva and he then read it carefully and thanked me for giving him such prompt notice of it.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

RECEIVED
OCT 19 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Chas. E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Note from Secretary of State to President of the
League of Nations Council, September 23, 1931.

"I have received from the American Minister at
Berne the copy of the resolution of the Council of the
League of Nations which you transmitted to him.

"I have noted the two parts of this resolution
and the fact that they have been embodied in a note
which you have addressed to the Governments of Japan
and China.

"I assure you that the Government of the United
States is in whole-hearted sympathy with the attitude
of the League of Nations as expressed in the Council's
resolution and will dispatch to Japan and China notes
along similar lines.

"I have already urged cessation of hostilities and
a withdrawal from the present situation of danger and
will continue earnestly to work for the restoration of
peace."

0467

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles R. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

no distribution

September 28, 1931.

AmEmbassy,

Tokyo, Japan.

This message is to be
 classified as confidential
 and not communicated to anyone.

DEC 14 1931

DIVISION OF FOREIGN
 AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL FOR NEVILLE.

175
 I had a talk this afternoon with the Japanese Ambassador, in the course of which I told him that our great difficulty at the present moment lay in the fact that we had no adequate information from our own people as to the situation in Manchuria. Our Consul General in Mukden is absent and we have there only a Vice Consul. I explained to him that, in order adequately to answer questions, I must have full and authentic information as to the situation. I told him that I should like to have Mr. Hansen, Consul General in Harbin, who has long and familiar knowledge of Manchuria, go to Mukden and the other ^{places} parts which have been occupied by Japanese troops to report to me and that I should like to have Mr. Salisbury, of the Embassy in Tokyo, join him. The Ambassador said that he would immediately telegraph

722.64/1916A

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

0 4 6 8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
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Washington,

AmEmbassy, Tokyo, page 2.

telegraph Baron Shidehara, urging that this should be done /
 and emphasizing once more the friendly attitude of the
 American Government. He said that it would not be an inter-
 national investigation and that it would seem the most natural
 thing possible for the Embassy under these circumstances to
 request that one of the staff be permitted to go to Manchuria.
 I should be glad to have you, therefore, request permission
 of Baron Shidehara to send Salisbury to Manchuria for your in-
 formation.) At the same time you might tell him that we want
 Mr. Hansen to join Salisbury there and that you hope the Japan-
 ese authorities will give Hansen and Salisbury all facilities
 to look into the situation. You may tell him that there will
 be no publicity as to this request and that it may well be
 taken as a routine matter in consideration of the fact that
 we have no trained officer at present in Mukden to report.

It is important that Baron Shidehara get Debuchi's
 telegram before you see him, but Debuchi promised that he
 would send it immediately and would urge that facilities be
 granted

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0469

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT
Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

AmEmbassy, Tokyo, page 3.

granted. If this is to be done, it is important that
it be done very promptly.

Strinson
Wk

U WRC/AB

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959 1-138

0470

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

 F/E

REP


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.


TOKIO

Dated September 29, 1931

Rec'd 10:30 a. m.



file
EAC



Secretary of State,
 Washington.

File *SECRET* *WRC*
 SEP 29 1931

166, September 29, 7 p. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 Department's 175. *1918A* *and* *AT 29/31*

I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon.

He said that he had not heard from Dubuchi but that there
 could be no possible objection on the side of the Japanese
 to our sending two service men over the region in
 Manchuria. He asked me to let him know when Salisbury
 would be going so that arrangements could be made to
 facilitate his travel.

I shall have Salisbury start in a day or two at the
 latest and shall request the Minister in Peiping to have
 Hanson meet him in Mukden or Changchung. They can ~~then~~
 plan their itinerary. I propose that they visit Changchung
 Kirin, TunhuaChiang, Chiatun, Taonan, Mukden, Yingkow and
 Antung or other places where the Japanese forces have been
 or where they have posts of observation. They should send
 reports

70.0.04/1.19

FILED
 SEP 29 1931

5

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #166, from Tokio, Sept. 29, 1931,
10:30 a. m.

reports to the Embassy and Legation regularly for trans-
mission to the Department and return to their posts.

If this meets with the Department's approval I
request authority to give Salisbury \$500 as emergency
expense money and have him account for it later.

NEVILLE

CSB

HPD

0472

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 or
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
 It should be carefully paraphrased before
 being communicated to anyone.

Washington,

September 30, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

Confidential 1/1919

Your 166, September 29, 7 p.m.

Inform Peiping adequately by telegram of contents
 of Department's 175, September 28, 6 p.m., and 177,
 September 29, 6 p.m., and Embassy's 166, September 29,
 7 p.m. Department has not hitherto informed Peiping
 regarding this correspondence and arrangement but ~~will~~ ^{is}
 send an instruction directing Legation to send Hanson
 to Mukden on basis of information which Peiping will
 receive from you in accordance with the above.

Instructions for Salisbury and Hanson should be
 communicated by you to Salisbury for communication to
 Hanson. It is suggested that these be conveyed orally.

Authorization for Salisbury's expenses will follow
 and for Hanson's expenses will be sent direct to Peiping.

Approved by
Mr. Caste

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

793.94
 615/1919

Stinson.

SKH

UNCLASSIFIED

0473

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department **X**
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

October 2, 1931.

6P

AMEMBASSY,

OCT 2 31

TOKYO (JAPAN)

180

793.94/1919

793.94/1919

Department's telegrams numbers 177 and 178.

Transportation and per diem \$12.00 authorized

for Salisbury. The \$500 mentioned in number 177
should be accounted for under this authorization and
charged to authorization No. ~~4~~ 1932. He should
draw separate draft render separate account.

793.94/1919

793.94/1919

*note
124.944*

*Stinson
WJ*

FA:HAH:HM:MDM

FP

BA

FE *man*

*A-C
Rader*

CR

Oct. 2 1931, *ps*

WAG

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

0474

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
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OR
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TELEGRAM SENT
Department of State

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

AC
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NO DISTRIBUTION.

793.94/

September 29, 1931.

SEP 29 31

AmEmbassy,
Tokyo.

177

11919
Your 166, September 29, 7 p. m.

I am gratified that Baron Shidehara so quickly appreciated my need of direct information from Manchuria and that he immediately consented to giving permission to Salisbury and Hansen to make the trip. You may give Salisbury, as you suggest, \$500 as emergency expense money to be accounted for later.

700.04/1019

124.944

What we want is to have him and Hansen visit the various points in Manchuria where there has been fighting or where Japanese troops have advanced, as to Kirin, beyond where they have a right to be under treaty. We desire an expression of their best judgment as to the justification for these troop movements, the scope and extent of these movements and the reasons alleged. The Japanese claim that

Enciphered by

the

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-138

0475

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

L 138
 PREPARING OFFICE
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

AmEmbassy Tokyo page 2

the occupation of these places is only temporary and that troops will be withdrawn as soon as danger to Japanese lives and property is past. We should like to have this checked on the spot and to have any evidence obtainable as to whether troops have been withdrawn or when it is planned to withdraw them. In places outside of Mukden we should like to know what form of civil administration, if any, has been set up by the Japanese and if anything of this sort has been done whether the military are unduly interfering with the Chinese civil administration. In Mukden we wish to know how far the Japanese are holding the international and the native sections of the city; to what extent civil administration has been restored and whether it can at present act with any independence. It is reported that the radio station put up by the R.O.A. in Mukden has been destroyed. We wish confirmation or denial of this and if the destruction was only partial

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1968 1-138

0476

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 4, 19761-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAINCollect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

AmEmbassy, Tokyo, page 3.

a statement as to whether the station is being restored to operation. We should like to know the attitude of the Chinese toward the Japanese; whether it is such as to make withdrawal of the Japanese troops difficult without incurring danger of banditry or reprisal resulting in loss of Japanese lives and property. It has been reported here that the Chinese actually resident in Manchuria were not unfriendly to the Japanese occupation. If senseless acts as reported in the papers, such as bombing of trains, have occurred, we should like to know whether they were done by irresponsible troops and whether the military authorities have dealt out the punishment deserved. It is taken for granted that both Salisbury and Hansen already understand the rights of the Japanese in Manchuria. Keeping these rights in mind, they should be able to inform us as to how far they have been illegally extended, whether the extension was justifiable and whether there seems to be a desire to restore

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

B. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960 1-128

0477

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Ryan Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 or
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

AmEmbassy, Tokyo, page 4

restore the status quo ante.

Full information, as secured, on these various points should be telegraphed without delay and after the inspection both Salisbury and Hansen should write the Department full reports as to the facts and the deductions in their opinion to be withdrawn from these facts. Salisbury should explain all this to Hansen when they meet. The Department wants very promptly as accurate a picture of the situation as can be cabled and later on a carefully considered estimate.

Strinson
WKG

U WRC/AB

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1965 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

GENEVA

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

29 1931

FROM

Dated September 29, 1931

Rec'd 11:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



145, September 29, 2 p. m.

In the meeting of the Assembly this morning the President of the Council presented a resume of the Sino-Japanese question to date but brought out nothing new. It is learned that the Chinese delegate was anxious to speak but was dissuaded, the question was thus not debated.

The present program is a meeting of the Committee of five this afternoon which will prepare a resolution to be submitted to the Chinese and Japanese this evening. If their concurrence is obtained the matter will be brought to a temporary conclusion in the Council tomorrow. Unless some new element arises in the situation the Council will then adjourn to reconvene in ten days to pass on developments in that interval.

HPD
 CSB

GILBERT

FILED

OCT 12 1931

0479

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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99 1931

Geneva

FROM Dated September 29, 1931

DIVISION OF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Rec'd 11:55 a. m.

7 SEP 30 1931

SEP 29 1931

Secretary of State, DIVISION OF FOREIGN

DIVISION OF

Washington.

WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

146, September 29, 3 p. m.

Cost of two telephone communications between the

Secretary of State and Minister Wilson on September 23

were approximately \$390. Request authorization for pay-

ment.

GILBERT

HPD

CSB

FILED

OCT-6 1931

793.94/131

048C

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

4-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department ☒ OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT *Gray*

Department of State

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
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PLAIN

OCT 2 31

October 2, 1931.

6P

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA, (SWITZERLAND).

61 Your No. 146, September 29, 3 p.m.

Mail instruction to Legation Berne authorizes
payment from contingent expense allotment that office.

Stinson
H.H.B.

793.94/1921
FA:FF:RL

WE

BA

CR
Sen
Oct. 2, 1931

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M. 19.....

793.94/1921

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 4, 1976

FA-23

1590
 The Honorable

October 5 1931

Hugh R. Wilson,
 American Minister,
 Berna.

Sir:

The Department has received from the American Consulate at Geneva, Switzerland, telegram No. 146 of September 29, 1931, with reference

to your allotments for the current fiscal year, and approves the following readjustments:

CONTINGENT EXPENSES, FOREIGN MISSIONS, 1932. The contingent expense allotment of the Legation is increased from \$5,990 to \$6,380, in order to provide \$390 in item 0510, telephone service.

793.94/1921


CR
 10-2-31
 1931

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

WE. 10-2-31
 WILBUR J. CARR

793.94/1921
 F-77:RL



WJH

048

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 29 1931
 Department of State

September 24, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR,
 MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI.

Japanese troops in Manchuria.

The Japanese Ambassador called today, evidently due to a misunderstanding, to ask whether I had finished my note to Japan and to China. I told him that I had not yet finished the note. It was left so that if I finished it this morning I was to let him know by telephone before one o'clock, and if I did not it would go over until tomorrow morning, as I found that he was rather anxious to get out of town for the afternoon. 793.94/1968

The Ambassador brought with him a clipping of the article of Hugh Byas in the New York Times of this morning and pointed out Byas' statement denying that the Japanese had begun any advance on Harbin. The Ambassador said he had officially confirmed this denial; that no such advance had been made. In reference to the occupation of Kirin, he said that only a few soldiers were left there; that the rest of them had withdrawn. He said he thought that the Japanese Government were beginning to withdraw their forces and he hoped to have definite news for me very soon.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

793.94/1968

RECEIVED

SEP 16 1931

048

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 CONFIDENTIAL DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY
 Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 29 1931
 Department of State
 September 24, 1931.

79394
 MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN
 MINISTER, MR. FERDINAND VEVERKA.

Manchurian situation.

The Czechoslovakian Minister brought up the Manchurian situation. I found he had been a member of the Council at the time of the Turkish Bulgarian boundary matter and he began by pointing out to me that he was afraid the League of Nations was going off on a false analogy with that case, which he thought was very different from the present situation in Manchuria. I then took occasion to give him as clearly as possible an epitome of my own views, and I said I feared that the proposition to send an investigating commission into Manchuria would have a very bad effect in exciting nationalistic feeling behind the militaristic element of the Japanese Government. He said he thoroughly agreed with me.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

FILED

OCT 19 1931

793.94/1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
September 24, 1931.
Division of EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 29 1931
Department of State
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR,
MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI.

793.94
note
843.74

Destruction of radio station at Mukden.

During the call of the Japanese Ambassador I told him that I had received word from the Radio Corporation of America as to the destruction at Mukden on September 19th of the radio station which they had built for the Chinese Government. I explained to him that the Radio Corporation regarded this as an important link in their chain of communication with the Orient and that its destruction had made a very unfortunate impression to the effect that the Japanese were trying to cut off communication with Manchuria. I told him that until that radio station was replaced this unfortunate suspicion would be likely to continue. He told me he would communicate with his government and let me know.

793.94/19:4

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OCT 19 1931

File No. ..

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By William J. Ryan NARS, Date June 1, 1976

0485

0486

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

September 28, 1931.

7P

SEP 28 31

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

176

URGENT.

The Department desires that you prepare on the basis of information *in hand and* ~~you now have~~ without consulting any Japanese source, and send within the next few hours the best possible estimate the Embassy can make of the number and present disposition of Japanese troops in Manchuria.

793.94/1925A

Stinson

SCH.

RMM
FE:RSM/ZMF

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Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

0487

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

GRAY

Tokio

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

September 29, 1931

Rec'd 11:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

FROM Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 29 1931
 Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.E.

165, September 29, 4 p.m.

Department's telegram number 176, September 28, 7 p.m.

The following is estimate of Japanese troops with
 colors now in Manchuria based on reports of Lieutenant
 Cranford in Mukden and data in Office of Military Attache
 Tokio:

Second division: Tunhua, one battalion of thirtieth
 Infantry, 500; Kirin, brigade headquarters, fourth infantry,
 thirtieth infantry less one battalion, second field
 artillery, one battalion of heavy field artillery, second
 squadron cavalry, second battalion engineers, 3300;
Changchun, second division headquarters, brigade head-
 quarters, sixteenth infantry, twenty ninth infantry,
 2200; fifth railway guards from Changchun to Tunhua,
 800; first railway guards from Changchun to Ssupingka
 800. Total in second division area 7000.

Thirty-ninth reenforced brigade from Korea:

Chengchiatun one battalion of seventy-eighth infantry, one
 battery of twenty sixth field artillery, one squadron of
 twenty sixth cavalry, 800; Mukden, Kwantung army

headquarters,

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NOTED
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

2-#165, Tokio, September 29, 1931
 4 p.m.

headquarters, thirty-ninth Brigade headquarters, seventy-seventh infantry less one battalion, seventy-eighth infantry less one battalion and two companies, twenty-sixth field artillery less one battery and one section, one battalion of engineers, 3400; Hsinmintun, two companies infantry and one section of field artillery, 340; Yinkow, two companies of infantry, 300; Antung, one company infantry, 150; one company of 6th railway guards from Chengchiatun to Ssupingkai, two companies of sixth railway guards at Ssupingkai, second railway guards, Ssupingkai to Mukden, third railway guards Mukden to Antung and Tashichiao, fourth railway guards in Kwantung. Total railway guards 3200. Total troops in thirty ninth brigade area 8200, sixth air regiment, probably including two observation squadrons, location unknown, 300. Total Japanese troops in Manchuria 15,500.

Above figures are based on estimated normal peace strength of units.

Total Japanese loss reported as follows: Mukden, killed 3 privates, wounded 4 officers, 19 privates; Changchun, killed 3 officers, 63 privates, wounded 3 officers 73 privates, total killed 69, wounded 99.

On twenty fifth, two armored trains reported sent to Taonan, returned twenty sixth.

NEVILLE

0485

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY

Division of
 EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 29 1931
 Department of State

September 24, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR,
 HERR FRIEDRICH W. VON PRITZWITZ UND GAFFRON

Manchurian situation.

The German Ambassador inquired about the Manchurian situation. I told him that it seemed quite clear that the Japanese coup had been managed by a militaristic element and there was a sharp division between them and the Japanese Foreign Minister and the civilian element of the Cabinet who were doing their best to withdraw from the difficult situation in which they were placed. I said I personally knew Mr. Wakatsuki and believed that he and Baron Shidehara were seeking to liquidate the situation, and that my object was to give them an opportunity to do so without running the risk by outside intervention for the present of arousing the nationalistic spirit of Japan behind their opponents, the militaristic element of the government. I told him that the situation, however, was difficult and delicate and that if they failed it might become necessary for the outside nations to take a clear and emphatic stand. I said that from my experience in the Orient I knew that Orientals were accustomed to settling such a situation by direct negotiation between themselves and that if they could do so it was the part of wisdom to let them.

S HLS:HHR

HLS.

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FILED
 OCT 16 1931

793.94

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence A. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 4, 1976


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY

September 24, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR,
 NOBILE GIACOMO DE MARTINO.

Japanese troops in Manchuria.

The Italian Ambassador asked me if I could give him an epitome in regard to my policy in Manchuria that he might take with him for personal narration to Signor Mussolini and Signor Grandi. I then told him that in Manchuria now we had a very different situation from that in 1929 in the case of China and Russia; that it seemed to be clear that the Japanese coup had been managed by a militaristic element and there was a sharp division between them and the Japanese Foreign Minister and the civilian elements of the Cabinet who were doing their best to withdraw from the difficult situation in which they were placed. I said it was thus not clear that Japan as a government had acted; that I personally knew Mr. Wakatsuki and believed that he and Baron Shidehara were seeking to liquidate the situation and that my object was to give them an opportunity to do so without running the risk by outside intervention for the present of provoking a flare-up of nationalistic feeling which would help their opponents - the militaristic element of the Government. I told him, however, that the situation



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 OCT 16 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY


- 2 -

situation was difficult and delicate and that if they failed it might become necessary for the outside nations to take a clear and emphatic stand. I told him further that I knew from my experience in the Orient that the Orientals were much more prone than Occidentals to desire to settle such a situation by direct negotiations between themselves and that if they could do so it was the part of wisdom to let them.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976



Telegram From The Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Nanking

Date September 27, 1931.

Mr. J. D. Thomson, British Manager of the Peking-Mukden Railway, left Huangkutung near Mukden on Train No.102 on Thursday, the 24th, with his wife and family, accompanied by one German and one Italian lady, in a special car attached to the rear of the train which was packed with refugees from Mukden. After proceeding for one hour the distance of about 34 kilometers a Japanese military aeroplane armed with machine guns appeared suddenly and fired upon the train. The noise of the aeroplane and the machine gun fire was distinctly heard in his car. By the time the train stopped the noise of the motor was audible though the aeroplane was invisible. Mr. Thomson immediately examined the train and found the fourth and fifth cars from the rear profusely spattered with bullet marks. Inquiries for casualties revealed two Chinese refugees killed, five wounded and others panic-stricken. He examined one of the killed and several of the wounded. He understood one wounded died later. Mr. Thomson definitely stated that the attack was totally unwarranted, no soldiers being in the vicinity or on the train. He examined the bullet holes and found in every case that the bullets penetrated in a downward angle, showing that they were fired from above as the railway track in the vicinity is higher than the ground.

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OCT 19 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

The above details have been furnished by Mr. Thomson to the British Consul General at Tientsin, adding that the lives of his wife, children, himself, and other foreigners were as much in danger as any refugee on the train, and he considers the attack upon the passenger train, filled with defenseless refugees, not only unwarranted but outrageous.

Since Mr. Thomson's return news has been received regarding similar attacks on another train. A Japanese aeroplane attacked Train No.105 at Yaoyangho at 11:10 on the morning of the 24th. Train No. 105 down was fired on at Chuliho on the 25th at 5:45 A.M. Two railway guards were taken off by Japanese. To the above activities of Japanese troops a new and sinister act was added yesterday. A locomotive and five cars of Train No.102 were derailed today near Paichipu about 50 miles south of Mukden owing to the removal of rails by alleged bandits in fact Japanese agents who looted the train. Thirty passengers were killed, among them as reported, one Englishman, one Russian, and one Hindoo. Shortly after the derailment a Japanese locomotive and two cars occupied by twenty Japanese arrived. They examined the wreck and turned Northward.

The Japanese Government has made a threat in a statement that if the Chinese authorities refused direct negotiations with Japan China should bear the responsibility for the consequences.

Chinese Legation,

Washington, September 27, 1931.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

*Handed to the Secretary of State
 by the Chinese Charge
 77-28-31*

FE

for courtesy copy of this note

See 793.94/2141

CHINESE LEGATION
 WASHINGTON

September 27, 1931.

SEP 29 1931

SEP 29 1931

Sir:

I have the honor to inform you that I am instructed to
 communicate to you the reply of the Chinese Government to
 the note of the American Government dated September 24, 1931,
 as follows:

"The Chinese Government received yesterday
 afternoon the communication from the American
 Government regarding the present situation in
 China, transmitted from Peiping by the American
 Minister to China.

"The Chinese Government and people are
 gratified to learn that the Government and people
 of the United States, feeling themselves much
 interested in the situation created in China by
 the action of Japanese troops, desire that prin-
 ciples and methods of peace, instead of armed
 force, should be used in the relations between
 China and Japan, as between any other civilized
 states. It is the conviction of the Chinese
 and Japanese Governments, that the American Gov-
 ernment has been prompted by the earnest desire
 to uphold, as one of the signatory powers, the

sanctity

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1931-6-1-130

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,

Secretary of State.

793.94/1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

*Handed to the Secretary of State
 by the Chinese Charge
 78-28-31*

FE

for correct copy of this note

See 793.94/2141

CHINESE LEGATION
 WASHINGTON

September 27, 1931.

SEP 29 1931
 Department of State

*file
 27.C*

SEP 29 1931

Sir:

I have the honor to inform you that I am instructed to
 communicate to you the reply of the Chinese Government to
 the note of the American Government dated September 24, 1931,
 as follows:

1868A

"The Chinese Government received yesterday
 afternoon the communication from the American
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 ernment has been prompted by the earnest desire
 to uphold, as one of the signatory powers, the

sanctity
 FILED
 OCT 19 1931

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,

Secretary of State.

793.94/1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

sanctity of those international treaties, particularly the Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed at Paris in 1928, which bind the parties not to have recourse to war but to use pacific means in their relations with one another.

"As a result of the aggressive movements of the Japanese troops, our territory has been invaded, our cities and towns have been occupied, and in certain cases ransacked, our public officers and innocent citizens have been injured, insulted and murdered. Even on the very day when the American Government despatched its identic notes to the Chinese and Japanese Governments, advising restraint from further hostilities, Chinese passenger trains carrying refugees on the Peiping-Liaoning (Peking-Mukden) Railway were attacked by bombs and machine gun fire from Japanese military aeroplanes, which resulted in many casualties. This, while the Japanese Government declares that it has taken all measures to prevent the aggravation of the situation and that the troops will be forthwith withdrawn from the occupied areas, and free acts of war are still being committed by the Japanese troops. In spite of such circumstances, the entire Chinese Nation has been exhorted to maintain a dignified calm, in the belief that the delinquent party will render a full account for its wanton acts to all the civilized states, under the principle of the sanctity of international treaties for the maintenance of peace.

"The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

"The Chinese Government can conceive no other way to satisfy the requirements of international law and international agreements, when international law and international agreements have already been trampled under foot, than for Japan to withdraw her troops immediately and completely from the occupied areas and to give full redress to the aggrieved party, the Chinese Government and the Chinese people.

"It is the earnest hope of the Chinese Government that most effective means will be promptly taken for maintaining the dignity and inviolability of the international treaties above referred to, so that all efforts heretofore made by the various powers, especially by the United States for the preservation of peace, might not be in vain."

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.


Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

0498

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clasun & Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

GREEN

Geneva

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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Dated September 29, 1931

29 1931

Rec'd September 2 p.m.

DIVISION OF

FROM

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

144, September 29, 9 a.m.

Consulate's 142, September 26, 10 a.m.

Council last night resumed consideration of the

Sino-Japanese dispute. Japan announced that the withdrawal of troops is continuing and that now Japanese soldiers remain outside railway zone only at Mukden, Kirin and small detachments at Tanamintung and ^{Ching} ~~tsi~~ shiatung. The Chinese delegate requested explanations of the reported attacks by air planes on trains of the Peiping Mukden railroad.

With regard to policy the Japanese reiterated their intention of withdrawing troops as the return of peaceful conditions makes it possible. The assurance of the Chinese government has not always been able to enforce its authority in the provinces.

In replying to the Japanese statement, the Chinese delegate wished the assurance that all the troops were withdrawn, the statu quo ante would be completely restored and that any property seized would be returned. On the question of how the evacuation should be carried out,

FILED

OCT 1 1931

1931/09/29

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

2-144, from Geneva, September 29, 19
9 a.m.

the Chinese delegate stated that the views of his government favoring a neutral commission of inquiry were well known to the council. However, in a desire to be conciliatory he

"proposed that the Council should help the parties to reach an agreement as to arrangements on the spot which would make it possible to fix an early date for the completion of the withdrawal of troops, and render it unnecessary for the Council to send a Commission of Inquiry from Geneva." In the debate upon this proposal that ensued the Japanese delegate declared that he would at once telegraph to Tokio the proposal for the organization of a Commission on the spot to expedite the evacuation provided such Commission was composed solely of Japanese and Chinese; if the Chinese proposal envisaged the inclusion of nations of any other state he would not transmit it to his government. The Chinese delegate maintained the view that since there were matters on which the two countries could not agree and since his proposals envisaged the Council's help in reaching an agreement, there should be a representative of the Council appointed on the Commission which would report to the Council.

Cecil here intervened in an attempt to reconcile the two points of view but no solution was reached in the meeting. His suggestion that the Chinese delegate put in writing

0500

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

3-144, from Geneva, September 29, 19
9 a.m.

writing his proposals for the organization of a commission
on the spot was adopted.

The Council then adjourned after a statement from the
President that he would ^{explain the} ~~the~~ entire situation to the
Assembly at its session this morning.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 4, 1976

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 29 1931
 DIVISION OF
 EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF EASTERN AFFAIRS
 Dated September 29, 1931
 Rec'd 2:45

FROM

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 29 1931
 Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.C.

188, September 29, 3 p. m.

Japanese Embassy here issued to newspapers of last night and this morning a communique in explanation of recent events in China, and Japanese Ambassador informs me that this communique has already been given to the press in Tokyo. The Japanese Ambassador has also submitted to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs a statement containing the substance of telegrams which he has received from Tokyo on this same subject and which he understands the Japanese Ambassador at Washington has already communicated to the Department for its information.

Translation of the above statements are going forward to the Department in mail despatch.

Repeated to Geneva.

KIRK

RR
 KLP

667.12.1831

700.04/1831

0502

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

m FE

WP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

A portion of this telegram Peiping
 must be closely paraphrased
 before being communicated
 to anyone.

Dated September 30, 1931

RECEIVED FROM
 30 1931

Rec'd 2:17 a. m.

Paraphrases sent to M.9.10.
M.9.10.
fe
E.9.10.

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

September 30, 8 a. m.

Following from Consulate General at Canton September

29, noon: (End gray)

"Japanese Consul General has informed me Sino-Japanese relations are being maintained on the basis of "modern statesmanship" at Canton, no serious anti-Japanese demonstrations or boycott being expected here. I interpret these facts to be the result of Eugene Chen's recent conversations with Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Cantonese seemed to be using Japanese pressure on young marshal to force favorable compromise from Chiang Kai-shek hence sympathetic attitude toward Japan. Japanese Consul General stated his government is determined to eliminate young marshal and Chang Tso-ping from Manchurian politics.

(Begin gray) Wang Ching-wei and Sun Fo left yesterday for Hong Kong to discuss peace proposal with Chen Ming-shu."

JS

JOHNSON

79394
 note
 893.00

793.94/1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By William S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

PARAPHRASE

A telegram of September 30, 1931 from the American Minister at Peiping transmits a telegram from the American Consul General at Canton giving the following information:

The American Consul General at Canton has been told by the Japanese Consul General that serious boycotts and agitation against the Japanese are not anticipated and that at Canton modern statesmanship serves as the basis for the present conduct of relations between Japan and China. This situation is believed to grow out of talks had recently by Eugene Chen with the Japanese Foreign Minister.

The Japanese Consul General states that Japan is determined to eliminate from Manchurian politics Chang Hsueh-liang and Chang Tso-ping. The Cantonese appear to be employing Japanese pressure on Chang Hsueh-liang to force from President Chiang Kai-shek a favorable compromise, and are thus sympathetically disposed toward Japan.



The American Consul General reports that on September 28 Wang Ching-wei and Sun Fo left Canton for Hong Kong to discuss peace proposal with Chen Ming-shu.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

*Handed to the Secretary of State
 by the Japanese Ambassador*
 IX-28-31

JAPANESE EMBASSY
 WASHINGTON



FE

*Le
 E.G.C.*

79394

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of September 25, in which you were so good as to convey to me the views of the American Government on the subject of the actual condition of affairs in Manchuria.

The Japanese Government is deeply sensible of the friendly concern and the fairness of views with which the American Government has observed the recent course of events in Manchuria. In common with the hope expressed by the American Government, it has already caused the Japanese military forces in Manchuria to refrain from any further acts of hostility, unless their own safety, as well as the security of the South Manchuria Railway and of Japanese lives and property within that Railway Zone is jeopardized by the aggression of Chinese troops or armed bands. Every care has been, and will continue to be, exercised by the Japanese forces to observe all the requirements of international law and international agreements, and to avoid any action that is calculated to prejudice an amicable settlement of the differences between Japan and China.

The Japanese Government is confident that by frank and unimpassioned discussions between the two parties in conflict, in the light of their true and lasting interests, an adjustment will be found to set at rest the existing situation of tension in Manchuria.

793.94/1034

FILED

OCT 19 1931

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Syme NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN
 Geneva

RECEIVED
 1-1330
 30 1931

Dated September 30, 1931

Rec'd 9:45 a. m. *FE*

FROM

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 30 1931
 Department of State

149, September 30, 10 a. m.

Consulate's 144, September 29, 9 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 SEP 30 1931
 DIVISION OF
 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

The following is the "compromise" proposal which
 the Chinese plan to present to the Council today:

"Whereas the Chinese Government still believes
 that the best method that may be devised by the Council
 for securing the prompt and complete withdrawal of the
 Japanese troops and police and the full reestablishment
 of the status quo ante, is the sending of a neutral
 commission to Manchuria and,

Whereas, the Chinese representative is desirous
 of being as conciliatory as possible and of meeting
 halfway the wishes of the Japanese Government; therefore
 the following proposal is made:

That the Council shall help the parties to come to
 an agreement as to arrangements on the spot which
 make

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793.94/1031

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Long NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #149, from Geneva, Sept. 30,
9:45 a. m.

make it possible to fix an early date for the completion of the withdrawal of all troops, police and aerial forces, thereby making it unnecessary to send a Commission of Inquiry in connection with the complete restoration of the status quo ante;

That the Council in making the arrangements referred to shall appoint neutral persons on the spot to represent it who shall participate in all arrangements made and report currently to the Council."

Please regard this as confidential until Consulate's telegram reporting this afternoon's session of the Council is received.

GILBERT

KLP
WWC

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Ryan NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

GRAY

Peiping via Naval Radio

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated September 30, 1931

RECEIVED

Rec'd 3:20 a.m.

1-1336 30 1931

FROM

DIVISION OF
Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

680, September 30, 9 a.m. Department of State

Following two telegrams from Mukden:

"September 29, noon. SWOOP, Japanese edited Chinese paper, today reports that Chinese officials at a meeting at Kirin on the 26th decided to form a provisional government and elected Chew Sha, the Chief of Staff and Acting Chairman, and Chang Tsin Hsiang as provisional governor of the province. Practically all other members of former commission have been elected as chief of their respective bureaus. This Government will control civil, military, and judicial proceedings, full responsibility for the administration resting on the Governor.

The commission form of government prescribed by Nanking has been abandoned apparently. Report not yet confirmed.

Latest according to information some Japanese forces are still at Kirin".

"September 29, 5 p.m. Three thousand Chinese police have been recruited for service Mukden, many of them

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 30 1931

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c.g.c.

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SEP 12 1931

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM -

2-680, from Peiping, September 30, 193
9 a.m.

them armed. Japanese forces are now less in evidence in the city. In order to restore confidence it is understood that Japanese forces will not be withdrawn until there is assurance that the Chinese can keep order. Traffic on the Peiping-Mukden line south of Hsinmin was interrupted for one day following the wrecking of southbound passenger train by bandits on the 26th. The southbound train which left here yesterday morning returned from Hsinmin last night due to the menace from bandits. Until adequate protection will be afforded travel on this section is hazardous.

The formation of the Kirin Government reported in my September 30, noon, confirmed. Local Japanese press reports Chinese opposition to proposed establishment of provincial government at Chihhsien and the existence of movement for the independence of Manchuria and Mongolia".

JOHNSON

KLP

HPD

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

*Handed to the Secretary of State
 by the Chinese Charge
 IX-28-31*

FE

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 29 1931
 Department of State

TELEGRAM FROM THE CHINESE ENVOY AT MOSCOW
 Dated September 24, 1931

He q. e.

SEP 29 1931

793.94

According to official reports Japanese troops after taking Liaoning (Mukden) have occupied in succession Antung, Yingkow, Changchun and Kirin, and seized the Kirin-Changchun and Ssupingchieh-Taonan Railways.

After occupying Liaoyuan, Japanese troops advanced toward Tungliao.

Japanese troops from Yenchih have occupied Tunhua.

Japanese troops have carried away the military stores from the Arsenal at Liaoning, and valuables from the principal banks.

Japanese authorities have put up a Japanese as Mayor of Mukden.

It is reported at Harbin that Japanese troops are coming and the Japanese Consul has notified his colleagues that unless for the purpose of maintaining order there will be no troop movements.

It is reported that on the night of September 22, 300 Japanese women and children entrained from Harbin for the South. The Chinese Commissioner of Foreign Affairs tried to stop them but without avail.

Chinese Legation,

Washington, September 26, 1931.

753.94/1537

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SEP 29 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE UNDERSECRETARY



September 25, 1931. *file 29.C.*

793.94
 Memorandum of conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, September 24, 1931.

The Japanese Ambassador called to say that he had had a talk with the Secretary about the Manchurian situation and wanted to have a really long talk with me about it the next day. He said that there was naturally a great deal of misunderstanding, which I admitted, but we did not go into any full discussion of the matter. He said that, although it was true that the military authorities in Mukden had appointed a Japanese as mayor, the Japanese Government had promptly disavowed this action. He said also that Japanese troops had gone to Kirin, but that they had immediately been withdrawn.

793.94/1931

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OCT 19 1931

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 23, 1931.

793-94

Mr. Kato, of the Japanese Embassy, called with a copy of the Japanese text of a telegram from the Japanese Foreign Office which Mr. Kato said was the first full account of the Manchurian situation that the Embassy had received.

Mr. Kato gave a running translation, in English, of the Japanese text, the contents of which appeared to be identical with the text of the letter addressed by the Japanese representative on the Council to the Secretary General of the League of Nations, as reported in Mr. Gilbert's telegram No. 133, of September 23, 8 p.m.

Mr. Kato intimated that he felt that the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs was having a very hard time in a very difficult situation and that the sympathies of the Embassy here were with Baron Shidehara in the circumstances in which he found himself placed.


Mr. Kato added that Ambassador Debuchi would delay his intended departure for Japan for a couple of weeks.

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RSM: RJT

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OCT 12 1931

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

FE

JS
The portion of this message
in confidential code must be GENEVA
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. Dated September 23, 1931
Rec'd 10:13 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

133, September 23, 8 p.m.

Consulate's 131 September 23, 2 p.m.

At the very last moment the decision was taken to
hold in private the Council meeting this evening.

The following is the text of a letter addressed
this afternoon by the Japanese representative on the
Council to the Secretary General in explanation and
defense of the Japanese position. He requested that
this letter be communicated to the President and members
of the Council and drew attention to the fact that the
entire information covering the period from September
18 to 21 was derived from official sources.

'On the night of September 18th, about 10:30 p.m.,
a Chinese detachment of some 350 men blew up part of
the main line of the South Manchurian Railway North of
Mukden at a point southwest of the Chinese barracks
at Peitaying. This detachment led by its officers was
proceeding in the direction of Lung-Kouchen, between
Peitaying and Mukden, when it was discovered by a
railway guard patrol which endeavored to stop it but
failing, was obliged to open fire. A battle ensued
in which a company of the Japanese garrison of Mukden
took

0512

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-2- from Geneva #133, sept 23.

took part.

In view of the gravity of the possible consequences of such an incident in present circumstances and the disproportion between the Chinese and Japanese forces, the Japanese headquarters at Mukden promptly took such steps as it considered indispensable. At 2:30 a.m. it had the Chinese barracks occupied and the troops who were stationed (#) disarmed; subsequently the open town, the official buildings and the arsenal were occupied.

Immediately upon receiving notice of the incident the troops stationed at Tichling, Kaiyuang, Tsuwingkai and Liao Yang concentrated at Mukden; and the Kwangtung staff proceeded in haste to that town at noon on September 19th.

On receiving news of the clash the guards stationed along the South Manchurian Railway took the precautions to protect the track and the safety of Japanese Nationals and to deal with any possible attack by the large Chinese forces in Mukden.

At Changchun a Japanese was sent on September 19 to the Chinese troops stationed in the neighborhood of the town at Kwangchiangtze and Nanking, to arrange for their disarmament, but the Chinese offered strong resistance to the Japanese troops who had 60 killed

and

-3 - from Geneva #133, Sept 23.

and 96 wounded. The garrison of Changchun however was disarmed without incident about noon on the same day.

On the 20th similar measures were taken at Antung, Fenghuang, Chong and Yingkow; various strategic points in the neighborhood of the railway zone were occupied. The customs offices at Antung, Yingkow, etc., were carefully respected.

In the places mentioned, order is being maintained in cooperation with the Chinese, and at Mukden the Chinese municipal police are continuing to discharge their duties under the direction of the Japanese authorities.

In places outside the railway zone the Japanese consuls have applied to the local authorities to provide for the protection of our nationals. As however Japanese subjects have suffered serious maltreatment at Kerin the Japanese detachment has proceeded to that town but has to return to its garrison in a day or two as soon as calm has been restored.

We have been able so far to ensure the complete safety of foreigners resident in the area under Japanese control. In view, however, of the disquieting situation caused by the presence of undisciplined hands and the attitude of the population in looser areas,

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-4- from Geneva #133 Sept 23.

areas, the small forces at our disposal have not been thought sufficient to provide effective protection for the railway lines and for Japanese and foreign residents and the Thirty Ninth Army Corps (4,000 men) was sent to Manchuria from Korea on September 21st. (End Green)

I have been confidentially informed that the members of the League not represented on the Council are planning to pass a resolution probably at the next plenary session of the Assembly indorsing the action taken by the Council. This plan is intended as a gesture to support the Council and to emphasize that the present is of world^{wide} concern.

GILBERT

#-omission

FW

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-4- from Geneva #133 Sept 23.

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GILBERT

#-omission

FW

0516
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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

COPY:KC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS.

September 23, 1931

793.94/1940 ✓
Subject: Manchurian Incident.

The Chinese Charge has brought in a copy of a telegram from his Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that the Chinese Government has made no proposal, formal or informal, for formation of a Sino-Japanese joint committee of investigation.

793.94/1940 (EXCERPT)

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

*file
29C*

79394

September 23, 1931.

Manchurian Situation

Mr. Yung Kwai, of the Chinese Legation, called and left copies of the attached telegrams which had been received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

He asked if the Department had any further information and I told him that we had received nothing which materially added to the very full reports which were appearing in the press. He said that the situation appeared to be growing worse and I replied that, while it was certainly worse than it appeared from the first reports received, the situation did not appear to have changed greatly during the last 24 hours. He asked what I thought would be the outcome of the matter. I answered that I thought we should have to await further developments both in Manchuria and at Geneva before that question could be answered.

793.94/1940

Mr. Yung Kwai then referred to the activities of the League as reported in the press and asked what the American Government was doing about it. I replied that the Department on two occasions had discussed the situation at some length with the Japanese Embassy here just as it had discussed the matter with the Chinese Legation, that it was giving the matter its very serious consideration and that everything that appeared possible was being done.

FILED
SEP 23 1931

RSM:EJL

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zym NARS, Date June 4, 1976



Handled by Mr. Yang Kwan
9/23/31
DDM

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING

Dated September 22, 1931.

Today's Rengo report from Tokyo stating that the Japanese Government has decided to accept the Chinese Government's formal proposal for the formation of a Sino-Japanese Joint Investigation Committee is not true.

The Chinese Government has never made such a proposal, formal or informal.

Chinese Legation,
Washington, September 23, 1931.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

*Handed by Mr. Young Kwan
9/23/31
Kwan*

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 23 1931
Department of State

Dated September 22, 1931.

The situation is becoming hourly more serious.

Japanese troops have occupied more places, including Antung, and are rapidly moving on.

It is reported that Japanese plain-clothes men have landed at Lungkow, Shantung.

The Military authorities in Tokyo have decided to order a general mobilization.

Chinese Legation,
Washington, September 23, 1931.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

*Handed to me by
Mr. Yung Kwai
of Chinese Legation
IX - 22 - 30
FE/SKHA
TE*

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AT NANKING

79394



OCT 17 1931 Dated September 21, 1931.

*R.E.
S.G.C.*

The movement of Japanese troops has not yet been stopped.

The Chinese Chargé d'Affaires at Tokyo reports that the Japanese Cabinet in a meeting yesterday decided to send troops to Chientao, and that the War Ministry is ready to mobilize a sufficient force for the purpose.

Reports from various sources indicate that Changchun, Yingkow and other places were occupied day before yesterday.

Last evening at six o'clock Japanese troops entered Kirin, the capital of the Province.

793.94/1931

Chinese Legation,

Washington, September 22, 1931.

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
OCT 19 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

*Handed to the Secretary of State
 by the Chinese Charge
 IX-28-31*


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FE



TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING

Dated September 23, 1931.



With reference to the charge made by Japanese that our soldiers attempted to destroy a bridge of the South Manchurian Railway, the Superintendent's office of the Peining (Peiping-Mukden) Railway reports that on the night of the 18th Japanese troops started the trouble by blowing up the Liu River bridge of the South Manchurian Railway and afterwards scattered dead bodies of our soldiers nearby so as to fasten the blame upon us for the destruction of the bridge.

The fact is that before destroying the bridge the Japanese had built a siding around this spot so that there would be no interruption in the running of trains. There was on the bridge a signal tower from which a strict watch was always kept.

This mode of manufacturing evidence defeats its own ends.

Chinese Legation,

Washington, September 26, 1931.

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OCT 19 1931


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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence D. Lyman NARS, Date June 4, 1976


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No. 639



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AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE
American Consulate
Tsingtao, China, September 1, 1931.

SUBJECT: Incident Between Japanese and
Chinese at Tsingtao.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SIR:

1/- I have the honor to transmit herewith, copy of
the Consulate's despatch to the Legation at Peiping,
China, No. 481, dated August 31, 1931, entitled as
above.

Respectfully yours,

W. Roderick Dorsey

W. Roderick Dorsey,
American Consul.

Enclosure:

1/- as stated.

Three copies to Department.

800.
WRD/FP

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OCT 15 1931

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0523
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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Copy for Department of State.

NO. 491

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE
American Consulate
Tsingtao, China, August 31, 1931.

SUBJECT: Incident Between Japanese and
Chinese at Tsingtao.

Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to state that the incident that occurred in Tsingtao on the night of August 18, 1931, between Japanese and Chinese, and to which considerable prominence has been given in the press was not a serious affair but has given rise to some speculation as to its real meaning.

It seems to have started through an altercation between a certain Japanese fish and ice dealer and some Chinese who either interfered with his movements or made some trouble over a payment for fish. Whatever the opening incident, blows were exchanged and a crowd composed of both nationalities soon gathered, the rioting assuming always a more serious nature.

The fish and ice dealer is a member of a society known as Kokusui Kai, which while being a guild or club for a group of men of his trade is also a pri-

vate.....

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

- 2 -

vate volunteer corps ready to protect Japanese interests when deemed appropriate. Their headquarters is located over the fish dealers shop.

As the mob increased additional members of the Club came to assist and eventually others further away were telephoned for to join their comrades. The melee became general and continued until the Public Safety Forces of the Municipality and the Japanese officials accompanied by their Police arrived on the scene and the rioters dispersed.

Exaggerated reports of the seriousness of the incident were soon about. It is not known how many received minor injuries but two days after the event only sixteen Japanese and ten Chinese had reached hospitals.

An examination made by a German doctor at the request of both sides shows that the wounds of the Japanese are generally light. In three cases bones were possibly broken. The damages were probably caused by blows from sticks, stones and kicks. Of the ten Chinese three were slightly injured but seven had more serious wounds made with knives or other sharp instruments. The Doctor asserts that these cuts indicate the victims were attacked from behind or when defending themselves.

There is no question that the members of the Kōkusei Kai brought arms into the fray, the weapons being sword-canes. Eye witnesses of western nationality have told me that they saw them drawn.

The Chinese point to the carrying of arms by an organized.....

0525

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

organized volunteer body as proof of culpability on the part of the Japanese.

The Japanese, on the other hand, assert that the assault was premeditated by the Chinese who took advantage of the absence of Japanese warships from the port to stage an anti-Japanese demonstration.

The general opinion seems to be that it was an ordinary incident swelled to undue proportions by the undercurrent of feeling that still lingers from the Korean incidents.

The situation was tense for a few days and precautions were taken throughout the area near the Japanese shrine where the fighting occurred and which is largely inhabited by Japanese. Strong patrols of Chinese Police and Pao An Tsei were maintained and Japanese Police were also on the scene in larger numbers. The Japanese cruiser KUMA returned under forced draught two days after the event.

All is outwardly quiet at present. The Japanese Community Association seeks to fasten all blame upon the Chinese and has passed resolutions demanding that the Japanese Consul General file a strong protest with the Chinese Authorities demanding punishment, compensation and guarantees for the future.

Preliminary conferences have been held between the Japanese and Chinese Authorities and both sides seem to be working for an early amicable adjustment.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

W. Roderick Dorsey,
American Consul.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence J. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 4 -

Original and one copy to Legation,
Three copies to Department of State,
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

800.
WRD/FP

A true copy of
the signed original.
FP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 30, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 1:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.



Tel. to Nanking
OCT 13 1931
Fl Ego

PRIORITY

685, September 30, 11 p.m.

One. Carter of the Institute Pacific Relations
telegraphs today from Shanghai where he has seen Chinese
leaders as follows:

"League encouraged by Stimson note was believed
ready propose neutral commission supervise Japanese
withdrawal, then Hoover stated desirable direct settlement
between China, Japan. This took heart out of League's
plans and immediately resulted in Japan's publicly altering
statement regarding troop withdrawal. Delay enabling
Japan repeat French Rhineland separatist movement. Each
day's delay increases possibility provocative incidents
both sides and general conflagration"

Two. I am reliably informed this evening that the
Manchurian provinces have declared their independence.

Three. My information is that there is growing
anti-Japanese movement in Yangtze Valley. For the present
the authorities have control here in the north but there
are

793.94/1944

FILED

OCT 14 1931

793.94
note
500.0112

X

J

0528
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

2-685, from Peiping, September 30, 1950.
11 p.m.

are rumors that this control is weakening and there is no
telling when trouble may occur. I feel that it is very
desirable that something be done on the part of the
League or ourselves to restore confidence among these
people who are inclined to blame League and Kellogg's
Pact signatories for their present predicament.

JOHNSON

CSB

0529

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

NAVAL RADIO

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

Washington,

October 13, 1931.

793.94/1944

AMERICAN CONSUL,
Nanking
SHANGHAI (China).

OCT 13 31

1P

89 FOR THE MINISTER. /1944

Legation's 685, September 30, 11 p.m., paragraph one.

You may inform Carter that your quotation of his
 message was duly received, that the many problems occa-
 sioned by the situation to which it relates have from the
 beginning had the Department's solicitous attention, and
 that his interest is appreciated.

793.94/1944

Stinson
 544

FE:RSM/ZMF
 SKH

RSM
 FE
 M.H.

OCT 13 1931.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.,

19

Index Bu.—No. 50.


U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1922 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

IN EARLY REFER TO
FILE NO.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE



AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

Geneva, September 24, 1931.

file

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

793.94

My dear Mr. Secretary:

As of possible interest to you I should like to give you an account of what took place yesterday in relation to our telephone conversations.

Mr. Norman Davis has been, as you know, associated with a lot of these continental gentlemen for years and as an old associate of the President, had desired to speak to the President and tell him how these very vivid and dramatic incidents in Geneva appeared to him. I knew of course that Mr. Davis had in mind to call him up.

I was in the Third Committee of the Assembly and indeed had just made a speech when an usher told me I was wanted on the telephone from the Consulate. An excited voice on the line said "Come on the gallop, the Secretary of State is on the wire". I rushed out of the door, commandeered a motor belonging to a Greek Secretary and got down to the Consulate in time to have my conversation with you.

Mr. Davis is very much impressed with the wisdom of the position that you and the President are taking relative to direct negotiations between the interested parties. He regrets that you do not feel able to take a seat on the Council but thoroughly understands your difficulties.

It is impossible to give you a picture of the strain under which everybody is working here. This seems an odd remark to make to you who are laboring under a heavier individual responsibility than any of these men here, but they react on each other and the very publicity which surrounds them renders the

situation

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.,
U. S. A.

Wilson

793.94/1944-1/2

FILED

1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-2-

situation more acute. They look on this episode as the test case for the League of Nations and counsels of despair are not lacking which urge that the Council pass a resolution that the League can do nothing about this and ask the United States to take it over. Other rumors are that the League should invite the United States to sit on the Council in spite of our attitude and either force our hand or make us assume responsibility for the future. I do not think these counsels will prevail but a state of extreme nerves and apprehension exists in which anything is possible.

I cannot tell you how much I appreciate the constant and prompt information and instructions that you are giving me. I have just had your message to the President of the Council and know this will create an excellent soothing effect.

Best of luck to you, my dear Mr. Secretary,
through these trying times.


Very sincerely yours,



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Syme NARS, Date June 4, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



FE
Jul
29C

Subject: Manchurian Situation.

MANCHURIA.

79394
note

Telegrams over the weekend indicate little change in the situation in Manchuria. The outward movement (from the railway zone) of Japanese military forces was practically completed before the middle of last week; the result was "occupation" of South Manchuria by those forces. Subsequent movements have been those of redistribution and consolidation. Although there are reports that the Japanese armed forces are being "withdrawn" into the railway zone, it can hardly be expected that, in a situation of excitement and antagonisms such as now exists, responsible authorities could or will remove those forces from places which have been occupied for the purpose, real or alleged, of protecting Japanese lives and property.

There are several reports of activity of Japanese airplanes. Hanson reports quiet at North Manchuria. American naval officer, telegraphing from Harbin, reports that sentiment is pro-Japanese.

In the latest telegram received, dated Nanking, September 27, 5 p.m. (Nanking's 73), Consul General Pech reports that the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs states that according to Chinese official reports from Manchuria the spoke of Japanese

793.24/1945

RECEIVED
SEP 28 1931

0533

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

Japanese military occupation is being extended and that "activities such as the bombing of trains are being continued if not intensified".

CHINA PROPER.

From Nanking it is reported that the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs has been assaulted and nearly killed by Chinese students who invaded the Foreign Office. From Hong Kong the reports indicate that at Hong Kong and Kowloon Chinese have rioted, have killed a Japanese family, and have had to be dealt with by police and soldiers, with resort to bayonets, and with several Chinese casualties in consequence. According to the Japanese Minister of Navy, special precautions are called for at Shanghai, at Hankow and at Canton. It is reported that Japanese naval forces are being sent to Hankow.

It may be remarked that, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs incapacitated, and with no Chinese Minister in Washington, and with the Chinese Minister to Great Britain absent at Geneva, China's diplomatic machinery is badly crippled.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

The Council of the League last week virtually announced that it had done all that it could. Lord Cecil said that the Council "had prevented war". The Council is supposed to

0534

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

to meet again today, and the Assembly is supposed to meet tomorrow. It may be assumed that the League will in one way or another attempt to shift the responsibility for action -- positive or negative -- to the United States.

UNITED STATES.

The American Government, on September 25, sent to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments identical notes calling attention to the desire that principles and methods of peace shall prevail in international relations, the existence of treaties the provisions of which are intended to regulate the adjustment of controversies without resort to use of force, and expressing hope that the Chinese and the Japanese Governments will so control their armed forces and so regulate their activities as not to prejudice the attainment of amicable methods of an adjustment of their differences. This Government sent, on Friday and Saturday, September 25 and 26, to its Embassy in Tokyo and its Legation in Peiping instructions informing those missions of action taken up to date, attitude and contemplated course of action.

The American Government's identical notes seem to have been received without resentment in Japan and with approval in China. In the latter country, however, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs has expressed surprise that there was no express mention of the Washington Conference treaties or the Kellogg Pact. Important American newspapers have commented

0535

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 4 -

mented favorably on the notes and the position taken by the Administration during the past week. Some commendatory telegrams have come in, and some telegrams calling for action under the Kellogg Pact have come in.

It may be expected that, if the Japanese and the Chinese authorities fail to preserve order and to prevent further bloodshed, public opinion in this country will begin to take sides, both as between China and Japan and in approval and disapproval of the action taken, the attitude assumed and the further position which may be adopted by the Government.

The question which perhaps should most engage the Department's thought at present is that of our obligations and responsibilities in relation to the Nine-Powers Treaty of 1922 and the Kellogg Pact. Both the legal and the political aspects of that question and of decisions which may have to be made with regard to it are of concern.

5-00.A4D
711.9312-
Anti-War

SKH/7M


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

*Handed to Mr. Carter
by the Japanese
Ambassador 9/25/31
jm.*

UNDER SECRETARY
SEP 25 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAPANESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON




~~DER~~
~~FE~~

STATEMENT ISSUED AFTER EXTRAORDINARY CABINET MEETING,
SEPTEMBER 24, 1931.

793.94

See 29.C



(1) The Japanese Government has constantly been exercising honest endeavors in pursuance of its settled policy to foster friendly relations between Japan and China and to promote the common prosperity and well-being of the two countries. Unfortunately, the conduct of officials and individuals of China, for some years past, has been such that our national sentiment has frequently been irritated. In particular, unpleasant incidents have taken place one after another in regions of Manchuria and Mongolia in which Japan is interested in especial degree until an impression has gained strength in the minds of the Japanese people that Japan's fair and friendly attitude is not being reciprocated by China in like spirit. Amidst an atmosphere of perturbation and anxiety thus created a detachment of Chinese troops destroyed tracks of the South Manchurian Railway in the vicinity of Mukden and attacked our railway guards at midnight of September 18th. A clash between Japanese and Chinese troops then

793.94/1946

FILED
OCT 19 1931

took place.

(2) The situation became critical as the number of Japanese guards stationed along the entire railway did not then exceed ten thousand four hundred while there were in juxtaposition some two hundred twenty thousand Chinese soldiers. Moreover, hundreds of thousands of Japanese residents were placed in jeopardy. In order to forestall imminent disaster the Japanese army had to act swiftly. The Chinese soldiers, garrisoned in neighboring localities, were disarmed and the duty of maintaining peace and order was left in the hands of the local Chinese organizations under the supervision of the Japanese troops.

(3) These measures having been taken, our soldiers were mostly withdrawn within the railway zone. There still remain some detachments in Mukden and Kirin and small number of men in a few other places. But nowhere does a state of military occupation as such exist. Reports that Japanese authorities have seized customs or salt gabelle office at Yingkou or that they have taken control of Chinese railways between Supingkai and Chengchiatun or between Mukden

0538

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

and Sinmintun are entirely untrue, nor has the story of our troops having ever been sent north of Changchun or into Chientao any foundation in fact.

(4) The Japanese Government at a special cabinet meeting September 19th took decision that all possible efforts should be made to prevent aggravation of the situation and instructions to that effect were given to the commander of the Manchurian garrison. It is true that a detachment was despatched from Changchun to Kirin September 21st, but it was not with a view to military occupation but only for the purpose of removing the menace to the South Manchuria Railway on flank. As soon as that object has been attained the bulk of our detachment will be withdrawn. It may be added that while a mixed brigade of four thousand ten was sent from Korea to join the Manchurian garrison the total number of men in the garrison at present still remains within the limit set by the treaty and that fact cannot therefore be regarded as having in any way added to the seriousness of the international situation.

(5) It may be superfluous to repeat that the Japanese Government harbors no territorial designs in

0539

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By William S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Manchuria. What we desire is that Japanese subjects shall be enabled to safely engage in various peaceful pursuits and be given an opportunity for participating in the development of that land by means of capital and labor. It is the proper duty of a government to protect the rights and interests legitimately enjoyed by the nation or individuals. The endeavors of the Japanese Government to guard the South Manchurian Railway against wanton attacks would be viewed in no other light. The Japanese Government, true to established policy, is prepared to cooperate with the Chinese Government in order to prevent the present incident from developing into a disastrous situation between the two countries and to work out such constructive plans as will once for all eradicate causes for future friction. The Japanese Government would be more than gratified if the present difficulty could be brought to a solution which will give a new turn to mutual relations of the two countries.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

September 21, 1931.

Mr. Blanchetel, First Secretary
of the French Embassy.

Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: The Situation in Manchuria.

Mr. Blanchetel stated that his Embassy would like to know the facts with regard to what had occurred in Manchuria.


Mr. Hornbeck stated that we were not sufficiently informed with regard to the origins of the situation to be able to explain the steps which have led up to it, but that the situation, as reported to us, is that Japanese military forces have occupied at least four strategic cities in Manchuria and have taken control of the public utilities at those points; possibly, also, a fifth city; but that, although they apparently have a cruiser at Tsingtao, they have not landed forces there.

Asked by Mr. Blanchetel what is our interpretation and what will be our attitude, Mr. Hornbeck stated that it would be necessary to know more about the matter before saying anything on either point and begged to be excused from discussing the possibilities. He ventured the opinion, however, that all of the major governments would feel concern and would be looking up treaties. The only other

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file
89C

793.94

793.94/1947

FILED
SEP 21 1931

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

other thing that he could say would be that this Govern-
ment was surprised and that it greatly regretted that
such a situation had developed.

SKH

SKH/ZMF

0542
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

INTERNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, 12 RUE DU VIEUX COLLEGE, GENEVA
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. SECTION, 1805 H STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C.

NATIONAL PRESIDENT
EMILY G. BALCH

HONORARY INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT
JANE ADDAMS

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DOROTHY DETZER

CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL BOARD
HANNAH CLOTHIER HULL

FINANCE SECRETARY
MABEL VERNON




September 22, 1931.

NATIONAL SECTIONS

793.94
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
BULGARIA
CANADA
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA
DENMARK
FINLAND
FRANCE
GERMANY
GREAT BRITAIN
GREECE
HAITI
HOLLAND
HUNGARY
IRELAND
ITALY
JAPAN
MEXICO
NEW ZEALAND
NORWAY
POLAND
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
UKRAINE
UNITED STATES

The President,
White House,
Washington, D. C.



Mr. President:

RESPECTFULLY,
We view with deep concern the attitude of the United States Government as reported in today's press regarding the application of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War in the present Manchurian crisis. Though unfortunately no consultative arrangement as yet is provided in the Kellogg-Briand treaty, it would seem that such consultative provision does appear in the Nine-Power Pacific Pact in which the United States is one of the contracting parties, agreeing to "respect the sovereignty, the independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China"; further agreeing that "whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any of the contracting parties involves the application of the stipulations of the present treaty and renders desirable discussion of such application there shall be full and frank communication between the contracting parties concerned."

It is also our conviction that the letter and spirit of solemn covenants entered into by our Government must be scrupulously observed lest such arrangements shall deteriorate into mere "scraps of paper".

We beg you, Mr. President, to use your high office in carrying out the sacred promises made by our country both in the Kellogg-Briand Treaty for the Renunciation of War and in the Nine-Power Pacific Pact by immediately demanding that "the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China" be observed by all parties to the pact.

Respectfully yours,

Dorothy Detzer
Dorothy Detzer
Executive Secretary

LOCAL GROUPS OR CORRESPONDING MEMBERS

ARGENTINA
CHINA
CUBA
ESTHONIA
EGYPT
INDIA
LATVIA
LITHUANIA
LUXEMBOURG
PALESTINE
PERU
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
ROUMANIA
SOUTH AFRICA
SPAIN
SYRIA
TUNIS
TURKEY
URUGUAY
YUGO-SLAVIA

793.94/1048

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

M
FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP


This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

FROM

Peiping

Dated October 1, 1931

Rec'd 6:09 a. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.



file
E.F.C.

686, October 1, 1 p. m.

Last sentence your 355, September 30, 6 p. m.

Train service to Mukden maintained but not very
safe. Telegraph communications only via Dairen over
Japanese lines. Chinese wireless functioning to Harbin.

JOHNSON

WWC

KLP

793.94/1049

FILED

OCT 15 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.002/234 FOR Telegram # 683 4pm.

FROM China (Johnson) DATED Sept. 30, 1931.
TO NAME 1-1172 ...

REGARDING:

Alfred Sze appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, succeeding C.T. Wang, whose resignation has been accepted. By appointment of Sze, Government wished to indicate it had not departed from policy in Sino-Japanese controversy.

jr

793.94/1060

193-10

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

FE
 412

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 30, 1931

Rec'd 6 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

PRIORITY.

683, September 30, 4 p. m.

Following from American Consul General at Nanking:

"September 30, noon. I have just been informed
 by the Minister of Finance that the resignation of
 C. T. Wang as Minister of Foreign Affairs has been accepted
 and Alfred Sze has been appointed to succeed him. T. V.
 Soong explained that by the appointment of Sze the Govern-
 ment wished to indicate that it had not departed from its
 policy with respect to the Sino-Japanese controversy".

JOHNSON

RR HPD

893.002
 793.94


893.002/234

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

M
FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP



FROM

GREEN

Tokio

Dated October 1, 1931

Rec'd 9:22 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



file
E.F.C.

169, October 1, 3 p. m.

Salisbury will leave by air tomorrow morning for Dairen where he will arrive October 3rd. I have given him one thousand yen and have telegraphed Peiping suggesting that he meet Hansen at Changchun or elsewhere as may be convenient. I have informed the Foreign Office and have given Salisbury proper instructions.

NEVILLE

OSB

FILED
 OCT 16 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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 O.N.I. AND M.I.D. *FE*
M

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

1-1330


FROM

GREEN

Tokio

Dated October 1, 1931

Rec'd 9:30 a. m.



793.94

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

170, October 1, 5 p. m.

Japanese General Staff today *gins* ~~(#)~~ Military Attache
 following distribution of Japanese troops in Manchuria
 for 29th September: second division main body Changchun,
 1500 Kirin; 39th brigade from Korea main body Mukden,
 500 Chienchiatun, 250 east of river Hsinmintun.

Railway guards; 5th battalion Kirin Changchun, 1st
 battalion Changchun Ssupingkai, 6th battalion Supigkai
 Chienchiatun, 2nd battalion Supingkai Mukden, 3rd
 battalion Mukden to Antung and Yinkou.

One battalion moving October 1st to Tsaihispanic
 (?) east of Tehling where many Koreans have been reported
 killed.

Repeated to Peiping.

NEVILLE

FILED

OCT-15-1931

OSB

HPD

(~~#~~) Omission

793.94/1032

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)


Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM



The White House
Washington



Mr. Hornbeck:

Mr. Richey wishes this handled by the State Dept
to determine who signers are, etc.

Opr White House.

Sept 26th-1931.

FILED

OCT 1 1931

793.64/1953

793.94

0549

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM

Postal.

NA 503 137 Cable

Chinese Govt.

The White House

Washington



Peiping 1140 PM Sept 26th-1931.

The President:

The White House.

Utilizing trumped-up charge Chinese wrecked section South Manchurian Railway, Japanese Army Navy units simultaneously occupied Mukden, Yingkou, Antung, Changchun, Kirin. Government organs, railways, schools, wireless, banks, arsenal seized, officials imprisoned, police and civilians murdered, private homes looted. Manchurian Army strictly ordered non-resistance retreated in face brutal attack. Feeling China running high, situation extremely dangerous because constant provocation.

Undersigned representing voluntary educational business industrial labor agricultural organizations Manchuria appeal your Excellency as signatory Washington nine power treaty Kellogg Peace Pact exert good offices persuade Japan cease terrorism, withdraw occupation forces, await international adjudication thus preventing perpetration monstrous act international aggression.

H. C. King---Business and Industrial.
K. C. Lu----Labor.
Paul Yen-----Agricultural.

655 PM

OCT 1 1931
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

September 29, 1931.

Dear Mr. Richey:

Referring to the memorandum of September 26 from your office stating that you wish that this Department determine the identities of the three persons, H. C. King, K. C. Lu and Paul Yen, who signed a telegram dated September 26 from Peiping, addressed to the President in regard to the Sino-Japanese situation in Manchuria, I find that the records of the Department and other materials available and consulted appear to contain no information in regard to these three persons; and none of the three is known to any of our officers.

As the senders of the telegram appear to be citizens of China, and as their message was not sent through official channels, it is suggested that the telegram might appropriately be filed without acknowledgment.

Yours sincerely,

Stettin

The Honorable

Lawrence Richey,

Secretary to the President,


The White House.

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

SEP. 30, 1931

9/29/31



700.94/1950

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM

Postal.

NA 503 137 Cable

The White House
Washington

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Department of State

FE

Chinese Govt.
RECEIVED
OCT 2 1931
DIVISION OF
The White House

Peiping 1140 PM Sept 26th-1931.

The President:
The White House.

RECEIVED
OCT 2 - 1931
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Utilizing trumped-up charge Chinese wrecked section South Manchurian Railway, Japanese Army Navy units simultaneously occupied Mukden, Yingkou, Antung, Changchun, Kirin. Government organs, railways, schools, wireless, banks, arsenal seized, officials imprisoned, police and civilians murdered, private homes looted. Manchurian Army strictly ordered non-resistance retreated in face brutal attack. Feeling China running high, situation extremely dangerous because constant provocation.

Undersigned representing voluntary educational business industrial labor agricultural organizations Manchuria appeal your Excellency as signatory Washington nine power treaty Kellogg Peace Pact exert good offices persuade Japan cease terrorism, withdraw occupation forces, await international adjudication thus preventing perpetration monstrous act international aggression.

H. C. King---Business and Industrial.
K. C. Lu-----Labor.
Paul Yen-----Agricultural.

655 PM

OCT 15 1931

FILED

1931

0552


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 4, 1976

SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION

793.94
June
Asked if any further communications had been received from Geneva regarding the Sino-Japanese situation the Secretary replied in the negative. A correspondent then asked how the situation appeared today as compared with that of yesterday. Mr. Stimson, in reply, said he had read some of the newspapers this morning and it appeared to him that the situation was working out as he expected. The Secretary added that he did not care further to discuss the Sino-Japanese problem.

A correspondent then asked if there was any other case where this Government had taken action in cooperation with the League by sending similar notes. In reply, the Secretary said that, offhand, he could not answer the question.

A correspondent then asked if the Department understood that Japanese troops are occupying only the railroad zones. In reply, Mr. Stimson he thought that in general that was true, but the confusion of facts was so great that he preferred not to make any statement about it for attribution. Mr. Stimson



Press Conf. 9/4/31

793.94/1854

-4-

explained that we are receiving conflicting statements from the two governments and that he did not want to make any statement for publication which would be attributable to the Department of State or to the United States Government in any way, especially as we are holding our minds open. The Secretary here added that the present case is a wholly different situation from the Sino-Russian trouble, in which case both Governments were concerned and each Government's army was in a different country, where it had no right to cross the boundary line. In the present trouble, however, both countries have a right to maintain certain forces in Manchuria.

A correspondent asked if the notes to China and Japan had gone forward. The Secretary replied in the negative and added that NONE OF HIS STATEMENTS IN THIS PRESS CONFERENCE ABOUT THE SINO-JAPANESE PROBLEM WERE FOR ATTRIBUTION IN ANY WAY.

A correspondent observed that his advices from Tokyo were to the effect that the Japanese Government had transmitted to the powers an explanation of its position and asked if this Government had yet received it. The Secretary replied in the negative.

Observing that press reports said two Americans were killed at Mukden, a correspondent asked how many Americans had been killed. In reply, the Secretary said that he did not believe that any Americans had been killed, as the Department had received no reports pertaining thereto.

A correspondent asked if the Department had received any information regarding Russia's action in the present situation. In reply, the Secretary said he had not received any information that he cared to speak about.

M. J. McDermott

793.94/1954

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

1-1936

CORRECTED FROM COPY


This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Tokio

Dated October 1, 1931

Rec'd 9:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



file
egc.

167, October 1, 1 p. m.

Department's 179.

One. When the incident occurred Cranford was in
China on leave. At the suggestion of the Minister at
Peiping he proceeded to Mukden with two officers from
the Legation. He arrived in Mukden on September 22nd and
left Manchuria on September 30th, I understand.

Two. So far as I know no other missions in Tokio
have had military or naval officers in Manchuria.

CSB

NEVILLE

F.W. 793.94/1955

FILED

OCT 15 1931

793.94/1955

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Tokio

Dated October 1, 1931

Rec'd 9:10 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington, D. C.

167, October 1, 1 p.m.

Department's 179

One. When the incident occurred Cranford was in
China on leave. At the suggestion of the Minister at
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Legation. He arrived in Mukden on September 22nd and
left Manchuria on September 30th (?) the naval authorities.

Two. So far as I know no other missions in Tokio
have had military or naval officers in Manchuria.

NEVILLE

CSB

FE

793.94
note
1215494

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 1 - 1931
Department of State

793.94/1935

S

0556

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

PM RECD

JOHN OLIVER, D. D., PASTOR
RESIDENCE 321 SAN FRANCISCO AVE.
PHONE 1195
COM. 24

Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church

Corner Gibbs and Pearl Streets

Church Office Phone 9662

Hamona, California

MRS. E. C. BEAHR, CHURCH SECY.
RES. 630 SAN FRANCISCO AVE.
RES. PHONE 3092

Sept. 26th, 1931.

OCT 1 1931 Secretary of State Stimson,
Washington, D. C.,
Honored Sir:

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 1 - 1931
Department of State

793.94

Allow me to commend you and your staff for the fine work done for Humanity and world betterment thru your notes to Japan and China.

ack'd

This Church of 800 members is interested in world affairs and rejoices that the nation is so worthily represented in President Herbert Hoover and yourself. God bless you.

October 7 1931
J.E.
79.c.

Very respectfully yours,

John Oliver

OCT 7 1931

FILED

793.94/1956

0557

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/1936

October 7 1931.

The Reverend John Oliver, D.D.,
321 San Francisco Avenue,
Pomona, California.

Sir:

The Department acknowledges with thanks the receipt
of your letter of September 26, 1931, in regard to action
taken by the Department in connection with the situation
in Manchuria.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:


Stanley K. Hornbeck
Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

m. j. h.
FE: ~~REK~~:LM

FE

10/6/31

Oct. 7 1931.



793.94/1936

0558

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

1-1336

FROM



GENEVA

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated October 1, 1931

Secretary of State

Washington



150, October 1, 9 a.m.

(GREEN) Council last night resumed consideration of the Sino-Japanese dispute.

The opening statement of the President was substantially as follows:

Under Article 11 of the Covenant the duty of the League is to safeguard peace and the Council has concluded to this end the withdrawal of Japanese troops into the railway zone is of paramount importance; it is recognized that a certain time must be allowed for this withdrawal. Since both parties have concurred in this view, without prejudice to the method of settlement of questions between them, the President was of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the discussions of the Council but it was his understanding that the Council "will follow the further developments of this affair" and "will be

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WZ
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egc.

793.94/1007

RECEIVED
OCT 1 1931

793.94
note
500.0112
893.002

S

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Long NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

2- #150, from Geneva,
October 1, 1931

be ready at all times to render any assistance that may be useful". Other portions of the President's statement were in line with the resolution later adopted. He then proposed the following resolution which is given in full as it forms the basis of the League's position:

"The Council

One. Notes the replies of the Chinese and Japanese Governments to the urgent appeal addressed to them by its President and the steps that have already been taken in response to that appeal;

Two. Recognizes the importance of the Japanese Government's statement that it has no territorial designs in Manchuria;

Three. Notes the Japanese representative's statement that his Government will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops which has already begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be;

Four. Notes the Chinese representative's statement
that

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

3- #150, from Geneva,
 October 1, 1931

that his Government will assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside of that zone as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police forces are reestablished;

Five. Being convinced that both governments are anxious to avoid taking any action which might disturb the peace and good understanding between the two nations, notes that the Chinese and Japanese representatives have given assurances that their respective governments will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation;

Six. Requests both parties to do all in their power to hasten the restoration of normal relations between them and for that purpose to continue and speedily complete the execution of the above mentioned undertakings;

Seven. Requests both parties to furnish the Council at frequent intervals with full information as to the development of the situation;

Eight. Decides, in the absence of any unforeseen occurrence which might render an immediate meeting essential,
 to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

4- #150, from Geneva, 1931
 October 1, 1931

to meet again at Geneva on Wednesday, October 14th, 1931,
 to consider the situations as it then stands;

Nine. Authorizes its President to cancel the meeting
 of the Council fixed for October 14 should he decide after
 consulting his colleagues, and more particularly the repre-
 sentatives of the two parties, that in view of such in-
 formation as he may have received from the parties or from
 other members of the Council as to the development of the
 situation, the meeting is no longer necessary."

The Japanese delegate accepted the resolution. He
 declared, however, it was entirely useless to take special
 measures for investigation particularly as there are "many
 persons" on the spot from whom information can be obtained.
 He then suggested that members of the Council send to the
 Secretary General for communication to the Council if he
 deems it desirable whatever information their respective
 Governments could collect.

The Chinese delegate in reply noted that the Japanese
 Government now recognized the necessity of neutral informa-
 tion. He interpreted the resolution as meaning that "the
 Council is conscious of its responsibility to help both
 parties

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

5- #150, from Geneva,
 October 1, 1931

parties to secure the complete and prompt withdrawal of the armed forces of Japan and the full reestablishment of the status quo ante and remains in session until that responsibility is fully discharged." If the establishment of the status quo ante is not achieved by October 14 he expected the Council to examine what other means may be required; in this connection he recalled his two proposals, one, commission of inquiry, two, local arrangements for investigation on the spot. Sze also stated he considered the establishment of the status quo ante as a preliminary step and reserved its right under the Covenant to look to the Council later for aid in determining the civil responsibility of the two parties.

The Japanese delegate declared that he could not accept the interpretation given by Sze but could only accept the resolution as presented.

The President thereupon stated that it is not necessary now to enter upon questions of interpretation and that the rights of the two parties remain intact.

The resolution was then adopted. (END GREEN)

With reference to the Chinese "compromise" proposal regarding

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

6- #150, from Geneva, October 1,
1931

regarding an inquiry commission (Consulate's 149, September 30) it will be observed that it was not presented to the Council. After the Council meeting Sze informed me confidentially that he had been persuaded not to bring it forward but that it had been circulated to the members of the Council as an "elucidation" of the proposal which he presented at the September 28th meeting of the Council (Consulate's 144, September 29th) and that he held this proposal in reserve for bringing it forward if necessary in connection with "further developments of the affair" mentioned in the President's speech.

Incidentally (*) that the European press has been carrying Sze designation as Foreign Minister of China. In his conversation Sze told me that it had been offered to him but that he had informed the Chinese Government that for personal reasons he would be unable to accept.

(GREEN) Those representatives of the powers in Geneva who seem to be best informed on Far Eastern affairs have expressed their opinion on happenings here as distinctly a Chinese diplomatic victory, the Chinese having attained their objective of keeping the matter in the hands of the League.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 4, 1976

MAM

7- #150, from Geneva,
October 1, 1931

League. They also express their belief that future Chinese policy will be to employ this present incident indefinitely in the future in securing the League's continuing concern with the whole Manchurian situation.

The implication which one present at the proceeding draws is that on the one hand it is the desire of the leaders in the Council to restrict the Council's action to the single question of the withdrawal of the troops while on the other hand it is the policy of the Chinese to involve the Council as deeply as possible in all of the aspects of the situation.

GILBERT

CSB

0565

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

JS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

1-1336

Dated October
 FROM
 Rec'd 8:55 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 OCT 18 1953
 DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
File WE
WIFE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 OCT 9 1953
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 9 - 1953
 Department of State
Leg

793.94
 500.0112

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

151, October 1, 10 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Consulate's 150, October 1st.

Following the conclusion of the Council's session late yesterday Drummond gave the following information and exposition of his views to Mr. Wilson:

He said that the statement of Yoshiwaza in the Council suggesting that all members of the Council inform the Secretary General of any information they could obtain from the disturbed area was the result of long and continued pressure on the Japanese by the Council and was the nearest that they could bring them to accepting any form of independent information from the district. The Japanese delegate felt that he made a very great concession in making this statement. Incidentally it is learned that a British Military Attaché is already on the spot, having proceeded there without orders and on his own responsibility as soon as

793.94/1953

Confidential File

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 10-16-51

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 - No. 151 from Geneva

he learned of the trouble. Sir Eric expressed the hope that any pertinent information that our government may feel it wise to let him have might be made available to him.

That portion of the speech of the President of the Council regarding the offer of help if it should be desired had been very carefully phrased and this also was the result of a long struggle with the Japanese. Before beginning negotiations it was purposely left vague in view of the Chinese insistence that a request from one party to the dispute should be sufficient to invoke help.

761.93
In the strictest confidence Drummond stated that the Chinese had several times threatened that if the League did not get results in this matter they might conclude an alliance with the U.S.S.R. On the other hand Sir Eric learned from the Japanese, also very confidentially, that they have been talking with the Soviets and that they anticipate no difficulty. He added that it is possible that the Chinese and the U.S.S.R. were discussing an alliance which did not entertain the thought of any direct action in Manchuria. Sir Eric believes that for the moment

at

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 - No. 151 from Geneva

at least this is headed off by the favorable turn which he feels this affair is taking. Sir Eric is anxious not to be placed in the position of having the Chinese continually approaching him with protests and with threats of action on their part. He felt that the Chinese should now undertake their share of what is to be done as independently as possible during the period of adjustment which lies immediately ahead. He would like if possible for the United States to make a suggestion in the sense of the foregoing to the Chinese.

With reference to this the delicacy of your making such a suggestion without the Chinese possibly drawing the implication of a lack of confidence in Drummond or that his case is being minimized is evident. I am however making known to you Drummond's thought which is that you might possibly find an occasion to cooperate with him in this matter.

GILBERT

JS

0568

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT *my*

Department of State

Washington,

October 7, 1931.

6P

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

OCT 7 31

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

67 193, 94/195, 8
Department's 64, October 5, 2 p.m.

If you have not already done so, you should read
to Drummond the whole text.

Simon
my

793.94/1958

CL
Oct. 7, 1931. PM
MKA

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

SKH

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-128

0565

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Syme NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
or
Charge to
\$

Washington,
October 3, 1931.

This cable was sent in confidential code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

*793- note
500.0112
63 Confidential. For staff use only.
Your 151/ Oct 1, 10 a.m.*

The Secretary of State wishes that you or Wilson inform Drummond in confidence that immediately after the outbreak of the trouble in Manchuria an officer from the office of the American Military Attaché, Peiping, and another, ~~then~~ present in China from the office of the American Military Attaché, Tokyo, proceeded to Manchuria. It is understood that a similar officer from the British Legation, Peiping, did likewise. The matter of their going was not referred to Washington ~~neither~~ for authorizations ~~nor~~ instructions, and it is assumed that they have acted simply as observers. Now, however, the Department of State is instructing the American Consul General at Harbin and a secretary of Embassy at Tokyo to make a tour of observation in South Manchuria and report facts to the Department. This is with knowledge and approval of the Japanese Government. The Secretary feels that it is necessary that he have as full and as accurate information as can be obtained concerning what has occurred and the facts

SKM

793.94/1000

SKM

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

of the situation as it unfolds. This should be regarded
as confidential information until such time as authorized
publicity is given it here.

Stimson.

SKH

Authorized by
the Secretary

FE:SKH/ZMF

RSM
F E

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

This cable was sent in confidence. It should be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

October 5, 1931.

2 pm

AmConsul,

Geneva, Switzerland.

64

I have your 150, October 1, 9:00 a.m., your 151,
October 1, 10:00 a.m.

I am much gratified at the success of the Council in having secured the consent of both the Chinese and Japanese Governments to its resolution of September 30, and the commitment of the Japanese Government to the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone, and that of the Chinese Government to the protection of Japanese nationals thereafter. I wish Drummond to know in confidence that I am working every day on this subject; that I am urging on both the Chinese and Japanese that they should assert themselves to the utmost to avoid a recrudescence of armed encounters; and that I have urged upon the Japanese an immediate withdrawal of their forces into the railway zone. I shall urge upon both the necessity of carrying out in good faith the commitments as expressed in the resolution of the Council.

I believe that our cooperation in the future handling of this difficult matter should proceed along the course which

has been

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

793.94/1958

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

has been followed ever since the first outbreak of the trouble fortunately found the Assembly and Council of the League of Nations in session. The Council has deliberated long and earnestly on this matter and the Covenant of the League of Nations provides well-tried machinery for handling such issues. Both the Chinese and Japanese have presented and argued their cases before the Council and the world has been informed through published accounts with regard to the proceedings there. The Council has formulated conclusions and outlined a course of action to be followed by the disputants; and as the said disputants have made commitments to the Council, it is most desirable that the League in no way relax its vigilance and in no way fail to assert all the pressure and authority within its competence towards regulating the action of China and Japan in the premises.

On its part the American Government acting independently through its diplomatic representatives will endeavor to reinforce what the League does and will make clear that it has not lost interest in the matter and is not oblivious to the obligations which the disputants have assumed to their fellow signatories in the Pact of Paris as well as in the Nine Power

Pact

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

AmConsul, Geneva, page 3.

Pact should a time arise when it would seem advisable to bring forward those obligations. By this course we avoid any danger of encouraging either disputant to seek to play off our action against that of the League or vice versa.

I have already informed Sir Eric of the presence in the disturbed area of my own ^{special} diplomatic representatives, and I shall be glad to comply with his suggestion of forwarding to him any pertinent information which we may be able to make available to him.

I think that what I have already said will answer Sir Eric's other inquiries. We shall endeavor to be as cooperative as possible, while trying to avoid any chance of embarrassment to him and the League in the task which they have undertaken.

Strinson
W4

S
~~U WRO/AB.~~

FE
SK

CR
new
Oct. 3, 1931

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPIES SENT TO
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REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

RECEIVED

2 1031
1-1334

DIVISION OF

RELATIONS AND

FROM

Tokio

Dated October 2, 1931

Rec'd 9:40 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.



file
Eg.C.

171, October 2, 4 p. m.

Japanese general staff furnished following information
yesterday to the Military Attache concerning Chinese troops
in Manchuria:

One. 21st brigade 5300 Mulin

Two. 26th brigade 7000 and 28th brigade 4700 from
Harbin to Hailin

Three. 1st brigade cavalry 1000 north of Harbin

Four. 27th brigade 6000 Chientao district

Five. 25th brigade 5200 just north of Kirin

Six. 22nd brigade 4000, one hundred kilometers south
of Harbin

Seven. 7th brigade cavalry 3000 Bodunay

Eight. Detached brigade 5300 Taonan

Nine. 66th regiment infantry 2000, one thousand kilo-
meters south of Tunhua

Ten. 23rd brigade 4000 just south of Kirin

Eleven.

793.94
note
893.0146

700.04/1931

FILED

OCT 15 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #171, from Tokio, Oct. 2, 1931,
 9:40 a. m.

Eleven. 3rd brigade cavalry 3500, one hundred kilo-
 meters west of Chienchiatun.

Twelve. Two regiments and one battalion infantry and
 one regiment cavalry 6000, two hundred kilometers east of
 Mukden

Thirteen. 7th (bandits) 1500, one hundred kilometers
 northeast of Mukden.

Fourteen. One regiment infantry (bandits) 2000 Antung

Fifteen. 19th brigade 6300 southwest of Hsinmintun

Sixteen. 12th brigade 6000 Chinchow

Seventeen. 9th brigade 6300 Chanli

Eighteen. Jehol army 20000, four hundred kilometers
 west of Mukden

Nineteen. Bandits - north of railway Kirin Tunhua,
 west of Changchun, north and west of Ssuningkai 1000, north-
 west Taonan 4000

Manchurian troops in north China 115,000.

Repeated to Peiping.

NEVILLE

KLP

GSB

0576

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clayton L. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

M F E

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 2, 1931

Rec'd 9:45 a. m.

*file
E.P.C.*



Secretary of State,
Washington.

77, October 2, 9 a. m.

Your September 28, 6 p. m.

Doctor C. T. Wang desires to express his grateful appreciation of the message of sympathy from the Secretary of State. Doctor Wang ^{thanks} ~~desire to~~ (#) Dr. Hornbeck also for a similar message (Department's September 28, 7 p. m.)

PECK

(#) Omission

CSB

793.94/1960

FILED

OCT 16 1931

057

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

1-1336
RECEIVED FROM

Peiping

This telegram must be 1931
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

Dated October 2, 1931

Rec'd 9:45 a.m.

793.94
2200
892.01

Secretary of State
Washington OCT 5 - 1931
DIVISION OF EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
OCT 3 - 1931
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

693, October 2, 7 p.m.

[Myers]

Following from Consul General at Mukden October 2,
10 a.m., re independence movement:

"There is good reason for believing that Japanese reports are misrepresenting this movement. From Yuan Chin Kai it has been ascertained that Japanese military authorities have repeatedly urged him to organize independent government which he has refused to do and that others may have been similarly approached; that the Japanese objective is the elimination of Chang Hsueh Liang's influence.

In view of the Japanese efforts and the possible readiness of some Chinese to avail themselves of the opportunity, this movement must be taken seriously. The Government of Liaoning, to whom the Japanese could turn over the Government if they wished, is being detained.

at Mukden

JOHNSON

FILED
OCT 15 1931
Came?

JHR

HPD

0578

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

RECEIVED
OCT 2 1931
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 2, 1931

Rec'd 1:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 2 - 1931
Department of State

File
E.G.C.

688, October 2, 11 a.m.

From Consul at Yunnanfu:

"September 28, 5 p.m. At a large mass meeting held today at the party headquarters and attended by all prominent officials, it was resolved to telegraphically request Nanking to reinstate Hu Han Min in order that Canton could unite for declaring war against Japan. Anti-Japanese agitation continues locally but the situation does not appear to threaten safety Japanese residents"

JOHNSON

JHR

CSB

OCT 11 1931

RECEIVED

793.94/162

✓

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

RECEIVED

1-1336 1931

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 2, 1931

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

THE UNDER SECRETARY

OCT 5 - 1931

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 2 - 1931
Department of State

Rec'd 1:10 p. m.

RECEIVED

file
3-1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

687, October 2, 10 a. m.

Following from Lieutenant Brown, Mukden, to Naval
Attache, Peiping:

"October 1, 11 a. m. Military occupation essentially
unchanged with one battalion Japanese forces sent from
Tiehling and Kaiyuan to the country districts 70 miles
northeast Mukden due to the Sino-Korean-Japanese disorders
wherein it is claimed 10 Japanese, 10 Koreans killed with
several Korean citizens kidnapped; some 5,000 Chinese
forces in that region. Japanese authorities here give
much prominence to move of Chinese to form independent
Manchurian Government representing this action as desired
on part of all classes of Chinese to separate themselves
from the other old regime. There is little evidence of
any return to normal economic conditions".

JOHNSON

RR

HPD

793.94/1931

OCT 16 1931

0580

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-126
PREPARING OFFICE
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Shay
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

October 2, 1931.

lean

793.94

OCT 2 1931

AMERICAN CONSUL,
MUKDEN (CHINA).

Please report by telegraph on present condition
and status of radio station; also on your facilities
for communication outward.

Stinson
SKH

793.94/1903A

✓
CR
SKH
Oct. 2 1931

FE:SKH/ZMF

m.m.H. pen
FE
SKH

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE
NOTE

SEE 893.00/11609 FOR Tel # 7pm
FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED Oct.1, 1931
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Canton Government has no plan for dealing with Manchurian situation.

793.94/1964

ag

5

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 2, 1931

Rec'd 1:25 p. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

691, October 2, 5 p. m.

FROM CONSUL GENERAL AT NANKING.

"October 2, 4 p. m.

One. Following is brief summary of informal conversation held with T. V. Soong September 30, 9 p. m. at his home; the Chinese Government is very apprehensive of a rapidly extending sentiment of friendship for the Soviet Government and of a popular feeling that ordinary diplomatic relations should be resumed immediately as offset to Japanese aggressive designs and to develop effective action by the League of Nations and signatories of the Kellogg Pact which now the Chinese people believe they can no longer hope for. Soong feels that the American Government is in some way accountable for the apparent lessening of the League's first eagerness to bring about

an (?)

700.94/1965

OCT 15 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #691, from Peiping, Oct. 2, 1931,
1:25 p.m.

an (?) adjustment of the present Manchurian controversy
and has been searching for the reason for the failure
of the United States, when drafting its identic notes,
to point out to Japan the danger of world conflict which
may follow Japan's continued use of military force.

(END PART ONE).

JOHNSON

KLP

HPD

0584

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Tamm NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

RECEIVED

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

9 1931

Dated October 2, 1931

DIVISION OF

Rec'd 2:10 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

691, October 2, 5 p.m. (PART TWO)

he considered it probable that the Japanese Ambassador must have convinced the American Government of the rectitude of Japan's intentions and of un wisdom of needlessly wounding the feelings of a sensitive people. Another explanation he finds in the possibility that the Japanese Government gave the American Government some positive assurance that Japan would desist from its present course. The sudden change of position by the head of the British delegation to the League Council *Council he thinks also may be accounted for by some such assurance* he expressed an earnest desire to learn why the United States, as shown by its two communications, seemed to attach so little importance to the Japanese military in Manchuria. He described the steps now being taken by the Japanese to encourage rebellious movements in Kirin and elsewhere and gave me translations.

(END PART TWO)

JOHNSON

CSB

(#) omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 2, 1931

Rec'd 1:30 p.m.

1-1330
RECEIVED
OCT 9 1931
FROM
DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

691, October 2, 5 p.m. (PART THREE)

Of confidential reports from Chang Hsueh Liang reporting machine gun and bombing operations by Japanese air planes in various places on September 27 and military seizure of railway plant at Huankutung on September 29. In the meantime he could not account for the "apathy" of the American Government under these circumstances.

Two. To give the conversation a more practical turn I inquired under what conditions the Chinese Government would consent to treat with the Japanese Government for a settlement of the controversy. He said that while the Chinese Government would never admit that Japan had any treaty right to station troops on the South Manchurian Railway he thought China could treat with Japan if all Japanese troops were withdrawn to the railway although even then the Chinese Government would be apprehensive that Japan would introduce irrelevant questions of which China would be unwilling to discuss. China

(END PART THREE)

JOHNSON

JHR

CSB

0586

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

RECEIVED
OCT 9 1931
DIVISION OF
ASIAN AFFAIRS

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 2, 1931

Rec'd 2:20 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

691, October 2, 5 p. m. (PART FOUR)

would, of course, expect compensation for the unwarranted damage inflicted.

Three. The two dominant impressions made on me by the interview were that he still hopes that the United States will evince a stronger interest in curbing Japan's warlike measures than the United States has hitherto shown and, secondly, that he deeply feared a popular swing toward Soviet Russia. He remarked that China for defense against Japan must place reliance either on her own military strength, on intervention by the League, the signatories to the Pact, (principally the United States), or on the Soviet Government. These views seem to be held by Chinese generally. I should add that Soong is very anxious lest popular resentment among the Chinese may precipitate actual hostilities and he instanced the killing of Japanese in Hong Kong.

Four. Soong appeared.
(END PART FOUR)

JOHNSON

KLP CSB

058

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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1-127 1031

DEPARTMENT OF

STATE

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 2, 1931

Rec'd 2:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

691, October 2, 5 p.m. (PART FIVE)

grateful when I said I would telegraph his remarks in substance, and that presumably you would transmit them to the Department of State. He again expressed his hope that I might be able to obtain for him some additional insight into the Department's attitude toward events in Manchuria.

Five. Frank W. Lee since September 30 acting Minister of Foreign Affairs called on me at the Legation. He outlined general situation much as Soong had done but the main object of his call evidently was to reiterate the hope of the Chinese Government that the United States still would issue some public statement, stronger than the identic notes, supporting the justice of China's position via Japan in Manchuria.

(END PART FIVE)

JOHNSON

CSB

0588

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles R. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 2, 1931

Rec'd 7:33 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

691, October 2, 5 p. m. (PART SIX).

He called attention to the fact that "The United States has a historical position with respect to Manchuria" and he made specific reference to the statement made by the Department of State at the time when the Japanese Government formally forbade Chinese internal conflicts in Manchuria. He said that the Department's statement had a most salutary effect at that time.

Six. I pointed out that it might be necessary to recognize a general deadlock as regards situation and I repeated to him the question I asked Soong regarding the circumstances which might make it possible for China to talk with Japan. Dr. Lee told me, quite as though the matter had been in his mind, that in default of action by
the League

0589
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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

REP

(Part Six),
2- #691, /from Peiping, Oct. 2, 1931
5 p. m.

the League China would be willing to commence negotiations
with Japan under circumstances similar to those of the
Washington Conference discussions at which Great Britain
and the United States had observers but that withdrawal of
Japanese troops to the railway area would be
(END PART SIX).

JOHNSON

KLP

HPD

0591

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Chambers & Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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1-1311 RECEIVED

9 1931

DIVISION OF

TELEGRAMS AND RELAYS

FROM

GRAY

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated October 2, 1931

Rec'd 2:45 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

691, October 2, 5 p.m. (PART SEVEN)

a prerequisite to such negotiations. Dr. Lee was positive that the Chinese Government having entrusted the protection of its rights to the League of Nations would await exhaustion of possibilities in that direction before adopting any other course. At the same time, he emphasized his earnest hope that the American Government in keeping with precedent and its past policies would take some independent action in support of China's rights and thus save China from being coerced by circumstances either into a disastrous war with Japan or a dangerous alliance with Russia. I told Dr. Lee I would report the substance of his remarks to the American Minister.

Seven. Dr. Lee incidentally deplored the fact that China had no Minister in Washington, seemed to feel that the free access enjoyed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary

1591
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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

2- #691, part seven, from Peiping,
October 2, 1931

Secretary of State must have had a powerful influence on the attitude taken by the American Government in regard to this controversy. I inquired when W Yen the Minister designate would go to Washington and Lee replied that that date had not yet been fixed."

(END MESSAGE)

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 19761-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHERCollect
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington, Oct. 4, 1931

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

AMLEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA).

OCT 4 31

360

Confidential for the Minister! Reference your 69Y, October 2, 5 p.m., and especially paragraph four of Nanking's telegram of October 2, 4 p.m., therein transmitted.

One. The Department in its previous telegrams to you, particularly its 341 of September 24, 6 p.m., 343 of September 26, 11 a.m., and information from Tokyo Embassy referred to in the Department's 355 of September 30, 6 p.m., has endeavored to give you an insight into the Department's attitude and efforts in reference to ~~events in Manchuria~~ ^{the present} ~~as the situation there has~~ ^{developed}. If Peck has not been given this information you should send to him for his personal information and guidance such of this information as you think will be of use to him ~~in this connection~~.

Two. ~~Further Instruction~~ ^{for action by Peck} in this connection will follow shortly.

Stinson

Skat

FE/SKH

NAME
FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

750.94/1965

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lynam Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 2, 1931

Rec'd 2:45 p.m.

FROM

DIVISION OF

Secretary of State

Washington

692, October 2, 6 p.m.

From Consul General at Harbin

October 2, 3 p.m. "Recent advices from Mantali

and Hailar indicate that there are no explanations of the movements of soviet troops near the border.

North Manchuria generally quiet although it is feared that the boldness of local brigands will increase".

JOHNSON

C.B.B

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FE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 3 - 1931
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.E.A.

EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.

OCT 7 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94/1966

OCT 14 1931
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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clayton S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

F-5

JS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RECEIVED

MUKDEN

OCT 6 1931

DIVISION OF

From Mukden October 3, 1931

Rec'd 2:54 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

October 3, 1 p.m.

Referring to Department's telegram of October

2nd.

Radio station held by Japanese authorities who report it undamaged. Repeated representations to Japanese Consulate relative to reestablishment of service fail to elicit more than statement that the Japanese authorities are considering the matter. Only facility for communication outward is the Japanese telegraph.

MYERS

JS

793.94
 893.74
 811.7693

793.94/1967

FILED
 OCT 15 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM RECD
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 25, 1931.

SEP 30 31

Mr. Castle:

Hugh Byas's Tokyo despatch in the NEW YORK TIMES (page 3, first two columns) of this morning makes it clear that the Japanese Foreign Office must have given out a copy of the statement which the Secretary of State read to the Japanese Ambassador on the afternoon of Tuesday, September 22. (Note: Mr. Byas states: "A copy of his remarks was handed to Ambassador Debuchi, but Secretary Stimson explained they were not to be regarded as a diplomatic note". He then goes on to paraphrase closely certain paragraphs of the text.) In view of this, I raise the question: Would it not be well to give the press here the full text of the "remarks"?

A copy is attached.

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Since dictating the above, I have read Tokyo's telegram 161, September 25, 7 p.m. In this, I note Neville's statement that Baron Shidehara asked Neville whether our identical note of yesterday afternoon (September 24) "had been published" and that "he would much prefer not to have it published as a certain section of the public might misunderstand". I readily appreciate

Baron

FILED

OCT 19 1931

73.24/1963

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

Baron Shidehara's preference in that connection; and one might go further: his preference would have been that we send no note at all. But, I doubt whether, the note having been sent, he cherishes any feeling of irritation over the fact of its having been published. And, if he does so, it is fortunate for us that he gave out the text of the Secretary's remarks to Debuchi, -- for, inasmuch as he did that without (so far as I know) having consulted us, and inasmuch as in so doing he was releasing what, as we view it, was the substance of an informal conversation, he certainly can have no ground upon which to take exception to our having released the text of a communication which the whole world knew we were going to make and in the contents of which the world had an interest. In brief, in the matter of disclosures, it seems to me that we break about even, with the advantage, if there be any doubt with regard to propriety, on our side.

My suggestion in section one above should, I think, be considered in the light of this, -- ^{and} it may perhaps be best to rule against it.

SKH

SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM 1000
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



Le
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September 25, 1931.

0073 31

Mr. Castle:

It looks very much as though the Japanese Foreign Office have given Mr. Byas a "doctored" version of what Mr. Stimson was reported to have said.

In Mr. Byas's account, I find:

"Responsibility for determining the course of events rested on Japan for the simple reason that the Japanese army was exercising control in South Manchuria, he said."

Mr. Stimson's statement was:

"It would seem that the responsibility for determining the course of events with regard to the liquidating of this situation rests largely upon Japan, for the simple reason that Japanese armed forces have seized and are exercising de facto control in South Manchuria."


I doubt whether Byas, with the original text before him, would have paraphrased it in the manner in which it appears in his despatch.

SKH

793.94/1369

SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976



CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY

October 1, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR,
MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI.

Manchurian tour by Messrs. Hanson and Salisbury.

The Japanese Ambassador said that he had received a message from Baron Shidehara telling him to inform me that the tour of Manchuria by Mr. Hanson from Harbin and Mr. Salisbury from Tokyo was perfectly welcome to the Japanese authorities and would be facilitated in every way by all of the Japanese authorities, including the military authorities. The Ambassador laid emphasis on the last words. I told him that I was much gratified and pleased and that I had received a short message to the same effect from Neville. I said I had made no announcement of my request and would try not to do so until it was agreeable to Japan. He said that the newspapers would undoubtedly announce the leaving of Salisbury from Tokyo and that I could then confirm it. I told the Ambassador that Mr. Forbes was here and would like to call on him. He said he would be very glad to see Mr. Forbes, and I then arranged with Mr. Castle to have them meet here.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

793.94/1970

OCT 19 1931



note
 123-4062
 W.C.

0599

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

Confidential File

SEE 500. A 15 A 4/421 FOR Tel. # 629, 6 pm

FROM France (Edge) DATED Oct. 2, 1931.
TO NAME 1-1172 ***

793.94/1971

REGARDING:

Briand said that he regretted very much that the Pacific Pact had not served as a basis for an attempt at the settlement of the Japanese-Chinese dispute concerning Mukden which had so recently troubled the League of Nations.

MN

0600

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND A.I.I.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

PLAIN

1-1238

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 3, 1931

Rec'd 10:35 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

695 *File*
 10-15-31

694, October this.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 3 - 1931
 Department of State

file
EQ-C

Reuter report from Nanking first "Dr. Wellington Koo
 arrived here from Peiping in Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang's
 Ford plane this afternoon and called on General Chiang Kai
 Shek at six p. m. when he submitted his views on Manchurian
 crisis.

Interviewed shortly after his arrival Koo said that
 he came at invitation of National Government and would
 submit his views to the Government for consideration.
 He added that Japanese troops were instigating the people
 in three eastern provinces to arise up and set up separate
 governments. This was serious development which should be
 closely watched.

Dr. Koo will be present at tomorrow's meeting of Special
 Foreign Relations Committee of Central Political Council
 which has been reorganized with Mr. Tai Chi Tao as Chairman
 and

700.04/1972

FILED
 OCT 11 1931

793.94
 20.56
 893.00

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rep

2- #694, from Peiping, Oct. 3, 1931.

and Mr. T. V. Soong as Vice Chairman. The Committee will meet at seven every morning to discuss Manchurian crisis.

It is considered likely in local Chinese circles that Dr. Wellington Koo will be offered foreign portfolio since Dr. Alfred Sze has declined appointment. Dr. W. ^{W. Yen} Vyn, newly appointed Chinese Minister to United States, is expected to arrive here from Tientsin, Saturday morning".

JOHNSON

HPD

1602

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

m FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

PLAIN

1-1336

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 2, 1931

Rec'd Oct. 3, 10:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

696, October 2, 4 p.m.

Reuter report from Washington second

"United States is taking no further action in Sino-Japanese dispute the State Department announces.

Department adds that Colonel Stimson has studied all available reports and has come to conclusion that the parties concerned are doing their best to conform with his advice."

JOHNSON

HPD

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 3 - 1931
Department of State

Reg. 5 Put
8-3-31
OCT 3 1931
Re Reg. C

793.94/1973

OCT 14 1931

FILED

0603

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

October 3, 1931.

AMLEGATION,

OCT 3 31

PEIPING (China).

359

Your 696, October 2, 4 p.m.

The American Government ~~is acting in reference to~~

~~this matter constantly.~~ It has made ^{such} no announcement.
~~with regard to the future.~~ You may so inform any
inquirers. Inform Nanking.

Stinson

SKH

793.94/1973

FE:SKH/ZMF

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

1604

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

JS

Plain

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated October 4, 1931

FROM

Recd 3rd 11:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

697 October 4, 8 a.m.

Following telegram has just been received from
the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs in Nanking
dated October third:

"The Chinese Government has the honor to inform
Your Excellency that in its view events of the next
twelve days during which the Japanese Government is
expected by the Council of the League of Nations to
complete the withdrawal of its troops to the railway
zone in terms of the Council's resolution of Septem-
ber thirtieth, will have the most far-reaching con-
sequences for the effective maintenance of peace and
the present status on the Chinese in the Far East.

On its part the Chinese Government has under-
taken before the League's Council to assume responsibility
for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese
nationals outside the railway zone

End part one

JOHNSON

JS

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 5 - 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 5
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FE
WE

793.94
793.94/1974

OCT 11 1931

0605
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

JS

Plain
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated October 4, 1941

FROM

Rec'd 11:16 p.m. 3rd

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

Priority, 697, part two.

during the process of withdrawal of Japanese troops
and the reestablishment of Chinese local authorities
and police forces.

The difficulties of this task are immeasurably
increased by the situation created by the Japanese
action which has violently disturbed the machinery of
central control in Manchuria. Every day brings fresh
incidents such as aerial attacks on trains, disarming
of isolated Chinese units, imposing of Japanese military
authorities on various localities, et cetera.

Your Excellency is aware that the Council of the
League resolved in the absence of any unforeseen occur-
rences which might render an immediate meeting essen-
tial, to convene at Geneva on Wednesday, October 14th

End part two

JOHNSON

JS

0606
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

JS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED^{ain}

RECEIVED

PEIPING VIA NR

11 4 10

Dated October 4, 1931
FROM

DIVISION

Rec'd 3rd 11:22 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

697, part three

in order to consider the situation as it then stands,
and that information with regard to the development of
the situation is awaited not only from the Chinese and
Japanese Governments but also from other members of the
Council.

Under all the circumstances as stated, the Chinese
Government has requested the diplomatic representatives
in this country of those powers which are members of
the Council of the League to send individual representa-
tives to Manchuria to collect information on the progress
of evacuation and all relevant circumstances for the in-
formation of the Council. In view of the fact that the
United States of America is one of the signatories of
the Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed at Paris
in nineteen: twenty eight

End part three

JOHNSON

JS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

JS

RECEIVED

OCT 4 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Plain

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated October 4, 1931

Rec'd 3rd 11:52 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D.C.

697, part four

and is deeply interested as the other powers in the effective maintenance of police in the Far East, I have the honor to request that the United States take immediate steps to be likewise represented and that information collected by your representatives on the movements of Japanese troops in Manchuria be transmitted to your government and the general public by telegraph.

On its side the Chinese Government will do its utmost to give all facilities to the representatives of Your Excellency in this most important task. The Chinese Government would be grateful if the present request were considered to be of the extreme urgency. General Chang Hsueh-liang has been instructed by the National Government to take all the measures to help your representative and the Chinese Government will be grateful if Your Excellency would communicate to him the names of your representatives.

Chinglun Frank W Lee, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, October third." End message.

JOHNSON

JS

0608

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-128
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

October 5, 1931.

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

361 CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

Your 697, October 4, 8 a.m.

Please reply to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs
 substantially as follows:

QUOTE I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of
 your telegram of October 3 informing me that the Chinese Gov-
 ernment has requested the diplomatic representatives in this
 country of those powers that are members of the Council of
 the League to send individual representatives to Manchuria to
 collect information on the progress of evacuation and all
 relative circumstances for the information of the Council,
 and requesting that, in view of the fact that the United States
 is one of the signatories of the Treaty for the Renunciation
 of War signed at Paris in 1928, the United States take im-
 mediate steps to be likewise represented.

I am instructed, in reply, to state that the American
 Government has noted with gratification the action, to which
 the Chinese Government refers, of the Council of the League
 of Nations, on which Council both the Chinese and the Japanese

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

793.4/1574

0605

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

Governments are represented, as expressed in the Resolution unanimously adopted by the Council on September 30; that it has noted the undertakings therein set forth of the various governments represented and of the Council itself, including the provision for the gathering and supplying of information by the Chinese and the Japanese Governments. With regard to the Chinese Government's request that the American Government send representatives to collect information, the American Government is happy to be able to state that it has already taken steps to supplement the efforts which have been made by its representatives in the Far East to keep it currently informed with regard to developments in this situation. Among these steps, it has recently issued instructions for the sending of two of its officers on duty at other points in the Far East to South Manchuria, to travel in that region, to observe, and to report to their Government on the facts as they find them; and, on October 3, before receipt of the Chinese Government's request, it had instructed the American Minister to China to inform the Chinese Government of its action in that sense. Its instruction has, as your Excellency knows, been carried out.

The American Government had thus anticipated the Chinese Government's request and it is confident that the Chinese

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 or
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

- 3 -

Government will regard this action on its part as another
 evidence of its desire to make its due contribution in the
 common effort which is being made to ensure reliance on
 peaceful methods for the settling of this dispute which
 is clearly a matter of concern to the whole world UNQUOTE.

Stinson
WZ

OR
 12
 6:15, 1981 PM
ms

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

SKH

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

This telegram should be
carefully paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

FROM

PEIPING

Dated October 4, 1931

Rec'd 12:41 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

698, October 4, 9 a.m.



Your 358, October 3, was repeated to Nanking

this morning with instruction to avoid giving im-
pression that it is in response to Chinese request
forwarded in the Legation's 697, October 4, 8 a.m.

JOHNSON

JS

793.94/1975

FILED

OCT 15 1931

0612

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.B.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
Plain

JS

PEIPING VIA NR

FROM
Dated October 4, 1931

Rec'd 3 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 5 - 1931
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

699, October 4, 10 a.m.

Your 359, October 3, 6 p.m. Following United Press

report from Washington dated October second:

"Hoover administration after series of conferences
on Manchuria has definitely decided for the present
upon hands off policy.

State Department officials declared today that so
long as Japan continues to withdraw her troops from
occupied area United States Government can see no basis
for further action.

This government is now awaiting results of League
of Nations resolution by which October fourteenth was
set as reasonable date for withdrawal of all troops and
restoration of status quo."

JOHNSON

JS

793.94
note
893.0146

793.94/1076

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles A. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

RH

COPIES SENT TO
 C.N.I. AND M.I.

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING VIA NR

UNDATED

1-1338


FROM

Rec'd. 6 am Oct. 4.

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

700



Following from Nanking, October 3, 6 pm.

"One. The attitude of the student class toward the situation in Manchuria is one of bitter resentment toward Japan. Following sentences from a leaflet distributed by students summarizes the student attitude, "an amicable settlement is hopeless and is absolutely impossible. People die for our country. We must save her by armed forces. Fear not the dwarf."

Two. The general population in Nanking seems more concerned with rumors of possible Japanese measures than with wrongs inflicted by Japan on China. I have heard the actions of Japan condemned as utterly indefensible and the positive conviction expressed that China could defeat Japanese army in land warfare by sheer numbers. I think little thought is given to possibility of assistance from the League or the United States. Missionaries from Wuhu state the

793.94/1977

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh #2 of No. 700 Part 1, from Peiping

state the laboring classes there are noticeably more
hostile to all foreigners of late.

Three. end part one.

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

PEIPING VIA NR

UNDATED

FROM

Rec'd. 6 am, Oct. 4

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

700 Part two.

Military officers here have expressed to me deep personal humiliation over invasion by Japanese troops and the feeling that war with Japan, although sure to result in defeat, is the only way of restoring Chinese honor. Some of them are convinced that Japan will repeat on the Yangtze River the sudden military measures recently taken in Manchuria.

Four. Government officials feel that effective action by the League or Pact signatories on behalf of China can no longer be expected. They think that the influence of Japan in the League so far out-predominates that of China that the League will not run the risk of alienating Japan."

end message

JOHNSON

WVC

061E

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Syme NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

Department of State

Washington,

September 30, 1931.

6 pm

SEP 30 31

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

355 Confidential.

One. Instruction will be sent you shortly ^{confirming} regarding
 instruction to send ^{concerning which} ~~sending~~ Hanson to Mukden. Explanatory information ~~will~~ ^{is being}
~~sent~~ sent you from Tokyo. Inform Myers, strictly confiden-
 tial, that Hanson and Salisbury are being sent, with
 approval of the Japanese Government, to South Manchuria,
 for purpose of special observation.

Two. Are regular channels of communication with
 offices in Manchuria open and safe.

Stinson

SKH.

700.04/1077A

Instruction
 given by
 Mr. Castle
 FE:SKH/ZMF

RM
 FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

RECEIVED
OCT 3 1931
DIVISION OF FOREIGN
OFFICE ADMINISTRATION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
Mr. Carr
October 2, 1931.

FA

Mr. Havens:

Please have these rewritten
giving them transportation and
per diem of \$12, referring to
Authorization --42, 1932 and
informing them to render separate
accounts and draw separate drafts.
I will insert Authorization num-
ber when the telegrams come
through here for initial.
RLdeL

The Secretary has approved this
payment from Emergency Fund.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

October 1, 1931

While these telegrams to Peiping and Tokyo have been drafted, authorizing the expenditures for the trip for Mr. Salisbury and Mr. Hanson to be paid from the regular transportation appropriation, it is suggested that it would probably be much more satisfactory to have an allotment made from the Emergency Fund, and grant a much larger per diem than can be authorized from the regular transportation appropriation.

First telegrams cancelled for money reasons. Mr. Salisbury in admin. with 7972

HARS

FA HAH:HM

FP concurs. Under travel regulations it is believed that their movements would be hampered and that it would be impossible for them to be reimbursed for all their expenditures.

HARS.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department **X**
 or

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT *Gray*

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

October 2, 1931.

OCT 2 31

6P

AMLEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA)

356

Department's number *355* September 30, 6 p.m.

Transportation and per diem \$12.00 authorized for
 Hanson to be charged to authorization No. 47, 1932. He
 should draw separate draft render separate account.

Please issue appropriate instruction to
 Hanson to ~~join Salisbury~~ *to join Salisbury* where his
 mission will be explained by Salisbury.

795.94/1977B

FA:HAH:HM:MDM

FP

BA

FE

man

A-e
Rdch.

Shinson

OK

Oct. 2 1931

MS

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Du.-No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

note
123 H/194

0620

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Ryan NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department

Charge to
\$

Department of State

It is to be carefully paraphrased before
communicated to anyone.

Washington,

September 30, 1931.

SEP 30 31

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

179 One. On what date
When did Lieutenant Cranford arrive in
Manchuria? SKH

Two. From what, if any, other diplomatic missions
in Tokyo have officers been sent to Manchuria since
September 18 and on approximately what dates?

793.94/19770

Stimson
SKH,

note
121.5494

Approved by
Mr. C. C. C.

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138


0621

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPIES SENT TO
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP



FROM

GREEN

Tokyo

Dated October 5, 1931

Rec'd 9:50 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

175, October 5, 4 p. m.

Department's 181, October 3, 2 p. m.

I saw the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs today.

He told me that Baron Shidehara was unable to see me as the new Chinese Minister was presenting his credentials and the Foreign Minister was in attendance at the Court for the occasion. I asked Mr. Nagai if that meant that the Chinese were prepared to negotiate. He said that he hoped so but that so far there had been no indication of it.

I then asked him what the situation was in Manchuria. He told me that the Japanese were gradually drawing their troops inside the railway zone and that this policy would be continued. He said that they felt that it was impossible to draw them all in immediately, as there was no

adequat

703.94/1973

FILED
 OCT 13 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #175, from Tokyo, Oct. 5, 1931,
4 p. m.

adequate police protection in some places. He said that the Japanese were now as always prepared to negotiate with the Chinese but that up to the present the latter had refused to do so. Until some new development took place, the Japanese Government was of the opinion that the only course to follow was one of calm waiting.

He said that in Manchuria women and children were being brought into the railway zone and it looked as if conditions were settling down and the Japanese Government hoped they would soon be peaceful and that matters could be cleared up by discussion. I asked him what matters would be discussed. He said it would depend largely upon the personnel of whatever commission might be appointed. I asked him whether he expected to clear up all the pending questions. He said that would hardly be possible as there were so many individual claims. In reply to my question he said they hoped to settle in principle a number of outstanding questions. I gather, although he did not say so directly, that the Japanese hope to settle a number of things, such as the Korean trouble with land, land rights and similar matters and let the individual cases be settled

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clayton S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

3- #175, from Tokyo, Oct. 5, 1931,
 4 p. m.

settled locally in accordance with the principles laid down by which negotiations may take place.

He then said that conditions in the Yangtze Valley were causing much anxiety, the boycott has affected the Japanese seriously, and it has been necessary to bring Japanese families into Hankow and similar large centers for protection. I am inclined to think that the Japanese merchants and traders in the Shanghai and Hankow region have been urging a speedy settlement on their Government, as Nagai told me that the Foreign Office had been receiving a number of protests from Japanese in Shanghai that the Government's course was not helping them and that they were losing business very fast. I asked him if this situation was new. He said that to a certain extent it was chronic but that the Manchurian incident had undoubtedly helped to make it acute. He said that Japanese business was suffering badly.

893.74
 Before I left he told me that he would look into the question of the wireless station and the reasons if any why it is kept idle. He admitted that closing it to us did not seem reasonable.

I left the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

4- #175, from Tokyo, Oct. 5, 1931,
4 p. m.

I left the Foreign Office with the distinct impression that, one, the Japanese do not at present intend to do anything in Manchuria until they have heard from the Chinese, that they will not pull their troops back into the railway zone until they have some sort of assurance of the safety of Japanese life and property there, and,

Two, that the general condition of Japanese in China is causing the Government here much anxiety, especially as the jingo element is becoming noisy.

Repeated to Peiping.

NEVILLE

HPD

0625

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

May
 1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

GREEN

October 2, 1931.

SP

AMLEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA).

Confidential for your information - staff use only.

Reference penultimate paragraph of section one of

Tokyo's telegram No. 175, October 5, 4 p.m., to the
 Department. 793.94/1978

One. The Department's No. 181, October 3, 2 p.m., to
 Tokyo ^{read} as follows: 793.94/1979A

QUOTE The Chinese Government radio station at
 Mukden was seized by Japanese forces at an early stage
 in the operations which began on the night of September
 18. It has been held, apparently inactive, by them
 ever since, thus interfering with communications.
 Consul General Myers reports that repeated representa-
 tions to the Japanese Consulate relative to reestablish-
 ment of service have elicited nothing more than a
 statement that the Japanese authorities are considering
 the matter. The only facility for communication with
 Mukden is the Japanese telegraph.

Please confer with Foreign Office stating that it
 is my understanding that this station is a Chinese

Enciphered by

Government

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-138

793.94/1978

793.94
 note
 811.7493 364

0626

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
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Charge Department
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TELEGRAM SENT
Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

Government utility, it constitutes an important terminus
of circuits the other termini of which are in several
countries, including Japan, China and the United States,
it is my feeling that it should not have been interfered
with, and it is my hope that it will be speedily reopened
under conditions which will insure general service by it
as a public utility. I believe this to be in the best
interests of all concerned. UNQUOTE

Similar representations have been made to the
Japanese Ambassador here.

Two. Instruct Mukden that any approach ^{oral or written,} whatever to the
Consulate by Japanese authorities or Chinese or Americans ^{SKH}
interested in this question should be reported to Depart-
ment at once and no commitments of any sort be made in
connection therewith without instruction.

FE: JEJ: EJJ

[Signature]

RAM
FE
SKH

Spinson
10/6

Oct. 7, 1981


Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

1627

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPY:KC



September 23, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

793.94/1978 1/6

Without knowing what the Japanese Ambassador might have said to you, but having read and studied with care today's incoming telegrams, I am forced, on the basis of the telegrams, to the conclusion that Japan's diplomacy at this moment is directed toward preventing, if possible, action by the League of Nations; and that, to that end, the Japanese representatives are endeavoring to create the impression that Japan and China, if left to themselves, will attend to this matter by diplomatic processes, thus rendering gratuitous any desire on the part of the League to act; and that China, on her part, desires action by the League or by any or all of the important powers.

I believe it is my duty to point out that it is only natural that Japan, the stronger power, military movements on the part of her armed forces having been successful, naturally would be only too happy to have the powers keep hands off; and that China, knowing that she is incapable of dealing with Japan, in a conference between those two powers only, with any chance of arriving at an equitable settlement, naturally desires

some

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F/DEW

793.94/1978 1/6

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -


some form of action by and on the part of other powers.

I also believe it my duty to state that it is my estimate that in any settlement which might be arrived at between China and Japan alone, the present military situation in Manchuria would not be liquidated and the sources of irritation which would tend to lead sooner or later to a real war on a large scale would be left inherent in the situation.

SKHZMF

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPY:KC



FE
File
JMS

September 29, 1931

Subject: Estimates of Numbers and Location of Japanese Armed Forces in Manchuria.

F/DEW

793.94/1978 1/3

The Tokyo Embassy estimates that Japanese troops with colors now in Manchuria total 15,500; and that these are distributed at the following points: Tunhua, Kirin, Changchun, Ssuping kai, Chengchiatun, Mukden, Hsinmintun, Yinkow, Antung, and Tashichiao. They say that two armored trains reported sent to Taonan "returned" on the 26th.

The Peiping Legation estimates that the Japanese forces in Manchuria include one division of 7,000 to 8,432 men, two air squadrons (strength unknown), a brigade of 3,000 men and railway guards of 5,000 men, together with some reservists (number in use unknown, number available 30,000) on active duty; and that these are distributed at the following points: Changchun, Kirin, Tunhua, Chenchiatun, Yinglingkan and Mukden. (Note: It would appear that in preparing this telegram the Legation started but forgot to finish its estimate of location.)

Comparing the two estimates and making a composite, it would appear that the Japanese troops number something over 15,000 regulars and some reservists; and that these are located variously at Tunhua, Kirin, Changchun, Ssuping kai,

Chengchiatun

793.94/1978 1/3
note
893/0146

MAY 11 1983
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0630
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

Chengchiatun, Mukden, Hsinmintun, Yinkow, Antung,
Tashichiao and Yinglingkan (all of these locations
except the last being mentioned in the Tokyo Embassy's
estimate).

SKH:ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPY:KC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS.
APR 5 - 1932
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

September 30, 1931

FE
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F/DEW
793.94/1978 1/2

793.94/1978 1/2
793.94/118

Subject: Foreign Observers in Manchuria.

The Peiping Legation informed us more than a week ago that an officer from the Military Attaché's office at Peiping had been sent to Manchuria. Tokyo's 165, September 29, 4 p.m., informs us that Lieutenant Cranford (who is an officer attached to the office of the Military Attaché at Tokyo) has reported from Mukden.

We thus know that there are in Manchuria an American Army officer from the Peiping Legation and an American Army officer from the Tokyo Embassy.

(Note: We have also had information originating from an unidentified "American Naval officer", dated Harbin.)

The British Embassy sent us on September 24 an aide memoire from which it appears that officers from both the French and the British Military Attachés' offices at Peiping had already gone to Manchuria and that the French and British Governments were conferring with regard to sending similar officers from their establishments in Tokyo.

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
We thus know that there are in Manchuria a British Army officer and a French Army officer from Peiping and that there are perhaps British and French officers from Tokyo.

SKH:ZMF

0632

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPY



DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 3, 1931.

793.94/1978^{2/3}

note
893,0144

Mr. Secretary:

This memorandum relates to two questions:

1. The right of sovereignty in relation to Manchuria; and
2. An express limitation in reference to Japan's rights in Manchuria with regard to the use to be made of railway guards stationed on the line of the South Manchuria Railway (i.e., Japan's guards stationed in Japan's railway zone.)

With regard to sovereignty, to the best of my knowledge neither Russia nor Japan has ever queried China's territorial sovereignty.

With regard to railway guards, China has ever since the building of the

Chinese

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

Chinese Eastern Railway contested the application in practice by the Russians and the Japanese of the rights which the Russians and the Japanese have contended have been theirs under the provisions of the treaties and agreements.

SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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MANCHURIA:
SOVEREIGNTY AND RIGHTS IN CONNECTION THEREWITH

F/DEW
793.94/1978 2/3

In the Treaty of Portsmouth, which concluded the Russo-Japanese War, ratified on September 5, 1905, we find, in Article III, the following:

"Japan and Russia mutually engage:

"1. To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria except the territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula ; and

"2. To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria now in the occupation or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of the territory above mentioned.

"The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they have not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity."

We

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

We find in Article IV the following:

"ARTICLE IV. -- Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries, which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria."

When, in confirmation of provisions of the above-mentioned treaty, Japan and China concluded at Peking, on December 22, 1905, what is known as the Komura Treaty, those two countries also concluded an additional agreement. During the negotiations there was drawn up a set of "Secret Protocols". Until recently, the text of those Protocols was never officially published. Unofficially, the text became known more than twenty years ago. It is printed in MacMurray's TREATIES, Volume I, on pages 554-555. For twenty-five years the Chinese have claimed that those "Protocols" were not a part of the treaty, that they constituted minutes or a draft of provisions which had been discussed but not agreed upon by the Plenipotentiaries. The Japanese, however, have contended that they were a part of the agreement and as binding as the treaty itself.

In a volume called "Report on Progress in Manchuria", the first number of which appeared in 1930, published by the South Manchuria railway, there has appeared a set of appendices giving "Texts of Treaties, Protocols, Agreements

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

ments, Notes, and Statutes of the Powers concerning Manchuria." Here the South Manchuria Railway (which is now a Japanese Government agency) publishes (as No. 10) the text of "Protocols attached to the Treaty of Peking -- December 22, 1905."

In view of the fact that the Japanese have always contended that these Protocols constitute a binding agreement, the present is an opportune moment to examine that text. In Article 14, we find the following:

"14.--The Japanese Plenipotentiaries declare that the Railway Guards stationed between Changchun and the boundary line of the leased territory of Port Arthur and Talien, shall not be allowed, before their withdrawal, to unreasonably interfere with the local administration of China or to proceed without permission beyond the limits of the railway."

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 3, 1931.

Manchurian Situation.

This situation map, as of October 1, indicates that the number of Japanese troops at certain indicated points outside of the railway zone has been decreased. It does not indicate what disposal has been made of those troops. So far as it goes, it does not definitely account for the present location of units other than those indicated of the whole body of fifteen to sixteen thousand Japanese regular troops and the unknown number of reservists on active duty known to be in Manchuria. It is reasonable to believe that the Japanese troops are being drawn into or toward the railway zone. However, it does not follow that the status quo ante is being or can be restored. The status quo at any moment has both its political and its military aspects. If all Japanese troops were (as they probably will be as rapidly as is practicable) withdrawn to the points at which they were stationed before September 18, there would be an apparent reversion, in the military aspect, to the status quo ante. But this would not restore the situation, in its political aspect, to that status. Nor would it restore it to that status in its economic aspect.

Action so far taken by the powers and the restraint which has so far been exercised by Japan and China since the initial action of September 18-20 may have prevented armed conflict

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May 1, 1954

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

at the present moment on large scale between China and Japan, but the excursion of Japan's armed forces outside of the railway zone and the acts of seizure and occupation in which they have engaged have altered the situation in Manchuria, and in China, and between China and Japan in such manner and to such extent that there can be no reversion to the political status quo ante. All parties concerned must henceforth recognize the existence of a new situation and deal with the problem on the basis of the existence of a new and evolving status quo.

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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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GRAY



FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 5, 1931

Rec'd 11:50 a.m.


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Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

702, October 5, 9 a.m.

Following from Mukden "October 3, 8 a.m.



file 89C

Japanese forces entered Chinese city of Newchwang at 2:15 this morning from Yingkou following bandit attack on the city".

JOHNSON

RR

HPD

793.24/1579

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0640

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Washington,

October 3, 1931.

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181
AMEMBASSY,

OCT 5 31

TOKYO (JAPAN).

The Chinese Government radio station at Mukden was seized by Japanese forces at an early stage in the operations which began on the night of September 18. It has been held, apparently inactive, by them ever since, thus interfering with communications. Consul General Myers reports that repeated representations to the Japanese Consulate relative to reestablishment of service have elicited nothing more than a statement that the Japanese authorities are considering the matter. The only facility for communication with Mukden is the Japanese telegraph.

Please confer with Foreign Office stating that it is my understanding that this station is a Chinese Government utility, it constitutes an important terminus of circuits the other termini of which are in several countries, including Japan, China and the United States, it is my feeling that it should not have been interfered with, and it is my hope that it will be speedily

reopened

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

793.94/1979A

1979A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
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Charge Department
OR
Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

reopened under conditions which will insure general
service by it as a public utility. I believe this
to be in the best interests of all concerned.

Stinson

CR
Oct. 3 1931

WLG
MM
FE: SAH: EJJ
RM
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SKA

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

0647

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clayton S. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976



IN
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FE
LA

No. 1057



Lima, September 26, 1931.

DIVISION OF
LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OCT 7 - 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 3 31

793 94
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 5 - 1931
Department of State

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK		Yes	No
TO THE SECRETARY			
TO THE DEPARTMENT			
TO THE BUREAU			
TO THE FIELD			

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

S i r:

I have the honor to report to the Department
that the Manchurian situation has found an echo
in Lima. The Japanese Legation has published a
telegram received from the Japanese Government
explaining its position, the first paragraph of
which strikes me as being rather surprising and
Jesuitical. The Department will note, however,
the statement that the Japanese have no idea of
annexing Chinese territory. At the same time the

papers

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OCT 8 1931

793.94/1000


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-2-

papers have carried a number of protests from young
2/ members of the Kuo Ming Ton, two of which I enclose
to the Department as samples.

Respectfully yours,


Fred Morris Dearing.

FMD-hkl

Enclosures.

- 1-Clipping from El Comercio of September 26, 1931,
attached to original only *and translation.*
- 2-Clipping from El Comercio of September 26, 1931,
attached to original only.

0644

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By *Charles E. Lyon* NARS, Date *June 1, 1976*

American Embassy
Lima, Peru
September 26, 1931.

Enclosure No. 1 to Embassy's Despatch No. 1057, Sept. 26, 1931.

From EL COMERCIO (Lima), September 26, 1931.

Subject: The events in Manchuria.

The following is a translation of the text of the Manifesto issued by the Government of Japan on the events in Manchuria. It is dated September 25, 1931.

EL INCIDENTE CHINO-JAPONES EN LA MANCHURIA

INTERESANTE COMUNICADO DE LA LEGACION DEL JAPON

La legación del Japón saluda atentamente a los señores redactores del diario «El Comercio» y tiene el agrado de enviarle adjunta una traducción del texto del manifiesto del gobierno del Japón sobre el incidente en Manchuria, que acaba de recibir de Tokio cablegráficamente, rogándoles quieran publicarla en el prestigioso diario de su digna redacción, por lo que les anticipa sus gracias más expresivas.

Lima, 25 de setiembre de 1931.

LAS DECLARACIONES FORMULADAS POR EL GABINETE JAPONES DESPUES DE LA REUNION EXTRAORDINARIA CELEBRADA EL DIA 24 DE SETIEMBRE:

El gobierno japonés se ha preocupado y esforzado constante y honestamente en la continuación de su política definida para mejorar las relaciones amistosas entre el Japón y China y para facilitar la mutua prosperidad y bienestar de ambos países. Desgraciadamente, la conducta de las autoridades y los ciudadanos de China de los últimos años pasados han sido de tal naturaleza que nuestro sentimiento nacional, muy frecuentemente ha sido provocado. Se han producido incidentes desagradables unos a continuación de otros en las regiones de Manchuria y Mongolia, en las que el Japón está vivamente interesado. Estas manifestaciones se han producido con tal frecuencia y han revestido tal gravedad hasta el punto de que el pueblo japonés se ha convencido que su actitud, francamente amistosa, no ha sido objeto de reciprocidad por parte del pueblo de China.

Entre una atmósfera de perturbaciones y de ansiedad creada de esta manera, un destacamento de tropas chinas destruyó la línea del ferrocarril del Sur de Manchuria cerca de Mukden en la media noche del 18 de setiembre, se atacó a nuestras guardias, las que tuvieron un choque con las tropas chinas. La situación revistió desde entonces caracteres de gravedad ya que el número de los guardias japoneses estacionados a todo lo largo del ferrocarril no excedía de diez mil cuatrocientos, mientras que las tropas chinas que se enfrentaban llegaban a cerca de doscientos veinte mil hombres. Más aún las vidas de cientos de miles de residentes japoneses se encontraban en peligro. Para evitar el desastre inminente, el ejército japonés tuvo que actuar sin dilación. Los soldados chinos acuartelados en las localidades vecinas fueron desarmados y la obligación de mantener la paz y el orden fué encomendada a las organizaciones chinas locales bajo la supervigilancia. Habiéndose tomado estas medidas la mayoría de nuestros soldados fueron retirados de la zona del ferrocarril. Han quedado algunos destacamentos en Mukden y en Kirin,

y un pequeño número de hombres en otros sitios pero en ninguna parte se ha producido, como tal, una ocupación militar.

Los informes de que las autoridades japonesas se han apoderado de las aduanas o de las oficinas de recaudación de impuesto de la sal de Yingkou o de que ellas se han adueñado de los ferrocarriles de China entre Shupigkai y Chongchiatun o entre Mukden y Simmintun, son completamente inexactas, como lo son también de que nuestras tropas hubieran sido enviadas al norte de Changchun o a Chientao. En realidad el gobierno japonés, en reunión especial de gabinete celebrada el 19 de setiembre, decidió realizar toda clase de esfuerzos para evitar que la situación se agravara y con este fin se impartieron instrucciones al comandante de la guarnición de Manchuria.

Es efectivo que se despachó un destacamento de Changchun a Kirin el 21 del presente, pero no se hizo esto con fines de ocupación militar sino solamente con el propósito de evitar la amenaza de un ataque de flanco al ferrocarril del Sur de Manchuria. Una vez que se obtenga este resultado el cuerpo principal de nuestro destacamento será retirado. Debemos agregar que mientras una brigada mixta de cuatro mil hombres se envió de Corea para que se juntara con la guarnición de Manchuria, el número total de tropas en la guarnición en la actualidad, permanece dentro del límite establecido por el tratado y por lo mismo este hecho no puede ser considerado como que tienda a aumentar la seriedad de la situación internacional. Consideramos superfluo repetir que el gobierno japonés no tiene intenciones de conquista territorial en Manchuria. Lo único que deseamos es que los súbditos japoneses puedan pacíficamente desenvolver sus actividades y que se les dé la oportunidad de participar en el desarrollo de aquella región con la ayuda de sus capitales y su trabajo. Es el deber de un gobierno proteger los derechos e intereses legítimamente adquiridos por el país o por sus ciudadanos. Los esfuerzos del gobierno japonés para proteger el ferrocarril del Sur de Manchuria contra los ataques sin control, no deben ser apreciados desde ningún otro punto de vista. El gobierno japonés siempre de acuerdo con su política tradicional está preparado para cooperar con la China con el fin de evitar la continuación de este, que puede convertirse en situación desastrosa para ambos países, o para preparar planes constructivos que de una vez por todas hagan desaparecer causas para futuras fricciones.

Nada halagaría más al gobierno del Japón que encontrar una inmediata solución a esta dificultad que redundará en beneficio de ambos países.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

American Embassy,
Lima, Peru.
September 26, 1931.

Enclosure No. 2 to Embassy's Despatch No. 1057, Sept. 26, 1931.

From El Comercio, Lima, September 26, 1931.

Subject: The events in Manchuria.

Los sucesos de Manchuria

El presidente del Centro Nacionalista Chino nos pide la publicación de lo siguiente, en relación con los sucesos que se desarrollan en la Manchuria:

Lima, 23 de setiembre de 1931.

Señores redactores de "El Comercio".

Muy señores nuestros:

Los graves sucesos que se están desarrollando en la Manchuria, en el territorio de la República China, y las publicaciones que han venido haciéndose de las noticias transmitidas por el cable, necesitan, para que el pueblo de esta noble tierra se dé cuenta de la verdadera situación creada, que el periodismo brinde ocasión, lo que solicitamos con todo fervor, para decir de las causas del conflicto y de su desarrollo y del peligro que encierra, desde el punto de vista de las doctrinas expansionistas y de la nefanda acción del imperialismo, que aun quiero subsistir en el mundo, pese a la acción de las naciones llamadas dirigentes y a las doctrinas internacionales de paz y concordia universal.

El Kuo Ming Tang, la institución representativa en el Perú de la obra que la China lleva a cabo por el prestigio y engrandecimiento de su patria, no puede callar, cuando ese prestigio puede comprometerse y cuando los principios por los que han luchado en la revolución, salvadora de su nacionalidad, se ven peligrar ante el nuevo ataque extranjero, cuya finalidad es de fácil esclarecimiento.

La obra de unificación de la nacionalidad China, de su organización y de afianzar sus instituciones, no le ha permitido desarrollar su acción internacional en forma tal que pudiera ponerse a cubierto de ataques, menos de producir conflictos, de buscarlos o de provocarlos; la catástrofe sufrida últimamente por sus poblaciones, por su agricultura, que a más de las víctimas causadas y de la miseria a que redujo a sus pobladores, se traducía en sus fuentes de vida, y especialmente en su comercio, absorbieron un momento todas las actividades, y es en ese instante cuando el Japón produce su acción pensada, de expansionismo necesitado urgentemente, para producir el conflicto Manchuriano y buscar, pretexto que no falta, para el fin deseado.

El territorio Chino, no es un predio, un campo abandonado, listo para el primer ocupante; es una nación con todos los derechos soberanos de todos los países civilizados y si pese a los contratos y tratados impuestos, la tolerancia que el tacto dirigente realizaba, no nos ponía en condiciones de salvar de las imposiciones aun: en cambio había el derecho

de exigir en todo momento a los enemigos de nuestra nacionalidad, el respeto, la consideración y el reconocimiento de nuestros derechos soberanos.

Si como dice o pretexto el Japón, ha habido algún ataque personal contra ciudadanos japoneses, militares o civiles, si ha habido, cosa que negamos, algún ataque a su propiedad o negocio, hay para él un gobierno responsable ante quien reclamar y, formas legales dentro del derecho internacional para zanjar el asunto y hasta para ir a la agresión si el caso llegara. Pero faltar a todas las reglas internacionales, pasar sobre los mismos pactos, la violación del pacto Kellogg, aprovechar de la actitud defensiva de la China, y aun de la postración en que se encontraba con la catástrofe producida por las inundaciones, es algo que significa, no un hecho aislado, sino un peligro para el universo entero por la obra de una nación propicia a estos actos reñidos contra toda ley y todo sentimiento patriótico.

Los hechos, la forma como se han producido, demuestran claramente las actitudes y los fines de China y Japón. Mientras nosotros por intermedio de nuestros generales, obligamos a no combatir, el Japón con sus ejércitos bien preparados, listos para la agresión, bien pensada y preparada, arrasa a ciudadanos indefensos y bombardea poblaciones, no respetando a las mujeres ni a los niños y así avanza en nuestro territorio para asegurar sus anhelos expansionistas y obtener como consecuencia de esa acción, ventajas para sus ansias de conquista.

La China, no ha de permitir, ni las naciones todas tolerar el que un nuevo peligro se cierna sobre las nacionalidades, como la nuestra, en organización, ni que el principio de conquista se imponga nuevamente, ni que por ello se produzca nueva conflagración mundial.

Nosotros los chinos, los miembros del Kuo Ming Tang, tenemos, pues, que elevar ante las naciones todas y los que reciben generoso hospedaje en el Perú, ante esta noble nación, nuestra protesta, por que sin razón, sin motivo y ~~además con miras expansionistas~~ el Japón invade nuestro territorio y busca el conflicto contrariando con nuestro pacifismo y deseamos que se sepa en todos los ámbitos de la tierra, la injusticia del proceder y que si nuestra moderada actitud no encuentra el apoyo de la justicia internacional encausando las cosas por el camino del respeto al derecho soberano de nuestra patria, la China tendrá que defender palmo a palmo su territorio, y sobre todo poner sobre todos los intereses y los apetitos, la gloria de su estandarte que proclama los derechos inalienables de las naciones en su convivencia internacional y los principios ampliamente nacionalistas que significan la defensa de la patria sacrificándolo todo y exponiéndolo todo.

Sírvanse, señores redactores, aceptar la publicación de nuestra carta y dispensar ~~nuestra explicación patriótica~~, pero es que sobre todos los sentimientos debe imperar el de la justicia entre los hombres y entre los pueblos.

Félix L. Chang, jefe de propaganda—
Enrique Lotinchiong, presidente.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter

August 10, 1972

By

Charles E. Lyon

NARS, Date

June 1, 1976

American Embassy,
Lima, Peru.
September 26, 1931.

From El Comercio, Lima, September 26, 1931.

Subject: The events in Manchuria.

El incidente chino-japonés

Es un hecho por todos reconocido que el Japón es una de las grandes potencias del mundo, y tal vez la única nación asiática que se ha preocupado en armarse de tal forma que no sólo le sea posible combatir a cualquier presunto enemigo, sino la posibilidad de tomar la ofensiva, si la probabilidad del éxito le anima; pero el Japón comprende que apesar de todos sus armamentos, su radio de acción está muy limitado, pues por más presunción que tenga, jamás podría sojuzgar la América ni Europa: todo su afán de conquistas está limitado al Oriente. Contra la China han ido siempre sus ataques y sus delirios de grandeza; por eso fué el Japón que encabezó la invasión y el saqueo del Pekín, en 1902, y el Japón ha sido siempre el primero en sugerir o apoyar cualquier tratado, o medidas que tiendan a mermar la soberanía china.

El presente asunto de la Manchuria no es más que un simple pretexto para el desborde del imperialismo japonés, y el primer síntoma ha sido la reciente masacre de chinos en Corea, pero la China, viéndose azotada con tremendas desgracias, sufrió la humillación, y el Japón buscó otro medio, y le provoca en una forma que no solo compromete la dignidad china, sino la paz del mundo. Sin cumplir las más elementales leyes del derecho internacional, sin plazo, sin ultimatum, el Japón ordenó el ataque a los soldados chinos, bombardea poblaciones indefensas, y se apodera sin más trámites de ciudades enteras.

La China ha elevado su protesta a la Liga de Naciones, y ha llamado la atención de los signatarios del pacto Kellogg. La China ha puesto una tremenda interrogación al mundo; de la respuesta se sabrá si todas esas ligas, esos pactos, esos tratados representan el sincero deseo de desterrar para siempre la injusticia y la discordia entre las naciones, o son simplemente una comedia, una farza para disimular los afanes de conquistas, o los despotismos de las potencias. No solo la China, sino el mundo entero está pendiente de esa respuesta.

El Japón está ofuscado por sus delirios de grandezas; de lo contrario comprendería que ya no estamos en el siglo dieciocho, o diecinueve sino en pleno siglo de reivindicaciones y que el imperialismo en cualquiera de sus formas encuentra el más franco repudio en todos los países. Si no estuviera cegado, comprendería la situación de la que fué un día la aliada de todas sus hazañas y conquistas: Inglaterra, esa nación que no reparó en medios para dominar al mundo, y que hoy, un esclavo, sin armas, sin dinero, un hombre diminuto, un sólo visionario: Gandhi, ha sido suficiente para estremecer las columnas de ese gigantesco imperio y precipitarlo irremediablemente a la decadencia.

La China, fiel a su tradición, es un país pacífico, y tal vez la única nación del mundo que no pone trabas para el ingreso de extranjeros; ella, a pesar de tener quinientos millones de hombres, no niega hospitalidad ni el derecho para

aprovechar sus inmensos recursos. El Japón, ligado por la sangre, por la religión y por las tradiciones, sería el más llamado a unirse a la China, y aprovechar pacíficamente sus fuentes de riqueza, pero el Japón, cegado por el orgullo, no acepta todas esas ventajas que espontáneamente le ofrece la China y quiere hacer alarde de su poderío, quiere humillarla, quiere obtener todas esas ventajas como un tributo.

El Japón ve con disgusto que sus antiguos aliados están tratando de ganarse la simpatía de la China; comprende que ella está resurgiendo rápidamente, que goza ya de más libertad, que dispone de sus entradas, que ha abolido los derechos de extraterritorialidad; el Japón comprende que todo eso es síntoma de la extinción de su predominio; por eso hace esfuerzos titánicos para ahogar la futura grandeza de la China. Esta es la razón que hoy, sin reparar en la injusticia de su causa, el Japón ataca a la China, en el momento que ella se encuentra dividida por una contienda interna, por una desgracia que ha azotado todo su territorio, por las inundaciones que han destruido ciudades enteras, dejando en la miseria y al desamparo a millones de hombres; en el preciso momento que los espíritus humanitarios de todas las naciones están enviando una ayuda a la China, el Japón le ataca y le obliga a ir a una guerra con grandes desventajas, porque la ferocidad y la peregrinación ha empujado al Japón a obtener una fácil victoria, tan fácil como despojar, atacar y destruir la casa de un hombre enfermo para imponersele en toda forma.

Sea cual fuere las ventajas que obtenga el Japón, de las conciencias honradas del mundo sólo recibirá una reprobación por su despotismo y por su falta absoluta de respeto a los elementales principios de justicia y de humanidad.

A. Kuan Veng.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

American Embassy,
 Lima, Peru.

The Chinese-Japanese incident in Manchuria.

The Japanese Legation presents its compliments to the editors of "El Comercio" and is pleased to enclose herewith a translation of the statement of the Japanese Government regarding the incident in Manchuria, which has just been received from Tokio, by cable, and requests their kindness for its publication, thanking them in advance for it.
 Lima, September 25, 1931.

Statement issued by the Japanese Cabinet after the extraordinary meeting held on September 24th.

The Japanese Government has been very busy and has tried constantly and honestly to continue its known policy to bring closer the friendly relations between Japan and China and to facilitate mutual prosperity and welfare of both countries. Unfortunately, the behaviour of the authorities and citizens of China in recent years has been of such nature that our national feelings have been frequently provoked. Disagreeable incidents have arisen one after another in the Manchuria and Mongolian regions, in which Japan is greatly concerned. These incidents have occurred so frequently and in such alarming manner that the Japanese people are convinced that their attitude, frankly of friendship has not been reciprocated by the people of China.

Amidst an atmosphere of confusion and anxiety, a regiment of Chinese troops destroyed the railroad line of southern Manchuria near Mukden at midnight on Sept. 18th and our guards were attacked causing a battle with the Chinese troops. The situation was then very serious as the number of Japanese guards along the railroad line did not exceed over ten thousand four hundred while the Chinese troops numbered about two hundred thousand men. Thus, the lives of thousands of Japanese residents were in danger. To avoid a nearing disaster, the Japanese army was compelled to act without delay. The Chinese soldiers barracked in the neighboring cities were disarmed and the obligation to maintain peace and order was commended on the local Chinese institutions with proper control. Most of our soldiers were withdrawn from the railroad zone after these measures. A small number of troops have remained in Mukden and Kirin and a small number of men in various places but no military occupation whatsoever has taken place.

News that the Japanese authorities have seized customs buildings or tax collection offices of salt in Tingkon, that the railroads in China, between Shupigkai and Chengchiatun have been taken are absolutely false as well as news that our troops had been sent to Changchun or to Chientao. In fact, the Japanese Government in special meeting of its cabinet on Sept. 19th decided to avoid by all means the complication of the situation and with this object, instructions were handed to the Commander of the Manchuria garrison.

It is true that a regiment was sent from Changchun to Kirin on the 21st inst., but was not done with the intention of military occupancy but only with the object of avoiding the menace of an attack to the southern railroad of Manchuria. Once this result is obtained the main body of our regiment will be withdrawn. We must add that while a mixed brigade of four thousand men was sent to Korea to join the regiment at Manchuria the total number of troops actually in the garrison remains within the limits established by the treaty and therefore this fact must be

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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regarded as to leading to a more serious international situation. We think useless to repeat that the Japanese Government has no intentions of territorial conquest in Manchuria. Our only desire is that the Japanese people may be able to develop their duties quietly and that they be given the opportunity to share in the development of the region with the aid of their capitals and work. It is the duty of a government to protect the rights and interests legitimately obtained by the country or their citizens. The efforts of the Japanese government to protect the southern railroad of Manchuria against any attacks should not be appreciated from any point of view than this. The Japanese government always in accordance with its traditional policy is prepared to cooperate with China with the object of avoiding the continuation of this incident which may become a disastrous situation for both countries, or to prepare constructive plans so that once for all, any reasons of future friction, may disappear.

Nothing would flatter the Government of Japan than to find an immediate solution to this difficulty which will cause benefit to both countries.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

American Embassy,
 Lima, Peru.

The Japanese-Chinese Incident.

It is a fact recognized by all the world that Japan is one of the great naval powers and probably the only asiatic nation that has armed herself in such a way that it may be possible to fight any possible enemy, but to take the offensive side if a probability of triumph were evident, but Japan understands that although all its armaments its circle of action is greatly limited, because no matter what thoughts it may have, she could never conquer America nor Europe; all its desire of conquest is limited to the Orient. Her attacks and desire of greatness have always been directed against China for which reason Japan was at the head of the invasion of Peking in 1902 and Japan has always been the first to suggest and protect any treaty or measures leading to diminish the Chinese sovereignty.

The actual incident at Manchuria is but a pretext for the inundation of the Japanese imperialism and the first symptom of which was the recent massacre of Chinese in Corea, but China, having undergone tremendous misfortunes, suffered humiliation, and Japan sought other means and provokes her in a manner that not only compromises Chinese dignity but also the peace of the entire world. Without complying with the most elemental laws of international rights, without a term or ultimatum, Japan ordered an attack against the Chinese soldiers, burns cities and takes them without any right.

China has filed its protest before the League of Nations and has called the attention of the signatories of the Kellogg Pact. China has put before the world a tremendous question; from a reply, it will be known if all these Leagues, those pacts and treaties, represent the sincere desire to destroy forever iniquity and discord among Nations or if they are simply a comedy, a farse to conceal desires of conquest or despotism of powerful nations. Not only China but the entire world is pending of this reply.

Japan is blind because of its desires of greatness, otherwise she would understand that centuries eighteen and nineteen are past and that we are now in the century of justice and that imperialism in any of its forms can only find open repulse in all countries. If this were not so, she would understand that the situation of the country which was once the ally of her triumphs and conquest; England which did not stop on the means to dominate the world and today a small man, without arms, without money, and insignificant, Gandhi has been the cause of her trembling being a gigantic empire and overthrown her undoubtedly to decay.

China loyal to her tradition is a quiet country and maybe the only nation in the world does not stop the entry of foreigners and which although having about five hundred million men does not deny hospitality nor the right to profit with her immense resources. Japan, tied by blood, religion and traditions, should unite herself to China and profit peacefully with her riches, but Japan, blind with pride does not accept all those advantages offered spontaneously by China and wishes to show her prowess, wishes to humiliate her and to obtain all those things as a tribute.

Japan looks with ill-humour at her old allies trying to win the sympathy of China, understand that China is growing again rapidly, that she is more free and disposes of her

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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receipts, that she has cancelled extraterritoriality rights; Japan understands that all this is a sign of loss of her control and therefore is trying by all means to stop the future greatness of China. This is the reason why today, without thinking little of justice in her cause, Japan attacks China in the moment when she is divided by an internal battle, by distress which has overcome all of her territory, by inundations which have destroyed entire cities, leaving millions of men helpless, when human people of all nations are sending an aid to China, Japan attacks her and compels her to a war of great disadvantage, because the ferociousness and keenness of Japan has obtained for her an easy victory, as easy as to seize, attack and destroy the house of a man who is ill to impose on him by all means.

Whatever advantage Japan may obtain, from the honest minds of the world she will only receive a reproof of her despotism and her lack of absolute respect to the elemental principles of justice and humanity.

A. Kuan Veng

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

American Embassy
 Lima, Peru
 September 26, 1931.

Enclosure No. 2 to Embassy's Despatch No. 1057, Sept. 26, 1931.

From EL COMERCIO (Lima), September 26, 1931.

Subject: Events in Manchuria.

Letter from Felix L. Chang, Chief of the Department of Propaganda, enclosing copies of cablegrams received from the propaganda department of the executive center of the Kuo Ming Tang of Nanking, giving accounts of the events in Manchuria.

Los sucesos de Manchuria

Lima, 25 de setiembre de 1931.
 Señores redactores de "El Comercio".
 Presente.

Muy señores nuestros:
 Tenemos el agrado de remitir a ustedes en copia los cablegramas que hemos recibido de la sección propaganda de la central ejecutiva del Kuo Ming Tang de Nanking, relacionados con la agresión que sufrimos de las tropas japonesas. Como diariamente recibimos estas comunicaciones, nos permitimos ofrecerle para su publicación, apenas lleguen.

Los recibidos ayer son los siguientes:
 "Noticias oficiales anuncian que las tropas japonesas han capturado Amur y Chun Fa Kon.

"El ministro de guerra japonés, ha ordenado el ataque general, cuya expedición saldrá de Kanti a China.

"La escuadra japonesa ha llegado a los puertos chinos de Ta Ku, Chan Wo Tu, Yin Kau y Yun Toy.

"La escuadra japonesa ha bloqueado los puertos de Yin Kua, Yin Tay, y Chan Wo Tu.

"Aeroplanos japoneses en Shan Hay Kuan, lanzan bombas incendiando edificios, causando numerosos muertos y heridos.

"Las tropas japonesas en el Arsenal de Guerra de Sin Yan, se han apoderado de 200 aeroplanos, 80,000 fusiles y demás pertrechos de guerra, cuyo costo asciende a cien millones de yens.

"El cuerpo consular en Shin Yan ha protestado contra la actitud japonesa.

"Los marinos japoneses han desembarcado en Shanghai y recorren en varios blindados el barrio chino, desafiando al pueblo. Las demás colonias extranjeras residentes en Shanghai protestan de tal actitud. El pueblo chino, en general está alarmado e indignado contra los japoneses.

"En la universidad central de Nanking tuvo lugar ayer una asamblea general a la que asistió el presidente Chang Kai Shieck, quien en su discurso exhortó al pueblo para que contrarrestara la acción japonesa."

De usted attos. y S. S.
 Félix L. Chang.
 Jefe de la Sección de Propaganda.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

American Embassy,
 Lima, Peru.

The Manchuria Incidents.-

Lima, September 25, 1931.

The Editors of "El Comercio",
 Lima.

Dear Sirs:

We have the pleasure to transmit to you in copy, the cablegrams received from the propaganda section of the central executive of the Kuo Ming Tang of Nanking, regarding the attack against us by the Japanese troops. As we daily receive these communications, we take the liberty of sending them to you as soon as received.

Those received yesterday are as follows:

"Official news announce that the Japanese troops have captured Amur and Chun Fa Kon.

"The War Minister of Japan has ordered a general attack which will begin from Kanti to China.

"The Japanese Navy has reached the ports in China of Ta Ku, Chang Wo Tu, Yin Kau and Yun Toy.

"The Japanese Navy has blocked the ports of Yin Kua, Yin Tay and Chan Wo Tu.

"Japanese aeroplanes in Shan Hay Kuan are burning buildings with bombs, causing many deaths and wounded.

"The Japanese troops in the Navy-Yard at Sin Yan have captured 200 aeroplanes, 80,000 guns and other war instruments, the cost of which amounts to one hundred million yens.

"The Consular Corps at Shin Yan has protested against the Japanese attitude.

"The Japanese sailors have disembarked in Shanghai and are patrolling the Chinese section in armoured cars challenging the people. The other foreign colonies protest of this attitude. The Chinese citizens in general is alarmed and furious against the Japanese.

"At the central University of Nanking, a general meeting was held yesterday to which President Chang Kai Sek spoke calling the people to a repel to the Japanese attack.

Yours very truly yours,

Felix L. Chang.
 Chief of the Propaganda Section.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 7, 1931.

Mr. C. S. Lyons:

The editorials hereunder from the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN and the LONDON TIMES are both well worth reading, particularly the GUARDIAN (third page hereunder).

The man who wrote the GUARDIAN editorial and got it into his paper as early as September 21 certainly had his head well "screwed on".

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976






EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

London, September 25, 1931.

No. 2277

793.94



The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

Sir:

With reference to the Embassy's telegram No. 376 of September 22, 6 p.m., I have the honor to enclose an editorial which appeared in the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN on September 21st, commenting on the recent fighting in Manchuria between Japanese and Chinese troops. It finds an analogy between the present incident and the dispute in 1929 between China and Russia over the Chinese Eastern Railway, and remarks that the United States and the League of Nations might with propriety invoke the Kellogg Peace Pact and the Covenant to induce the two nations to seek a peaceful settlement of their difficulties.

The London

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
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The London TIMES, however, observes editorially on the same day that Japan has borne with patience a series of attacks upon its interests in Manchuria, which it conceives to be of essential importance, as well as upon the lives and property of its nationals in other parts of China; and it believes that the refusal of China to recognize the interests of Japan and to cooperate with Japan gives ground for disquietude.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:


Ray Atherton
Counselor of Embassy.

Enclosures:

"The Japanese in Manchuria", MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Sept. 21, 1931.
"Fighting in Manchuria", The TIMES, Sept. 21, 1931.
"An Unofficial War", DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 22, 1931.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

PAPER MANCHESTER GUARDIAN

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE Sept. 21, 1931.

The Japanese in Manchuria

The situation in Manchuria is obscure but dangerous. On Friday the Japanese army occupied Mukden, the Manchurian capital, after some fighting. They seem also to have seized a number of Chinese railway posts. The cause of this violent action is said to be an attack by Chinese soldiers on the South Manchurian Railway, which is a Japanese possession. This, however, is denied by the Chinese. In the absence of any impartial investigation it is impossible to decide which account is correct. But it is clear that the Japanese operations were carried through with great skill and careful co-ordination, and this suggests that at the very least thorough preparations had been made for such an emergency. The suspicion that this drastic move was not entirely unpremeditated is strengthened by the violent propaganda in favour of such a demonstration which the Japanese military authorities have been allowed to undertake. It is true that the recent assassination of Captain Namakura, who was travelling in disguise through Chinese territory, was a serious provocation which naturally inflamed Japanese opinion, just as British opinion in China is embittered as a result of the tragic disappearance of Mr. Thorburn. The truth is, of course, that in her present state of disintegration China cannot guarantee the safety of foreigners any more than of her own citizens. The moral is not that foreign Governments should try and protect their nationals by punitive expeditions and military demonstrations—such measures in the long run defeat their own object and make confusion worse confounded,—but rather that foreigners who travel in China should

be warned by their Governments of the grave risk they run and, if necessary, should be prevented from undertaking rash adventures because of the international complications which may ensue.

The Japanese Government seems inclined to minimise the whole affair and to attempt to curb the zeal of the military. One hopes that this effort may be successful, but it is not altogether easy to forget that when the Poles seized Vilna, which they still hold, from Lithuania this action was undertaken by a "rebel" general against the orders of the Government of the day. If the Japanese initiative in China were to result in a similar enlargement of the Japanese zone the situation would become extremely serious. Manchuria is a storm centre. Not only would Chinese Nationalism have fresh cause for hatred of Japanese Imperialism, but Russia would have serious reason for disquiet. Free and unthreatened communication with Vladivostok is indispensable for Russia. The enlargement of the Japanese zone toward the north would at once threaten her line of communications. The situation which has grown up since Friday demands international action. It is not unlike the trouble last year over the Chinese Eastern Railway between Russia and China. Then military measures were taken and international war seemed imminent. On that occasion the Powers reminded both parties that they had promised in the Kellogg Pact not to make war on each other. In the end the matter was successfully settled by negotiation. A similar policy would seem to be desirable in the present case, and it is a little difficult to see why the United States State Department should take the line that the Kellogg Pact has not been infringed by the Japanese action. To most laymen it would seem patent that it had, if words have any meaning. But there is another means of action possible in this dispute which was not available in the Chinese Eastern Railway question. The League Assembly and Council are both meeting at Geneva, and Japan and China, unlike Russia, are both members of the League. It would seem clear that some steps should be taken to bring the parties to a peaceful settlement, steps which the Japanese Government has unfortunately forgotten to take on its own account. The situation is not unlike that which arose when Mussolini bombarded Corfu because an Italian military mission had been assassinated by the Greeks, as it was alleged. The Council took action then, and it ought to take action now. The question does not concern Japan and China alone, but every Power that has interests in China and every signatory of the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact.

0657
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

PAPER THE TIMES

NUMBER

CITY

LONDON

DATE

Sept. 21, 1931.

Fighting in Manchuria

Exasperated by the murder of CAPTAIN NAKAMURA and a multitude of other incidents, the Japanese garrison in Manchuria has taken the law into its own hands. Such is the gist of the important message in which our Tokyo Correspondent describes the origin and progress of the hostilities which broke out near Mukden on Friday afternoon, and have ended in the seizure of the whole length of the South Manchurian Railway, the military occupation of Mukden, and the disarmament of the local Chinese forces by the Japanese Army. The news appears to have completely surprised the Japanese Foreign Office, which had hoped against hope for a diplomatic settlement of the many questions pending between China and Japan. The soldiers, it is clear, were tired of waiting for satisfaction. An incident, serious enough in itself, gave them their chance of retaliation. A party of Chinese troops is stated to have attacked and cut the South Manchurian Railway, the chief and most visible symbol of the economic and political interests of Japan in the country where less than a generation ago her soldiers spilt their blood to keep the Russians out. In our Correspondent's words the attack "found them prepared. . . . the button was pressed, and the plan carried out." The fighting that followed was brief and apparently decisive. The Chinese resistance was partial, thanks to the orders wisely issued by their Commander-in-Chief at Peking, and in any case the troops who made so poor a resistance to a small Russian force two years ago were no match, in spite of their numerical superiority, for the formidable islanders. For their part, the Japanese appear to have shown restraint in reprisal. It seems that there was no serious bombardment of the military establishments at Mukden, and at points where no resistance was offered they contented themselves with the disarmament of the Chinese garrisons and the occupation of barracks and bridges. The Korean garrison, though ready for emergencies, has not crossed the frontier, and there is as yet no confirmation of the report that Tsingtao in Shantung has been militarily occupied, although it is possible that the Japanese vessels which have been ordered there will land marines to protect their compatriots.

It is clearly unnecessary to preach moderation at Tokyo. The Japanese Foreign Office and the Japanese Liberals who are now in power have no desire to quarrel with the Chinese authorities in Manchuria; still less with the Central Government at Nanking. They are probably profoundly embarrassed by the action of their forces in Manchuria, which exposes isolated Japanese citizens to attack, and may lead to a fresh boycott of Japanese trade. At the same time they realize that public opinion is by no means united in deploring the haste with which the troops in Manchuria passed to the offensive. The Japanese are a proud and a sensitive people; they have endured with remarkable patience a series of affronts, beginning with the cruelties and indignities inflicted on Japanese subjects at Nanking; they only attacked at Tsinan when Chinese Nationalist mobs, aided by so-called regular troops, had begun to commit atrocities on Japanese subjects; they have waited vainly for months for a Chinese official investigation of the murder of a promising officer travelling with the consent of the Chinese authorities in what is supposed to be the best governed province of China; they have observed that the Chinese Press is not prevented by a strict censorship from demanding the rescission of Japanese concessions in Manchuria, and the evacuation of that country by Japanese troops; and they have drawn their own conclusions. These conclusions may be inaccurate; but the refusal of the Chinese Nationalist politicians and publicists to recognize the vital interests of Japan in Manchuria and the immense advantages of Sino-Japanese cooperation is a disquieting phenomenon, especially when China is in disastrous political and economic straits, and has everything to lose by incurring the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

strict censorship from demanding the rescission of Japanese concessions in Manchuria, and the evacuation of that country by Japanese troops; and they have drawn their own conclusions. These conclusions may be inaccurate; but the refusal of the Chinese Nationalist politicians and publicists to recognize the vital interests of Japan in Manchuria and the immense advantages of Sino-Japanese cooperation is a disquieting phenomenon, especially when China is in disastrous political and economic straits, and has everything to lose by incurring the distrust of her mighty neighbour. To say this is not to excuse the action of the Japanese officers who struck their blow without consulting their Government. They have presented Nanking with a grievance of which it is making the most. DR. C. T. WANG has already demanded the prompt evacuation of the points which have fallen into their hands, and will probably lay the matter before Geneva, while foreign observers at Peking are wondering how BARON WAKATSUKI's Government will free itself from the entanglements into which they have dragged it.

0 6 5 9

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

PAPER DAILY TELEGRAPH

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE Sept. 22, 1931.

AN UNOFFICIAL WAR

To-day's news leaves the Sino-Japanese situation in suspense. The outstanding question is, as it was yesterday, whether the Manchurian trouble can in fact be localised, or whether it will spread until the Far East generally is involved in hot dispute and finally in open hostilities. The Japanese army accomplished at the end of last week an unofficial and astonishingly successful act of war. Yesterday the Japanese General Honjo, who is in occupation of Mukden, issued a proclamation on the necessity of upholding the national dignity of Japan and announcing a military occupation of parts of Manchuria.

The situation in Manchuria already appears to be well under Japanese control, and our Correspondent in Tokio reports that there is a strong opinion against increasing the number of troops there. But that is a question which the Japanese Cabinet will not settle till to-day, and in a sense it is the key to future developments. In the meantime China has appealed to the League of Nations. But the League is in no position to exercise anything but moral suasion in such a quarrel, and its position is further weakened by the fact that Russia and the United States, both of whom have special interests in China, are outside its membership.

0661

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 4, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

October 3, 1931.

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

793.94 358
Please inform Chinese Government through Peck/
that Hanson and Salisbury are being sent on tour of
observation in South Manchuria.

Stinson
SKH

793.94/1931A

FE:SKH/ZMF

Enciphered by _____


Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.--No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Szymanski NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

FROM Dated October 5, 1931

Rec'd 11:50 a.m.

Secretary of State
 Washington



*file
89.c*

701, October 5, 8 a.m.

Following from Consul General at Nanking, October
 4, 10 p.m.

"I have been informed from a reliable source that a telegram from Geneva states that the United States was persuaded by Shidehara that insistence on the sending of an international commission to Manchuria would result in a military dictatorship in Japan and that the United States opposed the sending of the commission with the result that the League abandoned the idea and accepted the assurances of Japan that its troops would be withdrawn".

JOHNSON

HPD

OCT 14 1931
 FILED

700.04/1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
FROM

GRAY


Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 5, 1931

Rec'd 11:50 a. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.



*Rel
E. J. C.*

703, October 5, 10 a. m.

Following from Consul General at Nanking, October 4, 11 p. m. is a summary of statements made to him by Tai Chi Tao, Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee handling Sino-Japanese controversy:

"In a logical and convincing argument Tai Chi Tao demonstrated that;

One, Japanese military measures in Manchuria were culmination of long methodical planning by the military party to make a desperate effort to regain popular favor and retain authority by achieving spectacular gain for the Empire;

Two, that this carefully fostered public opinion in Japan now supports the militaristic;

Three,

066

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2-- #703, from Peiping, Oct. 5, 1931,
11:50 a. m.

Three, that the success of this policy will confirm present opinion in Japan;

Four, that it is futile to expect that Japan will abandon this militaristic policy before October 14 or that China could enter into discussions with Japan, with the intention of surrendering everything;

Five, that popular support in Japan is vital necessity for the continuance and success of the militaristic policy and,

Six, that an explicit statement condemning Japan's military measures in Manchuria as violating China's moral and legal rights, if statement were issued by the League of Nations or by powerful countries like the United States and Great Britain would destroy confidence felt in this policy by the Japanese people and thus cause its failure. Tai Chi Tao pointed out necessity of justifying faith of China's thinking classes in international guarantees of justice by loss of this faith will powerfully augment the trend toward communism and chaos in China".

JOHNSON

CSB

0664

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 5, 1931

Rec'd 11:50 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

707, October 5, 6 p. m.

Legation's 697, October 4, 8 a. m.

At a meeting this afternoon of Chiefs of Mission

whose governments are members of the Council of League

of Nations and which I attended as a friendly observer

the note of the Chinese Government was discussed. Most

of those present felt that the situation growing out

of the events in Manchuria was fraught with serious

possibilities and that the Chinese proposal should

therefore not be lightly dismissed. However, inasmuch

as the League had abandoned the idea of a commission

it would be very difficult for the interested governments

to comply without appearing to take sides. I informed

my colleagues in confidence of the despatch of Hansen and

Salisbury with the knowledge of the Japanese and that



the Chinese Government had been advised thereof, it having

been made clear that this decision had been reached prior

to and not in response to the Chinese proposal.

JHR OSB

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1931 148266 JOHNSON



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Riga

FROM

Dated October 5, 1931

Rec'd 11:36 a.m.



Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

41, October 5, 3 p.m.

IZVESTIA 273 October third denies that any Soviet
patrols whatsoever have crossed Chinese-Soviet border.

COLEMAN

CsB

703.94/1935

FILED

OCT 15 1931

0666

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

October 3, 1931.

5P

This cable was sent in confidential code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

CONFIDENTIAL for staff use.

The Secretary of State talked with the Japanese Ambassador this morning. On basis of information received from American officers in China, the Secretary informed the Ambassador that he believed that the Chinese will be willing to negotiate as soon as the Japanese troops are all withdrawn within the railway zone. The Ambassador said that he considered that condition not unreasonable. The Secretary then summarized the efforts which he has made, the evidence that the Chinese will negotiate if the Japanese troops are withdrawn and the affirmation made by the Ambassador, and said that, speaking frankly, he thought that the troops should be gotten back into the railway zone at once. The Ambassador said that he would report this conversation to Baron Shidehara immediately. In conversation with Baron Shidehara, you may urge this point

of view.

~~Report to~~ Inform Peiping. RAM
FE:SKH/ZMF FE SKH

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Harbin/47 FOR Despatch # 5248
FROM Harbin (Hanson) DATED Sept. 10, 1931.
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1172 ...

REGARDING:

Japanese - Chinese relations at Harbin. No visible attempt to boycott Japanese goods on part of Chinese as has happened in other parts of China. No anti-Korean outbursts in the district during August.

jr

793.94/1986

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

JAPANESE-CHINESE RELATIONS.

793.94
 There was no visible attempt to boycott Japanese goods on the part of the Chinese, as has happened recently in other parts of China, nor were there any anti-Korean outbursts in this district. Mr. C. Chashi, the Japanese Consul General, who arrived at Harbin during my absence, complained to me that it was extremely difficult to deal with the Chinese authorities. As far as the local and Heilungchiang officials are concerned, they evidently do not wish to add to the difficulties they are experiencing with the Soviet Russians by antagonizing the Japanese. Several Japanese were recently murdered in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone and the culprits not caught. However, it is not believed that these crimes were due to any particular anti-Japanese feeling.

Count Uchida, a former Japanese Ambassador, now President of the South Manchuria Railway, arrived at Harbin on September 5th and remained here three days, after having made a trip in North Manchuria, studying conditions. He was elaborately wined and dined by the Japanese community and the Chinese and Soviet railway and other officials during his stay and, at a return reception and entertainment given by him at the local Railway Club, the Chinese, Japanese and Soviet flags were much in evidence. His visit was preliminary to a railway rate conference which is to be held here soon and to which the South Manchuria Railway will send

-delegates-

0669
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

893.00 P.R. Morden/52 FOR Despatch # 34

FROM Morden (Vincent) DATED Sept. 12, 1931.
TO NAME 1-1172

REGARDING:

Report on Sino-Japanese relations during August 1931.

jr

793.94/1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

193.94
Sino-Japanese
Relations.

The details, as reported by the Japanese
Consulate General, of the Nakamura case
were given to the Legation in my despatch
No. 440 of August 20th. Granted that the execution of a
military official of one nation by order of a military
official of a friendly nation is a serious offense, never-

theless

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

theless there is good reason to believe that internal Japanese politics are more responsible for the present threatening aspect of Sino-Japanese relations than anything that the Chinese have done or left undone with respect to the case. It is my opinion that relations between the Japanese Army and the Japanese Foreign Office (representing non-army elements in the Government) are as much strained just now as relations between China and Japan, and that the Army authorities are quite as willing to have the negotiations fail as the Foreign Office is anxious to have them succeed. The report of the first Chinese group of investigators having been wholly unsatisfactory, a second and more capable group was sent out on September the sixth. The first group simply reported that their investigations failed to disclose any evidence to support of the Japanese statement. It was shown, however, that their investigations were anything but thorough. Despite insistence from Japanese Army quarters for a prompt settlement, Consul General Hayashi informs me that no definite time limit has set with respect to a reply from the Chinese. The situation is not believed to be as critical as intimated in the press although further evidence of procrastination or insincerity on the part of the Chinese will make it extremely difficult to avoid a Japanese military display in Manchuria. It has been impossible to obtain information concerning the sanction or sanctions which might be applied in the event of a breakdown of negotiations.

No progress was made during the past month in the

discussions

0677

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 4 -

discussions looking towards a settlement of the Wanpashan trouble. The Japanese police have been removed. The Chinese are demanding the departure of all the Koreans who do not wish to remain as day labourers. The Japanese insist that they be allowed to remain as tenant-farmers. The negotiations have reached an impasse and the Koreans continue to reside at Wanpashan.


The anti-Japanese boycott has made very little headway in Mukden. The sale of Japanese goods has been steadily declining for the past two years but this has been due to the gold yen exchange.

Very respectfully yours,

John Carter Vincent.
American Consul.

Original and two copies to Legation.
In quintuplicate to Department.

JCV:WTF
800



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976



(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF PRESS CONFERENCE, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1931

SINO-JAPANESE

793.94

At the press conference at 4:30 this afternoon Secretary Stimson announced the release of a note which has been sent to the President of the Council of the League of Nations in answer to the resolution of the Council which was sent to us and which was printed in this morning's newspapers. The Secretary added that he did not care to comment further on the Sino-Japanese question.

A correspondent asked if the absence from Tokyo of Ambassador Forbes embarrassed the Department in its dealings with the Japanese Government. The Secretary replied in the negative and added that Ambassador Debuchi is here and is remaining in Washington and that Mr. Neville, our Charge d'Affaires in Tokyo, is a very experienced officer. Asked if the note to the League of Nations had been sent to any other places, such as Tokyo or Peiping, Mr. Stimson again said he had nothing further to say regarding the Sino-Japanese trouble.


793.94/1938

OCT 6 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles A. Zygmunt NARS, Date June 4, 1976(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS CONFERENCE, FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1931

SINO-JAPANESE

79394

At the press conference this afternoon Undersecretary Castle announced that the Japanese Ambassador had left with him during the morning the text of a statement issued officially in Tokyo last night after an extraordinary session of the Cabinet. Mr. Castle said a part of it had appeared in the morning papers, but not the entire text. He pointed out that it was a very interesting statement because it is an absolutely official statement of the Japanese Government as to what they are doing, what they plan to do and not to do.

A correspondent enquired if the text would be given out here. Mr. Castle replied that the Japanese Ambassador informed him that he (the Ambassador) intended to give it out this afternoon. He added that the correspondents might read the statement in Mr. McDermott's office.

A correspondent enquired if the statement told in a few words what the trouble was all about. The Undersecretary replied in the affirmative. The statement related that this trouble arose because the Chinese were tearing up the railroad and that the Japanese had to take certain advanced positions to protect themselves, inasmuch as there were two or three hundred thousand Chinese and only ten thousand Japanese there. Mr. Castle said he thought the most interesting part of the statement was the last paragraph in which the Japanese said, "It may be superfluous to repeat that the Japanese Government harbors no territorial designs in Manchuria. What we desire is that Japanese subjects shall be enabled to safely engage in various peaceful pursuits and be given an opportunity for participating in the development of that land by means of capital and labor. It is the proper

790.94/1931

OCT 6 1931

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-2-

duty of a government to protect the rights and interests legitimately enjoyed by the nation or individuals,"etc., and then, "The Japanese Government, true to established policy is prepared to cooperate with the Chinese Government in order to prevent the present incident from developing into a disastrous situation between the two countries and to work out constructive plans as will once for all eradicate causes for future friction. The Japanese Government would be more than gratified if the present difficulty could be brought to a solution which will give a new turn to mutual relations of the two countries."

A correspondent enquired whether there had been any communication, verbal or otherwise, between this Government and the Japanese Government since our note of yesterday. The Undersecretary said there had been none, except that the Japanese Ambassador this morning had given him the text of the statement issued by the Cabinet last night.

A correspondent referred to a press report that the League of Nations had sent the State Department an expression of appreciation of what we had done, but made the suggestion that it might be even more effective if we cooperated more closely with the League. The Undersecretary said a communication had been received, but that in reading the note he did not get the impression the correspondent spoke of. The note merely said--the report of an expression of thanks as to our attitude was correct--that they would be very glad to inform us of anything they did and hoped we would equally inform them of anything we did in the matter. There was no suggestion of dissatisfaction as to the extent of our cooperation at all. The Undersecretary observed that normally it would be appropriate for the League of Nations to give the text of the note out. It is so obviously the kind of a thing which should be given out. He would be very glad to do

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Ryan NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-3-

it, except for the fact the message was considerably garbled in transmission and some of it just could not have been written in the way it was received here.

A correspondent enquired if the identic notes given out last night and the Japanese statement issued last night made a harmonious picture. The Undersecretary replied that he had no reason to think that the note we sent to Japan had been received before they issued their statement. He added that he thought it was a little difficult to say whether the two made a harmonious picture. The Japanese statement obviously showed that Japan was trying to straighten matters out. Mr. Castle said he felt all the news of the last twenty-four hours on the situation had been very hopeful. A correspondent enquired if those remarks might be used as coming from the State Department. Mr. Castle replied in the affirmative.

A correspondent asked if it might be assumed that the Japanese statement was accepted on its face as a sincere document, indicative of a peaceful solution. Mr. Castle replied in the affirmative. A correspondent enquired if we felt it would take the place of a reply to our note. The Undersecretary replied in the negative and added that it was merely a statement given out by the Cabinet in Japan to the press and primarily for Japan. A correspondent asked if it was correct to say that our note of yesterday did not anticipate a reply. Mr. Castle replied that he did not think it would be rude not to reply, but he felt the chances were that the Japanese would reply, but not necessarily within the next few hours. A correspondent observed that there was some suggestion that a reply was not expected. Mr. Castle stated that it did not require a reply, but he thought they were very courteous people. It was a polite note and probably will bring a polite answer.

A correspondent referred to the portion of the state-

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ment which the Undersecretary had read, saying that it was necessary for the Japanese to make certain disposition of their troops because they were ten thousand against several hundred thousand Chinese, and enquired whether that would seem to indicate that the Japanese will maintain those troops there or that they will retire and permit the Chinese to tear up the railroad. The Undersecretary recalled that the Japanese had an absolute right to have troops in the railroad zone. The correspondent pointed out that the Japanese seemed to have troops outside of the railroad zone and enquired if they intended to keep them there. Mr. Castle said he thought the whole tone of the statement suggested that they would bring their troops back into the railroad zone, although it did not say so in so many words.

A correspondent enquired if there was any reason to be suspicious of the motives of the Japanese or any disposition to feel that they were using an incident, which they alleged to have taken place, as an excuse for extending their sphere of influence in Manchuria. The Undersecretary replied that that was a question which he could not answer because it would be purely speculative. We do not know really what has happened over there and the Undersecretary could not discuss a purely speculative point. He added, NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION OR QUOTATION, that he had felt for a very long time that the stories that Japan wanted to annex Manchuria were not true. He continued that Japan had a great interest in the railroad zone in Manchuria, of course. Also as people over there point out, because so many of their troops, killed during the Chinese-Japanese war, are buried there, that district means a great deal to them. The Undersecretary said he thought they felt that they wanted to keep a certain amount of control in the district, but he never had felt that they wanted to annex it for the reason that, if they

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had, they would not have assisted four or five million Chinese to move into Manchuria from other parts of China. A correspondent then asked if the Japanese used those Chinese as laborers. The Undersecretary replied in the negative and explained that the Chinese went to Manchuria, where they had small farms, because Manchuria was the safest place in China to live.

A correspondent asked if the statement indicated that the Japanese did not want any interference. Mr. Castle replied in the negative.

A correspondent observed that an informal announcement in Tokyo said the Japanese representative at Geneva had been instructed to oppose the sending of a commission of enquiry to Japan and that such action was in marked contrast to the action of Secretary of State Stimson, which they praised. The report also said that the Secretary told Ambassador Debuchi that a neutral investigating committee was not necessary. The correspondent enquired whether Mr. Castle could verify that statement. Mr. Castle replied in the negative and explained that he could not because he was under the impression that he had read all the Secretary's memoranda of conversations in the matter and he could not remember anything of that sort.

A correspondent enquired if this Government saw any reason for undue activity by the League if it appeared that China and Japan would get together by themselves. The Undersecretary replied that if China and Japan can straighten the situation out themselves, and, as he pointed out previously, the news looked favorable, everyone would agree that the other nations should go slowly.

A correspondent enquired whether any information had been received on the position of the Soviet Government as

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regards the Manchurian situation. Mr. Castle replied that so far as he knew the Soviet Government was remaining neutral and not interfering.

A correspondent asked if the Chinese Charge d' Affaires had talked to the Department during the morning. Mr. Castle said he had not so far as he knew. He may have seen Mr. Hornback, but he did not see Mr. Castle.

A correspondent said he realized that yesterday was Diplomatic Day, but he wondered whether there was any particular significance in the fact that the visitors included virtually all the larger powers represented in the Pacific Nine-Power pact or it was merely a coincidence. Mr. Castle said he thought it was absolutely a coincidence because he thought, if the correspondent had looked carefully, there were a number of people who called who were not in the Nine-Power Pact.

When a correspondent enquired whether the American Government was occupying a major or minor role in the Manchurian incident, the Undersecretary declined to answer.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

A correspondent referred to a report from Europe to the effect that the League of Nations had asked us to appoint a temporary representative on the Council and enquired as to its truth. The Undersecretary replied that the report was not accurate. Another correspondent asked if it was likely that we would take such a step. The Undersecretary replied that he could not conceive of it.

Referring to our cooperation with the League in the Manchurian situation, a correspondent enquired whether there was any function of the League with which we were not wholeheartedly cooperating at the present time. In reply, Mr. Castle said he thought we were cooperating with most of them.

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GERMANY

A correspondent asked if there had been any exchange of communications or any information about the possible visit of the German Minister Bruening to the United States following the visit of M. Laval to this country. Mr. Castle, in reply, said that we had had no suggestion whatever about it except in the press. He added that Mr. Bruening is a very fine man and if he wishes to come to this country, we should no doubt welcome him heartily, but there has been no suggestion of such a visit. The correspondent observed that the report was a "trial balloon," and, when Mr. Castle enquired where it came from, he was informed it originated in Geneva.

FRANCE

A correspondent asked if Paris had notified the Department of the action of the Council of Ministers. The Undersecretary replied in the negative. The correspondent explained that according to press reports they had agreed unanimously that M. Laval should visit this country. Mr. Castle, in reply, said that he was not surprised.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Referring to Mr. Schoenfeld's impending departure to the Republic, a correspondent asked if there was a situation in that country. Mr. Castle explained that Mr. Schoenfeld is going to the Dominican Republic as our Minister there. He added that there are always situations. The correspondent explained his enquiry by saying it seemed a matter of importance that a man of such standing should be sent to such a small post. The Undersecretary, in reply, said that there was nothing of particular importance, but there are always difficulties in those countries. Mr. Schoenfeld is an exceedingly able and first class man. Mr. Castle recalled

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that he had been a member of the Foreign Service, but had resigned. He added that he thought we were all awfully glad to get a chance to bring him back into the Service.

MEXICO

A correspondent enquired whether any word had been received recently from Mexico City regarding the mixed claims conventions. In reply, Mr. Castle said there was nothing unless something had come in during his absence from the Department.

BOLIVIA-PARAGUAY

A correspondent enquired whether any reply had been made to the Bolivian request for postponement of the opening of the negotiations looking toward the signing of a pact of non-aggression between Bolivia and Paraguay. Mr. Castle said there was none so far as he knew. He pointed out that the matter would have to be taken up with the other neutrals before a statement could be made.

ARMAMENTS

A correspondent enquired whether the suggestion had reached the Department that the armaments holiday project might fail because of French objections. The Undersecretary replied in the negative and observed that we should be disappointed in such an event.

SECRETARY OF STATE

A correspondent asked if the Secretary was still working on the Manchurian problem. In reply, Mr. Castle said he did not know what the Secretary was doing, except he had attended Cabinet meeting during the morning. He added that so far as he knew the Secretary was not working particularly on the Manchurian problem, but there is always a good deal to be done in the Department.

M. J. McDermott.

0682
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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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FRANCE

In view of the fact that the Council of Ministers in France had announced that M. Laval would visit this country, a correspondent asked if the Undersecretary would care to comment on M. Laval's visit. Since the Secretary knows M. Laval, the Undersecretary referred the correspondents to him for any statement, saying that it was much easier to make such comment if one knew the man.

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEPHONE, MAYHARNET 0692
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BEFORE THE
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MRS. MAUD FOLEY VAN VARENNEWYCK, Boston
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MR. JASPER WHITING, Boston
PROF. GEORGE GRAFTON WILSON, Cambridge
MRS. SAMUEL B. WOODWARD, Worcester

October 5, 1931.

The Honorable Henry L Stimson
Secretary of State
Washington District of Columbia



Sir:

The Massachusetts Branch of the League of Nations Association, with some 3,500 members, is grateful for the recent action of the Government of the United States in expressing its approval of the attitude of the League of Nations with relation to the difficulty in Manchuria.

If it were possible for the Government of the United States to collaborate more often with the Council of the League, this would be profoundly appreciated by many people in this community.

Sincerely yours,

Executive Secretary of the
Massachusetts Branch of the
League of Nations Association



753.54/1990

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

REP

RECEIVED
OCT 6 1931
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND
TRANSPORTATION

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 6 - 1931
Department of State

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 6, 1931

Rec'd 9:32 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

712, October 6, 7 p. m.

Following from Consul General at Hankow:

"October 5, 1 p. m. One. Am informed that all but a
very few Japanese have evacuated Kiukiang and Ichang.
At Changsha and Chinkiang Japanese are concentrated on
hulks on the water front.

Two. I understand that the Chinese military authorit-
ies at ^{Ichang?} ~~Hankow~~ have warned all Chinese to avoid physical
clashes with Japanese and have threatened severe punishment
to anyone who may cause disturbance involving the Japanese".

JOHNSON

RR

HPD

700.06/1091

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lynn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

FROM Peiping via N. R.
 Dated October 6, 1931
 Rec'd 9:15 a.m.

RECEIVED
 OCT 6 1931
 DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 6 - 1931
 Department of State

*for
 egc.*

713, October 6, 8 p.m.

Recent reports from Nanking and Hankow would seem to indicate preparations for large concentration of troops and aeroplanes at and near Chengchow in Northern Honan. Military Attache now in Yangtze valley is investigating.

JOHNSON

JHR

CSB

OCT 11 1931

793.94/1992

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 note
 893.00

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Szymanski NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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OCT 6 - 1931
Department of State
THE SECRETARY

OK
JL
egc
October 3, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR,
HERR FRIEDRICH W. VON PRITZWITZ UND GAFFRON, 11:30 O'CLOCK.

Manchuria.

During the call of the German Ambassador, he asked me what the news was in regard to Manchuria - whether I was optimistic about the situation. I said that I fully appreciated the very serious dangers that were inherent in a situation where three great countries were in close, suspicious and even hostile contact in a single geographical area as Russia, China and Japan were in Manchuria, particularly when two of these nations had the right to keep troops in the same area. I said there was always the possibility of a spark which would set up a conflagration, but that at present I was much encouraged by the conciliatory attitude of the Japanese, and I told him of my experience with Wakatsuki at London in a similar situation which had given me confidence in the statements of his Foreign Minister, Baron Shidehara, that they were doing everything they could to withdraw from the present situation and to pacify the relations of the two countries.

793.94/1993

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

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OCT 16 1931

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

CONFIDENTIAL
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 6 - 1931
 Department of State
 October 3, 1931.



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR,
 MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI, 11:45 O'CLOCK.

Manchuria.

I sent for the Japanese Ambassador. When he came he told me first that he had decided to stay longer here because, although it was very inconvenient to him, he felt that it was important that he should be here. I thanked him and said that I was considering sending Mr. Forbes back at once to Tokyo, but that he could not arrive for a month and in the meanwhile I should be very glad to have Mr. Debuchi here.

I told the Ambassador that I had received some messages, all of them from my own people, which I thought would be of interest to his government. I told him that Consul General Myers was now back in Mukden and one of these messages was from him. I pointed out to him how I had under close observation these autonomous outbreaks in Manchuria because the Chinese were making accusations that these were instigated by the Japanese. I told him that Myers had now cabled me that the Governor of the Province of Liaoning, of which Mukden is the capital, is being detained by the Japanese although they could if they wished

793.94/1994

OCT 10 1931

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

wished turn over the Government to him. The Ambassador replied that he had been officially informed by his government that no important Chinese officials were under detention and he thought this statement must be incorrect, but he would at once inform Baron Shidehara.

I then told the Ambassador that I had received a long cable from Minister Johnson in China in which he reported a conference which the American Consul General at Nanking had had with Mr. T. V. Soong, during which Soong had expressed the opinion that he thought China would treat directly with Japan if all Japanese troops were withdrawn to the railway zone.

I then said that Mr. Johnson himself reported that he had been visited by Mr. Frank W. Lee, the present Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, at which time Mr. Lee had made the same suggestion: namely, that China was willing to commence direct negotiations with Japan but that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the railway area was a prerequisite condition. Mr. Debuchi at once said he thought that that condition was reasonable and he said that he had already advised Baron Shidehara, who was his personal friend, that the Japanese troops should be at once withdrawn to the railway zone. I then said to him that

of

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

of course I was not attempting to meddle but I thought that this was information which Baron Shidehara would be much interested in. I summed it up as follows:

First: The American Secretary of State has already informally suggested to the representatives of the League of Nations that China and Japan should be allowed to settle their trouble by direct negotiations - that being in accordance with the customs of the Orient - and the Japanese Government has expressed itself as very grateful for that suggestion.

Second: That now the Finance Minister of China, Mr. Soong, who is known as one of the most able and responsible members of the Chinese Government, and Mr. Lee, the Acting Foreign Minister, have each made the suggestion that China would be willing to thus negotiate directly with Japan provided the Japanese troops were withdrawn to the railway zone first.

Third: That the Japanese Ambassador himself thinks that that condition is not unreasonable.

Mr. Debuchi laughed and referred back to the time when he was Foreign Vice Minister and Baron Tanaka as Premier had intervened in Shantung, saying that he had urged most strongly upon Tanaka the immediate withdrawal of the

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By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 4 -

of the Japanese troops from Shantung but that it took two months for him to do it. He said that of course withdrawals take time and there is the danger of bandits imperiling the lives of Japanese if the Japanese troops are withdrawn prematurely. I replied that withdrawals were always difficult and that such reasons were always given by the military authorities but they must be weighed against the big advantages of an immediate withdrawal unless otherwise a greater catastrophe occur. Speaking frankly, I told him I thought they ought to get out at once. He said that I knew already that Baron Shidehara had greatly appreciated my friendly action in the beginning of this trouble and that any suggestion of mine would be received by him with great weight and this would go to him at once.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

~~SECRET~~

Aug 9/72

Note change in
first three lines.
We (J+J) think it
should go this way and
not too far behind
the answer to Legation's
697. RLM

Mr. Castle

Mr. Castle

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 5, 1931.

Mr. Castle:

This is a follow-up on a telegram sent yesterday in reply to Peiping's 691 (copies of both here attached).

SKH
In view of the concurrence of views with regard to the substance of other telegrams pending, I feel that this may as well, to save time, be on its way.

SKH/ZMF

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

This cable was sent in Washington, October 5, 1931.
It should be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

793-94

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (CHINA).

362

and Urgent
Confidential for the Minister. Reference

Department's 360, October 4, 2 p.m.

Please instruct Peck, in the light of the information you have sent him and in the light of the Department's reply to your 697, October 4, 8 a.m., to inform Minister Soong and Vice Minister Frank Lee, orally and informally, that the Department is continuously giving this whole subject careful and solicitous attention in the light of all the information we are able to obtain; that, while we have not been in position formally to identify ourselves with the deliberations and action of the League, we have nevertheless been constantly informed of the views and efforts of the League and have cooperated with the League along parallel lines as far as it has been possible to do so; that we have noted with gratification the resolution adopted by the Council of the League at its final meeting on September 30, which was accepted by both China and Japan; that it is our conviction that it is desirable at the present juncture to give both China

755.04/1904A

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

and Japan a fair opportunity themselves to carry out in good faith and in a mutually conciliatory and reasonable spirit their respective commitments as expressed in the said resolution; that it is the earnest hope of the American Government that both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments will make every possible effort in that connection; and that we are expressing ourselves in the same sense in our conversations with representatives of the Japanese Government.

Repeat to Tokyo Embassy ^{as Sept 183} for its information and guidance.

SPinson
Wky

CR
Ren
Oct. 5. 1931

FE: SKH/ZMF:EJL

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0692

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

Gray

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department

Department of State

OR
Charge to
\$

Washington,

October 5, 1931.

68

OCT 5 31

AMLEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA).

363

For the Minister.

11814a

The Department's 330, September 19, 3 p.m. The Department feels that it would be advantageous and would simplify communication for you to be during the next few weeks in Nanking.

Unless you perceive and wish to report reasons contra, please proceed to Nanking at earliest possible moment. Report date of starting, estimated date of arrival and arrival and names of persons accompanying you.

793.64/1934A

Shinson
Wky

CR

Oct. 5 1931

FE: SKH/ZMF: EJJ

FE

Sick

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 7, 1931. *S*

Manchuria Situation:
Hanson and Salisbury. *F-E*

Mr. Secretary:

When we instructed Geneva to inform Drummond with regard to our sending special observers to Manchuria, we said: "This should be regarded as confidential information until such time as authorized publicity is given it here."

793.84/1995
 Gilbert now asks whether, with regard to our sending observers, publicity is being given.

We have given out nothing on this here, but news despatches from Tokyo and from China, from October 3 on, have carried items with regard to Hanson's and Salisbury's presence in Manchuria.

Would it not be well for you to inform the press here that we have sent these officers to observe and report? (Note: The correspondents

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

have been inquiring, and I find that they talk about "investigation", a "commission", "mediation" and such things. Might I suggest that emphasis be placed on the fact that these officers are sent to observe and that they are acting in the capacity of observers only.

FE is drafting a brief statement.

SKH

SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 4, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN



Geneva

FROM

Dated October 6, 1931

Rec'd 3:36 p. m.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.



156, October 6, 4 p. m.

1931
Department's 63, October 3, 5 p. m.

The following is a translation of an item in the
JOURNAL DE GENEVE of today:

"It is reported from Mukden to the "DAILY TELEGRAPH"
that a secret conference has taken place in a station
of the Chinese Eastern Railway to the north of Changchuen
between Mr. Salisbury, Secretary of the American Embassy
at Tokyo and Mr. Hanson, Consul of the United States at
Harbin.

This conference will furnish to the Department of
State the elements of an oral report on the situation in
the north of Manchuria since the beginning of the con-
flict.

In certain American circles at Mukden there is a
feeling of uneasiness concerning the marked attitude of
coolness

FILED

OCT 9 1931

793.94/1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

B- #156, from Geneva, Oct. 6, 1931,
4 p. m.

coolness of the Japanese vis-a-vis Americans. An official Japanese organ, the "MANCHURIA DAILY NEWS", violently attacks the American attitude of intervention in an article entitled: "HANDS OFF AMERICA". This newspaper says that Japan will withdraw its troops but only after it has been assured of the protection of its nationals and it challenges America to display in a question "essentially Japanese".

With reference to final sentence of Department's telegram under reference, is publicity being given?

Am shortly telegraphing results of conversation with Drummond.

GILBERT

CSB

0699

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles D. Lynn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

October 7, 1931.

OGF 734

SP

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

793.94
 66
 1995
 Your 156, October 6, 4 p.m., penultimate paragraph.

The Under Secretary of State informed the press this morning with regard to our observers. It should be understood that these officers have been sent with the knowledge and approval of the Japanese and the Chinese Governments and that it is their function to travel, to observe and to report to their Government. They have been given no other capacity.

The Department notes a press report dated Washington, October 6, which states that the United States, Great Britain, France, Spain and other powers have sent QUOTE missions UNQUOTE to Manchuria to investigate and report on the Japanese-Chinese conflict. We are not yet informed with regard to what other powers have done in this matter, except that there was a British Military Attaché sent from Peiping.

CR
 Oct 7, 1931 pm

Simons
 WY

FE:SKH/ZMF
 Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.,

Index Bu.—No. 30.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

793.94/1995

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By William S. Lyon NARS, Date June 4, 1976

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

RECEIVED
OCT 6 1931

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N R

Dated October 6, 1931

Recd 4:20 p.m.

793.94
Secretary of State
Washington.



708, October 6, noon.

Following from American Consul General at Nanking:

"October 5, 11 p.m. Soong handed me a statement prepared by himself which he said he had shown to no one else. He asked that I telegraph it to you. Statement follows.

"There is up to the present no indication that Japan intends immediately to withdraw her troops within the railway zone in accordance with her promises at Geneva. On the contrary, there are many signs, both in the statements issued in Japan by responsible statesmen, and in the troop movements on the spot, that she aims at keeping her troops in certain places outside the zone, under one excuse or another, as long as possible. It is clear that in doing so she is hoping that, by prolonging the period during which the Chinese police and military forces are prevented from assuming proper control, (End part one)

JOHNSON.

CSB

793.94/1996


OCT 11

0701

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib



FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N R

Dated October 6, 1931

Recd 4:10 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

708, October 6, noon. (PART TWO)

some incident will arise which will furnish a pretext for continuing, consolidating, and even extending her military occupation.

Even if Japan should desist from further acts of violence such as no government, however pacifically inclined, could leave unanswered, there is already heavy pressure on the Chinese Government, both from within and without, urging upon it the view that the friendly efforts of the powers have no effect upon the plans of the Japanese Government, and that the only salvation lies in a fresh understanding with Soviet Russia. At this juncture the demand for direct action against Japan is everywhere increasing. As an example, the boycott of Japanese goods, which is everywhere complete, is a direct result of popular feeling. (END PART TWO)

JOHNSON.

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

FE

RECEIVED
OCT 6 1931
DIVISION OF
REPRESENTATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Undated

Rec'd October 6, 1931
9:35 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

708, (PART THREE).

It has not been inspired by the government; but no government which attempted to prevent it could remain in power for a day.

The situation is therefore one of appalling danger for the peace of the Far East. If it continues, it is absolutely certain that it must sooner or later involve consequences which will be fatal to peace, will destroy all order in China, and later possibly itself.

If Japan can be persuaded to keep in the letter and in the spirit the promises she has made, we still have hope that peace and order may be maintained. Given freedom from external provocation, the Chinese Government is resolved to

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

(Part Three)

2- #708, from Peiping, /Oct. 6, 1931.

resolved to maintain them and it is believed fully capable
of doing so. All that it asks is that the United States
Government may take the first steps which it may find
possible in order to ensure the prompt and complete with-
drawal of the Japanese troops".

(END MESSAGE).

JOHNSON

JHR

CSB

0704

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT *Gray*

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,
October 7, 1931.

793 at

AMERICAN LEGATION,
PEIPING (CHINA).

bp

OCT 7 31

365

Confidential for the Minister. Reference your 708.

October 6, noon transmitting telegram of October 5,
11 p.m., from American Consul General at Nanking. The
telegrams under reference evidently crossed the Depart-
ment's numbers 361, October 5, 2 p.m., and 362, October 5,
3 p.m., which it is felt clearly indicate the attitude of
this Government toward the situation covered by Soong's
statement. It is suggested that Peck be instructed to
inform Soong, orally and informally, that the statement
has been received, that its contents, like those of all
other communications relating to this subject, are being
given the Department's most careful consideration and
that the Department is giving its most solicitous atten-
tion to the many and difficult problems which this
situation presents. Peck might repeat that, as stated
in its previous telegrams above referred to, the Depart-
ment feels that China and Japan should now be given an
opportunity themselves to carry out their respective
commitments; and that the Department earnestly hopes
that

708.64/1936

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

that both the Chinese and Japanese Governments will make every possible effort to ensure reliance on peaceful methods for the settling of this dispute.

Stimson
SKM

WLE

RSM
FE: RSM: EJJ

~~FE~~
SKM

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

0706

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972




By Chaim S. Lerner NARS, Date June 1, 1976

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Geneva, Switzerland, September 24, 1931.

No. 2237.

793.94
note
500.012



OCT-631

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Consulate's telegram No. 123 of September 22, -6 P.M. and transmit herewith single copies of certain documents relating to the Chinese Japanese question.

In this connection the Department is respectfully referred to the Legation's despatch No. 2236 of September 23, 1931, with enclosures.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]
for Hugh R. Wilson,
American Minister.

Enclosures: ✓

C. 591. M. 235. 1931. III.

C. 592. M. 236. 1931. VII.

FILED

OCT-26-1931

793.94/1997

1997

370

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated
to the Council
and the Members
of the League.

C.591.M.235.1931.III.

Geneva, September 23rd, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN VIRTUE OF
ARTICLE 11 of the COVENANT.

The following letter from the Chinese Representative together with the 8 cable messages to which it refers are circulated to the Council.

To the Secretary-General.

September 22nd.1931

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of eight further cable messages I have received in addition to the two of which copies were sent to you this morning. I shall be glad if you will be good enough to have these messages circulated at once to the Members of the Council.

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

-2-

No. 3.

Text of a telegram received by the Chinese Delegation
from Nanking, dated September 22nd. 1931.

(1) Mr. Shigemitsu called on Mr. T.V. Soong on Saturday morning September 19th.

Owing to seizure by Japanese of all wires and wireless in Manchuria only information then available pointed to a purely local incident. He discussed advisability of setting up a mixed Sino-Japanese commission to adjudicate upon matter so as to prevent this incident from threatening friendly relations between the two countries.

Mr. T.V. Soong expressed personal opinion that feasibility of such a step might be considered at both capitals.

(2) At noon September * 21[?] Japanese consul called on Mr. T.V. Soong at Nanking declaring that Japanese Government favoured speedy constitution of such a commission.

(3) Mr. T.V. Soong replied officially that when matter was discussed between Mr. Shigemitsu and himself it was believed that it was a mere local clash. But now it cannot be denied that Japanese troops have started warlike operations on a large scale and invasion of Chinese territory still continues and therefore situation is entirely changed and establishment of such a commission could not be considered.

* 21 (?) mutilated

0709

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Chambers & Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-5-

Text of telegram received by the Chinese Delegation from
Nanking, dated September 22nd. 1931.

With Japanese army in complete occupation of Kirin,
Mukden and Chanchun and all strategic points in Manchuria
situation tense in Harbin where Chinese soldiers concentrate
after evacuating other points not having fought pursuant
to Chang Hsueh Liang's orders. Young Japanese civilians
in Harbin organizing volunteer corps policing strategic
places and small arms have been distributed among Japanese
residents there.

No.5. Text of telegram received by the Chinese Delegation from
Nanking, dated September 22nd. 1931.

Japanese troops occupied Kowpangtze afternoon Sept-
ember nineteenth. Gun-fire caused heavy casualties among
Chinese civilians and peasants. Japanese soldiers reported
moving towards Shanhaikwan. They announced first defence
line from Yingkow to Kowpangtze. Haicheng, Tashihchiao,
Liaoyang, Shenyang, Kungchulin, Ssupinkai, Kaiyuan, Changtu
and Changchun on South Manchurian Railway and Pingchihu,
Tsachkow, Chikuanshan, Fenghuahgcheng on the Antung-Fengtien
Railway; all occupied by Japanese troops. Japanese air-
planes making demonstrations over Shenyang and Sinmin dropp-
ing bombs on innocent inhabitants. Japanese aviation
squadron at Pingyang Korea reached Shenyang. Headquarters
of Japanese Second Division removed from Shenyang to Chang-
chun. Incendiary fires lit by Japanese soldiers who taking
advantage of confusion looted and plundered. Peitaying
camp and part of buildings of North Eastern University razed
to ground students being dispersed. More than hundred Chinese
police murdered in cold blood while number deaths among
civilians cannot be ascertained. Students who offered remon-
strances were bayoneted. Japanese "mayor" is now in charge
of Mukden. Reported four North Eastern armoured trains at
Kowpangtze destroyed by Japanese soldiers. Six Chinese
gunboats stationed Sungari River disarmed and seized for
transportation.

-4-

No.6.

Text of a telegram received by the Chinese Delegation from Nanking, dated September 22nd, 1931.

General Chiang Kaishek today issued following message to the nation "An hour of unprecedented gravity has struck for the entire Chinese nation. Without warning and contrary to all practice of the civilised world and all covenants freely contracted, the Japanese army has invaded our territory on September 18th, killed our citizens and inflicted indignities on our civilian and military authorities. This invasion continues.

The challenge thrown to us is a challenge also to all nations. The League of Nations was established to prevent war and bring collective action into play to stop aggression. We have immediately informed the League of the aggression and have asked to obtain as a first step the immediate withdrawal of the invaders. The Council of the League is dealing with the matter at Geneva today. We have asked the Council, once the Japanese troops withdraw, to help in finding a peaceful solution of this conflict. We are confident that every impartial enquiry will give us the fullest justice and compensation.

As we have entrusted our case to the League the National army has received the strictest orders to avoid all possibility of clash with the invaders. We exhort the entire nation to maintain dignified calm. We have ordered all civilian authorities to take the strictest measures to protect Japanese citizens in our midst. We know how often innocent are made to suffer for the misdeeds of militarist.

All internal dissensions must cease. We call upon everyone, man and woman, and upon every political group without any exception to rally around the National Government which has engaged in the fight for the safety and the independence of the country. There is

-4a-

but one China and one national representation to-day. Let no provocation disturb the attitude of calm and determined expectancy which the nation must impose upon itself.

The National Government is watching the events. It has taken the people of the country into its confidence and will be publicly rendering account of the development of the situation from time to time."

No.7.

Text of telegram received by the Chinese Legation from Nanking, dated September 22nd, 1931.

Chang Hsueh Liang anxious prevent clashes between Chinese Japanese forces in Manchuria issued fresh instructions North Eastern forces prohibiting all Government troops leaving barracks. Messages reaching Nanking from important centres all over country indicate while studiously refraining from acts retaliation the nation is seething with indignation over unprovoked and aggressive military actions of Japanese troops in Manchuria. In Hankow various civic organisations met yesterday and voiced feelings resentment over Japanese aggression despite acute sufferings caused by floods.

- 5 -

No.8.

Text of a telegram received by the Chinese Delegation from
Nanking, dated September 22nd 1931.

Kirin occupied by Japanese troops six o'clock yesterday evening and all official buildings seized. General Hsyita, Chang Tschsiang's Chief of Staff, Commissioner Ma of Agriculture and Mining and Twenty-fifth Brigade Commander Chang Tsochu made prisoners. Twenty-fifth Brigade having received instructions to offer no resistance, retreated. Kirin station demolished by heavy gun-fire. Kirin-Changchun Railway under control of South Manchurian Railway and Taonan, Anganchi, Tausdan, Tung-liao, Liaoyuan, Taonan, Sulan, Shenyang, Hailun Railways taken. Japanese troops now in full occupation of eight districts of Chientao on the Kirin-Korea border. Sixth Division of Japanese forces reached Chientao from Huining. Sinmin taken yesterday, Japanese scouting planes reconnoitering over city and environs, heavily bombarded Tienchuangtai on Kow-pangtze-Yingkow branch of Peking-Mukden Railway. Japanese increased sentinels at Shanhaikwan. Main North Eastern forces are concentrating at Chinchow. Chinese barracks burned by Japanese troops. Besides killing several Chinese officials, Japanese soldiers also slew their families and buried alive over one hundred wounded Chinese soldiers. At Changchun station Chinese flag removed and replaced by Japanese flag. People of Mukden are living in daily fear. Mukden arsenal completely in hands of Japanese troops, and ammunition sufficient for ten divisions have been confiscated, entailing loss of over one hundred million dollars to Chinese. New railway depot of Peking-Mukden Railway cost over million dollars, entirely ruined. Streets of commercial area Mukden being re-named. Conditions at Huangkuteng even worse; communication organs, banks and money exchanges having been confiscated. Unscrupulous Koreans rob and plunder Chinese houses. Japanese soldiers after setting fire Changtu camp put to death over one hundred soldiers. Two Japanese cruisers despatched to Chefoo and Lungkow, additional marines landed Tsingtao ostensibly protection of Japanese residents. Two other cruisers arrived Chinwangtao*. Warlike atmosphere evident; Tangku near Tientsin where trenches dug and sandbags piled with Japanese gun-boat standing by.

* Sea-port of the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company.

0713

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Long NARS, Date June 1, 1976

No. 9.

- 6 -

Text of a telegram received by the Chinese Delegation
from Nanking, dated September 22nd, 1931

Confirmed report ex Peiping Brigadier Commander Fu
together with all members of family including five year
old son, found with stomach slit open, killed by Japanese
troops following bombardment of Changchun.

No. 10.

Text of a telegram received by the Chinese Delegation
from Nanking, dated September 22nd, 1931.

Arsenal, telegraph administration North East defence
forces headquarters and many official quarters all occupied
by Japanese troops following disarming Chinese soldiers.
During confusion heavy firing by Japanese soldiers no re-
liable estimate losses lives and property yet. With regard
Japanese reports Chinese soldiers had pulled up part of
South Manchurian Railway we pointed out South Manchurian
Railway always been under Japanese military guard and is
known fact that no Chinese soldiers could get within twenty
li, (6½ miles). South Manchurian Railway has never been
interrupted from the time of Japanese mobilization to the
attack upon Chinese. Whereas Peking-Mukden line has been
interrupted at Huangkutung since Japanese railway guards
from South Manchurian Railway dynamited its rails prior to
aggression of major Japanese forces in Kwantung.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to
the Council and
the Members of
the League.

C.592.M.236.1931.VII.

Geneva, September 23rd, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN VIRTUE OF

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

The following letter from the Chinese Representative,
together with the 5 cable messages to which it refers, are
circulated to the Council.

Geneva,

September 23rd, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of five
further cable messages I have received in addition to the
previous ten, copies of which have already been sent to you,
thus making a total of fifteen. I shall be glad if you will
be good enough to have these messages circulated at once to
the Members of the Council.

For Sao-Ko Alfred Sze
(Sgd.) K.L. Low.

No.11.

Cablegram from Nanking dated September 23rd.

Press reports from Harbin 22nd Kirin still burning and
being looted stop Chinese 56th Regiment exterminated stop
Reports foreign sources Peking street fighting between Chinese
Japanese stop Kirin casualties Japanese troops 60 Chinese
troops 105 stop.

Exharbin provincial Government officials retreated to
Panshih stop Chinese police functioning but forced to don
Japanese uniform stop Japanese formed public safety maintenance
committee with 7 Chinese & Japanese members all under direction
Japanese military headquarters stop.

0715

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clayton S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-2-

No.12-

CABLEGRAM FROM NANKING DATED SEPTEMBER 23.

THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT HAS CATEGORICALLY ANNOUNCED THAT IT IS NOT CONDUCTING ANY DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN OVER THE JAPANESE AGGRESSION IN MANCHURIA THE CASE HAVING BEEN ALREADY PLACED BEFORE THE LEAGUE COUNCIL STOP EXPEKING TWENTY SECOND TWO JAPANESE WARCRAFTS LANDED (MARINES?) CHEFOO AND OCCUPIED ALL STRATEGIC POINTS LIEUCHIENLIENS TROOPS RETREATED WITHOUT RESISTANCE STOP CONFIRMED REPORTS JAPANESE SOLDIERS KILLED TIENTSIN CUSTOMS SUPERINTENDENT HANLIENSUN

No.13.

Cablegram from Nanking dated September 23rd

RECEIVED FROM HANKOW 22nd THAT REPRESENTATIVES FAMINE SUFFERERS IN HANKOW AND WUCHANG THIS MORNING SENT URGENT TELEGRAM TO RELIEF AUTHORITIES SHANGHAI DECLINING FOOD AND MEDICINE DONATED BY JAPANESE FLOOD RELIEF COMMISSION IN FOLLOWING LANGUAGE QUOTE PLEASE CONVEY OUR THANKS TO THE PEOPLE OF JAPAN FOR THEIR KINDLINESS BUT STARVING AS WE ARE WE ARE TOO PROUD TO ACCEPT RELIEF FROM A COUNTRY WHOSE MILITARISTS HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO SLAUGHTER OUR BRETHERN IN MANCHURIA AND INVADE OUR TERRITORY AT A TIME WHEN 16 OF OUR PROVINCES ARE SUFFERING FROM THE DISASTROUS FLOODS THERE IS MORE GLORY TO DIE BY STARVATION THAN TO LIVE THROUGH THE FOOD SUPPLIED BY A COUNTRY WHICH WANTS TO MAKE US ITS SLAVES UNQUOTE

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

No.14 Cablegram from Nanking dated September 23rd.

As Chairman National Flood Relief Commission send following message to Baron Fukar Chairman Japan Flood Relief Commission declining four thousand tons foodstuffs and relief supplies from Japan per Amagi Maru. "You will doubtless understand that recent events in Manchuria have made it impossible for my Commission to accept these supplies which the people of your country have sent for flood relief stop The generous act of your Emperor in recognising the unprecedented nature of the catastrophe in China by donating 100,000 Yen to the relief of the flood sufferers was greatly appreciated by us stop Equally appreciative are we of the sympathy shown by the people of your country as is now evidenced by these supplies stop But that your ~~country~~ militarists should seize this moment when all of China is prostrated by the catastrophe and tens of millions are starving to launch a dastardly blow against us serves but to make mockery of the humanitarian feelings of your people stop It would be bitter bread for the flood sufferers to swallow were we to accept your assistance now and would thus ill requite the genuinely sympathetic feeling of civilian Japan." T.V. SCONG

No.15. Cablegram from Nanking dated September 23rd.

Press report from Tokio 22nd War Office announce Japanese casualties in Manchuria soldiers 65 killed 93 wounded officers 3 killed 7 wounded stop Extientsin reports from Huangkutan say Japanese soldiers in Mukden burned dead bodies of Chinese troop and civilians stop Party of Peking correspondents four Chinese four foreign arrive Kowpangtse; upon hearing fall of Sinmin only foreign correspondents proceeded Now at Tahushan.

0717
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League.

C.594.M.237.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Geneva, September 23rd, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE
COVENANT.

COMMUNICATION BY THE JAPANESE REPRESENTATIVE ON THE COUNCIL.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate
to the Council the attached note which he has just received
from the Japanese representative on the Council.

"JAPANESE DELEGATION TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Geneva, September 23rd, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have the honour to send you herewith a summary
of the information which I have received since yesterday on
the events in Manchuria, covering the period from Septem-
ber 18th to 21st. I should be very grateful if you would
communicate it to the President and Members of the Council.

I would draw your attention to the fact that the
whole of this information is derived from official sources."

(s) K. YOSHIKAWA.

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Tokio, September 22nd.

On the night of September 18th, about 10.30 p.m., a Chinese detachment of some 350 men blew up part of the main line of the South Manchurian Railway, north of Mukden, at a point south-west of the Chinese barracks at Peltaying. This detachment, led by its officers, was proceeding in the direction of Lungkuchen, between Peltaying and Mukden, when it was discovered by a railway guard patrol, which endeavoured to stop it, but, failing, was obliged to open fire. A battle ensued in which a company of the Japanese garrison of Mukden took part.

In view of the gravity of the possible consequences of such an incident in present circumstances and the disproportion between the Chinese and Japanese forces, the Japanese headquarters at Mukden promptly took such steps as it considered indispensable. At 2.30 a.m. it had the Chinese barracks occupied and the troops who were stationed there disarmed; subsequently the open town, the official buildings and the arsenal were occupied.

Immediately on receiving notice of the incident, the troops stationed at Tiehling, Kaiyung, Tsupingkai and Liaoyang concentrated at Mukden, and the Kwangtung staff proceeded in haste to that town at noon on September 19th.

On receiving news of the clash, the guards stationed along the South Manchurian Railway took the necessary precautions to protect the track and the safety of Japanese nationals and to deal with any possible attack by the large Chinese forces in Manchuria.

At Changchun a Japanese force was sent on September 19th to the Chinese troops stationed in the neighbourhood of the town,

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

at Kwangchiengtze and Nanling, to arrange for their disarmament, but the Chinese offered strong resistance to the Japanese troops, who had 60 killed and 96 wounded. The garrison of Changchun, however, was disarmed without incident about noon on the same day.

On the 20th, similar measures were taken at Antung, Fenghuangcheng and Yingkow; various strategic points in the neighbourhood of the railway zone were occupied. The Customs offices at Antung, Yingkow, etc., were carefully respected.

In the places mentioned, order is being maintained in co-operation with the Chinese, and at Mukden the Chinese municipal police are continuing to discharge their duties under the direction of the Japanese authorities.

In places outside the railway zone, the Japanese consuls have applied to the local authorities to provide for the protection of our nationals. As, however, Japanese subjects have suffered serious maltreatment at Kirin, a Japanese detachment has proceeded to that town, but has orders to return to its garrison in a day or two, as soon as calm has been restored.

We have been able, so far, to ensure the complete safety of foreigners resident in the areas under Japanese control. In view, however, of the disquieting situation caused by the presence of undisciplined bands and the attitude of the population in certain areas, the small forces at our disposal have not been thought sufficient to provide effective protection for the railway lines and for Japanese and foreign residents, and the 39th army corps (4000 men) was sent to Manchuria from Korea on September 21st.

0720

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Geneva, Switzerland September 23, 1931.

No.2236.




OCT - 6, 31

The Honorable,
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Consulate's telegram No.123 of September 22, 6 p.m. and to transmit herewith single copies of the documents relating to the Chinese-Japanese question.

These documents have been received from the Secretary General of the League of Nations, who forwarded them to me in accordance with a decision taken by the Council on the afternoon of September 22, 1931. They include the Minutes of the Council meetings held on that day relating to the appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant together with other documents on that question. Any further documents which may be received from the Secretary General, in accordance with the Council's decision, will be forwarded as rapidly as possible.



Respectfully yours,

Hugh R. Wilson
for Hugh R. Wilson,
American Minister.

- Enclosures:
- C.585.M.232.1931.VII
 - C.586.M.233.1931.VII
 - C.589.M.234.1931.VII
 - C.588.1931.VII.
 - C.65th Session/P.V.2
 - C.65th Session/P.V.3

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0721

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League.

C.585.M.232.1931.VII

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Geneva, September 21st, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE
11 OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following note, which he has just received from the Representative of China on the Council.

In view of this communication, the Secretary-General, in agreement with the President of the Council, has the honour to convoke the Council to meet on Tuesday, September 22nd, 1931, at 10.30 a.m.

Geneva, September 21st, 1931

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I am instructed by the National Government of China to bring to your attention the facts stated below, and to request that, in virtue of Article Eleven of the Covenant of the League of Nations, you forthwith summon a meeting of the Council of the League in order that it may take such action as it may deem wise and effectual so that the peace of nations may be safeguarded.

Through statements made to it at its meeting on September nineteenth, by the representatives of China and Japan, the Council was advised of the fact that a serious situation had been created in Manchuria. In his statement at that meeting the representative of China declared that the information which he then had, indicated that the situation had been created through no fault upon the part of the Chinese.

- 2 -

Since September nineteenth, the undersigned has received from his Government information which discloses a situation of greater gravity than had appeared by the first report, and which revealed that, beginning from ten o'clock of the night of September eighteenth, regular troops of Japanese soldiers, without provocation of any kind, opened rifle and artillery fire upon Chinese soldiers at or near the city of Mukden, bombarded the arsenal and barracks of the Chinese soldiers, set fire to the ammunition depot, disarmed the Chinese troops in Changchun, Kwanchengtse and other places, and later took military occupation of the cities of Mukden and Antung and other places and of public buildings therein, and are now in such occupation. Lines of communication have also been seized by Japanese troops.

To these acts of violence the Chinese soldiers and populace, acting under instructions from the Chinese Government, have made no resistance, and have refrained from conduct which might in any way aggravate the situation.

In view of the foregoing facts, the Republic of China, a Member of the League of Nations, asserts that a situation has arisen which calls for action under the terms of Article Eleven of the Covenant. I am therefore instructed by my Government to request that, in pursuance of authority given to it by Article Eleven of the Covenant, the Council take immediate steps: to prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations; to re-establish the status quo ante; and to determine the amounts and character of such reparations as may be found due to the Republic of China.

I will add that the Government of China is fully prepared to act in conformity with whatever recommendations it may receive from the Council, and to abide by whatever decisions the League of Nations may adopt in the premises.

(Signed) SAO KE ALFRED SZE

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

C.586, M.233.1931.VII.

(Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE XI
OF THE COVENANT.

The following two telegrams from the National Government of China are submitted for consideration to the Council.

No. 1.

Text of cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation, dated Nanking September twenty first 1931.

Kirin Changchun Railway seized: Japanese announced it will be managed by South Manchurian Railway which latter has sent 130 employees to Kirin to take over Chinese line, Yingkow, Antung, Changchun, Fushun, and many other towns have been seized by Japanese who have cut all telegraph, telephone and wireless, hence difficult for Government to get complete news. Japanese stock exchange in Tokio has closed. Japanese troops also seized Huangkutun, Santungchiao, and seized railway quarters Peking, Mukden Railway there, outdriving all employees. Also seized many locomotives, cars belonging railway. On entering Mukden Japanese have seized besides chief of staff eleven important members Tengtsein provincial government. They have entered Marshal Chang Hsuehliang private residence and have systematically looted all contents. Leinshanwan occupied by Japanese marines. Japanese military administration of Kwantung has moved into Mukden. Two more divisions being sent into Manchuria from Korea. United Press report today from Mukden inter alia "with Japanese in complete control of communication throughout South Manchuria today disquieting reports were current regarding disturbances and possibility of conflict. With difficulty are propaganda, unfounded rumour being sifted from welter of

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

Japanese reports official and unofficial at present virtually all news from this area of crisis emanates from Japanese sources.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation dated Nanking, September twenty-first, 1931.

Special to China press from Peiping twentieth "various reports received here from different centres in Manchuria indicate that by far greater destruction of Chinese property and lives took place at Changchun which city it is feared now half in ruins. Following bombardment of city by Japanese troops last evening fire broke out in several sections and a later despatch received here this afternoon states that while Japanese are in complete control of situation there, conflagration continues unchecked. Magistrates office, bureau of foreign affairs, bureau public safety and several other public buildings have gone up in flames while numerous other small private buildings have likewise been rased to ground. Death toll includes Brigadier Commander Fu whose unit was garrisoning Changchun and vicinity at time of Japanese invasion. Approximate casualties among Chinese soldiers and civilians estimates 600 while over one thousand now under detention by Japanese military. Entire region Wanpaoshan has been occupied by Japanese troops How Yung Teh who leased his holdings to Korean farmers and who was for some time storm centre of Wanpaoshan controversy has been liberated by Japanese authorities now in control of Changchun. Changchun Commissioner public safety special border guards commander Chairman preparatory municipal committee and several officials reported killed."

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Communicated to the Council and
Members of the League.

C.589.M.234.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Geneva, September 22nd, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Text of the Telegram despatched by the President in
Office of the Council to the Governments of China
and Japan on September 22nd.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate
to the Council the text of the telegram which the President in
Office of the Council has just despatched to the Governments of
China and Japan.

I have the honour to inform you that at its meeting
to-day devoted to the Chinese Government's appeal under
Article 11 of the Covenant in connection with the situation in
Manchuria, the Council of the League of Nations unanimously
authorised me (1) to address an urgent appeal to the Governments
of China and Japan to refrain from any act which might
aggravate the situation or prejudice the peaceful settlement of
the problem (2) to endeavour in consultation with the Chinese
and Japanese representatives to find adequate means of enabling
the two countries to withdraw their troops forthwith without
the safety of their nationals and their property being
endangered. (3) The Council further decided to forward the
minutes of all the meetings of the Council and documents
relating to this question to the Government of the United
States of America for its information. I am firmly convinced
that in response to the appeal which the Council has authorised
me to make to you your Government will take all possible steps
to prevent the commission of any act which might aggravate the
situation or prejudice the peaceful settlement of the problem.
I am about to begin the consultations contemplated with the
Japanese and Chinese representatives with a view to the
execution of paragraph (2). For these consultations I have
obtained the assistance of the representatives of Germany,
Great Britain, France and Italy. The decision referred to
under (3) has been carried out.

LERROUX.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain,
President in Office of the Council of the
League of Nations.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Communicated to the Council:

C.588.1931.VII.

Geneva, 22nd September, 1931

LEAGUE OF NATIONS:

Appeal of the Chinese Government under Article
11 of the Covenant.

My colleagues and I have listened this morning with the closest attention to the statements of the Representatives of China and Japan. We take due note of the request of the Representative of Japan to adjourn the discussion of the question until the next meeting.

I request the Council to authorise me:

- (1) to address an urgent appeal to the Governments of China and Japan to abstain from any act which might aggravate the situation or prejudice the peaceful settlement of the problem;
- (2) to seek, in consultation with the representatives of China and Japan, adequate means whereby the two countries may proceed immediately to the withdrawal of their respective troops, without compromising the security of life of their nationals or the protection of the property belonging to them.

I ask the Council to decide to forward for information, the Minutes of all the Meetings of the Council, together with the documents relating to this question, to the Government of the United States of America.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

In accordance

C.65th Session/P.V.2.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL.

Provisional Minutes.

SECOND MEETING (Public)

Held on Tuesday, September 22nd, 1931 at 10.30 a.m.

President: M. LERROUX.

Present: All the representatives of the members of the Council and the Secretary-General.
France was represented by M. Massigli and Poland by M. Sokal.

SUMMARY.

2909 APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT*

M. SZE made the following declaration:

I will not take up the time of the Council by reading the Note which I had the honour, on behalf of my Government, to communicate to you through the Secretary-General yesterday.

I wish first of all to thank you for convening this special meeting to-day and with your permission, I beg to read to the Council two cable messages I received from Nanking last night. The first cable is as follows:-

"Kirin Changchun Railway seized: Japanese announced it will be managed by South Manchuria Railway which latter has sent 130 employees to Kirin to take over Chinese line, Yingkow, Antung, Changchun, Fushun and many other towns have been seized by Japanese who have cut all telegraph, telephone and wireless, hence difficult for Government to get complete news. Japanese stock

* Document C.585.M.232.1931.VII.

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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stock exchange in Tokio has closed. Japanese troops also seized Huangkutun, Santungchaio and seized railway quarters Peking, Mukden, Railway there, driving out all employees. Also seized many locomotives, cars belonging railway. On entering Mukden Japanese have seized besides chief of staff eleven important members of Fengtien provincial government. They have entered Marshal Chang Hsuehliang private residence and have systematically looted all contents. Leinshanwan occupied by Japanese marines. Japanese military administration of Kwantung has moved into Mukden. Two more divisions being sent into Manchuria from Korea. United Press report today from Mukden inter alia 'with Japanese in complete control of communication throughout South Manchuria today disquieting reports were current regarding disturbances and possibility of conflict. With difficulty are propaganda, unfounded rumour being sifted from welter of Japanese reports official and unofficial at present virtually all news from this area of crisis emanates from Japanese sources'".

The second telegram reads as follows:-

"Special to China Press from Peiping 20th 'Various reports received here from different centres in Manchuria indicate that by far greatest destruction of Chinese property and lives took place at Changchun which city it is feared now half in ruins. Following bombardment of city by Japanese troops last evening fire broke out in several sections and a later despatch received here this afternoon states that while Japanese are in complete control of situation there conflagration continues unchecked. Magistrates office, bureau of foreign affairs, bureau public safety and several other public buildings have gone up in flames while numerous other small private buildings have likewise been razed to the ground. Death roll includes Brigadier Commander Fu whose unit was garrisoning Changchun and vicinity at time of Japanese invasion. Approximate casualties among Chinese soldiers and civilians estimated 600 while over 1,000 now under detention by Japanese military. Entire region Wanpaoshan has been occupied by Japanese troops How Yung Teh who leased his holdings to Korean farmers and who was for some time storm centre of Wanpaoshan controversy has been liberated by Japanese authorities now in control of Changchun. Changchun

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Chambers & Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

3/4.

Commissioner public safety special border guards commander
Chairman preparatory municipal committee and several
officials reported killed."

I beg to add that the places mentioned in the cable
despatches which have been occupied by Japanese troops, and are still
in their occupation, are located in an area as extensive as the United
Kingdom of Great Britain, Northwen Ireland and the Irish Free State/
together.

The messages I have read undoubtedly give a very gloomy picture
of the situation. Gloomy as it is, I am afraid it is only an incomplete
picture because, as I stated in my communication of yesterday to the
Secretary-General, the Japanese troops have seized, in places under their
occupation, Chinese means of communication. It therefore becomes in-
creasingly difficult, if not impossible to get accurate, prompt and
full information.

A further point I wish to emphasise is that the situation is
much graver than at the time when I wrote my note to the Secretary-
General yesterday.

It must appear from the facts mentioned in the cables which I
have read to you that it has become a serious question as to whether
the application of other Articles than the eleventh Article of the
Covenant may not be required. It is to be hoped, however, that through
prompt and effective action on the part of the Government of Japan, this
will not become necessary.

In conclusion, I beg to refer again to the steps which I requested
the Council to take in my letter to the Secretary-General, viz:

"To prevent the further development of a situation
endangering the peace of nations; to re-establish the
status quo ante: and to determine the amounts and
character of such reparation as may be found due to the
Republic of China."

It is, of course, with reference to the first and second steps
that immediate action is imperatively required.

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M. YOSHIKAWA made the following declaration:

I am the first to deplore the unfortunate incidents that have occurred in Manchuria. I intend to reply to the Chinese representative's statement after I have received instructions from my Government. Meanwhile, I should like to offer a few observations which will, I think, clear up the position and help to determine the scope of the problem before us.

To form a clear idea of the situation we must look at the area where that incident has occurred.

Manchuria is, as you are aware, a vast territory where we have enormous interests and rights guaranteed by numerous treaties. Our nationals there number some hundreds of thousands: that is a fact which calls for note.

In this vast region the Chinese authorities have an armed force of nearly 220,000 men, whereas we, in virtue of the treaties, have garrisons aggregating about 10,000 men. At Mukden alone China has an army of 24,000 men, whereas we have a garrison of only one battalion. The incident mentioned occurred in the neighbourhood of Mukden where the comparative strength of the forces is 500 to 24,000 men. Those figures in themselves demonstrate the character of what has happened.

The Chinese representative has alleged that the incident took place without provocation on the part of the Chinese troops. That is a mere affirmation and we cannot accept it without clear proof. According to official information in our possession the incident was caused by the destruction by Chinese troops of part of the Japanese railway near Mukden. Hence it was as a result of this act of destruction - such acts are unhappily frequent in those parts - that the small Japanese garrison force was obliged to take up arms. It was necessary to occupy important points in certain towns in order to prevent further incidents and to

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protect the South Manchuria Railway and the life and property of our nationals resident in the district.

I should like to point out in this connection that the contention that the Chinese troops offered no resistance is not in accordance with the facts. The dead and wounded among our troops in one city alone, Chang-chun, number over 150. The position has, however, become calmer.

It should be observed that this regrettable incident is not an isolated event. We must go back to earlier occurrences which contributed to the creation of the atmosphere which gave rise to the present incident.

As I have already said, we have vast interests and rights recognised by international treaties in Manchuria. For years we have unfortunately been faced on the part of the Chinese with activities that are calculated to imperil our interests and endanger our rights which are based on international undertakings. Further, deplorable incidents like the murder of Staff-Captain Nakamura by Chinese soldiers have occurred since the beginning of the year and thus created a feeling of tension and given rise to circumstances which are likely to disturb ^{the} good understanding between our two peoples. The recent incident may be regarded as an explosion due to this tension, which has been becoming worse for some time past.

In its letter to the Secretary-General the Chinese delegation refers to the possibility of a demand for reparation for losses caused in consequence of these incidents; any such claim is unintelligible to us since in our view the Chinese troops are responsible for the incident. It is, to my mind, unjust to make any such claim until the Council has finished discussing the merits of the case which have been brought before it under Article 11 of the Covenant.

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles D. Tamm NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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As to the demand in the Chinese Government's letter for the re-establishment of the status quo ante, that is a question which, in my opinion, cannot be properly settled except on the spot, and by taking into consideration the various factors existing in each locality. I cannot therefore express any opinion on this point until I have obtained my Government's views.

The unfortunate occurrence which is the cause of the present discussion is an eminently local one. Immediately after the incident, the Japanese Government sent a formal order to the commander of our forces in Manchuria to take the necessary steps to prevent the troubles from spreading. My Government has no intention of aggravating the position or of provoking further collisions. Far from us the idea of making war on the Chinese Republic.

According to the information in my possession, my Government and the Chinese Government are unanimous on the need for preventing everything that might aggravate the situation, so that a settlement may be found more easily. According to the particulars I have just received, a proposal has been made from the Chinese side that the solution should be sought by direct negotiation between the two Governments. The Japanese Government, I am told, have welcomed this proposal. Premature intervention in these circumstances would only have the deplorable result of needlessly exciting Japanese public opinion which is already over-excited, and thus impede the pacific settlement of the situation. I am firmly convinced that a pacific settlement can be achieved by direct negotiation between the two Governments.

In conclusion, I will acquaint the Council with my Government's views as soon as I have received the instructions I am expecting at any moment. In the circumstances, I must ask the Council to postpone the matter to its next meeting.

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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M. SZE:

The representative of Japan in the statement which he has just read to you said that he had not yet received instructions from his Government to make a definite reply and that the views which he expressed were his own.

While I do not wish to take up too much of your time, I feel it is my duty to make a preliminary reply, reserving my answer in detail.

The first point touched on by the representative of Japan referred to the accuracy of my statements. As far as accuracy in regard to facts is concerned, I am prepared, on behalf of my Government, to agree to an inquiry being carried out by a Commission appointed by the League and I am willing to leave the matter in the hands of an impartial commission. The Japanese delegate referred to certain cases, the case of Nakamura and other cases, as being responsible for the present incident. There is no need for me to tell the Council that such references are quite irrelevant. If there are other cases besides the one before us now, there are means provided in the Covenant itself to which we can resort: diplomatic means, or, failing them, judicial means or, finally, an appeal to the Council. This is all specified clearly in the document before us, the Covenant of the League of Nations. Reference has been made to defensive measures, but such measures

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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cannot be pleaded in justification, because the Council has itself on previous occasions clearly specified that no nation may plead defensive measures, and on those occasions the representative of Japan endorsed the declarations of the President of the Council, M. Briand, of the Rapporteur, Sir Austen Chamberlain, and others. I will not take up your time by quoting the relevant passages, but I may perhaps be permitted to state that they may be found in the Minutes of the 36th Extraordinary Session of the Council, held in Paris from Monday, October 26th to Friday, October 30th 1925.

The Japanese representative alleged that the Chinese had proposed direct negotiations. But how can we enter into diplomatic negotiations when a large portion of our territory is under military occupation by that country and, further, when that very country has resorted to means other than diplomatic negotiations? I do not think that any self-respecting State can agree to open diplomatic negotiations for the solution of a situation so long as a considerable portion of its territory is under forcible military occupation by the party which requests a diplomatic settlement. The representative of Japan, in taking up that position practically questioned whether the matter was within the competence

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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of the Council or not. I will not deal with that point now, because there is not the least doubt that the matter is within the competence of the League; cases of a far less serious nature than this have been taken up, examined and adjusted by the Council.

I do not wish to occupy more of your time but I would like to express my appreciation of the assurance given by the Japanese representative that his Government has no idea of war. I cannot, however, disguise my impression that we are very close to war and that immediate steps are imperatively necessary and must be taken by the Council. I may also add that the status quo ante must be restored before negotiations are possible.

In any case, as I stated in my communication to the Secretary-General yesterday, the Government of China is fully prepared to act in conformity with whatever recommendations it may receive from the Council, and to abide by whatever decisions the League of Nations may in the circumstances adopt.

M. YOSHIKAWA:

I wish to refer to certain points in the Chinese representative's observations. In the first place M. Sze has said that in my opening speech I stated that I had received no instructions

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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from my Government and that the information which I had furnished to the Council was my own. What I meant was that I had not yet received instructions from my Government as to the line of policy which it proposed for the settlement of this incident. I did not intend to imply that the information I submitted had not been furnished by my Government. All the information I have given the Council this morning is of an official character, and has been communicated to me by my Government.

Next, the Chinese representative said that communications had been cut off and that reports from Manchuria were very meagre. In reply to that, I would say that the first news regarding this incident came from Peking, and I presume that the telegram from Peking was based upon information transmitted from Manchuria. Subsequently, telegrams appeared day after day in the press, and all this information was presumably supplied by Chinese reporters in Manchuria. I cannot, of course say definitely whether all communications in Manchuria are intact, but I do not think it can be said that information from Manchuria in regard to the incident is meagre.

Thirdly, M. Sze said that I had implied that the consideration of the question did not

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come within the competence of the Council. That is not the case. What I did say was that the incident was one which might be settled by direct negotiation between the two Governments. As I pointed out in my earlier statement, not only the Japanese Government but the Chinese Government as well are inclined to settle the question in this way. I have received official information by telegram from my Government that one of the highest officials in the National Government at Nanking spoke to the Japanese Minister there to this effect. He proposed to our Minister that the incident should be settled by certain means, which I hope to be able to communicate to the Council in due course. I trust, however, that I may be permitted not to refer to them for the time being. According to the latest telegram received, my Government would seem ready to accept this proposal, though I have not yet been informed whether an answer has so far been communicated to the Chinese National Government in that sense. I am, however, able to report to the Council that my Government is ready to accept the suggestion. The remark I made in my earlier speech was therefore based upon facts.

My own view is that we must make every effort to settle this unhappy incident by direct negotiation between the two Governments. I never said that the question did not fall within the competence of the Council; I only asked the Council to adjourn the matter until its next meeting, when I hope to be in receipt of definite instructions from my Government.

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M. SEE:

I think I have understood the Japanese representative's meaning correctly. I understood from the first that he was not in a position to reply to my letter because he had not yet received instructions from his Government. I further understood that he intended to make certain observations. I did not say that these were personal observations, but perhaps we can let the matter rest there. I may have been misunderstood owing to the fact that I am not speaking my own language.

With reference to the Japanese representative's remark regarding statements made by a Chinese official, I should point out that at the present moment there are no direct negotiations in progress. Moreover, I doubt whether a person can make statements in the name of his Government when he is not authorised to do so. In this connection, I may say that during the last few days I have again and again heard statements attributed to the Chinese delegation, but on enquiry it has been found that neither I nor any other of the Chinese delegates have made them. I do not accuse anyone of purposely fabricating statements; I simply mention the fact that in the course of conversation things may be alleged which have never actually been said.

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I do not wish to take up more of the Council's time, beyond saying that, as I stated in the letter submitted to you on behalf of my Government through the Secretary-General, the case is left with the Council.

M. YOSHIZAKA:

Although I am not in receipt of instructions indicating a line of policy for the settlement of this incident, I am nevertheless in a position to reply to the remarks made M. Sze. I am speaking in my official capacity, and all that I have said has been based upon official information supplied by my Government. I may add that I will acquaint the Council at its next meeting, which I will ask the President to convene at a very early date, with such information as I may receive.

The Chinese delegate said that he doubted whether a person who was not authorised to do so could make statements such as those to which I have alluded. On this point I would inform the members of the Council that the official in question is a man holding one of the most important portfolios in the National Government of China, and there is no reason why the Japanese Minister should regard his statement of policy as of no official importance. After mature consideration, the Japanese Government is inclined to express its agreement with the suggestions made by this very responsible person.

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Viscount CECIL of CHELWOOD spoke as follows:

I shall have the assent of all my colleagues in saying that this is undoubtedly a matter of considerable seriousness and gravity, and it is not made less so by reason of the present condition of the world, when it is of vital interest to every country to avoid anything in the nature of political disturbance in any part of the world.

I therefore venture at the very outset to present that view of the case to my colleagues from Japan and China and to beg them to do their very utmost to avoid anything which can seriously disturb the peace of the world.

Though the matter is serious, it has some aspects which are encouraging.

In the first place, if I may be allowed to say so, it is a fortunate matter that the dispute should have arisen between the two countries in question. Japan has always been one of the great pillars of the League. From the very outset she has been a Member. She has taken the greatest interest in all its proceedings. She has, I believe, although this is a smaller matter, the largest society in support of the League of Nations of any Member of the League, except possibly the country which I have the honour to represent. China also has taken great interest in the League and it is only a few days ago that she was unanimously elected as one of the non-permanent members of the Council. We can therefore feel perfectly certain that both Governments will act fully and unreservedly in the spirit of the Covenant and will recognise their obligations, both direct and indirect, which arise from that instrument.

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I am quite sure I shall have the warmest assent from my Japanese colleague in that statement, because Japan has always been pre-eminent amongst the nations of the world in her strict and rigid adherence to all international obligations.

Having said this, I do not think there is any question arising at this moment of any settlement of the merits of the dispute between the two parties. We are not in possession of the facts necessary to form an opinion. There is a very natural difference between the accounts given to us by the representatives of the two countries as to both the origin and the extent of the incident. It would obviously be quite impossible for us to decide exactly what the facts may be, since the two of our colleagues most interested are not agreed upon them and we shall have to consider what other steps it may be necessary or possible for us to take in order to elucidate to the full what has happened.

In the meantime, there are, I think, certain preliminary steps which we may hope to take. This is not the first international dispute of this nature. There have been several in which clashes of arms have taken place and where there has been, I hope, no question of a resort to war, as we are assured by our Japanese colleague and our Chinese colleague is the case at this instant. The Council has now established what I think may be regarded as a settled procedure in these matters.

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The first thing that has always been done has been for the Council, through its President, to issue an earnest appeal to both sides not to do anything to aggravate the position and to avoid further fighting of all kinds. Our Japanese colleague has already given an assurance that his country will do everything it can to avoid this, and, although I am not sure that I heard any specific assurance from our Chinese colleague to the same effect, the whole tenor of what he has said goes to show that he is ready to give the same assurance.

Another step has been taken I think in every case. Where it has been established that the troops of either party have entered the territory of the other, it has been customary for the President to issue an earnest appeal to the troops of both sides to withdraw from the territory of the other party and to avoid anything which might lead to a clash.

Subject to anything which may be said, I hope that our President may feel it possible to issue an appeal in that sense. Obviously, each case differs and it may be necessary to word that appeal in one form in one case and in another form in another case; it may be necessary to take some precautions in one case which would be unnecessary in another. On all those details of form I am quite content to trust to the discretion and judgment of our President, in communication with the two parties.

I do feel, however, rather strongly that any troops which are on the territory belonging to the other party ought to be withdrawn without delay. That is the course which has been taken in previous cases, and I hope we shall not make any difference in our dealings with one country rather than another.

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There are two other matters I would like to mention. In the first place, our Chinese colleague has referred to certain statements which have been made in the Council, indicating the general principles which the Council thinks ought to be adopted in cases of this kind. I have before me the statement made by the then President, M. Briand, at the session of the Council held in Paris in October 1925.⁽¹⁾ The statement reads:

"...He had understood the representative of Greece to indicate that all these incidents would not have arisen if his country had not been called upon to take rapid steps for its legitimate defence and protection. It was essential that such ideas should not take root in the minds of nations which were Members of the League and become a kind of jurisprudence, for it would be extremely dangerous. Under the pretext of legitimate defence, disputes might arise which, though limited in extent, were extremely unfortunate owing to the damage they entailed. These disputes, once they had broken out, might assume such proportions that the Government, which started them under a feeling of legitimate defence, would be no longer able to control them.

(1) See Official Journal, 6th Year, No. II (Part II), November 1925 Thirty-Sixth (Extraordinary) Session of the Council, page 1709.

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"The League of Nations, through its Council, and through all the methods of conciliation which were at its disposal, offered the nations a means of avoiding such deplorable events. The nations had only to appeal to the Council. It had been shown that the criticisms which had been brought against the League of Nations to the effect that its machinery was cumbersome and that it found it difficult to take action in circumstances which required an urgent solution, were unjustified. It had been proved that a nation which appealed to the League, when it felt that its existence was threatened, could be sure that the Council would be at its post ready to undertake its work of conciliation."

This statement was approved by my predecessor, Sir (then Mr.) Austen Chamberlain on behalf of the British Empire, by Viscount Ishii, speaking for Japan, by M. Scialoja, speaking for Italy and by a number of other members of the Council. I think it may be regarded now as the locus classicus as to the policy and procedure of the Council in cases of this kind.

One other matter I ought to mention. We are all aware that there are certain treaty obligations - or international instruments, let me call them - which affect this dispute beyond the League of Nations, for instance the Pact of Paris, and the Treaty regarding Principles and Policies to be followed in matters concerning China, signed by the United States and other Powers. In both these instruments the United States of America are very closely interested, in the first place, as one of the

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promoters of the Pact of Paris, and in the second, as one of the signatories of the latter Treaty. It seems to me that we should do well in these circumstances to communicate to the United States a statement of all the proceedings of this Council, and of all the discussions which have taken place within it. The United States Government will then be fully informed of what we are doing and they will be able to take any action they think right in connection with the subject.

The PRESIDENT observed that it was hardly possible for the Council to adopt a resolution on a matter of that kind at once and he would therefore ask for time to prepare a draft resolution.

Agreed.

The Council rose.

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C/65th Session/P.V.3.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

Provisional Minutes.

THIRD MEETING, (Public)

held on Tuesday, September 22nd, 1931
at 3.30 p.m.

PRESIDENT: M. LERROUX

Present: All the representatives of
the Members of the Council, and the
Secretary-General.

SUMMARY.

2910. Appeal from the Chinese Government under
Article 11 of the Covenant (Continuation
of the discussion).

M.YOSHIZAWA fully endorsed the noble sentiments
to which Viscount Cecil had given expression at the
morning's meeting and which had prompted the conclusion
of various important international agreements, among
them the League Covenant and the Briand-Kellogg Pact.
The Japanese Government adhered loyally to the terms of
those international agreements and conventions. Not
only had it respected them in the past, but it would con-
tinue in the future to observe the stipulations contained
in them in all respects.

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At the same time, M. Yoshizawa wished to explain as briefly as possible the conditions in Manchuria, where Japan had enormous interests. She had there the South Manchuria Railway and more than a million nationals, while her investments in Manchuria were estimated at 2,000 million Yen. Unfortunately, there were hundreds of outstanding questions which had been allowed to remain unsettled between the two Governments, and since the beginning of the present year the situation had been aggravated by tension between the Japanese residents and the local authorities and people. The relations between the two peoples were so acute that it was difficult for those who lived in Europe to appreciate them.

Notwithstanding a series of unfortunate incidents the Japanese Government was doing its utmost to settle all these various questions in the friendliest possible manner. M. Yoshizawa would not enumerate the incidents in question, but, if need be, he would explain them more fully to his colleagues on the Council. The unfortunate incident now engaging the Council's attention might be viewed from that angle, and that was a point which he desired to lay before the Council for its consideration.

M. SZE, with reference to Lord Cecil's suggestion concerning assurances as to the withdrawal of troops, drew attention to the following paragraph on page 2 of his note⁽¹⁾ to the Secretary-General:

(1) Document C.585, M.232.1931.VII.

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"To these acts of violence the Chinese soldiers and populace, acting under instructions from the Chinese Government, have made no resistance, and have refrained from conduct which might in any way aggravate the situation".

The language of that paragraph was quite clear and explicit; but M.Sze was sure that when they had seen the telegrams which he had received since the morning's meeting the Members of the Council would have no hesitation in agreeing with him that the situation in Manchuria was becoming worse and worse every minute, and that it required their immediate attention. Time was the essential element in the situation: not a minute must be wasted.

M.Sze would repeat again the request he had made that morning that the Council should order the immediate withdrawal of the Japanese troops, which had now gone beyond the limits at which they had been stationed previously. Many Chinese, among them innocent women and children, had been killed. Some of the details contained in the telegrams he had received were, without any exaggeration, of the most revolting character.

With regard to the Japanese representative's request for an adjournment, M.Sze would repeat that the adjournment should not be for too long and that, if possible, the discussion should be continued the next day.

With regard to the question raised by the Japanese representative, of direct negotiations between the two Governments, he had received since the morning a message which had cleared up the situation; that

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message would be circulated.

The Japanese delegate had repeated his assurances of Japan's desire for an amicable settlement with China. There was nothing the Chinese Government and the Chinese nation desired more than that all questions outstanding not only with Japan but with any nation in the world should be settled in an amicable way. China, as a Member of the League was bound, by the agreements she had signed, to submit every difference for settlement by peaceful means.

M.Sze thanked Lord Cecil for reading the quotation from the Minutes of a previous Council meeting with reference to so-called defensive measures. He repeated that if there were questions outstanding between China and Japan, methods for settlement were provided in the Covenant, in more than one Article and in more than one way, but he wished to emphasise once more that the question at present before the Council was that of the present invasion of Chinese territory. No other questions could be discussed by the Council at that time.

He hoped that the request he had made that morning that a commission of inquiry should be sent by the Council at the earliest possible moment, would receive the Council's immediate attention and assent. Every step must be taken at once if the Council's authority was to be effective.

In conclusion, according to the despatches he had received, the area of Chinese territory under occupation was being extended. That must be stopped immediately and the troops withdrawn.

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The PRESIDENT observed that his colleagues and himself had listened with keen attention that morning to the statements of the Chinese and Japanese representatives. They noted the Japanese representative's request that the discussion of the question should be postponed till the next meeting.

The President asked the Council to authorize him:

- 1) to make an urgent appeal to the Chinese and Japanese Governments to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation or prejudice the peaceful settlement of the problem;
- 2) to endeavour, in consultation with the Chinese and Japanese representatives, to find adequate means of enabling the two countries to withdraw their troops immediately, without the lives of their nationals and the safety of their property being endangered.

He asked the Council to decide that the minutes of all the Council's meetings and the documents relating to the question should be forwarded to the Government of the United States of America for its information.

He proposed that the two Parties concerned should be asked to meet immediately after the meeting of the Council, but he would also ask permission to associate certain Members of the Council in those proceedings.

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M. CURTIUS said he believed and hoped that unanimity could be reached in the Council in favour of the decision the resident had proposed. When he said unanimity he included the two Parties to the dispute. If the Council arrived at such a unanimous decision, he thought his colleagues would agree that that decision could only be regarded as a first step towards the peaceful settlement of the question. At a moment when world economic and political conditions were extremely difficult, the Council was called upon to settle a highly complex dispute. That was a duty which it could not evade. He therefore thought that the Council should not rest content with this provisional measure, this first step, but should go further in the matter and take other steps in the direction of a final settlement.

It was of the greatest importance for all the Members of the Council to uphold the Council's authority in that matter and to show the whole world that such conflicts could be amicably settled in the Council. It was from that standpoint that he would accept the President's proposal, and he hoped that it would receive unanimous approval.

M. MASIGLI desired to associate himself with what M. Curtius had just said, which expressed the sentiments of all present. The steps proposed were only the first - indeed the very first. It was the Council's absolute duty to exert all its authority, all its influence, to secure the speediest possible settlement of a question which had already been developing for several days between two States,

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in order that the necessary solutions might be considered in an atmosphere of restored confidence and calm.

In a matter of that kind, time was an essential factor. There was no time to be lost. The Members of the Council were aware of the difficulties encountered by the delegations concerned in communicating quickly with distant Governments and obtaining the information required in order to discuss the matter at the Council table. When the President held his meeting with the Parties concerned, he should urge the representatives of Japan and China to do their utmost to place the Council quickly in possession of the necessary information to bring the matter to a close. It was essential that the next meeting should take place very soon - otherwise the Council might find itself in an infinitely more delicate position, which would add to its difficulties in accomplishing its fundamental mission.

M. BRADLAND supported the President's proposal. The facts in the question before the Council were not yet, he said, sufficiently well established to warrant him in holding any opinion as to the actual merits of the dispute. He desired, however, to express the keen anxiety he felt at the occurrence of such an incident between two Members of the League. He was firmly convinced that a complete solution would speedily be found for the problem, in accordance with the spirit of the Covenant and the Council's past decisions.

The responsibilities of the League and of all its Members must remain unimpaired. He trusted that, when the Council met again, it would receive communications which

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would enable it to congratulate the two Governments concerned and the League of Nations itself on the fact of real progress having been made towards a final settlement.

M. GRANDI said the representatives of Germany, France and Norway had so perfectly expressed his own views that he could do no more than repeat what had already been said.

He desired, however, to associate himself, on behalf of his Government, with the remarks of the previous speakers, and to support the President's proposal.

At the same time he would earnestly appeal to the two Parties in the hope that a solution might be found with the help of their goodwill- a solution which would not merely satisfy both Parties, but would be of the highest importance to the whole world.

M. SOKAL said that a great responsibility rested on the Council in the matter which had been laid before it; but it was to be hoped that, with the goodwill that the Governments directly concerned had already shown, the Council would find a solution.

He likewise accepted the President's proposal and trusted that the Council would be able to settle this dispute with all possible speed.

M. SZE understood that the members who had spoken after the President had submitted his resolution all agreed that time was an essential element in the situation and that the resolution was only the first of a series of steps to be taken. He also understood - he hoped correctly - that in the consultations which would take place between the present and the

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next meeting, the work would be in a sense, within the Council, that was to say, there was no question of direct negotiation between the Chinese Government and the representative of Japan. Subject to these remarks, M. Sze approved the resolution.

He wished, however, to explain that he did so because he thought the resolution a good one so far as it went, even though it did not expressly and definitely provide for steps to be taken immediately by the Japanese Government for the purpose of fully re-establishing the status quo ante and thus not only preventing further loss of life and destruction of property, but paving the way for an impartial examination of all the events since September 18th, under the auspices and control of the League, and with a view to determining and apportioning the blame and the reparation to be made. He hoped and expected that the action authorized by the resolution would be promptly followed by such other acts on the part of the Council as the circumstances demanded. Finally, he trusted that the Council would be in a position to resume its discussion the following day.

M. YOSHIZAWA said he also highly appreciated the sentiments by which his colleagues were animated in the interests of the settlement of the dispute. He expressed his sincere thanks for the attention which the Council had given to the matter before it.

Various speakers had referred to the date on which the Council should meet again to consider the question. For his part, M. Yoshizawa might say that he was making every effort to supply the Council with fuller information so as to enable it to discuss the matter in greater detail, but he could

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not at the moment say whether he would be in a position to ask the President to convene another meeting on the following day. He would, of course, make the necessary request to the President as soon as he was in receipt of definite instructions from his Government.

Viscount CECIL accepted the resolution as a first step, as M. Curtius had so properly termed it. With regard to the next meeting it was, of course, useless to meet unless the Council could take some action, but if the information given by the Chinese delegate was correct, very grave incidents were still taking place in Manchuria, and obviously there must be no avoidable delay.

He thought therefore the decision as to the next meeting must be left to the President and he ventured very respectfully to appeal to his Japanese colleague to hasten as much as he possibly could the necessary instructions he was awaiting from his Government.

M. Yoshizawa, in reply to Lord Cecil, repeated that he was making every possible effort to obtain further information from his Government, and he would not fail to submit a more comprehensive report at the earliest possible moment.

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He understood Lord Cecil to have said that if the statement made by the Chinese delegate was correct, that statement included a report of the slaughter of hundreds of men, women and children, the Council could not hesitate to meet as soon as possible and even earlier than M. Yoshizawa might ask. He hoped, however, that this interpretation was not correct.

Viscount CECIL said his meaning was that, in view of what the Chinese delegate had said, the matter was extremely urgent - as M. Yoshizawa would undoubtedly agree, and that he hoped that the instructions which the Japanese delegate was awaiting from his Government would arrive at the earliest possible moment.

M. LEMROUX, speaking as President of the Council and as representative of Spain, associated himself with his colleagues' remarks. He could assure the Council that the question would be investigated with the utmost diligence, and the French representative's suggestion regarding the necessity of obtaining information would be borne in mind.

M. GARAY said that the American countries represented on the Council could not view without concern a question which affected the peace of the world. In view of the regrettable events that had taken place in the Far East, they felt that it was the Council's duty, in a spirit of world co-operation, to take all necessary steps, in conformity with the League Covenant and the other Treaties, to secure the immediate cessation of hostilities, to prevent any resumption of the offensive by either Party, and to bring about a restoration of peace in all those countries which at that time deserved every sympathy on account of the deplorable calamities they had recently suffered. He trusted that the situation would again become normal as soon as possible.

The meeting rose.

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FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

793.94

FROM

GRAY

Peiping

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 9:16 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



*file
89.1*

RECEIVED

OCT 8 - 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

793.94/1599

PRIORITY.

719, October 7, 2 p. m.

Following from American Consul General at Nanking:

*note
693.9412*

"October 6, 7 p. m. I am informed that a telephone message from Shanghai states that the Japanese Government has sent a peremptory demand to the Chinese Government that the boycott be stopped; that otherwise the Japanese Government will adopt forcible measures. Rumor that Japan will land armed forces tonight in Chapei Shanghai. I have been informed during the last few days that the Chinese Government would be obliged to regard such a landing as an act of war. I have been informed recently also that if any military measures are taken at Nanking by the Japanese the Chinese will retaliate. One Japanese cruiser here now. The Consulate General has in readiness tentative

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REP

2- #719, from Peiping, Oct. 7, 1931,
2 p. m.

tentative plans for the evacuation of American citizens on to the destroyer but no warning has been issued as conditions do not yet seem threatening.

The Legation has received no alarming reports from other sources except anti-Japanese agitations in Yunnan referred to in my 715, October 7, 9 a. m. Reuter reports from Tokyo October 6th speak of Japanese taking "Chinese Government severely to task for its negligence in failing to check anti-Japanese boycott" and of despatching cruiser TOKIWA to Shanghai with bluejackets for protective purposes. Also that all Japanese living in districts along the Yangtze have been ordered to withdraw to Hankow and Shanghai.

JOHNSON

RR

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tsingtao/41 FOR Despatch # 646

FROM Tsingtao (Dorsey) DATED Sept. 10, 1931.
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1172 ***

REGARDING:

Japanese - Chinese Incident.
Disturbances of note during August in Tsingtao, between
Japanese and Chinese.

Jr

793.94/2000

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Japanese-Chinese Incident.

793,94
The only disturbance of note during the month was a clash between resident Japanese and Chinese originating in an altercation between a Japanese fish dealer and some Chinese, blows being exchanged, a crowd composed of both nationalities soon gathering and fighting ensued. A group of Japanese known as Kokusai Kai, but really a private volunteer corps ready to protect Japanese interests when deemed appropriate, took a very active part in the proceedings, using sword-canes as weapons. Sixteen Japanese and ten Chinese were sent to hospital as a result of the incident, the former with light wounds caused by blows from sticks, stones and kicks. Seven of the Chinese bore wounds inflicted with knives or other sharp instruments. The situation was tense for a few days but all is outwardly quiet at present. This incident was more fully reported in the Consulate's despatch No. 481 of August 31, 1931.

Anti-.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 842.9111/61 FOR desp. #532

FROM Canada (Riggs) DATED Oct.2, 1931
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Manchurian Crisis.

Substance of comments of Canadian press
criticising the failure of the League
of Nations to effect a peaceful ending
to the -.

fo

793.94/2001

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

The failure of the League of Nation's efforts to bring about a peaceful ending to the crisis in Manchuria has brought about severe criticism of that body in the Canadian press. The Liberal Toronto GLOBE states that never was the weakness of the League more clearly shown than by its complete inability to come to a decision on the Manchuria situation and to enforce that decision. The GLOBE's opinion of the League is put in these words:

"The truth is that from the moment the United States walked out of the League the Geneva organization has been an increasingly expensive futility. At present it is nothing more or less than an academic forum, subsidized by the taxpayers of the world - or, rather, by those taxpayers who pay their bills.

"The British Empire pays one-quarter of the total League budget. Canada's share is almost a quarter of a million dollars per year. These are hard times, when wasting money is a crime. The British Empire is forced to economize at home. Why not economize by refusing to spend more in the attempt to make broken reeds look like policemen's batons?"

The Conservative Montreal STAR in an editorial entitled "Would The Americans Fight?", expresses the opinion that the present crisis will not lead to war, in spite of the League's failure, since the representations of the United States are backed by the American Navy. The STAR has little sympathy with the Japanese side of the case and believes that Japan "is merely collecting dividends on her investments in fighting material". It also believes that Japan will be repeating her blunder of the "Twenty-one Demands" if she is proceeding on the assumption that the United States and other countries are too disturbed by the economic depression to oppose, by force, if necessary, a consolidation of the Japanese position in Manchuria. The STAR concludes:

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

"But Japan will make a major mistake if she imagines that the United States will not act now. There are a lot of people between Maine and California who would regard a sudden war with Japan as a god-send. It would immediately raise the price of wheat. The farmers could endure that - so could the Farm Board. It would revive certain forms of manufacture as a timely rain revives vegetation. We would soon begin beating our railway equipment into shells. Money would flow freely. The gold reserves would come out and fight. The rest of the world would benefit. China has precious little to lose.

"It seems incredible that Japan could make such a mistake."

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

GRAY

Peiping

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 11:02 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 7 - 1931
Department of State

PRIORITY.

715, October 7, 9 a. m.

Following from Consul at Yunanfu received only late
last night by Chinese Exchange Radio:

"October 3, 6 p. m.

During a huge anti-Japanese demonstration which took
place in Yunanfu this afternoon thousands of Chinese
students with the assistance of several hundred armed
Chinese soldiers and the local police completely de-
stroyed fronts and interiors of all Japanese shops and
damaged Japanese residences. Japanese subjects who
have taken refuge in local hotel and Japanese Consulate
have not yet suffered bodily harm. Circumstances in-
dicate destruction done with the knowledge and consent
of the authorities".

A few hours earlier the following telegram from
to the American Consul General at Shanghai reached the
Legation.

793.94
note
393.94

793.94/2002

FILED
OCT 15 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

HPD

2- #715, from Feiping, Oct. 7, 1931
9 a. m.

Legation.

"Local conditions very dangerous for Japanese subjects who will be evacuated to Hanoi as quickly as possible. Request instructions regarding consular property and my remaining here. Hashimaru".

In response to Shanghai's inquiry I authorized the Consul General to communicate the message to the Japanese Minister there.

JOHNSON

HPD

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Thomas A. Ryan NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 10:32 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

718, October 7, 10 a. m.



From Lieutenant Brown at Mukden to the Naval Attache:

"October 6, 6 p. m. Japanese fifth railway battalion detachment near Ssuningkai clashed body Chinese forces 5th instant. Japanese casualties 1 killed, 3 wounded; 7 Chinese killed. Japanese army sentry murdered brutally on 2nd. Battalion in the country districts northeast Mukden returned to Kaiyuan reporting guerrilla warfare and 500 Korean farmers murdered or missing. Two companies Japanese sent to northeast Fushun account of anti-Korean outbreaks. Detailed account follows."

Chinese Committee of Public Safety headed by Yuan Chin Kai issued proclamation denying intention establish provincial government".

JOHNSON

JHR
HPD

703.94/2003

OCT 11 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY


Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.



721, October 7, 4 p.m.
Your 362/ October 5, 6 p.m.

FOR THE SECRETARY.

I cannot get away from Peiping before Monday
October 12th and am making arrangements to leave on
that date, taking with me Miss Powell and Murray.
Should reach Nanking on Wednesday morning October
14th.

JOHNSON

CSB

7/24
10/24

FILED

OCT 15 1931

793.94/2004

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clayton S. Syme NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Notes

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128 TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒ X
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department

Department of State

Charge to
\$

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be marked as such and not be
being communicated to the public.

Washington, October 11, 1931

6 p.m.

793.94/2041

AMLEGATION

3812031

PEIPING (CHINA)

388 Confidential! Urgent,
793.94/2041
Your 7939/October 11, 10 a.m.

1. Department desires at earliest possible moment/
complete report/regarding bombing of Chinchow, including/
as far as possible/full account of the incident/ number
of casualties, what/property/damage/ etc./ You should make/
in your discretion/what arrangements/you deem most/feasible/
for prompt/execution/ If this/can be attained (by/sending)
Hanson/ and Salisbury/at once (to that/ spot, rush/instructions/
to them/ to proceed there/ and to report/ at the/earliest pos-
sible moment) Otherwise/send some/one/ else./

2. Inform Department/of Hanson's/ and Salisbury's/ present
whereabouts/ and of/ the arrangements/ which you/ make for, car-
rying out/ the above./

3. Regard the/above/ as unusually/urgent./

Sturman

SKH

FE/SKH

793.94/2004

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

0770

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
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\$

TELEGRAM SENT Gray
Department of State
Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

October 7, 1931.

AMERICAN LEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA)
For the Minister.
Your 721, October 7, 4 p.m.

Department considers it important that you
arrive in Nanking not later than the date you set.

Stinson
Sent

793.94/2004

RAM
FE: RSM: EJJ
FE
Sent

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-128

0771

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-135
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

May
1-135

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington.

October 12, 1931.

OCT 12 31

793.94

AMERICAN LEGATION,
PEIPING (CHINA).

390

URGENT.
Your 721, October 7, 4 p.m.

12004

One. Immediately telegraph Chinese Foreign Office
at Nanking that the Minister is on his way to
Nanking. Also specify date of Minister's arrival.
Two. Please telegraph Department latest information
with regard to Minister's expected date of arrival
at Nanking and request that he, immediately upon
arrival, telegraphically inform the Department.

793.94/2004

Stinson
Skt

FE:AMH:LM
mmh

RAM
FE

OCT 12 1931
OCT 13 1931

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-135

0772

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By *Charles E. Lyon, Jr.* NARS, Date *June 1, 1976*

COPIES SENT TO
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

FE
m

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

RECEIVED

7 1931

GRAY

FROM

Harbin

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 2 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 7 - 1931
Department of State

file
egc.

October 7, 3 p. m.

Following message from Hanson by telephone October
7, 8 a. m.:

"The number of Chinese killed during the fighting
Nanking at ~~Nanking~~ and Kuanchengtse totalled 118, wounded 199.

The town Chinese police and Chinese Eastern Railway
police at Kuanchengtse are unarmed. They are on duty
and are under control and jurisdiction of Japanese
gendarmes. Each of the Chinese Eastern Railway police
has on his coat sleeve badge of white cloth giving in
Chinese name of his company and in addition little red
stamp about one and one quarter inches square which
bears Chinese characters signifying Changchun Japanese
gendarmes. About 20 Japanese gendarmes at Kuanchengtse
are armed, two of whom meet each train.

Leaving

790.94/2005

FILED

OCT 12 1931

077
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- From Harbin, Oct. 7, 1931,
3 p. m.

Leaving this morning for Kirin and will return
evening of the 9th about six p. m."

Legation informed, Tokyo informed.

DUTKO

RR

OSB

0774

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED
GRAY


Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 9:55 a. m.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.



723, October 7, 6 p. m.

In reference to Legation's 708, October 6, noon,
Consul General at Nanking reports further under date of
October 6, 11 a. m. and October 6, 3 p. m.

"One. Soong gave me the information reported in
my October 4, 10 p. m. and added that Shidehara had
convinced the State Department, according to his
report, that the civil element in the Japanese Govern-
ment still controlled the military and that troops
would be withdrawn as required. Soong cannot but
feel that withdrawal will not be accomplished unless
a strong stand is taken by the League or by one or
more powerful nations independently of the League.
As part of his grounds for holding this view he said
that Chang Kaing, President of the Bank of China in
the days immediately following September 18th had
spoken with Count Uchida and Kimura of the South Man-
churia Railway Company.

(END PART ONE)

CSB

JOHNSON

793.94/2006

FILED
MAY 1 1931

0775

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 9:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

723(2)

6 pm (2)

723, October 7, 11 p. m. (PART TWO).

Editor of the SOUTH MANCHURIA DAILY NEWS with the Japanese Consul General and with other Japanese and that all had spoken of the two wars Japan had waged for Manchuria and had said that since events had taken their present course Japan would not relinquish this area.

Two. I inquired what steps China was taking on her own part to ascertain whether Japanese troops were being withdrawn and he replied that the Chinese Government on October 4th had sent a communication to the Japanese Government stating that instructions had been issued to Chang Tso Hsiang and Wang Shu Chang to enter into negotiations with the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria in order to reestablish Chinese control over areas progressively evacuated. He said no reply had been

0778

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #722, from Peiping, Oct.7,1931
11 p.m.

had been received from the Japanese Government.

Three. Soong said that if the justice of Chinese position were not vindicated in some way by October 14th he did not think the Government could survive popular resentment if the Government passively accepted the situation".

(END PART TWO).

JOHNSON

OSB

0777

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 9:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

723, October 7, 6 p. m. (PART THREE).

"Shortly after our conversation and before his departure Soong sent by confidential messenger a second statement with request that I telegraph it to you. This morning he sent me a note written on the train expressing fear that the statement might seem to you somewhat presumptuous in tone in that it offers advice regarding course to be taken by the United States; he asked me to explain that the statement arose from our discussions of possible action which the United States might take on behalf of China. Soong also sent me Rengo report dated from Mukden October 18 stating that Kwantung army headquarters will broadcast daily from Northern Wireless Station "for purpose clarifying impartial stand of Japanese troops Manchuria and conveying correct information on various Manchurian problems for home and abroad".

(END PART THREE).

CSB

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 10:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

723, October 7, 6 p. m. (PART FOUR).

Soong made marginal notation "while talking this evening about how sensitive Japanese really are to world opinion".

Second statement follows "The following facts for His Excellency Minister N. T. Johnson: The action of the League of Nations weakened perceptibly on the reported announcement that the United States proposed to take no action concerning the Manchurian crisis. It is believed here that the attitude of the United States was inspired by an appeal from Shidehara that public pressure on the part of the powers would soon result in a military coup d'etat and the formation of a military dictatorship in Japan, and that on the other hand the Japanese Government desired and was succeeding in ordering

0779
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Syme NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #723, from Peiping, Oct.7,1931
6 p.m.

ordering military uprisings.

Through reliable official reports from Manchuria
and from the interviews which the Governor of the Bank
of China,

(END PART FOUR).

JOHNSON

CSB

0780

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

GRAY

PEIPING

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 4:25 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

723, October 7, 6 p.m. (PART FIVE)

Mr. Chang Kaingau, with General Honjo, Consul General Hayashi, Count U^hcida and Mr. Kimura, the last two as late as October second, it is clear that both the Japanese military and civilians have the firmest determination not to withdraw troops, and further they are organizing local shadow governments in Manchuria and Mongolia, which will be autonomous and under their protection.

Such being the case, the Manchurian crisis is reaching to a climax and it is to be hoped that as stated United States addressed both to China and Japan the hope that the two countries will withdraw their troops, and as Japan will not carry out her promise of so doing, the United States will make its influence felt in Tokyo, Japan not daring to oppose a firm attitude of the United States of America. This will encourage the League of Nations

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

2- #723, from Peiping, October 7,
1931

Nations, particularly if the United States of America
would assure it that the United States will view with
sympathy action calculated to bringing Japan to carry
out her undertaking to withdraw her troops, which she
morally bound herself to carry out before October 14th".

(END MESSAGE)

JOHNSON

CIB

278

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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REP

CORRECTED COPY

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 9:45 a. m.

793.94/2006

Secretary of State,
Washington.



723, October 7, 6 p. m. (PART TWO).

Editor of the SOUTH MANCHURIA DAILY NEWS with the
Japanese Consul General and with other Japanese and
that all had spoken of the two wars Japan had waged
for Manchuria and had said that since events had
taken their present course Japan would not relinquish
this area.

Two. I inquired what steps China was taking on
her own part to ascertain whether Japanese troops were
being withdrawn and he replied that the Chinese Govern-
ment on October 4th had sent a communication to the
Japanese Government stating that instructions had been
issued to Chang Tso Hsiang and Wang Shu Chang to enter
into negotiations with the Japanese military authorities
in Manchuria

793.94/2006

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lynn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

2- #723, from Peiping, Part Two,
 Oct. 7, 1931, 6 p. m.

FROM

in Manchuria in order to reestablish Chinese control
 over areas progressively evacuated. He said no reply
 had been received from the Japanese Government.

Three. Soong said that if the justice of Chinese
 position were not vindicated in some way by October
 14th he did not think the Government could survive
 popular resentment if the Government passively accepted
 the situation".
 (END PART TWO).

JOHNSON

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0784

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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AM


Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 6:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.



726, October 8, 9 a.m.

FROM LIEUTENANT BROWN AT MUKDEN TO NAVAL ATTACHE

"October 7, 4 p.m

It is confirmed that 300 Japanese Infantry plus field
artillery left Mukden 2 o'clock this morning for
Hsinmin area Peiping-Mukden Railroad to reinforce detachments
there. Six airships departed daybreak. Headquarters reports
that Chinese forces straggling towards Chinchow terrifying
district."

JOHNSON

KLP

HPD

793.94

FILED
OCT 16 1931

793.94/2007

0785

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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O.N.I. AND M.I. *896*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FE

AM

GREEN

Tokio

FROM

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 7:04 a.m.

793.94

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 8 - 1931
Department of State

*file
896*

178, October 8, 5 p.m.

The General Staff has issued an information bulletin to foreign military attaches stating that the banditry and atrocities committed by the defeated Chinese troops in Manchuria make it impossible to withdraw the Japanese Army to their original stations or even to the contiguous territory; that any further withdrawal would aggravate the present situation. A proclamation to this effect was made by the commander of the troops in Manchuria and is declared to be in complete accordance with the view of the General Staff.

I believe that the Japanese Government is becoming increasingly irritated, and apprehensive of developments in China and may resort to further measures to protect the lives of Japanese there. I have just been informed orally by the Foreign Office that a note is being sent to Nanking complaining of the anti-Japanese activities in intramural China.

Repeated to Peiping.

NEVILLE

KLP
HPD

793.94/2008

FILED
OCT 15 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
*PREPARING OFFICE
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OR
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1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

October 9, 1931.

3P OCT 9 1931

793.94/2008

793.94/2008
It should be noted that this telegram is being sent to the Embassy in Tokyo, Japan.

AmEmbassy,

Tokyo, Japan.

191

URGENT.

I should like to have you see Shidehara immediately to ask the two following questions.

1. Has the Japanese Government given its assent to the information bulletin of the General Staff, summarized in your 178, in which it is stated that, for various reasons, Japanese troops cannot be withdrawn?

2. It is reported on what seems good authority that Japanese airplanes have dropped bombs on Chinchow. Is this information correct?

Strinson
Wly

U WRC/AB

Oct. 9 1931

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

793.94/2008

0787

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 OR

Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

October 9, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

72 Reference Manchuria situation.

Inform Drummond confidentially that I was informed
 yesterday from Tokyo, under date October 8, ¹²⁰⁰⁸ that Japanese
 General Staff has issued to foreign military attachés an
 information bulletin stating that the banditry and atroc-
 ities committed by the defeated (sic) Chinese troops in
 Manchuria render it impossible to withdraw the Japanese Army
 (sic) to their original stations or even to the contiguous
 territory. My informant stated that the Japanese Government
 is becoming increasingly apprehensive of developments in
 China and may resort to further measures to protect the
 lives of Japanese there, and that the Foreign Office was
 sending a note to Nanking complaining of the anti-Japanese
 activities in China proper. I received last evening from
 the Japanese Embassy here a copy of the text of a memorandum
 sent by the Japanese Government to the Chinese Government
 under date October 9. In this the Japanese Government
 employs a decidedly threatening tone.

FE:SKH/ZMF

CR

Enciphered by

Oct. 9. 1931, 24

Sent by operator

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1934 1-128

793.94/2008

0788

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CORRECTED COPY

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 8, 1931

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

728, October 8, 2 p. m.


Following from American Consul General at Nanking:

"October 7, 5 p. m. A responsible official of the Chinese Government October 7, 2 p. m. told me that the Government takes seriously a report which has reached it that the Japanese have in contemplation landing forces in and bombarding Nanking. He said that he told me this so I could make plans to protect myself from the trouble which would inevitably follow either action. He asks that I informally convey this warning to other consulates."

Repeated to Tokyo. Has the Department any information as to the intentions of the Japanese Government in this respect?

JOHNSON

CSB



0789

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM


GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated 8, 1931

Rec'd 6:45 a. m.

743.94
Secretary of State
Washington.



1 day. 5 Peiping.
X-8-31

PRIORITY.

OCT 9 - 1931

728, October 8, 2 p. m.

Following from American Consul General at Nanking:

"October 7, 5 p. m. A responsible official of the Chinese Government October 7, 2 p. m. told me that the Government takes seriously a report which has reached it that the Japanese have landed forces in and bombarding Nanking. He said that he told me this so I could make plans to protect myself from the trouble which would inevitably follow either action. He asks that I informally convey this warning to other consulates."

Repeated to Tokyo. Has the Department any information as to the intentions of the Japanese Government in this respect?

JOHNSON

CSB

743.94/2009

0790

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

October 8, 1931.

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

AMLEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA).

368
 Your 728, October 8, 8 p.m., transmitting telegram
 from American Consul General, Nanking, October 7, 5 p.m.

With reference to final paragraph, see final
 paragraph of Tokyo Embassy's No. 178, October 8, 5 p.m.
 The Japanese Ambassador here in conversation with the
 Under Secretary on October 7 said that it was unthinkable
 that Japan should do any such thing as bombard Nanking.
 The Department has no further authentic information.

793.94/2009

Stinson

WZ

FE:RSM:EJL

FE

SKH

OCT 8 1931 PM

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19_____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lynn Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.T.

AM

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 6:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY

729, October 8, 8 p.m.



*File
E.G.C.*

Following information just received from (?)
of Young Marshal's office.

"Between one and two fifteen this p.m. twelve
Japanese airplanes flew over Chinchow, new seat of
the Chinese provincial government in Manchuria and
dropped 36 bombs, chiefly directly at the University
buildings and House Provincial Government. Buildings
were damaged but casualties so far unknown. A bomb
was dropped on service car number 141 killing two
Chinese cleaners and one was dropped on the locomotive
sheds. Telegraph lines between Chinchow and Shankaikwan
interrupted."

JOHNSON

CSB

FILED

OCT 15 1931

703.94/2010

793-94

0792

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Ryan NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department

Charge to
 \$

793-94

Department of State

Washington.

October 7, 1931.

SP

AMLEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA)

367

Confidential for the Minister.

On the subject of our policy in cooperation with the League,
 the Department telegraphed the American Consul at Geneva on
 October 5, for informal communication to Drummond as follows:

QUOTE / I am gratified at the success of the Council in having
 secured the consent of both the Chinese and Japanese Governments
 to its resolution of September 30, and the commitment of the
 Japanese Government to the withdrawal of its troops into the
 railway zone, and that of the Chinese Government to the protection
 of Japanese nationals thereafter. I wish Drummond to know in
 confidence that I am working every day on this subject; that I
 am urging on both the Chinese and Japanese that they should
 assert themselves to the utmost to avoid a recrudescence of
 armed encounters; and that I have urged upon the Japanese an
 immediate withdrawal of their forces into the railway zone. I
 shall urge upon both the necessity of carrying out in good faith
 the commitments as expressed in the resolution of the Council.

I believe that our cooperation in the future handling of

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1918 1-122

793.94/2010A

2010a

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 4, 1976

1-134
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-135
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

- 2 -

of this difficult matter should proceed along the course which has been followed ever since the first outbreak of the trouble fortunately found the Assembly and Council of the League of Nations in session. The Council has deliberated long and earnestly on this matter and the Covenant of the League of Nations provides well-tried machinery for handling such issues. Both the Chinese and Japanese have presented and argued their cases before the Council and the world has been informed through published accounts with regard to the proceedings there. The Council has formulated conclusions and outlined a course of action to be followed by the disputants; and as the said disputants have made commitments to the Council, it is most desirable that the League in no way relax its vigilance and in no way fail to assert all the pressure and authority within its competence towards regulating the action of China and Japan in the premises.

On its part the American Government acting independently through its diplomatic representatives will endeavor to reinforce what the League does and will make clear that it has not lost interest in the matter and is not oblivious to the obligations which the disputants have assumed to their fellow signatories in the Pact of Paris as well as in the Nine

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

- 3 -

Power Pact should a time arise when it would seem advisable to bring forward those obligations. By this course we avoid any danger of encouraging either disputant to seek to play off our action against that of the League or vice versa.

I have already informed Sir Eric of the presence in the disturbed area of my own special representatives, and I shall be glad to comply with his suggestion of forwarding to him any pertinent information which we may be able to make available to him.

I think that what I have already said will answer Sir Eric's other inquiries. We shall endeavor to be as cooperative as possible, while trying to avoid any chance of embarrassment to him and the League in the task which they have undertaken. ^{End} ~~UNQUOTE!~~

Two/Repeat to Tokyo ^{as Sept 18/6} ~~confidential~~ for the charge!

Stimson

SKH

As instructed.

FE/JEF:BMU

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FE

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

PEIPING

FROM

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 8th, 6:34 a.m.

MEMBER SECRETARY

OCT 9 - 1931

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 9 - 1931

Department of State

724, October 7, 7 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Telegram to Peiping
Tokyo and General
J.E.
89.1

My telegram No. 721, October 7, 4 p.m.

I know of no adequate reasons for not proceeding to Nanking. In view of the fact that I had told my British and French colleagues that I do not expect to go South at this time I have informed them of present change in plans and I expect that they also may go South.

We all agree that the situation is fraught with serious possibilities but are somewhat doubtful whether moderating influence at Nanking would be effective unaccompanied by similar influences at Tokyo calculated to justify confidence hitherto placed by Chinese in League and Pact for renunciation of war.

There appears to be a real danger of incidents which may cause Japan to move in the Yangtze Valley, telegrams recently received from Peck and being repeated to the

793.94/2011

793.94/2011

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

2-#724, from Peiping, October 7, 1931,
 7 p.m.

to the Department tell of state of great uneasiness
 there and authorities appear even to talk of war.

There is a similar danger here in the North. I
 have communicated to the Department embarrassing
 situation due to presence of Japanese guard in Peiping
 and Japanese troops at Tientsin (see my 645, September
 24, 1 p.m.). This is one of the causes which made it
 seem advisable for Chiefs of Missions to remain in
 Peiping.

Situation at interior points in Manchuria, now
 overrun by Chinese wandering soldiery dispersed by
 Japanese, is very bad. Should Japanese repeat in Yangtze
 Valley, or at other points, measures taken in Manchuria,
 there is danger of this kind of situation spreading to
 the great harm of everyone.

It is my opinion that pressure should be brought
 to bear in Tokyo to persuade Japanese Government of
 the danger to all if present conditions allowed to
 continue and necessity of Japanese Government taking
 early steps to encourage restoration of Chinese control
 and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

3-#724, from Peiping, Oct. 7, 1931,
7 p.m.

and administration in Manchuria. I am sure that if the
powers and Japan permit matters to go along as they
have been going we are likely to have more serious
consequences in China.

JOHNSON

JHR

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Chambers & Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated FROM
to anyone.

PEIPING

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 8th, 6:34 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



724, October 7, 7 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY. /2004

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793.94/2011

0 / 9 9

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #724, from Peiping, Oct. 7, 1931,
7 p. m.

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It is my opinion that pressure should be brought
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

3- #724, from Peiping, Oct. 7, 1931,
7 p. m.

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JOHNSON

JHR
CSB
11

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

3
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

1936 JUL 1 AM 11 04

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
COMMUNICATIONS 1936
Department of State

Doc. 82, 1931.

793.94

Dear Dr Harnbeck,

With reference to
our conversation of this morning, I
enclose copies of the two telegrams
I showed you, together with copy
of a later one on the same
subject from Paris.

793.94/2011
1
2

Yours sincerely

D. G. Johnson.

JUL 1 1936


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F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRITISH EMBASSY,
 WASHINGTON.

936 JUL 1 AM 11 04



Feb
Oct. 8th, 1931.

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 I showed you, together with copy
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 subject from Paris.

Yours sincerely

D. G. Brown.

793.94/2011 1
 N
 JUL 1 1936
 FILED
 F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

C O P Y.

Telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Peking to Foreign Office, repeated to H. M. Embassy at Washington on October 6th:-

"I discussed Wai-Chiao-Pu message at informal meeting with Spanish, French, American and German Ministers and Italian Secretary of Legation on October 5th.

Spanish Minister after referring to apparent connection between Chinese message and paragraph 9 of Council Resolutions of September 30th as reported here in Press said that he had already a few days before received instructions from his Government to send his Consul from Shanghai to Manchuria to report. (There is normally no Spanish Consul in Manchuria). He had now reported Wai-Chiao-Pu message to his government and awaited instructions.

I said I had done the same. I added that my first impression had been that Chinese were trying to manoeuvre us into a course of action (on lines of a commission) already rejected at Council of League of Nations. In this way Chinese message seemed to me to complicate matter and to make it more difficult for us to do something which we should otherwise have done. Probably had Chinese not sent their message I should have already despatched special representative to Manchuria to watch and report on situation. Now I must await your instructions.

French Minister said he had simultaneously with receipt of message received telegram from Paris instructing him to supply all possible information - especially withdrawal of troops to South Manchurian Railway zone, liberation of prisoners and restitution of public buildings; but as Japan had expressed disapproval of

"general/

0804

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-2-

"general measures" this information should be collected as discreetly as possible. French Minister is now repeating Wai-Chiao-Pu message to his government and had added that in his view it should be taken very seriously in view of grave issues involved.

U. S. Minister said he had received a similar telegram from Wai-Chiao-Pu but appealing to U. S. Government as parties to Kellogg Pact and interested in peace in Far East. He had repeated message to Washington. He added for confidential information of meeting that his government had already before receipt of message arranged with Japanese Government to send two American representatives to observe situation. These gentlemen were already in Changchun before Wai-Chiao-Pu message (? words omitted) representatives had no connection with their message.

German Minister said he had merely repeated Wai-Chiao-Pu message to his government and awaited their instructions.

In the course of general discussion it was decided (a) that it was inherently desirable that we should all have our representatives on the spot to report developments but that in view of apparent Chinese manoeuvre to get us to endorse their interpretation of resolution 9 we should walk warily and avoid anything savouring of a formal commission and (b) that we should do nothing pending receipt of instructions from our respective governments. U. S. Minister was recognized as being on a different footing as his government had already sent representative by agreement with Japanese Government.

I said that I had thought of acknowledging receipt of Chinese message by saying that I had repeated

it/

-3-

it to you for instructions and that in the meantime I was keeping my government fully informed of such reports as reached me from Manchuria. But after further discussion we decided that as we might receive our instructions at any moment we would none of us send any reply until we had heard from our governments.

I request very urgent instructions. Before receipt of Chinese message I had intended sending military attaché and secretary of legation to Manchuria to collect information and report on developments in situation including progress of Japanese withdrawal but I shall now do nothing until I hear from you. I beg that my instructions may include terms of reply to Chinese Government. I share views of my colleagues as to gravity of situation and regard matter as most urgent."

- - - - -

Telegram of instruction despatched on October 6th from Foreign Office to H. M. Embassy at Paris, repeated for similar action to Washington, Berlin, Rome and Madrid.

(Refers to Peking telegrams giving text of Wai-Chiao-Pu message and reporting discussion thereon)

"H. M. Minister at Peking reports that popular agitation against Japan has led to talk in responsible Chinese circles of war being only ultimate solution. Chinese feeling is evidently greatly inflamed and some action which may have effect of restraining Chinese Government partly by advising moderation and partly by meeting as far as possible their request in regard to despatch of neutral representatives to Manchuria seem eminently desirable.

Inform French Government that if they will instruct their representative(s) at Peking and Tokio to counsel moderation on Chinese and Japanese Governments alike and will
send/

0 8 0 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-4-

send representative from Peking to watch events in Manchuria after obtaining agreement of Japanese Government in the same way as has already been done by United States Government similar action will be taken by H. M. Representatives at Peking and Tokio.

Representatives of Powers would naturally report to their respective governments and not to Geneva direct as contemplated by Chinese Government."

- - - - -

Telegram despatched October 7th from H. M. Embassy at Paris in reply to previous telegram: repeated to other missions concerned:

"French Government have received from French Minister at Peking same information as that telegraphed by Sir M. Lampson. Their representatives at Peking and Tokio have already urged moderation on two governments but opportunity offered by my communication will be taken to instruct them to renew representations.

French Military Attaché and Air Attaché have already visited Manchuria and reported on events; and I gather that visit will be renewed or continued as Japanese Government have no objection to presence in Manchuria of normally accredited representatives of Embassies.

French Government agree (---) such representatives should continue to report to their government. Information based on such reports can if necessary be supplied to delegates at Geneva.

French Government seem to expect Council will have to meet in Geneva on October 14th. "

0807

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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-3-

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Inform French Government that if they will instruct their representative(s) at Peking and Tokio to counsel moderation on Chinese and Japanese Governments alike and will

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Chaim S. Zgoni NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-4-

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French Government seem to expect Council will have to meet in Geneva on October 14th. "

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.B.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 2:52 p. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.


730, October 8.

Reuters report from Washington seventh "In con-

formity with Chinese Government request United States
 Government appointed representatives to visit to
 scene of Sino-Japanese dispute in Manchuria and report
 on the situation".

JOHNSON

CSB



793.94/2012

793-94

FILED

OCT 15 1931

0812

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

Geneva

FROM

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 12:40 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 10 1931
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 9 - 1931
Department of State

Rel. to Geneva
Oct 9, 1931
File
eg.c.

793.94

10-20-31

162, October 7, 5 p. m.

Department's 64, October 5, 2 p. m.

I have indicated Sir Eric's extreme ^{ure}pleas at the nature of your message to him. I naturally made (#) known to him orally. He now asks me if I could send him the substance in writing stating that Wilson frequently followed this procedure. The presumption is, of course, that he refers only to paragraphs two and three. Although he did not directly ask it I could see that it would greatly gratify him and that he feels that it would serve a useful purpose could this expression of the relationship between you be made generally known in some instances. (See Consulate's No. 161, ²⁰¹⁵October 7, 3 p. m., paragraph six).

I would appreciate instructions.

GILBERT

(#) Apparent Omission

JHR
CSB

FILED

OCT 10 1931

793.94/2013

0813

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

October 9, 1931.

6P

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

73

2013
 Your 162, October 8, 5 p.m.

You are authorized to hand to Sir Eric Drummond in writing a memorandum containing the following message from me dated as of October 5, 1931. He may feel free to communicate ~~this~~ ^{confidentially} to the members of the Council.

QUOTE I believe that our cooperation in the future handling of this difficult matter should proceed along the course which has been followed ever since the first outbreak of the trouble fortunately found the Assembly and Council of the League of Nations in session. The Council has deliberated long and earnestly on this matter and the Covenant of the League of Nations provides permanent and already tested machinery for handling such issues as between States members of the League. Both the Chinese and Japanese have presented and argued their cases before the Council and the world has been informed through published accounts with regard to the proceedings there.

The

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/2013

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

- 2 -

The Council has formulated conclusions and outlined a course of action to be followed by the disputants; and as the said disputants have made commitments to the Council, it is most desirable that the League in no way relax its vigilance and in no way fail to assert all the pressure and authority within its competence towards regulating the action of China and Japan in the premises.

On its part the American Government acting independently through its diplomatic representatives will endeavor to reinforce what the League does and will make clear that it has a keen interest in the matter and is not oblivious to the obligations which the disputants have assumed to their fellow signatories in the Pact of Paris as well as in the Nine Power Pact should a time arise when it would seem advisable to bring forward those obligations. By this course we avoid any danger of embarrassing the League in the course to which it is now committed. UNQUOTE.

Stinson
WHL

WHL
 WE:PM:MLD

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.-No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1926 1-138

0815

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
GENERAL DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Date: October 8, 1931

Rec'd 3:47 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

163, October 8, 9 a.m.

793 af

(GREEN) One. In the various messages from Nanking and Tokyo which the (*) and the Japanese have addressed to the Secretary General there has been nothing of particular significance (in this Drummond concurs) since those summarized in the Consulate's 339, September 25, 11 a.m., and those whose substance I have conveyed incidentally in other telegrams to the Department, with the exception of a recent telegram from Nanking stating that Marshal Chiang Hsueh Liang had been placed by the President of the National Government in special charge of Chinese forces in South Manchuria.

Two. Drummond states that, despite press reports to the contrary, the Japanese are greatly pleased with this, seeing better facilities for a settlement in their being able to deal directly with an official of the authority



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700.04/2014

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Long NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

2- #163, from Geneva, October 8,
1931

authority of the Marshal.

It is also believed here that the presence of the Marshal in the area will speedily dissolve the various "separate governments" which it is rumored Chinese officials have set up in various parts of Manchuria.

Three. After dinner last evening, Drummond showed me three telegrams which he had received from London, embodying telegrams which London had received from the British Legation at Peiping. These chiefly deal with the results of the informal meeting of certain members of the Diplomatic Corps at Peiping on October 5th. Inasmuch as our Legation in Peiping is undoubtedly informing the Department direct and as I noted that these telegrams have been repeated from London to the British Ambassador in Washington, it does not seem necessary to me to refer to them here. I mention them chiefly to indicate the information at the disposal of Drummond.

Four. Drummond then reviewed and expressed his views on the entire situation at some length. He expressed himself as distinctly alarmed at the turn the matter

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

3- #163, from Geneva, October 8, 1931

matter has taken within the last day or two, fearing that the tide of public opinion in China against the Japanese and rumored action being taken by the Japanese with a view to protecting their nationals in various parts of China, might lead to war. He added that the Chinese and Japanese officials here were expressing the same fears and were extremely anxious (END GREEN)

Five. Drummond then showed me a memorandum of his conversation with Sze in which Sze displayed grave concern over the possibilities envisaged in the foregoing and in which Drummond stated that, in his opinion, "everything depended on the Chinese exercising self restraint for the next ten days". Sze promised to urge this on Nanking although the question as to whether Nanking can control the situation is evidently problematical. Drummond feels that the action of the interested powers might well take the form of such advice to the Chinese Government at the present time.

Six. Drummond then showed me a telegram which he had sent to London which is in effect his suggestions as to British policy. The gist of his telegram is as follows:

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clayton S. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

4- #163, from Geneva, October 8,
1931

follows:

(a) The powers can legitimately base individual action in sending officials to Manchuria on the statement of the Japanese representative to the Council on September 30 (?) paragraph nine of the Council's resolution which was accepted by the Japanese (Consulate's 150, October 1, 9 a.m.). Japan could hardly object if representatives reported to their own governments (which should in turn transmit the information urgently to Geneva). But in view of American ^{President} (?) it is advisable first to obtain Japanese consent.

(b) While it might be desirable to postpone Council meeting to await the receipt of better information such a postponement might inflame Chinese opinion. He expects to advise the President of the Council on this point on October 10th.

Seven. Incidentally, in his discussion of the question Drummond made clear that in his view the Japanese action in Manchuria was long planned and was taken by the Japanese military party who thought they perceived a favorable opportunity for this in view of the preoccupation of

0819
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 4, 1976

MAM

5- #163, from Geneva, October 8,
1931

preoccupation of the powers with other questions, but
that the Japanese are now alarmed at the international
concern which has been shown and are doing what they
can to settle the matter.

GILBERT

CSB

0820

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons Jr NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

October 9, 1931.

OCT 9 31

2P

793.94

AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

70

Your 163, October 8, 9 a.m.

2014

Inform Drummond that I trust that he intends to
advise calling the meeting of the Council.

Stimson

793.94/2014

OR
Oct. 9, 1931. 35
VH

RSM
FE: RSM: EJJ
FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Geneva

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated October 7, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 1:22 p.m.

Division of

EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 9 - 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

158, October 7, 1931

Department's telegram number 63 October (#)

The following is based on a conversation with

Drummond last evening. (Sir Eric has been out of town for a day or two returning yesterday)

One. Sir Eric stated that his evaluation of the situation in Manchuria is still very difficult as his information is as yet almost entirely based on Chinese and Japanese sources and is in consequence most conflicting. All that he has which he feels to be of sufficient interest to send you at present is the following from Dr. Reichmann (Director of the Health Section of the League) who is in Nanking. (This will be sent as part of section two of this telegram)

Two. With respect to the U. S. S. R.

Sir Eric stated that from the inferences he has been

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OCT 10 1931

700.94/2015

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

2-158, October 7, 1931 from Geneva
 9 a.m.

able to draw from semi-official information they are playing more or less a double game -- on the one hand telling the Chinese that they are their closest friends with perhaps insinuations of support and on the other hand telling the Japanese that they will stand completely aside in the dispute. He has no first hand knowledge of Soviet action either diplomatic or military.

Three. On account of the general lack of information Sir Eric is highly gratified to learn that there have been present in Manchuria the officials from the offices of our Military Attaches in Peiping and Tokyo and of our more recent action envisaged in the instructions which have been sent to our Consul General at Harbin and to our Embassy at Tokyo respecting a tour of observation in South Manchuria.

Four. He feels that while, for the present at least, the Japanese objections to a "neutral commission" might for reasons of policy be sustained, nevertheless, all interested powers should go as far as possible in obtaining, and in mutually exchanging information. To this end he has been urging the British, French, Italians and Germans to take steps in this direction and has suggested that the obtaining of information might appropriately be worked

out by

0823

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

3-158, October 7, 1931, from Geneva
9 a.m.

out by informal arrangements between the diplomatic representatives of the powers in China with the view to their taking not (repeat not) "common" but "similar" action. I discussed with Sir Eric that this would perhaps serve the useful purpose of creating Peiping and Nanking as central points for the transmission of well defined and relatively reliable information to Geneva, Washington and to the capitals of other powers; that it would serve to obviate the dissemination of rumors and of biased opinion; and that it would perhaps form a basis for a common understanding which could lead when desired to coordinated action. We concluded, however, in an afterthought, that to secure common concurrence for the despatching of important news might cause undesirable delays and that perhaps an agreement only to exchange information would be more practical. It would, I think, be helpful if you could state your reactions to some such plan either in general or in detail and also whether you are prepared to take any steps along these lines.

Five. As an element of the foregoing he has gained the impression that the French are quite willing to send Military Attaches to Manchuria but that they do not wish

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

4-158, October 7, 1931, from Geneva
9 a.m.

not wish to act alone. He has noted the recent pro-Japanese tone of certain sections of the French press and has little doubt but that they are subsidized by the Japanese. He feels, however, that he can fully rely on the French Foreign Office. With respect to the British he learns that the British officer at Mukden (see the Consulate's 151, October 1, 10 a.m.) is a Major Thornhill and that he has sent in a report to the British Foreign Office "with the approval of his French and Spanish colleagues" although he does not understand the meaning of the latter phrase. Sir Eric is taking steps to obtain this report or excerpts therefrom which he has asked should be made available to you through him. He feels this may be a better procedure than to have London transmit it direct to Washington although London of course will take the final decision in this matter. With respect to Germany and Italy they have said they would be "helpful" but he yet knows of no definite action on their part. With respect to Spain he believes that they are doing "something" through one of their Consuls General in

China

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

5-158, October 7, 1931, from Geneva
9 a.m.

China but he is not at all clear what it is. He felt that for reasons of policy the Spanish might be encouraged to participate. What they have done so far is doubtless at the instigation of Leroux who has shown great interest; and in view of Leroux's position as President of the Council Spanish cooperation would be helpful as a matter of prestige. It is evident that Madariaga is responsible for much of Leroux's policy in this. Section two follows.

GILBERT

CSB

RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 5:40 p. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

159, October 7, 11 a. m.

(PART TWO OF MESSAGE).

Department's 63, October 5th.

Sir Eric asks that the Secretary regard this information for his personal use inasmuch as no one outside of the Secretariat is aware that he is in communication with Dr. Reichmann on this subject.

One. Reliance of the League and unity of action. The Chinese Government are putting themselves entirely in the hands of the League and issuing strict orders to avoid making any resistance, or giving rise to incidents, and to watch over the safety of Japanese lives and property. There are no local negotiations and the Government is handling the whole situation. Under the pressure of events the Canton Government are making moves to become reconciled to Nanking. Marshal Chiang Hsu Liang has refused

082

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Long NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #159, from Geneva, Oct. 7, 1931,
11 a. m.

refused repeated attempts at direct negotiations and insisted upon a settlement under the covenant after withdrawal.

The Japanese are reported as trying to terrorize the Manchurian authorities and as insisting upon direct negotiations. According to continued Japanese press statements from Tokyo and Shanghai Japan will not consent to the interference of the League or the Kellogg signatories in this matter and semi-official statements announce that withdrawal must be conditional upon a satisfactory outcome of negotiations.

Two. Attitude of Soviet Russia.

The Soviet Government is believed at Nanking to be definitely anti-Japanese on this issue and is said to have assured the Government of its friendliness.

Three. Developments of situation.

The policy of offering no resistance and of protecting Japanese lives and property will be imposing a great strain upon the country and Chinese navy

unless

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter

August 10, 1972

By Charles S. Lyman Jr.

NARS, Date

June 1, 1976

REP

3- #159, from Geneva, Oct. 7, 1931,
11 a. m.

unless Japanese troops quickly withdraw from the railway zone. What is feared is that there may be incidents leading to the landing of Japanese marines in the Chinese city of Shanghai and even the navy yards of Nanking which the government believe is actually contemplated and which would be resisted leading to the outbreak of war. If this pass was reached the government is in such a critical position already that it might fall and the Communists come into power by means of a popular rising. Already a Soviet alliance is openly advocated and is being seriously considered by leading members of the Nanking Government and of the entourage of their northern ally several of whom are preparing to turn Communist.

Four. Information from the spot.

Capital importance is being attached by the Chinese Government and public opinion to getting neutral information from Mukden and every effort is being made by the government to get the United States and the members of the Council represented at Pe^{ip}ing to organize such a service.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

4- #159, from Geneva, October 7, 1931,
11 a. m.

service.

I gain the impression from Sir Eric's manner in discussing this with me and from my personal knowledge of Dr. Reichmann's extreme pro-Chinese leanings that his opinion may be regarded as altogether Chinese inspired.

I understand that Lionel Curtis is associated with Reichmann in Nanking.

(PART THREE FOLLOWS).

GILBERT

HPD

0836
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM GENEVA

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 8:50 a. m. 8th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

160, October 7, 1 p. m.

(PART THREE OF MESSAGE).

^{792.94/1458}
Department's No. 63, October 3, 5 p. m.

One. With respect to the possible meeting of the Council on October 14, Sir Eric stated that if things took a favorable turn it might not be necessary but that present indications did not allow of a definite forecast. He said that he hoped that the Council might, if held, be made stronger by the presence of a larger number of foreign ministers than was the case at the end of the regular session when the Sino-Japanese case came up (see Consulate's 141, September 26, 9 a. m. Paragraph four). He believes that in any event Briand is quite ready to come.

Two. With respect to Council policy in this matter he expanded on one point (see three of Council's resolution, Consulate's 150, October 1, 9 a. m.). The Council has all along

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #160, from Geneva, Part three,
October 7, 1931, 1 p. m.

along insisted on the use of the term "withdrawal of troops within the railway zone" or some similar phrase, while the Chinese have employed and have endeavored to have adopted the term "reestablishment of the status quo ante" or something of the same purport. He said that Sze had urged on him the use of the expression of "status quo ante" and that he had countered by suggesting the term "in accordance with treaty stipulations". This caused Sze to retreat from his demand inasmuch as China, I understand, takes the position that she does not recognize the 'validity' of the treaties and in particular because I also (*), under those instruments Japan is entitled to a larger number of troops and to the occupation of more points than Sze envisages in the "status quo ante".

Three. In connection with the foregoing I wish to add that Sze came to see me yesterday. He first made some statements about the position of forces in Manchuria, et cetera, which were chiefly repetitious
of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

3- #160, from Geneva, Part Three,
 October 7, 1931, 1 p. m.

of previous Chinese assertions. He then took occasion to say that Chinese policy was to demand in turn that three successive steps be taken.

"A", the reestablishment of the status quo ante;

"B", reparations for damages;

"C", an examination of causes of difficulty in the general Manchurian situation with a view to their settlement.

Four. With respect to Chinese policy in general, Sir Eric concurred in the opinion expressed in the two final paragraphs of the Consulate's 150, October 1, 9 a. m., and stated that, although he was only giving his own views, he believed that if success were achieved by bringing about the Japanese withdrawal to within the railway zone the League would endeavor to follow its customary course of having the two parties agree to the procedure for adjusting the other outstanding questions by direct negotiations between themselves. From the attitude of the Chinese they might make this difficult but he felt it to be
 desirable

083

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP.

4- #160, from Geneva, Part Three,
Oct. 7, 1931, 1 p.m.

desirable because otherwise there would be a danger that the Chinese would thereafter bring before the League every small question or would appeal to the League whenever a hitch occurred. If the Chinese persist in their endeavor to keep this matter on the ^{national} international plane he naturally is not clear as to what might develop.

Five. With reference to the opinion expressed in the Consulate's 141, September 26, 9 a. m., paragraph seven, Sir Eric expressed concurrence and agreed that should Japan prove recalcitrant in the execution of the program so far accepted, an extremely difficult situation would arise. He concurred that in view of the present world situation pressure in the form of economic sanctions would be quite out of the question but a form of pressure which had occurred to him as possible, if worse came to worst, was for the leading powers to withdraw their chiefs of mission from Tokio. Consequently, in his opinion, that would prove to be a form of pressure which the Japanese would find most difficult to resist.

(PART FOUR FOLLOWS).

GILBERT

HPD (*) Apparent Omission
CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be **FROM**
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 1:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

161, October 7, 3 p. m.

(PART FOUR OF MESSAGE).

Department's 64, October 5, 3 p. m.

One. In my talk with Sir Eric I could see that he was greatly cheered by the evidence of your understanding and cooperation in the difficult problem in Manchuria. He perceives clearly the important relationship of this question to the whole world situation in the political and economic spheres and in particular in its relationship to the problem of disarmament. He feels strongly that no steps should be omitted at this juncture and that no word should be left unsaid which would assist in achieving a speedy adjustment.

Two. He is most happy that you are in general concurrence with the policy which the Council of the League has followed in this matter and is particularly grateful for your message showing such complete understanding of the

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

Part four,
2- #161, from Geneva, /Oct. 7, 1931,
3 p. m.

the League's attitude past, present and future, in this dispute. He is convinced that the cooperation shown in the present case may be of the utmost value for assuring world peace in the future.

Three. With respect to the matter of the exchange of information, he notes that you will transmit what you may be able to make available to him. He wishes me to say that he will be glad to reciprocate.

Four. In connection with this, however, certain questions arise in his mind on which he would like to reach an understanding with you. From the nature of his position it is incumbent upon ^{him to act} ~~(?) (?)~~ for the ^{8:20 p.m.} ¹⁰⁻²⁰⁻³¹ interest of all League states. As it is the Council of the League before which this question comes at present he has undertaken to make known to all members of the Council such information as he may receive from the Chinese or the Japanese or from any Council member (see Council resolution, paragraphs seven and nine Consulate's 150, October 1, 9 a. m.). Such information is commonly "circulated" by him to all members of the Council. Thus far all messages from Washing^{ton} embodying information or embodying expressions of opinion (except your

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REF

3 - #161, from Geneva, Part four,
 Oct. 7, 1931, 3 p. m.

your formal messages to the President of the Council, see Consulate's 123, September 23, 4 p. m. and 126, September 24, 4 p. m.) have been with the understanding that they were for his sole information. In private meetings of the Council which have taken place and in meetings of the "committee" of five he has often been asked what the policy or the views of the United States were since it is generally known that he has received communications from Washington. In response to such requests he has up to the present time given an oral summary of information received from you. He feels however that such a procedure has many unsatisfactory elements. In the first place such a resume may carry implications of his own interpretation which he is of course anxious to avoid. Moreover, as it is relatively impossible to keep anything of that sort strictly confidential, there is always the danger of its ^{ch} reaching the press and of your feeling perhaps that he has not entirely respected your confidence. Therefore, although he is quite willing to continue this system, any suggestions from you which would allow him to make

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

4- #161, from Geneva, Part four,
Oct. 7, 1931, 3 p. m.

to make written communications to the members of the Council would be very welcome and would perhaps help forward the common action which is frankly sought.

Five. In view of the foregoing, Sir Eric suggests that if you see your way clear you designate in such communications as you may make to him what he may textually make known to the Council or to Council members and what you are sending him for his more personal information.

Six. The foregoing refers chiefly to information respecting the situation in Manchuria as envisaged in the latter part of your telegram referred to. There is also the question of expressions of policy either as to the attitude of the United States toward the League in this matter particularly respecting the course which the Council has pursued as for example ^{made known in your} ~~(?)~~ ~~(?)~~ same telegram. He holds such expressions on your part as to the present time solely for him. He would, however, appreciate your opinion on the use which might properly be made of them and in

244.
10-20-31

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

5- #161, from Geneva, Part four,
Oct. 7, 1931, 3 p. m.

and in this connection asks that you take into considera-
tion the good effect in quieting world anxiety and also the
restraining effect on the Japanese could you or he be ^{able to} ~~be~~ *D.W.*
make it known that similar views exist between the United *10-20-71*
States and the League on certain of the more vital
aspects of the question.

(END OF MESSAGE).

GILBERT

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Geneva

FROM

Undated

Rec'd October 9, 1931
5:06 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.


VERY URGENT.

Consulate's telegrams numbers 158, 159, 160, 161,
are all parts of the same message. The sections were
given separate numbers for convenience in future
references.

GILBERT

HPD

FE
WE



FW 793.94/2015

793.94/2015

0840

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
or
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Gray

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

October 9, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (Switzerland). 931

2015-18

69 Your 158 to 162 are receiving attention.

Stinson
SKE

793.94 / 2015

793.94/2015

FE: SKE/ZMF

OR
Oct. 9, 1931.
WA

Enciphered by *SKE*

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1925 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
or
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

October 9, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

Your 158, October 7, 9 a.m., (SECTION ONE), with special reference to paragraph four.

You may inform Drummond that I agree with his conclusion that an attempt to establish a central clearing house for the despatching of important news might cause undesirable delays. Events appear to be moving much too rapidly for such procedure. In any case, the American Government could not conveniently be a party to such an arrangement. You may assure Drummond that, as stated in my previous message (No. 64, October 5, 2 p.m.), I shall be glad to send him pertinent information from our observers which we may be able to make available to him. We greatly appreciate the information he is sending us and trust that he will continue to send us what he can. I shall hope to communicate with him again through you very soon.

793.94/2015

FE:RSM:EJL

FE

Stinson

Oct. 9, 1931

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

0842

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington.

October 10, 1931.

67 PM
OCT 20 31

793.94/2015
American Consul,

Geneva, Switzerland.

Urgent. Confidential
78. Your 160, October 7, 1 p. m. /2015-
Inform Drummond as follows:

One. Reports on China-Japan situation
warrant grave concern. I have again urged on both
Governments that the two countries must exercise great
self-restraint and endeavor to live up to their commit-
ments as expressed in the Resolution of the Council
of September 30.

Two. I assume that the Council of the
League will meet not later than October 14 and that
it will turn its attention immediately to the China-
Japan situation.

Three. As I see the situation, each of
the disputants has a good many and constantly increasing
grounds for irritation at and complaint against the
other. They unquestionably ought to negotiate a settle-
ment

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-128

793.94/2015

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 19761-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
ORCharge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

American Consul, Geneva, page 2.

ment, but as the situation is developing they are proceeding in the direction of warlike measures rather than ~~that~~ of peaceful measures. The question arises whether it has not become necessary formally to remind the disputants of their obligations under the Treaty for Renunciation of War. As the League has from the beginning been occupied with this situation, I have felt that invocation of the Pact should be held in reserve, but am inclined now to believe that the unfortunate events of the last few days seem to make the necessity of resort to the Pact imminent. I should welcome the expression of Drummond's views as to how, in the event that such action becomes necessary, attention may most effectively and promptly be called to the obligations of this treaty. If this question should come up at the coming meeting of the Council, you are authorized, if invited, to participate in the discussion thereon.

For

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

American Consul, Geneva, page 3.

For the time being all the above should be
regarded by Drummond as confidential.

Stinson
all

DISTRIBUTED


S.K.H.
H.L.S.
U WRC/AB

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



October 8, 1931.

RECEIVED
OCT 8 - 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Walter
793.94/2015

Mr. Secretary:

At Geneva, Mr. Gilbert and Sir Eric Drummond have been talking over the question of the use to be made of observers. As reported on page 3 hereunder, they have discussed the possibility of having a central point as a sort of exchange and clearing house for information, and Gilbert states that he thinks it would be helpful "if you could state your reactions to some such plan and also whether you are prepared to take any steps along these lines".

FE is of the view, in the light of its understanding of your views with regard to the use of our observers and with regard to the attitude of the Japanese Government, that it would not be advisable for us to indicate willingness on our part to participate in an exchange and clearing house procedure.

Although the incoming telegram is not yet complete, FE is drafting with regard to the point under reference.

Sent

SKH
100-288000

793.94/2015

Quinn's 158 Oct. 7, 9 a.m.

793.94/2015

SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED


Peiping via N. R. **FE**

Dated October 8, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 10:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.



727, October 8, 1 p.m.

Following from Hanson and Salisbury at Changchun

"October 6, 2 p.m.

One. There was fighting between Chinese and Japanese at Nanling, three miles south of Changchun, at Kuanchengtz, three kilometres north east Changchun, and at the main station of the Kirin Changchun Railway at Changchun.

Two. Local Japanese officials have informed us that they learned of the clash between Chinese and Japanese soldiers at Mukden at 12:15 a.m. on September 19th. The Japanese military commander at Changchun sent two hundred of his troops at 3 a.m. toward the barracks at Nanling where there were about 3500 Chinese soldiers. The Japanese attacked the barracks at about 5 a.m. Later they were reenforced by 200 South Manchuria railway guards.

(END PART ONE)

JOHNSON

RR

CSB

793.94/2016

FILED
OCT 14 1931

0847
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 8, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 10:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

727, October 8, 1 p.m. (PART TWO)

brought from Kungchuling a few miles south of Changchun. Fighting ceased early in the afternoon after most of the Chinese soldiers had fled. The Japanese casualties amounted to 43 killed and 52 wounded. The Chinese casualties were 180 dead, number of wounded unknown. The Japanese commenced the fighting by delivering a surprise attack. The Japanese officials justified the action on the grounds that they were afraid that the Chinese soldiers at Nanling, where there were 36 field pieces, upon learning in regard to the Mukden incident, would shell the Japanese settlement at Changchun, and the Japanese attacked to forestall such an attempt. We believe possible Chinese soldiers in question had no intention of shelling nor the audacity to shell the Japanese settlement, so that the Japanese Government were not justified in making the attack unless for military reasons.

L

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

2-727, from Peiping, October 8, 1931
1 p.m.

reasons. The Japanese troops withdrew from Nanling
on the 20th. According to the Japanese military,
the next day, Chinese

(END PART TWO)

JOHNSON

JHR

CSB

0849

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Tamm NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM GRAY
Peiping via N. R.
Dated October 8, 1931
Rec'd 10:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

727, October 8, 1 p. m. (PART THREE).
started to steal what articles were left behind in the
partially ruined barracks and a guard of 25 Japanese
soldiers was sent to protect the property. The guard
is still located there.

Three. It is evident that the Japanese do not
intend for the time being to occupy these much ruined
barracks. The Japanese military do not permit Chinese
or Russians to visit the barracks but the Japanese
civilians and schoolboys are daily making excursions
to the "battlefield".

Four. The same time the Japanese military command
at Changchun sent the Japanese detachment toward Nanling,
3 a. m. on September 19, it ordered 300 Japanese troops
from

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #727, from Peiping, Oct. 8, 1931,
1 p. m.

from Changchun to attack the Chinese barracks at Kuanchengtze, the southern terminal of the Chinese Eastern Railway. These barracks contained about five or six hundred Chinese regular troops, a few village police and some Chinese Eastern Railway. (END PART THREE).

JOHNSON

CSB

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 10:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

727, October 8, 1 p. m. (PART FOUR).

Chinese police. The village and railway police surrendered as soon as the attack, which was concentrated on the building where the regular soldiers slept, was made in the dark by the Japanese. The Chinese soldiers resisted until eleven a. m. when the Japanese put into action a three inch gun which fired four or five shots causing the Chinese to surrender. The Japanese casualties were 23 killed and 33 wounded. Chinese reports indicate that about 35 Chinese were killed.

Five. The Japanese authorities very vaguely expressed to us the fear that the troops in these barracks might make an attack on the Japanese forces. We believe that the attack on these regular soldiers, whose duty it was to guard the Chinese Eastern Railway, the village

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Syme Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #727, from Peiping, (Part Four)
Oct. 8, 1931, 1 pm

the village police, whose duty it was to safeguard
Chinese and Russian residents of Kuanchengtze,
(END PART FOUR).

JOHNSON

RR

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 3 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

727, October 8, 1 p.m. (PART FIVE)

and the railway police whose duty it was to guard the stations of the railway, was unjustifiable from the standpoint of international law. These barracks, now empty and partially destroyed, are still under control of Japanese soldiers, 20 of whom are stationed in the headquarters formerly occupied by the Chinese Eastern Railway police.

Six. The Japanese have given no evidence that they intend to withdraw their troops at Kuanchengtze, whose presence is not needed to protect any Japanese lives or property, which are non-existent here and whose presence most likely acts as an irritant to Soviet Russia. Chinese Railway police could afford the necessary protection to Chinese Eastern Railway property but the Japanese military refuse to allow Chinese Railway police on duty at Kuanchengtze station to carry (END PART FIVE)

JOHNSON

JHR

0854

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED SHIPING VIA NR

Dated October 8, 1931

FROM Rec'd 3:05 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

727, October 8, 1 p.m. (PART SIX)

weapons of any sort. In the morning of October 6th about 200 young Japanese employees of the South Manchurian Railway in military formation, apparently volunteers accompanied by regular Japanese army officers marched through the village of Kuanchengtze in the direction of station Ichienpo, 9 kilometres north from Kuanchengtze on the Chinese Eastern Railway. They carried spades and sticks only. The reason for this march could not be learned locally.

Seven. At 5 a.m. on September 30th Japanese troops burned the barracks of the Railway guards of the Kirin Chinese Railway powerhouse, main station of this railway at Changohun, during the operations to secure control of this Railway's telegraph and telephone lines to facilitate the advance of Japanese troops toward Kirin City.

Eight. The Japanese and Chinese officials

(END PART SIX)

JOHNSON

KLP

085

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

GRAY

Peiping, via N. R.

FROM

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 7:45 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

727, October 8, 1 p. m. (SECTION SEVEN).

interviewed by us stated that the three actions mentioned above, were started by the Japanese military.

No. 9. The Changchun Chief of Police informed us that the Japanese have shown no evidence that they intend soon to abandon the airplane landing field constructed by them outside the South Manchuria Railway zone since the clash.

No. 10. As far as Changchun is concerned, the Japanese have not inaugurated a civil administration. However the Japanese gendarmes are exercising control over the Changchun city police and is flying the Japanese flag over the headquarters police station in the native city. Japanese military are exercising control over the Chinese telephone and telegraph stations in the native city. This military control is causing

0856
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

#727, October 8, 1 p. m., (SECTION SEVEN) from Peiping

-2-

is causing much loss to merchants of all nationalities,
but the Japanese military show no inclination to
relinquish this control. They do not interfere otherwise
with the civil administration city nor with the (END
SECTION SEVEN).

JOHNSON

FW

085

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

GRAY

FROM

Peiping, via N. R.

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 5:25 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

727, October 8, 1 p. m., (SECTION EIGHT).

Chinese passport officials.

No. 11. The thinking classes of Chinese at Changchun feel against the Japanese while the larger unthinking masses are indifferent in regard to the recent events except as they affect them financially. It has been stated that the most of the Chinese population fears the Japanese military.

No. 12. The withdrawal of Japanese troops from Nanling, Kuanchengtze, the airplanes passing over and telephone and telegraph offices in the native city and of Japanese gendarmes from supervision over the Chinese police would not result in injury to Japanese lives or property or danger from banditry.

No. 13. According to the Chinese Chief of Police the Japanese military have not damaged the Chinese

radio

0858

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

#727, October 8, 1 p. m., from Peiping (SECTION EIGHT).

-2-

radio station at Changchun but have dismantled the principal parts of its machinery.

No. 14. The failure of the ^{local}~~large sized~~ Japanese military to withdraw their troops from the places above mentioned would indicate a lack of desire to return to the status quo ante. (END SECTION EIGHT).

JOHNSON

FW

0859
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charmie S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

GRAY

FROM Peiping, via N. R.
Dated October 8, 1931
Rec'd 7:25 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

727, October 8, 1 p. m. (PART NINE).

No. 15. We are planning to leave Changchun
for Kirin 8:30 a. m. October 7th."

Repeat to Tokyo. Repeat to Department.
(END MESSAGE).

JOHNSON

FW

0860

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Chaim S. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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O.N.I. AND M.F.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FE

REP

FROM


GREEN

Tokio

Dated October 9, 1931

Rec'd 7:24 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,



file
F.G.C.

179, October 9, 5 p.m.

The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs told me today that owing to continued boycotting of Japanese goods and people it was becoming extremely difficult for Japanese to remain in China. Chinese merchants refuse under any circumstances to do any business whatever with Japanese individuals and banks refuse to cash checks made out to Japanese. In addition the Japanese have been subjected to personal abuse and even violence on a scale which indicates a deliberate plan.

The Japanese Government he said has therefore addressed a note to the Nanking Government asking that steps be taken to check this movement and prevent aggravation of the present situation. It informed the Nanking Government that the latter will be held responsible for whatever may be the consequence of

failure

FILED
OCT 15 1931

730.64/1017

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #179, from Tokio, Oct. 9, 1931,
5 p. m.

failure to suppress the anti-Japanese movement and to afford adequate protection to the lives and property of Japanese subjects in China. The Vice Minister told me further that two cruisers the TATSUTA and the TENRYU, were being despatched to the Yangtze. I told him that according to a report which has reached me the Chinese believed that Nanking and perhaps other places would be attacked. He said that there was no intention on the part of Japan to occupy any territory; that their forces in the Yangtze region were less than those of the British or the Americans and that no forces would be landed from the Japanese ships until after consultation with the Japanese Consul General in Shanghai.

I do not know what the Japanese intend to do about the boycotting and other matters they complain of. They are somewhat excited and exasperated but hope that they can get the Nanking Government to do something about them. It is possible that they may make reprisals of some sort in case the Nanking Government refuses.

Repeated to Peiping.

NEVILLE

RR
HPD

086
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zgonc NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

Peiping

Dated October 9, 1931

Rec'd 4:26 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

734, October 9, 10 a.m.

Your 362, October 5, 3 p.m. /1994A


Following from Consul General at Nanking, October 8, 1 p.m.

"Soong is in Shanghai but I delivered Department's message orally and informally to Lee. He appeared somewhat reassured and said he would inform the special Diplomatic Commission whose members have authority and responsibility in this matter and I emphasized confidential character of the message. Popular feeling against Japan is growing still more intense".

JOHNSON

KLP

HPD



086

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I. 2.

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY
Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 9, 1931

FROM Rec'd 6:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.



file
e.g.c.

733, October 9, 9 a.m.

From Consul General at Mukden.

"October 8, 8 p.m.

Ten Japanese airships bombarded Chinchow this noon, Japanese Commander-in-Chief General Hsu despatched scout planes to Chinchow this afternoon which dropped leaflet containing statement by him as Commander which is virtual ultimatum to Chinchow Government. He states that Chinchow Government is creation of Chang Hsueh Liang which is conducting intrigues in Manchuria inimical to Japanese forces; that military ^{again} operation/was necessary; and that it was not directed against Chinese civilians."

JOYERSON

HPD

793.94/2019

FILED

OCT 14 1931

0864

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976




PM RECD

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Riga, Latvia,

September 25, 1931.

OCT 8 31



CONFIDENTIAL

793.94

793.94/2020

No. 8093

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK		Yes	No
To the Field	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
In U. S. A.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the Soviet press resumed the discussion of the Japanese-Chinese conflict on September 21.*

Before entering into an examination of its comment, I draw attention to the return of the
President

*See the Legation's despatch No. 8064, of September 18, 1931.

DEC 3 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

-2-

President of the Revolutionary Military Soviet, K.E. Voroshilov, to Moscow on September 19.* Voroshilov had been in the Far East and in the Ural territory, and was at Magnitogorsk when the conflict burst. He proceeded to Chelyabinsk, in completion of his itinerary as planned, before returning to the Capital. While on this journey Voroshilov made speeches on military preparedness and inspected military units, but nothing indicated that the journey was in any wise connected with the tension in Japanese-Chinese relations.

- The renewed attention to Japanese-Chinese affairs was simultaneous in the news and editorial columns of all the leading newspapers. Inasmuch as the tone and language were very similar, only selective extracts are given in some cases. Besides its editorial remarks, the PRAVDA in a news headline stated that "the United States sanctions the occupation of Mukden!" The reference was to the news telegram in regard to an alleged announcement from Washington that the State Department did not regard the events in Manchuria as touching the Kellogg pact. The IZVESTIA left the matter to a special writer, as did the LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA and the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. The second named foresaw a prolonged
- 1/
 - 2/
 - 3/
 - 4/

* Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 260, of September 20, 1931.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-3-

a prolonged period of conflict and tension, and the last predicted that the Mukden authorities probably would be forced to yield to all the Japanese demands. ZA INDUSTRIALIZATSIU sought the explanation of the conflict not only in a desire on the part of Japan to extend its railways and to prevent them from being paralleled by Chinese lines, financed by other countries, and particularly from being blanketed by Chinese railways in the direction of Eastern Mongolia, but also in the economic depression and political unrest in Japan. Returning to the subject on September 22, the PRAVDA surmised that Harbin also would be occupied by the Japanese forces, although a careful inspection of the news telegrams discloses nothing to support this suggestion.

The enclosures to this despatch indicate that the Soviet press was allowed within definite limits to direct the attention of its readers to the gravity of the events that are taking place in Manchuria, but not to say anything to indicate the attitude of the Soviet Government to these events. It is further to be noted that the official newspaper, among others, has not spoken in its own name. Whether the Soviet Government was surprised by the Japanese action remains to be disclosed.

Respectfully

0867

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence L. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-4-

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

David B. Macgowan
David B. Macgowan,
First Secretary of Legation.

(In quintuplicate).

Enclosures:

1. Japanese Imperialism Active.
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 261, September 21, 1931).
2. The Japanese Intervention in Manchuria.
(Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 261, September 21, 1931).
3. Japanese Imperialism Attacks.
(LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, No. 261, September 21, 1931).
4. The Japanese Offensive in Manchuria.
(Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, No. 254, September 21, 1931).
5. The Explosion in the Far East.
(Moscow ZA INDUSTRIALIZATSIU, No. 261, September 21, 1931).
6. Manchuria is only the Beginning.
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 262, September 22, 1931)

Copy to E.I.C., Paris.
Copy to E.I.C., Paris, for Peiping.
Copy for Amconsulate, Harbin, via Dept.

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

ENCLOSURE NO. 1 TO DESPATCH NO. 8093 OF SEP 25 1931
 FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
 No. 261,
 September 21, 1931.

JAPANESE IMPERIALISM ACTIVE.

(Translation of leading editorial.)

Japanese troops have seized Mukden, have occupied the principal points along the Southern Manchurian Railway, and practically hold in captivity the Mukden political authorities, with the exception of the satrap of the three eastern provinces, Chang Hsueh-liang, himself, who with his headquarters staff is at present in Peiping. The Japanese authorities have seized the arsenal, all the more important Chinese banks in Mukden, and have occupied with their troops all the more important strategical points in Southern Manchuria. All this is going on under the pretext that the Chinese troops tried to destroy a section of the Southern Manchurian Railway.

The Japanese troops were brought into action without notifying of this the so-called Chinese central Government in Nanking, and without any warning to the Mukden authorities. Chang Hsueh-liang has ordered his forces not to show any resistance. The Chinese military rulers have shown their impotence in the face of the Japanese military forces.

The

-2-

The activity of Japanese imperialism in Southern Manchuria did not come unexpected. Preparations for it had been made for several years past. What Japanese imperialism is striving for in Manchuria is to strengthen its old positions, and to extend its economic and political sway. Japanese imperialism wants to obtain concessions for the construction of a whole number of new railways. It wants Chinese capital, which is a menace to the monopoly of the Southern Manchurian Railway, to abandon its railway and harbor development schemes. Japanese capitalism wants to have the complete control over the financial and the currency system of Manchuria. The Japanese imperialists do not make a secret of their desire to extend their sphere of influence to Mongolia. The fact of Mukden recognizing the Nanking Government as the central government has evoked sharp protests on the part of the Japanese imperialists. They perceived in that recognition an attempt on the part of Mukden, using Nanking as a screen, to lessen its own dependence on Japan.

Such facts as the Mukden Government having granted gold-mining concessions to English capitalists, a concession for the construction of a sea port at Hulundai to Dutch capitalists, etc., have intensified the aggressive tendencies in the midst of the Japanese imperialists.

For the military occupation of a whole number of towns in Manchuria, the soil had been prepared by the artificially provoked clashes between the Korean settlers and the Chinese authorities in Manchuria, by the interference

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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ference of the Japanese police in these conflicts, by the anti-Chinese pogroms in Chosen, the murder of the captain of the Japanese General Staff, Nakamura, in the hills of Inner Mongolia, and by the kindling of the generals' war in northern China. At the same time the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Canton Government, that agent of American imperialism, was accorded a friendly reception in Tokyo, although of not quite an official nature. The appointment of the ex-minister for war, Ugaki, to the post of Governor-General of Chosen, the increase of the Japanese garrisons in Chosen by one division, and the appointment of the well-known Japanese diplomat, Uchida, to the post of chairman of the board of the Southern Manchurian Railway, were also constituent parts of the plan which is now being carried into effect by Japanese imperialism.

The Japanese troops have occupied the capital of Manchuria, Mukden. In Geneva a session of the League of Nations is taking place. Japan is a member of the League of Nations. China too is a member of the League of Nations, and the representative of China was even admitted to the Council of the League of Nations. However, as might have been expected, the League of Nations hit on nothing else but to note "with satisfaction" the statement made by Yosizawa, the representative of Japan. Once more the proof was forthcoming that the League of Nations is but a tool for imperialistic oppression and violence.

Japan

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Japan is a signatory of the Kellogg Pact. China too has signed the Kellogg Pact. However, the Kellogg Pact could not prevent Japan from taking military action against another signatory of the Kellogg Pact, China. While in Washington (at the Department of State of the United States) it is pointed out that the events in Manchuria give no cause to speak of a violation of the Kellogg Pact. The authors of the famous pact themselves make sport of their own piece of work. The toilers throughout the world have here an object-lesson of what the League of Nations is worth as an "instrument of peace," and of what the Kellogg Pact is worth as a guaranty against news wars.

The military occupation of the more important strategical points in southern Manchuria, and the capture of the capital of the three eastern provinces, Mukden, by Japanese troops is a manifestation of Japanese imperialistic aggressiveness. In Manchuria where these military operations are going on, the interests of the largest imperialistic Powers: the United States, Japan, England, and France, are in conflict with one another. The events in Manchuria are likely to make the question of a possible clash between the imperialistic Powers in the Chinese question crop up full size.

The toilers of China can learn once more what the rule of the generals and the squires' cliques, and the policy of the Kuomintang, are leading to.

The toilers in the U.S.S.R. are watching vigilantly the events that are now taking place in Southern Manchuria.

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

ENCLOSURE NO. 2 TO DESPATCH NO. 8093 OF SEP 25 1931
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow IZVESTIA,
No. 261,
of September 21, 1931.

THE JAPANESE INTERVENTION IN
MANCHURIA.

(Summary.)

Events of the greatest moment are taking place in Manchuria. Japanese military forces have forcibly occupied Chinese cities and ports. The Mukden Government has ceased to function. Its armies have been disarmed, its arsenal occupied. The control of the main banks of Manchuria has passed into Japanese hands.

The official Japanese explanation is that the military occupation of Manchuria was occasioned by attacks by Chinese troops and attempts to destroy the South Manchurian railway. But a series of anterior utterances and measures by the Japanese during several months clearly foreshadowed a military offensive. "Japanese imperialism" was displeased with the Nanking Government, as too subject to American and British influence. It is no secret that Japan had a hand in the formation of the Canton Government, whose foreign minister hastened to Japan to report. "Japanese military circles" viewed the rapprochement between Mukden and Nanking askance, and were bent upon consolidating Japan's position in Manchuria.

Activists

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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Activists were appointed as Director of the South Manchurian railway and Governor of Chosen. In Chosen Chinese and Korean lives were sacrificed to the new policy. Mongolia was not forgotten. Then came the murder of Staff Captain Nakamura.

The cardinal question in Manchuria is that of railway construction, which Japan is determined to control, in order to strengthen its economic and military position and to prevent the extension of competitive lines. There are other matters to regulate.

Chinese expectations of sharp protests at Geneva and Washington have not been satisfied. The suspicion that Japan made good diplomatic preparation for military action is thrown out, but rather faintly; on the other hand the view is propagated that self-interest will impel other Powers to prevent Japan from going too far, and that, therefore, the international situation will become still tenser. The Soviet Union must, therefore, give Japanese-Chinese developments close attention.

(Signed) N. PAKHOMOV.

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

ENCLOSURE NO. 3 TO DESPATCH NO. 8093 OF SEP 25 1931
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA,
No. 261,
of September 21, 1931.

JAPANESE IMPERIALISM ATTACKS.

(Summary.)

The serious events in Manchuria were not unexpected. Everything has pointed for months to Japan's availing itself of the freedom of action given by the depression and crises in America and Europe to strengthen its position in Manchuria and Mongolia. One of its aims was to create a second trunk line, to a port in Chosen on the Japan Sea, and to halt Chinese railway construction in Manchuria. A long period of Japanese-Chinese conflict and tension will follow. Mukden will be obliged to capitulate, and, in the end, Nanking to sanction the arrangement. This will help to mobilize the toiling masses of China for struggle for national emancipation, which can be attained only through "a Soviet revolution."

(Signed) A. KARDOV.

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

ENCLOSURE NO. 4 TO DESPATCH NO. 8085 OF SEP 25 1931
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA,
No. 254,
of September 21, 1931.

THE JAPANESE OFFENSIVE IN MANCHURIA.

(Summary.)

The events that are taking place in Manchuria are of exceptional importance. The Japanese offensive had been in preparation for several months.

Probably, Japan will obtain from the Mukden authorities the full satisfaction of its immediate demands. Secretary Stimson's noteworthy declaration indicates that Japan had felt the way before stepping out. Nevertheless, the strengthening of Japan's position in Manchuria cannot but sharpen the struggle between the "imperialists" for the Chinese market. The toilers of the Soviet Union must be alert, lest there go along with these events all sorts of anti-Soviet provocations.

(Signed) N.

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

ENCLOSURE NO. 5 TO DESPATCH NO. 8893 OF SEP 25 1931
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow ZA INDUSTRIAL-
IZATSIU,
No. 261,
September 21, 1931.

THE EXPLOSION IN THE FAR EAST.

(Translation of leading editorial.)

In the strained atmosphere of the unprecedentedly grave crisis of the world capitalistic economic system, and in the midst of the extremely sharpened conflict of imperialistic interests, an explosion has taken place. Japanese troops, after having thrown back the weak advanced units of Chang Hsueh-liang, have captured Mukden. The military operations continue.

The Japanese official version explains this military action by the alleged fact that "the Chinese troops attempted to demolish a part of the Southern Manchurian railway line." Chang Hsueh-liang, on the other hand asserted that Japan's military action "has for its purpose to provoke incidents that would permit the Japanese to occupy Manchuria." The same explanation was put by Chinese sources on the ultimatums and the feverish activities of the Japanese diplomats and military circles in connection with the murder of the Japanese captain, Nakamura, on Chinese territory.

There is no need to go into the details of the murder of that Japanese officer, the history of which

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 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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has up to the present not yet been made clear. It is evident that the alarming Manchurian events have been caused by more serious and deeper factors. The moving forces of the Japanese aggressiveness must be looked for first of all in the deep economic crisis experienced by Japan as well as by the other capitalistic countries. Japan's principal export article is cotton yarn, going chiefly to China and India, and raw silk, exported to the western countries. The world crisis and the never-ending generals' squabbles have utterly destroyed China's purchasing power. India too is ruined. At the same time, Japan's principal competitor, the English textile industry, continues its stubborn fight for retaining its positions in the narrowed eastern markets. Also the demand for raw silk, which constitutes nearly one half of the Japanese exports, has sharply declined, since luxuries are nowadays not much in demand. All in all, the Japanese exports, which in the early stages of the world crisis showed a certain stability, have fallen 21 per cent. The numbers of the unemployed exceed 1½ million. In agriculture, which before the world crisis was in a state of profound depression, matters have grown still worse. Of late the crisis has begun to shake the financial system. The alarming events in Germany, having caused a general panic, resulted also in a calling-up of the short-term investments placed in Japan, as a result of which the gold reserves of the Bank of Japan have dropped to the lowest figure on record since 1919.

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By Charles E. Ryan NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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As an outcome of the crisis, the aggressiveness of the Japanese imperialists has increased, that is, of the adherents of the so-called continental policy, the policy of expansion on the continent, more especially in Manchuria. That most wealthy region, on the territory of which, two and a half times larger than the territory of Germany, there lives a population of only 23 million, has long ago become the center of the colonizing activities of Japan. The Southern Manchurian railway has become a sponge as it were that absorbs the juices of the whole region. Around that railway has grown up a number of large enterprises of heavy industry and chemical industry, controlled by the Japanese Rockefeller, the Mitsubishi concern. The crisis could not but extend also to Southern Manchuria which latter is closely bound up with the economic life of Japan and China. The income of the railway and of the enterprises has experienced a sharp fall. The Japanese bourgeoisie tries to make good its losses by extending its sphere of influence.

The weakness of economically ruined and disunited China acts as an additional tonic, stimulating Japanese aspirations. The crisis deepened by the unprecedented fall of the price of silver, the unexampled flood in the Yang-tse region, which have ruined entire provinces with a total population of 80 million — all this is still more enhanced by the parasitical and marauding policy of the bourgeois-squire-and-comprador bloc with Chiang Kai-shek at its head. The entire economic, and more especially the agrarian, policy of the Nanking Government further accentuates these

calamities

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By William A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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calamities and devastations. The "rallying of the Chinese territories," so solemnly announced by Chang Kai-shek, has suffered ignominious defeat. The generals' leap-frog game over the backs of the Chinese peasant and workman, is continuing. The Canton Government is in a state of war with the "central" Government in Nanking. The old glib satrap, Yen Hsi-shon, remains in Shensi, in spite of the stern command emanating from Nanking. In other provinces generals, formerly under Feng Yu-hsiang's command, are operating. The Manchurian dictator, Chiang Hsueh-liang, forced to apply to Nanking for aid (so far as the Nanking people are at all able to give any aid) against the Japanese, still pursues a line of policy of his own.

Notwithstanding all the kicks he receives, Chiang Kai-shek continues licking the boots of the imperialists, in order to obtain their assistance against the Chinese red armies, a thousand and one times "definitely destroyed" by him.

The Japanese bourgeoisie, which has reason to desire that expansion abroad should draw the attention of the masses away from the economic crisis, has decided to take advantage of the critical position of China for materializing its own aspirations. What the scope and the range of the operative plans of the Japanese military headquarters are is not known. But be that as it may, the situation which has been brought about in Manchuria is fraught with great danger to the cause of general peace.

The policy of the United States is still insufficiently clear. The Washington Department of State informs that in Japan's aggressiveness it does not perceive an infringement

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By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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infringement of the Kellogg Pact. This creates the impression as if the imperialists were trying to come to an understanding between them in regard to China. But in the way of such an understanding are the sharp internal conflicts of interest between them, which conflicts, in connection with Japan's action, will become ever more aggravated, and prove a menace to the cause of peace, to defend which cause is the principal task of the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R.

The masses of toilers in the U.S.S.R. should with greatest attention watch the development of events on the storm-clouded horizon of the Far East.

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

ENCLOSURE NO. 6 TO DESPATCH NO. 0083 OF SEP 25 1931
 FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
 No. 262,
 September 22, 1931,
 Page 6.
 Editorial comment
 on new reports.

MANCHURIA IS ONLY THE BEGINNING.

(Translation.)

The Japanese intervention in Manchuria extends to the most important points of the "Three Eastern Provinces." All of Southern Manchuria is already occupied. The Japanese troops are moving toward the Peiping-Mukden Railway. Newchwang, Kaipingcheng, Hun-ho, the harbor of Huludao (which must be especially noted, since this port was built to compete with the Japanese port of Dairen), Tzing-chow, Chang-tu, and other places, as well as points situated between Kirin and Korea, have been occupied. Japanese war-ships have made their appearance on the inland rivers of Manchuria.

It is manifest, however, that the Japanese occupation will not confine itself to these places. It is quite likely that the Japanese occupation will extend also to the regions and geographical points situated outside the limits of Southern Manchuria. Rumors about the "dangerous situation" in Harbin, which are spread from Japanese sources, afford grounds for the belief that this point, too, has

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been included within the sphere of Japanese occupation.

The most important operation, however, has been the landing of Japanese troops at Tsing-tao (in the Province of Shantung), which has always been a coveted object to the Japanese militarists, and the landing of Japanese troops at Che-foo and Taku. The hints which were made by the Japanese press about an "intervention on a large scale" are now being outlined more clearly. Japanese imperialism is taking as a pledge for the execution of its demands on China the most important strategic points in the Yellow Sea, and opening for itself a way to Shantung, not to mention at all Manchuria. This is undoubtedly bound to elicit an appropriate response by the ruling spheres of the remaining imperialistic countries having large interests in China.

It is true, thus far the Japanese occupants have been able to act without hindrance from the largest imperialist Powers. The attitude of the latter is not yet clear. The French press, for instance, confines itself to an "objective" recital of events, and does not give expression to its point of view. It is also not clear whether Japanese imperialism has "coordinated" its action in China with England. One section of the London press claims that there are no coordinated actions. Lastly, there is not sufficient clarity in the position of the United States -- the biggest rival of Japan and perhaps the most vitally concerned

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in limiting Japanese expansion in China. There has been, it is true, the declaration of the Secretary of State of the United States saying that the Japanese action does not conflict with the Kellogg Pact; but, as we know, the interests of American imperialism are not bound to coincide with the Kellogg Pact, and therefore the rubber-stamp declaration of the United States does not introduce absolute clarity.

The "great" Powers, whom the Japanese action has, apparently, taken by surprise, are engaged upon the preparation of appropriate measures for snatching some benefits also for themselves.

Special mention should be made of the bankruptcy of the Nanking clique. Back of all the theatrical attempts at organizing a "mass protest" may be seen a complete capitulation to Japanese imperialism and the absolute impotence of Chiang Kai-shek and Company. Precisely the Nanking counter-revolutionary clique, which has drenched in blood the Chinese workmen's quarters and villages, which is trying to choke the mass movement of the workers and peasants, which has sold itself to American imperialism and is selling out China wholesale and retail, has prepared the ground for the success of the armed Japanese occupation.

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY


FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Undated

Rec'd October 8, 1931
8:12 p. m.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.



Telegram to Peiping

732.

793.94 / 1947 C.

Referring to the Legation's telegram 685, September
30, 11 p. m.

Following has been received from Jerome Greene at
Shanghai October 7, 3 p. m.:

"Must ask your indulgence for trespassing in matter
outside my province by asking you to consider cabling
following statement to Washington as my personal commu-
nication and if necessary at my expense.

I have been asked to do this by person coming straight
from highest quarter who thought I might use some personal
channel to get statement before Department, perhaps to
reenforce representations already made officially but I
prefer to act only through you. Position seems to be
that rapprochement with Southern Group now rendered
doubtful by exaction made as condition precedent to
union

793.94/2021

REP

2- #732, from Peiping

union including complete retirement of present chief. Latter is sincerely convinced that such an associate during present crisis would mean break in continuity of Government and probably collapse and general chaos. On the other hand he is willing after union to have conference to discuss any plan of reorganization which will not imperil continuity, including his complete elimination. Popular conviction seems unsupported that enemy was concentrating complete and permanent occupation of northern provinces as objective of recent events. Those who think this regard even a hopeless and disastrous war as better than submission. Surprisingly conservative people are saying this now. In order to win control of present consummation southern group would appeal to popular support as spokesman of such policy, however fatal. First step would be acceptance of alliance now definitely offered by Russia and rapid infiltration of well prepared communist organization. Fact that alliance would provide enemy with more plausible excuse

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REP

3- #732, from Peiping

excuse for turning occupation into conquest while realized by present chief apparently would not deter southern group from alliance. Under these circumstances it is hoped United States will not refrain from putting maximum friendly pressure on Japan to adopt moderate and conciliatory course and thus increase prestige of Government here vis-a-vis domestic opponents opposite course including threatened naval occupations would precipitate discipline. Furthermore, it is hoped a way can be found for Japan to accept principle of neutral commission to certify withdrawal to limit of safety if not to treaty limits. Meanwhile steps are being taken by central government to ensure that the provincial head of the three eastern provinces either assert effective control of his region or be supplanted by more competent official or commission. To this statement from source indicated at the beginning I should like to add some observations of my own. Most competent, experienced residents here, Japanese, British, American, all agree present conditions (?) intercourse campaign practically
hundred

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By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

4- #732, from Peiping

hundred per cent tie-up beyond all precedent, paralyzing both trade and all personal relations. This is forcing Japanese mercantile interests who are normally pacific to countenance and even advocate war measures as legitimate ultimate Japanese weapon as against China's ultimate weapon by the destructive boycott. Evidence increases that material damage already inflicted on Japanese trade far exceeds in importance any ordinary military engagement or naval bombardment. Japanese merchants here and Osaka argue war could be no worse, so go to it and have it over. In more realistic Chinese circles one hears validation of ¹⁹¹⁵~~115~~ treaty as probably inevitable result of official inquiry in return for delimitation partisan treaty to Manchuria and admission of Japanese residents in eastern Mongolia only by relinquishment of extraterritorial rights in that region. I pass along all this from responsible sources as grist for your mill and your discretionary use".

JEN.
10-15-31

JOHNSON

CSB

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Gray

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Collect
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Department of State

Washington,
October 10, 1931.

793.94

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

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Your 732. */2021*

Please inform 'Greene' that his telegram of October 7,
3 p.m., has been received and that the situation with
which it deals has the Department's solicitous attention.

Zpm

Spencer
WLC

793.94/2021

12 OCT 1931



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Enciphered by _____


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Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Long NARS, Date June 1, 1976



(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)
Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1931

At the press conference this afternoon Undersecretary Castle announced that the text of Secretary Stimson's remarks at the opening of the Pan-American Commercial Conference next Monday would be made available to the correspondents today.

A report from Ambassador Laughlin to the effect that the American light and power plants in Las Palmas, which were seized a while ago and operated by the municipality, were returned to the owner on September 30 will also be made public today.

A press release containing the appointments under the Treaty of Conciliation between the United States and Belgium will also be issued today.

There is being made available to the press today data concerning the next examination for the Foreign Service.

Colonel and Mrs. Lindbergh's airplane was slightly damaged in an accident this morning. The details of the accident will be issued in the form of a press release.

SOUTH AFRICA

In the absence of any spot news to announce, Mr. Castle said a press release would be issued today concerning the visit to South Africa of an American athletic team, which, in addition to winning all of the matches, made a tremendously good impression in that country. On the last day of the visit, however, the South Africans won the baseball game in the ninth inning.

MANCHURIA

Asked if the Department had received any reports from the

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Consul General in Harbin concerning the political situation in that district, the Undersecretary replied in the negative. The correspondent then said that press despatches mentioned the mobilization of Russian troops in Siberia and contained a story to the effect that the Chinese would eventually find themselves working with the same Russians with whom they were at loggerheads a couple of years ago. Mr. Castle, in reply, said that no reports concerning the alleged mobilization had been received.

SINO-JAPANESE TROUBLE

Asked if the Department contemplated communicating further with the Chinese and Japanese governments, following Ambassador Forbes' conference with the Secretary, Mr. Castle replied in the negative. A correspondent asked if it would be correct to say that no action would be taken until the League Council reconvenes on October 14. The Undersecretary replied in the negative and added that we are simply watching the situation and that the League Council presumably would meet before the fourteenth if an unfavorable change in the situation should demand it. Another correspondent then asked if the Department of State would refrain from any action until the meeting of the Council of the League. In reply, Mr. Castle said the Department certainly would not take any action if it appeared that the Japanese were going ahead with their troop withdrawals. Mr. Castle here added that he would not want to commit the Department to anything, because we cannot tell what will happen. The correspondent then asked if it would be correct to say that any further communications to China and Japan would be sent in co-operation with the League. In reply, the Undersecretary said he did not think such a statement would be fair. If any outside action is needed, however, and if the

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 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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League can do it, we shall be delighted. Asked then if we would leave further action to the League, Mr. Castle said he could not say that, as an occasion might possibly arise in which we ought to take helpful action. We are hoping, however, that the withdrawal of troops is going along quietly and calmly and that the Chinese will be able to make the areas evacuated by the Japanese safe so that no further unpleasant incidents will occur. A correspondent then asked if this government was likely to suggest to our representative at Geneva that the League should not do anything helpful while the situation remains fairly quiet. In reply, the Undersecretary said he thought both the League and this government would remain quiet as long as the situation in Manchuria remains fairly good. A correspondent asked if the Undersecretary would explain what was meant by making safe the areas evacuated by the Japanese. Mr. Castle then explained that there is always irritation after an occupation and, as the Secretary said the other day, it is easier to get into a bad position than to get out. The Japanese are naturally slow in withdrawing their troops until they are quite certain that the Chinese police are so organized that the withdrawal of the troops will not mean attacks on Japanese citizens. Asked then if that meant an interim political regime, the Undersecretary replied in the negative.

FRANCE

Asked if any further information was available concerning the visit of Premier Laval, Mr. Castle said that M. Laval had apparently decided definitely to sail on October 16. It is understood, furthermore, that, as the French Embassy in Washington is not very large, Ambassador Edge has placed his Washington house at M. Laval's disposal. The program so far is purely tentative.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Referring to the visits of Secretary Stimson, Secretary Lamont and Undersecretary Mills to the White House yesterday, a correspondent observed that there was some mysterious conference under way and asked if a plan was being prepared for world economic relief. In reply, Mr. Castle said there was no mysterious conference at the White House. No doubt people are discussing any and all kinds of plans for economic improvement. The President has talked with many people on that subject, but there is no plan for world economic relief.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

Asked if there had been any further development of the suggestion for a world monetary conference, the Undersecretary replied in the negative.

A correspondent asked if this government had received an invitation from the League Council to attend a conference on the Litvinoff proposal for a world economic non-aggression pact. In reply, Mr. Castle said he had read something about the matter in the newspapers, but that the invitation had not been received.

M. J. McDermott.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976



(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF PRESS CONFERENCE, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1931

2nd page
✓ At the press conference this noon Secretary Stimson announced the release of information received from our Chargé d'Affaires at Copenhagen to the effect that Denmark had abandoned the gold standard until November 30 in accordance with a law passed on September 29.

The Secretary also announced issuance of a press release containing information received from our Chargé d'Affaires at Rome to the effect that the Chief of the Italian Government telegraphed orders to all diplomatic and consular officers in the world "to deny once again in the most categorical manner in all places and to everyone" that the Italian Government has any intention of altering the exchange rate of the lire as fixed by a law of December 31, 1927.

The Secretary said the correspondents might have the text of a note left at the Department by the Swedish Minister, explaining the reasons why Sweden went off the gold standard.

The Secretary also announced that Italy and the United States had reached an agreement granting reciprocal recognition of inspection of passenger vessels.

ARMAMENTS

A correspondent enquired whether the Department had received the official text of the resolution adopted by the Third Committee. In reply, the Secretary said he believed it had come. The correspondent enquired whether the Secretary had any comment to make regarding the countries re-action. The Secretary replied in the negative and added that the correspondents might have the text of the resolution

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and study it themselves. A correspondent observed that judging from the text which appeared in the press it seemed to be very vague. The Secretary declined to comment.

A correspondent enquired the next step to be taken in regard to the arms truce. The Secretary said, in reply, that he understood we were invited to make a declaration before November 1 in common with all other countries of our intentions. The correspondent asked if it was likely this Government would consent to make such a declaration. In reply, the Secretary told the correspondent to wait until we had had a chance to study the resolution and decide what we should do. At the present time we are busy with other things.

SINO-JAPANESE

A correspondent asked if this Government regarded seriously the reported independence movement in Manchuria. The Secretary explained that our despatches did not go quite as far as the press despatches in that matter. While we have not received different news, we have not heard all that has been reported in the press reports. The correspondent asked if the Secretary would reserve judgment. In reply, the Secretary said that we would reserve judgment until we know more about the situation.

A correspondent enquired whether the Department's reports showed any change was rather for the better in the situation. The Secretary replied in the affirmative and added that so far as it went, the change was rather for the better. We are getting now, from both Chinese and Japanese sources, estimates of the number of Japanese troops which are there. The figures tally so exactly the indication is that they are probably nearly right and show that the Japanese have in the

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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neighborhood of about 15,000 troops in Manchuria. A correspondent asked if there was any reason why the press should not have that information. The Secretary, in reply, said there was no more information than what he had just given the correspondents. The estimates received by our representatives from both Chinese and Japanese sources tally very closely with that figure. The correspondent called attention to the fact that the press had received through the Department only very scanty information concerning the situation. The Secretary said the figures might be secured from Mr. McDermott. One estimate was 15,000 and the other 16,000, which is very close, considering that one was from China and the other from Japan.

A correspondent asked if the Department had received any information regarding actual withdrawals of troops. The Secretary replied that general information had been received, but nothing in detail. In response to enquiries, The Secretary said the Department had been receiving reports regarding withdrawals for several days, but he cautioned the correspondents that in any such situation progress was bound to be very slow. It is much easier to get into trouble than to get out. The Secretary warned the correspondents that none of the information he had given the correspondents was for quotation. The process of withdrawal will necessarily be a very slow one and it is evidently cautious. A correspondent asked if it now seemed likely that the situation would work out without further hostilities. In reply, the Secretary said that no one could prophesy that. When bodies of troops are scattered through a country that contains bodies of different troops, some of them under discipline and some not, no one can prophesy when there will be a clash. The correspondent asked if the situation seemed to be pacific so far as the Governments were concerned. The Secretary, in

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 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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reply, said it seemed to be more pacific. He added that he wanted to speak in no more detail than to say that the trend seemed to be in the right direction.

In view of the fact that the Secretary had said he wanted to reserve judgment on the independence movement until more information was received, a correspondent assumed that this country would make no further diplomatic move in the situation at this time. In reply, the Secretary said the correspondents might understand only what he had said about reserving judgment on the independence movement; that the trend of our reports on the military situation is favorable; that there seem to be withdrawals from advanced positions taken; and that the number of Japanese troops seems to coincide with what they stated. A correspondent said he would like clarification as to what we were reserving judgment on--the movement itself or the attitude we will take. In reply, the Secretary recalled that in answer to previous questions he had said we had no information, except that in the press, concerning the movement for independence. A correspondent asked if there was the least indication of assumption of Japanese control. The Secretary replied that only general information had been received, no details. The correspondent observed that that appeared to be an important phase of the situation. The Secretary agreed that it was an important thing and would require watching. He recalled that the information he received stated that all Japanese troops, except the police officers and the guard at Chang's palace, had been removed from the Chinese city of Mukden.

A correspondent enquired whether any further communication had been sent to the League or Japan or China regarding the Manchurian situation. The Secretary replied that none had been sent so far, and it was not customary to an-

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nounce such things beforehand.

A correspondent asked if it would be practicable for the United States to use its "good offices" to bring China and Japan together to reach an amicable settlement. In reply the Secretary said he thought the phrase "good offices" was used very loosely by citizens in general, and very narrowly by diplomats. As he recalled it, the phrase "good offices" is used when two countries that have a controversy agree a third country shall mediate between them. The Secretary added that he did not think any such movement had been made toward this Government or any other government.

DEBTS AND REPARATIONS

A correspondent pointed out that Mr. Albert Wiggin, chairman of the bankers committee set up by the London conference on debts, and the British Labor Party were in agreement in their pronouncements that something would have to be done about cutting down international debts and tariffs. The correspondent asked the Secretary for background in the matter and whether there was any apparent possibility of diplomatic discussion of the matter of debts. In reply, the Secretary said there was no background and no foreground that he could give the correspondents at the present time.

PORTO RICO

A correspondent enquired whether the Secretary saw Governor Roosevelt of Porto Rico during the morning. The Secretary said that the Governor sat in the President's ante-room as the Secretary came out of the President's room and he stopped to shake hands with him. A correspondent asked if they talked of the Philippines. The Secretary replied in the negative and added that they only shook hands.

A correspondent enquired whether anything was being done regarding Governor Roosevelt's request that Porto Ricans be

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admitted to the Foreign Service. The Secretary said he did not know, but remembered that the Governor had mentioned the matter several times, but he was informed there are some Porto Ricans serving in the service as clerks.

WHITE HOUSE

A correspondent asked if the Secretary could give the press any other news on his visit to the White House. The Secretary replied in the negative. He explained that he went to the White House to discuss two things only--one was the plans for M. Laval's visit and the other was details about the armaments conference, neither of which he could go into more detail about.

FRANCE

A correspondent asked if there was anything definite on M. Laval's visit. The Secretary, in reply, said there was nothing definite except the fact that he seemed to be coming.

A correspondent asked if the Secretary could give the press some idea of the program for Laval's visit. In reply, the Secretary said that as soon as the program was settled he would give it to the press in great detail, but it has not yet been settled. We proposed a program to M. Laval, so far as we were able to forecast it, but it has just been sent to him and he has not yet replied. Until he does reply, there is no program. A correspondent asked whether, as a matter of form, M. Laval would be the guest of the White House or the United States. The Secretary said he could not tell him until the program was ready, and as soon as the program is agreed upon it will be given to the press in full detail. The Secretary made it clear that he meant the program for M. Laval's entertainment and not an agenda.

A correspondent asked if M. Laval was expected to arrive in time to attend the Yorktown celebration. In reply,

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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the Secretary said if he arrived the 20th he would not be in time to attend the celebration at Yorktown, but he might be in Washington at the time Marshal Petain is here if he arrives on the 20th as reported by the press from Paris.


RUSSIA

A correspondent asked if this country was likely to send a delegate to the conference to take place in Geneva November 2 to consider Litvinoff's economic non-aggression proposals. The Secretary replied that no steps had been taken and the matter had not been considered.

M. J. McDermott.

0900

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976



MEMORANDUM OF PRESS CONFERENCE, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1931

At the press conference this morning Secretary Stimson announced the release of a telegram of condolence from the Governor of British Honduras on the death of the pilot and occupants of the airplane which was carrying assistance to Belize. The arrival of another Navy airplane at Belize today with medical supplies was also announced.

JAPAN

The Secretary also said that word had been received from Japan to the effect that the Foreign Office had issued a permit for Messrs. Herndon and Pangborn to begin a trans-Pacific flight from Japan.

CHINA

Secretary Stimson said that the news received by the Department concerning the occurrences at Mukden, Manchuria, substantially confirmed the press despatches. The contents of the telegrams to the Department have been conveyed to the press, NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, because the news contained therein was from Chinese sources. Asked if the telegrams to the Department substantiated this morning's press reports concerning the capture of Mukden by the Japanese, the Secretary replied that Mukden appeared to have been taken by Japanese soldiers against the opposition of their Government representatives. The Secretary said, furthermore, that from the press despatches and the telegraphic despatches received by the Department it appears to be perfectly clear that the incident was caused by the action of the soldiers against the efforts of the representatives of their Government at Mukden. The Secretary said that he was merely giving the correspondents the reports he had received to date and which, so far, had not

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 By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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been contradicted. A correspondent here observed that when Polish soldiers captured a Lithuanian town they gave out the same story. In reply, Mr. Stimson said he did not remember the details of the Lithuanian incident.

Asked then if the incident in Mukden came under the provisions of the Four-Power Pacific Treaty, the Secretary said he thought not and that, judging from the despatches received, it was not a clash of Governments, but a clash of subordinates of Governments, and that it would not, therefore, come under either the Kellogg Pact or any of the other Treaties. A correspondent then observed that clashes between governments usually grow out of smaller things. In reply, Mr. Stimson said it might lead to something that would call for the invocation of the Kellogg Pact or other Treaties, but it certainly is not yet an act of war by one Government against another, according to the press despatches. The Secretary here said that his remarks were NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION TO HIMSELF OR TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE and that they were FOR GUIDANCE ONLY. A correspondent then said he thought he had a right to know whether the United States viewed this incident as coming under the provisions of any of the Treaties above mentioned. He was informed, in reply, that the Secretary had given him all he was entitled to know and that the information given above was merely for his guidance. The correspondent then said that the public was not interested in his (the correspondent's) view and that it is interested in the views of the Department of State. The correspondent then asked if he could obtain some statement which he could publish on the authority of the Department of State. Mr. Stimson then said that our information was very imperfect and that the correspondents were trying to make him jump before he was ready. The correspondent then said that he was not attempting to do such a

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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thing or to do anything that would be unfair to the Secretary of State. In reply, Mr. Stimson said he did not mean to use the word "unfair," but the fact of the matter is we are just beginning to receive despatches from the disturbed area. Anyone who has the facts probably would reach the same conclusion which the Department has, which is that so far the matter does not involve the two Governments and is not, therefore, under the provisions of the Kellogg Pact. The correspondent then said that the above statement was proper news and interesting to the reading public because of the great interest in the Kellogg Pact. Mr. Stimson then said that the correspondents might use the following FOR ATTRIBUTION: The Department is following the matter carefully, but on the news thus far received there seems to be no ground for indicating any violation of the Kellogg Pact.

Asked if the United States has any extensive commercial interests in the region around Mukden, the Secretary said he understood our trade with that district was small.

SECRETARY OF STATE

111.018
 A correspondent referred to rumors, which originated during the absence of the Secretary of State, to the effect that he had changed his attitude toward the press conferences. The correspondent said that the fact that some of the Assistant Secretaries of State had been holding the conferences during the past few days might indicate that the Secretary had really changed his attitude. In reply, Mr. Stimson said there were some very erroneous despatches or inferences brought to his attention while he was away, some of which were to the effect that it was his intention to give up the press conferences. Mr. Stimson then said he had no idea of giving up the conferences but that even before he went away he was taking steps to try to make his part in the conferences more effective

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by confining his work to those subjects on which he thought he could be of the most assistance and by permitting the Undersecretary of the Assistant Secretaries to handle the others. That plan is only tentative and the Secretary has been trying since his return to put forth special efforts and to give the correspondents as much information as possible along those lines in which the Secretary is especially interested. A correspondent here said he thought it would be highly beneficial for the Assistant Secretaries to take press conferences now and then as it would bring them into closer contact with the press. The Assistant Secretaries should have authority, however, to deal in all questions. The correspondent here said that in the press conference yesterday he asked Assistant Secretary White a question which Mr. White could not, or did not, answer and that no attempt was made to obtain the desired information. The Secretary here pointed out that the Division of Current Information was always at their disposal for the obtaining of information and that if the matter was important enough it could be referred to the Secretary direct. Mr. Stimson here explained that there was no attempt to give the correspondents less news, but, on the contrary, the purpose is to give them more.

A correspondent then said that while he greatly appreciated the value of any information which the Secretary prepared in advance it was also extremely important to be able to ask questions, especially about the present Sino-Japanese trouble. Mr. Stimson replied that there would be no attempt on his part to get away from the important questions in which the correspondents were interested; and that he was leaving the matter of the press conferences flexible in order that, when an important matter becomes current, he may be able to take the conference himself.

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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A correspondent then said it would be helpful if the Assistant Secretaries are made to feel that they may speak on any subject authoritatively in reply to questions. The Secretary, in reply, said he did not want to encourage the spokesmen to discuss questions with which they were not familiar and that he would rather have them refer the correspondents to him in case such questions should arise.

MEXICO

A correspondent observed that the Mexican Ambassador in Washington had been recalled and asked if he was being fired or promoted. The Secretary, in reply, said he had not seen the press despatches. The correspondent then asked if he was to understand that the Department knew nothing about it. He was informed, in reply, that we do not know anything which we can discuss.


WHITE HOUSE

A correspondent observed there had been considerable speculation about the significance of the conference at the White House last night and asked if the Secretary could say anything about it. Mr. Stimson, in reply, said he had been here about two and a half years and had never discussed what had taken place at the White House.

M. J. McDermott.

0905

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976



Mr. Castle:

Mr. Secretary:

This telegram, just received, strengthens my conviction that we should give evidence at once -- and in a manner which will be of record -- of our concern over the latest evidences that the situation is developing in the direction of increasing seriousness.

The despatching of the telegrams which I sent down a few minutes ago to Tokyo and to Nanking, concurrently with a further appeal to the Japanese and the Chinese representatives here, would constitute concurrent but independent action paralleling action (which I think we may assume) will be taken by Leroux on Drummond's suggestion as herein reported.

SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Tamm NARS, Date June 4, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. FROM

GENEVA

Dated October 9, 1931

Rec'd 2:20 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DOUBLE PRIORITY.

166, October 9, noon. (GREEN)


Consulate's number 165, October 9, 11 a. m.

I have just returned from an interview with
Drummond.

One. He is proposing to Leroux the immediate despatch of identic telegrams to the Chinese and Japanese Governments reminding them of their engagements not to aggravate the situation.

Because of recent developments this is essentially aimed at the Japanese. It is hoped however that its publicity will assist in quieting Chinese public opinion which is looking to the League to "do something" immediately. (END GREEN).

One. Drummond informed me confidentially that in view of developments which he regards as most alarming that the



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0907

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #166; from Geneva, Oct. 9, 1931,
noon.

that the Council will probably meet on Monday evening
or Tuesday morning. He believes that it will meet on
Monday evening. He reiterated his most earnest hope
Washington will have something for him to present at
that time. He feels that 'neutral' information in
his hands to present to the Council upon its first
convening might turn the tide in the whole mest!

mest?

GILBERT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GENEVA

FROM Dated October 9, 1931

Rec'd 4 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

187, October 9, 4 p.m.

Consulate's 166, October 9, noon.

The following identic telegram has just been

by Lerroux as President of the Council to Chinese and Japanese Governments:

"Information received tends to show that incidents are taking place in Manchuria, and elsewhere which cannot but embitter feeling and thus render settlement more difficult. In these circumstances and pending the meeting of the Council, I feel it is my duty as President of the Council to remind the two parties of the engagements taken before the Council to refrain from any action which would aggravate the situation, and to express the confident hope that steps are being taken on both sides to execute fully the assurances given to the Council and embodied in its resolution of the 30th September".

GILBERT

KLP
CSB

793.94

OCT 10 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

793.94/2026

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

A portion of this telegram ^{FROM} must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State
Washington


URGENT

165, October 9, 11 a.m.


(GREEN) One. This morning Sze showed me telegram from Nanking (a) concerning bombing of Chinchow by Japanese aeroplanes, (b) concerning news from Chengchiatung that Japanese are arming Mongolians at Talingchen and at other points from supplies of Mukden arsenal and are inspiring a Mongolian independence movement. Sze will undoubtedly give the substance of this to the press.

Two. Sze regards (END GREEN) these actions as deliberately provocative on the part of Japanese military party. Drummond concurs.

Three. Sze also showed me telegram from Tientsin from Sherwood Eddy reading as follows "I was present at capture of Mukden, I testify that Japan endeavors to establish (?) independent government Manchuria under



Rec'd 3:30 p.m.



f.e.
e.g.c.

F/P
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RECEIVED
OCT 9 1931
DIVISION OF
WESTERN AFFAIRS

MAM

2- #165, from Geneva, October 9,
1931

her military control", Sze asked that this be regarded as strictly confidential as he does not desire Eddy to be known as a source of his information.

Four. In the light of the foregoing Sze has this morning urged upon Drummond the calling of the Council "forthwith" (see article 11 of the Covenant and paragraph eight of the Council resolution, consulate's ¹⁹³⁷ 150, October 1, 9 a.m.), in other words in advance of October 14.

He called attention to the circumstance that the Japanese have not fulfilled their assurances that no action would be taken further to aggravate the situation. Sze states that Chinese public opinion is such that it is essential that news of early meeting of the Council reach China as soon as possible to avoid an outbreak against the Japanese. He is particularly apprehensive of developments during Chinese holiday tomorrow. Sze also declared that the "diplomatic language" used by the Council and by the Powers is being considered by the Japanese military party as a weakness and urges the employment of stronger terms which the

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By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

3- #165, from Geneva, October 9,
1931

the military party will "understand".

Five. Drummond is hesitating between (a) necessity of calming Chinese opinion by publishing immediate summoning of Council and (b) objections to having Council meet with only conflicting information from Japanese and Chinese sources to present and without "neutral information" which would serve to stabilize Council action. He desires most earnestly that information from Washington on the actual situation in Manchuria be in his hands as soon as possible.

GILBERT

OSB

0917
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Memorandum sent by the Japanese Government
to the Chinese Government on Oct. 9th. 13 1931

JAN 27 1933

Shigemitsu has been instructed to forward

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to the Chinese Government the following memorandum
dated October 9. (1) The Japanese Government has
already made it clear that the Manchurian affair is
nothing but the outcome of a deep-rooted anti-Japanese
feeling in China which has taken a specially provocative
form in the recent challenge to Japanese troops com-
pelling the latter to resort to measures of self-defence.
The responsibility for the present situation naturally
lies with the Chinese Government.

The Japanese Government has time and again re-
quested the Chinese Government to take proper steps to
check the anti-Japanese movement so systematically car-
ried out in various places in China. Being desirous
of maintaining cordial relations between the two coun-
tries, this Government has exercised the greatest pa-
tience and forbearance in the hope that this deplorable
state of affairs may yet improve. Unfortunately, however,
this anti-Japanese agitation seems now to be assuming
alarming proportions. It is learned that the anti-
Japanese societies at Shanghai and elsewhere have passed
resolutions not only to enforce prohibition of trading
in and transportation of Japanese goods but to order
cancellation of existing contracts and otherwise to
prohibit all business transactions and to cancel con-

F/H/S

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MAR 21 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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tracts of employment between Chinese and Japanese in order thus to effect the so-called "severance of economic relations with Japan". For that purpose examination and detention of goods and persons, intimidation and violence, and various other means are being employed to give effect to such resolutions and severe penalties are meted out to any who may fail to comply with these orders, some societies even going so far as to threaten capital punishment. Moreover, cases of expropriation and detention of goods owned by Japanese people and of threats and violence against their lives and property have become so numerous and insistent throughout China that they have been forced to withdraw totally or partially from various localities.

(2) It is to be noted that the anti-Japanese movement in China is conducted as an instrument of national policy under the direction of the Nationalist Party which in view of the peculiar political organization of China is inseparable in function from the Government. That movement must therefore be clearly distinguished from the one which originates spontaneously amongst the people. It is therefore evident that the present anti-Japanese movement in China is not only in contravention of the letter and spirit of the treaties existing between the two countries but consti-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

tutes a form of hostile act without the use of arms contrary to all standards of justice and friendship. The Chinese Government will be assuming a very serious responsibility if it should fail to take prompt and effective measures to quell that agitation. Moreover, in meting out penal sentences to individual citizens anti-Japanese societies which are purely private organizations are clearly usurping the authority of the National Government.

(3) It will be remembered that at a recent meeting of the Council of the League of Nations at Geneva the Chinese representative as well as the Japanese gave assurance that their respective governments would endeavor to prevent aggravation of the situation. The Chinese Government obviously against that pledge is actually aggravating the situation by making no honest or effective effort to restrain activities of anti-Japanese societies which are jeopardizing the lives and property as well as the liberty of trade of Japanese subjects in different parts of China.

(4) The Japanese Government desires to call once more the serious attention of the Chinese Government to these actions on the part of anti-Japanese societies and to declare at the same time that the Chinese Government will be held responsible for whatever

0915
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 4 -

may be the consequences of its failure to suppress
the anti-Japanese movement and to afford adequate
protection to the lives and property of Japanese sub-
jects in China.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Syme NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

^m WE
FE

Geneva

FROM Dated October 9, 1931

Rec'd 3:48 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 12 1931
Department of State

file
egc

168, October 9, 6 p. m.

Council, meeting set for noon Tuesday October 13
at Geneva. Drummond is confident that Reading and
Briand will attend and that other foreign ministers
will follow suit.

GILBERT

RR
OSB

793.94

note
570 C112

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 10 1931
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

FILED
793.94/2028

FILED
OCT 17 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence A. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 12 1931
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FROM
Dated October 10, 1931

Rec'd 1:19 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

October 10, noon.

Following from Peck:

"October 9, 12 P. M. The acting Minister of Foreign Affairs this evening asked me to inform you that it is the hope of Chinese leaders that the United States will be represented by an observer at the meeting of the League Council which it is believed will be held October 14. He urges that you recommend this proposal favorably to the Department by telegraph".

JOHNSON

WP

FILED

OCT 16 1931

F/S
793.94/2029

0918

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RECEIVED

Peiping

Dated October 10, 1931


Rec'd 7 a.m.

FROM

DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

736, October 10, noon.



Copy of following memorandum published as Reuter message in this morning's PEKING LEADER has just been supplied by the Japanese Legation with statement that it was to be communicated to the Chinese Government.

"One. Japanese Government has already made it clear that Manchurian affair is nothing but outcome of reported anti-Japanese feeling in China which has taken specially provocative form in recent challenge to Japanese troops compelling latter to resort to measures of self defense. Responsibility for present situation naturally lies with Chinese Government.

Japanese Government has time and again requested Chinese Government to take proper steps to check anti-Japanese Government so systematically carried out in various places in China. Being desirous of maintaining cordial relations between two countries this Government has exercised greatest patience and forbearance in hope that this deplorable state of affairs may yet improve.

/ Unfortunately however this anti-Japanese agitation seems now to be assuming alarming

793.94/2030

FILED
OCT 16 1931

0915

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

-2 #736, from Peiping, October 10,
1931, noon

alarming proportions.

It is learned that anti-Japanese societies at Shanghai and elsewhere have passed resolutions not only to enforce prohibition of trading in and transportation of Japanese goods but to order cancellation of existing contracts and otherwise to prohibit all business transactions and to cancel contracts of employment between Chinese and Japanese in order thus to effect so-called 'severance of economic relations with Japan'. For that purpose examination and detention of goods and persons, intimidation and violence, and various other means are being employed to give effect to such resolutions and severe penalties are meted out to any who fail to comply with these orders, some societies even going so far as to threaten capital punishment. Moreover cases of expropriation and detention of goods owned by Japanese people and of threats and violence against their lives and property have become ^{so} numerous and insistent throughout China that they have been forced to withdraw totally or partially from various localities.

Two. It is to be noted that anti-Japanese movement in China is conducted as instrument of national policy

under

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

3-#736, from Peiping, October 10,
1931, noon

under direction of Nationalist Party which, in view of peculiar political organization of China, is inseparable in function from Government. That movement must therefore be clearly distinguished from one which originates spontaneously amongst people. It is therefore evident that present anti-Japanese movement in China is not only in contravention of letter and spirit of treaties expiring between two countries but constitutes form of hostile act without use of arms contrary to all standards of justice and friendship. Chinese Government will be assuming very serious responsibility if it should fail to take prompt and effective measures to quell that agitation. Moreover in meting out penal sentences to individual citizens and anti-Japanese societies which are purely private organizations, they are clearly usurping authority of National Government.

Three. It will be remembered that at recent meeting of Council of League of Nations at Geneva Chinese representative as well as Japanese gave assurance that their respective Governments would endeavor to prevent aggravation of situation. Chinese Government obviously against that pledge is actually aggravating situation by making no honest or effective effort to restrain activities of anti-Japanese societies which are jeopardizing lives
and property

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

4-#736, from Peiping, October 10, 1931
noon

and property as well as liberty of trade of Japanese subjects in different parts of China.

Four. Japanese Government desires to call once more serious attention of Chinese Government to these actions on part of anti-Japanese societies and to declare at same time that Chinese Government will be held responsible for whatever may be consequences of its failure to suppress anti-Japanese movement and to afford adequate protection to lives and property of Japanese subjects in China".

Tokyo appropriately informed.

JOHNSON


HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



Handwritten: ~~U~~
~~10~~
~~FE~~
for ack.



Handwritten: Ack'd + letter to Senator Watson

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Handwritten: f.e. 290

Handwritten: October 13 1931

793.94/2031

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am passing on to you some
information in regard to China which may
be of interest.

Yours faithfully,

Handwritten signature: Wendell Hoover

793.94

FILED

OCT 16 1931

092.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

JAMES E. WATSON
CHAIRMAN

United States Senate

CONFERENCE OF THE MAJORITY

October 8, 1931

Hon. Herbert Hoover,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am handing you the within at the
request of George B. Lockwood for such
action as you may see fit to take.

Very respectfully,

James E. Watson

0924

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

RECEIVED BY SENATE OFFICE BING BRANCH NA 3120-111 021 STANDARD TIME INDICATED ON THIS MESSAGE	<h2 style="margin: 0;">Postal Telegraph</h2> <p style="font-size: small; margin: 0;">THE MURRAY SYSTEM</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: center; align-items: center;"> </div> <p style="font-size: x-small; margin: 0;">ALL AMERICA CABLES COMMERCIAL CABLES</p>	<p style="font-size: x-small; margin: 0;">This is a full rate Telegram or Cablegram unless otherwise indicated by signal in the check or in the address.</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 20%;">DL</td> <td>DAY LETTER</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NL</td> <td>NIGHT LETTER</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NM</td> <td>NIGHT MESSAGE</td> </tr> <tr> <td>LCO</td> <td>DEFERRED CABLE</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NLT</td> <td>NIGHT CABLE LETTER</td> </tr> <tr> <td>WLT</td> <td>WEEK END CABLE LETTER</td> </tr> </table>	DL	DAY LETTER	NL	NIGHT LETTER	NM	NIGHT MESSAGE	LCO	DEFERRED CABLE	NLT	NIGHT CABLE LETTER	WLT	WEEK END CABLE LETTER
DL	DAY LETTER													
NL	NIGHT LETTER													
NM	NIGHT MESSAGE													
LCO	DEFERRED CABLE													
NLT	NIGHT CABLE LETTER													
WLT	WEEK END CABLE LETTER													

Form 16

W20 150DL=MUNCIE IND 6 220PM

1931 OCT 6 PM 4 20

HON JAMES E WATSON=

=UNITED STATES SENATE=

=AFTER CONFERENCE TODAY WITH ARTHUR RUH FOR TWENTY YEARS
 ENGAGED IN CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION WORK IN CHINA DESIRE TO MAKE
 FOLLOWING FURTHER OBSERVATIONS WHICH WISH YOU WOULD LAY BEFORE
 THE PRESIDENT AMERICA HAS ROOM FOR FRIENDLY INTERVENTION IN
 REQUEST THAT ON THE ONE HAND JAPAN NOT AS A SURRENDER OF RIGHTS
 BUT TO AVOID WORLD DISASTER WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM MANCHURIA AND
 THAT ON THE OTHER HAND CHINA BE ASKED TO ACCEPT JAPANS POSITION
 IN FAVOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS RATHER THAN BY

0925

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

RECEIVED AT SENATE OFFICE BLDG. BRANCH NA 3120 BP 929 INDICATED ON THIS MESSAGE	<h1>Postal Telegraph</h1> <p>THE MACKAY SYSTEM</p>  <p>AMERICA CABLES COMMERCIAL CABLES</p>	This is a full rate Telegram or Cablegram unless otherwise indicated by signal in the check or in the address. <table border="1"> <tr><td>DL</td><td>DAY LETTER</td></tr> <tr><td>NL</td><td>NIGHT LETTER</td></tr> <tr><td>NM</td><td>NIGHT MESSAGE</td></tr> <tr><td>LCO</td><td>DEFERRED CABLE</td></tr> <tr><td>NLT</td><td>NIGHT CABLE LETTER</td></tr> <tr><td>WLT</td><td>WEEK END CABLE LETTER</td></tr> </table>	DL	DAY LETTER	NL	NIGHT LETTER	NM	NIGHT MESSAGE	LCO	DEFERRED CABLE	NLT	NIGHT CABLE LETTER	WLT	WEEK END CABLE LETTER
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NLT	NIGHT CABLE LETTER													
WLT	WEEK END CABLE LETTER													

Form 16

LEAGUE WHICH JAPAN REFUSES IT WOULD MOREOVER BE A MAGNIFICENT
 GESTURE THAT WOULD MOVE THE WORLD IF AMERICA UNDERTOOK FLOOD
 RELIEF ON VAST SCALE WITH AMERICAN WHEAT SURPLUS IN LONG RUN
 THIS WOULD COST US NOTHING AND ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD HAVE
 TREMENDOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT IN WARDING OFF BOLSHEVISM
 AND PROBABLY GENERAL WAR FARMERS OBJECTIONS TO THIS ARE PETTY
 AND SHORTSIGHTED SINCE THIS WOULD INCREASE WHEAT PRICE AND
 SHOULD BE DISREGARDED=

GEORGE B LOCKWOOD.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

PATRONS ARE REQUESTED TO FAVOR THE COMPANY BY CRITICISM AND SUGGESTION CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a full-rate Telegram or Cablegram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable sign above or preceding the address.

WESTERN UNION

NEWCOMB CARLTON, PRESIDENT

J. C. WILLEVER, FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

The filing time as shown in the date line on full-rate telegrams and day letters, and the time of receipt at destination as shown on all messages, is STANDARD TIME.

Received at Senate Office Building, Delaware Ave. and "C" St. N. E. PHONE NATL. 3120

BRANCH 1111

WE46 79 DL=MUNCIE IND 6 851A

HON JAMES E WATSON=

U S SENATE=

HAVE ASKED STEELE SHOW YOU CABLEGRAM RECEIVED FROM MY
BROTHER WILL IN SHANGHAI THIS MORNING HE HAS INTIMATE
KNOWLEDGE RESULTING FROM TWENTY YEARS CLOSE CONTACT
INTERNAL AFFAIRS THROUGH MOST IMPORTANT LEADERS BELIEVE
DANGER EXISTS WORLD WIDE CONFLAGRATION RESULT SITUATION
HE DESCRIBES AND WHILE CONDITION IS DELICATE AND PERILOUS
FROM AMERICAN STANDPOINT IF UNITED STATES CAN DO ANYTHING

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE

SIGNS

DL = Day Letter
NM = Night Message
NL = Night Letter
LCO = Deferred Cable
NLT = Cable Night Letter
WLT = Week-End Letter

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

PATRONS ARE REQUESTED TO FAVOR THE COMPANY BY CRITICISM AND SUGGESTION CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

CLASS OF SERVICE
This is a full-rate Telegram or Cablegram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable sign above or preceding the address.

WESTERN UNION

NEWCOMB CARLTON, PRESIDENT

J. C. WILLEVER, FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

12018

SIGNS
DL = Day Letter
NM = Night Message
NL = Night Letter
LCO = Deferred Cable
NLT = Cable Night Letter
WLT = Week-End Letter

The filing time as shown in the date line on full-rate telegrams and day letters, and the time of receipt at destination as shown on all messages, is STANDARD TIME.

Received at Senate Office Building, Delaware Ave. and "C" St. N. E. PHONE NATL. 3120
BRANCH 1111

FURTHER BELIEVE IT WOULD BE GREAT SERVICE TO PEACE OF
THE WORLD AND OUR OWN SAFETY FULFILLING SPIRIT KELLOGG
TREATY AND WASHINGTON AGREEMENT=

GEORGE B LOCKWOOD..

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

RESPONSIBLE FOR DEALING WITH THIS CABLE:

CABLEGRAM

COPIES TO:
 FILES
 CONFIRMATION
 CABLE SECRETARY
 CABLE BOOK

GEORGE LOCKWOOD

GEORGE LOCKWOOD

OCTOBER 5, 1931

NA13 49 SHANGHAI 750P OCT 4 1931

NAVOM (PLEASE FORWARD FOLLOWING MESSAGE IN ORDINARY LANGUAGE TO)
 GEORGE LOCKWOOD NATIONAL REPUBLIC WASHINGTON CONFIDENTIAL
 FORSEC NEWYORK

GRAVITY CHINA JAPAN RELATIONS INCREASING HOURLY THERE IS
 DANGER OF OVERTURN PRESENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN PREFERENCE
 SUBSTITUTE RADICAL GOVERNMENT DEMANDING WAR IN ALLIANCE
 WITH RUSSIA AS ONLY ALTERNATIVE STOP VERY GREAT DISAPPOINT-
 MENT CHINESE BECAUSE OF THE VERY WEAK ACTION LEAGUE OF
 NATIONS AND UNCERTAIN ATTITUDE AMERICAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DESPITE JAPAN VIOLATION OPEN DOOR POLICY WASHINGTON CONFERENC
 AGREEMENT KELLOGG PACT ALL OF WHICH ACKNOWLEDGED AMERICAN
 POLICY INVOLVED WE RECOMMEND YOUR URGING PRESIDENT TAKE
 STEPS IMMEDIATELY INSIST WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT DELAY JAPANESE
 SOLDIERS AND MAINTENANCE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT AT PRESENT
 EXISTING AND MAKE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

W W LOCKWOOD

0929
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

WALTER S. STEELE
GENERAL MANAGER

FRANK P. LITSCHERT
EDITOR

NATIONAL REPUBLIC

511 ELEVENTH STREET, NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON, D. C.

My dear
Senator Watson:

10/6/31

I have tried to get in touch with
you this a.m. but in vain - I am
enclosing cablegram received this
a.m. from Will Lockwood Far Eastern
Secy of the Int'l Y.M.C.A., Mr. Lockwood
is a brother of George & has been in
China as the Y.M.C.A. representative
for a number of years. He is a very
conservative type & therefore feel
that what he says is alarming, indeed.

Col. Geo. B. felt that you might
want to take this matter to the White
House with you tonight.

Resps

Steele

Have you been able to find time as
yet to see Mr. Lucas about
the matter George talked to
you about the other day?

0930

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr NARS, Date June 4, 1976

793.94/2031

October 13 1931.

793.94/2031

My dear Mr. President:

I have your letter of October 9, 1931, enclosing a letter addressed to you by Senator James E. Watson on October 8, 1931, with enclosures thereto, referring primarily to the Sino-Japanese situation in Manchuria.

I have read these communications with interest, and I am addressing an acknowledgment to Senator Watson.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

The President,
The White House.

793.94/2031
11/12/31

793.94/2031

FE: CBC: EMU:

10/12/31

RECEIVED
11/12/31
FE
HLS

D

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

October 12 1931.

In reply refer to
 FE 793.94/2031

My dear Senator Watson:

The President has referred to me your letter of October 8, 1931, enclosing two telegrams from Mr. George B. Lockwood of Muncie, Indiana, together with a letter from Mr. Walter S. Steele of the NATIONAL REPUBLIC transmitting a copy of a cablegram from Mr. W. W. Lockwood at Shanghai, relating primarily to the Sino-Japanese situation in Manchuria.

I am glad to receive the views expressed in these communications and I assure you that the situation referred to is continuing to receive solicitous and careful attention.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

The Honorable

James E. Watson,

United States Senate.

Oct. 12, 1931.

FE: CBC: EMU

10/12/31

W. W. Lockwood
 FE

SK

793.94/2031

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lynn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 10, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 7 a.m.

DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

737, October 10, 1 p.m.

Reuter report from Tokyo, ninth:

"While deploring the necessity of bombing
Chinchow, the Japanese Cabinet is reported to have
decided to recognize that the military authorities
were forced by the circumstances to act thus".

Two. Reuter report from Washington, October
ninth:

"President Hoover discussed the Manchurian
affair at meeting of the Cabinet today. No statement
was issued as to what was decided but there are
indications th t the United States Government will
seek to mobilize world opinion against further Sino
Japanese hostilities.

Colonel Stimson is giving the problem the whole
attention of the State Department and it is expected
that action will be taken shortly. While no definite
information is available it is explained that the
administration



*Rel to Peiping
file
EG.C.*

793.94/2032

FILED
1931-9-1-130

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

2-#737, From Peiping, October 10, 1931
1 p.m.

administration is not likely to make any active move
against Japan as such procedure would involve a sharp
note to Japan".

Three. Reuter report from Geneva, October ninth,
reads in part as follows:

"Senor Lerocoux (Spain), the Acting President of
the Council of the League, has summoned by telegraph all
the members of the Council to meet at noon October
thirteenth at the request of China's representative owing
to 'serious information received!.

JOHNSON

HPD

0934

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Syme NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

October 10, 1931.

793.94/2032

AMERICAN LEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA).

375

Confidential for the Minister. Your No. 737 of

12032

October 10, 1 p.m.

One. For a statement of the policy which the
Department is pursuing see the Department's No. 367, 2010A
October 7, 8 p.m.

Two. A full resume of your No. 727, 2016 October 8,
1 p.m., has been sent to Drummond at Geneva for his
confidential use.

Three. The Department is giving the situation,
in all its bearings, the closest attention and thought
along the lines of the third paragraph of the
communication sent to Drummond on October 5, as given
in the Department's No. 367, above referred to. 2010A

Repeat to Tokyo as Department's 193 as
confidential for the Chargé.

793.94/2032

12 OCT 1931

Stinson
WDC

FE:RSM:EJL

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-138

0935

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 or

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

October 9, 1931.

OCT 9 31

American Consul,

Geneva, Switzerland.

114
 You may give Drummond, for his discreet use confidential as to source, the following information received by the Department from Manchuria. We should be glad to know whether this information corresponds with other information in possession of the League.

(1) Officials at Changchun learned of the clash between Japanese and Chinese soldiers at Mukden at 12:15 a. m. on September 19th. At 3 a. m. the Japanese military commander sent 200 troops toward the barracks at Nanling, where there were about 3500 Chinese soldiers. The Japanese attacked at 5 a. m. and were later reinforced by 200 South Manchurian railway guards. The fighting ceased in the early afternoon, when most of the Chinese soldiers had fled. Japanese casualties were 42 killed and 52 wounded. The Chinese casualties were 180 dead, number of wounded unknown. The Japanese began fighting by a surprise attack. Their officials

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-138

793.94/2032A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

L 138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

Department of State

Washington,

American Consul, Geneva, page 2

their officials justify this action on the ground that they feared Chinese soldiers at Nanling, where there were 36 field pieces, would shell the Japanese settlement at Changchun when they learned of the Mukden incident. As this is only surmise the Japanese ^{were apparently} ~~do~~ not ~~feel~~ justified in making the attack unless for military reasons. Japanese troops withdrew from Nanling on the 20th, but a guard of 25 Japanese soldiers was sent to protect the property from looting. There seems to be no intention of occupying the barracks, but the Japanese do not permit Chinese or Russians to visit them.

(2) At the time when troops were sent to Nanling 300 Japanese troops were sent to attack the Chinese barracks at Kuanchengtze, the southern terminal of the Chinese Eastern Railway. These barracks contained about five or six hundred troops, in addition to police. Village and railway police surrendered as soon as the attack was made on the building where the regular soldiers slept. These soldiers resisted until 11 a. m. when the Japanese fired a three inch gun causing the Chinese to surrender.

Enciphered by _____

Japanese

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

American Consul, Geneva, page 3.

Japanese casualties were 23 killed and 33 wounded. Chinese reports indicate that about 35 Chinese were killed. The excuse is made that it was feared the troops might make an attack on the Japanese forces. The attack on these soldiers, whose duty it was to guard the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the village and the railway police seems to have been unjustifiable from the stand point of international law. The barracks partially destroyed are still under the control of Japanese soldiers, 20 of whom are stationed in the headquarters formerly occupied by the Chinese Eastern Railway police. The Japanese give no evidence that they intend to withdraw their troops at Kuanchengtze, where they are not needed to protect Japanese lives and property, there being no Japanese residents. It seems that their presence might act as an irritant to Soviet Russia. The Japanese military do not allow the Chinese Railway police to carry weapons of any sort.

(3) At 5 a. m. September 30th Japanese troops burned the barracks of the railway guards at Kirin. All three actions were apparently started by the Japanese military.

(4)

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 19761-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

American Consul, Geneva, page 4.

(4) The Japanese show no evidence of abandoning the airplane landing field constructed by them ^{there} since the clash outside the railway zone.

(5) The Japanese have not inaugurated a civil administration at Changchun, but the Japanese gendarmes control the city police and fly the Japanese flag over the headquarters police station in the native city. The Japanese military exercise control over the Chinese telephone and telegraph stations in the native city, which causes much loss to merchants there of all nationalities.

It is believed that the intelligent Chinese at Changchun oppose the Japanese although the unthinking masses are indifferent in regard to recent events. It would not appear that the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Nanling and Kuanchengtze and giving over the administration of the telephone and telegraph offices and the supervision of the Chinese police ^{in Changchun} would result in injury to Japanese lives or property.

(6) The radio station at Changchun has not been damaged, but the principal parts of its machinery have

been

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

American Consul, Geneva, page 5

been dismantled.

(7) The failure to withdraw troops seems to indicate a lack of purpose to restore the status quo ante.

Shinn
Wky

U WRC/AB

FE
Sk4
CR
ben
Oct. 5 1972 *DM*

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

094

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Division of
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 1 - 1936
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

October 10, 1931.

793.94

Dear Dr Hornblow,

I enclose with
a Berlin telegram in connec-
tion with the others I have
sent you, but it is of no
great interest in the present
position. I have no news
except from the papers. If
there is anything that you
could usefully tell me, I
would come & see you any
time, but perhaps you

793.94/2032

NI

FILED
1 1936

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

C O P Y.

Telegram from H. M. Ambassador at Berlin to Foreign Office, repeated to Washington and other interested missions October 9th:-

"German representatives in China and Japan will be instructed to counsel moderation 'in suitable terms' provided other representatives take similar action. Instruction giving such advice had been sent previously as a result of meeting at Geneva but suspended when it was discovered that they had not yet reached French Ambassador at Tokio.

No special representative is being sent to watch events but staff at Mukden is being strengthened by return of Consul and retention of Acting Consul Kuhlborn who speaks both Chinese and Japanese. Consulates at Mukden and Harbin have been instructed to report by telegraph on situation in supersession to previous strict instructions to send no telegrams for sake of economy.

Germany will be represented on October 14th (? "by" omitted) Herr von Mutius who has had experience in Far East and at Geneva, assisted by Baron von Schoen as expert in charge of Far Eastern Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Delay in furnishing above information which has just been obtained verbally is due to cabinet reconstruction and consequent pressure on Secretary of State."

0 9 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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Delay in furnishing above information which has just been obtained verbally is due to cabinet reconstruction and consequent pressure on Secretary of State."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date January 1, 1976

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRITISH EMBASSY,
 WASHINGTON.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JUL 1 - 1936
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS

October 10, 1931.

793.94

Dear Dr Harnack,

I enclose with
 a Berlin telegram in connec-
 tion with the others I have
 sent you, but it is of no
 great interest in the present
 position. I have no news
 except from the papers. If
 there is anything that you
 could usefully tell me, I
 would come & see you any
 time, but perhaps you

793.94/2032 1

2

FILED
 1 1936


F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

already letting the Foreign Office
know what you are doing through
the Embassy in London.

Yours sincerely

D. G. Johnson.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TOKYO

Dated October 10, 1931

Rec'd 9:50 a.m.

FROM

DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.



180, October 10, 6 p.m.

One. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just told me that the bulletin issued by the General Staff was not a Government pronouncement. He then said that two days ago the Chinese Minister had addressed a note to him suggesting that Chang, the Governor of Kirin, and Wang, the Governor of Hopei, should act as commissioners to restore peace and order in South Manchuria and take over the government of the places outside the railway zone occupied by the Japanese army. This proposal he had not accepted for the reason that these two men were also generals in the Manchuria army and Chang at least had had an active part in what fighting had taken place; consequently to turn the situation back to them would be merely to place matters where they had been before. He suggested to the Chinese Minister last night that instead independent commissioners be appointed on both sides to devise means for allaying the tension that existed, that they should lay down

793.94/2033

FILED
OCT 16 1931

0948

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

2 #180 from Tokyo, October 10,
1931, 6 p.m.

lay down a general plan for settling outstanding troubles
FROM
which would then be handled individually on their merits;
the Japanese would prefer to deal with China as a whole
and not with local units. I asked him if this note meant
that direct negotiations were started, he said that he
hoped so and would make every effort to settle matters.

Two. In reply to my question about the bombing
of Chinchow he said that the military authorities had
reported as follows:

Information had reached the Commanding General
that there was a large concentration of Chinese troops
in that vicinity and Japanese army planes had been sent
to make a reconnaissance. They had been fired at by
the Chinese troops and had replied by dropping bombs on
the barracks. He minimized the affair stating that it
was of no importance.

Three. I made no comment on the information he
gave me. I felt that inauguration of direct negotiations
was an indication of improvement in the situation. I
shall keep in touch with events and report further.

Repeated to Peiping.

NEVILLE

KLP

0947

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Gray
1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department

Charge to
\$ *4*

Washington, October 11, 1931

7 p.m.

AMEMBASSY

TOKYO

Your 180 October 10, 6 p.m. / *2033*

You will thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs for his reply to my questions. You will say to him in respect to his answer to the second question. QUOTE. The Secretary of State cannot understand how the bombing of Chinchow can be minimized or how it can be said to be of no importance. The explanation given by the Japanese Military authorities seems quite inadequate. Chinchow is ~~more than a hundred miles~~ *more than fifty miles* from the Japanese Railway Zone and is situated in territory where the Chinese have an entire right to maintain troops. The Secretary of State is at a loss to see what right Japanese military planes had to fly over the town, thereby provoking attack, ~~and~~ *and* to ~~respond by dropping~~ bombs. Casualties among civilians have been asserted by the Chinese to have taken place. Bombing of an unfortified and unwarned town is one of the most extreme of military actions, deprecated even in time of war. The Japanese military authorities are quoted in usually reliable press sources as asserting that this attack on Chinchow was intended to prevent Marshal Chang from establishing

793.94/2033

SKH

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

lishing his new capital at that place and resuming his authority in Manchuria.

Both of the foregoing reasons given in explanation of this attack would appear quite at variance with the commitments undertaken by the Japanese Government in respect to the resolution of September 30th of the Council of the League of Nations.

The Secretary of State is thus constrained to regard the bombing of Chinchow as of very serious importance and he would welcome any further information from the Minister for Foreign Affairs which would throw light on it. UNQUOTE. You may leave a memorandum of this statement with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Stinson
SCH

As instructed.
FE / SCH

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

0949

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington, October 11, 1931

793-94/2033
AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA

OCT 10 31

82

You may read (the following to Drummond) /

The Secretary has just telegraphed to the Embassy, Tokyo,
as follows: QUOTE Your 180 etc. / You will thank

(teleg.room copy remainder from text sent to Tokyo.) 2033 *Unq vote*

793.94/2033

Stinson
SKH

FE / SKH

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

0950

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

793.94/2033

M
S
U
FE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 10, 1931.

File
E.F.C.

Manchuria Situation.

Taken with the fact that the Japanese Army is in control, by occupation, of South Manchuria and has announced that it does not expect to withdraw its forces within the Railway Zone, this statement makes the situation as follows: Japan (i.e., the Japanese state or nation as a political entity, regardless of its constitutional structure or the location therein of effective authority), with one arm, the Army, has occupied Manchuria, declines to withdraw, has destroyed the Chinese Administration and prevents the Chinese from setting up a new Administration; and, that situation prevailing and continuing, expects with another arm, the Foreign Office, to hold off the powers and induce China to accept such terms of settlement as may be offered.

793.94/2033

Query: Whether or not this be "recourse to war as an instrument of the national policy", it would seem to be an attempt at "settlement or solution" of a "dispute or conflict" by other than "peaceful means" (see Pact for the Renunciation of War, Article II).

FILED
OCT 22 1931

Tolson 180
SKH/ZMF

793.94/2033

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

FE

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY


Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated October 10, 1931

Rec'd 5:45 a.m.

RECEIVED
 OCT 10 1931
 DIVISION OF



*Rel. to General
 File
 E.G.C.*

F/
 793.94/2034

*793.94
 note*

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

735, October 10, 11 a.m.

Following telegram has been received from
 Hanson and Salisbury via Harbin.

"October 9, 8 a.m. Arrived in Tunhua yesterday evening, shall leave this morning at 10:30 for Kirin. Japanese soldiers withdrew from Tunhua and Kirin -- Tunhua Railway on October 5th two days after our arrival at Changchun. Shall leave Kirin for Changchun early tomorrow morning".

Repeated to Tokio.

JOHNSON

KLP

*123 H 194
 123 203*

FILED
 OCT 16 1931

0952

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

October 10, 1931.

793.94
AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

79
Department's 74, October 9, 7 p.m.

You may inform Drummond under conditions stated in previous telegram that we are informed that Japanese soldiers withdrew from Tunhua and the Kirin-Tunhua Railway on October fifth, two days after arrival of observers at Changchun.

Stinson

Sick

793.94/2034

FE RSM:LM

FE

793.94/2034

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh

GRAY VIA NR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED CANTON

FE

Dated Oct. 11, 1931

FROM

Rec'd. 5.05 pm

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

PRIORITY

October 11, 8 pm

*Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 12 1931
 Department of State*

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I. *89c*

743-94

Serious rioting by students occurred last night

following detention by police of soldier who intimidated
 shopkeeper selling Japanese goods. Students attacked
 police station and police fired upon mob. Tense situation
 prevails in the city today and one newspaper issued extra
 charging police with responsibility for numerous casualties.

Commissioner of Public Safety informed me martial law
 will be proclaimed this evening as evidence has been found
 of a communist plot to make trouble. He is confident of
 his ability to maintain order but extra police have been
 placed around Shameen to prevent any incident involving
 foreigners and the concession. British authorities are
 also preparing for emergencies. USS HELENA is in port.
 Although I anticipate no danger to Americans I am advising
 them to refrain from going abroad at night.

Repeated

*F/94
 793.94/2035*

OCT 1 6 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh #2 of Oct 11 from Canton

Repeated to the Department, Nanking, Legation.

BALLANTINE

KLP

0955

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh

TELEGRAPH RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE GENEVA

OCT 14 1931
FROM
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Dated Oct. 11, 1931

Rec'd. 4.33 pm

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 12 1931
Department of State

793.94
OCT 12 1931
F/E

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

177, October 11, 4 pm

Consulate's 171, October 11, 2 pm

Drummond has handed me for communication to you the following message from the German Government dated October 10, which has been circulated to members of the Council:

"In conformity with paragraph nine of the resolution of the Council I have the honor to communicate to you the following information which comes from the German Legation at Peiping, with the request that you transmit it to the Council of the League of Nations:

The consulate at Mukden telegraphs on October 9 that the number of the Japanese troops has not changed; their distribution changes every day; since quite recently the troops are frequently concentrated in the camps and replaced by the Japanese gendarmerie and by Chinese police agents.

In order

793.94/2036

OCT 17 1931
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh #2 of No. 177 from Geneva

In order to combat fugitive soldiers and bandits, expeditions
take place almost every day on Chinese territory; every day
airplanes reconnoiter towards the west and even drop bombs
when, as affirmed on the part of the Japanese, they are
attacked. For the moment no definite information can be
obtained here concerning events at Chinchow because all
communications are disturbed."

GILBERT

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh

TELEGRAM RECEIVED PLAIN

PEIPING VIA NR

FROM

Dated Oct. 10, 1931

Rec'd. 4.25 am 11th

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

740, October 10, 8 am


PRIORITY

Following received en clair from Acting Minister of

Foreign Affairs, Nanking, dated October ninth:

"His excellency, Nelson Trusler Johnson, American
 Minister, Peiping.

While the Chinese Government is making every exertion
 to fulfill its undertakings given in its reply to the recent
 note of the American Government and to the communication from
 the President of the Council of the League of Nations to pro-
 tect the Japanese residents and do nothing to aggravate the
 present situation pending its solution before the Council of
 the League of Nations, the Japanese militarists committed
 yesterday another act of war by the bombardment by twelve
 military airplanes of Chinchow, outside the so-called South
 Manchuria Railway zone, where the provincial government had
 been transferred.



F/

793.94/2037

FILED

OCT 14 6 31 PM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh #2 of No. 740 from Peiping

been transferred after the occupation of Shenyang. The attack resulted in many casualties including one foreign professor as well as considerable damage to property and particularly to the University Building lodging the temporary provincial headquarters.

As. Chinchow is strongly held by the Chinese garrison the situation has become exceedingly grave. The Chinese Government has telegraphed to Geneva asking the Council of the League of Nations to take urgent measures for the conservation of peace and inviting an immediate visit to Chinchow from the League's missions for investigation and report on them for the Council's meeting on October 14 or earlier should the Council so decide. The Chinese Government will be grateful if the American Government should delegate a person or persons to participate in the work of the League's mission and if this request could be treated as one extreme urgency in view of the seriousness of the situation, which the Chinese Government does not wish to disguise. The Chinese Government reposes entire confidence in the support of the American Government. (signed) Chinglun Frank Lee, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs".

JOHNSON

KLP

0959

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clayton S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

May
 1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department

Department of State

OR
 Charge to
 \$

Washington,

October 13, 1931.

30

793.94/2037

AMERICAN CONSUL

NANKING (China).

91 For the Minister. /2037

Legation's 740, October 10, 8 a.m. /2036

In view of your 748, October 12, 8 p.m., you are
 authorized in reply to inform the Acting Minister of
 Foreign Affairs that the American Government is
 expecting momentarily to receive from American official
 sources a full report with regard to the incident at
 Chinchow.

Stimson

793.94/2037

793.94/2037

SKH
 FE:MMH/VDM

FE

Oct. 13, 1931, ...

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Long NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

GENEVA

Dated Oct. 11, 1931

FROM

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

171, October 11, 2 pm

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 12 1931
Department of State

Rec'd. 12.30 pm
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 12 1931
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Drummond has handed me for communication to you the

following message from the British Government, dated
October 10, which has been circulated to members of the
Council:

"Report dated October 6 from Mukden states that points
outside railway zone still occupied by Japanese forces are:

- (one) Mukden, no material change since September 19
except that two gates, only of walled city, are now
occupied; (two) Kirin, one or two battalions; (three)
Tunhoy, no definite information; (four) Chulinho, twenty-
nine miles west of Mukden and Sirmin, between 350 and 400
men; (five) Tienchuanantai, twelve miles north of Newchwang,
one company, Taona, 36 men. In addition Japanese armored
trains operating along southern (#) 41 miles from Mukden

Hailed

FILED
OCT 17 1931

793-94
note
843.0146

793.94/2038

0961
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh #2 of No. 171 ~~from~~ Geneva

Hailun and along line west from Supinauai to Tunghiao. This
is not definitely confirmed."

There is apparently an omission after word "southern",
but text is being transmitted as given to me.

GILBERT

klp

(#) apparent omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh

TELEGRAM RECEIVED GREEN

GENEVA

FROM



Dated Oct. 11, 1931

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

174, October 11, 7 pm

Consulate's 172, October 11, 6 pm, paragraph 3



F 793.94/2039

Drummond has handed me for communication to you the following message from the Chinese Government, dated October 10, which has been circulated to the members of the Council:

"Chinese Minister in Tokyo notified Japanese Government on October 6, that Chang Tsohsiang and Wang Shu Chang appointed representatives to take over places to be evacuated by Japanese military forces and asked for telegraphic instructions to be sent to Japanese military commanders to begin handing over. No reply received up to date.

Chinese Minister is instructed to deliver second note as follows:

"Fulfillment of Council resolution September 30th requires immediate transfer to Chinese authorities of localities occupied by Japanese troops since September 18th. The Chinese Government having pledged itself to assume

responsibility

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh #2 of No. 174 from Geneva

responsibility for safety of lives and property Japanese nationals during process of withdrawal of Japanese troops and reestablishment local Chinese authorities and police forces notified Japanese Government October 6 of appointment of its representatives and asked it to make immediate arrangements to enable Chinese troops effectively to take possession of evacuated localities and thus to protect lives and property of residents in conformity with its undertaking given at Council. As no reply received and the matter extremely urgent, I am instructed to request, one, that the Japanese Government indicate immediate localities to be taken over this week, two, that in the course of the day instructions be telegraphed to military commanders so that re-occupation can begin tomorrow."

GILBERT

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh
A portion of this TELEGRAM RECEIVED
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated Oct. 11, 1931

FROM

Rec'd. 4.20 pm

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

175, October 11, 8 pm


Drummond has handed me the following message from an informant in Tientsin on whose judgment he says he places the greatest reliance. In giving it to me he stated that he "feared it was true".

(GREEN) The position here appears to be as follows:

"The Japanese are prolonging their occupation and exerting themselves to provoke incidents so as to give a pretext for taking much stronger action. It looks as though they would succeed but even if they fail there is no hope of avoiding anarchy, war and probably both unless the Council adopts a much more definite attitude in support of China". (END GREEN)

GIBBERT

KLP



793.94/2040

FILED
OCT 16 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED PEIPING

Dated Oct. 11, 1931

SION OF

Rec'd. 4.25 am

SECRETAR OF STATE

WASHINGTON

739, October 11, 10 am

Following from Hanson and Salisbury at Harbin:

"October 10, 2 pm. Returned from Kirin City this morning."

Repeated to Tokio.

JOHNSON

KLP



FILED

1931.11.13

793.94/2041

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clayton S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

rh
This message must be closely
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone.

GENEVA

FROM

Dated Oct. 11, 1931

Rec'd. 3.10 pm

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

VERY URGENT

172, October 11, 6 pm

One. I have made available to Drummond the information
conveyed in your telegram No. 74, October 9, 7 pm.

Two. With respect to your inquiry whether the informa-
tion you have furnished corresponds with other information
in the possession of the League, he wishes me to say that he
is sending you all that comes to him. You will note from
what you are receiving that what you have furnished is much
more complete and far reaching than anything which he has
yet at his disposal and thus that a checking in any detail
has not yet become a practical question. He has already sent
you information from the British Government, (Consulate's
171, October 11, 2 pm). He expects much more from that
source and also has hopes of getting something from other
Governments, particularly the French and German.

He will send

Del. to Geneva
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DIVISION OF
OCT 12 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Department of State

793.94/2042

FILED
OCT 13 1931

rh #2 of No. 172 from Geneva

He will send you everything he has as rapidly as it comes in.

Three. Drummond wishes me to say that he highly appreciates the information which you have sent him, which is of great assistance to him personally but he feels that its value would be enormously enhanced if he were at liberty to communicate the facts either confidentially or otherwise to the members of the Council, particularly as so many foreign ministers are likely to be present at the forthcoming special meeting. He feels that coordination and comparison of reports from all sources will be of the utmost help in the deliberations and discussions of the meeting.

Four. He then discussed his position as Secretary General of the League in relation to a matter of this character. He pointed out that his position was in no way analagous to that of a Foreign Minister. In a relationship between governments and the League, he is in effect no more than an agency for transmission. Thus an exchange of information with him alone is in no way tantamount to exchanging it with the Council or with Council members. With reference to this valuable information from you, he is thus handicapped in employing

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh #3, of No. 172 from Geneva

in employing it in any practical way while restrained by the injunction that he must not reveal its source. In communicating it to anyone the source of such information would be the first question asked him. From the nature of his reply it would either not be given due weight or its source would be surmised. In the latter case he might be put in the position of seeming to breach Consulate's confidence. He said that there were three ways in which factual information from neutral sources as to the situation in Manchuria might be made use of. These in the order of their effectiveness are :

- (a) Circulation to members of the Council and made public.
- (b) Members of the Council confidentially informed.
- (c) Made known to the members of the so called committee of five for their confidential use.

Five. He said that he trusted that you would understand the spirit in which he is making his position in this matter known to you, and that he solicited your assistance in any way in which you felt it possible give it.

Six.

0965
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

rh #4 of No. 172 from Geneva

Six. I wish to make clear to you that in the foregoing I am transmitting Drummond's views as he expressed them to me.

GILBERT

KLP

0970

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

October 12, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

Your 172, October 11, 6 p.m.

Please explain to Drummond that my observers are officers of the Foreign Service who have been specially trained for service in China and in Japan respectively, and who are assigned to posts in those countries respectively. I have sent them into Manchuria on a delicate mission to observe and to report facts as they see them to the American Government. Their reports necessarily are coming in piecemeal as they gather the facts, and they themselves are moving about continuing their observations and sending in data as they gather it. Disclosure of what they report from day to day would add to the difficulty of their work, might place them in danger, would place an unnecessary obstacle in the way of their obtaining the maximum amount of accurate information, and might impair their ultimate usefulness in the countries where they serve. I feel that it is perfectly possible to compare data material from various sources without labeling or disclosing the sources. Reports from different observers will doubtless agree in some particulars

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____.

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/2042

793-94
 83
 Confidential
 2042

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 19761-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAINCollect
Charge Department
on
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

and disagree in others. Disclosure of sources to numerous groups, such as the Council, would tend to induce controversy. I therefore feel that, as my observers are working primarily for the information of the American Government, and in the light of the above considerations, I am, in making it available to Sir Eric for confidential use without disclosure of source, going as far with it as for the present I feel warranted in doing.



CR
Oct. 12 1941 1043
Am

FE:SKH/ZMF FE
Enciphered by SKH
Sent by operator SKH, 19

0972

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

M
FE

rh
This telegram must be closely
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GENEVA

FROM

Dated Oct. 11, 1931

Rec'd. 10.20 am

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

URGENT

176, October 11, 3 pm



F

793.94/2043

I beg to inquire whether the Secretary will talk with
me on the telephone some time tomorrow Monday. If so, at
what hour and will the call be initiated at Washington or
Geneva?

Gilbert

KLP

793.94

FILED

OCT 19 1931

0973

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington, October 11, 1931

5 p.m.

793-94/2043
AMERICAN CONSUL
GENEVA

NOV 10 31

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

80.
Your 176, October 11, 3 p.m. / 2043

Secretary or Undersecretary will talk with you on /
telephone on Monday 10 a.m. Washington time. Will put in /
call from here.

Stinson
Sick

793.94/2043

FE / Sick

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

0974

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

th
This message must be closely
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone.

GENEVA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED Dated Oct. 10, 1931

Rec'd. 8.40 pm


SECRETARY OF STATE

FROM

WASHINGTON

170, October 10, 9 pm

Department's telegram 73, October 9, 6 pm



I handed a memorandum embodying a paraphrase of your
message to Drummond this afternoon.

This is being transmitted confidentially to the Council.

Drummond wishes to point out, however, that there now exists
the danger of such information becoming known either in its
textual or distorted form (see Consulate's 161, October 7,
3 pm, paragraph four). This is mentioned to the Department
as the Department may wish to take it into consideration.

GILBERT

KLP



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793.94/2044

793.94

FILED
OCT 11 1931

0975

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

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 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 or
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington, October 11, 1931

6 p.m.

743 AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA

OCT 10 31

81 Your 170 October 10, 9 p.m. 2044

The Department is releasing to the Press a statement
 that on October 9 the Secretary of State sent to the Ameri-
 can Consulate at Geneva for communication to the Secretary,
 General, of the League of Nations a message, as follows;
 and there follows the text of the message as authorized,
 in Department's 173, October 9, 6 p.m.

Stinson
Sick

793.94/2044

FE/Sick

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

GRAY

RECEIVED

PEIPING

FROM

Dated October 10, 1931

Rec'd 12:05 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 12 1931
Department of State

OCT 12 1931

738, October 10, 6 p.m.

Paragraph No. 2 of the Department's 364, October 7,

5 p.m., repeated to Mukden, which has replied as follows:

"October 10, 11 a.m. This Consulate General has in-
formed orally the Japanese Consulate General, in response
to its oral and written requests, made on behalf of the
Japanese military authorities, that it does not consider
the present situation justifies the Japanese request for
a copy of agreement between a Chinese Government admin-
istration and an American corporation. The Japanese
Consulate General has been informed further that the
Radio Corporation's interest in the physical plant is
based upon the effect which damage to the plant would
have upon the operation of its traffic agreement. The
Japanese Consulate General yesterday unofficially in-
formed Vincent that a telegram received from the Legation
Foreign

F/p

793.94/2045

OCT 12 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Thomas S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

2- #738, from Peiping, October 10,
1931

Foreign Office for transmission to Japanese military authorities would hasten the reestablishment of service".

Two. Legation has replied as follows:

"October 10, 5 p.m. Your October 10, 11 a.m. Being repeated the Department. Your telegram fails to state but Legation assumes that your reported conversations with the Japanese took place prior to receipt of Department's instructions transmitted in the Legation's October 9, 11 a.m., which provides for reference of any inquiries regarding radio station to the Department prior to any reply by your office."

Three. Above transmitted in the Legation's October 10, 5 p.m., to Tokyo "for its information pending receipt of Department's further instruction".

Four. Department's instructions are requested.

JOHNSON

0978

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 Charge Department

OR
 Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

may
 1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

OCT 12 31

October 10, 1931.

793-94 / 2045
 AMERICAN LEGATION,
 PEIPING (CHINA).

389

Your 738 October 10, 6 p.m. / 2045

Instruct Mukden promptly to inform the Department of any new developments bearing upon the statement of the Japanese Consulate General reported in last sentence of Mukden's telegram of October 10, 11 a.m. to the Legation, or upon any other phase of the question, and to take no new steps in relation to this matter without first ^{informing} ~~reporting to~~ the Department and requesting instructions; also to transmit ^{full} ~~a~~ report by mail despatch.

793.94/2045

Stop

1234
 FE:RSM:LM

1234
 FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

GENEVA

Dated October 11, 1931

Rec'd 7 p. m.


Secretary of State,
Washington.

173, October 11, 6 p. m.

One. The following is the substance of a message received by Drummond from the same source cited in Consulate's 159, October 7, 11 a. m. Source thus should be kept confidential.

(GREEN). A. Airplane bombardments of Chenchowfue absolutely indefensible as it is outside of railway zone and is held by reliable troops of Marshal Chang. Japanese cannot plead in justification that their planes were attacked by. (?) troops inasmuch as Japan agreed that Chinese troops should occupy points necessary to restore order and that thus such troops were legitimately in occupation.

B. A demand will be made that a neutral commission be sent immediately to Chenchowfue. If this be not complied with



0980

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #173, from Geneva, October 11, 1931
6 p. m.

with Chinese will lose faith in intentions of Western Powers.

C. In view of provocative acts by Japan, Chinese Government could not maintain itself if it attempted to reprove or to prevent popular demonstrations but it is exerting itself to the utmost to exercise control. In this situation in which the Chinese Government is faced by appalling obstacles liable at any moment to cause its overthrow, it is only receiving "counsels of perfection" from the Western Powers. Although those Powers are identified with the maintenance of the present political status in the Far East they are giving the Chinese Government but little support and small evidence of understanding. Control by the Chinese Government of popular temper depends on the attitude and the action of the Powers. It is considered particularly significant that no Minister of any great power has left Peiping for Nanking.

D. While there is every desire on the part of the Chinese Government to reach an understanding with the
reasonable

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

3- #173, from Geneva, Oct. 11, 1931,
 6 p. m.

reasonable elements of Japan, the Japanese Government is not affording any assistance to the Chinese Government to maintain itself nor are the Powers putting any pressure on Japan to that end.

E. There is no evidence whatsoever of any processes toward complete withdrawal by the Japanese.

F. The Japanese have left unanswered the Chinese note asking that arrangements be made for the taking over by the Chinese of responsibility for the safety of Japanese lives and property in the places outside of the railway zone as they are evacuated. (END GREEN).

Two. Drummond regards the foregoing as indicative of the course China will take before the Council in the statement of their case and in their line of argument.

Three. With reference to one D. above, Drummond feels that if it be true that the Japanese have not answered such a note or are long in answering it the Chinese have a strong point.

Four. I have just learned that a Chinese note to the League in the sense of one B. above is being sent by the Chinese to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

4- #173, from Geneva, Oct. 11, 1931,
6 p. m.

the Chinese to Washington.

Five. Drummond feels that the note of the Japanese of October 9 is a statement of their entire position. I learn that it is available to you from your 72, October 9, 4 p. m., so I will not refer to it here.

GILBERT

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated October 11, 1931

Rec'd 10:40 p.m.

file
W 1931
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 12 1931
 Department of State

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

178, October 11, 9 p.m.

Drummond has handed me for communication to you the following communication from the British Government respecting the situation in Manchuria based upon a telegram from Peiping dated October 9th.

"Consul General, Tientsin, has been informed by Mr. Thompson of Peiping-Mukden Railway that University buildings at Chinchow, which is present seat of Provincial Government, were bombed by twelve Japanese airplanes at 1:30 p.m. yesterday. Between thirty and forty bombs are reported to have been dropped. Foreign engineer states that locomotive shed at Chinchow was hit and five men killed and fifteen wounded".

GILBERT

HPD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 OCT 11 1931
 DIVISION OF
 WESTERN AFFAIRS
 793.94/2047

FILED
 OCT 17 1931

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0984

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 12 1931
DIVISION OF
OPERATIONS AND RECORDS
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
October 10, 1931.
file 295

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI.

Manchuria.

593-94
Division of
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 12 1931
Department of State

The Japanese Ambassador came in and I told him that I was very profoundly disturbed at the situation which had developed in Manchuria. I told him that in considering the original coup of September 18th in Manchuria, I had been reassured, not only by the Ambassador's explanation that this did not represent his government, but by the Resolution of September 30th of the League of Nations, which both China and Japan had consented to, under which the Japanese were to withdraw as soon as possible into the railway zone and the Chinese were to protect Japanese nationals. I read him the provisions. I said that now events have occurred which indicated that these commitments were likely to be repudiated. I referred to the bombing of Chinchow and I referred to the statement of the General Staff that they would not withdraw to the railway zone. I then read to the Ambassador the questions which I had telegraphed to Baron Shidehara through Neville, and he asked me if I had received an answer. I told him that

I

793.94/2048

0985

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By William S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

I had but that answer did not reassure me, and I then read the contents to him, emphasizing particularly the statement of Baron Shidehara that the affair of the bombing was a matter of no importance. The Ambassador did not attempt to defend that. He said at once that it was a matter of great importance. I said it was a matter of great importance in this country. I pointed out that Baron Shidehara's objection to Chang, the Governor of Kirin, and Wang, the Governor of Hopei, had given me the unfortunate impression that Baron Shidehara did not differ from the accounts that were appearing in the press to the effect the army made up his mind not to permit the resumption by the young Marshal Chang of the government which he had formerly exercised in Manchuria and I pointed out that this seemed to me to be a complete departure from the policy of the Resolution of September 30th. The Ambassador said he could make no answer to this, but he was quite sure that Baron Shidehara did not minimize the bombing incident or regard it as of no importance. I then read to him the article by Hugh Byas in the TIMES, reporting that the Cabinet had met yesterday and substantially indicated that they regarded it as of not sufficient importance to resign. I asked him to convey
to

098F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

to Baron Shidehara my position as above stated and I resummarized it to the effect that I had been reassured by the commitments of the Resolution of September 30th, and I was now greatly disturbed by these events, including Baron Shidehara's answer to my questions, as well as the other news from Manchuria which indicated that those commitments were going to be violated. He said he would report that to Baron Shidehara and begged me not to do anything in the meanwhile. I said I could make no such commitment - that I must retain full liberty of action, as matters were changing too rapidly. I told him that the League was going to meet next week and that we should undoubtedly follow the policy which we had already initiated of cooperating with the League on this matter.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

0987

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
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Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-128
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,
 October 13, 1931.

793-94
 AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

86
 Department's Your 180 October 11, 4 p.m.
 multimeter photograph.
 Discuss in strict confidence with Drummond the

following:

The greatest obstacle in the way of inducing China and Japan to enter into negotiations between themselves seems to be that, although the Japanese, the stronger party, profess willingness to negotiate, the Chinese, the weaker party, feeling at a disadvantage because of disparity of strength and loss in position already incurred in the course of developments in the current encounter, are so apprehensive regarding the concessions which they would be forced to make that they feel quite unable to enter into a negotiation with the Japanese alone.

I have a suggestion to offer, in strictest confidence. I should like to have Sir Eric consider it and, if he finds any virtue in it, make it his own idea and do what he may be able to do with it. When China and Japan were contending over the Shantung question as it stood after the Peace Conference, the Chinese were afraid and declined to negotiate

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/2049

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128 TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

- 2 -

Washington,

with the Japanese until finally it was arranged that they should negotiate in the presence of friendly observers. Then, during the period of the Washington Conference, with the help of Mr. Balfour and Mr. Hughes and in the presence of and with the aid of representatives of those delegates ~~of Great Britain and the United States respectively~~, they succeeded in negotiating and concluding an agreement.

It occurs to me that in the present situation it would be warrantable to suggest that Chinese and Japanese representatives meet in the presence of friendly observers and, in such presence, at least make the attempt to adjust their differences and come to an agreement. Such a suggestion, if and when put forward as a proposal, should, I feel, originate within and be made by the Council, for the reasons, first, that this whole problem is being dealt with in fact, and rightly, primarily by the League and, second, that, coming from that source it would be received with less initial resentment by one at least of the disputants than would be the case if it were put forward by the American Government or were known to have been conceived in this country.

I should like to have Sir Eric's views on this and
 Enciphered by _____ if he should see fit to make it his own he may go ahead

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Washington,

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with it and may be assured that if and when the Council
 chooses to suggest such a procedure I will give its sugges-
 tion my support.

I enjoin upon him absolute secrecy with regard to the
 fact of my having submitted this idea for his consideration.

Stinson
WLY

WLY

Oct. 28, 1972 10¹⁵
MB

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

SKH

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0990

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

7-23-94
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 12, 1931.

Mr. Castle:

This is the telegram which was drafted
as part two of what we were considering on
Saturday.

12049
Gilbert's incoming telegram of this
morning, 180, attached, brings nearer the
moment when we should decide.

Gilbert thinks the Council will continue
to recommend negotiation between the two
parties. I think the Chinese have made it
clear that they are so fearful regarding the
outcome of such negotiations that they will
not be able to agree thereto -- unless they
are offered some kind of supervisory protection.

See 793.94/2057
SKH/ZMF

SKH

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Zygm NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 13 1931
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Gen'l
Dated Oct 11, 1931
Rec'd 10:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

VERY URGENT

OCT 13 1931
Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 12 1931
Department of State

180, October 11, 11 p.m.

The meeting of the Council summoned for October 13 noon will deal solely with the Sino-Japanese question (Council resolution paragraph eight Consulate's 150 October 1, 9 a.m.) (END GREEN)

From my observations I am of the opinion that the following will be the policy of it. Council will endeavor to pursue:

Discussion as to the causes is quite beside the question now. To enter into a discussion as to causes might raise issues by which the Chinese or Japanese could seek an avenue of escape from their present commitments. Everything must be focused on the Japanese undertaking to withdraw ^{to} within the railway zone and on the Chinese undertaking to safeguard Japanese lives and property as the Japanese evacuate points outside of the railway zone.

The foregoing also holds good respecting question of reparations

793.94/2049

OCT 10 1931

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

2-180, From ~~Peiping~~, October 11, 1931
11 p.m.

of reparations or of any settlement of the Manchurian question as a whole.

If developments in the Council shape themselves as it is hoped, it is anticipated that the Council may be able to say that as soon as evacuation has taken place and undertakings fulfilled by both parties, the Council will recommend that the procedure for a settlement of other outstanding questions affecting the two parties to the dispute shall be negotiated between themselves.

Note. It is felt that this attitude of the Council may serve as a face saving device for the Japanese who thus may be able to feel that "once they are out" they will be able to begin direct negotiations with the Chinese Government.

GILBERT

CSB

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

THE UNDER SECRETARY
OCT 14 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 13, 1931.

Tokyo Embassy's despatch No. 335 of September 26, 1931, hereunder, supplements recent telegrams reporting movements of Japanese forces in Manchuria.

The Chargé thinks that, as stated in his telegram No. 157 of September 22, the military acted on the night of September 18 without the knowledge of the Foreign Office, which being faced with a fait accompli did its best to check further aggressive movement by the military.

The Chargé was informed orally that the Foreign Office had just about reached a settlement of this question when the present situation developed. His informant stated further that in his opinion the troubles in Manchuria were largely due to economic depression.

Another possible reason for the acts of the military, held by a number of thinking Japanese, is the approaching disarmament conference, the campaign of propaganda on the part of the military

being

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Thomas A. Ryan NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

being apparently for the purpose of instilling in the minds of the people the need of maintaining Japanese land forces at their present strength.

There has appeared in the Japanese press no comment adverse to the action of the Japanese military in Manchuria. The press was unanimous in the view that the army acted within treaty rights and that, had prompt measures not been taken, further outrages might have been committed by the Chinese. The press did not welcome the suggestion of the League of Nations regarding a joint investigation commission.

The attitude of the United States has been dealt with editorially in an appreciative vein. It is felt that the Government of the United States understands the situation but it is regretted that Washington was influenced by the League to the extent of addressing identical notes to the Governments of Japan and China.

RSM
RSM:EJL

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
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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lynam NARS, Date June 1, 1976



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

EE

No. 235



Tokyo, September 26, 1931.

OCT 10 31



Copy in FE

793.94

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to supplement briefly my recent telegrams reporting the movements of Japanese forces in certain places in Manchuria.

Since the receipt at Tokyo on the morning of September 19th of reports of the military action, I have of course kept in constant touch with officials of the Foreign Office and, through the Military Attache, with the War Department. During my initial conversations

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OCT 14 1931

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 4, 1976

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with the Foreign Office I could not but feel, as I stated in my telegram No. 157 of September 22, 5 p.m., that the Foreign Office and probably other branches of the Japanese Government were genuinely surprised by the action of the Army at this time. I felt, also, that the Foreign Office was not inconsiderably dismayed by the Army's contravention of Baron Shidehara's conciliatory policy toward China. That there existed a divergence of views between the War Department and the Foreign Office seems further borne out by the fact that on Monday, the 21st, a Cabinet meeting was held which lasted for seven hours and following which there occurred no new forward movements of importance by the Japanese forces in Manchuria. I am not in a position to obtain definite information on this point, but it seems entirely possible that the Foreign Office, being presented by the military with a fait accompli, did its utmost - and apparently with success - to check any further aggressive movement by the military. That the military acted on the night of September 18th, without the knowledge of the Foreign Office seems also to be indicated by various other circumstances which I shall discuss later in this despatch.

It is scarcely credible that the destruction by Chinese of tracks of the South Manchuria Railway was more than the immediate cause of the action of the Japanese forces. The real motives of the Japanese military are, I believe, considerably more profound than this relatively minor incident which has had a counterpart more than once in the past without so serious an effect. Previous to the incident there were indications for some time of increasing

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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irritation on the part of certain sections of the Japanese, including the military, at the apparent intransigence of Chinese officials, soldiery, and citizens. The Japanese Government, for example, has been unable, in spite of serious efforts, to reach a solution with the Chinese of important problems deeply affecting Japanese interests in Manchuria, such as the construction of railways by the Chinese allegedly in contravention of existing agreements, the problem of land rights, taxation, Koreans in Manchuria and the boycott of Japanese goods. Regrettable occurrences, furthermore, that create ill-feeling between Chinese and Japanese in Manchuria, have happened in recent months with increasing frequency. The most serious recent incident of this sort in the eyes of the Japanese military was undoubtedly the killing by Chinese soldiers of a Japanese staff officer, Captain Nakamura, and his two companions on June 27th (Embassy's despatch No. 324 of September 12, 1931). This incident, I feel confident, further incensed the Japanese. A part of their indignation was directed toward the conciliatory policy of Baron Shidehara. Subsequently it was shown that the Foreign Office did not view this incident eye to eye with the War Department and I was informed orally that the Foreign Office had just about reached a settlement of this question when the present situation developed. It appears to me reasonable to suppose that the Japanese military seized upon the recent destruction of the tracks as an opportunity to create a situation which would force a general liquidation of outstanding issues, at least in Manchuria. With strategic points under its control, the

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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military probably believed that the Japanese bargaining power would be considerably enhanced.

Dissatisfaction with Baron Shidehara's conciliatory policy has been noticeable for some time, particularly among those Japanese most closely in touch with Manchuria. This is not surprising since it is usual for residents of any frontier area to be dissatisfied with the policies of the central government. It is not unnatural therefore, to suppose that the Japanese military in Manchuria have been susceptible to the same influences and opinions. An example of this sort was recently brought to my attention by an official of the Foreign Office which, although it does not relate directly to the military, is, I believe, pertinent. In July delegates of Japanese Chambers of Commerce in China met in Tokyo at the invitation of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, delegates from Manchuria coming in force. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Finance attended, by invitation, one of the meetings and listened to many bitter complaints regarding the Government's policy. The burden of these complaints was apparently that the Chinese are very troublesome and that the Japanese are making no money. The Foreign Minister, in reply, stated that scarcely any organization in the world is making money and gave as an example the cut of dividends by railway companies throughout the world, pointing out that the South Manchuria Railway Company could not hope to escape, especially with the bean market so depressed. The official who related this to me brought out an interesting point in this connection: these delegates apparently did not realize that when in

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By Harold S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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elsewhere in Manchuria and China they are in a foreign country and cannot expect to compete permanently with the Chinese on their own ground, that the Chinese may some day redeem the South Manchuria Railway, and that their position is purely an economic one. He stated further that in his opinion the troubles in Manchuria, (and to some extent elsewhere in China), the mutual irritability, the bandits, and other evidences of unstable conditions are due largely to economic depression. It seems probable that the viewpoint of the Japanese military in Manchuria is not much different from that of these delegates.

A further possible reason for the action of the military, a reason which I hesitate to suggest, although I am aware that a number of thinking Japanese hold this view, is the approaching Disarmament Conference. As the Embassy has reported from time to time, the Japanese Government in its campaign for economy has been unable to do much with regard to the expenditures of the War Department (Despatch No. 223 of May 9, 1931). The War Department may be wholly sincere in its contention that its expenditures cannot be reduced without endangering the national safety. It is possible that the Army regards both Russia and China with genuine anxiety, especially as the Russians have recently strengthened their Far Eastern army, while local conditions in Manchuria are so unsettled that they might give legitimate cause for apprehension. Before the occurrence of the recent action in Manchuria, I understand, the War Department had decided to transfer permanently

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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from Japan Proper one division to Chosen and to make the division in the Kwantung Leased Territory a permanent Army Post without increasing the total military strength. During the past few months, also, there have been evidences of a campaign of propaganda on the part of the military apparently for the purpose of instilling in the minds of the people the need of maintaining Japan's land forces at their present strength. Taking these matters into consideration, it is not impossible - however reprehensible - that the military may have been influenced by the belief that an action such as they have recently carried out in Manchuria would help to convince others that conditions on the Asiatic continent make a reduction of the army unsafe. This point of view I shall discuss more in detail in a subsequent despatch.

There has appeared in the Japanese press no comment adverse to the action of the Japanese military in Manchuria. For the first few days following the incident, editorials were devoted to vindication of the Army, to a review of the indignities and insults which Japan has continually suffered at the hands of China, and to assurances that Japan's forces would be withdrawn as soon as China would guarantee the safety of Japanese lives and property. The press was unanimous in the view that the Army acted within treaty rights and that, had prompt measures not been taken, further outrages might have been committed by the Chinese. The better newspapers were free from an aggressive attitude with the exception of the Tokyo ASAHI which on September 20th stated

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 By Clarence S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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1/ editorially: "The time has at last come for Japan to show what serious sacrifice and what desperate efforts she is always ready to make when her legitimate rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia are actually jeopardized and trampled under foot."

The press did not welcome the suggestion of the League of Nations regarding a joint investigation commission. On the whole, the newspapers seemed to regard the League as acting within the sphere of its duties but believed that any outside interference would delay a settlement.

2/ The attitude of the Government of the United States has been dealt with editorially during the past two or three days in an appreciative vein. The Tokyo Hochi this morning stated that it appreciates the objection of Washington to the League's proposal of an investigation commission, but regrets that Washington has been influenced by the League to the extent of addressing identical notes to the Governments of Japan and China. Any step taken by a third party at this time, the Hochi feels, might aggravate the situation and delay settlement, since China would rely upon this outside Power for solution. The Tokyo JIJI, which perhaps views the whole matter the most dispassionately, stated in its editorial of yesterday that Mr. Stimson's conversation with Mr. Debuchi and the document handed by the former to the latter indicate that the Government of the United States realizes that Japan has no ambitions that should cause the Kellogg Peace Pact or the Nine Power Agreement to be brought forward. The United States Government, it believes,

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fully understands Japan's position and sympathizes with the Japanese Government.

I am enclosing translations of the pertinent portions of editorials which have appeared in the more influential papers as of possible interest.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin L. Neville

Edwin L. Neville,
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosures:

- 1/ Asahi Editorial. (1a & 16)
- 2/ Hochi Editorial.
- 3/ Jiji Editorial. (1a & 16)
- 4/ Other Editorials. (4 & 9)

Copy to Peking.

Embassy File No. 800 - Manchuria

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Enclosure No.	<u>122</u>
Despatch No.	<u>334</u>
From American Embassy Tokyo.	

Translation.

THE PROTECTION OF JAPAN'S RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN MANCHURIA

(Editorial in the Tokyo ASAHI, September 20, 1931.)

The armed conflict between Japanese and Chinese troops in Mukden and neighboring districts have given a serious shock to the Japanese Government and people as a most grave and alarming development of the situation. The cause of hostilities was the blasting of a portion of the South Manchuria Railway by Chinese troops and then fire was exchanged between Chinese troops and Japanese
✓ railway garrison. With a lightening speed, Japanese forces attacked the Mukden troops which are directly responsible for the blasting of the railway and then took possession of the walled city of Mukden which is the stronghold of the Chinese forces in that vicinity. The Japanese military authorities in Manchuria are thus taking necessary measures to cope with the situation.

The present incident is simple and clear. As above stated, Japanese forces simply exercised the right of self-protection against the outrage committed by Chinese forces. For the sake of self-protection Japanese forces have been compelled to occupy temporarily Mukden and other positions for security, thereby guarding the South Manchuria Railway. This was apparently unavoidable under the circumstances. The fact that the whole responsibility rests with the Chinese side is quite clear. It is entirely incomprehensible that, just at a time when

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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the Chinese authorities in Mukden recognized the massacre of Captain Nakamura at the hands of regular Chinese troops and thus the Nakamura case was on the eve of an amicable settlement, such an outrage as the blasting of the railway should have been committed by regular troops in Mukden.

The Sino-Japanese relations in Manchuria and Mongolia have of late been nothing but an accumulation of unpleasant incidents. The wholesale destruction of Japan's rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia is the sole objective of the Chinese authorities and people, who have trampled under foot the Sino-Japanese treaties now in force for the attainment of their object. The Chinese authorities have in many cases taken the initiative and started anti-Japanese agitations in various forms. Those who have watched closely the proceedings of such agitations feared that the Sino-Japanese relations would ultimately be strained to a serious degree. For the sake of friendship the Japanese Government and people have as far as possible endured such a hostile and contemptuous attitude on China's part. However, there is a limit to Japan's endurance. The time has at last come for Japan to show what serious sacrifice and what desperate efforts she is always ready to make when her legitimate rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia are actually jeopardized and trampled under foot.

The resolute stand taken by Japan at this moment is not in the least for the mere chastisement of China nor

for

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By Charles S. Zgoni NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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for any ambitions but solely for the protection of Japan's treaty rights. In other words, the temporary occupation of Mukden and other positions by Japanese forces as security is nothing but the protection of her rights. Japan is most eager to make the world understand that the measures taken against China in Manchuria are based on uprightness and fairness. For the issue of the present grave situation in Manchuria responsibility rests with the Chinese side only. We hope that the Japanese military authorities will do their best to prevent aggravation of the situation and that the Japanese Government will promptly try to settle the situation by diplomatic means. In so doing it is most urgent for Japan to make the world know that her self-protecting measures taken in Manchuria are based on principles of justice and uprightness.

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Enclosure No. 1-6
 Despatch No. 336
 From American Embassy
 Tokyo.

Translation.

STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
REGARDING THE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT.

(Editorial in the Tokyo ASAHI, September 25, 1931.)

Referring to an official statement issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs on the night of September 24th, explaining Japan's military operations in Manchuria, we wonder why the Japanese Government was so slow in issuing the statement. Such procrastination on Japan's part has caused irresponsible news agencies and others abroad to circulate baseless information and to entertain doubts and suspicions as to Japan's motives in dealing with the situation. Though temporary, the circulation of such information has placed Japan in a most disadvantageous position internationally. The consequence was that Mr. Yoshizawa, Japanese Ambassador to France, has experienced difficulties in explaining Japan's position fully before the Council of the League of Nations and that the atmosphere at the League of Nation's Office became unfavorable to Japan. For the issue of such a discouraging state of affairs the Japanese Government is responsible through its procrastination.

The publication of the official statement in Tokyo is sufficient to show that no dissension exists among members of the Japanese Government and that the Cabinet Ministers are now acting as one body. The Japanese War
 Office

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By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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Office entertains the view that the Japanese troops now occupying various important positions in Manchuria would be withdrawn gradually when the menace to Japan's special rights and interests in Manchuria is either removed or lessened. Speaking practically, the present military operations on Japan's part were prompted by a desire to protect her rights and interests against outrages committed by China. How to settle the present incident and to root out all causes thereof for the future is a great question, the solution of which requires a great deal of patience and indefatigable efforts.

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Tzou NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Enclosure No. 2
Despatch No. 335
From American Embassy
Tokyo.

Translation.

STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE
ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

(Editorial in the Tokyo HOCHI, September 26, 1931.)

We highly appreciate the attitude of the Washington Government in raising objection to the proposal of the League of Nations to dispatch an international investigation commission to Manchuria for the purpose of making inquiries into the actual conditions of the present incident in that region. The above proposal, coupled with the League of Nation's warning given to Japan and China a few days ago, is sufficient to show that the Council of the League of Nations has jumped to a hasty conclusion. While we appreciate the attitude of the United States, we regret that the Washington Government has been influenced by the League of Nations and has addressed to Japan and China identical notes expressing a desire to prevent aggravation of the situation.

It is an open secret that the National Government at Nanking has approached the Japanese Government with a proposal to appoint a joint Sino-Japanese diplomatic investigation commission for the purpose of solving the present incident. Chang Hsueh-liang, the war lord of Mukden, is also reported to have expressed a desire to settle the present incident as a local question.

In view of all this, any step to be taken by a third party at this moment may delay settlement of the incident. We fear it would aggravate the situation.

Such

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such a step, if taken, will prevent Japan and China from finding an early opportunity for opening direct negotiations with a view to solving the present incident as quickly as possible. We fear that any further advice or warning from a third party, such as the League of Nations, will cause China to rely upon a foreign country or countries for the solution of the situation and the result will be that an opportunity to open direct negotiations between Japan and China for a speedy solution will be lost.

As regards the statement issued by the Japanese Government on the night of September 24th, it is quite sufficient for us to point out that Japan will be loyal to pledges given therein.

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Enclosure No.	<u>3-a</u>
Despatch No.	<u>335</u>
From American Embassy Tokyo.	

Translation.

A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
 AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

(Editorial in the Tokyo JIJI, September 25, 1931.)

A statement explaining Japan's military operations in Manchuria was officially given out by the Department of Foreign Affairs on the night of September 24th.

Regarding the issue of the present incident in Manchuria, the Council of the League of Nations has addressed a warning to the Governments of Japan and China. We may say that in so doing the Council has discharged its duties properly and that the principle under which the Council acted is admissible. At an interview between Mr. Stimson, Secretary of State, and Mr. Debuchi, Japanese Ambassador at Washington, on September 23rd, Mr. Stimson handed to Mr. Debuchi a document addressed to the Japanese Government, in which the United States Government expresses a hope that is based on a thorough understanding of the present situation in Manchuria. From this document we see that the United States Government is well aware of Japan's attitude in devoting her energy to a peaceful solution of the present incident by restricting the sphere of her military operations as far as possible and that it is not difficult for us to understand what idea the United States Government entertains.

The conversation between Mr. Stimson and Mr. Debuchi

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 By Charles E. Lynam NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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on September 23rd and the document above mentioned indicate that the United States Government is under the impression that Japan has no such ambition as to cause the United States to bring forward the Anti-War Pact and the Nine-Power Agreement, although South Manchuria is now placed under Japan's control as a result of the present military operations, the scope of which the Japanese Government is most anxious to curtail as far as possible. Accordingly, the United States Government does not take any urgent and resolute step in dealing with the present incident at this juncture. However, the United States Government thinks that the issue of the present incident in Manchuria is an unfortunate event and that the Japanese Government is greatly annoyed thereby. The present incident is, in fact, a collision between the Japanese and Chinese troops in Manchuria. From a statement of the Japanese Government endeavoring to prevent aggravation of the situation, the United States Government fully understands how Japan is devoting her energy to a prompt and peaceful solution of the present incident. If the United States Government should formally take any measures at the present moment it would undoubtedly stir up the public opinion of Japan and result in some unusual occurrence. The United States Government, therefore, remains silent over the situation. Such is the attitude of the United States Government.

From the above we see that the United States Government fully understands Japan's position and sympathizes with the Japanese Government. It appears that the Governments
 of

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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Japan and China have already issued orders to their respective troops in Manchuria to suspend hostilities. Under the circumstances the United States Government seems to entertain a hope that the above orders will be faithfully observed by the Japanese and Chinese troops in Manchuria and that the present military operations will not be used for the attainment of any sinister motives. From this it is quite easy for us to see what idea the United States Government entertains. Now that the attitude of the United States Government is made quite clear as above indicated, we hope that the League of Nations will refrain from intervention in the present incident. If the League of Nations should do so, the situation might be further aggravated. Therefore, we hope that the various Powers will watch calmly the development of the situation for some time and entrust to both Japan and China the task of the solution of the present incident by opening direct negotiations. Any excited measure on the part of the various Powers will, if taken, precipitate the situation to a serious extent and thus render its solution all the more difficult.

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Enclosure No. <u>3-6</u>
Despatch No. <u>335</u>
From American Embassy Tokyo.

Translation.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE SITUATION IN MANCHURIA.

(Editorial in the Tokyo JIJ, September 26, 1931.)

On September 24th, the Japanese Government forwarded, through Mr. Yosjizawa now at Geneva, a reply to the League of Nations in response to the League's communication received in Tokyo on September 23rd and relating to measures to be taken for the settlement of the situation in Manchuria. The contents of this reply are nearly the same as those of the statement issued by the Japanese Government on the night of September 24th.

We would call the attention of the various Powers and the League of Nations to the fact that any sort of mediation or warning from a third party at this moment is not the way to solve the situation quickly. A proposal made by the League of Nations to dispatch an international joint investigation commission to Manchuria is totally useless. The dispatch of such a commission to the scene of the present military operations might, if carried out, excite the feelings of both the Japanese and Chinese and delay settlement.

The issue of the present incident in Manchuria is due to various causes which are very complicated. The relations between Japan and China in Manchuria in recent years have not been so simple as is supposed by outsiders. The direct cause of the present incident was the blasting of a section of the South Manchuria Railway by Chinese troops.

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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troops. Even if the present incident be settled, there will remain many other causes for future troubles between the two peoples. Japan is, therefore, most eager to solve all pending questions along with the present incident at one and the same time.

We hope, therefore, that if the League of Nations is desirous of establishing and maintaining peace in the Far East it will remain passive for a time and calmly watch the development of the situation, replying upon Japan's above-mentioned reply.

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Enclosure No. 4
 Despatch No. 335
 From American Embassy
 Tokyo.

Translation.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE JAPANESE STATEMENT.

(Editorial in the Tokyo NICHU NICHU, September 25, 1931.)

Now that an official statement has been made public by the Japanese Government on the night of September 24th, explaining Japan's military operations in Manchuria, we are confident that the various Powers, particularly the United States of America, will understand Japan and her motives in dealing with the present incident in Manchuria. To speak more plainly, the Powers will be convinced of the fact that Japan's stand taken in Manchuria at this time is just and reasonable.

In this connection we want to draw the attention of the League of Nations and the various Powers to the fact that in recent years the Chinese authorities and people have from time to time insulted Japan and the Japanese in various ways. Even Chiang Kai-shek, the head of the Nanking Government, has often uttered irresponsible statements at public meetings against Japan, pointing out that he would fight Japan. We fear that so long as Chiang Kai-shek remains at the head of the Nanking Government Sino-Japanese relations will be aggravated.

As regards a warning addressed to Japan and China from the League of Nations, we do not entertain any unpleasant feeling nor do we regard it as intervention from a third party. In so doing, the League of Nations has apparently discharged its proper duties. In view of the fact that Japan is a member of the League of

Nations,

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Nations, she is in duty bound to reply to the above warning with due courtesy. This reply was made in the form of an official statement issued by the Japanese Government on the night of September 24th, as above stated.

With the issue of the official statement by the Japanese Government, we are confident that the League of Nations will not take any further measures beyond the warning already addressed to Japan and China. We hope that the various Powers will reply to Japan's official statement just issued. We may add that Japan is perfectly free from any aggressive ambitions.

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Enclosure No. 35
 Despatch No. 335
 From American Embassy
 Tokyo.

Translation.

THE SITUATION IN MANCHURIA

(Editorial in the Tokyo CHUGAI SHOGYO, September 24, 1931.)

The present incident in Manchuria was apparently due to the fact that Chinese troops belonging to the Mukden Headquarters blew up a section of the South Manchuria Railway and then challenged Japanese railway guards to fight. The military operations started by Japan in Manchuria are entirely self-defensive. Whether the sphere of the operations will be widened or not depends entirely upon the attitude of China and her people. For the purpose of maintaining peace and order in Manchuria it is most urgent to take prompt and appropriate measures at this moment. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the dispatch of troops from the Japanese Army Divisions in Chosen beyond the frontier is inevitable.

Now that Japan has started military operations in Manchuria it is urgent for this country to make public a statement explaining the reasons therefor and rectifying misconceptions on the part of the various Powers as to Japan's motives. We are confident that the doubts and misunderstandings now entertained by the various Powers will disappear in the not distant future when everything is made clear.

How to settle the present incident in Manchuria is a great question. However, if we should try to solve it
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from the standpoint of fairness and uprightness, it would not be difficult to do so. In view of the fact that the Chinese military authorities in Mukden have taken the initiative and thus brought about the present incident in Manchuria, it is well for Japan to watch what attitude the Chinese authorities will take in dealing with the situation. Speaking practically, the future action of Japan depends entirely upon the attitude of the Chinese authorities. It is hardly necessary to point out that at this moment there is no necessity for Japan to consider any intervention from a third party.

The Chinese authorities in Mukden should study fully the causes of the present incident and then endeavor to remove such causes fundamentally. If this is done it would be possible to find a way for the solution of the present incident. Any temporizing policy on either side for the settlement of the situation must be disregarded. We urge the Japanese Government to adopt the policy of settling all outstanding problems between the two countries at one and the same time. Any attempt on Japan's part to settle the present incident as a local question will in no way eradicate the real causes of disagreement.

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Enclosure No. <u>6</u>
Despatch No. <u>335</u>
From American Embassy Tokyo.

Translation.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

(Editorial in the Tokyo NICHU NICHU, September 23, 1931.)

As a result of a Ministerial Conference on September 22nd, at which the Government gave consent to the War Office's proposal to settle all outstanding Sino-Japanese questions at one and the same time in connection with the issue of the present incident in Manchuria, Baron Shidehara, Minister for Foreign Affairs, yesterday decided to abandon his so-called "peaceful policy" in dealing with China. Now that it has become quite clear that the present incident has been brought about by unlawful direct actions of Chinese troops, the self-defensive measures taken by Japanese troops in Manchuria in no way contravene international law and usage. There is, therefore, no necessity for Japan to defer either to mediation or intervention from outside. The Japanese Government has decided to settle the present incident with China only. The view of Baron Shidehara regarding Japan's military operations now exercised in Manchuria is as follows:

The issue of the present incident in Manchuria was due to the blasting of a section of the South Manchuria Railway by regular Chinese troops belonging to the Mukden headquarters. Needless to say, the South Manchuria Railway constitutes one of Japan's important rights and interests in Manchuria. Japan has

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has merely taken urgent military measures for self-defence. As regards Japan's military operations and the consequent temporary occupation of the walled city of Mukden, and of other positions which are outside the South Manchuria Railway zone, there are some who contend that the operations are beyond the sphere of rights of self-defence of a State. Such a contention is apparently attributable to a lack of sufficient knowledge as to real conditions in Manchuria. In all law-abiding countries at the present time self-defensive operations must be restricted properly. However, in a country like China where administrative organs are still imperfect, it is only just and proper that self-defensive rights shall be exercised beyond the scope of treaty stipulations. Furthermore, the strength of Japanese troops to be stationed in Manchuria at the present time is fixed at about 15,000 officers and men under treaty stipulations. The total number of Japanese troops now stationed in that region does not exceed 10,400. Even if the detachment of 4,000 men who were dispatched beyond the frontier of Chosen at this time should be added to the above total, there still remains a margin. Under the circumstances, Japan has legitimately exercised her self-defence rights which are recognized by treaties now in force.

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Enclosure No.	<u>7</u>
Despatch No.	<u>335</u>
From American Embassy Tokyo.	

Translation.

THE CAUSES OF THE PRESENT INCIDENT IN MANCHURIA

(Editorial in the Tokyo NICHU NICHU, September 23, 1931.)

Regarding the issue of the present incident in Manchuria, the Japanese Government is said to have decided to adopt a policy that will prevent any aggravation of the situation. The phrase "to prevent any aggravation of the situation" seems to be very simple and clear, but under existing conditions the definition of the phrase is by no means simple and easy. It is therefore deemed urgent to study the causes of the present incident.

The military operations directed against Chinese troops by Japanese forces was no more than the execution of proper duties on the part of their commander. Japan has treaty rights of stationing a certain number of guards along the South Manchuria Railway. The acquisition by Japan of this right was due to the fact that China lacked, and is still lacking, sufficient capacity to maintain peace and order in the South Manchuria Railway zone. The principal reason why the safety of the railway service must necessarily be guaranteed and maintained by means of arms is that in the South Manchuria Railway zone and neighboring districts there are always dangerous and unlawful elements which the Chinese authorities in Mukden are unable to control. In case these elements attempt or precipitate outrages upon the South Manchuria Railway,

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it is only just and proper under treaty stipulations to start military operations on the part of the Japanese railway guards. A treaty for this purpose has been signed between Japan and China.

The unlawful elements which destroyed a section of the South Manchuria Railway at Lintiaokou on the night of September 18th were no other than regular Chinese troops belonging to the Mukden headquarters; they also opened fire upon Japanese railway guards. The consequence was the development of the present situation in Manchuria. For the purpose of securing the safety of Japanese railway guards the commander of our forces in the Kwantung Leased Territory is in duty bound to take prompt and appropriate measures. This is because Japanese railway guards are less in numbers in comparison with the Chinese troops in Mukden and its neighborhood. If the commander should fail to take appropriate measures it is not impossible that Japanese railway guards would be annihilated by the powerful Chinese troops. The measures taken by the commander in the Kwantung Leased Territory are, therefore, just and proper. Even in times of peace Chinese troops destroyed a section of the South Manchuria Railway and thus it is quite plain to see that under the existing situation in Manchuria they would commit further outrages against Japanese residents in that region and against the South Manchuria Railway.

Under the circumstances it is only proper that Japan quickly distribute her troops in various parts of Manchuria for the protection of her legitimate rights and residents. How to settle the present incident is a great question. In Manchuria where Japan has special rights
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and interests the Chinese authorities and people have of late committed various sorts of outrages such as the violation of treaty stipulations by the Mukden authorities, the pressure brought to bear upon Japanese by Chinese officials and individuals in economic and other circles, and threats against the lives and property of our residents there. In settling the present incident Japan claims a guarantee on China's part not to repeat such outrages in the future. The distribution of Japanese troops in various points in Manchuria is obviously based on a desire to secure the said guarantee. If China should give Japan the desired guarantee and also ensure the complete safety of Japanese residents in Manchuria, Japan would then withdraw her troops from Mukden and other points which are temporarily occupied.

The Nanking Government demands the unconditional withdrawal of Japanese troops but such a demand is entirely unentertainable. Unless the causes whereby Japan started military operations are either removed or guaranteed to be removed, Japan will not withdraw her troops unconditionally. We are, therefore, under the impression that the phrase "to prevent aggravation of the situation" may be taken as signifying that Japan will not distribute her troops beyond the sphere of necessity. The above demand of the Nanking Government without any effort toward giving Japan the desired guarantee is nonsensical.

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Enclosure No. <u>8.</u>
Despatch No. <u>335.</u>
From American Embassy Tokyo.

Translation.

WARLIKE OPERATIONS IN MANCHURIA

(Editorial in the Tokyo NICHU NICHU, September 20, 1931.)

On the night of September 18th, Chinese troops suddenly destroyed a part of the South Manchuria Railway and then attacked the Japanese garrison whose duty it is to guard the railway. This outrage was committed by Chinese regular troops who threatened the safety of the Japanese garrison. The situation is, therefore, very grave. Japan's rights and interests in Manchuria are now facing a crisis, the nature of which is such that not a moment should be lost in saving the situation.

The Japanese garrison quickly responded to the attack by Chinese troops. The prompt action taken by the Japanese garrison is only natural. If the garrison had remained passive and failed to discharge its duty in a proper manner, not only the Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria but also her dignity abroad would have been lost forever. Viewed in this light we highly appreciate the prompt action of the Japanese garrison.

The fighting between the Japanese garrison and Chinese troops, the latter of whom destroyed a portion of the South Manchuria Railway, has since developed into hostilities between the two opposing forces in various parts of Manchuria. Information received up to the present is not sufficient to illustrate all details of the situation in Manchuria, but it appears that the

Japanese

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Japanese military authorities in that region are compelled to expand the sphere of their self-protecting operations against Chinese troops who have assumed a hostile attitude everywhere.

Japan has special rights and interests in Manchuria and this fact is well recognized by all the nations through historical background and provisions of treaties now in force. China is unfortunately suffering from civil commotions all the year round and consequently Japan is obliged to station her troops in Manchuria for the protection of her special rights and interests as well as for the preservation of peace and order there. The prompt measures taken by Japan in Manchuria at this time may be regarded as an eloquent testimony showing that our country was obliged to do so. We greatly regret the issue of the present incident, but, in view of the fact that China herself lacks ability to maintain peace and order within the limits of her territory, it was inevitable that the present incident should arise.

We are at a loss to understand why Chinese troops took the initiative and committed such an outrage as the destruction of a part of the South Manchuria Railway. The Chinese people have of late come to hold Japan and the Japanese people in contempt. A boycott of Japanese articles in China is one of the humiliations directed toward Japan but the Japanese people have endured such humiliation up to the present in spite of the fact that we are entitled to take a retaliatory measure against the Chinese boycott. Even the leaders of the Nanking Government, including Chiang Kai-shek, have dared to commit themselves

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themselves in open insult to Japan and the Japanese in their public speeches. Under these circumstances the lives and property of Japanese residents in China have been often threatened and at times subjected to destruction at the hands of the Chinese in official and private circles. It is, therefore, not to be wondered at that Chinese troops in Manchuria committed this latest outrage.

We are, however, most anxious to maintain friendly relations with the Chinese people on the basis of the principles of mutual existence and prosperity. Now that Chinese troops have gone so far as to destroy the South Manchuria Railway under a misconception, it is well for Japan and the Japanese to give China a lesson in the form of emergency measures which the Japanese military authorities are now taking in Manchuria and which are based on a desire for the maintenance of the principles of mutual existence and prosperity.

Whatever may be the opinions of the Chinese authorities in Mukden and of the Nanking Government over the issue of the armed conflict between the Japanese and Chinese troops in Manchuria, Japan has fundamental principles, namely, the protection of her rights and interests in Manchuria, and the maintenance of her dignity and national honor. The prompt measures taken by the Japanese troops in Manchuria are based on the above principles. China has in latter years violated Japan's treaty rights in various ways. Public opinion in Japan demands the solution of all outstanding questions between the two countries. If the present incident in Manchuria should be settled speedily and thus pave the way for the solution of other pending questions,

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questions, it would mean that the present incident would ultimately bring about peace and prosperity between the two peoples for the future. We hope that the Chinese authorities in Mukden will understand the above psychology and deal properly with the present incident.

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Enclosure No.	<u>9</u>
Despatch No.	<u>335.</u>
From American Embassy Tokyo.	

Translation.A STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENTON THE SITUATION.

(Editorial in the Tokyo CHUGAI SHOGYO, September 25, 1931.)

Nothing can be more regrettable than the fact that the Japanese Government was so slow in its issuance of an official statement explaining Japan's military operations in Manchuria. It was on the night of September 18th that Chinese troops blew up a section of the South Manchuria Railway, thereby causing an armed conflict between Japanese and Chinese troops in Manchuria. If an official statement had been issued by the Japanese Government at the time of the occupation of Mukden by Japanese troops, the attitude of the League of Nations and the public opinion of various Powers, including the United States of America might not have been so unfavorable to Japan as at present.

With the exception of the New York Herald Tribune, which in its issue of September 23rd expressed a fair and impartial view of the situation in Manchuria, several newspapers of the United States have ventilated their views against Japan. We see that the United States and her people are not totally blind as to the causes of the present incident and the measures taken by Japan in dealing with it. If the official statement issued by the Japanese Government should dispel doubts and misunderstandings of the various Powers to a certain extent, though not wholly, the world would gradually understand

Japan's

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Japan's motives on Manchuria.

We want to draw the attention of the world to the fact that the Chinese troops were the first to commit such an outrage as the blowing up of an iron bridge on the South Manchuria Railway. In view of this, it is not impossible that the Chinese authorities and the Chinese may dare to commit further outrages against Japan and the Japanese. The military operations of Japan in Manchuria are apparently directly against such an emergency, besides maintaining peace and order in that region. The Japanese Government regards the present incident as a local question and is thus endeavoring to settle it by direct negotiations with the Chinese authorities without relying upon a third party for any sort of mediation or intervention. It is, therefore, still premature to try to settle the present incident through the medium of the Nine-Power Treaty or other international agreements.

The various Powers do not appear to understand fully the relations between Japan and China in recent years. It may be rather difficult for Japan to make the Powers understand what the Sino-Japanese relations are. However, we hope that the Japanese Government will do its best to clear away doubts and misunderstandings on the part of the various Powers. It appears that the Governments of the various Powers and their nationals are influenced greatly by the propaganda of China whose people are very clever in this particular campaign. The Japanese Government should exercise the utmost caution with respect to Chinese propaganda and take appropriate measures in dealing with it without

a moment's

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a moment's hesitation.

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


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

EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

London, September 29, 1931.

No. 2289



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 In U. S. A. ☐

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

Supplementing my despatch No. 2277 of September 25, 1931, I have the honor to state that, in reply to questions, the following statement was made on September 23rd in the House of Commons by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in regard to the situation in Manchuria:

"On the 18th and 19th of September Japanese troops guarding the South Manchurian Railway occupied Mukden and other towns in or near this railway line. The circumstances in which this action was taken have not yet been definitely established. I understand that the Chinese Government have brought the matter before the Council of the League of Nations and that it is being discussed there today."

A further question having been put the following day, the Under Secretary said:

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"Since the 19th of September Mukden and other towns on or near the South Manchurian Railway have been occupied by Japanese troops. An appeal has been made to the League of Nations by the Chinese Government, and at a special meeting of the Council held on the 22nd of September, it was decided to appeal to both the Chinese and Japanese Governments to abstain from any action which might aggravate the situation or prejudice a pacific settlement, and to ask them to seek, in consultation with their representatives at Geneva, means to allow the two countries to proceed immediately to the withdrawal of their respective troops without compromising the safety of the lives or property of the nationals of the two countries. Telegrams were addressed to the Chinese and Japanese Governments to that effect."

I have the honor to enclose a further editorial from the London TIMES of the 26th instant, which is perhaps the most interesting and objective discussion of the Manchurian incident which has yet come to my notice. It notes with gratification that the Council of the League has elicited the declaration by the Japanese Government of its willingness to discuss with China a peaceful settlement of the dispute and to withdraw its troops from regions where their presence is not authorized by treaty, and after reciting several disquieting reports arising out of the situation, it reminds China that the action of the Council is not to be construed as a promise of sympathy with any delay by China in composing its differences with Japan.

The British public has been so completely absorbed in the financial situation at home that there has been no real call for the Government to act definitively towards the settlement of a dispute in so remote a quarter as Manchuria. It was generally thought that this was a matter which might well be left to the United States, which seems to be regarded

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tacidity as the particular guardian of the Kellogg Pact, and to the League of Nations. Some days ago, British press correspondents at Geneva seemed to think that the Council had injured the League's prestige, first, by addressing itself too hastily to the disputants, and next, by appearing to lend undue sympathy to Japan to the prejudice of China's case. More recent despatches indicate, however, that those who were not satisfied with the Council's course of action now incline towards the view that the League can be more faithful to its functions by trying to maintain peace than by searching for the causes of a dispute.

It is not unlikely that events in the Far East of the past few days may bring about a change in the attitude of detachment with which the British public has thus far viewed the incident. As is well known, British interests in Manchuria are, with one notable exception, virtually negligible. The disorder into which the operation of the Peking-Mukden Railway has fallen, the reported attacks by Japanese airplanes upon trains on this line carrying refugees, and the general breakdown of Chinese administration following the Japanese occupation of Mukden, which made possible the derailment of a train and the attacks upon its passengers by Chinese bandits, have been recounted with no little warmth by British correspondents, who are reminding the public at home of their substantial investment in that railway. Yesterday's papers give considerable space to reports of disturbances at Hongkong, when Chinese rioters attacking Japanese were suppressed by British troops, and of the alleged/


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the alleged seizure at Mukden by the Japanese forces of airplanes delivered by British manufacturers to General Chang Hsueh-liang but not yet paid for. These incidents may not in themselves be sufficiently important to cause perturbation, but the prominence given these reports by the press indicates the possibility that if the situation does not soon take a more hopeful turn the British Government may be called upon to show some active interest, quite apart from action through the League.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:


Ray Atherton
Counselor of Embassy.

Enclosure:

"Manchuria and the League", The TIMES, Sept. 26, 1931.

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By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

PAPER THE TIMES

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE Sept. 26, 1931.

MANCHURIA AND THE LEAGUE

Our own national preoccupations and their repercussions throughout the world must not be allowed to divert public attention from the good work of the Council of the League of Nations in the dispute between China and Japan. The situation which confronted the League at the beginning of the week was undoubtedly serious. The Japanese garrison in Southern Manchuria had attacked and disarmed the Chinese forces. Its action had taken the Japanese Government by surprise; important elements among its Liberal supporters, large sections of the Conservative Opposition, and powerful military interests were disposed to applaud rather than to deplore the readiness of the soldiers to "give the Chinese a lesson"; there seemed to be a risk that the Wakatsuki Ministry would be made an unwilling accomplice after the fact in a breach of the Kellogg Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations. On the other side Chinese popular indignation was growing so rapidly as to threaten at any time to aggravate the situation by presenting the Japanese Army with good reasons for extending the scope of its military operations. Fortunately for the peace of the Far East and of the world—for no one could safely predict that such a struggle would involve no other nation—the League has shown itself equal to the occasion. On Monday the Chinese Government appealed to the League under Article II. of the Covenant, which provides for the summoning of a meeting of the Council in the event of any outbreak or threat of war. The Council met next morning under the presidency of SEÑOR LERROUX. On the same evening it addressed an urgent appeal to the two Governments to abstain from every act which might prejudice a pacific settlement. It asked them also to seek means to allow the two countries to withdraw their respective troops from the theatre of hostilities without compromising the safety of the lives and property of their nationals. At the same time it wisely decided to communicate the minutes of its discussion and decision to the Government of the United States of America. The Chinese Government has naturally welcomed the action of the League, while any uncertainty as to the attitude of the Japanese Government should be dispelled by the reply which was communicated yesterday. Japan emphasizes her desire to prevent any aggravation of the situation and to ensure the peaceful settlement of pending questions by direct negotiations with China; she announces at the same time that she has already withdrawn the greater part of her forces into the zone where she is entitled by treaty to maintain them, and that the small bodies remaining outside this area for the protection of Japanese nationals and of the South Manchurian Railway will in their turn be withdrawn as the situation improves.

The Council's appeal has thus borne fruit already in the improvement of the local situation and in the encouragement which it has given to the moderate elements in Japan. And the prompt and efficacious assistance of the United States has contributed in no small measure to this initial success. It is no exaggeration to say that the American Government, though not a member of the League, has been in closer collaboration with it during the last few days than at any previous time. In one respect indeed it has handled a difficult and obscure situation more skilfully than the Council was at first disposed to do. The manner of Mr. STIMSON's intervention was as tactful as was the text of his communication to the Japanese and Chinese Governments. His refusal to support the proposal mooted at the meeting of the

condemning the Japanese troops for doing on a much smaller scale what the Red Army did two years ago. The Chinese Government was fully justified in laying its case before the League; but there was no real justification for its sudden withdrawal (not to say repudiation) of the proposal made, however informally, by its Minister of Finance for the examination of all the ~~causes~~ of the present dispute by a joint Commission. As LORD CECIL pointed out at the end of last night's meeting of the Council, the passing of judgment on a particular set of incidents is not the present duty of the League; and the Chinese Government would be ill-advised if it mistook sympathy for partisanship and took no serious steps to arrive at a general settlement of its difference with Japan. Aggrieved national minorities have been known to put themselves as much in the wrong as the hard-handed Governments of which they complain both by rancorously exploiting their grievances and by demanding impossible satisfactions. In the present dispute the Council's championship of peace does not in the least mean that it has any sympathy with the "pin-pricking" policy in which Chinese Governments have indulged only too often in recent years. Its object, and that of the Governments of the several nations which compose it, is to further an understanding between its two Far Eastern members by all appropriate means, and the attitude of America justifies the hope of her continued collaboration in this good cause.

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
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

handled a difficult and obscure situation more skilfully than the Council was at first disposed to do. The manner of Mr. STIMSON's intervention was as tactful as was the text of his communication to the Japanese and Chinese Governments. His refusal to support the proposal mooted at the meeting of the League Council for the dispatch of a Military Commission of Inquiry to Manchuria showed a sagacious appreciation of the dangers inseparable from such a step. Any action which gave the proud and sensitive islanders the impression, however unfounded, that their Government was regarded with distrust by other Powers must have increased the embarrassments of Tokyo and might well have defeated the good intentions of Geneva. As a Great Power possessing a multitude of interests in the Far East, as a party to the Nine-Power Treaty guaranteeing the respect of "the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China," as the originator of the Kellogg Pact renouncing war as an instrument of national aims, America could not in any case have watched the outbreak of hostilities with detachment. But the promptitude with which her Government advanced to the aid of the League and of its two disputant members encourages the hope that the cooperation of Geneva and Washington will be more than an agreeable but isolated historical incident.

Meanwhile the problem of Sino-Japanese relations in Manchuria remains to be solved. The League has done much to remove the immediate danger of developments which at the very least would have made the next Disarmament Conference a mockery. Its task would now seem to be one of conciliation rather than of inquiry. The immediate cause or causes of the Japanese attack on the Chinese troops at Mukden are of small account by comparison with the necessity for a comprehensive understanding between the two countries. There is clearly a danger that the League's action may encourage important factors in China to challenge the internationally recognized rights of the Japanese in Southern Manchuria. Already there is talk—it may be no more than talk—of an *entente* between the rival Governments of Canton and Nanking on an anti-Japanese basis; and it is interesting to note that the inspired Press of Soviet Russia is already expressing its sympathy with the Chinese, and

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 By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976




LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 The Hague, Netherlands,
 September 28, 1931.

FE

No. 136

OCT 10 31



*Copy to FE
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793.94

793.94/2052

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose, as of possible interest to the Department, the translation of a leading editorial in the NIEUWE ROTTERDAMSCHÉ COURANT of the twenty-fifth instant, entitled "The League, America and the Chino-Japanese Dispute". The article exults in the fact that the United States has taken action in this connection and regards it as a "joint political action with the League in the Far East".

There is no doubt that America's cooperation in the solution....

OCT 10 1931


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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Laurits S. Swenson NARS, Date June 4, 1976

--2--

solution of any European or Far Eastern question is
welcomed by public opinion in Holland.

Respectfully yours,



Laurits S. Swenson.

✓
Enclosure:
Translation.

File No. 710

In quintuplicate

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

ENCLOSURE TO DESPATCH NO. 136

Translation

from

NIEUWE ROTTERDAMSCHER COURANT
 September 25, 1931.

THE LEAGUE, AMERICA AND THE CHINO-JAPANESE DISPUTE.

As was to be anticipated upon the grounds of many experiences, the Japanese Government has not made haste with the furnishing of instructions to its delegates in Geneva regarding the adoption of the manner in which the Council of the League proposes to regulate the Mukden incident. Even though at the time of writing this article the Japanese reply is not known, there nevertheless exists in Geneva the impression that a slackening of tension is approaching. The matter is therefore all the more interesting as a test of how great is the influence of the moral pressure that may be exercised from Geneva.

The test is of vital interest for the prestige of the League of Nations which has much to gain or to lose by a favorable or unfavorable result. It is also a matter of great weight for the prospective Disarmament Conference. Many nations will, to a considerable degree, base their views concerning the more or less practical value of the institutions of Geneva, as securities against war, upon these events.

The Council acted wisely by making its requirements of Japan as modest as possible. A success has already been attained; the appeal to big brother America has not been....

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 By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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been in vain. It may have been venturesome and have resulted from the feeling of not being sufficiently sure of being able to bring about a settlement itself; in any case it has had as result that the big brother is exhibiting great interest. As a matter of fact America's interest for the League Assembly has on this occasion been considerable. America is being irresistably carried into the affairs of the outside world. Mr. Hoover's proposal was only the beginning.

✓ America now sees itself compelled to a joint political action with the League in the Far East; it will soon see itself bound to extend its Monroe doctrine to the whole world. That doctrine will definitely disappear, as a result of its generality - swallowed up by the Covenant of the League.

In the meantime there is some displeasure in Geneva concerning the way in which the great powers are again making the Chino-Japanese affair practically an inter nos in the Council. It would seem, on this occasion, as if those gentlemen would not escape a protest against oligarchic manners. Such action would be useful.

It is to be hoped that, both for peace in the Far East and for the soundness of international institutions, the League will succeed in liquidating the conflict further by pacific means.

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By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, September 16, 1931.

No. 1181

OCT 10 1931

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 12 1931
Department of State

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793.94

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

793.94/1770

With reference to the Legation's telegram No. 578, of September 12, 5 p.m., concerning the Nakamura incident, I have the honor to transmit herewith an interesting editorial on this subject, which appeared in the PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES, in three sections, on September 9, 10, and 11, 1931.

1/

The first section of the editorial asserts that Captain Shintaro Nakamura, of the Japanese General Staff, and said to be a spy, was executed by Chinese soldiers of the Khingan Reclamation Army, in the bandit-infested Solun region of Manchuria, where (according to the second section) he was traveling

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presumably
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By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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presumably to investigate the interesting reclamation, colonization and agricultural enterprise which is being carried out in this area, but very possibly to collect political and economic information that would be of interest to the Japanese General Staff.

The Nakamura incident has greatly incensed the Japanese and has led the military clique to demand strong action, if not the occupation of portions of Manchuria itself. Following as it does upon the anti-Chinese riots in Korea, it has tended to counteract the anti-Japanese propaganda in the Chinese press and may possibly result in a toning down of the Chinese demands upon the Japanese Government for satisfaction and an indemnity for the victims of the riots.

It is well known that the Japanese grievances against China are many and, as pointed out in the enclosed editorial, the Nakamura incident is but an expression of the growing animosity between the Chinese and Japanese in Manchuria. So long as the settled policy of the Chinese authorities in Manchuria is one of obstruction and hostility to the Japanese, such incidents are bound to occur and any one of them might precipitate a serious crisis.

Further details of this case are to be found in the press clippings being transmitted to the Department by the same pouch as **this** despatch.

A second

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-3-

A second and more thorough investigation is now being conducted by the Chinese authorities, and the Legation will not fail to keep the Department fully informed of subsequent developments.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

Enclosures: ✓

- 1/ Copies of editorial from the
PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES of
September 9, 10, and 11, 1931,
"The Nakamura Affair".

Copy to: American Embassy, Tokyo.

RLB:epg.

800.

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1931.

THE NAKAMURA AFFAIR.

I

THE Chinese Authorities went too far with the Soviet and brought about an invasion by the Red Army. The latest despatches from Tokio make it perfectly clear that the Japanese Military and the Opposition parties are determined to force a show-down on the Nakamura affair. The precise nature of the demonstration already planned has not been disclosed, but if it comes about it is likely to be a much more serious affair than the mock battle in the centre of the Mukden settlement which so rudely awakened the residents some weeks ago. Feeling is running higher among the Japanese over the murder of this staff officer than obtained in Shanghai over the Thorburn case, with which it presents certain resemblances, particularly in the methods of tergiversation with which the higher authorities have endeavoured to evade responsibility. There cannot be the slightest doubt but that the Japanese will take drastic action unless the Mukden authorities give way.

Assiduous enquiries were conducted by the Japanese before the details of the affair were disclosed, and as a result they are now in full possession of the facts. It appears that Captain Nakamura, of the Japanese General Staff, accompanied by an ex-warrant officer named Isugi, a Russian named Shroekoff, and a Mongol, left Pokutu, on the western section of the Chinese Eastern Railway, on a journey through the Khingan territory to Taonanfu. They were furnished with a Chinese passport. Two or three weeks later they reached a place called Minanchen, and were taking a meal in an eating-house when a party of Chinese soldiers belonging to the Khingan Reclamation Army attacked them, locked them up on a charge of espionage, then executed them and mutilated the remains. It is alleged, as in the case of Thorburn, that the bodies were afterwards burnt and other efforts made to keep the matter secret.

The actual commander of the regiment was away at Mukden at the time, but his second-in-command, named Kuan Yuheng, who ordered the execution, is alleged to be a man of brutal disposition and a terror to all who have any relations with him. Of the sum of \$3,000 found on the party, a small amount was distributed to the troops and the rest pocketed, it is alleged, by Colonel Kuan. This man has now been ordered to report in person at Mukden, but it is doubtful whether he will do so, for the Japanese may not await protracted legal processes and may take summary vengeance, as in the case of a Korean correspondent after the Wanpaoshan affair.

It was a Japanese woman who was mainly responsible for the disclosure of the main details of the story. Ex-Sergeant-Major Isugi (companion of Captain Nakamura on the journey) was the proprietor of a Japanese inn at Tsitsihar, and he acted as go-between when the Japanese woman married a Chinese there. This couple kept a shop in a rather remote place in this part of Inner Mongolia. The woman, for some reason or other, expected to hear from Isugi during his travels, and became uneasy at his silence. Then, as chance would have it, four or five Chinese soldiers of the Khingan Reclamation Army called at the shop. They began to talk to the woman's husband, and the woman overheard them tell the story of how a party (evidently that under Captain Nakamura) was captured and shot. The woman herself then questioned the soldiers, and became convinced that the party concerned was that which included Isugi. Accordingly she wrote to a "friend of hers" at Tsitsihar, who in turn evidently communicated with the Japanese Authorities.

The Japanese assert that the officials sent to enquire into the affair, following the official protests in Mukden, merely did all they could to complete the destruction of all evidence in the case. The Fengtien Provincial Governor told the Japanese he knew nothing about the case. Nevertheless a little later Dr.

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

at a mass meeting in Dairen, who urged at the end of his address that the Japanese Government should exact the privilege of free, safe travel in Manchuria and Mongolia, and freedom to engage in agriculture and trade; and that in honour of the dead a memorial worthy of them should be erected at the scene of the outrage.

An eye-witness of the execution is quoted by the Japanese authorities as stating that the party on being arrested were at once accused of acting as spies. The Captain retorted by asking what use could be made of any information concerning the barren waste where they had been arrested, adding that while Sino-Japanese relations were "so friendly" there could be no occasion for spying upon the Khingan Reclamation Army, which, in his opinion, was not remarkable for its formidableness! The arguments, we are told, failed to make the Chinese military change their minds.

The Japanese allege that in this newly-opened district, where a railway has been built 60 miles in length, the Mongols, "groaning under the Chinese rule," have been prone to display more or less resistance, and the Chinese authorities have been unable to get over the suspicion that the Mongols might "possibly enlist Japanese sympathy to create trouble with the Chinese." Consequently rigorous restrictions on access of Japanese to the district have been officially ordered. In fact the Taonan-Solun line is virtually a forbidden area to Japanese, and this was more politely but not less plainly indicated on Captain Nakamura's passport as issued in Mukden.

The senior staff officer of the Kwantung Garrison, Colonel Itagaki, stated that the General Staff in Tokio had made it a practice for many years to send out officers to travel in the interior of Manchuria and Mongolia, and had done so with the understanding of the Chinese Authorities. They were provided with Chinese passports, and under the Sino-Japanese agreements, ought not to be menaced. He added that even supposing

C. T. Wang informed the Japanese diplomats in Nanking that he had received a report from the Governor, who asserted that the people responsible for the execution of the party were not regular soldiers, but rebel bandits. The district in which the affair happened is known to be in a large area menaced, like many parts of Manchuria at present, by bandits. It is admitted that Isugi himself, who only returned to his home the day before Captain Nakamura arrived, after travelling in the interior, had just had a remarkable escape from bandits. However, contend the Japanese, the Chinese Authorities have large military forces in the region and must accept responsibility in any event.

It is a curious fact that the passport taken out by Captain Nakamura in Mukden specified the scene of the outrage as being within a zone dangerous for travel. On the other hand the further passport issued to him in Harbin included no such references. Incidentally this was taken out in the name of Shintaro Nakamura, and the Chinese allege that his profession was given as "educationalist," a statement roundly denied by the Japanese Authorities.

Be that as it may, the party knew well enough the great risks they were taking in travelling through this wild and largely uninhabited territory. It is not to be supposed for a moment that the Captain had been sent by the War Office, direct from Tokio, on a mere holiday jaunt, or for his health. It is a cause of bitter complaint by the Japanese that while other foreigners are permitted to visit the celebrated Reclamation Camp, everything possible is done to keep them away. It is not without significance that Isugi, though an inn-keeper, spends a great deal of his time travelling in the interior, is exceptionally familiar with the country, is "an adept at dealing with bandits," was the conductor and guide of the party, and returned only one day before the arrival of the staff officer. These facts were disclosed by a brother staff officer!

a Japanese traveller were a military spy, all that the Chinese could properly do was to hand him over to the custody of the Japanese Consular Authorities, and certainly they had no right to shoot such travellers down like dogs and then hack their bodies to pieces.

(To be Concluded)

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Syme NARS, Date June 1, 1976

PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1931.

THE NAKAMURA AFFAIR.

II

THE scene of the murders is the centre of one of the most ambitious and enterprising colonisation schemes ever organised by the Chinese in Manchuria. The leader of the enterprise has been touring Western countries for the past year, endeavouring to enlist the support and interest of foreign capital in the venture, particularly in the construction of the railway line already roughly laid down for part of the required distance by the Chinese. The colonisation scheme is very familiar to foreigners in China, owing to the official publicity given to it. It was inaugurated by General Tsao Tso-hua, commander of the Fengtien Artillery Corps, after the Nationalist occupation of Peiping, the retreat of the Mukden army back to Manchuria, and the assassination of Chang Tso-lin.

It represents the first serious effort to turn a Chinese army into colonists and cultivators. It is, moreover, the first attempt to mechanize agriculture in Chinese territory, for caterpillars and motor-cars were speedily introduced to assist in opening up the land. No doubt the Japanese are interested in the project, for it may have far-reaching results on the future of this part of the world. And it is to be supposed that this curiosity was merely whetted by the very evident intention to keep them away and the ostentatious methods of General Tsao Tso-hua in seeking the help of foreign capital from anybody willing to take part, except from the Japanese.

It may be recalled that Mr. Owen Lattimore visited the Solun region last year and contributed two most interesting articles to this paper on the subject. He pointed out that in the space of a single year, as a result of the use of motor-cars and the laying of a temporary railway line over part of the distance, the frontier of settlement in this largely unknown territory had been pushed forward over 150 miles—"a distance certainly never equalled,

in such a short time, in the history of Chinese colonisation." Here the flag and the force went first, and the settlers came afterwards.

It is hardly to be supposed that all the Mongols welcomed this determined and resourceful intrusion. There are ancient Chinese associations with the neighbourhood, though mostly of the trading class, for both the Liao and Chin dynasties once had their "northern capitals" near Taonanfu. Indeed Chinese civilisation had long since left its impress on the territory, and accounts for the fact that the Mongols in that region, as in Jehol, live a settled life, unlike their nomadic brethren. But though not forced away to pasture land deeper in the interior, as the nomads have been when confronting the irresistible advance of Chinese colonisation, the local Mongols have no doubt regarded the Khingan enterprise with anxiety if not hostility.

We happened to be visiting Mukden early in 1929, when General Tsao Tso-hua had just returned from the district with the first cinema pictures of the occupation and colonisation of the territory. The sight of the columns of heavily-armed men on the march made one think of an expeditionary army rather than a force of colonisers, and this impression was not removed by the later films showing the General and the principal Lama priests standing in an almost affectionate, certainly very amiable group. Undoubtedly the venture conforms to that type so often stigmatised by the Chinese themselves as "Imperialistic and aggressive." But it is nevertheless of the most constructive character, and an experiment of great value in the future, when the problem of colonisation and disbandment of superfluous soldiery will probably be solved to the advantage of both.

Whether the soldiers were ever meant to be colonists is doubtful. If they were, their rôle was soon greatly modified, but not wholly limited to the protection of the settlers who soon began to swarm in. Some

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 By Clarence S. Thompson NARS, Date June 1, 1976

of them were given charge of the caterpillar tractors and other machinery, with results that were rather hard on the engines, owing to lack of technical skill. The enterprise was not limited to the cultivation of a particular section of this region. The aims were more ambitious and far-reaching. We will quote Mr. Lattimore:—

"The headquarters of the Khingan project is at Tao An, some 20 miles from Taonan. The new railway, which is the artery of the whole project, is to follow the course of the Tao river up into the mountains. The gradient is easy enough to penetrate right into the mountains, and probably to cross the Khingan watershed without tunnelling—a great advantage over the C.E.R. route to the north. Most important of all, the crossing of the watershed will bring Chinese colonists within immediate reach of the fertile eastern plains of Outer Mongolia. Thus it turns the corner of the Gobi, which always had been the main impediment to Chinese advance into Outer Mongolia."

Though the Chinese vanguard entered in the full panoply of military accoutrement, the policy toward the Mongols was enlightened and successful. The Mongol farmers were detached from their own princes by lighter taxation, so that "turning farmer" became equivalent to "turning Chinese," a tendency then encouraged in every way. No doubt the Princes looked upon it in a different light. Whether this policy has been consistently pursued since and is still successful in spite of the general economic depression in Manchuria, is a point on which more up to date information would be interesting both to the public at large and, doubtless, to the General Staff in Tokio. The Chinese hitherto have not had a particularly good record insofar as the Mongols are concerned, and any reversion to the old policy is likely to provoke serious trouble. Mongol hostility is not a thing to be laughed at, especially in this particular quarter.

The outrage which occurred in this region is an expression of the fundamental collision between Chinese and Japanese in Manchuria and Mongolia. We have no doubt whatever that the party under Captain Nakamura were executed, not by bandits, but by regular soldiers, acting under orders from higher authorities. Equally we have no doubt that the party were in search of information—not necessarily military secrets, for there are none to be gleaned there, but political and economic information normally available to anybody. Whether there were contacts with disgruntled Mongols cannot be told, though it is significant that following the arrest of the party certain reprisals were immediately carried out by the Chinese military.

Like Thorburn, Captain Nakamura and his companions took serious risks, but the fate of both, similar as in all probability it was, was no less outrageous for all that. If the truth were known, it would doubtless be found that in neither case was there anything in the nature of a real trial, let alone a fair trial, but that the Chinese Military executed them out of hand on mere receipt of the order to do so from authorities some distance away and incapable of forming any adequate judgment of the exact circumstances.

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES, FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1931.

THE NAKAMURA CASE.

III.

WE referred at some length to the Khingan Reclamation and Colonisation Scheme not merely because it was the scene of the execution of the Nakamura party, but because it is the most solid and notable expression of the new "Nationalist" economic policy in the enormous territories outside the Wall. The Chinese are determined to develop these lands as far as they can by their own resources. They are willing to enlist foreign capital when needed, and to play off such interests against the Japanese, but at all costs they seek to exclude their neighbours. There was no necessity whatever for Tsao Tso-hua to hawk his wares round the Western capitals. He could have obtained all that is necessary in the way of capital and technical help in Japan. It was the Japanese who built the railway to Taonanfu for the Chinese. They would have been ready and eager to build the new line through the Khingan foothills to the illimitable lands beyond. But the Chinese outside the Wall, so drastically has sentiment changed, would rather see this great colonisation and "Imperialistic" enterprise collapse than enlist Japanese co-operation.

This is, of course, not a permanent phase. It is not a practicable policy, for China has not the power to carry it out. She continues to put the cart before the horse, and while dissipating her own power and vitality in incessant internal wars and disputes, rushes impetuously to attack the foreigner. There were, broadly speaking, three phases in the Manchurian problem before this present phase developed. Firstly, there was the brief and melodramatic Russian episode, and an annexation that ended in the Russo-Japanese War. A period of slow growth followed, during which the Japanese patiently and industriously laid the foundations of an enormous prosperity, and prepared the way for the immigration movement which began in earnest after the Revolution and de-

veloped full force a few years ago as a result of the disorders inside the Wall.

Up till this time the Japanese were the principal arbiters in Manchuria. But the immense growth of the Chinese population and of Chinese interests raised them virtually to partnership. And in this second phase there was a form of mutual co-operation, not very sound in texture or cordial in spirit, but of undoubted advantage to both, for all that in the main it was imposed on the Chinese. New railways were built, to provide new openings for the Chinese farmer. From the time of the Sino-Russian Treaty in 1924 onward the policy of co-operation has been at the mercy of events and the caprice of the moment. On the whole Chang Tso-lin managed to retain fairly amicable relations with the Japanese, but the oscillations of sentiment were violent.

From 1928 onwards the movement has been steadily away from co-operation, and during the past year the Chinese Authorities have assumed a definitely hostile attitude towards Japan's interests in this region. It has been expressed in a variety of ways and in a multitude of incidents, coming in rapid succession one on top of the other. They were of such volume and frequency as to prove a general policy entirely removed from the peccadilloes of individuals or the accidents of chance. In a situation such as that obtaining in Manchuria for years, occasional friction is inescapable. But sentiment and policy alike have gradually become openly hostile.

Everybody knows how sensitive the Japanese are about Manchuria, how proud they deservedly are of the immense constructive work they have done, and how vital is their position there. No challenge short of that of invasion of their own territory could be more grave than an organised policy to tear up their interests in Manchuria by the roots and destroy them. The C.E.R. is an ironical luxury for anti-Imperialist Moscow, yet the latter took armed action to restore its position. Sooner or later the

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 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

anti-Japanese policy of China would inevitably have forced a similar solution.

The Nakamura case is but one of many incidents, and had it stood alone it might have provoked no greater repercussions in Japan than the Thorburn case in London—a warning to go slow, but hardly enough to bring about intervention. The Japanese Army were hardly likely to take this outrage lying down in view of what had gone before. They were deeply incensed by the irresponsible slanders publicly uttered by Chang Chi, one of the veteran members of the Kuomintang hierarchy, who alleged that the Japanese troops at Chinwangtao actively assisted drug smugglers and engaged in other nefarious activities, and when directly interviewed by a Japanese officer produced no proof for this grave calumny other than that he “was told so by others.”

A mob could hardly run Chinese foreign policy more incompetently than it has been conducted of late. It is destitute of foresight, statesmanship, patience and all the other qualities which ought peculiarly to inform the policy of so weakened and disunited a State. China allows any pettifogging little body to play havoc with the goodwill of other States. The Andrews

Expedition, which has a large following in the United States, is a case in point. No country can afford to snap and snarl at the heels of everybody else without finding herself in a position of helpless isolation in the end. And in this present crisis that is approximately the situation in which this country is found. The latest comment of *The Times*, linking the Nakamura outrage with the Thorburn case, illustrates the point. In view of the Communist menace in this country, and the consequences of a provocative foreign policy on the one hand and of reprisals on the other, there ought to be ample scope for a reasoned policy of co-operation instead of a policy of all-round antagonism.

The methods hitherto adopted in the Thorburn case will

not work in this instance, and the sooner this is realised and the real facts of the matter avowed or admitted the better. But a mere settlement of this particular trouble is not enough. So long as the settled policy of the Chinese Authorities is one of hostility to the Japanese in Manchuria, so long will these incidents persist, and lead to another crisis. The strength of the Chinese position has been immeasurably deepened and widened by the policy of co-operation, enabling adequate transportation for the stream of immigration and for the fruits of their toil. Annexation by Japan is no longer possible with 30,000,000 Chinese inhabiting the territory. But general industrial and economic co-operation is not only possible but essential. The time may come when, with China out of the wilderness of anarchy in which she has been wandering so long, the balance will steadily turn in her favour. But the provocative policy she has been following during the past year or so threatens to ruin everything.

There is nothing whatever to be gained by shielding British military officers who deal with the lives of foreigners as summarily and callously as if they were mere flies, mutilate them as if they were cattle, burn all traces of the crime, and then lie unblushingly about it when inconvenient enquiries are made. There is neither “face” nor prestige in this sort of international crime to be protected. It is beastly and disgraceful, and ought to be publicly and unconditionally repudiated rather than condoned by the Authorities. We have waited more than three months for a clearing up of the Thorburn case, and are still waiting. The world is watching the methods used by the British and Japanese Governments in the respective cases, and will not fail to note their results.

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 12, 1931

Rec'd 10:28 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

744, October 12.

Reuter report from Washington tenth:

"United States Government expects to take action
regarding Manchurian situation as soon as it is
definitely convinced that Chinese and Japanese pledges
to League of Nations are not being fulfilled."

For the Minister.

ENGERT

KLP

AVC

OCT 1 9 1931

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Thompson NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 12, 1931

Rec'd 10:36 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 12 1931
 Department of State

fb
EGC

745, October 12.

Reuter report from Canton eleventh:

"A dozen people were killed and twenty seriously wounded last night in first serious outbreak since inception of anti-Japanese boycott movement.

Students broke into 'New World' store and carried out all articles alleged to be of Japanese origin and made bon fire of them in street.

Police arrested ring leader and took him to the police station. Mob then attempted to release him and stoned police station. Police opened fire with result aforementioned.

All shops in Winghon Road are closed today and police have been heavily reinforced and are patrolling street.

As sequel to shooting the Chief of Police is resigning tonight and public bodies and students demanding punishment of police."

For the Minister.

ENGERT

KLP
 WVC

F/DEW

793.94/2055

FILED

OCT 16 1931

793.94
 with
 693.9412

1052

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

file

October 12, 1931.
10:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM OF TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND GILBERT AT GENEVA.

GILBERT: I wanted to know whether the information I
sent in today is clear to you.

SECRETARY: What particular information do you mean?

GILBERT: Drummond's views, for example regarding the
application of the Kellogg Pact.

SECRETARY: I do not remember that coming up.

GILBERT: I received a telegram from you asking me to
ascertain Drummond's views.

CASTLE: We have not had an answer to that.

SECRETARY: What are his views?

GILBERT: His views are that to apply the Kellogg
Pact at this time would bring in the question of non- applica-
tion. Japan would plead that. It brings the question up
all over again of Corfu. When the Italians took the case
to the Council of Ambassadors, the settlement was delayed
a very long time.

SECRETARY: Do you mean that the Kellogg Pact does
not apply and the incident at Corfu is a precedent against

GILBERT: He does not know whether it can be interpreted
that a state of war exists, and bringing forward the Kellogg
Pact will bring new issues into the discussion. The
Japanese will be able to evade their commitments. He is
very much afraid of that. That happened in 1923 in the Corfu
incident. He advised that the atmosphere might be cleared
by notifying the Japanese and the Chinese that while you were
giving careful consideration to this on account of the

793.94/2055 1/2

Confidential File

*note
7/1/00 12 Anti
rewas*

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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seriousness of the situation . Holding
 decision in reserve. A great deal of the question seems
 to be going off onto another turn, that is the applying of
 the Kellogg Pact with a different background. The whole
 League policy at present is based on both (break in connection)
 The League policy is that those commitments were very difficult
 to obtain from Japan.

SECRETARY: I telegraphed giving the policy which we
 are trying to follow out of cooperation with the League.
 That made it very clear that we are following along behind
 the September 30th resolution, and we have no intention
 of doing anything to run any risk of crossing wires with
 that. For that reason we have taken no independent action
 on the Kellogg Pact. We have been very carefully not to
 invoke the Kellogg Pact by ourselves because we did not want
 to run the risk of crossing wires with the League.

GILBERT: I felt that. On your part, while you were
 considering the Kellogg Pact you would not bring it forward
 at this time.

SECRETARY: You are authorized if invited to join
 in the meeting with the Council to discuss the whole matter
 of the application of the Kellogg Pact. We do not intend to
 act alone on the Kellogg Pact, certainly at present; if any
 action is taken on the Kellogg Pact it should be taken by all
 or the great majority of the signatories in the way in which
 it was invoked two years ago. In that case we had a preliminary
 meeting of the five or six great powers who all agreed to
 join and ask the other.- We want that discussed in the same
 way at the Council where those powers will be present.
 At that meeting these matters which you are now telling me
 of, but which have not yet been received here, can be
 discussed and the views of the great powers obtained. It

is

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
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is not our intention to butt into the matter with our own view unless circumstances should arise which show that we differ entirely from the views of the others. This, we do not at present. In other words it is eminently a matter in which it is appropriate that there should be a discussion by the powers in the way in which they can discuss it at the Council. I agree fully with you and with Drummond that the resolution of September 30th is the strongest thing in the foreground from which to start at present but the difficulty is that that does not bring in the great mass of world opinion. Our reason for thinking of the invocation of the Kellogg Pact was that all the powers of the world practically are signatories and if they all joined in an expression of opinion on that subject it would be very strong. But that is a matter for conference and discussion.

GILBERT: Not only with Sir Eric Drummond but the others? I cannot however go before the Council unless that question is raised?

SECRETARY: We do not want you to discuss questions which are peculiar to the League, such as the question of sanctions.

GILBERT: I will try to explain to you something else.

GILBERT: You have furnished Sir Eric Drummond, through me the most complete information that exists upon Manchuria. At the last meeting of the Council they had nothing but conflicting statements from Japan and China. Other information is coming in but they have nothing as good as ours on which to base their action. The military information which you sent me which came to the Department is only given to me to give Sir Eric Drummond confidentially and therefore it has no value in Geneva whatsoever, because it is not made known to the Council. This information Sir Eric would

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Chaim D. Rosen NARS, Date June 1, 1976

like to use. There is very tense and strong feeling here because throughout the United States has been more or less a "silent partner". The influence of the United States has however been felt in the meetings. In the Council meetings the Japanese have intimated on account of American relations with the Japanese Ambassador in Washington and the Japanese representative at the last meeting would not go forward at all because of the position of the United States. The Council would like to predicate its action on information from a neutral spot. Our information is the best now. Purely from this aspect, Drummond would like to have me present this information to the Council - not to discuss policy.

SECRETARY: Would it not be sufficient for Drummond to be authorized to give the information and simply say that he had it from a neutral source.

GILBERT: It would be impossible. He would be immediately asked what the source was. They would say it sounds like Chinese information, if he did not give the source.

SECRETARY: That would not be a neutral source. Our feeling here is pretty strong so far that it would destroy the future value of our observers there if that were done and I am expecting some more important information from them.

GILBERT: Our information is very strong. If the Council meets tomorrow, they will be in the same situation they were in a week or two ago. Quite frankly the other nations have not come forward and the Council very much needs the support of some definite information to go on.

SECRETARY: I will not authorize that now - any further than what I told you, that is, the information ^{as} ~~is~~ coming from a neutral source.

GILBERT: What they are anxious for is world opinion.

They

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
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They feel the lack of definite information.

SECRETARY: On further thing. That information which we sent you related to September 19th. The important thing now is what has been done since September 30th. I think the information of the 19th is secondary now because of the subsequent resolution and the commitments of the Japanese and the Chinese. The important thing now is to know what has happened since. I think the most important thing in the situation now is the bombing of Chinchow because that with other movements indicate that the parties are not keeping their obligations under the Resolution of September 30th.

GILBERT: It will be done this way. Can I be empowered to discuss the information with the Council committee which is not a committee of the council at all but a group brought together to consult with the President of the Council.

SECRETARY: I think that would leak out. I will think it over but will not agree to it now. We will discuss it here and perhaps answer you later today. I wish nothing further done than what I have said. I think to discuss it with the Committee of the Council would be just as bad as to do it with the Council.

GILBERT: In that eventuality I could keep you completely advised as to the feeling of the other powers and they would feel that we were interested with them in this matter. They feel that this whole thing may go to pieces at the next meeting of the Council, which would of course have a very bad effect on the disarmament question. The feeling is very tense on the American relationship.

SECRETARY: You are trying to unite the powers not on the treaties but on us. I am very much disappointed. I feel that Drummond is afraid of the Kellogg Pact. I do not

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 By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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share in this.

GILBERT: I am giving you Drummond's views.

SECRETARY: I think he is wrong. I think it is time for the Kellogg Pact to come in but it must be brought in at the meeting of the League and not by us coming in from outside.

GILBERT: If the big show is not put on now, they feel the situation will get out of hand and the Japanese will think they have America coming in with them.

SECRETARY: I think the big show should be the Kellogg Pact. I think Drummond's timidity on that is likely to wreck the whole thing. Frankly I do not know anything about Corfu but I know about the Pact and I know about what we did in 1929 in the Chinese-Russian affair, which the Japanese opposed strongly, and of course they will oppose the Pact. But that does not mean that their view is right or that they are not afraid of it and it is the only way to stage the big show.

GILBERT: I am only expressing to you what is represented to me here.

SECRETARY: Express my views with equal clearness to them.

GILBERT: I am not advocating any cause - only putting it to you as they put it to me.

SECRETARY: I do not care at all about Corfu. That will not serve as a precedent. Corfu cannot sidetrack Manchuria.

GILBERT: I will give your views to Drummond.

SECRETARY: What did Japan and China mean when they signed that treaty and what did the rest of us mean? There has been one demonstration of what we meant when a great

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majority of the powers of the world sent their protest to Russia and China in 1929 in a very similar case to this.

GILBERT: I will express that to Drummond.

SECRETARY: Express this, with equal clearness, that the success of what I am saying depends on perfectly whole-hearted action at Geneva, because it makes it all the more important that the initiative and the beginning of this thing should not come from outside, in America. This would indicate a cleavage. They must take hold of this. They are members of the Kellogg Pact; their responsibility is just as great as ours and the initiative must come from Geneva because if it does not, and if it comes from here, it looks as though Geneva did not agree with it.

GILBERT: Will you take into consideration just for your information this. You supplied me with certain military information from Manchuria which I told orally to Drummond in line with your request. Would it be possible for me to submit that to the Committee of five.

SECRETARY: That would show where it came from. I am afraid not.

SECRETARY: I want to know just as soon as you are asked to join in these discussions, because I cannot give it out here until I know whether you are invited. I want to give it out just as quickly as you are invited.

GILBERT: I will let you know that at once - and then you will send me full instructions how to act.

SECRETARY: You have had your instructions already. You are to participate in the discussion so far as it relates to the Kellogg Pact and not the rest.

GILBERT: I am authorized to act for the United States as you have expressed it to me on the telephone.

SECRETARY

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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SECRETARY: You are authorized by this authority now, and then you are to report to me the result of those discussions, of course without committing us until we have had an opportunity to hear the report.

GILBERT: Would it be possible for you and Mr. Castle to confirm the outline of your position by telegraph.

CASTLE: When does the Council meet?

GILBERT: Tomorrow noon.

CASTLE: They are not having the meeting tonight?

GILBERT: No.

CASTLE: We just wanted to be sure. We will send you a full telegram right away.

GILBERT: I wish you would consider that question of the information. They feel very strongly about it.

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Zygon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

FROM

Peiping

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated October 12, 1931

Rec'd 9:47 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY

748, October 12, 8 p.m.

Your 388, October 11, 6 p.m.



As Hanson and Salisbury are probably en route to Taonan the Legation is sending Colonel Margetts to Chinchow tonight and Lieutenant Brown from Mukden will join him there.

For the Minister

URGENT

JHR

CSB

F/m
793.94/2056

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FILED

OCT 19 1931

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

793-94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 12, 1931.

Mr. Castle: *I think Mr. Ligon has come to make his*
793.94/2049 suggestion.
 Since the memorandum hereunder was

written, there has come in Tokyo's 182, *2057*
 October 12, 10 a.m. (copy attached at bottom
 of file). Neville talks about "direct con-
 versation between the Chinese and Japanese as
 the only way out". But he reports Shidehara
 to have referred to the Shantung negotiations
 and the delay, the Chinese refusing to nego-
 tiate, after the Paris Conference and until the
 Washington Conference, "when all points were
 settled with relatively little difficulty by
 direct conversations between the Chinese and
 the Japanese representatives". This gives
 warrant for the hope which I entertain that the
 suggestion that there be Chinese-Japanese
 negotiations in the presence of neutral ob-
 servers, if injected at the psychological

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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moment, might be accepted by both the Japanese
and the Chinese.

SKH

SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zgonc NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GREEN

Tokio

FROM

Dated October 12, 1931

Rec'd 3:57 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Division of

EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 12 1931

182, October 12, 10 a.m.

Department's 191, October 10, 2 p.m.

I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read the message it contained. He asked me for a copy which I gave him. He told me that he had received a telegram from the President of the Council of the League which he read to me. It was similar to the message I was instructed to deliver. He stated that he was replying to it Monday or Tuesday at the latest and would give me a copy; the reply will also be given to the Ambassador in Washington I understand.

The Minister then said that the British and French Ambassadors had called on him and delivered messages similar to mine and to that of the President of the Council of the League. He spoke very frankly to me and said that in his judgment the affair would drag on as long as the Chinese could avoid direct conversation; that as far as he could see it was the record of the Shantung negotiations over again; after the ratification of the

F/P 793.94/2057

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

2- #182, From Tokio, October 12, 1931
 10 a.m.

of the Versailles Treaty the Japanese had notified the Chinese that they were prepared to open negotiations for the rendition of Tsingtau and the railway to China; the Chinese refused to negotiate and the affair dragged on until the Washington Conference, when all points were settled with relatively little difficulty by direct conversations between the Japanese and Chinese representatives. He said that the present matter could be speedily settled between them if direct negotiations could be inaugurated; that so long as the Chinese have any encouragement to believe that some pressure can be brought to compel the Japanese to yield in the present situation they will evade any negotiations. He said the Japanese obligation to withdraw within the railway zone was contingent upon the Chinese ability and willingness to safeguard the lives and property of Japanese subjects lawfully in the country; that the Chinese have made no effort to respect the lives and property of the Japanese; that in some cases it might be difficult for the Nanking Government to fulfill their obligations, but that the lower Yangtze Valley was in their power and the Japanese residents fared worse than in many other places. In such circumstances he said that the

Japanese

In the
 presence of
 neutral
 observers.

SCH

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

3-#182, From Tokio, October 12, 1931
10 a.m.

Japanese could not withdraw their forces, and until an indication is given that the Chinese intends to safeguard Japanese lives and property in fact as well as in name, he did not see what could be done; all these matters would settle themselves if the Chinese were made to realize that they have no chance of settlement except by direct negotiations; once that is made clear to them, the irresponsible agitation by students and professional politicians will die down because the Kuomintang will have no chance to make ^{domestic} political capital out of baiting the Japanese. He said that in the meantime Japan would exercise extreme forbearance and not provoke any trouble. I said that the Chinchow incident had aroused much comment. He had nothing of importance on this point he said than he had told me before.

I am pretty well satisfied that the statement I made in my 162 is still correct: direct conversation between the Chinese and Japanese is the only way out, because the Japanese for the present will not welcome interference by any third party.

Repeated to Peiping.

NEVILLE

KLP

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 4, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.

FROM

Geneva

Dated October 11, 1931

Rec'd 9:33 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

DOUBLE PRIORITY

179, October 11, 11 p.m.


I conveyed to Drummond to-day your message to him
 embodied in your telegram 78, October 10, 10 p.m.
 is deeply grateful at the confidence in him which you
 display in so frankly giving him your views on this
 most serious situation. With respect to your solicitation
 of an expression of his views as to the possibility of
 invoking the Kellogg Pact he has handed me the following
 informal memorandum with the request that I transmit
 it to you.

"Secretary of State has been good enough to ask
 my views as to how attention may most effectively be
 drawn to the obligations assumed under the Pact of Paris.

Any formal invocation at present juncture of Pact would
 to my mind have certain grave practical disadvantages,

One. It would create double jurisdiction and
 competence which the League has reason to fear from

past experience



793.94/2058

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

2-#179, from Geneva, October 11, 1931
 11 p.m.

past experience.

In Corfu incident in 1923 such parallel competence occurred as between League and Conference of Ambassadors and the withdrawal Italian troops and ships from the Island and arrangement of settlement of dispute was delayed and rendered more difficult.

Two. It would allow either party to present dispute to choose one competence and deny the other thereby rendering negotiations far more difficult. Here again Corfu incident showed dangers of creation of such a situation.

Three. It would allow either party to remove present discussions to an entirely different plane, viz, whether the Pact of Paris had in fact been violated or not thus allowing engagements given to the Council to assume a secondary position.

Either party which desired to secure delay would assuredly utilize situation explained under two and three.

Further assuming that the only breach of the Pact of Paris is a resort to war a point on which I hardly venture to express an opinion my legal advisers not being available, then such resort is clearly at the present state of the

Sino-Japanese

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Long NARS, Date June 4, 1976

REP

3- #179, from Geneva, Oct. 11, 1931,
 11 p.m.

Sino-Japanese dispute a violation of the Covenant (notably of Article 12) with all that such violation entails under Article 16, and the policy of the United States would be all important in such a most serious issue.

On the other hand, I venture to suggest that if the Secretary of State saw fit he might possibly address a written or verbal communication to the two parties or to either stating that he had grave doubts whether the Pact of Paris was not in imminent danger of violation but that he did not intend at the moment formally to invoke that Pact because the League had been ^[seized?] (?) of the question at issue and had obtained assurances from the two parties which if loyally executed as he feels assured they should be, would prevent danger of violation of the Pact. While he supported fully the action of the League, nevertheless, he felt bound solemnly to remind the two Governments of their obligations under the Pact, a violation of which by resort to war might be held by members of the League to imply a violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

If the

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By Charles E. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

4- #179, from Geneva, Oct. 11, 1931,
11 p.m.

If the Secretary of State addressed such a note as
I have suggested to the two Governments and informed the
Council, I feel that the position would be singularly
clarified".

Drummond requests that as these are his personal
views you regard them as confidential.

GILBERT

CSB

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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

REP

FROM GREEN
Geneva

Dated October 12, 1931

Rec'd 10:16 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



181, October 12, 8 a. m. *2046*

Consulate's 173, October 11, 6 p. m., paragraph three.

Drummond has handed me for communication to you the following message received today from the Japanese delegation in Paris. It refers to the Japanese Government's reply of October 9 to the Chinese note of October 5th.

"First part of Chinese Government's note states that
"Japanese representative on League of Nations has formally
declared for withdrawal of all Japanese troops in different
districts and reestablishment of situation existing before
September 18th and adds that Council's resolution ordered
total withdrawal of Japanese troops before meeting of
October 14th". As appears from Japanese representative's
repeated statement to Council the withdrawal of Japanese
troops in railway zone is conditional on security of our
nationals in Manchuria. Moreover Council's resolution of
September

Drum.
10-20-31

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793.94/2059

REP

2- #181, from Geneva, Oct. 12, 1931,
10:16 a. m.

September 30th contains no provision ordering withdrawal of our troops before Council meeting of October 14th. Regarding points raised in second part of Chinese note, Japanese Government is prepared to define its attitude as follows:

One. Military operations undertaken by Japanese army along South Manchurian Railway line since incident of night of September 18 between Chinese and Japanese troops near Mukden, were designed solely to avert by preventive action the potential menace constituted by presence in these districts of Chinese armies in crushingly superior numbers. Japanese troops have in fact suffered considerable losses of men in spite of proclamation of non-resistance of Chinese troops.

Two. Chinese Government proposes appoint generals Chang Tso Hsing and Wan Shu Chang to arrange with Japanese military authorities for suitable means for maintaining order in certain localities in railway zone after withdrawal of Japanese troops. The present concentration in these localities of armed Chinese soldiers to cope with any eventuality, although maintenance of order is sole

object

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By Charles E. Zgon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

3- #181, from Geneva, Oct. 12, 1931,
8 a. m.

object in view, would very probably under present circumstances, as at the time of incident, have regrettable effect upon troops' feeling of serious impending menace.

In view of extreme tension of national feeling on both sides danger of conflict between troops of both parties is probably greater than at any moment hitherto.

Three. Japanese Government considers most urgent task of moment is collaboration of our two Governments with a view to calming over excited national feelings by rapidly establishing through direct negotiations fundamental points capable of constituting a basis allowing for resumption of normal relations. Once national feelings are allayed by direct negotiations Japanese troops might without over-much apprehension return entirely to railway zone thus facilitating assertion of authority and maintenance of order in localities in question.

Four. Japanese Government is ready to negotiate immediately with responsible representatives of Chinese Government in order to establish fundamental points referred to."

GILBERT

CSB

1073

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 12, 1931

Rec'd 11:06 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

DIVISION OF
EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 12 1931
Department of State

PRIORITY

747, October 12, 4 p.m.

FROM CONSUL GENERAL AT NANKING

"October 10, 6 p.m. H. H. Kung, Minister of
~~Commerce~~ (2) asked for an interview with me and I
called upon him October 10, 5 p.m. He has just
returned from Shanghai. He asked me what information
I had regarding the position of my Government toward
the actions of Japan in Manchuria. He says that he
had been informed by a League official who happens
to be in China that after Japan had assured the League
that Japan had no territorial ambitions in Manchuria,
et cetera, the United States discouraged the idea of
further intervention by other nations. I replied in
the sense of the Department's authorized reply to
Soong. Kung then objected that Japan had been continuing
its military activities in Manchuria even after giving
its assurances to the League and he inquired what the
attitude of the American Government would be if Japan
evinced

Telegram to Nanking
Oct. 13, 1931
FE EGC

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

2-#747, From Peiping, October 12, 1931
4 p.m.

evinced no intention of carrying out its commitments.
I replied that this question must rest for the time
being until October 14, that the period allotted by
the League had expired".

For the Minister

ENGERT

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 or

Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

Naval Radio

October 13, 1931.

11a

AMERICAN CONSUL

NANKING (CHINA).

88

For the Minister.

Legation's 747, October 12, 4 p.m., and Consul

General's October 10, 6 p.m., to Legation, transmitted therein.

The following is the text of the statement given to the press (for publication) on October 11, 1931:

QUOTE On October 9, 1931, the Secretary of State sent to the American Consulate at Geneva, for communication to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, a message as follows:-

793.94/2013

I believe that our co-operation in the future handling of this difficult matter should proceed along the course which has been followed ever since the first outbreak of the trouble fortunately found the Assembly and Council of the League of Nations in session. The Council has deliberated long and earnestly on this matter and the Covenant of the League of Nations provides permanent and already tested machinery for handling such issues as

Enciphered by _____

between

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/2060

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-128 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

between States members of the League. Both the Chinese and Japanese have presented and argued their cases before the Council, and the world has been informed through published accounts with regard to the proceedings there. The Council has formulated conclusions and outlined a course of action to be followed by the disputants; and as the said disputants have made commitments to the Council, it is most desirable that the League in no way relax its vigilance and in no way fail to assert all the pressure and authority within its competence towards regulating the action of China and Japan in the premises.

On its part the American Government acting independently through its diplomatic representatives will endeavor to re-inforce what the League does and will make clear that it has a keen interest in the matter and is not oblivious to the obligations which the disputants have assumed to their fellow signatories in the Pact of Paris as well as in the Nine Power Pact should a time arise when it would seem advisable to

bring

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

- 3 -

bring forward those obligations. By this course we
avoid any danger of embarrassing the League in the
course to which it is now committed. UNQUOTE
Repeat to Tokyo.

Stimson
SKH

Rum
FE: RSM: EJJ
mmh
FE

Oct. 18 1931.
Amv

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

1078

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 12, 1931

Rec'd 10:52 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

742, October 12, 5 p.m.

Legation's 715, October 7, 8 a.m.

Following from Consul at Yunanfu:

October 9, 9 a.m.

"Although Provincial Chairman gave me verbal assurances he would protect Japanese subjects my opinion is that should further incidents occur elsewhere to aggravate Sino-Japanese relations Lung will be able but not disposed to protect Japanese subjects. With the exception of Japanese Consul and a dentist all local Japanese evacuated to Tonkin by special train night of October 5th. Chinese police are now guarding Japanese Consulate."

Japanese Minister has authorized his Consul through our Consul to evacuate to Indo-China leaving Consulate in care of Chinese authorities or of a foreign consulate.

For the Minister.

ENGERT

JHR
HPD

F
793.94/2061

FILED

OCT 16 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 12, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

NOV 3 1931

In relation to the occurrences
at Chinchow,

The attached telegram has just
come.

It states, on authority of
"two reliable foreigners returning
from Chinchow":

- 30 bombs dropped;
- 16 killed -- all civilians;
- No soldiers in the area
bombarded.

SKH/ZMF

1080

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COMIN

29.C. 2
 7/E

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 12, 1931

Rec'd 10:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

W
 DIVISION OF
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 12 1931
 Department of State
 NOV 3 1931

Lee
 29.C

746, October 12, 6 p. m.

From Lieutenant Brown at Mukden to the Naval Attache.

October 10, 11 p. m. "Two reliable foreigners returned from Chinchow state that thirty bombs dropped, sixteen killed including one foreigner either Russian or German citizen. No military activities, bombarded casualties all civilians. Japanese authorities officially announced bombing but claims Chinese forces fired upon planes which all foreigners state improbable as there were no soldiers in the area bombarded".

For the Minister.

OSB

ENGERT

FILED

NOV. 4 1931

F/ 793.94/2062

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Ryan NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department

OR

Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

October 12, 1931.

793.94/2062
AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

84 We have from Manchuria, through official channels
 but not ^{as} from official sources, the following: 793.94/2062

QUOTE Two reliable foreigners returned from Chinchow
 state that thirty bombs dropped, sixteen killed including
 one foreigner either Russian or German citizen. No mili-
 tary activities, bombarded casualties all civilians. Japa-
 nese authorities officially announced bombing but claims
 Chinese forces fired upon planes which all foreigners
 state improbable as there were no soldiers in the area
 bombarded UNQUOTE.

793.94/2062

Department does not bond for
 this and is not to be referred to as
 channel or source.

Stinson
 Wdy

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 13, 1931.

~~M.~~

~~U.~~

In this the Japanese Foreign Office, for practical purposes, commits the Japanese Government to defense and approval of the acts of the Army: (p.4).

(90, 82, 12, 1931, 12, 130 / 100)

SKH


SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM



Dated October 12, 1931

Rec'd 12:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



182, October 12, 11 a. m.

Drummond has handed me for communication to you the following message from the Japanese Government which has been circulated to the members of the Council.

"Firstly, since the beginning of present incident Japanese Government has spared no efforts to circumscribe events and settle matter by direct negotiations. It has further drawn up plan for withdrawing Japanese troops outside of railway zone to within zone progressively as protection of railway and security of life and property of Japanese nationals are assured. In this spirit Japanese Government responded to appeal of President of Council and joined in Council resolution of September 30th last. Secondly, the Japanese Government is firmly resolved to follow up line of conduct above indicated. With this

object

F/m
793.94/2063

FILED
 OCT 17 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #182, from Geneva, Oct. 12, 1931,
 11 a. m.

object the Japanese Government has not complied with urgent requests of Japanese nationals residing in Northern Manchuria and Tientao district for despatch of troops for their protection but on the contrary has not hesitated where necessary to take extreme measures in shape of orders not only to Japanese nationals but also to consular staff to evacuate Manchuria and China properly speaking. Japanese Government cannot understand Chinese Government's unperturbed aggravation of situation by failure to take any effective measures to arrest anti-Japanese movement which increased daily throughout the country especially in districts under Nanking Government's control. Japanese Government continues to put forward idea of calming by direct negotiations atmosphere of extreme tension between the two peoples and not only settling present incident but also eradicating deeper causes of present incident with a view to preventing regrettable eventualities in future. Chinese Government is informed directly and indirectly of Japanese Government's intention in this respect. In pursuance of program above indicated Japanese Government is withdrawing to within railway zone troops sent outside

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

3- #182, from Geneva, Oct. 12, 1931,
 11 a. m.

outside zone so far as situation permits. Withdrawal has made real progress since Japanese declaration of September 24th last.

Thirdly, Chinese Government has withdrawn its unofficial proposal for direct negotiations which Japanese Government accepted on the ground that Council of League was dealing with the matter. Japanese Government continues to believe in direct negotiations as effective means of relieving situation and is glad to think that Council of League took same view when it called upon both parties by resolution of September 30 last to leave no stone unturned in order to hasten reestablishment of normal relations between the two parties. Since above unofficial proposal the Chinese Government has taken no steps calculated to show its sincere desire to ease situation as you desire and has rendered practically impossible all efforts to clear up disagreeable atmosphere prevailing between the two countries and especially to relieve the tension between the two armies in Manchuria, thus depriving of all practical value

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

4- #182, from Geneva, Oct. 12, 1931,
 11 a. m.

value the assurance given by Chinese representatives to Council that China assumed responsibility for security of Japanese nationals with progressive withdrawal of Japanese troops within the railway zone. Under these circumstances military authorities are compelled to forego decision to withdraw troops except from localities in Manchuria where organizations exist capable of maintaining order. Growing insecurity of Japanese nationals in localities without Japanese troops as shown by communications made to Council renders particularly difficult the efforts to restore normal situation.

Fourthly, the Chinese Government might explain its inactivity in connection with protection of Japanese nationals by flight of its local officials and dispersion of its troops as a result of Japanese troops operations. These operations are only a consequence of provocation of Japanese railway guards by Chinese soldiers which is natural outlet of animosity displayed by China towards Japan for years past. This anti-Japanese attitude has led Japanese troops to take measures of protection in a somewhat

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

5- #182, from Geneva, Oct. 12, 1931,
 11 a. m.

somewhat wide area to safeguard their own existence as well as the railway and Japanese nationals. For these reasons the Japanese Government is firmly convinced that only constructive way of solving the difficulties is to arrest anti-Japanese movement throughout China and to negotiate directly as soon as possible with a view to calming and limiting dangerous situation now prevailing between the two countries.

Fifthly, the Chinese Government through its Minister at Tokyo has presented to the Japanese Government a note dated October 5 regarding the possibility of withdrawal of troops and maintenance of order in Manchuria. The Japanese Government replied to this note October 9 repeating once more its intentions and urging necessity of immediate negotiations with representatives of the Chinese Government on points raised by Chinese note as well as fundamental points indispensable for reestablishment of normal relations. Improvement of present situation therefore depends solely on sincerity displayed by Chinese Government in considering Japanese Government's reply".

GILBERT

OSB

1088

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated October 12, 1931

Rec'd 1:05 p.m.

793-94
 Secretary of State,
 Washington.

183, October 12, 11 a. m.

Drummond has handed me for communication to you the



following message from the Japanese Government which is
 being circulated to the members of Council.

"Following on anti-Japanese movement several Japanese
 Consulates in China particularly those situated along
 river Yangtze been obliged evacuate towns in which
 established to seek refuge in safer localities. Present
 position as regards evacuations as follows:

One. Japanese Consulate at Chengchow, five members
 including their families, ten Japanese residents. Anti-
 Japanese movements becoming very serious. All members
 of Consulate their families and Japanese residents left
 town September 28th in order to avoid their way to refuge
 being out off. They arrived at Hangkow September 30th.

Two.

F/9
 793.94/2064



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #183, from Geneva, Oct. 12, 1931,
11 a. m.

Two. Japanese Consulate at Yunnan, three members including their families, 25 Japanese residents. Since beginning of incident Chinese authorities at Yunnan have seized all telegrams addressed to Japanese Consul thus causing much anxiety. In view of increasingly serious situation the Consul caused the 25 Japanese residents to evacuate the town about October 5th. They arrived at Hanoi October 7th. Minister of Foreign Affairs ordered Consul on October 7th to leave his post if necessary in order to assist the residents in refuge Hanoi after having taken necessary steps to safeguard consulate and property left by the Japanese residents.

Three. Japanese Consulate at Chungking fifteen members including their families, 80 residents. One gun-boat and a steamer are placed at disposal of Japanese refugees. Anti-Japanese movement so strong in this town that Japanese concession is in danger of being attacked by over-excited individuals. In these circumstances Minister of Foreign Affairs has ordered Consul to send residents out of town down Yangtze. Consul also been authorized withdraw if necessary to Hankow with members of consulate

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

3- #183, from Geneva, Oct. 12, 1931,
11 a. m.

of consulate after collecting members of consulate and
Japanese residents at Chengtu.

Four. Consulate General at Chengtu five members
including their families, five residents. The situation
at Chengtu does not at present seem sufficiently serious
to warrant immediate evacuation. If these residents
remained in Chengtu the consulate and Japanese residents
at Chungking would be in such a position that they
could not withdraw in case of necessity. In these cir-
cumstances Minister of Foreign Affairs issued on October
7th instructions to Consul General that whole Japanese
colony of Chengtu should be brought to Chungking as soon
as possible so that thence the Japanese residents might
take refuge down the Yangtze".

GILBERT

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated October 12, 1931

FROM Rec'd 11:40 a.m.

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 12 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

October 12, 3 p.m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

Confidential. Conditions in the International

settlement, particularly in the northern district, have
 become more threatening each day during the last week.

The Municipal authorities have endeavored to lessen the
 tension by conciliatory methods. These efforts were

successful until the 10th and during the past 48 hours
 outbreaks have been threatened continuously. Yesterday

afternoon the Japanese held a mass-meeting in the

Japanese Primary School on North Szechuen Road attended
 by some two thousand of their nationals. This was

followed by a Japanese civilian parade. A serious clash
 between Chinese and Japanese was only prevented by the

timely intervention of the International Settlement

police. The tension between the Chinese and Japanese

is due on the one hand to what is believed to be an

unnecessary display within the Settlement and on

Settlement roads of military forces by the Japanese.
 Chinese

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 693.9412

file eg.c.

OCT 13 1931

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FILED

OCT 13 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

2-From Shanghai, October 12, 1931
 3 p.m.

Chinese are past masters in their ability to display on posters libellous caricatures and this ability may have been carried to a very great extreme not only in Chinese territory but in Chinese business houses in the settlement and these but naturally incite the Japanese to make efforts to suppress such posters.

Another contributory cause is the extension of the Japanese boycott, which prior to September 19th was not deeply seated, to enforcing a policy of non-intercourse with the Japanese, which has resulted in an unprecedented paralyzing both of trade and personal relations. To illustrate the extent to which such a course is being pressed, one of the local Japanese banks paid a commission of some six hundred dollars to secure 75,000 local silver dollars on the 8th, through a private agency, rather than apply to one of the larger foreign institutions to supply the amount for fear admission of such extreme necessity would too seriously affect the standing of Japanese institutions with foreign banks. I have never known the advocacy of so complete non-intercourse during any of the preceding boycotts as there has been no justification. War conditions would not cause a more complete non-intercourse policy than is

109

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

3-From Shanghai, October 12, 1931
3 p.m.

than is being enforced during the last few days in
Shanghai.

The International Settlement authorities previously have attempted to exclude caricature posters that were either anti-foreign or affected only one nation. The Municipal authorities now, due to modified administration, are impotent in their efforts to prevent posters being displayed in the Chinese shops in the International Settlement though they did suppress them in 1925. These posters are of such a character as to justly incite the Japanese and threaten law and order in the Settlement. The Municipal authorities of the International Settlement have orally expressed the hope that I would suggest to the Japanese the undesirability of an extraordinary display of military forces. Though I feel that the Japanese Marines stationed here are unnecessarily conspicuous and have numerically increased by some 200, it is difficult to find a satisfactory reason for bringing it to the attention of the Japanese Consul General or to express the hope that until the municipal police authorities have become incapable of handling the situation that this display should not be increased beyond what has been customary during the last three years.

HPD

CUNNINGHAM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

GREEN
GENEVA

FROM Dated October 12, 1931

Secretary of State
Washington

186, October 12, 8 p.m.

Drummond has handed me for communication to you the two following messages from the Chinese Government dated Nanking October 11th which have been circulated to the members of the Council.

First message "Peking-Mukden Railway report two armor and one passenger cars conveying Cheng Chia Tun arrived Tungliiao and three cases of ammunition moved toward city. North-South station damaged in 26 places. Goods depot South station destroyed. One Japanese plane dropped hand bills; since ninth passenger trains go only as far as Tung-liao South station".

Second message "Japanese air craft cruised October 10th over the industrial city Tongshan and other Chinese territories inside the great wall thus aggravating situation continuously and extending area of military operations".

GILBERT

FW

793.94

ZE

WE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 13 1931
Department of State
OCT 14 1931
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

F
793.94/2066

FILED
OCT 17 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

FROM
 PEIPING

Gray

Dated October 13, 1931

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

Priority.

752, October 13, 8 a.m.

Your ⁸⁴⁰~~300~~, October 12, 2 p.m. Minister starts


Nanking forenoon October 14th. Foreign Office informed.

For the Minister

ENGERT

JS

A/E



F/

793.94/2067

OCT 26 1931

FILED

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lynn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

GRAY

FROM PEIPING VIA NR

Dated October 12, 1931

Rec'd 3:06 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington



751, October 12, 11 p.m.

Following from American Consulate General at Mukden:

"October 11, 3 p.m. Bank of Three Eastern Provinces and the Frontier Bank which were seized by the Japanese military authorities on September 19th, are to be reopened on October 15th according to a statement issued by Japanese authorities today. Regulations governing reopening were drawn up by Sino-Japanese committee under Colonel Doihara, Mayor of Mukden. Outstanding provisions of the regulations are as follows:

Stringent limitation on withdrawal of deposits ^{payments} ~~fixed~~ in silver; prohibition against withdrawal of government and public funds; provision for distinct accounting for any new Government deposits; recalling of all public loans and restriction of new loans to urgent cases; and "in case a new Government is established in Manchuria, these regulations will be enforced after handing over the banks to the new Manchurian Government".

Several Japanese are to be invited to serve on the banks



793.94/2068

793.94
893.516OCT 12 1931
1-130

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

2- #751, from Peiping,
October 12, 1931

banks committee in a supervisory capacity."

For the Minister.

ENGLERT

KLP

WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAIN

GRAY

PEIPING VIA NR


FROM

Dated October 12, 1931

Rec'd 3:30 p.m.

793.94

Secretary of State
Washington



file
cg.c.

PRIORITY

750, October 12, 10 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Nanking dated October 11, 12 noon, and October 11, 7 p.m.

"Questioned in regard to recent developments Soong said that no reply had been received from the Japanese Government to the notification of the appointment of Chinese representatives to take over charge of evacuated areas, after the bombardment of Chingchow. The Chinese Government, through the Chinese Minister in Tokyo, pressed for a reply but unsuccessfully. Finally a note was received from Japanese Government stating that to satisfy public opinion representatives should be announced by the two governments to discuss matters in Manchuria. October tenth the Chinese Government inquired of the Japanese Government, (a), what sort of representatives should be appointed; (b), what the scope of the discussions should be and, (c), was it the intention of the Japanese Government that the discussions should be deferred until after military

F/ 793.94/2069

FILED

1099

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAN

2- #750, from Peiping,
October 12, 1931

military withdrawal had become completed. No reply has been received.

The Japanese note protesting against the boycott was presented by the Japanese Minister October 11, 10 a.m. Soong said that popular criticism of the Chinese Government for its alleged weakness was growing stronger.

(END PART ONE)

For the Minister.

ENGERT

GW

1 1 0 1
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

Undated

FROM

Rec'd 3:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY

750 (PART TWO)

He reiterated that military measures by the Japanese in the Yangtze valley would be resisted and he confirmed current reports that concentration of Chinese forces in the region north of the Yangtze is taking place to overcome the initial advantage the Japanese would have in regions near the coast and large rivers"

"Soong said he understood the policy of the American Government which was cooperation with the League in regard to the present crisis but he said that he thought that independent action by the American Government would be very desirable either on the basis of the Kellogg Pact or the Nine Power Treaty. He inquired whether the American Government could not call another nine power conference. I said I could only transmit his question to you.

Frank Lee has informed me that the Japanese Minister
handed

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence A. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

2-750, From Peiping, Undated

handed the memorandum of protest to him accompanied by an English translation and observed that no explanatory comments seemed necessary. Lee said the interview lasted only a few minutes. The Japanese Minister today sent me English translation of the memorandum almost exactly as published in the SHANGHAI TIMES October 10th".

(END MESSAGE) For the Minister

ENGERT

CSB

1102

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

HSM

GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
Peiping, via N. R.

Dated October 12, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 3:42 p. m.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY.
749, October 12, p. m.

Following is Nanking's 81, October 11, 6 p. m. to
you.

"Your 87, October 10, 2 p. m. Your instructions
were carried out October 11, 5 p. m.

Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs made no comment
but asked whether I knew what failure by China to carry
out commitments was referred to. I replied I did not
know. As of probable interest to me he then showed me
confidentially copy of a telegram just received from
Drummond giving text of an undated communication from
the Department. I noted but did not inform Lee that
this was substantially the first part of the communica-
tion whose text was recently telegraphed to Berne by the
Department. I respectfully request that fact of disclosure
by Lee be kept confidential."

For the Minister

ENGERT

CSB

F/10
793.94/2070

FILED

OCT 26 1931

1103

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

Washington,
October 13, 1931.

793.94/2070

2P

OCT 15 31

AMERICAN CONSUL,

NANKING (China).

/2070

90

Your 81, October 11, 6 p.m., apparently to Legation,
penultimate sentence.

Department urgently requests more ^{definite} ~~complete~~ identifica-
tion of the communication referred to.

SKH

Stinson
SKH

793.94/2070

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-138

1104

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lynch NARS, Date June 4, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN


FROM

Tokio

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 7:50 a. m.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.



183, October 13, 11 a. m. / 2032
Department's 194 of October 11, 7 p. m.

I was unable to get an appointment with the Foreign Minister yesterday and as there is a Cabinet meeting today I saw the Vice Minister late yesterday afternoon and left the memorandum with him. He told me that he would see that Baron Shidehara got it before leaving if possible.

I believe the Government realizes that the incident is one that cannot be minimized or explained away but they are handicapped by the fact that the General Staff is not subordinate to the Minister of War, who has control of administration and supplies but not of strategy and tactics. expect to hear from the Minister soon.

In previous times I have referred to the desire of the Foreign Minister to negotiate direct with the Chinese.

Frankly

F/m

793.94/2071

FILED

1 1 0 5

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lynam NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #183, from Tokio, Oct. 13, 1951,
11 a. m.,

Frankly I believe that this is the best solution. The situation presents so many anomalies that attempts to settle it by outside powers are likely to do more harm than good. Both China and Japan are fixed in this part of the world and they will have to get along as neighbors as best they can. If we can help them to get together peacefully we will be doing them a service. We cannot sit in judgment on them or force a settlement that will be lasting. I venture to urge therefore that every effort be made to find a formula that will enable them to negotiate directly with each other to their own benefit and as an example to the world. I realize that this may be difficult but they must face each other in the emergency, if for no other reason than that geography compels them to. We can help best it seems to me by insisting that they settle their differences. It may well be that an opportunity to air their grievances may do them both good by relieving their minds; but the final settlement will have to be made by China and Japan. I can see no alternative in the long run.

NEVILLE

JHR
HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clayton S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 14, 1931.

Mr. Castle:

Would there be any objection to leaving off the last sentence?

We took great pains in telegraphing Drummond to impress upon him that we wanted him to seize the idea if he cared for it but not under any circumstances to have it known that the initial suggestion came from the United States.

The Far Eastern Division cannot too strongly emphasize its view that in all probability our communications into and out of Japan are decoded by the Japanese. In our drafting, we proceed on that assumption.

The sentence in question cannot add anything to what Neville needs to know, and if deciphered will give the Japanese just what we do not wish to have them know.

*Japan
Justification
Wdy*

Stop

1107

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

October 14, 1931.

AMEMBASSY

TOKYO (JAPAN)

Your 183, October 13, 11 a.m. 1931

You seem somewhat to mistake the attitude of the Department. We are not attempting either to "sit in judgment" or to "force a settlement". You are quite right in saying that the two disputants must themselves reach a settlement. All the League is attempting to do, and with this aim the United States heartily concurs, is to bring about a cessation of hostilities so that Japan and China may be enabled to reach their own settlement without recourse to war. That the settlement shall be accomplished in a peaceful manner is of direct concern to all the powers. If Japan does not recognize this she will find arrayed against her the opinion of practically all the nations of the world. I think it important that you should make the above clear to Baron Shidehara so that he may ~~clearly~~ understand that we have no desire to sit in judgment or to suggest terms of settlement but that our sole aim is to prevent hostilities and encourage

Enciphered by _____

settlement

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793/94/2071

1108

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington.

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO PAGE 2.

settlement through direct negotiations.

Confidential for Neville. Shidehara suggested to you the Shantung settlement in support of direct negotiations. Debuchi brought up the same matter this morning with the Under Secretary and discussed it at some length, pointing out the success of the negotiations. Castle reminded him that he had omitted one vital point which was that neutral observers had been present at the negotiations. Debuchi said he did not know what his Government's attitude would be on this and Castle told him that since the Chinese demanded a neutral commission it seemed that Japan might be ready at least to admit observers on condition that its main point of direct negotiations was accepted, that obviously both sides must make some concessions. I do not wish you to take this matter up with Baron Shidehara but if he should bring it up with you you may express the opinion given above. ~~I may add confidentially that we have already suggested this method to the League as a possible solution.~~

U WRO/LM

Strinson
Wg

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1966 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. *egk*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

W
FILE

AM

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N., R.

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 10:30 a.m.

793.94

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C..

W
Division of
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 13 1931
Department of State

file
egc

F/
793.94/2072

755 October 13.

Reuter report from Washington 12th.

"State Department has expressed grave concern
at China's threat officially telegraphed this morning
to declare war if League of Nations fails to settle
Manchurian dispute.

Statement is considered most alarming and most
significant since trouble began.

Colonel Stimson, Secretary of State, immediately
took matter up to exclusion of everything else."

For the Minister

ENGERT


HPD

FILED


OCT 17 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976



CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE



AF
OK

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

October 8, 1931.

free egs

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR,
HERR FRIEDRICH W. VON PRITZWITZ UND GAFFRON.

Manchurian situation.

793.94

The German Ambassador called and told me he had received a message from his government, saying that the Chinese Chargé had called and said that the Japanese were threatening to land from warships at Nanking and commit acts of war against China and that China was asking the other nations to intervene under the Kellogg Pact. The Ambassador said he was embarrassed because he really did not have any government at home just at the moment owing to the change of Cabinet and he wanted to know whether I had any news of such a situation. I told him no, but that I had read in my morning report of the rumors that had come yesterday to the effect that the Japanese were refusing to withdraw in Manchuria unless the Chinese Government called off the boycott and that the Japanese Government was threatening to land troops at Shanghai, and I gave to the Ambassador a resumé of Mr. Castle's report on that subject after he had seen Debuchi. I told him that so far as I knew there had been no request upon us to invoke

the

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793.94/2073

NSA 61130

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

the Kellogg Pact. I said that I had just had an interview with the Chinese Charge', who had been called here at my own instance in regard to the Manchuria trouble, and that he had not alluded to such a subject at all, so that neither here nor through our Minister to China had we any news of such an invocation of the Kellogg Pact. The Ambassador then said he thought that the Chinese Charge' in Berlin must have misunderstood his instructions.

HLS.

S;HLS:HHR

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Thomas E. Ryan NARS, Date June 1, 1976

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

OCT 13 1931

October 12, 1931. **IO**

793.94

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI
MONDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1931, AT 11:45 O'CLOCK.

Manchuria. *Eg. Lee*



Eg.

The Japanese Ambassador said he came to ~~Manchuria~~ *Manchuria*.
Baron Shidehara's reply to my message to him of Saturday,
October 10th. (See aide memoire that date.) It was as
follows:

First: Baron Shidehara was strongly of the opinion
that the General Officer, commanding in Manchuria, was not
in a position to take charge of diplomatic negotiations; and
that such a question as the recognition of Marshal Chang's
authority in Manchuria was a question for the Imperial
Japanese Government.

Second: It was very far from Baron Shidehara's real
thought to minimize the bombing at Chinchow; that all he
wished to express was that the bombing was an isolated
military action which did not reflect the real attitude
of the Japanese Government.

Third: Baron Shidehara wished Ambassador Debuchi to
assure me that the fixed policy of Japan towards China
will not be influenced by a few incidents caused by
Japanese military officers in Manchuria, which incidents
might



793.94/2074

OCT 21 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

might be merely the result of temporary states of mind on their part.

Fourth: Baron Shidehara has entirely approved Ambassador Debuchi's explanation of the Japanese memorandum to China (a copy of which was left by Debuchi at Mr. Castle's home the other evening), which was to the effect that this memorandum was merely a precautionary measure and could not be construed as an ultimatum or as evidence of aggressive action on Japan's part.

After conveying these messages, the Ambassador made some personal observations. One was to the effect that the position of the Japanese Cabinet is very difficult; that Shidehara is responsible to the Cabinet and to Parliament and for that reason it was very difficult for Shidehara to say whether he approved or disapproved the action of the Japanese military in Manchuria or of the act of Japanese airplanes in bombing Chinchow.

I replied that I understood Mr. Shidehara's position. I said that my attitude towards him personally was not modified by the fact that he did not seem to be able to control his general officers, but that on his part he must remember that I faced the fact that these actions by the general officers may affect the safety of the world and must

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

must govern my action accordingly. As the Ambassador left I told him that the one important thing I wished him to convey to Baron Shidehara was that the situation in Manchuria was regarded here as most serious, both by our government and the American people, and there should be no mistake about that. I then told Debuchi that I was going to authorize Gilbert to sit with the Council of the League of Nations, if invited, in their discussion on any matters that related to treaties to which we were a party. I told him my reason was that both for the sake of the effect on the world at large and the relations of this country with Japan I wanted it to be clear that we stood not alone vis-à-vis Japan but with the other nations of the world.

HLS.

S HLS:HRH

1 1 1 C
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Geneva

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 9:20

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.


URGENT

187, October 13, 11 a.m.

FOR THE SECRETARY

193-94
Since my conversation with you on the telephone yesterday for which I am extremely grateful, and since the receipt of your 83, October 12, 11 a.m., I have presented anew to Drummond your position respecting his employment of military information from Manchuria which you are furnishing him and have now also been able to disclose to him the reasons for your position.

The whole situation in this respect is now entirely clarified. He was much interested in and fully appreciates the weight of your contention between the great difference in value from information commenting on Manchuria before the Japanese and Chinese commitments to the Council on September 30th and information obtained from that date. He agrees with you that information subsequent to that date has a peculiar value in its relationship



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

2-#187, Geneva, October 13, 1931, 11 a.m.

relationship to those commitments.

He informed me that he has reason to expect that the British will shortly come forward with information of great value, much of it probably confirmatory of yours. I must make it clear that in this he is not expressing a promise but an expectation. He will, of course, send everything he receives to you and will appreciate your continuing to make available to him what you can. It is necessary for me to say that he again assured me that he will make use of the information from you which he has in hand only in strict conformity with your stipulations as to its employment.

GILBERT

KLP

HPD

1 1 1 7
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *file* October 13, 1931.
1:10 p.m.
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MEMORANDUM OF TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN
SECRETARY STIMSON AND MR. GILBERT AT GENEVA.

GILBERT: Everything is going your way here.

SECRETARY: Have you been invited yet?

GILBERT: No sir, but the situation here has entirely
~~XXXXXXXX~~ changed since I had my conversation with you
and the clarifying telegram which you sent me.

SECRETARY: In what way?

GILBERT: As regards the two items we discussed the
other day, I will dispose of the simpler one first. I
explained your position regarding military information
to Drummond. He understands it now and fully agrees
with the wisdom of your withholding the source. In the
other respect about Drummond's views regarding a possible
conflict in the Kellogg Pact and Council action there was
a meeting this morning of the Committee of five. After
that meeting Drummond told me that he was very glad to say
he had been entirely wrong; that each of the five unanimously
felt there was no conflict whatsoever; that there was
no reason why the two actions could not go on simultaneously.
It was a very satisfactory conversation. Yesterday, I
expressed Drummond's personal opinion to you - I felt it
was my duty to send his opinion to you. The situation
is developing very fast. Briand is to bring forward the
Kellogg Pact in the Council. It will probably be supported
by the other Council members but that is not arranged yet.
Then the United States will be mentioned not as a signatory
but particularly in the sense of a proponent of the Pact, as
an initiator. That fits in with this particular situation
and makes a peculiar reason for our having a particular
interest in it. When that is done, there will be a suggestion

by

793.94/2075 1/2

Confidential File

*note
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now*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

by Briand or possibly Lord Reading that the United States in view of its peculiar interest will be asked to join in the discussion.

SECRETARY: That means you will be invited to come in.

GILBERT: I cannot say positively.

SECRETARY: In case you are invited to come in I want you to understand this. I want you to be very careful so as to avoid the danger which Drummond feared. In invoking the Pact of Paris, in case it is invoked, I have always had in mind that it should be done as a warning only, or as a caution against a future act of war which has been anticipated or feared and not at all as implying a decision that such an act has already taken place. I agree with Mr. Drummond that it would be dangerous to invoke the Pact of Paris in such a way as to indicate that war has already taken place. I want you to state that emphatically to the Council if it comes up. Do you understand?

GILBERT: I am quite certain that I do understand.

SECRETARY: You see if those people say that an act of war has already taken place it would open the whole question of sanctions, with which we have nothing to do.

GILBERT: They are avoiding, of course, making any sanctions.

SECRETARY: They may have this perfectly clear in mind but I want -

GILBERT: As a warning to the two disputants not to in the future commit an act of war and not as a protest or a decision that they have already done so.

GILBERT: Of course, when I am called, what I will do
 presumably

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

presumably, after answering Mr. Briand's greeting, is make an opening statement. In view of the delicacy of the situation and possible misinterpretation of words I would appreciate it if such a statement could be telegraphed to me.

SECRETARY: If possible, but it is pretty difficult.

GILBERT: Very difficult. I could write it if you prefer.

SECRETARY: Your telegram which came today, giving your conception of your position there, is entirely correct and I am just confirming it. You are to sit there merely as an observer, if you are invited, on matters which do not relate to the Pact of Paris.

GILBERT: They have had great difficulty in working on that phase. They first thought they could have a separate Council meeting just for that situation. There are only two items on the agenda. When the Pact of Paris is not under discussion, Briand would protect me entirely. What they think will happen is this. They are looking more than anything else I understand to the psychological effect and they believe that if I make an opening statement that will probably be all that will be necessary. Then the other Ministers will make statements, leaving out the question of our invoking the Pact of Paris at Geneva, which is in line with your policy as I understand it. Could I have an opening statement?

SECRETARY: When will the Council meet? Tomorrow?

GILBERT: I believe it will not meet until Thursday.

SECRETARY: I was a little afraid that a statement sent you would be narrowing and cramp your attitude. I do not know exactly the situation there.

GILBERT:

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 4 -

GILBERT: I would naturally phrase the words so as to follow what Briand would say. I know about what he is going to say now. This has been drawn up by one of his advisers.

SECRETARY: Read it.

GILBERT: "The representative of the Chinese Government indicated - " I must say in advance that the Chinese Government mentioned today the Kellogg Pact. That is what Briand bases his reference on. "The representative of the Chinese Government indicated the question before the Council was of the greatest concern not only to members of the League but also to all powers signatory to the Pact of Paris. This statement is indeed true. Article 2 of that Pact reads - (Article 2 is quoted) All of the signatories of the Pact are greatly interested in securing a settlement of the present difficulty. - - - - I have high hopes therefore that if the United States as a party to the Pact and as the Secretary of State has expressed his whole hearted sympathy in the settlement of the dispute/^(omission)we should therefore invite the United States to sit at the Council table so that it could be - - - - I am sure that action under the Pact whenever taken cannot but strengthen the conditions to that Pact and peaceful settlement of the problem under discussion. "

SECRETARY: Cable that on - as quickly as you can.

GILBERT: Mr. Briand is going to work with me tomorrow. This will ease the situation. He understands your feeling and is going to develop the whole situation along the lines of your policy. His adviser is fully in accord.

SECRETARY: What does Briand know about my policy?

GILBERT: We had to intimate that if we were asked that

we

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 5 -

we would be willing to sit at the table. It would seem more desirable that no separate action of any kind be taken by the United States so as to assure the minds of the people that we are acting in the general line on this situation. Your statement to the League that you approved of its action so far made this clear. Briand said, "I see the position of the Secretary of State clearly."

GILBERT: I am perfectly willing to form my statement in any way agreeable to you. I cannot say what Briand will do tomorrow.

SECRETARY: The next thing is this. The telegrams that have come in today apparently make a little change in the situation; there has been somewhat of a change in this respect in that the Japanese seem to be more conciliatory today and more inclined to the solution which the League is apparently anticipating according to your cables: namely, by direct negotiation between China and Japan. I do not want to convey anything that I have said in suggesting action in regard to the Pact of Paris to mean that I think we ought in all events and regardless of consequences to push ahead with an invocation of that pact. That is a matter for the judgment of the gentlemen who are meeting in Geneva and who are assuming the responsibility of invoking the Pact.

GILBERT: Am I permitted to express your views to Lord Reading also.

SECRETARY: It is very important that you should.

GILBERT: I have not seen Lord Reading yet but I believe he is coming to work with Briand.

SECRETARY: One thing which would be dangerous would
be

1 1 2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 6 -

be for me here in Washington, three thousand miles away, to try to insist upon my views or any views about the invocation of the Pact. The situation is changing from day to day. About the only instruction I can give to you is that it has seemed that it might become advisable to do it, but that ought to be a matter of discussion, and it ought to depend upon what the facts are at the time it finally comes up. All I wanted to have understood was that we stood ready to consider it, in such a discussion, as a matter which, in case it should be decided to invoke it, we would feel that we could join, and join in the way in which I have suggested - as a warning to the future and not as a decision as to the past.

GILBERT: The Council could not invoke the Pact.

SECRETARY: But its members could.

GILBERT: My opinion is that the matter would be left with a statement that if conditions are not improved shortly it would be necessary to invoke the Pact. In other words, these gentlemen at the Council table are also speaking for their governments and some have a dual capacity in the eyes of the world. They would take the initiative if it became necessary to invoke the Pact and whatever they decided upon at the Council table would be passed on by their governments.

GILBERT: When I talked to you yesterday, I was very much handicapped by the fact that I had only talked to Drummond and Drummond I feel was wrong and he admitted to me today that he had had an opinion which he now believes was erroneous. He said, "I am glad to admit it." I was apparently condemning your views - but this was not really the case. I felt it was my duty to tell you Drummond's views and often I repeated myself because I thought you had

- 7 -

had not heard me.

SECRETARY: That is all right now. The situation seems to have ameliorated a little so far as the Japanese are concerned

GILBERT: When you called me I was at the Council and heard there that the situation was improving with respect to the Japanese. The Japanese delegate is so hard to hear that one must talk to someone near him to know what really did happen.

SECRETARY: The reason I spoke of it is that it may have a bearing as to whether the Pact of Paris may be invoked and it might make that unnecessary eventually.

GILBERT: Any statement made by anyone would be that they hoped the situation would not make it necessary.

SECRETARY: I was not speaking from a prejudgment that it should be done. I have no desire to force any such decision at all.

GILBERT: I have been very careful to explain that. Considering the complications of it, if I could have a statement by tomorrow night here in your own words and look it over it would give me a much greater feeling of confidence, as the phraseology is quite important.

SECRETARY: I will try to do that.

GILBERT: Do you wish me to cable the invitation for you to formulate the reply?

SECRETARY: No. You are authorized, as I told you yesterday, to accept the invitation and prepare the reply. Is there any likelihood, that you have heard, of the other treaty, the Nine Power Pact, coming up for discussion?

GILBERT: I have not heard the Nine Power Pact mentioned in Geneva except for the newspaper speculation which followed your statement to the League in which you mentioned it.

SECRETARY: If that should come up and it was desirable for

1 1 2 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 8 -

for you to talk about it I might extend your authority to that. If it has not been discussed, bringing it up might complicate matters.

GILBERT: The general feeling is that it should not be discussed in view of the fact that the Pact of Paris fits into the picture much better, because all members of the Council are signatories. In the case of the Nine Power Pact that is not so.

SECRETARY: In my announcement and my telegram to you I will confine your authority to the Pact of Paris.

GILBERT: That will be much better. Can I expect a statement to make to the Council?

SECRETARY: I will try to get the opening statement to you by tomorrow.

GILBERT: I appreciate the confidence you are showing in me in this, Sir.

SECRETARY: It is a very delicate situation, but you are acting with great circumspection. Goodbye.

S HHR

1125

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Rec'd
79.94
October 14 1931. *[Signature]*

REP

FROM

Paraphrase sent to the President
PEIPING

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 9:30 a. m.

793.94

Secretary of State,
Washington.



F/DEW

793.94/2076

URGENT.
761, October 13, 4 p. m. (GRAY).

Chester Rowell, now in Mukden, request, subject to your approval, the following personal message from him be delivered to the President. Message was encoded by Consulate General, Mukden, October 13, 1 p. m. (END GRAY).

"Fate of Disarmament Conference depends on American Government and League of Nations taking prompt action. Situation passed matter of withdrawal of troops to zone. Destruction former civil Government of Manchuria effectively accomplished and establishment of a Government recognizing authority of Marshal Chang or Nanking prohibited. Personally saw results of Chinchow air raid which was not directed against the military forces but against railway and Provisional Government. Censor altered my quoted press article to read to the contrary. Independent governments in Manchuria

FILED
OCT 19 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #761, from Peiping, Oct. 13, 1931,
4 p. m.

in Manchuria and inner Mongolia under Japanese influence
unconcealed objective of the army authorities despite
professions of helplessness on the part of Japanese Minister
(February ?)
for Foreign Affairs. Disarmament futile next December,
League of Nations suicide and future is to mightiest
unless all nations make united moral sentiment effective
now. (Signed) Rowell".

For the Minister

ENGERT

OSB

1127

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 4, 1976

793.94/2076

October 14 1881.

793.94/2076

My dear Mr. President:

I enclose herewith a paraphrase of a personal message to you in regard to the situation in Manchuria from Mr. Chester Rowell, who was then at Mukden and who is in China as a member of the American Delegation to the Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mr. Rowell's message was cabled to me by the American Consul General at Mukden through the American Legation at Peiping.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
Paraphrase of
message from
Chester Rowell.

Oct. 14, 1881.

The President,
The White House.

FE:MMH/VDM
10/14/31

FE

[Handwritten signature]

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE TO THE
PRESIDENT FROM MR. CHESTER ROWELL.

The Chinchow air raid, the results of which I witnessed personally, was directed against the railway and the civil Provisional Government and not against military forces. My press article which was quoted was altered by the censor to read to the contrary. In spite of professions of helplessness on the part of the Japanese Foreign Minister, the unconcealed objective of the Japanese army authorities is the establishment, under Japanese influence, of independent governments in inner Mongolia and in Manchuria. The former civil government of Manchuria has been effectively destroyed and the establishment of a government which recognizes the authority of the Nanking Government or of Marshal Chang Heueh-liang has been prohibited. The situation has passed the question of the withdrawal of troops to the railway zone. The fortune of the Disarmament Conference depends on prompt action being taken by the American Government and the League of Nations. Unless all nations make effective now a united moral sentiment, the Disarmament Conference next February will be rendered futile, the suicide of the League of Nations will result and the future will be to the mightiest.

1129

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles D. Lynch NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated FROM
to anyone.



Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 11 a. m.


Secretary of State,
Washington.

DOUBLE PRIORITY.

188, October 13, noon.

Referring to my telephone conversation with you of
yesterday I talked with Drummond last night and again this
morning after the receipt of your 85, October 12, 6 p. m.,
concerning your views respecting an appeal to the Pact of
Paris.

He now understands your position clearly and while it
is yet too early to state just what will eventuate, my
personal views are that developments in Geneva will shape
themselves along the lines of your policy. I shall report
all developments to you as rapidly as they occur. There
is one point which I wish to make clear to you at this
time. Should I be invited to sit at the Council table,



F/DEW

793.94/2077

FILED
OCT 16 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lynch NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #188, from Geneva, Oct. 17, 1931,
 upon.

in the event that the question of the Pact of Paris is raised, it will (in line with an established League precedent) not (repeat not) be as a member of the Council but solely in a capacity to follow the proceedings and take an ~~impartial~~ friend part in the discussions. I feel that you will regard this as very ^{convincing} (#).

Should I act in the foregoing capacity I will follow strictly the instructions you have given me in this respect which I am confident are now entirely clear to me.

Furthermore, I shall take due care that my acceptance of such an invitation will not be delivered until I have been able to notify you of my intention and that you will be able to give publicity in Washington.

GILBERT

1 1 3 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-122
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-125
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,
October 13, 1931.

5P

OCT 13 31

793.94/2077
note

AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA, (SWITZERLAND)

12077

87

Your views as expressed in your 188 are approved.

In the event that the United States is invited by the Council of the League of Nations to participate in their discussion of the present situation in Manchuria you are authorized to accept this invitation and to sit as an observer and auditor in any discussion of this subject and to participate in the discussions of the Council when they relate to the possible application of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, to which treaty the United States is a party.

793.94/2077

Stinson
Wiley

note
500.2112

See
793.94/2210A

U WRO/LM

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1926 1-128

1 1 3
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

743-44
REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

FROM

Geneva


Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 11:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

189, October 13, 1 p. m.

Drummond has handed me for communication



following message from the British Government dated October 10 which has been circulated to the members of Council.

"Consul General at Tientsin has been informed that Japanese armored train arrived Tungliao, 10 a. m. yesterday, and remained for few hours. Part of track between north and south stations was removed and goods yard mined. Leaflets were dropped from Japanese airplanes informing population that Japanese troops had come to protect them against brigands.

Consul General at Mukden stated that Japanese informed his United States colleague on October 8 that Japanese troops at Mukden outside railway zone numbered two thousand. It is believed that no further withdrawal's from zone have taken place at Mukden or elsewhere during last 48 hours".

GILBERT

HPD

F/DEW

793.94/2078

FILED
OCT 14 1931

113

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

FROM

Geneva

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 11:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

190, October 13, 2 p. m.

Drummond has handed me for communication
following message from the German Government dated
Geneva, October 13, which has been circulated to the
members of Council.

"Strength of Japanese military occupation, outside
the railway zone, on October 9: Mukden, Chinese and
European quarters, two thousand seven hundred men,
Chiliuho two hundred and twenty, Kirin one thousand two
hundred and sixty, Kirin-Changchuen Railway six hundred
and seventy, Wirtzkou, one hundred and eighty".

GILBERT

GW

FLE

WHE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 13 1931
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 1
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

F/DEW

793.94/2079

FILED

OCT 17 1931

793.94

1 1 3 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Brown NARS, Date June 4, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

October 10, 1931.

OCT 10 1931

793.94 / 2079a

American Consul,
 Geneva, Switzerland.

VERY URGENT. 76

Please inform Drummond that I have
 just sent the following telegram to China and
 Japan:

QUOTE. Until recently we have been reassured
 by the commitments made by the governments both of
 China and Japan to the League of Nations which were
 embodied in the Resolution of the 30th of September.
 Under that Resolution, Japan agreed to continue as
 rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into
 the railway zone, while China with Japan's consent
 agreed to assume responsibility for the safety of
 lives and property of Japanese nationals outside of
 that zone. I am, however, much disturbed by later
 reports, especially of the last forty-eight hours,
 which indicate that these commitments are not being
 carried out by either government.

I wish

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-128

793.94/2079A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

American Consul, Geneva, page 2.

I wish that you would call upon the Foreign Minister at once and, after reading him the above, impress upon him the dangers to all interests in China which we feel will inevitably result unless the pacific policy thus agreed upon is observed and unless both the Japanese and Chinese nations exercise at this time the utmost self restraint. I am urging this also upon the Japanese Ambassador and the Chinese Charge here. UNQUOTE.

Stinson
WJ

U WRC/AB

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19_____, _____

1136

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence A. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

October 10, 1931.

OCT 10 51 2 PM

AmEmbassy,

Tokyo, Japan.

very urgent 192
 Until recently we have been reassured by the commitments made by the governments both of China and Japan to the League of Nations which were embodied in the Resolution of the 30th of September. Under that Resolution, Japan agreed to continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone, while China with Japan's consent agreed to assume responsibility for the safety of lives and property of Japanese nationals outside of that zone.

I am, however, much disturbed by later reports, especially of the last forty-eight hours, which indicate that these commitments are not being carried out by *either* ~~Government~~ *Government*.

I wish that you would call upon Baron Shidehara at once and, after reading him the above, impress upon him the dangers to all interests in China which we feel will inevitably result unless the pacific policy thus agreed upon is observed and unless both the Japanese and

Chinese

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

793.94/2079B

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER
 Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

AmEmbassy, Tokyo, page 2.

Chinese nations exercise at this time the utmost self
 restraint. I am urging this also upon the Japanese
 Ambassador and the Chinese Charge here.

Stimson

U WRC/AB

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles D. Brown NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M. I. D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY
Peiping via N. R.
Dated October 13, 1931
Rec'd 10:45 A. M.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 13 1931

reg.

757, October 13, 1 p. m. /1992
Legation's 713, October 6, 8 p. m.
Following from Consul General at Hankow
"October 13, 2 p. m."

A Kinhan Railway official has informed a member of my staff that the railway has been instructed by the National Government to prepare a hundred trains for transportation of troops from Hankow north. Informant stated that the troops to be sent north would be withdrawn from Kiangsi and ~~the~~ Hunan.

Repeated to Nanking.

ENGERT

RR

HPD

(*) Apparent omission

FILED
OCT 17 1931

F/M
793.94/2080

1 1 3 5
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

THE

AM

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 10:22 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY

762, October 13, 5 p.m.

In view of great expense of cabling lengthy
Hanson-Salisbury reports to Tokio I hope Legation
be authorized to instruct Harbin to send code
texts to the Embassy by registered mail.

For the Minister

ENGERT

KLP

793.94
Tel. to Peiping
OCT 13 1931
Department of State
OCT 17 1931
file
2.9.C

F/pt
793.94/2081

OCT 20 1931
PTM:MD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

may TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington, ¹⁷
October ~~16~~, 1931.
3P

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

OCT 17 31

³⁸⁵
Your 762, October 13, 5 p.m.

You need neither cable nor mail this to Tokyo.
Department will expect Salisbury to take original material.

Stinson
WZ

793.94/2081

793.94/2081

FE:SKH/ZMF *mm/1*
FE
614P

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

1 1 4 1
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

✓
FE

REP

FROM


GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 10:30 a. m.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.



October 13, 9 a. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

12065-

Subsequent to my telegram of October 12, 3 p. m. I received a call from representative of Mayor of Shanghai who described local conditions as being extremely serious. He said that the Mayor was concerned only in the local situation; that he was doing his utmost to preserve peace and order and to curb the activities of the anti-Japanese and the latter and have them keep within legal bounds. He added however, that if any attempt were made to occupy Chinese territory such as for example the arsenal, the Chinese would use force to prevent this which would create a most unhappy situation in Shanghai.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

WWC

FILED
793.94/2082

FILED

OCT 20 1931

114
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 4:10 a. m.


Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY.

754, October 13, 6 a. m.

Following from Hanson and Salisbury, October 10, 8 p. m.
via Harbin, October 11, 10 a. m.

"One. On September 19th Japanese women and children commenced to withdraw from Kirin, two hundred Japanese troops started from Changchun for Kirin City via the Kirin-Changchun Railway. Upon learning of their approach, General Hsi Chia, Chief of Staff of Chang Tso Hsiang's Kirin troops, ordered the seven thousand Chinese troops at Kirin City to withdraw from the town, which they did, thus avoiding a clash with the Japanese troops, who in the evening of the same day entered the City and immediately took over the wireless, telephone and telegraph stations and principal government organizations and sealed the vaults



F
793.94/2083

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #754, from Peiping, Oct. 13, 1931,
6 a. m.

the vaults of the principal banks, The troops were preceded by Japanese airplane which dropped leaflets announcing the speedy arrival of the troops and urging the Chinese populace not to be alarmed.

Two. According to a statement made at Kirin to Hanson by Jung Bus, former Tao Yin at Newchwang, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Changchun and until October 2nd Provincial Treasurer of Kirin, who has been known to Hanson for 17 years, delegates from the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs' office and of various organizations met the Japanese troops, told the Commander that the Kirin people were not concerned with Mukden problems; that the south Manchurian Railway zone, important to the Japanese, was far away, indeed situation in Kirin City was quiet; that no Japanese residents had been or were in danger; that the Chinese troops had been withdrawn to avoid a possible clash; and that the Japanese troops were not wanted at Kirin. They asked the Japanese Commander why the Japanese troops were being sent and were informed by him that all he knew was that he had been ordered to Kirin and that he must obey orders. Subsequently General Hsi Chia met General

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clayton S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

3- #754, from Peiping, Oct. 13, 1931,
6 a. m.

met General Tamon, the Japanese High Commander unofficially at the Japanese Nagoya Hotel and was asked by the latter to order the withdrawn Chinese troops to surrender arms by noon of the 23rd. Protesting that this was very difficult, as the soldiers were not in barracks, General Hsi Chia managed to gather several hundred rifles by the time indicated. General Tamon became enraged and accused General Hsi of trying to trick him. At the conference called to discuss this matter there were Generals Hsi and Tamon,
(END PARTS ONE, TWO, THREE).

ENGERT

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 9:11 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY.

754, October 13, 6 a. m. (PART FOUR).

the Chinese Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Shih Lu Pen, the Japanese Consul General Ishii, and a Chinese interpreter named Liu Chun Fen. General Tamon, stating he wished to discuss a purely military matter, requested the Japanese Consul General to withdraw from the room. Thereupon the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs also withdrew, leaving Generals Hsi and Tamon and Liu together. General Tamon then stated that Hsi deserved punishment and that he would leave him alone to think over this situation. He and Liu departed. Immediately after, two Japanese soldiers came into the room and holding pistols pointed at Hsi's head remained with him in this position for one hour. General
Tamon

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #754, from Peiping, Oct.13,1931,
6 a. m.

Tamon then returned and suggested to Hsi that he submit
to the will of the Japanese military command,
(END PART FOUR).

For the Minister.

ENGERT

HPD

1 1 4
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 9:19 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY.

754, October 13, 6 a. m., (PART FIVE).

which would support him with money and ammunition in case he did and in case he formed a new government for Kirin Province, and would punish him if he did not. Again Tamon gave Hsi some time to think this over. During this interval the Japanese military adviser of General Chang Tso Hsiang and Chinese high provincial officials entered the room and urged Hsi to accept. Thereupon Hsi accepted in order temporarily to give Kirin a breathing space with the hope of saving province for the Chinese later. Under pressure of Japanese military Hsi abolished present form of government, as ordained by Nanking, established a new government with himself

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Clarence S. Long NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #754, from Peiping, Oct. 13, 1931,
9:19 a.m.

himself as "Chang Kuan" "high official" and with military
and civil authorities already there under him and discharged
those provincial officials who,
(END PART FIVE).

For the Minister

ENGERT

KLP

1 1 4 5

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 9:29 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

754, October 13, 6 a. m. (PART SIX).

according to a list drawn up by the Japanese military, had shown themselves pro Chang Tao Hsiang, pro Chang Hsueh Liang or anti-Japanese. Among those were Chung Yu, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Harbin, and Jung Hou. The Kirin office of Commissioner for Foreign Affairs was abolished speedily. The result is that the Kirin Provincial Government is now independent of Nanking and the former Mukden Government clique and is controlled and ^{dominated} by the Japanese military.

Three. Jung Hou's version of what occurred at Kirin on September 21st to 24th has been confirmed to us as correct in its main points by:

A Dane who is employed by the agents of the Catford Tractor Company and who has resided in Kirin for some months

1 1 5 0
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #754, from Peiping, Oct.13,1931,
6 a. m.

months past; two Chinese employees of the Chinese postal
service at Changchun;
(END PART SIX).

For the Minister

ENGERT

HPD

(*) Apparent omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter

August 10, 1972

By Charles A. Lyons

NARS, Date

June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 9:35 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY.

754, October 13, 6 a. m. (PART SEVEN).

a Chinese employee of the postal service, an American,
three American returned students, a police inspector, and
a Chinese employee of the British-American Tobacco Company,
transmitted
all residing at Kirin;/to magistrate at Tunhwa and by the
Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and a Chinese official
connected with the Telephone Administration at Harbin.

Four. One October 9th we informed Mr. Ischi that we
had learned of this report and he states there are regula-
tions that no Japanese governmental establishment should
interfere with foreign governments. On October 10th
Salisbury spoke to the Mitsui official at Changchun in
regard to these reports and was told first that the
Japanese military forces aided Hsi to form a new Govern-
ment and, later, that it was Hsi's ambition which caused
him to form a new Government.
(END PART SEVEN).

For the Minister
ENGERT

WWO

1152
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lynn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1931

Secretary of State,

Rec'd 9:43 a.m.

Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY

754, October 13, 6 a.m. (PART EIGHT)

When Salisbury asked the Japanese Consul at Changchun about this the Consul hesitated for a moment and said: "Did you discuss this with Mr. Ishi?" The Consul did not deny or affirm the report. In none of these instances could the inquiry be pressed because of the apparent disinclination of the Japanese to discuss this matter.

Six. It might be presented here that none of the Japanese military nor consular officers with whom we spoke at Changchun and Kirin volunteered to cooperate with us by official information, except Major Hosoki who limited his voluntary explanations to personal knowledge of Japanese attacks on Chinese troops at Nanling and Kuanchengtze. The Japanese officials however were polite and hospitable in a social way, but indirectly showed much interest in the people we talked with and in our movements.

(END PART EIGHT)

For the Minister

ENCLOSURE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 9:52 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

754, October 13, 6 a. m. (PART NINE).

On October 8th we called at the residence of General Hsi Chia and were shown into a reception room. One of the Japanese soldiers on guard went into the residence and shortly we were informed that Hsi would receive us at office a little later. We then called at his Yamen where Japanese soldiers, who were also on guard at the entranceⁿ, were very much in evidence. After considerable delay, during which two Japanese in civilian clothes, without being ushered in, abruptly entered the reception room, looked at us and inquired of the attendants who we were, we were received by Hsi in a room in which three secretaries made simultaneous notes of all that was said. Hsi, a man of about

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

(Part nine)
2- #754, from Peiping, /Oct. 13, 1931,
6 a. m.

of about forty, looked as if he were suffering from a
strain.

(END PART NINE).

For the Minister

ENGERT

JHR

HPD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 9:59 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY

754, October 13, 6 a.m. (PART TEN)

We made certain usual conventional remarks called for on a first visit and received assurance of (*) while ^{protection} travelling to Tunhua. Attending Hsi as interpreter was Liu Chun Fen, who was interpreter during the Tamon Hsi interviews and who was recently made manager of the Yung Heng Provincial Bank. Hsi desired me say nothing in regard to making a return ^{therefrom} call or excusing him. From all appearances, he is being closely watched by the Japanese, who do not give him an opportunity to act independently.

Seven. On October 7th we called on Major General Amano who stated that he was constructing an airdrome just North of Kirin because the Japanese army needed one there, that he had about 1500 soldiers in Kirin,

(END PART TEN)

For the Minister

CSB
HPD
(*) apparent omission

ENGERT

115F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

C

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

FROM Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 10:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY

754, October 13, 6 a.m. (PART ELEVEN)

that some of these would soon be leaving for Changchun and that he would not leave Kirin until ordered to do so by his superior officers. He added that the Chinese had removed parts from the ^{Wireless station} (?) and he had no experts to repair and operate same, although he probably would send for some.

Eight. The larger stations of the Kirin-Changchun Railway are guarded by Japanese railway guards and over some are flying the Japanese flag. Small bodies of Japanese troops are to be seen moving back and forth on the trains.

Nine. Kirin city is guarded effectively day and night by Japanese soldiers and gendarmes, under whom are some armed Chinese police. Business is bad. Banks are permitted to remain open a few hours a day, but the Japanese military, according to advices to reliable Chinese authority, (END PART 11)

For the Minister

JHR
CSB

ENGERT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 10:06 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY

754, October 13, 6 a.m. (PART TWELVE)

do not allow Provincial Government funds to be sent to pay the wages of the Chinese soldiers outside the city. Chinese are leaving the city for Changchun and points south. The Japanese command has issued many proclamations which indicate that the Japanese army is the ruling organization and that the Chinese and Japanese residents will benefit through its rule.

Ten. The Japanese Consul General gave us understand that the reason for the Japanese military occupation of the Kirin Changchun Railway and Kirin City (and also the Kirin Tunhwa Railway and Tunhwa) was the protection of Japanese lives and property. The Chinese and one American we interviewed stated that there was no unrest nor anti-Japanese movement in Kirin City before the Japanese troops came. We believe that the one thousand Japanese residents were fearful of Chinese attacks.

(END PART TWELVE)

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 10:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

PRIORITY.

754, October 13, 6 a. m. (PART THIRTEEN)..

but it appears that it would have been more reasonable and economical to have withdrawn these residents three hours by rail to the South Manchuria Railway zone than to have sent troops to occupy in a military sense this city of 100,000 Chinese and a railway, which although financed ^{Chinese} by the Japanese, was run and policed by ~~the~~. Up to the present time the Japanese have given no indication of withdrawing from Kirin. They stated to us that they did not think Hsi's Government strong enough as yet to protect the city from the Chinese troops which left the city and which are now without funds. The circle is vicious. The coming of the Japanese military caused these troops to leave and are now, according to reliable information, (END PART THIRTEEN).

For the Minister
 ENGERT

JHR CSB

1155

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 10:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

754, October 13, 6 a. m. (PART FOURTEEN)

refusing to allow the Chinese authorities to use government funds to support them. I am convinced they will soon become brigands against whom it will be necessary to maintain a Japanese garrison at Kirin. Unless some provision is made for the upkeep of these Chinese troops or of a strong Chinese garrison in the city, it would be dangerous to Kirin if the Japanese troops withdrew.

The thinking Chinese at Kirin feel bitter against the Japanese military on account of their actions, although the Japanese soldiers have conducted themselves correctly and are attempting to ingratiate themselves into the good graces of the Chinese common people. The latter are extremely afraid
of the

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

()
Part 14,
2- #754, from Peiping, Oct. 13, 1931,
6-a. m.

of the Japanese soldiers.

12. According to information received by us while
at Tunhwa from the evening of October 8th to the morning
of October 14th as guests of magistrate Liu Hsing Pei,
(END PART FOURTEEN)

For the Minister

ENGERT

WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 10:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY

754, October 13, 6 a.m. (PART FIFTEEN)

the Chinese garrison at Tunhwa numbering about 500 left that city of about 10,000 people on September 22nd in order to avoid a conflict with the Japanese troops, 200 of whom arrived on September 23rd. The latter, after, occupying the Kirin-Tunhwa Railway, disarmed the Tunhwa Chinese police, occupied the barracks and governmental establishments, and released from the Chinese jail 49 Korean prisoners, who have extraterritorial rights, charged with being Communists (a large number were also on duty at Kirin). They left for Kirin on October 5th taking with them the 18 Japanese residents of Tunhwa, some rifles and some Chinese military coats. The Chinese at Tunhwa believed that the news of our coming had caused the Japanese to evacuate the town and railway,

(END PART 15)

For the Minister

ENGERT

JHR

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Chas. E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 10:20 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY

754, October 13, 6 a. m. (PART SIXTEEN).

and they hoped that something might be done to prevent the return of the Japanese tyrants. The Chinese were much disturbed by the arrival of the Japanese soldiers.

Thirteen. In our presence magistrate Liu telephoned to the Chinese garrison commander at Yenchi and was informed by the latter the two divisions of Japanese troops fully equipped and supplied to build the Tunhwa-Kainei Railway, were stationed on the Korean side of the Tumben river, ready to cross at any moment. There was no evidence that the Japanese were planning to build this railway from Tunhwa eastward. The telegraph line to Harbin station Yenchi and Tungning was in operation.

Fourteen.

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2-- #754, from Peiping, Oct.13,1931,
6 a. m.

Fourteen. There was no justification for this
military seizure of the Kirin-Tunhwa Railway and of Tunhwa
in order to protect the lives of 18 Japanese and Koreans,
who had few interests in Tunhwa and who might have been
evacuated easily to Changchun,
(END PART SIXTEEN)

For the Minister

ENGERT

OSB

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 10:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY

754, October 13, 6 a.m. (PART 17.)

in case they were in danger.

Fifteen. On October 9th there appeared to be no reason to believe that the Chinese inhabitants of Tunhwa were in danger of suffering from brigand attacks, as it had a local guard and a police force amounting to several hundred persons and as the magistrate was attempting to persuade the 500 Chinese soldiers who left to return to their barracks at Tunhwa.

Sixteen. After much deliberation we accepted the offer from the Japanese at Kirin to provide us with a guard to and from Tunhwa. We felt that the chances of brigand attack would be fewer if we had a Japanese guard with us. It is natural to presume that the Japanese military would have made much capital for themselves from a brigand attack upon us. The magistrate understood our motives and the Chinese at Tunhwa were not offended by our action in this respect." Repeated Tokyo.

(END MESSAGE)

WNC

For the Minister

ENGERT

1165

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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or
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

October 13, 1931.

793.94/2083

AMERICAN CONSUL OCT 15 31

8P

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

89
You may give Drummond, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, the following ^{material based on} information received today by the Department from Manchuria. ^{793.94/2083} He should not disclose names or designations of persons mentioned. One. On September 19, Japanese women and children, ^{Sket}

commenced to withdraw from Kirin. Two hundred Japanese troops started from Changchun for Kirin City via the Kirin-Changchun Railway. The 7,000 Chinese troops at Kirin City were ordered to withdraw from the town, which they did, thus avoiding a clash with the Japanese troops who entered the city on the evening of the same day and immediately took over the wireless, telephone and telegraph stations and principal government organizations and sealed the vaults of the principal banks. The troops were preceded by a Japanese airplane which dropped leaflets announcing the speedy arrival of the troops and urging the Chinese populace not to be alarmed.

793.94/2083

Two. According to ^{testimony on good authority} a statement made at Kirin by a ~~local Chinese official~~, delegates from the Commissioner

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

of

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zym NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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Washington,

- 2 -

of Foreign Affairs' office and of various organizations met the Japanese troops, told the Commander that the Kirin people were not concerned with Mukden problems; that no Japanese residents had been or were in danger; that the Chinese troops had been withdrawn to avoid a possible clash and that the Japanese troops were not wanted at Kirin. The Japanese Commander replied that he had been ordered to Kirin and that he must obey orders. The Commander of the Japanese troops subsequently requested General Hsi-chia to order the withdrawn Chinese troops to surrender arms by noon of the 23rd. General Hsi protested that this was very difficult, as the soldiers were not in barracks, but managed to gather several hundred rifles by the time indicated. Later General Hsi was threatened by the Japanese officers and urged to form a new government for Kirin Province which they would support with money and ammunition. Under pressure of Japanese military, General Hsi abolished the present form of government, as ordained by Nanking, established a new government with himself as QUOTE high official UNQUOTE and with military and civil authorities already

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

1167

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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Department of State

Washington,

- 3 -

already there under him. Provincial officials unacceptable to the Japanese military were discharged. The Kirin office of Commissioner of Foreign Affairs was abolished. The result is that the Kirin Provincial Government is now independent of Nanking and the former Mukden Government clique and is controlled by the Japanese military.

Three. The above ^{account} ~~Chinese version~~ of what occurred at Kirin on September 21 to 24 has been confirmed to our observers as correct in its main points by a number of witnesses, including both foreigners and Chinese.

Four. Japanese officials who were interviewed by our observers in regard to the above report were non-committal on the subject, and the inquiry could not be pressed because of the apparent disinclination of the Japanese to discuss the matter. They were polite but did not volunteer to cooperate with our observers by giving official information.

Five. The residence and yamen of General Hsi-chia were guarded by Japanese soldiers, and Japanese in civilian clothes were in attendance in his reception room and office. From all appearances he is being

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

closely

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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Washington,

- 4 -

closely watched by the Japanese, who do not give him an opportunity to act independently.

Six. On October 7 Major General Amano informed our observers that he was constructing an airdrome just north of Kirin because the Japanese Army needed one there; that he had about 1,500 soldiers in Kirin; that some of these would soon be leaving for Changchun and that he would not leave Kirin until ordered to do so by his superior officers.

Seven. The larger stations of the Kirin-Changchun Railway are guarded by Japanese railway guards and over some stations are flying the Japanese flag. Small bodies of Japanese troops are to be seen moving back and forth on the trains.

Eight. Kirin City is guarded effectually day and night by Japanese soldiers and gendarmes under whom are some armed Chinese police. Business is bad. Banking hours and operations are controlled by the Japanese military. Chinese are leaving the city for Changchun and points south. The Japanese command has issued many proclamations which indicate that the Japanese Army is the ruling organization and ^{suggest} that the Chinese and Japanese

Enciphered by

residents

Sent by operator M., 19.....

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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Washington,

- 5 -

residents will benefit through its rule.

Nine. The Japanese Consul General intimated that the reason for the Japanese military occupation of the Kirin-Changchun Railway and Kirin City (and also the Kirin-Tunhua Railway and Tunhua) was the protection of Japanese lives and property. Information from Chinese and foreign sources was to the effect that there was no unrest or anti-Japanese movement in Kirin City before the Japanese troops came. It is believed that the 1,000 Japanese residents were fearful of Chinese attacks but it ~~is pointed out that it might~~ ^{is pointed out that it might} ~~appear that it would~~ have been a comparatively simple matter to have withdrawn these residents three hours by rail to the South Manchuria Railway zone. Stat

Up to the present time, the Japanese have given no indication of withdrawing from Kirin. They stated that they did not think Hsi's government was strong enough as yet to protect the city from the Chinese troops which left the city and which are now without funds. It is stated that the Japanese military are refusing to allow the Chinese authorities to use government funds to support these ^{troops} ~~troops~~. It is likely that they will soon become brigands against whom it will be necessary to maintain

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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- 6 -

a Japanese garrison at Kirin. Unless some provision is made for the upkeep of these Chinese troops or of a strong Chinese garrison in the city, it would be dangerous to Kirin if the Japanese troops withdrew.

The thinking Chinese at Kirin feel bitter against the Japanese military on account of their actions, although the Japanese soldiers have conducted themselves correctly.

Ten. According to information received at Tunhua from Chinese sources, the Chinese garrison at Tunhua, numbering about 500, left that city, of about 10,000 people, on September 22, in order to avoid a conflict with the Japanese troops, 200 of whom arrived on September 23. The latter, after occupying the Kirin-Tunhua Railway, disarmed the Tunhua Chinese police, occupied the barracks and governmental establishments, and released from the Chinese jail 49 Korean prisoners, who have extraterritorial rights and who had been charged with being communists. The Japanese troops left for Kirin on October 5, taking with them the 18 Japanese residents of Tunhua. The Chinese at Tunhua believed that the news of the coming of our observers

Enciphered by _____ had
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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- 7 -

had caused the Japanese to evacuate the town and railway.

Eleven. The Chinese magistrate at Tunhua was informed by the Chinese garrison commander at Yenchi that two divisions of Japanese troops, fully equipped and supplied to build the Tunhua-Kainei Railway, were stationed on the Korean side of the Tumen River ready to cross at any moment. There was no evidence that the Japanese were planning to build this railway from Tunhua eastward. The telegraph line to Harbin station, Yenchi and Tungning was in operation.

Twelve. There appeared to be no justification for the military seizure of the Kirin-Tunhua Railway and of Tunhua in order to protect the lives of 18 Japanese ~~and~~ ~~Koreans~~ who might easily have been evacuated to Changchun in case of danger. On October 9 there appeared to be no reason to believe that the Chinese inhabitants of Tunhua were in danger of suffering from brigand attacks, as it had a local guard and a police force amounting to several hundred persons and as the magistrate was attempting to persuade the 500 Chinese soldiers, who had left, to return to their barracks.

SKY

OK

Enciphered by FE:RSM:EJL FE

Sent by operator M., , 19

Stinson

SKY

1172

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence A. [unclear] NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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Department of State

This cable was sent in confidence.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.
Washington, October 14, 1931.
5P

793-94

AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

91

Reference Department's 89, October 13, 8 p.m.

2083

You may give Drummond, under the same conditions as to confidential use, the following material based on reports received today by the Department from Manchuria.

One. There now exists a civil municipal government in Mukden with a Japanese mayor and Japanese chiefs of the various major departments and bureaus, including police department. During the past week approximately 1,500 Chinese have been put into service by this municipal government. Japanese military police authorities and gendarmes might still be considered effective police force of the municipal area. Return to the status quo ante in the Mukden municipality is considered not an immediate possibility.

Two. Complete withdrawal of Japanese soldiers to railway zone under present unsettled conditions would, it is believed, jeopardize not only lives and property of Japanese but also those of foreigners and Chinese. An effective Chinese municipal administration and police force

793.94/2083

Enciphered by _____
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1173

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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Washington.

- 2 -

force should first be established. Armed robbery and
brigandage are common both in Mukden and in outlying
areas.

Three. Information received on the afternoon of
October 13 from Japanese military source was to the
effect that there had been no material change in the
disposition of the Japanese forces since October 8;
that no withdrawals were being made but further
extensions were feared necessary.

Stamps
SKH

Wk

FE:RSM:EJL

m.m.H.
FE

SKH

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Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-138

1 1 7 4
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Syme NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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
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Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 2:13 p.m.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.



758, October 13.

Kuo Wen publisher's today alleged proclamation said to have been dropped by Japanese planes during raid on Chinchow. Text apparently taken from Japanese newspaper follows:

"At a time when he has lost his base as well as the heart of the masses in the northeast and when four northeastern provinces have already manifested their desire for revolt, the ambitious and greedy greenhorn Chang Hsueh Liang still shows no signs of awakening to his mistakes. He has established the lianong provisional government at Chinchow for purpose of carrying on his intrigues in territory under the protection of the Japanese Imperial army.

(END PART ONE)

For the Minister

ENGERT

CSB

FILED

OCT 17 1931

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793.94/2084

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 2 :20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

758, October 13th (PART TWO)

The Imperial army which strives to uphold rights of masses on basis of righteousness will under no circumstances recognize Chang Suie Liang and the authority of his Provisional Government at Chinchow. The army is now compelled resort to positive action to destroy his base.

Two. Citizens should accept favor of Japanese Imperial army and oppose Chang Suie Liang and prevent him from establishing his government otherwise you will be presumed as having opposed Japanese Imperial army which will then be determined to destroy Chinchow. It is up to you to consider and advise an alternative to this."

For the Minister

ENGERT

HPD

117E

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

PM REC'D




OCT 12 1931

793.94

PEACE COMMITTEE
OF THE RELIGIOUS SOCIETY OF FRIENDS
OF PHILADELPHIA AND VICINITY
304 ARCH STREET, PHILADELPHIA

RECORDED



October 9, 1931.

Hon. Henry L. Stimson,
The State Department,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As the silent member of the delegation presented to you by William T. Stone on Tuesday to inquire about Manchuria, I want to record my appreciation of your generosity of time and energy in giving us such a frank and interesting account of the situation.

It was a cause of profound satisfaction to learn directly from you of the steps being taken to insure a satisfactory solution; and to find it possible for our Government to cooperate so fully with the League of Nations.

Even more gratifying was the systematic concern for developing the instruments of pacific settlement which, as you showed, has actuated our Government ever since the present trouble developed. Your remarks were both enlightening and encouraging; and I am grateful to you for giving us the interview.

Sincerely,

Richard A. Wood
Secretary

RRW: EDT

FILED

OCT 14 1931

F/DEW

793.94/2085

1 1 7 7
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Ryan NARS, Date June 1, 1976

No. L-93

Extra Copies Sent To The Department Without Covering
Dispatch.

DEPT OF STATE
AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE
American Consulate General
Nanking, China

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 14 1931
Department of State

OCT 12 31

September 12, 1931.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Reported Intention of Japan to take Forceful
Action in Manchuria.

793.94
Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram to the Legation
of July 11, 1931, to the Legation's instruction of July 28,
1931, and to other correspondence regarding the suspicion
entertained by the Chinese Government that the Japanese
Government is deliberately preparing the ground for military
intervention in Manchuria.

On September 10, 1931, I received a call from Dr. M.T.Z.
Tyan, a Counselor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Chief of the Department of Intelligence and Publicity, in
relation to the same subject. Dr. Tyan handed me an Aide-
Memoire, dated September 10, 1931, setting forth various
indications of Japanese "provocations in Manchuria in order
to provide excuses for the use of force, as well as an
intensive propaganda campaign designed to blind the eyes of
the world to the facts of the situation". He told me that
similar statements had been supplied to the British Legation
in China and to the League of Nations, through the Chinese
representatives. The Aide-Memoire handed to me for the
American Legation was typed on plain paper, bore no seal or

other

F/DEV

793.94/2086

1 1 7 8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

- 2 -

other sign of its origin and was enclosed in a "Waichiaopu" envelope which bore no address.

I have had a copy of this document made for the files of this office and am enclosing the original and four copies, together with the envelope, herewith. The matter has not been reported to the Department.

Respectfully yours,

Willis R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
Original and four carbon copies of
Aide Memoire of September 10, 1931.

In quintuplicate to the Legation.
No copy to the Department.

809
WRP/D

AIDE-MEMOIRE

The military clique in Japan has of late been clamoring for a drastic policy towards China, particularly in regard to Manchuria and Mongolia. At the Military Commanders' Conference the Minister of War publicly drew attention to the possibility of what he termed grave developments in Manchuria and Mongolia, and urged the necessity of preparedness. Such preparedness, as interpreted in the light of recent events, seems to consist of repeated provocations in Manchuria in order to provide excuses for the use of force, as well as an intensive propaganda campaign designed to blind the eyes of the world to the facts of the situation. The following facts are illustrative of the present developments in Japan's policy towards China.

1) At the Military Commanders' Conference on June 27, 1931, it was decided to increase the Japanese forces in North Korea by two divisions and to place the Japanese garrison in Manchuria on a permanent basis.

2) Balked at the failure of Japanese colonization in Manchuria, Japan has during recent years attempted to make use of Koreans in colonizing the territory. The number of Korean immigrants in Manchuria has almost reached a million, and under Japanese influence as well as protection the Korean settlers have presented a grave problem to the Chinese authorities in Manchuria. The Wanpaoshan Affair affords a glaring example.

In March this year a large number of Korean

farmers

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clayton S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

farmers, acting under Japanese encouragement as well as an illegal contract, forcibly seized about 5,000 mow of Chinese land in Wanpaoshan, north of Changchun, and constructed an irrigation canal, resulting in serious damage to the Chinese farmers.

To make the matter worse, the Japanese Consul at Changchun despatched a number of Japanese gendarmes to Wanpaoshan to protect such illegal activities. Repeated protests from the local Chinese authorities were flagrantly ignored. At the same time the Japanese correspondents, playing on the mind of the ignorant Koreans, indulged in a press campaign against China, alleging the grossest maltreatment of Korean settlers in Manchuria. As a result of such vicious misrepresentations, the Koreans were incited to an unparalleled attack upon Chinese lives and property in Korea.

3) During July 3 to 12, 1931, approximately 150 Chinese residents were murdered in Korea, 340 were injured and another 70 were found missing. The losses directly and indirectly inflicted upon Chinese property is estimated at no less than 3,000,000 yen. Although amply warned against the possibility of such riots, the Japanese authorities did not act in sufficient time to prevent them, nor were effective measures taken to suppress the riots after they had occurred.

4) During the weeks following August 4, 1931, the Japanese troops staged manoeuvres in Hueining, Korea. On August 11, a party of 34 Japanese soldiers crossed over to Chinese

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Tyson Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

Chinese territory and started surveying for the construction of bridges. On August 15 the Japanese troops mined the center of the Tumen River, while two steam launches manned by Japanese soldiers were seen patrolling the unmined portions of the river. On the same day, a party of about 30 Japanese reservists again trespassed on Chinese territory and there practised with their machine guns.

Nanking, September 10, 1931.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles D. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

No. D-107

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE
American Consulate General,
Nanking, China.

(G)

September 17, 1931

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
A-C/C
OCT 12 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
793

Subject: Reported Intention of Japan to
take Forcible Action in Manchuria.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 14 1931
Department of State

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose copies in quadruplicate
of my despatch No. L-96, dated September 15, 1931, to
the Legation on the subject, "Reported Intention of
Japan to take Forcible Action in Manchuria".

Respectfully yours,

Willis H. Peck
Willis H. Peck.
American Consul General

Enclosure: As stated

In quadruplicate to the Department.

WRP:ECH

800

793.94/2087

FILED

NOV 18 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

No. L-96

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
 Nanking, China.

September 15, 1931

Subject: Reported Intention of Japan to take
 Forceful Action in Manchuria.

Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 93 of September 15, 1931 with which I transmitted a copy of a Memorandum dated September 10, 1931 prepared in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and handed through me to the American Legation, in which the view was expressed that Japan is endeavoring to prepare the ground for forcible action by that country in Manchuria.

In this connection I have the honor to report to the Legation the gist of an interesting conversation held by Consul P. W. Meyer of this Consulate General on the evening of September 11, 1931, with a very intelligent and reliable Chinese newspaper correspondent. The informant is in close touch with Chinese officials in Nanking and this office has hitherto found his statements of fact dependable.

The informant told Mr. Meyer confidentially that on the night of September 10, 1931, President Chiang Kai-shek received an urgent telegram from Marshal Cheng Hsueh-liang stating that it had always been his policy to support the National Government; that he realized that should the Nanking

Government

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 2 -

Government fall there would be no central Government in China for some time to come; but that, much to his regret, he was obliged to report that a state of affairs then existed in the North which would make it impossible for him again to render assistance to the National Government, even though his assistance might be needed, and that the National Government should no longer rely upon him for such assistance. The informant said that the expression "state of affairs" referred indubitably to the situation created by the Japanese.

The informant stated, also, that the reason why General Chang Tso-hsiang had presented his resignation from the post of Chairman of the Provincial Government of Kirin was not the death of his father, as stated, but because General Chang felt himself unable to cope with Japanese pressure in Manchuria.

In a conversation held by me with Mr. T. V. Doong, the Minister of Finance, on September 13, 1931, I asked him whether General Chang Tso-hsiang had resigned for the reason given above. Mr. Doong denied it, and said he had resigned merely because of the death of his father, and the Government had already persuaded him to withdraw his resignation and remain at his post. It is possible that General Chang Tso-hsiang acted from mixed motives.

It was asserted by the informant that the Japanese were assisting the Cantonese group with money and munitions - the result, in part, of Eugene Chen's visit to Japan during the

past

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

past sum or. In this connection I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 1-65, of August 1, 1931, wherein I reported a statement made to me by an officer of the Bureau of Aviation of the National Government, to the effect that the Chinese authorities had precise evidence that General Shih Yu-san received 2500,000 Chinese currency from the Japanese to induce him to revolt and that a similar sum was received from the same source by General Han Yu-chu.

There is enclosed with this despatch a copy of a mail press despatch published in Shanghai September 14, 1931, in which the United Press Staff correspondent reports that the report is prevalent in Chinese papers in Peiping that the Japanese military party is assisting the faction at Canton.

In view of the wide-spread belief that THE FAR EASTERN REVIEW, published in Shanghai, receives some support and inspiration from Japanese sources, it is interesting to note that in the August number of that journal there appear three articles written by Mr. George Bronson Hae, an American citizen, entitled "The Communist Menace in Manchuria", "Realities", and "Behind Wanpaoshan", which have bearing on the question of whether Japan is contemplating forcible action in Manchuria. The general idea behind these articles is that China is politically bankrupt, that the country cannot be administratively united, and that the Powers should abandon the attempt to maintain the political and administrative integrity of China and should deal with

different

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 3 -

past summer. In this connection I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. L-65, of August 1, 1931, wherein I reported a statement made to me by an officer of the Bureau of Aviation of the National Government, to the effect that the Chinese authorities had precise evidence that General Shih Yu-san received \$500,000 Chinese currency from the Japanese to induce him to revolt and that a similar sum was received from the same source by General Han Yu-chu.

There is enclosed with this despatch a copy of a mail press despatch published in Shanghai September 14, 1931, in which the United Press Staff correspondent reports that the report is prevalent in Chinese papers in Hoiping that the Japanese military party is assisting the faction at Canton.

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clayton S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

- 4 -

different portions of the country as separate entities.
 The paragraph which begins at the bottom of page 466 of this
 number of THE FAR EAST REVIEW is especially emphatic in
 its forecast of the probability that Japan will take
 forcible action to protect Japanese interests in Manchuria
 if the latter are at any time seriously threatened.

Respectfully yours,

Willis R. Peck.
 American Consul General.

Enclosure: Copy of press despatch.

In duplicate to the Legation.
 In quadruplicate to the Department.
 Single Copy to Canton.
 WRP:GCH

800

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

**Canton-Tokyo Pact Charged by Chinese Press
 In Peiping**

**Agreement Declared To Have Been Concluded Whereunder
 Japan Will Provide Funds, Firearms For Anti-
 Hanking Drive**

By D. C. BESS

(United Press Staff Correspondent)

PEIPING, Sept. 11.--(By mail)-- An Agreement between Japan and the revolutionary Chinese Government in Canton has been concluded, according to the Chinese press here. The agreement is purported to provide that Japan will contribute money and ammunition to the Canton Government to finance a campaign against Hanking.

Chinese officials sent by Manchuria to persuade Cantonese leaders to compromise their differences with Hanking have now returned and they declare that they learned definitely that the Japanese military party has agreed to assist the Cantonese campaign. Because of this agreement, they declare, the chances of a peaceful settlement are slim.

Advisers Sent To Canton

The Chinese press reports that a large number of Japanese military and technical advisers already have arrived in Canton and are taking the same part in the anti-Chiang Kai-shek movement as Soviet advisers did in the anti-north campaign started from Canton in 1926.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Thomas S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-2-

One Chinese official who has just returned from Canton explains that the Japanese have decided that they cannot settle satisfactorily outstanding differences with the government at Nanking and therefore will support the Cantonese. He says the Japanese feel that Nanking is allied with the United States and Great Britain and is working to end Japanese influence and trade with China.

Boycott Act Of War

The underground boycott against Japanese goods which has been pursued in territory controlled by Nanking is regarded as virtually an act of war by the Japanese, this official declares. He says that no such boycott has been started in territory controlled by the Canton group, which he cites as conclusive evidence of an agreement.

"The Cantonese leaders have sold out their country to the Japanese military party," said this official. "It is therefore impossible for any loyal faction to compromise with them. Another civil war appears inevitable, and in this war the Japanese military party will be definitely allied with the Cantonese."

Antagonism Seen

The agitation in Japan regarding the murder of a Japanese army officer in Mongolia and the demand of Japanese residents in Manchuria for settlement of more than 200 disputes regarding alleged violation of treaty rights by Chinese, is regarded by Chinese here as another evidence of Japan's antagonism to the Nanking government.

Several Manchurian army officers recently have declared openly that they expect trouble with Japan in Manchuria very soon, and that they are ready to fight

Japan.

-3-

Japan, if necessary, hoping to weaken the Japanese position in Manchuria.

Force May Be Necessary

Foreign military observers who have toured Manchuria recently declare that the situation is tense, and that force may be necessary to settle it. While Japan is pressing the local authorities in Manchuria for a settlement of outstanding disputes, the Manchurians insist that foreign affairs is entirely in the hands of the government at Hanking, and they can do nothing.

The situation in South Manchuria is similar to that in North Manchuria in 1929, these observers declare. At that time, Soviet Russia accused Chinese of violating treaties, and pressed for a settlement. When the Chinese did nothing, the Soviet finally sent armies into North Manchuria.

Japan May Follow Soviet

It generally is believed here that unless the Chinese act quickly, the Japanese will take similar action.

The Chinese, however, show no signs of agreeing to Japanese demands for settlement.

1191

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
29.C.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peking via N. R.
Dated October 13, 1931
Rec'd 2:35 p.m.

793.94

Secretary of State,
Washington.

FROM
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 13 1931
Department of State

760, October 13, 3 p. m.

Following from Consul General at Tientsin:

"October 12, 4 p. m.. The Chamber of Deputies of the Hopei Provincial Government sent a representative to me today to state that he is viewing the local situation with increasing anxiety and that he is continuing his efforts to prevent any anti-Japanese outbreak and suppress any local disturbances. There is now apparently more local concern both among Chinese and Japanese, as well as among ^{foreigners} provinces, over possible eventualities than there has been at any time since the Mukden occupation. A decided change in this respect has taken place past few days. Barbed wire entanglements and sand bags have been ^(placed) (#) near junction points of the Chinese city and Japanese concession but concession has not been closed. I believe the Chinese are making a sincere and determined effort to prevent any local disturbance which might aggravate situation."

7)

CSB

For the Minister
ENGERT

793.94/2088

FILED
OCT 14 1931

1191

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

FROM

GREEN

GENEVA

Dated October 13, 1931

Secretary of State

Washington


191, October 13, 3 p.m.

Drummond has handed me for communication to you the following message from the French Government dated October 13th which has been circulated to the members of the Council:

"In accordance with paragraph 9 of the resolution of September 30 I have the honor to communicate to you and to ask you transmit to the members of the Council the most recent information at the French Government's disposal regarding the Manchurian situation.

South of a line passing through Taonan, Chengchiautun, Changchun, Kirin Tanhua on the one hand, and north of Kao-pangtse on the (*), Manchuria may be considered as controlled by Japanese troops exclusively. Their distribution (the effectives being limited) frequently varies by reason of the use of armored trains on the railway lines. Moreover, Japanese airships fly over this region.

The



F/ 793.94/2089

FILED
 OCT 14 1931

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

2- #191, from Geneva, October 13,
1931

The effectives consist of detachments from the second division, and a mixed brigade taken from the forces normally stationed in Korea, as well as railway guard battalions. A certain number of aeroplanes have been furnished by the Korean troops.

The civil governor of Mukden has been arrested but in the other places occupied there have been no arrests or detention of Chinese officials.

The situation in the interior of the province is made grave by the presence of numerous brigands and deserters. The Catholic mission at the gates of Mukden has been attacked".

GILBERT

CSB

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
FROM GREEN

Geneva

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 6:11 p. m.

793.94
 Secretary of State,
 Washington.



193, October 13, 5 p. m.

The Council met this noon under the presidency of Madarariago. Madarariago handed the chairmanship over to Briand who made certain general declarations as to the necessity for the extraordinary session.

The discussion was confined to the Chinese statement of the case. Sze explained that the Japanese actions subsequent to the last session particularly the bombing of Chinchow prompted his request for an immediate convocation of the Council. He quoted from recent speeches by President Shek as a proof that Chinese policy still remained one of "dignified calm" and implicit trust in the League for settlement. A failure in this case, he said, would involve the "tragic calm"

of the

793.94/2090

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

#193, October 13, 5 p. m. from Geneva

-2-

of the Covenant and the Briand-Kellogg Pact and also a series of "diplomatic consequences throughout the Far East." He declared that if the League and the United States failed to cooperate successfully to avert of (the?) threat to peace the first result would be the extinction of the disarmament movement and all ideals of international security. Sze made no (#) over your mention of a resort to war in the event of such failure but his remarks might be interpreted are (as?) conveying that implication.

The Japanese representative will be heard at the second meeting at 3:30 this afternoon.

GILBERT

FW

(#) Omission

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Thomas S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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REP

FROM

CORRECTED COPY

GREEN

Geneva

Dated October 13, 1931


Rec'd 6:11 p. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

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 by President Shek as a proof that Chinese policy still
 remained one of "dignified calm" and implicit trust in
 the League for settlement. A failure in this case, he
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 the Briand



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OCT 20 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #193, from Geneva, Oct. 13, 1931,
5 p.m.

Briand-Kellogg Pact and also a series of "diplomatic consequences throughout the Far East." He declared that if the League and the United States failed to cooperate successfully to avert this threat to peace the first result would be the extinction of the disarmament movement and all ideals of international security. Sze made no outright mention of a resort to war in the event of such failure but his remarks might be interpreted as conveying that implication.

The Japanese representative will be heard at the second meeting at 3:30 this afternoon.

GILBERT

FW

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

RE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

FROM GRAY

Canton via NR

Dated October 13, 1931

Recd 4:11 p.m.

Secretary of State
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 14 1931
 Department of State
 12035

egc

October 13, 5 p.m.

My October 11, 8 p.m.

743.94

Although no disturbances have been reported subsequent to Saturday, tension continues. Commissioner of Public Safety has been forced to resign, students and labor unions are threatening to call general strike unless the police involved in Saturday's affair are executed, while police threaten strike if any of them are executed. Authorities who have taken weak attitude, are in dilemma but have agreed to constitute special court for the trial. Troops are arriving in the city apparently to overcome possibility of radical elements getting out of hand. Repeated to Department, Nanking Legation.

BALLANTINE.

CSB

F/ 793.94/2091


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OCT 20 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lynn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

NORMAN H. DAVIS
 FORTY-EIGHT WALL STREET
 NEW YORK



SECRETARY'S OFFICE

OCT 14 1931

PERSONAL

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,
 Department of State,
 Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

In case you have not seen it I am enclosing an editorial from the London Times of September 26th with regard to your action in the Manchurian situation which will no doubt be of interest to you.

I am sorry this question has flared up again and I hope it does not cause you too much trouble and anxiety particularly now when there are so many difficult problems with which you have to deal. It is at least gratifying that your recent statement as to your policy in cooperating with the League in the solution of this problem should have met with such apparent approval.

So much depends upon the outcome of Premier Laval's forthcoming visit and it is too bad the French seem to be so nervous now for fear that the President will hand to him a plan which he will be called upon to accept or reject. I have been wondering if it would not be advisable for a statement to be given out to the effect that the President has no intention of attempting to impose his views on France or any other nation but that since it is of the utmost importance that France and the United States and other powers should collaborate in taking such steps as may be possible to work out of this depression, which has become world-wide, the President wishes to exchange views with Monsieur Laval in the hope that they may agree upon a program of collaboration with other powers. No doubt something to this effect has already been conveyed to the French Government but I am inclined to believe that a public statement would help to improve the atmosphere.

With best regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

Norman H. Davis

NHD:EH

793.94/2091-1/3

FILED

1933

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Davis

October 14, 1931

Dear Mr. Davis:

Thank you very much for your letter of October thirteenth. You will see in the Press tomorrow that I have followed out one of your suggestions.

With best regards,

I am

Very sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Norman H. Davis, Esquire,
48 Wall Street,
New York City

793.94/2091-1/3

A true copy of
the signed original
R

1200

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
THE SECRETARY
OCT 27 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

October 17, 1933.

Mr. Secretary:

Mr. S. O. Levinson telephoned from Chicago this morning and asked that the late Senator Knox's proposal and his comment thereon be brought to your attention. They will be found on pages 14 and 15 of his pamphlet "The Sanctions of Peace" attached hereto. Mr. Levinson stated that this is a much stronger statement than any thus far produced in the present dispute between China and Japan.

Mr. Levinson sent you this pamphlet before you left for the London Naval Conference. I believe you have already read it but Mr. Levinson would like to have you see it again.

793.94

WMM

FILED

FEB 18 1933

793.94/2091-2/3

Memorandum

1201

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

October 10, 1931.

American Consul

Nanking, (China)

VERY URGENT. 87

Until recently we have been reassured by the commitments made by the governments both of China and Japan to the League of Nations which were embodied in the Resolution of the 30th of September. Under that Resolution, Japan agreed to continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the rail-way zone, while China with Japan's consent agreed to assume responsibility for the safety of lives and property of Japanese nationals outside of that Zone. I am, however, much disturbed by later reports, especially of the last forty-eight hours, which indicate that these commitments are not being carried out by either government.

I wish that you would call upon the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs at once and, after reading him the above, impress upon him the dangers to all interests in China which we feel will inevitably result unless the

Enciphered by _____

pacific

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

793.94/2091A

793.94/2091A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

Page 2 to Nanking


pacific policy thus agreed upon is observed and unless
both the Japanese and Chinese nations exercise at this
time the utmost self restraint. I am urging this also
upon the Japanese Ambassador and the Chinese Charge here.

Stinson
WM

U WRO/LM

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976



(TO BE TRANSMITTED IN NAVY CODE)

October 18, 1931

For the President aboard the S.S. Arkansas, Hampton Roads

11/93,94
 Gilbert informs me from Geneva that at ten o'clock last night, Saturday, the Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain, Italy, Germany and Spain ^{were to send} ~~sent~~ to the Japanese and Chinese Governments, respectively, through diplomatic channels, identic telegrams calling the attention of those Governments to Article II of the Pact of Paris. He also informs ^{ed} me that the French Government is to telegraph notifications of this action to all signatories of the Pact of Paris in the name of the said five Governments, namely, of France, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, and Spain. In other words, the Governments now assembled at Geneva are following precisely the method followed in respect to the Russian-Chinese controversy in 1929, except that the initiative is being taken by France in the name of the said five Governments instead of by the United States. When we receive this notification the opportunity will be open to our Government to send a similar note calling attention to Article II to China and Japan. I regard the situation as entirely satisfactory.

Stimson.

793.94/2091 A

1204

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT *may*

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

October 9, 1931.

AMERICAN LEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA).

372 urgent. For the Minister

One. Repeat to Peck Department's 367, October 7,
 8 p.m.

Two. Inform Peck that the Secretary of State had
 a long conversation with the Chinese Chargé on
 October 8. The Secretary explained our attitude and
 policy and urged necessity for self-control on part of
 both the Japanese and the Chinese nations. He has
 repeatedly urged same ^{on} Japanese Ambassador.

Repeat Tokyo.

Stinson
W4

FE:RSM:EJL

FE

Oct. 9 1931.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

793.94/2091B

1205

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

October 12, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA, (SWITZERLAND).

85 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Please take up with Sir Eric Drummond the following
 suggestions as to appeal to the Pact of Paris:

I have been alive to the danger of creating
 embarrassment to the work of the League of Nations by
 independent initiative in Washington. It was for that
 reason that I have held back and simply cooperated so
 far as I could in the line which the League was pursuing.
 In the question of the Pact of Paris, however, I confess
 I had seen no danger of embarrassment to the League
 provided the invocation of the Pact was left, as I
 expressly suggested, in the hands of the Council of the
 League. The Pact of Paris involves no investigation, no
 argument, and no discussion. It involves simply the
 expression of a caution or protest representing the views
 of the signatories. Its chief efficacy is the wide
 measure of public opinion that it evokes, inasmuch as
 a very large number of the signatories would probably

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 30.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/20910

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 19761-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAINCollect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

- 2 -

join in a caution to the two disputants. In 1929, although we had no machinery and little time and although the two disputants hurriedly got into communication to forestall our protest, nevertheless a large majority of the signatories responded. Referring to Drummond's suggestion that America alone should address a note to Japan and China calling attention to the Pact of Paris, this seems to me to mistake the whole purpose of the invocation of the Pact: namely, to bring into action as large a percentage of the signatories as possible and thus to mobilize what is virtually the public opinion of the world against a breach of the peace in Manchuria. Therefore, while I am thoroughly alive to the danger of double jurisdiction in ordinary cases and have been seeking to avoid the slightest possibility of it in this case, I do not see how the invocation of the Pact, made under the auspices of the Council of the League of Nations could possibly involve this danger. On the other hand, this danger might possibly occur if America alone and independently sent such a note under the Pact of Paris.

S. HLS:HHR
Enciphered bySTIMSON.
STIMSON.

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1939 1-138

1207

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lynch NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 8:55 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

URGENT

195, October 13, 9 p.m.



FOR THE SECRETARY

793.94

I have just learned that the Japanese (behind the scenes of course) are strenuously objecting to the United States uniting in the deliberations of the Council under any condition. I understand that an invitation to the United States would be brought up under article five paragraph two of the Covenant and I am informed that the juridical position is that Japan cannot technically prevent such an invitation being extended as such action is customarily decided by a majority vote. The question has not developed far enough for me to venture any prediction as to the outcome.

FW

GILBERT



F/ 793.94/2092

1208

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Zyma NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

FROM

GREEN

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

192, October 13, 4 p.m.

Drummond has handed me for communication to you the following message from the Japanese Government dated October 12 which has been circulated to the members of the Council:

"In view of the very strained situation created by the development of the anti-Japanese agitation in the towns along the Yangtze the Japanese Government decided to send to Shanghai the cruiser TSUSHIMA with four torpedo boats and subsequently on October 8 the cruisers TENERYU and TOKIWA together with two one hundred marine fusiliers. However, the government gave formal instructions to the Commander of these naval forces to consult the Japanese diplomatic and Consular officers before landing any fusiliers should events appear to call for such action. The sole object of these purely precautionary measures, which are not in any way exceptional and are merely in

accordance

Geneva
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Dated October 13, 1931
Rec'd OCT 9:34 p.m. 1931
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OCT 14 1931
Department of State
file
E.G.C.

F/ 793.94/2093

FILED

OCT 20 1931

1209

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

AM

2-#192, From Geneva, October 13, 1931
4 p.m.

accordance with the custom followed by nations in such cases, is protect Japanese residents if necessary. Needless to say the Japanese Government wishes to avoid as far as possible any act likely to upset or irritate Chinese public opinion and consequently it will not be necessary to land the marine fusiliers in question if the Chinese authorities take effective steps to combat the anti-Japanese movement."

GILBERT

HPD

4

1210
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.E.

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 11:38 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 14 1931
Department of State

764, October 13, midnight.

Reuter report from Nanking twelve states that at a political meeting this morning General Chiang Kai Shek animadverted strongly on the Sino-Japanese situation.

He said he hoped League of Nations would take steps for just settlement of imbroglio and prevent almost inevitable war. Trusted League would take proper measures to bring home to Japan her errors in refusing to abide by League's decisions and in occupying Chinese territory without justifiable grounds.

General Chiang declared that National Government of China had appealed to League because being member of it China was under obligations to comply with provisions of covenant.

He declared Japanese allegation that China went to

League

F/10
793.94/2094

FILED

OCT 20 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #764, from Peiping, Oct. 13, 1931,
Midnight.

League for protection was false.

National Government's patience had been tested to last degree. If League failed China would take matter into her own hands. "China respects Covenant of League and Kellogg Pact but if signatories to League and Kellogg Pact fail to uphold their sacred duties China will not hesitate to make the supreme sacrifice of bankrupting country for half century to go to war to uphold dignity and sacred rights of international agreements and safeguard world peace".

For the Minister

ENGERT

JS

1 2 1 2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Chaim S. Lerner NARS, Date June 1, 1976

↑ FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

REP


GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 14, 1931

Rec'd 1:32 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



Leg. Sec.

PRIORITY.

767, October 14, 9 a. m. / 2056

Legation's 748, October 12, 8 p. m.

Military Attache returns from Chinchow late tonight or early tomorrow morning. His report will immediately be telegraphed to the Department.

For the Minister

ENGERT

JS

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793.94/2095

FILED
OCT 20 1931

1214

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

4-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department ☒
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington, Naval Radi

OCT 15 31

October 15, 1931.

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING, (CHINA).

381

Your 766, October 14, 8 a. m. /

Seven dollars per diem authorized for Minister and members of his staff. Charge to item for travel in regular contingent/expense allotment. Inform Minister.

Stearns

(OK)

Oct. 15 1931

793.94/2096
 FA-HAH:FF

FF

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1918 1-138

793.94/2096

note
 124-934

Gray

15
 7 p.m.

1008
 J. Van

M.M.H.

1215

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

A portion of this
 telegram must be closely
 paraphrased before being
 communicated to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 7:50 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT.

194, October 13, 8 p. m.

FOR THE SECRETARY.

In compliance with your request made in our telephone
 conversation just concluded there follows the draft text
 prepared by one of Briand's assistants of a statement for
 Briand to make before the Council in introducing a dis-
 cussion of the relationship between Council action and the
 Kellogg Pact.


(BEGIN GREEN). "The representative of the Chinese
 Government indicated that in his opinion the question which
 was before the Council was of the greatest concern not
 only to the members of the League but also to all the
 powers signatory to the Pact of Paris. This statement is
 indeed (*) since Article two of that Pact is couched as

follows

F/ 793.94/2097

OCT 12 1931
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file
EgC.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #194, from Geneva, Oct.13,1931,
 8 p. m.

follows (read Article two).

All the signatories to the Pact are therefore interested in securing a settlement of the present dispute by pacific means but above all the United States of America, with the then Secretary of State of which country I was proud to be associated as a joint author of the Pact of Paris.

I propose therefore, in view of the fact that the United States was a proponent party to the Pact and further that the Secretary of State has expressed his whole-hearted sympathy with the attitude of the League in the Sino-Japanese dispute with which we are dealing, that we should invite the United States Government to send a representative to be associated to our deliberations so as to be in a position to consider with us the relationship between the present situation and the provisions of the Pact". (END GREEN).

I wish to make perfectly clear that I have no direct word from Briand that statement will follow that wording. I believe however that it can be assumed that it will be of the same general tenor.

I venture

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

3- #184, from Geneva, Oct.13,1931,
8 p. m.

I venture to suggest this will be of assistance to
you in preparing a statement for me to make before the
Council as I assume that the program will be that our
statement will follow very closely upon that of Briand.

GILBERT

HPD

(*) Apparent omission.

1218

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Chambers & Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


FROM



REP

CORRECTED COPY

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.



Rec'd 7:50 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

URGENT.

793.94/2097
194, October 13, 8 p. m.

FOR THE SECRETARY.

In compliance with your request made in our telephone conversation just concluded there follows the draft text prepared by one of Briand's assistants of a statement for Briand to make before the Council in introducing a discussion of the relationship between Council action and the Kellogg Pact.

{BEGIN GREEN). "The representative of the Chinese Government indicated that in his opinion the question which was before the Council was of the greatest concern not only to the members of the League but also to all the powers signatory

793.94/2097

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #194, from Geneva, Oct. 13, 1931,
 8 p. m.

signatory to the Pact of Paris. This statement if indeed true since Article two of that Pact is couched as follows (read Article two).

All the signatories to the Pact are therefore interested in securing a settlement of the present dispute by pacific means but above all the United States of America, with the then Secretary of State of which country I was proud to be associated as a joint author of the Pact of Paris.

I propose therefore, in view of the fact that the United States was a proponent party to the Pact and further that the Secretary of State has expressed his whole-hearted sympathy with the attitude of the League in the Sino-Japanese dispute with which we are dealing, that we should invite the United States Government to send a representative to be associated to our deliberations so as to be in a position to ~~consider~~ with us the relationship between the present situation and the provisions of the Pact". (END GREEN).

I wish to make perfectly clear that I have no direct *
 word

1 2 2 1
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

3- #194, from Geneva, Oct.13,1931,
8 p. m.

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GILBERT

HPD

1 2 2 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
ADM. AND M. I. D.

REP

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 14, 1931

Rec'd 7:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

768, October 14, 11 a. m.

FROM LIEUTENANT BROWN, MUKDEN TO NAVAL ATTACHE.

"October 13, 4 p. m. Conferred with member of general staff 3 p. m. today who officially informed me there is no change in the disposition of the Japanese forces since my memorandum of October 8th with the exception of one infantry company plus one squadron cavalry despatched from Mukden today to clear Mukden Railway of bandits between here and Chuliuho. No withdrawals being made but further extension feared necessary.

Train which left the city yesterday morning attacked by bandits near Tahurgan, 30 members of guard disarmed. Planes left here daybreak this morning dropped bombs Koupangtse. Japanese lieutenant shot last night Huangku Tsingpoo station here by plain clothes men".

For the Minister.

ENGERT

RR
HPD

792.94

F

793.94/2098

FILED

OCT 20 1931

1222

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

~~AE~~

AM

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 14, 1931

Rec'd 6:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 14 1931
Department of State

*file
29.C*

769, October 14, 2 p.m.

Hanson and Salisbury left Mukden today for
Chinchow and Newchwang. Tokyo informed.

For the Minister

ENGERT

AJC

CSB

793.94/2099

OCT 19 1931
FILED

1 2 2
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 14, 1931

Rec'd 3 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



file
egc.

765, October 14.

Sir Miles Lampson left this morning for Nanking by plane.

For the Minister

ENGERT

HPD

793.94

OCT 18 1931
FILED

FE
F
793.94/2100

1224

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Zorn NARS, Date June 1, 1976

FILE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

GRAY

FROM


PEIPING VIA NR

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 5:10 p.m.

793.94

Secretary of State
 Washington



file
 7.9.c.

763, October 13, 6 p.m.

Following from Hanson - Salisbury "October 12, noon.

Following is a gist of the information contained in
 a letter date October 8th, 1931, addressed to Hanson at
 Kuangchengtse by Consul General Myers of Mukden:

One. With respect to civil administration in the
 Chinese areas of Mukden, there now exists a civil municipal
 government with a Japanese mayor (Doihara) and Japanese
 chiefs of the various major departments and bureaus, in-
 cluding police department. During past week approximately
 fifteen hundred Chinese police have been put into service
 by this municipal government. Japanese military police
 authorities and gendarmes however still might be considered
 effective police weapon of the municipal area. The extent
 to which Japanese control makes itself felt is shown by the
 fact that the special delegate of the Ministry for Foreign
 Affairs

793.94/2101

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

2- #763, from Peiping, October 13,
1931

Affairs (Chinese) must obtain Japanese approval prior to
issuing visas for foreign passports.

(END PART ONE)

For the Minister

ENGERT

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

FROM

GRAY

PEIPING

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 4:25 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

763, October 13, 6 p.m. (PART TWO)

A return to the status quo ante in the Mukden municipality is certainly not an immediate possibility.

Two. Complete withdrawal of the Japanese soldiers to the railway zone at this time with conditions as unsettled as they are would not only jeopardize lives and property of Japanese but also that of foreigners and Chinese. An effective Chinese municipal administration and police force must first be established. Armed robbery is common both within Mukden and in outlying areas. Chinese robbers and brigands are taking full advantage of the situation, some Chinese homes in the city have been completely cleaned out and the Mukden municipal Bank of Chosen was robbed of eighty thousand yen according to an official report of Japanese military headquarters. Resentment against Japanese would without doubt make withdrawal of Japanese forces difficult. However,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

2- #763, part two, from Peiping,
October 13, 1931

However, indiscriminate robbery and general insecurity ^{which would}
~~will~~ probably follow upon their withdrawal unless an effective
Chinese administration can be immediately established which
is most

(END PART TWO)

For the Minister

ENGERT

CSB

1 2 2 8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1931

Rec'd 8:40 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

763, October 13, 6 p. m. (PART THREE.)

unlikely seem to be major problem.

Three. Mukden radio station has not been destroyed and Japanese Consul General has declared that whatever damage plant may have suffered is only minor and that service might be resumed without difficulty. Consul Vincent visited transmitting station and central control office.

Four. He found a former Chinese watchman who stated that, although there had been considerable petty thievery, equipment had not been damaged. It was observed however that one large cable had been cut; at latter place he found detachment of Japanese soldiers billeted and was informed that it was impossible to transmit messages.

Replies of the Japanese Consul General to representations of the Mukden Consulate General concerning resumption of

service

1 2 2 5
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #763, from Peiping, Oct. 13, 1931,
6 p. m.

service has so far elicited Nanking a statement to the
effect that matter is under consideration by the military
authorities.

(END MESSAGE).

For the Minister

ENGERT

2

1230

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.

FROM

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 14, 1931

Rec'd 6:10 a. m.

793.94

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 14 1931
 Department of State

fig
eg.c.

793.94/2102

770, October 14, 3 p. m.

FROM CONSUL GENERAL at Mukden:

"October 14, 10 a. m. Four trains of Japanese troops estimated at five thousand with about twenty Liberty motors and armored cars left Mukden this morning at four on Peiping Mukden Railway. Detailed for duty at Koupangtzau. Train service stopped, telegraph telephone communications cut this end P. M. R.

893.77
 893.72
 893.75

FILED
 OCT 20 1931

Yesterday a report from Japanese reliable source stated that there were 8,000 Chinese forces along the Railway between Liao Yuan and Tungliao".

For the Minister

ENGERT

CSB

7 1 2 3 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 14, 1931

Rec'd 9:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.



*file
S.G.C.*

772, October 14, 5 p.m.

793.94/2099
My 769, October 12, 6 p.m.

Hanson -- Salisbury now report that on account
of Japanese troop movements they were unable to
proceed to Chinchow and are leaving today for Newchang.
Tokyo informed.

For the Minister

ENGERT

WVC

CSB

793.94/2103

OCT 19 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

~~EE~~
~~WE~~

AM

FROM GREEN
Geneva

Dated October 14, 1931

Rec'd 11:10 a.m.

793.94

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

197, October 14, 1 p.m.

FOR THE SECRETARY

Sze called on me this morning and said that statements were emanating from various quarters that China was negotiating directly with Japan or was willing to undertake such negotiations. He asked me if I would transmit to you his categorical denial of such statements or such intentions on the part of China.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 14 1931
Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OCT 15 1931
793.94/2104

GILBERT

KLP

FILED
OCT 21 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 14, 1931

Rec'd 6:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



*Le
Tog C*
(12?)

84, October 14, 2 p. m.

Your 90, October 13, 2 p. m.

793.94 / 2010 a

Communication was quoted in the Department's 367,

October 7, 8 p. m. to the American Legation. United States Navy radio press bulletin October one carries message from Washington stating that the Department of State published this note to the League which is identified by the following quotation "it is most desirable that the League" down to "Japan in the premises". Same bulletin carries message from Tokyo stating that the American Charge d' Affaires transmitted to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs substance of American note to the League pledging moral support. Presumably reference is to the same communication. [The American Legation transmitted this communication to me in confidential code, hence my cautious reference.]

793.94/2105

FILED
OCT 26 1931

CSB

PECK

1234

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM


This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated October 14, 1931 *FE*

Rec'd 11:45 a. m.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.



198, October 14, 2 p. m.

DSN 10-20-31 I imparted to Drummond your ⁸⁶ ~~88~~ _^ October 13, 11 a. m., at noon today. He informed me that Briand had brought forward a suggestion along the same lines in the committee of five this morning which is being given consideration. He wished me to say that your views in the premises are thus of great assistance at this juncture.

GILBERT

OSB

793.94/2106

OCT 20 1931

FILED

1 2 3

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM



Dated October 14, 1931

Rec'd 12:32 p. m.


Secretary of State,
 Washington.

199, October 14, 3 p. m.

FOR THE SECRETARY.

Drummond informed me in confidence this morning that Briand was privately discussing with a few Council members an "ingenious plan". Japan's resistance to "neutral observers" being sent to Manchuria is well known. Briand's idea is that neutral individuals could be sent with the Chinese forces as, in line with Chinese commitments, they took over points evacuated by the Japanese. A request to this effect could be made to China. There appears to be little question but that China would accede. Their duties would be to observe and to report the observations and the manner in which China was carrying out its commitments in the premises.

Japan



FILED

1931 OCT 12 120

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #199, from Geneva, Oct. 14, 1931, 12:32 p.m.

Japan could hardly object to such a procedure. I believe that the implications of such a plan are obvious.

Drummond solicits your comments if you have any which you care to give.

GILBERT

RR

HPD

1 2 3 7

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Charge to
\$

793.94/2107

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased. October 16, 1931.
being communicated to anyone.

Washington,

OCT 16 31 2 pm

AMERICAN CONSUL
GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

95
CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 199, October 14, 3 p.m.

You may say to Drummond confidentially: The
Department approves this idea in principle but feels
that caution should be used in applying it without
the consent of the ^{Chinese and} Japanese Government.

For your information, the Chinese Chargé left
with the Department on October 10 a copy of a telegram
from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated
October 9, giving the text of a QUOTE second note UNQUOTE
which the Chinese Minister in Tokyo had been instructed to
deliver to the Japanese Foreign Office, in which the Chi-
nese Government requested that the Japanese Government
indicate localities to be evacuated QUOTE over this week
UNQUOTE and it was stated that copies of the note were being
communicated to the League Council and the Department of
State. The Chargé was instructed to ask the Department of State
to instruct its Legation in Peiping authorizing QUOTE military

793.94/2107

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

or civilian representatives to accompany each unit
 proceeding to occupy the evacuated territories UNQUOTE.
 By way of reply, the Department gave the Chargé an
 informal memorandum stating that QUOTE note has been
 made of and consideration is being given to the Chinese
 Government's request thus conveyed UNQUOTE. The
 Department has as yet taken no further action in regard
 to this matter.

Spinson
WJ

793.94/2107

FE:SKH/ZMF:EJL

Rem
 FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

24
 Oct. 18, 1981 PM
WVC

1 2 3 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒
PLAIN

Washington,

October 13, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

URGENT *Double Priority*

88 Responding to your request over the telephone, if you are invited to participate in the discussions of the Council, you may make the following opening statement of your position:

QUOTE. ^X I thank you for your invitation at this moment of deep international concern, to sit in your deliberations and participate in your discussions as far as the Pact of Paris, to which my country is a party, is concerned. My country does not seek to intrude into or express any opinion in respect to such measures as you have under consideration as representatives of the League of Nations. Acting independently and through diplomatic channels my Government has already sought to signify its approval and moral support of your effort in this capacity to bring about a peaceful solution of the unfortunate controversy in Manchuria. In your deliberations as to the application of the machinery of the Covenant of the League of Nations we can, of course, take no part. ⁺

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/2107A

124C

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

But the Pact of Paris, bearing as it does the signature of the President of this meeting together with that of our former Secretary of State as joint proponents, represents to us in America an effective effort to marshal the public opinion of the world behind the use solely of pacific means in the solution of controversies between the nations of this earth. We feel that this public opinion is a most potent force not only in the domestic affairs of every nation, but that it is of constantly growing import and influence in the mutual relations ~~to~~ *each other* of the members of the ~~great~~ family of nations. *HL S*

The timely exercise of the ~~great~~ power of such opinion may be effective to prevent a breach of international peace of worldwide significance. We assume that this may be the reason why the invocation of this treaty has been suggested by this conference, and I have been directed by my government to accept your invitation in order that we may most easily and effectively take common counsel with you on the subject. It is our earnest hope that by its action this conference may assist in the fruition of the efforts which ~~we hope~~ are being made by the disputants *HL S*

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1918 4-738

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1 138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

- 3 -

themselves to adjust by peaceful methods their own
 differences. UNQUOTE.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR GILBERT. In the course of the
 discussions we wish you to make it perfectly clear to
 your conferees that we have not prejudged the action
 which should be taken in respect to the Pact of Paris.
 The situation in Manchuria is changing from day to day
 and we do not wish to be thought to be insistent as to
 what may be ultimately found to be the wisest course of
 procedure. It is our feeling that such a mobilization
 of world opinion against a breach of the peace as may
 be found possible under the Pact of Paris may be very
 useful in effecting a peaceful solution in Manchuria.
 But if such a peaceful solution during the course of your
 deliberations seems to be approaching without the invocation
 of the Pact, we certainly do not wish unduly to press it.

STIMSON.

HLS

S HLS:HHR

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 59.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1923 1-138

1 2 4 2
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated October 14, 1931

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

196, October 14, 9 a. m.

793.94/2090
Consulate's 193, October 13, 5 p. m.

At the Council meeting last night the discussion was immediately opened with a long statement by Japanese representative. This statement can be divided into two parts, one of which consisted of a detailed historical account of the Manchurian problem, the Japanese rights involved and the increasing provocations to which the Japanese Government has been subjected in that region. The second part was largely in response to the Chinese statements in the morning session of the Council and declared that in many parts of China, Japanese nationals were in a position of increasing danger on account of the rising tide of anti-Japanese agitation. No further

explanations

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #196, from Geneva, Oct.14,1931,
 9 a. m.

explanations of the Chinchow incident than those already given out by the Japanese Government were made. With regard to policy the position taken by the Japanese was essentially the same as that heretofore reported. The troops would be withdrawn as the protection of the Japanese lives and property was assured. Meanwhile, the Japanese Government is ready to enter into direct negotiations in the spirit of the Council resolution of September 30th.

Sze replied that the anti-Japanese agitation was the result of the occupation of Chinese territory and the bombing of defenseless Chinese cities, "suppress the cause and the agitation will cease". He then read two telegrams which he had just received regarding the bombing that very day of two towns Tahan 150 kilometers and Koupangtze 172 kilometers from Mukden. He also read a telegram from Sherwood Eddy in the same sense as that referred to in 193.94/2027 Consulate's 166, October 9, 11 a. m. Regarding direct negotiations he declared it absolutely useless to discuss such negotiations as long as Japanese troops occupied

Chinese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

3- #196, from Geneva, Oct.14,1931,
9 a. m.

Chinese territory and as long as reparations had not been arranged. He then read some additional information concerning the Chinchow incident.

In reply the Japanese representative declared that Japanese airplanes had been fired upon at Chinchow and had replied with bombs. Sze replied that there were no anti-air craft guns in or near Chinchow.

Lord Reading then asked the Japanese delegate to obtain information on the newly reported bombardments. The Japanese representative stated that he would ask his government for such information.

Briand then made a conciliatory statement recalling the promises of the two countries and declaring that the situation although grave was not irremediable. He asked to have the assurance that nothing would be done to aggravate the situation further or to complicate the already difficult task of the Council.

GILBERT

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976




DIVISION OF
 LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS
 OCT 19 1931
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 137 Buenos Aires, September 30, 1931.

Sent by air mail October 1.
 Copy by regular mail.

OCT 12 1931



OR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK

YES NO

TO THE
 LIAISON OFFICE

793.94/2109

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that I have received this day from the Minister of Japan to Argentina a third person note stating, "At a time when the world's attention is turned to the events in Manchuria, the Minister of Japan in Argentina has the honor to send herewith, for the information of His Excellency the Ambassador of the United States of America, the speech pronounced by Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, ex-Vice President of the

OCT 19 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

-2-

of the South Manchurian Company, on the occasion of the Third International Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Japan in 1929."

Although I have not had occasion to inquire of my colleagues, I assume that a similar communication has been sent by the Japanese Minister to other foreign chiefs of mission in Buenos Aires. I have merely made acknowledgment of the Minister's note without comment on the text of Mr. Matsuoka's speech.

The pamphlet accompanying the Minister's note is entitled, "An Address on Manchuria Its Past and Present and Reply to Prof. Shuhsi-Hsu's Criticisms and Observations", and was published at Kyoto, Japan, in 1929. The Department undoubtedly has cognizance of this speech and the copy received from the Japanese Minister is therefore not transmitted.

Respectfully yours,


Robert Woods Bliss

Qn.
711
RWB-AH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 6, 1931.

Mr. Castle:

You may be interested in
noting the under-scored part of
Sherwood Eddy's telegram, the
text of which is incorporated
in the attached incoming letter.

M. W. W.

MMH:LM

1248

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

RECEIVED

SHERWOOD EDDY
347 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK CITY

OCT 1 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Hon. Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Sir:

I hand you herewith a copy of a cablegram just received from Sherwood Eddy and sent from Tientsin, China, which reads as follows:

"I WAS PRESENT CAPTURE MOUKDEN. EVIDENCE OF MANY WITNESSES INTERVIEWED AT TIME AND ON SPOT POINTS TO PREMEDITATED CAREFULLY PREPARED OFFENSIVE PLAN OF JAPANESE ARMY WITHOUT PROVOCATION OF ANY CHINESE ATTACK PRODUCING BITTER RESENTMENT WHEN CHINA SUFFERING WITH FLOOD DISASTER AND WORLD PREOCCUPIED. JAPANESE TROOPS NOT WITHDRAWN BUT ALL STRATEGIC POINTS SOUTHERN MANCHURIA STILL HELD BY JAPANESE AND CHINCHOW BOMBED. I TESTIFY TO EVIDENCE OF EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH PUPPET INDEPENDENCE GOVERNMENTS MANCHURIA UNDER JAPANESE MILITARY CONTROL. I HAVE FORWARDED SWORN STATEMENT OF INTERVIEWS WITH CHINESE LEADERS MANCHURIA WHO TESTIFY TO REPEATED PRESSURE OF JAPANESE TO INDUCE THEM TO HEAD INDEPENDENCE GOVERNMENTS. UNIVERSAL INDIGNATION IN CHINA TAKING FORM ECONOMIC BOYCOTT WHICH GOVERNMENT CANNOT CONTROL. EFFORTS OF NANKING GOVERNMENT STILL PEACEFUL NONRESISTANCE WHICH IMPERILS GOVERNMENT IF PACIFIC SETTLEMENT FAILS. SITUATION CRITICAL. GRAVE DEVELOPMENTS IMMINENT. ALL ORIENT LOOKING TO KELLOGG PACT SIGNATORIES AND LEAGUE OF NATIONS FOR ACTION. ASIA BELIEVES PACT AND LEAGUE ARE ON TRIAL AS WELL AS JAPAN AND CHINA. A NOTABLE TURNING TOWARD SOVIET RUSSIA AS AN ALLY AND COMMUNISM IS DEVELOPING POINTING TOWARD FALL OF NANKING GOVERNMENT AND WIDESPREAD COMMUNIST ANARCHY IF PACT AND LEAGUE FAIL IN THIS SUPREME CRISIS AND MENACE OF WAR. (Signed) SHERWOOD EDDY."

Most respectfully yours,

Secretary

FILED

OCT 19 1931

793.94/2110

793.94

See
793.94 / 22481
22654

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Chambers & Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

October 17 1931.

In reply refer to
 FE 793.94/2110

Miss Jessica M. Moreland,
 347 Madison Avenue,
 New York, New York.

Madam:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of
 October 13, 1931, addressed to the Secretary of State,
 quoting the text of a cablegram sent from Tientsin by
 Mr. Sherwood Eddy in regard to the present situation
 in Manchuria.

The Department appreciates your courtesy in
 sending it a copy of Mr. Eddy's message and desires
 to assure you that the situation in Manchuria is
 continuing to receive the Department's careful and
 solicitous attention.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:


CR
 Oct. 17 1931

M. M. Hamilton
 Maxwell M. Hamilton,
 Assistant Chief,
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

FE:MMH:VIM/cmu

FE

10/16/31



793.94/2110

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 23, 1931.

793.94/1832

Referring to Geneva telegrams, 127, September 22,
 9 p.m. from Gilbert and 156, September 22, 11 p.m. from
 Wilson, --

Gilbert's telegram, 127, purports to give "text of
 identic telegrams despatched today by the President of
 the Council to the Governments of China and Japan". The
 text as quoted states that the Council has authorized
 the President:

1. To address an appeal to the Governments of China
 and of Japan;
2. To promulgate adequate means to commit both
 countries to immediate withdrawal of their armed forces;
3. (Note: Gilbert's telegram at this point takes up
 an adjective matter, and carries on therewith to the end.).

Comment: It is evident that either (a) what purports
 to be the "text of identic telegrams" is not such or (b)
 these identic telegrams themselves were drafted in such
 haste that the numbers therein, "One", "Two" and "Three",
 do not flow from the introductory paragraph.

A possible clarification of the text of the "identic
 telegrams" is attached hereto.

FILED

1831-1-1931

793.94/2111

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 24, 1931.

Subject: MANCHURIAN SITUATION
Destruction of Chinese Government's
Radio Station (Built by the Radio
Corporation of America) at Mukden.

S
FF
FL
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egc

793.94
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811.7493

Colonel Manton Davis, counsel of the Radio Corporation, called me from New York on the 'phone this morning.

He said that the Radio Corporation had just received word that, on Friday evening, September 19, the Japanese had "shot up" and put completely out of commission the radio station at Mukden which the Radio Corporation had built for the Chinese Government. He said that, although the Chinese Government owns and had operated that station, the Radio Corporation has a parental interest with regard to it; it had gone to a lot of trouble in connection with its building and developing its business -- which had gotten up to some seventy messages per day. The Mukden station constituted one end of one of the various circuits over which the Radio Corporation's business flows. He said the Radio Corporation was very much concerned and that it was its considered opinion that the Japanese had deliberately made it a point to put the station "out of business" and to that extent interrupt communications.

793.94/2112

FILED
OCT 17 1931

Colonel Davis said that, in addition, in connection with communications with the Far East, one of the Pacific cables

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence A. Lyons, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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cables was now crippled or broken, this having happened on the night of September 22 supposedly as the result of an ocean bed earthquake.

Colonel Davis said that the Radio Corporation would like to know whether the American Government can do anything toward assisting in the reestablishing of the Mukden circuit, and whether we can tell them how long it is likely to be before that circuit is reestablished.

SKH

SKH/ZMF

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

9/28/31

U:

This is highly suggestive
as material for opinion
against sending our officers
to "investigate".

SKH

1254

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDERSECRETARY



September 25, 1931.

Memorandum of conversation with the Japanese Ambassador,
 September 25, 1931.

793.94
 The Japanese Ambassador told me that he had just received a communication from his Government as to the latest developments in Manchuria. He said that the Japanese were trying to draw in their lines, in order to liquidate the present unfortunate situation; that it was also obvious that the Premier and Baron Shidehara had now got control of the situation, at least to a very large extent. He said that it was the feeling of the Japanese Government that the Chinese were consciously making a great deal out of the situation and were enormously exaggerating. This they believe to be due largely to political conditions, Chiang Kai Shek being himself in a very dangerous position and wishing to consolidate Chinese opinion back of them by taking a very belligerent attitude. The Ambassador said that it is very curious that violent anti-Japanese feeling seems to be centered in Nanking, that it is much less violent in Canton and least violent of all in the territories

793.94/2113

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 100-1-100

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

MAM

2- #763, from Peiping, October 13,
1931

Affairs (Chinese) must obtain Japanese approval prior to
issuing visas for foreign passports.

(END PART ONE)

For the Minister

ENGERT

OSB

1 2 5 8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDERSECRETARY

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situation is improving and the very best method of settling the whole matter would be through direct conversations with the Chinese. The Ambassador says that his Government is very grateful to this Government for its sympathetic attitude in the whole matter and hopes that we shall be content to let matters rest for the time being until Japan can prove by actions their good intentions. I told the Ambassador that this was very important, that, so far as we could see, there had been a violation of treaties, possibly without intention, and that neither this Government nor the rest of the world could sit quietly by in a situation as tense as the present, although I personally was only too glad to give the Japanese an opportunity to prove the good faith which I know they have. I pointed out to the Ambassador that the world had for years suspected Japanese intentions in Manchuria and that this made the world attitude more critical than it perhaps would be. For this reason I told him it was clear that the Japanese Government should act as quickly and as openly as possible in the restoration of legal treaty conditions. The

Ambassador

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By James A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDERSECRETARY

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Ambassador said that he was sure that his Government fully appreciated this and would so act. He spoke of the despatch of British troops to Shanghai some years ago and our own so-called bombardment of Nanking, but admitted that this was a different situation than the present in that at that time the question was international and that there could be no claim that we were seeking selfish advantages.

The Ambassador said that now that Baron Shidehara and Baron Wakatsuki were in control of the situation, he felt that things would improve perhaps more rapidly than we believe possible, but that it remained very important not to complicate matters by the imposition of some outside body for investigation or anything else. I pointed out to him that possibly another reason for prompt action might be that it was necessary within the range of possibilities - if not probabilities - that the Russians might take the attitude that they were friends of China and would help put out the Japanese; that, if anything of the sort happened, it would infinitely complicate the situation. The Ambassador said that his Government was fully aware of this possibility, but that

he

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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he thought the evident determination of the Japanese to withdraw its forces from advanced positions had already shown the Russians that there was no intention of annexation of South Manchuria or of interference with Chinese control. I told him that I hoped most sincerely that his belief as to the facts would prove true and that we might see a steady amelioration in the present dangerous situation.

W. R. Castle, Jr.

1259

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Zyma NARS, Date June 4, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDERSECRETARY

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RECEIVED
OCT 1 9 1931
DIVISION OF

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 1 - 1931
Department of State

September 30, 1931.

Memorandum of conversation with Mr. Henry, Counselor
of the French Embassy, September 28.

793.94

Mr. Henry came in to tell me that he had reported
to his Government the attitude of this Department with
regard to Manchuria, as I explained it to him about the
24th. He had a telegram which he read me, stating
that the French Government was grateful for the communi-
cation, that it was entirely in sympathy with the atti-
tude of this Government and felt that what had been done
so far was thoroughly wise.

793.94/2114

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OCT 17 1931

1260

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

Geneva

FROM

Dated October 14, 1931

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Rec'd 8:40 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

200, October 14, 7 p. m.

793.94/2092
Consulate's 195, October 13, 5 p. m.

There was no Council meeting today. The situation in private conversations between Council members on the situation.

Drummond has just informed me as follows:

Briand informally broached to his Council colleagues who represent the great powers the question of inviting the United States to take a seat at the Council table should the Pact of Paris come under discussion. They were unanimous in their approval. Then for reasons of policy he regarded it as incumbent upon him to take the question up with the parties to the dispute. Yoshizawa stated that as this was a new point he would have to consult his government. There seems to be little

doubt

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 15 1931
Department of State
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OCT 16 1931
193.94/2115
FILED
OCT 20 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

#200, October 14, 1931, 7 p. m. from Geneva

-2-

doubt but that Japan strongly objects to such an invitation being extended and his statement that he must obtain instructions from Tokyo is construed as his desiring at least to delay as long as possible this action being taken.

The principal Council members are anxious to hold a Council meeting tomorrow and to take up then the question of an invitation to the United States. Japan wishes to have such a meeting postponed until Friday but it is now tentatively decided to hold it tomorrow at 5 p. m.

Drummond wants me to make clear to you that there was no desire to delay matters here but that it was felt desirable to give the Japanese representative an opportunity to communicate with Tokyo.

I will report developments.

GILBERT

FW

1 2 6 :

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.F.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

FROM

Gray

PEIPING

Dated October 15, 1931

Rec'd 1:00 a.m.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

773, October 15, 8 a.m.

Legation's 770, October 14, 3 p.m. Following from

Mukden:

"October 14, 3 p.m. Japanese authorities
announce that movement this morning was against
five thousand bandit soldiers north of Hsinlungtien,
that the force comprised 2650 troops with artillery
and aircraft and that the troops will return as soon
as bandits have been dispersed. Force is said to have
taken six-inch gun with it."

For the Minister

ENGERT

JS

793.94/2116

FILED

OCT 20 1931

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA
FE

HSM

FROM GRAY
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.V.
Canton, via N. R.

Dated October 14, 1931

Rec'd 8:14 p. m.

793.94
with
843.00

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 15 1931
Department of State

file
E.g.c.

793.94/2091

October 14, 7 p. m.

Referring to my telegram of October 13, 5 p. m.,
Mayor informs me that authorities now have complete
control of the situation and that there is no danger
of further disturbance.

793.94/2117

He added that telegram has been received from
Chiang Kai Shek stating that he would go with Hu Han Min
to Shanghai in a few days and requested despatch of
Cantonese delegates to unification conference. Mayor
believes peace now assured, although there is still
no decision on the personnel of the delegation or the
date of departure.

OCT 20 1931

FILED

Department, Legation, Nanking informed.

BALLANTINE

FW

1264

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Thomas S. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT *Gray*

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Collect
 Charge Department

Department of State

OR
 Charge to
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Washington,

October 14, 1931.

3P OCT 14 31

793 94

AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND)

90

Telegraph without fail when and if you are
 invited to attend the Council meeting, also the
 hour of the meeting, so that we can give to the
 press a copy of the statement you have been authorized
 to make.

Stinson
Skw.

793.94/2117A

OR
Oct. 14. 1931 *ps*

U WRC/LM

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____


126

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles E. Lynn NARS, Date June 1, 1976



No. 1069.

RECD



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Rome, October 2, 1931.


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OCT 14 31



793.94



The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

793.94/1932

With reference to my telegram No. 188 of September 29, 3 p.m., I have the honor to enclose translations of the communique issued to the Italian press and of the statement furnished to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Japanese Embassy in Rome, concerning the situation in Manchuria.

Italian public opinion as evidenced by the press is naturally a little apathetic as to the Sino-Japanese difficulty. Since national interests in the Far East, especially in Manchuria, are comparatively negligible and little understood, the newspapers have devoted

OCT 22 1931

large

793.94/2118

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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large space to a statement of the historical background and of the resources and conditions of that part of the world. Furthermore, as Italian attention has recently been concentrated on events in Geneva, where the Sino-Japanese controversy also was involved, the latter situation was naturally relegated by the press to a secondary place in favor of the disarmament question. However, the newspapers, notably the *MESSAGGERO*, do call attention to what they term real acts of war, undertaken by Japan whatever "the elegant formula proffered by Nipponese mentality may care to call them." The *TRIBUNA* and the *TEVERE* are inclined to sneer at what they frankly allege to be the bankruptcy of the Kellogg Peace Pact as far as its efficacy in solving matters of this grave nature are concerned. The *TEVERE* notes mockingly that the bombardment and occupation of Mukden took place only several hours after the Third Commission of the League Assembly had met to adopt the formula that "if under circumstances which in the opinion of the council do not give rise to a state of war between the nations concerned, forces of one of these powers have penetrated into the territory or the territorial waters of the other or fly over said territory or waters, the Council may prescribe the necessary measures for the withdrawal of these forces." "They may prescribe, but will they?" inquires the *TEVERE*. "They may, but perhaps they don't want to; or they may want to, but can't. Geneva will wash its hands of the affair in the same way that the Kellogg Pact seems to have done."

The

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 By Charles D. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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The CORRIERE DELLA SERA, in an article dealing with the general international situation, feels that Russian intervention may be forced if Japan persists in her militaristic policy. The article continues with the following confused statement upon the attitude of the United States toward Russia:

"Nor could Russian intervention come to pass without the participation of the United States, which today is in excellent relations with Russia and which strikes an attitude as protector of China against Japanese imperialism. England for opposite reasons should support Japan, but the financial and political condition of the British Empire has taken away from her the means for this initiative."

Again, while referring to the traditional secrecy surrounding Japanese foreign policy and to the attempts of Japan during the Great War to carve for herself an empire on the Asiatic mainland, the CORRIERE says:

"So far it cannot be ascertained whether Japan desires only to reaffirm her prestige within definite limits on the Asiatic continent or whether she seeks, during the almost general apathy of the other powers, the chance of solving by one blow the problem of her economic and demographic expansion."

Respectfully yours,

Alexander Kirk

Alexander Kirk,
 Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosures: Clippings.

Copies to E.I.C. Paris.

SC/eh
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1069 of October 2, 1931,
from the Embassy at Rome.

Translation of statement to the press by
the Japanese Embassy in Rome, as
appearing in the GIORNALE
D'ITALIA of September 29.

The Japanese government has consistently and sincerely endeavored to adhere to the established policy of encouraging friendly relations between Japan and China and of promoting the common prosperity and common welfare of the two countries.

Unfortunately the conduct of the Chinese functionaries and private persons during the past few years has been such as frequently to irritate our national sentiments. In particular, there has been a frequent series of unpleasant incidents in the regions of Manchuria and Mongolia, in which Japan is especially interested. In this manner, the Japanese have become convinced that the equitable and friendly attitude of Japan was not reciprocated in the same spirit by China.

In the atmosphere of unrest and anxiety thus created, a detachment of Chinese troops, toward midnight on September 18, destroyed a portion of the South Manchurian railroad near Mukden and attacked our railway guards, thus provoking a conflict between the Japanese and Chinese troops.

The situation was critical, since the Japanese guards, who were scattered along the entire railway line, had to face 220,000 Chinese soldiers, whereas their number did not exceed 10,400. Moreover, hundreds of thousands of

Japanese

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles E. Lyon Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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Japanese residents were in serious danger. To avoid imminent disaster, the Japanese army was forced to act rapidly: the Chinese soldiers in nearby garrisons were disarmed and the duty of maintaining peace and order was entrusted to the local Chinese organizations under the surveillance of the Japanese troops.

Having thus taken the essential measures of precaution, our troops were for the most part withdrawn into the railway zone. There are still a few detachments at Mukden and Kirin and a small number of men in a few other localities; but nowhere is there any military occupation. Information to the effect that the Japanese authorities have taken over the customshouses or the Kingkou salt gabelle or that they have assumed control of the Chinese railways between Tsupingkai and Chengchi-atun or between Mukden and Sinmintun, is absolutely false; also the report that our troops have been sent north of Changchun or into Chientao is entirely without foundation.

In the special Cabinet meeting of September 19, the Japanese government determined to make every possible effort to prevent an aggravation of the situation and instructions were given to this end to the Commander of the Manchurian garrison.

It is true that a detachment was sent from Changchun to Kirin on September 21. But it did not have orders to proceed to a military occupation, but simply to remove any menace along the South Manchurian railway. As soon as this aim had been achieved, the greater part

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of the detachment was to be withdrawn (as in fact has already occurred). It is well to add that although a mixed brigade of 4010 men was sent from Korea to the Manchurian garrison, the total number of troops now in the garrison is still under the limit established by the treaties and that this fact cannot, therefore, in any way be considered as having contributed to the seriousness of the international situation.

It would appear superfluous to repeat that the Japanese government cherishes no territorial ambitions with regard to Manchuria. What we desire is that Japanese subjects may be able to carry on their various occupations and thus have the opportunity to contribute to the development of those regions with their capital and their labor.

It is the duty of any government to protect the rights and interests legitimately enjoyed by the nation and by private persons. The efforts put forth by the Japanese government to safeguard the South Manchurian railway against untimely attacks should not be considered in any other light.

The Japanese government, loyal to the established policy, is ready to collaborate with the Chinese government in preventing the incident from developing into a disastrous situation between the two countries and in preparing constructive means whereby the causes of future dissension may once and for all be eliminated.

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyon NARS, Date June 1, 1976

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 1069 of October 2, 1931,
 from the Embassy at Rome.

Translation of memorandum in French submitted
to the Foreign Office by the Japanese
Embassy in Rome.

On the night of September 18 (10:30 p.m.), three or four hundred Chinese soldiers belonging to the Peitaying barracks (outside of the west gate of Mukden), under orders from their officers blew up a section of the main line of the South Manchurian railways and advanced in the direction of Liutiaokou (between Mukden and Peitaying). The Japanese railway garrison at Hushihtai (second station north of Mukden), which had been warned of the situation, was fired upon by these Chinese troops. This was the beginning of a skirmish between a company of Japanese troops and the Chinese troops.

After this skirmish and in view of the situation thereby created there was reason to fear that our troops at Mukden and its vicinities would be surrounded by the Chinese. Therefore the local military authority was forced to take prompt measures to eliminate the menace represented by the latter by proceeding to disarm them. To this end, early on the 19th the Japanese garrison of Mukden occupied the strategic points of Mukden itself and of Peitaying, for the purpose of maintaining safety therein.

At the same time, the Japanese troops scattered at Tiehling, Kaiye, Ssuping kai, and Liaoyang concentrated

at

-2-

at Mukden, leaving only very small guard corps in their garrisons. And the Commander of the Swantung Army left Port Arthur for Mukden, where he arrived at noon.

Subsequently, the situation growing serious throughout the entire Japanese railway zone since, against the 220,000 men which the Chinese had in the region, the railway guards were represented by a total detachment of only 10,400 men, it became also necessary to proceed to the disarmament of the Chinese posts located in the vicinity of the Japanese lines. Therefore in order to guard the railway and protect residents, measures had to be taken the same day, and the following day at Yingkow, Antung, Fenghuangcheng, and Penhsihu. However, the Japanese troops have not at any time interfered in the administration of the port customshouses of Antung and Yingkow. Furthermore, outside of the South Manchurian railway zone, the Japanese consular authorities have confined themselves to requesting effective protection of residents by the Chinese authorities.

Upon receiving information that there was serious danger from the Chinese at Kirin, on the 21st some Japanese troops were sent there from Changchun, returning to their garrison a few days later, leaving only a very small detachment in that city in view of the fact that the situation there had by that time become fairly quiet.

Therefore, it is only within the Japanese railway zone and nearby places that there are now Japanese troops, whose total number at the present moment amounts to 14,400 men, including the 4,000 soldiers sent as reinforcement

from

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from Korea (it is to be recalled that the treaties set 15,000 as the limit of troops which Japan may maintain in this zone).

As to the movements of the Japanese troops, rumors are current to the effect that Japan has occupied or intends to occupy the principal cities of Manchuria. These rumors are entirely unfounded. The truth is that, while the Japanese government is holding strictly to its policy of not permitting the incident to spread, the Japanese troops for their part are not advancing to the north of Kirin.

It is ridiculous to spread the report that the Japanese have occupied the offices of the Salt Gabelle or that the Japanese military authorities have sent troops toward Chientao (situated on the Korean frontier) and Harbin, or that other Japanese troops have occupied Tsingtao and Chefoo, or that a detachment of Japanese marines has been landed in Chinese territory.

In the cities of Mukden, Yingkow, Antung, and Changchun (which certain reports state are occupied by Japanese troops), as well as in the cities located along the South Manchurian railway and in Kirin, administration is in the hands of the Chinese authorities; and the Japanese garrisons are doing their best to help maintain order.

Beyond this limited intervention, there is no explanation for the rumors spread with regard to a military administration or occupation. Moreover, with the restored tranquility which is already foreseen, if no

further

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
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further steps are taken by the Chinese, this intervention is even now destined to cease, the Japanese military authorities having already received instructions to this effect.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter August 10, 1972

By Charles E. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976LA TRIBUNA, Rome.
September 22, 1931.

Despatch No. 1069.

L'occupazione di Mukden

La Manciuria è in conflitto col Giappone come due anni fa con la Russia sovietica.

Le operazioni militari possono ammettere definizioni occasionali, dettate da un qualche opportunismo diplomatico e giuridico, ma sono operazioni militari. Le quali possono anche assumere un singolare carattere, poichè nel conflitto i termini opposti sono scarsamente analogici. Da una parte ci sono unità organiche, fortemente dotate di mezzi, esperte dell'arte della guerra, come le giapponesi; e dall'altra, da parte cinese, questo non c'è.

Fu lo stesso due anni fa nel conflitto con la Russia, quando il governo sovietico si compiacque massimamente di poter fare, in confronto delle truppe mancesi, una affermazione tipicamente militarista, mettendo insieme unità bene armate.

Comunque sia, oggi, come due anni fa, le operazioni militari avvengono, presente e formalmente attiva la Società delle Nazioni, non ancora revocato il Patto Kellog che bandisce la guerra.

Ed è presumibile che oggi, come due anni fa, le operazioni militari avranno il risultato normale e automatico che hanno simili operazioni, quando si svolgono tra forze diverse, come sopra abbiamo accennato.

r. f. d.

Mentre a Ginevra si discute...

While discussions are going on
at Geneva

(Cina, Russia e Stati Uniti in allarme per l'occupazione giapponese della capitale della Manciuria).



IL GIAPPONE: - "Torno subito!.."
Japan: I'll be right back!

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 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

II TOWNS, Rome.
 September 21, 1931.

Despatch No. 1069.

Guerra in tempo di pace

I conflitti in Manciuria non sono nuovi, nè possono sorprendere. La Manciuria è, anzitutto, una regione incredibilmente ricca, dove si trova il ferro e il carbone, l'oro e il legname; ed è poi un grande mercato al quale i giapponesi, che vi hanno speso molto denaro, non sapranno mai rinunciare. Durante il conflitto mondiale, quando il Giappone sperava di poter conservare le posizioni prese ai tedeschi in Cina e lo Shantung, il conte Okuma, primo ministro, in un momento di euforia, dichiarò che la guerra era «l'ora, l'occasione attesa da mille anni!». Poi le cose presero una piega diversa: ma il Giappone ha sempre un occhio sulla Manciuria.

L'origine del conflitto attuale è dunque da ricercarsi un poco più in là dell'uccisione del capitano giapponese Nakamura. In queste regioni del nord della Cina i semi della discordia sono le ferrovie, necessarie al traffico delle merci e allo sfruttamento delle risorse del territorio. Due anni fa il conflitto russo-cinese fu dovuto alla ferrovia del nord; il conflitto odierno è nato intorno al «South-Mandchourian-Railway» che, da Mukden, è il prolungamento della ferrovia coreana dei giapponesi. Le ferrovie, in paesi di penetrazione commerciale, sono come un sistema nervoso; guai a toccarlo senza riguardi.

Così, siamo arrivati ad atti di guerra. Perché, contrariamente a quanto si fa dire, da alcune agenzie, ai circoli governativi americani — che, cioè, il conflitto cino-giapponese non può ancora esser considerato come una violazione del Patto Kellogg — l'occupazione di Mukden, gli scontri sanguinosi che l'hanno accompagnata, la mobilitazione generale in Corea, non possono esser chiamati che atti di guerra. Anche il conflitto russo-cinese, di due anni fa, non costituì violazione del Patto Kellogg; questo patto, una volta violato, non sarebbe più che un inutile straccio, ed è chiaro, dunque, che non gli convenga dichiararsi violato. Nondimeno, il cannone, le mitragliatrici, i fucili si son fatti sentire in Manciuria; e un po' di sangue è stato versato.

Il più divertente è che, poche ore prima del bombardamento e della occupazione di Mukden, si riuniva a Ginevra la Terza Commissione dell'Assemblea della S. d. N. per discutere il «progetto di convenzione generale per lo sviluppo dei mezzi di prevenzione della guerra». La Commissione adottava un nuovo testo del primo alinea dell'articolo secondo, così concepito: «Se, in circostanze che non creano, secondo il parere del Consiglio, lo stato di guerra fra le potenze in causa, le forze di una di queste potenze sono penetrate nel territorio o nelle acque territoriali dell'altra, o le sorvolano, il Consiglio può prescrivere le misure per assicurare l'evacuazione delle dette forze...».

Il Consiglio può prescrivere... Prescriverà? Potea, non volle; or che vorrà, non puote. Il Patto Kellogg già pare se ne sia lavate le mani; è cosa che non lo riguarda, non si sente violato. Finirà col lavarsene le mani anche Ginevra. Tanto, presto o tardi, tutto s'accomoda.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyman NARS, Date June 1, 1976

IL TEMPO, Rome.
 September 25, 1931.

Despatch No. 1069.

Una mano alla Cina nazionalista

Le ultime notizie dalla Cina, di fonte inglese, se non sono completamente rassicuranti quanto a una soluzione pacifica del conflitto, sono almeno interessanti per quel che riguarda l'evoluzione del nazionalismo cinese. Sono pochi quelli che credono alla fatale opera di consolidamento che le guerriglie, le rivoluzioni, le lotte di marescialli e di governi operano lentamente nella fermentante Cina. Pure si è visto sorgere un governo di Nanchino, e questo governo reggersi malgrado le lotte interne e le... informazioni delle agenzie. Pochi sanno bene discernere di qual colore sia questo governo, e quanto della famosa dottrina di Sun Yat Sen sia vivo nella politica odierna. Ma tutto questo ha ben poca importanza di fronte a un fatto certo: che è quello dell'esistenza d'un nazionalismo operante in Cina, d'un nazionalismo intransigente e, spesso, feroce.

Dicevamo che le ultime notizie sono interessanti rispetto all'evolversi del nazionalismo. Difatti, a parte le operazioni militari in Manciuria, le ripercussioni a Ginevra, gli umori sovietici e americani, c'è in primo piano la reazione del nazionalismo cinese contro l'invasione giapponese. Si parla d'una folla di centomila persone che a Nanchino dimostra e chiede la mobilitazione generale. Oratori eloquenti hanno rivendicato alla Cina ogni pollice quadrato della Manciuria. Bandiere a mezz'asta, nella città di Hong-Kong — che è poi da considerare come una città inglese — manifestano il lutto della Cina per l'occupazione di Mukden. E' stato osservato un minuto di silenzio. I luoghi di divertimento sono in parte chiusi. Si parla di boicottaggio dei pro-

dotti giapponesi. Infine — e questa è la manifestazione più importante — il capo del governo di Canton, Cien-Cia-Tong, avrebbe deciso di rappattumarsi col governo di Nanchino.

A questo punto si può ripetere quel che spesso fu scritto in queste colonne; cioè che l'unità, la fino a ieri inconcepibile unità politica del mondo cinese, la faranno, la fanno gli stranieri: in questo caso, i giapponesi.

I processi di unificazione si compiono in difesa di qualche cosa o contro qualcuno. Il miracolo d'una unificazione politica dei clans cinesi, d'un accordo fra gl'innumerabili marescialli, giovani e vecchi, che comandano in Cina, può esser provocato da imprese come questa giapponese. Ci vuol poco a far rifiammeggiare in Estremo Oriente la xenofobia, che è di casa in quelle plaghe. A una tal fiamma, si può saldare anche la più sconnessa intelaiatura, cioè la intelaiatura politica dell'attuale Cina.

Un proverbio cinese — che nella lingua originale suona come una scarica di mortaretti — dice presso a poco che il galantuomo non si fa soldato; e questo può spiegare le avventure dei marescialli e generali cinesi e delle loro bande. Ma ora pare che sotto la guida del governo di Nanchino i galantuomini diventino patrioti. Intanto è da notare questo sintomatico mutamento. La Cina era l'unico paese del mondo in cui il monarca non portasse armi indosso. Ora invece il capo dello stato è armato, anzi è un soldato di professione.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter

August 10, 1972

By *Charles E. Lyon Jr.*

NARS, Date

*June 1, 1976*CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan.
September 20, 1931.

Despatch No. 1069.

Panorama internazionale

Di solito gli avvenimenti esteri veramente interessanti si fanno attendere a lungo; trascorrono mesi nei quali non accade o sembra che non accada nulla: poi è una specie di finimondo. Se un accorto demiurgo della politica internazionale potesse graduare e distribuire con un po' di metodo quegli eventi, si procurerebbe la gratitudine più sincera dei giornali e del pubblico. Dopo una pausa non breve, vediamo oggi accumularsi un certo numero di fatti nuovi, ciascuno dei quali meriterebbe uno studio accurato, ed è suscettibile di accaparrarsi l'attenzione commossa dei popoli. La lira sterlina che non si può più convertire alla pari in oro, il Giappone che occupa Mukden, l'Assemblea della Società delle Nazioni che parla sul serio di disarmo, Laval che sta per andare a Berlino e a Washington; tutti questi — e ne abbiamo lasciati da parte dei buoni — sono fenomeni importanti che dimostrano al tempo stesso il disagio della situazione generale degli Stati e il desiderio di porvi in qualche modo un riparo: desiderio che, per quanto ostacolato da particolari egoismi e perciò in taluni casi rimasto allo stato puramente verbale, tende tuttavia ad affermarsi sempre più, accennando al momento fatale in cui diventerà forza travolgente e determinante l'azione collettiva di domani.

Quello che accade a Ginevra è sintomatico. Non ci eravamo dunque ingannati quando osservammo (e crediamo d'essere stati i primi) che la Conferenza per la riduzione degli armamenti era virtualmente incominciata dinanzi alla Società delle Nazioni. La proposta italiana per una tregua provvisoria ma immediata non poteva fare a meno di indurre i rappresentanti delle Potenze, grandi e piccole, a prendere posizione. Sotto questo aspetto il successo italiano è stato pieno e assoluto, non solo nel campo tattico, nel quale l'Italia non cerca piccole soddisfazioni passeggerie, ma nel campo morale al quale teniamo infinitamente di più. L'adesione d'un grandissimo numero di Paesi alla tesi onesta e veramente civile e societaria della Delegazione italiana è stata superiore ad ogni aspettativa; coloro stessi che per ragioni varie, se non tutte belle, hanno creduto di fare restrizioni, obiezioni, o cercare diversivi e scappatoie, hanno però questa volta dovuto riconoscere, esplicitamente o implicitamente, la bontà sostanziale della proposta dell'on. Grandi, sviluppata e difesa sul terreno tecnico con la consueta autorità dal generale De Marinis.

Più di questo non si poteva ottenere. Sarebbe stato ingenuo aspettarsi che la Francia accettasse cordialmente una tesi che mette in mora le sue costanti velleità egemoniche e disturba insieme con gli interessi politici dei suoi ceti dominanti quelli materiali dai suoi *maîtres des forges*. I Paesi che gravitano con regolarità newtoniana nell'orbita francese hanno naturalmente dato ai loro rappresentanti l'ordine di appoggiare le riserve del signor Massigli. Ci pare però che questa volta gli accenti di qualcuno di costoro siano stati meno convinti, meno calorosi. Essi s'accorgevano di parlare non solo contro il sentimento della maggioranza, ma contro lo spirito stesso dell'ambiente, contro le ragioni su cui si basa l'ordinamento ideale della Società delle Nazioni. Ci sono stati dei toni falsi nella voce di taluni di quei coristi, ed anche di ciò si debbono essere accorti a Parigi, dove si esagera nel voler ridurre il consenso ginevrino a semplice esponente decorativo dello *statu quo* militare imposto

rate prima di costringere tutto il mondo a entrare nella contesa. Ma è impossibile azzardare previsioni fino a che non si veda chiaro nei piani del Governo giapponese, cinti del più completo mistero. Quanto premiano su quello le correnti militariste, sempre forti nel Giappone e tonificate dall'influenza di un'aristocrazia eminentemente guerriera, è difficile dire, perchè uno dei caratteri della politica nipponica è il segreto di cui sa circondarsi, nonostante l'apparente pubblicità dei dibattiti dinanzi al Parlamento e nella stampa. Non si sa finora se il Giappone voglia solo riaffermare il suo prestigio sul continente asiatico entro limiti definiti, o se cerchi nella fiacchezza quasi generale delle altre Potenze una buona occasione per risolvere d'un colpo il problema della sua espansione economica e demografica. V'ha di buono che il dubbio dovrà essere chiarito presto, perchè nessun Paese oggi può restare nello stato di tensione che implica una situazione come quella in cui il Giappone s'è posto con la sua avanzata *brusquée* in Manciuria.

Un avvenimento del tutto idillico è

la prossima andata del Presidente del Consiglio francese a Berlino, preceduta dall'interessante scambio di messaggi fra il nuovo ambasciatore della Repubblica e il Maresciallo Hindenburg: esso deve quindi essere guardato con simpatia da tutti i sinceri amici della normalizzazione internazionale: peccato che il significato del prossimo incontro sia stato svalutato in gran parte dall'atteggiamento del Governo francese in materia di disarmo. La cortese iniziativa del signor Laval non apparirà più destinata a ristabilire buoni rapporti con la Nazione tedesca, sopra un piede di decorosa eguaglianza, ma sarà ridotta a semplice prammatica, oppure verrà interpretata come uno sforzo di sollevare le sorti del pericolante Gabinetto Brüning-Curtius, ultimo campione, forse, della democrazia tedesca al Governo. Dell'altro viaggio di Laval a Washington avremo tempo di riparlare. Sono i due crisi che sentono il bisogno di consultarsi, forse perchè temono di correre, a lungo andare, la non lieta avventura del loro antico predecessore asiatico. Metaforicamente, s'intende.

1275

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

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Ciò sarebbe tanto più desiderabile, in quanto ragioni obiettive di complicazioni non mancano.

La situazione in Estremo Oriente non è tranquillante. In altri tempi sarebbe bastato molto meno per generare negli ambienti diplomatici la più viva eccitazione. Oggi i nervi sono più ottusi, e d'altronde le deliberazioni estreme diventano sempre meno probabili per l'imponenza dei rischi che ne derivano: perciò nessuno vuol creare l'irreparabile, pure sfiorandolo qualche volta. Il Giappone lo sfiora certamente in questi giorni: la sua mossa è veramente pericolosa, non solo perchè suscita per la prima volta nella Cina una reazione nazionalista veemente e sincera, ma perchè provoca il Governo dei Sovieti a intervenire in una eventuale sistemazione della immensa regione manciuriana e mongolica. Né l'intervento russo potrebbe andare senza una partecipazione degli Stati Uniti, oggi in eccellenti relazioni con Mosca e atteggiandosi a protettori della Cina contro l'imperialismo nipponico. L'Inghilterra per ragioni opposte dovrebbe sostenere il Giappone; ma le condizioni finanziarie e politiche dell'Impero britannico gli tolgono molta facoltà di iniziativa. Fra tutto questo viluppo di elementi è da sperare che un accordo diretto avvenga fra Tokio e Nanchino: sarebbe loro interesse risolvere le loro vertenze ormai invete-

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Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By *Thomas S. Lyon* NARS, Date *June 1, 1976*

IL MESSAGGERO, Rome.
September 25, 1931.

Despatch No. 1069.

La Manciuria: pomo di discordia

Gli avvenimenti nell'Estremo Oriente hanno richiamato di nuovo l'attenzione dei lettori sulla Manciuria scarsamente conosciuta in Europa, più di nome che di fatto e solo per una serie di eventi a carattere guerresco che vi si svolgono da oltre venticinque anni. Dalla lotta contro i famosi boxers, nella quale hanno riaffermato le virtù della razza i battaglioni italiani comandati dal colonnello Garioni, a traverso la guerra russo-giapponese del 1904 e le vicende interminabili delle zuffe tra i nordisti e i sudisti cinesi siamo giunti all'odierna situazione risentendo sempre il nome della Manciuria, classico terreno di operazioni militari.

Pochi di noi si rendono conto dell'importanza effettiva di questo angolo nord-orientale dell'ex-Impero Celeste dalla superficie di poco inferiore a quella dell'Austria-Ungheria d'anteguerra (941.728 kmq.) popolato da 22.083.434 abitanti con una media di 23 individui per kmq. La Manciuria, già stato indipendente fino al 1600 si fuse quarant'anni dopo con la Cina formando un unico territorio dell'immenso impero governato dai dinasti di origine mancese stabiliti, in seguito alla guerra vittoriosa contro la dinastia cinese dei Ming, a Pechino sulla soglia tra la Cina e la Manciuria.

Tre secoli di vita comune trasformarono i mancesi in una casta di governo cinesizzata in seguito al tradizionale e lento assorbimento della cultura cinese esercitato più volte durante i numerosi secoli della storia cinese. Intorno al 1858, iniziata la marcia dell'Impero russo verso le zone estremo-orientali, la Manciuria vide intaccata la sua integrità senza che le condizioni interne potessero permettere una seria reazione per arginare la penetrazione moscovita accresciutasi specialmente dopo il 1896 ossia nell'epoca della prima costruzione ferroviaria incominciata dai russi sul suolo mancese.

Il disgregamento territoriale dell'integrità mancese proseguì rapidamente a traverso la moltiplicazione dei mezzi di comunicazione celeri specialmente nel periodo dal 1900 in poi. La colonizzazione militare lungo il corso dell'Ussuri e dell'Amur effettuata dai russi in previsione dei futuri conflitti con il Giappone e con la Cina e la costruzione della transiberiana che attraversa il suolo mancese su una lunghezza di 1200 km. accelerarono il processo della trasformazione radicale economica del paese dei manciù.

La guerra russo-giapponese nel 1904 svoltesi quasi interamente sul suolo mancese ha diminuito sostanzialmente il prestigio della razza bianca ritenuta invincibile dai popoli di colore nell'Estremo Est asiatico ed ha riaffermato il prestigio del Giappone assunto al ruolo di una grande potenza, consegnando quasi interamente nelle mani nipponiche le realizzazioni russe raggiunte sul suolo mancese.

La Manciuria, naturalmente divisa in due parti nettamente distinte, dovette subire le conseguenze del complicato giuoco internazionale nella zona: la parte nordica inclinata verso la conca dell'Amur altrimenti chiamato Kara-muren (4000 km. di lunghezza) è irrigata dal fiume Sunagri e dai suoi affluenti, mentre la parte meridionale, percorsa dalle acque di Liao-ho alimentato dall'affluente Sciara-muren, è orientata verso il golfo di Liao-tung. La prima, quasi interamente composta dalla provincia di Hei-lung-kiang, coperta da vaste foreste ben descritte in alcuni lavori del celebre scrittore polacco Ferdinando Antonio Ossendowski, è scarsamente popolata (circa 3 individui per kmq.) e quasi tutta la popolazione si raccoglie nella bella e ricca pianura del medio Sungari. Essa pende naturalmente verso le zone siberiane e quindi costituisce una logica zona di influenza russa.

La parte meridionale fertilissima e ben popolata fiancheggia la Corea che costituisce attualmente la provincia giapponese col nome di Ciosen e quindi è esposta all'influenza nipponica consolidata a traverso tutta una serie di vaste iniziative colonizzatrici che hanno apportato al miscuglio di sangue tartaromongolo-russo la particella nipponica.

La maggior parte della popolazione, come abbiamo detto si compone di meticcii sino-manciù, accanto ai mancesi puri ed ai cinesi propriamente detti provenienti dallo Scián-tung e dal Chihli specie tra i braccianti agricoli.

tracce del petrolio nella parte montagnosa del nord-mancese e, secondo ogni probabilità, la grande esplorazione scientifica del sottosuolo vagheggiata già da maresciallo Ciang-Tso-Lin ed effettuata parzialmente dal suo figlio attuale governatore, Ciang-Siu-Liang, potrà rivelare altre grandi ricchezze minerarie della terra dei guerrieri manciù.

La popolazione locale offre un eccellente campo di mano d'opera a buon mercato e con scarse esigenze alimentari: i meridionali si dedicano ai commerci ed in parte alle locali industrie, mentre i settentrionali infinitamente superiori ai primi dal punto di vista fisico, privi dello spirito di avventura, conservatori per eccellenza, tranquilli e lavoratori costituiscono l'elemento eminentemente agricolo e forniscono i migliori soldati della Manciuria.

Tutto questo complesso aggiunto al distacco geografico della zona dalla Cina propriamente detta ha determinato una particolare situazione, grazie alla quale — fino ad oggi — i maggiori competitori internazionali, il Giappone e la Russia, hanno contribuito alla valorizzazione della Manciuria. I russi hanno costruito la ferrovia Carbin-Pogranična (1212 km.) in prosecuzione successiva fino a Vladivostok e Carbin-Dalnji (attualmente Dairen) 941 km. con le diramazioni Tasci-kiau Ging-tseku (22 km.) e Nan-cuan-ling Porto Arthuro (48 km.) contribuendo al riallacciamento di Mukden con la capitale a Pechino. I giapponesi hanno costruito la linea Mukden-Antung estesa più tardi a traverso tutta la Corea.

L'esploatazione del suolo e del sottosuolo intrapresa dagli stranieri ha contribuito allo sviluppo dei maggiori centri come Mukden (già antichissima capitale della dinastia mancese), Kirin e Hei-lung-kiang presso il confine siberiano, dando un poderoso impulso alle industrie sussidiarie dell'agricoltura ed estrattive.

Fino a poco tempo fa il Giappone e la Russia Sovietica, svolgendo ambedue un'intensa politica di penetrazione economica e politica nelle rispettive zone adiacenti ai rispettivi territori, custodivano gelosamente l'equilibrio ottenuto mediante l'elaborazione di trattati a spese della Cina. Questo equilibrio oggi non esiste più, l'atto delle autorità militari ha spostato la bilancia a favore del Giappone, pur non intaccando direttamente gli interessi di Mosca nel campo economico e ledendo soltanto le possibilità politiche. Il linguaggio di Mosca si è fatto già sentire: esso ammonisce i governanti di Tokio di non far pendere di più la bilancia dalla parte del Giappone, altrimenti la formula elegante escogitata dalla mentalità nipponica che occupa i territori militarmente ma non si considera in istato di guerra potrebbe trasformarsi in una formula più aderente alla realtà.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)

Department of State letter

August 10, 1972

By *Charles E. Lyon*

NARS, Date

June 1, 1976

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La maggior ricchezza del suolo è rappresentata dal legname e dai prodotti agricoli, soprattutto dalle tre principali qualità di soya. I fagioli di soya coltivati nella Manciuria danno una resa di 15-20 quintali per ettaro (circa 20 kg. di semi per ettaro). Nonostante l'ingente consumo locale l'abbondanza del prodotto permette una vasta esportazione verso la Corea, il Giappone e la Cina meridionale che assicura l'introito medio di circa 300.000.000 di lire oro italiane all'anno per i soli fagioli gialli interi oppure ridotti in forma di farina commestibile.

L'esportazione dei panelli pressati rende in media 200.000.000 di lire oro all'anno, mentre l'olio estratto da questa qualità di soya (23 %) ed usato come commestibile, illuminante e lubrificante dà all'incirca 100.000.000 di lire oro. Inoltre vi crescono in abbondanza, specie nella zona meridionale, il riso, il grano, il sorgo, il granturco, il tabacco, il lino, la canapa, l'indaco, il cotone, la patata ecc.

Si può dire che la Manciuria rappresenta dal punto di vista di bisogni alimentari una delle più ricche zone di rifornimento, ma la sua vera importanza consiste anche nelle grandi ricchezze del sottosuolo scarsamente esplorato e più scarsamente sfruttato.

Tutta la zona lungo il corso del fiume Amur è ricchissima di giacimenti auriferi, mentre nella provincia di Kirin, per esempio, ci sono parecchie miniere di carbon fossile e di ferro. L'estrazione del carbone in certi punti della Manciuria centro-orientale è facilissima dati i giacimenti molto superficiali (per esempio nei dintorni del villaggio Ho-lin) oppure a Fuscium. Sono state trovate anche le


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FE

REF

FROM



NANKING

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated October 15, 1931

Rec'd 2:24 a. m.

793.94

Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY.

October 15, 10 a. m.

Arrived 14th, called upon Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and President Chiang. T. V. Soong and H. H. Kung present during latter call. All waiting word as to action of League. All ask:

One. What will be the attitude of United States toward proposal to invoke Nine Power Treaty should League fail to accomplish anything;

Two. Will United States take the initiative in invoking Nine Power Treaty? Can Department give me any reaction to these questions to use in conversations here?

I told President Chiang and later W. W. Yen that initiative had been taken when China appealed to the League. I said that United States had not by any means lost interest in the matter

Telegram to Nanking
Oct. 16, 1931
L. J. C.

793.94/2119

FILED
OCT 20 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons, Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- from Nanking, Oct.15,1931. 10 a.m.

in the matter but was cooperating in every way possible
with the League in the hope that action there might be
successful.

JOHNSON

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDERSECRETARY
October 16, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

(1) I think the last sentence of the first paragraph (page 2 line 7) adds nothing and suggests that we have a definite plan of settlement.

(2) In the last line do you want to say "direct negotiation"? Until the two parties are willing to talk with each other, with or without observers, the matter will never be settled. Japan will never agree to a settlement by a foreign commission and no such settlement would be carried out except with the help of foreign policing, which is unthinkable. I see no harm in letting the Chinese know that this is our opinion.

W.R.C.Jr.
(W. R. Castle Jr.)

1285

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles S. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 15, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

This telegram is intended to incorporate in a single message (a) the suggestion which you made to me through Mr. Klots this morning that we instruct Johnson to urge the Chinese to exercise self-restraint and (b) a sufficient reply to Johnson's request for guidance as made in the incoming telegram.

Skofvare
Approved
Castle
Johnson letter you to look
over this & make an
suggestion
H-15
 SKH/ZMF

1286

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence S. Lyons Jr. NARS, Date June 1, 1976

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

Department of State

Washington, 16
 October 15, 1931.

This cable was sent to the President.
 It should be carefully perused and before
 being communicated to anyone.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

NANKING (China).

93

Confidential for the Minister - for guidance
 Your ~~The Ambassador~~ October 15, 10 a.m. from Nanking. *SKH*
 2119

It is believed that the attitude of the American

Government toward this problem as a whole has been adequately indicated. It is difficult, if not impossible, to answer a question based on a hypothetical future condition which may or may not eventuate and with reference to a situation which is unfolding and constantly changing. The objective of the American Government is, first of all, to prevent the development of a situation in which it would be impossible to invoke any of the instruments which have been devised for settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. The Department has not taken sides in this controversy as between the disputants. The Department, in determining attitude and action, does not intend to be forced by either party into the role of policeman or prosecutor. Exercising its best judgment, it will take such steps as it feels are best calculated in view of the situation at any moment to meet the needs of the moment in relation to the objective referred to above. Its thought with regard to the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Powers Treaty

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/2119

1287

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Clarence E. Lyman NARS, Date June 4, 1976

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

- 2 -

Washington,

is indicated in the second paragraph of its communication to the Council of the League of Nations, text of which was communicated to the Consulate General at Nanking in Department's 88, October 13, 11 a.m., for the Minister. ²⁰⁶⁰ Its thought with regard to the course which should be pursued by it, as to action, at the present stage, is indicated in the same communication. ~~The Department feels that it would not be advisable for it at this moment to disclose further the possible steps which it has in mind.~~ ¹⁷⁵

^{should} You ~~may~~ say to your interlocutors that your Government feels that for the present the Chinese and the Japanese Governments should (a) first of all, continue to take every possible precaution against activities or the occurrence of incidents which are likely to aggravate the situation and (b) endeavor, with the aid of the Council of the League and in conformity with advice offered by the American Government, to arrive at an understanding which will make possible ^{direct} settlement by negotiation of their differences. ¹⁷⁵ You should stress both points.

Shinson

FE:SKH/ZMF

Enciphered by *SKH*

CE /
 Oct. 16, 1931. PM

Sent by operator M., 1931

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1925 1-128

1288

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
 Department of State letter August 10, 1972
 By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.



GENEVA

Dated October 15, 1931


Rec'd 8:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

VERY URGENT

201, October 15, 10 a. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.



793.94/2120

Should I take a seat on the Council in the Sino-Japanese dispute it might easily eventuate that the President of the Council would ask me to join the so-called Committee of Five. You will recall that this is not a formal committee of the Council but up to now has been made up of the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain whom the President of the Council has requested to assist him in his consideration of the question. Should I sit with this group it would of course be under precisely the same terms as my sitting at the Council table. The request might easily come to me in the form that the relationship between the present situation

and the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Charles A. Lyons NARS, Date June 1, 1976

REP

2- #201, from Geneva, Oct. 15, 1931,
10 a. m.

and the Pact of Paris was to be the subject for consideration.

I would appreciate your instructions as to what reply I should make to such an invitation should it be informally extended to me.

GILBERT

HPD

1290

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.3 (E) and 5 (D) or (E)
Department of State letter August 10, 1972
By Clarence S. Lyons NARS, Date June 4, 1976

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

October 15, 1931.

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

793.94

OCT 15 31

Ham

American Consul
Geneva (Switzerland)

VERY URGENT 93

Your 201, October 15, 10 a.m. 793.94/2120

I think the opening statement which you have been authorized to make at the meeting of the Council clearly defines the purpose of this Government as to your cooperation with the League. If, therefore, you are asked to sit with the Committee of Five I have no objection on the understanding that your participation concerns solely discussion of treaties to which the United States is a party. Our purpose is to cooperate with the efforts of the gentlemen now meeting in Geneva to secure peace in Manchuria by whatever method of conference is most appropriate.

793.94/2120

Spinson

Wdy

U WRC/LM

FE
SKH

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

MICROCOPY

970

ROLL

1

