

**NATIONAL  
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PUBLICATIONS**

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**NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS**

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS  
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 2

1930-39

739.94/2121-2340  
Oct. 1931



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

### INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.


## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.



EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 15, 1931

Mr. ~~Castler~~

Mr. Secretary:

Hereunder a copy of Colonel Margetts' (our Military Attaché at Peiping) report (after personal investigation on the spot) on the bombing of Chinchow; together with a memorandum in the course of which exhibited a statement by the Chinese representative at Geneva which throws the spotlight on the incident.

RECEIVED  
793.94/2121  
OCT 15 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

SKH/ZMF

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
M RECEIVED

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 15, 1931

Rec'd 2:30 a. m.



File  
E.G.C.

793.94/2121

FILED

OCT 20 1931

Legation's 767, October 14, 9 a. m.

Colonel Margetts has just handed me his report regarding Chinchow incident of which following is summary.

At about 2 p. m. October 8th, without any previous warning, twelve Japanese planes flew over the city of Chinchow at estimated altitude about 2,000 feet. They circled city once and then headed for radio station where they began dropping bombs. Flight continued over north-east suburbs and bombs were dropped in the vicinity of the Irish Presbyterian Mission Compound and the French Catholic Mission. Bombing was very promiscuous in the northeast city flight then continued toward railroad station and

University

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FVE

FROM

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 15, 1931

Rec'd 2:20 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



PRIORITY.

774, October 15, 9 a. m.

Legation's 767, October 14, 9 a. m.

Colonel Margetts has just handed me his report regarding Chinchow incident of which following is summary.

At about 2 p. m. October 8th, without any previous warning, twelve Japanese planes flew over the city of Chinchow at estimated altitude about 2,000 feet. They circled city once and then headed for radio station where they began dropping bombs. Flight continued over northeast suburbs and bombs were dropped in the vicinity of the Irish Presbyterian Mission Compound and the French Catholic Mission. Bombing was very promiscuous in the northeast city flight then continued toward railroad station and

University

793.94/2121

OCT 20 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #774, from Peiping, Oct. 15, 1931,  
9 a. m.

University of (?). Bombing continued for half an hour  
during which time between 30 and 36 bombs exploded.  
(END PART ONE).

For the Minister  
ENGERT

RR

HPD



## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 15, 1931

Rec'd 4:20 a.m.

DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY

774, October 15, 9 a.m. (PART TWO)

At the time of the raid there were in and about the city 2000 infantry troops and one regiment field artillery. No anti-aircraft artillery located in the vicinity. All witnesses emphatic in stating that no fire of any kind was directed against the airplanes.

Casualties were 16 killed 12 seriously wounded and about 30 slightly wounded. Of the wounded 3 have since died including a Russian professor. Only one soldier killed and 2 wounded, all others civilians including several women and children.

Property losses slight mostly broken windows and scarred walls as most bombs landed in open plots of ground, only 6 hitting residences. No bombs dropped within walls of the Chinese city.

(END PART TWO).

WWC

For the Minister

ENGERT

REP

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 15, 1931

Rec'd 4:20 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

774, October 15, 9 a. m. (PART THREE).

From fragments examined it is believed bombs weighed 40 or 50 pounds with very powerful explosive charge.

*254  
10-20-31*  
University buildings apparently principal objective *because they are* housing Provincial Government headquarters. Second objective was probably military camp about three miles from the center of town where twelve bombs burst but caused little damage.

Although the raiders may have had a military mission evidently little attention was given to modern conventions of ordinary *humanity* ~~war measures~~ or protection of personal property. It was mere accident that two foreign missions and the railroad hospital which flew two Red Cross flags were not directly hit by bomb. Bursts were so close to them that fragments were found in all three compounds.

Full particulars with photographs by mail.  
(END MESSAGE).

For the Minister  
ENGERT

KLP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED  
CORRECTED COPY

AM

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 15, 1931

Rec'd 2:20 a.m.

793.94/2121  
Secretary of State, Division of  
Washington. FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

PRIORITY.

774, October 15, 9 a.m.

Legation's 767, October 14, 9 a.m. /2095

Colonel Margetts has just handed me his report  
regarding Chinchow incident of which following is summary.

At about 2 p.m. October 8th, without any previous  
warning, twelve Japanese planes flew over the city of  
Chinchow at estimated altitude about 2,000 feet. They  
circled city once and then headed for radio station where  
they began dropping bombs. Flight continued over north-  
east suburbs and bombs were dropped in the vicinity of  
the Irish Presbyterian Mission Compound and the French  
Catholic Mission. Bombing was very promiscuous in the  
northeast city. Flight then continued toward railroad  
station and University of Communications. Bombing  
continued for half an hour during which time between 30  
and 36 bombs exploded. (END PART ONE).

For the Minister

RR

ENGERT

HPD

793.94/2121

FILED

OCT 21 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

file THE  
e.g.c.

793.94  
Conversation.

October 2, 1931.



Colonel Manton Davis, Counsel,  
Radio Corporation of America.

Mr. Hornbeck.

Colonel Davis called me from New York by telephone. He said that the Radio Corporation is informed by its agent in Shanghai that the Chinese Government radio station at Mukden has been examined by a representative of the Radio Corporation and is found to be in such condition that, with a few hours work it could be prepared again to operate; and that the Japanese are contemplating reopening it under Japanese operation. He said that the Japanese have demanded that they be given a copy of the contract concluded and in effect between the Chinese authorities and the Radio Corporation. (Note: A statement to this effect appeared in the news despatches this morning.)

Colonel Davis asked for advice with regard to complying with the Japanese demand for a copy of the contract. He said that he felt that compliance or non-compliance involved considerations of state. I said that it might be assumed that there were at least two questions involved first, was there any reason on the part of the Radio

Corporation,

793.94/2122

891.1.130  
OCT 11 1931

- 2 -

Corporation, on the basis of the contract, which would cause the Corporation to desire that the text be not known to the Japanese; second, from point of view of policy, the question would arise whether it is expedient to comply. Colonel Davis said that there was no objection to the text being made known to the Japanese, but he indicated his view that the Japanese had no right to demand that a text be given them.

After some discussion, it was decided that the Radio Corporation should instruct its Shanghai agent to send to the American Consul General at Mukden a copy of the contract, so that a copy might be in the Consul General's hands for disposal in accordance with instructions as and when given.

793.94/196<sup>3A</sup> It happens that the Department had at an earlier hour this morning telegraphed to Mukden asking for a report on the present condition and status of the radio station.

793.94/196<sup>7</sup> It may be expected that the Department will be informed probably along the lines of the statement made by Colonel Davis as recorded above. If we are informed that the Japanese intend to operate this station (Chinese-owned) and that they have demanded a copy of the contract, it will be necessary to decide (a) whether the Department will authorize the Consul General to communicate to them <sup>Japanese</sup> a copy of the contract and (b) what attitude the Department will take on the question of retention of control and assumption of operating functions in relation to this station by the Japanese.

SKH/ZMF

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FE

REP

FROM

PLAIN

Wanking via N. R.

Dated October 14, 1931

Rec'd October 15, 1931  
10 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



Reg.C

Information American Legation, Peiping.

Number 85, October 14, 4 p. m.

Following is Foreign Office copy of Chinese memorandum

in reply to Japanese memorandum of October ninth with  
reference to the memorandum of the Japanese Government of  
the ninth instant.

"The Chinese Government has the honor to make the  
following observations: in defiance of international law  
and in violation of the provisions of the Convention of  
the League of Nations as well as the peace Pact of Paris  
and the Nine Power Treaty signed at Washington, Japan has  
suddenly and without provocation invaded and occupied por-  
tions of the Chinese provinces of Liaoing and Kirin, over-  
turned the lawful provincial and district administrations  
and in the course of the invasion committed many acts of war  
and others

793.94/2123

REP

2- #85, from Nanking, Oct. 14, 1931,  
4 p.m.

and others not permitted by international law, even in war, such as the killing of innocent civilians and the bombardment of fortified towns, the bombing of passenger trains, and the removal and seizure of public and private property, et cetera. China and Japan being both bound by the above mentioned international agreements imposing on the signatories the obligation to seek for the peaceful settlement of all disputes, China at once appealed to the Council of the League of Nations. The Council called upon the Japanese Government to give orders for immediate withdrawal of their troops from the areas occupied since September eighteenth and decided to accept the solemn pledge given by Japan to comply with its request fixing its further meeting for October fourteenth, should by that time the pledge remain unfilled. The Chinese Government refrained from the very beginning from any and every act of hostility going to the length of strictly ordering all the military forces not to offer resistance in whatever form to the continuous advance of the Japanese troops and in spite of provocative actions increasing every day intensely and embracing

REP

3- #85, from Nanking, Oct. 14, 1931,  
4 p. m.

and embracing over wider areas. At the same time the strictest discipline was imposed for the nation for the protection in every way of the lives and property of Japanese residents within Chinese territory under Chinese administration and the fact that no untoward incident has occurred anywhere in the vast area under Chinese jurisdiction proves conclusively that the undertaking given by the Chinese Government to the Council of the League of Nations is being observed most scrupulously. Repeated Government orders and proclamations have been confined. The righteous indignation of our people within lawful bounds and the mandate of the Chinese Government issued on October seventh ordering all local authorities to give full protection to foreign nationals and to prevent undesirable elements from taking advantage of the situation by inciting any unlawful actions further strengthened government injunctions just at the time when it became only too obvious that the Japanese Government was not fulfilling its pledge of withdrawal. Acting upon the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations the

Chinese



REP

4- #85, from Nanking, October 14, 1931,  
4 p. m.

(appealed?)

Chinese Government has opposed to this official to take over the places to be evacuated and duly notified the Japanese Government and the Council to that effect but the Japanese Government has not yet carried out its declared intention to hand over the places under their occupation to the Chinese authorities as is shown by the report of a neutral observer. Such places as Shenyang, Kirin, Tunhua, Chuliuh, Hinmin, Tienchangtai are all under the control of the Japanese troops. Meanwhile these troops keep on killing and wounding innocent citizens and destroying property without the slightest justification. It must therefore be a matter of surprise to the world that popular indignation in China has limited itself to the mere refusal to purchase Japanese goods. The freedom to choose on purchases is an individual right with which no government interferes and while it is the duty of every government to protect foreign nationals it is bound neither by any recognized standard of government nor by any principal of international law to prohibit and punish the exercise of an elementary right of citizenship. If there be responsibility at all in the matter it entirely lies with the

Japanese

REP

5- #85, from Nanking, Oct. 14, 1931,  
4 p. m.

Japanese Government which has by many acts of unfriendliness since the Wanpaosaaan incident created the general prejudice against Japanese merchandise. While the Chinese Government is observing with the greatest scrupulousness the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations by adopting special measures for the protection of Japanese lives and property and by refraining from all acts tending to aggravate the situation with the result as already stated that no untoward incidents have happened to any Japanese subject the Japanese military have continued their aggressive actions in the northeastern provinces which have culminated in the recent air raid attack on Chinese where the Provincial civil authorities of Liaoning have established their provisional offices since the occupation of the Shenyang and its capture. This act of war as the Japanese Government is aware has led the Council of the League of Nations to decide to meet earlier than on the date originally fixed. The Chinese Government notes with satisfaction the reference made by the Japanese Government to the responsibility of both countries to the League of Nations but desires to point out that it is Japan that has committed during the past ten days the various acts which have so aggravated the situation that the resolution of the Council of the League

REP

6- #85, from Nanking, Oct. 14, 1931,  
4 p. m.

of the League of Nations has failed to be carried out for which the Chinese Government cannot be held responsible. The Chinese Government will continue to exert its best to protect the lives and property of Japanese subjects although in the face of the greatest difficulty due to the unceasing aggressive acts on the part of the Japanese troops and will hold the Japanese Government responsible for any unfortunate consequences resulting from the continued employment of military force by Japan as an instrument of her national policy especially in view of the fact that both Governments have presented their cases before the Council of the League of Nations which has prescribed a course of action for the two countries to follow. Firmly believing that the present lack of understanding and the difficulties in the commercial intercourse between the Chinese and the Japanese people are the inevitable outcome of the numerous unlawful acts of the Japanese troops the Chinese Government is confident that should the Japanese Government exert itself to remove the causes that have brought about the present deplorable situation gratifying results will be secured in the improvement of the relations between the two countries and the maintenance

REP

7- #85, from Nanking, Oct. 14, 1931,  
4 p. m.

maintenance of world peace.

Nanking, October thirteenth, nineteen thirty one".

PECK

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 17 1931

DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

REP

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 15, 1931

Rec'd 10 a. m.

*The Telegram to  
No. 381, 1931.  
Peiping  
October 15, 1931*

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



October 15, 2 p. m.

*793.94/2096*

Will the Department kindly authorize per diem for  
myself, Powell and Murray while absent from Peiping.

JOHNSON

KLP

*793.94  
note  
124.934*

*FE  
LFA  
FIE*


793.94/2124

OCT 17 1931  
FILED

COPIES SENT TO  
C.N.I. AND M.I.D. *AE*

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP



FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 15, 1931

Rec'd 5:20 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



*file  
egc*

775, October 16, 10 a. m.

Following from Consul General at Hankow, October 14,  
noon, and October 14, 5 p. m., combined.

One. Boycott of Japanese goods at Hankow is increasingly  
effective.

Two. I am informed that practically all Japanese in  
Chungking are staying on steamers to sail down river upon  
very short notice.

Three. There is much speculation here over rumors  
that the Chinese capital will be temporarily moved from  
Nanking to Loyang in the event of a military move by  
Japan.

Four. While the Japanese not likely remain in Kiukiang,  
/ Changsha, Shasi, Ichang and Chungking are in readiness to  
evacuate

*793.94  
note  
693.9412*

793.94/2125

FILED

OCT 20 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #775, from Peiping, Oct. 15, 1931.  
10 a. m.

evacuate on short notice. No preparations for Japanese  
evacuation at Hankow are known. The Japanese concession  
is barricaded and in state of defense.

Nanking informed.

For the Minister

ENGERT

KLP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

REP

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated October 15, 1931

Rec'd 10:17 a. m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 15 1931

Secretary of State

Washington

October 15, 1 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"In an interview this week between a member of the staff of this Consulate General with Wu Tieh Chen, Nanking representative to Mukden, the following interesting observations were made by him: General Wu stated that so far as the Canton situation <sup>went</sup> ~~were~~ nothing definite had yet been decided and would not be decided until the Canton delegates had had a conference in Shanghai. That all leaders realized that they could not get along without Chiang Kai Shek.

Regarding the Japanese situation, Wu stated that China would not declare war on Japan under any circumstances but would resist the Japanese by force if they attempted to land marines or troops anywhere south of the wall;

793.94/2126

FILED

OCT 20 1931

793.94  
note  
843.00



REP

2- from Shanghai, Oct. 15, 1931,  
1 p. m.

the wall; he stated that the Nanking Government was depending on the League to force the Japanese to withdraw from Manchuria.

Regarding the situation in the north, General Wu stated that it was a fact as alleged by the Japanese that the Mukden militarists had looted the country for some years past through an official organization as purchasing soya beans paying for same in worthless Fengpiao notes. He also stated that the system of absentee landlordism by which Mukden officials kept the peasants in a virtual state of serfdom was a vicious one and tended to pauperize the tenants. This uneconomic policy he had pointed out many times to Chang Hsueh Liang.

In connection with the maintenance of Chang Hsueh Liang's troops south of the wall, also the Shansi troops, he remarked that the Nanking Government would attempt to take care of them financially during the present crisis."

CUNNINGHAM

CSB


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State



This cable was sent in confidential Code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.

Washington,

October 14, 1931.

OCT 14 31

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

793.94/A  
92.  
The following information has been received from  
various points in China, through official channels but  
~~not~~ <sup>only in part</sup> from our official sources:

(GRAY) One. An observer reports from Mukden that the  
destruction of the former civil government of Manchuria  
was effectively accomplished and the establishment of a  
government recognizing the authority of Marshal Chang  
or Nanking was prohibited.

Two. A report from Tientsin states that there is  
now apparently more local concern both among Chinese  
and Japanese, as well as among foreigners, over possible  
eventualities than there has been at any time since the  
Mukden occupation. Barbed wire entanglements and sand  
bags have been placed near junction points of the Chinese  
city and Japanese concession but the concession has not  
been closed.

Three. A report from Shanghai states that the mayor  
of that city appears to be giving himself concern only

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

with

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

793.94/2126A

102  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
\$

## TELEGRAM SENT

### Department of State

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

with regard to the local situation; that he states that he is doing his utmost to preserve peace and order and to curb the anti-Japanese activities but that, if any attempt were made to occupy Chinese territory such as, for example, the arsenal, the Chinese would use force to prevent this.

Four. Department does not vouch for the above and it is not to be referred to as to channel or source.

Stinson  
SKH


FE:REM:EJL FE

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1966 1-128



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



October 3, 1931.

793.94/1963A

793.94/1979A

In considering this draft, please see the outgoing telegram, the memorandum of conversation with Colonel Davis of the Radio Corporation, and the incoming telegram (Mukden, October 3,) attached hereunder. 793-94/1967

It is the estimate of this Division that the Japanese are holding this radio station with the expectation, or at least hope, that they will be able to keep possession of it under the terms of the contemplated final settlement. It is our feeling that this Government should not lend assistance to that plan either by acquiescing in their present holding of the station or by any act (such as supplying them with a copy of the contract between the Chinese Government and the Radio Corporation) which would imply a <sup>conception</sup> ~~concession~~ on our part that they have a right to make such a demand.

It is important to get the station opened, but it would be better to leave it closed than to lend our aid to any project for its retention by the Japanese administrative authorities in Manchuria, - for the reason that, first, it is Chinese property and, second, ~~that~~ such retention would mean that all channels of communication with Mukden become Japanese channels.

SKH:EJL

*St. H. E. J. L.*

793.94/2127

FILED

OCT 19 1931

note  
793-94  
we have no proof  
of this but it is from  
the and in any case  
I support the cable.  
why

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 10, 1931.

S.

Mr. Secretary: OCT 10 1931

The Secretary of the Interior forwards to you a telegram received by him from Mr. David Yui on the subject of the China situation.

Mr. Yui is the General Secretary of the National Committee of the Y.M.C.A. in China. He was a co-delegate to the Washington Conference and is one of the most prominent private citizens in China.

For your convenient reference, FE has had the telegram copied.

RECEIVED

OCT 10 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

SKH/ZMF



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR  
WASHINGTON

October 8, 1931.

RECEIVED

OCT 8 - 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE



*FE*  
*Ack'd*  
*October 12 1931*

*793.94/2128*

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am in receipt of the attached cablegram from an old friend, David Z. T. Yui, of Shanghai, who was the leader of the Chinese delegation at the Institute of Pacific Relations during the sessions when I was its Chairman. He has been very close to the Nanking government. If you see any way in which I can be helpful, please let me know.

Will you be kind enough to present the message to the President.

Very sincerely yours,

*Rogers*

Hon. Henry L. Stimson,  
Secretary of State.

FILED

OCT 16 1931

RECEIVED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D)  
*Interior letter No. 3, 1912*  
*ju* *3/19/73*

Inclosure.

COPY: EJJ

*Copy of enclosure is  
with Secretary Wilbur  
letter of October 4, 1931*

COPY

POSTAL TELEGRAPH

1931 Oct. 8 AM 2 06

B19 192 CABLE  
Shanghai 7 800P

NLT WILBUR

INTERIOR WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUOUS JAPANESE AGGRESSION MANCHURIA AND  
BEGINNING JAPANESE MILITARY DEMONSTRATION SHANGHAI AND  
YANGTSE VALLEY ARE DRIVING DEFENSELESS CHINA AND INNOCENT  
CHINESE PEOPLE STEADILY IN FOLLOWING PSYCHOLOGY HONORABLE  
DEATH THAN PERISH IN DISGRACE AND UNDER WANTON CRUELTY AT  
NO TIME WERE CHINESE WORSE DISAPPOINTED THAN NOW BY ATTITUDE  
OF. UNCERTAINTY AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE STOP STILL  
CHINESE PEOPLE ARE STAKING EVERYTHING ON AMERICAN AND LEAGUE  
FRIENDSHIP FOR REAL HELP AT THIS MOMENT OF UNPRECEDENTED  
NATIONAL PERIL STOP MAY WE APPEAL THROUGH YOU TO PRESIDENT  
HOOVER AND AMERICAN PEOPLE EITHER TAKE INDEPENDENT ACTION  
ALONG LINES OF OPEN DOOR POLICY WASHINGTON CONFERENCE TREATY  
AND KELLOGG PEACE PACT OR IF IT SEEMS MORE EFFECTIVE SUPPORT  
LEAGUE TO INSIST UPON AND SUPERVISE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL  
JAPANESE TROOPS FROM MANCHURIA AND ELSEWHERE IN CHINA AND  
APPROVE COMMISSION ASSIST SINO JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS LATER  
IN EITHER CASE TO GIVE EARLY SUPPORT NANKING GOVERNMENT SO  
HELP PREVENT ITS DOWNFALL AND SUBSTITUTION BY COMMUNIST REGIME  
ALSO IMPERATIVE AMERICA SUPPORT SHIDEHARA AND CIVIL ADMINIS-  
TRATION HELP PLACE JAPANESE MILITARISTS UNDER CONTROL STOP  
PLEASE REPEAT THIS MESSAGE TO HOOVER STIMSON HORNBECK  
ALEXANDER MOTT AND SHOTWELL. (sgd.) DAVID Z T YUI

COPY: EJJL

COPY

POSTAL TELEGRAPH

1931 Oct. 8 AM 2 06

B19 192 CABLE  
Shanghai 7 800P

NLT WILBUR

INTERIOR WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUOUS JAPANESE AGGRESSION MANCHURIA AND  
BEGINNING JAPANESE MILITARY DEMONSTRATION SHANGHAI AND  
YANGTSE VALLEY ARE DRIVING DEFENSELESS CHINA AND INNOCENT  
CHINESE PEOPLE STEADILY IN FOLLOWING PSYCHOLOGY HONORABLE  
DEATH THAN PERISH IN DISGRACE AND UNDER WANTON CRUELTY AT  
NO TIME WERE CHINESE WORSE DISAPPOINTED THAN NOW BY ATTITUDE  
OF. UNCERTAINTY AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE STOP STILL  
CHINESE PEOPLE ARE STAKING EVERYTHING ON AMERICAN AND LEAGUE  
FRIENDSHIP FOR REAL HELP AT THIS MOMENT OF UNPRECEDENTED  
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AND KELLOGG PEACE PACT OR IF IT SEEMS MORE EFFECTIVE SUPPORT  
LEAGUE TO INSIST UPON AND SUPERVISE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL  
JAPANESE TROOPS FROM MANCHURIA AND ELSEWHERE IN CHINA AND  
APPROVE COMMISSION ASSIST SINO JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS LATER  
IN EITHER CASE TO GIVE EARLY SUPPORT NANKING GOVERNMENT SO  
HELP PREVENT ITS DOWNFALL AND SUBSTITUTION BY COMMUNIST REGIME  
ALSO IMPERATIVE AMERICA SUPPORT SHIDEHARA AND CIVIL ADMINIS-  
TRATION HELP PLACE JAPANESE MILITARISTS UNDER CONTROL STOP  
PLEASE REPEAT THIS MESSAGE TO HOOVER STIMSON HORNBECK  
ALEXANDER MOTT AND SHOTWELL. (sgd.) DAVID Z T YUI



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# Postal Telegraph

RECEIVED AT  
INTERIOR DEPT. BLDG.  
NORTHWEST WING  
TELEPHONE NATIONAL 8800  
STANDARD TIME  
INDICATED ON THIS MESSAGE



ALL AMERICAN  
CABLES

COMMERCIAL  
CABLES

This is a full rate Telegram or Cablegram unless otherwise indicated by signal in the check or in the address.

|     |                       |
|-----|-----------------------|
| DL  | DAY LETTER            |
| NL  | NIGHT LETTER          |
| NM  | NIGHT MESSAGE         |
| LOC | DEFERRED CABLE        |
| NLT | NIGHT CABLE LETTER    |
| WLT | WEEK END CABLE LETTER |

B19 192 CABLE

SHANGHAI 7 800P

NLT WILBUR

INTERIOR WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUOUS JAPANESE AGGRESSION MANCHURIA AND  
BEGINNING JAPANESE MILITARY DEMONSTRATION SHANGHAI AND YANGTSE  
VALLEY ARE DRIVING DEFENSELESS CHINA AND INNOCENT CHINESE PEOPLE  
STEADILY IN FOLLOWING PSYCHOLOGY HONORABLE DEATH THAN PERISH IN  
DISGRACE AND UNDER WANTON CRUELTY AT NO TIME WERE CHINESE WORSE  
DISAPPOINTED THAN NOW BY ATTITUDE OF.

1931 OCT 8 AM 2 06

INTERIOR DEPT. BLDG.  
NORTHWEST WING  
TELEPHONE NATIONAL 8800 BR. 12

INTERIOR DEPT. BLDG.  
NORTHWEST WING  
TELEPHONE NATIONAL 8800 BR. 12

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED AT

52  
71  
123

STANDARD TIME  
INDICATED ON THIS MESSAGE

# Postal Telegraph

THE MERRY SYSTEM



ALL AMERICA  
CABLES

COMMERCIAL  
CABLES

This is a full rate Telegram or Cablegram unless otherwise indicated by signal in the check or in the address.

|     |                       |
|-----|-----------------------|
| DL  | DAY LETTER            |
| NL  | NIGHT LETTER          |
| NM  | NIGHT MESSAGE         |
| LCO | DEFERRED CABLE        |
| NLT | NIGHT CABLE LETTER    |
| WLT | WEEK END CABLE LETTER |

1931 OCT 8 AM 2 06

CB19/2/ SHANGHAI WILBUT WASHINGTON  
UNCERTAINTY AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE STOP STILL CHINESE  
PEOPLE ARE STAKING EVERYTHING ON AMERICAN AND LEAGUE  
FRIENDSHIP FOR REAL HELP AT THIS MOMENT OF UNPRECEDENTED  
NATIONAL PERIL STOP MAY WE APPEAL THROUGH YOU TO PRESIDENT  
HOOVER AND AMERICAN PEOPLE EITHER TAKE INDEPENDENT ACTION  
ALONG LINES OF OPEN DOOR POLICY WASHINGTON CONFERENCE TREATY  
AND KELLOGG PEACE PACT OR IF IT SEEMS MORE EFFECTIVE SUPPORT  
LEAGUE TO INSIST UPON AND SUPERVISE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL.

INTERIOR DEPT. BLDG.  
NORTHWEST WING  
TELEPHONE NATIONAL 6800 BR. 18

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# Postal Telegraph

THE MORMON SYSTEM



ALL AMERICA  
CABLES

COMMERCIAL  
CABLES

RECEIVED AT

RECEIVED AT

STANDARD TIME  
INDICATED ON THIS MESSAGE

This is a full rate Telegram or Cablegram unless otherwise indicated by signal in the check or in the address.

|     |                       |
|-----|-----------------------|
| DL  | DAY LETTER            |
| NL  | NIGHT LETTER          |
| NM  | NIGHT MESSAGE         |
| LCO | DEFERRED CABLE        |
| NLT | NIGHT CABLE LETTER    |
| WLT | WEEK END CABLE LETTER |

CB19/3/ SHANGHAI WILBUR WASHINGTON

1931 OCT 8 AM 2 06

JAPANESE TROOPS FROM MANCHURIA AND ELSEWHERE IN CHINA AND  
APPROVE COMMISSION ASSIST SINO JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS LATER  
IN EITHER CASE TO GIVE EARLY SUPPORT NANKING GOVERNMENT SO HELP PREVENT  
ITS DOWNFALL AND SUBSTITUTION BY COMMUNIST REGIME ALSO IMPERATIVE  
AMERICA SUPPORT SHIDEHARA AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION HELP PLACE  
JAPANESE MILITARISTS UNDER CONTROL STOP PLEASE REPEAT [AT OUR EXPENSE]  
THIS MESSAGE TO HOOVER STIMSON HORNBECK ALEXANDER MOTT AND  
SHOTWELL

DAVID Z T YUI.


INTERIOR DEPT. BLDG.  
NORTHWEST WING  
TELEPHONE NATIONAL 6800 BR. 19

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR  
WASHINGTON

October 8, 1931.



Dear Mr. Hornbeck:

I am inclosing copy of a cablegram just received from  
David Z. T. Yui, which is self-explanatory. I have com-  
municated with the Secretary of State.

Very sincerely yours,

*Raymond M. Helmer*

Mr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Inc.

FILED

OCT 17 1931

October 12 1931  
F.W. 793.94/2128

COPY

POSTAL TELEGRAPH

1931 Oct. 8 AM 2 06

RI9 192 CABLE  
Shanghai 7 800P

NLT WILBUR

INTERIOR WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUOUS JAPANESE AGGRESSION MANCHURIA AND BEGINNING  
JAPANESE MILITARY DEMONSTRATION SHANGHAI AND YANGTSE VALLEY ARE  
DRIVING DEFENSELESS CHINA AND INNOCENT CHINESE PEOPLE STEADILY IN  
FOLLOWING PSYCHOLOGY HONORABLE DEATH THAN PERISH IN DISGRACE AND UNDER  
WANTON CRUELTY AT NO TIME WERE CHINESE WORSE DISAPPOINTED THAN NOW BY  
ATTITUDE OF. UNCERTAINTY AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE STOP STILL  
CHINESE PEOPLE ARE STAKING EVERYTHING ON AMERICAN AND LEAGUE FRIENDSHIP  
FOR REAL HELP AT THIS MOMENT OF UNPRECEDENTED NATIONAL PERIL STOP MAY  
WE APPEAL THROUGH YOU TO PRESIDENT HOOVER AND AMERICAN PEOPLE EITHER  
TAKE INDEPENDENT ACTION ALONG LINES OF OPEN DOOR POLICY WASHINGTON  
CONFERENCE TREATY AND KELLOGG PEACE PACT OR IF IT SEEMS MORE EFFECTIVE  
SUPPORT LEAGUE TO INSIST UPON AND SUPERVISE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL, JAPANESE  
TROOPS FROM MANCHURIA AND ELSEWHERE IN CHINA AND APPROVE COMMISSION ASSIST  
SINO JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS LATER IN EITHER CASE TO GIVE EARLY SUPPORT  
NANKING GOVERNMENT SO HELP PREVENT ITS DOWNFALL AND SUBSTITUTION BY  
COMMUNIST REGIME ALSO IMPERATIVE AMERICA SUPPORT SHIDEHARA AND CIVIL  
ADMINISTRATION HELP PLACE JAPANESE MILITARISTS UNDER CONTROL STOP PLEASE  
REPEAT THIS MESSAGE TO HOOVER STIMSON HORNBECK ALEXANDER MOTT AND SHOTWELL.

(sgd.) DAVID Z T YUI

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 12 1931.

In reply refer to  
FE

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your  
letter of October 8, with which you enclosed a  
cablegram from Mr. David Z. T. Yui, of Shanghai, relat-  
ing to the situation in China.

The situation to which you refer is, as you know,  
being given my most solicitous attention.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

The Honorable

Ray Lyman Wilbur,

Secretary of the Interior.


Wk

RM  
FE:RSM:EJL

FE  
614

OK  
Oct. 12/1931.

MM



793.94/2128

103  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DCR


October 12, 1931.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Please let me thank you for your letter of  
October 8, 1931, enclosing a copy of a cablegram  
which you had just received from David Z. T. Yui  
relating to the situation in China.

This situation is being given solicitous atten-  
tion and every communication with regard to it is  
being studied with care.


Yours sincerely,



The Honorable

Ray Lyman Wilbur,

Secretary of the Interior.




✓  
C. W. B. W.  
1931. PV.

FE:SKH/ZMF

F.W. 793.94/2128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



CONFIDENTIAL



My dear Mr. Secretary:

Referring to my letter of the 8th instant, I am  
inclosing another cablegram just received from David  
Z. T. Yui, which is self-explanatory.

Very sincerely yours,

*Rafaela Hilborn*

F.W.

793.94/2128

Hon. Henry L. Stimson,  
Secretary of State.

✓ Inc.

FILED

OCT 24 1931



1036  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Dunstons NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy of Western Union telegram.

WE40 RCA-F Shanghai 244 10 1101P 1/51

1931 Oct. 19 PM 12 34

LCD Wilbur,  
Interior, Washington, D. C.

GREAT SATISFACTION HOPE RIGHT WILL TRIUMPH OVER MIGHT AS LEAGUES STRONG POSITION NOW BEING HEARTILY SUPPORTED BY AMERICAN PARTICIPATION JAPANESE MILITARISTS REFUSE WITHDRAWAL TROOPS UNLESS CHINA GUARANTEES PROTECTION THEIR SATISFACTION MEANWHILE THEY MAKE IMPOSSIBLE THIS PROTECTION BY BOMBARDING CHINCHOW PREVENTING RE-ESTABLISHMENT CHINESE AUTHORITY MANCHURIA INTERFERING CHINESE RAILWAYS CENSORING MAILS TELEGRAPHS PARALYZING CHINESE INDUSTRY BOMBING TRAINS ARMING RESTIVE MONGOLS INCREASING BANDITRY INSTIGATING AND SUPPORTING INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS LEADING CHINESE RESIDENTS MANCHURIA LIVING UNDER OPPRESSION ESPIONAGE PERSECUTION SIMILAR BELGIUM BEGINNING WORLD WAR THIS VICIOUS CIRCLE RESULTS PROLONGING AND INCREASING JAPANESE MILITARY AGGRESSION MANCHURIA AND MORE PROVOCATIVE MILITARY DEMONSTRATION SHANGHAI YANGTSE VALLEY UNDER GUISE PROTECTING HER SUBJECTS MANCHURIA JAPANESE MILITARISTS EAGERLY PUSH EXPLOITATION PLAN OUTLINED FORMER PREMIER TANAKA MEMORIAL FLAGRANTLY VIOLATING LEAGUE COVENANT WASHINGTON TREATY AND KELLOGG PACT FULFILMENT AGGRANDIZING AMBITION OUTWEIGHS COMPLETE WRECK ALL INTERNATIONAL PACTS SANCTIONS WORLD JUSTICE AND PEACE WE APPEAL THROUGH YOU TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT PEOPLE FIRST TO INSIST IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL JAPANESE TROOPS INDEMNIFICATION CHINESE LOSS AND DAMAGE MANCHURIA UNDER LEAGUE SUPERVISION SECOND TO FOLLOW WASHINGTON CONFERENCE PRACTICE OVER SHANTUNG ISSUE NAMELY TO DECIDE BY LEAGUE MEETING AMERICA PARTICIPATING PRINCIPLES AND TERMS OF JUST AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF MANCHURIAN PROBLEM OR FORMULA OF RIGHT SOLUTION SAME TO BE ACCEPTED BY CHINA AND JAPAN BEFORE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS TO WORK AND CARRY OUT ACTUAL PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT WITHIN DEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME REPEAT THIS MESSAGE HOOVER STIMSON HORNBECK ALEXANDER BORAH WATSON MOTT AND SHOTWELL CHINESE CHAMBER COMMERCE STRONGLY SUPPORTS ABOVE APPEAL.

DAVID YUI.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BUREAU OF INDEXES AND ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 23 1931.

In reply refer to  
 FE 793.94/2128

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of October 20, with which you enclosed a copy of another cablegram from Mr. David Z. T. Yui, of Shanghai, in further reference to the situation in China.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

F.W. 793.94/2128

The Honorable

Ray Lyman Wilbur,


Secretary of the Interior.

Oct. 21 1931.  
 CR  
 WMO

FE:MMH:LM  
 10/20/31

FE

SCH



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CABLEGRAMS: { INTRIMMISSION, NEW YORK  
INMISCO, LONDON

CODES: { MISSIONS  
CHINA INLAND MISSION

TELEPHONE: { NEW YORK: CALEDONIA 9137  
LONDON: SLOANE 1425

## INTERNATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL

Composed of the following Organizations

NATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA  
SOCIÉTÉ BELGE DE MISSIONS PROTESTANTES AU CONGO  
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF CHINA  
CONSEIL PROTESTANT DU CONGO  
DANSK MISSIONSRÅD  
DEUTSCHER EVANGELISCHER MISSIONSBUND  
SOCIÉTÉ DES MISSIONS ÉVANGÉLIQUES DE PARIS  
CONFERENCE OF MISSIONARY SOCIETIES IN GREAT  
BRITAIN AND IRELAND

NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF INDIA, BURMA, AND  
CEYLON  
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF JAPAN  
KOREAN NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL  
COMMITTEE ON COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA  
NEAR EAST CHRISTIAN COUNCIL  
COMMISSIE VAN ADVIES (THE NETHERLANDS)  
NETHERLANDS INDIA  
NATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL OF NEW ZEALAND  
NORSK MISSIONSRÅD


FOREIGN MISSIONS CONFERENCE OF NORTH AMERICA  
(UNITED STATES AND CANADA)  
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINE  
ISLANDS  
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF SIAM  
MISSIONARY SOCIETIES OF SOUTH AFRICA  
SUOMEN LAHETTYSEUVOSTO  
SVENSKA MISSIONSRÅDET  
ASSOCIATION OF MISSIONARY SOCIETIES IN SWITZER-  
LAND

Chairman: JOHN R. MOTT, 230 Park Avenue, New York City

Secretaries: J. H. OLDHAM; WILLIAM PATON, 2 Eaton Gate, London, S.W. 1

A. L. WARNSHUIS, 419 Fourth Ave., New York City

October 8, 1931.



Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Dr. Hornbeck:

We have received this morning the following cablegram which I am transmitting immediately to you:-

"Immediate peace action imperative, Chinese restraint breaking, radical farreaching chaos feared [confidence International] confidence in International conciliation endangered, thirty missionaries. Nanking".

During the past ten days Dr. Mott has also received important cablegrams from representative bodies in China bearing upon this same subject. As these cablegrams were addressed to him personally and as he was out of the city, I have not felt free to take any action with reference to them.

Naturally, the whole situation has given us great concern. From the newspaper reports we are aware of the action already taken by our own government and we have been fully appreciative of all that you have done. I am sure that you fully realize the urgency that is expressed in the cablegram that I have quoted above.

Yours very sincerely,

*A. L. Warnshuis*

ALW/MHS

The wording of the cablegram is given as received. It seems to me that the words bracketed are repeated by mistake - ALW

FILED

OCT 16 1931

793.94/2129

103  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 10, 1931.

My dear Dr. Warnshuis:

I thank you for your letter of October 8, 1931, quoting the text of a cablegram from thirty missionaries at Nanking, in regard to the present situation between China and Japan.

I assure you that that situation is continuing to receive the solicitous and careful attention of the Government.

Yours sincerely,


*SKT*  
Stanley K. Hornbeck,  
Chief,  
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

Dr. A. L. Warnshuis,  
International Missionary Council,  
419 Fourth Avenue,  
New York, New York.

✓  
C&  
Oct. 12 1931.

FE:MMH/VDM

WE



793.94/2129

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY

*file*  
*m.m.H.*

October 10, 1931.

FE ✓

Dear Doctor Hornbeck:

The Secretary has seen the  
attached letter and would like a  
very nice reply drafted making no  
reference, however, to the suggestion  
contained in the postscript.


*HCC.*

*793.94*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

October 10, 1931



Mr. Secretary:

The attached note from Representative Lewis, the newly elected Democratic Congressman from Maryland, was left at this office by the Congressman's Secretary. The Secretary said that the Congressman was particularly anxious that you see the letter personally in order that you might know that you had his full support in your Manchurian policies.

HSC.


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DAVID J. LEWIS  
6TH DIST. MARYLAND



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON

10 October, 1931



Hon. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The severest test to which the League Covenant and our own covenants have been subjected seems presented in the Japanese-Chinese situation. If you succeed in winning the issue, the turning point for public law in the world will have been gained. Allow me to assure you of my own humble efforts in such efforts.

Sincerely yours,

Department of State

*David J. Lewis*  
*ack'd file EJC*

P. S. Yesterday's Washington Star reported Chinese in the United States indulging in a boycott against Japanese here. A suggestion from your office that such conduct on their part will not be tolerated should have a good effect in a number of your efforts when published in Japan.

DJL-B

793.94

793.94/2130

FILED  
OCT 17 1931



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 13 1931.

The Honorable

David J. Lewis,

House of Representatives.

Sir:

I have your letter of October 10, 1931, in regard to the present situation relating to Manchuria.

I am very glad to have this expression of your views and sincerely appreciate the assurance of your support in efforts being made by the Government directed toward settlement of the present dispute by peaceful means. I may add that I am continuing to give the situation solicitous and careful attention.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

FE:MMH/VDM/LM  
 10/12/31

FE

Oct. 13 1931.



793.94/2130

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY

October 12, 1931.

RE

The attached letter refers  
to a letter sent to your Division for  
the draft of a reply, on Saturday.

HSC

F.W. 793.94/2130

*[Handwritten signature]*

## Chinese Ban Japanese Products in America

**Boycott Is Ordered on All Trade as Reply of Orientals in  
America to Japan's Invasion of China's Territory**

NEW YORK—A boycott against Japanese goods, ordered at secret meetings in New York, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco, was put into effect today by Chinese in this country, according to Chinese here.

Representatives from every Chinatown in the United States were said to have aided the draft of a passive plan of resistance against Japanese goods brought into this country.

### Fine or Ostracism

Penalty for buying Japanese goods is to range from a \$500 fine to ostracism from society, the Chinese decided.

Orders for \$750,000 worth of Japanese merchandise were canceled by merchants in Boston yesterday, while a spokesman in New York estimated the boycott would bring about a loss of \$1,000,000 to the Japanese in New York alone.

### Tongs Unite

The boycott was ordered, a spokesman for the Chinese people said, because of the Sino-Japanese trouble in Manchuria which is causing "Chinese to shed blood on their own soil."

The mutual animosities of the Hip Sings and On Leongs, leaders of the tong gangs, were forgotten to bring about the boycott.

The founding of a Chinese patriotic organization was another outgrowth of the secret meetings. A mass meeting was to be held here

today at which time officers for the society will be sworn into office.

At the offices of the Kuomintang it was said the forming of the society was unofficial and non-political.

A notice on the door said the

world "is facing a critical crisis, which threatens to upset all peace machineries and again may bring your sons, husbands, brothers and other relatives before the bayonet and the cannon. China is making this urgent appeal to you to formulate a policy to cope with this threat of challenge against mankind."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

DAVID J. LEWIS  
6TH DIST. MARYLAND

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

10 October, 1931

October 13 1931.



Mr. Cummings, Secretary  
Hon. Henry L. Stimson  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Cummings:

The Congressman has directed me to send to you the attached clipping, which appeared to-day in the Washington Daily News, in connection with the note from the Congressman I delivered to you this morning for Secretary Stimson.

Sincerely yours,

*Harvey A. Bush*  
Harvey A. Bush  
Secretary

B-B

F.W. 793.94/2130

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OCT 17 1931

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Shanghai/39 FOR despatch #7863

FROM Shanghai ( Cunningham ) DATED Sept. 17, 1931  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Japanese Aggression

793.94/2131

**793.94**  
**CHINESE AGGRESSION**

There has been a growing sentiment that the Japanese were becoming more aggressive than they have been for a number of years. To support this belief there is pointed out (see **FRIDAY MORNING POST** of August 2, 1961) that since the occurrence of the "Mitsubishi Incident" and the anti-Chinese outrage in Korea there have been various other

**Incidents**

-4-

incidents that were premeditated moves of the Japanese Government towards the realization of a continental policy. Disappointment is expressed that the negotiations for the settlement of the Manchukuo Incident and the Korean affair have reached a deadlock while Japanese aggression is still progressing, and the following instances are pointed out in support of this theory:

1. The Japanese in southern Formosa have recently mobbed the Chinese community in that region.
2. The Japanese community in the three eastern provinces have requested their home government to protest to the Chinese authorities against the construction of the railway between Manchou and Lungtiao.
3. The Japanese in Manchuria have organized an association to "protect Japanese interests in the three eastern provinces, and they have resolved to oppose the abolition of extra-territoriality and to refuse to pay the usual taxes to the Chinese authorities.
4. The new Director General of the South Manchuria Railway has openly declared his readiness to adopt a positive policy in the administration of the railway.

There is a growing belief that the Japanese have reached the limit of the policy of extreme conciliation in dealing with China. This impression is not confined to Chinese circles but has been reached by many foreigners.

Notwithstanding a decided feeling that Japanese policy is becoming more firm, the Japanese boycott has not assumed any very great proportions. It can be stated with confidence that the CHINA NATION (a Chinese Journal published in the English language) in its editorial of August 26th illustrated the case when it said:

"The present anti-Japanese boycott as those in the past, has resulted from a spontaneous outburst of indignation against Japan for just reasons."

Page

-5-

There is no spontaneous outburst locally in favor of the Japanese boycott, and there would be no attempt to boycott Japanese goods except that it is supported by Sunmintang propaganda. It is true that many of the local Chinese organizations have perfunctorily endorsed the boycott, prominent among these being the National Products Maintenance Association, the Chinese Planning Commission of the Shanghai Municipality, the Anti-Japanese and Chinese Emigrants Support Committee, and the Tariff Inspection Committee, but these are not of great importance and are simply tools in the hands of the Sunmintang. According to the Municipal Police reports, the Japanese goods seized during the month, part of which was subsequently released, were valued at \$112,500.00. It is admitted that the Chinese officials of the Municipality of Shanghai could have entirely suppressed the boycott, but it has continued to exist because of their indifference, if they do not actually support it.

On August 11, 1931, the Japanese officials in a practical manner recovered certain merchandise which had been seized by the pickets of the boycott association. The Shanghai Municipal Police report describes the incident of that date after the release of the Japanese goods on Canton Road and at Nathan Road Junction, as follows:

"Following the detention of a boat loaded with fifteen bundles of jute bags, at 5.30 a.m., August 11, on the Leochow Creek near Nathan Road Junction, a representative of the Japanese Consulate in company with a member of the local police called at the Chapel Inspection Office, 99 Ai Yue Shing Li, Pootung Road, Chapel, at 1 p.m. and demanded the release of the cargo. Consequently a member of the Inspection Office together with the consular representative and the member of the local police proceeded to the scene with the intention of investigating the ownership. On their arrival



-6-

It was learned that the goods were forcibly taken away by some 20 Japanese marines, at 12 noon the same day."

A second incident happening on the night of August 18th, is described in the Shanghai Municipal Reports as follows:

"At 10 p.m., August 18, when four pickets of the Customs Inspection Office attempted to seize at the 45 Yang Sharf 171 bales of Japanese cotton yarn, valued at \$10,000.00, about twenty armed Japanese marines arrived on the scene and took the four pickets into custody. They were taken to a Japanese warship anchored in the Yangtze River and later conveyed to the Japanese Consulate General from where they were released at 11 a.m., August 18 on representations made by the Shanghai Public Safety Bureau."

On the afternoon of August 18th another incident occurred which is described in the police reports as follows:

"At 4.30 p.m., August 18 pickets attached to the Chapel Inspection Office attempted to inspect the 4 boxes of Japanese cotton yarn and 4 bags of other articles loaded on two wheelbarrows on Ning Shui Road, Chapel, near North Szechuan Road, but were prevented from doing so by a Japanese who accompanied the goods. A dispute followed and both parties were taken by the Chinese police to the Lu Ching Road Police Sub-station, where the authorities ordered the goods to be detained in the Chapel Inspection Office. However the Japanese protested and the goods were ordered to be taken to the 5th District Police Station, Szechuan Road, Chapel, but instead of carrying out these instructions, the pickets took the cargo to the Chapel Inspection Office, 41 Pao Shing Li, Szechuan Road. Immediately following this action, some twenty Japanese marines arrived at the office by motor truck and took away in addition to the goods in question, some 20 packages of cotton yarn and about 1,000 glass bottles loaded in 8 bushets."

Mr. Yu Yu-ching, a member of the Municipal Council of the International Settlement, formerly president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and a large ship owner, has been severely criticized by various Chinese organizations, particularly by the Chairman of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, because he is reliably reported to have said

-7-

in substance that in looking for suitable measures the importance of avoiding international complications and maintaining the livelihood of hundreds of thousands of Chinese workers now in the employ of Japanese factories should not be overlooked. Subsequently he advocated that a tax be levied on materials imported from Japan which are indispensable to Chinese industry and that the fund raised be used for the establishment of factories to manufacture these materials. Certain Chinese organizations are now advocating that Mr. Yu Ts-ching should be deprived of his civil rights and that his property should be confiscated.

The organizations fostering the anti-Japanese boycott began the publication on August 15th of a very objectionable periodical called the BLOODY HILL. Several issues of this journal have appeared. Its chief object is to encourage the boycott although it does not confine itself entirely to this subject. In its issue of August 15th, in addition to the usual anti-Japanese propaganda, this publication strongly denounced local Chinese merchants for having openly smuggled Japanese goods, and concluded with the following paragraph:

"These merchants are the strongest supporters of the Japanese imperialists as they even disguise Japanese goods as national products so as to cheat the general public."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 22, 1931.



Subject: The Manchurian Situation.

793.94

As I understand it, we had been seriously considering the applicability to the above situation of the Kellogg Pact and of the Nine-Power Treaty to determine what our obligations are under those international engagements. We have been awaiting the course of events in the expectation that the pacific policies of Baron Shidehara, Minister for Foreign Affairs, would prevail in the Japanese Cabinet and we have hesitated to take immediate action for the reason, among others, that we thought it possible that such action on our part might embarrass, rather than assist, Baron Shidehara in his conflict with the military faction of the Japanese Government, because of the suspicion in which we are apparently held by the latter.

In the meantime, the more recent developments have belied our hopes that a peaceful solution of the question was in sight through the efforts of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. We have also been approached both by the Chinese Government and by the Secretary of the League of Nations on the subject of the applicability of the

above

793.94/2132

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- 2 -

above international engagements.

The above factors, together with public interest in the matter in this country, indicate that the time has come for a definition of our attitude toward the question raised by the League and by the Chinese Government.

It is suggested that our answer should be that the events which have already taken place in Manchuria do constitute a violation of the spirit, if not the terms, of the international engagements above referred to, to which we are a party, and that in the solution of the situation thereby presented we should act, as far as possible, in harmony with the League of Nations both as to the finding of facts and as to the action to be taken, - inasmuch as the parties to the Kellogg Pact and to the Nine-Power Treaty referred to are also members of the League of Nations.


I am inclined to think that once a decision is reached as to what our attitude is on this question a talk with some member of the Japanese Embassy, simultaneously with informing the Secretary of the League of Nations, in which a frank statement of our position should be made, will be perhaps the most expeditious way of bringing to bear upon the situation through the Japanese Government the weight of our opinion and thereby in so far meeting our obligations under our engagements.

*M. O. Gustafson*  
RSM: EJJ

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 23, 1931.



*file  
figc*

793.94  
Article I of the Four-Power Treaty of 1922 relates to the rights of the High Contracting Parties (paragraph 1) "in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean".

Paragraph 2 of Article I stipulates that

→ "If there should develop between any of the High Contracting Parties a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely to effect the harmonious accord . . . they shall invite the other High Contracting Parties to a joint conference . . .".

I would say that the above provisions concern only

- (1) a controversy between any of the High Contracting Parties (namely, the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan) which involves ~~our rights in the Far East~~;  
(2) our rights in relation to our insular possessions in the Far East; and (3) a controversy which has not been satisfactorily settled by diplomacy.

I do not see how under the above interpretation the provisions of this Treaty apply to the present Manchurian situation, which is not between the High Contracting Parties, which does not relate directly to our insular ~~possessions~~ and our rights therein and as to which the means of settlement by diplomacy have not been exhausted.

*RSM*  
RSM:EJL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

9/30/31

Reference is to items  
Nos. 39 and 44 in "Summary of  
Press Clippings" from American  
Embassy, Tokyo, dated  
September 12, 1931.

RSM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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SEP 29 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 12 1931

September 29, 1931.

MANCHURIAN SITUATION.

Mr. Castle:

Please note items 39 and 44, of September 5 and September 9, respectively.

This suffices to make it clear that the Japanese Government had ample knowledge that the Japanese army and protagonists of the "positive policy" might take the bit in their teeth at any moment. In other words, whatever may be the truth with regard to K. K. Kawakami's statement recently published in this country that the Foreign Office had assented to an arrangement whereby authority to act was to be vested in the higher Japanese authorities in Manchuria, action in Manchuria by the army cannot have come as a surprise to the civil authorities, including the Foreign Office, in Tokyo.

One sentence in Neville's telegram No. 162, September 28, 3 p.m., paragraph five, bears this out. Neville says: "I know that Shidehara was dreading the present incident".

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OCT 12 1931


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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 29, 1931.



Subject: Manchurian Situation - Movement to  
Establish an Independent Government  
in Manchuria.

The press reports this morning indicate that there is a movement on foot to establish an independent government in Manchuria. The NEW YORK TIMES of September 29, 1931, gives the names of three Chinese who are leaders in this movement as follows:

1. Yuan Chin-kai, former Civil Governor of Mukden during the rule of Chang Tso-lin.
2. Kan Chao-hsi, former Governor of Jehol.
3. Hsi Sia, former Chief of Staff of the Kirin Provincial Army.

The first two, Yuan Chin-kai and Kan Chao-hsi, are reported to be the leaders of the movement at Mukden while the third, Hsi Sia, is reported to have already set up a government in the city of Kirin.

Comment: No one of these three men is known to any officer of FE and none has been of sufficient importance heretofore in Chinese affairs to have found a place in the Who's Who of China.

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OCT 12 1931


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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RECEIVED  
OCT 3 - 1931  
September 30, 1931.

Manchuria: American Interests in ---. SECRETARY'S OFFICE

It has been asked that this Division prepare a map showing the location and distribution of the American interests in Manchuria.

The Division has consulted the materials of known availability in the Department and has consulted the Department of Commerce.

In consequence, the Division is preparing a map which will meet as far as possible the requirements of the request made.

It is felt, however, that the extent of American interests in Manchuria coincides with the geographical extent of Manchuria itself. The two greatest American commercial interests in Manchuria are those of the Standard Oil Company of New York and the British-American Tobacco Company. Each of these companies has a distributing organization in Manchuria, and its products are sold and distributed under the managing direction of its "foreign" personnel, including field agents who travel about and supervise the various substations and make and maintain contact with Chinese agencies of distribution and retailing.

The American Government at one time maintained five consular offices in Manchuria. The office at Newchwang was discontinued in 1915. The office at Antung was discontinued in 1928. We maintain now three offices: at Harbin a Consulate

General

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- 2 -

General (raised to that grade in 1931); at Mukden a Consulate General; and at Dairen a Consulate.

American nationals resident in Manchuria are, in numbers, as follows:

In the Harbin district, 95

In the Mukden district, 109

In the Dairen district, approximately 50.

American investments in Manchuria cannot be accurately estimated. For the property and business in Manchuria of the British-American Tobacco Company, we have no figures. With regard to the company itself, it is understood that the majority of the stock, by a small margin, is American owned. For the property and business in Manchuria of the Standard Oil Company of New York, we have no figures. American property and business for which we have figures amounts to approximately \$4,000,000, of which \$3,425,000 is in the Harbin district and \$586,000 in the Mukden district. The total, however, including tobacco and oil, is of course very much greater.

American trade with Manchuria was, in 1929, according to combination of American and other statistics, as follows:

U.S. exports to Manchuria, approximately U.S.\$12,000,000

U.S. imports from Manchuria, approximately U.S.\$5,000,000

Total trade, approximately U.S.\$17,000,000.

SKH

SKH/ZMF




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LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



San José, Costa Rica

October 8, 1931

No. 631



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793.94/2137

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Washington

Sir:-

I have the honor to advise the Department that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has verbally confirmed the notice which appeared in the local press of the 30th ultimo, which was in substance:

That the Costa Rican Minister in Panama had notified the Foreign Office in San José by cable that the Chinese Minister in Panama had inquired "urgently" if the Chinese Government could count on the moral aid and support of Costa Rica before the League of Nations in the matter of armed aggression of the Japanese Government against China.

To which the Minister of Foreign Relations replied by cable:


That the Government of Costa Rica could not lend

(its

- 2 -

its moral aid in the Japanese - Chinese matter  
as requested, since Costa Rica was not a member  
of the League of Nations.

Respectfully yours,



CHARLES C. EBERHARDT

500 - League of Nations


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

KENT E. KELLER  
25TH DISTRICT  
ILLINOIS  
HOME: AVA

THE UNDER SECRETARY  
OCT 19 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.



COUNTIES:  
FRANKLIN WILLIAMSON  
PERRY UNION  
RANDOLPH ALEXANDER  
JACKSON PULASKI

RESPECTFULLY REFERRED  
FOR CONSIDERATION

October 12, 1931.



RECEIVED

OCT 20 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Copy to the President  
To His Excellency  
Honorable Herbert Hoover,  
President of the United States.

My dear Mr. President:

I trust you will pardon this intrusion. But I cannot sit  
silently by and see Japan willfully, and with malice aforethought,  
bring on a war against China.

I cannot forget that China was the very first nation with  
which the new-born United States of America formed her first  
friendship; that China has always been America's friend, and  
America has always been China's friend. I cannot forget that we  
have stood by and permitted ourselves to be cut off from the trade  
and spiritual contacts with most of the vast populations of Asia.

I am thankful, however, that we were courageous enough, and  
farsighted enough when Asia was being divided up among the aggressive  
nations of the earth, that we prevented the dismemberment of China,  
and showed some appreciation of the long standing friendship for that  
people.

At the present time, in my judgment, we cannot do less than to  
serve special notice on Japan that America will not recognize any  
alienation of territory, or trade privileges with the Chinese peoples.  
It is the only open door we have left in the Orient. It is our open  
door as much as it is China's open door. If we make such a declara-  
tion and stand by it, Japan will find a way to keep out of China. If  
we are too cowardly to do that, that door will largely be closed to  
us.

Trusting that the expression in this letter may be accepted as  
expressive of at least a sufficient number of people in our country  
to justify the consideration of the matters herein referred to, I am

Sincerely,

*Kent E. Keller*


KENT E. KELLER, M.C.

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## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM



FROM

GREEN

GENEVA

Dated October 15, 1931

Rec'd 7:11 p.m.


Secretary of State

Washington

VERY URGENT

202, October 15, 9 p.m.

Department's 90, October 14, 3 p.m.



After protracted private session of Council which has just concluded Drummond informs me as follows:

As expected, the Japanese opposed extending an invitation to the United States to participate within the Council in discussion of the Pact of Paris. No compromise was effected and the Council after exhaustive discussion of Japanese legal objections proceeded to vote on the basis of the question being one of procedure (see Consulate's 195, October 13, 9 p.m.). A resolution was then adopted by which the United States will be invited to participate in such discussions with only the dissenting vote of Japan. It is expected that the invitation will be finally approved and issued some time tomorrow. A Council meeting has been tentatively fixed for ten a.m. to confirm publicly this decision.

There is

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAM

2- #202, from Geneva, October 15,  
1931

There is still hope that the Japanese at the last  
moment may withdraw their opposition and thus make the  
decision unanimous.

GILBERT

FW


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Handed by Mr. Yung Kwai  
to Mr. Miller, Oct. 1, 1931*

793.94  
TELEGRAM FROM MR. SAO-KE ALFRED SZE,  
CHINESE DELEGATE TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, GENEVA,  
DATED OCTOBER 1, 1931.

*RSM*

*file  
RSM*



China still believes in sending a commission of inquiry,  
but wishing to be conciliatory and meet Japan halfway I made  
the following compromise proposal and confirmed it to the  
Council in writing:

That the Council shall help the parties to come to an  
agreement as to arrangements on the spot which will make it  
possible to fix an early date for the completion of the  
withdrawal of troops, police and aerial forces thereby making  
it unnecessary to send a commission of inquiry in connection  
with the complete restoration of the status quo ante.

That the Council in making the arrangements referred to  
above shall appoint neutral persons on the spot to represent  
it who shall participate in all arrangements made and report  
concurrently to the Council.

Chinese Legation,

Washington, October 1, 1931.

793.94/2140

FILED

OCT 22 1931





*Handed by Mr. Yung Kwai  
to Mr. Miller, Oct. 1, 1931*

*RSM*  
**CHINESE LEGATION  
WASHINGTON**

*793.94*  
**CORRECTED COPY  
OF THE LEGATION'S NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1931.**

September 27, 1931.

*793.94*  
Sir:

I have the honor to inform you that I am instructed to communicate to you the reply of the Chinese Government to the note of the American Government dated September 24, 1931, as follows:

*793.94/1868A*  
"The Chinese Government received yesterday afternoon the communication from the American Government regarding the present situation in China, transmitted from Peiping by the American Minister to China."

"The Chinese Government and people are gratified to learn that the Government and people of the United States, feeling themselves much interested in the situation created in China by the action of Japanese troops, desire that principles and methods of peace, instead of armed force, should be used in the relations between China and Japan, as between any other civilized states. It is the conviction of the Chinese

Government

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,

Secretary of State.

FILED

OCT 23 1931

793.94/2141

- 2 -

Government that, in addressing its notes to  
the Chinese and Japanese Governments, (that)  
the American Government has been prompted by  
the earnest desire to uphold, as one of the  
signatory powers, the sanctity of those inter-  
national treaties, particularly the Treaty for  
the Renunciation of War signed at Paris in  
1928, which bind the parties not to have re-  
course to war but to use pacific means in  
their relations with one another.

"As a result of the aggressive movements  
of the Japanese troops, our territory has been  
invaded, our cities and towns have been occupied,  
and in certain cases ransacked, our public  
officers and innocent citizens have been injured,  
insulted and murdered. Even on the very day  
when the American Government despatched its  
identic notes to the Chinese and Japanese Govern-  
ments, advising restraint from further hostili-  
ties, Chinese passenger trains carrying refugees  
on the Peiping-Liaoning (Peking-Mukden) Railway  
were attacked by bombs and machine gun fire from  
Japanese military aeroplanes, which resulted in  
many casualties. Thus, while the Japanese  
Government declares that it has taken all meas-  
ures to prevent the aggravation of the situation  
and that the troops will be forthwith withdrawn  
from the occupied areas, (and) free acts of war  
are still being committed by the Japanese troops.  
In spite of such circumstances, the entire  
Chinese Nation has been exhorted to maintain a

dignified

- 3 -

dignified calm, in the belief that the delinquent party will render a full account for its wanton acts to all the civilized states, under the principle of the sanctity of international treaties for the maintenance of peace.

"The Chinese Government can conceive no other way to satisfy the requirements of international law and international agreements, when international law and international agreements have already been trampled under foot, than for Japan to withdraw her troops immediately and completely from the occupied areas and to give full redress to the aggrieved party, the Chinese Government and the Chinese people.

"It is the earnest hope of the Chinese Government that most effective means will be promptly taken for maintaining the dignity and inviolability of the international treaties above referred to, so that all efforts heretofore made by the various powers, especially by the United States for the preservation of peace, might not be in vain."

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

YUNG KWAI  
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

TRANSLATION

Japanese Embassy

Washington.

793 94  
Council (1) takes note replies which government of China and of Japan have given to the urgent appeal which its President had addressed to them, as well as measures which have already been taken in conformity that appeal (2) recognizes the importance of the declaration of the Government Japan under the terms of which the latter has no territorial aim in Manchuria (3) takes note declaration made by representative Japan according to which its government will continue as rapidly as possible retreat already begun its troops to bring them back within the railway zone to a point where the security of life of Japanese nationals and the protection of their property shall be effectively assured and hopes to realize completely such intention in the shortest possible time (4) takes note declaration of the representative of China under the terms of which its government will assume responsibility for security of Japanese nationals and protection of property belonging to them outside of the said zone in proportion as the retreat of the Japanese troops is carried out and the reestablishment of the local authorities and the Chinese police forces is effected (5) being convinced that the two governments desire to avoid any act capable of disturbing peace and good understanding between two nations, takes note the fact that representatives of China and of Japan have given

assurance

793.94/2142

- 2 -

assurance that their governments will respectively take all measures necessary to avoid magnifying the incident or aggravating the situation. (6) requests both parties to make every effort to hasten the restoration between them of normal relations and for this purpose to proceed with and promptly complete the execution of the above mentioned engagements (7) requests the two parties to give the Council frequent full information as to the development of the situation (8) decides, if no unforeseen event takes place which would make an emergency convocation indispensable, to meet again at Geneva on October 14, to study the situation at that date (9) authorizes its President to cancel the convocation of the Council for October 14 in case, after having consulted with his colleagues, in particular, representatives two parties, he should decide that the information received from the parties or the other members of the Council, as to the development of the situation no longer makes the said convocation necessary.

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JAPANESE EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON



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Conseil (1) prend acte reponses que gouvernement de Chine et du Japon ont donnees a l'appel urgent que son president leur avait adresse ainsi que mesures qui ont deja ete prises conformement cet appel (2) reconnait l'importance de declaration du gouvernement Japon aux termes de laquelle celui ci n'a aucune visee territoriale en Mandchourie (3) prend acte declaration faite par representant Japon selon laquelle son gouvernement poursuivra aussirapidement possible retrait deja commence ses troupes pour les remener dans zone chemin de fer dans mesure on securite de vie des ressortissants Japonais et protection de leurs biens seront effectivement assurees et espere realiser completement cette intention dans le plus brief delai (4) prend acte declaration du representant de Chine aux termes de laquelle son gouvernement assumera responsabilite de securite des ressortissants Japonais et protection des biens leur appartenant en dehors ladite zone au fur et a mesure que se poursuivra retrait des troupes Japonaises et que s'effectuera retablissement des autorites locales et des forces de police Chinoises (5) convaincu que deux gouvernements desirent eviter tout acte susceptible de troubler paix et bonne entente entre deux nations prend acte fait que representants de Chine et du Japon ont donne l'assurance que leurs gouvernements prendront respectivement toutes mesures necessaires pour ne pas elargir l'incident ni aggraver situation (6) demande aux deux parties mettre tout en oeuvre pour hater retablissement entre elles relations normales et a cet effet poursuivre and achever rapidement l'execution engagements

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Handwritten of info  
re by the Japanese Ambassador  
Oct 11 WHE

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susmentionnes (7) demands aux deux parties donner au conseil informations completes frequentes sur l'evolution de situation (8) decide sauf evenement imprevu qui rendrait indispensable convocation d'urgence se reunir de nouveau geneve mercredi 14 Octobre pour examiner situation a cette date (9) autorise son president annuler convocation conseil pour 14 Octobre dans cas ou apres avoir consulte ses collegues notamment representants deux parties il deciderait que informations qu'il aurait recues des parties ou des autres membres conseil sur l'evolution de situation ne rendent plus ladite convocation necessaire.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDERSECRETARY



OCT 3 - 1931

October 1, 1931.

793.94  
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Memorandum of conversation with the Japanese Ambassador,  
October 1, 1931.

The Japanese Ambassador called when Mr. Forbes was in my office. After greeting Mr. Forbes he asked if he might pass on to me the messages which he had come to discuss, adding that he would like to have Mr. Forbes listen.

Mr. Debuchi said that he had already told the Secretary that the Japanese Government would welcome Mr. Salisbury and Mr. Hansen in Manchuria to make an investigation on the spot of what is going on. To this he added that the Japanese Government would be very glad to have them associate with themselves American military officers, if they so desired.

The Ambassador said that the Secretary had asked him about the wireless station in Mukden, which was reported to have been destroyed. He said that only the "dispatch line" was out of commission. He was not sure the meaning of this, but it obviously means the instrument for transmitting messages. This can, according to his information, be restored at any moment and Baron Shidehara has promised to do his best to get the station into operation as quickly as possible.

Mr. Debuchi said that probably the military had closed the station

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE UNDERSECRETARY

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station temporarily. He said that protests had been made by the American Consul in Mukden, on behalf of the Radio Corporation. As to general communications with Mukden the Ambassador said that press and official telegrams were given preference, although, of course, there might be some delay owing to congestion. He said that, although these telegrams went through Japanese authorities, there was obviously no censorship since many of the press messages were very critical of the Japanese.

The Ambassador brought up the question of aeroplane bombing of trains. He said that no bombs have ever been dropped on a train and that no attempt has been made to do such a thing. There appears, however, to have been a clash between Chinese and Japanese troops near the railway train running parallel to the trouble between the troops. Apparently a Japanese plane did turn its machine gun on the troops. No shots were fired at the train. (This seems to me an extraordinarily weak explanation.)

✓ So far as the Separatist movement in Manchuria is concerned, the Ambassador denies that it is in any way stirred up by the Japanese. He says that, on the contrary,


Baron

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE UNDERSECRETARY

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Baron Shidehara has instructed all consuls in the territory not in any way to interfere either for or against any kind of political movement.

The Ambassador said that the most significant news he has heard is that Japanese women and children are being withdrawn from Harbin and Kirin and places outside the railway zone held by Japanese troops. He says that the only possible explanation of this can be that the troops are very shortly to be withdrawn and that, in consequence, it is felt to be unwise to leave Japanese women and children where they may be subject to attack by bandits.



U WRC/AB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 3, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

The memorandum hereunder relates to the request made by the Secretary General of the League of Nations that the American Government give certain advice to the Chinese Government and to the latest telegram from Consul General Peck at Nanking, the contents of which have asked the line of reasoning developed in the memorandum and the conclusions arrived at therein. *affected*

The memorandum summarizes the contents of all three telegrams sufficiently for purposes of the consideration given to Drummond's request, and it is believed that if you will read the memorandum you will not need to study the whole of the texts of the telegrams themselves.

The conclusion at which this Division arrives is that we should not take upon ourselves the task which Drummond offers us, but that we should, informally and through Consul General Peck at Nanking, pass on some suggestions, to T. V. Soong, which may help toward keeping the Chinese officialdom on the right track.

*SKH*  
*—*

SKH/ZMF

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-12-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 2, 1931.

793.94  
Reference Geneva Consulate's 150 and 151 (both  
October 1) and Peking 691 Oct. 2, 5 P.M. 793.94/1965

Telegram 150 contains the text of the resolution proposed  
to and adopted by the Council of the League in conclusion of  
the first stage of its efforts in reference to the Manchurian  
situation. In this, the Council calls upon the Japanese and  
the Chinese Governments to do all in their power to hasten the  
restoration of normal relations and "for that purpose to con-  
tinue and speedily complete the execution of several undertak-  
ings, most important among which are Japan's pledge to with-  
draw her troops from outside of the railway zone and China's  
pledge to assume responsibility for the safety of the lives  
and property of Japanese nationals outside of that zone and  
the pledge of both to take all necessary steps to prevent  
any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation  
of the situation.

Mr. Gilbert, commenting, states that it is considered  
that the Chinese have won a diplomatic victory in having at-  
tained their objective of keeping the matter in the hands of  
the League and remarks that it is believed that the Chinese  
will make use of the incident to secure henceforth "the  
League's continuing concern with the whole Manchurian situa-  
tion".

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OCT 5-1931

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- 2 -

tion". He infers that it is the desire of the leaders in the Council to restrict the Council's action to the question of the withdrawal of the troops, while it is the policy of the Chinese to involve the Council as deeply as possible in all aspects of the situation.

Telegram 151 gives an account of facts and views communicated by Drummond to Wilson. Drummond referred to Yoshizawa's statement suggesting that all members of the Council inform the Secretary General of information which they may obtain from the disturbed area. This, he said, was a great concession on Yoshizawa's part. Great Britain, he said, has a Military Attaché on the spot. Drummond hoped that the American Government would make available to him (Drummond) any pertinent information possessed by it that it feels wise to let him have. In strict confidence, Drummond stated that the Chinese have threatened to conclude an alliance with Soviet Russia; and that the Japanese have told him that they have talked with the Soviets and anticipate no difficulty. He believes that for the moment at least this is headed off. He wishes to avoid having the Chinese continually approach him with protests and threats. He feels that they should now be willing to do independently their share of what is to be done during the period of adjustment. And he indicates that he would like to have the United States make a suggestion in that sense to the Chinese. He bespeaks in that connection our cooperation.

PROBLEM: In the light of the above, the question before us  
is

- 3 -

is whether we shall or shall not comply with Drummond's request as outlined above.

For discussion of that question, see Mr. Miller's memorandum attached hereunder.

It is evident that the Chinese hope that the machinery of the League and the provisions of the Covenant will serve in some measure to compensate for their otherwise almost complete helplessness, from the point of view of self-protection, in the contract between themselves and the Japanese à deux. If that machinery serves its purpose, well and good. If it fails, the Chinese, together with the sponsors in general of the League, are almost certain to try to throw blame upon the United States. For the action taken by the Council to have a beneficial effect, it will be necessary that the Chinese and the Japanese approach the problem in a spirit, on both sides, of conciliation, that the Chinese demonstrate their capacity to ensure the safety of Japanese lives and interests outside of the railway zone, and that the Japanese withdraw their forces from the outlying points. Whatever contribution can be made toward ensuring compliance with these three requirements will be a contribution on the side of peaceful settlement. In view of what passed between this Government and the League last week, it is believed desirable that within the limitation of what is politically practicable, it will be advantageous for us to respond favorably to suggestions for cooperation with the League in action intended to create an atmosphere and attitude conducive to amicable discussion between the Chinese and the Japanese.

At

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At the same time, it seems reasonable to ask: Why, in view of the fact that the Sino-Japanese controversy was taken up by the League, in conformity with the League's obligations under its own Covenant, and the further fact that the League has acted -- why should the League now pass the ball (or try to pass it) to the American Government? In other words, admitting that China's entreaties and her attempt to take shelter as far as possible under the wings of the League are embarrassing and troublesome to Drummond -- why should the American Government invite embarrassment for itself by taking over responsibility in that connection?

The answer to the above, it seems reasonable to suggest, must be sought in connection with the answer which may be given to another question, namely: Can the United States give to the Chinese with greater likelihood of beneficial effectiveness than can the League (Drummond) the advice (suggestion) which Drummond expresses the hope that we will give? Here, it is believed that the facts of the situation suggest an answer in the negative.

Drummond and Gilbert are quite right in saying that this is a delicate problem.

The simple facts of the situation are: (1) The Chinese Government in the early stages of the Manchuria incident brought the matter to the attention both of the American Government and of the Council of the League. The Council took the matter up at once and gave publicity to its action. The American Govern-

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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ment did not indicate publicly that it was taking action. The Chinese Government then made a formal appeal to the League and the League asked the American Government to cooperate with it in a definitely outlined course of action which it had under consideration. The American Government explained its inability to cooperate in the manner which the League suggested (in part at least) and it expressed views in discouragement of the Council's idea of sending a commission of inquiry. The League sent identic notes to the Chinese and Japanese Governments, and the American Government sent similar notes. The Chinese know about most of this and, right or wrong, they have gained the idea that the Council of the League was prepared to act more promptly and more vigorously than it has acted, that the American Government threw cold water on the League's ideas and that the failure of the League to act more emphatically than it has acted is attributable to the deterring influence of the American Government. In consequence of this, the Chinese Government is doubtful of our attitude and is disposed to believe that the League has shown itself in action more friendly to China than has the United States. In the present period of excitement and nervousness on their part, the Chinese are incapable of seeing the intricacies and subtleties of the problem or of appreciating the fact that the first and most difficult of the steps that have needed to be taken were steps which would tend to minimize rather than to add to the likelihood of further and more emphatic action on the part of the Japanese.

This



- 6 -

This being the present state of the Chinese mind, it is believed that proffer of any advice to the Chinese without the accompaniment of some assurance on our part that if the advice is followed we will take some action on their behalf would be likely to increase their suspicion, to add to their resentment over what they fancy to be our lack of sympathy, and to encourage a tendency on their part toward an increase rather than a decrease of recalcitrancy; in other words, would be likely to have an effect just the opposite to that intended.

It is therefore recommended that we do not undertake to assume any part of Drummond's (the League's) possible responsibility.

Nevertheless, it is believed that we might talk with the Chinese, through Consul General Peck at Nanking, along lines that would be helpful. Peck has the confidence of the Chinese and is one of the most tactful of our officers. In Peiping's telegram 691, October 2, 5 p.m., we have a report by Peck of an informal conversation between himself and T. V. Soong on September 30, 9 p.m., at Peck's home. In this conversation Soong expressed the inability of the Chinese to understand the course which the American Government has pursued and Soong told Peck of the tendency of the Chinese to look toward Soviet Russia for aid and comfort. He also made it clear that China does not accept the contentions of Japan with regard to the extent of Japanese treaty rights in Manchuria, particularly in connection with the question of railway guards.

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- 7 -

It is believed that the Department might give Peck an instruction which Peck in turn might make the basis of friendly oral advice in informal conversation with Soong. (Note: Soong is probably the clearest headed, the coolest and the most effective of all the Chinese officials now functioning at Nanking. Views conveyed by Peck to Soong may have some effect, and the procedure suggested would not commit the American Government to having made "representations" to the Chinese Government.)

If this suggested course of procedure is approved, this Division will draft (1) for consideration a telegram to Wilson explaining in confidence for Drummond's information our reaction to his request and (2) a telegram to Peck outlining what he should say to Soong.

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SKR/ZMF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 2, 1931.

793.94  
SHE:

793.94/1958  
With reference to Geneva's 151 of October 1, 10 a.m.,  
hereunder:

It is clearly evident from the attitude of the Chinese representative at Geneva, as reported in Geneva's 150, October 1, 9 a.m., that he intends to pin upon the League Council, and perhaps also upon us, the responsibility for some further action should the present arrangements not work out satisfactorily by October 14.

The responsibilities assumed by the Chinese under the Compromise Resolution adopted by the Council on September 30 depend in part upon the prior action of the Japanese in withdrawing their troops but in a larger measure depend upon the disposition to do what they can toward composing the present situation by preventing any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation and to hasten the restoration of normal relations between themselves and the Japanese.

The Chinese Government and people have not indicated any strong disposition to meet the Japanese half-way in composing their differences. Reports from China indicate rather the reverse.

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OCT 22 1931

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In view of the fact that we ourselves may sooner or later be faced by a similar request from the Chinese for further action, perhaps we should do now what we can, in the line of Sir Eric's suggestion, by giving to the Chinese a word of friendly counsel on this point, just as we have on a number of occasions spoken frankly to the Japanese Ambassador.

Against any such proposal it may be said: (1) that we do not wish to get entangled with any action which the League, under its obligations, may feel it necessary to take; (2) that any such action on our part might be futile in the present state of mind of the Chinese and might even be considered by them as further evidence that we were not disposed to render them the assistance which they feel they have a right to expect from us under our obligations.

In favor it may be said: (1) that, as we will probably have to face a similar request sooner or later from the Chinese, it is better to face the situation now and do what we can to assist them in reaching a reasonable state of mind; (2) that we should be as ready to give advice to the one party as we have been to the other; (3) that such a word of friendly counsel might be timely just now, when the selection of a new Minister for Foreign Affairs and the appointment of ~~the~~ Chinese representatives

abroad

- 3 -

abroad is under consideration.

It is suggested that a telegram might well be sent through the Legation at Peiping to Mr. Peck at Nanking, instructing him to informally and personally convey to the Foreign Office a message along the lines suggested in the telegram under reference.

We should also note and consider Sir Eric's hope "that any pertinent information that our Government may feel it wise to let him have might be made available to him".

*RM*  
FE: RSM: EJJ

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 3, 1931.

793.94  
SHH:

*Lee*  
*egg*  
In the light of the advices this morning, both from the Legation at Peiping and from the newspapers it appears that this is not an opportune time for giving to the Chinese Government any friendly counsel along the lines recently suggested by Sir Eric Drummond in a recent Geneva despatch.

It is at the moment doubtful just whom Dr. Frank Lee, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom the communication would presumably be addressed, represents. The press reports indicate that the formation of a coalition government between the Canton and Nanking factions is making definite progress and that the coalition when formed will be largely in control of the Canton faction.

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It is reported that a meeting to form the coalition has been called for October 12. It would seem particularly futile, therefore, to address any communications to the Chinese Government on this subject at this time.

It is possible if not probable that the message of Dr. Lee transmitted through Mr. Peck in Peiping latest telegram is inspired by local political considerations with a view to bolster up the position of President Chiang and Mr. Soong in the new coalition.

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
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It is also possible if not probable that the suggestion of the danger that China may be forced into the arms of Russia is also inspired by the hope that we might thereby be induced to take some action which would support the hands of President Chiang and Mr. Soong. The Chinese leaders cannot be unmindful of the obvious danger to themselves of such a course.

The Japanese and Chinese authorities in Manchuria are now presumably engaged in carrying out their respective obligations assumed under the compromise resolution adopted at Geneva. The wise course would seem to be to assume that these obligations are being met in good faith until there may be evidence to the contrary and that before taking any further action upon Drummond's suggestion we should await further information from the neutral observers, including our own in Manchuria, as well as the developments in the political situation in China.

RSM/VGD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING

Dated October 4, 1931.



On October 3rd President Chiang Kai-Shek telegraphed to Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang to designate commanders of Chinese troops in various districts in Manchuria who are to receive the transfer of territories vacated by Japanese troops, and to assume all responsibility for the establishment of law and order in those places disturbed by Japanese troops.

Chinese Legation,

Washington, October 5, 1931.

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Handed by Mr. Yang Kwai  
to Mr. Miller Oct 5, 1931  
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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



*Handed by Mr. Yung Xuan  
to Mr. Muller Oct. 5, 1931*

*Ram*

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING

Dated October 2, 1931.



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893.0.  
It is reported that Japan incites Manchuria to set up  
a new government and to establish a republic in a movement  
having for its object secession from the National Government.  
She makes use of an organization formed by a certain Yuan  
Chin-Kai, under the name of an "Association for the  
Maintenance of Order in Manchuria", as the central directing  
authority for the new Northeastern political uprising.

It is also reported that Kirin has abolished the commis-  
sion form of government though this report is not confirmed.  
As the territory is under Japanese military control Japanese  
authorities can do just as they please. If this report is  
true then it is done under compulsion.

Today the Special Committee on Foreign Affairs has  
passed a resolution declaring that before the formal return  
to China of the places and cities occupied by Japan, the  
acts of all the unauthorized organizations in various places,  
shall be laid to the charge of the Japanese Government and  
shall not be recognized by the Chinese Government.

Chinese Legation,

Washington, October 5, 1931.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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OCT 7 - 1931

October 4, 1931

Mr. Secretary:

I have the feeling that it is altogether probable that the Japanese are "breaking" every confidential telegram that goes to and from us, in Japan and in territory controlled by Japan. It is not impossible, but less likely, that the Chinese are doing the same thing.

Whatever may be the facts, I feel that we should have the possibility constantly in mind.

793.94/2149

*Skottlund*

*note  
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OCT 22 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 6, 1931.

Manchuria Situation:  
Hanson and Salisbury.

7a3.94  
Mr. Secretary:

It seems to me that we need to give thought to the question of adequately protecting Hanson and Salisbury, from point of view, first, of their personal safety, second, their present usefulness to us as sources and channels of information, and, third, their future usefulness to us as officers functioning in our Far Eastern establishment.

It is not going to be an easy matter to get through in its integrity information which they undertake to send us currently by telegram. It may be expected that both the Chinese and the Japanese will use whatever means they can to obtain for their own purposes knowledge of what our observers report. It may be expected that they will be more or less successful in that effort. That we cannot prevent.

It stands to reason that the Press and the public (and probably the League and perhaps other governments) will be pressing us for information with regard to the reports which we receive.

It seems to me that, toward ensuring the maximum

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OCT 23 1931

793.94/2150

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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of usefulness to us of the work which these observers are doing, we should take the position that while they are in the field and until their present mission is completed, what they report will be regarded and treated as confidential between them and the Department. Unless we do that, we will run the risk of subjecting them to interference and perhaps personal danger and the further risk of making it impossible, by exhibiting their work piecemeal, for them to produce an accurate and balanced picture in its totality. We should have the whole of their findings before we undertake to decide what portions, if any, we may be in position to put on exhibition. At that time we shall have to consider what effect the releasing of any portion or all of what they have reported may have upon their future usefulness in the posts to which they are at present assigned.

SKH ambach

FE/ SKH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Handed by Mr. Young Kwei  
to Mr. Miller, 10/17/31 Rem  
TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING  
DATED October 6, 1931. file 29.000 4

793.54  
A fleet of Japanese warships arrived at Shanghai yesterday. T/L

THE UNDER SECRETARY

OCT 7 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Major Chang telegraphed that it looked as if preparations were being made for landing troops.

It is reported that more than 50 warships under the command of a Japanese admiral are coming. The situation is becoming very critical.


This clearly sets at naught the understanding reached September 30th by the Council of the League of Nations. The situation is now becoming more critical than the situation which that understanding was intended to relieve, with the result that the trouble is spreading. All sense of justice seems to have been entirely lost.

If an outrage similar to that which has been committed in Liaoning (Manchuria) can be committed along the Chinese coast and the Yangtze River then whole China may pass under the military control of Japan.

It is the hope of the Government and people of China that the nations of the earth, in order to maintain the efficacy of the covenant of the League of Nations and the treaty for the renunciation of war and to preserve the status quo in the Far East and the peace of the world, will pay special attention to the movements of the Japanese fleet which is about to attack China and make a display of force along the coast and the Yangtze, and draw their just conclusions.

Chinese Legation,

Washington, October 7, 1931.



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OCT 22 1931

793.54/2151

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Handed by Mr. Yang Kwai  
to Mr. Miller, 10/10/31*

793.94  
TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING

DATED OCTOBER 7, 1931.

The situation in Shanghai and Nanking is very tense during the last forty-eight hours.

It is reported, but the report has not been confirmed, that 150 Japanese marines were landed last night at Pootung opposite the arsenal and more Japanese squadrons from Sasebo and Kure have been ordered to prepare for mobilization and proceed to China.

It is also reported that Japan is sending a note to China demanding the suppression of anti-Japanese movements and probably threatening grave consequences.

Chinese Legation,

Washington, October 7, 1931.


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OCT 23 1931

793.94/2152

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



October 7, 1931. *File 29-C*

Mr. Castle:

You must read pages 2 and 3 of the enclosure.

*793.94*

The report carries the signature of John Carter  
813.00-PR-Mukden/52  
Vincent and the date Mukden, September 10. Vincent's  
reports have been frequently remarked in FE as superior.  
He went from the Legation to Mukden about five months  
ago.

Herein, he points out that there is in the internal  
situation nothing to threaten opposition to the existing  
administration (Chang Hsueh-liang) and that the tendency  
is toward the disappearance of Manchuria's semi-autonomous  
status and its assimilation to the status, in relation to  
the National Government, enjoyed by the provinces in China  
proper. But, he says, "it is extremely doubtful that the  
international political position of Manchuria will permit  
of such a development. Certainly it would be contrary to  
Japanese wishes and plans, and instances are not wanting  
of Soviet preference for dealing with Manchuria as a  
separate entity". He then goes on to comment on considera-  
tions of internal politics in Japan.

*SKH*


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FILED  
OCT 22 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



October 7, 1931.

RECEIVED

OCT 8 - 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

793.94  
Mr. Castle:

Reference to Peiping's 719, October 7, 2 p.m.

FE adjudges this altogether likely. At any rate, the situation at Shanghai and at Nanking must be very tense.

Might it not be well for you to call Ambassador Debuchi and, in the manner of friendly counsel, tell him that adoption of forceful methods in support of a demand that the Chinese Government do something which, first of all, the world will readily believe that it is not capable of doing and, second, which a majority of disinterested observers will feel that it is under no obligation to do would put Japan in an unenviable position at the bar of public opinion.

It might also be said that the whole world is going to have to be annoyed if Japan carries this thing to a point where it necessitates the withdrawal of nationals of countries other than Japan from their places of residence and business in China and upsets everybody's trade and destroys the one and only government with which, whatever may be its shortcomings, the world is able to keep its contacts and to hold responsible for performance on China's part of treaty obligations and administrative responsibilities.

This

793.94/2154



- 2 -

This could be done without committing this Government as to policy or giving any indication of a possible or probable course of action.

SKH

SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE UNDERSECRETARY

OCT 8 - 1931 October 7, 1931.

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Memorandum of conversation with the Japanese Ambassador,  
October 7.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 8 - 1931  
Department of State

I asked the Japanese Ambassador to come to the Department to speak with me about the various newspaper reports today from China and the attached telegram from Mr. Peck in Nanking. (719 Oct. 7, 2 p.m.) 793.94/1999

As to the demand on the Chinese that the boycott be stopped, the Ambassador said he thought it might well be true that the Japanese Consul General in Nanking had used very strong language since it was the belief of the Japanese Government that the Chinese Government was inciting the boycott. He said that he could not imagine the Consul General having threatened resort to forcible measures on the part of Japan as Japan had no idea of taking any measures which will bring war with China. He referred again and again to war as unthinkable.

As to the landing of Japanese forces in Chapei, the Ambassador said that he had heard nothing of it, but could not believe that anything of the sort was intended unless possibly some few troops from destroyers might have

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OCT 11 1931

793.94/2155

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE UNDERSECRETARY

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been landed. He pointed out that Japan had no Marines to land as we do. The Ambassador said that it was quite true that there was a cruiser at Nanking, but that it was unthinkable that Japan should do any such thing as bombard Nanking.

Mr. Debuchi said that the Consul in Nanking had authority to evacuate Japanese throughout the city to the water front, where they could be protected, if this was necessary, but he had told his Government that he did not consider it necessary at this time. I pointed out to the Ambassador that it would certainly create a very bad impression in the world if, as the newspapers seem to report, the Japanese Government made the withdrawal of its troops to the railway zone in Manchuria contingent on the stopping of the boycott. I said that, on the other hand, the world would sympathize with Japan if it withdrew its troops in Manchuria into the railway zone and, after it was done, urged the Chinese Government to stop the boycott. I told him that it seemed to me very unfortunate to take any measures which would undermine the Chinese Government since, whether that Government was liked or not,

it

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE UNDERSECRETARY

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it was the only government with which any of us could negotiate. The Ambassador agreed to this, but said he felt the Chinese Government was in a very bad position since the Cantonese would apparently insist on the resignation of Chiang Kai Shek and there seemed to be no one to take his place. He said the best man in the Government seemed to be T. V. Soong.

✓ As to the troops in Manchuria, the Ambassador said that they had been entirely withdrawn from two places and he believed they were being withdrawn from others, but not as quickly as he wished they might be. He said that he was not a military man and could not understand why the evacuation was not being more quickly carried out.

I told the Ambassador that we were, of course, very much disturbed by all these reports that kept coming in, not necessarily because Japan was doing something which should not be done, but because as the situation continued it became inevitably more and more tense and might lead to exceedingly unfortunate incidents. The Ambassador told me that he had sent a very long and vigorous telegram to Baron Shidehara about

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE UNDERSECRETARY

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about the wireless in Mukden and also the banking situation in Mukden, telling him that the military there should certainly understand that it was to their disadvantage to interfere with such important institutions as the National City Bank and the wireless with its Radio Corporation interests.

The Ambassador said he hoped I would feel free to call him at any time to comment on reports we got because he wanted to cooperate to the limit.

*WRC*

U WRC/AB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 8, 1931. *FE*  
*793.94/2156*

SECRETARY OF STATE

OCT 8 - 1931

*793-94* Mr. Secretary:

In reference to your conversation with Yung Kwai:

There are submitted herewith two papers which you may care to use.

1. The first is a copy of the note which Johnson was instructed on October 5 to hand to the Chinese Government in response to its request that we send observers to Manchuria.

This you may wish to read and hand to Mr. Yung Kwai.

2. The second is a paraphrase of your message to Drummond sent to Geneva on October 5, which it is suggested you might read, but not hand to, Mr. Yung Kwai as a statement of our position.

FE feels, however, that Mr. Yung Kwai should not be told that such a message has been sent to the League, as this information has not as yet been communicated to any other foreign government or representative.

*RSM*  
RSM:EJL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 8, 1931

OCT 8-1931

This piece, which contains  
a paraphrase of your message to  
Sir Eric Drummond, might be read  
and commented upon, but should  
not be handed to the Chinese  
Chargé.

*Return to FE.*  
*WV*

SKH/ZMF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 8-1931

October 8, 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

OCT 8-1931

Mr. Secretary:

Do you wish that I make an appointment  
with the Chinese Chargé to see you? If so,  
this being Diplomatic Day, I would suggest  
that the appointment to see the Chargé be  
made for a period either before the diplomatic  
hour or this afternoon.

*SKHambury*

*Return to FE*  
*WV*

SKH/ZMF

NOT OF STATE  
OCT 8 - 1931

On October 5, 1931, the Secretary communicated through the American Consul at Geneva, to Mr. Drummond, a message substantially as follows:

It is with pleasure that I note the success of the Council in regard to its resolution of September 30 to which both the Chinese and Japanese governments have committed themselves, and in connection with which the Japanese Government has made a commitment to the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone, and the Chinese Government a commitment that it will protect Japanese nationals thereafter. I wish you to know that this subject is engaging my attention every day; both the Chinese and Japanese are being urged to assert themselves to the utmost to avoid a renewal of armed encounters; and that the Japanese have been urged to withdraw their forces immediately into the railway zone. The necessity of carrying out in good faith the commitments expressed in the resolution of the Council is being continually urged upon both parties.

The course which has been followed since the outbreak of the trouble is believed to be the course which our cooperation in the future handling of this difficult matter should pursue. The Covenant of the League of Nations provides well tried machinery for handling an

issue

793.94/2156

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- 2 -

issue of this kind, and the Council has deliberated carefully in this regard. The cases of the Chinese and Japanese have been presented and have been argued before the Council and the proceedings have been made public. Certain communications and a course of action which should be followed by the disputants have been formulated by the Council; and as commitments have been made by these disputants to the Council, the League should in no way relax in its vigilance and in no way fail to bring all pressure and authority in its power toward regulating the action of the Chinese and Japanese governments in the premises.

Acting independently through its diplomatic representatives, the American Government will endeavor to re-enforce the action which the League takes. The American Government will make clear that it has not lost interest in the matter and that it is not unmindful of the obligations which the contending parties have assumed by reason of having signed the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Pact if and when a time arises that these obligations should be brought forward.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 8 - 1931 October 8, 1931.

Points for possible mention in conversation with  
Chinese Chargé.

— The necessity for exercise of probity and discretion  
on the part both of the governments and the people of both  
China and Japan.

— Evidences of tendency toward violence of utterance  
and of action among the Chinese.

— Necessity for calmness of judgment and of action on  
the part both of the disputants and of other powers.

— The American Government is exercising the best  
judgment of which it is capable in deciding upon courses  
of action which it feels will contribute most toward the  
maintenance of peace and the keeping of this situation  
within such bounds as will make possible a peaceful  
settlement.

— The American Government is playing no favorites.

SKH/ZMF

STATEMENT

(as basis for oral statement to Chinese change)

In regard to Observers (Manchuria):

The Department of State, in its consideration of recent developments in Manchuria, has felt the need of full information from its own sources concerning the course of events there. To supplement the work of its usual sources of information, its officers regularly stationed on the spot, the Department has sent Mr. Salisbury, a Secretary of the Embassy at Tokyo, and Mr. Hanson, Consul General at Harbin, to proceed to South Manchuria, to observe conditions there and to report to the Department the results of their observations. This has been done with the knowledge and approval of both the Japanese and the Chinese Governments. This informal action on the part of the American Government does not constitute the sending of a "commission" or the making of an "investigation". These officers are sent to observe and are acting in the capacity of observers only. Their instructions are to travel in Manchuria, to observe and to report to their Government on the facts as they find them.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
X-8-31  
For approval.  
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OCT 9 - 1931  
SECRETARY'S OFFICE  
OCT 12 1931  
SKH.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

The Secretary of State.

The Chinese Chargé.

(Present, Mr. Hornbeck)

OCT 12 1931

October 8, 1931.

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OCT 9 - 1931

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The Chinese Chargé called at the request of the Secretary.

The Secretary stated that he wished to talk with the Chargé with regard to the Manchuria situation. He said that he had wanted to talk with the Chargé at intervals since this situation began to develop, that he had regretted having been called away from the conversation begun when the Chargé called on him a few days ago, that he had been kept constantly and fully informed by Mr. Hornbeck with regard to matters discussed in the course of the Chargé's conversations with officers of the Far Eastern Division and Mr. Castle, and that he wanted at all times to be kept informed as fully as possible with regard to matters which the Chargé might wish to bring to his attention and with regard to the situation in general. He said that he had found that he would have a period free this morning and had immediately asked that the Chargé be asked to call on him.

The Chargé said that he greatly appreciated being sent for.

The Secretary said that he wanted to explain his thought and the course of action which he was following with regard to the Manchuria problem. He said that it was a delicate and difficult problem. First of all, he wished to refer to a request which the

Chinese

793.94/2157

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OCT 9 1931

- 2 -

Chinese Government had made that the American Government send observers to Manchuria. The Chinese Government had informed us that they were asking the principal governments which were members of the League to send observers and that they hoped that we as signatories to the Kellogg Pact would do likewise. It had happened that we had already felt the imperative need of having more complete and accurate information than had yet reached us with regard to the facts in Manchuria, and we had arranged to send two observers, a Secretary from our Tokyo Embassy and the Consul General from Harbin. We had informed the Japanese and the Chinese Governments. The observers are already in Manchuria.

The Chargé asked whether we had received any reports. The Secretary said that reports had not yet reached us.

The Secretary gave the Chargé a copy of the reply which we had instructed the American Minister to make to the Chinese Government on the subject of observers.

The Secretary then said that it had been fortunate that at the time when the present trouble began the Council of the League was in session. The League has a Covenant in which provision is made in detail for meeting a situation of this sort. The League had acted promptly and had succeeded in agreeing unanimously on the Resolution of September 30. The American Government had been acting while the League was acting and on parallel lines. We had been gratified at the success of the League in adopting the Resolution. In the Resolution the Japanese Government made commitments and so did the Chinese Government. The League expected the two governments to live up to these commitments. So did the American

can

- 3 -

can Government. We have been urging upon the two governments the necessity of making every effort possible toward that end.

The Chargé voiced a suspicion that the Japanese would not live up to their commitment.

The Secretary said that it was better in international relations to proceed on the assumption that a government will keep its pledges than on the suspicion that it will not. He went on to say that we were looking to both governments to make every possible effort. He had observed that the Chinese Government seemed also to be suspicious with regard to our attitude. He wanted to assure the Chinese Government that we are proceeding along those lines which we think will best contribute to the keeping of the peace. We have not attempted to go into the question of right and wrong in the dispute; for the moment we are concerned with the question of peace.

The Chargé said that the matter was one of vital concern to the Chinese.

The Secretary said that it was of concern to the whole world. He said that we are not taking sides, that we are working to prevent conflict, that we will be equally opposed to any party that makes trouble, and that we are "playing no favorites". He said that the situation calls for calmness and self-restraint, even repression. The public is agitated in China and the public is agitated in Japan. The governments must try to keep their people in control. Action that is likely to give provocation should be avoided.

The

- 4 -

The Chargé thanked the Secretary for calling him in and thus clearly outlining this Government's attitude and course of action.

The Secretary said that he hoped that the Chargé would come to us at any time and he would make it a point to find time to receive him whenever the Chargé felt that it was necessary.

With that, the conversation ended.

SKH.

FE:SKH/ZMF



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

OCT 12 1931

October 8, 1931.

Mr. Osborne, Counselor of the  
British Embassy.

Mr. Hornbeck.

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OCT 24 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Subject: Sending of Observers to Manchuria.

793.94

Mr. Osborne called and read and showed to me the texts of several telegrams received by the British Embassy from London. These telegrams were in part repeats of telegrams received by the British Foreign Office from the British Minister in China. The substance of the whole was that the Chinese Government had asked the British Government and others to send observers to Manchuria. Before receipt of the Chinese Government's request, the British Minister to China had been on the point of sending a Secretary of Legation and a Military Attaché to Manchuria, but in view of the Chinese Government's request he was withholding action and referring the request to his Government. The British Government had telegraphed to the French and other Governments that it was willing to do two things: (a) to send observers and (b) to address both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments calling on them to refrain from hostilities, provided the other Governments would agree to do likewise.

I explained to Mr. Osborne that we had had a similar request from the Chinese Government and that we had been in the fortunate position of being able to reply that we had already sent our observers.

There

793.94/2158

FILED  
OCT 22 1931

- 2 -

There followed some discussion of the capacity of observers and the distinction between observation by them in the capacity of reporters to their own governments and the function which might be that of observers who would attempt to make a common report. Mr. Osborne said that his understanding of the Chinese Government's proposal was that each set of observers should report to its own government. I said that that was what the American observers were doing, namely, to report to the American Government. I said that newspaper reports here had indicated that there had been some kind of observers of each of four governments, American, British, French and Spanish, in Manchuria, but that reports from Geneva indicated that Geneva was not sure how many observers or of what countries were there.

Mr. Osborne said that he believed his Government wanted to send observers for its own information. I said that I thought it might be said that this Government hoped that they would.

The conversation there ended, with a statement by Mr. Osborne that if he received additional information on this subject he would at once communicate it and a statement by Mr. Hornbeck that he would be glad to try to reciprocate.

SKH

SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING

DATED OCTOBER 9, 1931.

793.94  
Twelve Japanese aeroplanes yesterday attacked Chinchow on the Peking-Mukden line by dropping more than fifty bombs and firing machine guns, killing one Russian professor, one soldier and fourteen civilians, and wounding more than twenty people. There was considerable damage to the railway station, including the destruction of three locomotives, other damages being under investigation.

The League circle has already been informed of this serious occurrence and is considerably alarmed.


The Department's attention should be drawn to the fact that the provincial capital has been removed to Chinchow since the occupation of Shenyang (Mukden).

Chinese Legation,

Washington, October 9, 1931.

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OCT 22 1931



793.94/2159

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

X-10  
7 p.m.

Mr. ~~Secretary~~,

This for your  
information.

It need not be  
acted on, I think,  
until tomorrow or  
Monday.

SKH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

Handled by Mr. Jung Kwai  
To Mr. Miller October 10, 1931  
4:30 p.m. Rm

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING  
DATED OCTOBER 9, 1931.

OCT 12 1931



793.94  
note  
823.0146

The Chinese Minister in Tokyo notified the Japanese Government on October 6th that General Chang Tso Hsiang and General Wang Shu Chang had been appointed representatives to take over places to be evacuated and asked for telegraphic instructions to the military commanders to begin to hand over. No reply has been received up to this date. The Chinese Minister has been instructed to deliver a second note as follows:

"The fulfilment of the Council's resolution of September 30th, requires the immediate transfer to Chinese authorities of localities occupied by Japanese troops since September 18th. The Chinese Government, having pledged itself to assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals during the process of withdrawal of Japanese troops and the reestablishment of local Chinese authorities and police forces, notified the Japanese Government on October 6th of the appointment of its representatives, and asked it to make immediate arrangements to enable Chinese troops to effectively take possession of the evacuated localities and

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OCT 22 1931  
and

793.94/2160

- 2 -

and thus to protect the lives and property of residents in conformity with the undertaking given to the Council.

"As no reply has been received and matters are extremely urgent, I am instructed to request (1) that the Japanese Government indicate the immediate localities to be taken over this week, and (2) that in the course of the day instructions be telegraphed to the military commanders so that reoccupation can begin tomorrow.

"I have the honor to add that copies of the present note are being communicated to the League Council and the Department of State and that reports of daily progress will be telegraphed to Geneva and Washington."

Please ask immediately the Department of State to wire instructions to Peiping authorizing military or civilian representatives to accompany each unit proceeding to occupy the evacuated territories. All facilities will be given to these representatives to remain in contact by telegraph and wireless with their Legation and with Geneva. Reports of daily progress will be telegraphed to Washington and Geneva and their texts will be discussed with these representatives beforehand.

This is a matter of extreme urgency and the Chinese Government will welcome any suggestions as to the most effective

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-12-75

*Handed to Mr. Young Kwan  
by Mr. Miller October 13, 1971  
RHM*


*793.94*

Referring to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' telegram of October 9 to the Chinese Legation, a copy of which was left at the Department by the Chinese Charge on October 10, note has been made of and consideration is being given to the Chinese Government's request thus conveyed that the Department of State issue to the American Legation at Peiping instructions authorizing military or civilian representatives to accompany each Chinese unit proceeding to occupy evacuated territories.

793.94/2160

*FE/MMH.*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE UNDERSECRETARY



October 12, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR.

The French Ambassador stated that he had come to talk about the Manchurian situation. The Secretary came in to say a few words to him about the Kellogg Pact and cooperation with the League. He told the Ambassador that it seemed that the time had come that the provisions of the Kellogg Pact probably should be invoked; that he had suggested this to Sir Eric Drummond, but that in a telephone conversation with Mr. Gilbert in Geneva this morning Mr. Gilbert had said that Sir Eric was afraid of invoking the Pact at this moment for fear that it might bring up other issues which would make settlement of the Manchurian problem more difficult. He suggested to the Ambassador that it might be well to telegraph to Mr. Briand, who will attend the meeting of the council tomorrow, informing him of our feeling in the matter, and assuring him that if the League should decide to call to the attention of

of

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OCT 13 1931



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of the Chinese and Japanese their obligation under the Pact, we would act concurrently; also the Secretary pointed out that since the League had taken action from the beginning in the Manchurian matter, it might be better for the appeal to the signatories of the Kellogg Pact to act independently to go out from Geneva rather than was the case four years ago when it was sent out from Washington.

After the Secretary left the Ambassador asked a little about the present situation in Manchuria, and I told him what our feeling was. He said that in general, although he thought the Japanese had of course gone too far and that they had not lived up to the agreement made with the League on September 30th, nevertheless his sympathies were with Japan, because he felt that they had endured almost more from the Chinese in Manchuria than was humanly endurable. He said of course it was very serious that the military should have taken control as they have, but believed that the Japanese Government and especially Baron Shidehara, for whom he has great admiration, would get the upper hand of the military before war was actually declared.

U WRC:GMH



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 8, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

The telegrams from China and Japan have been coming in so fast that before a memorandum was typed other telegrams have arrived which should be taken cognizance of.

There are now attached at the bottom of this file <sup>19</sup> telegrams which have arrived from the Far East during the day and all of which have a bearing on the subject discussed in my principal memorandum hereunder.

OCT 13 1931

*Schomburg*

SKH/ZMF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 8, 1931.

793.94  
Mr. Secretary:

The memorandum hereunder was prepared before the receipt of the telegrams, Tokyo's 178, October 8, 5 p.m. and Peiping's 729, October 8, 8 p.m., of which copies are attached. 2010

The contents of these telegrams confirms FE in the view that the situation is becoming more and more serious and we should anticipate the necessity of very prompt action by the League and/or interested governments on and after the 14th -- if there remains at that time anything that they can do toward preventing war -- or resign ourselves to simply letting China and Japan fight the whole thing out between and exclusively between themselves and in their own way.

SKH/ZMF

*Schomburg*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 8, 1931.

OCT 13 1931

Manchuria Situation.

Mr. Secretary:

In the light of the most recent incoming telegrams from Peiping and Geneva and of news despatches, it appears improbable that the Japanese will be able to withdraw their armed forces in Manchuria into the railway zone by October 14 and it is obvious that the situation in China is delicate: the Chinese anti-Japanese boycott has become an important fact, Chinese students, etc., are making attacks on Japanese property and threatening the lives of Japanese nationals, the Chinese public is talking "war", Japanese naval forces are being distributed in Chinese waters and are alleged to have landed marines, and the "positive policy" party seems to have the ascendancy in Japan. The likelihood that China and Japan, if left to their own devices, will be able to reach an agreement for peaceful settlement by process of negotiation by and between themselves alone diminishes.

It may be expected that when the Council of the League meets on October 14 the situation will be such (if not so before then) that nothing short of prompt and rather vigorous action on the part of the League or of outside powers will avert either (a) a complete collapse of Chinese authority in China or (b) recourse to hostilities (in the course of which Japan's armed forces would be able to rout the Chinese at any point and speedily but not without

793.94/2162

FILED

OCT 17 1931

- 2 -

a considerable amount of killing and of damage to property -- causing a great deal of hardship to an innocent, non-competent Chinese populace and a great deal of inconvenience and loss to the nationals of other powers by reason of enforced evacuation, some destruction of property, and disruption of trade).

It appears to me that an effort should be made to formulate a constructive suggestion which <sup>will</sup> <sup>now</sup> goes <sup>beyond</sup> further than merely reminding the disputants of their ~~treaty~~ obligations and enjoining upon them self-restraint. There is need for a suggestion of a "way out".

The League has this case in hand. Will the League think of every possibility? Might it not be helpful to the Council to receive suggestions?

793.94/2049 conf.

I have this to offer: The Council of the League might suggest to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments that negotiations be entered into by representatives of the two powers in the presence of observers appointed by each of the powers party to the Nine-Powers Treaty of February 6, 1922. (Note: This procedure would be comparable to that which was adopted and carried to a successful conclusion in connection with the agreement concluded between China and Japan with regard to the Shantung question, at the time of and concurrently with but not as a part of the Washington Conference negotiations. Then, as now, the Chinese were willing to negotiate with the Japanese but were afraid to meet them alone. American and British observers were appointed and in their presence and with their advice negotiations were conducted and an agreement was reached by the Chinese and Japanese.) There is good authority for this, it seems to me, in Articles I and VII of the Nine-Powers Treaty.

Such

- 3 -

Such a suggestion, if made, should emanate from and appear to have originated in the Council of the League. To get it to the Council, we might need to go about the matter by indirection. Among possibilities, we might perhaps instruct Wilson to convey the suggestion in confidence to Drummond, enjoining secrecy as to the source, but assuring Drummond that if such a suggestion were made by the Council it would have the approval and would be given the moral support of the American Government. Or, it might perhaps be conveyed through a conversation between you and the British Ambassador and thence through British channels. I have a feeling that it should not be discussed either by us or by Drummond with the Chinese or the Japanese and that it should be brought to light, if and when, only through action taken with regard to it by the Council. (Note: if, after we have offered it as a suggestion to the Council, the Council should fail to make use of it, we might then, in the light of facts in the situation as it evolves, give consideration to the possible expediency of bringing the suggestion forward on our own authority.)

I should like very much to have your reaction to this, for, if you consider it impracticable, I shall turn my thought to other possibilities.

*SKH*

SKH/ZMF

AM

GREEN

Tokio

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 7:04 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

178, October 8, 5 p.m.

793-04/2008  
The General Staff has issued an information bulletin to foreign military attaches stating that the banditry and atrocities committed by the defeated Chinese troops in Manchuria make it impossible to withdraw the Japanese Army to their original stations or even to the contiguous territory; that any further withdrawal would aggravate the present situation. A proclamation to this effect was made by the commander of the troops in Manchuria and is declared to be in complete accordance with the view of the General Staff.

I believe that the Japanese Government is becoming increasingly irritated, and apprehensive of developments in China and may resort to further measures to protect the lives of Japanese there. I have just been informed orally by the Foreign Office that a note is being sent to Nanking complaining of the anti-Japanese activities in intramural China.

Repeated to Peiping.

NEVILLE

KLP  
HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

AM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 6:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY

729, October 8, 8 p.m.

Following information just received from (?)

of Young Marshal's office.

793.94/2010  
"Between one and two fifteen this p.m. twelve Japanese airplanes flew over Chinchow, new seat of the Chinese provincial government in Manchuria and dropped 36 bombs, chiefly directly at the University buildings and House Provincial Government. Buildings were damaged but casualties so far unknown. A bomb was dropped on service car number 141 killing two Chinese cleaners and one was dropped on the locomotive sheds. Telegraph lines between Chinchow and Shankaikwan interrupted."

JOHNSON

CSB

FEZ

AM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 6:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

726, October 8, 9 a.m.

FROM LIEUTENANT BROWN AT MUKDEN TO NAVAL ATTACHE

"October 7, 4 p.m

193-44/2007  
It is confirmed that 300 Japanese Infantry plus field  
artillery left Mukden 2 o'clock this morning for  
Hsinmin area Peiping-Mukden Railroad to reinforce detachments  
there. Six airships departed daybreak. Headquarters reports  
that Chinese forces straggling towards Chinchow terrifying  
district."

JOHNSON

KLP

HPD

(Chinese)



*FE*

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated 8, 1931

Rec'd 6:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

728, October 8, 2 p. m.

Following from American Consul General at Nanking:

793-94/2009  
"October 7, 5 p. m. A responsible official of the Chinese Government October 7, 2 p. m. told me that the Government takes seriously a report which has reached it that the Japanese have landed forces in and bombarding Nanking. He said that he told me this so I could make plans to protect myself from the trouble which would inevitably follow either action. He asks that I informally convey this warning to other consulates."

Repeated to Tokyo. Has the Department any information as to the intentions of the Japanese Government in this respect?

JOHNSON

CSB

*FZE*

AM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 4:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

725, October 8, 8 a.m.

*725-24/2164*  
Kuo Wen report from Nanking seventh "Meeting was held at residence of Dr. H. H. Kung this evening to discuss Japanese protest against anti-Japanese boycott movement in China. Among those present were General Chiang Kai Shek, Mr. Tai Chi Tao, Mr. Shao Li Tze and Departmental heads of Waichiaopu.

It was unanimous opinion of those present that boycott movement is spontaneous movement of Chinese people and that so long as it is conducted along peaceful and legal lines National Government cannot very well check it without opposition of masses. However, Government will instruct Provincial Authorities to afford special protection to Japanese life and property in their midst so that no untoward incidents may occur.

Meeting decided to cable Dr. Alfred Sze instructing him to advise League of Nations with attitude of Government in regard to boycott movements."

JOHNSON

0319 SB 80CT  
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GRAY

Canton via. N. R.

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

October 8, 4 p.m.

My October 5, 1 p.m.

A member of the State Council has informed me that on October 6 a telegram was received from Chiang Kai Shek stating that he could not resign pending reorganization of the Government since in the interim the Government would be without a responsible head. Leaders here are skeptical of his good faith and are reluctant to send delegates to Shanghai until at least Hu Han Min is released. They are still hopeful of an agreement as outcome of personal reproof by Chen Ming Shu (#) Chiang after arrival at Nanking.

Repeated to the Department, Legation Nanking.

BALLANTINE

CSB

(#) Omission

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 9:55 a. m.

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Secretary of State,  
Washington.

723, October 7, 6 p. m.

In reference to Legation's 708, October 6, noon,  
Consul General at Nanking reports further under date of  
October 6, 11 a. m. and October 6, 3 p. m.

"One. Soong gave me the information reported in  
my October 4, 10 p. m. and added that Shidehara had  
convinced the State Department, according to his  
report, that the civil element in the Japanese Govern-  
ment still controlled the military and that troops  
would be withdrawn as required. Soong cannot but  
feel that withdrawal will not be accomplished unless  
a strong stand is taken by the League or by one or  
more powerful nations independently of the League.

As part of his grounds for holding this view he said  
that Chang Kaing, President of the Bank of China in  
the days immediately following September 18th had  
spoken with Count Uchida and Kimura of the South Man-  
churia Railway Company.

(END PART ONE)

CSB

JOHNSON

FE

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GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 9:45 a. m.

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793.94/2006  
Secretary of State,

Washington.

723 (2)

6 pm (!)  
723, October 7, 11 p. m. (PART TWO).

Editor of the SOUTH MANCHURIA DAILY NEWS with the  
Japanese Consul General and with other Japanese and  
that all had spoken of the two wars Japan had waged  
for Manchuria and had said that since events had taken  
their present course Japan would not relinquish this  
area.

Two. I inquired what steps China was taking on  
her own part to ascertain whether Japanese troops were  
being withdrawn and he replied that the Chinese Govern-  
ment on October 4th had sent a communication to the  
Japanese Government stating that instructions had been  
issued to Chang Tso Hsiang and Wang Shu Chang to enter  
into negotiations with the Japanese military authorities  
in Manchuria in order to reestablish Chinese control  
over areas progressively evacuated. He said no reply  
had been

REP

2- #722, from Peiping, Oct. 7, 1931  
11 p.m.

had been received from the Japanese Government.

Three. Soong said that if the justice of Chinese position were not vindicated in some way by October 14th he did not think the Government could survive popular resentment if the Government passively accepted the situation".

(END PART TWO).

JOHNSON

OSB

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 9:40 a. m.

DEPT. OF STATE, Secretary of State,

Washington.

723, October 7, 6 p. m. (PART THREE).

"Shortly after our conversation and before his departure Soong sent by confidential messenger a second statement with request that I telegraph it to you. This morning he sent me a note written on the train expressing fear that the statement might seem to you somewhat presumptuous in tone in that it offers advice regarding course to be taken by the United States; he asked me to explain that the statement arose from our discussions of possible action which the United States might take on behalf of China. Soong also sent me Rengo report dated from Mukden October 18 stating that Kwantung army headquarters will broadcast daily from Northern Wireless Station "for purpose clarifying impartial stand of Japanese troops Manchuria and conveying correct information on various Manchurian problems for home and abroad".

(END PART THREE).

JOHNSON

CSB

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REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 10:40 a. m.

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Secretary of State,  
Washington.

723, October 7, 6 p. m. (PART FOUR).

Soong made marginal notation "while talking this evening about how sensitive Japanese really are to world opinion".

Second statement follows "The following facts for His Excellency Minister N. T. Johnson: The action of the League of Nations weakened perceptibly on the reported announcement that the United States proposed to take no action concerning the Manchurian crisis. It is believed here that the attitude of the United States was inspired by an appeal from Shidehara that public pressure on the part of the powers would soon result in a military coup d' etat and the formation of a military dictatorship in Japan, and that on the other hand the Japanese Government desired and was succeeding in

ordering



REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 10:40 a. m.

DISTRIBUTION

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SA Secretary of State,  
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A-G Washington.

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A-B 723, October 7, 6 p. m. (PART FOUR).

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FE Soong made marginal notation "while talking this  
LA evening about how sensitive Japanese really are to  
WE world opinion".  
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CO Second statement follows "The following facts for  
FA His Excellency Minister N. T. Johnson: The action of  
FP the League of Nations weakened perceptibly on the  
TD reported announcement that the United States proposed  
IC to take no action concerning the Manchurian crisis. It  
PD was believed here that the attitude of the United States  
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CI pressure on the part of the powers would soon result in  
VO a military coup d' etat and the formation of a military  
BA dictatorship in Japan, and that on the other hand the  
CR Japanese Government desired and was succeeding in

ordering

REP

2- #723, from Peiping, Oct. 7, 1931  
6 p.m.

ordering military uprisings.

Through reliable official reports from Manchuria  
and from the interviews which the Governor of the Bank  
of China,

(END PART FOUR).

JOHNSON

OSB

MAM

GRAY

PEIPING

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 4:25 p.m.

DISTRIBUTION Secretary of State

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Washington

723, October 7, 6 p.m. (PART FIVE)

Mr. Chang Kaingau, with General Honjo, Consul General

Hayashi, Count Uchida and Mr. Kimura, the last two as

late as October second, it is clear that both the Japanese military and civilians have the firmest determination not to withdraw troops, and further they are organizing local shadow governments in Manchuria and Mongolia, which will be autonomous and under their protection.

Such being the case, the Manchurian crisis is reaching to a climax and it is to be hoped that as stated United States addressed both to China and Japan the hope that the two countries will withdraw their troops, and as Japan will not carry out her promise of so doing, the United States will make its influence felt in Tokyo, Japan not daring to oppose a firm attitude of the United States of America. This will encourage the League of Nations

MAM

2- #723, from Peiping, October 7,  
1931

Nations, particularly if the United States of America  
would assure it that the United States will view with  
sympathy action calculated to bringing Japan to carry  
out her undertaking to withdraw her troops, which she  
morally bound herself to carry out before October 14th".

(END MESSAGE)

JOHNSON

CIB

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

PEIPING

Dated October 7, 1931

Rec'd 8th, 6:34 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

724, October 7, 7 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

My telegram No. 721, October 7, 4 p. m.

703.94/2011  
I know of no adequate reasons for my proceeding to Nanking. In view of the fact that I had told my British and French colleagues that I do not expect to go South at this time I have informed them of present change in plans and I expect that they also may go south.

We all agree that the situation is fraught with serious possibilities but are somewhat doubtful whether moderating influence at Nanking would be effective unaccompanied by similar influences at Tokyo calculated to justify confidence hitherto placed by Chinese in League and Pact for renunciation of war.

There appears to be a real danger of incidents which may cause Japan to move in the Yangtze Valley, telegrams recently received from Peck and being repeated to the

EE  
"not?" [We are getting "service" on this. SKH]

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

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Secretary of State,  
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CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

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"not?" [We are getting "service" in this. SKH]

REP

2- #724, from Peiping, Oct. 7, 1931,  
7 p. m.

to the Department tell of state of great uneasiness  
there and authorities appear even to talk of war.

There is a similar danger here in the north. I  
have communicated to the Department embarrassing  
situation due to presence of Japanese guard in  
Peiping and Japanese troops at Tientsin (see my 645,  
September 24, 1 p. m.). This is one of the causes  
which made it seem advisable for Chiefs of Missions  
to remain in Peiping.

Situation at interior points in Manchuria, now  
overrun by Chinese (?) soldiers dispersed by Japan,  
is very bad. Should Japanese repeat in Yangtze Valley,  
or at other points, measures taken in Manchuria, there  
is danger of this kind of situation spreading to the  
great harm of everyone.

*use* It is my opinion that pressure should be brought  
to bear in Tokyo to persuade Japanese Government of  
the danger to all if present conditions allowed to  
continue and necessity of Japanese Government taking  
early steps to encourage restoration of Chinese control

and

REP

3- #724, from Peiping, Oct. 7, 1931,  
7 p. m.

and administration in Manchuria. I am sure that if the  
powers and Japan permit matters to go along as they  
have been going we are likely to have more serious  
consequences in China.

JOHNSON

JHR  
CSB



AM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 10:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

727, October 8, 1 p.m.

Following from Hanson and Salisbury at Changchun

"October 6, 2 p.m.

793-24/2016  
One. There was fighting between Chinese and Japanese at Nanling, three miles south of Changchun, at Kuanchengtz, three kilometres north east Changchun, and at the main station of the Kirin Changchun Railway at Changchun.

Two. Local Japanese officials have informed us that they learned of the clash between Chinese and Japanese soldiers at Mukden at 12:15 a.m. on September 19th. The Japanese military commander at Changchun sent two hundred of his troops at 3 a.m. toward the barracks at Nanling where there were about 3500 Chinese soldiers. The Japanese attacked the barracks at about 5 a.m. Later they were reenforced by 200 South Manchuria railway guards.

(END PART ONE)

JOHNSON

RR

CSB

AM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 10:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

727, October 8, 1 p.m. (PART TWO)

brought from Kungchuling, a few miles south of Changchun. Fighting ceased early in the afternoon after most of the Chinese soldiers had fled. The Japanese casualties amounted to 43 killed and 52 wounded. The Chinese casualties were 180 dead, number of wounded unknown. The Japanese commenced the fighting by delivering a surprise attack. The Japanese officials justified the action on the grounds that they were afraid that the Chinese soldiers at Nanling, where there were 36 field pieces, upon learning in regard to the Mukden incident, would shell the Japanese settlement at Changchun, and the Japanese attacked to forestall such an attempt. We believe possible Chinese soldiers in question had no intention of shelling nor the audacity to shell the Japanese settlement, so that the Japanese Government were not justified in making the attack unless for military reasons.

AM

2-727, from Peiping, October 8, 1931  
1 p.m.

reasons. The Japanese troops withdrew from Nanling  
on the 20th. According to the Japanese military,  
the next day, Chinese

(END PART TWO)

JOHNSON

JHR

CSB

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 10:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

727, October 8, 1 p. m. (PART THREE).

started to steal what articles were left behind in the partially ruined barracks and a guard of 25 Japanese soldiers was sent to protect the property. The guard is still located there.

Three. It is evident that the Japanese do not intend for the time being to occupy these much ruined barracks. The Japanese military do not permit Chinese or Russians to visit the barracks but the Japanese civilians and schoolboys are daily making excursions to the "battlefield".

Four. The same time the Japanese military command at Changchun sent the Japanese detachment toward Nanling, 3 a. m. on September 19, it ordered 300 Japanese troops  
from

REP

2- #727, from Peiping, Oct. 8, 1931,  
1 p. m.

from Changchun to attack the Chinese barracks at  
Kuanchengtze, the southern terminal of the Chinese  
Eastern Railway. These barracks contained about  
five or six hundred Chinese regular troops, a few  
village police and some Chinese Eastern Railway.  
(END PART THREE).

JOHNSON

CSB

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 10:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

727, October 8, 1 p. m. (PART FOUR).

Chinese police. The village and railway police surrendered as soon as the attack, which was concentrated on the building where the regular soldiers slept, was made in the dark by the Japanese. The Chinese soldiers resisted until eleven a. m. when the Japanese put into action a three inch gun which fired four or five shots causing the Chinese to surrender. The Japanese casualties were 23 killed and 33 wounded. Chinese reports indicate that about 35 Chinese were killed.

Five. The Japanese authorities very vaguely expressed to us the fear that the troops in these barracks might make an attack on the Japanese forces. We believe that the attack on these regular soldiers, whose duty it was to guard the Chinese Eastern Railway, the village

REP

2- #727, from Peiping, (Part Four)  
Oct. 8, 1931, 1 pm

the village police, whose duty it was to safeguard  
Chinese and Russian residents of Kuanchengtze,

(END PART FOUR).

JOHNSON

RR

OSB

AM

PLAIN

Peiping

Undated

Rec'd October 8, 1931  
10:45 a.m.

Secretary Stimson,  
Washington.

Once more Japan is subjecting people of Manchuria to ravages military aggression, killing many, forcing thousands peaceful citizens abandon their homes and take refuge other parts China at time when country suffering from unprecedented flood disaster. Contrary to what has been declared by Japanese to world their troops are not evacuating but are making excuses for extension of their occupation Manchuria. Japan has in past brought two wars in Chinese territory, has for quarter of century exploited people Manchuria politically, economically. Will public opinion of world find no effective means of expressing strong disapproval Japan's unlimited ambition to aggrandize herself. The Manchurian refugee appeal to world for sympathetic action against this outrageous disregard of most elementary principles, humanity and international conduct, which if not checked will have grave consequences.

Committee of the People of Manchuria in Peiping,  
Chinenchi, Chairman, Mukden Chamber of Commerce.


KLP  
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793.94/2163

RECEIVED

OCT 13 1931



BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON.

*Free E.G.C.*  
Oct. 12, 1931.  
*Rec'd Oct. 17*  
*to act.*

Dear Dr Hornbeck,

Herewith the  
substance of Saturdays +  
today's telegrams in a memo-  
randum.

I am afraid you must  
be having a very busy +  
choppier time these days!

Yours sincerely  
D. G. I. Brown

793.94/2163


FILED

OCT 17 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



OCT 13 1931 October 13, 1931.

RECEIVED  
SECRETARY'S OFFICE  
OCT 17 1931

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egc

In the memorandum hereunder the British Embassy gives a summary of information, which they telephoned to me on Saturday evening, October 10, and which I reported to the Under Secretary and the Secretary, concerning action taken by His Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs in reference to China and Japan on October 10. They add that, on the 12th, in reply to a telegram from the British Minister to China, Lord Reading instructed the Minister (Lampson) not to make the representations to the Chinese Government which he had been told on the 10th to make unless further instructed.

A party of observers from the British Legation in Peiping proceeded to Manchuria on the night of the 9th.

793.94/2163

SKH

OCT 17 1931

FILED

SKH/ZMF



MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Minister presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that instructions in the following sense were telegraphed to His Majesty's Representatives in Tokio and Peking on the 9th instant in connection with the situation in Manchuria.

To His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokio Lord Reading stated that he was greatly disturbed by the news of the aerial bombardment of Chinchow which it was difficult to reconcile with the assurance given by the Japanese Government to the Council of the League of Nations that they would do nothing to aggravate the situation. Moreover press reports of the dropping of political manifestoes gave reason to fear that this is inspired by a desire to dictate or interfere with the form of Chinese administration in Manchuria. Any such action could only render a settlement by negotiation more difficult. Lord Reading instructed Sir Francis Lindley to urge most strongly on the Japanese/

*Re. Ambassador Tokyo*

-2-

Japanese Government the necessity for moderation in the sense of their declaration to the Council of the League of Nations. He was also to remind them that there was a large British financial interest in the Peking and Mukden Railway.

To His Majesty's Minister in Peking Lord Reading expressed his anxiety lest Chinese popular feeling should lead to attack on Japanese persons and property and thus to Japanese measures of retaliation which would greatly aggravate the situation. He instructed Sir M. Lampson to lose no opportunity of urging the necessity of moderation both in Peking and Nanking and to press upon the Chinese Government the desirability of their reaching an understanding with the Japanese without making evacuation to a point outside the railway zone a preliminary condition.

On the 12th instant, in reply to a telegram from Sir M. Lampson, Lord Reading stated that the above instruction to urge the Chinese Government to negotiate without the above-mentioned preliminary condition was based on the consideration that otherwise in view of the Japanese attitude and the excuse afforded them by the insecurity of their nationals in Manchuria a complete deadlock must continue with almost certain aggravation of the situation as time passed. As, however, the meeting of the League Council was about to open and as in

Sir/

-3-

Sir M. Lampson's judgement the proposed steps would do no good, Lord Reading informed him that he should not take it in the absence of further instructions.

Mr. Osborne has further been instructed to inform Mr. Stimson that a party of observers from His Majesty's Legation was to leave Peking for Manchuria on the night of the 9th instant.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

October 12th, 1931.

October 14, 1931.

Dear Mr. Osborne:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of  
October 12 covering the British Embassy's  
memorandum of that date and I enclose herewith  
an acknowledgment of that memorandum. In this  
connection, please let me thank you for your  
courtesy in telephoning on Saturday and on  
October 12 the information set forth in the  
memorandum under acknowledgment.

Yours sincerely,

*[Handwritten signature]*

Enclosure:  
Memorandum.

Mr. F. D. G. Osborne, C.M.G.,


Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Great Britain.

Oct. 14, 1931

FE:MMH/VDM

*[Handwritten initials]*

*[Handwritten initials]*  
FE



793.84/2163

MEMORANDUM

The Secretary of State acknowledges with appreciation  
the British Embassy's memorandum of October 12, 1931,  
containing the substance of instructions telegraphed  
on October 9 to the British diplomatic representatives  
in Tokyo and in Peiping in connection with the situation  
in Manchuria.

793.94/2163


Department of State,

✓ Washington, October 14 1931.

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Oct. 14, 1931. PV

FE:MMH/VDM  
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10/14/31

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Scot

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated October 8, 1931

Rec'd 4:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

725, October 8, 8 a.m.

Kuo Wen report from Nanking seventh Meeting


was held at residence of Dr. H. H. Kung this evening to discuss Japanese protest against anti-Japanese boycott movement in China. Among those present were General Chiang Kai Shek, Mr. Tai Chi Tao, Mr. Shao Li Tze and Departmental heads of Waichiaopu.

It was unanimous opinion of those present that boycott movement is spontaneous movement of Chinese people and that so long as it is conducted along peaceful and legal lines National Government cannot very well check it without opposition of masses. However, Government will instruct Provincial Authorities to afford special protection to Japanese life and property in their midst so that no untoward incidents may occur.

Meeting decided to cable Dr. Alfred Sze instructing him to advise League of Nations with attitude of Government in regard to boycott movements."

JOHNSON

0319 SB 80CT  
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FILED

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793.94/2164

793-94/2164  
noted  
693-94/12

FE



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

*FE*

AM

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 16, 1931

Rec'd 1:12 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.



*See  
Engert*

778, October 16, 9 a.m.

Hansen, Salisbury, due at Antung from Newchang  
this evening.

For the Minister

ENGERT

JSP

793.94/2165

*793.94*

FILED

OCT-21 1931

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

✓  
AE

REP

FROM

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.F.B.

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 16, 1931

Rec'd 3:55 a. m.

793.94

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

779, October 16, noon.



Re  
egc.

793.94/2166

Local headquarters confirm reports from Harbin that troops of General Chang Hai Peng, defense Commissioner at Taonan, occupied Tsitsihar last night, presumably acting under Japanese direction. Some of the Chinese forces at Tsitsihar are said to have withdrawn including personnel of radio station. Two train loads of Japanese troops reported at Taonan.

For the Minister  
ENGERT

KLP HPD

FILED  
OCT-22-1931

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

REP

GREEN

Geneva

Dated October 16, 1931

Rec'd 9:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

EXTREMELY URGENT.

204, October 16, 1 p. m.

FOR THE SECRETARY.

793.94 / 2117a

Your 90, October 14, 3 p. m.


Invitation to sit at Council table just handed me.

I shall hand acceptance to President of Council at 5 p.m. today. This is one hour before time set for the next meeting of the Council. I shall be in attendance at that meeting. Please note, however, that there is always a possibility that the time for any Council meeting may be changed at the last moment.

I am thus giving you all time possible under the circumstances for publicity in Washington for the invitation. The League is releasing text of invitation now and will release text of acceptance here at 5 p. m.

I am

793.94  
note  
500.0112



793.94/2167

FILED  
OCT 18 1931

REP

2- #204, from Geneva, Oct. 16, 1931,  
1 p. m.

I am telegraphing immediately text of invitation  
and text of the reply.

743.94/2107A  
Your 88, October 13, 6 p. m. As soon as possible

I am also telegraphing text of my opening statement  
before the Council. In line with your authorization  
by telephone/and in view of changes in my instructions  
by your 87/2077 October 13, 5 p. m., I have introduced  
certain changes in the statement which you sent me  
which I feel will render it more appropriate to the  
present situation. I beg, therefore, to suggest that  
you delay giving publicity to my statement until you  
have received the text.

GILBERT

KLP

HPD

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

A portion of this telegram  
must be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone.

TOKYO

Dated October 16, 1931

Rec'd 4:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

185, October 16, 11 a.m.

(GREEN) I saw the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, yesterday afternoon. He referred to a press despatch from Geneva stating that the United States was prepared to have an observer at the League Council meeting and asked me if it was true. I said that I did not know. I added that presumably the United States would do so only if invited and that Japan, having a representative in the Council, would know about it. He said that they had as yet received no such report from Geneva but that communications seemed to be bad as they had only fragmentary reports from Yoshizawa. I do not know how much truth there may be in the press reports in this matter.

My own feeling is that there is not likely to be a war. Japan has no money for a campaign in China and in any case is not prepared to face the odium which would arise from it. China is unable to fight as the country has no organized fighting forces of any military value. Neither side could get any money for warlike activities.

With



793.94/2168

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#185, From Tokyo, October 16, 1931  
11 a.m.

With temper running high on both sides and the Chinese administration in Manchuria in a disorganized condition we must expect a certain number of incidents. I do not believe it will be much more than that. It is unfortunate and trying but it does not amount to a world crisis. (END/GREEN)

713.94 / 2071  
Department's 196. I think the Department's policy of urging moderation on both disputants, with the offer of assistance in any way possible to get the parties to negotiate, is the one best likely to get results. If I have given any other impression it was done inadvertently and I am sorry. I venture to urge again, however, that this purpose should be our only concern; that we should not be diverted in the slightest degree therefrom and that we should avoid getting entangled in League policies on account of it. Such action would raise a decided political issue, which only the gravest international complication could justify, and I do not believe that the present situation is in that category.

The Japanese, I am sure, do not suspect our motives. The Vice Minister assured me so on behalf of Baron Shidehara who, he said, has all along been sensible of our disinterested

AM

3-#185, From Tokyo, October 16, 1931  
11 a.m.

our disinterested friendliness. I have had no opportunity  
to discuss the character of any negotiations.

NEVILLE

HPD

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GREEN

Geneva

FROM

Dated October 16, 1931

Rec'd 10:37 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

URGENT

205, October 16, 2 p.m.  
793.94 / 2167  
Consulate's 204, October 16, 1 p.m.

The following is the text of the invitation addressed to you by the President of the Council (translated in the Consulate)

"I have the honor to inform you that the Council of the League of Nations has approved today the terms of the following proposal which I had the honor to make to it in my capacity as President of the Council.

'In the course of the discussion the opinion has been expressed that the very important question before the Council concerns the fulfillment of obligations arising not only from the Covenant of the League of Nations but also from the Pact of Paris.

This opinion is certainly well founded since in accordance with Article 2 of that Pact:

"The high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever

793.94/2169

FILED  
OCT 22 1931



AM

2-#205, from Geneva, October 16, 1931  
2 p.m.

whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means".

Foremost among the signatories of the Pact of Paris appear the United States of America. The United States were one of the proponents of the pact, and I may be allowed to recall that I had the honor to be associated with the then Secretary of State of the United States as joint author. In consequence, the United States may be regarded as being especially interested in insuring a settlement of the present dispute by pacific means.

Moreover the Government of the United States, with which communications regarding the dispute before the Council have already been exchanged, has expressed its whole hearted sympathy with the attitude of the League of Nations, and has affirmed its desire to reenforce the action of League.

I feel confident that I shall be meeting the wishes of my colleagues in proposing that we should invite the Government of the United States to be associated with our efforts by sending a representative to sit at the Council table so as to be in a position to express an opinion as to how, either in view of the present

AM

3-#205, from Geneva, October 16,  
2 p.m.

present situation or of its future development, effect  
can best be given to the provisions of the Pact.  
By this means also the opportunity will be afforded him of  
following our deliberations on the problem as a whole.

I am sure that any action that might be taken  
under the Pact could not but strengthen the efforts which  
are now being made by the Council in accordance with  
the obligations imposed upon it by the Covenant of the  
League of Nations to effect the peaceful settlement of  
the problem under discussion.

In consequence, I have the honor to address to the  
Government of the United States the invitation contained  
in the said proposal.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the  
assurance of my high consideration".

Text of my acceptance will follow.

GILBERT

HPD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 16, 1931

Rec'd 9:16 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



Re  
Cg.C

OCT 16 1931

793.94/2170

780, October 16, 6 p. m.

Following just received from Hanson-Salisbury  
at Taonan, dated October 12, 4 p. m., evidently  
delayed in transmission.

"One. Arrived at Taonanfu 8 a. m. today.

Two. According to Commander Chang Hai Pang, the  
23 Japanese residents of Taonanfu departed on September  
20; a Japanese airplane dropped<sup>2</sup> harmless bombs on the  
24th; 600 Japanese troops arrived on the morning of  
25th and returned next day. The 7000 Chinese troops  
near Taonan had withdrawn on the 24th. The Japanese  
troops behaved extremely well while here. The Commander  
of the Japanese troops, Lieutenant Colonel Veda,  
informed General Chang that the Japanese soldiers had  
come to protect the Japanese residents, to search for  
the murderers

REP

2- #780, from Peiping, Oct. 16, 1931,  
6 p. m.

the murderers Captain Nakamura and to protect the  
Ssuningai-Taonanfu Railway.

(END PART ONE).

ENGERT

KLP

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

REF

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 16, 1931

Rec'd 9:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

780, October 16, 6 p. m. (PART TWO).

in which the Japanese were financially interested.

Three. A Japanese employee South Manchuria Railway here informed us that the Chinese invited the Japanese troops to come to protect the city from the troops which had fled and who might become brigands. This the Chinese officials deny. Considering the dislike of the Chinese here for the Japanese, it appears to us that the Chinese did not invite the Japanese troops to come. This Japanese also informed us that five Japanese had returned before the Japanese troops came. We could not ascertain why they were withdrawn.

Four. General Chang stated that on October 15th he would

REP

2- #780, from Peiping, Oct. 16, 1931,  
9:45 a. m.

he would assume office as North Liao Ninghai Mongolian  
Border Administrator to which he has been appointed  
by Chang Hsueh Liang, but which he claims the Chinese  
and Mongols of this section have elected him. He  
denied that, although he was in control of independent  
territory, he had made himself independent at the  
request of the Japanese".

Repeated to Tokyo.

(END MESSAGE)

For the Minister

ENGERT

RR

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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OR  
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\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-128

*Partlepong*  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,

October 16, 1931.

69

AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

96 Reference Department's 91, October 14, 5 p.m.

You may give Drummond, under the same conditions as to confidential use, the following material based on reports received today by the Department from Manchuria.

793.94/2170  
(GRAY) One. The 23 Japanese residents of Taonanfu departed on September 20; a Japanese airplane dropped two harmless bombs on the 24th; 600 Japanese troops arrived on the morning of 25th and returned next day. The 7,000 Chinese troops near Taonan had withdrawn on the 24th. The Japanese soldiers were reported to have come to protect the Japanese residents, to search for the murderers of Captain Nakamura and to protect the Ssupingai-Taonanfu Railway.

Two. Information from Japanese sources was to the effect that the Chinese had invited the Japanese troops to come to protect Taonan from the troops who had fled and who might become brigands. This report the Chinese ~~officials~~ deny.

Three.

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-126  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
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## TELEGRAM SENT

### Department of State

Washington,

1-126  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

- 2 -

Three. It was reported that a Chinese official who had been appointed by Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang as North Liao Ninghai Mongolian Border Administrator would assume office on October 15 upon the claim that Chinese and Mongols of that section had elected him thereto. It was <sup>stated</sup> ~~denied~~ that the official in question <sup>that he</sup> ~~denied~~ had made himself independent at the request of the Japanese.

*Stinson*  
*Shy*

*RAM*  
FE:RSM:EJL      *MM*  
FE

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1965 1-126



## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GREEN

Geneva

FROM

Undated

Rec'd October 16, 1931  
12:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

URGENT

207

Consulate's 205, October 16, 2 p.m.

The following is the text of my acceptance.

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication addressed to the Secretary of State of the United States of America, under date of October 16th, in which you cite a proposal adopted by the Council of the League of Nations. You extend an invitation, in accordance with that proposal, to the Government of the United States to send a representative to sit at the Council table, so that he may be in a position to consider with the Council the relationship between the provisions of the Pact of Paris and the present unfortunate situation in Manchuria, and at the same time to follow the deliberations of the Council with regard to other aspects of the problem with which it is now confronted.

I am directed by the Secretary of State to accept on behalf

793.94  
with  
500.0112

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 16 1931  
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OCT 17 1931  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FE  
WE  
AE

793.94/2171

FILED  
OCT 16 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2-#207, from Geneva, Undated

AM

on behalf of the Government of the United States this  
invitation to send a representative, and to inform  
you that he has designated me to act in that capacity.

I beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance of  
my highest consideration".

GILBERT

HPD

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM GREEN  
Geneva

Dated October 16, 1931

Rec'd 1:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

209, October 16, 6 p. m.

Consulate's 208, October 16, 6 p. m.


Council met at six p. m. and I delivered statement.

I understand that you are releasing in Washington.

GILBERT

CSB

793.94  
note  
500.1C/112



793.94/2172

FILED  
OCT 20 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED



AM

Geneva

FROM Dated October 16, 1931

Rec'd 1:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.



URGENT

208, October 16, 5 p.m.  
Consulate's 204, October 16, 1 p.m.

Following is text of my opening statement.

"In this moment of deep international concern,  
I thank you for your invitation to sit in your  
deliberations and to participate in your discussions  
in so far as the Pact of Paris, to which my country  
is a party, is concerned.

The Government of the United States of America  
has been following with the closest attention the  
proceedings before the Council for the settlement of  
the dispute at present unhappily existing between  
China and Japan. My Government does not seek to  
intrude with respect to such measures as you may  
propose under the Covenant of the League of Nations;  
and is not in a position to participate with the  
members of the Council in the formulation of any  
action envisaged under that instrument, for the  
composing

AM

2-#208, from Geneva, October 16, 1931  
5 p.m.

composing of differences existing between two of its members. It has already conveyed to you its sympathetic appreciation of your efforts, and its whole hearted accord with the objective you have in view; and it has expressed the hope that the tried machinery of the League may in this case, as on previous occasions, be successful in bringing this dispute to a conclusion satisfactory to both parties. Moreover, acting independently and through diplomatic channels my Government has already signified its moral support of your efforts in this capacity to bring about a peaceful solution of the unfortunate controversy in Manchuria.

In your deliberations as to the application of the machinery of the Covenant of the League of Nations, I repeat, we can of course take no part. But the Pact of Paris, bearing as it does the signature of the President of this meeting together with that of our former Secretary of State as joint proponents, represents to this extent in America an effective means of marshaling the public opinion of the world behind the use of pacific means only, in the solution of controversies between nations. We feel not only that this public  
opinion

AM

3-#208, from Geneva, October 16, 1931  
5 p.m.

public opinion is a most potent force in the domestic affairs of every nation, but that it is of constantly growing importance and influence in the mutual relations of the members of the family of nations.

The timely exercise of the power of such opinion may be effective to prevent a breach of international peace of world wide consequences. We assume that this may be the reason why the consideration of the relationship between the provisions of the Pact of Paris and the present situation has been brought forward in this body; and the purpose which has moved my Government to accept your invitation is that thus we may most enthusiastically and effectively take common counsel with you on this subject".

GILBERT

HPD

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. C 111/516 FOR Despatch # 157 Pol.

FROM Geneva (Gilbert) DATED October 5, 1931.  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Speeches delivered at the closing meeting of the  
Assembly on September 29, 1931, in one of which  
reference was made to the cooperation of the U.S.  
with the Council in the settlement of the Sino-  
Japanese dispute.

hs

793.94/2174

118F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Mittie O. Gutzkow NARS, Date 12-18-75

DCR

793-94/A

October 15, 1931.

My dear Mr. President:

I think you will find it interesting to  
read the three reports enclosed herewith from  
Manchuria. / 2083-2101

The first two are from the two men I sent  
to make investigations, our Consul General at  
Harbin, Mr. George O. Hanson, and our Second  
Secretary of Embassy at Tokyo, Mr. Laurence K.  
Salisbury. The third report is from the  
American Military Attaché at Peiping, Lieutenant  
Colonel Nelson K. Margette. / 2121

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Enclosures:  
Three reports.

793.94/2174A



The President,

The White House.

S HAMBRECHT

A true copy of  
the signed orig-  
inal


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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED THE UNDERSECRETARY

OCT 15 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR

OCT 19 1931

The Ambassador said that he wanted to tell me in a very confidential manner the bases on which Baron Shidehara would like to have direct negotiations with the Chinese. He said that Baron Shidehara had not expressed these various points directly in his talk in Tokyo with the Chinese Minister, but that he had undoubtedly indicated his policy. He said that although these five points would probably leak out in Geneva they were for the moment entirely confidential. Baron Shidehara would like to have direct negotiations with the Chinese based on the following points:

1. Mutual declaration of non-aggressive policy or action in Manchuria.
2. Mutual engagements to suppress hostile agitation.
3. Reaffirmation by Japan as to the territorial integrity of China, including Manchuria.
4. Japanese subjects in Manchuria to be sufficiently

protected

FILED

OCT 21 1931

793.94/2175

-2-

protected by the Chinese when carrying on their peaceful and legitimate proceedings.

5. Arrangements to be reached between Japan and China for the prevention of ruinous railway competition and for the carrying into effect of existing railway agreements.

Mr. Debuchi pointed out that these five points were all included in present treaties.

only

U WRC:GMH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Huntzger NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

RECEIVED

OCT 15 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE



October 14, 1931.

OCT 19 1931

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR.



The Ambassador asked me whether I knew what the proposal of the League would be in the Manchurian matter. I told him that I could not possibly have any more idea as to this than he had. He said that he was afraid that the League would insist or try to insist on a neutral commission; that this would be taken in Japan as an affront to the national honor and that it could not possibly be accepted by his Government.

He said that his Government, according to the morning paper, has at last become united and that he takes as very important the statement of the Minister of War that he has definitely ordered cessation of any advances in Manchuria. In answer to a question from me he said that undoubtedly Baron Shidehara had also had to back down to a certain extent in accepting the Manchurian situation as it exists, but that the statement of the Minister of War showed that calmer

OCT 21 1931

793.94/2176

-2-

counsel had prevailed. He said that certainly the civil element of the government, as well as the military would oppose any order from the League to submit to a neutral commission. He said that it was feared furthermore that the League might ask a definite promise from Japan immediately to withdraw its troops to within the railway zone or to do so within a specified number of days. He said that he felt that to sign a blank check of this kind might be impossible.

In considering these possibilities he said that his mind reverted more and more to the Shantung negotiations in Washington and that he felt something along these lines might create a way out of the situation. He referred to Article 3 of the Shantung treaty, which established a joint Chinese-Japanese Commission for the withdrawal of Japanese troops in Shantung and to Article 10, which stated that the Japanese troops would be out of Shantung, if possible, within three months and certainly within six months. He said that during the illness of Baron Shidehara he had himself sat in the negotiations which resulted in the treaty and that he had also been on the Chinese-Japanese Commission which brought about the evacuation of Shantung. He said that

he

-3-

he believed a suggestion on the part of the League for similar negotiations in the present instance might be successful. I pointed out that in what he had said he had omitted one point. This was, that the Chinese were brought to accept direct negotiations on the understanding that neutral observers would be present. I said that a similar case might arise if the League should make the suggestion today and asked him whether Japan would be willing to carry on such negotiation in the presence of observers. He said that that was a point which he had been studying very carefully; that at the time of the Washington Conference Japanese public opinion had been so excited over all the other questions which were being discussed, that the Shantung question was more or less incidental and that, therefore, the question of observers had not made any particular impression in Japan; that at the present time the entire Japanese nation was thinking about the Manchurian affair and that to accept observers in direct negotiations might be a hard pill to swallow. I told him that I recognized this but that I nevertheless felt that whatever decision was arrived at, it would inevitably mean compromise and the giving up by both parties of something

-4-

something which they wanted. If in this case China wanted a neutral commission that it would be a far greater thing for China to give up the neutral commission and accept direct <sup>negotiation</sup> / than it would be for Japan to add observers to direct negotiations. The Ambassador said that he fully realized this and that he believed there was real possibility that a solution could be worked out along these lines. He said, however, that the quality of the observers would be very important; that the League of Nations meant nothing to the Japanese and that they would not be interested in observers appointed by the League of Nations, whereas they felt that observers in Washington in 1922, representing Great Britain and America, really meant something.

( The fact that Baron Shidehara brought up the Shantung negotiations with Mr. Neville more or less incidentally and that that has been followed here by a very much fuller explanation on the part of the Ambassador, would suggest to me that this is obviously the line on which Japan is thinking.)

U WRC:GMH

*WRC*

CONFIDENTIAL  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 16 1931

Department of State

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

OCT 16 1931

DIVISION OF  
RECORDS

October 15, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON  
AND THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN MINISTER, MR. FERDINAND VEVERKA.

Manchuria.

793. af

The Czechoslovakian Minister wanted to know about Manchuria and the negotiations in Geneva. I told him that we had had no news today; that we had been sounded out on whether we would confer with the Council with respect to the Kellogg Pact and we had said we were prepared to do so if they invited us. I said that having made that gesture, we were sitting tight, and our attitude towards the League was to give it our moral assistance and not to embarrass its action. In response to a question of his, I said we had no desire to put forward any solution for the Sino-Japanese differences in Manchuria and we were not interested in that, but we were interested that any differences there should be settled by peace and not by war.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

5

793.94/2177

FILED

OCT 16 1931



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE

RECEIVED

OCT 15 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

OCT 15 1931

The Secretary:

When the Japanese Ambassador was talking with me

this morning he said that the sentence in our communication to the League of Nations, reading as follows,

"The Council has formulated conclusions and outlined a course of action to be followed by the disputants; and as the said disputants have made commitments to the Council, it is most desirable that the League in no way relax its vigilance and in no way fail to assert all the pressure and authority within its competence towards regulating the action of China and Japan in the premises."

had created more or less of a sensation in the Japanese press. The reason for this was our use of the phrase "to assert all the pressure and authority". The trouble comes from the word "pressure". The Japanese press interpreted this as meaning something beyond moral pressure. I told the Ambassador that of course this was complete nonsense; that the sentence quoted applied to both the Japanese and Chinese, and that it obviously could only mean moral pressure, that is, moral pressure and the pressure of public opinion which is a moral pressure.


FILED

OCT 19 1931

793.94/2178

-2-

He said that he understood this perfectly, and that he brought it up simply as an illustration of how easily a misunderstanding could arise. He referred to a similar misunderstanding which had arisen in this country on account of Haihara's use of the expression "grave consequences", an expression which Hanihara had not used in its diplomatic sense, but the consequences of which had been the Japanese Exclusion Law. I told the Ambassador that I trusted he would make it quite clear to his Government that in the use of this expression we had no thought in mind except the moral pressure of public opinion.



U WRC:GMH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



October 16 1931.

OCT 16 1931

RECEIVED

OCT 16 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Mr. Secretary:

I am very, very glad that you told the Ambassador at once that this was "complete nonsense".

They ~~have~~ have taken words out of their context. Your suggestion was not that the League "assert all pressure and authority" but that it "assert all pressure and authority within its competence".

It looks to me as though they were attempting to muddy the waters. They of course remember the effective and conclusive use which Senator Lodge made of the slip which was attributed to Mr. Hanihara in connection with the "grave consequences" note, and they are looking for anything on which they can seize to put you in the wrong. They will not succeed in this case, for (a) nobody is going to be taken in by their part quotation of your words and (b) there is no parallel between a note addressed by one country to another (only) (which was the case with the "grave consequences" note) and a note addressed by one country to the League in reference to but in no way taking sides with regard to a dispute which is of concern to the whole world.

The fact, however, that they make this effort should put us on guard: we should exercise extreme care in all drafting that is done and in the phrasing of every communication or statement with regard to this case.

SKH/ZMF

793.94/2179

FILED

THE WHITE HOUSE  
RECEIVED WASHINGTON


OCT 16 1931

EASTERN EUROPEAN

NOV 2 - 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY'S OFFICE



My dear Mr. Secretary:

The enclosed letter from Dr.

Burdette G. Lewis is referred for your  
tention.

Sincerely yours,

*Walter H. Newton*

WALTER H. NEWTON  
Secretary to the President

Hon. Henry L. Stimson,  
Secretary of State.


Enclosure



MAR 28 1932

FILED

743.94  
note  
893.51-*Wilson*  
861.51



793.94  
12180

EE  
EE  
FA  
AT

J.C. PENNEY-GWINN CORPORATION

J.C. PENNEY CO. BUILDING

330 W. 34<sup>TH</sup> STREET

NEW YORK

October 14, 1931.

Dear Mr. Newton:

Recently, I learned from a source, which for the last twenty years has been very reliably informed concerning banking and monetary matters in the Far East and also in Europe, that Soviet Russia is responsible for having "dumped" on the markets of the world the mysterious 244,000,000 ounces of silver, which has pushed the price down so much in the last year or year and a half. Reports had it that it seemed to come from family sources in Switzerland and other sections in middle Europe.

It appears, however, that the Soviet has been collecting for years all of the silver, trinkets and jewelry, and utensils possible within Russia proper; has been melting them down and has been "dumping" them in order to get cash to bolster its credit structure.

Word has recently come from China that they repeated the gathering process in that country where the natives are prone to hoard silver in any way possible. To accomplish their purpose, it is said, they have opened a large store in Mukden, an immense establishment, and have been busily engaged trading Russian merchandise at any figure for Chinese and Manchurian silver trinkets, jewelry; any kind of silver. When the silver is received, it is melted down and "dumped".

X My informants say that there is much evidence to show that this is one of the real contributing causes to the present situation in Manchuria. The discovery of these operations was resented by the Japanese because they are losing all of their trade and did not know what would happen next.

It seems to me that this is worth looking into if it has not been reported upon already and that you will know best what to do respecting it. Our informants say that the consensus of opinion is that the Russians have about reached the end of their tether with respect to this silver and that it may be expected that the International price of that metal will begin to rise before long.

Very sincerely yours,

*Burdette G. Lewis*

Burdette G. Lewis

Walter H. Newton, Esq.,  
Secretary to the President,  
White House, Washington, D.C.

793.94/2180

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE ECONOMIC ADVISER

3/24/32

This file returns to  
my desk March 24, 1932  
after crossing my desk  
rapidly Nov. 3, 1931 and  
going and sliding else-  
where in the interim.  
I should be glad to have  
it marked "file" by whom  
it may concern

72

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE ECONOMIC ADVISER 11/3/31

~~11/3/31~~ Mr. Lewis seems to think  
that Russia is dumping goods in  
Manchuria and instead of trans-  
ferring the proceeds through the  
exchange market to points where  
Russia has foreign bills to pay  
is buying up silver trinkets in  
Manchuria, melting them and  
dumping the bullion where it  
will do the most harm, e.g. in  
London (He does not suggest where the  
silver dump is). This would be a very  
mean act by Russia and rather costly  
unless it can buy and melt trinkets  
for much less than the market price of silver.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Memo

11-3-31

No information is available in  
EE to indicate that there  
have been any considerable  
shipments of silver from Russia  
in recent years. The Legation at  
Koon reports some shipments  
of gold and silver (amount of  
silver not furnished separately)  
since January 1, 1931, from  
Russia to Germany  
(660.M.61251/2)

BR

RPK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

EE: \_\_\_\_\_  
MA: \_\_\_\_\_  
AR: \_\_\_\_\_

NOVEMBER 2, 1931

NOV 2 - 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 28 1932  
DIVISION OF

Office of Economic Affairs  
NOV 3 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject: Reported Russian Silver Manipulation in China.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
NOV 4 - 1931  
MR. ROGERS

FILED

Referring to the annexed letter from Mr. Burdette G. Lewis to Mr. Walter H. Newton (File No. 793.94/2180) FE supplies the following data in regard to the reference to China contained therein.

The Department has received no reports which indicate that Russia is dumping silver in China.

Reports from Shanghai show that attempts are being made by the Soyuzneft (United Petroleum Trust of U.S.S.R.) to dump kerosene and other petroleum products in Central and North China. (Shanghai Report March 31, 1931. - File No. 693.6117/2)

Some business is being done in Soviet products, particularly lumber, in Tientsin. See Tientsin report July 18, 1931. (File No. 693.6117/3.)

For some time past, Soviet enterprises have been dumping manufactured goods of many kinds in Northern Manchuria, distributing them mostly from Harbin.

A campaign has also been instituted for dumping Russian manufactured goods in South Manchuria, from Mukden

FILED  
MAR 28 1932

- 2 -

Mukden as a distributing center. Regarding sheet iron and steel, tin plate and bar iron and steel see report from Mukden February 28, 1931, File No. 693.6117/1. This report also lists other lines of manufactured goods which the Russians are also pushing in South Manchuria.

Regarding these miscellaneous lines, and the retail shop opened at Mukden by the Soviet Trade Representation and later closed, see Mukden report of August 14, 1931, File No. 693.6117/4.

It is not believed the effort to extend the sale of Russian goods in South Manchuria has met with any great success.

So far as Manchuria is concerned, it is suggested that the reply to the letter under reference be made to contain observations something as follows:

"While the Department has received information from time to time in regard to the efforts of Soviet Russia to extend its trade in ~~China and~~ Manchuria, such information does not indicate that these efforts have resulted in any large increase in Russian trade in those areas.

offer  
part  
of  
China

"According to the reports which the Department has received from Mukden, the <sup>Soviet</sup> State Import and Export Trade Bureau ~~of the U.S.S.R.~~ maintained a small retail shop in Mukden for a few weeks last summer but this shop was eventually closed, and the extension of Russian trade in the area commercially tributary to Mukden has been limited."



Stuart J. Fuller.



FE:SJF:LM



October 16, 1931.  
1:00 o'clock. P.M.

MEMORANDUM OF TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN  
SECRETARY STIMSON AND MR. GILBERT AT GENEVA.

EVERETT: This is Mr. Everett, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY: Yes, Mr. Everett.

EVERETT: Mr. Gilbert is here now - just a moment.

SECRETARY: I tried to get you before you went into the  
meeting because I was a little worried.

GILBERT: It was just starting and I could do nothing but go in.

SECRETARY: My reason was I was a little worried by your state-  
ment in your cable - that you had changed your introductory  
statement. I am troubled about that. What did you change?

GILBERT: I can read it. I am talking at the League of  
Nations Secretariat. I would like to tell you that - I am  
talking from a little outside office - the meeting has just  
concluded this moment. I am getting my speech out of an  
envelope that is here - I will have it in a moment.

SECRETARY: I want to express the hope that you did not  
leave out any part that I gave you.

GILBERT: You sent me a slight change in my instructions.  
I will read you what I have said.

"In this moment of deep international concern, I thank  
you for your invitation to sit in your deliberations and  
to participate in your discussions in so far as the Pact  
of Paris, to which my country is a party, is concerned.

"The Government of the United States of America has  
been following with the closest attention the proceedings  
before the Council for the settlement of the dispute at  
present unhappily existing between China and Japan. My  
Government does not seek to intrude with respect to such

measures

793.94/2180 1/2

FILED

JUL 12 1932

Confidential File

- 2 -

measures as you may propose under the Covenant of the League of Nations; and is not in a position to participate with the members of the Council in the formulation of any action envisaged under that instrument, for the composing of differences existing between two of its members. It has already conveyed to you its sympathetic appreciation of your efforts, and its whole hearted accord with the objective you have in view; and it has expressed the hope that the tried machinery of the League may in this case, as on previous occasions, be successful in bringing this dispute to a conclusion satisfactory to both parties. Moreover, acting independently and through diplomatic channels my Government has already signified its moral support of your efforts in this capacity to bring about a peaceful solution of the unfortunate controversy in Manchuria.

In your deliberations as to the application of the machinery of the Covenant of the League of Nations, I repeat, we can of course take no part. But the Pact of Paris, bearing as it does the signature of the President of this meeting together with that of our former Secretary of State as joint proponents, represents to this extent in America an effective means of marshaling the public opinion of the world behind the use of pacific means only, in the solution of controversies between nations. We feel not only that this public opinion is a most potent force in the domestic affairs of every nation, but that it is of constantly growing importance and influence in the mutual relations of the members of the family of nations.

The timely exercise of the power of such opinion may be effective to prevent a breach of international peace of world wide consequences. We assume that this may be the

reason

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2a -

reason why the consideration of the relationship between the provisions of the Pact of Paris and the present situation has been brought forward in this body; and the purpose which has moved my Government to accept your invitation is that thus we may most enthusiastically and effectively take common counsel with you on this subject."

- 3 -

GILBERT: All the way through I stated and then reiterated under that we took nothing under the Covenant of the League of Nations.

SECRETARY: That's all right - you have relieved my anxiety - I was not sure.

GILBERT: Your message came somewhat garbled and I worked it out as best I could - in line with certain things I knew Briand was going to say.

SECRETARY: I think you have done very well - much obliged to you for telephoning it to me. You will keep us posted just as much as you can every day and they will understand that we need to have that done. I take it that the League will help in accomodating you by giving time for you to report to us.

GILBERT: They will do their best. We will ask for meetings, you know.

SECRETARY: One thing more - the situation here in the press has been pretty tense and so to make your instructions so perfectly clear to the press, I have sent you today a new cable giving you the same instructions but in a little clearer language, so do not give out your instructions until you get ours. We have given them out here. I don't think it is necessary for you to give them out at all.

GILBERT: I do not think it is - I have kept away from the Secretariat because it seemed more delicate - was the question of inviting the United States - was before the Council, - nor have I permitted any member of my staff to be there. In my opinion I felt it best not to sit in and listen to a debate of that character - kept away from the press for the same reason only saying we have not been invited.

SECRETARY: Very wise step to take.

- 4 -

GILBERT: Following what I had to say, all of their representatives with the exception of two Powers of Latin America, Guatemala and Panama, made polite statements. I have to analyze the statements to see exactly what they meant. In spirit they concurred with what I have said. Do you wish me to go any further here? I shall go over those statements by those representatives and cable you. Is that answer what you hoped to have happen or do you expect further developments here?

SECRETARY: I expect further developments there. We have no plan to send you. I want you now to seek not to push yourself into the foreground. It would be well to keep modestly in the background.

GILBERT: I would like to get one or two things clear if I may. Of course there is the pact. Do you expect it to be invoked in Geneva?

SECRETARY: If it is invoked at all, it should be invoked only at the instance of the Powers who are assembled in Geneva.

GILBERT: I see. I don't know what they will do.

SECRETARY: I don't want them to pass it back to us.

GILBERT: They answered what I had to say and made no commitments even by suggestion.

SECRETARY: I do not want to have them send the initiative back here to Washington as to the invocation of the pact. Do you understand me?

GILBERT: I did not get it - I am sorry.

SECRETARY: If the Kellogg Pact is to be invoked, that must be done in Geneva and the communications to the other Kellogg Pact signatories must be sent from Geneva. Do you understand?

GILBERT: I understand there is some difficulty in their minds as I understand them and it is that of course it could not be done by an action of the Council.

- 5 -

SECRETARY: That is true.

GILBERT: And it would have to be done outside.

SECRETARY: It is much easier to hold such an outside meeting there in Geneva where they are all present than it would be in Washington.

GILBERT: I can't say whether they will do that or not.

SECRETARY: I want you to insist on it.

GILBERT: You wish me to insist on it?

SECRETARY: Yes.

GILBERT: I will.

SECRETARY: It must not be sent back here.

GILBERT: I don't know. They have not been at all responsive and quite evasive.

SECRETARY: Please listen here exactly and take these instructions. The situation which has been made by the Japanese objection makes it doubly important that the initiative should not be taken here.

GILBERT: I understand that perfectly.

SECRETARY: You must not under any circumstances allow them to get under way in sending it to us.

GILBERT: I know. I will not do that. My question is whether they will do it themselves or not. I see no indications of it.

SECRETARY: If they are not hearty enough or eager enough about the invocation of the pact to do it themselves, then it had better not be invoked at all.

GILBERT: I understand. If they are not hearty enough about the invocation of the pact it had better not be invoked at all.

SECRETARY: We do not ask to have it invoked.

GILBERT: Could you not talk with the representatives in Washington of the Powers?

SECRETARY: We do not want it invoked by the representatives of the Powers here.

- 6 -

GILBERT: Can you not talk with the British and French representatives and others of your desires in the premises?

SECRETARY: I will if necessary, but I want it done primarily by you.

GILBERT: Yes Sir, but it would very much reinforce it if you would say it. There has been no hearty concurrence. They made a great many in their speeches which I have not analyzed. They are very solicitous, but have made no suggestion of taking any definite action of invocation - not in the slightest.

SECRETARY: The incidents which took place yesterday in the objection of Japan to our coming in would be very disastrous. If we should take over the invocation of the pact here, Japan would believe that we have gone into it to do that very thing instead of on the invitation of the League. She would resent it and believe that we have something behind our actions and it would set back the cause of the settlement of this thing very much. The people at Geneva must understand that. Japan's action in objecting to our sitting with the League has very much changed the situation and it has made it necessary to proceed with the utmost delicacy so far as we are concerned.

GILBERT: I realize that.

SECRETARY: And the most we can do now is to keep in the background and not give any occasion for Japan to feel that we are seeking to guide the whole thing.

GILBERT: The Japanese called on me today and wished me to say that of course their objection had been based purely on juridical grounds; they were very sorry they had to take that position.

SECRETARY: You know that is nonsense.

GILBERT: He said their action was in no way directed against the United States and they would be very happy to have us there.

- 7 -

SECRETARY: That is eye-wash.

GILBERT: I know.

SECRETARY: You must not under any circumstances let the members of the Council send the question of the Kellogg Pact here for organization and invocation.

GILBERT: Yes I understand.

SECRETARY: I am sure Mr. Briand will see that.

GILBERT: But if you take it up in Washington with the representatives there and reinforce it as soon as possible it would make a very great difference.

SECRETARY: You mean it would make a bad difference?

GILBERT: No. Could you not do it confidentially with the British and French?

SECRETARY: Get that out of your head. We won't do it at all. It would be the worse thing in the world.

GILBERT: I thought perhaps they would do it for you.

SECRETARY: ~~No~~ That would put the name of Washington to it. It must be done in Geneva.

GILBERT: I thought that the British Ambassador would protect your confidence in that.

SECRETARY: No, he cannot do it here. You absolutely must stand unyielding and absolutely staunch on that question. Rather than do that, we would give up the question of invoking the pact.

GILBERT: I will do the best I can here.

SECRETARY: You had better talk to Mr. Briand at once about that and you had better talk to the British Ambassador and tell them of this talk with me; that if any such attempt as that was made, we would feel that it was better to give up the invocation of the pact altogether. It would destroy the whole purpose and would produce an issue with Japan which would make difficult the whole settlement.

GILBERT: I understand perfectly. I shall discuss that with

Briand



- 8 -

Briand and Lord Reading. And of course Madariaga is very anxious to have that happen here. Madariaga, the Spanish Ambassador, is the only one who has expressed to me the anxiety of the Powers here to take that action. The others have all been evasive.

SECRETARY: There was no reason for coming into this Geneva meeting at all except to give them a chance to consult and carry on there and if they send it back here, there is no reason for you to be in the conference.

GILBERT: I understand.

SECRETARY: You have got to stand absolutely firm on that and say that you have been instructed personally by me.

GILBERT: I will Sir. I will do that and I will do it at once. Anything further? - I will analyze the statements to take a point of departure for the conversations and will then proceed at once.

~~S-HNR~~  
WE:AMW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 17, 1931

Rec'd 6:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.



781, October 17, 8 a. m.

Legation's 773, October 15, 8 a. m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"October 16, noon. Expeditionary force returned to Mukden yesterday after dispersing bandit soldiers. Engagement between opposing groups resulted in small casualties both sides. Traffic Peiping Mukden Railway resumed yesterday.

Reliable information has been received that Talin - Chanonliao Yuantungliao Railway was occupied by two thousand Mongols on thirteenth and Yuantung by Mongols on 14th. On 13th Japanese forces were moving west along this railway to fight bandits".

Lieutenant Brown reports as follows "Anti-bandit force of two battalions infantry, one battalion artillery, preceded by

793.94/2181

REP

2- #781, from Peiping, Oct. 17, 1931,  
8 a. m.

preceded by armored train accompanied by planes left here October 14, 4 a. m. to clear area east of Liao River and north of P. M. Railroad between Mukden and Hsinmin. Due to the operation railway traffic interrupted, telephones sealed and guarded. Expeditionary force returned October 15, 1 p. m. having driven Chinese irregular force, reported to be five thousand, westward Liao River. Japanese casualties three killed same amount wounded, Chinese fifteen dead, no wounded. Headquarters admits the projected repetition of expedition. Sino sources indicate more serious engagement.

For the Minister

ENGERT

OSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-100  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
\$

Washington,

October 17, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

Reference Department's 96, October 16, 6 p.m.

You may give Drummond, under the same conditions as to  
confidential <sup>ca</sup> use, the following material based on  
reports received today <sup>723.94/2181</sup> by the Department from Manchuria.

One. Talin-Taonan-Liaoyuan-Tungliao Railway and  
the town of Yuantung in Inner Mongolia were occupied by,  
Mongols on October 13 and 14. On the 13th, Japanese  
forces were moving west along this railway to fight bandits.

Two. Anti-bandit force of two battalions infantry  
one battalion artillery preceded by armored train  
accompanied by planes left Mukden October 14 to clear  
area east of Liao River and north of Peking-Mukden Railway  
between Mukden and Hsinmin. Railway traffic and communica-  
tions were temporarily interrupted. Expeditionary force  
returned October 15 having driven Chinese irregular force,  
reported to be 5,000, westward Liao River. Japanese  
report casualties small. Chinese sources indicate more  
serious engagement. Traffic Peiping-Mukden Railway  
resumed October 15.

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

FE:RSM:EJL

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-120

793.94/2181

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

FROM  
CORRECTED COPY

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 19 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
GREEN  
GENEVA  
OCT 20  
Dated  
Rec'd 1:14 a.m.  
F/DEW

Secretary of State

Washington

210, October 16, 10 p.m.

Discussion of the proposal to invite the United States to participate in the deliberations of the Council touching the application of the Pact of Paris was concluded at a public meeting this morning following which the invitation was extended. It is understood that the debate today was a formal repetition of that which took place in yesterday evening's private meeting (Consulate's 202, October 15, 9 p.m.)

Briand opened the discussion by reading a letter addressed by Yoshizawa, following an earlier conversation between them, basing objection to the invitation on juridical grounds on the principle that the proposal was incompatible with the Covenant. The letter questioned whether within the meaning of Article 4 of the Covenant the United States could be invited by a state particularly interested in

MAM

2- #210, from Geneva, October 16,  
1931

in matters concerning Article 11; two, whether the status of an invited representative of a non-member state could be that of observer with right of discussion or of fully qualified member of the Council; three, whether a precedent would thereby be established in all questions relating to Article 11; four, the constitutionality of deciding upon an invitation without a unanimous vote of the Council. In his written reply which he also read Briand pointed out that it was not a question of inviting the United States to be a Council member, that an invitation was fully in accord with the previous resolution of joint cooperation and that as the invitation was clearly a question of procedure, a majority vote sufficed. With regard to precedent, he saw no objection to the Council taking similar action in the future.

It has been learned that in an effort to make a concession to Japanese objections, the appointment of a committee of jurists to examine the legal aspects of the question was considered yesterday evening. The Japanese refusing, however, to be bound by their decision, the motion was defeated against the affirmative votes of Japan and Germany, the Japanese delegate explained that his inability

MAM

3- #210, from Geneva, October 16,  
1931

inability to accept the findings of such a committee arose from a conviction that the Council being sovereign the opinion of its members cannot be anticipated by any other committee or body not excluding the Permanent Court of International Justice. He affirmed that he objected purely on a question of principle and that in the fundamental aspects of the matter Japan appreciated "the friendly and understanding attitude of the United States in the present circumstances". Lord Reading vigorously sustained the thesis that the invitation be voted upon as a question of procedure\* as provided in Article 5 claiming that if the contrary were upheld there could never be raised any question of procedure under Article 11 which is no different from any other Article in the Covenant. He urged upon the Japanese representative to content him with discharging his judicial scruples in the form of the protest he had already made and refrain from delaying further consideration of a settlement which Japan declared it earnestly desired.

In a final statement Yoshizawa regretted that inasmuch as his Government regarded the question a matter of substance and not of procedure his attitude remained unchanged. The debate on this issue progressed no further beyond

MAM

4- #210, from Geneva, October 16,  
1931

beyond this point and the decision of yesterday evening's meeting was considered sustained without a regular vote,

Among subsequent observations made by the other members of the Council, that of the representative of Poland is of interest, it being to the effect that his Government regarded the major constitutional question as to who is to decide whether a question before the Council is one of procedure or one of substance or how that question is to be decided was not settled by yesterday's vote but was reserved; in this particular instance he affirmed that Poland considered it temporarily set aside on the ground that the initial decision to exchange information with the United States had been carried by one unanimous vote. The representatives of Yugoslavia and Norway associated themselves with this view.

RR

GILBERT



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

1-1336

FROM

GREEN


Geneva

Dated October 16, 1931

Rec'd 17th, 1:14 a. m.



Secretary of State,  
Washington.



210, October 16, 10 p. m.

Discussion of the proposal to invite the United States to participate in the deliberations of the Council touching the application of the Pact of Paris was concluded at a public meeting this morning following which the invitation was extended. It is understood that the debate today was a formal repetition of that which took place in yesterday evening's private meeting (Consulate's 202, October 15, 9 p. m.).

Briand opened the discussion by reading a letter addressed by Yoshizawa, following an earlier conversation between them, basing objection to the invitation on juridical grounds on the principle that the proposal was incompatible with the Covenant. The letter questioned: whether within the meaning of Article 4 of the Covenant the United States

793.94/2182

FE  
WE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

1-1836

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated October 16, 1931

Rec'd 17th, 1:14 a. m.



Secretary of State,

Washington.

210, October 16, 10 p. m.


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793.94  
with  
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REP

2- #210, from Geneva, Oct. 16, 1931,  
10 p. m.

the United States could be invited by a state particularly interested in matters concerning Article 11; two, whether the status of an invited representative of a non-member state could be that of observer with right of discussion or of fully qualified member of the Council; three, whether a precedent would thereby be established in all questions relating to Article 11; four, the constitutionality of deciding upon an invitation without a unanimous vote of the Council. In his written reply which he also read Briand pointed out that it was not a question of inviting the United States to be a Council member, that an invitation was fully in accord with the previous resolution of joint cooperation and that as the invitation was clearly a question of procedure, a majority vote sufficed. With regard to precedent, he saw no objection to the Council taking similar action in the future.

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REP

3- #210, from Geneva, Oct. 16, 1931,  
10 P. M.

of a committee of (#) to examine the legal aspects of the question was considered yesterday evening. The Japanese refusing, however, to be bound by their decision, the motion was defeated against the affirmative votes of Japan and Germany, the Japanese delegate explained that his inability to accept the findings of such a committee arose from a conviction that the Council being sovereign the opinion of its members cannot be anticipated by any other committee or body not excluding the Permanent Court of International Justice. He affirmed that he objected purely on a question of principle and that in the fundamental aspects of the matter Japan appreciated "the friendly and understanding attitude of the United States in the present circumstances".

Lord Reading vigorously sustained the thesis that the invitation be voted upon as a question of procedure as provided in Article 5 claiming that if the contrary were upheld there could never be raised any question of procedure under Article 11 which is no different from any other Article in the Covenant. He urged upon  
the Japanese

REP

4- #210, from Geneva, Oct. 16, 1931,  
10 p. m.

the Japanese representative to content him with dis-  
charging his judicial scruples in the form of the  
protest he had already made and refrain from delaying  
further consideration of a settlement which Japan  
declared it earnestly desired.

In a final statement Yoshizawa regretted that  
inasmuch as his Government regarded the question a  
matter of substance and not of procedure his attitude  
remained unchanged. The debate on this issue progressed  
no further beyond this point and the decision of  
yesterday evening's meeting was considered sustained  
without a regular vote.

Among subsequent observations made by the other  
members of the Council, that of the representative of  
Poland is of interest, it being to the effect that  
his Government regarded the major constitutional  
question as to who is (?) whether a question before  
the Council is one of procedure or one of substance  
or how that question is to be decided was not settled  
by yesterday's vote but was reserved; in this particu-  
lar instance he affirmed that Poland considered it  
temporarily

REP

5- #210, from Geneva, Oct. 16, 1931,  
10 p. m.

temporarily set aside on the ground that the initial decision to exchange information with the United States had been carried by one unanimous vote. The representatives of Yugoslavia and Norway associated themselves with this view.

GILBERT

RR



(#) Apparent omission

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

1-1286

FROM



Dated October 16, 1931

Rec'd 12:22 a. m. 17th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

211, October 16, 11 p. m.

This evening's Session of the Council convened  
at 6 p. m.

Briand presiding read my letter of acceptance.  
He then requested me to take my seat at the Council  
table. When I was seated he expressed the satisfaction  
which he and his colleagues felt in welcoming me among  
them "on the terms defined as between his Government  
and the Council of the League". He continued:

"We are happy to see a public demonstration of  
the spirit of good understanding and loyal cooperation  
which has throughout conjoined the efforts of the United  
States Republic and the League of Nations since the  
inception of the present difficulties which are sub-  
mitted to a procedure for pacific settlement.

It is the

793.94/2183

RECEIVED  
OCT 17 1931  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

1072224331

FE

MAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

CORRECTED SECOND PAGE

OCT 19 1931

DIVISION OF

COMMUNICATIONS AND RELATIONS

2- #311, from Geneva, October 16,  
1931

793.94/2183

793.94/2183

It is the natural and practical outcome of that close associated solidarity which has existed harmoniously among them for a month past to the satisfaction of the two parties concerned. And is this not the first link which is being established between the United States and the League of Nations since the Pact of Paris placed on record our common determination to seek the solution of disputes by no other than pacific means?

The nations of the world that watch the progress of every world peace will not without emotion see the ranks of those who are anxious to prevent war being thus closed; they therefore consider that your presence here, sir, is significant and symbolic of that public union between the greatest moral forces which are enlisted in this world in the cause of peace. They will welcome as a very great event, worthy in their eyes of justifying the greatest hopes, the fact that a noble nation - like the American nation - which is actuated by ideals of justice and peace, is bringing to the League of Nations the support of its great authority.

On behalf of all my colleagues I have the honor to  
welcome



REP

3-#211, from Geneva, Oct.16,11 p.m.

to welcome you at the same Council table".

I replied: "I wish to thank you Mr. President for the kind words you have spoken in your own name and in the name of the Council.

May I be permitted first to convey to you Mr. President the sentiments of deep admiration and respect which the Government and the people of the United States entertain towards you as the untiring artisan of peace and the co-author of the Pact of Paris. It is indeed a happy augury Sir that you should be presiding over the deliberations of this body at this time, and I wish to assure you of our deep gratification at being once more associated with you in the cause of peace". I then continued with my prepared statement (see Consulate's <sup>2173</sup>208, October 16, 5 p. m.).

Lord Reading expressed himself as concurring in the remarks made by Briand and continued:

"It must be a satisfaction to all of us who are members of the League of Nations to find ourselves associated on this very serious occasion with the representative of the United States, whose interest is in the Pact of

REP

4- #211, from Geneva, Oct. 16, 11 p.m.

Pact of Paris. It further shows most clearly that the objects of the Pact are the objects also pursued by the League of Nations, that is, the pacification of all controversies, instead of the arbitrament of war, is the main object not only of the Pact of Paris but also of the League".

Grandi expressed his satisfaction at the presence of an American representative. The most important portion of his speech was as follows:

"The importance of this event will be obvious to everybody and I see in this a valuable earnest of the continuation and improvement of the cooperation which we desired from the outset and obtained from the outset and which I feel sure will undoubtedly facilitate the accomplishment of the important, difficult, and delicate task which the Council has to perform."

I also see in the presence of the American representative a cause of great rejoicing to us because it shows once again that the Government and the great people of the United States are always ready to work with us whenever the efforts of all nations have to be associated in order to solve difficulties and override obstacles

REP

5- #211, from Geneva, Oct. 16, 11 p.m.

obstacles which have a bearing on the interests of all her countries and of the peace of the world.

The representative of the American Government was invited to take his seat at our table because it was recognized that the question before the Council has a reference to the observance of the obligations arising not only out of the Covenant of the League of Nations but also out of the Pact of Paris, and because it was felt expedient that a representative of America should have an opportunity of expressing the opinion of his Government as to the manner in which, under present circumstances or in connection with future developments, effect might best be given to the provisions of the Pact of Paris. I am convinced that in taking that course the Council has acted with great wisdom. Not only as a signatory of the Pact of Paris but as one of the promoters of that Pact, the Government of the United States is interested to a peculiar degree in the pacific settlement of the dispute now before us, in the same way as we are interested in it as signatories of the Covenant.

Since

REP

6- #211, from Geneva, Oct. 16, 11 p.m.

Since the 1930 Assembly the League of Nations has been seeking means of bringing into harmony the Covenant of the League and the Pact of Paris, and this bringing into harmony of the two instruments has been greatly desired in view of the fact that the two instruments have the same purpose or object; they are mutually complementary and consequently they are called on to operate on occasion in the same direction.

The presence here of the representative of the American Government proves to us that a harmony does in fact exist between the two instruments and therefore their respective signatories should and must work together".

Von Mutius, Germany, expressed his satisfaction "at this demonstration of cooperation at the time when the question of the Pact has been brought up".

De Madariaga made a speech of welcome in part as follows: "The connection between our lines of work is obvious; if the juridical channels differ the flow of good will that

793.44/2183  
CORRECTED SEVENTH PAGE

FE  
7- #211, from Geneva, October 16,  
1931

MAN

good will that runs along them is evidently the same. There is no question about that; if there were the slightest difference in spirit between the Paris Pact and the Covenant, Mr. Briand would not have produced with Mr. Kellogg the Paris Pact".

Matos, Guatemala, and Lester, Irish Free State, made statements expressing their satisfaction at the presence of an American representative.

Sokal, Poland, said in part as follows:

"In joining others, on behalf of my Government in what has been said concerning the cooperation of the United States of America with the League, I should like to add that I feel sure that all those members of the League who are at the same time signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Pact regard it as absolutely essential to secure the closest possible cooperation of the United States of America, who are the promoters of that Pact. That Pact will shortly have to be brought into harmony with the Covenant of the League and I think that work will be greatly facilitated by the effective collaboration of the United States of America with the League of Nations".

793.44/2183

REP

8- #211, from Geneva, Oct. 16, 11p.m.

Nations".

Garay, Panama, struck a different note from the other speakers, after referring to the ties which bind the United States and Panama and a formal word of welcome he concluded: "I venture to express the hope that the cooperation of the United States of America may be soon transformed into a valuable association on a footing of equality with the other states here represented - such an association as the world has been awaiting and desiring for many a year".

Fotitch, Yugoslavia, Sze, China and Barreto, Peru, followed with brief statements associating themselves with the speakers who had preceded.

Thus all the members present except the representatives of Japan and Norway, expressed their satisfaction at the presence of an American representative. It is generally understood that Yoshizawa was instructed not to speak. It is reported that the representative of Norway abstained in order not to embarrass the representative of Japan by putting him in the position of being the only member of the Council to keep silence.

The President

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

9- #211, from Geneva,

The President then called on me and I replied briefly expressing appreciation for the welcome which I had received from the Council. The Council then adjourned.

GILBERT

HPD

GW

(\*) Apparent omission.

REP

2- #211, from Geneva, Oct. 16, 11 p.m.

It is the natural and practical outcome of that close associated solidarity which has existed harmoniously among them for a month past to the satisfaction of the two parties concerned. And is this not the first link which is being established between the United States and the League of Nations since the Pact of Paris placed on record our common determination to seek the solution of disputes by no other than pacific means?

The nations of the world that watch the progress(?) world peace will not without emotion see the ranks of those who are anxious to prevent war being thus closed; they therefore consider that your presence here, sir, is significant and symbolic of that public union between the greatest moral forces which are enlisted in this world in the cause of peace. They will welcome as a very great event, worthy in their eyes of justifying the greatest hopes, the fact that a noble nation - like the American nation - which is actuated by ideals of justice and peace, is bringing to the League of Nations the support of its great authority.

On behalf of all my colleagues I have the honor  
to welcome



REP

7- #211, from Geneva, Oct, 16, 11p.m.

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GREEN

Paris

Dated October 17, 1931

Rec'd 9:22 a.m.



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EGC*


*FE*  
*WE*  
*FE*

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

669, October 17, 11 a.m.

Widespread publicity is given



of the League of Nations for an American observer to take part in the deliberations regarding the Manchurian situation. The ultra conservative French press criticises the action of the League but the more important moderate press such as PETIT PARISIEN, INTRANSIGANT and JOURNAL are in hearty sympathy with the League and severely criticises the Japanese for opposing the invitation.

EDGE

CSB

793.94/2184

FILED

OCT 23 1931

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 17, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 11:16 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

783, October 17, 7 a.m.

Legation's 774, October 15, 9 a.m.



In reply to inquiry from Hanson-Salisbury I  
have informed them that the Legation assumed it would  
not be necessary for them to proceed to Chinchow for  
the present. Does the Department wish them to make  
an independent investigation of the bombing?

For the Minister

ENGERT

RR

CSB



FE  
Reply drafted  
Oct 18, 1931  
Int  
JL  
egc

793.94/2185

FILED

OCT 21 1931

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-188  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department **X**  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State



Washington,

1-188  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

October 18, 1931.  
OCT 17 31  
11a

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (CHINA).

387 Your 783, October 17, 7 a.m.

Second sentence. Answer is no.

*Stinson*  
*SKH*

793.94/2185

FE:SKH:EMF

*PAM*  
FE

793.94/2185

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

1-1236

FROM

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

NANKING

Dated October 17, 1931

Rec'd 9:50 a. m.

Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.  
October 17 1931  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
Department of State

October 17, 9 a. m.

One. Theemura, Secretary to Japanese Legation and  
Consul General at Nanking, told me last evening of  
efforts made by his Government to dissuade United States  
from sending observer to meeting of Council of League.  
He said that Japan would negotiate only with China and  
without observers or interference by a third party.  
He intimated that if China would but begin negotiations  
she would find that Japan was asking little, merely  
that China give protection to Japanese lives, rights and  
property in Manchuria.

Two. Later and after dinner with Soong last night  
latter told me that China would welcome any suggestions  
that the United States might have to offer as long as it was  
that China felt helpless in negotiations with Japan with-  
out the presence

793.94/2186

REP

2- from Nanking, Oct. 17, 9 a. m.

out the presence of a neutral observer; that what Japan wanted was the putting into effect of the 1915 treaties. He did not believe that Japan had any political ambitions in Manchuria, Japan wanted economic control and railways. He expressed the belief that even now, while in occupation, the Japanese were working feverishly to complete the much disputed road between Kirin and Huining. He insisted that China could not negotiate so long as Japan was in occupation of Chinese cities and territory; that no Chinese Government would survive the popular agitation that would be sure to follow the commencement of negotiations under such circumstances. Soong said that they feared the Japanese were just standing by intending to create an incident at Shanhaikwan to serve as a pretext for landing more men at that place and thus cut off the remainder of the Chinese army in Manchuria. He said that this would mean war as the Chinese soldiers would have to fight their way out.

Three. Replying to my inquiry as to what guarantees might be arranged for protection of Japanese during period of evacuation Soong said that China would be willing

REP

3- from Nanking, Oct. 17, 9 a. m.

be willing to accept neutral observers or a vanguard  
made up of an international force. He thought a very  
small force would be sufficient. He wondered what the  
United States might think of a suggestion that China  
yield to Japan control over railways built or building  
in Manchuria, with a dominant economic position pro-  
vided that Japan took away all troops now in Manchuria,

Four. With reference to Canton situation Soong  
told me that the prospects of a peaceful settlement  
were very bright. He said that the Cantonese delegates  
headed by Wang Ching Wei and including Eugene Chen  
and C. C. Wu were to arrive in Shanghai shortly where  
they would have a preliminary meeting. Hu Han Min  
has gone to Shanghai to participate. He said that  
Chen Ming Shu would take over the position of garrison  
commander here, that this was a political gesture  
intended to restore the confidence of the Cantonese.  
He admitted that in the beginning the Cantonese had been  
inclined to use the Manchurian situation for the purpose  
of bringing Nanking to terms but said that all of this  
had stopped

REP

4- from Nanking, Oct.17,9 a. m.

had stopped when the students went after them and that  
now the Cantonese leaders were only too happy to come in-  
to favor again on any terms.

JOHNSON

RR

CSB



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 22 1931

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 20 1931  
Department of State

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF  
STATE  
OCT 19 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM  
OCT 19 1931  
noted  
HLS

October 18, 1931. *file  
89.5.*

Subject: Direct Negotiations with Neutral  
Observers

793.94/2186

In this telegram Johnson reports that T. V. Soong says that China would welcome any suggestions that the United States might have to offer as to a way out. Soong said that China felt helpless in negotiations with Japan without the presence of neutral observers. Soong also said that China would like to have neutral observers attend the taking over by Chinese troops of positions in Manchuria now held by Japanese troops.

The important point for the moment is that China's willingness to negotiate with Japan provided the negotiations be held in the presence of neutral observers is affirmed.

F. W. 793.94/2186

Nanking <sup>1931</sup> Oct. 17, 9 a.m.  
FE:SKH:EMF

793.94/2186

OCT 22 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Kellogg, Morgan, Chase, Carter & Headley

ATTORNEYS AT LAW  
 MERCHANTS NATIONAL BANK BUILDING  
 St. Paul, Minn.

RECEIVED

OCT 8 - 1931

October 7, 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

DAVIS, KELLOGG & SEVERANCE, 1889-1916  
 DAVIS, SEVERANCE & OLDS, 1917-1919  
 DAVIS, SEVERANCE & MORGAN, 1919-1923, 1923-1929  
 DAVIS, KELLOGG, SEVERANCE & MORGAN, 1923

FRANK B. KELLOGG  
 GEORGE W. MORGAN  
 GUY CHASE  
 WARREN S. CARTER  
 CLEON HEADLEY  
 WARREN S. EGE  
 JOHN K. FESLER



Personal and Confidential.

Hon. Henry L. Stimson,  
 Secretary of State,  
 Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Yesterday I received the following message from Wang Chung Hui, which he stated he had been requested to transmit to me.

Quote Chinese Government people determined, offer no resistance to Japanese hostile acts Have absolute faith treaties initiated by your Excellency and accepted by all nations and in sense of justice, fair play of American Government people Stop Chinese Government people would be very grateful if your excellency would be good enough to use your good offices unofficially bring about pacific settlement Manchuria questions in the interest world peace Unquote

Of course I do not know who sent this message beyond what appears on the face of it - somebody undoubtedly in the Nanking Government.

I have not made any answer to Wang for several reasons. I do not know enough about the situation in Manchuria to give any answer. In other words, while I am deeply interested in your being able to bring about a pacific settlement of the Manchurian question, I do not wish my name to be used to encourage the Chinese to hold out for something to which they are not entitled.

I feel as though you have a right to make a strong request of China because she is under deep obligations to the United States for what we have done for her for years. You are undoubtedly familiar with what occurred at the Washington Conference in 1921 and also with the fact that I stood against the British Government and most of the other

F/Hs

793.94/2186-1/4

MAR 3 1933

FILED

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Hon. Henry L. Stimson

-2-

governments in favor of granting tariff autonomy to China and that we made the first treaty with China on this subject. Furthermore, at a time of assault by the Chinese on foreigners including British and United States citizens at Nanking we declined to join in military sanctions to punish the Chinese. So you undoubtedly have a right to be pretty firm in your demands on China.

I do not like to interfere in or muddy the waters in a matter that you are handling. I have felt and still feel that these two countries would not go to war, but all I know about the situation is what I have seen in the press. I hope - in fact I have no doubt - that you are doing everything possible to bring about a settlement of the Manchurian trouble.

I am sending this to you very confidentially and I think it should not be made a part of the files of the State Department. I shall not make any answer to my telegram from Wang until I hear from you. I don't suppose I could say anything to him in any event, more than the fact that I am deeply interested in the settlement of the whole Manchurian question, or something to that effect. Of course Wang knows of all I did for China and how deeply China is indebted to the United States for its stand on various matters.

Sincerely yours,

*Frank B. Kellogg*

FBK:OLH

VIA AIR MAIL

P.S. I do not know exactly what Wang means by asking me to use my good offices unofficially unless it is with the Government of the United States. I hardly believe he could expect me to use my good offices with China and Japan.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 9, 1931

Personal and Confidential

Dear Mr. Kellogg:

I have your letter of October 7. I fear I cannot advise you as to what to say to such a request. The Manchurian situation is very tense and dangerous and has been occupying my principal attention ever since it arose.

In such a case each side is likely to think that the American Government is siding with the other, when in fact it has been careful to avoid any such thing and is simply exerting its entire efforts single-mindedly for peace and without playing favorites.

I have a little reason to believe that the Chinese think that I have sided with the Japanese simply because I have refused to do one or two things which would have played into their hands. That may account for your friend's message.

Very sincerely yours,

H.C.S.

Honorable Frank B. Kellogg,  
Merchants National Bank Building,  
St. Paul, Minnesota

793.94/2186-1/4

A true copy of  
the signed orig-  
inal

124  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1386

RECEIVED

FROM

OCT 12 1931

3po ab 80

SECRETARY'S OFFICE  
St Paul Minn 1115A



793.94  
Hon Henry L Stimson

Secty State Washn

Your letter October ninth I have of course no idea of making any communications to the governments nor to individuals which could be used by either Government under circumstances I see nothing to do but ignore the communications and make no answer as anything I might say might be construed as being deluged with requests by the press for statements which I have absolutely declined to make am deeply interested of course and hope you can bring about a n adjustment

Frank B Kellogg

125pm

793.94/2186-1/2


124  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FRANK B. KELLOGG  
SAINT PAUL

*Per Bud*

October 10, 1931

793.94  
Personal and  
Confidential



*Reply + telegram + translation sent 10/13/31 WE-PM-m&D*

Hon. Henry L. Stimson,  
Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I enclose to you a telegram that I received last night from Nanking, China, via The Hague. The telegram is evidently garbled in sending and I wish you would have an accurate translation sent to me. I think "due Dordest" is "du Nordest" or "of the North-east", which would mean "our two northeastern provinces."

In substance they are complaining, of course, that Japan is taking advantage of the flood which has overwhelmed the Chinese people to occupy their provinces, and this flagrant violation of the Agreement of Washington and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact is aggravated these days by the sending of warships into their seaports and river ports, and they call on Mr. Briand and myself in order that the reign of justice be re-established and that there be not a second Sarajevo case.

I do not know the names signed to the telegram but your Far Eastern Division will probably be able to figure it out. I am sending this to you for your information.

I suppose I must make some answer to the telegram of Wang Chung Hui and to this telegram. I wish you would let me know what answer you think I should send. I judge that you will do everything possible and I don't know just how a private individual could make representations to China and Japan. Of course I am anxious to do anything I can. I wish you would give me the exact situation there and what answer I should make to these telegrams.

Sincerely yours,

*Frank B Kellogg*

FBK:IS  
Enc.  
Air Mail

F/H/S

793.94/2186-3/4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 13, 1931

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. Kellogg:

I have your letter of October 10, enclosing a telegram you had received from Hanking, China, via The Hague. I return it herewith together with a translation; it seems clear that "Dordest" is a typographical error for "Nordest".

Your letter evidently crossed mine to you of October 9, which you were good enough to acknowledge by telegram on October 12. I think you were entirely right in deciding not to answer the communications in question. The situation is still very tense, and we are not relaxing for a minute our efforts to bring about an ultimate adjustment.

Very sincerely yours,

Enclosures:  
 Telegram and  
 translation.

The Honorable


Frank B. Kellogg,

Merchants National Bank,

St. Paul, Minnesota.

PM  
 WE:PM:MLB 10-13-31

HENRY L. STIMSON




793.94/2186-3/4

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED Authority: letter  
of 1-8-59 from W. H. Anderson, State Dept.  
By W. H. Anderson Date 4-22-64

793-94

not  
861.77-cc

711



OK.  
October 15, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON  
AND MR. CHARLES R. CRANE.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 17 1931  
Department of State

Le  
Eg

Manchuria.

Mr. Crane came to tell me of how he had been starting a movement to send Japanese Christians into China and that one of them, Mr. Toyohiko Kagawa, had just been there. Mr. Crane spoke very highly of Mr. Kagawa, saying that he had won great influence and credit among the Chinese. He said Mr. Kagawa was in New York when the present outbreak in Manchuria came and that he was broken-hearted that his country, Japan, had taken a step which would so upset this work.

Talking over the situation in general, Mr. Crane said he did not see how Japan could have acted without having some understanding with Russia by which Russia would get the Chinese Eastern Railway, which she wanted, and would in return consent to Japan's consolidating her position in Southern Manchuria.

In respect to the situation at Geneva, Mr. Crane said that he thought I was in a perfect position, that I had made my gesture and all I had to do was to sit tight now and to let them do the worrying.

FILED  
OCT 16 1931

793.94/2187

HLS.

S HLS:HHR



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

1-1236

FROM



GREEN

Berne

Dated October 17, 1931

Rec'd 11:35

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 21

DIVISION OF

WESTERN AFFAIRS

RECEIVED

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

181, October 17, 10 a.m.

Reviewing last evening's Council meeting JOURNAL DE  
GENEVA this morning over initials of William Martin  
says in part as follows;

"It is not only in law that Japan has placed herself  
in an unfortunate position but also in fact. It is  
evident that the Council was deciding a question of  
high policy under the guise of legal discussion. It  
is that fact which should have prevented Japan, if only  
as a matter of tactics, from placing obstacles in the  
way of a result which for all members of the League  
of Nations must appear to be the beginning of a new era.

It is that thought which under various forms  
all the members of Council expressed in the meeting  
yesterday afternoon. Had it not been for the  
abstention of Norway for which no doubt there was  
political reason, Japan would have found herself in  
a tragic isolation. -- an intruder in a family party.

It is sad, when one understands the desire of the  
Council

793.94/2188

OCT 24 1931

AM

2-#181, From Berne, October 17, 1931  
10 a.m.

Council to save Japan, to spare her amour propre, to spare her a check in the eyes of the world, to see the representative of the Japanese Government force his colleagues into inflicting a public condemnation which was repugnant to them. In any case he must have been conscious this evening of the first results of this situation. For this reason the speeches which in appearance were merely academic discourses' were in reality statements of the highest political importance.

GREENE

HPD

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

GREEN

Geneva

Dated October 17, 1931

Recd 9 p.m.

Secretary of State AND

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

212, October 17, 9 p.m.

FOR THE SECRETARY.

The following is taking place with respect to the invocation of the Pact of Paris:

One. The Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain and Italy are telegraphing at ten o'clock tonight from Geneva to Tokyo and Peiping (or Nanking) informing the Japanese and Chinese Governments respectively through diplomatic channels that the Pact is formally invoked respecting the situation in Manchuria.

Two. Germany and Spain are taking the same action from Berlin and Madrid respectively.

Three. The text of these identic telegrams reads as follows:

"The (blank) government has followed with anxiety the development of events in Manchuria, which, since September 18 have created a disquieting situation between China and Japan."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
OCT 19 1931  
DIVISION OF

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 19 1931  
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OCT 19 1931  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

793.94  
note  
500.C/112

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FILED

OCT 23 1931

-2- # 212, from Geneva, October 17,  
1931, 9 p.m.

Japan.

This situation has already been laid before the Council of the League of Nations which is making active efforts to arrive at a settlement and in these efforts my government's representative is associate.

My government further considers it to be its duty to call the attention of the Chinese (or Japanese) Government, a co-signatory with itself, of the Pact for the Renunciation of War of August 27, 1928 to the provisions of that pact and especially to Article two by which (here follows Article two).

Public opinion throughout the world expects the two governments to adhere to the undertakings thus assumed. My government is confident that this hope will not be disappointed and that the two governments concerned, bearing in mind the scope of these solemn undertakings and of the obligations thereby imposed upon them towards the other signatories of the Pact, will be careful to refrain from taking any step that might endanger the success of the efforts already in progress to secure the settlement by peaceful means of the conflict that has arisen between them."

Four. French Government will telegraph notifications of this action to all signatories of the Pact of Paris in the name

-3- #212, from Geneva, October 17,  
1931, 9 p.m.

the name of France, Great Britain, Italy, Germany and Spain.

Five. A press communiqué is being issued from Geneva in the following terms:

"The members of the Council, with the exception of the two parties concerned, continued their examination of the Sino-Japanese conflict today, and discussed what proposals might be submitted to the two parties. Further, the members of the Council who are also signatories of the Pact of Paris decided that their governments should call the attention of the Governments of Nanking and Tokyo to the obligations which they have undertaken under Article two of this Pact. This article reads as follows (here follows Article two).

GILBERT

FW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAN

1-1236

FROM

GREEN

GENEVA

Dated October 18, 1931

Rec'd 9:26 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

URGENT


214, October 18, 1 p.m.

Consulate's 212, October 17, 9 p.m.

The Foreign Minister of Norway who is sitting on the Council informed me this morning that he telegraphed last night from Geneva to Norwegian Minister at Tokyo and to Norwegian Consul General at Shanghai an invocation of the Pact of Paris indentic with the text cited in the Consulate's telegram under reference.

GILBERT

RR  
FW



793.94/2190

FILED

OCT 20 1931

note  
500.C112

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 19, 1931.

~~REU:~~  
SKH:

I assume, although I am not positive that this assumption is correct, that the second paragraph of telegram No. 788 of October 18, 11 a.m., from Peiping, means that the Japanese Consul has advised Japanese merchants of Chefoo to endeavor to settle all outstanding disputes which have arisen in regard to the payment of customs duties and which are in the process of being decided in accordance with the provisions of Rule I of the "Import Tariff Provisional Rules".

I have made the above assumption as I know of no special customs matters in dispute at Chefoo.



JEF/VDM *per*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

GRAY

1-1836

FROM

PEIPING


RECEIVED  
OCT 18 1931

Dated October 18, 1931

DIVISION OF

Rec'd 4:40 a.m.

Secretary of State



Washington

788, October 18, 11 a.m.

From Consul at Chefoo, October 16, 3 p.m.

"Beginning tomorrow Japanese merchandise is not to be permitted to be discharged or handled. This will be enforced by anti-Japanese boycott organization which apparently has approval of Kuomintang authorities.

Confidential. I learn that local Japanese merchants have been advised by their Consul to endeavor to secure settlement of all outstanding customs duties".

For the Minister

Engert

GW

795.94  
note  
693.9412

795.94/2191



# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

1-1228

FROM

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated October 17, 1931

Rec'd 11:45 a., 18th.

Secretary of State

Washington

URGENT

213, October 17, 12 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.



Private meetings of the Council were held at eleven thirty and six p.m., today. Consideration was given to further Council action vis a vis Japan and China of the situation in Manchuria. In these meetings the Chinese and Japanese representatives were not present.

I was in attendance (of course taking no part) at both meetings.

At the close of the second meeting the following draft on the situation was formulated and distributed to the members of the Council Committee for study as a basis of a possible program of action.

This resolution will be discussed at a private

/ Council meeting to be held at eleven am., tomorrow, Sunday, Resolution



793.94/2192

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MAN

2- #213, from Geneva, October 17,  
1931

Resolution follows:

(GREEN) "The Council, in pursuance of the resolution passed  
on the 30th September;

One. Having requested the parties to do all in  
their power to hasten the restoration of normal relations  
between them, assumes that neither party will resort to  
aggressive policy or action and that the two governments  
will take every possible measure for the suppression of  
hostile agitation, and notes the assurances already given  
on this point;

Two. Having noted the statement of the Japanese  
representative that the Japanese Government would continue  
as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into  
the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives  
and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured  
and the statement of the Chinese representative that his  
government will assume the responsibility for the safety  
of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside  
that zone, assumes that the pledge of the Chinese Govern-  
ment includes the extension of efficient protection to  
Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria;

Three.

MAN

2- #213, from Geneva, October 17,  
1931

Resolution follows:

(GREEN) "The Council, in pursuance of the resolution passed on the 30th September;

One. Having requested the parties to do all in their power to hasten the restoration of normal relations between them, assumes that neither party will resort to aggressive policy or action and that the two governments will take every possible measure for the suppression of hostile agitation, and notes the assurances already given on this point;

Two. Having noted the statement of the Japanese representative that the Japanese Government would continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and the statement of the Chinese representative that his government will assume the responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone, assumes that the pledge of the Chinese Government includes the extension of efficient protection to Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria;

Three.

MAM

3- #213, from Geneva, October 17,  
1931

Three. Having recognized the importance of the Japanese statement that Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria, notes that this statement is in accordance with the terms of the Nine Power Treaty, the signatories of which are pledged to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

Four. Considers that these engagements and the agreement of the Chinese and Japanese representatives to the interpretation placed upon them by the Council are of a nature to facilitate the restitution of normal relations between the two parties but that the establishment of such relations cannot be adequately secured until the decisions taken by the Council in its resolution of the 30th of September are fully executed;

Five. Calls upon the Japanese Government to begin immediately to proceed progressively with the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone so that the total withdrawal can be effected within a maximum period of three weeks from the date of the present resolution;

Six. Calls upon the Chinese Government to make  
such

MAM

4- #213, from Geneva, October 17,  
1931

such arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated as will insure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals there, and further requests the Chinese Government to assist with the Chinese authorities designated for the above purpose representatives of other powers in order that such representatives may follow in execution of the arrangements;

Seven. Recommends that direct negotiations shall at once be begun between representatives of the Chinese and Japanese Governments so as to insure that the details of the execution of all points relating to the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territory may proceed smoothly and without delay;

Eight. Recommends that direct negotiations should be begun between the two governments not later than seven days before the term fixed for the total evacuation - provided such evacuation has made good progress by that date - on any points of execution arising out of the engagements referred to in points one, two and three, but excluding those set out in five and six, on any further question arising out of the occupation of the territory in question, and on

MAM

5- #213, from Geneva, October 17,  
1931

and on the questions outstanding between the two governments, among which the first matter to be examined should be arrangements between the Japanese and Chinese railway administrations with a view to a practical solution of existing difficulties arising out of the railway situation in Manchuria;

Nine. The Council, though always at the disposal of the two parties should they desire its good offices, calls their attention to the precedent governing the conversations which led to the settlement of questions relative to Shantung, in which the two governments requested the assistance of two personalities belonging to neutral states, the Council would be willing, if invited, to nominate one or two persons for this purpose".

GILBERT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 18, 1931.



Mr. Secretary:

Referring to Gilbert's telegram, Geneva, 213, October 17, 12 p.m., reporting on the Resolutions which the Council of the League has under consideration today (Sunday), --

I. The fact that the Council is taking this action considerably simplifies our problem both of the moment and for the future.

The Council

notes the assurance<sup>A</sup> which the disputants have given,

notes Japan's statement that Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria and remarks that this statement is in accordance with the terms of the Nine Power Treaty,

considers that the establishment of normal relations cannot be adequately brought about until the decisions taken in the Resolution of September 30 are fully executed,

calls upon the Japanese Government to effect withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone within three weeks,

calls upon the Chinese to make adequate arrangements

FILED  
OCT 20 1931  
2192

793.94/2192

- 2 -

ments to take over the territory evacuated and to ensure safety of lives and property of Japanese there,

recommends that direct negotiations be begun at once with regard to the execution of the above points,

recommends that direct negotiations be begun within two weeks for an agreement on the main points at issue, and

calls attention to the precedent set in the Shantung negotiations for direct negotiations in the presence of two neutral observers.

It would appear that members of the Council are seeking to avoid the necessity for bringing into consideration the applicability of various of the adjective provisions of the Covenant. Action having been taken by the Foreign Ministers of several of the member Powers in invoking the Kellogg Pact, and France having undertaken to circularize the signatory Powers on the subject of calling attention to the Pact, the Council proceeds on the assumption that China and Japan will refrain from hostilities; and the Council proceeds to give advice and suggestions to China and Japan to the end that those two Powers may be persuaded to proceed promptly to regulate the matter by their own efforts. It may <sup>therefore</sup> ~~further~~ be assumed, for the moment at least, that the Council will not during the next few days discuss the possibility of

bringing



- 3 -

bringing to bear the special pressure of the sanctions in the Covenant.

If this line of reasoning appears sound, it would seem that the question whether Mr. Gilbert shall or shall not continue to sit in the meetings of the Council presents no great difficulty. We will probably before tomorrow morning receive our copy of the circular which the French Government is sending out on the subject of invoking the Kellogg Pact. We will probably in the course of the day send our notes to China and Japan. Meanwhile, the Council, having met today, may or may not meet tomorrow. If it meets, it would seem that there could be no great likelihood of anything embarrassing to us arising out of our letting Gilbert continue to sit. When the matter of invoking the Kellogg Pact is completely disposed of by our having sent our notes (the notes of six Powers having already been sent), as other Powers will probably be doing at about the same time, to China and Japan; and when we have <sup>had</sup> a chance to see what occurs in Geneva in the course of the day (i.e. tomorrow), we could probably without its occasioning <sup>much</sup> ~~any~~ comment announce that the matter in relation to which we were asked to send a representative to sit with the Council has been disposed of and, that being the case, the presence of our representative is no longer required and he will be instructed

- 4 -

instructed to cease to sit. Or, if the day's developments make it appear that no embarrassment is likely to follow from his continuing to sit as an observer, we might let him continue to sit indefinitely.

Skatunovich

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7  
1  
If they are going to expect Gilbert "to express an opinion as to how, either in view of the present situation or of its future development, effect can best be given to the provisions of the Pact" (the quotation is from M. Briand's statement), it might be the safer course for us not to have Gilbert present.

Skatunovich

- 4 -

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Sgt. H. M. M. M.

If they are going to expect Gilbert "to express an opinion as to how, either in view of the present situation or of its future development, effect can best be given to the provisions of the Pact" (the quotation is from M. Briand's statement), it might be the safer course for us not to have Gilbert present.

Sgt. H. M. M. M.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 18, 1931.



*file*  
*sgc*  
Manchuria Situation  
II.

OCT 20 1931

Secretary:

Continuing the discussion which appears in my memorandum of even date, part I, on Gilbert's telegram, Geneva, 213, October 17, 12 p.m., <sup>2192</sup>reporting on the Resolution which the Council of the League has under consideration today, --

II. The Council has adopted the idea which we put forward in the form of a confidential suggestion to Drummond that it be suggested to the Chinese and the Japanese that they negotiate directly in the presence of neutral observers. We have already had both from Japan and from China evidence that the two Governments have been thinking of that possibility and that both are disposed to look upon it with favor. I am confirmed in the belief which I have entertained for some time that that procedure will be adopted.

There is, however, still a possibility that unfortunate incidents may occur which will delay or prevent the reaching of an agreement which will put an end to the threat of hostilities. It may happen that the Council of the League and/or some of the Powers will have to come into action again. If such a situation develops, it would be

FILED  
OCT 22 1931

F.W.

793.94/2192

- 2 -

my suggestion that we be prepared to take the position that we would welcome and would give solicitous consideration to any suggestions which the Council might formulate for concurrent action by, on the one hand the League and/or the Powers which are its members, and on the other hand ourselves. It may be assumed that such action as the League Powers find that they can afford to take and are able to agree among themselves to take would be susceptible of being taken by us. This suggestion is offered for consideration by way of anticipating a situation which may conceivably yet develop.

Returning to the subject of direct negotiations in the presence of observers, I feel moved to suggest at this time that if and when the American Government is called upon for its views or for approval of that idea, it should be prepared to approve; if it is asked to name an American citizen as one of the observers, it should be prepared to do so; but if it is asked for an opinion with regard to the place at which the negotiations should be held, it should be prepared to suggest some place not on American soil. These negotiations might perhaps to best advantage be held in Geneva or in London. From the point of view of American interests, in our general relations with Japan and China, it would <sup>seem</sup> ~~be~~ preferable that they be not held in Washington and not under American aegis <sup>as</sup> or auspices.

OCT 20 1981

*Approved*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GREEN



~~FE~~  
~~WE~~  
~~FE~~  
FROM  
Berne  
Division of  
Dated October 17, 1931  
FAR EAST  
Rec'd 12:30 p.m.  
file 29.C

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

182, October 17, 1931 a.m.



Was present at League Council meeting yesterday evening accompanied by Joseph Green. Tremendous public interest in first appearance of United States representative at Council table, Gilbert spoke and comported himself with an easy dignity which was universally commented on and admired. His speech, which you had largely prepared, was followed with unusual attention and earnestness by the distinguished members of the Council.

Consulate's telegram 211, October 16, midnight, gives the contents of the principal speeches of welcome but I feel that you should be aware of the dramatic aspects of the situation as I saw it purely as an observer. The public is obviously despairing of any effective check to this threat of war by the League alone. The members of the Council and the public also are thoroughly

793.94/2193

183  
OCT 22 1931  
OCT 22 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#182, from Berne, October 17, 1931  
1 a.m.

thoroughly aroused to the dangers of war in the Far East  
and its potential expansion. Into this situation,  
therefore, the arrival of United States collaboration  
comes at a moment when it has the most helpful and  
important effect.

GREENE

RR

CSB

whb

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

Geneva

1-1936  
OCT 19 1931

Dated October 18, 1931.

Rec'd 2:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

219, October 18, 7 p.m.

Drummond has handed me for communication

following message from the French Government dated October 16 which has been circulated to the members of the Council.

"It is reported that a Japanese column sent to the District south of the Peking-Mukden Railway line and east of the River Liao came into collision with a large body of soldiers and brigands (about five thousand men). The fighting is continuing but the staff states that the Japanese troops will not cross to the right bank of the River Liao unless it is absolutely necessary.

From the point of view of the military occupation the position remains unchanged, the extreme points being Taonan to the west and Hoening to the east (this latter town is on the Korean frontier).

Lastly the construction of the Kirin-Hoening Railway line is progressing normally."

FW

GILBERT

FILED

OCT 23 1931

793.94/2194



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAN

RECEIVED  
OCT 19 1931  
DIVISION

GREEN  
FROM GENEVA

Dated October 18, 1931

Secretary of State  
Washington

220, October 18, 3 p.m.


Drummond has handed me for communication to you the following message from the German Government dated October 14 which has been circulated to the members of the Council:

"One. The German Consulate at Mukden reports under date of October 13, reported "number and distribution of Chinese troops unchanged; four hundred men however have been withdrawn from the International Concession at Mukden to the Japanese Concession;

Two. The German Consulate General at Tientsin reports on October 13, reported "between Peking and Shanhaikwan so far no serious incident; no military activity observable on either side. Numerous public demonstrations and acts of boycott."

GILBERT

FW



793.94/2195

FILED

OCT 23 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

whb

GREEN

1-1236

RECEIVED

OCT 19 1931

DIVISION

Geneva  
FROM

Dated October 18, 1931

Rec'd 2:10 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 19 1931

Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 19 1931

DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,

Washington.

216, October 18, 4 p.m.

A public meeting of the Council is scheduled for  
tomorrow October nineteenth.

The present plan is that at that time the Chinese and  
the Japanese representatives will be reminded of their  
engagements and will be asked to inform the Council as to  
the measures they have taken to carry out their undertakings.

The following are the points which will be taken up in  
this manner with the Representatives of the two parties of  
the dispute.

"At its meeting on September 30th the Council unani-  
mously adopted a resolution whereby it noted the fact that  
each of the parties undertakes to take certain measures.

One. The Japanese Representative, after declaring  
that his Government had no territorial designs in Manchuria  
added that it would continue as rapidly as possible the with-  
drawal of its troops which had already been begun into the  
Railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and  
property of Japanese nation <sup>als</sup> was effectually assured and

793.94/2196

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

vnb

-2- #216 from Geneva, Oct 18, 1931.  
4 p.m.

1-1226

and that it hoped to carry out <sup>FROM</sup> this intention in full as  
speedily as possible.

Two. The Chinese Representative declares that his  
Government would assume responsibility for the safety of the  
lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone  
as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops continued and the  
Chinese local authorities and police were reinstated.

Three. The Chinese Representative gave the assurance  
that his Government would take all necessary steps to prevent  
any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation  
of the position.

Four. The Japanese Representative gave the same assur-  
ance as the Chinese Representative.

Five. The Council requested both parties to do all in  
their power to hasten the restoration of normal relations be-  
tween them and for that purpose to continue and speedily com-  
plete the execution of the above mentioned undertakings."

It is possible that these items will be brought forward  
formally in the Council in the above form but, on the other  
hand, Briand may merely employ them as a guide to his ques-  
tioning.

FW

GILBERT

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

1-1836

RECEIVED

OCT 18 1931

DIVISION

FROM GREEN

GENEVA

Dated October 18, 1931

Rec'd 2:20 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

215, October 18, 2:20 p.m.

Consulate's 215, October 17, midnight.

In a private meeting of the Council which was held at

eleven a.m. this morning, the draft resolution cited in  
the Consulate's telegram under reference was discussed.

The following changes were introduced:

One. "Normal relations between them, assumes that  
neither party" now reads "normal relations between them  
is confident that henceforward neither party".

Paragraph two unchanged.

Paragraph three. "This statement is in accordance  
with the terms of the Nine Power Treaty" now reads "this  
statement is in accordance with the principle of Article  
10 of the Covenant and with the terms of the Nine Power  
Treaty".

Paragraph



Four. "Restitution" now reads "restoration"; "ade-  
quately" is deleted.

Paragraph

Five. "To begin immediately to proceed" now reads  
"to begin immediately and to proceed".

Paragraph six unchanged.

Paragraph



793.94/2197

793.94  
note  
500.c.c.2

OCT 23 1931

MAN

2- #215, from Geneva, October 18,  
1931

Paragraph Seven was recast as follows:

"Recommends that the Chinese and Japanese Governments should immediately appoint representatives to arrange the details of the execution of all points relating to the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territory so that this may proceed smoothly and without delay".

Paragraph eight now reads "places on record the formal undertaking of both parties to begin, on the day on which the evacuation is completed, negotiations on all the questions outstanding between the two governments including especially the questions arising out of recent incidents and out of controversies about the railway situation in Manchuria".

Paragraph nine was eliminated.

Note: these changes were introduced in open discussion, and probably slight alteration in some of the wording may be made when a final English and French text is prepared. Such drafting changes will be however of no significance.

I am preparing a telegram respecting the discussion in this morning's meeting with particular regard to the status and employment of this draft resolution.

GILBERT

FW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED  
GRAY

WMB

1-1336

RECEIVED

OCT 19 1931

DIVISION

Secretary of State,

Washington.

787, October 18, 1931 a.m.

Legation's 779, October 16, noon.

Captain Nimner of Naval Attache's Office returned to Harbin from Manchuli and Tsitsihar yesterday and reports as follows, October 17, 3 p.m.

Big crowds at Tsitsihar station yesterday awaiting opportunity to leave for points south. People in panic, lost Japanese planes, three of which flew over that area on the afternoon of 15th, might bomb it and fear promiscuous firing from Tsitsihar garrison troops. Foreigners from Tsitsihar arrived at Harbin on same train as Captain Nimner; Japanese and Koreans are leaving also. Officials at ~~Anganghola~~ <sup>anganghola</sup> equally panic stricken.

General Chang, of Taonan who has Japanese material and who was moving <sup>(ent) on</sup> ~~and~~ Tsitsihar with 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers but is delayed by Tsitsihar troops who damaged Nonni River bridge, forcing Chang to halt indefinitely or to move thirty miles to another bridge.

Peiping via N.R.  
FROM

Dated October 18, 1931.

Rec'd 4:40 a.m.



Del to Bureau  
10.19.31

file 29.0  
10.19.31

793.94/2198

OCT 23 1931

whb

-2- #787, from Peiping, Oct 18th.  
10 a.m.

Departure of Tsitsihar, Japanese Consul and Japanese subjects has increased panic among Chinese officials for they interpret this as definite indication Chang will have support of Japanese bombing planes after he succeeds crossing the Nonni.

Captain Nimmer is of the opinion Chinese authorities doing all in their power to protect foreigners and especially Japanese, and rather than lose all to the Japanese or to their puppet Chinese Generals or to both are actually prepared to turn this area into a Red reign of terror in order to enlist thereby foreign support.

He was given access to every place and official person and to put such questions as he pleased.

Captain Nimmer states that Hailar is peaceful on the surface but seething internally; troops unpaid for five months; general in command arrogant, unscrupulous and incompetent. Mister Mamen, Norwegian subject and his wife, an American, both residents Hailar and students Mongolia consider that situation there very tense. Captain Nimmer added that along the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Pogradichma to Manohuli above are the only affected areas they knew.

whb

-3- #787 from Peiping, Oct 18th.  
10 a.m.

393.11  
Telegraph and telephone communication with Tsitsihar City open but radio service discontinued because departing radio staff reported to have dismantled radio station when retreating Tsitsihar troops. I have sent urgent telegram this morning to Mister Vos informing him Consulate General has reliable report situation at Tsitsihar dangerous and suggested that he, his wife, Miss <sup>Mac Cracker</sup> ~~Cloudson~~ and Miss <sup>Gustafson</sup> ~~Hun~~, all American missionaries at Tsitsihar, should evacuate to Harbin soonest possible and adds that office informed their whereabouts and welfare. Mr. and Mrs. Mamen of Hailar, I am informed are removing to Puketu.

Japanese aeroplane flew over Harbin this morning.

For the Minister,

FW

ENGERT.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
 PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 OR

Charge to  
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-128  
 TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PLAIN

Washington,  
 October 20, 1931.

1931  
 AMERICAN CONSUL OCT 20 51  
 GENEVA (Switzerland).

110

Reference Department's 106, Oct 20, 11 am.

793.94/2198

You may give Drummond, under the same conditions as to confidence, the following information based on reports from Manchuria ~~despatched on October 15 and received here~~ *stay*  
 October 19:

One. According to statements of the Japanese military authorities at Newchwang (Yingkow) three companies of Japanese troops arrived at Newchwang on September 19; disarmed unresisting eight hundred Chinese police and three hundred regular Chinese troops stationed in the city; took over Chinese telegraph and telephone offices and the Peking-Mukden railway station across the Liao river from Newchwang; and cut this railway line at a point one thousand two hundred meters beyond the station. The disarmed Chinese troops were paid two yen each and told to go away. It was understood from the same authorities that they did not come to protect the Japanese residents at Newchwang as there

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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- 2 -

there had been no anti-Japanese feeling, but to dissipate the military forces of Chang Hsueh-liang. The Peking-Mukden railway station was found to be deserted with the exception of a guard of twelve Japanese soldiers. A Japanese flag flew over the station and the Japanese have built trenches across the tracks.

Two. The Chinese barracks at Newchwang were found to be occupied by twenty-four Japanese soldiers and with a Japanese flag flying. Five hundred rifles taken from Chinese soldiers, three trench mortars, many boxes of ammunition and other military equipment were found on the premises.

Three. It was understood that the Chinese officials remaining in Newchwang were receiving orders from the Japanese who prevented them from communicating with Chinese officials outside of Newchwang. The Chinese chief of police arranged with the Japanese military authorities after their arrival to allow the Chinese police to be re-armed and function under him subject to Japanese orders. It was understood that all Chinese Government institutions and banks and the Chinese wireless station <sup>are</sup> ~~were~~ completely *g* under the control of the Japanese military.

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Four.

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
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Washington,

- 3 -

Four. It was understood that the office of the Chinese magistrate at Newchwang was occupied by Japanese soldiers for twenty-two days during which time the magistrate was kept under surveillance and not permitted to go out except under guard. The magistrate's office appeared to have been looted.

Five. It was understood that there would have been no danger to the Japanese or Korean residents at Newchwang had the Japanese troops not been sent there, but that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops at the present time without making provision for a Chinese defense force would lay the city open to danger of brigand attacks.

*Strinson*  
*WJG*

CR  
Oct. 20, 1931 pm

FE:JEL/VDM

*Ram*  
FE *m.m.h.*  
*SKT*

Enciphered by *[Signature]*

Sent by operator M., 19

1285

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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*man*  
Washington,  
October 19, 1931.  
*23*  
*11 am*

*793.94*

AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

*106*

*793.94/2198*

Reference Department's *102* October 19, 5 p.m.

You may give Drummond, under the same conditions /  
as to confidence, the following based on reports from  
Manchuria despatched on the 17th and received *the 19th:*

One. On September 19 about 50 Japanese soldiers /  
from Shingishu, Korea, entered the Chinese city of Antung;  
disarmed the entire force of Chinese police; took  
possession of the Chinese governmental establishments,  
with the exception of the post office; and put out of  
commission the electric light plant in the Chinese city.  
At the same time Japanese South Manchuria Railway guards /  
from Liutaokow, about one mile outside of the city, dis-  
armed and sent by rail to Mukden several hundred Chinese /  
soldiers stationed at Fenghuangchen, about 30 miles from  
the city. These were the only Chinese soldiers stationed /  
in the vicinity of Antung.

Two. Three or four days later the Japanese soldiers /  
left the Chinese city of Antung and Japanese gendarmes /  
were

Enciphered by *KP*

Sent by operator *M.*, \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

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793.94/2198

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Department of State

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TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,  
October 19, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

Reference Department's 102, October 19, 5 p.m.

You may give Drummond, under the same conditions /  
as to confidence, the following based on reports from  
Manchuria despatched on the 17th and received ~~the 19th~~;

One. / On September 19 / about 50 Japanese soldiers /  
from Shingishu, Korea, entered the Chinese city of Antung;  
disarmed the entire force of Chinese police; took  
possession of the Chinese governmental establishments,  
with the exception of the post office; and put out of  
commission the electric light plant in the Chinese city.  
At the same time Japanese South Manchuria Railway guards  
from Liutaokow, about one mile outside of the city, dis-  
armed and sent by rail to Mukden several hundred Chinese  
soldiers stationed at Fenghuangchen, about 30 miles from  
the city. These were the only Chinese soldiers stationed  
in the vicinity of Antung.

Two. Three or four days later the Japanese soldiers  
left the Chinese city of Antung and Japanese gendarmes

were

Enciphered by KP

Sent by operator M., 19  

793.94/2198

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

- 2 -

were stationed at the offices of the magistrate, and of the city, river and district police. The Chinese telegraph office was closed by the Japanese gendarmes, on September 19, and they have been censoring mail at the Chinese post office since September 13, the delivery of Chinese newspapers from Shanghai and Tientsin being prohibited.

Three. According to the Japanese military authorities, at Antung, the Chinese customs inspection shed at the Antung end of the Japanese railway bridge across the Yalu, was closed by them in order that they might better defend that bridge. As a result, customs inspection, except of trains, is practically impossible and the way is now open for the entry into Manchuria of goods ~~which do not pay duty~~ *without payment of duty*.

Four. The Chinese magistrate at Antung is under the surveillance of Japanese gendarmes. The Chinese officials at Antung are being prevented from receiving instructions from their own authorities and are therefore compelled to act independently of any outside Chinese authority.

Five. There appears to be no indication of a desire on the part of the Japanese to withdraw their gendarmes from

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

128 F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

- 3 -

from the native city, although they are permitting the  
 patrolling of the streets by Chinese police under the  
 direction of Japanese gendarmes.

Six. According to the Japanese authorities at  
 Antung, it was necessary to disarm the Chinese police  
 to prevent them from making an attack on the Japanese  
 concession and to insure the maintenance of peace and  
 order and ~~the~~ the gendarmes would be withdrawn as soon as  
 they were sure that conditions would remain quiet and  
 that the danger of an attack by bandits no longer existed.  
 It did not appear, however, that there had been any danger  
 from banditry at Antung for many years. It was not  
 believed that the withdrawal of the Japanese forces at  
 Antung would result in any danger to the lives and  
 property of Japanese subjects there.

Seven. The only bloodshed which occurred at Antung  
 arose out of a commotion caused by a Chinese policeman's *having*  
 firing three shots, whereupon Japanese gendarmes sent to  
 restore order fired into a crowd of Chinese who had taken  
 refuge in a silk mill.

FE:JEL

FE

Enciphered by

Oct. 20, 1931.

Sent by operator M., 19

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
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Department of State

Washington,

October 19, 1931.

5P

AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA (Switzerland).

Reference Department's 100, October 17, 3 p.m.

You may give Drummond, under the same conditions as  
 to confidence, the following based on reports from  
 Manchuria ~~despatched on the seventeenth and~~ received  
 today: 793.94/2198

One. Big crowds at Tsitsihar in panic and awaiting  
 opportunity to leave for points south on account of fear  
 of Japanese airplanes, three of which flew over that  
 area on the afternoon of the fifteenth, and fear of  
 promiscuous firing on the part of Tsitsihar garrison  
 troops. Officials at Anghsia equally panic stricken.  
 Some foreigners at Tsitsihar have left for Harbin and  
 Japanese and Koreans including the Japanese Consul are  
 also leaving.

Two. General Chang of Taonan, who was moving  
 on Tsitsihar with fifteen to twenty thousand soldiers,  
 has been delayed by Tsitsihar troops who damaged Nonni  
 River bridge.

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_ Three. Hailar is peaceful on the surface but troops  
 Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_ have

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1922 1-138

793.94/2198



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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### Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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Washington,

- 2 -

have remained unpaid for five months and the general  
in command is an uncertain quantity.

Four. The places mentioned above are the only  
points along the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway  
from Pogranichnaya to Manchuli known to be affected  
areas. Telegraph and telephone communications with  
Tsitsihar remain open but radio service discontinued.

*Stinson*  
*SKH*

*[Signature]*  
FE:JEN/VDM

*RAM*  
FE:MMH

*GA*  
Oct 19, 1931. *Y*

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

TELEGRAM RECEIVED 1931

DIVISION OF  
LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED

FROM

Gray

OCT 19 1931

LIMA

DIVISION OF

Dated October 17, 1931

Rec'd 8:00p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

341, October 17, 3

Minister

Foreign ~~Office~~ this morning expressed his

and the Junta's deep interest in finding a way  
through cooperation to settle not only the Chaco  
dispute but the Manchurian imbroglio. He declared his  
dedication to any measures for the elimination of war  
and the establishment of peaceful processes voicing his  
special interest in the Kellogg Pact and adding he  
wished to see the prestige of the League heightened  
in every way possible. He was delighted with the  
instructions our Government has given Mr. Gilbert  
in Geneva as reported in today's press. I got the  
impression he has intimated to the Japanese Government  
and Chinese Government that Peru would be glad to  
see a peaceful settlement in accord with the Kellogg  
Pact and through the good offices of the League and  
that the Japanese have so far made no reply.

Our

DIVISION OF  
LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS  
OCT 20 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94/2199

-2- from Lima #341, Oct 17

Our conversation was necessarily hurried  
as the Minister was on the point of going to  
cabinet meeting at the Palace.

DEARING

JS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

whb

Geneva

FROM  
Dated October 18, 1931.

Rec'd 3:20 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 19 1931  
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 23

WESTERN  
DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

793.94/2200

FILED

OCT 26 1931

Secretary of State,

Washington.

218, October 18, 6 p.m.

Drummond has handed me for communication

the following message from the Japanese Government  
October fourteen which has been circulated to the members  
of the Council:

"Regarding the movement of Japanese troops at Mukden  
I have the honor to inform you that according to an official telegram from Tokio maintenance of order by the Chinese having become increasingly effective the military authorities have decided to hand over the policing of the Chinese quarters to the Chinese gendarmes and police. Consequently the headquarters staff of the forty-third infantry regiment which was quartered in the open town has been transferred to the former premises of the South Manchurian Railway Hospital inside the zone and the headquarters staff of the Seventy-eighth regiment removed from the Chinese town to the arsenal outside the Chinese town. Eighteen hundred men have withdrawn and brought back either outside the Chinese town or inside the zone. There are at present only about four hundred men left in the Chinese town and in the open town and 250 men in the industrial quarters.

793-94  
note  
893.0146

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

whb

218 from Geneva, Oct 18, 1931.  
6 p.m.

The cruiser TOKIWA reached Shanghai on October 10th  
and reenforcements of 230 men were sent to the naval  
barracks October 14. I should be obliged if you  
would inform my colleagues on the Council of the above."  
Yoshizawa.

FW

GILBERT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

FROM

Geneva

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

222, October 19, 10 a. m.

Consulate's 213, October 17, noon and 215, October 18,  
2 p. m.

Final draft of resolution introduces the following  
changes reported.

Paragraph Three. "With the principle of Article 10  
of the Covenant" now reads as follows: "With the terms of  
the Covenant of the League of Nations."

Paragraph Eight now read as follows: "Notes the formal  
engagement of China and Japan that on the day on which evacua-  
tion is completed direct negotiations will begin between the  
two Governments on questions outstanding between them, in-  
cluding those raised by the occupation of the territory,  
as well as existing difficulties arising out of the railway  
station in Manchuria, a practical solution of which should  
be sought by means of arrangements between the Chinese and  
Japanese railway administration."

RR

GILBERT

793.94  
note  
500.0112

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 19 1931  
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Date October 19, 1931  
Rec'd 6:55 a. m.  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

frege  
2197

793.94/2201

GREEN

**FROM**

Rec'd 8:50 p. m.

217, October 18, 5 p. m.

This note was discussed in the private meeting of the Council held at eleven o'clock this morning, (Chinese and Japanese representatives being absent).

Two. When the League Council discussed the question

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OCT 19 1931  
DIVISION OF  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

793.94/2202

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OCT 23 1963

- 2 - No. 217 from Geneva .

of inviting the Government of the United States of America to send an observer to sit on the Council, the Japanese representative expressed at length his doubts as to the interpretation of the Covenant - that is to say whether the presence in the Council of an observer of a non-member State was or was not compatible with the provisions of the League Covenant, and whether the question of the invitation could be or could not be regarded under the Covenant as a question of procedure. Although the Japanese representative asked the Council to examine these points the latter did not go fully into the questions raised by him and likewise rejected his request that they should be referred to a committee of legal experts for examination. The President of the Council left all these legal questions in abeyance and put the question of the invitation to the note, regardless of the opposition of the Japanese Government's representative; he also decided that this was a question of procedure and stated that the proposal had been adopted by a majority.

Three, The opinion was expressed that as the United States Government was a party to the Paris Pact it should have the opportunity of expressing its opinion before the League Council solely in regard to the application of that treaty.



- 3 - No. 217 from Geneva

treaty. The Japanese Government is not only firmly convinced that the present situation is not such that there is any danger of war between Japan and China but also considers that, as the Paris Pact is a treaty between a large number of states including non-member states, the granting of an opportunity to sit on the Council with the right to express an opinion to the United States representative alone, raises a delicate question. This also shows that the invitation to the United States is not simply a question of procedure.

Four. The Japanese Government cannot help feeling the profoundest misgiving as to the correctness of the precipitate adoption of a majority decision and the leaving in abeyance of the preliminary question whether a proposal requires unanimity or whether it can be decided by a majority. It is anxious to know when the legal questions outstanding are to be discussed and how the note of October 15th will affect the result of those discussions.

Before deciding upon the attitude which it will adopt in regard to the questions now raised as a whole the Japanese Government will be happy to have the opinion of the President of the Council on the above mentioned points."

After

- 4 - No. 217 from Geneva

After a short discussion it was agreed that Briand as President of the Council should draft a reply. Briand stated that his reply would probably be along the following lines:

There was nothing in the Covenant to prohibit the Council from calling at any time representatives of governments to the Council table to consult or exchange information. Referring to the fact that the Japanese representative had previously called attention in this connection to Article 4 of the Covenant, he would make it clear that inviting the representatives of the United States to sit at the Council table did not mean that he was incorporated in the council body nor had the power to vote. The action taken therefore in inviting the United States was in no wise analogous to action under Article 4 of the Covenant. The Council consequently considered that the question of inviting the United States to the Council table for consultation and exchange of information was one of "procedure". This was particularly true since the matter to be discussed with the representative of the United States was a question which did not concern the members of the League as such, and was not embraced in the provisions of the Covenant.

In

- 5 - No. 217 from Geneva


In regard to the question of the appointment of a committee of jurists to study the legal question cited by the Japanese, Briand stated that in reply to a direct question which he had previously put to the Japanese representative asking whether the Japanese Government would accept as final the conclusions of such a committee the Japanese representative had replied in the negative. Briand stated that in view of this attitude it would mean simply a loss of time to appoint such a committee.

Respecting the atmosphere of such a part of the discussion relating to this subject, it is natural as you will well understand that certain distress should be felt by some members of the Council particularly those representing the small states over any question of such a character being raised in the League. The spirit is, however, that technicalities must be laid aside at this juncture to accomplish a common objective, the maintenance of peace.

GILBERT

PFC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 19, 1931. *Fre*

Reference to Geneva's 217, October 18, 5 p.m. /2202

In my opinion, the Council of the League has blundered.

It should not have rushed matters, in the face of Japan's opposition based on the contention of legality. There was no need for precipitate action with regard to discussion of the question of invoking the Pact of Paris. There was, as had been concluded in our discussions here, less of urgent need for invoking the Pact last week than there had been toward the end of the preceding week.

Also, I think, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the five powers which addressed notes to China and Japan on Saturday invoking the Pact were unduly precipitate and employed bad tactics. They should at least have given the American Government notice of their intention and should have sent their notes either simultaneously with or subsequent to the issuance by the French Government of its circular calling upon the signatories of the Kellogg Pact to take similar action. The notes of those five powers went forward some thirty-six hours ago. The circular from the French Government has not yet been received here. In the interval, the Japanese have had opportunity to prepare and perhaps to expedite their rejoinder. All this without its having been possible, under the circumstances, for us to send our contemplated notes. This lack of coordination

and

F.W. 793.94/2202

OCT 20 1931  
FILED

- 2 -

and synchronization robs the notes of the five powers of some of the force which they would have had if those powers had so arranged that their notes and ours and that of other powers could have gone forward simultaneously; and by the same fault of omission they make it inevitable that the force of our note, if and when sent, will, for the same reasons, be diminished.

Forster

SKH/ZMF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 19, 1931.

Reference, Geneva's 217, October 18, 5 p. m.

In my opinion, the Council of the League has blundered. It should not have rushed matters, in the face of Japan's opposition based on the contention of legality. There was no need for precipitate action with regard to discussion of the question of invoking the Pact of Paris. There was, as had been concluded in our discussions here, less of urgent need for invoking the Pact last week than there had been toward the end of the preceding week.

Stettinbury

*FE*  
*Pilegms*

OCT 19 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

F. E.  
793.94/2202

MAY 11 1934

FILED

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

743.24  
MAM

GRAY

NANKING

Dated October 18, 1931

Rec'd 6:25 a.m.

1-1836  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED

OCT 19 1931

DIVISION OF

COMMUNICATIONS AND RELATIONS

Secretary of State

Washington

PRIORITY

October 18, 10 a.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 19 1931  
Department of State

file  
EGC

One. Following is message which is being sent in identical wording by myself, British and French Ministers:

Two. "President invited me and my French and American colleagues to meet him today privately on October 17th. Following is our joint report on interview.

Two. President opened the discussion by inquiring whether we had yet received replies from our governments regarding despatch of troops to Shanhaikwan to watch acts of Japanese there. On our replying in the negative, he told us that he had just received telegraphic information from Chang Hsueh Liang that Chinese troops were being withdrawn westwards to avoid contact with Japanese but indicated that he still feared that Japanese intended to provoke an incident with a view to occupying the City and Pass and thus cutting

793.94/2203

FILED  
OCT 23 1931

MAM

2- from Nanking, October 18, 1931  
Section one

cutting off Manchuria from the rest of China. He then referred to situation at Shanghai where according to his reports Japanese were similarly to provoke an incident. Japanese Consul had twice called on Mayor in connection with securing supplies for Japanese (which Mayor had agreed to arrange) and had on both occasions given a vague warning that trouble was to be expected in a few days. President begged that attention of our governments might be specifically drawn to both Shanhaikwan and Shanghai during the next few days.

Three. Referring to general situation President developed the argument that it was essential to deal firmly with Japan in this crisis. It was due to the weak attitude of the Chinese especially in Manchuria that the crisis had arisen. China was now determined to see the thing through. He hoped that the League and American would equally realize the necessity of dealing firmly with the situation. Only thus could Japan be induced to see.

Four. His Excellency then referred to the difference in the psychology of the Chinese troops inside and  
outside



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAM

3- from Nanking, October 18, 1931  
section one.

outside the Wall. The latter were traditionally afraid of  
and cowed by the Japanese army. The former had no such in-  
feriority complex.

(END FIRST OF TWO SECTIONS)

JOHNSON

FW

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

1-1234

GRAY  
FROM

Nanking via N.R.

Dated October 18, 1931

Rec'd 9:00 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY.

October 18, 10 a. m.

Section Two.

On the contrary they were spoiling for fight with Japan. He mentioned in illustration of this point the Tsinanfu incident of 1928 which he had to restrain his troops from continuing hostile attitude. If, therefore, the Japanese Government took any hostile action inside the Wall a clash was unavoidable. He wished us clearly to understand that this was in no sense meant as a <sup>h</sup>reat but that in such circumstances hostilities would be inevitable.

Five. The President referred to the Nine Power Pact and the incompatibility thereto of the 1915 agreements which had been wrested from China by force. Did we not think they should have been brought up for general discussion? We referred to a well known attitude of Japan as formulated

- 2 - from Nanking (section two)

formulated at the Washington Conference and on other occasions that she would not permit these agreements to be called in question and we expressed the view that it would be a mistake to bring them into the picture at the present time when the League and America were concentrating on the immediate problem of preventing serious hostilities.

Six. In conclusion the President made the following observations which he asked might be regarded as an official declaration and communicated to our respective governments. The Japanese Foreign Office might be to some extent susceptible to the public opinion of the world. This was not the case with the Japanese general staff. The latter had taken advantage of the preoccupation of the foreign powers with the great war to extort from China the 1915 agreement. They were similarly now seeking to take advantage of the preoccupation of the foreign powers with the world wide economic crisis to repeat this maneuver.

But the National Government and the China of 1931 were not the same as the Chinese Government and the China of 1915; nor was he, Chiang Kai Shek, the same as Yuan Shih Kai. Under no circumstances would China now yield to threats

- 3 - from Nanking (section two)

threats of force nor negotiate in any shape or form until the Japanese troops had been withdrawn and the status quo ante September 18 restored. His Excellency repeated this statement with the greatest earnestness and speaking with a vigor and intensity of purpose which convinced us of his sincerity requested that we would report his words to our respective governments."

Three. Reference to despatch of troops by foreign governments. Such a request was made of the British, French and Italians. I was also approached but replied that we had no forces at Shanhaikwan implying that we had none to send. I made inquiry at Peiping as to truth of report that Japanese had landed or intended to land troops. No reply has been received.

Four. President expressed belief that Japanese were deliberately laying the ground to provoke an incident at Shanghai or at Shanhaikwan.

(End message).

RR  
HPD

JOHNSON

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

1-1834

FROM

GRAY

PEIPING via N.R.

Dated October 17, 1931

Rec'd 11:19 p.m.

Secretary of State



Washington

785, October 17, 8 p.m.

Following from Hansen, Salisbury October 15, 10 p.m.

"One. Arrived Newchwang (Yingkow) yesterday at five-thirty p.m.

Two. Japanese Consul Arakawa and Lieutenant Colonel Iwaszo, Commander of troops at Tashihchao and Newchwang, informed us that three companies of Japanese troops came to Newchwang on September 19th at five-thirty a.m.; disarmed unresisting eight hundred Chinese police and three hundred of five hundred regular Chinese troops stationed in the city (the remaining two hundred having been out of the city pursuing brigands did not return) took over Chinese telegraph and telephone offices, Peking-Mukden railway station across the Liao river from Newchwang and cut this railway line at a point one thousand two hundred meters beyond the station. The three hundred disarmed troops were paid two yen a person and



OCT 20 1931

793694/2204

MAM

2- #785, from Peiping,  
October 17, 1931

and (\*)away. The Colonel stated that troops did not come  
to protect the

(END PART ONE)

ENGERT

FW

(\*) apparent omission

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1836

FROM

WP

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated October 17, 1931

Rec'd 2:40 a. m., 18th.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

785, October 17, 8 p. m.

(PART TWO)

Two thousand five hundred Japanese residents, as there had been no anti-Japanese feeling among the Chinese, but to dissipate the military forces of Chang Hsue Liang, who had been acting in an outrageous manner against the Japanese, and to break his power in Manchuria. He added that the Japanese had attacked the Chinese soldiers at Changchun for the same reason. He also said that this was not war but simply disarming and sending away the enemy.

Three. This morning with the Colonel we visited <sup>in</sup> the Peiping-Mukden Railway station which was deserted with the exception of the guard of 12 Japanese soldiers. A Japanese flag flew over this station and the Japanese had built trenches across the tracks to defend the station.

Four. We next inspected with the Colonel Chinese barracks

- 2 - No. 785 from Peiping (part two)

barracks in the city which were occupied by 24 Japanese  
soldiers with two four inch field pieces and which contained  
about five hundred rifles taken <sup>from</sup> ~~by~~ Chinese soldiers, three  
trench mortars, many (end part two)

ENGERT

EPD



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

FROM

Dated October 17, 1931

Rec'd 2:40 a. m. 18th.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

785, October 17, 8 p. m.

(PART THREE)

boxes of ammunition and other military equipment. A Japanese flag was flying over these barracks which were in the native city.

Five. After awhile, among others, we conversed with the British Consul Bristow, Chief of Police Pai and Magistrate Yang, all of whom confirmed the Japanese version of the capture of Newchwang, the British Consul stated that the entire city was controlled by the Japanese military, who issued orders to the Chinese officials and who prevented the latter from getting in touch with the Chinese officials outside of Newchwang. He added that, if the Japanese troops were withdrawn now, there would be extreme danger of brigand attacks.

Six. Pai stated to us that as soon as the Japanese troops

- 2 - No. 785 from Peiping (part three)

troops arrived he arranged with the Japanese Commander to allow Chinese police to be re-armed and function under him subject to Japanese orders. He added that all other Government institutions and banks were under Japanese (End part three)

ENGERT

HPD

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

1-1886

GRAY  
FROM

Peiping via N.H.

Dated October 17, 1931

Rec'd 2:40 a. m. 18th.

OCT 19 1931

DIVISION

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

785, October 17, 8 p. m.

(PART FOUR)

military control. The Chinese wireless station had been  
dismantled by the Japanese.

Seven. Magistrate Yang informed us that 40 Japanese soldiers forced their way into his Yamen on September 19th and occupied it for 22 days. During this time he was under house arrest in a small room and was permitted to go out only under armed guard. His statements were confirmed by the British Consul. He complained that the Japanese soldiers destroyed many of his records and stole the furniture and fixtures of the Yamen, which appeared to have been looted just prior to our inspection of the premises. He was in a highly nervous state. He stated that the Japanese Consul and military gave him no reason for his arrest or the occupancy of his official premises.

Eight. We found Newchwang and the Peiping and Mukden

Railway

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 785 from Peiping (part four)

Railway terminal opposite under control of the Japanese  
military who supervise closely the work of the Chinese  
officials. (End part four).

ENGERT

HPD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM  
GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated October 17, 1931

Rec'd 2:40 a. m. 18th,

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

785, October 17, 8 p. m.

(PART FIVE)

If they really had desired solely to protect the Japanese residents, their troops could have arrived and stayed in the large Japanese concession. We believe that, if the Japanese troops had not been sent, neither the Japanese nor Korean residents would have been in danger. However, if the Japanese troops are now withdrawn without making adequate provision for raising and arming a Chinese defense force or allowing Chinese troops now stationed at Koupangtze to enter Newchwang the city would be in danger of brigand attacks. Although the Japanese have withdrawn two hundred soldiers they have shown no inclination to withdraw all their troops from Newchwang. Lieutenant Colonel Iwata, in reply to a direct question, stated that the troops would be withdrawn when ordered. This withdrawal of a portion of troops residents, their troops could have arrived and stayed in the large Japanese concession. We believe that,

- 2 - No. 785 from Peiping (part five)

troops has no significance as the Chinese are so thoroughly  
cowed that the presence of a handful of Japanese soldiers  
is sufficient to exercise complete control over (end part  
five)

ENGERT

HPD

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1230

WP

FROM  
GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated October 17, 1931

Rec'd 2:40 a. m. 18th.

OCT 19 1931  
DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

785, October 17, 1931

(PART SIX)

Newchwang and its Chinese population.

Nine. The thinking Chinese at Newchwang are strongly opposed to the presence there of Japanese troops, who, they urge, should settle at and with Mukden the dispute arising from the clash between Japanese and Chinese troops at that place, the dispute being of no concern to the Chinese at Newchwang.

Ten. Lieutenant Colonel Iwata informed us that on September 29th-30th, when Chinese ex-soldiers were planning an attack on the real Newchwang, some distance up the Liao River from Yingkou, an airplane was sent to that place and, dropping two or three bombs, frightened the Chinese ex-soldiers away and thus prevented harm to the village where

thirty

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 785 from Peiping (part six)

thirty Japanese resided."

(END MESSAGE)

For the Minister,

ENGERT

HPD



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Amoy

Dated October 19, 1931

Rec'd 9:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 19 1931  
Department of State

file  
29.C

October 19, 10 a. m.

Admiral Liu, commander Chinese naval defense force at Amoy informs me that situation cannot continue and that it is only with greatest difficulty and vigilance that he is maintaining order due to the anti-Japanese feeling. New Japanese Consul Mr. Miura told me that it was "lucky" no violence used against Japanese subjects by the Chinese at Amoy and that it appears Chinese authorities have situation in hand. Japanese war ship in port.

Repeated to Legation.

FRANKLIN

CSB

793.94/2205

FILED

OCT 23 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO  
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

*FE*

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 18, 1931

Rec'd 2:40 a. m.

793.94  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.



*Le*  
*29.C*

786, October 18, 8 a. m.

Legation's 742, October 12, 5 p. m.

Following from Consul at Yunanfu: *2061*

"October 16, 9 a. m. Japanese Consul departed today  
for Hankow after placing consular properties *in custody* with (#)  
of the local authorities".

For the Minister

ENGERT

(#) Omission  
WSB  
CSB

*Hongkong (?)*

793.94/2206


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1861-83-100  
OCT-23-1931

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RH

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.



Oct. 19, 1931

Rec'd. 12:05 pm

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

221, October 19, 9 am

Consulate's 213, October 17, midnight; and 215,

October 18, 2 pm.

The draft resolution quoted in the telegrams under reference is not a finished plan comprising final conclusions to be presented to the Council for adoption but constitutes a tentative basis of action and embraces elements for negotiation between the President of the Council and the Chinese and Japanese representatives. It was the general opinion in the preparatory session yesterday that it would be premature to present and solicit their acceptance of its provisions. In this connection it was recalled that since the Council is acting under article eleven of the Covenant its proposals must be adopted unanimously, including the parties to the dispute, in order to be binding. Bearing in mind the opposing views already expressed by the two parties in regard to certain the most important measures envisaged in this resolution the Council

FILED  
OCT 23 1931  
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793.94/2207

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500.2112

rh #2 of No. 221 from Geneva

Council was of the opinion that it would be necessary to take some preliminary steps in order to feel out the ground and prepare the way for final action. After a brief discussion as to procedure the Council decided on a tentative program of action comprising the following steps:

One. A public session today to hold a discussion along the lines indicated in the Consulate's 216, October 18, 4 pm. The object of this discussion will be to obtain a public explanation of the intentions of the parties and to ascertain from them what they have already done to fulfill their engagements and how far they are willing to go to seek a common ground for agreement. This meeting will also serve the purpose of informing public opinion as to the status of the situation and in an exchange being in public render more effective any commitments obtained.

Two. On the basis of the results of this discussion, and with the draft resolution as a guide, Briand is to carry on private negotiations with the parties in the attempt to find a compromise solution.

Three. If no agreement is reached in this way the Council is to intervene and suggest the program embraced in the draft resolution, after further study of and modification of its provisions in the light of any concessions or proposals made by the disputants.

The following

rh #3 of No. 221 from Geneva

The following are the chief considerations which led to the more important changes made by the Council yesterday in the text of the draft resolution, as reported in the Consulate's <sup>2197</sup>215, October 18, 2 pm:

Paragraph One. The insertion of the word "henceforward" was suggested by Madariaga in order to carry the implication that "aggressive action" had been resorted to in the past. Briand accepted the change though he felt inclined to avoid any disagreeable allusions to the past.

Paragraph 3. Attention was called to the analogy between Article 10 of the Covenant and the clause quoted from the Nine Power Treaty. The reference to Article 10 was inserted in order doubly to reinforce the obligation and link it up with action under the Covenant.

Paragraph 7 was partially recast in order to make it more flexible and to avoid any explicit mention of "direct negotiations" which would be disagreeable to the Chinese by leaving the impression of supporting the Japanese insistence on this point. (END GREEN)

Paragraph 8 constitutes the pivotal center of the whole program of action. The original wording of the text was strongly opposed by Reading on the ground that the terms were too elastic and would at best inevitably result in slight progress toward evacuation and further disputing at the end of the term fixed.

AM

4-#221, from Geneva

fixed. The Japanese would delay evacuation until the time approached for direct negotiations. On the other hand the Chinese would refuse direct negotiations because the evacuation had not made "good thus far"

Briand preferred the more elastic original text on the ground that the Japanese would fear that after the evacuation was completed the Chinese would refuse direct negotiations on the totality of the questions pending between the two parties. He reaffirmed the necessity for the League to confine its intervention to the questions of evacuation and security leaving all other matters to be settled through direct negotiations since any other course would involve the League in an interminable process. Moreover he did not wish to give either party too much encouragement which might be taken advantage of.

On the insistence of Reading and Madariaga it was decided that formal undertakings should be given to initiate direct negotiations on the day of the completion of the evacuation.

(GREEN) For the sake of greater simplicity the references to previous numbered paragraphs were deleted.

Paragraph 9. For fear of opposition on the part  
of Japanese

5- #221 from Geneva

of Japanese to the formal acceptance of this proposal,  
it was decided at least for the present not to  
include this paragraph in the resolution but to allow  
the President of the Council to make the suggestions  
at an appropriate moment in a general statement.

GILBERT

WSB

SKIT

file

October 19, 1931.  
12:00 noon.

MEMORANDUM OF TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN  
SECRETARY STIMSON AND MR. GILBERT AT GENEVA.

Manchuria.

SECRETARY: Mr. Gilbert? Has any invocation been sent to  
the United States by France on behalf of the Five Powers?

SECRETARY

GILBERT: Yes, sir. I understand so.

SECRETARY: It has not been received yet. They are intending  
to send one are they? Do they intend to send a formal  
notice to us.

GILBERT: Absolutely. The Foreign Ministers of France,  
Great Britain and Italy met on Saturday night and arranged  
at that time to send a notification to all signatories,  
of which Washington was one.

SECRETARY: Tell them it has not been received and verify  
it, will you?

GILBERT: I will verify it at once. I understood it is  
going to all signatories. They wanted to place the United  
States in a special position, but I said no - send it to  
Washington as just one of the signatories.

SECRETARY: We are holding back our note until we get it.  
Our note ought to go at once - today. If it has not been  
done, you look it up. Here is point No. 2. I am sending  
you instructions today that in view of the fact that the  
Kellogg Pact matter seems to be disposed of, we think that  
it is wise for you to withdraw from the meetings. They  
are now taking up matters which belong peculiarly to the  
League and we all think here that in view of that fact and  
in view of present tension with Japan it would be better

for

793.94/2207 1/2

Confidential File

note  
7/1/00/12 anti-war

JUL 19 1962

FTI 500



- 2 -

for you to withdraw. You will receive notice to do that, by cable. It has been sent now. Of course, make your position clear that you stand ready and available for consultation at any time there is need of it; but your presence there in case they should discuss other matters under the League covenant alone is open to misconception both here and in Japan. Do you understand?

GILBERT: I understand perfectly. I would like to say something. The Japanese came to see me today and told me they had prepared a statement which the Japanese wish to make at the opening of the next public meeting of the Council, in which they wish to say that their objection to the United States was entirely on juridical grounds. I prepared a brief reply. Briand wished them to say something at the Council of that sort favorable to the United States to relieve the tension. It was also arranged by Lord Reading. They are very anxious that that statement on the part of the Japanese should be made public and that I should make a reply.

SECRETARY: What kind of a reply?

GILBERT: It would seem most unfortunate for me to withdraw before the Japanese have had the opportunity to say that.

SECRETARY: What do you propose to reply?

GILBERT: I have the statement here. I will read you the Japanese statement and my reply.

SECRETARY: Read me your statement.

GILBERT: "I have heard with deep gratification what the representative of Japan has said, and I wish to assure him that I heartily appreciate the spirit in which he has spoken. I have never had any thought of attributing this decision in this matter to other than juridical considerations, but it gives me great pleasure to be able to hear

him

- 3 -

him say this himself, and to reassure him that on my part they may have no fear of my interpreting his attitude in any other light. The sentiments he has expressed as to the friendship and amity between our countries are cordially reciprocated. The long period of friendship between our people and the people of Japan is among the happiest stages in our history. It is furthest from our minds that that record will ever be broken."

SECRETARY: That is the end of the statement? That is all right. I am very glad to have you stay until that is done, provided it is done right off.

GILBERT: I cannot say when the next meeting is to be held. Briand and Reading have all worked on the Japanese very hard to get them to make the statement.

SECRETARY: Let them say it before they get into the other matters. I will tell you what I am afraid of. The resolution which they are working on now contains certain matters which in my opinion will probably not be adopted by the Japanese and will probably lead to a new deadlock.

GILBERT: I will tell you just what is happening here. They have no intention at the present time of submitting a resolution which will not be adopted by the Japanese. The resolution which they are working on, of which I am now sending you various amendments, is merely a project developed in the private meetings, by Briand and Reading and sometimes Grandi. Briand is all the time working with the Japanese and the Chinese to get their acceptance of various elements and work out a compromise. There is no intention now of any kind to present a resolution which would be in the form of a public ultimatum for the acceptance of Japan and China. It is all being worked out  
in

- 4 -

in private conversations to reach a possible solution and that is the plan they are working on now. They have private meetings of the Council in which the policy of proposed projects is discussed. Briand works on the Chinese and Japanese and comes back and reports the results, and is going on in that way until something is reached which can be accepted in public.

SECRETARY: I understand, and I am very glad to hear it. I want you to know my views. That is going to take a long time. They are not going to accomplish a resolution which will be acceptable to both the Chinese and Japanese without long and laborious negotiations. In the meanwhile they are attending to something which relates purely to the League of Nations and not to the Kellogg Pact and it is something which conceivably may make a deadlock or renew trouble at any time in which Japan may be strongly arrayed against the League. You are in there simply to handle the Kellogg Pact matter and by staying in while this resolution is being argued and worked out, you run the risk of being apparently dragged into a conflict between the League and Japan. I want you to arrange with the League at once, talking with Reading, Briand and Grandi, so that they can see that we must make clear here the fact that your sitting in there has been, as we have always stated, connected solely with the Kellogg Pact. And also for these other reasons it is quite undesirable that you should remain there, because it may bring up again the issue between America and Japan. Therefore, they ought to be able to arrange a brief public meeting at which this Japanese statement could be made. The quicker that statement is made the better will be its effect both here and in Japan, while if it is delayed during long negotiations in secret there will be all kinds of rumors and guesswork in the press concerning

- 5 -

concerning the issue between Japan and America. If they would hold a very brief public meeting, even if only for a few minutes, to dispose of this matter, that would do more to end the trouble which the press is speculating about now, namely, trouble between America and Japan, than anything else, and then it would leave you free to get out and clear the situation in that way, while they go on working and knowing all the time that we are ready to consult again whenever it seems appropriate to do so and can always consult informally with you or with me here so long as you remain in Geneva. It would very much clear the air from a general standpoint if those speeches of the Japanese representative and yourself were made right off and the atmosphere cleared up. Then you could withdraw on the ground that the function for which you were admitted publicly to the League was over, remaining standing on the sidelines ready for consultation in case you were needed. I want you to do that and I shall send you a cable confirming this.

GILBERT: Mr. Secretary, if I withdraw, then I would like to have a statement to make at the time of my withdrawal.

SECRETARY: You will find enough material to make this statement in my cable which has already gone to you.

GILBERT: Shall I in any way discuss the effect of this withdrawal with Lord Reading before I actually do it.

SECRETARY: Yes. Certainly you want to notify your fellow members, like Reading and Briand, that you are going to do this.

GILBERT: They may have various ideas of their own on the international effect of it.

SECRETARY: I cannot help that. We must be the judge of that here. I want you to be courteous to them and hear

them

- 6 -

them, but unless there is something very astonishing, I want you to go ahead and withdraw after the public meeting.

GILBERT: There is only one point. May I make it? I am afraid it will be impossible for me to ask them to have a special public meeting for that purpose as they are very anxious at the next public meeting, which I think will be tomorrow or next day at the latest, to indicate to the world that they have moved a little ahead in this matter. I feel that it will be asking too much of them to raise public opinion by the announcement of a public meeting and then have nothing other happen than my withdrawal. If that could be accompanied by something else to present to the world, it would be very much better.

SECRETARY: Is it not possible to have the statement of the Japanese representative and your reply given out to the press without having a public meeting?

GILBERT: I do not know. They worked this up with great difficulty with Tokyo and in that way in stages, feeling this would relieve tension.

SECRETARY: Read the statement of the Japanese representative. I am afraid there will be an indefinite delay and I am sure they propose to present certain things in their present resolution which will take a lot of time.

GILBERT: I do not think the next meeting will be under that resolution necessarily. Their plan was to have it at a certain point to ask Japan and China what they had done under the commitments already given. I am afraid they cannot defer that more than another day. I feel that it would be too much to ask in view of the way the League feels about this entire matter and the rather great difficulties they have experienced. It would be better if I could allow them that much time. I am very sorry. Of course I will carry

out

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out any instructions naturally, but I am presenting the way it looks to me. If I could withdraw at a natural meeting it would be better. Otherwise it would look as if Japan had demanded that I withdraw.

SECRETARY: I do not want that to occur. Suppose you read me the Japanese statement.

GILBERT: . It is purely on juridical grounds. He is speaking to members of the Council. "I raised the objection the other day, from a constitutional point of view, to inviting a representative of a non-member state to participate in the deliberations of the Council. \* \* \* They still maintain the legal stand I took on that occasion, but now that the representative of the United States sits at this table, I am glad to assure him and the members of the Council that it is the traditional policy of my country to promote friendship and amity with the United States, and both the Government and the people of Japan are determined to live in peace and good will with that country by following this policy consistently at all times."

SECRETARY: Let me ask you a question. In these secret meetings which are going on now, are you sitting?

GILBERT: Yes, sir.

SECRETARY: Why is that necessary?

GILBERT: I can withdraw if you desire.

SECRETARY: That might be the solution of it. If they would have the public meeting within a day or two and if you will withdraw from going to the secret meetings and let that leak out in the press there, then it will not be necessary to make a formal withdrawal. But I do not want you to be sitting in at the meetings in which this resolution and matters of that sort under the League covenant are being taken

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up and I want it to be known that you are not.

GILBERT: I was going to suggest something of that sort.

Then I will not go to the meeting today or tomorrow. I will arrange my liaison to get the information anyway.

SECRETARY: Of course you will get that from the representatives.

GILBERT: The reason I have sat at the secret meetings was because we accepted an invitation to be an auditor and the belief was that at any meeting of the Council I would continue to be an auditor and observer.

SECRETARY: There is no need of doing that. I do not think it is necessary. You can explain the situation to Briand, Reading and Grandi, so that there will be no misunderstanding.

GILBERT: Then I will go into the next public meeting anyway.

SECRETARY: Yes, you can go into the next public meeting, that is, if it is not postponed too long.

GILBERT: And that would be the last meeting?

SECRETARY: Yes, and it would be my preference that they should take up your and the Japanese representative's statements in the very beginning, before they take up the question of what reports are made under their own resolution of September 30th. That will allow you to retire gracefully before they take up those other matters in public. Is that clear?

GILBERT: Yes, sir. I will talk with Lord Reading and of course I will tell him what I will do. If he has any comment which is really pertinent, I shall let you have the benefit of it.

SECRETARY: But in the meantime, I expect you not to attend the secret meetings, and let this leak out to the press.

GILBERT: And not make a statement that I am not attending.

SECRETARY: Let your colleagues know what the grounds are. It is clear to us here that you have attended to the matter which

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which it was your purpose to participate in, and that is over. What they are working on now are matters which in no way relate to the Kellogg Pact. Unfortunately an issue between Japan and America in the press has arisen and it is important that no color should be given to the idea that America is participating in secret meetings aimed against Japan.

GILBERT: I understand, sir.

SECRETARY: And therefore you will stay away.

GILBERT: I understand perfectly, and I will then, after talking to Lord Reading, formulate the most graceful way of doing this. If he has any suggestions to make which will make it as easy as possible for them.

SECRETARY: I am very anxious to make it easy for them and they must know, as you will see from my telegram, that we will continue to cooperate with them.

GILBERT: I understand.

SECRETARY: But I do not want to have the danger of the misunderstanding in Japan, as well as in this country, which would arise from your participating in secret meetings on these other matters.

GILBERT: I have never spoken a word at the meetings.

SECRETARY: I know. I have not the slightest suspicion of you and have nothing but congratulations for the way you have handled this. But I want to protect you against any such unfortunate suspicions.

GILBERT: Thank you, sir. If I could discuss this frankly and confidentially with Lord Reading and he has any really pertinent thing to add, I will let you know at once.

SECRETARY: Yes, keep me posted just as fully as you can.

GILBERT: I cannot go so far as to ask them to have a special public meeting. It would have a very bad appearance

before



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before the public.

SECRETARY: I do not ask that, as long as you do not go to the other meetings and the public meeting is not too long deferred.

GILBERT: I think that is the best way - if I do not attend the secret meetings but merely disappear. Are you satisfied with the action on the Kellogg Pact here? As far as the action taken here goes, it was just as you wanted I think. From the technical point of view there was one difficulty that had to be straightened out. They felt that Washington being the depository of the Pact, we were the nation which would have to send out the notifications, and I had to take my own responsibility to say that the states initiating the action were the proper ones to notify the other signatories.

SECRETARY: You did that very well indeed. ~~The fact that~~

GILBERT: The fact that we had invoked the Pact once ourselves and were at the same time the depository state did not create a general precedent, and I took the responsibility of saying that those were your views. Was that satisfactory?

SECRETARY: You did very well. I am very much gratified.

GILBERT: Thank you, sir. I will see Lord Reading at the first opportunity.

SECRETARY: You can tell Reading and the others that the form in which the invocation of the Kellogg Pact took place was exactly the way in which I think it was wisest to do it and it accorded fully with my views.

GILBERT: I will take this matter up at once.

S HHR  
WE AMW

*file*  
Telephone Conversation between the Secretary and Lord Reading  
in Geneva. October 19, 1931 3:15 p.m.

DRUMMOND: Mr. Secretary, Lord Reading would like to speak to you.

READING: Hello, Mr. Stimson, Reading speaking. Can you hear? Mr. Gilbert has just informed me of your instructions to him to withdraw from the sessions of the Council on the ground that the objective of his participation has now been reached. I do not wish to suggest that you withdraw your instructions but I am sure it will be regarded, whatever explanation would be given, as expressing definite disapproval of the discussions now proceeding to the extent that you will not even allow your representative to sit at the table in accordance with the terms of your acceptance of the invitation as publicly announced and the subsequent speeches. Above all, I do want to state I am afraid of its effect (I am speaking frankly. You don't mind) of its effect upon the various countries and upon the rest of the representatives on the Council. It will, I fear, be disastrous (I cannot refrain from using strong terms) if after those most gracious terms of acceptance you will almost immediately thereafter withdraw so that the objective other than the Kellogg Pact cannot be reached: with the exception of the invocation of the Kellogg Pact which has since been done, nothing has yet been done except to attempt to draw up a resolution which both the Chinese and Japanese Governments will accept. That is what we are trying to do now. I have not dared to mention the matter to Briand or to any other member of the Council. The withdrawal would have the most serious effect upon Briand and may quite seriously bring about his downfall as Foreign Minister. It will be most dangerous you see. And of course the effect upon the disarmament conference which we are now discussing and making preparations for will be very serious.

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Confidential File

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serious and just now especially when my government as well as all others (connection interrupted). That is its possible effects upon the world's financial and political situation.

SECRETARY. I know it is very difficult.

READING. I assure you that it will have really disastrous effects. They will say you disapprove of the Council's action. Whatever you may say they will think that the cooperation which is expressed in your letter includes the discussions of what we are going to do in the League with regard to Manchuria as mentioned in the public letter. Now it is all right about the Kellogg Pact but it is after all the other thing that is the difficult thing which we are now discussing and about which nothing has happened. You are taking quite a different stand and consequently seem to disapprove of what we are now doing and that will be regarded as the only reason why you would be withdrawing. Am I making myself clear?

SECRETARY. Can you hear me now. Did you not see the instructions under which Mr. Gilbert was authorized to join? Did you not hear the instructions under which he was authorized to participate in the meetings.

READING. Yes.

SECRETARY. They were very clear in limiting his participation to the treatment of the Kellogg Pact.

READING.

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READING: Yes, but it was not only that you see. I have the letter here. I will just read it if I may.

SECRETARY: I have it here before me.

READING: If you will look towards the last part of the first paragraph. It says there he is "to be in a position to consider with the Council the relationship between the provisions of the Pact of Paris and the present unfortunate situation in Manchuria, and at the same time to follow the deliberation of the Council with regard to other aspects of the problem with which it is now confronted." You see that deals with two things.

SECRETARY: You have not got the last copy of his instructions - the second copy of the instructions.

READING: I have not got that with me. At the moment, I heard it of course.

SECRETARY: In the light of what occurred when the Japanese made a particular issue with this Government I, for the purpose of clarifying those instructions, sent another set. The situation was changed when the Japanese made their special issue with this Government by objecting to the seating of Gilbert and also by the announcement of their Foreign Office in Tokyo. We then sent instructions to Gilbert clarifying the former ones a little, so as to make it clearer that he was limited only to participation.

READING: That is all he is doing.

SECRETARY:

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SECRETARY: You have finished the Kellogg Pact matter have you not?

READING: The Kellogg Pact. Yes, but we have only finished the first part of the discussions for which he was desired. We have done that but of course the other part of it is the thing we are now engaged in. If he withdraws now, having announced that he was there for the Government of the United States to sit in the deliberations of the Council with regard to other aspects of the problems arising because of this unfortunate situation in Manchuria with which it is now confronted, that is not as we understood his participation.

SECRETARY: Lord Reading, I have not got here before me the two papers but the situation must have been made clear to you that his only participation was to be in regard to the Pact of Paris. In all other matters he was to be merely an observer and that part was put in for the purpose because we did not know how long the sessions of the Council would last before the Pact of Paris was finished. Now you have embarked on a very long series of negotiations which do not relate to that.

READING: We are at the present moment in long series, trying to arrive at something to which they will agree. If we can get the two governments to agree now to an announcement.

SECRETARY:

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SECRETARY: That may take some time in working out.

READING: We haven't come to a conclusion. We haven't even got to that yet we are just still discussing it. We hope to get it through within the next 48 hours but I cannot tell.

SECRETARY: I am going to be just as frank with you as you have been with me. I have read your new resolution and I think it is going to take you a long time to get through that. Unless it is very materially modified.

READING: What we are trying to do here is to work out their facts and see what modifications can be accepted that is what we are discussing with them.

SECRETARY: The whole situation seems to me to have been very materially modified by the very unexpected attitude Japan has taken towards American participation, the unexpected objection that Japan has made to our sitting with you at all.

READING: Who the Japanese?

SECRETARY: Yes. I do not want this whole situation to be confused so as to inflame the Japanese and thereby protract peace. They have taken a very narrow position but it is one out of which a great deal of dust can be raised in the newspapers at large, both in Japan and elsewhere. The objection which

Japan

- 6 -

Japan has made to American participation has created a new issue which bids fair greatly to delay and make more difficult the final solution if anything is done to aggravate it, and I am very much afraid that if Mr. Gilbert continues to sit in sessions of the council which are clearly not devoted to the matter for which we authorized his participation the Japanese will jump to the conclusion that we sought to get in there in order to push you along to more vigorous action against them, if you see what I mean. They will think we have some ulterior motive against them. I don't know whether you have seen the news from Tokyo? It indicates rather an unpleasant attitude towards this government - singling us out. There has thus been created an issue between Japan and America. I think it is not the part of wisdom to do anything which will allow them to accentuate that.

READING: We have accepted that situation and they are willing and say so.

STIMSON: You have not said so publicly and they have not said so publicly. Let me make clear to you. I told Gilbert this morning that he was at once to withdraw from the secret sessions where he is now sitting merely as an observer - the sessions at which Japan and China were not participating. If Gilbert goes to meetings which are secret and in which

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Japan is not represented and China not represented, it will undoubtedly lead to suspicion in Tokyo. It will undoubtedly give a most suspicious look to the case, a most suspicious appearance in the minds of the Japanese to have Gilbert continue going to meetings which no longer have anything to do with the Kellogg Pact and which are secret meetings at which Japan is not represented.

READING: Well, but you know, of course, it would be unfortunate if it had to happen but how would it be if he attended the one tomorrow. I think at most it would be a session in the morning in which we want to hear the result of certain interviews today between the President and Japan and China and then after that if you don't want him to attend the secret sessions they could be so arranged - what we will do - we should have a day in order to do that. We should end our secret session.

SECRETARY: It would not do for us to state in the same way that he was attending any secret sessions because some inferences would be drawn.

READING: I quite follow your point of view. In order to meet it as regards the secret sessions--- What I was suggesting to you was to let him attend the meeting tomorrow. He will take no part and then not attend any further secret meetings. After that I think what will be necessary, what I am myself



*Continuity reviewed -  
see file*

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continues to sit in sessions of the Council which are clearly not devoted to the matter for which we authorized his participation, the Japanese will jump to the conclusion that we sought to get in there in order to push you along into more vigorous action against them, if you see what I mean - they will think that we have some ulterior motive against them. I don't know whether you see the news from Tokyo, but the news from Tokyo has indicated rather an unpleasant attitude toward this Government, singling us out- there has been created an issue between Japan and America. Well now I think it is not the part of wisdom to do anything which will allow them to accentuate that.

R. Have accepted that situation - willing to say so.

S. You haven't said so probably and they have not said so. Let me make it clear to you. What I told Gilbert this morning - that he was to at once withdraw from the secret sessions. He was to withdraw from the secret sessions where he is now sitting merely as an observer. The sessions at which Japan and China were not participating. If Gilbert goes to meetings which are secret and in which Japan is not represented and China not represented, it will invariably lead to suspicion in Tokyo. Don't you see what I mean? Hello - do you hear me?

R. Yes.

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very anxious we should have is a public session and then from that moment we wont have any more secret sessions.

SECRETARY: Of course that will be commented upon.

READING: But it wont be so important. It wont be so much noticed if it is not done suddenly like a withdrawal tomorrow morning. If he can go and attend that and then if we do not have any further secret sessions until after the public meeting and then after that public meeting he can drop out the secret sessions altogether. No announcement need be made to that effect; simply he will not be sitting at the secret sessions.

SECRETARY: I have already authorized him to attend the public session tomorrow at which I understand the Japanese are going to withdraw their objection or to say their objection was purely on juridical grounds and Gilbert is to make a reply to that. It has been my view and still is that that offers the best time to declare that the Kellogg Pact work is finished. (I mean the Pact of Paris,) and to give Mr. Gilbert an opportunity to say that that being so he will attend no more meetings unless you desire to consult with him or to consult with this country on some other

matter

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matter on which we are directly concerned. You see we have got to look out also for our future steps in this matter in the light of American public opinion. American public opinion has been quite alarmed at the thought that we were going further than was warranted by our treaties. They are not altogether reassured of the language of the authority which has been published here which is about as clear as the English language could make it.

It is because I am so anxious that nothing shall be done to undo the measure of cooperation which I have found possible thus far and that we shall not excite adverse public opinion here which would make such action impossible in the future, that I have been anxious to make it perfectly clear that we are cooperating with you only on matters in which we had a business to cooperate, namely, matters to which we were parties by treaty. Do I make myself clear? Now you are going on into the consideration of the resolution of September 30th or rather a follow-up resolution to that resolution, a matter which you carried on under the League of Nations covenant and without our participation then, and there is the American man in the street to consider, who will say there is no more reason for Mr. Gilbert to participate

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now than there was when the original resolution of September 30 was made. So I thought that was the natural place for him to withdraw, remaining only in reserve. He will be available for consultation in case a matter comes up again which is directly in line with this country's obligations and duties.

READING: Very well.

SECRETARY: Do you not see that so long as he is going in and out of the council chamber it makes two kinds of objections. First, that he is doing more than our treaty duties call for and second that he is really the embodiment of this country's hostility towards Japan. I want to show two things. I want to show that we are not meddling either beyond our own obligations recognized here in America or above all beyond what we are entitled to directly with Japan, and there is a very strong feeling evidently in Tokyo that it is we who are trying to get Japan out of Manchuria. That I will have to look out for, because it will delay peace throughout the world. It will block what you are doing. It will make your task more hard. It does not mean that I will not myself keep on in the same line as before and it does not mean that you

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cannot call Gilbert whenever a matter comes up which will be recognized as directly concerned with what he has already been doing.

READING: What I can't quite follow is this--I am not hearing very well. He came in under the League invitation and under the letter on your behalf with regard to the Pact of Paris to follow the deliberations of the council with regard to the other aspects of the problem on which action was required by the council. The Second is now going on and deliberations are proceeding. All he is doing is following the deliberations of the council with regard to these other aspects of the problem. If he withdraws from that objective--there are really two: one is the Pact of Paris and the other the other aspects of the problem with which the Council is confronted--there will be great difficulty you see. Certainly nobody at the council was thinking he was being limited to the Pact of Paris because in the letter of the President to Mr. Briand both those matters were referred to and he was invited and accepted in your name to follow the deliberations, not to take part in them of course but merely to hear and observe. That is quite understood. It was with regard to both that he was welcomed.

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SECRETARY: That is one of the difficulties in handling a matter so far away. As a matter of fact I did not see the answer or the invitation until after they had been delivered but here is the instruction under which Mr. Gilbert was acting and to which I alluded. It will make clear to you my standpoint here and this of course is in the light of not only the attitude of the Department of State but the general opinion of this country. My language when I authorized him was as follows: "You are authorized to participate in the discussions of the Council when they relate to the possible application of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, to which treaty the United States is a party. You are expected to report the result of such discussions to the Department for its determination as to possible action. If you are present at the discussion of any other aspect of the Chinese-Japanese dispute, it must be only as observer and auditor."

That represents the way in which my mind projected itself into this matter.

READING: I think that is as we understood it.

SECRETARY: But when a situation arises where the Kellogg-Briand Pact is finished and where there seems to be very grave danger that participation, particularly in secret meetings, may make the other part of it where we wanted to help you more difficult instead of easier and where there is grave danger of being misunderstood by the Japanese nation I thought it was the part of wisdom for him at the next convenient opportunity to

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make a public statement that the Kellogg Pact having been finished, he would hold himself in reserve and would not attend any further meetings until or unless he was called for consultation upon some matters to which our treaties related and I did not see how that could possibly embarrass you. My last purpose in the world is to embarrass you. It is the last thing in the world that I want to do - embarrass you in your effort, and I was afraid that his remaining there, particularly in secret meetings, would be of course a source of great embarrassment and great danger. The most important part is the secret meetings. If it is going to be a very great embarrassment for you to have him stay away from public meetings where he can be recognized only as an observer and where everybody knows that he is not pulling wires against Japan, I will reconsider that and think it over. But I do not want him to go to any further secret meetings now that the Kellogg Pact is over.

READING: If you will let him go tomorrow, I quite appreciate your view of course with regard to the other but you see what I am most

anxious

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anxious about is a public discussion of his having been withdrawn from the secret sessions while everyone is following them. What I was suggesting was that if you would allow him to attend, as he has done today the meeting tomorrow, then I would suggest that the difference of one day won't really make a very serious difference. If he does that then after that we will have a public meeting which he attends as only an observer and will continue to attend publicly as auditor and observer. Of course we quite appreciate and understand that you do not wish him to attend any secret meetings but I would suggest that nothing be said about your instructions on these meetings. Of course we shall be bound by them. He would not be called in any further secret meetings, but I am anxious that there should be no comment on it.

SECRETARY: I do not intend to comment on it provided we can get him out of danger. When would the next public meeting take place?

READING: I think it must take place certainly within the next 48 hours. Perhaps less.

SECRETARY: Can you not have it tomorrow? I do not want Gilbert to attend any more secret meetings if possible and if you have got to have him at one - not more than one.



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READING: All I ask is that you will be good enough to let him attend the one which is already called for tomorrow?

SECRETARY: Is that a secret meeting?

READING: Yes, that is a secret meeting. What I was suggesting to you is that there would be a public meeting after that and then that he should not attend any more secret meetings at all but would merely attend the public meetings as auditor and observer. If he attends the secret sessions in the morning, it will be only following out what he has done today. If he does not, this will have created a situation which will become most serious. That is the only reason I am calling - just with reference to tomorrow's meeting.

SECRETARY: I do not want to cause that.

READING: I beg you not to withdraw him yet. The effect on the French situation would be more serious even more than on ours but it would be very embarrassing to all. I am trying to explain it as I think I understand the situation that I was describing to you.

SECRETARY: One further thing, Lord Reading, you have got to protect me throughout. If I protect you, you must protect me. When he does attend those public meetings after the Kellogg Pact matter is over and after his interchange of reconciliation with the Japanese is over, he must attend purely as an observer. I think it would make it much easier for us and make our position clear if he took the

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position which observers have taken, rather than a seat among the members of the Council.

READING: We have always understood that you know.

SECRETARY: I am not familiar with the physical surroundings in the Council room but the newspapers have represented Gilbert as having been given a seat among the members of the Council and that has been played up everywhere as if he had been made a member of the Council.

READING: It was a distinction most deliberately drawn. He did not sit with members of Council as a member as that would have implied unanimity.

SECRETARY: What I am suggesting now is that the physical surroundings in the room be altered so as to conform to the actual legal facts as to his constitutional attendance.

READING: I see what you mean. That is easily done.

SECRETARY: Just let me get this clear. He has been sitting at the Council table so long as you were considering the Kellogg Pact and so long as he was in the category of the first part of my authority which I gave him. Now that is over and if any more public meetings take place he is merely there as an observer. Can you not do something which will make this physically apparent. Do you understand that?

READING: I don't understand the last part.

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SECRETARY: When he was deliberating with you on the Kellogg Pact, you with great formality gave him a position at your own table. I do not understand that the ordinary observers either from our country or other countries who have in the past attended the meetings of the Council have been given such a conspicuous position. I suggest therefore, as soon as the Kellogg Pact, the Pact of Paris, is formally disposed of, that Mr. Gilbert, while he may remain in the room in the public session, shall take the ordinary position or the ordinary chair of an observer.

READING: Yes, I see what you mean.

SECRETARY: That will disarm a great deal of suspicion. It seems a little thing, but the Japanese objection has made everybody think that Gilbert had become a member of the Council. They did not read your decision. They read only the basis of the Japanese objection. That not only reacts badly in Japan but reacts very badly in America and I am trying to kill those two birds with one stone. I am willing to compromise with you in that way for the present and, until further advised Gilbert may go for one more secret meeting. Then he can attend the public meeting where the Japanese statement will be made and his

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response will be made. That involves his making a little speech. That however will terminate his service under the Pact of Paris and while he need not withdraw altogether from the attendance, he can then subside back into the position of an observer which is strictly in accordance with the way in which he came in and he will also be in a position where he can follow what you are doing, if you desire that, provided it is in public session.

READING: I want to see if I have it. You would allow him to attend one more secret meeting, and only the one tomorrow; then after that he would attend the public sessions where he is to make his answer and then after that sitting take the position he had the other day not at the council table but as an observer. The only observation upon that which I would like to make is that would it not be sufficient at the meeting, at which statement is made by the Japanese and at which he makes his answer, that he takes no further part at the end of table and that hereafter if you wish it he should not sit at the table but have his chair at the table as an observer. The reason is that I am particularly anxious for the same reason as already explained that he should not have to change his position at the same meeting.

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SECRETARY. All right I will accept that.

READING. Then he will withdraw.

SECRETARY. I will accept your suggestion that he retain his position during the ceremony of that public meeting but at the next public meeting he will go to the new position. You understand, I hope, that I have no desire to embarrass you. I am only trying to protect you as well as myself.

READING. Of course I feel the reaction which would take place in America as you have pointed out to me. I am inclined to point out what they have been over here.

SECRETARY: The reactions which have taken place in America have been based upon reactions which have taken place in Japan and I think it would be very dangerous to the business which we all have in view to feed any more fuel to that flame.

READING: We have been deliberating in these secret sessions for we did not want them to be put in a difficult situation publicly. We shall have to have a public meeting and it must take place certainly within 48 hours, where they must state their position in public. This cannot go on forever.

SECRETARY: I understand. My own opinion is that the great effect of the solidarity of all the

nations

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nations of the world in favor of peace in Manchuria  
has already been accomplished by our original action.

READING: I do not want to change it I assure you, but  
over here in Europe your withdrawal would be taken as  
nothing else but disapproving of what we are doing.

SECRETARY: We certainly do not disapprove and we do  
not want to be mistaken on that.

READING: There are difficulties in our position here in  
meeting your views which I would like of course to meet.

SECRETARY: But apart from that I want to follow in with  
your views. I readily recognize that you are trying to  
follow in with mine. We will go ahead on that basis.

READING: Mr. Secretary, may I inform Mr. Gilbert or  
shall he hear it from you.

SECRETARY: Tell him of our conversation but I will follow  
it up with a cable to him direct.

READING: I am sorry to have troubled you. You understand  
I had to. If I can be of any use in any way you have only  
to let me know.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 19, 1931

Rec'd 6:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

793, October 19, 11 p. m.

Following from Hanson and Salisbury at Mukden, October  
17, 5 p. m. and October 17, 6 p. m.

"One. Arrived yesterday at Antung at 7 a. m. and de-  
parted 2:45 p. m.

Two. According to Chinese officials and Japanese  
military and civil authorities we interviewed there, on  
September 19th early in the morning about 50 Japanese  
regular soldiers from Shingishu, Korea, entered the  
Chinese city of Antung, disarmed the entire force of  
Chinese police, took possession of the Chinese govern-  
mental establishments, with the exception of post office,  
and put out of commission the electric light plant in the  
Chinese city. There were not and have not been for long  
time any Chinese soldiers in Antung. At the same time  
Japanese South Manchuria Railway guards from Liutaokow,  
about one mile outside the city, disarmed and sent by rail  
to Mukden

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 19 1931  
Department of State

*Telegram to Geneva  
10/20/31  
file  
793*

793.94/2208

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OCT 22 1931  
10:28:130

REP

2- #793, from Peiping, Oct. 19, 1p.m.

to Mukden several hundred Chinese soldiers stationed at Fenghuangchen about 30 miles from the city. These were the only Chinese soldiers stationed in the vicinity of Antung.

Three. Three or four days later the Japanese soldiers left the Chinese city and Japanese gendarmes were stationed at the offices of the magistrate and of the city, river and district police. The Chinese telegraph office was closed by the Japanese gendarmes on September 19th and was still closed when we tried to send a telegram on <sup>October</sup> ~~September~~ 16th, according to the postmaster, the Japanese gendarmes commenced censoring Chinese postoffice mail <sup>on October 13th,</sup> ~~on September 13th,~~ special attention being paid to mail addressed to Chinese officials and the delivery of the Chinese newspapers from Shanghai and Tientsin being prohibited.

Four. The Chinese owned electric light plant owes Anderson Meyer and Company, an American firm, \$90,000 gold for equipment. When asked why the Japanese soldiers put out of commission this plant, Mr. Yonezawa, the Japanese Consul at Antung, replied that it was done for military reasons

which he



REP

3-1 #798, from Peiping, Oct. 19, 1 P.M.

Which he did not understand, inferred that the Japanese electric plant had a monopoly on furnishing electric current, and said that the Chinese company had no right to operate and that it could not make enough profit to pay interest on its debt.

Roy Talbot, American Commissioner of Chinese Customs at Antung, informed us that the Japanese military, who stated that they acted in order better to defend the Japanese railway bridge across the Yalu closed the customs inspection shed at the Antung end of this bridge. This forced the customs to attempt inspection work in tents located several hundred feet from the bridge with the result that inspection except of trains is practically impossible and the way is now open for the entry into Manchuria of large amounts of goods which do not pay duty, thus seriously affecting customs receipts. There is no longer any cooperation with the customs on the part of Japanese officials. We inspected the customs situation at the bridge head and found it to be as described by Mr. Talbot.

Six. ~~Then~~ we called at the office of the Chinese magistrate

REP

#793, from Peiping, Oct. 19, 1937.

magistrate he stated that he could not talk frankly with us as there were Japanese gendarmes listening to our conversation behind the curtain at the end of the room where we were. We saw two Japanese officers behind the curtain mentioned. The magistrate agreed to meet us a half hour later at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, where he informed us that Japanese guard had been stationed over him in his office since September 19 for reasons unknown to him. He stated that, when the Japanese Chief of Gendarmes informed him of the expected arrival of Japanese troops, he protested against their arrival on the grounds that conditions were peaceful in the city, that the 600 Chinese police had maintained and could maintain order and that the quarrel between Japanese and Chinese at Mukden was no concern of the Chinese inhabitants of Antung. He also said that a committee consisting of himself, the chiefs of city and river police, the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, one banker and two merchants, one of whom speaks Japanese, had been formed to advise in regard to maintenance of peace and order in the city. This committee meets once

REP

5- #793, from Peiping, Oct. 19, 1 p.m.

meets once daily but has no governmental power. We could not discover whether the Japanese had anything to do with the formation of this committee. According to the Chinese officials, they are being prevented from receiving instructions from Chinchow or Nanking and therefore they are compelled to act independently of any outside Chinese authority.

Seven. The thinking Chinese at Antung are very much opposed to the occupation by Japanese gendarmes of the Chinese city of Antung.

Eight. The Japanese Consul and four Japanese military officers with whom we talked for two hours stated that although there had existed only friendly relations between the 12,000 Japanese and 10,000 Koreans and the Chinese, the Japanese army felt it necessary to disarm the Chinese police to prevent them from making an attack on the Japanese concession, where practically all the Japanese residents were living.

When asked when the Japanese gendarmes would withdraw from the native city, they replied that this would be done as soon as they were sure that conditions would remain quiet and that

RWP

6- #793, from Peiping, Oct. 19, 1 p.m.

and that the danger of an attack by bandits would disappear.

In this connection we might remark that both Japanese and Chinese interviewed stated that the City of Antung has for many years been practically free of banditry. As far as we could ascertain there are various disbanded soldiers in this neighborhood and, therefore, there is no more danger of an attack from brigands than there was before the Mukden incident occurred. The Japanese Consul informed us that there was no Japanese censorship at the post office and that telegrams could be despatched by the Chinese telegraph office. These were misstatements and, considering the fact that he made other misstatements, it was apparent that he was attempting to mislead us. In reply to a question in regard to the presence of two Japanese officers in the magistrate's office, Captain Kato, Chief of the Gendarmes, stated that he had no knowledge of their presence there but would investigate. As the conversation developed he admitted that he himself was living at the magistrate's office and we discovered that he was one of the officers we had seen behind the curtain. The Consul then stated that the reason the

gendarmes

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

From #793, from Peiping, Oct. 19, 1 p.m.

gendarmes were there was to see that peace and order were being maintained in the city.

Nine. Mr. Talbot was informed late in the afternoon of October 16 by the Japanese commander of the Japanese troops at Shingishu that he was withdrawing on that day to Korea his troops (about 150) stationed at Antung. The withdrawal of these troops will have no effect on the control by Japanese of the native city, for, as long as the Japanese gendarmes remain there, the Chinese Government institutions will not be able to function independently.

We could see no indication of a desire on the part of the Japanese to withdraw their gendarmes from the native city or to return to the status quo ante, although they had returned 40 rifles (of 500 taken) to the Chinese city police, who were patrolling the streets under the direction of the Japanese gendarmes.

Ten. We believe that, as far as actual protection from possible attacks against Japanese residents is considered, the Japanese authorities were not justified in taking possession of the native city of Antung, as they had near at hand ample police and military forces to quell almost instantly any anti-Japanese outburst.

Eleven.

REP

#793, from Peiping, Oct, 19, 1 p.m.

Eleven. In our opinion the immediate withdrawal of the Japanese armed forces at Antung would not result in any danger to the lives and property of Japanese subjects there. In view of the fact that there are Japanese gendarmes and 150 Japanese police in the Japanese concession, some Japanese railway guards stationed one half a mile away at Liutoku, and many Japanese soldiers at Shingishu, we believe that neither the Chinese Government police nor inhabitants, no matter how bitter they felt against the Japanese, would dare attack the Japanese inhabitants and that a brigand attack could be easily warded off.

Twelve. Four days after the Japanese took over the native city, through a misunderstanding brought about by a Chinese policeman shooting three shots, Japanese gendarmes sent to restore order firing into a crowd of Chinese who had taken refuge in a silk mill during the excitement caused by the shots and who had armed themselves with spears and other weapons to resist the Japanese gendarmes. Four Chinese were killed. This was the only bloodshed which occurred

REP

9- #793, from Peiping, Oct. 19, 1 p.m.

occurred in connection with the Japanese occupancy of Antung.

Not repeated to Tokyo.

For the Minister

ENGERT

RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



CONFIDENTIAL  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

October 16, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON  
AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI, 3:45 P.M.

Manchuria.

The Japanese Ambassador had come to see Mr. Castle but as Mr. Castle was engaged and I was free, I saw Mr. Debutchi. He told me that the Council had voted to invite the United States to participate in the discussion of the Kellogg Pact and he did not know what had happened after that. I told him that I had talked with Mr. Gilbert on the telephone and I knew; that the invitation had been extended and that it had been accepted at 5:00 o'clock and Mr. Gilbert had sat in the Conference at 6:00 o'clock, and that the opening speeches had been interchanged. He said that personally he was very glad. He said that the objections by his country had been made only on juridical grounds. I told him that in spite of that last fact, the fact that Japan had opposed the invitation to us and that on the same day a spokesman of the Foreign Office at Tokyo had made the statement which he had made yesterday, would certainly lead the whole world to believe that Japan did not wish us to sit and that our two countries were arrayed against each other. I said I was

very

793.94/2209

CONFIDENTIAL

OCT 16 1931



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

very sorry over this for it undid every thing that I had been working for since September and I thought it would also undo much that the Ambassador and I had been working for during the past two years. He said he knew that, it was true, and he felt very sorry. I then said that in accepting the invitation of the League of Nations I had had very largely in mind avoiding this appearance of a personal issue between Japan and America which would otherwise appear in case the Kellogg Pact were invoked by us in America instead of its being done by the group of nations in Geneva. The Ambassador got the point at once and immediately said he had felt all along that that was my purpose. I reminded him that I had been working from the beginning to have Japan and China get an opportunity to settle this by direct negotiation. He said he knew that. I told him that neither the President nor I could understand this action of the Foreign Office spokesman yesterday and we did not see how Mr. Shidehara could have done it. He again said, as he had said yesterday, that he felt certain the spokesman had made a mistake. He told me that he had sent a very long telegram yesterday expressing his views strongly against what had been done in Tokyo. He told me that the press had

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

had had a flash that immediately after the receipt of the telegram the Cabinet at Tokyo had gone into session, but he said he had received no news of what they had done.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



CONFIDENTIAL  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 19 1931

Department of State

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

October 16, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON  
AND THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, MR. PAUL CLAUDEL, AT 4:00 O'CLOCK.

Manchuria.

7-23-31  
I called for the French Ambassador to come to my office. When he came I told him that I had an important message for him. I told him that the Council of the League of Nations had invited us to have a participant at the discussion of the question of the Kellogg Pact in Geneva; that we had accepted and Mr. Gilbert had taken his place. I told the Ambassador that I had talked with Mr. Gilbert on the telephone and had learned from him that it had been suggested there that the duty of organizing the invocation of the Kellogg Pact should be sent back here from Geneva to be done by us in Washington. I said that that was quite impossible; it would be better not to invoke the Kellogg Pact than to do it in that way. I told him that under any circumstances it was much better to have the work of communicating with the various signatories of the Kellogg Pact done from Geneva by the group of nations represented there than from Washington under the leadership of one nation, the United States. But I said that since the occurrences of yesterday, when Japan had protested

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

protested against the invitation to us, it had become doubly impossible, and that we could not do it without inflaming Japan and without setting back the ultimate solution of this question. He said he understood the situation perfectly and agreed with me. He said that what was needed was tact; that Oriental nations liked to settle their problems by diplomacy and not by judicial proceedings, and that what was needed was time and a chance to cool down. I said I agreed perfectly with him and I told him how I had already prevented in the beginning of this matter the sending of a military mission by the League to Manchuria which would have inflamed Japan and set back the whole thing. He again expressed his entire agreement with what I had done.

I said that now I wanted him to communicate to M. Briand at once my views and to say that we could not take up the matter here; that it was better not to invoke the Pact than to have it done from Washington. I said that in Geneva they were all present and could discuss together, and the matter could be handled by united cooperation and the whole body of nations would be arrayed  
in

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

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in favor of peace without any personal affront to  
either Japan or China. I said it was of great advantage  
too that it was under the leadership of M. Briand. He  
left, saying that he would send a telegram to Briand at  
once and send it to Geneva instead of Paris.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

October 16, 1931.

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793.94  
AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND)

94 *Very Urgent*

Since the receipt (today) of the invitation  
from the Council for you to attend its meetings  
I think it well to repeat, for the purpose of 2077  
absolute clarity, your instructions, which are as  
follows:

You are authorized to participate in the  
discussions of the Council when they relate to the  
possible application of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, to  
which treaty the United States is a party. You are  
expected to report the result of such discussions to the  
Department for its determination as to possible action.  
If you are present at the discussion of any other aspect  
of the Chinese-Japanese dispute, it must be only as  
an observer and auditor.

12 91 120

U WRC:GMH

*Stinson*

Enciphered by *HP*

Sent by operator

M.,

19

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OCT 16 1931

793.94/2210A

1377

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

This cable was sent in confidential Washington,  
It should be carefully paraphrase October 16, 1931.  
being communicated to anyone.

AMERICAN CONSUL

OCT 16 1931 GENEVA (Switzerland)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL - FOR GUIDANCE.

Referring to my 'telephone' conversation with 'you' this morning. I desire to 'enforce' what I 'then' said. You are to 'participate in' no 'discussions' except 'as to possible' invocation of the 'Kellogg' Pact 'as a' means of 'mobilizing' world opinion against 'war. The situation in' the 'Far East' changes 'day' by 'day' and if, 'in the' opinion of 'the Council,' appeal to the 'Pact' seems 'unwise' you are 'under no circumstances' to urge it. On the other hand, 'should the' Council 'decide' to invoke the 'Pact' you should make 'it' quite 'clear that' the initiative must come from Geneva. I 'quite' understand the 'difficulty' for the 'Council,' as such, to invoke the pact 'but I' see no reason why 'the' individual 'members of the' Council, 'as' representatives of 'governments' signatory 'of the' Pact, should not take the initiative 'toward' effecting its invocation. Under existing circumstances I can 'not' initiate 'it' in Washington. The whole 'purpose of' authorizing 'you' to sit 'with the' Council 'was that,' as the 'initiative' in connection with 'discussion of' the question of 'invoking' the Pact 'should be taken' in 'Geneva,' I was 'willing to' have you, 'by' participating, 'express' the cooperation of 'this' Government.

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1935 1-138

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DECLASSIFIED: / E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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## Department of State

Washington,

TO AMERICAN CONSUL GENEVA PAGE 2.

If I should call in the representatives of the various signatory governments here to make the suggestion it might lead to the crossing of wires. It would be most unfortunate if the Council should ask the United States to invoke the Pact <sup>alone or to propose invoking it</sup> and you must make every effort to avoid this. Japan is undoubtedly anxious that the Pact should not be invoked and it was presumably to prevent this if possible that objection was made to our sitting at the meeting of the council. If, therefore, we are put in the position of ourselves urging other nations to invoke the Pact Japan would consider that we had failed in neutrality and the peaceful settlement of the dispute might be actually delayed. The events of the last two days have made this situation between Japan and the United States far more serious. Not only did Japan oppose our representation on the Council but the spokesman for the <sup>Japanese</sup> Foreign Office yesterday made other statements which would unfortunately tend to inflame Japanese public opinion against the United States. The result of all this is that the appearance of this Government as urging invocation of

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

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Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 1-128



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

TO AMERICAN CONSUL GENEVA PAGE 3.

the Kellogg Pact would be instantly and deeply resented in Japan. The very fact that such an appeal was made in Washington, that it had a Washington date line, might well result in such irritation in Japan that the effect, which it had been hoped an appeal to the disputants on the basis of the Pact would have would not only be nullified but might even result in postponing the settlement of the issue. You will understand, therefore, how important it is that you keep in the background in order that no possible suspicion may arise that it is the United States which is taking the initiative in the matter or is in any way pressing for invocation of the Pact.

*Stinson*  
*Wdy*

U WRO/LM

FE

Stet

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1965 1-128

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

October 17, 1931

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This cable was sent in confidential Code.  
Should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.

American Consul

Geneva (Switzerland)

99

~~Confidential~~  
Special for Gilbert from the Secretary:

1. I expressed my views to you on the telephone yesterday as to the necessity of not permitting the organization of any movement under the Pact of Paris to be referred back here to Washington. You must be absolutely staunch against that. That would array America vis-a-vis Japan, in the most forcible way and would delay peace in Manchuria. It would be better not to invoke the Pact at all than to invoke it in that way. The reasons for this have been given you in a previous cable confirming my telephone conversations. I have notified Briand and Reading through their embassies of my views on this point.

2. I wish you now to understand my general view of the situation. I believe that by the step taken yesterday in aligning formally the United States with the other nations at Geneva in a conference to preserve peace, the principal and most efficacious step towards preserving peace has already been taken. It may well be supplemented, if the Conference so agrees, by the organization at Geneva of a formal protest by the signatories of the Pact of Paris.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-128

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

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But the firm impression of solid alignment of public opinion has already been given. I am inclined to think that it may well be desirable to go forward with such a general protest for the purpose of clinching this appearance of solidarity. But I have an entirely open mind on the subject and if it should appear in the discussions that there was a danger of such further steps inflaming the situation between Japan and China so as to delay peace, I should be quite willing to acquiesce in going no further.

3. I am firmly convinced that the ultimate solution of the Manchurian problem must be left to direct negotiations of the parties themselves, whether with or without neutral observers. The neutral nations should not undertake to intrude into the terms of that settlement. Their only interest is to prevent war and to insist that the settlement <sup>shall</sup> ~~must~~ be HLS  
by pacific means. ~~This general principle is reinforced by the well-known inclination of Oriental nations and individuals to settle their disputes by negotiation rather than by judicial procedure.~~ HLS  
Every inducement, therefore, should be given to Japan and China to settle the present controversy

Enciphered by .....  
Sent by operator ..... M., ..... , 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

-3-

in that way. While there is danger of further minor clashes in the present tense situation, I believe that neither nation wishes to have a war, particularly in view of the present aroused opinion of the world; and the requisite time must be found somehow for them to overcome the obstacles to beginning such negotiations.

4. As the situation stands at present a great step has been taken to demonstrate the solidarity of the nations of the world even when faced with a major crisis in their resolution to stand together for peace and a great vindication of the present peace machinery of the world has similarly been made. Our object should be to hold this present situation and to insure that a settlement be reached by negotiation and without further break.

5. You may when it seems desirable communicate these as my views to Briand and Reading, and *Grandi* HVS

Stimson.

HVS

Enciphered by

Oct. 17, 1904

Sent by operator

M.

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1925 3-1118

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
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Washington,



October 16, 1931.

AMERICAN EMBASSY OCT 17 31

TOKYO (JAPAN).

*198* The Legation at Peiping has been instructed to inform Hanson and Salisbury that the Department desires that they conclude their survey within a few days and as soon as convenient return to their respective posts. *Instructions is being sent to Salisbury through Peiping. Salisbury has been informed that he should take material for full report to Embassy.*

*Stinson*

*Secret*  
 793.94/2200D

FE: RSM: EJJ

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Enciphered by *KP*

Sent by operator *M.*, 19 *31*

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-128

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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## Department of State

Washington, <sup>17</sup>  
 October 16, 1931.

4p

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

OCT 17 31

386

Inform Hanson and Salisbury that Department desires that they conclude their survey within a few days and as soon as convenient return to their respective posts. They should arrange for Myers to have a record as complete as possible of what they have reported, and Myers should continue to collect such data and should make it a point to send us whenever possible the most accurate statements of fact which he is able to acquire with regard to any new developments in the military and political situations.

Inform Salisbury that he should take material for full report to Embassy.

*Stinson*

79B.94/2210E

FE:SKH/ZMF

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_ 19 \_\_\_\_\_

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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OCT 20 1931

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|                     |                                 |
|---------------------|---------------------------------|
| THE UNDER SECRETARY | SECRETARY OF STATE              |
| OCT 20 1931         | DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS |
| DEPARTMENT OF STATE | October 20, 1931.               |

HANDLING OF HANSON-SALISBURY REPORTS.

FE considers that the decision of the League to delay for the time being circulation to members of the Council and release to the press of "military information" from Manchuria is wise.

It will be remembered that it was decided here at the outset that we would hold this information in confidence, at least until Hanson and Salisbury had completed their reporting, and that, in sending the information to Gilbert for communication to Drummond, we would do so on the understanding that Drummond would keep it confidential as to source and would give information with regard to it to members of the Council only.

SKH/ZMF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone.

FROM Geneva

Dated October 18, 1931

Rec'd 7:55 p. m.

743.94  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.

224, October 19, 7 p. m.

For the Secretary.

Consulate's 219 October 18, 7 p. m. and number  
2195  
220, October 18, 8 p. m. and similar telegram.

One. I was informed this morning that the League  
would for the time being delay acting on the circulation  
of "military information" from Manchuria to members of  
the Council and subsequent release to the press.

This change in procedure is made for tactical  
reasons. It is felt:

(a) That the constant issuance of such information,  
much of it carrying implications unfavorable to the  
Japanese and sometimes to the Chinese, is an unnecessary  
irritant at this time and

(b) That it is also more expedient to hold this  
information in reserve particularly from the Chinese  
and

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 20 1931

OCT 20 1931

793.94/2211

OCT 28 1931

FILED



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

#224, October 19, 7 p. m., from Geneva

-2-

and Japanese for possible future use.

I have made arrangements to obtain direct from the British and the French whatever information may come to them here and through Drummond such as may come from other sources. This I will transmit promptly to you as I receive it and as you will note it will be for the time being confidential.

2210C  
 Your 98, October 17, 2 p. m., paragraph five.

Two.

/I have made known to Briand and to Reading

(Grandi is temporarily <sup>in</sup> ~~out of~~ Rome) your views as <sup>DEW.</sup> 10-28-31

expressed in your telegram under reference particularly paragraphs three and four and they are giving what you have to say fullest consideration. I have arranged with them for a most satisfactory liaison respecting information and opinion. They feel most strongly the necessity of keeping you fully and currently informed of all developments here and also respecting their policy as it is being shaped from day to day. This I will transmit to you as promptly as possible. They are looking to you for an expression of your views on the various questions as they arise and on proposals as they

are

#224, October 19, 7 p. m., from Geneva

-3-

are formulated and realize the very great necessity for common action in so far as that may be attained.

Three. To assist you in getting the picture here, what is going on from day to day is about as follows.

In the private meetings of the Council in which all members are present <sup>except</sup> without the Chinese and the Japanese a general policy is discussed and formulated. Briand then assumes the major burden of discussing the elements of a project to carry out that policy with the Chinese and Japanese representatives here. Reading assists him in this and at times Grandi plays a similar part.

After these private conversations with the Chinese and Japanese, Briand reports the results to the next private meeting of the Council with suggested modification in the original project which may have appeared desirable during the interval either because of a shift in the situation or to be able to meet as far as possible the views of the Chinese and Japanese. This procedure continues until a point is reached when the project may be brought forward in a public meeting of the Council with some hope of its acceptance by the two parties to the dispute or when a public meeting of the Council

may

#224, October 19, 7 p. m. from Geneva

-4-

may seem desirable in order to acquaint public opinion with what is transpiring.

Reading said to me today that in view of the position of the Japanese and in view of the whole situation a "perfect solution" could hardly be looked for, compromises would undoubtedly be necessary, but that they were doing everything possible.

Four. Reading informed me this morning that the Japanese are attempting in private conversations to create the impression here that you appreciate better than Geneva the situation in Manchuria and that for that reason you do not lay particular stress on the evacuation of troops. In reporting this to you I am taking care to employ as near as possible Reading's words.

GILBERT

FW

139

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Luntz NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
\$

793-94/2211

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington.

October 20, 1931.

This cable was sent in confidential Code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

OCT 20 31

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA, (SWITZERLAND)

107

CONFIDENTIAL FOR GILBERT FROM THE SECRETARY.

Your 224, October 19th. /2211

500.1112

One. This gives me exactly the kind of current information that I wish. I hope that you can continue it currently as promptly as possible without placing an undue burden on your work.

Two. We must anticipate such attempts by both China and Japan as are described in your paragraph numbered four. You may assure Briand and his associates that such suggestions make no impression upon us and that I am perfectly satisfied with the progress of the negotiations and the manner in which they are being carried on. I will not allow any impression of divided counsel to obtain support from here.

Three. X The arrangement for your own representation which I agreed to with Lord Reading over the telephone and which is embodied in my number 103 of October 19th /2220B I think is the best possible arrangement to meet the

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 70.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1918

793.94/2211

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
or  
Charge to  
\$

## TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

## Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

exigencies of the situation. The chief criticisms which have been current here and in Tokyo will be met by your abstention from secret sessions and by your assuming the physical post of observer in the public meetings when matters concerning the Pact of Paris are not under consideration. The situation will also be ameliorated by Japan's withdrawal of her objection which was brought to me after my talk with Lord Reading and by which the situation in our press is considerably bettered.

STIMSON.

*HS*

*Wly*  
S HLS:HHR

*FE*  
*SKA*

*35*  
*11*  
Oct. 20, 1981.

Enciphered by .....  
Sent by operator ..... M., 19.....

Index Bu.--No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1972 1-128

RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 20 1931 DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
SECRETARY'S OFFICE MAY 11 1934  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

SECRETARY OF STATE October 20, 1931.

OCT 20 1931  
*noted*  
*H.L.S.*

Mr. Secretary:

793.94/2211/2 The circular from the French Government with regard  
to invoking the Pact of Paris has apparently not yet been  
received.

*SKH*  
*/*

793.94/2211 1  
2

FILED

MAY 11 1934

SKH/ZMF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

GREEN

FROM

GENEVA

Dated October 19, 1931

Rec'd 7:25 p.m.

793 94  
Secretary of State  
Washington

223, October 19, 1931

Consulate's 217, October 18, 5 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 20 1931

Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OCT 21 1931  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

The concluding paragraphs of the telegram under reference indicated the probable nature of Briand's reply to the latest Japanese note to the Council regarding the participation of the United States. This reply has now been issued in its final form and is found not to differ materially from that which Briand made to the first Japanese note of objection to American participation on legal grounds or from the indications of the reply given in the telegram under reference. The first exchange of letters regarding this point was summarized in the second and third paragraphs of the Consulate's 210, October 16, 10 p.m.

Briand's reply to the second Japanese note states in addition that at the Council meetings of October 15 and 16 he was careful to make it clear that "the object of the proposal

793.94/2212

FILED

OCT 23 1931

MAM

2- #223, October 19, 1931, from  
Geneva

proposal laid before the Council was limited, being merely to supplement the arrangements already made to enable the Council to obtain information with greater ease". Legal questions of a general nature to which the Japanese called attention did not arise "and should therefore remain entirely reserved". Furthermore the reply states that Briand also added in the meetings of the Council that "it was not necessary for those questions to be settled before the Council could come to a decision of the proposal submitted to it".

With regard to the reasons why and the conditions under which a representative of the United States was invited to sit at the Council table, the reply refers to Briand's first letter summarized in the Consulate's 210, October 16, 10 p.m.

With respect to a discussion of the legal questions involved the reply states that in view of the foregoing, "no useful purpose would be served by undertaking at the present time a judicial study of problems which, however important and interesting they might be in themselves do not at the moment arise, though they can be examined later if the



MAM

3- #223, from Geneva, October 19,  
1931

if the members of the League so desire".

The reply then expresses the hope that the Japanese Government will for the reasons explained "agree that such a study would be in any case wholly unrelated to the vote given by the Council on October 15th" and since these texts will convince the Japanese Government that the most serious consideration has been given to the Japanese views and that the Council has been careful to take no action in contradiction to the Covenant.

GILBERT

FW

OX

139F

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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OCT 20 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 20 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 20, 1931.

RADIO STATION AT MUKDEN.

In this telegram Neville reports that the Foreign Office has informed him that the wireless station at Mukden will be opened "with operators supplied by South Manchuria Railway".

In this morning's newspapers, Mr. Debuchi is reported as having told the correspondents yesterday afternoon that this wireless station was being "restored to its Chinese operators".

SKH/ZMF

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.T.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RECEIVED

JS

FROM

Gray

OCT 20 1931

TOKIO

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Dated October 20, 1931

Rec'd 4:07 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

189, October 20, noon

Department's 181 October 3, 2 p.m. I have been

informed orally by the Foreign Office that the wire-  
less station at Mukden is expected to be in operation  
some time this week, with operators supplied by South  
Manchurian Railway.

Repeated to Peiping.

NEVILLE

JS

FILED

OCT 26 1931

793.94/2213

793-94  
note  
793-74

*[Handwritten signature]*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 20 1931  
Department of State

SECRETARY OF STATE  
OCT 20 1931

*[Handwritten initials]*  
793C

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

31

UNION OF  
GREEN A. V. AFFAIRS

Geneva

Dated October 20, 1931

Rec'd 9:17 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

226, October 20, noon.

FOR THE SECRETARY.

793.94 / 2189

My 212, October 17, 9 p. m. I am informed notification

of joint action of invoking the Pact of Paris on the part

of France, Great Britain and Italy has now been sent to

you by the French accompanied by an "explanation" of

delay. I am not informed what their explanation will be.

I had a firm understanding with the French, British and

Italians in line with paragraph 4 of my telegram under

reference at the hour I sent that telegram.

Immediately following your telling me on the tele-  
phone yesterday that you had not received such a notifica-

tion I took the matter up with the British, They told me

that they had fully understood that the French would

notify Washington simultaneously with the notification

being

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 20 1931  
Department of State

793.94/2214

FILED  
OCT 24 1931

REP

2- #226, from Geneva, Oct. 20, noon,

being sent to the other signatories, as had been arranged between us. The British immediately took this matter up with the French. I went to the British first in this in order not to have a direct discussion with the French over what Reading told me he knew to be an error or misunderstanding on the part of the French.

GILBERT

WSB

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

AE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 20, 1931

Rec'd 10 a.m.  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 20 1931  
Department of State

file  
EGR

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

796, October 20, 10 a.m.

Legation's 757, <sup>1080</sup> October 13, 8 p.m.

Following from Consul General at Hankow:

"October 19, 4 p.m. Transportation through  
Hankow has been completed of the first division of  
troops from Kiangsi and of the second division from  
Hunan to the north by means of the Peiping-Hankow  
railway. Their destination is stated to be Chengchow.

Movable equipment of the railway repair ship  
lines at kilometre ten on the Peiping-Hankow Railway  
has been transferred to some point north of Hankow.

Nanking informed".

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

FILED

OCT 22 1931

793.94/2215

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO  
N.I. AND M.I.D.  
AE

CORRECTED COPY

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 20, 1931.

Division of Rec'd 5:10 a.m.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 20 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

796, October 20, 10 a.m.

Legation's 757, October 13, 3 p.m.

Following from Consul General at Hankow:

"October 19, 4 p.m. Transportation through  
Hankow has been completed of the first division of  
troops from Kiangsi and of the second division from  
Hunan to the north by means of the Peiping-Hankow  
Railway. Their destination is stated to be Chongchow.

Movable equipment of the railway repair shop  
located at kilometre ten on the Peiping-Hankow Railway  
has been transferred to some point north of Hankow.

Nanking informed".

For the Minister

ENGERT

CSB  
WSB

FILED

1861-23-1301

793.94/2215

793.94/2215

PM RECD

No. 36



AMERICAN CONSULATE

GENERAL

Mukden, China, September 20, 1931.


SUBJECT: Japanese Military Occupation of Mukden.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:



COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

- 1/ I have the honor to enclose five copies of my despatch to the Legation, Peiping, dated September 20, 1931, entitled "Japanese Military Occupation of Mukden."

Respectfully yours,

For the Consul:

*Andrew G. Lynch*  
Andrew G. Lynch  
American Vice Consul.

- 1/ Enclosure: Copy of despatch to Legation, Peiping.

AGL:AAB  
800.

4 Carbon Copies

Received *JM*  
copies  
1 " to note } ARD.

no FE  
11/6/31  
RH

NOV 10 1931  
RECEIVED

793.94/2216

FE  
act



No. 446.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

September 20, 1931.

SUBJECT: Japanese Military Occupation of Mukden.

CONFIDENTIAL.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to advise the Legation as stated in my several telegrams of September 19 that at about 1 a.m. on that morning, Japanese troops entered the International Settlement at Mukden and surrounded the Native City. The city itself was invested in the early hours of the morning. Chinese troops were, at the first signs of trouble, ordered to retire without resistance. In so far as Mukden is concerned the transfer took place with no resistance from Chinese troops and with few indications of any desire to fight on the part of the Chinese. A few unfortunate incidents will be noted in this despatch. Since the taking over of Mukden, the Consulate General has been informed that Changchun, Newchwang, Antung and Kwang-chengtze were also taken over on the morning of the

nineteenth.

- 2 -

nineteenth. The International Settlement has been quiet and Americans and other foreigners, although advised to remain at home after dark, have felt fairly safe.

Firing started about eleven o'clock on Friday evening and for some time thereafter it was believed by most people to indicate only the not unusual Japanese sham battle. At about eleven thirty, however, firing from heavier guns was heard from the southeast of Mukden. Shortly after twelve I proceeded to the Japanese Consulate General and was informed by Vice Consul Miura that Chinese troops had blown up two sections of the South Manchuria Railway at Pei Tai Ying near the Chinese north camp, a few miles north of Mukden; they had also opened fire on a detachment of Japanese troops who had defended themselves and called for enforcements. This was the explanation of the firing then heard. Unbelievable as it may sound, I am reasonably certain that the Japanese Consulate General did not know at that time that it was the intention of the military authorities immediately to occupy Chinese territory. They were, of course, intensely worried as to the probable repercussions of the affair but I very much doubt their having prior knowledge of the actual moving of troops. I was, while at the Consulate General, assured as to the entire safety of foreigners.

The

- 3 -

On Saturday, the nineteenth, the Consulate General notified Americans that while it had little doubt as to their safety, as an elementary precaution, it was recommended that they remain at home after dark. In company with the British Consul General I called on the Japanese Consul General at 5 p.m. to inquire as to what measures were being taken for the protection of the life and property of our nationals in the International Settlement and in the native city. The Japanese Consul General assured us that he had made every effort to impress upon the Commander-in-Chief, S. Honjo, the necessity for such protection and while he could not tell us the exact number of police, troops and gendarmes that would be available for this work, he had every hope that his urgings had had the desired effect. Mr. Hayashi told us in confidence that when the military came in charge they were extremely difficult to deal with. This fact has been obvious from the first. Both Mr. Eastes and I had to be satisfied with Mr. Hayashi's statement with regard to protection. I requested a special military guard for the National City Bank of New York and Mr. Eastes for the Hongkong Bank. It is now the night of September 20 and, although a few shots can be heard from time to time, it is believed that every precaution is being taken for the protection of foreigners.

The two code telegrams sent from this Consulate General early Saturday morning were returned from the

Chinese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

Chinese telegraph office and were sent Japanese lines via Shanghai. No assurance could be obtained as to their getting through in code and there was considerable doubt about telegrams en clair. Another telegram was, however, sent en clair and in order to make assurance doubly sure the Consulate General got indirectly into communication with Consul Langdon at Lairen and requested that he telegraph the bare details to the Legation, the Department and the Embassy at Tokyo. Up to this time this consulate General does not know how many, if any, of its wires have been received by the Legation. True readings of the code telegrams and readings of the en clair telegrams are therefore enclosed.

This Consulate General finds it difficult to give credence to the Japanese explanation of the incident. The movement into Chinese territory was too sudden and too concerted to have been caused by an explosion on the South Manchuria Railway line at 10:30 p.m. Officials of the Consulate General have not given this as their own explanation but they confine themselves to saying "We have been informed by the military authorities that, etc. etc." At 5 p.m. on the afternoon of the eighteenth I called at the Japanese Consulate General to ascertain if there were any new developments in the Nakamura affair. I found that it was felt to be progressing very satisfactorily due to the conciliatory attitude recently

adopted

- 5 -

adopted by the Chinese. To quote a statement made to me that day by an official of the Japanese Consulate General when discussing the possibility of trouble: "The Chinese are very wise to adopt a conciliatory attitude and tell the truth in this matter for Japan holds two sabres, the South Manchuria Railway lines from Dairen to Mukden and from Korea to Mukden. But Japan with this strength in the form of these sabres would be very wrong to use it unless something very bad were done by the Chinese and unless they refused to treat the matter fairly."

The "something very bad" happened but I cannot believe that the Japanese Consulate General had any idea that it was going to happen and I do not believe that the Japanese consular officials give any credence whatsoever to the military authorities' statement that the affair was a matter of Chinese aggression.

Captain Mayer's telegram of 6 p.m. September 20 gives a very clear account of Japanese military activity so far, which he obtained from the Japanese military authorities. There were a few incidents of what is believed to have been unnecessary terrorism. Japanese troops are reliably reported to have seized the Trench Mortar Arsenal, to have killed the military guards who offered no resistance and to have tossed hand grenades into the workmen's quarters killing twenty men. The

old

- 6 -

old gateman at the Chinese Post Office made a faint gesture of protest when troops took the postmen's bicycles and received a terrible beating with rifle butts for his pains. He was sent to the Hospital. It is understood that Chinese policemen were shot in many instances when a few police boxes endeavored mistakenly to resist the Japanese. This morning Mr. Sugden, the British works manager of the Peking-Mukden Railway shops, endeavored to reach his office in his car driven by a Chinese chauffeur and draped with the British flag. The car was stopped the chauffeur beaten and the British flag torn from the car stamped and spat upon. Mr. Sugden escaped with a torn coat. The British Consul General protested strongly to the Japanese consular authorities and Mr. Hayashi, the Japanese Consul General, immediately called in person on the military authorities. An apology is expected soon. As was stated in my telegram of eight a.m. September 19, a Chinese chauffeur was killed opposite the Mukden Club at about two a.m. The owner of the car died in the morning from wounds received. Stray bullets entered the Mukden Club and in addition damaged the motor cars of several Americans in the Club compound. No foreigners were hurt. A protest was made by this office to the Japanese Consulate General and expressions of extreme regret as well as assurances of future safety for Americans were received. However, when it is considered that a city of some 400,000 people changed from

Chinese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
Chinese to Japanese hands literally overnight it must be admitted that there has been remarkably little bloodshed and few untoward incidents.

Respectfully yours,

Andrew G. Lynch.  
American Vice Consul.

Original and two copies to Legation.  
Five copies to Department.  
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

800  
AGL:AAB



PM REGD

No. 44908

Q

FE  
a/c

793.94  
note  
893-0146

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL  
Mukden, China.  
September 26, 1931.  
JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF SOUTH MANCHURIA.  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
NOV 1 1931

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China

Copy in 72  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 20 1931  
Department of State

Sir:

Referring to this Consulate General's despatch No. 446, of September 20, 1931, in regard to the Japanese occupation of Mukden and to subsequent telegrams reporting the extension of this occupation to all centers along the South Manchuria Railway and to other places along the Chinese lines built with Japanese loans, I have the honor to submit further information on this subject. Mukden and Antung were occupied during the night of September 18th and during the next few days all cities along the South Manchuria Railway lines including Newchwang and Changchun were also occupied. Japanese troops subsequently seized Kirin and Tunhua, the eastern terminus of the Kirin-Tunhua Railway, Liacyuan (Chengchiatun) Tungliao and

Taonan,

793.94/2217

FILED  
NOV 01 1931



- 2 -

Taonan, terminal points on the Ssupingkai-Taonan and Taonan-Angangchi Railways. It was learned yesterday (September 25th) that the Japanese battalion at Tunhua had been withdrawn to Kirin and that the occupation of Tungliao has also terminated. A report of the imminent evacuation of Kirin has also been heard. Indications are that the occupation of further territory is not contemplated under existing conditions. It is evident, too, that reinforcements would be required were the occupied area to be extended. Official information is to the effect that the Japanese troops in Manchuria number 15,000, which number is within the quota of railway guards permitted by treaty (15 men per kilometer). Reservists who were called to the colors, it is claimed, have been released from duty. In the opinion of some observers, the above figure is small.

The pretext for this occupation, as given out by the Japanese, was the blowing up by Chinese soldiers of the South Manchuria Railway tracks near the North Barracks (Peitaying). Consul Vincent visited the scene of the explosion yesterday and his memorandum on the incident is enclosed. The Chinese have denied that their troops blew up the railway tracks and state that the Japanese troops attacked without cause. Like the numerous other incidents which have occurred in recent years in Manchuria, the Japanese and Chinese versions are totally different and contradictory.

In

- 3 -

In this connection it may be added that there is good reason to believe that the Chinese troops were ordered to offer no resistance and according to information believed trustworthy orders to this effect were received over the telephone from Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang shortly after 11:30 p.m. on September 18th. The Japanese losses in the attack on Peitaying of two killed and about 20 wounded after four hours of "furious fighting" is sufficient testimony of the absence of any directed resistance on the part of the Chinese.

The immediate pretext, after all, is relatively unimportant. That the Japanese have been preparing for such an eventuality is plain from the rapidity with which the occupation was effected. Since the killing of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the Japanese have built concrete turrets or blockhouses at every bridgehead and tunnel on the South Manchuria Railway lines. Prior to that time trenches, reinforced in some cases with railway ties, were only to be seen. Barracks, too, in several places were enlarged in the past few years and it had been reported that the transfer of the headquarters of the Kwantung army from Port Arthur to Mukden or Liacyang was planned. During several weeks just prior to the occupation, the local Japanese troops held manoeuvres almost every night in the railway settlement and on one or more occasions staged a sham fight to the

accompaniment

- 4 -

accompaniment of rifle and machine gun fire. It seems possible, therefore, that the alleged pretext was a signal for action, following, as it did, so closely upon the Japanese Cabinet crisis over the Nakamura case. The present is no doubt an opportune time for effecting a solution of the outstanding questions between China and Japan over Manchuria and the recent announcement of the Japanese Government indicates that this is intended. The Japanese view that Manchuria is vital to the safety and welfare of Japan, a view which is widely or universally held in that country, will probably have to be recognized by the Chinese. Needless to say the situation is charged with possibilities.

The Japanese Government has stated that it regards this occupation as a local issue, one obviously to be negotiated with Mukden rather than with Nanking. The Japanese authorities here are anxious, it is understood, to secure the return of some of the high officials of the Mukden Government who are now at Peiping or elsewhere. Overtures to that end have been made, it is reported, both to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and General Chang Tso-hsiang who is now in mourning at Chin Hsien, his home. It is not thought that the latter could be induced to accept the responsibility of forming a government and of handling these negotiations. Marshal Chang, on the other hand, seems to be

the

- 5 -

the logical person for this difficult and thankless task. Unless he accepts it his position both in Manchuria and China is bound eventually to be impaired.

Chinese officials disappeared as rapidly as the occupation was effected and consequently Chinese administration in the occupied territory ceased to exist. However, in interior districts it is believed that it still functions. The efforts of the Japanese thus far to secure Chinese willing to cooperate with them in carrying on the primary functions of government have met with little success. A municipal bureau, with a Japanese mayor, has been formed at Mukden. It has organized a Chinese Police force with an ex-magistrate (Feng Ching-yi) as head, which so far has not been provided with arms but due to the spread of robbery further steps for the maintenance of peace and order will have to be taken. The latest step in this direction was the formation yesterday of a commission comprising nine Chinese ex-officials, among whom Yuan Chin-k'ai (袁金凱), Yü Ch'ung-han (于冲漢), Li Yu-lan (李友蘭) and K'an Shao-hsi (閻朝璽) are the most prominent.

Respectfully

- 6 -


Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.  
American Consul General.

Enclosure: Memorandum of Consul J. C. Vincent.

Original and two copies to Legation.  
Five copies to Department.  
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

MSM:AAB  
800.



Enclosure to despatch No. 449 of M. S. Myers, American  
Consul General at Mukden, China, dated September 26, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China, September 26, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONSUL VINCENT'S VISIT TO THE SITE OF THE  
EXPLOSION OF THE SOUTH MANCHURIA RAILWAY AND OF THE SUB-  
SEQUENT CLASH BETWEEN JAPANESE AND CHINESE TROOPS.

Strictly Confidential.

On September 25th, the writer was invited by the Japanese authorities to visit the scene of the explosion on the South Manchuria Railway which occurred the night of September 18th, and of the clash between Chinese and Japanese armed forces which ensued. The members of the party making the visit were Major General Miake, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Kuantung Army; Mr. Hayashi, Japanese Consul General in Mukden; the British Military Attache and Aide from Peiping; and the writer. Lieutenant Colonel Shimato, who commanded the Japanese troops attacking the Chinese military camp on the night of September 18-19, was in charge of the party and acted as our informant. Major Watari, a retired army officer in the employ of the South Manchuria Railway, acted as interpreter.

The day before, September 24th, Lieutenant Colonel Shimamoto had taken a group of newspaper correspondents and Captain Mayer and Lieutenant Brown of the Legation, and Lieutenant Cranford of the Embassy at Tokyo, to make an inspection of the same nature. As the two officers from the Legation are making reports to their respective offices which will be available to the Legation, the writer will not attempt to give a detailed account of the occurrences from the military standpoint..

Upon our

- 2 -

Upon our arrival at the site of the explosion, about five miles north of Mukden on the South Manchuria Railway, Lieutenant Colonel Shimamoto began his lecture by giving a summary of the violation of Japan's treaty rights in South Manchuria and irritating incidents in general which have occurred during the past half year. Most of the incidents enumerated have been reported to the Legation in this Consulate General's despatches. They included such occurrences as minor clashes between Japanese and Chinese soldiers and police, attempts at damage to South Manchuria Railway trains by placing rocks on the track and throwing missiles at passing trains, insults to Japanese women, et cetera. It is interesting to note that no mention was made of the Nakamura case or of the Wanpaoshan incident although the enumeration was not confined to incidents directly affecting the South Manchuria Railway.

On the night of September 18th, six Japanese soldiers commanded by a lieutenant were holding patrol exercises along the railway. They were proceeding in a southerly direction away from their barracks which were about a mile and a half distant. They had just passed by the site of the explosion when they were startled by the detonation and running back saw several Chinese in uniform fleeing down the embankment. The Lieutenant ordered his men to open fire. We were subsequently shown the badly decomposed bodies of two Chinese in uni-

form

- 3 -

form near the site of the explosion. Blood stains along the side of the track were also pointed out to us. Shimamoto stated that for humane reasons the bodies should have been buried but that they had kept them there to prove that it was Chinese soldiers who were responsible for the explosion. Visual evidence spoke louder than words, he added.

Two new rails had been put in to replace the ones damaged by the explosion. Our attention was invited to these but in answer to the writer's inquiry we were told that the rails which had been damaged had been removed. (The day before a section of the damaged rail was shown to the visitors and Lieutenant Brown gave it as his opinion that it did not appear to be a rail which had seen much use.)

The lieutenant in charge of the patrol party sent one of his men back to the company barracks (a distance of one mile and a half) to notify the company commander while he, with the remaining five men exchanged rifle fire with Chinese who were hiding in a nearby field of kaoliang. The company was able to arrive on the scene in twenty minutes because they were drilling at the time. (The day before the visitors were not informed that the company were in readiness when the news was received, an oversight which excited comment because of the time element involved.) Lieutenant Colonel Shimamoto, who was out on a party, was also informed and brought up the other two companies of his battalion from near Mukden, arriving about midnight. He also sent to Fushun for

the



- 4 -

the remaining company of his command which arrived some time later in the night.

Shimamoto then described the engagement which resulted in the capture of Pei Ta Ying, the Chinese military camp. The camp is located about a quarter of a mile from the site of the explosion, to the north. It is about an eighth of a mile to the east of the railway and is adjacent to and north of the kaoliang field. We were not taken to the camp, the description of the encounter being given to us from a vantage point on the railway embankment.

Shimamoto thought at the time he ordered the attack upon Pei Ta Ying, but was not certain, that there were ten thousand Chinese soldiers in the camp. He had something over four hundred men in his command at the time. Later when the Fushun company arrived he had a total of about six hundred and fifty men. The writer inquired whether at the beginning or at any subsequent time the Chinese soldiers in the barracks took the offensive, to which Shimamoto replied in the negative. The writer then asked Major General Miake, who spoke English very well, whether he did not think it rash for so small a body of men to start an offensive against such overwhelming odds, and whether or not reinforcements were not readily available in Mukden. The Major General stated that at this juncture an offense was the best defence and that the number of troops in Mukden was not sufficient to permit the despatch of reinforcements. (At approximately the same time (midnight) that the attack was started on Pei

Ta

- 5 -

Ta Ying, the investment by Japanese troops in Mukden of the Mukden Commercial Settlement, the Chinese walled city, and the arsenal and aviation field, was commenced.)

One corner of the camp was occupied by the Japanese after a prolonged and sharp exchange of rifle fire. When the Fushun company arrived, a general attack on the barracks was begun which ended in the complete occupation of the camp by five-thirty, A.M. The Lieutenant Colonel stated that although there were reports to the effect that the Chinese troops had been instructed to offer no resistance, he could testify that they had defended themselves furiously. He stated that fortunately he had found a loaded trench mortar inside the camp and that it was only by firing it as a passage way which the Chinese were defending that he was able to advance to the interior barracks. From the time the attack was commenced until the camp was completely occupied a period of approximately five hours had elapsed. Lieutenant Colonel Shimamoto then (5:30 a.m.) personally led an attack on the kaoliang field and cleared it of Chinese soldiers. The writer asked Shimamoto why, since the Japanese had been originally attacked from the field by what they estimated as being three hundred soldiers, he had not attempted to clear it sooner. He replied that most of the Chinese therein had fled when the attack on Pei Ta Ying had started.

Shimamoto stated that about three hundred Chinese had been killed and an equal number captured. The writer asked how many Japanese casualties there were and received the reply that there were two killed and twenty odd wounded.

The

- 6 -

The party then returned to Mukden. The inquiries made by other members of the party were concerned with the military details of the engagement and have therefore not been included in this report.

Although there is strong suspicion that the Japanese account of the explosion and engagement are not authentic, it will be seen from the above that matters might have been as described above. It is not a convincing account and the carefulness with which evidence is displayed and the story is told tends more to arouse than to allay suspicion. Discrepancies have been found in various Japanese accounts of the incidents but they are of minor importance and might have occurred in any similar circumstances. What actually happened on the night of September 18-19 will probably never be known, unless, of course, one is prepared to accept the Japanese as the true version, which the writer is not.

The events of the week preceeding the explosion, and the feeling and desire of the Japanese Army have no bearing on the events as related by the Japanese, but they are particularly pertinent to the unbiased observer. Without trying to place the responsibility for the explosion, the fact is that it was decidedly desirable from the Japanese Army standpoint and quite as undesirable from the Chinese viewpoint. The Japanese Army wanted, openly and anxiously, action in Manchuria. For a while it appeared that the Nakamura case and the Chinese attitude thereto would provide the desired provocation for action. However, on September

- 7 -

16th and 17th a settlement of the case which would have satisfied the Japanese demands seemed to be forthcoming at an early date. (Consul General Hayashi has stated, subsequent to the occurrences of Friday, the 18th, that he could have reached a settlement of the Nakamura case through negotiation within a short time if the explosion had not occurred.) The Japanese Army saw, in the probable settlement of the Nakamura case through negotiation, its opportunity for action vanishing. Therefore regardless of the responsibility for the explosion, its occurrence at the time was most desirable and opportune for the fulfillment of the wishes of the Japanese Army.

It, of course, should not be overlooked that the threat of military occupation was probably responsible in a large degree for Consul General Hayashi's success in handling the Nakamura case. Furthermore, the Japanese, from their point of view, have had good reason for being irritated with the attitude and actions of the Chinese in Manchuria during the past year. However, while one may sympathize with the Japanese in their difficulties in Manchuria, one cannot condone the creation of a pretext for military action by the Army which, to the writer, seems to be the true explanation of the explosion and engagement which occurred on Friday night, September 18-19.

Signed:

John Carter Vincent  
American Consul

800  
JCV/jcv

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 20, 1931

Rec'd 10:42 a. m.

7a3.24  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.

798, October 20, 3 p. m.

Reuter report from Washington 19:

"It is announced that United States Government will join Council of League of Nations in invoking Kellogg Pact in order to prevent hostilities between China and Japan but will carefully refrain from taking a leading role.

Japan has withdrawn her opposition to American participation in the League Council's discussions according to statement made by Japanese Ambassador Debuchi to Colonel Stimson declaring that Japan still reserved right to object to questions of procedure before the Council.

The Ambassador added that Japan was already withdrawing her troops across Yalu River into Korea and had recalled her aerial bombing squadrons where airway communications were being restored and banks in Manchuria were gradually reopening".

For the Minister  
Engert

KLP




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OCT 24 1931

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP



October 20, 1931

Rec'd 12:03 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



229, October 20, 3 p. m.

Please telegraph me Department's action in invoking  
Pact of Paris and whether I can make it known to the press  
here.

GILBERT

WSB

FILED

OCT 24 1931

793.94/2219

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

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WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

Washington,

October 20, 1931.

Your 229, October 20, 3 p.m. /2219

On receipt today of the circular note from the French

Government identic notes were sent to the American Chargé  
d'Affaires at Tokyo for communication to the Japanese Minis-  
ter for Foreign Affairs and to the American Minister at  
Nanking for communication to the Chinese Acting Minister  
for Foreign Affairs.

Text follows:

QUOTE The Government and people of the United States have  
observed with concern the events of the last month in Manchuria.  
When the difference between China and Japan came to a head on  
September 19th, one of the parties to the dispute referred  
the matter to the League of Nations and since that time the  
American Government by representation through diplomatic  
channels, has steadily cooperated with the League in its  
efforts to secure a peaceful settlement. A threat of war,  
wherever it may arise, is of profound concern to the whole  
world and for this reason the American Government, like other  
Governments, was constrained to call to the attention of both  
disputants the serious dangers involved in the present situa-  
tion.

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

793.94/2219

142r

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
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PLAIN

### Department of State

- 2 -

Washington,

This Government now desires, as do other signatories of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, particularly to call to the attention of the Chinese and the Japanese Governments the obligations which they voluntarily assumed when they became parties to that Treaty, especially the obligations of Article II, which reads:

SUBQUOTE The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means END SUBQUOTE.

The American Government takes this occasion again to express its earnest hope that China and Japan will refrain from any measures which might lead to war and that they will find it possible in the near future to agree upon a method for resolving by peaceful means, in accordance with their promises and in keeping with the confident expectations of public opinion throughout the world, the issues over which they are at present in controversy UNQUOTE.

You may tell the Press that we have taken this action but should not release the text of the note. Has the text of the note sent by the five Governments been released to the Press?

FE:SKH/ZMF  
U WRC/LM  
Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

FE

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M.

Index Bu.—No. 50.

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1951

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FROM

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
GREEN

Geneva

Dated October 19, 1931

Rec'd 20th, 11:10 a. m.

743.94  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.



file  
eg.c

227, October 19, 7 p. m.

One. The following is a summary of the military situation in Manchuria as of October 11 which I have just received from the British:

From a summary of the information reaching us from various sources it seems that Japanese troops are still in occupation of the following places outside of the railway zone: Mukden, Kirin, Chengchiatun, Kaiping, Fenghua, Fenghuangchen, Tunhua, Chinlinho, Taonan, Tienchungtai, Newchwang Tashihohiao, Tichling, Changchuen.

Armoured trains are also reported to be operating on Chinese Government lines between Mukden and Hailung and west of Ssupingkal.

The railway zone consists of the land expropriated for the purposes

793.94/2220

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OCT 23 1931

REP

2- #227, from Geneva, Oct. 19, 7 p. m.

the purposes of the railway at each station; between stations it consists of the track and a few feet on each side of it. Many of the above named places are Chinese towns on the South Manchurian Railway but outside the zone.

GILBERT

WSB

OSB

1420

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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OR

Department of State

Charge to  
\$

Washington,

October 19, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL

18

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND)

101 *Urgent and Confidential*

*note  
to C. C. C.*

X If discussion of application of the Pact of Paris has been concluded I can see no good reason why you should continue to sit at meetings of the Council. It seems clear that further discussions will concern action to be taken by the League under machinery of the League and in that we can take no part. If the situation should not improve it is possible that the Council might discuss action under Article 16 of the Covenant and in that case it is essential that you should not be present. (I, therefore, deem it wise for you to withdraw now on the ground that while your presence appeared advisable during discussion of the Pact, there seems no adequate reason for you to attend meetings where the discussions must necessarily be concerned with procedure under the Covenant. X Of course the League must understand that we shall continue, through diplomatic channels, to use our influence in the support of their general objective, namely, the preservation of peace between China and Japan, and you should state that

793.94/2220A

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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AMERICAN CONSUL - GENEVA \* PAGE 2

that you hold yourself available at any time for  
consultation.

*S. Prinson*  
*WNY*

U WRC:GMH

FE  
*sent*

OR  
Oct. 19, 1961.  
*MA*

OCT 19 1961



Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_\_

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 19, 1931.

Mr. McBride:

Mr. Cumming:

Please give this to the  
Secretary at the earliest possible  
moment -- so as to save him the  
trouble, unless he wishes to  
draft otherwise, of himself draft-  
ing.

SKH  
—

SKH/ZMT

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
OCT 19 1931

Washington,  
October 19, 1931.

6pm

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

793.94/2220A

Department's 101, October 19, 1 p.m.

103

URGENT AND CONFIDENTIAL.

X In conformity with the understanding arrived at in conversation just concluded between Lord Reading and myself, you are authorized to sit in tomorrow's secret session of the Council; also, and in the seat which you have taken at the table, in the next succeeding public session; and thereafter you will occupy a seat such as is ordinarily assigned to an QUOTE observer UNQUOTE. It is my understanding that at the next public session the Japanese representative will make a statement in explanation of the objection which Japan has made to the United States being represented and that you will make a statement in acknowledgment of his statement. At that session you will retain your seat until the end of the session. At subsequent sessions you will sit in the seat of an QUOTE observer UNQUOTE. X

793.94/2220B

Spinson  
WY

Enciphered by FE:SKH/ZMF

FE  
744

Sent by operator M., 19

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
Department of State

Charge to  
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Washington,

October 19, 1931.

793.94



AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND)

*Ym*

104

We have not yet received from the French Government/  
the notification as to the action taken regarding notes/  
to China and Japan calling to their attention their/  
obligations under the Pact of Paris. We are with-  
holding our note until such notification has been received.  
Please bring this to the attention of M. Briand.

793.94/2220C

*Strinson*  
*WJ*

U WRC:GMH

OCT 19 31

Enciphered by OK

Sent by operator M., 1931

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1920 1-120

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 12, 1931.


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OCT 12 1931

Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Castle:

SECRETARY'S OFFICE



793.94/2221

Mr. Charles R. Crane has just telephoned me from New York saying that he would like to talk with the Secretary with regard to the Manchuria situation on Wednesday. I explained that the Secretary was exceedingly busy but that I would ask for an appointment. I said that if the Secretary could not make an appointment, I would ask the Under Secretary to make an appointment.

I recommend that if possible the Secretary receive Mr. Crane for a few minutes -- for the sake of the effect which it would have on Chinese official and public opinion. Mr. Crane is an "honorary adviser" to the Chinese Government. He was at one time our Minister to China. The fact of his call would doubtless be made public and the Chinese would attach more importance to it than to news that the Chinese Chargé has been received by the Secretary.

793.94/2221

If this is not possible, I recommend that the Under Secretary receive Mr. Crane.

I promised to telegraph.

10.45 a.m. Wednesday?

Mr. Crane saw the Secretary

SKH/ZMF Thursday X-15-31.

See 793.94/2187

Secretaries

YWS

OCT 16 1931  
FILE



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDERSECRETARY



OCT 14 1931

October 12, 1931.



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR.

Mr. Debuchi told me that he had taken up with the Secretary the following four points.

1. Shidehara feels strongly that the Commander of the Japanese Army in Manchuria is not in position to take charge of any diplomatic negotiations. The question therefore as to whether Marshal Chang can be recognized or not is one to be decided only by the Japanese Government.

2. It was very far from the thought of Shidehara to minimize the Chinchow incident. This was an isolated military action and in no way reflected the attitude of the Japanese Government.

3. Shidehara wants the Secretary to be assured that the fixed policy of Japan toward China, which is a policy of peace and friendship, will not be influenced by incidents brought about by military officers under the stress of excitement.

4. Shidehara entirely approved Mr. Debuchi's explanation of the recent Japanese memorandum sent to the

793.94/2222

APR 16 1930

-2-

the Nanking Government. He added that although the terms of the note were rather severe in language, this was customary in notes to the Chinese Government. The Ambassador asked me if I would tell him what I thought the American attitude was toward the Manchurian situation at the present moment. I told him that I thought at the beginning, although people felt that the Japanese military authorities had gone too far, nevertheless American opinion was restrained in the matter, possibly because many people realized that the Japanese in Manchuria have suffered many and continued irritations. I told him that everyone was relieved when the League of Nations passed its resolution of September 30th concurred in by the Japanese and Chinese Governments, but that since that time we had all been profoundly disturbed by the fact that Japan did not seem to be carrying out its own commitments under that resolution in that there was very little evidence of an attempt to withdraw the troops within the railway zone and that there was, on the other hand, an apparent willingness to go on further than they had already gone. I pointed out to him that even in war time such an incident as that of Chinchow would have caused serious criticism and

-3-

and that for the Japanese planes to fly far outside the lines was a provocation which seemed to have no justification under international law. I told him, therefore, that in spite of the fact that the Chinese did not appear to be taking the steps they should take to protect Japanese lives and property, I felt that the Japanese unwillingness to carry out their own commitments was rapidly turning American sentiment against them, and in this case American sentiment would inevitably be similar to that of the rest of the world.

I told the Ambassador that we still looked for direct negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese as the only solution of the matter and reminded him that he had himself said he thought the Chinese terms, that they would negotiate when the Japanese troops had been withdrawn from the railway zone were fair. The Ambassador said that he did not pretend to be a military man, and that he could not understand why the withdrawal of these troops had been so slow.

Mr. Debuchi said that Baron Shidehara was very anxious to negotiate with the Chinese and showed me, in the utmost confidence, one of the statements which Baron Shidehara was prepared to make as one of the

bases

-4-

✓ bases of these negotiations. This statement was a very vigorous assertion that Japan did not wish any territorial concessions in Manchuria, including the eastern provinces thereof and that it did not wish to interfere with the Chinese administration of the country. He repeated continually the determination of the Japanese not to go to war and did not once attempt to defend the army for its advances since the commitment was made to the League of Nations.

The Ambassador, of course, represents the Shidehara policy which is essentially peaceful and friendly. He said that the latest batch of Japanese newspapers he had received played up the friendly attitude of this country in the present crisis and said that he hoped nothing might happen which would change that attitude. I told him that I also hoped nothing would happen to change the <sup>American</sup> ~~Japanese~~ sentiment, but that I felt it ✓ depended very largely on Japan and the actions of the army in Manchuria, since after all there was a strong feeling for the sanctity of treaties and the Japanese must not drive American opinion, as unfortunately they were rapidly doing through such incidents as the bombing of Chinchow, into the idea that Japan did not consider treaties as real obligations.

U WRC:GMH

WRC

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

REP

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 20, 1931

Rec'd 1 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



file  
E.G.C.

797, October 20, 11 a. m.

United Press report from Washington published today,

"Officials of American Government are devoting earnest attention to proceedings of the League of Nations Council and at same time are watching eagerly for indications from Tokyo that American attitude is more clearly understood.

What attitude State Department officials emphasized today is that United States is interested only in preventing outbreak of open warfare in the Far East. The United States officials stated is not concerned in any way with the terms of settlement which may be reached between Japan and China so long as warfare is averted".

For the Minister

ENGERT

CSB

793.94/2223

FILED

OCT 26 1931

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GREEN


FROM

Geneva

Dated October 19, 1931

Rec'd 12:38 p.m., 20th

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.



225, October 19, 10 p.m.

The Japanese delegation issued yesterday evening a communique defending at considerable length Japanese action in Manchuria. This memorandum was given to the press and it is understood that it will not be formally communicated to the Council:

The communique reviews; (one) the menace to Japanese nationals caused by the concentration near Chinchow of 32,000 Chinese troops and 72 cannon following the railway incident of September; (two) the defensive tactics of Japanese railway guards; (three) the necessity for increased vigilance demanded by outbreaks of disorder and banditry in the regions in which such concentrations took place. Attention is called to propaganda activities in China and in international circles on the part of China seeking to influence the deliberations of the Council itself to the effect that Japan intended to occupy Manchuria permanently. The statement refutes the foregoing and cites in support that Japan

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OCT 23 1931

AM

2-#225, from Geneva, October 19, 1931  
10 p.m.

that Japan at present maintains in Manchuria 14,000 men as against 15,000 permitted by treaty, that these are distributed along 1200 kilometers of railway line, and that aggressive maneuvers are therefore impossible. It states further that withdrawal of troops into the zone is being continued with the result that there now remains outside only small detachments in scattered localities.

It is not true according to the statement that Japan's insistence upon arriving at a common accord with China before complete withdrawal represents an opportunist shift of policy, since Japan has always maintained that an agreement upon certain fundamental issues should precede a renewal of normal relations and was more convinced than ever of its necessity in view of public dissatisfaction in both China and Japan with the present situation.

The Chinese contention that agitation will cease as troops are evacuated is refuted on the ground that the anti-Japanese movement does not consist of a single explosion of popular feeling on account of Manchurian incidents. It is claimed that this agitation is of long standing and fostered by Chinese authorities. In support of this assertion concerning agitation against foreigners

AM

3-#225, from Geneva, October 19, 1931  
10 p.m.

foreigners and concerning general Chinese instability, the memorandum refers to the landing of troops by the British in Shanghai in 1927.


The Japanese delegation considers that action is necessary but it should be action with a constructive end in view and should not be misled by sensational digressions. To this end it is first essential that Chinese forces abstain from all measures and acts of hostility toward the Japanese protective troops. A second point of equal importance is that the Chinese Government and the local Chinese authorities should respect the rights given by treaties and that they should give sufficient guarantees of their sincerity by effective protection of Japanese lives and property. Under these conditions only can the troops be withdrawn. While the Chinese Government has declared itself willing to accord this protection, Japan has some hesitation concerning the execution of this assurance under present conditions of unrest in China.

To these facts the Japanese delegation asks the Council and public opinion to accord most serious consideration. It hopes that the Council can effect a real appeasement, so devoutly wished by all, by taking into account the good faith of Japan and by having an appreciation of the exact circumstances.

WSB  
CSB

GILBERT





OCT 10 1931

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR,  
October 17, 1931.

743.94

The Japanese Ambassador and Madame Debuchi lunched with us today, the first time, he said, that they had been anywhere since the trouble began. After luncheon the Ambassador talked with me at some length about the situation and I took the opportunity to make very clear to him that we felt rather keenly about the announcement made by the Foreign Office spokesman that two notes had been received from this Government which had not been given out for fear of inflaming public opinion. I told him that this country had taken throughout a neutral attitude in the whole affair and that we felt it exceedingly unfortunate that public opinion in Japan should be stirred up against this country.

The Ambassador told me that he had had word that all bombing planes had been withdrawn from Manchuria and that he had every assurance that there would be no further unfortunate expeditions like the bombing of Chinchow. I further took occasion to point out to the Ambassador that in all we had done our purpose had been to

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OCT 21 1931

793.94/2225

-2-

to prevent a state of war in the Far East. I said to him that it was clear that this Government, like every other government, had a perfect right to work to the limit to prevent war in any part of the world. In this case it happened to be Manchuria, but that our attitude would be just the same had it been on some other part of the globe. He said that there was a certain feeling in Japan that the reason for our endeavors was that the trouble had arisen in Manchuria. I told him that I was conscious of this feeling, which was based on nothing whatever. I told him that the impression that we wanted the Japanese out of Manchuria altogether was entirely false; that we had not considered a final settlement, which we felt must be reached by the Chinese and Japanese themselves, but that in the reaching of such a settlement we certainly should not attempt to bring out or even to suggest the complete withdrawal from Manchuria on the part of Japan, since it was clear that Japanese troops were there under treaty stipulation. The Ambassador said that he would make this clear to Baron Shidehara.

U WRC:GMH



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 16, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

This is something merely to be read. It calls for no action. I submit it in the thought that it may be useful in connection with the thought which you give to the shaping of our course in relation to the Manchuria problem and in connection with discussions into which you have to enter with regard to it.

OCT 19 1931

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OCT 16 1931

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SECRETARY'S OFFICE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 16, 1931.

OCT 19 1931

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OCT 16 1931

Mr. Secretary:

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

743-44  
The Japanese are obviously endeavoring now, in both their official and their unofficial utterances with regard to the current dispute, to foster the impression that the matter is a domestic or local quarrel, a "family matter" (between two Far Eastern nations), not properly of concern and not of practical interest to other nations.

I have the feeling that we should not let that effort go <sup>unnoted</sup> ~~unchallenged~~. Manchuria is and long has been an international problem. Whatever happens, whether from the immediate or from the ultimate point of view, in or with Manchuria is bound to affect all nations that have interests and/or influence in the Pacific. A breach of the peace there cannot but bring into question the various multilateral treaties which relate to the problems of war and peace, which treaties are of concern to everybody. War there cannot but affect the rights and the practical interests of other nations -- and to a far greater extent than would some wars which might occur in some other parts of the world.

In the present instance, what has happened already has involved interference with communications, disturbance of trade (both in and with Manchuria and in and with China proper), losses to commerce and new burdens and expense to various governments the world over.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

A striking example of the way in which this works is afforded in the effect which it has had on our effort to sell and ship wheat to China for flood relief, as told in the news item hereunder attached. The interests involved are both Chinese and American, both philanthropic and commercial. The mere threat of possible war between Japan and China has apparently brought the carrying out of the contract to a halt -- and the consequences may be starvation to a lot of Chinese, additional difficulties for the Chinese Government and financial loss to the American Government, to American farmers and to American shipping firms.

There can be no "localized" wars any more.

Moreover, no recognition has ever been given to Japan's so-called "Monroe Doctrine for the Far East". Japan has said a lot during the past few years about her position as the guardian of the peace and custodian of the principle of stability in the Far East. In so far as the peace is or may be broken, whether because of or in spite of Japan's activities, the other nations have a right to assert their interest and concern with regard to the situation.

The question of the peace of the Far East is a matter of rightful and inevitable practical concern to any and all of the nations which have political and commercial interests beyond their own boundaries and it is of moral concern to all nations.

clipping attached.

SKH/ZMF

From the New York Times

October 14, 1931.

**WHEAT CARGOES HELD UP.**

Far Eastern War Threat Delays  
Shipments From Seattle.

*Special to The New York Times.*

SEATTLE, Wash., Oct. 13. --War clouds in the Far East today cast their shadows on the Seattle waterfront, where shipping men have been preparing for the movement of the Nanking Government's purchase of wheat and flour from the American Farm Board.

War between Japan and China would mean that not a pound of the 433,000 tons of wheat and flour could be landed at Shanghai or any other port in the republic, because it would be contraband and all the charters made for the movement of wheat and flour from Seattle and Portland would be cancelled because shipowners would refuse to send their vessels into the war zone.

Private information received in Seattle today said no more Japanese ships would be sent to China until the situation clarified.

The firm of W. L. Comyn & Sons of Seattle has chartered six vessels for the movement of wheat and flour to China.

DEPT. OF STATE

OCT 19 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 17, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

This memorandum contains reflections on the Manchuria Situation and our problems in connection therewith.

To read. No action.



SKH/ZMF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 17, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

The Japanese Ambassador states both in private and in public that "there will be no war".

It may be assumed that his prediction will prove correct.

From now on, there may be some clashes and Japan's army and navy may take some action here and there, -- but the war has already been fought. Japan, by a surprise attack in Manchuria, <sup>and</sup> by disposing of her naval forces (which China can in no way oppose) at important points on the coast of China and on the Yangtze River, has reduced China to a state of helplessness <sup>almost</sup> as complete as was China's state after a year of fighting, in 1894-95, at the end of the Sino-Japanese war.

The war has been fought and Japan is the victor.

What is now going on, as between China and Japan, is diplomatic maneuvering not for prevention of war but toward conclusion, first, of an armistice and, second, of a treaty of peace.

The plans of the "positive policy" party in Japan have been carried to success with regard to their principal military objective; they have, however, as I estimate it, gone a little bit awry in one or two particulars. I think that they expected China to put up some resistance: they expected that there would be "war" in an obvious and technical sense, that they would achieve a speedy and crushing victory over Chinese armed forces,

793.94/2227

OCT 21 1931

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- 2 -

forces, and that they would be able to dictate peace terms. The very real and surprisingly effective self-restraint which the Chinese Government and the Chinese armed forces have exhibited, in that the former did not resist and the latter allowed themselves to be disarmed (in Manchuria), upset the calculations of the Japanese General Staff. The fact that, from a technical point of view, there came no "war" has made it possible for the rest of the world to express legitimate concern for the maintenance of peace and avoidance of war. Thus, the League of Nations and the American Government have been able to come into action in a manner which and to an extent that would not have been possible if the Chinese, instead of resisting, had fought <sup>had</sup> and thus made it an obvious and an established fact that China and Japan were "at war".

The result is that the Japanese find themselves not in position to dictate to the Chinese as a technical victor would to his vanquished foe the terms of a "treaty of peace". They realize that, no matter what form the negotiations take, the world is going to insist that the agreement concluded between China and Japan shall be a "negotiated" rather than an "imposed" settlement.

Hence, they are now maneuvering for position. They are endeavoring to combat the adverse impression which their use of force has made upon foreign governments and the world public. They are endeavoring to conciliate those statesmen who are most advantageously placed for exercise of influence in relation to the settlement.

I

- 3 -

It is my impression -- not yet a definite conclusion -- that the Japanese Ambassador is endeavoring to maneuver you into the position of a mediator.

If my surmise is correct, if this is the Japanese Ambassador's present line of approach, I have a feeling that you might to advantage manifest reluctance to take on that task, follow tactics of delay, and at least force them to press it upon you before you accept it.

As the situation stands now, it is your intention, repeatedly and definitely announced, not to cross wires with the League. You have succeeded in compelling the League to accept and to continue to carry the responsibility for devising ways and means to deal with the problem which this breach of the peace has presented to the world. You have proceeded on the principle that it is neither appropriate, desirable nor your intention that the United States be drawn into a position of isolated or separate responsibility in this connection. The League has admitted its responsibility and is attempting to fulfill its obligations. The Japanese will continue efforts to drive wedges between the efforts made by the League and those which might be made by the American Government. You will need, I suggest, <sup>to</sup> be at all times on guard against that and against possible attempts to lure the American Government "all by itself" into the jungle of this Chinese-Japanese--Manchurian mix-up -- which is full of hidden explosives, dense underbrush, quicksands, etc.

You

- 4 -

You need not, I think, be worried over the opposition which Japan made to the invitation by the Council to you to send a representative to sit with the Council; nor by the outcry against the United States, in Japan, in connection with that episode. The Japanese Government is engaging in tactics which are often resorted to by lawyers, even lawyers of great repute, of raising objections and making challenges which tend to give them time, afford them technical advantages, and, if successful, add to their prestige, <sup>and which</sup> ~~while~~ if not successful aid in creating a psychological situation on the part of judge and/or jury and/or the public which they think will be advantageous to them at later stages in the proceedings. If they can establish the impression that they are being forced to accept conditions of which they do not approve, or that they are being bullied by the powers, or that they are champions of a principle of constitutionality which is being ridden over roughshod by their colleagues in the interest of opportunism, or that they are making concessions, they will gain, here and there, cumulatively, increments of popular sympathy. If, at the same time, they can make foreign offices and foreign nations believe that they are righteously indignant and are prepared to manifest intolerance of interference, they tend thereby to bring about a relaxation of whatever "pressure" is being brought to bear upon them.

During

- 5 -

During the past four weeks you and your staff have had to work under pressure and with haste in relation to this subject. Several of our most hazardous moments and not a little of our hardest work have been occasioned by the fact that decisions were being made in haste and immediate execution was being demanded. I feel that the situation has now reached a point where haste in arriving at conclusions and in execution will not, except occasionally, be necessary. The situations at the fronts (in the Far East and at Geneva) have become, in a comparative sense, stabilized. The question of arranging for negotiations and concluding a settlement is one that is going to be with the world for some time. From now on, you may to advantage, I think, proceed with much greater deliberateness than has been possible during the past four weeks.

May I urge that, in dealing with the Japanese Ambassador, you make your strategy defensive until such time as there may develop a situation in which you will need to take the offensive. In relation to the League, may I suggest that you adhere strictly to the principle that the Council of the League is to bear the brunt of the campaign and that your efforts to cooperate with the Council will be regulated on the principle of mutual consultation and effective coordination. By way of conserving your energies and safeguarding yourself against being pushed too fast either by the disputants or by the League, may I suggest that you impose upon your staff more of the

- 6 -

the responsibility and accountability for initiative and execution in relation to this matter. And, may I suggest that, as (a) we are probably going to be in action for weeks and months to come on this "case", and (b) there may at any time come new periods of special stress, you give thought to (1) the conservation of the energy of your shock troops and (2) the establishing and maintenance of "reserves".

*SKH/Humboldt*

SKH/ZMF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 19, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

*On Question of Note  
invoking Pact of Paris*

OCT 19 1931

The circular from the French Government calling upon the signatories to take action with regard to the invoking of the Kellogg Pact has not yet been received.

This leaves outstanding the question of action to be taken by us with regard to sending to the Chinese and Japanese Governments the notes, which we have ready, with regard to the Pact. It was understood yesterday that we would wait, it being our assumption that the circular would arrive soon, until the circular was received. Thirty-six hours have gone by since five of the powers represented on the Council sent their notes.

Our notes, it seems to FE, *if to be sent* ought to be on their way. Every hour of delay, in view of the fact that notes have gone from other powers, will tend to impair the effectiveness of our notes. If you concur, and if you have had time to look over the draft, I would suggest that you let me have the draft with a view to the preparation of the telegrams. This will take a little time and perhaps in the interval the circular from the French Government will have arrived. If, when the telegrams are ready, the circular has not arrived, we can confer with a view to deciding for or against immediate expedition.

SKH/ZMF

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*SKH*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 19 1931 October 19, 1931.

ON THE MATTER OF INVOKING PACT OF PARIS OCT 19 1931

793-94

In the opinion of FE, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the five powers which addressed notes to China and Japan on Saturday invoking the Pact were unduly precipitate and employed bad tactics. They should at least have given the American Government notice of their intention and should have sent their notes either simultaneously with or subsequent to the issuance by the French Government of its circular calling upon the signatories of the Kellogg Pact to take similar action. The notes of those five powers went forward some thirty-six hours ago. The circular from the French Government has not yet been received here. In the interval, the Japanese have had opportunity to prepare and perhaps to expedite their rejoinder. All this without its having been possible, under the circumstances, for us to send our contemplated notes. This lack of coordination and synchronization robs the notes of the five powers of some of the force which they would have had if those powers had so arranged that their notes and ours and that of other powers could have gone forward simultaneously; and by the same fault of omission they make it inevitable that the force of our note, if and when sent, will, for the same reasons, be diminished.

SKH/REK

SKH

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 19, 1931.

Manchuria Situation.

793-94

In my opinion, the Japanese Government's attitude with regard to the proposal that it undertake to withdraw its troops into the Railway Zone within three weeks is sound. Without going into the question of the right or wrong of the action begun on the night of September 18 and the steps taken subsequently, a situation has been produced and is a fact; and that situation is such that the hazards of a withdrawal are such that it would be inadvisable for them to make promises with regard to a specified date in the near future on or before which they would undertake to make the withdrawal effective and complete. It must be remembered that there are in Manchuria some thirty million people; that the Chinese administration has been destroyed; that Chinese soldiers in large numbers have been disarmed and disbanded; that no provision has been made for any form of maintenance of these soldiers; that the whole situation is one of excitement and animosities; and, finally, that the Japanese Army, in proceeding to the occupation of South Manchuria, did so with a definite objective and continues committed to that objective.

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OCT 27 1931

Sgt H. H. H. H.

SKH/ZMF



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 19, 1931.

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SHE:  
(From Mr. Miller)

With reference to your memoranda (I and II)

October 18 on the Manchurian situation:

I agree that we should continue to work alongside the Council of the League, as far as we consistently may, in order that we may avoid as long as possible any appearance of a split between ourselves and the Council which, as you pointed out in a previous memorandum, may be what the Japanese Government is manouvering to bring about.

If, however, the Council, in order to maintain the position it has taken under the League Covenant, should feel it necessary to insist upon the complete evacuation of Japanese troops from all the points now occupied by Japanese forces outside the railway zone as a condition precedent to direct negotiations between the parties, it seems to me they are headed for an impasse with the Japanese Government and would be taking a position which might be difficult for them to sustain <sup>or</sup> for us to support.

I understand that in our instructions to Gilbert on Saturday emphasis was placed upon the <sup>ultimate</sup> ~~immediate~~ inception of direct negotiations between the parties as the most important objective at the present juncture. Such a position would doubtless create for us new difficulties

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

with the Chinese Government but it seems to me that this is a difficulty which we must sooner or later face if we are to maintain our position as a neutral and impartial party.

*RSM*  
RSM: EJL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 19, 1931.

795.94  
Mr. Secretary:

A survey of the press of the past two days brings into relief the fact that the news writers are very much in confusion in regard to Mr. Gilbert's instructions and authority. Several writers talk of him as being in the Council on a basis of equality with the other members.

It occurs to me that it might be well, in press conference, to clarify this by bringing out the following points:

1. Gilbert has authority to sit in the meetings of the Council;
2. He has authority to participate in the discussion when the Pact of Paris is under consideration;
3. Otherwise, he has no such authority and is merely an observer; and
4. He has no vote.

It might be well to point out that the full extent of Gilbert's authority is indicated in the instructions which were given him as described in the release which was given to the press.

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MAY 11 1934

SKH:REK


**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

**DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS**


October 19, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

I hope that you will be able  
to read this before the Japanese  
Ambassador calls.



*SKH*



SECRETARY'S OFFICE

SKH/ZMF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 19, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

793.94  
If the press despatch, from Geneva, marked hereunder, correctly represents Japan's action and objective, the move which it describes should be given our serious consideration.

It would mean, first of all, effort on Japan's part to drive a wedge between this Government and the League; second, an effort to cause the American Government to do what we have consistently refused to do in relation to the present Manchuria problem, namely, to take, as among the foreign powers, the principal responsibility in relation to policies of interference; and, third, as a concomitant, to weaken the position of the League and put us in a position of embarrassment and increased responsibilities.

I think that it is undoubtedly true that high officials of the American Government are better qualified than are the high officials of the French, the British, and the Italian (and other European) Governments to understand the Manchuria problem. It does not follow that the American Government is best situated to take on a unique, peculiar or exclusive responsibility with regard to it.

From close study of the press during the past few days I feel that the preponderance of opinion in this country is that

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MAY 11 1934

- 2 -

that the United States should not "get mixed up in" this Sino-Japanese controversy. On the basis of what I know of the background and underlying causes of the controversy, and of what I know of the history of the action and efforts of the American Government with regard to the Manchuria problem during the past thirty years, I feel sure that no judge, arbiter or mediator, if one were selected and given jurisdiction over the matter, would be able to render a decision or advise a course of action to be agreed upon between China and Japan without, in course and in consequence thereof, incurring the enmity of both parties. In other words, the Manchuria problem is such that the nearest approximation that could be made to a fair and equitable settlement would leave both China and Japan utterly dissatisfied. The needs and the interests of the two parties are in conflict. Their views with regard to their respective legal rights are utterly at variance. A world court backed by military force might, if there were such, take jurisdiction and render and have enforced a decision. But even so, the parties at issue would not be satisfied and both would resent the decision -- even as Japan at this moment resents the position taken by the Council of the League.

In my opinion, it follows that we should resist any efforts from any quarter (just as we have been doing) to put this problem on our lap.

In

- 3 -

In one of my memoranda of last week, I stated that it was my impression that the Japanese Ambassador was attempting to work us into readiness to accept a position as a mediator. I can conceive of the situation so developing that, like it or not, we may have to take on some such responsibility. In anticipation of that, I feel that our tactics should be those of resistance and that if the Japanese endeavor to move us in that direction we should, by resistance, compel them so definitely and persistently to urge their objective that, if and when we accept this responsibility, it would be clear that we do so only because the efforts of the Council of the League and of other powers have failed and the task has been forced (especially by the insistence of the Japanese Government) upon us. By following such a procedure, our position, if ultimately we have to act in a mediatorial or arbitrarial capacity, will have been greatly strengthened.

SKH/Humbly

SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972  
By *Milton O. Blum* NARS, Date 12-18-75

Largest Morning Circulation in the Nation's Capital

# Washington Herald

AN AMERICAN PAPER FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

MONDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1931. Published

Second-class matter at Washington, D. C. Postoffice at Washington, D. C.

## Japanese Demand Washington Take Over Peace Move

HOOPER RECEIVES DEPARTMENT OF OUR SERVICE DEP

Japan's Request  
To Intercede

ABOARD THE U. S. S.

ARKANSAS, Oct. 18.

Overhauling this battle-

ship today in a speedboat,

Richard Southgate, of the

State Department at Wash-

ington, delivered several im-

portant messages to Presi-

dent Hoover from Secretary

of State Stimson.

It was learned unofficially

that these messages involved

Japan's request to take the

Sino-Japanese tangle from

the League of Nations and

place it in the hands of

President Hoover and others

at Washington.

The President refused to

comment.

Mather was endeared to Cleve-  
land for his generosity, in active  
leadership and personal contribu-  
tions to charity. As the richest  
man in Ohio, he had contributed  
nearly \$8,000,000 to various funds  
and memorials. His last public  
act was to assure the Hoover com-  
mittee on mobilization of relief  
that Cleveland would take care of  
her indigent unemployed without  
outside assistance.

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# Washington Herald

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AN AMERICAN PAPER FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

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MONDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1931.

Published

## Japanese Demand Washington Take Over Peace Move

Geneva Authority  
to Seat Gilbert  
Challenged

NOTE BRISTLES

Hoover and Castle  
Held Best Fitted  
for Problem

### Draft in China

LONDON, Oct. 19 (Monday).  
A dispatch from Shanghai  
to the London Times states  
that owing to the present  
crisis the Chinese govern-  
ment has ordered the draft-  
ing of a national conscrip-  
tion law for immediate pro-  
mulgation.

By GEO. W. HINMAN, Jr.  
(Copyright, 1931, Distributed By  
Universal Service, Inc.)

GENEVA, Oct. 18—Frankly  
dissatisfied with the manner in  
which the League of Nations  
is handling the controversy,  
Japan today marshalled all her  
resources in a determined ef-  
fort to transfer from Geneva  
to Washington the negotia-  
tions for settlement of the  
Sino-Japanese Manchurian  
situation.

Two outstanding moves by  
Tokyo featured the opening of  
this drive:

1—The publication with dra-  
matic suddenness of a Tokyo  
note to French foreign Min-  
ister Briand, president of the  
emergency League Council ses-  
sion, publicly challenging the  
League's authority to proceed in-  
considering the Manchurian  
problem with the United States  
at the council table. Prentiss  
Gilbert, American minister to  
Geneva, is sitting in as an "ob-  
server."

### LOOKS FOR ADVICE

2—An authoritative declara-  
tion by Japan that she con-  
siders President Hoover and  
U. S. Undersecretary of State  
Castle, with their background  
of study and experience in the  
Far East, better qualified than  
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### Hoover Receives Japan's Request To Intercede

ABOARD THE U. S. S.  
ARKANSAS, Oct. 18.

Overhauling this battle-  
ship today in a speedboat,  
Richard Southgate, of the  
State Department at Wash-  
ington, delivered several im-  
portant messages to Presi-  
dent Hoover from Secretary  
of State Stimson.

It was learned unofficially  
that these messages involved  
Japan's request to take the  
Sino-Japanese tangle from  
the League of Nations and  
place it in the hands of  
President Hoover and others  
at Washington.

The President refused to  
comment.

Largest Morning Circulation in the Nation's Capital

# Washington Herald

AMERICA FIRST

AN AMERICAN PAPER FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Second-class matter at  
postoffice at Washington, D. C.

MONDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1931.

Publish  
v

## Japanese Demand Washington Take Over Peace Move

Geneva Authority  
to Seat Gilbert  
Challenged

NOTE BRISTLES

Hoover and Castle  
Held Best Fitted

to Washington the negotia-  
tions for settlement of the  
Sino-Japanese Manchurian  
situation.

Two outstanding moves by  
Tokyo featured the opening of  
this drive:

1—The publication with dra-  
matic suddenness of a Tokyo  
note to French foreign Min-  
ister Briand, president of the  
emergency League Council ses-  
sion, publicly challenging the  
League's authority to proceed in-  
considering the Manchurian  
problem with the United States  
at the council table. Prentiss  
Gilbert, American minister to  
Geneva, is sitting in as an "ob-  
server."

LOOKS FOR ADVICE

2—An authoritative declara-  
tion by Japan that she con-  
siders President Hoover and  
U. S. Undersecretary of State  
Castle, with their background  
of study and experience in the  
Far East, better qualified than  
Briand, British Foreign Secre-  
tary Lord Reading, and Italian  
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made it most plain that Tokyo is  
relying on Washington contacts  
between Japanese Ambassador De-  
buchi, the White House, and State  
Department, rather than the drag-  
ging interchanges at Geneva, to  
find the ultimate way out of the  
present wilderness of controversy.

By this unexpected change of  
front, Japan achieves a double  
purpose. She emphasizes that her  
opposition to the United States'  
participation in the League Coun-  
cil sessions is not directed against  
Washington's direct participation  
in efforts to solve the problem,  
and, simultaneously, takes a vigor-

Hoover Receives  
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To Intercede

ABOARD THE U. S. S.  
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(Continued on Page 2, Col. 2)

FORCING A LOCK, POLICE SAID.

## Japanese Demand Peace Parley in Washington

(Continued From First Page)

ous slap at the League for the Council's action in so unceremoniously overriding Tokyo's juridical objections to the invitation extended the United States.

### NOTE IS DEFIANT

On explicit instructions from Tokyo, Kenkichi Yoshizawa, Japan's representative on the council, presented Briand with a vigorous note literally bristling defiance. The note wound up with a virtual ultimatum:

"Before deciding on what attitude to take regarding the ensemble of the questions pending, the Japanese government would be glad to know the view of the president of the council regarding the points raised therein."

Briand, appointed by the "committee of thirteen"—the council excluding China and Japan, but including the United States, a non-member—was quick to reply with an answering declaration that matched Tokyo's blunt tone. Reviewing briefly the fact that the juridical consideration involved already had been exhaustively discussed, Briand concluded the note, delivered through Yoshizawa, with the declaration:

"This being the case, I consider that my colleagues agree that no useful purpose would be served by undertaking at the present time a juridical study of problems, which, however important and interesting they may be in themselves, do not at the moment arise, though they can be examined

later if the members of the League desire.

### STUDY UNRELATED

"I trust that the Japanese government will agree that such study would, in any case, be wholly unrelated to the vote by the council October 15. I venture to hope that the foregoing explanations will convince the Japanese government that I and my colleagues have given the most serious consideration to the views it expressed to us and that we have been most careful to take no action in contradiction to any article of the covenant or the council's practice."

Immediately afterward it was announced that, on account of the present situation, the full council session scheduled for Monday had been countermanded.

Pessimism is thick in Japanese circles where Tokyo's possible withdrawal from the League of Nations is again being seriously discussed.

### Two Chinese Named To Mayor Posts

MUKDEN, Manchuria, Oct. 18 (U.S.).—Two Japanese-educated Chinese were today appointed mayors of Mukden and Kirin, principal cities in the Japanese occupation zone.

Chang Chin-Po, formerly legal adviser to Marshal Chang Hseuh-Liang, governor of Manchuria, accepted the Mukden post, and Hsi-Chieh the Kirin mayoralty. The present incumbents will continue as advisers.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated October 20, 1931

793.94  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.

228, October 20, 8 p. m.

793.94/2211  
Consulate's 224, October 19, 7 p. m.

One. The following is a resume of military and collateral information respecting Manchuria which I have just received from the British. In handing me this they stated that this brought their information up to date.

On October 11th it was reported that there had been no change in the Japanese military dispositions with the exception that flying troops had been withdrawn from Tunhua. There was still one brigade at Kirin, a detachment at Chengchiatun and a squadron of airplanes at Changchuen and Mukden. A small detachment had been ostensibly sent for liaison purposes with the Japanese troops outside the Great Wall from Tientsin to Shanhaikwan.

A report received from Changchuen, dated October 12th, stated



Rec'd 1:35 p. m.

See  
e.g.c.

793.94/2234

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OCT 26 1931

REP

2- #228, from Geneva, Oct. 20, 2 p.m.

stated that there was no Japanese occupation of the city which however was commanded by Japanese troops from outside. Japanese control the municipal administration the new head of which comes from Dairen, and has been appointed by the Japanese controlled Government of Kirin. The Japanese military authorities stated that their forces were not operating far from the railroad.

An unconfirmed report from Harbin dated October 13th, stated that a Japanese cavalry brigade had penetrated north of Tsitsihar and that there was another brigade between there and Taonan.

On October 14th it was reported that the Japanese showed signs of extending their operations towards Chinchow on the Peiping-Mukden Railway. The object of the moves appeared to be to deny the use of the line to Chinese troops destined for inside the Wall and to accelerate the departure of the emergency provincial government organized at Chinchow. A report from Mukden of the same date stated that several thousand Japanese troops in armored trains had left that place for Sinmin and that  
all Chinese

REP

3- #228, from Geneva, Oct. 20, 2 p.m.

all Chinese traffic by that route had stopped.

Koupangtsingpoo was bombed by Japanese aircraft on October 13th.

Tungliao was attacked and looted by 500 Mongolians on the morning of October 14th. Detachments from the third cavalry brigade moved up and cleared the town. During the proceedings six Japanese airplanes circled over Tungliao and dropped bombs.

As regards the general situation in South Manchuria the hsien administration is still functioning in the interior but there are no organized troops to keep order, but the Chinese general at Shanchengtzu is trying to rally the Chinese troops on the Mukden Kirin Railway.

The Japanese military authorities stated that the figures for Japanese troops were as follows: Changchung - one division with a brigade (about 1200 men) at Kirin; Tunhua - the detachment was withdrawn some days ago; Chengchiatun - 300 men; Sinmin - 100 men and 2 guns.

Except at Mukden no other Japanese troops were outside the railway zone, and the total in Manchuria was 14,000.

WSB

GILBERT

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM


GRAY

FROM

Paris

Dated October 20, 1931

Rec'd



Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

672, October 20, 5 p.m. 2184

Embassy's telegram 669, October 17, 11 a.m.

Since the above telegram the action of the League of Nations in inviting an American observer to the Council and Briand's responsibility for the invitation have been widely criticised in the Conservative press on two grounds:

One. It is unjust as the United States is interested in the dispute and prejudiced against Japan; it is politically inexpedient and will earn for France the hostility of Japan. Those criticisms are expressed in the ECHO DE PARIS, LIBERTE, ORDRE and VICTOIRE and most emphatically in the ACTION FRANCAISE which draws a parallel between the Japanese action in China and the United States action in 1916. The REPUBLIQUE joins the Conservative papers in criticising the justice and advisability of the invitation. PARIS MIDI thinks it hasty and ill-considered.

Both

793.94/2235

FILED

OCT 23 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2-#672, from Paris, October 20, 1931  
5 p.m.

Both the Conservative and Moderate press now stress the chaotic conditions in Manchuria and China in general and urge the League to judge the Manchurian situation from a realistic point of view. The semi-governmental LE TEMPS deplores the fact that even the question of Japan's retiring from the League of Nations should have arisen and states that it is high time that the Manchurian conflict should be liquidated under conditions safeguarding the moral authority of the League and taking into account the political realities which exist in the Far East and which it is not in the power of anyone to suppress.

EDGE

RR

WSB



October 20, 1931.  
12:30 o'clock.

*file*

MEMORANDUM OF TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN  
SECRETARY STIMSON AND MR. GILBERT AT GENEVA.

Manchuria.

SECRETARY: This is Secretary Stimson. What is it?

GILBERT: I have had your telegram sent me after your conversation with Lord Reading and I believe I understand the situation perfectly. They have been discussing this with me all day and I believe you will agree with me that our position in this matter should be in the general terms of your decision. They suggest that in the matter of method, however, we should go to any extreme to satisfy them. I mean in the matter of method.

SECRETARY: I think we have worked out a very satisfactory method in that telegram.

GILBERT: Yes, sir. But there are one or two details.

SECRETARY: I thought we had gone into detail sufficiently. If you have anything further regarding details let me know.  
(Break in connection)

SECRETARY: What is it? What are those details?

GILBERT: You sent me a statement which I might make, you know, at my last appearance. Briand is asking that he might make the statement respecting why I will not be there any more and he feels that he should make that view of his having made the original statement. Is that satisfactory to you?

SECRETARY: all right. I think so. I think he should let you see in advance what he is going to say. I think our interests are parallel there.

GILBERT: He is going to say something like the following: That certain objections were raised perhaps and were entirely on juridical grounds. Possibly some misunderstanding

795.94/2235 1/2

Confidential File

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- 2 -

arose to the effect that I was taking part actively in League matters, which was not true; that in order to allay such misunderstandings ---. That is about the line he will take. In order to protect his situation in the League he should be able to do that.

SECRETARY: Absolutely. That is all right. I want him to understand like the others that the position I am taking is not in the least based upon any desire to change my cooperation but it is to make it permanent for the future. We must be able to hold the step we have taken which is based upon and embodied in the instructions which I gave you on the day you went in and there must be no failure of this conference. The danger was the secret meetings. I could see great probability of danger in the misunderstanding which might occur in Japan. They did not know the extent of your participation during the secret meetings and therefore that was the most important thing. I do not want you to go to any more secret meetings but I have no objection to your going to the open meetings provided you take the attitude of observer only - take the position of observer whenever the Kellogg Pact is not under discussion. You understand that.

GILBERT: Yes, sir. Those are the terms of your telegram which is very clear and precise. As I said in the beginning I must really tell you that it caused the most tremendous excitement here when I told it to Reading, Drummond and Briand. I really feel it my duty to give you the picture. Drummond almost broke down and of course I feel it my duty to tell you what Briand said. Would you like to know.

SECRETARY: Certainly.

GILBERT: Briand said in the first place he was very deeply concerned. He said in the first place that Japan would

- 3 -

feel it to be a great diplomatic victory which they had achieved in response to representations which they had made in Washington. The second thing he said was that it would give the Japanese a new lease on life here and so strengthen their position that the efforts of the Council might prove ineffectual. The third thing he said was that he was even more deeply concerned over what might result at home and internationally. The other views Reading expressed to you have been transmitted to Lindsay.  
SECRETARY: I have already talked to Lindsay.

GILBERT: Briand said it placed him in an exceedingly difficult position as President of the Council. He spoke of possible unfortunate repercussions in respect to Laval's visit and its objects; he feels it might mean a failure here which meant a failure in February. That is exactly the expression he used; and I am just reporting to you.

SECRETARY: I have envisaged all of those things and I am obliged to follow my own judgment on them after giving them careful consideration. Frankly, I do not see how all of those results can happen from that change in the secret meetings.

GILBERT: He thinks it would be well that I ask you in case that they do not any longer invite me to the secret meetings that as a concession I might remain in the public meetings as I have up to now, until they end. Adjournment is expected in a very few days. They are naturally pressing that request.

SECRETARY: Do not you understand you have permission now to sit in the public meetings.

GILBERT: But only for the first one?

SECRETARY: My understanding with Reading was that you could continue in the public meetings provided you changed your seat.

- 4 -

GILBERT: They asked that there be no public comment about my changing my seat.

SECRETARY: There need not be any comment.

GILBERT: It is hard for you to realize the drama which has been built up around my position here.

SECRETARY: They ought not to have put you in that seat. They ought not to have staged up that point.

GILBERT: It was nothing that I did, sir.

SECRETARY: I know that.

GILBERT: I have been very careful about publicity. I have had to have my picture taken once or twice coming out of the building.

SECRETARY: There is not the slightest criticism of you and I do not criticize them.

GILBERT: I am always afraid you will confuse their views with mine. There probably will be only one more public meeting and two at the most. They felt that if I shifted my seat it would cause the press to come out with endless interpretations. I am just presenting their views - what they feel.

SECRETARY: I do not see how that could arise.

GILBERT: Briand, after expressing himself as I have told you, then said, "Can you make this one request?" I said, "I will most certainly make it." I had to say that. They will not invite me to any more secret meetings except within the limits of your telegram, and said my changing my seat would be passed all over Europe by the press saying, "What is the significance of this" and their making all kinds of interpretations. I mentioned this point in the end of my telegram. I would like to read the last paragraph. "I feel that I should tell you that there is constantly being brought to my attention by

- 5 -

members of the Council and by representatives of the American press here that the Japanese are with no small success bending every effort to give the appearance that there is a marked division of policy between Washington and Geneva." This will be the Japanese position. The American press came to me today and said that you felt evacuation was not necessary. I said, "Where do you get this sort of thing?" They replied, "Well you know the Japanese pass it out."

SECRETARY: As a matter of fact the Japanese have made no representations to us about your seat there or about your position. You must keep your mind off that. They have made no representations whatever. Their conduct has been perfectly all right. There has been no criticism here and you can take that flat and we have not in any way yielded to any Japanese criticism here. There has not been any made.

GILBERT: I am sure that that would have been the case. I wanted to tell you just what is being said here. The American press surrounded me today and all said the same thing.

SECRETARY: You cannot run a great negotiation like this with such undue attention to the press.

GILBERT: I know that, but I fear the Japanese are actually doing it.

SECRETARY: What you have got to do is to go ahead and insist on it and when the time comes we will back you up. I have just had a talk with the British Ambassador for the benefit of Lord Reading, to reassure him on the whole question, and I believe he appreciates our position better than you can appreciate it in Geneva both with reference to Tokyo and this country. I said we were doing it that we might hold the ground we have gained so that it might

- 6 -

not be lost.

GILBERT: In response to Mr. Briand's question, if they ask can I tell them whether I can sit in the seat I have occupied in the public meetings, provided they do not invite me to the private meetings. They do not believe there will be more than two more public meetings.

SECRETARY: Let me ask you this question. Are there any other observers there?

GILBERT: No, sir. No other nations have any observers.

SECRETARY: Are there any seats there recognized as observer's seats?

GILBERT: They sit in the audience normally. Of course, something might be fixed up artificially. They want to avoid newspaper comment on the change of seat. I will of course not go to any secret meetings.

SECRETARY: When does your next public meeting come?

GILBERT: It is not scheduled yet. It has been put off from day to day until they reached -

SECRETARY: Reading promised me it would be held within forty-eight hours.

GILBERT: They do not want to have a public meeting until - you see they are trying to get something to bring into the public meeting to make it a success and naturally they cannot make commitments. When they meet before the public they wish to make it look successful.

SECRETARY: My impression is that you are running more of a risk to postpone that meeting and to have other secret meetings in the meanwhile, to which you will not be invited, than you would to have that meeting and wind up by having announced openly the withdrawal of the Japanese objection.

GILBERT: I do not know what they will do. I have to express to you what Mr. Briand said. He talked about it a

- 7 -

great deal and after a long consultation with Drummond and with Reading made that request.

SECRETARY: It is now understood you will go to no more secret meetings.

GILBERT: Except the first one, if there is one.

SECRETARY: Secret meetings?

GILBERT: I will go to no more secret meetings?

SECRETARY: You have had your last one now.

GILBERT: They did not have a secret meeting today. They had none. It says in your telegram that I am authorized to sit in today's secret session, but they did not have one.

SECRETARY: So that you will go to no other secret meetings now at all. They are agreeable to that? They understand that?

GILBERT: My understanding with Reading was that I would go to the next one, probably tomorrow, but I think there will be no difficulty about my not going to any more secret meetings.

SECRETARY: But don't you see, the longer they put it off, the longer they hang in doubt.

GILBERT: I will go to no more secret meetings.

SECRETARY: They have lost their chance by not holding the one today.

SECRETARY: You can go to the first open meeting and sit at a regular seat, and then I will inform you about what happens after that.

GILBERT: There is one suggestion I feel I should make to you. Under the provision that we do everything possible to help them, this suggestion was made: I might be under orders to return to Washington for consultation in case this went on much longer, that is before the next time I sit at a meeting it would be announced that I would return to Washington for consultation.

- 8 -

SECRETARY: I can do that, if they would rather have you go.

But I may be able to let you go on in the public meetings.

GILBERT: Mr. Everett is exceedingly capable. He is able to carry this forward. I can recommend him fully. They said that it seemed desirable I might be ordered to Washington. I would like some kind of an authorization in case it suddenly came up. I would withdraw from the table. At the same time the Japanese would have the impression that my going to Washington kept a very strong contact on information with the League. I thought that if they felt that way you might be able to approve. I can hardly describe to you how they talked this morning. It was very trying.

SECRETARY: I see the point.

GILBERT: May I then have your authority, if it reaches that point and Briand asks it, to take that step?

SECRETARY: I will telegraph you on that. I think I can probably meet that.

GILBERT: You see my point is simply trying to meet them.

SECRETARY: I have nothing but satisfaction for your action, so do not worry about that.

GILBERT: From a personal point of view, any kind of newspaper comment here will make future work in Geneva a little more difficult. I hope it will be done perfectly smoothly.

SECRETARY: I think they make a great deal of unnecessary stress out of a matter which can be easily cared for in other ways.

GILBERT: I have to give Briand and Lord Reading the benefit of their sincerity.

SECRETARY: I know. Before we get through with this situation they will have no doubt about our cooperation and the



- 9 -

Japanese will have no doubt about our cooperation and the world will have no doubt of our cooperation, but they must not try to put me in a position where I have not get a secure footing. I think they are unduly excited about what is a very simple matter.

GILBERT: My being ordered away would not cost us anything.

SECRETARY: I think they have been very hysterical about it but I do not intend to criticize them because I know they are in a difficult position. You are to go to no more private meetings, but you can go to the first public meeting and take your regular seat, and about your seat in subsequent public meetings I will let you know after I have time to reflect over it.

GILBERT: About the other matter. Could I have some kind of general authority to leave Geneva.

SECRETARY: Yes. You can have that. But I do not want you to go. I hope it can be settled the other way.

GILBERT: They talked about that so strongly. If you were here you would understand. I have a telegram -

SECRETARY: I am very busy. I am getting ready for the Laval visit.

GILBERT: I must tell you the very latest situation in Manchuria. Would you like to have that read to a stenographer?

SECRETARY: She is already taking down everything we say. Go ahead.

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GILBERT: I am reporting on meetings of the Council as they occur. That, by no means, however, completes the picture of what is taking place here. It is not expedient to bring forward in the Council which has too large a membership for that purpose, the more important developments. These lie in direct conversations between Briand, Reading, Drummond and Grandi, when he is present, and the Chinese and Japanese representatives, but most of the problem seems to be that Japan is standing on two demands. Safety for Japanese lives and property and more general settlement of questions between China and Japan in Manchuria including in particular, questions relating to the South Manchurian Railway. Japan's position is that the latter does not involve new demands. In other words, it is not in addition to those embraced in the Council resolution of September 30 which was intended by Japan to mean security in a general sense. The interpretation of security in the September 30th resolution has already long been understood to mean immediate safety for Japanese life and property incident to the evacuation. There is a feeling here, however, which I believe I am interpreting correctly, that the Japanese will insist on their objective respecting these general demands before they retire or at least before they will agree to retire. I understand they have made known these demands to Reading, Drummond, and Briand but that the latter are, for reasons which seem to be compelling, keeping this secret at the present time. Their efforts were in the direction of adjusting these demands to a possible Chinese acceptance. If this can be accomplished the problem regarding Japanese withdrawals and Chinese reoccupation can be easily resolved.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-11-

Reading and Drummond have told me that they did not regard the Japanese demand as particularly exacting and they were hopeful of an adjustment with the Chinese. The Japanese contended that should an agreement be reached with the Chinese prior to evacuation for undertakings during and subsequent to evacuation, the Chinese might not follow out their undertakings in the premises. In reply, the Japanese were informed that these were commitments on the part of China; and that if Japan fulfilled her commitments and China did not, the role of the two disputants would be reversed and Japan would be in the position of a plaintiff. With respect to the negotiations, indicated above, which took place with the Japanese, I have been informed by Drummond that the following was brought out. Drummond informed Sawada that with respect to the Japanese demand inasmuch as they have been given to him in the strictest confidence, he was unable to divulge them. They could not, therefore, be used as a basis for private negotiations. Second: Drummond told Sawada that in order that this information could be put to a useful purpose it was important that it should be communicated to the members of the Council and even made public.

Such action might strengthen the Japanese case. Moreover, the Chinese might be able at once to accept and if this took place the whole problem would be easier. Sawada replied that he could not express any opinion on this. He would, however, suggest it at once to Tokyo.

Does that give you some conception of the picture?

SECRETARY: Yes, go on.

In other words, they intimate to me that these demands did not seem to be something that could not be gotten around.

-11a-

The Japanese were given to understand that these demands had the appearance of something new. When they were asked, "You are backing away from your September 30th resolution?" They said, "Not at all; we must have security." When told that security was only supposed to be in connection with evacuation, the Japanese said they required security in a more general sense, and had always meant that.

- 12 -

SECRETARY: Don't go into that. That is a matter for the Council to iron out there. I am familiar with everything you have said except for the fact that it is now under discussion. I know of those two points because they have been before me for some weeks, and I have formed the same impression of the feasibility of the Japanese demands.

GILBERT: May I ask one direct question? Do you know the exact demands?

SECRETARY: I think I do. Of course, I can not tell until I compare them with what you have. But I have had in my possession what the Japanese say are their ultimate demands, for some time. That is confidential to you and the matter is that it seems to me that that is a matter which is well within the bounds of negotiation and compromise.

GILBERT: That is the way they feel here.

SECRETARY: That is the way they ought to settle it.

GILBERT: The Japanese still insist that this can not be made public and they will not come out in the open and state the limit of what they want. In that way they do not like to leave it to direct negotiations between the Chinese and Japanese, and have the Japanese make excessive demands which might bring on war with China. They feel that the Japanese should commit themselves in public to do something definite.

SECRETARY: Can't they commit themselves? Would it not serve the same purpose if the Japanese committed themselves in private to those demands in the Council? But the Council must remember that if there is one thing an Oriental negotiator dislikes to do it is to make his demands public,

and

-13-

and they do not care at all to negotiate in public. The Council will have to find some way of permitting them to negotiate their own way and yet protect the other fellow against oppression.

GILBERT: I see your point. That is very helpful. I consider that this conversation will not make a cable necessary.

SECRETARY: Send your cable just the same. I have just sent you a telegram in answer to your cable I received this morning reporting on the situation and I have just said the same thing to you. I have commented on the facts you gave me in that cable and I have asked you to send more cables like it and I will comment on those. We have been talking long enough on this now. You go ahead and send that cable and keep me informed up to date as rapidly as you can on everything that takes place and I will answer as fast as I can.

GILBERT: I am doing that to the utmost of my ability.

SECRETARY: It meets my full approval and I will try to get you my comments back as soon as your reports come in.

GILBERT: You do not wish a cable on this?

SECRETARY: I do wish it sent me. That would be helpful.

GILBERT: I think your suggestion about Orientals working in private will probably interest them very much.

SECRETARY: You do not have to code your own telegrams do you?

GILBERT: No, sir.

SECRETARY: You have someone else to do that?

GILBERT: We have three men who have been coding from two o'clock in the morning until six o'clock at night.

SECRETARY: I will see if I can get you any further help.

-14-

I do not want you to have to do it yourself.

GILBERT: There are a great number of telegrams to go out in these confidential codes and sometimes it takes two or three hours for a couple of pages.

SECRETARY: You need not send that one then if it is going to throw that extra burden on you. The stenographer probably got it. This conversation has come in very clearly.

GILBERT: Lord Reading said that yesterday it was very bad. Will I hear from you on that other point? May I not sit at the table a second time, if necessary.

SECRETARY: You can sit there the first time. I am going to telegraph you about the second time.

GILBERT: About my coming to Washington, have I that permission?

SECRETARY: You have permission in case it becomes material.

GILBERT: Otherwise, if Briand says I wish that you would do this, as it would help me enormously, I will say yes.

MAM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

A portion of this telegram  
must be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated October 20, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 8:58 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

232, October 20, 9 a.m.

Consulate's 221, October 19, 9 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

No public session of the Council

but there was a private session at ten thirty a.m., without  
the presence of the Chinese and Japanese representatives.

I was in attendance at this session.

The President first explained the reasons for not  
holding a public meeting by stating that news has been re-  
ceived concerning a lessening of the tension in Manchuria  
and of a slight abatement of the excitement in China as a  
whole; that in view of this apparent amelioration of the  
situation it would be wiser to allow this detente to oper-  
ate further in a natural manner rather than to press devel-  
opments forward in a public session which might cause an  
unfavorable reaction. As concrete evidence of this lessen-  
ing

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
OCT-21 1931  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND  
INFORMATION

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 21 1931  
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OCT 21 1931  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

793.94/2236



MAM

2- #232, from Geneva, October 20,  
1931

lessening of the tension in Manchuria he referred to information just received that the Mukden Hailung-Cheng Railway had resumed operations through an administrative arrangement between the Chinese and Japanese local authorities. He felt that this action was probably not an isolated and totally undirected incident but perhaps was the result of some more or less definite trend operating behind the scenes. Since this movement was in a favorable direction he considered it advisable to give it further time for development and felt that this moment was opportune for continuing the negotiations between himself and the Chinese and Japanese representatives. This is the plan which Briand is following today and the date of convening the next meeting of the Council will depend upon developments.

After this procedure was decided upon the Council next examined the positions of the Chinese and Japanese respectively as they now stand in so far as known. (END GREEN)

Briand read a summary of an aide memoire handed to him by Sze on October 18th explaining the Chinese position.  
The

MAM

3- #232, from Geneva, October 20,  
1931

The following indicate the general tenor of the points covered:

One. With regard to Briand's questions as to whether the Chinese Government would be prepared to start negotiations with Japan after the latter had substantially withdrawn her troops and given an indication of completing this withdrawal (see draft resolution quoted in Consulate's 213, October 17, midnight) the aide memoire presented the following:

(A) In order to reassure public opinion in China the Council's session should not formally terminate but merely adjourn until evacuation is completed and the President should follow events closely in liaison with the Secretary General.

(B) China accepts the suggestion that neutral officers and civilians be attached to Chinese troops as observers in taking over evacuated areas but feels that there should be in addition a League Commission of Neutral Observers in Manchuria to supervise evacuation and reoccupation; in a spirit of conciliation however would be willing to modify this proposal by presenting it as a corollary, on the one hand,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAM

4- #232, from Geneva, October 20,  
1931

hand, to the Japanese proposal and the Council resolution  
of September 30th concerning the communication of informa-  
tion by neutral persons on the spot, and on the other, to  
the attaching of neutral observers to the Chinese troops  
taking over evacuated areas.

(END SECTION ONE)

GILBERT

FW

OX

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

A portion of this telegram  
must be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated to  
anyone.

Geneva

Dated October 20, 1931

Rec'd 9:22 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C. DIVISION OF

232, October 20, 9 p. m.

(SECTION TWO)

(C) Chinese opinion is passively unanimous in a determination not to negotiate under the pressure of military occupation. Only after assurance of the loyalty and effectiveness of Japanese withdrawal and the certainty of the time limit which might be agreed upon, could Chinese apprehensions be allayed and thus permit an approach to the other problems in a tranquil frame of mind.

Two. Linking up the foregoing immediate question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops with the problem of a general settlement after the completion of the withdrawal, the remaining portions of the aide memoir briefly summarized are as follows:

(A) The League must not become indifferent to the problem involved in the settlement of the Japanese claims

in

- 2 - No. 232 from Geneva

in Manchuria. The appearance of deserting China and abandoning her to "direct negotiations" with Japan might have the gravest consequences on the internal situation in China.

(B) No departure should be allowed from the principle of equal opportunity set forth in the Nine Power Pact and from the rights of the parties under the Covenant. This principle is of interest not only to China but to the Powers.

(C) In order not to leave the impression of abandoning China and leaving her face to face with Japan the Council and the United States jointly should offer to appoint neutral members or "referees" to assist the parties to arrive at a settlement as was done at the Washington Conference.

(D) It should be made clear at the outset that the scope and nature of the ensuing conversations should be limited by the necessity of respecting the situation established by the treaties, the resolutions of the Washington Conference and of reserving the rights of the parties under the Covenant.

(E)

- 3 - No. 232 from Geneva

(E) Suggests seizing this opportunity to lay the foundations of enduring peace and amity between China and Japan by the establishment of a permanent board of conciliation and <sup>arbitration</sup> ~~arbitrary procedure~~, on such lines proposed for such bodies in the "general act", to facilitate the solution, apart from present controversies, of Sino-Japanese problems as a whole. (END GREEN)

The Chinese position as set forth above was not discussed at great length by the Council. It was felt that the greatest difficulty lay in obtaining sufficient concessions from Japan to meet the minimum demands of China. The latter it was thought could be made to harmonize with the Council's resolution of September 30. On the other hand if the principles set forth in this resolution were abandoned to meet Japanese demands it would probably mean that China would go to war.

The Japanese position as brought out in the Council meeting and in subsequent private conversations is less well defined but the chief elements as known are as follows:

One. Japan maintains that the security of the  
lives

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 - No. 232 from Geneva

lives and property of Japanese nationals can not be assured until a complete detente between the two nations has been brought about.

Two. In order to obtain this end there are certain points based on the respect of existing treaties which must be first agreed upon between the two governments.

Three. As soon as an agreement on these points is reached the Japanese assert that normal relations could be resumed and the evacuation take place.

Four. The above represents a new element not hitherto contained in the Japanese demands.

Five. This new element only serves apparently to reenforce their former position in regard to direct negotiations.

Six. It was pointed out however that the Council might act as the negotiator between the two governments on these points and thus satisfy the Chinese opposition to direct negotiations.

(END SECTION TWO)

GILBERT

FW

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

A portion of this telegram must  
be closely paraphrased ~~from~~  
being communicated to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated October 20, 1931

Rec'd 8:35 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

OCT 21 1931

DIVISION OF

CONFERENCES AND

232 (SECTION THREE)

Seven. Of a more reassuring nature is the fact that  
the Japanese reiterate their denial of any territorial  
ambitions in Manchuria.

Eight. With regard to the Chinese offer to allow  
neutral officers and civilians to act as observers during  
the evacuation and reoccupation to watch over the security  
of Japanese nationals, the Japanese representative has im-  
plied that the responsibility for their security should  
rest on the powers whose nationals act in this capacity.  
This it was pointed out in the Council discussion is impos-  
sible. To do this would mean the stationing of foreign  
troops in Manchuria, and this would be objectionable to the  
Japanese themselves. The Japanese position on this point  
is not clear. (END GREEN)

Nine. Some members of the Council feel that the Jap-  
anese



MAM

2- #232, from Geneva, October 20,  
1931, section three.

Japanese position on other points is not clear enough to enable intelligent negotiations and suggest that it is necessary to induce the Japanese to state exactly what they mean.

Reference was made during the course of the Council discussion to certain misunderstandings which have arisen at Tokyo in regard to what is taking place here. The implication is that possibly the Japanese representative here is not keeping his government accurately informed. It was suggested that the powers clarify the situation at Tokyo through communications to their Ambassadors there. The British have already taken action along this line.

In this connection it referred to the very efficacious (which?) support ~~while~~ the United States might lend independently through diplomatic channels to League efforts in regard to the whole problem.

(END MESSAGE)

GILBERT

FW

OX

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

October 20, 1931.

OCT 20 31

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
or  
Charge to

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

388

Please deliver to the Acting Minister for Foreign  
Affairs immediately, as a note, the text which follows.  
Inform him that an identical note is being communicated by  
the American Ambassador to Japan to the Japanese Minister  
for Foreign Affairs:

Text:

QUOTE The Government and people of the United States  
have observed with concern the events of the last month in  
Manchuria. When the difference between China and Japan  
came to a head on September 19th one of the parties to the  
dispute referred the matter to the League of Nations and  
since that time the American Government by representation,  
through diplomatic channels, has steadily cooperated with  
the League in its efforts to secure a peaceful settlement.  
A threat of war, wherever it may arise, is of profound  
concern to the whole world and for this reason the American  
Government, like other Governments, was constrained to call  
to the attention of both disputants the serious dangers  
involved in the present situation.

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/2236A

793.94  
with  
711.0012 - anti War application  
711.9312 - anti War  
506.712 - anti War

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
 PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

## TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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Collect  
 Charge Department  
 OR

## Department of State

Charge to  
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Washington,

- 2 -

This Government now desires, as do other signatories of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, particularly to call to the attention of the Chinese and the Japanese Governments the obligations which they voluntarily assumed when they became parties to that Treaty, especially the obligations of Article II, which reads:

SUBQUOTE The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means  
 END SUBQUOTE.

The American Government takes this occasion again to express its earnest hope that China and Japan will refrain from any measures which might lead to war and that they will find it possible in the near future to agree upon a method for resolving by peaceful means, in accordance with their promises and in keeping with the confident expectations of public opinion throughout the world, the issues over which they are at present in controversy UNQUOTE.

*Stinson*

FE:SKH/ZMF

per  
 FE

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

GRAY

Peiping, via N. R.

Dated October 21, 1931

Rec'd 20th - 11 p. m.

HSM

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

800, October 21, 11 a. m.


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Your 388, October 20, 2 p. m. has been repeated

to Nanking. For the Minister,

ENGERT

FW



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OCT 22 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY

October 13, 1931

U  
Mr. Castle: *Wick*  
SA  
Mr. Klots:  
FE  
Dr. Hornbeck:


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Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 14 1931  
Department of State  
*Chen in FE*

The Secretary has noted  
the attached and asks that it be  
referred to you for your information.

HAM


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE UNDERSECRETARY



Memorandum from Ambassador  
Forbes to the Secretary. ✓

Show  
Rasche  
Klots  
~~to the Secretary~~



October 9, 1931.

*Milton O. Gustafson*

I think it would help the plans of the present handling of the Manchurian situation if we were to

OCT 13 1931

outline very definitely the situation which we like

to see brought about. In other words, suppose we were

made arbitrators, how would we solve the Manchurian

situation in a way which stood in any way of being made

satisfactory? The situation there is now that there are

180,000 Japanese residents in Manchuria most, I take it,

in Mukden and within the South Manchurian Railway Zone.

I do not know the exact proportion of the Japanese popu-

lation outside of these areas, but understand it is

almost negligible, mostly urban citizens. In addition

there are some 800,000 Koreans, widely scattered and

mostly rural, many of whom have taken out Chinese

citizenship and often claim to be Japanese or Chinese,

according to their own convenience or purposes of protec-

tion. I have it on the authority of Baron Dan, the head

of the Mitsui Company, that the Chinese have not given

adequate protection to these Japanese residents, that

there have been many murders, confiscation of property

and other abuses, many more than the press have taken

notice of and that this publicity has been withheld fearing

lest

793.94/2238

SEP 16 1931

- 2 -

lest the publication would inflame opinion of the Japanese people to the point which made it difficult to maintain peace. Moreover I have it on the authority of Mr. Kinney, the American propaganda agent of the South Manchurian Railway and in Japanese employ, that the Chinese have not observed the terms of the treaty in regard to customs charges and taxes. This was very acute during the winter, but I think the Chinese finally backed down on it, but there is no doubt there has been cause for irritation. The situation is inherently difficult, due to the fact that the Chinese Government has been too weak to give a protection to Japanese citizens and property that the Japanese Government is going to demand and which these citizens ought to have. A possible suggested objective might cover the following points:

First, that the Japanese withdraw all these troops, discontinue offensive operations upon the assurance that the Young Marshal Chiang will take over the Government of Manchuria and will undertake adequate protection of Japanese citizens and property.

Second, on the question of losses as a result of offensive movements which have taken place since September 19th, an impartial appraisal be made and the matter be adjusted by representatives of both powers with arbitration, if necessary.

Third,



- 3 -

Third, that the Japanese withdraw all troops from the South Manchurian Railway Zone and their place be taken by a civil organization of Japanese police, suitably armed, similar an organization, perhaps, to the State Police in various of our States, the Canadian Mounted Police or the Philippine Constabulary. Such men would have sufficient power to maintain order without the military character and appearance which the regular soldier has, and that notice be served upon the Chinese administrators of Manchuria that, in case of lack of proper protection of Japanese citizens, that they must expect an increase in the numbers of these police and possibly an extension of the Zone of the region over which they would enforce public order, possibly concurrently with Chinese police. If the personnel of this force could be made up in part of Chinese enlisted men, under Japanese enlisted men, under Japanese pay and under Japanese control, it is likely that very much less hostility would be incurred and the Japanese would find less difficulty in handling the situation. We found this to be notably the case in the Philippine Islands among the Mohammedans and even among the savages in the hills.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 14, 1931.

Mr. Castle:

This was on the machine when I was called into the Secretary's conference yesterday. You need not take the trouble to read it now, but it stands, particularly from the bottom of page 8, as a record of the views which were mine at the moment and which I tried to express orally in the conference by way of estimate.

*Thanks*

*W.H.  
A.H.C.*

*Sgt*

SKH/ZMT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE UNDER SECRETARY  
OCT 14 1931  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 13, 1931.

*Free*  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY  
OCT 15 1931  
MR. KLOTS

Status of Question of Invoking Kellogg Pact.

On October 10, the Secretary of State said (in telegram 78 to Geneva):

"I should welcome the expression of Drummond's views as to how, in the event that such action becomes necessary, attention may most effectively and promptly be called to the obligations of this treaty (Kellogg Pact)."

On October 11, 11 p.m., Drummond is quoted (in Geneva's 179) as saying: "Any formal indication at present juncture would to my mind have certain grave practical disadvantages." He then raises the question of creating confusion of "jurisdiction". But he suggests that:

"... if the Secretary of State saw fit he might possibly (sic) address a written or verbal communication to the two parties or to either (sic) stating that he had grave doubts whether the Pact of Paris was not in imminent danger of violation but that he did not intend at the moment formally to invoke that Pact because the League had been (?) of the question at issue and had obtained assurances from the two parties which if loyally executed as he feels assured they should be, would prevent danger of violation of the Pact. While he supported fully the action of the League, nevertheless, he felt bound solemnly to remind the two Governments of their obligations under the Pact, a violation of which by resort to war might be held by members of the League to imply a violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations."

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OCT 17 1931

- 2 -

On October 12, the Secretary informed Gilbert (in telegram 85 to Geneva), for conference with Drummond, that in the question of the Pact he saw no danger of embarrassment to the League, providing the invocation was left, as he had expressly suggested, "in the hands of the Council of the League"; that the Pact involves no investigation, argument or discussion; merely expression of the views of the signatories; and that its chief efficacy is the wide measure of public opinion that it invokes. Referring to Drummond's suggestion that the United States alone address a note tentatively invoking the Pact, the Secretary said, "this seems to me to mistake the whole purpose of the invocation . . . . namely, to bring into action as large a percentage of the signatories as possible" and thus mobilize world public opinion. I do not see in this any possible danger of double jurisdiction; "on the other hand, this danger might possibly occur if America alone and independently sent such a note under the Pact of Paris".

Mr. Gilbert has been authorized to sit in meetings of the Council if the Kellogg Pact is discussed and in connection with that discussion.

The newspapers for the past several days, especially Sunday and Monday, have carried statements that the American Government is thinking of invoking the Pact. The Secretary's message to Drummond, published on the morning of the 12th, conveys the statement that we are not unprepared to invoke the

- 3 -

the Pact and/or the Nine-Powers Treaty if the situation so develops as to warrant. The Secretary has told the Japanese Ambassador that we have the Kellogg Pact in mind.

All this amounts to a preliminary warning and intimation, a tentative invoking of the Pact.

The situation in the Far East is substantially as follows: China and Japan have been made aware by the League and by the principal powers that the spotlight of world opinion is turned upon them and that every move that they make will be scrutinized and judged. In Japan, the governmental crisis is no longer acute: the "positive policy" party is in the saddle: the Foreign Office is bending its efforts to defense of the course which the Army, acting for Japan, has pursued and is trying to make good by diplomatic process on what has been accomplished by military process. There is no need for any further offensive on the part of the Japanese armed forces in Manchuria. All that they have to do in the immediate future is to "stand pat".

The Council of the League goes into action today. It will take a day or two to develop indications with regard to its likely course of action. Therefore, it need not be expected that within the next day or two there will be further acts of hostility.

From this I would deduce that there is less urgent reason for invoking the Kellogg Pact today than there was several days ago -- immediately after the bombing of Chinchow.

I


- 4 -

I therefore think that we should wait for further word from Drummond and watch the proceedings of the League for a little while at least before taking any further step in this connection.

SKH/ZMF

SKH/ZMF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



October 13, 1931.

file E.F.C. 12240

Mr. Victor Podoski, First Secretary of the Polish Embassy, called to see Dr. Hornbeck, who was engaged with the Secretary.

Mr. Podoski said that he wished to obtain information as to the attitude, and course of action, of the United States in the light of the most recent developments in the Manchurian situation. He stated that his particular interest was how the action which Russia might take in the matter might thereby be affected.

I told Mr. Podoski that our attitude on this question was clearly given in the statement of yesterday; that the center of interest had now shifted to Geneva; and that it was not likely that there would be any further developments here until the results of the Conference were known.

793,94/2240

RSM

RSM  
RSM:EJL

OCT 17 1931

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

X-13

Mr. Secretary

This was brought  
in by the  
Chinese chargé.



SKH unbuck



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 13 1931

Handled by Mr. James Kwei  
to Mr. Hillen October 13, 1931

Rem.

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING

DATED OCTOBER 13, 1931.

Free eg. C. FE

Following is the substance of a memorandum in reply to

Japan:

"In defiance of international law and in violation of the provisions of the covenant of the League of Nations as well as the Peace Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty, Japan suddenly and without provocation invaded and occupied Liaoning and Kirin, overturned the lawful provincial and district administrations, and committed many acts of war and others not permitted by international law even in time of war such as the killing of innocent civilians, the bombardment of unfortified towns, the bombing of passenger trains, and the removal and seizure of public and private property, etc.

"China at once appealed to the Council of the League. The Council called upon the Japanese Government to give orders for the immediate withdrawal of troops from the areas occupied since September 18th and accepted the solemn pledge given by Japan to comply with its request, fixing a further meeting on October 14th should

by

12241  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
OCT 14 1931

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- 2 -

by that time the pledge remain unfulfilled.

"The Chinese Government has refrained from the very beginning from any and every act of hostility, ordering all its military forces not to offer resistance to the continuous advance of Japanese troops in spite of provocative actions increasing every day in intensity and embracing ever wider areas.

"At the same time the strictest discipline has been imposed on the nation for the protection in every way of the lives and property of Japanese residents within Chinese territory and under Chinese administration and the fact that no untoward incident has occurred anywhere in the vast area under Chinese jurisdiction proves conclusively that the undertaking given by the Chinese Government to the Council is being observed most scrupulously. The repeated Government orders and proclamations have confined the righteous indignation of our people within lawful bounds, the Mandate of the Government of October 7th has further strengthened the Government's injunctions just at the time it became too obvious that the Japanese Government was not fulfilling its pledge of withdrawal.

"Acting

- 3 -

"Acting upon the resolution of the Council, the Chinese Government has appointed two high officers to take over places evacuated and duly notified the Japanese Government and the Council to that effect. But the Japanese Government has not yet carried out its declared intentions as the reports of neutral observers indicate that Shenyang, Kirin, Tudhua, Chuliuh, Sinmin, Tienchangtai, etc., are still under the control of Japanese troops.

"It is a matter of surprise to the world that popular indignation in China has limited itself to mere refusal to purchase Japanese goods. Freedom to choose one's purchases is an individual right which no government can interfere; while it is the duty of every government to protect foreign nationals it is bound neither by any recognized standard of governance nor by any principle of international law to prohibit or punish the exercise of the elementary right of citizenship. If there should be responsibility at all it lies with the Japanese Government which has, by many acts of unfriendliness since the Wamoaoshan incident, created this general prejudice against Japanese merchandise.

"While the Chinese Government is observing with the greatest scrupulousness the resolution of  
the

- 4 -

the Council by adopting special measures for the protection of Japanese lives and property and by refraining from all acts tending to aggravate the situation the Japanese military has continued aggressive actions in the northeastern provinces which culminated in a recent aerial attack on Chinchow where the provincial civil authorities of Liaoning established provisional offices. This act of war led the Council of the League to decide to meet earlier than on the date originally fixed. The Chinese Government desires to point out that it is Japan that has committed during the past ten days various acts which have so aggravated the situation that the resolution of the council has failed to be carried out for which the Chinese Government cannot be held responsible.

"The Chinese Government will continue to exert its best to protect the lives and property of Japanese subjects although in the face of the greatest difficulty due to unceasing aggressive acts of Japanese troops and will hold the Japanese Government responsible for any unfortunate consequences resulting from the continued employment of military force by Japanese as an instrument of her national policy especially in view of the fact that both governments have presented their cases before the Council which has prescribed a course of action for

- 5 -

for the two countries to follow.

"Firmly believing the present lack of understanding and difficulties in commercial intercourse between the Chinese and Japanese people are the inevitable outcome of the numerous unlawful acts of the Japanese troops, the Chinese Government is confident that if the Japanese Government should exert itself to remove the causes that have brought about the present deplorable situation, gratifying results will be secured in the improvement of relations between the two countries and the maintenance of the world peace.  
Nanking, October 12, 1931."

Chinese Legation,

Washington, October 13, 1931.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Mr. Secretary:

Herewith a summary, for the White House, as requested by your office, of information sent by our observers in Manchuria.

*not seen*

I have used in preparing this exhibit not only the material sent by Hanson and Salisbury but the reports from the Consulate General at Mukden and the military officers who went to Manchuria from the Legation at Peiping, the latest of whom was Colonel Margetts, whose report regarding Chinchow arrived today.

*SCH*  
SCH

793.94/2242

FILED  
OCT 20 1931

SKH/ZMF

5

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 16 1931 October 15, 1931.

Manchuria Situation: Facts and Comments  
as Reported to the Department of State  
by Officers of the American Government in  
Manchuria.

Our observers have reported that on the night of September 18-19 Japanese forces took over the whole of the city of Mukden and occupied Changchun, Antung and Newchwang, and took control of the public services at those places. All foreigners were safe.

During the encounter at Mukden some bullets passed over buildings in the International Settlement and a Chinese chauffeur in the Settlement was killed by machine gun fire. The Japanese seized the Chinese wireless station and arsenal (NOTE: The wireless station has not since been opened).

The Japanese arrested the Chinese mayor at Mukden and established a new administration under a Japanese mayor, which is still functioning.

The Japanese armed forces in Manchuria were promptly reenforced by the bringing in of some 3,000 men from the Japanese Army in Korea, bringing the total of Japanese forces in Manchuria up to a little over 15,000.

At most points, Chinese troops made no resistance, but at Mukden and at Changchun there were what might be called small battles, in which there were casualties on both sides.

At

- 2 -

At Changchun, the Japanese, without warning, advanced against and attacked the Chinese barracks. There were engaged apparently some 400 men on the Chinese side. The Chinese had 3,500 soldiers in the barracks. In the course of the fighting and having lost 180 men killed, the Chinese withdrew. The Japanese casualties were 43 killed and 52 wounded. Japanese officials stated in justification of the action that they had feared that the Chinese soldiers upon learning of the Mukden incident would shell the Japanese Settlement at Changchun. Our observers consider that the situation did not warrant the attack.

At the same time, Japanese troops attacked the Chinese barracks at Kwangchengtze, the southern terminal of the Chinese Railway. The Chinese soldiers resisted. The Japanese suffered casualties of 23 killed and 33 wounded; the Chinese 35 killed. These Chinese soldiers had been on duty as a guard of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Our observers consider that the attack was unjustifiable. They state that Japanese troops continue at Kwangchengtze though there is no need of them there to protect Japanese lives or property.

At Mukden, the Japanese have installed a Japanese mayor and Japanese chiefs of the various major departments and bureaus, including the police department. They have taken charge of the visaing of foreign passports. A return to the status quo ante not an immediate possibility. Chinese robbers and brigands are taking advantage of the situation. All Chinese administration in the neighborhood has been disrupted.

On



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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On September 19, Japanese women and children began withdrawing from Kirin. Two hundred Japanese troops were sent from Changchun to Kirin. The Chinese general in command at Kirin ordered his 700 troops withdrawn in order to avoid a clash. Japanese troops entered the city and at once took over the wireless, telephone and telegraph stations and the principal governmental organizations and sealed the vaults of the principal banks. On the approach of the Japanese troops, a Chinese civilian delegation met them and stated that the people of Kirin were not concerned with Mukden politics, that they were remote from the South Manchuria Railway Zone, that the city was quiet, that Japanese residents were not in danger, that Chinese troops had been withdrawn, and that Japanese troops were not wanted. Later, the Japanese commander asked the Chinese commander to surrender all arms by noon of the 23rd. The Chinese surrendered several hundred rifles, whereupon the Japanese accused them of holding back equipment. A conference was held, in the course of which apparently the Chinese commander was intimidated into agreeing to form a new government for Kirin Province. Offered support with money and ammunition if he acceded and threatened with punishment if he did not, the Chinese commander abolished the existing government and established a new government with himself at its head, discharging certain Chinese officials at the demand of the Japanese. The office of Commissioner for Foreign Affairs was abolished. Thus, the Kirin Provincial Government became independent of Nanking and passed under Japanese control. The Japanese attribute the destruction of the old government and the setting up of the new to the ambition of the Chinese commander. Our observers were given information

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

tion by Chinese and foreigners other than Japanese, but the Japanese, both military and consular officers, with one or two exceptions, declined to give information. Wherever our observers called on Chinese officials, they found Japanese personnel present, sometimes in the room, sometimes in the offing.

On October 7, the Japanese were constructing an air drome north of Kirin, stating that the Japanese Army needed an air drome there. There were some 1,500 Japanese soldiers in Kirin. The railway stations were guarded by Japanese and over some there were Japanese flags. Banks were permitted to remain open only a few hours a day. Business was bad. The Japanese would not allow the Provincial Government to pay the wages of Chinese soldiers outside of the city. Chinese residents were leaving. Proclamations issued by the Japanese commander indicated that the Japanese Army was the ruling organization. Local residents stated that there had been no unrest or anti-Japanese movement before the Japanese came. Kirin is three hours away by rail from the South Manchuria Railway. There was no evidence of any intention of the Japanese to withdraw. It was likely that the dispersed and unpaid Chinese soldiers would become brigands, thus increasing whatever need there may have been for the presence of a Japanese garrison. The thinking Chinese were bitter against the Japanese military; the Chinese common people were afraid of the Japanese soldiers.

At Tunhwa, a city of about 10,000, the Chinese garrison was withdrawn on September 22 to avoid conflict with 200 Japanese troops who arrived on September 23. The Japanese troops disarmed the local Chinese people, occupied the barracks and governmental establishments,

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

lishments, and released forty-nine Korean prisoners from the Chinese jail. They withdrew on October 5 to Kirin, taking with them the eighteen Japanese residents. Our observers ascertained that a little to the east on the Korean side of the Tumen River there were two divisions of Japanese troops fully equipped for building a railway line. Our observers remarked that the Japanese might easily have withdrawn their eighteen nationals from Tunhwa.

On September 30, at 5 a.m., at Changchun, Japanese troops burned the barracks of the Railway guards of the Kirin (Chinese) Railway power house and the main station of the Railway. This was during operations to obtain control of the Railway's telegraph and telephone lines. Both Japanese and Chinese officials stated that the operations were begun by the Japanese military.

Also, at Changchun, the Japanese have constructed an airplane landing field outside of the Railway Zone, since the clash. At Changchun, Japanese military control the telephone and telegraph stations in the Chinese city, control the city police, and fly the Japanese flag over the police headquarters. Adverse effects are being felt by merchants of all nationalities. The Japanese are not otherwise interfering with the civil administration at Changchun. The Chinese population fears the Japanese soldiers. Our observers believe that withdrawal of the Japanese troops and cessation of airplane flying would not result in injury to Japanese lives or property there or in a meance of banditry. The Japanese have not damaged the Chinese wireless station but have dismantled the principal parts of its machinery. Indication is lacking

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

lacking of any desire of the Japanese to restore the status quo ante.

On October 8, Japanese infantry and field artillery left Mukden at 2 a.m. for the Sinmin area on the Peiping-Mukden Railway.

On October 6, Japanese and Chinese forces clashed at Ssupingkai.

On October 3, Japanese forces entered the Chinese city of Newchwang at 2:15 a.m.

On October 2, the Consul General at Mukden reported that the "independence movement" must be taken seriously, that the Japanese military authorities were urging Chinese officials to organize an independent government, and that the Chinese objective was the elimination of the influence of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang.

On September 27, the Consul General at Harbin reported that Japanese airplanes were again flying over Harbin, although the situation in North Manchuria was quiet.

On October 8, Japanese airships bombarded Chinchow at noon. The American Military Attaché at Peiping has since visited Chinchow and, after careful personal investigation, has reported that at about 2 p.m., on October 8, without any previous warning, twelve Japanese planes flew over the city at an estimated altitude of about two thousand feet. They circled over the city and then headed for the radio station where they began dropping bombs. They next dropped bombs over the northeast suburbs in the vicinity of the Irish Presbyterian Mission compound and the French Catholic Mission. They continued toward the railway station and the University.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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University. The bombing continued for half an hour and from thirty to thirty-six bombs were exploded. There were at the time in and about the city 2,000 Chinese infantry and one regiment of field artillery. There was apparently no anti-aircraft artillery. All witnesses have stated that there was no firing of any kind directed against these planes. Sixteen persons were killed, twelve seriously wounded and about thirty slightly wounded. Among the dead are a Russian professor and one soldier; among the wounded two soldiers; all the others were civilians, including several women and children. Property losses were slight. No bombs were dropped inside the walls of the Chinese city. Bombs are believed to have weighed from forty to fifty pounds and to have had powerful explosive charges. The principal targets apparently were University buildings housing Provincial Government headquarters; the secondary objective, probably the military camp some three miles from the center of the town. Fragments of the exploded bombs were found in the compounds of two foreign missions and the railway hospital, which flew Red Cross flags. The observer states:

"Although the leaders may have had a military mission, evidently little attention was given to modern conventions of ordinary war measures or protection of personal property."


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 15, 1931.



*793.94*

The best commentary on this whole incident, that I have seen, is contained in the account here attached on things said by Mr. Yoshizawa and Dr. Sze at the meeting of the Council on Tuesday last, as reported in the NEW YORK TIMES of yesterday, October 14.

*12243*

**Sze Refers to Chinchow Bombing.**

Dr. Sze said that he had appealed for the immediate summoning of the Council because on Oct. 9 twelve Japanese airplanes bombed Chinchow with great loss of life and property damage. To this the Japanese delegate replied that the planes had been fired upon, and had been obliged to resort to bombs in retaliation.

Dr. Sze then demanded why reconnaissance planes should travel in groups of twelve and carry bombs, and added that Japan was fully aware of the importance of foreign flying over one's territory, since only this year the Japanese had arrested the two American aviators, Herndon and Pangborn, who were merely crossing Japan on a scientific world flight.

Mr. Yoshizawa said that airplane scouting was necessary because the Japanese troops were outnumbered and kept in anxiety by the superior numbers of the Chinese army, and added that the Japanese army was "a very sensitive army" in that respect.

Dr. Sze also precipitated a discussion when he read a cablegram from China, which he had received from the American social worker and international organizer, Dr. Sherwood Eddy, in which the American informed Dr. Sze that he had evidence of premeditated aggression by Japan, and of Japan's deliberate efforts to form puppet governments in Manchuria. Dr. Eddy said he was forwarding sworn statements to the League.

*Dr. Eddy always makes trouble.*

*SKH*

SKH/ZMF

793.94/2243

OCT 17 1931

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 21, 1931

RECEIVED FROM

OCT 21 1931

DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Rec'd 12:23 a.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 21 1931

Department of State

799, October 21, 8 a.m.

Department's 379, October 12, 1 p.m.

One. In despatch dated October 12th Consul DEC 4 - 1931.

General at Mukden states Chinese representative  
of Radio Corporation of America at Shanghai on

October 8th wrote to him in part as follows:

"You may inform the Japanese authorities that while we do not own direct interest in the station the C. N. E. T. T. R. A. owes us approximately gold dollars ten thousand for engineering services and traffic balances. Further, that during the operation of the Mukden-San Francisco service from June until suspension of service my company was earning the revenue of approximately gold dollars three hundred per day therefrom. If the Japanese authorities fail to permit resumption of the service we must look to them for equal compensation for damage incurred".

Two. Consul General states he will take no action pending receipt of Department's instructions.

Three.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94/2244

DEC 10 1931

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823.74

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#799, from Peiping, October 21, 1931  
8 a.m.

Three. Legation has informed him of Tokyo's  
189, October 20, 1 p.m. / 2213

For the Minister

ENGERT

JHR

KLP



1531


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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PM RECD  
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State



*Gray*  
1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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Washington,  
November 30, 1931.  
DEC 4 - 1931  
*6P*

DEC 4 31

AMLEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA)

*793.94/2244*  
*note*  
*897.74*  
*451*

Department's 364, October 7, 5 p. m. paragraph 2  
and your 799, October 21, 8 a. m. in regard to the  
radio station at Mukden.  
The Consul General at Mukden may bring to the at-  
tention of the Japanese Consul General at Mukden the  
interest of the Radio Corporation ~~of America~~ in the  
radio station at Mukden and the losses reported by the  
Radio Corporation ~~to be suffered~~ as a result of closing  
the station. He should not repeat not, however, furnish  
the Japanese authorities with a copy of the contract or  
with technical information in regard to the station.  
Inform Tokyo of action taken.

*793.94/2244*

*[Signature]*  
FE:J:EMU

*m.m.H.*  
FE *RUM*  
*SK*

*Stinson*

*W.H.*  
*TD*  
*[Signature]*

GR

DEC 4, 1931.P.M.

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_


Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



October 16, 1931.

Geneva: Present Situation.

In view of Japan's clearly evinced opposition to our being invited to sit with the Council, and inasmuch as the original suggestion that we sit came from members of the Council and not from us, and inasmuch as the principal thought underlying our conclusion that we would accept an invitation if given us was that we wanted to be able to discuss most advantageously with the members of the Council the question of the advisability and timeliness of invoking the Kellogg Pact, it would seem to me that, if discussion of the Kellogg Pact is made by M. Briand, the point of emphasis in relation to the introduction of Mr. Gilbert and Gilbert's reply features the subject of discussion of the Kellogg Pact, it would be advisable for us seriously to consider the possibility of having Gilbert sit in while and only while the Kellogg Pact is under discussion. It may be that it would be possible to have him present in the room but not at the table during all discussions. It may be that it would be necessary to have him not present at all except during discussion of the Pact. My point is that we should attempt to make it both clear and obvious that he has gone in in connection with the question of the Pact and that he has not gone in in connection with the question of the League's deliberations in reference to the applicability of provisions of the Covenant. Both for world

consumption

793.94/2245

FILED

OCT 20 1931

- 2 -

consumption and for American domestic consumption we need to combat the idea and/or the charge that we are "joining the League" or mixing up in the League's affairs. For Japanese consumption we must combat the idea that we are instigators of a policy of interference, which policy, no matter how scrupulously we may avoid taking sides as between the disputants, cannot but operate, if effectively, in a manner which the Japanese will construe as to their disadvantage.

SKH/ZMF

1534

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
 PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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Collect  
 Charge Department  
 OR

Department of State

Charge to  
 \$

Washington,  
 October 20, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,  
 TOKYO (Japan).

200

Please deliver to the Minister for Foreign Affairs  
 immediately, as a note, the text which follows. Inform  
 him that an identical note is being communicated by the  
 American Minister to China to the Chinese Acting Minister  
 for Foreign Affairs.

Text:

QUOTE The Government and people of the United States  
 have observed with concern the events of the last month in  
 Manchuria. When the difference between Japan and China  
 came to a head on September 19th one of the parties to the  
 dispute referred the matter to the League of Nations and  
 since that time the American Government by representation  
 through diplomatic channels, has steadily cooperated with  
 the League in its efforts to secure a peaceful settlement.  
 A threat of war, wherever it may arise, is of profound  
 concern to the whole world and for this reason the American  
 Government, like other Governments, was constrained to call  
 to the attention of both disputants the serious dangers  
 involved in the present situation.

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1925 1-138

793.94  
 711.0012-anti-War  
 711.9412-anti-War  
 006.712-anti-War

793.94/2245A

1535  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
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OR

Department of State

Charge to  
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Washington,

- 2 -

This Government now desires, as do other signatories of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, particularly to call to the attention of the Chinese and the Japanese Governments the obligations which they voluntarily assumed when they became parties to that Treaty, especially the obligations of Article II, which reads:

SUBQUOTE The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means  
END SUBQUOTE.

The American Government takes this occasion again to express its earnest hope that China and Japan will refrain from any measures which might lead to war and that they will find it possible in the near future to agree upon a method for resolving by peaceful means, in accordance with their promises and in keeping with the confident expectations of public opinion throughout the world, the issues over which they are at present in controversy UNQUOTE.

*Stimson*

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by .....

*Text*


Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY




Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 20, 1931

Rec'd 6:51 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.



PRIORITY.

October 20, noon.

793.94/2203

My October 18, 10 a. m.

1 copy to Peking  
Oct 22/1931  
file  
egc.

One. Following is identic text of telegram which I, with the British, French and German Ministers, am sending reporting conversation yesterday with President Chiang Kai Shek.

Two. "President invited me and my French, American and German colleagues to meet him again on October 19. In course of general discussion he invited our observations on a proposal which he understood to be under consideration at Geneva that Council should fix a time limit for withdrawal of Japanese troops, that within this time limit negotiations without observers regarding details of evacuation should be opened between Chinese and Japanese representatives, and that neutral observers should be attached to Chinese

793.94/2246

OCT 19 1931  
FILED

REP

2- from Nanking, Oct. 20, noon.

to Chinese side only to watch transfer. In reply to our inquiries he said that without observers present at these evacuation negotiations such an arrangement would not satisfy China as there would be no guarantee that withdrawal would be completed in time specified, and he referred to failure of Japanese to withdraw by October 14 as promised to Council on September 30. He requested us to impress following three points on our respective Governments.

(1). That everything possible should be done to expedite withdrawal, further delay in which was fraught with grave dangers:

(2). Neutral observers should be present to watch arrangements for withdrawal and after:

And, (3). China trusts Council will not adjourn until withdrawal has been completed, as Japan is playing for adjournment reinfected as had happened on September 30. He also emphasized with usual arguments difficulties and dangers with which Chinese Government would be faced in regard to internal situation, especially from the left, if Council failed to find a solution".

Section two follows by cable.

JOHNSON

RR WSB

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

FROM

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

Nanking

Dated October 20, 1931

Rec'd 9:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

October 20, noon. (SECTION TWO)

Three. My British, French and German colleagues,  
acting under instructions from their Governments and  
pursuant to action taken at Geneva, presented identic  
notes to Chinese Government on the 19th inviting Chinese  
Government's attention to Article Two of Kellogg Pact  
for the Renunciation of War.

Four. Situation may be summarized today as follows:  
The Japanese are in effective occupation of South  
Manchuria. They have succeeded in paralyzing Chinese  
administration in that area. They have systematically  
carried out a campaign of which the bombing of Chinchow  
was a part calculated to destroy the peoples confidence  
in the Chinese administration in that area. Reports  
from Hanson and Salisbury and reports received by  
British Minister from his observers there indicate that  
there is no present intention on the part of the Japanese  
forces of occupation to withdraw from present positions.

Chinese



AM

-2# from Nanking, October 20, 1931  
noon

Chinese have thus far shown admirable control over their people who are becoming more and more inflamed against the Japanese. Japanese state that they will not alter present positions until Chinese have begun negotiations and given adequate guarantees. In other words, Japanese apparently intend to hold Manchuria in pledge until Chinese are forced to negotiate for its restoration.

Five. On the other hand Chinese insist that they can not negotiate so long as (END SECTION TWO)

JOHNSON

WSB

KLP

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be- **FROM**  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

Nanking

Dated October 20, 1931

RECEIVED

Rec'd 21, 3:40 a.m.

OCT 21 1931

DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

October 20, noon (SECTION THREE)

Japanese occupy areas beyond places hitherto held.

Six. To myself and to my British and French

colleagues conditions appear to be approaching a crisis.

We feel the urgency of the situation and the necessity  
for some action that will enable both sides to work  
out a solution of their difficulties without loss of  
face to either. Conditions being as above described,  
however, we find it exceedingly difficult to determine  
what suggestions to offer. The Japanese appear to have  
worked themselves up to a point where the mere  
suggestion that they withdraw their forces in preparation  
for negotiations is taken as an insult and an undue  
interference in the domestic policies of Japan..

Seven. To suggest to the Chinese that they bury  
their pride and begin negotiations while Japan is in  
occupation of Chinese territory would, we feel, amount  
to telling the Chinese that they must accept such terms  
as the Japanese desire to impose.

Eight.

2-from Nanking, October 20, 1931  
noon

Eight. It has seemed to me that if both parties could be persuaded to call for a discussion of the matter under Article 7 of the Nine Power Treaty regarding principles and policies this would be the best thing all around. Certainly there would appear to be no question of loss of face on the part of Japan if this convention were availed of as it calls for nothing new in the way of a set up. The only question in my mind is the interpretation of the phrase "nations concerned" in the Article in question which would seem to limit discussion to the two nations involved, whereas, what seems desirable in the present situation is that all parties to the treaty get together for the purpose of facilitating a solution.

Nine. President Chiang is indicating a desire to consult with us fairly frequently and we see no harm in these meetings. On the contrary we believe that they offer us opportunity for good counsel here.

END MESSAGE

RR

JOHNSON

WSB

154

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State

Washington,

October 21, 1931.

793.94/2246  
AMERICAN CONSUL,

NANKING (China).

98  
FOR THE MINISTER.

Your October 20, noon.

The Department's No. 96, sent you yesterday (one p.m.) today before the

receipt of the complete text of your telegrams under reference, will have made clear to you the attitude and aims of the Department with reference to the Manchurian situation and the limitations within which our representative at Geneva was instructed to cooperate with the Council of the League. You will note that QUOTE he was scrupulously to refrain from taking part in discussion of measures which the Council might be considering under and in relation to provisions of the Covenant of the League or any other instrument except the Pact of Paris UNQUOTE.

793.94/2246

In view of the above and with special reference to paragraph eight of your telegram under reference, the Department is strongly of the opinion that the suggestion at this time of recourse to possible lines of procedure other than such as may be under consideration at Geneva, or of any agency

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
 PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

## TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PLAIN

Collect  
 Charge Department  
 OR  
 Charge to  
 \$

## Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

agency for the settlement of the question other than <sup>the agency</sup> ~~that~~  
 which is now <sup>especially</sup> struggling with it, namely the Council of the  
 League, would tend merely further to confuse the situation.

500A4D  
 Department feels that for the time being, although  
 possibilities in connection with the Nine Power Treaty may  
 be discussed among its officers and representatives,  
 discussion thereof with others should in no case be upon  
 our initiative and should for the most part be avoided.

Your paragraph nine. The Department concurs and  
 approves of your meetings with President Chiang.

Carth  
 auz

✓  
 been CR  
 Oct. 22 1931

FE:RSM:REK

RAM  
 FE

5/4/4

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 20 1931

THE UNDER SECRETARY

OCT 22 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MANCHURIAN SITUATION

October 21, 1931

OCT 22 1931

Noted HKS

Reference Minister Johnson's telegram from Nanking.

October 20, noon. /2246

In this telegram Mr. Johnson, after reviewing the situation and giving an account of statements made by President Chiang Kai-shek, makes the statement that to himself and his British and French colleagues conditions appear to be approaching a crisis; that they feel the need of some action but feel it exceedingly difficult to determine what suggestions to offer; they feel that "to suggest to the Chinese that they bury their pride and begin negotiations while Japan is in occupation of their territory, would, we feel, amount to telling the Chinese that they must accept such terms as the Japanese desire to impose." Mr. Johnson then expresses the view that "if both parties could be persuaded to call for a discussion of the matter under Article 7 of the Nine Power Treaty regarding principles and policies this would be the best thing all around." This he says would occasion the Japanese no loss of face. There might be a question regarding interpretation of the phrase "nations concerned" which might be construed to mean only the two disputants, but the desirable thing is that all parties to that treaty get together for the purpose of facilitating

E.W. 793.94/2246

FILED

OCT 29 1931

793.94/2246

- 2 -

facilitating a solution. (Note: It is believed that there is no sufficient reason for affirming or admitting that ~~the~~ "nations concerned" <sup>would mean</sup> ~~are~~ the disputants only: from the point of view of both legal rights and material interests which are involved and which, in the event of war, would be substantially impaired, this situation is of legitimate concern to all of the great commercial nations).

(Note: In the Department's telegram to Gilbert for communication to Drummond for communication to the Council of October 9, the Secretary of State said: "On its part the American Government acting independently through its diplomatic representatives will endeavor to reinforce what the League does and will make clear that it has a keen interest in the matter and is not oblivious to the obligations which the disputants have assumed to their fellow signatories in the Pact of Paris as well as in the Nine Power Pact should a time arise when it would seem advisable to bring forward those obligations." Action has already been taken with regard to the Kellogg Pact. It will probably be necessary before this question is disposed of to give further consideration to the question of the Nine Power Treaty).

→ See Draft of Telegram to Nanking.  
712.84/2246

SKH/REK

*SKH*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM



This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

TOKIO

Dated October 21, 1931

RECEIVED

Rec'd 3:20 a. m.


Secretary of State,

Washington.

191, October 21, 11 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

DIVISION



793.94/2247

The main interest of the Japanese Government the past few days has been domestic. A large element in Japan is bitterly opposed to the Manchurian policy of the present Government, and they have been demanding that the Government take a stronger attitude. The situation became so serious that the Government, fearing, it is said, a coup d'etat in the part of the chauvinistic element, has arrested or put under strict surveillance a number of persons supposed to be ringleaders. Among these are several army officers who are isolated in the Gendarmerie Headquarters.

So far the Government has been able to keep this out of the press, over which there is a severe censorship,

extending to



REP

2- #191, from Tokio, Oct. 21, 11 a.m.

extending to foreign correspondents. I have been told that a communication to the press will be made in a few days.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that rumors had greatly exaggerated the affair; that there was a measure of dissatisfaction over the Manchurian policy; but that none of the critics had anything constructive to offer and the fact that, he added, that in his judgment there had been no danger and insufficient evidence to implicate or justify the prosecution of any civilians. The army he said had its own discipline, which he could not discuss.

NEVILLE

KLP

WSB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 22, 1931.

The American Consul General at Mukden reports that the Japanese General in command of the Japanese Army in Manchuria issues, to a Chinese official, instructions for control by the Japanese Army in Manchuria of the (Chinese) bank of the three Eastern Provinces and the (Chinese) Frontier Bank -- and the banks are reopened "on a limited and unsatisfactory basis".

SKH

RECEIVED  
OCT 23 1931  
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

SKH/ZMF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*file*  
October 28 1931.

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 21, 1931

Rec'd 8:45 a. m.

RECEIVED

OCT 21 1931

DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



801, October 21, 12 a. m.

793.94 / 2068  
Legation's 751, October 12, 1 p. m.

Following from Consul General at Mukden, October 20,  
2 p. m.

"An instruction from General Honjo to Yuan Chin Kai published yesterday provides for effective control over the bank of the three Eastern Provinces <sup>and</sup> of the Frontier Bank by the Kuantung army. The outstanding points in the instruction are as follows:

One. Army approves the reopening of the bank of the three Eastern Provinces.

Two. Measures must be taken to protect the interests of the Army and to restore order.

Three. Supervision appointed the Army must be employed by the Japanese and special investigator <sup>a</sup> will be appointed by the Army

793.94/2248

FILED  
OCT 28 1931

REP

B- #801, from Peiping, Oct. 21, 12 a.m.

the Army from time to time.

Four. Army may suspend whole or part of bank's business at its discretion.

Five. Army approval of the officers to be employed by the bank must be obtained.

Six. No business hostile to the Army may be transacted.

Seven. Directions given the bank by the Peace Preservation Committee must be approved by the Army.

Eight. Branch banks not to be permitted to hold large reserves.

Nine. Instructions to apply also to the Frontier Bank.

Banks reopened on the 15th and are transacting business and making silver conversion on a limited and unsatisfactory basis. Mail report follows".

WSB

For the Minister  
ENGERT

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY  
Tokio

Dated October 21, 1931

RECEIVED

OCT 21 1931

FROM

Rec'd 3:52 a.m.

DIVISION

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.



192, October 21, 1 p.m.

Embassy's 191, October 21, 11 a.m. / 2247

I delivered the note this morning in person. / 2245A

The Minister for Foreign Affairs read it and said that its tone was sympathetic and he desired once again to express his appreciation the considerate attitude of the United States. He said that conditions in Manchuria seemed to be improving and that he was hopeful about it. He insisted that there was no likelihood of war and that Japan was prepared to negotiate with China at any time.

It is difficult to realize the determination of the Japanese public to have no interference by the parties in Manchuria. No government would dare to admit it unless well camouflaged. Shidehara has been put to great straits to prove to the Powers that there was no war and no danger of one and to the Japanese public that their rights were being adequately protected and that there has been no outside interference.

JS

NEVILLE

793.94/2249


FILED  
OCT 23 1931

THE UNDER SECRETARY

OCT 20 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Handed to Mr. Carlisle  
by Mr. Newell  
pm.*



793.94/2250

Le Gouvernement français a suivi avec inquiétude le développement des événements de Mandchourie qui, depuis le 18 septembre, ont créé entre la Chine et le Japon une situation préoccupante.

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations en est déjà saisi et s'emploie activement à régler: mon Gouvernement est associé à ces efforts.

Il estime en outre qu'il est de son devoir d'attirer l'attention des Gouvernements chinois et japonais, signataires avec lui du pacte de renonciation à la guerre du 27 août 1928, sur les dispositions de ce pacte, et spécialement sur l'article 2 aux termes duquel:

"Les hautes parties contractantes reconnaissent que le règlement ou la solution de tous les différends ou conflits, de quelque nature ou de quelque origine qu'ils puissent être, qui pourront surgir entre elles, ne devront jamais être recherchés que par des moyens pacifiques."

L'opinion publique du monde entier<sup>attend</sup> de la Chine et du Japon qu'ils observent les engagements ainsi contractés. Mon Gouvernement a confiance que cet espoir ne sera pas déçu et qu'ils, conscients de la portée de ces solennels engagements et des obligations qu'il leur impose à l'égard

des

FILED  
OCT 27 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

des autres signataires du pacte, les deux Gouvernements en cause s'abstiendront soigneusement de toute initiative qui pourrait compromettre le succès des efforts déjà entrepris pour assurer le règlement par des voies pacifiques du conflit qui s'est élevé entre eux./.

Signé : Aristide Briand

TRANSLATION

The French Government has followed anxiously the course of the events in Manchuria which, since September 18, have created a disturbing situation between China and Japan.

The Council of the League of Nations has already taken cognizance of the matter and is actively engaged in adjusting it: my Government is associated with these endeavors.

It esteems it its duty, moreover, to call the attention of the Chinese and Japanese Governments, signatories with it of the Pact for the Renunciation of War of August 27, 1928, to the provisions of the said Pact, and particularly to article 2, according to which:

"The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

The public opinion of the whole world expects China and Japan to observe the engagements thus contracted. My Government has confidence that this hope will not be disappointed and that the two Governments involved, conscious  
of



-2-

of the meaning of these solemn engagements and the obligations which are imposed on them with regard to the other signatories of the Treaty, will carefully refrain from any initiative which may compromise the success of the efforts already undertaken to assure the settlement by pacific means of the dispute which has arisen between them.

(Signed) Aristide Briand.

TR-FGH:MLS.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

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(Signed) Aristide Briand.

TR-FCH:MLS.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quifon NARS, Date 12-18-75

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-2-

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(Signed) Aristide Briand.

TA-VGH:MLS.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

October 20, 1931

On receipt of an official statement from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aristide Briand, through the French Embassy, that Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain and Germany had sent identic notes to Japan and China calling to their attention their obligations under the Pact of Paris, the American Government has also sent identic notes to these two countries along the same general line.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
October 21, 1931.

The Provinces of Jehol  
and Chahar are adjacent to  
Manchuria on the west.

THE UNDER SECRETARY

OCT 21 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SKH/REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 21, 1931

Rec'd 8:43 a. m.

RECEIVED

OCT 21 1931

DIVISION C

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 21 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

802, October 21, 3 p. m.

Japanese Legation informs me that they are withdrawing  
their Consular Officers and Europeans Japanese residents  
from Provinces of Jehol and Chahar.

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

793.94/2251

OCT 24 1931  
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M. F. B.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

CORRECTED COPY  
FROM

RECEIVED

OCT 23 1931

DIVISION OF

ATTORNS



GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 21, 1931

Rec'd 8:43 a.m.

79394/2251 Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

802, October 21, 3 p.m.

Japanese Legation informs me that they are  
withdrawing their Consular Officers and evacuating  
Japanese residents from Provinces of Jehol and Chahar.

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

793.94/2251

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1931 OCT 23 130


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SECRETARY OF STATE

OCT 20 1931

October 20, 1931.



Manchuria Situation: Effect on Internal  
Situations in Japan and in China.

The NEW YORK TIMES of October 19 contains a news despatch from Hugh Byas, TIMES correspondent, dated Tokyo, October 18, in which Mr. Byas states that Japan's Home Minister, Kenzo Adachi, "is the real chief of the Government party and controls its political machine. His sympathies are undisguisedly with the Army. . . . The political situation in a sentence is at present that the Government can retain power, but only by following national sentiment on the Manchurian question. Any weakening would mean that even the lives of the Ministers would not be safe".

To compare or to contrast with this, we have no so definite and categorical statements from China, but despatches from Japan of the past two or three days have reported the expectation in Japan that the Nanking Government may fall. On the basis of reports with regard to public opinion in China, it appears that the Nanking Government is as hard pressed by a jingo or "go-to-war" public sentiment as is the Japanese Government by the "press-on-in-Manchuria" public sentiment there.

In

793.94/2252

FILED  
OCT 22 1931

- 2 -

In our estimates of possibilities, it needs to be kept in mind that, if the Japanese Government fell, the principal result would be simply the going out of a part of the present cabinet personnel and the stepping in of other personnel: there would probably be no great commotion; the "positive policy" would become more positive. But, the fall of the Nanking Government would mean the termination of the present Chiang Kai-shek quasi-dictatorship and the substitution of an attempted government by a Cantonese oligarchy -- with the probable result that conditions in China would quickly become even more chaotic than they are at present.

We of course do not desire to see the fall of either Government, but we should envisage the possibilities in case either one or both fall.


SKH/ZMF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.



Geneva

Dated October 21, 1931

Rec'd 12:45 p.m.

793.94

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

234, October 21, 4 p.m.

FOR THE SECRETARY

Your 93, October 15, 11 a.m. /2120

\* Private meetings of the Council are not being held at present. Instead meetings of the so-called Committee of Five are taking place. I assume from your recent instructions respecting the position I am to take here that you would not desire me to participate in the meetings of the Committee of Five for these of course are held in private. To be perfectly clear on this point, however, in view of your telegram under reference I respectfully solicit your desires. \*

GILBERT

RH

WSB



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1931 OCT 23 100

793.94/2253

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

October 21, 1931.

*Stinson*

This case should be communicated to anyone before October 31.  
This case should be communicated to anyone before October 31.  
This case should be communicated to anyone before October 31.

(Switzerland).

October 21, 4 p.m.

*2253*

*I have reviewed  
Mr. Carter.  
This is perhaps  
backing in "secret"  
- but I think it  
clear.*

*SKH*

require that you sit in no repeat no secret  
no repeat no part in any discussions  
others other than the Kellogg Pact unless and  
instructions are expressly altered. This normally  
few of the authorization which I have given  
to sit at the table in public meetings as

an observer, my assent to the proposal that as an alternative  
to withdrawing you might be ordered to the Department for  
consultation ~~and~~ no longer stand. Your instructions are  
to sit at the table in the public sessions, to attend no  
repeat no secret meetings, and to take no repeat no part  
in discussion except as stated above.

Three. You may receive and report to me any expressions  
of views or conclusions which may be imparted to you, but  
you are not repeat not to express views except when and as  
you may be instructed.

*Stinson*  
*WLL*

FE:SKH/ZMF

*SKH*  
*FE*  
*SKH*

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

793.94/2253

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
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## TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

### Department of State

Washington,

October 21, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

113 Your 234, October 21, 4 p.m.

X One. I desire that you sit in no repeat no secret meetings and take no repeat no part in any discussions relating to matters other than the Kellogg Pact unless and until your instructions are expressly altered. *This naturally includes the Committee of Four.*  
Two. In view of the authorization which I have given you to continue to sit at the table in public meetings as an observer, my assent to the proposal that as an alternative to withdrawing you might be ordered to the Department for consultation ~~and~~ no longer stands. Your instructions are to sit at the table in the public sessions, to attend no repeat no secret meetings, and to take no repeat no part in discussion except as stated above.

Three. You may receive and report to me any expressions of views or conclusions which may be imparted to you, but you are not repeat not to express views except when and as you may be instructed. X

FE:SKH/ZMF

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/2253

Stinson  
wky

Rdm  
FE  
SKH

793.94  
with  
500.0112

This copy is not to be  
It should be kept in confidence  
being communicated to anyone.

12253



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AM

FROM

GREEN . OCT 26 1931

Geneva DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Dated October 21, 1931

Rec'd 12:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

235, October 21, 5 p.m.  
793.94 2219  
Department's 108, October 20, 4 p.m., last

paragraph

I have informed the press and the Secretariat of  
your action but without giving the text of the note.

I understand from conversations here that French  
and British Government have likewise notified the  
press at Paris and London, respectively, concerning  
their action in invoking Article II of the Paris Pact,  
but without releasing the text of their notes. The  
Secretariat while having notified the press of the  
action taken here has also refrained from giving out  
the text of the note. I learn from the French delegation  
that in addition to the reason involved in the  
customary procedure of delaying release until sufficient  
time has elapsed for the notes to be delivered at  
Tokyo and Nanking, there is in this instance a further  
object in view. Other governments may wish to send

similar

793.94/2254

FILED  
OCT 26 1931

AM

2-#235, from Geneva, October 21, 1931  
5 p.m.

similar notes and some have already expressed the intention of doing so. Some may wish to use <sup>the</sup> ~~of~~ *the* same text and others a different wording. To release the text of the notes already sent might indirectly restrict their liberty of action or otherwise embarrass them. There might also be tendency on the part of some to take the view that inasmuch as the texts already sent had been given publicity there would be no need for them to take any action. *the* *10-28-31*

Although the original notes invoking the pact on the part of France, Great Britain and Italy were sent from Geneva, the notification of this action to the other signatories (except those represented on the Council) were transmitted from Paris and any subsequent action will probably be taken at Paris and at the capitals concerned. It is difficult to learn here what may be going on at the various capitals, and for this reason it is suggested that the Department might find it useful to communicate directly in the premises with our missions particularly at Paris, London, Rome, Madrid and Berlin.

GILBERT

WSB

157

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

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CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
-PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department X  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State

Washington,

October 27, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

OCT 27 31

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

793.94/2254

Your 235, October 21, 5 p.m.

Have texts of notes on Pact of Paris addressed  
by any of the various Governments to the Chinese and  
Japanese Governments and replies thereto been in any  
instances made public?

793.94/2254

FE:MMH:EMF

FE

Oct 27 1931

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated October 21, 1931

Rec'd 10:17 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

October 21, 2 p. m.  
CONFIDENTIAL.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 21 1931  
Department of State

Continuing my October 13, 9 a. m. regarding preservation of order in the International Settlement and the display by Japanese of military force, I submit the following:

Conditions continue tense but while potentially they are not improved ~~and that~~ <sup>actually</sup> greater confidence is felt in ability of Shanghai Municipal Council to maintain order.

Sunday the 18th was noteworthy because of numerous attacks on Japanese by unruly students and mobs particularly in Japanese mill district in vicinity of Ferry Road. One attack on Naigaiwatakaisha mill quarters where Japanese marines were on guard narrowly missed being a most serious incident. The Japanese Consul General on the following day filed a very strong protest with the Shanghai Municipal Council for its failure to preserve order in that district claiming

793.94/2255

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with 893.102 S

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## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

2- from Shanghai, Oct. 21, 2 p. m.

claiming that no serious disturbance would have occurred if street meetings by Chinese students and laborers had been suppressed by International Settlement police. The Shanghai Municipal authorities replied that if the Japanese Marines had not been in evidence the mob would not have attacked the mill premises. There is some foundation for each statement. As a result of this verbal protest of the Japanese Consul General it was arranged that there should be a conference on the 20th of the Chairman of the Municipal Council, the Director General, and the Commissioner of Police on behalf of Shanghai Municipal Council and Japanese Consul General representative of Commander of Japanese Marines and two Japanese members of the Municipal Council to endeavor to find a reasonable solution of the present problem which offers so many difficulties in the preservation of peace. As a result of this prolonged conference it was agreed that no drastic action by Japanese within International Settlement would be undertaken without consultation with International Settlement police authorities. This if lived up to is important move toward maintenance of peace during this tense period. It was emphasized by municipal authorities that they

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

3- from Shanghai, Oct. 31, 2 p.m.

that they were responsible first and primarily for maintenance of order and as in the past when they consider they are inadequate to meet the emergency they will so notify all the <sup>powers</sup> ~~the~~ through the Senior Consul.

Two. As indicating impotence of Municipal authorities it may be mentioned that on Sunday two Japanese took refuge in a shop and a mob stormed the shop, destroyed the glass and the leaders were arrested by police and prosecuted in Shanghai District Court and found guilty being fined insignificant sum of \$3 for destroying the front of the shop. This is mentioned to show handicap under which Municipal Police are placed as compared with all previous occasions when Court was administered for protection of Settlement rather than promulgation of alleged patriotic efforts.

Three. The Director General who reported orally concerning the Municipal and Japanese Conference stated that he did not desire any action taken at present time by the Senior Consul: that he would keep Senior Consul well informed in regard to all happenings but as yet no action was requested; in event it was desired that communication of decision reached at conference be conveyed to members of Consular Body he would notify Senior Consul.

He stated,

REP

4- from Shanghai, Oct. 21, 2 p. m.

He stated, however, that the British Consul General as well as the American Consul General would be kept well informed.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

KLP

WSB

(#) omission

1578

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
 PREPARING OFFICE  
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Collect  
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Department of State

Washington,

October 20, 1931.

*58*

*793.94/2255A*

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND)

*109*

*50.0112*

One. Referring to our telephone conversation of this morning, I authorize you to continue sitting in the open meetings of the Council and in the seat at the table which has been assigned you. It is my understanding that you will attend no more secret meetings and that at the public meetings your role will be strictly that of an observer.

Two. I shall study the text of the telegram which you read me in lieu of cabling, when the stenographic record becomes available to me.

793.94/2255A

*Shinn*  
*Wly*

*CR*  
 Oct. 20, 1931 p.

FE:SKH/ZMF  
 U - WRG/LM

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128



1576

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-126  
PREPARING OFFICE  
ALL INDICATE WHETHER

## TELEGRAM SENT

1-126

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Department

OR

to

## Department of State

Washington,

October 20, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

One. Referring to our telephone conversation of this morning, I authorize you to continue sitting in the open meetings of the Council <sup>and</sup> in the seat at the table which has been assigned you. It is my understanding that you will attend no more secret meetings <sup>and this is the policy</sup>

Two. I shall study the text of the telegram which you read me in lieu of cabling, when the stenographic record becomes available to me.

*meetings you will be  
strictly for an hour.*

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

ed by \_\_\_\_\_

*SKH*

perator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_\_

Bu.-No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1926 1-126

158

1-138

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-12

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/2255C

8  
EE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

October 17, 1931.

OFF 19  
noted  
HLS

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

As you will have observed in the press, developments in the Manchuria situation have been moving very swiftly since you were at the Department at the beginning of last week. As you would doubtless be most interested in the course of events as they relate to your own post I will deal briefly with those first in order that you may be informed of the situation as it has developed up to the present in that quarter.

We at the Department have been in almost daily contact with the Japanese Ambassador here and with the Japanese Foreign Office through our Embassy at Tokyo. We have spoken very frankly to the Ambassador and made equally frank representations through the Embassy at Tokyo in an earnest effort to make clear our attitude toward this whole situation and to exert to the fullest our moral influence in the interests of the maintenance of peace and of reliance upon peaceful methods on the part of both Japan and China for the settlement of this dispute between them.

The Honorable

W. Cameron Forbes,  
Sheridan, Wyoming.

793.94/2255C

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

On October 10, following the bombing of Chinchow and other disturbing developments both in Manchuria and China, we instructed Neville to call upon Baron Shidehara and say to him that until recently we had been reassured by the commitments that had been made by the Governments both of China and Japan to the League of Nations as embodied in the Resolution which was adopted on the 30th of September last, but that I was much disturbed by the later reports, especially of the preceding forty-eight hours, which indicated that those commitments were not being carried out by either Government. Neville was requested to impress upon Baron Shidehara the dangers to all interests in China which we felt would inevitably result unless the pacific policy that had been agreed upon was observed and unless both the Japanese and the Chinese nations exercised at this time the utmost self-restraint. Similar representations were made to the Japanese Ambassador and the Chinese Charge here.

When Neville saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read to him the above message, Baron Shidehara stated that he had received similar telegrams from the President of the Council of the League and also from the British and French Ambassadors. Neville reports that Shidehara spoke

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

spoke very frankly to him and said that in his judgment the affair would drag on as long as the Chinese could avoid direct negotiations. In this connection Baron Shidehara referred to the Shantung negotiations which he said dragged on in much the same way until the Washington Conference, when all the points were settled with relatively little difficulty by direct conversations between the Japanese and Chinese representatives; and added that the present matter could be speedily settled between them if direct negotiations could be inaugurated.

A day or two later Debuchi called at the Department and expressed himself in much the same way; from which we gathered that this was obviously the line on which Japan at that time was thinking, although we are not sure that in making this suggestion they had in mind the presence of neutral observers at their conversations as was the case in the Shantung negotiations.

As Neville appeared to be under some misapprehension as to the attitude of the Department we cabled him on the 14th that we were not attempting either to "sit in judgment" or to "force a settlement"; that we quite agreed with the opinion he had expressed to the effect that the two disputants must themselves reach a settlement.

We

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

We told him that what the League was attempting to do, an aim with which we heartily concurred, was to bring about a cessation of hostilities so that Japan and China might be enabled to reach their own settlement without recourse to war; that such a settlement should be accomplished by peaceful means was of direct concern to all the powers; and that if Japan would not recognize this fact we feared she would find the opinion of practically all the nations of the world arrayed against her.

We asked Neville to make our position as above stated clear to Baron Shidehara in order that he might understand that we had no desire to sit in judgment or to suggest terms of settlement, but that our sole aim was to prevent hostilities and encourage settlement through direct negotiations.

In the meantime, since October 8, we have been receiving frequent and full reports from Hanson and Salisbury giving us the results of their observations at various places in Manchuria. They have visited Changchun, Kirin, Tunhua, Mukden, Taonanfu and Yingkow. The details they found in these various places differ but the picture is very much the same in all of them; the Japanese military forces and civil officials seem to be in effective control

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

control of all the pivotal points in Manchuria; the Chinese forces have been dispersed or disarmed; the Japanese officials have taken over the control of communications and have either set up civil administrations in the various towns and cities or have arranged that the existing administrations be under their influence; and nowhere do they show any inclination to relinquish this control.

The situation in China has also been giving us much concern. You will have noticed that the Japanese have been rapidly evacuating their nationals from isolated places to Hankow and other large centers.

Our relations with the Council of the League in dealing with the present situation were clearly indicated, particularly in the statements given to the press on October 11,<sup>15 and 16.</sup> We have tried to impress upon the members of the League Council, and upon the world at large, that our representative at Geneva was to participate in the Council's discussions only when such discussions relate to the possible application of the Paris Pact to which Treaty we are a party; that in the discussion of any other aspect of the Chinese-Japanese dispute he was to be merely an observer and auditor, our main purpose being to exert our full moral force in settlement of  
 the

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

the dispute by peaceful means.

Hanson and Salisbury were yesterday instructed to conclude their tour within the next few days and return to their posts.

You may also be interested in the attached summary of recent newspaper clippings received from Japan which deal with the events leading up to the conflict of September 18.

Very truly yours,

Henry L. Stimson

Enclosures:

Press statements dated  
October 11, 15 and 16.

Résumé of clippings from  
Japanese press,  
September 10-18.

WJL

a true copy  
per

FE:RSM/VDM

FE

SKH

OR  
Oct. 17. 1931 ✓



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Handed by Mr. Young Kwai &  
Mr. Miller, October 16, 1931  
Rear


*See*

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING DATED OCTOBER 15, 1931.

743-24

2276

Please at once inform the State Department China welcomes most sincerely the participation of an American representative in the deliberations of the Council of the League concerning the Manchuria question.



RECEIVED

OCT 17 1931

Chinese Legation,

Washington, October 16, 1931.

793.94/2256

OCT 21 1931

FILED



Handed by Mr. Young Kwai to  
Mr. Hull, October 16, 1931  
Rhm

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING

DATED OCTOBER 14, 1931.

OCT 19 1931

OCT 17 1931

Please make official denial regarding starting direct negotiations with Japan.

Minister Tsiang only insisted on the immediate withdrawal of troops, made no proposal whatever, and absolutely refused to discuss any plan with the Japanese Foreign Office.

Also deny today's Reuter report that one important Kuomintang member intimated to the Japanese Minister direct negotiations if the League fails.

In making these denials, please call attention to the fact that this is part of the Japanese propaganda designed to throw dust in the eyes of the world.

\* The New Chinese  
Minister to Tokyo

Chinese Legation,

Washington, October 16, 1931.

OCT 21 1931

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793.94/2257

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75



*Handed by Mr. Yang Xuan  
Sept 30, 1931.*

*file 89.5, RSM.*

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING

DATED SEPTEMBER 30, 1931.

*793.94*

Last forty-eight hours rumours afloat independence  
movement in Liaoning Kirin under Japanese intrigue.

*note  
893.0144*

793.94/2258

Chinese Legation,

Washington, September 30, 1931.

OCT 14 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 16, 1931.

Digest of  
Newspaper Items.

NEW YORK TIMES

Geneva despatch, October 15, quotes the text of a communiqué issued by the League explaining its position on inviting the United States to join in deliberations on the Manchurian situation. "At earlier debates certain members expressed the opinion that the Sino-Japanese dispute concerned the execution not only of obligations resulting from the Covenant but also from those of the Pact of Paris, Article 2 ..... The Council examined a proposal to send an invitation to the United States Government ..... Without taking a decision on the legal and constitutional aspects of these questions the Council unanimously, except for one vote, expressed itself in favor of issuing such an invitation to the United States Government. The text will be drawn up tomorrow."

Tokyo despatch, October 15 (Hugh Byas), states that "the Japanese Government regards the proposal that an American observer sit in with the League of Nations Council on the Manchurian discussion as an innovation of questionable friendliness and has instructed Kenkichi Yoshizawa, Japanese


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793.94/2259



- 2 -

Japanese delegate to the League to ask that the plan be dropped."

A Foreign Office spokesman pointed out "that Japan had received two memoranda from Washington, which had not been published because the Government was doing its utmost to prevent public irritation. The proposal that the United States participate in the League's deliberation, coming on top of Secretary Stimson's strong worded message was likely to create an unfortunate impression here."

Shanghai despatch, October 15 (Hallett Abend), reports that "while Japanese troops continue extending their zone of operations by seizing more towns in Manchuria, the chaos of banditry spreads rapidly and the size of the lawless units increases."

"Mukden has been disturbed by daily reports that various small Korean settlements have been wiped out in massacres. Japanese military leaders say it is impossible to protect all their nationals, because of the lack of soldiers."

"In Shanghai the situation is becoming more serious . . . ."

"The movement of Chiang Kai-shek's Nanking armies into Hupeh and Honan Provinces continues on a vast scale. The Chinese newspapers in Shanghai fear a new civil war with Yen Hsi-shan, Feng Yu-hsiang and Han Fu-chu aligned against Chiang Kai-shek, whom the Cantonese presumably will not assist."

- 3 -

Moscow despatch, October 15 (Walter Duranty), states that "the Soviet press greets the news from Geneva with sour and sarcastic headlines."

"No official or press comment is forthcoming, but it is not difficult to express the Soviet point of view. On the one hand, this is a good occasion to sneer at the League of Nations."

"The headlines convey genuine Russian annoyance because the League or capitalist world seems to be letting the Japanese 'get away with' their action in Manchuria."

Indianapolis report of October 16 quotes Representative Hamilton Fish of New York as asserting that the American notes to the League and Tokyo regarding Manchurian situation are a "Useless Gesture" and are part of a policy which "will make the United States the laughing stock of the world."

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

Geneva despatch, October 15 (John T. Whitaker), states that "a twenty-four hour delay in extending the invitation (to the United States) was agreed upon to enable Japan, if she chooses, to make the overture unanimous. The Tokyo Government's representative in the Council struggled for five hours today against direct American co-operation."

"The

- 4 -

"The Council proposed to have American sit with it, and today it was intimated that, if it were blocked, the Council would have the Governments invoke the Kellogg Pact, move into another room, and proceed in co-operation with the United States."

/// Tokyo despatch, October 16 (A.P.), reports that Ambassador Debuchi "cabled today from Washington that he believed it advisable for Japan to reconsider her opposition to American participation in the discussion of the Council of League of Nations on Chinese-Japanese controversy."

Washington despatch, October 15, states that "unless Japanese objections are renewed in vigorous form tomorrow", the United States will accept the invitation of the Council to take part in its deliberations.

#### WASHINGTON POST

An editorial, October 16, states that in regard to the Manchurian question the United States "is in an awkward position" and that "if unhappily the Japanese and Chinese governments are unable to prevent a conflict, the most skillful diplomacy will be needed at Washington in order to retain the friendship of both disputants, while also avoiding an uproar in Congress resulting from the apparent readiness of the Department of State to assume responsibilities which the people have emphatically refused to assume."

BB  
CBC:RJT



No. 1114



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Lima, October 12, 1931.

FE

OCT 21 31



HPW  
X

793-94/rvc

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

S i r:

1/ I enclose for the Department's information the  
text of the Instructions sent by the Japanese Govern-  
ment to its Minister in China with regard to the  
Manchurian situation, as communicated officially to  
the press in Lima, October 10, 1931, by the Japanese  
Legation.

Respectfully yours,

Fred Morris Dearing.

FMD-hkl

Enclosure:

1-Clipping from El Comercio, October 11th, attached to  
original only.

793.94/2260

FILED

1931 OCT 23 100



American Embassy,  
Lima, Peru.

Enclosure No. 1 to Embassy's Despatch No. 1114, Oct. 12, 1931.

Clipping

El Comercio

October 12, 1931.

Communication from Japanese Legation

### Comunicado de la legación japonesa

El gobierno del Japón ha dado instrucciones a su ministro en China, por medio del siguiente memorándum, fechado el 9 de octubre:

El gobierno del Japón ya ha hecho la aclaración de que la situación en Manchuria es, únicamente, la consecuencia del arraigado sentimiento anti-japonés en China, que ha culminado recientemente con provocaciones especiales desafiando a las tropas estacionadas en Manchuria, que se vieron obligadas a tomar medidas de defensa propia. Por consiguiente, la responsabilidad del actual conflicto recae, naturalmente, sobre el gobierno chino, en vista del desarrollo de los acontecimientos.

Hace mucho tiempo que el gobierno del Japón ha requerido, reiteradamente, al gobierno chino, para que tomara medidas destinadas a reprimir el movimiento anti-japonés tan sistemáticamente desarrollado en varios lugares de China. El gobierno japonés, deseoso de mantener sus relaciones cordiales con China, ha demostrado verdadera paciencia y benevolencia durante mucho tiempo, confiado en que este deplorable estado de cosas iría desapareciendo. Desgraciadamente no ha sido así, pues la agitación anti-japonesa ha ido tomando cada vez proporciones realmente alarmantes.

Sabemos que las asociaciones anti-japonesas en Shangai y otros lugares han aprobado no solamente resoluciones en el sentido de prohibir los negocios y transportes de mercaderías japonesas, sino que han ordenado, también, la cancelación de contratos existentes, pretendiendo prohibir, además, toda clase de transacciones mercantiles y cancelar contratos de empleo celebrados entre chinos y japoneses; haciendo así más efectiva la llamada "Suspensión de relaciones económicas con el Japón". Con el fin de conseguir este propósito se están inspeccionando y deteniendo las mercaderías y las personas, valiéndose de intimidaciones, violencias y otros medios. Se están aplicando severos castigos a los que faltan al cumplimiento de estas resoluciones, y algunas de las sociedades anti-japonesas, extreman su actitud amenazando con la aplicación de penas capitales a los infractores.

Casos de detenciones y expropiaciones de mercaderías pertenecientes a japoneses; y casos de amenazas violentas contra la vida y propiedades de los súbditos japoneses, se han repetido tan frecuente e insistentemente a través de todo el territorio de China, que los residentes japoneses se han visto obligados a evacuar total o parcialmente algunas ciudades chinas.

No se puede ocultar que el movimiento anti-japonés en China es utilizado como un instrumento de la política nacional bajo la dirección del Partido Nacionalista Chino, que en vista de la peculiar organización política de su país, es inseparable del gobierno en sus funciones. Es preciso, pues, distinguir claramente entre este movimiento y aquellos que emanan de la espontánea voluntad del pueblo. Por esta razón, es evidente que el presente movimiento anti-japonés en China significa no solamente la infracción de la letra y del espíritu de los tratados existentes entre los dos países, sino que constituye también una

forma de hostilidad, sin hacer uso de las armas, contraria a todos los principios de justicia y amistad. El gobierno chino tendrá, pues, que asumir la responsabilidad sumamente seria si fracasare al tomar prontas y efectivas medidas para calmar la agitación. Las sociedades anti-japonesas que, a simple vista, son puramente organizaciones particulares, están usurpando claramente las atribuciones del gobierno nacional, imponiendo, directamente, a los ciudadanos sentencias penales.

Recordamos que, en la reciente sesión del consejo de la Liga de Naciones, tanto los representantes chinos como los japoneses, aseguraron que sus respectivos gobiernos no omitirían esfuerzo alguno para evitar que la situación se agravara. Pero el gobierno chino, evidentemente en contra de este compromiso, está agravando actualmente la situación al no hacer ningún esfuerzo honesto y efectivo por detener las actividades de las sociedades anti-japonesas que están poniendo en peligro la vida, las propiedades y la libertad de comercio de los súbditos japoneses residentes en distintos lugares de China.

El gobierno del Japón desea llamar, una vez más, seriamente la atención del gobierno chino respecto de estas acciones de parte de las sociedades anti-japonesas y declarar, al mismo tiempo, que el gobierno chino será responsable de las consecuencias que se deriven de su fracaso en sofocar el movimiento anti-japonés y de dar amplia protección a las vidas y propiedades de los súbditos japoneses residentes en el territorio chino.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE X-17

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
THE UNDER SECRETARY

DOT 10 1931  
REPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Gantz  
exhibits letters  
(both) in this instance  
are worth reading.  
Much more balance  
than he usually  
exhibits.


SKH  
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DCA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



✓  
SHE:

I called up Dr. Gulick's office on long distance and informed his secretary, with reference to Dr. Gulick's letter of October 14, 1931, that the question submitted therein was hardly one upon which the Department could properly express an opinion but that it saw no objection to the course Dr. Gulick had in mind.

Rsm.

RSM:EJL

X-15

MA

Please telephone  
Dr. Gulick  
"no objection".

SKA

U  
FE

U:

I think we  
should say  
by telephone  
"no objection".

Smith

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CABLE ADDRESS: FEDCIL

TELEPHONE: GRAMERCY 6-3476

Commission on  
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND GOODWILL

of the

FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA  
(INCORPORATED)

105 EAST 22ND STREET  
NEW YORK, N. Y.

THE UNDER SECRETARY  
OCT 19 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

HON. ALANSON B. HOUGHTON,  
HON. GEO. W. WICKERSHAM,  
REV. SIDNEY L. GULICK  
REV. EVERETT R. CLINCHY  
REV. WALTER W. VAN KIRK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OCT 19 1931  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

October 14, 1931

RECEIVED

OCT 15 1931

BISHOP FRANCIS J. MC CONNELL, PRESIDENT  
FRANK H. MANN, TREASURER  
REV. SAMUEL MCCREA CAVERT, GENERAL SECRETARY  
REV. ROY B. GUILD, ASSOC. GENERAL SECRETARY

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 17 1931  
Department of State

Rec'd by Telephone  
Oct. 16, 1931  
J.E.C.

The Honorable Henry Lewis Stimson,  
Secretary of State,  
Department of State, Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Stimson:

May I express our appreciation of and confidence in your careful  
handling of the difficult Sino-Japanese problem in Manchuria?

And may I ask your thought regarding a letter I have written to  
Ambassador Debuchi, a copy of which I enclose? I may say that having lived  
in Japan for twenty-five years I have many friends there who, I believe,  
look to me with goodwill and confidence. I have also enjoyed for many  
years personal and cordial relations with the Ambassador.

Before mailing him this letter I wish to be sure that there is  
no reason for not doing so. I shall delay until I may be assured by your  
office that you see no objection. I shall be guided by your judgment.  
If your secretary can phone to my office on this matter some time tomorrow,  
I shall greatly appreciate it.

Respectfully and sincerely yours,

*Sidney L. Gulick*  
Secretary

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

105 East 22nd Street,  
New York, N.Y.  
October 15, 1931

His Excellency, The Imperial Japanese Ambassador,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Debuchi:

These must be anxious times for you and for all those in positions of responsibility in Japan. I am hoping and praying that some way of peace may soon be found by which to solve the Manchurian problem.

May I report that friends of peace are deeply concerned over the news from the Far East that seems to grow increasingly ominous? I have no private sources of information and no special wisdom to offer. But it may not be amiss for me to report that few, if any, of those who talk with me about the Manchurian problem have any adequate appreciation of Japanese difficulties through the break-down of law and order, nor do they understand the history of the past half century, by which Japan has come to have the position, rights and responsibilities in Manchuria which she unquestionably has there. They also do not appreciate the aggressive ambitions and purposes of groups of uninformed and ill-advised young men in China. Knowing something of these facts as I do, I am deeply impressed with the inherent difficulties which Japan is facing.

It seems to me, however, that Japan has made some serious mistakes which have aggravated the psychological situation in China proper, and which also are causing Americans to misunderstand and mistrust Japan. The flying of airplanes over Chinese territory could not fail to arouse Chinese indignation and provoke firing upon the planes. Dropping bombs or using machine guns under such circumstances does not seem justified. Such a procedure does lend color to the Chinese charge that Japan is the aggressor - and Americans generally, I think, take that view of it.

Japan's demand, moreover, that Chinese patriots shall not express their nationalistic enthusiasm in demonstrations and shall not advocate anti-Japanese boycotts seems to go beyond the bounds of reason - at least it seems so from the usual American point of view.

The refusal, still further, of Japan to be willing to submit her contention and demands to an international commission set up by the League of Nations, or to allow an American representative to sit with the Council of the League of Nations for conference on the problem, gives the impression that Japan is unwilling to let impartial neutrals know or scrutinize all the facts - a virtual admission that her contentions cannot stand the light of public consideration. It is difficult for me to think this is really the case - but this is, I am confident, the way it looks to many Americans.

I am writing this letter, which is quite personal and confidential, to let you know how deeply I sympathize with you and the other Japanese leaders as they are dealing with this most difficult matter, and I am praying earnestly to the God of Peace - the Father of all mankind - that He will guide the leaders in Japan and in China and in the League of Nations, and that some just, honorable and peaceful solution may be found.

Very cordially yours,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 17, 1932.

Mr. Secretary:

Herewith on first page


STATEMENT THAT JAPANESE  
GOVERNMENT IS UNITED.

SKH/ZMF



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 21 1931

DIVISION OF

COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

October 17, 1931

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JAPAN UNITED.

OCT 19 1931

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The Japanese Ambassador, in conversation with Mr. Castle on October 14, said that his Government, according to the morning paper, had at last become united and that he took as very important the statement of the Minister of War that he had definitely ordered cessation of any advances in Manchuria. In answer to a question of Mr. Castle, he said that undoubtedly Baron Shidehara had also had to back down to a certain extent in accepting the Manchuria situation as it existed. But that the statement of the Minister of War showed that calmer counsel had prevailed.

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(NOTE: By that time there was no longer, from the military point of view, need for "any advances in Manchuria." The Japanese military had effectively occupied all strategic points in South Manchuria and had effectively broken up the Chinese military organization and the Chinese civil administration in that area. Naturally, if Baron Shidehara accepted the Manchuria situation as it existed, the Minister of War could view the matter calmly.

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
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*See Mr. Castle's Memo of Conversation  
with Japanese Ambassador, Oct. 14.*

*SKH*

DECLASSIFIED: E.C. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Huntzger NARS, Date 12-18-75



(NOT FOR THE PRESS)  
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State  
Division of Current Information.

MEMORANDUM OF PRESS CONFERENCE, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1931.

At the press conference this afternoon Undersecretary Castle announced the release of a telegram from Baron Shidehara to the Secretary of State congratulating him on the successful flight of Messrs. Pangborn and Herndon.

The receipt of a telegram from Finland to the effect that the Finnish Government desires to maintain the gold standard was also announced.

The Undersecretary also announced the issuance of a press release containing a letter from the Secretary of State to Mr. H. Percival Dodge on his retirement from the Foreign Service.

Mr. Castle also announced the release of a telegram offering the sympathy of Premier Laval and Foreign Minister Briand on the death of Senator Morrow.

A press release containing statistics on immigration will be issued by the Division of Current Information during the day.

WHITE HOUSE

A correspondent asked if the Undersecretary could give him any information regarding his recent conference at the White House. He was informed in reply that there was nothing in the conference that would be of interest to the correspondents.

ARMAMENTS

A correspondent observed that there were some interesting reports in the press this morning about the luncheon

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conference between Secretary Stimson and Senator Borah where various matters were alleged to have been discussed, including the question of the Polish corridor, the cancellation of debts and one or two other questions. The correspondent said he had previously understood that the Department was not considering those questions but that on the contrary the press reports in question appear to be authentic. The correspondent then asked if the Department was considering any sort of security arrangement with France. He asked, furthermore, if the Department felt that some sort of security agreement had to be worked out and if the Department could work out a plan to give the French the security which they appear to desire. In reply the Undersecretary said that we do not know what France wants and we shall have to wait, therefore, until their desires have been communicated to us. But regarding the conversation between the Secretary and Senator Borah, the Secretary said that he and Senator Borah had luncheon together and that they had a very interesting and satisfactory talk. A correspondent here said that he understood that the luncheon was held merely to communicate facts but that the story now current discloses that there was some discussion of an extension of the inter-governmental debt holiday linked with disarmament. The Undersecretary in reply said that as far as he knew there was no basis for that story. The correspondent then said he had received the impression that the Polish corridor question was regarded as one of the most important obstacles that had to be removed before the equilibrium could be restored in Europe. Mr. Castle in reply admitted that it is one of the many causes of dissatisfaction in Europe. Asked

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then if there was anything he could tell the correspondents regarding the open-mindedness of the Department of State or as to the proper attitude to take, the Undersecretary said he thought the Department would be open-minded on all questions but that he had no idea whether the subject had been discussed by the Secretary and Senator Borah. A correspondent asked if Secretary Stimson had not said sometime ago that he was pleased to see that the Poles were settling their differences with the other European governments and that the matter was really none of our business. Mr. Castle in reply said that was probably true.

A correspondent said that at the London Naval Conference the question of security came up and that the French wanted some kind of a pledge from the British in regard to security. The correspondent then asked if the Undersecretary could tell him, for background, whether Great Britain and France have made any progress toward reaching an agreement on the subject. In reply Mr. Castle said that no agreement had been reached between the two Governments so far as he knew but that the Department had heard nothing about the matter for a long time. A correspondent said that along toward the end of the London Naval Conference Secretary Stimson said that if the European nations would not construe it as a pledge on the part of the United States that we were obligated to help Great Britain, we would consider a consultative pact. The correspondent asked then if our position had changed in any way since that time. The Undersecretary in reply said he did not remember seeing that statement except in the press and that if the statement was made by the Secretary of State he did not desire to interpret it for him.

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DEBTS AND REPARATIONS

A correspondent said that in the President's statement this morning there was a statement regarding an extension of the moratorium and that there would have to be conversations with other nations; that the Department expected the other day that they would have to be begun in the near future but that they had not as yet started. The Undersecretary in reply said he was not sure that the above was in the President's statement and asked the correspondent where he obtained it. In reply, the correspondent said he may have inadvertently mixed the statement up with some other stories which were not official. Another correspondent said he presumed that the State Department was anxious to work out some plan with Premier Laval or to see the solution of the Polish corridor question advanced. He was informed in reply that it was obvious that we would like to see the question solved but that we do not desire to tell Premier Laval how to solve it as the question is one for the European governments to settle. We cannot tell what problems M. Laval will bring up during his visit but if they should be purely European political questions the chances are that we would decline to give any advice of any kind. A correspondent asked if the Undersecretary could throw any light on a recent press statement that we would discuss the matter of governmental debts with Premier Laval. In reply, Mr. Castle replied in the negative and added that inter-governmental debts was probably one of the questions which would inevitably arise and that he was very glad the President had mentioned it in his statement.

PANAMA

A correspondent asked if; in the absence of Mr. Davis,

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the Minister at Panama, the Department had received any report concerning a new cabinet in that country. In reply Mr. Castle said that we were notified that the old cabinet had resigned. Incidentally Mr. Davis is at his post. He was going away on leave of absence but later telegraphed that he had postponed his leave.

SINO-JAPANESE AFFAIRS


A correspondent said he understood that the Chinese had transmitted to this Government a request for an investigation in Manchuria. In reply the Undersecretary said that we had received the request and had answered the note. The note, however, cannot be made public without the permission of the Chinese. It requested, however, that we send people to Manchuria to investigate the situation. In answering the note we pointed out to the Chinese that we already have several people there. On September 28, the Secretary felt that we were not obtaining sufficient information from Manchuria and told the Japanese Ambassador, therefore, that we wished to send people to Mukden to assist Mr. Myers, our Consul General there, in getting information. We also told the Ambassador that we wanted to send Mr. Laurence E. Salisbury, who speaks Japanese, from the Embassy at Tokyo, and Mr. George C. Hanson, who speaks Chinese, from the Consulate General at Harbin. We received an immediate answer from the Japanese Government that it would be very glad to have Messrs. Salisbury and Hanson visit the points where there was trouble and that all possible assistance from both the civil and military authorities would be given. Messrs. Salisbury and Hanson are going there as observers to report to us the facts as they see them. A correspondent asked if there was

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any reason for asking Japan to consent to the idea of the investigation in Manchuria. He was informed in reply that we had to seek the permission of the Japanese in order that our representatives might receive facilities to enable them to circulate and obtain the facts. A correspondent asked if the Undersecretary had any idea, in view of the fact that these two men have gone to Manchuria, why the Chinese wanted further action. In reply Mr. Castle said that, while he was merely speculating, he thought the Chinese had sent similar notes to all governments asking them to send representatives to Manchuria and they probably sent the note to us, even though they knew we had already sent our representatives to the points in question. CONFIDENTIAL AND FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY the Undersecretary added that when the reports begin coming in we shall not give them out to the press. The reports will be more or less contradictory from day to day. Then, also, if the Chinese or the Japanese feel that we are giving out reports critical of one or the other, they would certainly not facilitate the task of our people. The findings of Messrs. Hanson and Salisbury will be in the nature of a report and will be for the confidential information of the Secretary of State. Asked if our representatives would confine their inquiries to Mukden, Mr. Castle said they would travel through Manchuria to various places where there had been trouble or where Japanese troops had advanced outside of their lines.

M. J. McDermott.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(NOT FOR THE PRESS)  
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF PRESS CONFERENCE, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1931

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At the press conference this morning the Secretary of State announced the issuance of a press release containing a report from the American Minister at Riga regarding the concentration in the Bank of Latvia of all foreign exchange transactions.

SINO-JAPANESE TROUBLE

In view of the apparent seriousness of the situation in Manchuria between China and Japan, many correspondents gathered in the Diplomatic Room this morning in anticipation of the announcement of important news from the scene of the trouble. Secretary Stimson then announced that President Hoover had sent a message direct to the President of the Republic of China. The message reads as follows:

"I extend to you and your fellow countrymen my sincere felicitations on this anniversary of the Proclamation of the Republic of China."

The tension thus having been relieved, a correspondent asked if the Department had under consideration some means of restoring or of safeguarding peace in the Far East. The Secretary, in reply, said the Department was working very hard on the situation in Manchuria but that he could not announce beforehand what the Department would do. Mr. Stimson, desiring to aid the correspondents in writing their stories, gave the following FOR BACKGROUND ONLY AND NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION IN ANY WAY: When the trouble broke out in Manchuria on September 18-19, the League of Nations was in session in Geneva. Both China and Japan were members and the League at once took jurisdiction of the matter and, with the

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consent of both China and Japan, sessions were devoted to the question - the results of which have been made public. They had discussions and obtained commitments of the two countries so that when they adjourned on September 30 they had done quite an effective piece of work. In fact, they had done a very effective piece of work, in that they had obtained the promise of Japan to withdraw its troops into the Railroad zone as soon as their nationals could be protected. They obtained the promise of the Chinese that China, after the withdrawal of the Japanese troops, would adequately protect Japanese and other nationals. Our attitude has been to back up the League and to cooperate with it, while retaining our own independence of position, and to do everything we can to make its work a success. That means that the thing to do now is to see, as far as possible, that these commitments which the League obtained for pacific action are made a success and to express our apprehension or our views, under whatever treaty we have a right to, in case the commitments do not materialize. The whole situation is to find out first whether they are being followed and then to do what we can in support of the League's action in trying to solve the problem by pacific means instead of resorting to war. That is the situation in a nut-shell and shows the lines along which we have acted and shall continue to act.

Asked if he could give any assurances that the situation in Manchuria was well in hand or if he considered the situation grave enough to warrant action within a day or two, Mr. Stimson said it was not a time when the Secretary of State ought to express an opinion publicly. A correspondent then asked if there were any Americans or American property in danger in Manchuria. The Secretary replied that there had

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been no specific reports that Americans or their interests had been imperiled, although our interests in Manchuria are quite large.

A correspondent asked if any definite action by this Government, such as the sending of notes, would be announced here first. In reply, the Secretary said that notes to foreign governments are usually announced after the governments have had an opportunity to receive and read them. Mr. Stimson then said that he was anxious to assist the correspondents, but that things were happening very rapidly and that he could not tie his hands with promises to do any certain thing.

#### DEBTS AND REPARATIONS

A correspondent observed that one of the morning newspapers said that after Premier Laval's conference with the President there probably would be a White House conference of congressional leaders on inter-governmental debts. In reply, the Secretary said the report sounded as though it came from one who persisted in being a jump ahead of the Department. Mr. Stimson added that he had no knowledge of such a proposition. The correspondent then asked if there was anything the Department could give which would in any way correct the misapprehensions indicated in the press reports. The Secretary, in reply, said that as practically every newspaper this morning contained a speculation entirely different from every other, it was rather hard for him to say anything.

#### FRANCE


Asked if the Department had been advised whether Premier Laval was bringing his daughter with him, Mr. Stimson said he

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had nothing to say. M. Laval must give out the names of the members of his party when he chooses to do so, and he has not done it either in regard to his family or to his advisors. Observing that press despatches from Paris were contradictory concerning the possibility of Mlle. Laval's visiting this country with her father, the Secretary said he did not care to add to the confusion by saying anything himself.

M. J. McDermott.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF PRESS CONFERENCE, MONDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1931

793.94/2265 At the press conference this morning Secretary Stimson announced the release of the rules and regulations governing flights of foreign airplanes over the Panama Canal Zone.

SINO-JAPANESE TROUBLE

A correspondent observed that it would be logical for Mr. Prentiss Gilbert, American Consul at Geneva, to sit in the Council of the League of Nations, and asked if the League had sent an invitation to this Government to have an observer attend the meeting on October 13. In reply, the Secretary said he had nothing to announce concerning the matter. Referring to the communication to the Secretary General of the League, which was made public in Washington Sunday afternoon, a correspondent asked if this Government would wait to see what action the League would take and what the League would be able to accomplish. The Secretary replied in the negative and added that it had been made clear that we had been in constant correspondence with the Secretariat of the League and with the Council when it was in session. A correspondent asked if there was any danger of the United States losing prestige in the Orient because of the peculiarities of the Oriental mind and because of our rather delicate and hesitant policy. Mr. Stimson replied that he would be very sorry if that were so. The correspondent then said that he did not mean to criticise the Department's policy but we have been very cautious not to injure the sensibilities of the more peaceful minded people in the Orient. In reply, the Secretary said he knew of nothing in the Oriental mind which would prevent the policy of patient firmness being successful there as elsewhere.

Observing that the attitude of the Japanese seems

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to be that they desire to negotiate directly with China on this crisis and that they desire, furthermore, for outside powers to keep their hands off the situation, a correspondent asked if there was a fear of a possible repetition of the situation when Japan presented her famous twenty-one demands while negotiating with China. Mr. Stimson asked the correspondent to repeat his question. The correspondent then said that Japan's position apparently is that she wishes to settle the Manchurian question by direct negotiations with China and that he understood that the United States and the other powers were reluctant to permit direct negotiations between the two Powers only on the question. In reply, the Secretary asked if the correspondent thought that either the United States or any other power wished to decide what was to be done in Manchuria so far as the ultimate settlement is concerned. The correspondent replied that he thought the powers would wish, at least, to oversee the negotiations as observers. THE SECRETARY THEN SAID THAT ALL OF HIS ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS AND ALL OF HIS STATEMENTS IN THIS PRESS CONFERENCE WERE FOR BACKGROUND.

The Secretary continued by saying that the situation in Manchuria is one of the most delicate and biggest problems in the world, certainly the biggest in that part of the world. Three great nationalities impinge on Manchuria, Russia, China and Japan, with apparently conflicting views -- nationalities which have been actually hostile in the past at different times and perhaps have been constantly suspicious of each other. The situation is also in a state of flux economically, arising out of the fact that Manchuria has a great immigration of nearly a million a year pouring into it from China. A situation like that is one of the most complicated things in the world. To try to forestall the settlement or to forecast the settlement is certainly the last thing which outside nations would want to do. It is a question which has to be settled by the forces

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there themselves and the interest of outside parties is to see that it is not settled by war, if possible, but by pacific methods and means. It would see, and it has been so stated many times, that manifestly the problem must be settled by the parties themselves by pacific means, and not at the dictation of the outside world. Another correspondent said he thought that the other correspondent who had asked the question had in mind the possibility of direct negotiations bringing about another series of demands such as the famous twenty-one demands which Japan made on China and which China would have to swallow. In reply, the Secretary said he thought there had been cases in the past of negotiations between China and Japan where neutral observers had been invited to sit in purely as observers. Mr. Stimson here asked the correspondents to look the matter up and verify his statement. The correspondent then said that the Chinese have, apparently, asked us to appoint two commissioners to attend the hoped-for evacuation of the non-treaty territory. The Secretary did not reply.

A correspondent said that recent press reports from the Orient quoted the President of China as saying that if the League does not settle the controversy tomorrow China will have to resort to military sources. The correspondent then asked if the verification of those reports would influence our policy. In reply, the Secretary said he preferred not to say anything on that. Asked for our attitude toward the question of appointing observers as suggested by the Chinese, as reported in press dispatches, Mr. Stimson said that until we are sure the evacuation is going on there is not much to observe. Asked if we had communicated with Japan or China directly by notes, the Secretary replied that he did not desire to discuss the matter at this time.

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GERMANY

Referring to the demonstrations in Germany yesterday of the National Socialists and Fascists, a correspondent asked what our diplomatic representatives at Berlin think of the possibility of those forces getting control of the German Government. In reply the Secretary said he had not received any information on the subject.

ITALY

Referring to the announcement of Signor Grandi's forthcoming visit to the United States, a correspondent asked if the visit would be along the same lines of Premier Laval's forthcoming visit. The Secretary in reply said that we have not yet prepared a program covering Signor Grandi's visit. Signor Grandi occupies a different position from that of Premier Laval. M. Laval is the Chief of the Government of France while Signor Grandi is Foreign Minister of Italy, the Chief of the Italian Government being Signor Mussolini. A correspondent asked if there was any possibility that representatives of Germany or Great Britain would visit the United States this fall. In reply the Secretary said that no other arrangements had been made for such visits.

M. J. McDERMOTT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

OCTOBER 15, 1931

TEXT OF THE INVITATION HANDED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL  
BY THE AMERICAN CONSUL AT GENEVA, MR. PRENTISS GILBERT,  
OCTOBER 16, 1931, IN RESPONSE TO HIS INVITATION ADDRESSED TO  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE, OCTOBER 16, 1931.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication addressed to the Secretary of State of the United States of America, under date of October 16th, in which you cite a proposal adopted by the Council of the League of Nations. You extend an invitation, in accordance with that proposal, to the Government of the United States to send a representative to sit at the Council table, so that he may be in a position to consider with the Council the relationship between the provisions of the Pact of Paris and the present unfortunate situation in Manchuria, and at the same time to follow the deliberations of the Council with regard to other aspects of the problem with which it is now confronted.

I am directed by the Secretary of State to accept on behalf of the Government of the United States this invitation to send a representative, and to inform you that he has designated me to act in that capacity.

I beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance of my highest consideration.

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INSTRUCTIONS SENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO MR. PRENTISS GILBERT, AMERICAN CONSUL AT GENEVA:

You are authorized to participate in the discussions of the Council when they relate to the possible application of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, to which treaty the United States is a party. You are expected to report the result of such discussions to the Department for its determination as to possible action. If you are present at the discussion of any other aspect of the Chinese-Japanese dispute, it must be only as an observer and auditor.

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OCT 21 1931



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FOR THE PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 16, 1931

STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN CONSUL AT GENEVA,  
MR. PRENTISS GILBERT,  
AT MEETING OF COUNCIL OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS,  
6 p.m., FRIDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1931.

"In this moment of deep international concern, I thank you for your invitation to sit in your deliberations and to participate in your discussions in so far as the Pact of Paris, to which my country is a party, is concerned.

"The Government of the United States of America has been following with the closest attention the proceedings before the Council for the settlement of the dispute at present unhappily existing between China and Japan. My Government does not seek to intrude with respect to such measures as you may propose under the Covenant of the League of Nations; and is not in a position to participate with the members of the Council in the formulation of any action envisaged under that instrument, for the composing of differences existing between two of its members. It has already conveyed to you its sympathetic appreciation of your efforts, and its whole hearted accord with the objective you have in view; and it has expressed the hope that the tried machinery of the League may in this case, as on previous occasions, be successful in bringing this dispute to a conclusion satisfactory to both parties. Moreover, acting independently and through diplomatic channels my Government has already signified its moral support of your efforts in this capacity to bring about a peaceful solution of the unfortunate controversy in Manchuria.

"In your deliberations as to the application of the machinery of the Covenant of the League of Nations, I repeat, we can of course take no part. But the Pact of Paris, bearing as it does the signature of the President of this meeting together with that of our former Secretary of State as joint proponents, represents to this extent in America an effective means of marshaling the public opinion of the world behind the use of pacific means only, in the solution of controversies between nations. We feel not only that this public opinion is a most potent force in the domestic affairs of every nation, but that it is of constantly growing importance and influence in the mutual relations of the members of the family of nations.

"The timely exercise of the power of such opinion may be effective to prevent a breach of international peace of world wide consequences. We assume that this may be the reason why the consideration of the relationship between the provisions of the Pact of Paris and the present situation has been brought forward in this body; and the purpose which has moved my Government to accept your invitation is that thus we may most enthusiastically and effectively take common counsel with you on this subject."

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FOR THE PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 16, 1931

INVITATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE BY  
THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS,  
HANDLED TO THE AMERICAN CONSUL AT GENEVA, Oct. 16, 1931

"I have the honor to inform you that the Council of the League of Nations has approved today the terms of the following proposal which I had the honor to make to it in my capacity as President of the Council.

"In the course of the discussion the opinion has been expressed that the very important question before the Council concerns the fulfillment of obligations arising not only from the Covenant of the League of Nations but also from the Pact of Paris.

"This opinion is certainly well founded since, in accordance with Article 2 of that Pact:

"The high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means".

"Foremost among the signatories of the Pact of Paris appear the United States of America. The United States were one of the proponents of the Pact, and I may be allowed to recall that I had the honor to be associated with the then Secretary of State of the United States as joint author. In consequence, the United States may be regarded as being especially interested in insuring a settlement of the present dispute by pacific means.

"Moreover the Government of the United States, with which communications regarding the dispute before the Council have already been exchanged, has expressed its whole-hearted sympathy with the attitude of the League of Nations, and has affirmed its desire to reenforce the action of League.

"I feel confident that I shall be meeting the wishes of my colleagues in proposing that we should invite the Government of the United States to be associated with our efforts by sending a representative to sit at the Council table so as to be in a position to express an opinion as to how, either in view of the present situation or of its future development, effect can best be given to the provisions of the Pact. By this means also the opportunity will be afforded him of following our deliberations on the problem as a whole.

"I am sure that any action that might be taken under the Pact could not but strengthen the efforts which are now being made by the Council in accordance with the obligations imposed upon it by the Covenant of the League of Nations to effect the peaceful settlement of the problem under discussion".

"In consequence, I have the honor to address to the Government of the United States the invitation contained in the said proposal.

"Please accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurance of my high consideration".

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793.94/2268

FILED

OCT 21 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

NO. 5253



Division of September 23, 1931.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 22 1931

Department of State

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.

OCT 21

793.94-2269  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OCT 31 1931  
RECEIVED  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: CONDITIONS IN NORTH MANCHURIA.

HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

- 1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the information of the Department, a copy of my despatch No. 2272, of even date, sent to the Legation on the subject of the political conditions in North Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

*G. C. Hanson*  
G. C. Hanson  
American Consul General.

1 enclosure as above indicated.

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TH/th

793.94/2269

NOV 5 1931

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 2872

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, September 25, 1931.

SUBJECT: CONDITIONS IN NORTH MANCHURIA

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peking, China

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the news received in the morning of September 19, 1931, regarding the Japanese-Chinese clashes in South Manchuria, considerably alarmed the Chinese and Russian inhabitants of Harbin and, when it was learned that the Japanese forces were extending their activities beyond the South Manchuria Railway zone, it was locally feared that a Japanese detachment would come to Harbin. Telegraphic, postal and railway communications were cut. The Chinese Eastern Railway train which left Harbin at 3 P. M. on the 19th proceeded only as far as Yachia station and then returned to Harbin. However, the train which left at 9.15 A. M. on the following day went through to Changchun, picking up on the way passengers, including five Americans, when the preceding train had left at Yachia. Soon after mail communication was restored, but it is still impossible to communicate with Mukden by telegraph or radio.

The Chinese civil and military officials became panic stricken and the Harbin dollar dropped in value. Japanese school children did not go to school and few Japanese appeared on the streets. A few Japanese and Russian shops closed their doors. The night of September 19th-20th passed without any untoward incidents

-occurring-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

occurring. The following day and night were quiet. However, in the evening of the 21st, the panic among the Chinese officials reached its highest point. Soldiers commenced to desert and the military authorities thought it best to order the main body of Kirin troops quartered in barracks in the northeastern suburbs of Harbin to move out partly across the Sungari River on the Heilungchiang side and partly to outlying points so that they could retreat in case the Japanese forces approached at Harbin. At 10 P. M. bombs were thrown by unknown persons at the Bank of Chosen, the "Harbin Nichi-Nichi" (Japanese newspaper printed in Chinese), Japanese military mission and Japanese Consulate General buildings. The bombs were very weak and did practically no damage. In fact, the one thrown into the Consulate General, where a meeting of the consular staff was taking place, failed to explode. (Confidential). A Russian watchman of a building which is located near the Consulate General stated that he saw an unnumbered sedan, containing a driver and three Chinese, drive up to the latter building. One of the Chinese, a young man, came from the car, threw the bomb and was helped back into the car by the other Chinese. The car then drove away. He might have been mistaken in his identity of the miscreant, as there are many persons, Chinese, especially, who believe the bomb throwing was instigated by the Japanese, who desired to create sufficient disturbances to warrant the arrival of Japanese troops for the protection of Japanese lives and property.

At midnight, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Chang Yu, called on the Japanese Vice Consul Mr. T. Nakano (The Consul General, Mr. C. Ohashi, being away in Siberia) and asked him if Japanese troops were coming to Harbin, and was told that the Japanese looked to the Chinese authorities for protection, but if the latter failed in this duty, Japanese troops would come.

-later-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

Later, his office telephoned to the various Consulates, requesting advice and help. I informed him that I looked to the Chinese authorities to maintain order, advised him that the police patrols should be strengthened and, if necessary, to place the city under martial law. He appeared fearful lest the Chinese police and soldiers should get out of hand and allow unlawful elements to start looting. He was told that every effort should be strained to afford protection, because if order was maintained, there would be no reason for outside forces to enter Harbin. Some Chinese officials telephoned, late in the night, suggesting that the Consular Body do something to ease the situation.

On the 28th, the leading Chinese military and civil officials held a meeting in the Civil Administrator's office. The Civil Administrator has been absent from Harbin for a long time, but his son, a boy of fourteen years, is here. I shall illustrate how panic stricken the Chinese were by stating that this boy, accompanied by a minor official disguised as a servant, came to this office and asked for protection. The Chinese Chambers of Commerce of Harbin and Fuchiatien held a joint meeting. The meeting at the Civil Administrator's office decided to adopt measures to strengthen the local police force and, it is suspected, made preparations to turn the office over to the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in case the Japanese troops appeared, thus leaving the officials free to flee. The Chambers of Commerce appointed a committee of public safety with instructions to prepare a defense force which would be independent of the officials.

On the same day, a meeting of the Consular Body was held at the residence of the Senior Consul, the British Consul General, Mr. A. G. Major. This was attended by him, the Czechoslovakian, French, German, Italian and Polish Consuls and myself. There was no representative from the Japanese Consulate General, owing

-to-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to the absence of Mr. G. Chashi. Mr. Major stated that he had seen the Japanese Vice Consul, Mr. T. Nakano, who, in reply to a question, stated that no Japanese troops would come to Harbin unless the local situation became so bad that the lives and property of the Japanese would be endangered and unless he requested them to come. The meeting decided that, inasmuch as the situation was not alarming, there was no necessity for the Consular Body to take any action. However, it is believed that the news that this meeting took place had a quieting effect on the Chinese.

A representative of the "Kung Pao" (a Chinese controlled newspaper printed in Russian) interviewed the principal consular officials. A copy, in translation, of the interview with me is enclosed herewith.

Throughout the period of unrest here, the Soviet Consular and railway officials have apparently maintained a neutral attitude. The Soviet Consul General, Mr. Orloff, filed with the local Japanese Consulate General a protest against the seizure of Kuanshengtue, which is the terminal station of the Chinese Eastern Railway near the Changchun station of the South Manchuria Railway, on the grounds that Soviet employees were thereby placed in danger. It is now understood that the Japanese troops withdrew from station Kuanshengtue, which is now being operated by a staff of Russian employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Chinese employees having been withdrawn.

On the 22nd, I learned by direct telephonic conversations with personal friends at Hailar and Manchuria Station that conditions in both these places are normal. At the latter place, no Soviet airplanes were seen nor was there other evidence of Soviet military activity. The Chinese Radio Station, which is in constant communication with Tschenfu and Taitaihar, informed me today that conditions in these places are normal. As far as

-the-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the latter place is concerned, I have just received a telegram from a personal friend there stating that all is peaceful at and near that city.

At present it appears that the Japanese military are not planning to occupy any stations on the Chinese Eastern Railway, nor Tsitsihar city, thereby avoiding any possible conflict with Soviet interests in North Manchuria. No doubt one reason for occupying Kirin city was to enable the Japanese to construct a railway line in the gap between Tunkua (terminus of the Kirin-Tunkua line) and the Korean border.


Respectfully yours,

G. C. HANSON

G. C. HANSON  
 American Consul General

800  
 CCE/TLL

5 copies sent to the Department  
 1 copy sent to Mukden.





DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Luntz NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Translated from the Russian)  
 KUNG PAO, September 22, 1931.

Interview with Mr. Hanson

Yesterday, the correspondent of the KUNG PAO, interviewed Mr. Hanson, American Consul General, who, with regard to the present events, made the following statements:

"The American Consulate General at Harbin is not sufficiently well informed of all the details of the incident to render a full account of the situation, more so, that at the present time there is no normal communication with Mukden or Peiping, the place of residence of the Minister of the United States of America.

"Undoubtedly, all powers are interested in the preservation of peace in Manchuria. In particular, America has business interests in Manchuria, American citizens residing both in Mukden and in Harbin."

Asked as to whether the Consular Body would hold a meeting in connection with the present events, Mr. Hanson for the present gave a negative answer stating that the measures taken by the local administration for the protection of foreigners, including Japanese residents, were entirely sufficient to guarantee the maintenance of complete order.

Mr. Hanson concluded his statements by saying that he was certain that normal life in Harbin would not be interrupted.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Oct. 23

~~SKA-~~

In despatch No. 5253 (793.94/2269), dated September 23, 1931,  
General  
from Harbin, Consul/George C. Hanson reports on conditions in  
North Manchuria from September 19 to 23, 1931, inclusive.

General  
The Consul/ states that there began a brief reign of  
hysteria in Harbin, following the receipt, on the morning  
of September 19, of news of the Mukden incident. Many shops  
were closed and most Japanese remained indoors. On September  
21, in the fear of the arrival of Japanese troops, Chinese  
officials became panic stricken, and are ~~reported~~ <sup>suspected</sup> to have made  
arrangements to turn over their offices to the Chinese Chambers  
of Commerce, and the latter appointed a Committee of Public  
Safety to prepare a defense force. Several bombs were thrown  
by unknown persons. One bomb landed in the Japanese Consulate  
General. Chinese soldiers began to desert and the military  
authorities moved the main body of the Kirin troops out of  
Harbin to nearby points. By September 23, the hysteria had  
partially subsided.

The Soviet consular and railway officials apparently  
maintained a neutral attitude, although the Soviet Consul  
General did file with the Japanese Consulate General in Harbin,  
a protest against the seizure of Kuanchengtze, on the grounds  
that the Japanese occupation endangered the lives of Soviet

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

railway employees on the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The Consul General adds that his information indicates that Hailar, Manchuria Station, Taonanfu and Tsitsihar were normal during the period covered. No Soviet military activity was reported.

RPB/

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75



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
LEGATION OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Riga, Latvia.

October 9, 1931.

OCT 21 31



FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK

Yes ☒

To the Field ☐  
In U. S. A. ☐

No. 8121

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit in translation the current comments of the principal Moscow newspapers on the Japanese-Chinese conflict. It is arranged chronologically, in the main.

The United States is demanding a share in the pillage of China, and the League of Nations has disclosed itself as an instrument of war in the Far East —

such

793.94/2270

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such was the analysis of the PRAVDA on September 24 and 25.

3/ The IZVESTIA on September 26 took about the same position, and added that the Soviet public cannot ignore the fact that the present events are occurring near the Chinese-Soviet frontier.

4-5/  
In  
one  
copy  
only  
Interest may attach to the annexed sketch maps, illustrating the supposed direction of Japanese ambition in Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia. In the first, Japanese railway plans are indicated as completing the paralleling of the Chinese Eastern Railway from the Japan Sea to Solun; in the second, the Japanese push is presumed to be northwestwards against Hailar, near the Chinese-Soviet frontier.

6/ The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on September 28 gave its attention to Japanese party politics.

7/ The IZVESTIA on September 30 reinforced its position, as taken on the 26.

8-9/  
In  
one  
copy  
only  
Two of its cartoons further illustrated its presentation of the League of Nations and of the United States, France and Great Britain as approving bystanders.

10/ On September 29 the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA undertook to disclose the Japanese objectives. It adopted both the variants of the sketch maps, and declared that Japan will also demand the transformation of its tenure of the Southern Manchurian Railway and the Kwantung Peninsula into complete property rights; Japanese control over all Chinese railways

and

-3-

and ports that compete with Japanese, certain customs privileges, and far-reaching colonization rights.

11/ On October 3 the IZVESTIA carried an official denial that any Soviet patrols whatsoever have crossed the Chinese-Soviet frontier.

12/ The PRAVDA on the same date reported the action of the League of Nations, with a commentary in the sense of its previous articles.

13/ In a lengthy editorial leading article on "the dividing up of China," the PRAVDA on the same date asserted that the United States would like to convert the whole of China into an American colony, but that the Government of the United States for various reasons has displayed considerable self-restraint in connection with the events in Manchuria.

The Moscow newspapers thus have pursued the aims of discrediting the capitalistic countries, especially the United States, and the several Chinese Governments and military commanders; and of making propaganda in the usual style for the world revolution.

14/ A weekly newspaper in the German language noted that the press on both sides of the Atlantic has been singularly passive, thereby displaying an intention to leave Japan complete freedom of action.

The Moscow press has refrained from indicating the attitude and the intentions of the Soviet Government.

It

-4-

It thus appears probable that the Soviet Government, at least, is resolved to leave Japan complete freedom of action, for the present. Should the Japanese push be made northwestwards, a more positive note may be expected\*.

Respectfully yours,

*F. W. B. Coleman*

F. W. B. COLEMAN.

Enclosures:

- 1/ The United States Demands its Share  
in the Pillage of China.  
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 264, September  
24, 1931.)
- 2/ Military Occupation of Manchuria.  
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 265, September 25,  
1931.)
- 3/ Intervention in Manchuria, and the  
Maneuvers of the Imperialists.  
(Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 266, September  
26, 1931.)
- 4/ Clipping of a Map from Moscow KOM-  
SOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, No. 267, September  
27, 1931.)
- 5/ Clipping of a Map from Moscow PRAVDA,  
No. 268, September 28, 1931.
- 6/ Bellisose Declaration Issued by the  
Seyukai Party.  
(Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, No. 261,  
September 28, 1931.)

7/

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\* Provincial newspapers recently have been directed to give a prominent place in their news to information of political conditions in the border countries. The Tashkent KOMSOMOLET'S VOSTOKA has been instructed to devote more space to the revolutionary activities in India, and both the Khabarovsk NABAT MOLODEZHNI and the Irkutsk VOSTOCHNOSIBIRSKI KOMSOMOLET'S have been invited to concentrate on Japanese and Chinese questions. (KOM-SOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, No. 275, October 5, 1931.)

-5-

- 7/ Japan Strengthens its Positions in Manchuria.  
(Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 270, September 30, 1931.)
- 8/ Clipping of a cartoon from Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 263, September 23, 1931.
- 9/ Clipping of a cartoon from Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 270, September 30, 1931.
- 10/ Second Phase of the Japanese Intervention.  
(Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, No. 262, September 29, 1931.)
- 11/ A Provocative Anti-Soviet Invention of the Daily Telegraph.  
(Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 273, October 3, 1931.)
- 12/ The League of Nations Gives to Japanese Imperialism the Mandate in Respect of Manchuria.  
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 273, October 3, 1931.)
- 13/ The Dividing up of China.  
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 273, October 3, 1931.)
- 14/ World Imperialism and the Japanese Intervention in Manchuria.  
(MOSKAUER RUNDSCHAU, No. 45, October 4, 1931.)

(In triplicate.)

Copy to E.I.C., Paris.

- " " " Paris, for Peiping.
- " "American Consul, Harbin, via Department.
- " "American Embassy, Berlin, direct.
- " "American Embassy, London, direct.

800 R - Japan-China.

DBM/rk



ENCLOSURE NO. 1 TO DESPATCH NO. 0121 OF OCT 9 1931  
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,  
No. 264,  
September 24, 1931,  
(Front page.)

THE UNITED STATES DEMANDS ITS SHARE IN THE  
PILLAGE OF CHINA.

Arbitrary behavior of the Japanese Military  
in Manchuria.

The League of Nations — an Instrument of War  
in the Far East.

Fighting for the Booty.

(Translation of editorial comment on  
sundry information from the Far East.)

The military occupation in Manchuria is extending  
to ever new territories. Noteworthy is the occupation,  
by Japanese troops, of all the principal points along  
the proposed railway line Kirin-Hoiren, in the vicinity  
of Kirin-and Taoyan. The imperialistic aggression  
finds its expression in the landing of Japanese troops  
in Taku, Tsingtau, and other Chinese ports, as well as  
in the despatch of Japanese cruisers and gunboats to  
Chinese territorial waters\*. As part of the general  
imperialistic onslaught, the Japanese troops are also  
taking independent action, intensifying and sharpening  
the onslaught.

As might have been expected, the action of Japanese

presenting itself as an instrument of imperialism

\*literally: interior waters.

-2-

imperialism has caused a sharpening of the imperialistic conflict of interests in the name of the interests of dollar imperialism. According to information received, the Department of State intends to allege infringement of the Washington Treaty of 1922, which guarantees the "sovereignty and the territorial integrity of China." That treaty did not hinder the United States from engaging more than once in military intervention in China. And now too, of course, it is not a question of the "sovereignty and integrity of China," but a question of sharing the booty. At any rate, it is characteristic that the United States is making reference to the Washington Treaty signed by nine imperialistic Powers, and not to the famous "Kellogg Pact" which, as it is claimed, eliminates war as an instrument of national policy.

The Japanese press protests very sharply against the interference of the League of Nations, and in general against any interference on the part of other Powers. To save its face, the League of Nations intimates to Japan to withdraw its troops from Manchuria, provided "this does not threaten the lives and the property of citizens of both countries." This ridiculous "formula" is to disguise imperialistic aggression: Since all the imperialistic Powers are carrying on in China military action on their own account under the pretext of "protecting the lives and the property of their citizens."

The League of Nations once more unmask itself, presenting itself as an instrument of imperialistic violence, as an instrument and the organizing agent of war.

-3-

of war. The finding of the League of Nations amounts to an appeal to brute force, and for extension of the occupation.

The Kuomintang, with the hangman of the Chinese toilers, Chiang Kai-shek, at its head, is indulging in "patriotic" phrases in connection with the seizure of Chinese territory. At the same time, the counter-revolutionary bloc of the Chinese bourgeoisie and the squires appeals for aid to the League of Nations which latter has shown itself as an instrument and organizing agent of war and appeals also for aid to the United States which latter demands its share in the plunder of China, and carries on negotiations with Japanese imperialism.

In Manchuria, the Chinese bourgeoisie and the squires lick the generals' boots of the Japanese invaders. In its turn, Nanking hides its preparations for ignominious capitulation to Japanese imperialism behind cheap theatrical phrases.

The toilers in the U.S.S.R. regard the action of Japanese imperialism, and the occupation of Chinese towns in Manchuria and other parts of China, as acts of imperialistic aggression, and as acts of military pressure. These acts result in a decidedly negative attitude on the part of the toilers in the U.S.S.R. and throughout the world. The sympathies of the toilers throughout the whole world are with the Chinese toilers who shed their blood under the brutal yoke of the imperialistic robbers and the Kuomintang.

js/fk

ENCLOSURE NO. 2 TO DESPATCH NO. 8121 OF OCT 9 1931  
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,  
No. 265,  
September 25, 1931.  
(Front page).

MILITARY OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA.

(Translation of excerpts from leading editorial).

.....

The imperialists from the League of Nations try to link themselves with the Manchurian question, in order to get hold of part of the booty. They have only this in mind when at the League of Nations the "Manchurian question" is under discussion.

The United States was the initiator of the Kellogg Pact. That Pact has shown itself once more as an instrument vindicating war. At a time when the Japanese troops were shelling Mukden, disarming Chinese troops, and comporting themselves as conquerors in a foreign country, seizing vast territories, the Government of the United States declared that "the Kellogg Pact has not been violated." This hypocrisy is not to be surpassed.

How did the social-fascist and pacifist hangers-on of American imperialism extol the Kellogg Pact! How much pacifist babble and verbiage was there forthcoming about "the pact that eliminated war as a means of national policy!" And now the United States itself shows up the Kellogg Pact as an instrument vindicating war and colonial plunder.

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The Government of the United States considers the situation in China as "causing apprehension,"\* and it sent a memorandum to Japan because the American bourgeoisie wanted, and still wants, to convert the whole of China into an American semi-colony. The United States is preparing for a new world war in the Pacific. The United States is preparing for a war for a new division of the world, for a new division of the colonies. This, and only this, is why they are alarmed in Washington in connection with the events in China. This, and only this, is the reason why the United States sent the memorandum to Japan.

.....

There is only one factor that would be able to put an end to the outrages of the imperialists against the toilers of China — and that factor is the victory of the workman and peasant in China, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. For several years, and not without success, the workmen and peasants of China have been carrying on armed struggle against imperialism and against the Kuomintang. Now that Japanese imperialism is trying to outrage the Chinese nation, the workmen throughout the world will stand up for the defense of the Chinese revolution.

The toilers of the U.S.S.R. are watching the struggle in China with utmost attention. Their sympathies are with the Chinese nation.

js/hs

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\*literally: perplexity

ENCLOSURE NO. 3 TO DESPATCH NO. 8121 OF OCT 9 1931  
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow IZVESTIA,  
No. 266,  
September 26, 1931.  
(Front page.)

INTERVENTION IN MANCHURIA, AND THE MANEUVERS OF  
THE IMPERIALISTS.

(Translation of concluding part of lead-  
ing editorial.)

.....

With the greatest cynicism the League of Nations endeavors to vindicate the actions of Japanese imperialism, and abets Japanese military intervention in China, camouflaging its attitude with hypocritical resolutions and idle talk. At a moment when military operations in the proper sense of the word are taking place on Chinese territory, when the territory of a country which is a member of the League of Nations is occupied by the armed forces of another member of the League of Nations, the leaders of that League actually take the part of the stronger side which in this case is Japan. The "humble" application of the Council of the League of Nations to the United States was one more clear proof that that Geneva organization considers itself, and acts, as the direct executor of the will of the large imperialistic Powers.

However, while backing for the time being the attitude of Japanese imperialism, the Powers do not mean at all to refrain from satisfying their own appetites.

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In the present phase of the Manchurian conflict, when the troops of Japanese imperialism have apparently executed their principal strategical task, but when there is the threatening possibility that the logic of the events and the whetted appetites of the militarists may carry Japan much further than, perhaps, it was intended at the beginning of the occupation, the wasps' nest of world imperialism is already astir. The mechanism of the internal imperialistic conflicts of interest has already come into motion in connection with the Manchurian events. While the attitude of the League of Nations amounted actually to supporting Japan, the attitude assumed by the United States should be regarded as a very unmistakable warning at the address of Japan.

When the Japanese troops were shelling the towns of Southern Manchuria, and forcibly disarming Chinese military units, the Department of State of the United States declared that "the information received from Mukden does not warrant the assumption that the Kellogg Pact has been violated." Thus it would appear that the fact of troops capturing on foreign territory the capital of the country is not likely to impair the virginity of the Kellogg Pact. What a desirable thing is innocence that cannot even be hurt by heavy guns. But now that Japan's sphere of influence in Northern China has expanded more and more, now that Japan has made attempts to carry into effect its broad program of expansion, the United States has given Japan a first warning. Even if putting the narrowest possible

-3-

possible interpretation on the American memorandum, it means that the United States stresses its direct interestedness in the present events, and in imperialistic language "interest in the events" means the desire to participate in the pillaging of the weaker countries.

But is Japanese imperialism willing to share the booty with the imperialists of other countries? For the time being it does not display such a desire. Japan's answer to the League of Nations, and after that its "explanations" in connection with the American memorandum, reflect in an equal measure the tendency of the Japanese policy not to permit the other imperialists to limit Japan's freedom of action. The only "concession" made so far by Japan is the declaration that Japan "desires peace," that its military circles "desire peace," and that the Japanese divisions operating on the territory of Manchuria, also "desire peace." The impression is created as if the Japanese diplomats in composing their notes to the Powers, as well as the Japanese military circles in declaring that the troops will soon be withdrawn, while at the same time they move those troops hither and thither within Manchurian territory, are both pursuing the identical aim -- the aim of gaining time.

Thus we may come to the conclusion that the Japanese military occupation of Manchuria is likely to have far-reaching consequences, both within the direct sphere of action of Japanese imperialism, as well as in the international arena as a whole.

Soviet



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Soviet public opinion which always stands on guard over peace, which is averse to any imperialistic outrages upon weaker countries, and to any military intervention, and which unswervingly struggles against the menace of war, cannot shut its eyes to the true character of the events taking place. Soviet public opinion understands that war, and nothing else, is going on in Southern Manchuria, and it is this conception that shapes Soviet opinion on the actions of Japanese imperialism. At the same time, Soviet public opinion cannot ignore the fact that the present events are taking place in closest proximity to the Soviet Union.


The events in Manchuria illustrate once more -- and in an exceedingly drastic way -- all the unprecedented instability in the capitalistic world of today, as well as the fact of how blurred the boundary line is between a state of peace and a state of war; furthermore, they exemplify the boundless hypocrisy of the pacifist phrases, the never-satisfied keenness of the imperialistic appetites, and that terrible levity and ease with which the imperialistic powers toy with the interests of peace and the fates of the nations. The toilers in the Soviet Union will with untiring attention watch the further development of events.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4 to despatch No. 1  
 of OCT 9 1931

*Komsomolskaya Pravda No 267*  
*Moscow, September 27, 1931.*



Карта Манчжурии.


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of OCT 9 1964

Moscow PRAVDA, 268, Sept. 28, 1931.

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ENCLOSURE NO. 6 TO DESPATCH NO. 8121 OF OCT 9 1931  
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow KRASSNAYA ZVEZDA,  
No. 261,  
September 28, 1931.  
(Front page, second double-  
column.)

BELLICOSE DECLARATION ISSUED BY THE SEYUKAI  
PARTY.

(Translation of editorial comment.)

After printing a correspondence from Tokyo, in which  
the gist of the declaration issued by the Seyukai Party  
is given, the following editorial comment is offered:

After the Minseito Government, with Wakatsuki and  
"cautious" Sidehara at its head, has carried into ef-  
fect in Manchuria the program of Japanese imperialism  
(within the limits permitted by the "great trans-oceanic  
neighbor"), which program could not have been carried  
out better even by the Seyukai Party if it were at the  
helm, the Seyukai people have now come forward with  
sharp criticism of the activities of the Government.

They criticize the untimeliness of the declaration  
addressed to the Powers, in which an explanation of  
Japan's action is given, and also the hesitating  
character of the steps following the seizure of the  
Taonan-Changchun-Kirin railway; they display "in-  
dignation" at the interference of the League of  
Nations which is placing Japan and China on the same  
footing;

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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footing; they demand once and for all that that unjust policy of China in respect of Japan be checked, and rendered impossible for the future\*, and lastly, they approve very much the action of the military authorities in Manchuria.

What is the meaning of all this ado? It is of course not that the Seyukai Party could inaugurate a policy different in any respect.

The Seyukai people know perfectly well that at a certain moment the United States would say: "Stop," irrespective of what Party is in power in Japan. It is simply a matter of pre-election tactics.

The elections for the provincial assemblies are shortly to begin in Japan, and at these elections the Seyukai will try to give battle to the Minseito Party, so that in the near future, when the elections for parliament take place, they might be returned to power. Speculating upon the chauvinistic dispositions of broad bourgeois and petty-bourgeois circles in Japan, as well as of the Japanese residents in China who, under the influence of the colossal ultra-patriotic agitation carried on by the Seyukai people and military circles on the eve and at the time of the recent events, had demanded that Manchuria and Inner Mongolia should  
 be

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\* obvious meaning of a confused passage.      Trans-  
 lator's note.

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be made a second Korea, and also that the military occupation should be extended to Harbin and Tatsienkai, the Seiyukai Party has now started the attack upon the Minseito Party, alleging that the step taken by the League of Nations, as well as the memorandum of the United States, and also the attitude of Nanking (the non-desire to conduct direct negotiations) are all due to the feeble policy of the Government.

"The Moor has done his duty (and very badly at that, adds the Seiyukai Party) -- the Moor can go;" this is the political tendency with which the Seiyukai Party is going into the election campaign, trying to pave the way to its return to power.

However, whatsoever one may think of the results of the Japanese action which undoubtedly will strengthen the position of Japan in Manchuria -- a way out of the crisis will not be afforded to Japanese imperialism, and even the Seiyukai Party, that Party of "bankruptcy, intervention, and political provocation" will not be able to save the extraordinarily complicated situation in which Japanese imperialism finds itself.

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ENCLOSURE NO. 7 TO DESPATCH NO. 8121 OF OCT 9 1931  
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow IZVESTIA,  
No. 270,  
September 30, 1931.

JAPAN STRENGTHENS ITS POSITIONS IN MANCHURIA.

(Translation of editorial comment on sundry telegraph  
information on this subject.)

Notwithstanding its "conciliatory" assurances, Japanese imperialism does not restrict but rather extends its intervention in Manchuria. The promises concerning the withdrawal of troops are of an intentionally vague character. From Tokyo come simultaneously mutually contradictory news concerning this matter. And in addition, the situation in Manchuria has become such that a formal withdrawal of the Japanese troops is no longer of decisive significance. The disarmament of the Mukden army, the confiscation of arms, the wrecking of the arsenal, and the seizure by the Japanese of the entire network of railways — all this proves in itself a sufficient obstacle in the way of the restoration of the Mukden political authority. The Japanese military have in reality already completed their task, and now their work can well be continued by the police, which even before the conflict have been very active in those districts of Southern Manchuria, that are of principal interest to Japan. In the event of the Japanese troops being withdrawn, the Japanese police will remain

-2-

remain the only and dominant armed force throughout the whole of that territory. It is characteristic that the Tsindao district to which it was originally contemplated to send Japanese troops, has now been occupied <sup>by</sup> Japanese police detachments.

Just now the Japanese imperialists are busy strengthening politically their positions "conquered" in Manchuria. For this purpose new "independent" organs of a native Chinese power are hurriedly created, composed of creatures of the Japanese. The statement made by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the "neutrality" of Japan in this "internal struggle" between the various Manchurian groups, scarcely requires any comment. The creating of new provincial governments in Manchuria, those governments announcing that they do not recognize Chang Hsueh-liang and Nanking, proves that the Japanese intervention is growing deeper, and it is fully in keeping with the long-cherished desire of Japanese imperialism and Japanese military circles to separate Manchuria from China proper, making its fate the same as Korea's.

This deepening of the intervention has been possible only thanks to the active support given to Japan by the European imperialists. The tactics of the latter are illustrated by that despicable comedy that is being played in Geneva in connection with the Japanese-Chinese conflict. The League of Nations has not merely demonstrated its impotence in this conflict; it has also shown beyond all doubt its

true



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true character -- its character as a direct tool of the rapacious predatory tendencies of the policy of imperialism. The words of Leroux about the "efforts of Geneva" with a view to arriving at a "satisfactory" settlement of the conflict, the mutual courtesies exchanged between Iosizava and Shek in connection with the assault upon Wang Chen-ting, the appeal addressed by the same Leroux to the journalists -- to approach this "delicate" question carefully, the explanation given by Cecil who demonstratively interpreted the proposal of the Chinese delegate the other way about, and lastly the pitiable grimaces of that latter delegate, -- all this goes to make up a repulsive picture for the hideousness of which scarcely words can be found.

But the fact of what is practically an alliance of Japan with European imperialism, which latter is bossing the League, cannot do away with the inevitable sharpening of the conflict of interests between the imperialists themselves, such sharpening being the consequence of the Japanese advance in Manchuria. That sharpening has already manifested itself in the tone of the American memorandum in which the United States very unmistakably established the fact of its interestedness, and practically suggested an adequate division of the booty. The sharpening of the conflict of interests between the imperialists themselves will become more pronounced in the measure that the concrete demands of Japan will outline themselves, and in the measure that its aspirations to a position of monopoly will become more distinct.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.8 to despatch No. 8221 of

12v, 263, Sept. 23, 1937

Р - 1

## На манчжурской арене

Рис. Бор. Ефимова



Бор. Ефимов-31

РОЛЬ ЖЕНЕВСКИХ МИРОТВОРЦЕВ


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 9 to despatch No. 3121 of OCT 9 1931

IZVESTIA, 270, September 30, 1931  
 p - 1

## Любимая музыка

Рис. Бор. Ефимова.



Бор. Ефимов. 31

СЛУШАТЕЛИ ЯПОНСКОЙ СИМФОНИИ

ENCLOSURE NO. 10 TO DESPATCH NO. 8121 OF OCT 9 1931  
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow KRASNAYA  
ZVEZDA,  
No. 262,  
of September 29, 1931.

SECOND PHASE OF THE JAPANESE INTERVENTION.

(Summary of editorial article).

Under American pressure, Japan has made a gesture of retreat, but nobody should accept its statement about a withdrawal of troops. Hardly a single armed Chinese soldier remains in the area of Japanese occupation.

It has been announced that separate negotiations will be conducted with Mukden and Nanking. The head of the Mukden government is at Peiping and apprehends that he might meet with the fate of his father if he undertook to return to Mukden, and the Japanese Minister for War has stated that there is no intention at Tokyo to invite him to return. Probably, the Japanese are looking over the available Chinese possibilities as heads of a new Mukden government. With that new government, when formed, Japan will negotiate for

1. The transformation of its tenure of the Southern Manchurian Railway and of the Kwantung peninsula into complete property rights;
2. The bridging of the 60-kilometer gap in the projected Kirin-Hoiren railway;
3. The building of a railway westwards from Kirin via Taoyan to Solun [due south of Hailar, a station of the Chinese Eastern Railway] and thence "northwestwards";
4. The building of a branch of the foregoing into Inner Mongolia;

-2-

5. Japanese control of all Chinese railways and ports that compete with the Japanese railways and ports;
6. The removal of the dues imposed upon Japanese exports from, and imports into, Manchuria;
7. The right to unhindered colonization of Inner Mongolia by Japanese and Koreans;  
or
8. The right/Japanese and Koreans to leave lands in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

Negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek to strengthen Japanese influence in the remainder of China would not be premising, because Chiang Kai-shek is under American guidance. Japan, therefore, will try to procure his removal or downfall; negotiations to this end are proceeding between Canton and Nanking.

DBM/hs

ENCLOSURE NO. 11 TO DESPATCH NO. 3121 OF OCT 9 1931  
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow IZVESTIA,  
No. 273,  
October 3, 1931.  
(Front page).

A PROVOCATIVE ANTI-SOVIET INVENTION OF THE  
DAILY TELEGRAPH.

(Translation)

London, October 1. (Information of the IZVESTIA).  
The DAILY TELEGRAPH has reproduced a lying news item  
from Mukden, alleging that Soviet cavalry patrols and  
armored cars have entered Manchuria, which, it is  
stated, has called forth a protest from the Chinese  
authorities. The newspaper further asserts that  
the Soviet Consul has stated that "the patrols are  
simply searching for white guards." The newspaper  
alleges that the real purpose of this crossing of the  
border was to "exercise pressure upon the Chinese."

\* \*  
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In the above news item of the DAILY TELEGRAPH it  
is not difficult to find all the characteristic signs  
of the most hideous anti-Soviet provocation. It goes  
without saying that the information of the DAILY  
TELEGRAPH is from beginning to end a falsehood pure and  
simple. No Soviet patrols whatsoever have ever  
crossed the Chinese-Soviet border, nor have they more  
particularly had the slightest intention either of  
"exercising pressure upon the Chinese," or of "searching  
for

-2-

for white guards." Persons of the latter kind could undoubtedly be found among the authors or inspirers of that false news item contained in the said Conservative newspaper. In the measure that the conflict in Manchuria develops, the local white guards are becoming active, and are clearly getting ready for some anti-Soviet provocation. The falsehoods published in the columns of the DAILY TELEGRAPH should be regarded as one of the characteristic manifestations of the anti-Soviet activities of certain groups which hope to take advantage of the complicated situation in the Far East, in order to try and carry their hideous plans into effect.

js/hs

ENCLOSURE NO. 12 TO DESPATCH NO. 5121 OF OCT 9 1931  
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: MOSCOW PRAVDA,  
No. 273,  
October 3, 1931.  
Front page.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS GIVES TO JAPANESE  
IMPERIALISM THE MANDATE IN RESPECT OF MANCHURIA.

(Translation.)

Geneva, September 30 (TASS). After nine days  
hesitation the Council of the League of Nations  
adopted a "resolution" in respect of the seizure of  
Manchuria by Japanese imperialism.

In opening the session, the chairman, Leroux,  
pointed out that, although the Council of the League  
of Nations attached principal importance to the with-  
drawal of the Japanese troops and their return to  
the railway zone, he considered at the same time the  
necessity of a certain "delay for assuring the safety  
of Japanese subjects."

After this Leroux read the draft of the resolution  
which amounts to the following:

1) The Council of the League of Nations notes the  
replies of the Chinese and the Japanese Governments,  
and also the fact that both have adopted measures  
for terminating the conflict.

2) The Council recognizes the importance of  
the declaration made by the Japanese Government

to



-2-

to the effect that it has no intention to acquire territory in Manchuria.

3) The Council notes the statement made by the Japanese delegate to the effect that the Japanese Government will endeavor to complete the withdrawal of its troops, and their return to the railway zone, as quickly as possible, in the measure that the genuine safety of Japanese citizens will be assured.

4) The Council notes the assurance given by the Chinese Government to the effect that it undertakes to guarantee the safety of Japanese citizens in the measure that the Japanese troops retire.

5) The Council notes the assurances given by the Japanese delegate and the Chinese delegate to the effect that their respective governments will adopt every possible measure to prevent the further spreading of the conflict, and a sharpening of the situation.

6) The Council of the League of Nations requests both sides to accelerate the restoration of normal relations between them, for which purpose the Council considers it necessary that both sides should fulfill the obligations they are assuming as quickly as possible.

7) The Council of the League of Nations requests both sides to keep the Council adequately and frequently informed of events that take place.

8)

-3-

8) The Council resolves, unless an unforeseen emergency necessitates an earlier date, to meet for its next ordinary session in Geneva on October 14.

9) The Council authorizes its chairman to call off the next session, if after communicating with the members of the Council, and more particularly with the Chinese and the Japanese parties to the dispute, he should come to the conclusion that the situation has changed so much as to render the meeting of the Council unnecessary.

After the speeches of the Japanese delegate Josizava, and the Chinese delegate, Shek, who agreed to the draft of the resolution, the resolution was adopted. In his concluding speech Leroux stated that he was "happy to note that the Council was unanimous," after which he prorogued the session till October 14.

\* \*  
\*

Every word of the carefully dressed resolution of the Geneva peacemakers is oozing with hypocritical falsehood. The Council of the League recognizes the "importance" of the declaration of the Japanese invaders, concerning the absence of any "intention to acquire territory in Manchuria!" Messrs. Leroux and Company assume an innocent air, just as if they did not know that at the very moment when that resolution was read in Geneva, the Japanese

-4-

Japanese military clique continued to spread terror and death, fortifying its positions within the seized territory of Manchuria.

The Council of the Geneva talking shop pretends not to notice the maneuvers of Japanese imperialism, which have the purpose of making Japanese rule in China permanent. Mukden, Kirin, and other important places in the country remain as hitherto in the hands of the invaders who openly declare that they do not intend leaving them. In every one of these towns, in Inner Mongolia and in the Harbin district, the mercenary adherents of the Kuomintang, hired by the Japanese command, are proclaiming "independence." And the League of Nations notes with satisfaction the <sup>empty\*</sup> declarations of the Japanese Government.

With the adoption of the "resolution" concerning the Chinese-Japanese conflict, the League of Nations has wound up the first period of its "peace-making" work. The next meeting is to take place on October 14. Japanese imperialism is thus given sufficient time to bring to a successful end the hideous plot between the imperialists and the traitors from the Kuomintang.

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\* literally: vegetarian.

ENCLOSURE NO. 13 TO DESPATCH NO. 0121 OF OCT 9 1931  
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,  
No. 273,  
October 3, 1931.  
Front page.

THE DIVIDING UP OF CHINA.

(Translation of leading editorial.)

The crisis which has shaken the whole capitalistic world has already brought about a sharpening of the conflict of interests between the several imperialistic countries, and groups of countries, in all parts of the globe. The danger of new wars for the purpose of dividing the world over again is becoming every day more and more imminent. The Manchurian events are not only a reminder of the fact that in the diplomatic chanceries and military headquarters of capitalism where preparations for war are going on. From the vast stretches of Manchuria the actual roll of the guns can already be heard.

The masses of toilers in China have even before this time personally experienced all the horrors of imperialistic oppression and exploitation, of their country being divided up into "spheres of influence," of the concessions, of the "possession by treaty," and of the economical and political commanding heights in the country being seized by foreign capitalism.

The

-2-

The Kuomintang has failed to unite China. The national consolidation of the country is possible only through the victory of the anti-imperialistic and anti-feudal revolution. The pitiful efforts of the hangman of Chinese workmen and peasants, Chiang Kai-shek, to rally the country under the sway of imperialism over China, while maintaining the feudal and semi-feudal agrarian system, could not but suffer ignominious defeat. During the rule of the Kuomintang, foreign capitalism has gained new positions in China. The groups in the Kuomintang and the militaristic groups have been but puppets in the hands of one or the other imperialistic Power.

The incessant wars of the generals have, at the same time, been wars between the imperialists for the division of the spheres of influence in China. Just at present the Japanese military clique is openly trying to bring about a new division of China. All the hypocritical phrases about the "sovereignty and territorial integrity" of China are not dropped. The sharpening of the imperialistic conflicts of interest as a result of the crisis, the tremendous importance of the Chinese markets, and the struggle for hegemony in the Pacific Basin have entered upon such a stage where actual division, and all it implies, become the principal form of the further extension and strengthening of the imperialistic positions.

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There is, however, one more consideration that makes the policy of division a foregone conclusion; namely, the struggle of the imperialists against a genuine rallying of the country by the Chinese masses of toilers under the guidance of the proletariat.

The heroic struggle of the workmen and peasant masses against the imperialists and their slaves, the generals and the Kuomintang people, has even now assumed grandiose dimensions. The south of China and the Yangtze Valley are all aflame with civil war. The red banner is waving already over the Soviet districts in the north of China. The ground under the feet of the Nanking pretorians, the Canton hangmen, and the other "rulers" of general's rank is afire.

The Kuomintang, that is, the bloc of the bourgeoisie and the estate holders, is prepared to sell the whole of China, as they have been selling it hitherto piecemeal to the imperialists in exchange for the latter's protection against the Chinese Soviets. The imperialists did support, and do support the militarists and the Kuomintang, who are at present the principal agents of the colonial enslavement of the Chinese nation. But the foreign imperialists as well as the Chinese slave owners, are fully accessible to the logic of real facts. The broader the front of the struggle for the workmen and peasant power becomes, and the stronger the tempest rages in Southern and Central China, shaking the sanguinary régime of the Kuomintang, the more  
clearly

-4-

clearly can the approach of the genuine rallying of China be discerned. The imperialists are making haste to get ahead of these events, they try to tear the body of China into pieces, to strangle the victorious labor-peasant movement, this being their way of solving the "Chinese question."

This double aim of the imperialists has been unmistakably formulated by Mr. Bronson Reagh [?], that American agent of the Japanese colonizers, in the FAR EASTERN REVIEW, who continuously advocates the co-operation of American and Japanese imperialism in China.

"The Chinese problem," writes Bronson Reagh, "can be solved in the prevailing conditions only by means of creating several separate compact states on the territory of China. A hundred years or so will pass before the Chinese nation will have assimilated the fundamental principles of self-government... Manchuria even now constitutes a self-contained unit, and sooner or later this fact will have to be recognized... Neither the Kellogg Pact, nor the League of Nations, nor any other similar institutions will be able to stop Japan."

"Just now," he goes on, "Canton tries to overcome the Nanking group. Would it not be more expedient if the foreign Powers were to recognize the independence of Canton (which would include Kwangsi, Hunan, and Kweichow provinces). The interference of the foreign Powers by recognizing the existing de facto situation, is the only way of saving China

from

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from splitting up into a number of Soviet republics."

Japanese imperialism is making for an open division of China with the support of the League of Nations and of part of the imperialistic Powers. It would be a great error to think that the imperialism of the United States objects to the occupation of Manchuria on the ground that it is against the division of China. The "maximum program" of American imperialism is the conversion of the whole of China into a colony of the United States. That is why the United States supported the Nanking hangmen not only in the struggle against the Chinese nation but also in the generals' wars against other militaristic and Kuomintang groups which acted as the agents of other imperialistic Powers.

The United States was bent upon rallying China, or a considerable part of China, under the government of Nanking, so as to convert, through the agency of Nanking, the whole of China into an American colony. The "recognition" of Nanking, even though it was a recognition in words only, and nominal one, and not an actual recognition, on the part of the Mukden group, therefore caused suspicion in the minds of Japanese imperialists. Japanese imperialism discarded its, by the way very devout, servant Chang Hsueh-liang and the other Manchurian satraps because in their haggling with Japanese imperialism they had tried to turn to account the Japanese-American conflicts of interest.

However,



-5-

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However,

-6-

However, within American financial capitalism there is not at all only one opinion prevailing in regard to its policy in respect of China, which fact is borne out, among other things, in the article by Bronson Reagh. Several groups in the camp of American financial capital have been trying to compromise, and agreed to cooperate with Japanese capitalism.

American imperialism is highly interested in the strengthening of its positions in China, and therefore it would not be averse to joining in the Geneva plot of the imperialists against the Chinese nation, if the particular acuteness of the American-Japanese conflict of interests were not an obstacle in this way. But it cannot be disputed that for the military occupation of Manch<sup>h</sup>uria by Japanese imperialism, the United States will try to compensate itself with some other portion of the country. In effect, the position of the American imperialists scarcely differs from the position of the Japanese, English, French, and other imperialists.

The Government of the United States has shown considerable self-restraint in connection with the events in Manchuria. The causes of that self-restraint are, first, that American imperialism, while having large interests in Manchuria, has had all the same its hands bound by the crisis, and could not therefore lodge an energetic protest against

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against the occupation of Manchuria, although on the other hand, it does not intend to withdraw from Manchuria either: thus the struggle for Manchuria is still ahead. Secondly, within the camp of American imperialism itself struggle is going on as to which of the tendencies in the Far-Eastern policy is to gain the upper hand. Thirdly, the imperialism of the United States fears a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance which was broken only in 1922 under the pressure of the United States.

As regards the Japanese colonizers, they are trying to dress their adventure in a Chinese-Mongolian gown. This task is all the more difficult since all this comedy, and the purpose of all this repulsive masquerade, is perfectly clear. But the Japanese military clique is not very embarrassed by this circumstance. In obedience to the prompters from Tokyo, "the independent" provinces of Kirin, Hailungcheng, and Mukden have cropped up, and also Inner Mongolia, which, along with Manchuria, has all along been a center of attraction for Japanese imperialism, has proclaimed its "independence." All these "new states" constitute another stage on the road towards turning Manchuria and Inner Mongolia into a second Korea.

In the light of these facts, the ado which for nine days has been going on in Geneva, acquires a truly hideous character. The jobbers from the League of Nations, who are selling the blood of the Chinese people, have given to Japanese

imperialism

-8-

imperialism their blessings in the matter of the occupation of Manchuria. The Council of the League of Nations tried to camouflage this Manchurian robbery by simultaneously organizing an if possible united front of the imperialists for the definite enslavement of the Chinese people.

At the same time the League of Nations pursues the task of extending the maneuvering possibilities of the hangmen from the Kuomintang. The League of Nations and the Kuomintang have endeavored to strengthen the positions of the imperialists, so that they might keep themselves afloat on the high-going waves of the national movement which threatens to wash the Kuomintang, as well as its bosses, off the face of China. In Nanking, as well as in Tokyo and Geneva, they are now very busy trying to find ways and means by which the division of China may best be achieved. In the face of the toilers throughout the world the League of Nations has shown itself once more as the organizer of war and of colonial robbery, and has proved that the Kellogg Pact is an instrument for justifying such war.

So far as it is able, the Second International too is playing a role in the plot of the imperialists against the Chinese nation. The "socialistic" Ministers of the English Government are supporting the Japanese imperialists, the "socialistic" press is busy in the interests of its masters, and the Berlin VORWAERTS justifies openly the outrage committed upon

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upon the Chinese nation.

The Second International is just as much an enemy of the Chinese nation as the imperialists are.

The Chinese proletariat, the Chinese indigents, and the Chinese masses of toilers are already carrying on struggle under the leadership of the labor class against the imperialistic division of China. The red banner of independence and of class emancipation is already waving in various districts of China. Only the masses of toilers, under the leadership of the proletariat, will be able to defend China against the new attempt on the part of the imperialists. Shoulder to shoulder the masses of toilers in Japan, Korea and Formosa will fight with them. The toilers in the U.S.S.R. and throughout the whole world are surrounding the Chinese toilers in this struggle with an atmosphere of sympathy and solidarity.

js/fk

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 14 TO DESPATCH NO. 0121 OF OCT 9 1931  
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: MOSKAUER RUNDSCHAU,  
No. 45,  
of October 4, 1931.

WORLD IMPERIALISM AND THE JAPANESE INTERVENTION  
IN MANCHURIA.


(Translation of an excerpt from the  
leading article, signed "N".)

\*\*\*\*\*

The Japanese appear not to have erred in their  
reckoning. The first comments on the Japanese action  
this side and beyond the Atlantic ocean are noteworthy  
for their extraordinary passivity; in other words,  
for the manifest readiness therein displayed to leave  
Japan complete freedom of action...

\*\*\*\*\*

DBM/fk



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 22, 1931.

*The Consul General at Mukden reports:*

The Japanese military authorities assume control, by agreement with the "peace preservation committee", over the Bureau of Finance of Liaoning Province (i.e., the province of which Mukden is the capital).

Four Japanese advisers are installed in the offices of the new (Chinese) municipal administration at Mukden.


*SKH*

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OCT 22 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

SKH/ZMF




**CONFIDENTIAL**  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

October 19, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON  
AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI

Manchuria.



The Japanese Ambassador came to tell me of three things.

First: He said that Baron Shidehara had authorized him to say that Japan had withdrawn her objections to Mr. Gilbert's participation as an observer in the meetings of the Council, although Japan remained insistent on her position that the action of the Council in admitting him was illegal.

Second: He said that Baron Shidehara retained his fullest confidence in the friendly attitude of this government and was very grateful for our friendly cooperation with Japan in this matter, about which he had previously expressed himself.

Third: He said that Baron Shidehara had authorized him to express to me his regret for the statements attributed to the spokesman of the Foreign Office the other day which were not authorized by Baron Shidehara.

The Ambassador then went on to say that there was

some

793.94/2271



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

some good news which he had to tell me, about events in Manchuria - not very important items, he said, but good as far as they went. He stated -

1st. That the radio station in Mukden, about the seizure of which I had protested, was to be turned back to its owners within a day or two and radio communication restored with the outside world.

2nd. That the foreign banks in Mukden were already open and doing business.

3rd. That Japanese withdrawals into the railway zone were still continuing.

4th. That the Japanese had had in Manchuria only one squadron of scouting planes and one squadron of fighting planes, and that the squadron of fighting planes was being sent back to Korea.

5th. That the operation of the railways was being restored.

I asked the Ambassador about the report that the construction of the railway from Kirin to Hueining was progressing normally. He said that this railway was being constructed by the Chinese and the despatch evidently referred to Chinese construction. I told him that I had  
received

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

received a good deal of information from many sources as to the situation in Manchuria and that I now unfortunately had very strong evidence that acts of aggression had been committed in Manchuria by men wearing the Japanese uniform and under the Japanese flag; that I had clung to my belief that the actions of these men were not authorized by the Japanese Government, in which I had faith, and I hoped that neither Baron Shidehara nor the Japanese Government would take any action which would amount to a ratification of these acts, because if they did I would be driven to the reluctant belief that the Pact of Paris had been violated. He admitted his belief that such acts had been committed, but he said he was very confident that they would not be ratified by his government.

He then asked me what was happening in Geneva. I told him that I had been informed that five nations had sent notes to China and Japan under the Pact of Paris. He said he had heard that and had no doubt that those notes had been received. He asked me whether these nations had notified me of their action and requested us to do likewise. I said that I had been informed that they would notify us, but no notification had yet been received.

Before

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 4 -

Before leaving, the Ambassador handed me the annexed memorandum of the number of Japanese, British and American men-of-war now actually in service in China.

HLS.


S HLS:HHR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FOREIGN MEN-OF-WAR IN CHINA

|                                   | Cruisers | Destroyers | River<br>Gunboat | Total | Submarines |
|-----------------------------------|----------|------------|------------------|-------|------------|
| Japan                             | 6        | 11         | 12               | 29    | -----      |
| Great<br>Britain                  | 6        | 6          | 19               | 31    | -----      |
| United<br>States<br>of<br>America | 1        | 17         | 7                | 25    | 10         |

TELEGRAM RECEIVED  
GRAY




WP

RECEIVED  
OCT 22 1931  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS

Peiping

FROM Dated October 22, 1931

Rec'd 11:25 p. m. 21st



RECEIVED  
OCT 22 1931

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

804, October 22, 7 a. m.

Following from Consul General at Mukden:

"October 21, 11 a. m. The Bureau of Finance  
Liaoning province was reopened on October 19 under  
provisional regulations drawn up by the peace preservation  
committee and sanctioned by the Japanese military authori-  
ties. Regulations which were published yesterday provided  
that scope of the Bureau's authority is the same as before,  
that Japanese advisers shall be engaged and their views  
respected, that a committee comprising Japanese repre-  
sentatives and the Japanese advisers in addition to  
representatives of specified Chinese offices and organi-  
zations shall revise the taxation system and that notice  
of the Chief of the Bureau must first be approved by the  
Japanese military authorities before issuance.

The

793.94/2272

- 2 - No. 804 from Peiping

The reorganization of the Bureau of Civil administration and industry along similar lines, no doubt is under way.

On morning of October 20 the Mukden municipal administration was transferred to Chinese by Japanese mayor. Instead of Japanese officers municipal offices will have four Japanese advisers."

For the Minister,

ENGERT

JS

168  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

FROM

GREEN

GENEVA

Dated October 21, 1931

Rec'd 5:11 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

VERY URGENT



237, October 21, 7 p.m.

FOR THE SECRETARY

Consulate's 211, October 16, 11 p.m., Department's 108,

October 20, 4 p.m.

In a conversation with Briand this afternoon the question of a "sequia" to the Council's action respecting the Pact of Paris in its meeting of October 16 was brought forward. It was suggested that in a public meeting of the Council in which it should seem most opportune to him, Briand, as President of the Council, should make a statement in simple terms as to the action which had been taken in invoking the pact (A) by states represented on the Council and (B) by other states signatories of the pact in far as that action could be ascertained by him at the time of the meeting). He is requesting Paris to keep him currently



793.94/2273

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note  
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793.94/2273

FILED  
OCT 24 1931

MAM

2- #237, from Geneva, October 21,  
1931

currently informed of such pertinent information as is received there.

Such a statement as he would make would not cite any note sent to Tokyo or Peking but would merely name the states which had sent notes and make references to Article two of the pact.

He then envisaged that I might make a similar statement or he would include the United States in his list. I said that I would take this up with you at once. I solicit your early instructions in order that, if this plan is to be carried out Briand may have the opportunity to get the matter in hand.

GILBERT

CSB



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
 PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-136

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NON-CONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Collect  
 Charge Department

Charge to  
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

This cable was sent in confidence.  
 It should be treated as such and not  
 be released to anyone.

OCT 21 1931

October 21 1931

7pm

793-94

American Consul

Geneva (Switzerland)

Hour 237, October 21, 7 p.m. /2273

114

For Gilbert

Department perceives no ~~reason~~ sufficient reason  
 for a separate statement. ~~must~~ Please inform Briand  
 that we feel that he should include the United States in  
 his list.

SICK

Stinson

SICK

793.94/2273

With Mr. Carter approval.

FE/SICK

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-136

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

GREEN

GENEVA

Undated



RECEIVED  
 OCT 21 1931  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 RECEIVED  
 October 21, 1931  
 4:25 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

236

*File*  
*EQC*  
*793-94/2274*  
 Department's 109, October 20, 5 p.m.

With reference to paragraph one: Your instructions  
 are entirely clear and I will follow them strictly.

With reference to paragraph two; for purpose of refer-  
 ence I have given number 233, October 20, 9 p.m., to the  
 telegram which I read to you over the telephone at 7 p.m.  
 Geneva time. If you advise me that the stenographic re-  
 cord is not complete or is not entirely clear I shall at  
 once cable the telegram in entirety or in such portions as  
 you may indicate.

CSB

GILBERT

793.94/2274

FILED

OCT 24 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
 PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138  
 TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
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 PLAIN

Collect  
 Charge Department  
 OR  
 Charge to  
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

*green*

October 22, 1931.

Do NOT DISTRIBUTE

AMCONSUL,

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND)

713.94/2274

Your 236, undated.

Referring to second paragraph, please telegraph text, in entirety of the telegram to which you have assigned No. 233, October 20, 9 p. m.

*Stimson*  
 (A.S.)

298.

DCR DAS:IU

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138


793.94/2274

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M. J. E

AM



GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 22, 1931

Rec'd 3:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

810, October 22, 11 a.m.

Legation's 787, October 18, 10 a.m.

Japanese Consul and staff have returned to  
Tsitsihar,

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

793.94/2275

FILED

OCT 23 1931

793.94  
with  
702.9493

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OCT 22 1931  
DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION


FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 22, 1931

Rec'd 12:50 a.m.



Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

807, October 22, 9 a.m.

Hansen and Salisbury have returned to their  
respective posts.

For the Minister

ENGERT

JS

793.94/2276

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note  
123  
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C.?  
C.?

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 20 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED

OCT 21 1931

THE UNDERSECRETARY

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

OCT 21 1931

October 18, 1931.

Division of  
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
 OCT 22 1931  
 Department of State

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR

The Japanese Ambassador came to see me this morning, Sunday, to say that he had heard from Tokyo that Japan was withdrawing its opposition to having Gilbert sit in at the meetings of the League, reserving, however, its position on the juridical point as to whether under the Covenant of the League an outsider could be asked in without unanimous consent. Mr. Debuchi said rather ruefully that he realized this was an eleventh hour decision after the harm had been done. He then said that his telegram further stated the regret of Baron Shidehara that the Foreign Office spokesman had made the statement he did. He told me, however, that he was coming to the Department to tell this to the Secretary officially and added that he had merely told me in this unofficial way as I might want to tell the Secretary in advance of his official call.

I asked the Ambassador whether there was not a certain significance in a statement in the press, which was given no importance, that there was to be a meeting on Monday in Tokyo between Baron Shidehara, General

793.94/2277


FILED

OCT 28 1931

-2-

General Minami, Prince Saionji, Count Makino and others to discuss the Manchurian situation. The Ambassador said that he felt this meeting was of vital importance on account of the standing of the men who were to take part and that he felt its influence would be very far reaching.

(Prince Saionji and Count Makino are certainly the two outstanding men of Japan so far as influence with the Emperor and on the Republic is concerned. Both, furthermore, are thoroughly pacific, both were of great help to me during the negotiations in London of the Naval Treaty and although I could not telegraph the information so definitely to London, I ceased to have any fear that Japan would refuse to make a treaty after being told by these two gentlemen that Japan must and would participate.)



U WRC:GMH



2  
EX-100  
File  
(NOT FOR THE PRESS)  
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF PRESS CONFERENCE, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1931.

ARMAMENTS

At the press conference this morning Undersecretary Castle announced that Minister Hugh Wilson arrived in Washington today. Mr. Wilson was ordered back by the Secretary of State immediately after the meeting of the League was over to discuss disarmament. Asked if Mr. Wilson would be one of the technical aides during the Hoover-Laval Conference, the Undersecretary replied in the negative and added that Mr. Wilson's arrival had absolutely nothing to do with the visit of Prime Minister Laval. Mr. Wilson was ordered to Washington before we knew that M. Laval was coming. In fact, Mr. Wilson probably will not even be in Washington during the visit of the French Prime Minister, as he desires to go to Chicago for private reasons.

793.94/2278

DR. BRINKLEY

A correspondent asked if the Undersecretary would tell something about the meeting yesterday with Dr. Brinkley, of Kansas City, and if Dr. Brinkley had been offered any assistance. In reply the Undersecretary said that Dr. Brinkley simply came to the Department and told him what his troubles were in Mexico. He was assured that his troubles at the present time do not arise from any action of this Government whatever. Mr. Castle said he had to admit that he saw no evidence why the Mexican Government would not allow Dr. Brinkley to broadcast. Dr. Brinkley said that the reason therefor was that our Embassy at Mexico City had asked the Mexican Government not to permit him to broadcast. He was assured that this was not true and that if the Mexican Government should ask Ambassador Clark whether he would object to his broadcasting the Ambassador would reply in the negative. Asked then if it is a fact that the Department does not object to Dr. Brinkley's activities, the Undersecretary re-



-2-

plied that we do not object at the present moment. Asked if the Vice President had arranged the interview, the Undersecretary said that the Vice President had asked for someone in the Department to see Dr. Brinkley. A correspondent observed that it appeared that the Federal Radio Commission had been in a dispute with Dr. Brinkley and asked if it was possible that the Commission had asked the State Department to make representations to the Mexican Government. The correspondent continued by saying that the Radio Commission had taken away Dr. Brinkley's radio license and his medical license and asked if the Department had any information that the Board of Health considered Dr. Brinkley as dangerous. The Undersecretary replied in the negative. The correspondent then asked if the question fell within the scope of the International Radio Convention. Mr. Castle replied in the negative and added that the International Radio Convention does not regulate broadcasting. A correspondent then asked if the matter was either a domestic or an international problem and if the State Department had received any protest from individual radio listeners about the station which Dr. Brinkley has set up on the Mexican border. Mr. Castle replied that the matter was largely a domestic problem in Mexico and that if the Mexicans do not like what he does they will probably say so. A correspondent then asked what Dr. Brinkley wanted the Department to do in the event Mexico should drive him out. He was informed in reply that Dr. Brinkley's claim was that we were pressing the Mexican Government to prohibit his broadcasting. Mr. Castle was able to assure the Doctor that we had made no proposals or suggestions of any kind to the Mexican Government beyond giving his record several months ago.

-3-

SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION

Asked if he was in possession of any recent news from Manchuria, Mr. Castle said that we had not received any word from the Orient this morning or yesterday and that we had not received any information of any kind from Geneva since we released the text of Mr. Gilbert's remarks before the Council of the League. Asked if the Department had received confirmation of the report that Consul General George C. Hanson was held up by bandits in Manchuria, the Undersecretary replied in the negative and added that Mr. Hanson had telegraphed that the Railroad was not in operation because of the fear of bandits and that this had momentarily delayed one of the trips that he and Mr. Salisbury had planned to make. Asked if there was any possibility that we might tell Mr. Gilbert that discretion would be the better part of valor and to withdraw, if the Japanese should become too insistent, Mr. Castle said that was purely speculative and that he could not answer the question. A correspondent then asked if the Department had any indication that Japan expected to withdraw from the League and the Undersecretary replied in the negative. A correspondent asked if any reports had been received from the Orient bearing out press reports of this morning that American participation in the League's efforts have been deemed extremely meddlesome by the military authorities in Japan. The Undersecretary replied in the negative. Asked if any confirmation had been received of press reports to the effect that there had been a battle between two forces of Chinese in northwestern Manchuria, the Undersecretary replied in the negative. A correspondent asked if the Department believed there was a prospect of a prompt and direct settlement of the Sino-Japanese trouble. Mr. Castle replied in the negative and added that the Department felt, as the Secretary has said, that a controversy of this kind can best be settled by direct negotiation and that the only hope we have is that war

-4-

may be avoided. The actual settlement of the points at issue is something outside of the invocation of the Kellogg Pact. A correspondent asked if the Department had any indications from Chinese or Japanese sources as to what possible course the ultimate settlement might take, whether it will go to the World Court or to an arbitration committee. Mr. Castle replied in the negative and added that we are not involved in that matter. Our only interest is to prevent war and we shall not take sides in the controversy and neither will we try to dictate the terms of settlement or even to suggest terms. Asked if direct negotiations between China and Japan have been broken off, Mr. Castle said that no formal negotiations had been going on, but that he had no doubt they were talking to each other both in Tokyo and Peiping. A correspondent asked if the American and British Ministers, who are both now in Nanking, would assist in bringing China and Japan together. The Undersecretary replied in the negative. Observing that this Government favors direct negotiations between the two countries, that Japan desires direct negotiations and that China opposes them, a correspondent said he presumed we were more sympathetic to the Japanese viewpoint than to that of the Chinese. The Undersecretary replied that this presumption was not true. NOT FOR QUOTATION OR ATTRIBUTION OR FOR USE IN ANY WAY, we heard that the Chinese want a commission to go into Manchuria to settle this matter. Whatever is done, there obviously must be direct contact between the two disputants, but we are not taking sides as to whether this would be alone or as part of a commission.

M. J. McDermott.


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 20, 1931.

Digest of  
Newspaper Items.



NEW YORK TIMES

Tokyo despatch, October 19 (Hugh Byas), states that Japan has consented to American participation in the League. Washington is reassured as Tokyo accepts American view of Gilbert's mission in Geneva. There is no deadlock in the Geneva parleys.

"Japan withdrew her objection to an American observer with the League Council at Geneva in considering the Manchurian dispute, while still questioning the legality of the action. She is ready, if direct negotiations with China are arranged, to give pledges that her occupation of Chinese territory will be short and not to demand anything beyond her treaty rights.

"Ambassador Debuchi told Secretary Stimson Japanese military forces have begun a gradual withdrawal and American officials hope a peaceful settlement is in sight.

"In Geneva the League Council continued its efforts to promote conciliation. M. Briand offered a plan for compromise between China and Japan."

Geneva despatch, October 19 (Lansing Warren), states

that "today only three Council members could report that their governments had despatched notes similar to the League's. These were Britain, Norway and France. The others

Warren has  
been getting  
50% of his  
stuff wrong  
every day  
for the past  
three at least.  
sick

793.94/2279

FILED

OCT 22 1931

- 2 -

others reported that their governments had not seen fit to act or that they had not been informed what course had been taken."

The TIMES states editorially that <sup>4</sup>events of the past week have shown that the Kellogg-Briand treaty is not the flimsy fabric of a dream which its opponents pictured it in a debate in the United States Senate. " - - - "

"The Pact of Paris is henceforth no mere 'moral gesture'. It is 'implemented', if not with its own institutions for the settlement of disputes, with the best and most effective that it can borrow from the experience of the civilized world."

RSM:EJL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 842,9111/62 FOR Despatch #544

FROM Canada ( MacNider ) DATED Oct.16,1931  
TO NAME 1-1127 ope

REGARDING: Manchurian crisis. The,- has led to renewed attacks in the Canadian press on League of Nations for its obvious inability to enforce its views on the Japanese Government. Criticism of U. S. by the Toronto GLOBE which sees no difference between Japan's attitude toward Manchuria and the U. S. attitude toward Nicaragua.

fp

793.947 2280

793.947

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 10 -

#### 4. THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS.

The continuation of the Manchurian crisis has led in the past two weeks to renewed attacks in the Canadian press on the League of Nations for its obvious inability to enforce its views on the Japanese Government. It has also led to criticism of the United States by the Liberal Toronto GLOBE, which sees no difference between Japan's attitude toward Manchuria and the United States' attitude toward Nicaragua. It says:

"Japan is in no mood to tolerate intervention by the United States, because she is aware that, in her place, the United States would long ago have annexed Manchuria outright, or reduced it to the relationship of Nicaragua or Panama. Her sensitiveness in regard to Washington's attitude is due to the fact that, since the Great War, the United States has repeatedly frowned upon Japanese attempts to increase her foothold on the Asiatic mainland."

The GLOBE then brings out the well-worn argument that Japan must either "expand or explode" and that if the Japanese are not permitted to extend their influence in Manchuria, it is only a question of time before the Russians will do so. The sovereign rights of China in the disputed area do not appear to receive any consideration and although the GLOBE believes that Japan in the present instance has acted in too high-handed a manner, it sympathizes with the Japanese point of view. Without going into the difficulties which would stand in the way of such a solution, the GLOBE concludes with the following suggestion:

"One way out of the difficulty might be to give Japan a League mandate to govern the country, guaranteeing to China the right of unrestricted immigration; and to other nations continuance of the 'open-door' trade policy."

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

RECEIVED

Nanking via N. R.

301

Dated October 21, 1931

DIVISION

Rec'd 7 a. m. 22nd.

793.94  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.



October 21, 7 p. m.

Following paraphrase of telegram from Sze given to  
me by Soong today:

"The Japanese delegation is unofficially telling people  
that after the Secretary of State's explanation to Japanese  
Ambassador indicating that America would not join in  
economic sanctions, Japan would not continue to object  
to the presence of American representative in Council  
meetings. Japan's tactics seem to separate Washington  
from Geneva just as she successfully did in September.  
Officially she is taking (October 20th) stiff attitude in  
negotiations with Briand, and this she may keep up two  
or three days longer, hoping by then that through small  
concession powers will gladly accept her wishes at our  
expense."

JOHNSON

RR  
WBA

793.94/2281

FILED

OCT 26 1931



1695

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-122  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT *part conf*

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,

October 22, 1931.

*midnight*

793.94/2281  
116  
AMERICAN CONSUL,  
GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

CONFIDENTIAL.

Reference: Manchuria/situation.

The Department is in receipt of a ~~statement~~ *statement* outlining the situation in Geneva as of October 20 in which appears the following:

QUOTE The Japanese delegation is unofficially telling people that after the Secretary of State's explanation to Japanese Ambassador (indicating that America would not join in economic sanctions, Japan would not continue to object to the presence of American representative in Council meetings. Japan's tactics seem to separate Washington from Geneva just as she successfully did in September. Officially she is taking stiff attitude in negotiations with Briand UNQUOTE.

You may inform Drummond or Briand or Reading ~~in~~ *the Secretary has* ~~confidence~~ of this. You may state that ~~A~~ *has* made no ~~statement~~ *repeated* ~~commitment~~ with regard to joining or refusing to join in action which may be taken or may be proposed by the League. This Government ~~maintains an open mind and~~

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 L 136

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
 PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

## TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PLAIN

Collect  
 Charge Department  
 OR  
 Charge to  
 \$

## Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

*has in no way committed itself either positively or affirmatively and has not abridged its right to freedom of action either independently or concurrently or in collaboration or cooperation with the League negatively in that connection.*

*Castle*  
*Acis*

FE:SKH:IM

*RM*  
 FE  
*say*

Enciphered by *JS*

Sent by operator

M.,

19

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

Washington,

- 2 -

*has in no way committed itself either affirmatively or*  
~~and has not abridged its right to freedom of action~~  
~~either independently or concurrently or in collaboration~~  
~~or cooperation with the League,~~  
*negatively in that connection.*

*Carth*  
*Wing*

FE:SKH:LM

*REM*  
FE  
*my*

Enciphered by *JS*

Sent by operator *M.*, 19\_\_\_\_

1702  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Luitjens NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT *Gray*

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Department of State

Charge to  
\$

Washington,

October 22, 1931.

793.94/2281

AMERICAN CONSUL,

NANKING (CHINA).

100

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MINISTER.

*repeat no*

Your October 21, 7 p.m. from Nanking.

The Secretary of State has made no ~~commitment~~ *statement*

with regard to joining or refusing to join in action

which may be taken or may be proposed by the League.

This Government *has in no way committed itself* ~~maintains an open mind and has not~~

~~abridged its right to freedom of action either~~

~~independently or concurrently or in collaboration~~

~~or cooperation with the League.~~

*either positively or negatively in that connection!*  
*(affirmatively)*

*Castle*  
*Beings*

793.94/2281

*SKH*

FE:SKH:LM

FE

*Gray*

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY.

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 22, 1931

Rec'd 3:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

808, October 22, 10 a. m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"October 20, 4 p. m. Secret societies appear to be forming at Fushun, Tiehling, Liaoyuan and at least six other places and their executive committees are provisionally functioning as administrators of the respective districts. The regulations of the Fushun Society state that the Chinese family system of succession shall be revived. These societies appear to be part of the monarchial movement concerning rumors of intrigue are heard from time to time. Japanese are reported to be advisers to some of the societies".

For the Minister

ENGERT

RR

KLP



*He*  
*Eg.C*

793.94/2282

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1931 OCT 23 130

743-94  
24  
813.101-2282

1704

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 20 1961.

793.94

1961 02 1000000

1000000

My dear Mr. Chargé d'Affaires:

There is enclosed herewith, for your information,  
a copy of an identical note which has been sent today

for communication by the American Chargé at Tokyo to  
the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and by the  
American Minister to China at Nanking to the Acting  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The text of this note is, for the present, not  
being given to the press.

I am, my dear Mr. Yung Kwai,

Very sincerely yours,

W. R. Gantley, Jr.

Enclosure:  
Copy of note.

Mr. Yung Kwai,

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of China.

FE:RSM/VDM  
10/20/31

FE 5X11

the signed and  
inal.

1000000

793.94/2282A

An identical note is being communicated by the American Chargé at Tokyo to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and by the American Minister to China at Nanking to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. The text is as follows:

"The Government and people of the United States have observed with concern the events of the last month in Manchuria. When the difference between China and Japan came to a head on September 19th, one of the parties to the dispute referred the matter to the League of Nations and since that time the American Government by representation through diplomatic channels, has steadily cooperated with the League in its efforts to secure a peaceful settlement. A threat of war, wherever it may arise, is of profound concern to the whole world and for this reason the American Government, like other Governments, was constrained to call to the attention of both disputants the serious dangers involved in the present situation.

"This Government now desires, as do other signatories of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, particularly to call to the attention of the Chinese and the Japanese Governments the obligations which they voluntarily assumed when they became parties to that Treaty, especially the obligations of Article II, which reads:

'The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.'

"The American Government takes this occasion again to express its earnest hope that China and Japan will refrain from any measures which might lead to war and that they will find it possible in the near future to agree upon a method for resolving by peaceful means, in accordance with their promises and in keeping with the confident expectations of public opinion throughout the world, the issues over which they are at present in controversy."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Swartz NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 20 1981.

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

There is enclosed herewith, for your information,  
a copy of an identical note which has been sent today  
for communication by the American Chargé at Tokyo to  
the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and by the  
American Minister to China at Hanking to the Acting  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The text of this note is, for the present, not  
being given to the press.


I am, my dear Mr. Debuchi

Very sincerely yours,

Enclosure:  
Copy of note. W. R. Castle, Jr.

His Excellency

Mr. Katsunji Debuchi,  
Ambassador of Japan.



FE: RSM: EJJ

FE

Oct. 20 1981

CR

793.94/2282B



An identical note is being communicated by the American Chargé at Tokyo to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and by the American Minister to China at Nanking to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. The text is as follows:


"The Government and people of the United States have observed with concern the events of the last month in Manchuria. When the difference between Japan and China came to a head on September 19th, one of the parties to the dispute referred the matter to the League of Nations and since that time the American Government by representation through diplomatic channels, has steadily cooperated with the League in its efforts to secure a peaceful settlement. A threat of war, wherever it may arise, is of profound concern to the whole world and for this reason the American Government, like other Governments, was constrained to call to the attention of both disputants the serious dangers involved in the present situation.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75



file e.g.c.

October 17, 1931.

OCT 22 1931 Digest of  
DIVISION Newspaper Items.  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

NEW YORK TIMES

Geneva despatch, October 16 (Lansing Warren), reports that "with the American delegate participating and the Japanese and Chinese delegates absent, the Council of the League of Nations will hold a private sitting tomorrow (i. e. October 17) and discuss the measures to be taken in the Manchurian situation. Throughout today and late tonight there were many conversations among the leading delegates and the principals in controversy, which it is hoped may lead to some means of settlement, but because of Japan's position, progress may be painfully slow. None tonight would predict that this session of the Council would be closed before the middle of next week even with the cooperation of the United States."

"The American Consul General at Geneva . . . was careful to make plain that in taking his place at the Council table . . . he did so with no authority . . . to participate in the workings of the League's machinery, but was merely collaborate in keeping the world's peace in so far as the United States is obligated under the provisions of the Briand-Kellogg treaty."

"While

793.94/2283

FILED

OCT 22 1931

- 2 -

"While this fact was recognized . . . there was an evident effort upon the part of the League, in devoting the entire plenary session to the reception of the American representative, to mark the solemnity of the occasion."

"All heartily rejoiced that circumstances rather than negotiation had brought about in this specific instance the possibility of collaboration of the United States with the League exactly as though a consultative clause had actually been introduced into the Briand-Kellogg pact."

"Briand . . . said he 'dared to speak the wish that this transitory collaboration of the United States will shortly be transformed into a durable association on an equal footing with other members of the League.'"

"Several speakers made a point of calling the Council's attention sharply back to the matter in hand, demanding rapid action now that the United States had joined them to check the trouble in the Orient."

Replying to Japanese objections to American participation, Lord Reading said that as "the United States was not coming to the Council table empowered to vote, there could be no question of principle involved. . . . That the Council choose to call the United States . . . to the table . . . to exchange information was purely a question of procedure which the Council was at liberty to decide without unanimity of vote."

Although the Japanese representative remained silent at

the session

- 3 -

the session while his colleagues were praising America, he approached the American delegate at the end of the session and warmly shook hands with earnest cordiality.

Shanghai despatch, October 16, states that the League action was received jubilantly in Chinese official circles, who regard the action as an affront to Japan. The situation in Shanghai is described as "crakling with tension."

Paris despatch, October 16 (P. I. Philip), states that the sympathy of the French press is with Japan, likening the latter's position in Manchuria to that of France in North Africa, regarding Japan as a "gendarme" in the Far East and feeling that even if Japan is in the wrong, nothing can be done.

Dairen despatch, October 16, reports a clash between rival Chinese armies at Tsitsihar, one representing the "independent" movement and the other the forces loyal to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang.

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

Tokyo despatch, October 16 (Wilfred Fleisher) indicates that the Japanese Government is disposed to contest the admission of the American Geneva representative to the League Council.

"Contrary

- 4 -

"Contrary to the forecast of officials that Japanese public opinion would resent American participation in the Geneva deliberations, two leading Japanese newspapers, "ASAHI" and "JIJI" contained editorials today welcoming the idea. "ASAHI" said there was no objection to an American representative on the Council so long as he acted only as an observer, while the other paper (JIJI) hailed the presence of an American observer as of great potential assistance in finding a solution to the present controversy. 'The action', JIJI concluded 'should be approved by every one anxious to see normalcy restored'".

Moscow despatch, October 16 (Ralph W. Barnes), states that armed intervention of Russia in Manchuria is apparently one of the least likely developments. The reason given is preoccupation with internal development.

WASHINGTON POST

Tokyo despatch dated October 17 (A. P.), states that "military authorities at a joint conference were reported to have voted to uphold Japan's position in objecting to having an American representative at the League Council table and the Rengo News Agency said that 'as far as the Army is concerned secession from the League, if necessary, would be quite in order.'"

The Rengo

- 5 -


"The Rengo News Agency today carried a statement from army authorities characterizing America's attitude on the Manchurian situation as 'extremely meddlesome.'"

New York report October 17, quotes Yukio Ozaki, member of Japanese Parliament and former Mayor of Tokyo, as stating that the Japanese Government is making a mistake in opposing United States participation in the Geneva discussion of the Manchurian situation.

Japanese Consul Horinouchi of New York said that Japan's existence is dependent on peaceful relations with China and the United States, that patience must be used in dealing with China and predicted that United States and Japan will eventually cooperate in developing the resources of China.

  
CBC:EMU

October 18, 1931.



NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

Geneva despatch, October 17 (John T. Whitaker), states that "The delegates, except that of Japan, of the countries which are members of the Council of the League of Nations, and the representative of the United States decided tonight that their governments should send identical notes to Japan and China reminding the two countries that, as signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, they are pledged to try to settle the Manchurian crisis without recourse to war".

Tokyo despatch, October 17 (Wilfred Fleisher), states that "while fresh instructions have been sent to the Japanese spokesman at Geneva, to contest the legality of the League of Nations Council's action in admitting a representative of the United States. . . . there are signs. . . . that the Japanese Government. . . . is prepared to accept the inevitable after seeking some way to save its face".

General Jiro Minami, Minister of War, said: "The matter should be settled by direct negotiations with China, and intervention from the outside should be countenanced. . . . but one thing is certain, that Japan's fixed policy, . . . is unalterable under any circumstances".

"It is evident that the army is having all the say at present.

793.94/2284

FILED

OCT 22 1931

- 2 -


present. Propaganda put out by the Government that public opinion in Japan resents participation in the League is not borne out by the facts. . . . The truth is that the army has been from the start, as it still is, opposed to America's participation".

WASHINGTON POST

Tokyo despatch of October 17 (A. P.) states that "The Japanese foreign office declared tonight Japan and China, left to themselves, would settle their difficulties peaceably, intimating if war developed from the Manchurian situation the interference of the rest of the world could be blamed".

  
CBC:REK





October 19, 1931.

NEW YORK TIMES

Geneva despatch, October 18 (Lansing Warren), states that "Stirred by the intense resentment against what is regarded as incorrect and unjust treatment of their legitimate claims, the Japanese were spurred into making a complete survey of their case ——— and in so doing many believe they have opened the way for negotiations on what had previously appeared to be an unbreakable deadlock."

Japan points out that she has but 14,000 troops in Manchuria, fewer than she is allowed to maintain to protect the South Manchurian Railway and that conditions of banditry and anti-Japanese sentiment are so serious that it is impossible to withdraw until calm is restored.

"It is to bring about this necessary calm that the Japanese Government has proposed to the Chinese Government an understanding on certain fundamental points which would permit relation ————— to be resumed in an atmosphere of serenity and good will."

Conditions for evacuation are given as two:

1. "Chinese forces must abstain from all acts or measures

793.94/2285

OCT 22 1931

FILED

- 2 -

measures of hostility against Japanese troops."

2. "That the Chinese Government and local authorities resolve "to respect her rights and recognize the treaties and that they give sufficient guarantees of effective protection of Japanese nationals."

The Council delegates find grounds for optimism in these conditions and the fact that Japan still commits its case to the League. But Japan expresses no confidence that either China or the League can afford Japanese proper protection in Manchuria.

In view of Japan's opposition to the participation of the United States delegate, the proposed plenary session of the League Council scheduled for October 19 has been abandoned for a private meeting of the thirteen delegates to hear Briand's proposal for a solution.

A further Geneva despatch of October 18 states that a new Japanese protest against American participation in the Manchurian discussion was rejected by the League Council late Sunday.

"The Manchurian crisis has enveloped prospects for the disarmament conference in February in a fog of skepticism.

"The proposed armaments truce already appears to be headed for oblivion. If the situation in the Far East does not improve soon, Japan will oppose arms reduction;

with

- 3 -

with Japan in this mood, America will not take the lead in a disarmament crusade, --- and there will be no armaments reduction."

Tokyo despatch of October 18 (Hugh Byas), states that the Japanese Government will not accept League Council's proposal that evacuation must come before negotiations. Evacuation is not of any military importance, but has become a symbol of Chinese victory.

The Foreign Minister "must be conscious of the judicial weight of the League's arguments, but he cannot, even if he would, advance toward meeting them. National opinion exasperated by years of Chinese flouting, has crystallized behind the army."

"All parties agree that Japan does not want to hold permanently the points she now occupies."

"The political situation in a sentence is ---- that the Government can retain power, but only by following national sentiment on the Manchurian question."

Reuters reports of October 18, that ten army officers were arrested for planning a violent protest against Manchurian situation.

London despatch of October 18, quotes J. O. P. Bland as warning the League of Nations not to provoke a dangerous enmity between Japan and the United States over the situation

in

- 4 -

in Manchuria.

Moscow despatch of October 18 (Walter Duranty), states that the American move in the Sino-Japanese dispute is favored by Soviet Russia, despite enmity toward this country.

Shanghai despatch of October 18 (Hallett Abend), regards Japanese occupation of Manchuria as set for the winter.

Severe fighting continues about Tsitsihar where the Chang Hsueh Liang forces have apparently defeated the "independent" forces, allegedly sponsored by Japan.

#### NEW YORK HERALD

Geneva despatch of October 18 (John T. Whitaker) concludes that "the Japanese are frightening Geneva by their bold attack on American collaboration and their increasingly strong hold on Manchuria. They protest that they have no territorial designs - but they will withdraw their troops only on their own terms. The Chinese are alarmed at the continued 'compromise talk'".

The NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE states editorially that "Mr. Stimson's original offer of co-operation with the League seemed more like an attempt to make a graceful exit than anything else. The Japanese have cried from the  
housetops

- 5 -

housetops that they are not going to let us make an exit.

"Their attitude seems so clearly to worsen their international position that one is forced to ask whether their motive is not really to be found in the domestic rather than the external field."

WASHINGTON POST

Tokyo despatch of October 19 (A.P.), states as follows:

"Official Japanese circles today said the League of Nations Council's terms for settlement of the Manchurian dispute with China were entirely unacceptable to the Tokyo government.

"The council asks that Japan give assurances evacuation of the controverted areas will be completed within three weeks and that China and Japan begin direct negotiations beforehand.

"The council's recommendations, as cabled to Tokyo by Kenkichi Yoshizawa, Japan's spokesman at Geneva, provide that the negotiations be held in the presence of neutral observers, and make nine additional recommendations, 'all of which,' Tokyo authorities declared, 'are quite unacceptable.'"

CBZ

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GREEN

FROM

Geneva

RECEIVED

Dated October 21, 1931


OCT 23 1931

Rec'd 22nd, 9:20 a.m.

DIVISION

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.



239, October 21, 12 midnight.

In a second press communique issued this morning under the same conditions as those referred to in Consulate's 225, October 19, 10 p.m., the Japanese delegation accuses China of violation of treaty obligations in Manchuria particularly as regards Japanese railway interests.

It is pointed out that the South Manchurian Railroad and the maintenance of law and order by Japanese troops have contributed enormously to the productivity of this region in the last twenty years, during which time moreover Japan has invested there over one hundred million dollars. Apart from operating the South Manchurian Railway Japan has advanced capital for the construction of other Chinese lines which are managed by Chinese or mixed boards of directors.

The statement declares that China has continually sought

793.94/2286

894.503/93

RECEIVED  
OCT 22 1931

AM

2-#239, from Geneva, October 21, 1931  
12 midnight

sought to evade treaty provisions and to embarrass in every way Japanese operation, ~~the~~ <sup>(#)</sup> By dilatory tactics China prevented this Spring a final settlement proposed by Japan of the status of the South Manchurian Railway and in the more recent past has condoned attacks of violence against railway property and guards. The note specifically mentions nine attacks which have occurred since June including the death of Nakamura.

393.942  
The assertion is made that it is moreover the considered policy of the Chinese Government to embarrass Japanese nationals throughout China in their legitimate and peaceable pursuits and the Japanese delegation cites in support of this laws prohibiting the sale or long leases of land to foreigners, the secret instructions to officials with a view to annoying Japanese nationals. Koreans residing in Manchuria suffer most from mistreatment since recent measures have been taken compelling them to naturalize themselves or submit to expulsion. Chinese nationals are forbidden to sell or lease property to Koreans and the number of evictions is shown to have increased alarmingly during the past year.

In conclusion it is declared: "Such are the circumstances which have brought about the present tension in Manchuria; such is the atmosphere which blocks the way of an

AM

3-#239, from Geneva, October 21, 1931  
12 midnight

of an immediate withdrawal of the Japanese troops". Japan considers it essential that China give assurance that it is willing to put a stop to the illegal and hostile acts of military and civil authorities directed against Japanese nationals in Manchuria. It is emphasized that Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria, but it desires that its nationals be able to continue to work in peace in these regions which are of such vital importance to Japan and wishes its relations with China to be founded not on the basis of an aggressive policy but of a fruitful collaboration.

GILBERT

WSB

# apparent omission



COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I. *590*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

OCT 22 1931

Dated October 22, 1931

DIVISION OF

Rec'd 9:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 22 1931  
Department of State

Washington.

811, October 22, 1 p. m.

Excerpt from despatch from Consul at Swatow, October

14th.

"Since the beginning of the trouble in Manchuria the local Chinese authorities have quite apparently made strenuous attempts to prevent all violent action on the part of the Chinese against the Japanese. Both the police and the military have been most vigilant and watchful in this regard and thus far there has been no anti-Japanese action except for a most peaceful but nevertheless thorough-going boycott of the Japanese and their products and the distribution of anti-Japanese posters and handbills".

For the Minister

ENGERT

KLP  
WSB

FILED

OCT 24 1931



793.94/2287

*793.94  
note  
693.94/2*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-13-75



No. 1111



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Lima, October 9, 1931.

OCT 21 31



|                          |  |     |    |
|--------------------------|--|-----|----|
| FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK |  | Yes | No |
| To the President         |  |     |    |
| In U. S. A.              |  |     |    |
|                          |  |     |    |
|                          |  |     |    |
|                          |  |     |    |

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

S i r:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No.  
1057 of September 26th, 1931, reporting the re-  
action in Lima of Chinese citizens here to the  
events taking place in Manchuria and to enclose to  
the Department a protest signed by various local  
Chinese citizens, which has been delivered to the  
Embassy.

Respectfully yours,

*Fred Morris Dearing*  
Fred Morris Dearing.

FMD-hkl

Enclosures:

1-2/ Protest from Chinese citizens - with translation.

793.94/2288

1931 OCT 28 100

FILED

743.94/1980

1/2/

American Embassy,  
Lima, Peru.

Enclsure No. 1 to Embassy's Despatch No. 1111, Oct. 9, 1931.

Los más vigoroso representatnes de la intelectualidad de la nueva China apelan a la conciencia de la America today y muy en especial a la de los intelectuales y periodistas, en el siguiente mensaje:

En el preciso momento en que la China se debate contra los más grandes desastres registrados en su historia; cuando realiza enormes sacrificios para reprimir el comunismo, el Gobierno Japonés de espaldas al más elemental sentido de comprensión y cooperacion tiene el valor de enviar numerosas fuerzas militares a nuestras provincias del noroeste y a lo largo de nuestra costa.

Si a tales actos de violencia, perpetrados contra gentes amantes de la paz, se les permite amplia libertad, el provenir de la humanidad civilizada con todo lo que representa, y por el cual luchan los intelectuales de la tierra, es en realidad desconcertante por lo cruel y equívoco.

Por mucho tiempo, el espíritu agresivo de la milicia Japonesa ha sido reconocido como un grave obstáculo para la paz del mundo. Y es ahora cuando se manifiesta en toda su ferocidad y saña; y con la ayuda de complicados intereses de varios poderes en la China, se produce y permite esta entera devastación del soberano territorio Chino por el militarismo Japonés. La perpetración de estos hechos revive una nueva tragedia en un segundo SERAJEVO. ¿Puede la humanidad consciente e ilustrada permitir que permanezca esto sin el castigo moral que merece?

THAI YUAN PEI, HU SHIS, LI SHIHT SENG, WU CHIH HUI,  
V.K. TING, CHENG YING KUO, LI CHI, OON WEN SHAO, YEH KUNG  
CHO, HSU TSEM MU, CHANG HSIN HAI, HSIEHI HO KANG, HIU  
PE ON, etc.

American Embassy  
Lima, Peru  
October 14, 1931.

Enclosure No. 2 to Embassy's Despatch No. 1111, Oct. 9, 1931.

T R A N S L A T I O N

The most vigorous representatives of the intelligentsia of modern China appeal to the conscience of America as a whole and especially to that of its intellectuals and journalists in the following message:

Just when China is struggling against the greatest disasters recorded in her history; while she realizes enormous sacrifices in order to suppress communism, the Japanese government, turning their backs on the most elementary feelings of understanding and cooperation, have the audacity to send troops to our province in the northeast and along our coast.

If no effort is made to suppress such acts of violence perpetrated against a nation of lovers of peace, the future of civilized humanity, with all it represents and for which the intelligentsia of the world are fighting, is, in truth, difficult to foretell.

For a long time the aggressive spirit of the Japanese military party has been recognized as a serious obstacle to the peace of the world. And it is now that it manifests itself in all its ferocity and brutality; and with the help of complicated interests of the different powers of China this wholesale devastation of the territorial sovereignty of China by Japanese militarism is allowed. The perpetration of these deeds threatens to develop into a second tragedy of Sarajevo. Can conscious and educated humanity allow this situation to continue without the moral chastisement it deserves?

THAI YUAN PRI, HO SHIS, LI SHIHT SENG, WU CHIH HUI,  
V.K. TING, CHENG YING KUO, LI CHI, OON WEN SHAO, YEH KUNG CHO,  
HSU TSEN LU, CHANG HSIN HAI, HSIEN HO KANG, HIU PE ON, etc...



No. 300

LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Sofia, Bulgaria October 2 1931.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 30 1931

DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

OCT 21 31

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 22 1931

Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 21 1931

DIVISION OF  
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to inform the Department that the action taken by the League of Nations in connection with the Japanese-Manchurian conflict has prompted the local press to draw comparisons between the course followed by the League in this incident and in the Petritch flare-up of 1925 between Greece and Bulgaria. It is the local opinion that these two incidents do not differ in principle, which goes to show that the League follows one course when small states are concerned and quite another when a great power is one of the miscreants. Even the newspaper of the Prime Minister's party, the ZNAME, finds the League's part in the Japanese-Manchurian affair of interest

793.94/2289

1931.98.NON

FILED

-2-

interest primarily because of the consequent loss of prestige to the Geneva institution. LA BULGARIE, the semi-official organ of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, is of the opinion that the Kellogg pact will also suffer loss of standing through the failure of the signatory powers to evoke it against Japan.

Respectfully yours,

*Henry W. Shoemaker*  
Henry W. Shoemaker.

COPY SENT TO E. I. C.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.

AM

PLAIN

RECEIVED FROM

Beiping via N. R.

OCT 22 1931

Dated October 22, 1931

DIVISION OF

Rec'd 12:32 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.



806, October 22.

United Press report from Washington 20th:

"United States Government feels that crisis in Manchuria is now definitely passed, State Department officials indicated today. Japanese Government's action in withdrawing fighting planes and in withdrawing objections to American participation in deliberations of Council of League of Nations has made very favorable impression.

Officials here expressed belief that it is hardly necessary to invoke Kellogg-Briand Treaty in view of improved position in Far East but that Mr. Stimson evidently felt it was incumbent upon him to send identical notes today because he had participated in earlier activities before Japanese Government had withdrawn its objections to presence of an American representative on Council of the League".

For the Minister

KLP

ENGERT

793.94/2290

FILED

OCT 26 1931

793-94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128 TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

October 21, 1931.

This cable was sent in confidential Code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.

793-94  
AMERICAN CONSUL

NANKING (CHINA).

96 Confidential.

For the Minister for information and guidance.

There appears to have been considerable misunderstanding with regard to the arrangements whereby the American Consul at Geneva is attending meetings of the Council of the League.

The facts are as follows. The Council invited the American Government to send a representative to sit in meetings of the Council, without a vote, to facilitate consideration of ways and means of cooperation in obtaining the objective which was common to the Council and to this Government, namely that of preventing a war.

This Government instructed the American Consul at Geneva to inform the Council that this Government accepted and instructed him to act as its representative in that connection. His instructions were to attend the meetings as an observer, to take part in discussion in connection with one question only, namely that of possible action

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

in

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

793.94/2290A



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

in relation to the Pact of Paris. He was of course to  
<sup>repeat no</sup> have no vote. He was told that he was not <sup>repeat not</sup> to take the  
<sup>^</sup> initiative or to press for an invocation of the Pact and  
he was scrupulously to refrain from taking part in  
discussion of measures which the Council might be  
considering under and in relation to provisions of the  
Covenant of the League or any other instrument except  
the Pact of Paris. He was told that this Government  
had not taken and would not take sides in the dispute  
and that it was not undertaking to make suggestions  
with regard to the terms of settlement although it  
believed that settlement must be achieved by process  
of direct negotiations between the two disputants. He  
was told that no attempt would be made in Washington to  
prompt the signatories of the Pact of Paris to take  
action and that if ~~any~~ action was taken along that line  
the initiative might in <sup>our</sup> ~~the~~ opinion best be left to the  
League or members thereof. All of this he understood,  
and he has in no way acted outside of his instructions.

Sketch

In your conversations with the Foreign Office you  
may make clear the attitude of the American Government

in

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
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# TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PLAIN

## Department of State

Washington,

- 3 -

in this whole matter, if it is not already understood. In the first place, we are interested in the prevention of war in any part of the world, including, of course, Manchuria. We believe that a solution of the matters in dispute is possible and should be arrived at by process of negotiation between the participants and we feel that prior to such negotiations we with the rest of the world have the right to urge upon both parties that they refrain from other than peaceful measures. The Foreign Office should understand, therefore, that the steps which we have taken and are taking are directed toward the prevention of war and have not been directed to passing judgment as to the merits of the dispute or to formulating conclusions as to terms which should be agreed upon in the process of and as a product of negotiation.

The Department feels that the solidarity of the nations in their desire to stand together for the maintenance of peace, even in the face of a major crisis, has been demonstrated; that the usefulness of the established peace machinery of the world has been shown; that that machinery has been strengthened; and that our object should be to maintain this situation and to insure that without further

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

unfortunate

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_\_

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
 PREPARING OFFICE  
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Collect  
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 \$

## Department of State

Washington,

- 4 -

unfortunate incidents a settlement be reached by  
 negotiations between the disputants.

<sup>as Sept 202</sup>  
 Repeat to Tokyo for the Chargé's information and  
 guidance.

*Strinson*  
*only*

CR  
 Oct. 21. 1931 ✓

FE: SKH: EJJ

FE

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
Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE GREEK MINISTER  
October 15, 1931.

The Minister came in to ask about Manchuria and I outlined the situation to him. He said that he was very glad that we had decided to allow Gilbert to participate in the League. I pointed out to him that this participation had only to do with the possible discussion of the Kellogg Pact and that it did not mean that he would take part in discussions of procedure under the covenant of the League. This, he said, he understood.

The Minister also asked about Laval's visit, but had nothing new to offer. I told him that there were no out-and-dried plans but that Laval would undoubtedly discuss all sorts of matters quite freely with the President.

U WRC:GMH

793.94/2291

OCT 22 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 841.00 P. R./200 FOR Despatch #2302

FROM Great Britain ( Atherton ) DATED Oct. 5, 1931  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Manchurian dispute. Attitude of British public  
towards,-.

fp

793.94/2292

793.94

**Manchurian Dispute.**

The British public has thus far seemed to be quite apathetic to the situation in Manchuria, which can be understood when one realizes the critical financial situation in which the country has been placed. There has been, however, an awakening to the gravity of the dispute between Japan and China, the press devoting more attention to the deliberations of the Council of the

League/

-9-

League in this regard, while the subject has been raised on more than one occasion in the House of Commons. So far as can be ascertained, the British Government has been content for the present to act through the League of Nations towards securing a pacific settlement of the dispute; and in view of the fact that the notes addressed by the League simultaneously to Japan and China have elicited the declaration by Japan that it had no territorial ambitions in China and would withdraw its forces as soon as practicable, there seems as yet to be no general sentiment favoring some more decisive measure towards intervention between the disputants on the part of the British Government.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


RECEIVED

OCT 22 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

21 Avery Drive,  
Atlanta, Ga.,  
October 21, 1931.

793.94  
Hon. Henry Stimson,  
Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.



My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have the honor of enclosing herewith three clippings from The Atlanta Constitution of recent date, which from different angles, treat of the recent bitter strife between China and Japan.

Mr. Clarke, the writer of one of the articles enclosed, is an earnest student of the past history and present state of affairs in Japan and China and was honored by being named on the party of American journalists sent to the Far East in 1929.

These journalists had the opportunity of first hand observations and were feted and given receptions, thus bringing them into personal contact with the political leaders of the two countries, the editors of the leading dailies, the bankers and educators.

The editorial is from the pen of Hon. Clark Howell, the veteran editor of one of the leading dailies of the South.

The writer of this letter was for about thirty-five years a missionary engaged in educational work in what is now Kwansai Gakuin University. He has the honor of being decorated by His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, "for Distinguished Service as an Educator, etc". The purpose of this writing was simply the recital of a number of indisputable facts.

If what we have written shall in any way be considered worthy of your consideration, we shall be made glad.

Very truly yours,

J.C. Calhoun Newton  
(Rev.) J.C. Calhoun Newton.

FILED

OCT 27 1931

793.94/2293





1 - 174  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply refer to  
FE 793.94/2293

October 27 1931.

The Reverend J. C. Calhoun Newton,  
21 Avery Drive,  
Atlanta, Georgia.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of  
October 21, 1931, addressed to the Secretary of State,  
enclosing several clippings from THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION  
of September 27, 1931, in regard to the difficulty be-  
tween China and Japan in Manchuria.

The Department appreciates your courtesy in forward-  
ing it these clippings and assures you that the situation  
in Manchuria continues to receive its careful and solicitous  
attention.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

A true copy of  
the signed orig-  
inal.

*M. M. Hamilton*  
Maxwell M. Hamilton,  
Assistant Chief,  
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.


FE

Oct. 26, 1931  
FE:CBG:EMU:  
10/24/31

F.W. 793.94/2293

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CABLE ADDRESS "AMASIASAT"



501 Fifth Avenue  
October 16, 1931

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New York

Stanley K. Hornbeck, Esq.  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hornbeck:

Referring to our telephone conversation of yesterday transferring the message of Mr. Cole to you, I have to advise that at the Annual Meeting of the Association at India House yesterday, one of our Members, Mr. Robert Wesselhoeft, proposed a plan that this Association should suggest to our Department of State, Geneva, Tokyo and Nanking that a commission should meet at Mukden to settle the Chinese-Japanese trouble on the ground, such commission to be formed of men experienced in Far Eastern affairs. The idea has some merit, but you have doubtless thought of every expedient by which war in the Far East could be averted. Our Meeting took no action other than that Mr. Cole asked me to telephone to you, as I did.

If such a step appears desirable to you, we are ready to telegraph at once to the United States Department of State, the League of Nations at Geneva and to the Governments of both China and Japan, possibly through their representatives at Washington or direct, as you may suggest. Should this step seem desirable to you, please telegraph me and our Executive Committee will act at once.

As you know, our President, Mr. Jerome D. Greene, is at present in Shanghai and, as you are aware, he is highly respected by both Japanese and Chinese and he is the type of man whom we have in mind for such a commission, although we are not in any way trying to suggest names for such an effort which might use government officials or private citizens. One thought was that Geneva is far away from the scene of the trouble and that action on the ground, if approved by both parties, might help.

We are aware that you already have able representatives in Manchuria, but we are eager to avert a war between China and Japan and this Association will do anything within its power toward that end. We admire the efforts the Department of State has made and desire not to do anything which might hinder instead of help. This letter is entirely personal so please do not feel impelled to let us take part in this affair.

Very sincerely yours,

*John B. Chevalier*  
John B. Chevalier

Personal

Am'd Oct 19, 1931  
Wm. L. E.

793-94/2294

October 19, 1931.

Dear Mr. Chevalier:

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of October 16 informing me of conclusions reached at the Annual Meeting of the American Asiatic Association. May I express my appreciation of your courtesy and of the thoughtful action of the Association in informing me of the Association's attitude and views.

It is gratifying to know that the Association approves of the efforts which the Department is making in connection with the critical situation which has developed in the Far East. It is also gratifying to have the Association's assurance of its willingness to help and of its desire not to do anything which might hinder.

As those of us here who have been living with this problem during the past few weeks see it, the present

Chinese-

John B. Chevalier, Esquire,  
American Asiatic Association,  
501 Fifth Avenue,  
New York City.

793.94/2294

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Chinese-Japanese trouble and the possible methods of dealing with the problem have for some weeks past been receiving the most earnest consideration of the Department of State, of the leading Foreign Offices of the world and of the statesmen who compose the Council of the League of Nations. The problem is one of extreme delicacy, inasmuch as one of the parties to the controversy appears not to wish to enter into direct negotiations for its settlement while the other does not desire the introduction of any third party into the discussion of a question which it contends should be settled solely between the two parties directly concerned. Having given the matter careful thought, we feel that an attempt such as you suggest to introduce at this time a new agency and channel for discussion would tend to further confuse, rather than simplify, the issue; and that the suggestion if made a proposal would have little chance of being adopted. Nevertheless, we greatly appreciate the Association's assistance and wish to assure you that the suggestion which you have made will be kept in mind.

Yours sincerely,

✓  
 Oct. 2, 1961

FE:RSM:EJL

FE





CABLE ADDRESS "AMASIAT"



*American Asiatic  
Association.*

AK  
J  
DER  
FE

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Office of the Secretary  
501 Fifth Avenue  
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□

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED

THE UNDER SECRETARY OCT 28 1931 501 Fifth Avenue  
DIVISION OF October 22, 1931

OCT 27 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS



Hon. Stanley K. Hornbeck  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hornbeck:

793.94/2294

Referring to your letter of October 19 regarding the Chinese-Japanese trouble, we fully appreciate your attitude. We earnestly pray that your efforts to avert war in the Far East will continue to meet with success; and you may be assured that this Association will support you in every way possible.

I beg to remain,

Very sincerely yours,

*John B. Chevalier*  
John B. Chevalier

F. W. 793.94/2294

FILED

NOV 3 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

Secretary of State  
Washington

238, October 21, 11 p. m.

793.94/2236  
Consulate's 238, October 20, 9 p. m.

The following information was obtained in a conversation with Briand late this afternoon.

One. The news from China and Manchuria continues to be more favorable indicating a certain relaxation of tension.

Two. Among other influences working in this direction Briand this afternoon referred to representations which are being made through diplomatic channels at Tokio by the French and perhaps by others to induce the Japanese to refrain from further occupation or from landing of troops in China or Manchuria. He cited in particular one recent instance of a Japanese intention to land forces at a Chinese port but on representations from the French Ambassador that this would be contrary to the agreements under the

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
NOV 2 1931  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
Dated October 21, 1931  
Rec'd 10:20 a.m. 22nd

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 22 1931  
Department of State

F  
793.94/2295

FILED  
NOV 4 1931

REP

2- #238, from Geneva, Oct. 21, 1 p.m.

under the Council's resolution of September 30 Shidehara gave a formal promise to desist.

Three. Briand is still waiting a reply from the Japanese in regard to his questions concerning the modification of their demands covered by the one crucial point of the five points based on treaties, communicated by the Chinese Minister to Briand and Drummond, Consulate's 233, October 21, 9 p. m. after giving statement in regard to Japanese position in the Consulate's 232, October 21, 8 p. m. The other four points seem reasonable but this one involves important problems relating to the question of the settlement of the Manchurian situation as a whole. Briand considers this demand as unacceptable not only to the Chinese but to himself and to the Council because being based on the settlement of a permanent problem it does not conform to the conditions of the Council's resolution of September 30 in regard to evacuation within a reasonable time.

Four. The Japanese expect a reply this evening and state that they received a cablegram this morning but that  
the last



REP

3- #238, from Geneva, Oct. 21, 1 p.m.

the last part of it was undecipherable. They have asked for a repeat. This is suspected here as being a mere pretext for delay.

Five. Briand is continuing his negotiations with the Japanese. He intends to meet them this evening not alone but in the presence of Drummond so that any commitments made by the Japanese will be made in the presence of a League official.

Six. Briand's plan now is that if the Japanese modify sufficiently their demands so as to make them appear reasonable and acceptable in the viewpoint of the Council, they will be submitted to the Chinese for their consideration. If accepted by the latter a solution of the immediate Manchurian question would seem to be assured.

Seven. In case the Japanese do not modify their demands to the extent deemed necessary, the Council will probably set forth, perhaps in the form of the resolution quoted in the Consulate's telegram number <sup>793.94/2192</sup> 213, October 17, <sup>793.94/2201</sup> midnight as amended by number <sup>222</sup> 222, October 19, 10 a. m., (modified further if necessary), the project of a settlement based on

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

4- #238, from Geneva, Oct.21,1 p.m.

based on the considerations which they believe to be  
just and right.

(END SECTION ONE).

GILBERT

OSB

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

Geneva

FROM

Dated October 21, 1931

Rec'd 22nd, 11:27 a.m.

RECEIVED

OCT 22 1931

DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

238, October 21, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

This project or resolution would be submitted to the  
*disputants*  
(?) (?) in a public Session of the Council to serve as a  
record of the Council's views that the parties should  
act upon that basis and report to the next session of  
the Council the extent to which they had fulfilled  
terms laid down. A definite date would be fixed for  
the next meeting of the Council.

Eight. In the meanwhile Briand has advised the  
Chinese not to wait until the last moment in regard to  
making preparations for the fulfillment of their  
engagements to insure the security of Japanese lives  
and property but immediately to make ready a plan for  
instituting the necessary administrative measures to  
that end so that operations could begin at once in  
order not to allow the Japanese any pretext for delay  
in withdrawal.

Nine.

AM

2-238, from Geneva, October 21, 1931  
11 p.m.

Nine. In regard to the information given in confidence by the Japanese to Briand and Drummond relative to the Five (#) Treaty<sup>points</sup>, the latter are still bound by their promise not to communicate this information to any one. Briand states that he purposely did not press the Japanese to render them public or make them more generally known to the members of the Council, his object in this being that it would be easier for the Japanese to modify them. If made public the Japanese would be committed before public opinion in Japan and thus find it more difficult to reduce the extent of their demands.

Ten. Briand, assuming that the Japanese may have discussed this with you, wonders whether the fifth crucial point referred to above may not have been presented to you in an entirely different way from that presented here.

Eleven. Suspecting that the Japanese had perhaps been attempting to negotiate directly with the Chinese on these five points in order to obtain commitments in advance of the conditions being made generally known and thus to undermine the Council's basis of negotiations, the French delegation approached the Chinese on this subject and learned that in fact such an attempt had apparently been made at Tokio through approaches

to the

AM

3-#238, from Geneva, October 21, 1931  
11 p.m.

to the Chinese Ambassador. It seems, however, that the  
Chinese here are not acquainted with the full purport  
of these demands.

(END MESSAGE)

GILBERT

RR

(#) apparent omission

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 22, 1931

Rec'd 7 a. m.

RECEIVED

OCT 22 1931

DIVISION

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

805, October 22, 8 a. m.

Following from Hansen, Salisbury:

"October 20, 4 p. m. One. This telegram will be an attempt to throw light on the general situation in Manchuria as a whole from September 18th to date.

Two. The Department is aware that the relations between the Chinese and Japanese had been so tense that it was but a matter of time when a clash would occur. The Japanese military leaders were determined that matters should be brought to head and the Chinese military in Manchuria disorganized. The Chinese military leaders, such as General Chang Hsueh Liang and Chang Tso Hsing, began to realize too late that the Japanese army was preparing to strike and, according to reliable Chinese reports, ordered the local Chinese military to withdraw



file  
E.G.C.

793.94/2296

FILED

OCT 22 1931

REP

2- #805, from Peiping, Oct. 22, 8 a.m.

withdraw their troops in case of attack on the part of the Japanese to avoid warfare in which they knew they would suffer defeat, humiliation and loss.

Three. The clash took place September 18th between 10 and 11 p. m. just outside of Mukden, and this started the Japanese Army in Manchuria into action.

Four. Four companies (600 men) of the Japanese independent railway garrison stationed at and near Mukden early in the morning of September 19th attacked the north barracks and put to flight the 10,000 Chinese troops who were stationed there. In the meantime the Japanese 29th Regiment (six companies) stationed in the Japanese concession at Mukden attacked the Chinese troops inside and outside the city and before the day was over Mukden was in the hands of the Japanese Army.

Five. The second division of Japanese troops under Lieutenant General Tamon was moved from Liaoyang to Mukden on the 19th and <sup>sub</sup>sequently General Honjo, Commander of Kuangtung Army, moved his headquarters from Port Arthur to Mukden.

Six.

REP

3- #805, from Peiping, Oct. 22, 8 a.m.

Six. Acting under orders from General Honjo, the Japanese military commanders directly concerned made surprise attacks (all of which began before dawn on the 19th) at the principal points of the South Manchurian Railway area and either drove away or disarmed the Chinese soldiers and police of that area. By early afternoon of the 19th the Japanese had taken, in addition to Mukden, Changchun, Newchwang (Yinkou) and Antung, the key cities. (together with Dairen) of the South Manchuria Railway area. Having consolidated their position in this area, the Japanese military then moved to obtain control of the Chinese railways paralleling the South Manchuria Railway. On September 21st they took Kirin city (along with the Kirin-Changchun Railway), thus controlling movement on the Chinese <sup>(Mukden-Hailuog)</sup> Shenhai and <sup>(Hailuog-Kirin)</sup> Kaiki Railways, which parallel the South Manchuria Railway on the east; on the morning of the 22nd they took over Chengchiatun and Tungliao, thereby controlling movement on the Chinese <sup>(Suijingba - Taonan)</sup> Sautao and <sup>(Taluoshan - Tungliao)</sup> Tatumg Railways, that parallel the South Manchuria Railway to the west. Tungliao was evacuated on the 23rd. Shortly after these movements



REP

4- #805, from Peiping, Oct. 22, 8 a.m.

movements the Japanese military began to advance along Chinese owned railways: on September 23rd they occupied the Kirin-Tunhwa line and Tunhwa (from which point they have been anxious to construct the Tunhwa-Kainei Railway) withdrawing however from this line and city on October 5th, and on September 25th Japanese troops moved north from Chengchiatun to Taonanfu whence they could advance on Tsitsihar via the Taonan-Anghsi line. They withdrew from Taonan on the 26th. Until the time we left Taonan October (14th?) the Japanese military forces controlled the Ssupingai-Taonanfu line to Chengchiatun and were patrolling the branch to Tungliao. Reliable Chinese reports (Jalmohan-Tungliao) state that the Japanese blew up a portion of the Tatung line below Tungliao, making transportation of freight on that line impossible. (Mukden-Hailung) (Hailung-Kirin) The Shenhai and Haiki lines were for a while in Japanese hands but are now run by the Chinese administrations under Japanese financial supervision.

Seven. At present control Kirin the capital of Kirin Province and (Kwa?) the capital of Liaoning Province, and New-chuang, Dairen and Antung the three

ports

CJH

Page 5, - #805 from Peiping  
dated Oct. 22, 8 a.m.

ports of entry into Manchuria. The all Chinese route from Tientsin to Tsitsihar is blocked by them thus isolating, as far as China proper is concerned, Tsitsihar and Harbin, both of which cities could be easily taken by Japanese. Eight. Officially, Japanese military and consular, including General Honjo, state that Japanese Army attacked Chinese Army to prevent the latter, about two one hundred thousand Chinese against 10,000 Japanese forces in Manchuria according to a Japanese report, aroused by the clash at Mukden, from annihilating Japanese forces and in the South Manchuria Railway zone and other places in South Manchuria. That this was not the real reason for the Japanese last attacks can be proved by the fact that the Chinese forces withdrew or allowed themselves to be disarmed in most cases when the Japanese advanced, thus indicating that they were under orders to do so, had no courage to fight Japanese, and in places like Harbin, which has Japanese population of 4000 and to which no Japanese forces were sent, did not attack Japanese residents. We believe that the real reason for the Japanese attack was the desire of the Japanese Army to strike a fatal blow to the Chinese North Eastern Army, to restore the prestige of the Japanese Army and to secure the pawn to be redeemed by the settlement favorable to the Japanese of the irritable (?) Chinese Japanese disputes pending. We believe that the Japanese occupation of the places mentioned above is not contingent upon whether the

live presence

REP

6- #805, from Peiping, Oct.22, 8 a.m.

presence of Japanese forces insures safety to lives and property of Japanese interests. At Antung and Changchun lives and property of Japanese are not in danger and would not be if Japanese forces were withdrawn. There is danger increasing throughout Manchuria from Chinese soldiers who have been driven away from their bases of supply and who have been forced by economic conditions to become brigands. There is little evidence that the Japanese desire to withdraw their troops in such a manner in which to forfeit their control of the principal political and military centers.

Nine. The Japanese military are controlling the Chinese civil authorities, some newly appointed since September 18, who are functioning fairly adequately at Newchwang, Antung, Mukden, Changchun and Kirin and other less important points. On October 19th we talked with Yuan Shin Kai, who is head of the Mukden Municipal Government Committee and who has been known to Hansen for six years. He stated he was only anxious for preserving peace until permanent municipal government could fix

REP

6 b#805, from Peiping, Oct. 23, 8 a.m.

could fix the blame. He was positive that the Japanese  
could not permit the return of Generals Chang <sup>Hauk</sup> Shue Liang  
and Chang Tso <sup>Huang</sup> Shang to Manchuria. He felt that the  
Japanese were scheming to place the ex-Emperor, Hsuan  
Tung, at the head of a new Manchurian Government.  
Judging by the fact that Japanese aircraft bombarded  
the Liaoning Provincial Government established at  
Chinchow, it is evident that the Japanese do not  
desire the formation of any government at or outside  
Mukden which is not

approved

CJH

Page 7 - #805 from Peiping  
dated Oct. 22, 8 a.m.

approved and controlled by them. Yuan stresses the point that in Kirin City, Hsichia, former chief of staff of Chang Shue Liang, had been sent by the Japanese to take over Provincial Government and declared it quite independent, and that General Chang Haipeng of Taonan was about to make himself ruler of an independent Heilung-Kiang Province, either on behalf of Hsuan-tung or the Japanese or both.

Thus, according to Yuan, the Japanese could easily force on Kirin and Heilungkiang Provincial Governments

or a government favorable to them and Liaoning Province would be forced to join an independent Manchuria. Reliable foreign and Chinese observers feel that Yuan is being unconditionally forced by the Japanese to form a Liaoning Provincial Government with self at the head. These observers believe that when Yuan has established a stable provincial government he will be replaced by some one more willing to be the tool of the Japanese. Generally speaking, the mass of the thinking Chinese resident in Manchuria are opposed to the Japanese occupation of South Manchuria. However, there are certain elements, realizing that they can gain an immediate material personal profit from the Japanese, who are in favor of Japanese occupation.

Ten. In all

CJH

Page 8 - #805 from Peiping  
dated Oct. 22, 8 a.m.

Ten. In all places taken by Japanese Military and visited by us Chinese telegraph offices were closed but the Chinese post offices were not molested. In several places like Antung and Newchwang censorship of Chinese addressed mail was established. Chinese wireless stations wherever found by Japanese were put out of commission. Telephone lines were everywhere operated only under Japanese supervision.

Eleven. In some places like Antung and Changchun Japanese forces could be withdrawn into the railway zone without danger of Chinese reprisals or attacks from brigands. In other places like Mukden and Kirin Japanese military by driving away Chinese soldiers have created the dangerous situations which they at first stated they were anxious to avoid. Unless some provision is made to control and solidify the disbanded Chinese soldiers, which the Japanese army wishes to permit pro-Japanese-Chinese officials to remain, Japanese troops cannot be withdrawn without exposing Chinese and foreign lives and property to danger.

Twelve, Consideration should be given to the fact that the Japanese army, although it will not admit it, is acting with relation to the armed Chinese, the civil population, government officers, foreigners and property, as if it were waging actual warfare and is guided

REP

9- #805, from Peiping, Oct. 22, 8 a.m.

is guided by army regulations. It may not have attained all of its objectives but it has sufficient of them to enable it to dictate to the Chinese the solution of the many Chinese-Japanese disputes at hand. At present a deadlock exists. The Japanese demand a settlement of the outstanding disputes before the withdrawal of the Japanese troops, before commencing a discussion. Japanese hope to force a settlement by dealing with local Chinese officials, approved and controlled by them, and perhaps independent of any Chinese Government south of the Great Wall. There is no indication that the Japanese army desires a return to the status quo ante at the present time".

For the Minister

Engert  
ENGERT

JHR

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OCT 26 1931  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
GENEVA

Dated October 22, 1931

Rec'd 2:55 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

241, October 22, 2 p. m.

Consulate's 240, October 22, 9 a. m.

I learn that the Japanese position on the crucial "fifth point" is unfavorable, that is, they insist on their demand that certain questions relating to the general settlement of permanent Manchurian problems be resolved prior to evacuation. I understand that the Council in its public meeting scheduled for this afternoon will fall back upon the resolution quoted in the Consulate's telegrams' 213, 19 and 22 with certain further modifications.

GILBERT

KLP

CSB

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 22 1931  
Department of State

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1931 OCT 26 130

793.94/2297

793.94

2192

2197 2201



176  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

793-94  
RECEIVED  
OCT 23 1931  
DIVISION OF

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 22, 1931

Rec'd 2:15 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



October 22, 4 p. m.

Your 388 Oct 29 2PM / 2236A  
~~Your October 21, 10 a. m.~~

file  
EGC.

I presented note to Acting Minister at 4:30 October 21st. I am now in receipt of reply dated October 22nd, which, after referring to our note and to the interest of the American Government in the development of events since September 18th, states:

"It has been in absolute reliance upon the principles of international law and international agreements, particularly those for the perpetuation of peace among nations, and further pledging respect for the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of states, that the Chinese Government has consistently refrained from employing force to meet the situation created by the occupation of Chinese territory by Japanese troops and other warlike actions of Japan in the belief that such actions would not be permitted to go unchallenged"

793.94/2293

FILED

OCT 26 1931

REP

2- from Nanking, Oct. 22, 4 p. m.

go unchallenged by the powers which should feel deeply concerned. Especially faithful to the obligations assumed under the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, the Chinese Government has been seeking, from the very beginning, a just and adequate settlement by pacific means. China has not adopted any measures of war but has appealed to the United States of America as well as the League of Nations under the provisions of existing international agreements.

It is the sincere desire of the Chinese Government to settle the present crisis by peaceful means under conditions which give a better chance of fair and equitable treatment for all concerned and to cooperate to the fullest possible extent with the American Government, the sponsor of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, in its efforts to uphold the sanctity of international engagements".

WSB  
CSB

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 462.11 W 892/1978 FOR memorandum  
FROM State Department  
Undersecretary ( Castle ) DATED Oct. 15, 1931  
TO \_\_\_\_\_ NAME \_\_\_\_\_ 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING:

Memorandum of conversation with the German Ambassador  
during which he asked to be advised of the status  
of the Manchurian situation.

793.94/2299

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

THE UNDER SECRETARY  
OCT 19 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MEMORANDUM  
OCT 22 1931  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
October 18, 1931

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 20 1931  
Department of State

INVOCATION OF PACT OF PARIS BY POWERS  
MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS  
PRECEDENT FOR PROCEDURE IN FUTURE

f.e.  
f.e.g.c.

The action taken by the five League powers prob-  
ably sets a precedent which <sup>may</sup> ~~will~~ settle the question  
of initiative in connection with invoking of the Pact  
of Paris. The League or the major powers in the League  
will probably become the custodian of that responsibility.


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FILED  
OCT 22 1931

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with  
711.0012-AW-991111

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



October 30, 1931.

Reference to paragraph two.

If, in the course of conversations with Yoshizawa, Briand found that the Japanese would not accept "time limits for withdrawals", and yet went ahead with the proposal for time limits, there would seem to be no good reason why, although Japan also refused to accept neutral observers, Briand should not go ahead with an attempt to bring ~~him~~ around to that idea.

*Seal*

CJH

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be GENEVA  
carefully paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated to **FROM** Dated October 22, 1931  
anyone.

RECEIVED

Rec'd. 3:52 p.m.

OCT 22 1931

DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,

Washington.

240, October 22, 9 a.m.

Consulate's 238, October 21, 11 p.m.

In a meeting yesterday evening Briand apprised  
the Committee of Five of the results of his negotiations  
with the Japanese. The following represents the net result  
and the situation arising therefrom.

One. The Japanese representative here has not re-  
ceived a reply from Tokyo concerning the Japanese position  
on the points referred to in paragraph three of the  
Consulate's telegram under reference.

Two. In the course of the negotiations Briand found  
that the Japanese would not accept (a) time limit for  
withdrawals and (b) neutral observers.

Briand then suggested to the Japanese that they under-  
take negotiations with the Chinese at once to embrace solely  
questions relating immediately to the evacuation and the  
security of Japanese lives and property to the exclusion of  
all other questions. This is in fact the same question which  
is referred to under one above today. A reply from the

Japanese is being

Division  
FAR EAST

OCT 22 1931

Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 2 1931

DIVISION OF  
WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS

793.94/2301

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NOV 4 1931

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJH

Page 2 #240 from Geneva .

Japanese is being awaited.

FROM

Three. To the Committee of Five Briand proposed a draft resolution which was adopted by the Committee.

Four. The first four paragraphs of this draft resolution (of which the French text only is available) seem to be identic with the first four paragraphs of the resolution quoted in the Consulate's telegram 213, October 17, 12 midnight, as amended by the Consulate's 215, October 18, 2 p.m.

The remaining paragraphs of this resolution differ widely from the previous resolution quoted in the Consulate's telegrams under reference .

The text will be sent in full as soon as the final wording has been decided upon. However, its essential idea is that in order to give effect to the Council's resolution of September 30, the parties will immediately begin conversations, through such representatives as they shall choose, in order to conclude the necessary arrangements both as regards the withdrawal of the troops and as regards the security of the lives and property of Japanese nationals, these arrangements to be such as to permit the completion of the evacuation with the least possible delay. The resolution further provides an adjournment of the Council until November 12 in order to allow the time necessary for the conversations in question and the complete evacuation to follow, the implication being that the Council expects the evacuation to be completed or to be well on the way toward

CJH

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

Page 3 of 4  
#240 from Geneva.

completion before the date fixed ~~from~~ for its next meeting.

Five. This resolution, if its terms are accepted by the disputants, will become a Council resolution.

Six. This resolution will first be <sup>presented to the</sup> ~~12~~ Japanese and if their answer is favorable Briand will send for the Chinese and try to persuade them to accept it. If accepted in turn by the latter the arrangement will then be confirmed in another conference with the Japanese. A report by Briand will be submitted to the Committee of Five at 10:30 this morning.

Seven. If the Japanese reply is unfavorable the Council will at its next meeting go back to the resolution quoted in the Consulate's telegram under reference. This resolution will be presented to the two Governments who will be invited to "reflect". The Council will then be adjourned to a specific date.

Eight. This last procedure will likewise probably be followed in case the Japanese accept and the Chinese refuse but this is regarded as less likely.

GILBERT

WSB



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7

HSM

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

Geneva

RECEIVED FROM

Dated October 22, 1931


OCT 23 1931

Rec'd 7:56 p. m.

DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,

Washington.



244, October 22, 1931 p. m.

793.94  
Consulate's 224, October 19, 7 p. m., paragraph one.

The Italian delegation has handed me the following  
message dated October 21 received from Mukden:

"One. An intensification of acts of brigandage  
by scattered troops of Chinese soldiers is to be  
observed. The Japanese forces of occupation represent  
the only effective authority in this region.

Two. The separatist movement in Manchuria seems  
to be confined for the moment to a small town to the  
north of Mukden. The leader of this movement is said  
to be General Ling Yin Chin."

GILBERT

FW

OX

FILED

OCT 26 1931

793.94/2302

5

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

GREEN

Geneva

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED FROM

Dated October 22, 1931

OCT 23 1931

Rec'd 8:32 p. m.

DIVISION OF

INDICATIONS ARE

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



243, October 22, 7 p. m.

Drummond has handed me for communication to you  
the following message from the Japanese delegation  
dated October 17, which has been circulated to the  
members of the Council:

The troops from the Shingishu (Korea) garrison  
which had been sent to Manchuria were all sent back to  
their garrison on the 16th instant. I had the honor  
to inform you in a previous letter that some of these  
troops were sent back to Korea on September 28th.

GILBERT

FW

OX

FILED

OCT 26 1931

793.94/2303

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C O N F I D E N T I A L .

P.O. Box 404, Glendale, Calif.

Oct. 13, 1931.

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Dr. Hornbeck;

I had the pleasure of meeting you while we were both serving at M. I. D. headquarters in Washington, which no doubt you have forgotten.

I am taking the liberty of submitting to you a very respectful suggestion in connection with the obstreperousness of the Japanese in Manchuria. The great trouble with the League of Nations and the Kellogg pact, is the absence of any means of enforcing compliance on the part of any strong nation like Japan.

In all the published discussions of the questions, I have never seen any mention of the most powerful weapon which might be used on the Japanese, to bring them to their senses, namely the threat of an embargo on imports into the United States of Japanese raw silk. If I remember correctly, over one-third the value of Japanese exports is in raw silk exported to the United States, and if this revenue were cut off, the Japanese nation would be completely bankrupted, and probably plunged into a revolution, and I believe the Japanese Government knows it only too well.

I have spent a good many years in the Far East, and feel I know something of conditions there, and I am very greatly interested in seeing the present trouble stopped before it goes too far, and gets Russia and other nations mixed up in it. I believe if you gentlemen in the State Department swing the threat of an embargo on raw silk over the heads of the Japs, you will bring them to time quicker than the League of Nations can by notes and oratory.

Very respectfully yours,

H. R. Robbins

FILED

OCT 24 1931

\* True

And what good would that do?  
Is it a new kind of war?

793.94/2304

MMH 10.19.74

Could Jake  
or Chamberlain  
take this over?

It seems a  
somewhat special  
reply may be in  
order.

RMH

MMH  
14

X-17

Please draft  
a friendly ack'  
+ reply. -

I do not ~~remember~~  
remember this  
man. SKH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 20, 1931.

My dear Mr. Robbins:

I have your letter of October 13, 1931, and am very glad to have this word from you.

I have read with interest your suggestion with regard to a means of settling the dispute between China and Japan, and I appreciate your courtesy in writing me on the subject.

The situation in Manchuria is, as you realize, a very delicate one and I can assure you that it is being given the Department's most careful and solicitous attention.

Yours sincerely,

*OK Gustafson*

Mr. H. R. Robbins,  
 P. O. Box 404,  
 Glendale, California.

✓  
 C. H. W.  
 Oct. 21. 1931. P.M.

FE:MMH:LM  
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 10/20/31

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 OCT 21 1931  
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM RECEIVED GREEN  
OCT 23 1931  
DIVISION OF FROM GENEVA

Dated October 22, 1931

Rec'd 4:02 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington



242, October 22, 6 p.m.

The Council convened in public session at four o'clock this afternoon. The Japanese representative immediately read the following statement

"As you will remember, I raised the objection the other day from a constitutional point of view to inviting a representative of a non-member State to participate in the deliberations of the Council. I still maintain the legal stand I took on that occasion, but now with the representative of the United States at this table I am glad to be able to assure him and the members of the Council that it is the traditional policy of my country to promote the principle of friendship and amity with the United States and that both the government and people are determined to live in peace and good will with that country for all times by pursuing this policy consistently".

I replied

793.94/2305

FILED  
OCT 23 1931

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

2- #242, from Geneva, October 22,  
1931

I replied to this as follows <sup>FROM</sup>

"The conditions of my association with you and the limitation with respect to my speaking are of course understood. In this instance I wish, however, to beg the indulgence of the President of the Council that I may be permitted to respond to the words of the representative of Japan.

I have heard with deep gratification what the representative of Japan has said and I wish to assure him that I heartily appreciate the spirit in which he has spoken. I have never had any thought of attributing his position in this matter to other than juridical considerations, but it gives me great pleasure, nevertheless, to be able to hear him say this and to reassure him that on my part he may have no fear of my interpreting his attitude in any other light.

The sentiments which he has expressed as to the relations between our countries are cordially reciprocated. We look upon the long record of peace and friendship between our people and the people of Japan as among the happiest pages in our history, and the thought is furthest from our minds that that record should ever be broken".

(END SECTION ONE)

OSB

GILBERT

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP


FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated October 22, 1931

Rec'd 10:37 p. m.



Secretary of State,  
Washington.

242, October 22, 6 p. m. (SECTION TWO),

Briand then spoke as follows:

"I desire to inform the Council that most of the governments represented on the Council having felt it necessary, as signatories of the general Pact for the Renunciation of War, to send on the 17th October by telegram, and through their diplomatic representatives, an identic note to the Governments of China and Japan calling their attention to the provisions of this Pact - and more especially to the terms of Article two thereof - I was requested to inform the other signatory Governments of that Pact by telegram of this fact.

These communications have been duly made through the representatives of the French Government to the Government of the United States, and also to the other governments concerned. There has been handed to those Governments a copy

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REP

- #242, from Geneva, Oct.22, 6p.m.

copy of the identical note sent by the members of the Council. Since this communication of the French Government was received by the Government of the United States, that Government, through the agency of its diplomatic representatives, sent by telegram an identical note to the Governments of China and Japan. I am not in a position yet to inform the Council of the action which may have been taken, as a result of my communication, by the other Governments concerned. As regards the reception by the parties of the identical note which was sent to them, I have received, so far as I am concerned, this morning, a communication from the representative of China, which will be read".

The Chinese representative then read a communication from his Government which incorporated the reply of the Chinese Government to the French note invoking the Pact of Paris. As this reply or a similar one is doubtless available to the Department, I am not transmitting it in this telegram.

Briand then made a statement summarizing the positions of both China and Japan and spoke briefly regarding the long negotiations which had taken place in an effort to find a formula satisfactory to all. He declared that the results of these efforts

REP

3- #242, from Geneva, Oct. 22, 6 p.m.

of these efforts are incorporated in the draft resolution which had been unanimously agreed upon, with the exception of the two disputants, which he then presented to the Council. The resolution follows:

"The Council, in pursuance of the resolution passed on September 30th, and noting that in addition to the invocation by the Government of China, of Article 11 of the Covenant, Article 2 of the Pact of Paris has also been invoked by a number of Governments, paragraph one recalls the undertakings given to the Council by the Governments of China and Japan in that resolution, and in particular the statement of the Japanese representative that the Japanese Government would continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured, and the statement of the Chinese representative that his Government will assume the responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of nationals outside that zone - a pledge which implies the effective protection of Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria; Paragraph Two recalls further that both Governments have given the

REP

4- #242, from Geneva, Oct. 22, 6 p. m.

given the assurance that they would refrain from any measures which might aggravate the existing situation, and are therefore bound not to resort to any aggressive policy or action and to take measures to suppress hostile agitation; paragraph three recalls the Japanese statement that Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria, and notes that this statement is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Nine Power Treaty, the signatories of which are pledged "to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China"; Paragraph Four. Being convinced that the fulfillment of these assurances and undertakings is essential for the restoration of normal relations between the two parties; paragraph (a) calls upon the Japanese Government to begin immediately and to proceed progressively with the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone, so that the total withdrawal may be effected before the date fixed for the next meeting of the Council; paragraph (b) calls upon the Chinese Government, in execution of its general pledge to assume

REP

5- #242, from Geneva, Oct. 22, 6 p. m.

assume the responsibility for the safety and lives of all Japanese subjects resident in Manchuria, to make such arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated as will insure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects there, and requests the Chinese Government to associate with the Chinese authorities designated for the above purpose representatives of other powers in order that such representatives may follow the execution of the arrangements; Paragraph Five recommends that the Chinese and Japanese Governments should immediately appoint representatives to arrange the details of the execution of all points relating to the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territory so that they may proceed smoothly and without delay; paragraph Six recommends the Chinese and Japanese Governments as soon as the evacuation is completed, to begin direct negotiations on questions outstanding between them, and in particular those arising out of recent incidents as well as those relating to existing difficulties due to the railway situation in Manchuria. For this purpose the Council suggests that the two parties should set up Conciliation Committee

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

6- #242, from Geneva, Oct. 22, 6 p.m.

Committee or some such permanent machinery; Paragraph seven decides to adjourn until November 16th, at which date it will again examine the situation, but authorizes its president to convoke a meeting at any earlier date should it in his opinion be desirable".

(END SECTION TWO).

GILBERT

JHR

WSB

7 3

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

GRAY

RECEIVED  
OCT 23 1931  
DIVISION C.

FROM

Geneva

Dated October 23, 1931

Rec'd 8:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

242, October 23, 6 p. m. (SECTION THREE).

Briand stated that this draft resolution must not be regarded as one that cannot be modified and he invited the representative of Japan and China to express their views as soon as they have had an opportunity to examine it sufficiently.

Sze then stated that at the first glance this resolution "appears to fall far short of what the Chinese Government considers the situation demands and what it is entitled to ask." He recognized however that it represents the results of the Council's labors to safeguard peace and secure justice and must therefore be carefully considered. He announced that the text has been telegraphed to the Chinese Government and requested a short delay in order to obtain instructions.

#242, October 22, 6 p. m., (SECTION THREE) from Geneva

-2-

instructions.

The Japanese representative thereupon read a long statement which was not entirely pertinent to the question at issue. He reviewed the whole Japanese position with regard to Manchuria, which has been summarized in previous telegrams, and reiterated that Japan has no territorial designs in that region. He stated that his government cannot "here and now fix a definite date at which circumstances will make it possible for the last of its men to be brought back within the railway zone" and declared that the exact moment of this withdrawal depends upon the "peaceful intentions and the good will shown effectively by the Chinese Government."

Yoshizawa then reserved the right to present observations on the draft resolution after a thorough study of the text.

Briand thereupon interposed to say that in accordance with the desires of both the Chinese and Japanese representatives to study the draft resolution and the desire of the Chinese delegate to secure instructions the Council naturally would accede to the request for a

brief

#242, October 22, 6 p. m., (SECTION THREE) from Geneva

-3-

brief delay.

After thanking the President for this courtesy Sze made a brief statement in reply to the Japanese wherein he declared "the obligations that each country assumes under the League Covenant, under the Paris Pact or under the Nine Power Treaty, or any other treaty which we have voluntarily entered into without any reservation, are expected to be carried out without any excuses for violating them." He then stated that he would not discuss at this time the speech of the Japanese delegate but that he would give it careful study and if necessary make an appropriate reply later.

The Japanese representative also reserved the right of further comment.

Briand then stated that the holding of another meeting of the Council would depend upon the instructions being received, he suggested that the next meeting should be fixed tentatively for tomorrow, October 23, 5 p. m. This was agreed to on the understanding that if the Chinese delegate had not received his instructions some other arrangement would be made. (END MESSAGE.)


GILBERT

OX  
FW



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



October 20, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

THE NEW YORK TIMES in today's issue (October 20, 1931) comments editorially on "An Effective Treaty" in part as follows:

"Events of the past week have shown that the Kellogg-Briand treaty is not the flimsy fabric of a dream which its opponents pictured it in a debate in the United States Senate. -----"

"The Pact of Paris is henceforth no mere 'moral gesture.' It is 'implemented,' if not with its own institutions for the settlement of disputes, with the best and most effective that it can borrow from the experience of the civilized world."

793.94/2306

*Handwritten signature*

OCT 23 1931

FILED

RAM  
RSM:EJL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be- FROM  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

RECEIVED  
OCT 24 1931  
GENEVA SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Dated October 20, 1931

Rec'd 9:58 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

233, October 20, 9 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY

I am reporting on meetings of the Council as they occur. That by no means, however, completes picture of what is taking place here. It is not expedient to bring forward in the Council, which has too large a membership for that purpose, the more important of the developments. These lie in direct conversations between Briand, Reading, Drummond (and Grandi when he is present) and the Chinese and the Japanese representatives.

The crux of the problem seems to be that Japan is standing on two demands, (one) safety for Japanese lives and property and, (two) a more general settlement of questions between Japan and China in Manchuria including in particular questions relating to the South Manchurian Railway. The Japanese position is that the latter do not involve 'new' demands, in other words, they are not in addition to those

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 23 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 24 1931  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

79394/2307

AM

2-#233, from Geneva, October 22, 1931  
9 p.m.

those embraced in the Council resolutions of September 30th but that they form a part of 'security' in a general sense. The interpretation of security in the September 30th resolution has all along been understood to mean 'immediate' security for Japanese life and property incident to evacuation.

There is a feeling here however which I believe I am interpreting correctly that the Japanese must achieve their objective respecting some of these general demands before they will retire or at least before they will agree to retire. I understand that they have made known the nature of these demands to Reading, Drummond and Briand but that the latter are for reasons which seem to be compelling keeping these secret at the present time. The effort here lies in adjusting these demands to a possible Chinese acceptance. If this can be accomplished details of method regarding Japan withdrawal and Chinese <sup>re-</sup>occupation can probably be easily resolved.

Reading and Drummond have told me that they did not regard the Japanese demands as particularly excessive and that they were hopeful of an adjustment with the Chinese. The Japanese contended that should an agreement be reached with the Chinese prior to evacuation formally to accept these demands in direct negotiations undertaken during

AM

2-#233, from Geneva, October 22, 1931  
9 p.m.

during or subsequent to evacuation, the Chinese might not in these negotiations follow out their undertakings in the premises. In reply the Japanese were informed that these commitments on the part of China (as well as those of Japan) would be made to the Council and in that event the roles of the two disputants would be reversed and that then Japan would be in the position of the plaintiff.

As far as the negotiation which I have above *(\*) indicated* are taking place here with the Japanese I have just been informed by Drummond of a conversation which he had with Sawada in which the following situation is brought out:

(One)-Drummond informed Sawada that with respect to the Japanese demands inasmuch as they had been given him by the Japanese in the strictest confidence he was unable to divulge them and thus this important information could not be used as a basis for private conversations between Briand and the disputants.

Two -Drummond told Sawada that in order for this information to be put to a useful purpose it was important that it be communicated to members of the Council and even made public. He added that if the points fall within the accepted treaties such action might strengthen the Japanese

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3-#233, from Geneva, October 22, 1931  
9 p.m.

Japanese case. Moreover he assures us that the Chinese might be able at once to accept them and if this took place the whole problem would be rendered easier. However, Sawada replied that of course he could not express any opinion on this but that it would be at once suggested to Tokyo.

I feel that I should tell you that there is constantly brought to my attention by members of the Council and by representatives of the American press here that the Japanese <sup>are with</sup> ~~are with~~ no small success bonding every effort to give the appearance that there is a marked division of policy between Washington and Geneva vis a vis the Japanese position. Their methods which I have mentioned in previous telegrams are to cite conversations between yourself and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington or to draw conclusions from such conversations. From intimations which Sawada himself has made to me and from the nature of the sources by which I have been apprised of these actions of the Japanese, I believe this to be true.

GILBERT

WSB

→ Note: This cablegram is a repetition of a message received by telephone.

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


WESLEY L. JONES, WASH., CHAIRMAN  
ROD SMOOT, UTAH  
FREDERICK HALE, ME.  
HENRY W. KEYES, N. H.  
HIRAN BINGHAM, CONN.  
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GERALD P. NYE, N. DAK.  
OTIS GLENN, ILL.  
FREDERICK STEIWER, OREG.  
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ROYAL S. COPELAND, N. Y.  
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SAM G. BRATTON, N. MEX.  
CAMERON MORRISON, N. C.

KENNEDY F. REA, CLERK  
JAMES H. DAVIS, ASST. CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

October 22, 1931



OCT 23 31



The Honorable Henry L. Stimson  
Secretary of State  
State Department

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am inclosing to you herewith a letter I have just received from Mr. Charles E. Dent of Portland, Oregon, relative to the situation now existing between China and Japan.

Mr. Dent is exceptionally well informed on business and trade conditions in the orient and for many years has carried on trade with the orient. I will be most appreciate if you will give careful consideration to the contents of Mr. Dent's letter.

Respectfully yours,

Frederick Steiwer

D  
Incl. ✓

FILED

OCT 28 1931

793.94/2308

Copy-LM

DANT & RUSSELL, INC.  
PACIFIC COAST LUMBER AND SHINGLES  
PORTER BUILDING  
PORTLAND, OREGON  
10/19/31

Senator Frederick Steiwer,  
United States Senate,  
Washington, D. C.

AIR MAIL

My dear Senator:--

In the present situation between Japan and China, it is a well known fact to those interested in trade between the United States and those countries that a boycott system has been built up in China during the past two years to exclude Japanese goods. This boycott, fostered under thinly veiled Chinese Governmental direction, has developed into an effective economic war. Grave losses to Japanese manufacturing interests serving China trade have been suffered. Very little difference exists between such an economic war and effective war.

Consideration must be given to the patience shown by Japan under trying circumstances in its relations with China. Every effort to adjust matters on a diplomatic basis having failed, public opinion in Japan called for the forceful measures lately adopted to protect her interests. Interference by America will only crystallize Japanese public feeling against us. Europe would benefit by this. Japan's position should be given the utmost consideration. Sympathy amongst those not acquainted with Oriental problems may be inclined to support China as the weaker country struggling to achieve Republican ideals, but common sense must outweigh sympathy. The fact is China plays on our sympathy to gain support diplomatically, while utterly failing to play square with established trade interests in her country, be they American, British, Japanese, Russian, or any other nationality.

America has only a small trade interest in China as compared with a large and growing trade in Japan. China protests friendship for America but her valuable business is not placed with us. Japan proves her goodwill towards

us

1794

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

us by supporting American trade in her country. She is our best customer in the Orient. We desire to retain that goodwill.

On behalf of American business interests in general, and the lumber interests of the Northwest in particular, I submit that the action taken by our State Department in Washington in authorizing our representative at Geneva to sit on the Council of the League of Nations calls for grave consideration. Is it to our interests to join in putting Japan on trial because she has, under duress, taken steps to protect her interests in China and Manchuria by military police methods when diplomatic means had failed. It should be regarded as a domestic affair between Japan and China. America should stay out of it. We have our own problems at home to attend to and can well allow Japan and China to adjust their own difficulties.

Our entry into the situation on the Committee of the League of Nations may so exasperate Japanese public opinion that it might result in actual war conditions against China being brought about as an expression of defiance of foreign interference. Let us wait until Japan and China jointly ask us to mediate in a mutually friendly spirit of goodwill, should a deadlock arise as between the viewpoint of the Oriental and that of the Occidental as represented through the League.

With kindest regards, I am,

Yours very truly,

(Signed) C. E. Dant



1795

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 27 1931.

In reply refer to  
 FE 793.94/2308  
 2308

The Honorable

Frederick Steiwer,

United States Senate.

Sir:

I have your letter of October 22, 1931, enclosing a letter to you, dated October 19, from Mr. C. E. Dant, in which he comments with regard to the present situation in Manchuria.

I am very glad to have Mr. Dant's views and I thank you for your courtesy in bringing them to my attention. I may add that the dispute between China and Japan is continuing to receive my most careful and solicitous attention and that this Department's efforts are directed only toward seeing that the dispute is adjusted by pacific means.

I have had made, for the Department's files, a copy of Mr. Dant's letter; the original is returned herewith.

Very truly yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Enclosure:  
 From Mr. C. E. Dant,  
 October 19, 1931.

A true copy of  
 the signed orig-  
 inal

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 10/24/31

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 6044

793.94/2308

Oct. 28. 1931.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHARLES L. McNARY, OREG., CHAIRMAN

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
THADDEUS H. CARAWAY, ARK.

BURTON K. WHEELER, MONT.

ELMER THOMAS, OKLA.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON  
AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY



OCT 22, 1931

OCT 23 31

October 27 1931



Honorable Henry L. Stimson,  
Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The author of the enclosed letter, Mr. C. E.  
Dant, of Portland, Oregon, is a substantial citizen of  
the State, whose judgment on most subjects is sound.

I submit the contents of his letter to your  
thoughtful consideration, and with sentiments of per-  
sonal esteem, I am

Very sincerely yours,

Chas. L. McNary

McN/B

enc.  
V

793.94/2309

FILED

1931.88.170

Copy-LM

DANT & RUSSELL, INC.  
PACIFIC COAST LUMBER AND SHINGLES  
PORTER BUILDING  
PORTLAND, OREGON  
10/19/31

Senator Chas. L. McNary,  
United States Senate,  
Washington, D. C.

AIR MAIL

My dear Senator:--

In the present situation between Japan and China, it is a well known fact to those interested in trade between the United States and those countries that a boycott system has been built up in China during the past two years to exclude Japanese goods. This boycott, fostered under thinly veiled Chinese Governmental direction, has developed into an effective economic war. Grave losses to Japanese manufacturing interests serving China trade have been suffered. Very little difference exists between such an economic war and effective war.

Consideration must be given to the patience shown by Japan under trying circumstances in its relations with China. Every effort to adjust matters on a diplomatic basis having failed, public opinion in Japan called for the forceful measures lately adopted to protect her interests. Interference by America will only crystallize Japanese public feeling against us. Europe would benefit by this. Japan's position should be given the utmost consideration. Sympathy amongst those not acquainted with Oriental problems may be inclined to support China as the weaker country struggling to achieve Republican ideals, but common sense must outweigh sympathy. The fact is China plays on our sympathy to gain support diplomatically, while utterly failing to play square with established trade interests in her country, be they American, British, Japanese, Russian, or any other nationality.

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us

- 2 -

us by supporting American trade in her country. She is our best customer in the Orient. We desire to retain that goodwill.

On behalf of American business interests in general, and the lumber interests of the Northwest in particular, I submit that the action taken by our State Department in Washington in authorizing our representative at Geneva to sit on the Council of the League of Nations calls for grave consideration. Is it to our interests to join in putting Japan on trial because she has, under duress, taken steps to protect her interests in China and Manchuria by military police methods when diplomatic means had failed. It should be regarded as a domestic affair between Japan and China. America should stay out of it. We have our own problems at home to attend to and can well allow Japan and China to adjust their own difficulties.

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With kindest regards, I am,

Yours very truly,

(Signed) C. E. Dant

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 24, 1931.

S:

Mr. Secretary:

793.94/2309

793.94/2308

Senators McNary and Steiwer send

you copies of an identic letter from Mr.  
C. E. Dant of Portland, Oregon, in regard  
to the Manchuria situation. Mr. Dant is  
sympathetic with the Japanese position  
in this matter and questions the advisa-  
bility of an American representative  
sitting with the Council of the League.

MMH:LM

7/24/31

27 1931.

1931, enclosing  
Mr. C. E. Dant,  
present situation

views and I thank  
to my attention.  
and Japan is  
and solicitous  
efforts are direct-  
is adjusted by

at's files, a copy

of Mr. Dant's letter; the original is returned herewith.

Very truly yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Enclosure:


From Mr. C. E. Dant,  
October 19, 1931.

FE:MMH:LM

10/24/31

FE

Oct. 26, 1931.



793.94/2309

October 27 1931.

In reply refer to  
FE 793.94/2309

The Honorable

Charles L. McNary,

United States Senate.

Sir:

I have your letter of October 22, 1931, enclosing a letter to you, dated October 19, from Mr. C. E. Dant, in which he comments with regard to the present situation in Manchuria.

I am very glad to have Mr. Dant's views and I thank you for your courtesy in bringing them to my attention. I may add that the dispute between China and Japan is continuing to receive my most careful and solicitous attention and that this Department's efforts are directed only toward seeing that the dispute is adjusted by pacific means.

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HENRY L. STIMSON

Enclosure:


From Mr. C. E. Dant,  
October 19, 1931.

FE:MMH:LM

10/24/31

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CR  
Oct. 26, 1931.





DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OSCAR DEPRIEST  
1ST ILLINOIS DISTRICT

MORRIS LEWIS  
SECRETARY

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

OFFICE:  
HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
Room 135



October 19 1931.

Dear Mr. President:-

Pursuant to request, I have the honor to hand you herewith Resolution adopted by the North Carolina Club of Chicago. I desire further to say that I subscribe to the matters presented to you in said resolution.

Respectfully yours,



*Dear Mr. President*  
*E.G.C.*

Honorable Herbert Hoover,  
President,  
The White House,  
Washington.

RESPECTFULLY REFERRED  
FOR CONSIDERATION.

*Lawrence R. ...*  
ccy. to the President.

793.94/2310

FILED

OCT 28 1931

Chicago, Illinois, October 16th, 1931.

R E S O L U T I O N

Whereas the people of the United States, have repeatedly gone on record as being opposed to this country entering into entangling alliances with foreign nations and as being particularly opposed to this country having a membership in the League of Nations, and

Whereas it is reliably reported that the President of the United States has ordered the United States Counsel at Geneva, to attend meetings of the League of Nations, in which meeting the impending war between Japan and China will be discussed and some ruling of the League as to the course of conduct of these two nations will be made which may lead this country into war.

THEREFORE, be it resolved, that the North Carolina Club of Chicago, hereby does earnestly request Congressman Oscar DePriest to urge upon the President of the United States, to rescind the order directing the American Counsel to attend the League of Nations' meeting and to further urge upon the President not to interfere with the controversy between Japan and China unless and until the interests and dignity of this country are vitally involved in the controversy.

Be it further resolved that a copy of these Resolutions be handed to Congressman DePriest and a copy be spread upon the minutes of this club.

NORTH CAROLINA CLUB OF CHICAGO

BY Anthony King  
President.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.37 / 161 FOR Tel # 174 11 am

FROM Cuba ( Reed ) DATED October 22, 1931  
TO NAME 1--1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Cooperation of the Cuban Government with the policy of  
the United States on the Far East situation.

FLH

793.94 / 2311

AM

LA  
FE

793.94  
827.51  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

Havana

Dated October 22, 1931

Rec'd 1:28 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

174, October 22, 11 a.m.

President Machado sent for me this morning and  
asked me to convey to you and the President the  
assurance of the whole-hearted support and cooperation  
of the Cuban Government and people in our policy with  
respect to the situation in the Far East. He  
added that we could count upon the same relations,  
ideals and aims in any international situation that  
might arise.

Machado has often made similar statements to the  
Ambassador and to me. I cannot however escape the  
impression that his present assurance is a bid for the  
Department's support in his Government's negotiations  
with American bankers.

REED

JHR

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



REP

FROM

A portion of this  
telegram must be closely  
paraphrased before being  
communicated to anyone.

PEIPING

Dated October 23, 1931

Rec'd 12, noon.

RECEIVED

OCT 23 1931

Secretary of State,

DIVISION OF

Washington.

PRIORITY.

814, October 23, 11 a. m. (GRAY)

CONFIDENTIAL.

I have recently had several informal talks with the  
young Marshal, Donald his adviser, Hawking Yen who has  
left for Washington, Yano, Counselor of the Japanese  
Legation who is son-in-law of Viscount Ishii, and other  
well informed persons. The following conclusions are  
based upon these conversations and upon a consideration  
of certain fundamental factors which are operative in  
Sino-Japanese relations irrespective of the present  
incidents in Manchuria: (END GRAY).

One. Neither the Chinese nor the Japanese people  
having been vitally affected in their thoughts and charac-  
ter by the ordeal of the World War through which Western  
civilization

793.94/2312

OCT 23 1931

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM  
2-#814, from Peiping, Oct. 23, noon.

civilization passed, both seem strangely unfamiliar with its lessons. Their arguments and the language in which they are couched in private conversation as well as official statements usually fail to take into account the great changes in outlook and method the post-war period has wrought in international relationships.

Two. Japan has shown a cynical disregard of formalities and the arrogance of her military is strikingly reminiscent of German conduct between 1914 and 1916 as is also her inaptitude in guaging public opinion in other countries. No provisions had apparently been made to prepare the world for the drastic action taken and such propaganda as has been put out since then has been singularly clumsy and unconvincing.

Three. Japan has large political and economic stake in Manchuria which has recently been threatened by closer cooperation between Mukden and Nanking and the violently anti-Japanese Kuomintang. Japan has therefore doubtless encouraged elements hostile to the Chinese National Government south of the Great Wall which has caused all her actions to be viewed with profound suspicion by the Chinese.

Four. On the other hand Chinese leaders and especially  
the young

REP

3- #814, from Peiping, Oct. 23, noon.

the young Marshal have in recent years deliberately ignored Japanese treaty rights and other legitimate interests in Manchuria. The fatuous attitude of prejudiced antagonism of the National Government towards all foreigners has led to particularly provocative measures against Japan in the Northeastern Provinces where a policy of petty annoyances, delay and evasion of responsibility has proved most exasperating to the Japanese Government. Literally hundreds of cases are said to be awaiting settlement while ambitious, but not always sound, schemes of Chinese railway construction are menacing the South Manchuria railway at a time when acute economic depression is rendering operation unprofitable.

Five. Domestic consequences of events in Manchuria are incalculable and bound to be most serious. Already the young Marshal's position, which was keystone of political structure in the North, has collapsed and it is not certain that his successor, whether it be Yen Hsi Shan or Wang Ching Wei or a gray general, will be as loyal to Nanking as he was. Even if the negotiations with Canton succeed, and there is every indication that they will,

REP

4- #814, from Peiping, Oct. 23, noon.

will, North China has so many complex problems of its own that complete unity seems too much to hope for.

Six. The Chinese Government appears very anxious to give the impression that unless the other powers assist China in her present predicament she may decide to accept help from Soviet Russia, quite apart from the possibility of an internal upheaval in favor of communism caused by the alleged embittered and disappointed masses. Unfortunately there is enough truth in this observation to warrant the greatest circumspection. The National Government has been in the habit of ascribing all its ills and misfortunes to the "imperialism" of Western nations and to the "unequal treaties" and with Canton in the ascendancy this spirit of reckless chauvinism will almost certainly be accentuated. As repeatedly emphasized in the Legation's reports the danger of Bolshevism in China is a very real one.

Seven. Whatever the formula for the settlement of the immediate problem may be it will be merely palliative if it does not lead to readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations along lines of intelligent and practical cooperation. Yano assures me that Japan was most willing to try but found

Chinese

REP

5- #814, from Peiping, Oct. 23, noon.

Chinese authorities obstinate and unresponsive. I assume the present autonomy movement in Manchuria and inner-Mongolia is being encouraged by Japan so as to be less dependent upon ephemeral central governments. If Japan were to show greater consideration for the susceptibilities of Chinese authorities, the latter may be prepared to recognize the constructive work of the Japanese in South Manchuria and avoid a course which can only lead to further military humiliations. A general settlement may be expected when both parties are genuinely determined to establish neighborly relations. Japan, like many other powers, is tired of making undignified bids for favors unwillingly bestowed, while China has a right to expect on the part of Japan a more scrupulous observance of the dictates of justice and fairness.

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

CSB

181

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 23, 1931.

S. K. H.

In leaving this corrected copy of the Chinese Legation's note of October 22, 1931, Mr. Yung Kwai stated that the clause "is especially gratified to learn that the American Government" in the second paragraph, lines 6 to 8, had been omitted from the copy handed in yesterday, - or rather that this clause had been inserted by error somewhere in the following paragraph.

Mr. Yung Kwai stated that he did not consider this change material, except for record, inasmuch as the text as handed in yesterday, has already been published.

*RSM*

RSM: EMU



Handed by Mr. Jungs Kawai  
to Mr. Miller, October 23, 1931

Recd.

CHINESE LEGATION



CORRECTED COPY  
OF THE LEGATION'S NOTE OF OCTOBER 22, 1931.

October 22, 1931.

Sir:

I have the honor to inform you that I am instructed by  
my Government to deliver to you the following note:

"The Chinese Government has received from  
the American Government the communication dated  
October 21st, in which the American Government  
calls the attention of the Chinese and Japanese  
Governments to the obligations arising from the  
Treaty for the Renunciation of War and expresses  
the hope that both China and Japan will refrain  
from any measures which might lead to war.

"The Chinese Government and people deeply  
appreciate the renewed expression, on the part  
of the Government and people of the United States,  
of the profound concern with which they have  
observed the development of events in China since  
the 18th of September. The Chinese Government is  
especially gratified to learn that the American  
Government has cooperated with the League of  
Nations in its efforts to secure a peaceful  
settlement

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,

Secretary of State.

793.94/2313

FILED  
MAR 21 1932

- 2 -

settlement.

"It has been in absolute reliance upon the principles of international law and international agreements, particularly those for the perpetuation of peace among nations, and for pledging respect for the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of states, that the Chinese Government has consistently refrained from employing force to meet the situation created by the occupation of Chinese territory by Japanese troops and other warlike actions of Japan, in the belief that such actions would not be permitted to go unchallenged by the powers which should feel deeply concerned in the matter. Especially faithful to the obligations assumed under the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, the Chinese Government has been seeking, from the very beginning, a just and adequate settlement by pacific means. China has not adopted any measures of war but has appealed to the United States of America as well as the League of Nations under the provisions of existing international agreements.

"It is the sincere desire of the Chinese Government to settle the present crisis by peaceful means under conditions which give a guarantee of fair and equitable treatment for all concerned and to cooperate to the fullest possible extent with the American Government, the sponsor of the  
Treaty

- 3 -

Treaty for the Renunciation of War, in its efforts to uphold the sanctity of international engagements."

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Yung Kwai

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

*Mr. Cottle*

*X-24*

*Have — the  
Chinese 9.5 reply  
to Secretary of State, Oct. 21.*



*When we rec'd the  
Japanese 9.5 note, I  
shall suggest for  
release of all the*


SECRETARY

2 1931

OF STATE

*Handed by  
the Chinese charge  
to SKH 12-22-30*

CHINESE LEGATION  
WASHINGTON



inform you that I am instructed by

to you the following note:

Government has received from  
ment the communication dated  
ich the American Government  
of the Chinese and Japanese  
obligations arising from the

Treaty, for the Renunciation of War and expresses  
the hope that both China and Japan will refrain  
from any measures which might lead to war.

"The Chinese Government and people deeply  
appreciate the renewed expression, on the part of  
the Government and people of the United States,  
of the profound concern with which they have  
observed the development of events in China since  
the 18th of September. The Chinese Government has  
cooperated with the League of Nations in its  
efforts to secure a peaceful settlement.

"It has been in absolute reliance upon the  
principles of international law and international  
agreements, particularly those for the perpetuation  
of peace among nations, and for pledging respect  
for the sovereignty, the independence, and the terri-  
torial

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,

Secretary of State.

*FILE*

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OCT 23 1931

CHINESE LEGATION

793.94/2313

MAR 21 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

CHINESE LEGATION  
WASHINGTON

SECRETARY  
2 1931  
IT OF STATE

October 22, 1931.

text which  
I am collecting.

inform you that I am instructed by

to you the following note:

No release until  
after the other Commission  
are published. Perhaps  
next week. H.C.

Government has received from  
the communication dated  
which the American Government  
of the Chinese and Japanese  
governments to the obligations arising from the  
Treaty for the Renunciation of War and expresses  
the hope that both China and Japan will refrain  
from any measures which might lead to war.

"The Chinese Government and people deeply  
appreciate the renewed expression, on the part of  
the Government and people of the United States,  
of the profound concern with which they have  
observed the development of events in China since  
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efforts to secure a peaceful settlement.

"It has been in absolute reliance upon the  
principles of international law and international  
agreements, particularly those for the perpetuation  
of peace among nations, and for pleasing respect  
for the sovereignty, the independence, and the terri-  
torial

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,

Secretary of State.

793.94/2313

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*See Corrected Copy*  
*793.94/2313*

*Handled by*  
*the Chinese charge*  
*to SKM*  
*8-22-30*

CHINESE LEGATION  
WASHINGTON

THE UNDER SECRETARY  
OCT 22 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET OCT 22, 1931.  
OCT 23 1931  
*Noted HLS*

Sir:

I have the honor to inform you that I am instructed by  
my Government to deliver to you the following note:

RECEIVED

OCT 23 1931

RECEIVED OFFICE



"The Chinese Government has received from  
the American Government the communication dated  
October 21st, in which the American Government  
calls the attention of the Chinese and Japanese  
Governments to the obligations arising from the  
Treaty for the Renunciation of War and expresses  
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for the sovereignty, the independence, and the terri-  
torial

793.94/2313

MAR 21 1932

FILED

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,

Secretary of State.

- 2 -

torial and administrative integrity of states, that the Chinese Government is especially gratified to learn that the American Government has consistently discountenanced employing force to meet the situation created by the occupation of Chinese territory by Japanese troops and other warlike actions of Japan, in the belief that such actions would not be permitted to go unchallenged by the powers which should feel deeply concerned in the matter. Especially faithful to the obligations assumed under the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, the Chinese Government has been seeking, from the very beginning, a just and adequate settlement by pacific means. China has not adopted any measures of war but has appealed to the United States of America as well as the League of Nations under the provisions of existing international agreements.

"It is the sincere desire of the Chinese Government to settle the present crisis by peaceful means under conditions which give a guarantee of fair and equitable treatment for all concerned and to cooperate to the fullest possible extent with the American Government, the sponsor of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, in its efforts to uphold the sanctity of international engagements."

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.


  
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

FROM

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone.



Dated October 23, 1931

Rec'd 7:53 p. m.



Secretary of State,  
Washington.

245, October 23, 6 p. m.

Following is the substance of a conversation which  
took place between Drummond and Yoshizawa yesterday  
evening:

The Ambassador showed Drummond the text of a telegram  
which he had received from Tokio. This telegram explained  
the reasons why the Japanese Government cannot agree to  
any time limit for the evacuation of troops (these reasons  
were those set forth in the Ambassador's statement before  
the Council yesterday afternoon, Consulate's 242, October  
22, 6 p. m.) but stated their willingness, as  
evacuation and direct negotiations proceeded, to inform  
the Council committee appointed as to the result. The  
Ambassador then expressed his regret that, in view of  
the

793.94/2314

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#245, October 23, 6 p. m. from Geneva

-2-

the step forward which he considered having been made by his government, the resolution had been presented to the Council.

Drummond told the Ambassador that he greatly regretted that the negotiations which had taken place between the Japanese and Briand had not reached a satisfactory issue. The whole object of Briand's proposal was that the "fifth point" should be so modified by the Japanese Government as to bring it under the terms of the September 30 resolution, particularly that portion which applies to security. Briand's position was that the modifications suggested in the fifth point by the Japanese did not object to this purpose. In view of this it was impossible for them to agree to recommend direct negotiations before the evacuation had taken place. The Ambassador then read to Drummond the amended fifth point which is as follows: (END SECTION ONE).

GILBERT

FW

OX

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

This telegram must be **FROM** Geneva  
closely paraphrased be- Dated October 23, 1931  
fore being communicated Recd 8:50 p.m.  
to anyone. RECEIVED

Secretary of State  
Washington.

OCT 24 1931

DIVISION OF

245, October 23, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

"An undertaking on the part of the Chinese Government to fulfill the obligations which China owes to Japan under the provisions of the existing treaties between the two countries relating to railways in Manchuria."

With respect to this fifth point Drummond states that the difficulty still remains. He added that he feared that the whole matter had now reached a stage in which it was impossible to go back to the stage which existed yesterday or the day before inasmuch as the new resolution had been made public.

Drummond then took up with him the question as to what the Japanese Government meant by the words "provisions of existing treaties." In other words did this mean provisions of treaties which were mutually recognized or did it refer to treaties which the Chinese Government did not accept.

The Ambassador declared that he could not (repeat not) give a direct answer but he thought for instance that it

-2- #245 from Geneva, October 23,  
1931, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

that it applied to the Pekin Protocol by which provision was made that no railways competing with the South Manchurian Railway should be constructed in China. Drummond replied that he understood that the Pekin Protocol was disputed. The Ambassador stated that such was the case and also there was a dispute over the Chien Tao treaty which had been concluded some twenty years ago which Japan regarded as very important.

Drummond then stated that this being the situation he did not see any way to meet the Japanese position. Drummond added that he could only suggest that the Ambassador might ask the Chinese representative in public whether or not China was prepared to fulfill the obligations undertaken under the terms of the treaties recognized by both parties. Should the Chinese representative answer in the affirmative the Japanese Government would then secure an undertaking which would give effect to their fifth point. Should then the question arise as to the validity of certain treaties Japan could have recourse to the Hague Court. To this the Ambassador replied that he feared his government would not be inclined to take questions of that character to the Court at the Hague.

Drummond then drew attention to the terms of the resolution which had been made public, (Consulate's 242, October 22, 6 p.m.). He stated that the Ambassador would  
note

-3- #245 from Geneva, October 23,  
1931, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

note that the first four points of the Japanese demands were included in the first three articles of the resolution. With respect to the fifth point the resolution contained a recommendation that it should be studied immediately after completion of the evacuation. Drummond then reiterated his suggestion that the Ambassador should question the Chinese representative on the Council in the sense he had already indicated.

With respect to the foregoing the Ambassador said that he feared that his Government, which was very firm, had probably said their last word on the subject. Moreover, if the meeting would be held the following afternoon there would scarcely be time for him to consult his government.

Drummond replied to this that if it were only a question of consultation of his government he felt sure that the Council, as it had done in the case of Sze, would be to give him a little longer time.

Drummond then reiterated to the Ambassador that the matter now gone beyond the stage where Briand's proposal (Consulate's 240, <sup>12301</sup> October 22, 9 a.m., paragraph four. Note: the full text was not sent as this project was dropped before a wording was decided upon) was still open for acceptance by the Japanese Government since the new resolution had

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4- #245 from Geneva, October 23,  
1931, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO).


had been submitted. If the Japanese Government had been able to drop the fifth point things would have been easy but it apparently had not been willing either to drop the fifth point or to modify it in the sense that Briand had proposed. The Ambassador's only reply was that he would give consideration to what had been said. (END MESSAGE)

OX

GILBERT

FW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



793.94/2314

The suggestion that Drummond made as reported  
(No. 245, Oct. 23, 6 p. m.)  
on the page marked hereunder, that recourse be had to  
the Hague Court, is in line with one of the suggestions  
which FE made in a memorandum of September 20.

note  
500 C 114

The reply of the Japanese Ambassador that he feared  
that his Government would not be inclined to take  
questions of that character to the Court at the Hague  
brings to mind what occurred in 1907. There was at  
that time a dispute, in which a part of the issue was  
in relation to interpretation of treaties, between the  
Korean and the Japanese Governments; the Korean Govern-  
ment wanted to take the matter to the Hague (there was,  
of course, at that time no Court, but the Second Hague  
Conference was in being) and for that purpose sent  
representatives to the Hague - but the Japanese succeeded  
in effecting there a refusal even to give the Koreans  
a hearing.

F.W. 793.94/2314

FILED  
OCT 29 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

GRAY

FROM

Peiping, via N. R.

Dated October 23, 1931

Rec'd 7:52 p. m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 24 1931

Department of State

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.F.P.

Secretary of State

Washington.

812, October 23, 7 p. m.

Following from Consul General at Mukden:

"October 22, 4 p. m. Japanese officially report  
clash between one thousand Chinese troops and two companies  
railway guards about eight miles south of Tiehling at  
10 o'clock 21st. Casualties were Chinese 60 killed and  
wounded. Japanese none reported. Troops are retreating  
westward from east of <sup>Kirin</sup> ~~(2)~~, Japanese cavalry despatched  
to cut them off.

Japanese aircraft scouting over Taonananganchi railway  
fired upon by Chinese troops and in turn dropped bombs.  
Troops scattered but no material damage done as bombs  
were dropped in open field. Two bridges on railway were  
recently destroyed Chinese troops and Japanese gave  
necessity of protecting their interest in railway as  
reason

793.94/2315

1381.62.130  
OCT 28 1931

#812, October 23, 7 p. m., from Peiping

-2-

reason for action.

Chinese troops were seemingly retreating toward  
Chin Hsien." For the Minister

ENGERT

OX



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

rh

GRAY

1-1836

FROM

PEIPING VIA NR

RECEIVED

Dated October 24, 1931

OCT 21 1931

DIVISION OF

Rec'd. 5 am

UNDER SECRETARY

OCT 28 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 24 1931

Department of State

818, October 24, 1931

793.94  
Legation's 799, October 21, 8 am

Following from Mukden:

"October 23, 4 pm. Following telegram has been received this afternoon from Shekellin Radio Corporation, Shanghai,

"Please expedite reply from Japanese authorities present status resumption Mukden - San Francisco radio service. Have patiently awaited definite information date resumption of service. Kindly press for immediate action".

In accordance with the Legation's October 9, 11 am an instruction from the Department is requested."

Two. Legation's October 9, 11 am. To Mukden repeated second paragraph Department's 364 / 1918 October 7, 5 pm.

For the Minister

ENGERT

JHN:CSB

OCT 29 1931

FILED

793.94/2316

file  
2912

1828

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington, 27  
October 25, 1931.

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NON-CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

793.94/2316

AMERICAN LEGATION

OCT 27 1931

PEIPING (China).

397

793.94/2316

Your 818, October 24, 11 a.m.

One. You may instruct Mukden to inform the radio corporation's representative at Shanghai that the question of ~~the resumption of service by~~ the Mukden wireless station is receiving the Department's consideration.

Two. The Embassy at Tokyo reported on October 20 that it had been informed orally by the Foreign Office that this station would soon be opened with South Manchuria Railway operators. Japanese Ambassador here told press that it would be restored to its owners. Instruct Mukden ~~to~~ report through you the ~~present status of this station and the prospect of the resumption of service.~~

note  
893.74  
811.7693

793.93/

CR  
Oct. 27, 1931, PM ✓

S. Finson  
Wdy

FE:JEJ/VDM

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1926 1-138

793.94/2316

SECRET

SECRET

CJH

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

TOKIO

FROM

Dated October 24, 1931

Rec'd. 4:10 a.m.

1-1336

NOV 1 1931

1931

1931

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



193, October 24, 9 a.m.

The Department's 200, October 20, 2 p.m.

I have received the following note from The Minister  
for Foreign Affairs:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your  
note of October 21 in which, under instructions of your  
Government, you were so good as to call the attention of  
the Japanese to the obligations assumed by Japan as a  
signatory of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War.

The Japanese Government highly appreciate the sympathetic  
concern of the American Government in the maintenance of  
International peace. Their position bearing on the  
stipulations of the treaty in question is set forth in the  
accompanying statement. Entertaining the same earnest hope  
expressed in your communication under review, the Japanese  
Government remain unshaken in the belief that a method for  
resolving by pacific means their present difficulties with  
China will soon be found upon direct negotiations between  
the two disputants in the spirit of mutual good will and  
helpfulness".

The accomp-

793.94/2317

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CJH

Page 2 - #193 from Tokio.

The Accompanying statement is as follows:

"One. The Japanese Government realize as fully as any other signatories of the Pact of Paris of 1928, the responsibility incurred under the provisions of that solemn pact. They have made it clear on various occasions that the Japanese railway guards in taking military measures in Manchuria since the night of September 18 last have been actuated solely by the necessity of defending themselves as well as of protecting the South Manchuria Railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects, against wanton attacks by Chinese troops and armed bands. Nothing is farther from the thoughts of the Japanese Government than to have recourse to war for the solution of their outstanding differences in China.

Two. It is their settled aim to compose those differences by all pacific means. In the note of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Chinese Minister at Tokyo, dated October 9, the Japanese Government have already declared their readiness to enter into negotiations with the responsible representatives of China for an adjustment of the present difficulties. They still hold the same view. So far as they are concerned, they have no intention whatever of proceeding to any steps that might hamper any efforts intended to assure the pacific settlement of the conflict between Japan and China.

Three. On the other hand they have repeatedly called the  
attention of

CJH

Page 3 - #193 from Tokio,

attention of the Chinese Government to the organized hostile agitation against Japan now in progress in various parts of China. The suspension of all commercial intercourse with Japanese at present in China is in no sense a spontaneous act of individual Chinese. It is enforced by anti-Japanese organizations that have taken the law into their own hands, and are heavily penalizing, even with the threat of capital punishment, any Chinese who may be found disobeying their arbitrary decrees. Acts of violence leveled against Japanese residents also continue unabated in many places under the jurisdiction of the government of Nanking. It will be manifest to all fair observers of the actual situation that those activities of the anti-Japanese organizations are acquiesced in by the Chinese Government as a means to attain the national ends of China. The Japanese Government desire to point out that such acquiescence by the Chinese Government in the lawless proceedings of their own nationals cannot be regarded as being in harmony with the letter or the spirit of the stipulations contained in Article Two of the Pact of Paris".

Repeated to Peiping.

NEVILLE

WSB

1832

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department ☒  
OR  
Charge to  
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PM TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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PLAIN

OCT 27 1931  
October 27, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

208 793.94/2317  
Your 193, October 24, 9 a.m.

Have texts of our note and/or of any of the  
other notes on Pact of Paris addressed by the various  
Governments to the Japanese Government and the replies  
thereto been made public?

793.94/2317

Stinson  
Secret

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MMH

MMH

OCT 27 1931


Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



*193.94/2317*

This telegram is the text of the Japanese Government's reply to our note invoking the Pact of Paris; also text of a statement by the Japanese Government which accompanies the note.

In the note they state that they entertain the same earnest hope with us expressed in your note and that they are confident that "a method for resolving by pacific means their present difficulties with China will soon be found upon direct negotiations between the two disputants . . . "

In the statement they affirm their realization of the responsibility under the provisions of the Pact of Paris; they say that nothing is further from their thoughts than to have recourse to war, and that they "have no intention whatever of proceeding to any steps that might hamper any efforts intended to assure the pacific settlement of the conflict. . . " Then, referring to "the suspension of all commercial intercourse with Japanese at present in China" they affirm that the Chinese boycott and hostile agitation against Japan is "enforced by anti-Japanese organizations that have taken the law into their own hands," that acts levelled against Japanese residents

*FILED*  
 OCT 28 1931  
 true

F. W. 793.94/2317

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

tinue and that acquiescence by the Chinese Government in these lawless proceedings of their nationals are not in harmony with the letter or the spirit of Article 2 of the Pact.

Both the note and the statement contain important affirmations and admissions. Taking the two together, I would infer that the efforts of the League and the American Government, especially the invoking of the Pact, have caused the Japanese authorities to realize that the Powers are really serious in their insistence that this dispute be settled by peaceful means only and that the Chinese boycott is proving sufficiently effective to have demonstrated that the Chinese are really serious in their determination to oppose with such weapons as they possess the effort of the Japanese to dispose of outstanding questions with regard to Manchuria by the method of military occupation.

I should say that the Japanese are yielding ground.

Stewart



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

1-1330

FROM

GREEN

GENEVA

Dated October 23, 1931

Rec'd 3:20 a. m. 24th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

246, October 23, 10 p. m.

The Council convened in public session at 6:30 p. m. today. There was immediately communicated to it the response of the Japanese Government to the telegram sent by the signatories of the Pact of Paris to Japan. As this reply has undoubtedly been received in Washington, I am not transmitting it here.

After a brief opening statement by Briand announcing the two disputants were prepared to comment on the draft resolution presented in yesterday's session, the Chinese delegate made a carefully prepared statement, pertinent portions of which are quoted or summarized as follows:

"The Chinese Government had hoped that this time the Council would have found it possible to settle the question of withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory speedily and completely. Today it is more than a month since large areas of Manchuria were occupied and these areas are still

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 23 1931

DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 24 1931  
Department of State

793.94/2318

NOV 4 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #246, from Geneva, Oct. 23, 10 p.m.

are still occupied in spite of Council's continuous deliberations on this matter from September 22 to September 30, and again from October 13 to this day, in spite of the cooperation of the United States as symbolized in a presence here of a representative of the United States and expressed in ~~a~~ <sup>the note of that</sup> note of ~~strictly~~ <sup>(#)</sup> Government to the Council in which it urged the League 'in no way to relax its vigilance and in no way to fail to assert all the pressure and authority in its competence', and for its part promised to act independently through its diplomatic channels 'to try to reenforce League action' and to 'make it evident that it has not lost interest in the question and is not oblivious to the obligations which Japanese and Chinese have assumed to other signatories of the Pact of Paris as well as the Nine Power Treaty'.

Public opinion is often unfortunately impatient and ill-informed and I cannot conceal from my colleagues here my fear lest public opinion may be tempted to draw the conclusion from the events of the last five weeks and the position reached today, that if the joint efforts of the United States and members of the League do not after five weeks suffice to free the territory of one member of the League and signatory of the

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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2- #246, from Geneva, Oct. 23, 10 p.m.

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REG

3- #246, from Geneva, Oct. 23, 10 p. m.

tory of the Peace Pact from the technical invasion of the army of a second member of the League the fellow signatory of the Peace Pact, there may be some hitherto unsuspected flaw in the machinery of peace or lack of determination on the part of the civilized nations to make that machinery work effectively. I need not point out, Mr. President, that if such a suspicion were to take root it would have consequences for the prospects of disarmament and American cooperation within the League that we should all deplore.

That is why I wish to make it perfectly clear that in my view these delays and this appearance of hesitation which I join with my colleagues on the Council in regretting, seem perfectly intelligible even natural: precisely because this is admittedly the gravest issue that has confronted the League since its foundation, precisely because it may ultimately involve stretching and testing to the utmost the authority of the competence of the League, the willingness of the United States to re-enforce its action and the readiness of world public opinion to support any wise the effectual action to safeguard the peace of nations, precisely for these reasons it is inevitable that our proceedings should be tentative

RFP

4- #246, from Geneva, Oct. 23, 10 p.m.

be tentative and groping and proceed step by step. The peace machinery of the world is slow and cumbersome. Some of its parts are yet untried but it is powerful and comprehensive and its effects are cumulative.

For this reason, although I regret that further delay, I bow to the Council's view of its necessity. For this reason too, and to show its unswervingly conciliatory spirit, the Chinese Government authorizes me to accept the resolution before us, although it appears to my Government to fail to grapple with some of the most urgent necessities and pressing dangers of the present situation. We accept it as a bare minimum, as marking merely the power stage in the League's handling of this problem and as a proposal which, because it is put before us publicly by all the members of the Council except the parties as the outcome of their prolonged discussions, must be regarded as fixed in its main lines and subject to amendment only on minor details".

Sze then went on to cite what the Chinese Government considered the most important provisions of the draft resolution, namely Section Four. He considered that the delay provided

RLP

5- #246, from Geneva, Oct. 23, 10 p.m.

delay provided in this proposal was very long and expressed the concern of his Government as to the grave danger that some incident might seriously compromise the peaceful settlement of the problem. He nevertheless declared that the Chinese Government accepts the proposal and expresses its readiness to carry out in full all of the obligations it imposes upon China. Moreover his Government was willing to go further by examining "in the most conciliatory spirit here and now any proposals for extending the system of neutral officers, or, with the help of the League, devising any other arrangements on the spot to guarantee the safety of Japanese lives and property in the reoccupied territory, in order to dispel any apprehension the Japanese Government may entertain as to the danger to its subjects that might result from compliance with the Council's resolution".

# With regard to the terms of "evacuation" and "taking over of evacuated territory" in the resolution, ~~Sze~~ stated that he interpreted these to mean in short that so far as possible the status quo ante shall be reestablished.

The concluding portions of his speech follow.

"I have the honor herewith to request the members of the Council and

REP

6- #246, from Geneva, Oct. 23, 10 p. m.

Council and the representative of the United States to be good enough to signify their readiness to accept an invitation from the Chinese Government, which will be forthcoming without delay, to designate representatives to be associated with the Chinese authorities, under Paragraph Four (b) of the Council's resolution.

And now I come to one more point which the Chinese Government regards as crucial: Paragraph Six. Resolution before us makes it clear that withdrawal is the only subject before the Council at present and that until withdrawal has been completed no other issue arises. But I should like to make it quite plain that in the view of the Chinese Government the only immediate issue arising out of the present situation besides withdrawal is the question of responsibility and assessing damages for the events that have occurred since September 18th. The Chinese Government is willing, nay anxious, and has been from the beginning, to submit to any form of neutral third party judgment on this issue in accordance with League principles and precedents and in conformity with elements of justice.

But any attempt to make the military invasion of

Manchuria the

REP

7- #246, from Geneva, Oct. 23, 10 p.m.

Manchuria the occasion for pressing for the solution of the other claims would be contrary to the spirit of the Covenant and a violation of Article Two of the Peace Pact. China will not discuss any subject with any power under the pressure of military occupation of her territory nor what amounts to the same thing, under the pressure of accomplished facts resulting from the use of force during such occupation. This point is vital and goes to the root of the whole controversy before the Council, is indeed the basic principle on which the Covenant and the Peace Pact are founded. It is because in the view of the Chinese Government this point is vital and fundamental that I have stressed it and it is for the same reason I add that the Chinese Government is assured that in adopting this attitude it has as a matter of fact the full and unqualified moral support of every member of the League and signatory of the Peace Pact.

It further goes without saying that any discussions between China and any other power on any subject must take place on the basis of Chinese rights and obligations under the Covenant and Peace Pact and must respect the principles laid down at the Washington Conference of 1922 with regard to relations between China and other powers."

(END SECTION ONE).

GILBERT



## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

1-1236

FROM

GREEN

RECEIVED

Geneva

OCT 24 1931

Dated October 23, 1931

DIVISION OF

Rec'd 11 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

246, October 23, 10 p. m. (SECTION TWO).

The President of the Council then submitted a counter-proposal presented by the Japanese representative. This counter-proposal conforms to the text of the draft resolution presented yesterday and transmitted by Consulate's 242, October 22, 6 p. m., in so far as the preamble and paragraphs one and two are concerned. With regard to paragraph three the Japanese counter-proposal would change the words "in accordance with the terms of the Covenant" to read "in accordance with the spirit of the Covenant".

The other paragraphs of the counter-proposal are worded as follows:

Paragraph Four. "Takes note again of the statement made by the representative of Japan on October 13, to the effect that the Government of Japan will proceed with the withdrawal  
into the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-12-75

REP

2-- #246, from Geneva, (Section Two),  
Oct. 23, 10 p. m.

into the railway zone of the troops that are still in a few localities outside the said zone as the pacification of public opinion and a detente is brought about by the conclusion of a preliminary agreement between the Chinese and the Japanese Governments as to the fundamental principles governing normal relations, that is to say, affording an assurance that the life of Japanese nationals and the protection of their property will be safeguarded".

Paragraph Five. "Recommends to the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they begin forthwith discussions with the object of concluding the agreement mentioned in paragraph Four".

Paragraph Six. "Recommends to the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they appoint representatives to settle the practical details of evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated localities".

Paragraph Seven. "Requests the Chinese and Japanese Governments to keep the Council informed of the progress of negotiations between them and of the progress made in carrying the present resolution into effect".

Paragraph

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3- #246, from Geneva, (Section Two)  
Oct. 23, 10 p. m.

Paragraph Eight. "Authorizes its President to take, after considering the above mentioned communications, such measures as he may think useful to insure that the present resolution shall be carried into effect, and to convene the Council at any moment with a view to re-examining the position".

In his observations on the draft resolution presented yesterday the Japanese representative reiterated the contention that his Government was only taking defensive police and security measures, without aggressive or hostile intention, that it had no territorial designs in Manchuria and would withdraw the troops as soon as circumstances permitted without danger to Japanese nationals and property. He would therefore accept Paragraphs One, Two and Three of the draft resolution but asserted that the Japanese Government under present conditions could not fix a definite date for evacuation. Japan harbors serious misgivings as<sup>to</sup> the real efficacy of the safeguard proposed in subsection (B) of Paragraph Four of the draft resolution and regards it as first essential that the present disorder in Manchuria should subside. The

Japanese

REP

#246

4- ~~#243~~, from Geneva, (Section Two),  
Oct. 23, 10 p. m.

Japanese Government has carefully thought out what is necessary to bring about such a detente and "has determined a number of fundamental points upon which normal relations between China and Japan should be based". He asserted that the Japanese Government regarded such an agreement as essential but stated that there was no question of attempting to wrest concessions or privileges from China but wished only to remove the causes of friction.

With respect to direct negotiations, to which reference is made in Paragraph Six of the draft resolution, the Japanese delegate expressed the willingness of his Government to begin such negotiations whenever convenient to China.

It was with the above considerations in mind that the Japanese delegation submitted its counter-proposal.

Sze thereupon declared that he could not accept the proposals submitted by the Japanese representative. Cecil enters the debate in an attempt to extract from the Japanese representative an interpretation of the words "the conclusion of a preliminary agreement between the Chinese and Japanese Governments as to the fundamental principles governing normal relations"

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

#246  
 5- ~~#246~~, from Geneva, (Section Two),  
 Oct. 23, 10 p. m.

relations" employed in Paragraph Four of the Japanese counter-proposal. He wished precise information as to what constituted these "fundamental principles"; nothing ~~had been said~~ about that on September 30. Cecil also requested an explanation with regard to Paragraph Eight of the Japanese counter-proposal. He wished to know if it were correct that the Japanese representative did not propose to fix any date for a future meeting of the Council and he would also inquire exactly what authority would be given to the President of the Council under this paragraph. In reply the Japanese representative stated that the fundamental principles were "matters which will give us an assurance that the lives and property of Japanese nationals will be effectively safeguarded". With regard to Paragraph Eight he said that the Japanese Government had no objection to the Council meeting of November 16; as to the authority conferred upon the President of the Council, he stated that they "have nothing special in view" under this statement.

In the concluding statement of the meeting Briand said that there was a crucial point in connection with the Japanese counter-proposal, which must be cleared up. In making an  
 analysis

REP

#246

6- ~~246~~, from Geneva, (Section Two),  
Oct. 23, 10 p. m.

analysis of the proposal, he considered that the proposed negotiations between the two disputants bear upon two groups of subjects very different in character. There is the first group in which he thought agreement should be comparatively easy and which consists of providing conditions of security which would assure the certainty that Japanese nationals and property will not be subject to reprisals in the area to be evacuated and would thereby enable Japan to withdraw the troops. Briand considered that action to this end would comprise police measures, administrative measures, possibly military measures but measures that can be quickly planned and expeditiously carried out.

If however the second group of subjects which comprises matters which have been under dispute for considerable time, is to be discussed before evacuation takes place, the time limit set by the Council for evacuation will be far too short for any effective result and on this point there is complete disagreement between China and Japan. He would therefore ask the Japanese representative whether, when reference is made to "fundamental principles" in Paragraph Four of the Japanese counter-proposal, there was an intention of including this  
second

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

#244

7- ~~12-18-75~~, from Geneva, (Section Two),  
 Oct. 23, 10 p. m.


second group of subjects and regarding them as an element of security. If such subjects were included the whole problem would arise anew. If on the other hand Paragraph Four of the Japanese counter-proposal is intended only to cover conditions on security as embraced in the first group of subjects it was Briand's opinion that a certain agreement had been effected.

After summarizing the difficulties with which the League was faced in this matter and pointing out the necessity for patience Briand suggested adjourning the discussions to 10 a. m. tomorrow October 24. This was agreed upon and the Council rose.  
 (END MESSAGE).

GILBERT

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



October 25, 1931

Reference to Geneva's telegram 246, October 23, 10 p.m.

The Chinese representative, Dr Sze, presents a masterly statement of the issue -- as regards the cause of peace and the survival and development of established agencies for preventing war and settling disputes without resort to force.

Note: There are two fundamental considerations which should be kept in mind in connection with this whole matter. There are going on two contests rather than one: (a) a contest between ~~China~~ and Japan which arises out of China's political impotence and failure to live up to elementary international obligations; and (b) a contest between the Powers of the world (including China) and Japan arising out of Japan's determination that China shall be compelled to live up to her obligations (both those that are undisputed and some that are in dispute) and Japan's failure to observe the conventions which now prevail (as expressed in the Covenant of the League and the Pact of Paris) among the members of the "Family of Nations". In the first of these contests, if China wins, China will be encouraged to persevere in the role of a trouble-maker; whereas, if Japan wins, Japan will be encouraged to persevere in the role of a self-

793.94/2318

OCT 29 1931

FILED



- 2 -

self-appointed arbiter of international rights in the Far East. In the second of these contests, if the world wins, China will have escaped some at least of the rightful consequences of her own weakness and obstreperousness; whereas, if Japan wins, the principle of resolving international controversies without resort to force will have been given a terrific set-back and the principle that "might is right" will have been substantially reinforced.

It is believed that serious thought must now be given to the question of a responsibility corollary to the responsibility which the Powers assume when they undertake to forbid one Power from having its way with another by use of force: if we insist on peace, we must be prepared to insist upon good behavior and just settlement as between disputants.

SKH on back

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

1-1336

FROM

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.L. AND M.I. D.

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 24, 1931

Rec'd 10:02 a. m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 24 1931  
Department of State

THE UNDER SECRETARY

OCT 26 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

819, October 24, 4 p. m.

Reuter report from Nanking twenty-third:

"Special meeting of Foreign Affairs Committee will be held tomorrow morning to discuss Alfred Sze's latest reports from Geneva which were received late this afternoon."

Only comment at present available concerns Japan's mention of China's 'treaty commitments'. With regard to this a closer definition is desired as it is pointed out that Manchurian authorities from time to time have signed a number of agreements with the Japanese many of which are unknown, unrecognized, and cannot be recognized by Chinese Government".

For the Minister

ENGERT

OSB

793.94/2319

FILED

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336

FROM

RSP

GRAY


DIVISION OF

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 24, 1931

Rec'd 10:18 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



820, October 24, 1931 p. m.

Following excerpt from Mukden despatch October 21st:

"It is well known that in the past the Provincial Government of this province enforced many regulations which were originated primarily for the purpose of preventing expansion of Japanese interests in this territory. Restrictions on the purchase of land and the mortgaging of property are cases in point. There can be no doubt that the Japanese, while controlling such Chinese administrations as the Mukden Municipal Registrar, and when established the Bureau of Civil Administration, will withdraw these restrictions and at the same time arrange a satisfactory settlement of Japanese cases that had been held up for years".

For the Minister

ENGERT

JHR

OSB

793.94/2320

1 1854

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

1-1336

FROM

GRAY


Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 24, 1931

Rec'd 5 a. m.

793.94  
ad.  
693.002  
Secretary of State,

Washington.



817. October 24, 10 a. m.

From Consul General at Hankow. "October 23, 4 p. m.

I have received <sup>AW</sup>(?) official notification dated October 15.

The Japanese Acting Commissioner of Customs at Shashi had  
on this date handed over charge of the Customs House there  
to a Chinese assistant in charge ad interim. Nanking  
informed".

For the Minister

ENGERT

CSB

793.94/2021

JS  
HSM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN  
Geneva



FROM

Dated October 24, 1931

DIVISION OF

Rec'd 10:33 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



247, October 24, 3 p. m.

The Council met in public session this morning at  
ten.

The Japanese representative opened on the discussion  
by defining the "fundamental principles" referred to in  
the Japanese counter-proposal (Consulate's 246, October  
23, 10 p. m.) as questions only intended to bring about  
pacification and "upon which agreement can be easily  
reached before withdrawal of troops." Matters pending  
agreement over a long period of time were not fundamental  
principles requiring immediate settlement but appropriate  
subjects for subsequent negotiation. He added that  
paragraph 7 of the Council draft resolution could be  
easily substituted for paragraph 8 of his counter-proposal  
if the Council so desired.

Oecil

793.94/2322

FILED

#247, October 24, 3 p. m., from Geneva  
JS

-2-

Cecil then inquired why, if the same interpretation was to be given to "fundamental principles" in both draft resolutions, Japan could not accept the first proposal. He then asked the Japanese representative to comment upon a newspaper statement to the effect that what Japan really demanded was a final acceptance by China of existing treaty provisions.

The Japanese representative replied that his government has a "certain idea" respecting fundamental principles which he was not authorized to communicate but which nevertheless pertained to the safeguarding of Japanese nationals in ~~Manchuria~~ Manchuria.

Madariaga asked what importance Japan attached to the substitution of paragraph 3 of its counter-proposal of the words "spirit of the Covenant" for "terms of the Covenant." He was of the opinion that troops of occupation tended to increase insecurity rather than allay it and was apprehensive lest the desire for security be indefinitely expanded to cover "pacification" which again might be made to depend on as having nothing to do with security or evacuation.

Cecil next read a Reuter despatch from Tokyo stating that Japanese official circles appeared to hold the

view

-3- from Geneva #247  
that inasmuch as the League had declined to recognize the sacredness of the treaties Japan should not be forced to change its stand. Cecil pointed out that no reflection had ever been cast upon the sacredness of the treaty obligations but that to the contrary the Covenant under whose terms the Council was acting reenforced such recognition. The meaning and validity of treaties was not always clear, he explained, but the settlement of these on something was the function of the Permanent Court and could hardly be made the condition of evacuation.

In reply to Madariaga the Japanese representative stated that with respect to paragraph 3 of the draft resolution he had no objection <sup>to</sup> reverting to the original wording whereby the word "terms" would be restored in place of the word "spirit." In reply to the other arguments of the Spanish representative namely those regarding the "fundamental principles" referred to and which must be considered in the questions of security and evacuation, the Japanese representative said that "it is <sup>the</sup> view of my government that it is absolutely necessary for it to reach an agreement in order to ensure security and as soon as that has been done our troops will be withdrawn immediately."

WSB

End Sec 1.

GILBERT

HSM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Geneva

RECEIVED  
OCT 26 1931  
DIVISION

FROM Dated October 24, 1931

Rec'd 10:15 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

247, October 24, 3 p. m.

In answering Lord Cecil the Japanese delegate asserted that he had never informed Tokyo to the effect that "the Council rejected the contention of our delegation concerning the upholding of the sanctity of treaties." He regarded the sending of any such press despatch as deplorable and wished to assure Cecil that he would send a telegram to Tokyo on the subject immediately following this morning's session.

Briand followed by analyzing the discussion which had taken place and appealed to the Japanese representative to be more conciliatory. His remarks may be summarized as follows: Between the two proposals before the Council "there is a fundamental difference regarding what are

the



#247, October 24, 3 p. m., from Geneva

-2-

the subject matters to be contemplated in connection with the safeguarding of the persons and property of Japanese nationals outside the zone, whereby the Japanese Government would be enabled to effect a withdrawal." With respect to the Council's proposal he was of the opinion that it had the merit of being absolutely clear <sup>the text of the</sup> whereas Japanese counter-proposal had certainly given rise to uncertainty and to difficulty of ipso facto. He felt sure that Japan would never take shelter behind an ambiguity and thought such a consideration alone recommended the Council's text. The latter he stated is based on obligations of both parties and is inspired by the statement made at the very beginning of the dispute by the Japanese representative, when he said his government "would proceed as rapidly as possible with the withdrawal of troops (which had already begun) into the railway zone in proportion as the protection of lives and property of Japanese nationals was effectively assured, and that it hoped to carry out its intention in full as speedily as possible." In view of this declaration Briand drew the inference that "precautions required for security are precautions that  
can

#247, October 24, 3 p. m., from Geneva

-3-

can be taken in a very short time," Otherwise a promise could not be given to carry out evacuation in the shortest possible time. It was therefore clear that if negotiations must be undertaken with reference to treaties, to railways or to other questions it is obvious that such negotiations cannot be accomplished within a short period. Referring to the League covenant he stated that under Article 10 the member states agree to respect each other's territorial integrity and political independence. He also referred to the terms of Article 2 of the Pact of Paris whereby all disputes of whatever nature shall only be settled by peaceful means. He thought that public opinion would find it difficult to admit that "military occupation could be assigned to the category of peaceable means."

A prolongation of such occupation also means the prolongation of a feeling of uneasiness which has already lasted too long. This uneasiness is felt because at any moment something might happen "which would make it impossible for this problem to be solved either under the terms of the covenant or under those of Article 2 of the Pact of Paris." He would therefore appeal to the Japanese representative to make a sign of conciliation. He

understood

#247, October 24, 3 p. m., from Geneva

-4-

understood quite easily that the Japanese Government may desire to enter into negotiations concerning general issues between the two countries but he considered "if that were to be involved before evacuation takes place, then it is perfectly clear that we shall not be able to succeed." He understood that the Japanese representative had stated that this was not the case and that the Japanese were willing to negotiate on long standing issues immediately after evacuation. In this regard he agreed with the Spanish representative as to the desirability of beginning negotiations on the very day on which evacuation is completed. It was his understanding that when the Japanese representative spoke of "fundamental principles" that they did not mean to extend these fundamental principles into wider questions but that they should be limited to the question of security proper. However he felt in spite of the explanations which had been made there was still uncertainty and that it would be preferable to have a clearer text.

Briand then went on to say that the Chinese Government has declared itself willing to accord the necessary protection and has further said that it is ready to discuss  
at once

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

#247, October 24, 3 p. m., from Geneva

-5-

at once arrangements for the evacuation and taking over of the territory. It was his opinion that the arrangements could be made very quickly and this was the sort of thing which had been visualized when the Council considered the declaration made on September 30 by the Japanese representative. He admitted that Japan would be justified in making a reservation to the effect that this pledge of evacuation should be carried out providing the Chinese Government shows that it is really prepared to grant those conditions of security. He therefore thought announcement that military pressure was about to cease would have considerable effect in improving the situation in regard to security and that relations would at once be better. He therefore appealed to the Japanese representative to accept the draft resolution proposed by the Council after further explanations if necessary. (END SECTION TWO).

GILBERT

OX

CJH

GREEN

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated October 24, 1931

SECRET  
DIVISION OF  
FROM

Rec'd. 2 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

247, October 24, 3 p.m. Section three.

The Japanese representative replied:

"To my great regret I am unable to accept the draft resolution which has been submitted by the President because as I have already explained, it does not in our view adequately safeguard the lives and property of Japanese nationals for which the Japanese Government is responsible.

May I be allowed to suggest again as representative of Japan that the Japanese Government has no intention of settling the present difficulties by military forces. Its only desire is to make certain that protection is effective".

The Spanish representative then made a final effort to secure some concession from the Japanese. He declared that the debates had been rendered difficult by the fact that the phrase "fundamental principles" had neither been explained nor revealed to the Council. He quoted a passage from the preamble of the Covenant regarding open relations between the nations and

expressed

CJH

Page 2 - #247 from Geneva.

expressed himself as greatly disappointed by the attitude of the Japanese Government in not revealing exactly what it desired. After reviewing the Japanese thesis regarding security he would ask whether the Japanese delegate would not be prepared to withdraw his proposal" if it were provided that both parties would give a solemn undertaking that on the very day that evacuation was concluded negotiations would be opened on all questions which are pending and at issue between the two countries". In his opinion the effect of such a declaration would be only of such a kind that "security would be adequately assured and that evacuation would thereby become possible".

Yoshizawa responded: "In the view of my Government the fundamental principles mentioned in our counter-proposal should not be set forth in the resolution; nor in our view should the details of these fundamental principles be discussed at the Council table. These are matters which should be discussed between the two countries".

The Spanish representative said that these principles do not appear to link up directly with evacuation or security. That view unfortunately is not the view of my Government which regards it as absolutely necessary to obtain an agreement beforehand, in which these fundamental principles will be set forth.

"I therefore regret that I am unable to withdraw the  
words

CJH

Page 3 - #247 from Geneva.

words "fundamental principles" as contained in our counter-proposal".

In conclusion Briand drew the attention of the Japanese Government to the fact that "it is a delicate matter, even an impossibility for the members of the Council to accept the inclusion in a draft resolution of a reference to fundamental principles which they do not know, without having the right to formulate those principles or to discuss them. It is really asking them to make a sacrifice which goes beyond the bounds of the possible. I do not think that there is any member of the Council that could agree to this without (#) what are those fundamental principles".

The Council then adjourned until four this afternoon.

(End of message).

GILBERT

WSB

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186

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone.

Geneva

Dated October 24, 1931

Rec'd 8:22 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.


248, October 24, 6 p. m.

Consulate's 247, October 24, 3 p. m.

The meeting scheduled for this afternoon for  
four p. m. was deferred to five to permit last minute  
negotiations between Briand and the Japanese representa-  
tive. The suggestion put forward by Briand was that  
the Japanese representative should append a reserva-  
tion to the Council draft resolution to the effect  
that if the conditions of the evacuation are not  
fulfilled by the time specified (see paragraph 4-a  
of the resolution), Consulate's 242, October 22, 6 p.m.,  
the Japanese might defer their evacuation until these  
conditions were fulfilled. Briand had a telegram from  
the French Ambassador in Tokio which I understand was  
to the effect that Shidehara had agreed to accept the  
resolution with that reservation. The Japanese  
representative asked a half hour to consider and then  
refused.

GILBERT

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793.94/2323

NOV 2 1931



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

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
GENEVA

Dated October 24, 1931

Rec'd. 11:32 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

250, October 24/10  
Consulate's 24/10, October 24, 6 p.m.



The Council convened at 5 p.m. and immediately

heard an announcement from Briand that the conferences which he had had this afternoon with the Japanese representative had not led to an agreement. This was followed by a declaration on the part of the Japanese representative restating briefly the Japanese position and the inability of his Government to accept the draft resolution of the Council.

The Japanese counter-proposal was first put to a vote and rejected 13 votes to 1, Japan voting in favor. A vote on the draft resolution was taken by roll call and was adopted by 13 votes to 1, Japan voting against.

Briand then expressed his regret that unanimity could not be obtained and went on to point out some of the difficulties in the settlement of this question and the success of the League in confining the conflict within its present limits and eliminating the threat of war. He

793.94/2324

OCT 31 1931

CJH

Page 2 - 20

war. He then spoke as follows:

"May I say how touched we have been and how grateful we are for the assistance which has been given us throughout by the great Republic of the United States of America. From the very outset the United States Government associated itself with our efforts and exchanged communications with us. Within the limits which it associates itself and in connection with those points which concerned it - that is to say, confining its attention to the Pact of Paris, of which it was the initiator - the United States Government gave its cooperation within those limits when asked. I should like to ask the representative of the United States to convey to his Government our warm thanks for the assistance which has thus been given us within these limits and to say that the moral effect of their support has contributed greatly to circumscribing the conflict".

After expressing the hope that between now and November 16 the conflict will be settled, Briand added that it should be understood that the resolution which had just been voted upon does not supersede the Council's resolution of September 30.

In the exchange of felicitations that took place at the conclusion of the meeting the representative of Norway associated himself in what Briand had said regarding the United States.

CJH

Page 3 - #250 from Geneva.

United States. I replied to these remarks as follows:

"I take this occasion to thank the President of the Council for the words he was kind enough to address to me earlier this afternoon, and also for those spoken by the representative of Norway. These I shall have the honor of transmitting immediately to my Government."

Regarding the United States, Madariaga spoke as follows:

"I venture to express the hope that we may have reached complete unanimity by the next meeting. I would like finally to be permitted to associate myself with what the President has said on the subject of the collaboration so valuable for us, of the Republic of the United States and to hope that if unfortunately the Council should have to continue its work in this affair, this collaboration will be again assured us".

In this regard Sze said:

"May I also join in with my colleague from Norway in expressing our deep gratification in having the cooperation of the representative of the United States at the Council."

The Chinese delegate also expressed himself pessimistically regarding an improvement in the situation in Manchuria in view of the Japanese insistence upon negotiations which China will not enter upon until the

evacuation of

CJH

Page 4 - #250 from Geneva.

evacuation of the troops. Considered the period of adjournment to November 16 too long and reserved the right to request the calling of an earlier meeting should the evacuation not proceed in accordance with the hope expressed by Briand.

GILBERT

WSB

1871

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone.

GENEVA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated October 24, 1931

Rec'd. 10:50 p.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

251, October 24, midnight.


At final session of the Council this evening Yoshizawa  
called on me.

He had a great deal to say about the friendly re-  
lations between our two countries and that he hoped no  
misunderstanding remained respecting Japan's position  
regarding our association with the Council. He em-  
phasized this by adding that Americans understood China  
and Japan and the Manchurian situation better than any  
other people, not excluding the British and that in  
particular he felt that you had a better grasp of the  
situation than Briand. His statements were of course  
not as direct as the foregoing but **they** conveyed that  
meaning.

He then declared that the Council's position  
in this matter was perfectly sound and entirely in  
accord with its obligations under the Covenant of  
which Japan was a signatory but that the Manchurian  
situation was "peculiar".

He then went on to disclose to me the now famous

"fifth point"



793.94/2325

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NOV. 3. 1931

CJH

Page 2 - #251 from Geneva.

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
"fifth point" in Japan's demands. His statement of this was in substantial agreement ~~with~~ <sup>from</sup> that in my report to you of the recent Drummond-Yoshizawa conversation. He said that the reason why he did not disclose this demand to the Council was because he was not permitted to do so by his instructions. He then added that had he brought them forward the Chinese representative would have questioned the validity of the "railroad treaties" and would probably have suggested the submission of them to the Permanent Court; but that Japan would not be willing to have them taken before the Court because its decisions would be "theoretical" while the "practical" question was that China would not live up to treaty provisions.

It is scarcely necessary for me to say that in my conversation with the Ambassador I maintained the role assigned to me by you in this entire connection. I did take occasion, however, to assure him that in the private meetings of the Council which I had attended I took no more part than I played in the public meetings; in other words, that after the first public meeting at which I was present, I took no part whatsoever except as required, as he was able to note, by the dictates of courtesy, which was something quite apart from participation in the discussions.

WSB

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



OCT 27 1931

October 26, 1931.

RECEIVED

OCT 27 1931

MANCHURIA SITUATION.

Mr. Yoshizawa's Statement  
to Mr. Gilbert.

793.94/2325

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Mr. Yoshizawa states that the position of the Council (last week) was sound and in accord with the Council's obligations under the Covenant of the League, -- but that the Manchuria situation is "peculiar". He is right -- on both points.

Mr. Yoshizawa affirms that Americans understand China and Japan and the Manchuria situation better than do others, not excluding the British, and that the Secretary of State has a better grasp of the situation than has M. Briand. It is believed that the last part of this statement is obvious. However, does Mr. Yoshizawa make this statement merely for the purpose of affirming the fact or does he make it with a purpose? It is believed that he feels that the British and the French have special objectives of their own which gives them a viewpoint less disinterested than is that of the United States.

Mr. Yoshizawa explains that he did not expound to the Council Japan's "fifth point", for the reasons that (a) was not permitted to do so by his instructions and (b) had he done so, the Chinese representative would have questioned the validity of the "railroad treaties" and might have suggested

F.W. 793.94/2325

NOV 1 1931

- 2 -

gested the submission of them to the Hague Court. He continues to the effect that Japan would not be willing to have the treaties taken before the Court for the reason that the decisions of the Court would be "theoretical" while the "practical" fact is that <sup>China</sup>~~Japan~~ would not live up to treaty provisions.

Comment. If the treaties are sound in law, would not the Court, if they were brought before it and if its decisions would be "theoretical" -- should it not be expected that the Court would give decisions in Japan's favor? And if the decisions were in Japan's favor, would not Japan's position in endeavoring to cause China to live up to the treaty provisions be stronger by virtue of the fact that the Court had so decided? On the other hand, if the treaty provisions are such that the Court might be expected to rule against Japan's contentions, is it to be considered surprising that China declines to live up to those provisions?

Is not the <sup>real</sup> "practical" question that of arriving at a decision with regard to the character and obligation of the treaty provisions, so as to remove at least one of the grounds over which China and Japan have been contending, the Japanese taking the position that certain rights exist by treaty and the Chinese taking the position that those rights do not exist either by treaty or otherwise?

If Japan wishes other than an "imposed" settlement, should she not be glad to have the assistance of neutral "observers"?

SKH/ZMF

Skatombuh



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED  
GRAY

PEIPING via N. R.

TO 23 HAN FROM Dated October 25, 1931  
DIVISION OF Rec'd. 1:53 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

821, October 25, 10 a.m.

Following from Consul General at Hankow:

"October 24, 1 p.m.

One. Nearly all of the Japanese in Chungking are reported to have sailed down river. Japanese Consul is remaining in Chungking for the present. It is also reported that the Japanese residents of Chengtu and the Japanese consular staff there have evacuated and are proceeding down river to Hankow.

Two. Last night a party of Chinese workers, acting presumably under orders of the local authorities, removed considerable number of anti-Japanese posters from walls and buildings in Hankow. Nanking informed."

For the Minister,

ENGERT

GW

CSB

*M*  
*FE*

*793.94*  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 26 1931  
Department of State

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793.94/2326

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OCT 27 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
October 26, 1931.

~~PSM~~  
SIZ:

"Tiehlin" is Tiehling  
"Yang" is probably the Tola River  
"Tofangko" is Taonanfu  
"Jeol" is Jehol

"Nunkingchiao" cannot be found on  
our maps.

"Yichienpao" cannot be found on  
our maps.



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated October 26, 1931

Rec'd 6:55 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

254, October 26, 19 a. m.

Consulate's 224, October 19. 7 p. m., paragraph one.

The Italian delegation has handed to me the following  
message dated October 23, received from Manchuria:

"About 10 last night, October 22, an engagement  
occurred in the neighborhood of Tielin, north of Mukden,  
between 2000 scattered Chinese soldiers and 600 Japanese.  
About 60 Chinese were killed.

Chinese troops attempted to set fire to the bridge  
over the Yang (?) in the vicinity of Tofangko. Japanese  
airplanes dispersed the Chinese forces by bombardment.  
Troop movements from Jool toward the east are to be  
observed".

GILBERT

WVC  
WSB

Capital of Jehol Province,  
West of Manchuria.

793.94/2327

NOV 2 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

Geneva

FROM

Dated October 26, 1931

Rec'd

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.


252, October 26, 7 a.m.

Drummond has handed me for communication to you  
the following message from the German Government,  
dated October 23, which has been circulated to members  
of the Council:

"Disposition of Japanese troops unchanged.  
Operations confined to expeditions against brigands  
and deserters. General position at Mukden quiet,  
increasing security.

Municipal administration of Mukden handed over on  
October 20th to the Mayor Chanhshinpo. Former provincial  
authorities being reinstalled; financial and industrial  
services and traffic commission will soon follow suit.  
Question of the governor undecided. All new authorities  
have, like the banks of issue, received Japanese  
advisers who are for the most part influential high  
officials of the Manchurian Railway.

Railway



FILED  
OCT 29 1931  
NOV 2 1931

793.94/2328

AM

2-#252, from Geneva, October 26, 1931  
7 a.m.

Railway service to Peiping inadequate; Mukden-  
Hailung line again opened."

GILBERT

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McL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

Geneva

Dated October 26, 1931


Rec'd 6:47 a. m.

793-94  
JUL 20 1931  
DIVISION

FROM

Secretary of State,  
Washington,

253, October 26 8 a. m.



Drummond has handed to me for communication to you the following message from the Chinese Government dated October 23 which has been circulated to members of the Council:

The authorities at Kirin report that on Wednesday a Japanese airplane flew to Nunkingchiao and dropped six bombs causing heavy casualties. On the same day Japanese airplanes dropped five bombs on Yichienpao Railway station. There has been no withdrawal whatsoever from the occupied areas, but instead the situation has been aggravated by these bombings by Japanese planes.

GILBERT

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NOV. 5 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

RECEIVED

FROM

GREEN

OCT 27 1931

Tokio

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Dated October 26, 1931

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 26 1931  
Department of State

Rec'd 9:30  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OCT 26 1931  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

196, October 26 5 p. m.

Japanese General Staff stated today to the Military

Attache the following:

"Some troops are being sent from Changchun to take stations in principal cities of the Taonan-Chienchiatun Railway to guard same from bandits; pro-Japanese force of Chinese who advanced on Tsingtau were stopped at Nonni River by Superior force of pro-Soviet Chinese troops from Tsingtau; the bridge over the Nonni was blown up by the force from Tsitsihar; this northern force had been hastily concentrated and included troops from Aigun to Manchuli; anti-Japanese propaganda had been sent out by radio from Harbin; Soviets have 20,000 troops at Pogradichnaya and large quantity of rolling stock near Manchuli; if Soviets entered Manchuria they would probably go south as far as Changchun and Taonan; Chinese detachments from Chinchow had occupied cities on the leading railways to Tahushan and

793.94/2330

SKH/ZMP

REP

2- #196, from Tokio, Oct. 26, 5 p.m.

to Tahushan and Yinkou and towns west of Kaiyuan; military authorities are considering sending another brigade to Manchuria."

I saw the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. His statements did not contain the information given the Military Attache. He said that the Government has no intention of sending additional troops into Manchuria. He said that he had no reason to believe that the Russians contemplate invading Manchuria but he considered probable some sort of understanding between the Russians and the Heiling Chiang general at Tsitsihar where the Chinese troops were withdrawn from the border.

I then referred to the action of League. It was obvious that the Japanese have no intention of evacuating Manchuria before November 16. They feel that the situation is one that can not be settled by talking in Geneva. There is a feeling in Japan, although he did not say so, that the British and French have their own interests in China and are not above using the League for their own purposes.

Repeated to Peiping.

NEVILLE

WSB


SKH/ZMF



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE



DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
RECEIVED

OCT 27 1931

October 26, 1931.

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

The Japanese General Staff inform our Military Attaché that they "are considering sending another brigade to Manchuria". The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs states to Mr. Neville that the Government has no intention of sending additional troops into Manchuria.

The General Staff inform the Military Attaché that the Soviets have 20,000 troops on the Manchurian border on the east and a large quantity of rolling stock on the Manchurian border on the west. ~~(XXXX)~~ The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs says to Neville that he has no reason to believe that the Russians contemplate invading Manchuria.

Military data given in this telegram is indicated on the attached map: for Russia, green; for Japan, red; for China, black.

Mr. Neville's concluding paragraph is important.

F/DEW

793.94/2330


793.94/2330  
note  
893.0146

T-107405 196 Oct 26 5 pm.

SKH/ZMF

NOV 2 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



1835

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GREEN

Geneva

RECEIVED

FROM

Dated October 26, 1931

DIVISION OF

Rec'd 9:50 a.m.

793.94  
Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

255, October 26, 10 a.m.  
793.94 / 2211  
Consulate's 224, October 19, 7 p.m.

One.

The following is a summary of information with

respect to the situation in Manchuria subsequent to  
October 18th which I have just received from the  
British.

"There are two independent brigades of Chinese  
troops on the railway line between Chinchow and Kowpangtze  
with a third cavalry brigade at Tungliao -- in all  
probably 13,000 men. Chinese troops movements are all  
southwards from the Great Wall. The remnants of the  
7th Brigade arrived at Nankow Pass on October 15th and  
the heavy artillery has also been brought inside the  
Wall from Chinchow, possibly to escape capture by  
Japanese.

A report from Mukden dated October 16th states that  
the situation as regards security continues to improve  
except round Faku, Tieling and places north of the  
railway

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 26 1931

Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 26 1931

DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

UNDER SECRETARY

OCT 27 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FILED

1881.2 NOV

793.94/2331

AM

2-7255, from Geneva, Dated October  
26, 1931 10 a.m.

railway zone. Japanese troops, being concentrated at fewer points are less in evidence. Japanese guards were withdrawn from the prefecture at Newchwang on October 11th. Taonan and Solun were reported to be still in Japanese occupation.

Reports from Chinese sources dated October 19 confirm the occupation of Tsitsihar on the night of October 15th by General Chang Hai Peng from Taonan "presumably under Japanese direction". Official forces were said to have been withdrawn.

A report dated October 15 gives the following general appreciation of the situation in Manchuria: the situation in Manchuria would appear to have reached a deadlock. The Japanese military authorities have full control locally and are making preparations to stay in the positions they occupy for the winter. They believe that it is impossible to withdraw as danger to Japanese life and property would be increased. This is probably true to a certain extent as there does not seem to be any organized Chinese force of any size in South Manchuria which could maintain order. Particularly in regions outside Japanese control disorganized detachments of Chinese troops are living  
on the

AM

3-#256, from Geneva, October 26, 1931  
10 a.m.

on the country and extensive bandit menace is not  
denied. According to the Japanese it is unlikely that  
the Chinese will be able to restore order at present nor  
is it likely that they will be able to do so so long as  
their present attitude is maintained by the Japanese  
army who regard the present situation as little less than  
a state of war. They are apt to regard anything like  
concentration of Chinese troops as a menace to their  
position and proceed to disperse it should it be  
anywhere in the vicinity, as for example in the case of  
the raid on Chinchow. The only exception seems to be  
at Kirin where General Hsianfu is being permitted to  
establish a small force for the purpose of maintaining  
order in that district. The results of the existing  
situation is trade stagnation and increase each day of  
bandit danger in the interior".

GILBERT

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED  
CORRECTED COPY

AM

FROM GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 26, 1931

Rec'd 12:45 a.m.

RECEIVED  
OCT 27 1931  
DIVISION

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

PRIORITY.

October 26, 10 a.m.

News of League action has been received here with feeling of gratification as Chinese believe that they have been vindicated before the world. All interest now centers in Japan and action which may be taken by Japan before reconvening of League Council on November 16th.

In view of above and in view of the fact that leaders locally are confining their interest to outcome of negotiations now being carried out with Cantonese leaders in Shanghai which will doubtless result in changes of personnel in several of the Government Departments including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I propose, with the Department's approval, to proceed to Shanghai taking my staff with me, there to await results with the intention of returning

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 27 1931  
Department of State

Tel. to Nanking  
Oct. 27  
File  
EGC

793.94/2332

1931-10-27-130

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

AM

2-from Nanking, October 26, 12:45 a.m.

of returning to Nanking by the 16th. It is my present  
plan to leave Nanking for Shanghai on October 29th.  
British, German and French Ministers are returning to  
Peiping.

JOHNSON

JHR

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 26, 1931

Rec'd 12:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

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October 26, 10 a. m.

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*Tel to Nanking*  
OCT 27 1931  
*file 898*

793.94/2332



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect.  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

October 26, 1931.

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

AMERICAN CONSUL,  
NANKING (China).

FOR THE MINISTER.

Your October 26, 10 a. m.

Department approves your proceeding to Shanghai as  
proposed.

Stinson

Secy

CR  
Oct. 27, 1931 pm

FE:MMH:REK

FE

FA  
NCA

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/2332

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



REP

FROM

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated October 26, 1931


Rec'd 11:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

257, October 26, 1 p. m.

FOR THE SECRETARY.



The situation here now reverts to that which prevailed during the period from September 30th, the date of the adjournment of the regular sessions of the Council, to October 13th, the date it reconvened.

It will be recalled that during the period referred to acting under your instructions I maintained contact with Drummond transmitting to you such information as I obtained from him respecting the current situation in the Sino-Japanese matter and furnished him for his use certain military information which he was to hold strictly confidential as to source.

(1) I respectfully solicit your instructions regarding the relations you desire me to maintain in Geneva during the present period.

With Particulars

793.94/2333

FILED

OCT 29 1931

REP

2- #257, from Geneva, Oct. 26, 1pm

(2) With particular reference to the so-called military information which I have been transmitting I have forwarded to you everything which has come to me from 'neutral sources' and all that seemed of any significance from Chinese and Japanese sources. I have been wondering whether from our own sources or from certain of the diplomatic missions in Washington you were not receiving much of the same material. In view of this I would appreciate your particular instructions on this point.

GILBERT

JHR

WSB

1895

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

Washington,  
October 27, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL,  
GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

793.94/2333

119 Your 257, October 26, 1 p. m.

The Department desires that you continue to maintain contact with Drummond and to exchange with him, under the same conditions as to confidence as heretofore, such information regarding developments in and with regard to the Sino-Japanese matter as may seem to be of significance.

It is suggested that, in the interim preceding the reconvening of the Council, data information, unless it appears to be of peculiar timeliness or significance, may be sent by mail rather than by telegraph.

793.94/2333

Stinson

SP

CR  
Oct. 27, 1931 pm

FE: ASM: REK

mmN  
FE

Stinson

Enciphered by .....


Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

1 3 4 5

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gutzfom NARS, Date 12-18-75



Subject: Despatch from Geneva, No. 162, Political,  
October 13, 1931.

2334

The telegrams from Geneva have adequately summarized the documents transmitted with this despatch.

With reference to the last paragraph of the despatch, the telegraphic messages from the Chinese and Japanese Governments were summarized in Geneva's No. 125, September 22, 8 p. m., No. 131, September 23, 2 p. m., No. 133, September 23, 8 p. m., and No. 139, September 25, 11 a. m. The messages deal largely with phases of the Manchurian situation which have since been covered by Messrs. Hanson and Salisbury.

The Chinese messages may be found in League documents: C 591 M 235 1931 VII and C 604 M 242 1931 VII.

The Japanese messages may be found in League documents: C 594 M 237 1931 VII, C 607 M 245 1931 VII, and C 609 M 246 1931 VII.

It is interesting to note from documents C 591 M235, and C 604 M 242 that the proposal for the appointment of a mixed Chinese-Japanese commission "to adjudicate upon matters" was first apparently made on September 19 by the Japanese Minister (Shigemitsu) in a conversation with the Minister of Finance and Vice Chairman of the Executive Yuan (Sooong), who personally deemed the procedure feasible and worthy of suggesting to the two governments. On September 22, the Japanese

Consul

F.W. 793.94/2334

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Consul General at Nanking called on Mr. Soong and informed him that the Japanese Government would be glad to constitute the commission. Mr. Soong thereupon informed the Japanese Consul General, on behalf of the National Government, that the invasion of Chinese territory by the Japanese troops made absolutely impossible any direct negotiations.

NOTE: The "face" of the two governments was therefore, at the outset, compromised.

*RPB*  
RPB/REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 162. Political.

AM. RECD  
OCT 24 1931  
AMERICAN CONSULATE

Geneva, Switzerland, October 13, 1931.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS  
LEAGUE OF NATIONS SECTION

OCT 26 1931  
ART  
RECEIVED

fr 93 94  
1-1065 GPO  
SUBJECT: Transmitting Procès-Verbaux of the Meetings  
of the Sixty-Fifth Session of the Council in  
its Consideration of "The Appeal of the Chinese  
Government under Article 11 of the Covenant".

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.



SIR:

I have the honor to cite the following excerpt of a  
resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Nations  
at its session on September 22, 1931, during the consider-  
ation by the Council of the "Appeal of the Chinese Govern-  
ment under Article 11 of the Covenant".

500 C 112  
"I ask the Council to decide to forward for  
information, the Minutes of all the Meetings of  
the Council, together with the documents relat-  
ing to this question, to the Government of the  
United States of America."

I am enclosing a complete set of the procès-verbaux  
of the meetings of the Council in which the question men-  
tioned above was under discussion, together with the pert-  
inent documents which have just been furnished me by the  
Secretariat of the League.

In

793.94/2334

NOV 2 1931



- 2 -

In this connection I wish to refer to the Department's telegrams No. 59 of September 25, 1931, 9.A.M., and No. 60 of September 26, 1931, 7.P.M., and to state that copies of the telegraphic messages referred to therein will be found in the procès-verbaux of the meetings of the Council and in the other documents mentioned above.

Respectfully yours,

*Prentiss B. Gilbert*  
Prentiss B. Gilbert.  
American Consul.

✓  
Enclosures:  
Documents mentioned above  
with list attached.

/ Original and Five Copies to Department of State.  
One Copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

1 copy to Miss Shaker - Room 472 1/2  
1 " attached to note

190

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LIST OF DOCUMENTS ATTACHED TO  
DESPATCH NO.162,POLITICAL.

October 13, 1931.

\* \* \*

M. Documents

C.M.232 up to  
C.M.239  
C.M.242 up to  
C.M.249  
C.M.251 up to  
C.M.255  
C.M.258  
C.648  
C.M.263  
C.M.268  
C.M.270  
C.M.272  
C.M.280  
C.M.282 up to  
C.M.286  
C.M.288  
C.M.290  
C.M.292 up to  
C.M.303  
C.M.306 up to  
C.M.312

P.V. Documents

|                          |         |
|--------------------------|---------|
| C./65th Session/P.V.1(1) | Sept.19 |
| P.V.2(1)                 | " 22    |
| P.V.3(1)                 | " 22    |
| P.V.4(1)                 | " 25    |
| P.V.5(1)                 | " 28    |
| P.V.6(1)                 | " 29    |
| P.V.7(1)                 | " 30    |

\* \* \*

Communicated to the Council  
and Members of the League.

C.585.M.232.1931.VII

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Geneva, September 21st, 1931

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE  
11 OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following note, which he has just received from the Representative of China on the Council.

In view of this communication, the Secretary-General, in agreement with the President, of the Council, has the honour to convoke the Council to meet on Tuesday, September 22nd, 1931, at 10.30 a.m.

Geneva, September 21st, 1931

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I am instructed by the National Government of China to bring to your attention the facts stated below, and to request that, in virtue of Article Eleven of the Covenant of the League of Nations, you forthwith summon a meeting of the Council of the League in order that it may take such action as it may deem wise and effectual so that the peace of nations may be safeguarded.

Through statements made to it at its meeting on September nineteenth, by the representatives of China and Japan, the Council was advised of the fact that a serious situation had been created in Manchuria. In his statement at that meeting the representative of China declared that the information which he then had, indicated that the situation had been created through no fault upon the part of the Chinese.

- 2 -

Since September nineteenth, the undersigned has received from his Government information which discloses a situation of greater gravity than had appeared by the first report, and which revealed that, beginning from ten o'clock of the night of September eighteenth, regular troops of Japanese soldiers, without provocation of any kind, opened rifle and artillery fire upon Chinese soldiers at or near the city of Mukden, bombarded the arsenal and barracks of the Chinese soldiers, set fire to the ammunition depot, disarmed the Chinese troops in Changchun, Kwanchengtse and other places, and later took military occupation of the cities of Mukden and Antung and other places and of public buildings therein, and are now in such occupation. Lines of communication have also been seized by Japanese troops.

To these acts of violence the Chinese soldiers and populace, acting under instructions from the Chinese Government, have made no resistance, and have refrained from conduct which might in any way aggravate the situation.

In view of the foregoing facts, the Republic of China, a Member of the League of Nations, asserts that a situation has arisen which calls for action under the terms of Article Eleven of the Covenant. I am therefore instructed by my Government to request that, in pursuance of authority given to it by Article Eleven of the Covenant, the Council take immediate steps: to prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations; to re-establish the status quo ante; and to determine the amounts and character of such reparations as may be found due to the Republic of China.

I will add that the Government of China is fully prepared to act in conformity with whatever recommendations it may receive from the Council, and to abide by whatever decisions the League of Nations may adopt in the premises.

(SIGNED) ALFRED SZYMOR

C.586.M.233.1931.VII.

(Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE XI  
OF THE COVENANT.  
-----

The following two telegrams from the National Government of China are submitted for consideration to the Council.

No. 1.

Text of cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation, dated Nanking September twenty first 1931.

Kirin Changchun railway seized; Japanese announced it will be managed by South Manchurian Railway which latter has sent 130 employees to Kirin to take over Chinese line, Yingkow, Antung, Changchun, Fushun, and many other towns have been seized by Japanese who have cut all telegraph, telephone and wireless, hence difficult for Government to get complete news. Japanese stock exchange in Tokio has closed. Japanese troops also seized Huangkutun, Santungchiao, and seized railway quarters Peking, Mukden Railway there, outdriving all employees. Also seized many locomotives, cars belonging railway. On entering Mukden Japanese have seized besides chief of staff eleven important members Tengtsein provincial government. They have entered Marshal Chang Hsueliang private residence and have systematically looted all contents. Leinshanwan occupied by Japanese marines. Japanese military administration of Kwantung has moved into Mukden. Two more divisions being sent into Manchuria from Korea. United Press report today from Mukden inter alia "with Japanese in complete control of communication throughout South Manchuria today disquieting reports were current regarding disturbances and possibility of conflict. With difficulty are propaganda, unfounded rumour being sifted from welter of

C.586.M.233.1931.VII.

(Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE XI  
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- 2 -

Japanese reports official and unofficial at present virtually all news from this area of crisis emanates from Japanese sources.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation dated Nanking, September twenty-first, 1931.

Special to China press from Peiping twentieth "various reports received here from different centres in Manchuria indicate that by far greater destruction of Chinese property and lives took place at Changchun which city it is feared now half in ruins. Following bombardment of city by Japanese troops last evening fire broke out in several sections and a later despatch received here this afternoon states that while Japanese are in complete control of situation there, conflagration continues unchecked. Magistrates office, bureau of foreign affairs, bureau public safety and several other public buildings have gone up in flames while numerous other small private buildings have likewise been rased to ground. Death toll includes Brigadier Commander Fu whose unit was garriscing Changchun and vicinity at time of Japanese invasion. Approximate casualties among Chinese soldiers and civilians estimates 600 while over one thousand now under detention by Japanese military. Entire region Wanpaoshan has been occupied by Japanese troops How Yung Teh who leased his holdings to Korean farmers and who was for some time storm centre of Wanpaoshan controversy has been liberated by Japanese authorities now in control of Changchun. Changchun Commissioner public safety special border guards commander Chairman preparatory municipal committee and several officials reported killed."

Communicated to the Council and  
Members of the League.

C.589.M.234.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Geneva, September 22nd, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT  
UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

( ) Text of the Telegram despatched by the President in  
Office of the Council to the Governments of China  
and Japan on September 22nd.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate  
to the Council the text of the telegram which the President in  
Office of the Council has just despatched to the Governments of  
China and Japan.

I have the honour to inform you that at its meeting  
to-day devoted to the Chinese Government's appeal under  
Article 11 of the Covenant in connection with the situation in  
Manchuria, the Council of the League of Nations unanimously  
authorised me (1) to address an urgent appeal to the Governments  
of China and Japan to refrain from any act which might  
aggravate the situation or prejudice the peaceful settlement of  
the problem (2) to endeavour in consultation with the Chinese  
and Japanese representatives to find adequate means of enabling  
the two countries to withdraw their troops forthwith without  
the safety of their nationals and their property being  
endangered. (3) The Council further decided to forward the  
minutes of all the meetings of the Council and documents  
relating to this question to the Government of the United  
States of America for its information. I am firmly convinced  
that in response to the appeal which the Council has authorised  
me to make to you your Government will take all possible steps  
to prevent the commission of any act which might aggravate the  
situation or prejudice the peaceful settlement of the problem.  
I am about to begin the consultations contemplated with the  
Japanese and Chinese representatives with a view to the  
execution of paragraph (2). For these consultations I have  
obtained the assistance of the representatives of Germany,  
Great Britain, France and Italy. The decision referred to  
under (3) has been carried out.

LERROUX.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain,  
President in Office of the Council of the  
League of Nations.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated  
to the Council  
and the Members  
of the League.

C.591.M.235.1931.III.

Geneva, September 23rd, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN VIRTUE OF  
ARTICLE 11 of the COVENANT.

The following letter from the Chinese Representative together with the 8 cable messages to which it refers are circulated to the Council.

To the Secretary-General.

September 22nd.1931

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of eight further cable messages I have received in addition to the two of which copies were sent to you this morning. I shall be glad if you will be good enough to have these messages circulated at once to the Members of the Council.

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

-2-

No. 3.

Text of a telegram received by the Chinese Delegation  
from Nanking, dated September 22nd. 1931.

(1) Mr. Shigemitsu called on Mr. T.V. Soong on Saturday morning September 19th.

Owing to seizure by Japanese of all wires and wireless in Manchuria only information then available pointed to a purely local incident. He discussed advisability of setting up a mixed Sino-Japanese commission to adjudicate upon matter so as to prevent this incident from threatening friendly relations between the two countries.

Mr. T.V. Soong expressed personal opinion that feasibility of such a step might be considered at both capitals.

(2) At noon September \* 21<sup>?</sup> Japanese consul called on Mr. T.V. Soong at Nanking declaring that Japanese Government favoured speedy constitution of such a commission.

(3) Mr. T.V. Soong replied officially that when matter was discussed between Mr. Shigemitsu and himself it was believed that it was a mere local clash. But now it cannot be denied that Japanese troops have started warlike operations on a large scale and invasion of Chinese territory still continues and therefore situation is entirely changed and establishment of such a commission could not be considered.

\* 21 (?) mutilated

No. 4

Text of telegram received by the Chinese Delegation from  
Nanking, dated September 22nd, 1931.

With Japanese army in complete occupation of Kirin, Mukden and Chanchun and all strategic points in Manchuria situation tense in Harbin where Chinese soldiers concentrate after evacuating other points not having fought pursuant to Chang Hsueh Liang's orders. Young Japanese civilians in Harbin organizing volunteer corps policing strategic places and small arms have been distributed among Japanese residents there.

No. 5. Text of telegram received by the Chinese Delegation from  
Nanking, dated September 22nd, 1931.

Japanese troops occupied Kowpangtze afternoon September nineteenth. Gun-fire caused heavy casualties among Chinese civilians and peasants. Japanese soldiers reported moving towards Shanhaikwan. They announced first defence line from Yingkow to Kowpangtze. Haicheng, Tashihchiao, Liaoyang, Shenyang, Kungchulin, Ssupinkai, Kaiyuan, Changtu and Changchun on South Manchurian Railway and Pingchihu, Tsachkow, Chikuanshan, Fenghuahgcheng on the Antung-Fengtien Railway; all occupied by Japanese troops. Japanese airplanes making demonstrations over Shenyang and Sinmin dropping bombs on innocent inhabitants. Japanese aviation squadron at Pingyang Korea reached Shenyang. Headquarters of Japanese Second Division removed from Shenyang to Changchun. Incendiary fires lit by Japanese soldiers who taking advantage of confusion looted and plundered. Paltaying camp and part of buildings of North Eastern University razed to ground students being dispersed. More than hundred Chinese police murdered in cold blood while number deaths among civilians cannot be ascertained. Students who offered remonstrances were bayoneted. Japanese "mayor" is now in charge of Mukden. Reported four North Eastern armoured trains at Kowpangtze destroyed by Japanese soldiers. Six Chinese gunboats stationed Sungari River disarmed and seized for transportation.

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No. 6.

Text of a telegram received by the Chinese Delegation from Nanking, dated September 22nd, 1931.

General Chiang Kaishek today issued following message to the nation "An hour of unprecedented gravity has struck for the entire Chinese nation. Without warning and contrary to all practice of the civilised world and all covenants freely contracted, the Japanese army has invaded our territory on September 18th, killed our citizens and inflicted indignities on our civilian and military authorities. This invasion continues.

The challenge thrown to us is a challenge also to all nations. The League of Nations was established to prevent war and bring collective action into play to stop aggression. We have immediately informed the League of the aggression and have asked to obtain as a first step the immediate withdrawal of the invaders. The Council of the League is dealing with the matter at Geneva today. We have asked the Council, once the Japanese troops withdraw, to help in finding a peaceful solution of this conflict. We are confident that every impartial enquiry will give us the fullest justice and compensation.

As we have entrusted our case to the League the National army has received the strictest orders to avoid all possibility of clash with the invaders. We exhort the entire nation to maintain dignified calm. We have ordered all civilian authorities to take the strictest measures to protect Japanese citizens in our midst. We know how often innocent are made to suffer for the misdeeds of militarist.

All internal dissensions must cease. We call upon everyone, man and woman, and upon every political group without any exception to rally around the National Government which has engaged in the fight for the safety and the independence of the country. There is

-4a-

but one China and one national representation to-day. Let no provocation disturb the attitude of calm and determined expectancy which the nation must impose upon itself.

The National Government is watching the events. It has taken the people of the country into its confidence and will be publicly rendering account of the development of the situation from time to time."

No. 7.

Text of telegram received by the Chinese Delegation from Nanking, dated September 22nd, 1931.

Chang Hsueh Liang anxious prevent clashes between Chinese Japanese forces in Manchuria issued fresh instructions North Eastern forces prohibiting all Government troops leaving barracks. Messages reaching Nanking from important centres all over country indicate while studiously refraining from acts retaliation the nation is seething with indignation over unprovoked and aggressive military actions of Japanese troops in Manchuria. In Hankow various civic organisations met yesterday and voiced feelings resentment over Japanese aggression despite acute sufferings caused by floods.

- 5 -

No.8.

Text of a telegram received by the Chinese Delegation from  
Nanking, dated September 22nd 1931.

Kirin occupied by Japanese troops six o'clock yesterday evening and all official buildings seized. General Hsyita Chang Tschsiang's Chief of Staff, Commissioner Ma of Agriculture and Mining and Twenty-fifth Brigade Commander Chang Tsochu made prisoners. Twenty-fifth Brigade having received instructions to offer no resistance, retreated. Kirin station demolished by heavy gun-fire. Kirin-Changchun Railway under control of South Manchurian Railway and Taonan, Anganchi, Tachusdan, Tung-liao, Liaoyuan, Taonan, Sulan, Shenyang, Hailun Railways taken. Japanese troops now in full occupation of eight districts of Chientao on the Kirin-Korea border. Sixth Division of Japanese forces reached Chientao from Huining. Sinmin taken yesterday, Japanese scouting planes reconnoitering over city and environs, heavily bombarded Tienchuangtai on Kow-pangtze-Yingkow branch of Peking-Mukden Railway. Japanese increased sentinels at Shanhaikwan. Main North Eastern forces are concentrating at Chinchow. Chinese barracks burned by Japanese troops. Besides killing several Chinese officials, Japanese soldiers also slew their families and buried alive over one hundred wounded Chinese soldiers. At Changchun station Chinese flag removed and replaced by Japanese flag. People of Mukden are living in daily fear. Mukden arsenal completely in hands of Japanese troops, and ammunition sufficient for ten divisions have been confiscated, entailing loss of over one hundred million dollars to Chinese. New railway depot of Peking-Mukden Railway cost over million dollars, entirely ruined. Streets of commercial area Mukden being re-named. Conditions at Huangkutong even worse; communication organs, banks and money exchanges having been confiscated. Unscrupulous Koreans rob and plunder Chinese houses. Japanese soldiers after setting fire Changtu camp put to death over one hundred soldiers. Two Japanese cruisers despatched to Chefoo and Lungkow, additional marines landed Tsingtao ostensibly protection of Japanese residents. Two other cruisers arrived Chinwangtao\*. Warlike atmosphere evident; Tangku near Tientsin where trenches dug and sandbags piled with Japanese gun-boat standing by.

\* Sea-port of the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company.

No. 9.

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Text of a telegram received by the Chinese Delegation  
from Nanking, dated September 22nd, 1931  
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Confirmed report ex Peiping Brigadier Commander Fu  
together with all members of family including five year  
old son, found with stomach slit open, killed by Japanese  
troops following bombardment of Changchun.

No. 10.

Text of a telegram received by the Chinese Delegation  
from Nanking, dated September 22nd, 1931.  
-----

Arsenal, telegraph administration North East defence  
forces headquarters and many official quarters all occupied  
by Japanese troops following disarming Chinese soldiers.  
During confusion heavy firing by Japanese soldiers no re-  
liable estimate losses lives and property yet. With regard  
Japanese reports Chinese soldiers had pulled up part of  
South Manchurian Railway we pointed out South Manchurian  
Railway always been under Japanese military guard and is  
known fact that no Chinese soldiers could get within twenty  
li, (6½ miles). South Manchurian Railway has never been  
interrupted from the time of Japanese mobilization to the  
attack upon Chinese. Whereas Peking-Mukden line has been  
interrupted at Huangkutung since Japanese railway guards  
from South Manchurian Railway dynamited its rails prior to  
aggression of major Japanese forces in Kwantung.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to  
the Council and  
the Members of  
the League.

C.592.M.236.1931.VII.

Geneva, September 23rd, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN VIRTUE OF  
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

The following letter from the Chinese Representative,  
together with the 5 cable messages to which it refers, are  
circulated to the Council.

Geneva,

September 23rd, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of five  
further cable messages I have received in addition to the  
previous ten, copies of which have already been sent to you,  
thus making a total of fifteen. I shall be glad if you will  
be good enough to have these messages circulated at once to  
the Members of the Council.

For Sao-Ke Alfred Sze  
(Sgd.) K.L. Low.

No.11.

Cablegram from Nanking dated September 23rd.

Press reports from Harbin 22nd Kirin still burning and  
being looted stop Chinese 56th Regiment exterminated stop  
Reports foreign sources Peking street fighting between Chinese  
Japanese stop Kirin casualties Japanese troops 60 Chinese  
troops 105 stop.

Exharbin provincial Government officials retreated to  
Panshih stop Chinese police functioning but forced to don  
Japanese uniform stop Japanese formed public safety maintenance  
committee with 7 Chinese 3 Japanese members all under direction  
Japanese military headquarters stop.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

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troops 105 stop.

Exharbin provincial Government officials retreated to  
Panshih stop Chinese police functioning but forced to don  
Japanese uniform stop Japanese formed public safety maintenance  
committee with 7 Chinese 3 Japanese members all under direction  
Japanese military headquarters stop.

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No.12.

CABLEGRAM FROM NANKING DATED SEPTEMBER 23.

THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT HAS CATEGORICALLY ANNOUNCED THAT IT IS NOT CONDUCTING ANY DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN OVER THE JAPANESE AGGRESSION IN MANCHURIA THE CASE HAVING BEEN ALREADY PLACED BEFORE THE LEAGUE COUNCIL STOP EXPEKING TWENTY SECOND TWO JAPANESE WARCRAFTS LANDED (MARINES?) CHEFOO AND OCCUPIED ALL STRATEGIC POINTS LIEUCHIENLIENS TROOPS RETREATED WITHOUT RESISTANCE STOP CONFIRMED REPORTS JAPANESE SOLDIERS KILLED TIENTSIN CUSTOMS SUPERINTENDENT HANLIENSUN

No.13.

Cablegram from Nanking dated September 23rd

RECEIVED FROM HANKOW 22nd THAT REPRESENTATIVES FAMINE SUFFERERS IN HANKOW AND WUCHANG THIS MORNING SENT URGENT TELEGRAM TO RELIEF AUTHORITIES SHANGHAI DECLINING FOOD AND MEDICINE DONATED BY JAPANESE FLOOD RELIEF COMMISSION IN FOLLOWING LANGUAGE QUOTE PLEASE CONVEY OUR THANKS TO THE PEOPLE OF JAPAN FOR THEIR KINDLINESS BUT STARVING AS WE ARE WE ARE TOO PROUD TO ACCEPT RELIEF FROM A COUNTRY WHOSE MILITARISTS HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO SLAUGHTER OUR BRETHREN IN MANCHURIA AND INVADE OUR TERRITORY AT A TIME WHEN 16 OF OUR PROVINCES ARE SUFFERING FROM THE DISASTROUS FLOODS THERE IS MORE GLORY TO DIE BY STARVATION THAN TO LIVE THROUGH THE FOOD SUPPLIED BY A COUNTRY WHICH WANTS TO MAKE US ITS SLAVES UNQUOTE

- 3 -

No.14 Cablegram from Nanking dated September 23rd.

As Chairman National Flood Relief Commission send following message to Baron Fukai Chairman Japan Flood Relief Commission declining four thousand tons foodstuffs and relief supplies from Japan per Amagi Maru. "You will doubtless understand that recent events in Manchuria have made it impossible for my Commission to accept these supplies which the people of your country have sent for flood relief stop The generous act of your Emperor in recognising the unprecedented nature of the catastrophe in China by donating 100,000 Yen to the relief of the flood sufferers was greatly appreciated by us stop Equally appreciative are we of the sympathy shown by the people of your country as is now evidenced by these supplies stop But that your ~~xxxxxx~~ militarists should seize this moment when all of China is prostrated by the catastrophe and tens of millions are starving to launch a dastardly blow against us serves but to make mockery of the humanitarian feelings of your people stop It would be bitter bread for the flood sufferers to swallow were we to accept your assistance now and would thus ill requite the genuinely sympathetic feeling of civilian Japan." T.V. SCONG

No.15. Cablegram from Nanking dated September 23rd.

Press report from Tokio 22nd War Office announce Japanese casualties in Manchuria soldiers 65 killed 93 wounded officers 3 killed 7 wounded stop Extentsin reports from Huangkutun say Japanese soldiers in Mukden burned dead bodies of Chinese troop and civilians stop Party of Peking correspondents four Chinese four foreign arrive Kowpangtse; upon hearing fall of Sinmin only foreign correspondents proceeded Now at Tahushan.

Communicated to the Council  
and Members of the League.

C.594.M.237.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Geneva, September 23rd, 1931

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE  
COVENANT.

COMMUNICATION BY THE JAPANESE REPRESENTATIVE ON THE COUNCIL.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate  
to the Council the attached note which he has just received  
from the Japanese representative on the Council.

"JAPANESE DELEGATION TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Geneva, September 23rd, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have the honour to send you herewith a summary  
of the information which I have received since yesterday on  
the events in Manchuria, covering the period from September  
18th to 21st. I should be very grateful if you would  
communicate it to the President and Members of the Council.

I would draw your attention to the fact that the  
whole of this information is derived from official sources."

(s) K. YOSHIZAWA.

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Tokio, September 22nd.

On the night of September 18th, about 10.30 p.m., a Chinese detachment of some 350 men blew up part of the main line of the South Manchurian Railway, north of Mukden, at a point southwest of the Chinese barracks at Peitaying. This detachment, led by its officers, was proceeding in the direction of Lungkouchen, between Peitaying and Mukden, when it was discovered by a railway guard patrol, which endeavoured to stop it, but, failing, was obliged to open fire. A battle ensued in which a company of the Japanese garrison of Mukden took part.

In view of the gravity of the possible consequences of such an incident in present circumstances and the disproportion between the Chinese and Japanese forces, the Japanese headquarters at Mukden promptly took such steps as it considered indispensable. At 2.30 a.m. it had the Chinese barracks occupied and the troops who were stationed there disarmed; subsequently the open town, the official buildings and the arsenal were occupied.

Immediately on receiving notice of the incident, the troops stationed at Tiehling, Kaiyuan, Tsupingkai and Liaoyang concentrated at Mukden, and the Kwangtung staff proceeded in haste to that town at noon on September 19th.

On receiving news of the clash, the guards stationed along the South Manchurian Railway took the necessary precautions to protect the track and the safety of Japanese nationals and to deal with any possible attack by the large Chinese forces in Manchuria.

At Changchun a Japanese force was sent on September 19th to the Chinese troops stationed in the neighbourhood of the town,

- 3 -

at Kwangchiengtze and Nanling, to arrange for their disarmament, but the Chinese offered strong resistance to the Japanese troops, who had 60 killed and 96 wounded. The garrison of Changchun, however, was disarmed without incident about noon on the same day.

On the 20th, similar measures were taken at Antung, Fenghuangcheng and Yingkow; various strategic points in the neighbourhood of the railway zone were occupied. The Customs offices at Antung, Yingkow, etc., were carefully respected.

In the places mentioned, order is being maintained in co-operation with the Chinese, and at Mukden the Chinese municipal police are continuing to discharge their duties under the direction of the Japanese authorities.

In places outside the railway zone, the Japanese consuls have applied to the local authorities to provide for the protection of our nationals. As, however, Japanese subjects have suffered serious maltreatment at Kirin, a Japanese detachment has proceeded to that town, but has orders to return to its garrison in a day or two, as soon as calm has been restored.

We have been able, so far, to ensure the complete safety of foreigners resident in the areas under Japanese control. In view, however, of the disquieting situation caused by the presence of undisciplined bands and the attitude of the population in certain areas, the small forces at our disposal have not been thought sufficient to provide effective protection for the railway lines and for Japanese and foreign residents, and the 39th army corps (4000 men) was sent to Manchuria from Korea on September 21st.

Communicated to the Council  
and Members of the League.

C.596.M.238.1931.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

GENEVA, September 24th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHINESE MINISTER  
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.  
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Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate  
to the Council the attached telegram from the Chinese Minister  
of Foreign Affairs to the President of the Council.

NANKING.

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your  
telegram conveying to me the decision reached by the Council of  
the League of Nations at its yesterday's meeting regarding the  
appeal of the Chinese Government to deal with the situation in  
China created by the action of Japanese troops. In accordance with  
the Covenant of the League while expressing the appreciation of  
the Chinese Government of the prompt response thus made by the  
Council, I am confident that the decision you have communicated to  
me is only first and preliminary step leading to the definite  
settlement of the question and that no time will be lost in the  
question and that no time will be lost in the adoption of measures

-2-

for giving complete satisfaction to the aggrieved party. In regard to first point, the Chinese Government declares that it welcomes and fully accepts the recommendations of the Council to abstain from any action liable to aggravate the situation or prejudice the pacific settlement of the question. In face of every provocation the Government has taken all possible precautions to this end. It will suffice to quote a passage from the proclamation issued to the Chinese nation by the President of National Government: 'As we have entrusted our case to the League the National Army has received the strictest orders to avoid all possibility of clash with the invaders. We exhort the entire nation to maintain dignified calm.'

As regards the second point, the Chinese Government specially welcomes the decision of the Council to the effect that the troops on both sides should return immediately to their original positions. No measures contrary to the letter or spirit of this decision have been taken by China, nor have any movements of troops taken place save those necessitated by the firm decision of the Government to offer no resistance to the aggressive movements of the Japanese troops. The Chinese Government is gratified to learn that Your Excellency is, on behalf of the Council, guiding the search for the most effective means of ensuring the immediate withdrawal of the Japanese troops. I earnestly request most prompt action in this regard as the situation is growing in gravity with every hour



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and the effective application of the Council's decision  
brooks absolutely no delay.

The Chinese Government will assume full responsibility  
for the protection of life and property as soon as we regain  
control of the areas evacuated by the Japanese troops.

The Chinese Government notes with satisfaction the  
third and last paragraph of the Council's decision which  
authorises you to forward the minutes of the meetings of  
the Council and all documents concerning this affair to the  
United States of America.- Chengting Wang, Minister of  
Foreign Affairs of the National Government of the Republic  
of China, September 23rd."

Communicated to the Council  
and the Members of the League.

C.597.M.339. ✓

Genève, le 24 septembre 1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE  
COVENANT.

Letter from the Government of the United States of America.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary General has the honour to circulate to the Council, in accordance with the instructions of the President of the Council, the following letter which the latter has just received from the Minister of the United States of America at Berne.

My dear President,

I have just received a telegram from the Secretary of State of the United States directing me to deliver a note to you in regard to the Sino-Japanese dispute as follows :

" I have received from the American Minister at Berne the copy of the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations which you transmitted to him. I have noted the two parts of this resolution and the fact that they have been embodied in a note which you have addressed to the Governments of Japan and China.

" I assure you that the Government of the United States is in whole-hearted sympathy with the attitude of the League of Nations as expressed in the Council's resolution and will despatch to Japan and China notes along similar lines.

" I have already urged cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal from the present situation of danger and will continue earnestly to work for the restoration of peace."

(Signed) Hugh R. WILSON.

Communicated to the Council  
and the Members of the League.

C.604.M.242.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Geneva, September 24th 1931

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER  
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Chinese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate  
to the Council the following communication which he has just  
received from the Chinese Representative on the Council.

Delegation of the Republic of China to  
the Assembly of the League of Nations.

Geneva,  
September 24th 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir:

I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of  
seven further cable messages I have received in addition to  
the previous fifteen, copies of which have already been sent  
to you, thus making a total of Nos. 1 - 22. I shall be glad  
if you will be good enough to have these messages circulated  
at once to the Members of the Council.

for SAO-KE ALFRED SZE

K. L. Low.

No 16.

Text of a telegram received by the Chinese Delegation  
from Nanking, dated September 23rd. 1931.

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United Press report from Mukden September twenty-third the situation in Manchuria grew more tense today as Japanese forces moved on Harbin where it is charged Chinese mobs have slaughtered Japanese citizens and as Japanese sources insisted that the danger of a Sino-Japanese clash near Kirin is imminent. Information reaching Changchun from Harbin says Japanese women and children are taking refuge some distance outside of the city. Also reported in Mukden that Japanese in Tsitsihar are preparing to evacuate to Japan. Japanese have demanded that Chinese forces near Kirin surrender their arms. Noon today was set as the latest possible date for surrender. However early today Chinese had turned over only 250 small arms. It is feared that when deadline at noon is reached today Japanese will resort to force to disarm Kirin soldiers. This morning Kirin military leaders were concentrating their units at Sungposhan 20 li (about 6½ miles) east of Kirin. On Monday night Lieutenant-General Tamon, Commander of the Second Division Japanese army and General Hsiho, Chief Staff Officer Kirin army met at Japanese Headquarters before Kirin. Kirin official agreed to surrender arms on condition that Japanese who have occupied Kirin would not attack city. Japanese insist there will be no change in the Wednesday noon deadline for the surrender of Chinese arms. Harbin now considered chief danger center. Prediction is martial law in Harbin soon, meanwhile staffs of such concerns as Mitsui Bussan Kaisha are evacuating towards Japan. Japanese mobilized volunteer corps 700 strong patrolling Harbin. In Manchuria Japanese continuing extend their sphere of military influence. At ten o'clock on

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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No.16 (continued)

Tuesday morning Japanese troops from Lienshan occupied Chenchiaschun. General Kuanyuheng who has been charged by Japanese with the "murder" of Captain Nakamura has been arrested by Japanese troops in Mukden. Four additional Japanese military aeroplanes have arrived at Changchun under Major Hirata. At present there are six Japanese planes at Changchun. As Japanese troops move northward towards Harbin from Mukden, Changchun and Kirin replacements are being provided. The replacements are in some cases from Lungshan Korea. One regiment of nineteenth division of Japanese Imperial army in Korea has been transferred to Mukden from Singyishow which is on Korean-Manchurian border. Japanese troops from Kirin and Mukden officially confirmed advancing towards Harbin.

No.17.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese  
 Delegation, dated Shanghai, September 23rd, 1931.

Because of large Japanese population in Shantung extra precautionary measures have been taken by Shantung Provincial Government. Telegram ex Tsingtao Municipal Government to Foreign Office states immediately after rise of Manchurian crisis Municipal Government local Party Headquarters and naval units devised steps for maintenance local peace and order. Bureau Public Safety instructed to accord adequate protection to Japanese residents. Last night Japanese Consul Tsinan called on Hanfuchu Chairman Shantung Provincial Government to discuss detailed measures for protection of Japanese nationals there. Han already ordered his units stationed along Kiaochowtsinan Railway and various district magistrates in railway region to extend full protection Japanese. Message from Lungkow Chamber of Commerce

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over 100 Japanese plain-clothes soldiers landed there compelling local Chinese garrison to leave. Japanese steamer "Lungping Maru" conveying additional soldiers to Lungkou. With tense public feeling existing countrywide because Japanese occupation Manchuria the National Government in an order to all military naval commanders emphasizes imperative necessity of maintaining peace order and precluding acts of violence against Japanese residents in China.

No.18.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation, dated Shanghai, September 23rd, 1931.

Report ex Peiping Japanese troops occupied junction South Manchurian Railways and Chinese Eastern Railways at Changchun Kuangchengtze Chinese Russian staff Chinese Eastern Railways Chinese inhabitants compelled flee for lives. Telegraph office attacked several staff members killed by gun-fire. Liaoyuan Chengchiateng occupied yesternoon two Japanese armoured trains heavily loaded with soldiers ammunitions arrived Chengchiateng from Supingkui by Supingkui-Paonan Railway en route Tungliao.

Japanese cavalry force reached Chientao on Kirin-Korean border reinforcements totalling three thousand Japanese soldiers arrived Lungchintsun, south of Yenki. Terror reigns at Kowpangtze since Japan announced Kowpangtze and Yingkow constitute first defence line. Inhabitants are assembling at railway station anxiously waiting for news. Over forty thousand Chinese soldiers concentrating in region between Kowpangtze and Chinchow. Changtu on South Manchurian Railway taken yesternoon. Japanese marines have landed Chinwangtao. Two gun-boats discovered at Hulutao on night of twenty-first, when queried by North Eastern naval squadron extinguished lights and scooted. Mukden suffering from food shortage. Only foreign members Sino-Foreign Press Delegation allowed enter Mukden but must obtain permission from military before proceeding places and forbidden take photos. Number young Chinese students reported either arrested or killed.

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No. 19. Text of a telegram received by the Chinese Delegation from Nanking, dated September 23rd, 1931.

Government statement "Mr. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Minister to China, called on Mr. T. V. Soong, Vice-Chairman of the Executive Yuan on Saturday morning, September nineteenth at Shanghai and in the course of a private discussion when through the seizure by Japanese troops of wireless, telegraph and telephone lines in Manchuria information available were mainly from Japanese sources, it seemed to point to a purely local clash and envisaged the feasibility of setting up without delay a mixed Sino-Japanese commission to investigate the facts of an isolated incident in order to prevent it from embittering friendly relations between the two nations.

Meanwhile the warlike character of the Japanese military operations became known, the invasion continue and the National Government appealed to the League Council, which fixed the debate for Tuesday September twenty-second at ten a.m. Geneva time and five p.m. Nanking time.

On the same day, Tuesday September twenty-second at noon Nanking, five a.m. Geneva time, the Japanese Consul-General in Nanking called officially on Mr. T. V. Soong to declare that the Japanese Government would be glad to constitute the commission referred to in the private conversation between Shigemitsu and T. V. Soong on the morning of Saturday, September nineteenth. Mr. T. V. Soong informed the Japanese Consul-General on behalf of the National Government that the invasion of Chinese territory by the Japanese troops made absolutely impossible any direct negotiations."

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No.20. Text of a telegram received by the Chinese Delegation  
from Nanking, dated September 23rd, 1931.

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United Press report San Francisco Hiram Johnson  
stated Japan waging war on China with precision, showing  
long careful preparation, declaring this another argument  
for proponents disarmament seeking destruction of "what  
little navy our diplomats have let us". He says while  
everybody has something to say for disarmament "some of  
us really believe it should be reciprocal and simultaneous.  
Where now is bugle call of State Department trumpeted so  
loudly prematurely when China Russia making faces each other.  
Where is League of Nations, where is the sacrosanct Kellogg  
Tact". He concluded by saying "But why worry, there remains  
League of Nations, political world court with distinguished  
Japanese president"

No.21. Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation  
dated Shanghai, September twenty fourth 1931.

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Taonanfu city northwest of Changchun has been  
occupied by Japanese troops.

No.22. Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation  
dated Shanghai, twenty fourth September 1931.

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Ex Peiping twenty fourth Japanese troops at Kungchul-  
ing Kirin have launched another attack on Chinese soldiers.  
Massacre of Chinese in Kirin city even more serious than in  
Mukden. Chinese civil and military officials were ruthlessly



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killed: about 200 met their death. Streets of Kirin have been re-named in Japanese. Railway guards of Kirin-Changchun Railway have been totally disarmed by Japanese troops; many Chinese civilians in Changchun slain. Chouyuping, director of Changchun Municipal Administration, found lying dead on road-side with seven bullet wounds fifty-one bayonet cuts; fifteen members of his family were also butchered. When first occupied Changchun Japanese troops bombed city twenty times in five hours, ruining large number houses. Japanese soldiers at Yingkow (Newchwang) reported moved to another locality. Chinese police maintaining peace order there now. Railway station still being occupied by South Manchurian Railway staff members. Chinese in Chengtu and Sinmin have sustained heavy losses Japanese and Koreans looted Chinese houses. Over 5,000 Chinese fallen victims to Japanese thirst for blood in Mukden three Japanese airplanes flying over city scattered handbills announcing to inhabitants that Japanese are going to hold Liaoning (Mukden) province permanently and that Chinese should keep quiet and carry on their business. Following appointment of Colonel Dchitara as "Mayor" of Mukden various municipal organs there are undergoing re-organisation. Mukden to be re-named Shenjing or incorporated with Kwantung district. Japanese announce Chinese merchants must resume their business at once. Fifteen million dollars reserve funds of frontier bank have been seized by Japanese. Machine guns mounted on city walls, trenches have been dug at commercial area outside city. Liaoning Provincial Government Chairman Sangshihi still detained at Mukden. At Chinwangtao Japanese soldiers searching all passengers on Peking-Mukden trains special attention being paid those travelling eastwards. Press representatives being closely scrutinised. Ex Mukden three Japanese armoured trains reported to have stopped at Tahushan. Much rifle fire heard last night uneasiness among Chinese population growing.

C.605.M.243.1931.VII.

Communicated to the Council  
and to the Members of the League.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Geneva, September 24th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Letter from the Acting President of the Council to the Minister  
of the United States of America at Berne.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the  
Council the text of a letter from the Acting President of the  
Council to the Minister of the United States of America at Berne.

Geneva, 24th September, 1931.

On behalf of the Council of the League of Nations  
I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the  
24th September, enclosing a telegram addressed to me in regard to  
the appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the  
Covenant of the League of Nations. May I ask you to transmit  
to the Secretary of State the following reply:-

The Council of the League of Nations has requested  
me to express to the Secretary of State its appreciation  
of the friendly answer which he was good enough to make  
in regard to the situation which has unhappily arisen  
between two highly respected Members of the family of  
nations, China and Japan. The Council is gratified to  
note that the Government of the United States is in whole  
hearted sympathy with the attitude of the League of Nations

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as expressed in the Council resolution, and that it will despatch to Japan and China, in addition to previous communications, notes on lines similar to those followed by the Council.

The Council has no preconceived method for solving the difficulties which have arisen; no procedure or formula to which it is irrevocably bound other than its obligation to "take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations".

To this end, the Council will gladly continue to keep the Government of the United States informed of any action it may take or any information it may secure, and ventures to hope that that Government will also be disposed to communicate with it. The Council feels confident that, irrespective of any individual effort which any Government may deem it desirable to make, it is by the continuance of common endeavour that a successful result is most likely to be achieved. The efforts which are now being made here will be continued by the Council in such form as circumstances may require.

(signed) LERROUX.

Acting President of the Council.

Communicated to the Council  
and the Members of the League.

C.606.M.244.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Geneva, September 24th, 1931.

( ) Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the  
Covenant.

Communication from the Association of Journalists in Nanking.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the  
Council, at the request of the Representative of China on the  
Council, the following communication:

( ) Minister Alfred Sze,  
Chinese Delegation,  
Geneva.

Please deliver the following message to the Members of the  
Council of the League of Nations:

The Japanese Government, without any excuse whatever, dispatched troops to occupy all the strategic points in Manchuria, maltreated Chinese citizens, killed Chinese officials, disarmed Chinese soldiers and burned down private and public Chinese buildings. These acts of violence constitute a grave violation of the provisions of the League Covenant, of the Washington treaties and of the Pact of Paris. We are peace-loving citizens and always abide by international agreements. At this time when China is overtaken by a great natural calamity and confronted with the menace of Communists, the barbarous action of Japan in taking advantage of her difficulties has aroused the indignation of the four hundred million. We appeal to you to stand for justice and righteousness so as to maintain the peace of the world.

Association of Journalists in Nanking.

Nanking, September 21st, 1931.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.607.M.245.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Geneva, September 25th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate  
to the Council the following letter to the President in  
Office of the Council received from the Japanese repre-  
sentative on the Council:

Geneva, September 24th, 1931.

Acting on instructions received from my Government,  
I have the honour to acquaint Your Excellency with the reply  
of my Government to the telegram of September 22nd which  
Your Excellency was good enough to forward to it.

1. As regards the first point mentioned in the  
message, the Japanese troops, since the beginning of the  
present events, have been careful to act only within the  
limits necessary to ensure their own safety, the protection  
of the Railway and the safety of Japanese nationals.  
The Japanese Government has firmly pursued the object  
of preventing an extension of the incident and the aggra-  
vation of the situation; it is profoundly desirous of

His Excellency Monsieur Alejandro Lerroux,  
President of the Council of the League of Nations,  
GENEVA.

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ensuring the peaceful settlement of this problem as rapidly as possible by negotiations between the two countries, and it has the firm intention not to depart from this line of conduct.

2. As regards the second point in the message, the Japanese Government desires to state that it has withdrawn the greater part of its forces to the Railway zone and that they are concentrated there. Outside that zone, only a few troops are, as a precautionary measure, quartered in the town of Mukden and at Kirin, and a small number of soldiers have been placed at certain points, these measures not constituting any military occupation.

The Japanese forces are being withdrawn to the fullest extent which is at present allowed by the maintenance of the safety of Japanese nationals and the protection of the Railway. The Japanese Government, which intends to withdraw its troops to the Railway zone in proportion as the situation improves, feels confident that the Council will, in this matter, trust the sincerity of its attitude.

In informing Your Excellency of the foregoing,

I am, etc.

(Sgd.). YOSHIZAWA.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.609.M.246.1931.VII

Communicated to the  
Council and the  
Members of the League.

Geneva, September 25th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN VIRTUE OF  
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.  
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The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate  
to the Council the following letter from the Japanese  
Representative, forwarding a declaration made by him on  
September 24th.

Japanese Delegation  
to the  
League of Nations.

Geneva, September 25th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have the honour to communicate a declaration  
made by the Japanese Government on September 24th, regarding  
the incidents in Manchuria. I would ask you to be good  
enough to forward this declaration to the President and  
Members of the Council.

(Signed) K. YOSHIKAWA

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The statement issued by the Japanese Government on September 24th, in regard to the recent incident in Manchuria.

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(1) The Japanese Government has constantly been exercising honest endeavours in pursuance of its settled policy to foster friendly relations between Japan and China, and to promote a common prosperity and wellbeing of the two countries. Unfortunately, the conduct of officials and individuals in China for some years past has been such that our national sentiment has frequently been irritated. In particular, unpleasant incidents have taken place one after another in the regions of Manchuria and Mongolia, in which Japan is interested in especial degree, until impression has gained strength in the minds of Japanese people that Japan's fair and friendly attitude is not being reciprocated by China in a like spirit. Amidst the atmosphere of perturbation and anxiety thus created, a detachment of Chinese troops destroyed tracks of South Manchuria Railway in the vicinity of Mukden, and attacked our railway guards in the midnight of September 18th. The clash between the Japanese and Chinese troops then took place.

(2) The situation became critical as a number of Japanese guards stationed along the entire railway did not then exceed ten thousand four hundred, while there were in juxtaposition some two hundred twenty thousand Chinese soldiers. Moreover hundreds of thousand Japanese residents were placed in jeopardy. In order to forestall an imminent



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disaster, the Japanese army had to act promptly. The Chinese soldiers garrisoned in neighbouring localities were disarmed and the duty of maintaining the peace and order was left in the hands of local Chinese organisations under the supervision of Japanese troops.

(3) These measures having been taken, our soldiers were mostly withdrawn within the railway zone. There still remains some detachments in Mukden and Kirin, and a small number of men in a few other places, but nowhere does a state of military occupation as such exist. The report that the Japanese authorities have seized Customs or Saltgabelle Office in Yingkou or that they have taken control of Chinese railways between Ssupingkei and Chenchiatun or between Mukden and Sinmintun are entirely untrue, nor has the story of our troops having ever been sent north of Changchun or into Chientao any foundation in fact.

(4) The Japanese Government at a special Cabinet meeting of September 19th took the decision that all possible efforts should be made to prevent an aggravation of the situation, and instructions to that effect were given to the Commander of the Manchurian garrison. It is true that a detachment was despatched from Changchun to Kirin on September 21st, but it was not with a view to military occupation. It was sent only for the purpose of removing menace to the South Manchuria Railway on flank. As soon as that object has been attained, our detachment will be entirely withdrawn. It may be added that, while a mixed brigade of four thousand men was sent from Korea to join the Manchurian garrison, the

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total number of men in garrison at present still remains within the limit set by treaty, and that fact cannot therefore be regarded as having in any way added to the seriousness of international situation.

(5) It may be superfluous to repeat that the Japanese Government harbors no territorial design in Manchuria. What we desire is that the Japanese subjects shall be enabled to engage safely in various peaceful pursuits, and be given an opportunity of participating in the development of that land by means of capital and labor. It is the proper duty of a Government to protect the rights and interests legitimately enjoyed by the nation or individuals. The endeavors of the Japanese Government to guard the South Manchuria Railway against wanton attacks should be viewed in no other light. The Japanese Government, true to its established policy, is prepared to co-operate with the Chinese Government in order to prevent the present incident from developing into a disastrous situation between the two countries, and to work out such constructive plans as will once for all eradicate causes for future friction. The Japanese Government would be more than gratified if the present difficulty could be brought to a solution which will give a new turn to the mutual relations between the two countries.

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C.610.M.247.1931.VII.

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

Geneva, September 25th, 1931.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Letter to the President of the Council from the  
Minister of the United States of America at Berne.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication which the President of the Council has just received from the Minister of the United States of America at Berne.

Legation of the United States  
of America,

Geneva, September 25th, 1931.

To the President of the Council  
of the League of Nations,  
Geneva.

My dear Mr. President,

I am authorised by the Secretary of State to deliver to you the text of the identic note addressed by him to the Governments of China and Japan and handed to their respective representatives in Washington.

The text of the note is herewith enclosed.

Believe me, my dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) HUGH R. WILSON.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

IDENTIC NOTE ADDRESSED BY THE SECRETARY OF  
STATE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE GOVERNMENTS  
OF JAPAN AND CHINA.

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The Government and people of the United States observed with regret and with concern events of the past few days in Manchuria. In view of the sincere desire of the people of this country that principles and methods of peace shall prevail in international relations, and of the existence of treaties, to several of which the United States is a party, the provisions of which are intended to regulate the adjustment of controversies between nations without resort to use of force, the American Government feels warranted in expressing to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments its hope that they will cause their military forces to refrain from any further hostilities, will so dispose respectively of their armed forces as to satisfy the requirements of international law and international agreements, and will refrain from activities which may prejudice the attainment by amicable methods of an adjustment of their differences.

Communicated to the Council  
and the Members of the League

C.616.N.248.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Appeal from the Chinese Government  
under Article 11 of the Covenant.

Communication from the Representative of China  
on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to  
the Council the following communication from the Representative  
of China on the Council.

Delegation of the Republic of China to  
the Assembly of the League of Nations

Geneva,  
September 26th 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of three  
further cable messages I have received in addition to the  
previous twenty-two, copies of which have already been sent to  
you, thus making a total of Nos. 1 - 25. I shall be glad if you  
will be good enough to have these messages circulated at once to  
the Members of the Council.

for SAO-KE ALFRED SZE

K. L. Low.

No. 23.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, September 25th 1931.

When occupied Yingkow Japan seized Customs salt revenues  
deposited Bank of China. Now returned funds.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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No. 24

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
 dated Hankin, September 25th 1931.

Tientsin telegram twenty-fourth reports one Jap  
 aeroplane flew towards Koupanetz via Tienchuantai. This noon  
 Jap aeroplanes machine-gunned Tientsin-Hakden passenger train,  
 injuring one, killing two passengers. Jap aeroplanes arrived  
 Tungtaying, 3 o'clock, threw four bombs two o'clock afternoon.  
 Japs claimed only ten thousand Jap troops Manchuria, military  
 activities carried on in conjunction with volunteers, over  
 hundred latter were seen by foreign journalists in train going  
 towards Chinwang nineteenth morning.

No. 25

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
 dated Hankin, September 26th 1931.

Japanese still prevent telegraphic communication with  
 Hakden except via Jap controlled service through Dailin.

No. 24

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, September 25th 1931.

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Tientsin telegram twenty-fourth reports one Jap  
aeroplane flew towards Koupangtzu via Tienchuantai. This noon  
Jap aeroplanes machine-gunned Tientsin-Hukden passenger train,  
injuring one, killing two passengers. Jap aeroplanes arrived  
Tungtaying, Chihhsien, threw four bombs two o'clock afternoon.  
Japs claimed only ten thousand Jap troops Manchuria, military  
activities carried on in conjunction with volunteers, over  
hundred latter were seen by foreign journalists in train going  
towards Chinwang nineteenth morning.

No. 25

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, September 26th 1931.

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Japanese still prevent telegraphic communication with  
Hukden except via Jap controlled service through Dairen.

Communicated to the Council  
and the Members of the League.

C.621.M.249.1931.VII.

Geneva, September 26th, 1931.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communications From the Japanese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication which he has just received from the Japanese Representative on the Council.

THE JAPANESE DELEGATION TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Geneva, September 26th, 1931.

Sir,

I have the honour to communicate to you a telegram from my Government, dated September 24th, which I should be glad if you would kindly transmit to the President and Members of the Council.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) K. Yoshizawa.

The Hon. Sir Eric Drummond, K.C.M.G.

Tokio, September 25th.

On September 24th, General Shimamoto, commanding the protective forces at Mukden, gave the foreign military attaches and Press correspondents the following details regarding the circumstances connected with the criminal attempt upon the South Manchurian Railway.

On September 13th, about 10.30 p.m., a patrol of the Japanese garrison of Hushihai, consisting of seven men, under Lieutenant Kawamoto, were making reconnaissances in two groups in the



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Railway zone when they heard behind them a violent explosion. The Japanese soldiers turned about and some 500 metres northwards near the place at which the explosion had occurred, they perceived Chinese soldiers in flight. Our men pursued them but suddenly found themselves under fire from soldiers ambushed in the neighbourhood. They were falling back returning the fire when a force of 400 to 500 Chinese soldiers debouched from the maize fields south of Peitaying and opened a violent fire on our men. Company Commander Kawashima, who was in charge of the operations, promptly came up with 120 men, pursued the Chinese troops and occupied part of Peitaying.

Communicated to the Council  
and the Members of the League.

C.627.M.251.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Geneva, September 28th,  
1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Representative of China on the  
Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the  
Council the following communication from the Representative of  
China on the Council.

Delegation of the  
Republic of China to the  
Assembly of the League of Nations

41 Quai Wilson, Geneva.

September 27th, 1931.

The Honourable Sir James Eric Drummond, K.C.M.G., C.B.,  
Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of seven further  
cable messages I have received in addition to the previous twenty-  
five, copies of which have already been sent to you, thus making a  
total of Nos. 1 - 32. I shall be glad if you will be good enough to  
have these messages circulated at once to the Members of the Council.

(Signed) for Sao-ke Alfred Sze  
K. L. Low.

No. 26.

Text of a telegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, September 26th, 1931.

From Peking September 25th Japanese occupied Tungliac junction  
Chengchiatun-Tungliac and Tahushan-Tungliac Railways twenty-third.  
Scores innocent people killed. Official buildings private residences  
plundered. Five plain-clothes Japanese corps reported organized by  
Japanese Kwantung garrison each of 1,000 men including Japanese  
Koreans being assigned duties Peking-Mukden, Mukden-Hailun,  
Ssuningkai-Taonan, Tahushan-Tungliac, Taonan-Angangchi, Kirin-  
Changchun, Kirin-Hailun, Kirin-Tunghua and Chinese Eastern Railways.

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Japanese troops taking census Mukden announced freedom movement to and from city disallowed except special permits. Mines laid Mukden arsenal all Chinese Government fighting planes transported towards Korea. Japanese armoured cars patrol streets. Train 102 upon arrival Huangkutung yesterday fired upon by Japanese machine-gun. Passengers were killed and injured. Japanese troops reported planning occupy east section Peking-Mukden Railway. Two Japanese detachments proceeded from South Manchuria station towards Chuliu via Huangkutun on armoured trains proceeding towards Tahushan to effect junction units all along Tahushan-Tungliao Railway. North Eastern Defence Headquarters and Mukden Provincial Government removed towards Chinchow from Mukden. Four Japanese planes dropped bombs city dawn yesterday morning. Scores Japanese soldiers disguising as Chinese discovered at station.

No. 27.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, September 25th, 1931.

All China seething with indignation and Government hard put to quieten populace with assurances that Japanese troops will be immediately forced to withdraw by enlightened world opinion without necessity force. As instance of mounting indignation as days go by is United Press message despatched 4 p.m. this afternoon showing even in British colony Hongkong situation tenser "Police had hectic day coping anti-Japanese riots all over city. Situation worsening, police reserve force ordered stand by."

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No. 28.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation  
dated Nanking, September 26th, 1931.

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Foreign official source reports from Mukden concensus  
foreign Chinese opinion that excuse for attack invasion  
deliberately incited by Japanese who for many nights previous  
held machine-gun practice which on Friday developed into attack.  
There no signs Chinese used field-guns as Japanese alleged  
nor any resistance. Japanese firing on TNT stores endangered  
whole city surroundings. Foreign observers returned today  
state Japanese disallow anyone visit site alleged explosion  
railway line. Japanese officer Mukden stated line was repaired  
6 a.m. nineteenth "There is now no trace explosion." Three  
Japanese versions commencement trouble; one, explosion two,  
no explosion but pulling up line by Chinese; three, explosion  
of line caused Japanese rail guards run towards it, met Chinese  
soldiers running investigate, clashed. Latter reason given  
by Major Usuda Staff Officer General Honjo four sham fights  
being conducted developed to walls north camp brought on conflict,  
Poulet connected with aerodrome morning nineteenth saw several  
unarmed people shot wantonly by Japanese. Saw reservists white  
bands one being barber Yamato Hotel in his white coat armed  
bandolier rifle in action. Private motor-cars taken from  
Chinese citizens in large numbers driven into Japanese concession.  
Poulet en route Keiping twentyfourth saw Japanese plane over  
Chinchow. General in command stated four bombs seen dropped.  
All observers comment on wanton killing. Japanese machine-guns  
placed international settlement opposite International Club  
fired on motor-car carrying Brigadier Hanyuenpang, killing  
chauffeur, wounding general who died nineteenth, many shots  
struck club, some entered.

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No.29.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, September 26th, 1931.

"J.D. Thomson, British Manager of Peking-Mukden Railway, left Huangkutung, Mukden on train 102 Thursday, twenty-fourth with wife also one German one Italian lady friends in special car attached to train which was packed with refugees from Mukden. After proceeding one hour about thirty-four kilometres Japanese military aeroplane armed with machine-gun appeared suddenly, machine-gunned train; noise aeroplane machine-gun fire distinctly heard from his car. When train halted, noise motor audible, plane invisible. Thomson immediately examined train found fourth fifth carriages from rear profusely spattered bullet marks. Enquiries for casualties revealed two Chinese refugees killed, five wounded, others panic-stricken. He examined one of the killed and several of the wounded. He understands one wounded died later, Thomson definitely states attack totally unwarranted no soldiers in vicinity or on train. Thomson examined bullet holes found every case bullets penetrated downward/<sup>angle</sup> showing fired from above. Railway track vicinity higher than ground. Thomson furnished above details to British Consul-General Tientsin adding lives wife, children self and other foreigners as much in danger as any refugee aboard; considers attack upon passenger train filled defenceless refugees not only unwarranted but outrageous. Since Thomson's return news received similar attack another train. Japanese aeroplane attacked train 105 Yacyangho eleven ten morning twenty-fourth. Train 103 down fired on at Chuliho five forty-five morning twenty-fifth two railway guards taken off by Japanese."

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No. 30.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Hanking, September 26th, 1931.

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Japanese marines at Chinwangtao. That Japanese intend occupy Mukden and Kirin permanently evidenced by fact that they have commenced collecting taxes various occupied territories Chinese merchants refusing resume business are placed under arrest. Colonel Pohibara Japanese mayor Mukden already re-organized Mukden Municipality appointed Japanese to different municipal posts. Machine-guns mounted west gate Mukden, two Japanese companies detailed in neighbourhood. Post office forced fly Japanese flag. President Fengyung University detained by Japanese troops General Tsangshihyi chairman Mukden Provincial Government still detained on hunger strike. Asked to sign document admitting Chinese soldiers had first launched attacks South Manchurian Railway Tsang flatly refused declaring he rather lose head than affix signature on fabricated document. From Chefoo twenty-sixth order being efficiently maintained by local authorities who have taken every precaution protection Japanese nationals.

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No. 31.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, September 27th, 1931.

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"To the black series bombing and machine-gunning passenger trains on Peking-Mukden Railway by Japanese troops new sinister act was added yesterday. Locomotive and five cars train 102 derailed to-day near Paichipu about fifty miles south Mukden owing removal rails by alleged bandits in fact Japanese agents who looted train. Thirty passengers killed among them reported one Englishman, one Russian, one Hindoo. Shortly after derailment Japanese locomotive and two cars occupied by twenty Japanese arrived examined wreck and returned northwards.

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No. 32.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, September 27th, 1931.

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Feeling tense all over the country, Taiyuen, Tsinan, Hankow, Nanchang, Changsha, Swatow, Hongkong and Ningpo yesterday popular demonstrations and mass meetings advocated strong measures. No untoward incidents. Local Government authorities take precautionary measures careful protecting Japanese residents. From Peking twenty-sixth Tsangshihyi, Mukden Provincial Government chairman still under Japanese detention hunger strike for five days. Among casualties of derailment of train 102 deaths many innocent passengers, one railway guard, two oilers, two firemen, besides Englishman, Russian, Hindoo. Japanese rifles discovered near torn rails. Japanese airplane dropped four bombs on Chinese barracks at Chinchow where Mukden Provincial Government now functioning. Many Chinese soldiers killed. From Harbin twenty-sixth two Japanese detachments boarded Chinese Eastern Railway passenger train to Changchun and forced engineer start train who refusing shot by Japanese troops. From Tientsin twenty-sixth Japanese troops laid mines on Peking-Mukden Railway at Mukden, Huangkutung, Yaoyangho, Paichipo and Sinmin. Peking-Mukden Railway officials protested Japanese commander who refused removal giving protection excuse. From Hsuehowfu twenty-sixth two Japanese war-crafts arrived Haichow twenty-fifth nine p.m. landing marines. Local negotiations Japanese marines unland failed.



Communicated to the Council  
and the Members of the League.

C.634.M.252.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Geneva, September 28th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of three further cable messages I have received in addition to the previous thirty-two, copies of which have already been sent to you, thus making a total of Nos. 1 - 35. I shall be glad if you will be good enough to have these messages circulated at once to the Members of the Council.

for SAO-IE ALFRED SZE

K. L. LOW.

No.33.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Peking, September 28th, 1931.

No foreigners killed train wreck. Foreigners arriving from Mukden describe conditions terrible, people in state of terror rapidly becoming foodless, no money owing to banks being closed by Japanese. All shops closed. Telegraphic and radio communication still difficult. Airplane alleged bandit attacks trains designed to frighten the people and prevent them leaving city, all searched by Japanese on leaving none permitted to take out more than hundred dollars. Hundreds private motor cars stolen by Japanese reported entrained towards Dairen. British railway employees Peking-Mukden Railway at stations near Mukden constantly abused by Japanese who endeavouring take over control, operation of railway gradually extending further southwards than Hsinmintun.

- 2 -

No. 34.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, September 28th, 1931.

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From Mukden twenty-seventh Mukden quiet today.  
Business will partly resume tomorrow after being at a  
standstill for over a week owing to Japanese operations.  
Bank of China and Bank of Communications expected to  
open their doors Monday. Japanese official reports  
confirm detachments of Japanese troops did go towards  
Taonon on Inner Mongolia Border. Report states they  
went on September twenty-fifth and left following day  
after evacuating all Japanese residents. Troops said  
to be now in Chengchuiatun. Japanese authorities now  
have considerable air force here, two squadrons planes  
which have accompanied troops here in addition between  
forty and fifty machines seized from Chinese troops with  
their markings removed and Japanese insignia painted on  
instead as if Japanese military authorities intended to  
retain them permanently. Messages from Harbin state  
city now quiet but it is reported Japanese aeroplanes  
have been flying and dropping leaflets in Russian  
language suggesting possible occupation.

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No. 35.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking September 28th, 1931.

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Please communicate Council immediately:

"While Government fully recognizes earnest endeavour of Council to maintain peace, the fact that neutral commission yet undespached Manchuria and continued Japanese air attacks on Peking-Mukden Railway, Japanese semi-official statement that Kwantung army should remain present positions pending completion negotiations, settlement present dispute, reported movement Japanese warships producing most unfortunate impression public opinion. Government effectively maintaining protection Japanese citizens everywhere in China in spite exceedingly high popular feeling as shown disturbances in British colony Hongkong. Government contradict most energetically Baron Shidehara's latest note alleging not taking effective measures such protection. Government most earnestly trust Council will exert its full authority maintain peace before too late".

Communicated to the Council  
and Members of the League.

C.636.M.253.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

GENEVA, September 28th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE  
COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China  
on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The two following telegrams, one from Singapore and one from  
the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Germany, are circulated at the  
request of the Chinese Representative for the information of the  
Council.

"Chinese Representative  
League of Nations, Geneva.

Please submit the following message to the League.

A mass meeting representing 400,000 Chinese in Singapore, ather-  
ring the unprovoked and atrocious attack of Japan on China during the  
present flood disaster, himbly requests the League, as custodian of  
international law and order, to restore to China immediately her full  
sovereign rights and to do its utmost to bring about the cessation of  
the wanton destruction by Japan of life and property the continuance  
of which may endanger the peace of the world. Tankankee chairman  
mass meeting - Singapore. 26.9.31."

"Please transmit the following to the League:

Japan continues to send troops to Manchuria and her action is  
getting more and more outrageous. The Chinese Government has so far  
adopted a policy of non-resistance, because it is confident that the  
League will, by virtue of the authority given to it by the Covenant  
and in pursuit of the principle of justice, take effective measures  
to check Japan's activities. If the League fails to act, the Chinese  
populace are determined to give full support to their Government in  
the carrying out of the only defensive measures that remain. As for  
the withdrawal of troops by the two countries, since Chinese soldiers  
have never gone beyond their own territory, which has been invaded by  
Japanese troops, it is irrelevant to speak of withdrawal of Chinese  
troops. We earnestly request the League immediately to take proper  
measures for the maintenance of its own prestige and the preservation  
of world peace. - Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Germany."

Communicated to the Council  
and the Members of the League.

C.638.M.254.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Geneva, September 29th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM CHINA UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Delegation of the Republic of China to the  
Assembly of the League of Nations.

GENEVA.

September 29th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith two copies of a further cable message I have received in addition to the previous thirty-five, copies of which have already been sent to you, thus making a total of Nos. 1 - 36. I shall be glad if you will be good enough to have these messages circulated at once to the Members of the Council.

For Suo-ke Alfred Sze.

K.L. Low.

No.36.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation, dated Nanking, September 29th, 1931.

From Tientsin twenty-eighth over hundred Japanese cavalry and artillery troops arrived Sinmin Saturday afternoon billeted railway station and warehouses. Scores of Japanese soldiers in Huangkatung Saturday afternoon spied upon railway workshop and inflicted injuries on railway guards, Changsochen's head and Weichangyu's foot bayoneted.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and the  
Members of the League.

C.641.M.255.1931.VII.

Geneva, September 30th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate  
to the Council the following communication from the  
Representative of China on the Council.

Delegation of the Republic of  
China to the Assembly of the  
League of Nations.

Geneva, September 29th, 1931.

The Honourable Sir James Eric Drummond, K.C.M.G., C.B.,  
Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith two copies of a  
further cable message I have received in addition to the previous  
thirty-six, copies of which have already been sent to you, thus  
making a total of Nos. 1 - 37. I shall be glad if you will  
be good enough to have this message circulated at once to the  
Members of the Council.

(Signed) for Sao-He Alfred Sze.

F.K. Low.

No.37.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, September 29th, 1931.

Railway authorities report twenty-seventh morning two Japanese  
planes circled above Tungtiao, dropped four bombs. Late in the  
afternoon of twenty-seventh six train-loads Japanese troops arrived  
Kirin, occupied points along Kirin-Tunhua Railway, Chinese unre-  
sisting.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.644.M.258.1931.VII.

Geneva,

September 30th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to  
circulate to the Council the following communication  
from the Representative of China on the Council.

September 30th, 1931.

Sir,

In conformity with the suggestion made by Lord Cecil  
at the meeting of the Council on Monday last, I beg to enclose  
herewith a brief memorandum outlining the compromise proposal  
which I made at that meeting.

I shall be grateful to you if you will be so good as  
to cause this memorandum to be circulated to Members of the  
Council.

(Signed) Sao-Ke Alfred Sze.

Compromise Proposal by Sao-Ke Alfred Sze.

Whereas the Chinese Government still believes that  
the best method that may be devised by the Council for securing  
the prompt and complete withdrawal of the Japanese troops and  
police and the full re-establishment of the status quo ante,  
is the sending of a neutral commission to Manchuria; and

Whereas the Chinese Representative is desirous of being  
as conciliatory as possible and of meeting half-way the wishes  
of the Japanese Government:

Therefore, the following proposal is made:

That the Council shall help the parties to come to an  
agreement as to arrangements on the spot which will make it possi-  
ble to fix an early date for the completion of the withdrawal of  
all troops, police and aerial forces, thereby making it unnecessary  
to send a Commission of Enquiry in connection with the complete  
restoration of the status quo ante.

That the Council in making the arrangements referred to  
shall appoint neutral persons on the spot to represent it, who  
shall participate in all arrangements made and report currently  
to the Council.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated  
to the Council.

C.648.(1)1931.VII.

Geneva, ✓

September 30th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM CHINA UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF

THE COVENANT.

DRAFT RESOLUTION.

The Council

1. Notes the replies of the Chinese and Japanese Governments to the urgent appeal addressed to them by its President and the steps that have already been taken in response to that appeal;
2. Recognises the importance of the Japanese Government's statement that it has no territorial designs in Manchuria;
3. Notes the Japanese representative's statement that his Government will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be;
4. Notes the Chinese representative's statement that his Government will assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police forces are reestablished;
5. Being convinced that both Governments are anxious to avoid taking any action which might disturb the peace and good understanding between the two nations, notes that the Chinese and Japanese representatives have given assurances that their respective Governments will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation;
6. Requests both Parties to do all in their power to hasten the restoration of normal relations between them and for that purpose to continue and speedily complete the execution of the above mentioned undertakings;
7. Requests both Parties to furnish the Council at frequent intervals with full information as to the development of the situation;
8. Decides, in the absence of any unforeseen occurrence which might render an immediate meeting essential, to meet again at Geneva on Wednesday, October 14th 1931, to consider the situation as it then stands;
9. Authorises its President to cancel the meeting of the Council fixed for October 14th should he decide after consulting his colleagues, and more particularly the representatives of the two Parties, that in view of such information as he may have received from the Parties or from other members of the Council as to the development of the situation, the meeting is no longer necessary.



Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

C.651.M.263.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 1st, 1931.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate  
to the Council the following information which he has just  
received from the Japanese Representative on the Council.

Japanese Delegation  
accredited to the  
League of Nations.

Geneva, September 30th, 1931.

To the Secretary General.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a communication  
regarding the information requested at the last Council  
meeting by the Honourable representative of China, together  
with a copy of a telegram dealing with the situation at  
Mukden. I should be glad if you would be good enough to  
communicate these particulars to the President and Members  
of the Council.

(Signed) K. YOSHIKAWA.

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

C.651.M.263.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 1st, 1931.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate  
to the Council the following information which he has just  
received from the Japanese Representative on the Council.

Japanese Delegation  
accredited to the  
League of Nations.

Geneva, September 30th, 1931.

To the Secretary General.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a communication  
regarding the information requested at the last Council  
meeting by the honourable representative of China, together  
with a copy of a telegram dealing with the situation at  
Mukden. I should be glad if you would be good enough to  
communicate these particulars to the President and Members  
of the Council.

(Signed) K. YOSHIKAWA.

30.IX.31/II.

With reference to the two points of fact raised at the last Council meeting by the representative of China, the Japanese delegation has just received (September 30th) the following information from its Government:

1. No Chinese civilian has been arbitrarily arrested; property ~~rights~~ has been strictly respected and protected, special measures of protection have been taken to prevent any damage to public buildings and valuable monuments. Naturally, as order is restored all these measures will be repealed.

2. No train was bombarded on the Peining line. The incident which may have been distorted and have given rise to this erroneous statement is probably the following: On the morning of September 24th between 11 and 12.30 some fighting aeroplanes left to reconnoitre the neighbourhood of Hsingmingtung. At Chenhokangtze, which is about 15 kilometres to the south-east of Hsingmingtung, some 30 Chinese soldiers hidden in a field of kaolian, 500 metres north of the Peining railway line, opened fire on one machine which after retaliating by firing some 15 machine gun bullets was obliged, owing to a breakdown, to return to its base. A train travelling east had been seen by the aeroplane, which did not fire until it had made sure that its line of fire was parallel to the direction of the train. It is absolutely certain that no damage can have been caused to the train by the aeroplane fire.

- 2 -

The Japanese delegation has also received the following telegram concerning the situation at Mukden: Tokio, September 30th.

The policing of the Chinese town and the open town of Mukden was assured on and after September 21st by corps of Chinese police under the direction of Japanese gendarmes. In view of the formation of a committee consisting of Chinese notables for the maintenance of order, the policing of the town will be transferred immediately to that committee.

The armed sentries who since the beginning of the present incident had been posted on the roads of approach between the open town and the railway zone, were replaced on September 21st by policemen, and on September 28th the Japanese sentries were withdrawn from all the gates of the Chinese town except two.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.656.M.368.1931.VII.

Geneva,

October 2nd, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

C. Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to  
circulate to the Council the following communica-  
tion from the Representative of China on the Council.

-----  
Geneva, October 2nd, 1931.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of two further  
cable messages I have received in addition to the previous thirty-  
seven, copies of which have already been sent to you, thus making a  
total of Nos. 1 - 39. I shall be glad if you will be good enough to  
have these messages circulated at once to the Members of the Council.

(Signed) Sao-Ke Alfred Sze.  
K.L. Low.

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No.38. Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, September 29th, 1931.

Peking-Mukden Railways report twenty-eighth three p.m. over  
hundred Japanese cavalry and artillery camped at Hsinmin Station.

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No.39. Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking September 30th, 1931.

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Reports from Peking state students proceeding mass meeting  
morning twenty-eighth Japanese ruffians wilfully drove motor car into  
students near Sochiemen Gate breaking Wang Wenjo's arm, two girl  
students fainted, treated at Peking Union Medical College. From  
Tientsin Huangkutun Railway station telephone telegraph rooms sealed  
by Japanese troops, not allow use, checking out-going news. Japanese  
troops removed contents Huangkutun grain warehouse towards South  
Manchurian Railway station.

G.659.M.270.1931.VII

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and the  
Members of the League.

GENEVA, October 3rd, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER  
ARTICLE II OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate  
to the Council the following information which he has just  
received from the Japanese Delegation to the League:

29.9.31.

Summary of telegrams received by the Japanese Delegation  
(up to September 29th):

1. In that part of the town of Mukden which is not controlled by Japanese troops, brigandage is common, and most of the shops remain closed.

On September 24th, a crowd of about 1000 people tried to break into the University and a secondary school, but the destruction of these buildings was prevented by speedy intervention on the part of our troops. A second attempt on the following day was also prevented.

2. On September 23rd, brigands attacked Tienchwangtai, near Yingkow. The President of the Traders' Association was able to reinforce the Association's police force with 150 militiamen who had taken refuge in the town. With the help of the

-2-

officer commanding the Japanese forces, the Chief of Police was able to provide pay for the police and order is thus being maintained in the town.

3. In the Tiehling district, large bands of Chinese soldiers have killed Koreans, ~~also~~ violated their women and set fire to their homes, and Korean families are consequently streaming towards the railway zone.

4. A group of employees of the Japanese Company "Okura", who were escaping from Tuliang, were attacked by mounted brigands, who carried off one of them as a hostage.

5. On September 26th, about 100 mounted bandits surrounded and attacked a <sup>train</sup> / 30 kilometres from Hsingningtung, and killed several passengers including an Estonian and an Indian.

6. The Japanese women and children in the parts of Manchuria distant from the railway and in Northern Manchuria are being rapidly evacuated to the railway zone. Owing to the presence of 4000 bandits and disbanded soldiers in the neighbourhood of Hailung, the Japanese residents have had to be urgently evacuated to Kirin.

7. Further, the local and regional committees of the Nationalist Party at Shanghai, Nanking, Peking, Hangchow, Hankow and Canton, aided by students' associations and Chambers of Commerce, are carrying on a violent propaganda and organising anti-Japanese demonstrations, demanding that economic relations be broken off.

At Canton a crowd of several thousand people demonstrated in front of the Japanese shops.

-3-

At Nanking and Hangchow the crowd demonstrated in front of the Japanese Consulates. Japanese women and children in Nanking and all Japanese residents in Hangchow have had to be evacuated to Changhai.

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Official telegram received by the Japanese Delegation on September 30th.

1. The staff of the battalion brought from Korea to reinforce the railway zone guards was sent back to its garrison at Shingishu (Korea) on September 28th.

2. On September 29th, 160 men of the Tashihchao garrison who had been concentrated in the Yingkow railway zone returned to their normal station.

3. On September 30th, 140 men of the Tichling garrison who had been sent to Mukden, Changchun and the Kirin-Changchun railway line, returned to their normal station.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.660.M.271.1931.VII. ✓

Geneva, October 3rd, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Representative of China the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council a further cable message received by the Chinese representative in addition to the previous thirty-nine, copies of which have already been circulated.

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The French translation will be circulated as soon as possible.  
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No.40.

Translation.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 1st, 1931.

A telegraphic message, dated September 30th, has been received by the Ministry from Marshall Chang Hsueh-liang to the effect that Japanese troops are still in occupation of the cities of Mukden, Kirin, Chengchiatung and Hsinmingtung. As to the places like Newchang, Antung and Changchun, which are still under Japanese control, it is yet impossible to know whether Japanese soldiers have been withdrawn or not, since telegraphic and postal communications are still interrupted and traffic not resumed. However, persons have already been sent to the spots to make investigations, which will take time because of the difficulties the investigators may meet to pass through the places held by the Japanese soldiers.

It is true that Japanese troops have evacuated the cities of Kwanchentze and Tungliao a few days ago, but no Japanese soldiers have yet been withdrawn from Changtu, Fushen, Kaping, Tenghua and Fenghuangchen. Moreover, with the occupation by the Japanese troops of the four important cities, Mukden and Kirin, the capital cities of Mukden and Kirin Provinces respectively, and Changchiatung and Hsinmingtung, it is absolutely impossible for the Chinese authorities to carry out their administrative power in that part of the country.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.661.M.272.1931.VII.

Geneva,

October 5th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Representative of China the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council a further cable message which has been received from the Chinese Government in addition to the previous forty, which have already been circulated.

No.41.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 3rd, 1931.

Press reports from Peking October second two Japanese military trains arrived Lungliao occupied railway station and traffic office. Japanese airplane dropped three bombs, one near police station, one near traffic office and one inside city. These troops withdrew 10 a.m.

Escaped banker from Mukden states firstly, business firms there closed again because disorder and damages caused by Japanese troops and Koreans although they had repeatedly resumed business under Japanese compulsion. Banks still closed including Hongkong Shanghai Bank, National City Bank New York. Secondly, before eight a.m. after five p.m. city under martial law. Death punishment for violation. Communications standstill. Thirdly, for several days past Japanese troops forcing Chinese press gang for transportation of ammunition and military equipment. Plain-clothes Koreans worked with robbers plundered streets, populace feared them more than Japanese soldiers. Fourthly, police were refused cartridges and given only obsolete, useless rifles on twenty-ninth. Fifthly, Japanese soldiers killed Chinese cruelly and wantonly at random. On my departure three Chinese died under Japanese soldiers' rifles Hsinming station.

No indication yet of withdrawal Japanese troops Mukden and Kirin.

According foreign source people in northeast entirely isolated. Newspaper not allowed enter, letters severely censored, telegrams not transmittable, wireless stations occupied.

- 2 -

Northwest refugees numbering hundred thousands organizing self-decision association warned northeastern public danger Japanese utilizing them and becoming second Koreans.

Japanese owned Chinese language newspapers inciting northeastern public self-government and independence. Responded by few disappointed politicians and speculative local rogues. Chang Hsueh Liang wired Central Government this effect and petitioned strong protest before League. October second reports from foreign sources that not only Japanese troops in Manchuria not withdrawn but also Japanese War Ministry preparing large shipment ammunitions to Manchuria secretly assisting independence movement Manchuria. Navy Minister even ordered warships Chinese waters exercise timely interference on anti-Japanese movements in China. From Harbin second Japanese troops Changchun and Kirin ordered leave for north Manchuria as camouflage commencement withdrawal troops.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.672.M.280.1931.VII.

Geneva,

October 6th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Representative of China the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council, for information, the following cable message from the Council for International Co-operation and International Culture Society.

Nanking, October 3rd, 1931.

Please transmit following to the Members of the Council of the League of Nations. We invite your honourable attention to unprecedented aggression dangerous to international law and peace. In a short period of eight hours Japanese troops on September 18th, suddenly seized ten more important cities in Manchuria, an area equivalent to British Isles or California and Washington combined. Mukden civil governor imprisoned and coerced to testify false proofs, but he refused. Changchun major dismembered. Many civilians, women and children killed. Cultural establishment destroyed. Japanese officers organize municipal administration wherever they occupy. All communications and sources of news controlled and strictly censored. For China this unprovoked invasion most unfortunate. Districts much needed energy from flood relief. Million lives left starving, dying. These hostile war activities entirely surprising. Japanese Minister to China actively negotiating Nakamura Case and many other problems just announced only friendly procedure adequate for solution. Japanese Cabinet made no effort restraining aggression of army officers. China made three protests to Tokyo, but no reply. Japanese under military guards now constructing Kirin-Hueining Line to direct whole business Manchuria to Chingchinkang in Korea and exploit monopoly natural resources North Manchuria. Frustrating Open Door Policy thwarted by world public opinion. Japanese going repeat same Korean story by instigating former Manchurian and Mongolian princes establish independent governments under Japanese tutelage for future annexation. Yet they declare their hands clean. Under such military duress Chinese firmly refuse direct negotiations though prepared settle the case in event Japanese evacuate. We appeal you on basis of international law and justice in redressing wrong done by Japanese military seizure of our territory. We appeal immediate action by friendly governments in spirit of Kellogg Anti-War Pact, Covenant of the League of Nations and Nine Power Treaty of Washington Conference. We hope justice and peace may finally prevail.

Council for International Co-operation and International Culture Society,

Nanking, October 3rd.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council  
and Members of the League  
of Nations.

C.675.M.282.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 7th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER  
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.  
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The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate  
to the Council the following telegrams which he has just re-  
ceived from the Japanese delegation to the League of Nations.

I. Telegram dated Paris, October 6th, 1931, 5-45 p.m.

Pursuing policy proclaimed of not aggravating  
situation Manchuria Japanese Government continues to urge  
Chinese authorities to take necessary measures for protection  
of Japanese nationals in Manchuria and does not hesitate to  
take extreme measures ordering withdrawal Japanese residents  
to safe localities (see Annex 1). Despite these measures  
acts of violence committed by Chinese disbanded soldiers  
brigands against Japanese and Korean nationals in interior  
of Manchuria becoming more numerous every day (see Annexes  
2 and 3) In addition anti-Japanese movement extending  
considerably in China proper, situation becoming more and  
more serious.

SAWADA.

- 2 -

ANNEX 1.

Position evacuation of Japanese residents in China on October 5 (1) In Manchuria have reached Harbin 25 Japanese residing in various localities to east of Eastern Chinese Railway 7 Japanese residing at Buokotu 19 Japanese employed by South Manchuria Railway residing Tsitsihar have reached Changchun 640 women children residing Harbin 230 women children residing Kirin all residents at Itung have reached Chengchiatung all Japanese residents Taonan and Toulia all women children residing Chengchiatung about 75 persons have reached Supingkai 17 Japanese women children residing Changtu have arrived in South Manchurian Railway zone about 100 Koreans residing Faku have reached Tiehling about 55 Japanese 28 Koreans residing in Hailung district and Tao-lu have arrived Kirin and Hai-Yuan all Japanese residents Hsinchiu 23 persons have withdrawn Hsingmingtung all Japanese residents Chin-Chow about 40 persons have withdrawn to Mukden all Japanese women children residing Newchang about 16 persons have arrived Hai-Cheng 20 women children residing Chu-Tze-Chieh all Japanese about 150 persons and about 100 Koreans residing at Hun-Chu have been received in branch of Japanese Consulate existing in each of these towns in Northern China all Japanese residents Tangshan 19 persons have reached Tientsin all Japanese residents Iwanchow and Changli about 26 persons have reached Shanhaikuan in Central China have reached Shanghai all women children residing Hanking all residents of Hangchow 30 persons

- 3 -

part residents Soochow 10 persons 26 women children  
residing Wuhu all women children residing Changsha about  
30 persons have taken refuge in safety zone of town have  
reached Hankow 17 women children residing Ichang all  
residents of Chengchow about 15 other residents of  
Tchang and majority of women children residing Chungking  
have been received on to Japanese ships in these ports  
in Southern China all women children residing Swatow  
about 85 have been received at Consulate consular author-  
ities taking measures to facilitate their departure  
500 residents Hongkong and 197 residents Kowloon have  
been received in place of refuge established in town.

SAWADA.

- 4 -

ANNEX 2.

Districts most affected by acts of violence  
Chinese disbanded soldiers and brigands are those situated  
in interior of Tiehling Haiyuan Fushan etc. According  
to information obtained from these localities by Japanese  
authorities up to October 3rd 3 Japanese (including one  
woman) and about 40 Koreans (29 in Haiyuan district) have  
been robbed and massacred by Chinese soldiers These  
have set on fire 17 houses belonging Japanese and Korean  
residents Koreans continue to seek refuge in districts  
offering greater security Chinese authorities especially  
police unable to exercise any control over disbanded  
soldiers, Japanese consular authorities have taken all  
measures demanded by circumstances to safeguard Korean  
lives.

SAWALA .



- 5 -

ANNEX 3.

C According to official telegram of Kwantung Government (1) October 2nd about 8-0 a.m. some 700 Chinese disbanded soldiers and bandits surrounded and attacked town Newchang causing violent conflagration Situation has become so disturbing that Chinese authorities themselves asked assistance Japanese troops In this town reside, some 20 Japanese nationals whose fate at present not known To ensure their protection was decided in agreement with Japanese Consul in that town send there one battalion railway guards This battalion accompanied by five police officers for protection Japanese residents wishing evacuate town left Haicheng at half past three afternoon. Aeroplane leaving Mukden at half-past two on reconnaissance flew over Newchang town and found town already in hands of bandits conflagration continuing aeroplane attacked during reconnaissance had to land involuntarily near Haicheng at half-past four afternoon (2) On October 2nd at 8-0 a.m. about 300 disbanded soldiers and bandits surrounded town Tunchiungkow in Changtu district and attacked Chinese troops gendarmes Fighting still continuing Japanese residents in that town not in position of safety.

SAWADA.

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II. Telegram dated Paris, October 6th, 1931, 11-0 p.m.

According official telegram Japanese Government Japanese troops have on one hand evacuated localities where their presence was no longer necessary and on other hand troops which had been sent to ensure safety of Japanese residents in districts where Chinese bandits had created state of insecurity have withdrawn to railway zone after having performed their task. (1) Part of railway guard consisting of 250 soldiers who had been sent to Hsinminfu returned to Chulinho in night September 30th (2) Japanese troops which had been sent to save Japanese residents of Newohang arrived in that town October 3 On learning of their arrival Chinese bandits fled which enabled troops to return to Haichung taking with them some 20 Japanese (3) Neighbourhood of Fuchun had been rumoured that Chinese bands of soldiers intended to attack said locality which had led to keen anxiety among Korean residents In these circumstances was judged necessary to send October 4th two companies of soldiers as far as Yingpan situated to east of Fuchun outside railway zone Latter found staff of Chinese garrison and requested assurance of ~~positive~~ protection for lives and property Japanese nationals. Having received affirmative reply in writing Japanese troops immediately withdrew to Fuchun (4) At Tienhuangtai situated other side of Yinjkow water reservoirs Chinese bandits attacked Korean farmers and even captured 19 to hold them to ransom. On this news

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officer accompanied by 10 Japanese soldiers and police  
was sent to study situation on spot      This task  
performed they returned to Singkow bringing under their  
guard some 100 Korean old men women and children.

SAWADA.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.676.M.283.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 7th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER  
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to lay before the Council the following communication, dated October 7th, which he has received from the Japanese Delegation regarding separatist movements in Manchuria.

Reports from Manchuria state that various separatist movements have broken out. Regarding these movements as purely Chinese affairs, to be dealt with by the inhabitants of Manchuria themselves, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs gave formal instructions to the Japanese Consular authorities in those regions on September 27th, 1931 that Japanese residents must be strictly forbidden to take part in these movements.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.677.M.284.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 8th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Representative of China the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following cable messages which have been received from the Chinese Government in addition to the previous forty-three, which have already been circulated.

No.44.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation, dated Nanking, October 7th, 1931.

According to a telegraphic message from Marshall Chang Hsueh-liang, dated October 7th, it is reported that on the fourth of the same month more than fifty Japanese soldiers arrived at Kongyepaozte, which is situated at about forty li to the southeast of Sinmin, where they remain up to this moment.

All Japanese troops and Japanese nationals were withdrawn from Tunghwa on the morning of October 5th.

No.45.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation, dated Nanking, October 7th, 1931.

Reuters reports from Mukden October fourth much attention attracted here by Japanese official declaration at recent Geneva Council meeting that occupation of Manchuria not warlike act. Following examples what Japanese army has done in Mukden will suffice show how far this assertion was from truth. Firstly, large number Chinese planes taken over and Chinese marks painted over with Japanese marks, many cases so badly that Chinese marks still visible. Secondly, at Trench Mortar Arsenal large portion of which had been re-organized for manufacturing motor trucks, all trucks ready for use together with those under assembly and all available spare parts have been removed by Japanese military authorities. Thirdly at Mukden arsenal (?) couple of days ago Japanese guards withdrawn for few hours so that Chinese were able enter freely. Everything found complete disorder especially the stores, but it was not possible ascertain how much equipment had been removed, as Japanese guards soon returned and expelled Chinese. Fourthly, great many houses belonging leading Manchurian officials have been searched and looted and many motor cars belonging to such officials seen in streets driven by Japanese.

Reliable eye-witnesses of fight at Peitaying on night of September 18th stated that ten minutes after explosion which is alleged to have wrecked South Manchurian Railway, he saw troop train arrive full of soldiers, who quickly alighted from train and immediately went attack Peitaying barracks. He gave assurance that not the slightest resistance was offered by Chinese soldiers there, who evacuated camp as soon as possible.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

C.678.M.285.1931.VII

Communicated to the  
Council and to the  
Members of the League  
of Nations.

Geneva, October 9th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER  
ARTICLE 11 of the COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to  
communicate to the Council the following telegram  
received from the Japanese Delegation to the League  
of Nations.

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Anti-Japanese movement which had again  
broken out in July in all parts of China as a result  
of events in Korea appeared to have calmed down, but  
in reality was only being organised in a more deliberate  
and disguised form leaving no room for optimism in this  
respect. Present affair in Manchuria was sufficient  
for this movement to be suddenly accentuated. Throughout  
China demonstrations of unprecedented violence and  
illwill took place in the form of popular meetings,  
processions, speeches, telegrams, circulars, posters, etc.  
Furthermore, at Shanghai and in other towns energetic

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

C.678.M.285.1931.VII

Communicated to the  
Council and to the  
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Geneva, October 9th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER  
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illwill took place in the form of popular meetings,  
processions, speeches, telegrams, circulars, posters, etc.  
Furthermore, at Shanghai and in other towns energetic

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efforts are being made to bring about rupture of economic relations with Japan. Not only are political parties, students, Chambers of Commerce and professional associations adhering to this movement, but numerous officials of the Chinese Government seem to be taking part.

It should also be noted that this anti-Japanese movement, as long as it manifested itself in the Canton region and in northern China, was to a certain extent controlled by the authorities, but along the Yangtse river and in the districts under the influence of the Nanking Nationalist Government control exercised by authorities is so weak that situation at Shanghai and Nanking is most critical. Thus, at Shanghai anti-Japanese associations have decided to break off economic relations with Japan and to this end have forbidden all purchase, sale or transport of Japanese goods, all trade with Japanese and all service or employment of Japanese. Punishments are even inflicted for any breach of these prohibitions. Furthermore, Japanese goods may be neither sold nor bought. Different manifestations are indulged in, such as seizure of Japanese goods (since September 29th two cases have occurred of goods belonging to Japanese being seized), refusal of Chinese banks and brokers to do business with Japanese and refusal of Chinese to deal with Japanese banks, expulsion of Japanese tenants from houses belonging to Chinese, refusal by Chinese associations to deal in Japanese goods, refusal to repair Japanese



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ships, threats against Chinese in the service of Japanese firms or individuals (as a result of such threats Chinese agents employed by Nisshin, Yusen, Chosen, Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Shokin companies have been obliged to declare they would leave their posts.

So far no Japanese has been killed, but there are daily cases of stones being thrown at Japanese children or of their being molested on their way to school. Similar assaults made against adults. Japanese nationals are daily subjected to numerous vexations with regard to post, telegraph and telephone. At Nanking students, including those of Naval School, take active part in anti-Japanese manifestations. After ill-treatment inflicted September 28th on M. Wang, Chinese Minister Foreign Affairs, Japanese Consulate has been obliged to make preparations to move, if necessary, to the river bank. On urgent recommendation of M. Changkaichek, students' movement at Nanking is noticeably quieter.

It is to be presumed that the situation prevailing at Shanghai and Nanking will rapidly spread all along the Yangtse river and into other parts of the country. Particularly up Yangtse river situation seems to be becoming more and more critical.

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Damage caused to Japanese nationals in Manchuria known up to October 5th 1931. and situation of disbanded Chinese soldiers. 1: In neighbourhood of Tiehling

A) September 22nd in Tiehling province three to four hundred disbanded Chinese soldiers (number continually increasing) appeared along River Fanno (tributary of Liecho), and then attacked some ten villages. Consequence of these attacks twenty-one Koreans, including two women, were wounded, twenty-one houses were burned, and some fifty houses destroyed or plundered.

B) September 30th, in province Fanhohata (situated north-east of Fuchun) three Koreans were assassinated by sixteen Chinese soldiers.

C) In western part of South Manchurian Railway district of Tiehling about three thousand disbanded Chinese soldiers plundered and set fire to houses at Enghot (situated west of Luansishan station of South Manchurian Railway). About three hundred Koreans were obliged to seek refuge at Luansishan.

D) About two thousand three hundred mounted Chinese soldiers and bandits appeared in province of Changtu.

E) In province of Hsian about three thousand disbanded Chinese soldiers appeared and on September 27th a Japanese woman was assassinated.

2: In neighbourhood of Hailung at Peishanchengtzu about four thousand disbanded Chinese soldiers appeared and on September 27th a Japanese was severely wounded.

3) In neighbourhood of Sinminfu on September 24th about six thousand disbanded Chinese soldiers killed two Japanese at Iantipaotzu (situated in province of Sinminfu).

4: In neighbourhood of Yinku October 2nd seven hundred disbanded Chinese soldiers and bandits occupied town of Newchwang and set fire to houses. Twenty-one Japanese residents of Newchwang had to take refuge on seacoast under protection of a company of Japanese soldiers

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accompanied by police. B) At Tienchuangtai October 2nd some thirty bandits attacked fifteen Korean peasant families and carried off eighteen of their women as hostages.

5) In neighbourhood of Antung October 1st Commander of Chinese battalion stationed at Hsinyen became a bandit. On same day seven disbanded Chinese soldiers wounded two Koreans in neighbourhood of Tungyuanpao (situated on Antung-Mukden railway line). October 3rd, disbanded Chinese soldiers appeared everywhere in neighbourhood of Antung. 6) A. In neighbourhood of Kirin October 3rd about a thousand disbanded Chinese soldiers plundered Chaiangmi. B) Since October 3rd about two thousand disbanded Chinese soldiers <sup>plundering</sup> villages in neighbourhood of Kuanmashan. 7) In neighbourhood of Changchun September 19th an employee of South Manchurian Railway Company disappeared near Itienpao (situated on Eastern Chinese Railway line). 8) In neighbourhood of Tung Liao <sup>attacked on</sup> September 23rd agricultural workers employed by Okura firm were/ the road by mounted Chinese bandits, who carried one of them off as hostage while others succeeded in taking refuge at Tung Liao.

SAWADA.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

C.679.M.286.1931.VII.  
Geneva, October 9th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Representative of China the  
following letter and telegrams are circulated to the Council.

Geneva, October 9th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I am in receipt of such serious information regarding further aggressive military operations upon the part of Japanese armed forces in Manchuria that I am compelled to ask in behalf of my Government that a meeting of the Council be forthwith summoned in order that it may determine what action shall be taken in the premises.

I have the honour to call to your attention that these military operations have taken place despite the repeated assurances given by the Japanese Government to the Council that its troops would be rapidly withdrawn and that no action would be taken which would tend further to aggravate the situation.

Copies of cables received by me this morning are enclosed (Nos. 46, 47, 48.)

(Signed) Sao-Ke Alfred Sze

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Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese

Delegation, dated Nanking, Oct. 9, 1931. No. 46.

Message from Chinchow states between one and two fifteen afternoon October eighth, twelve Japanese aeroplanes circled over Chinchow, dropped thirty-six bombs, chiefly directed at university buildings where Provincial Government temporarily located. University buildings damaged, casualties not yet reported. Railway service car 141 struck by bomb, killing two Chinese cleaners. Loco shed also bombed. Telegraph between Shan-hai-kwan Chin-chow interrupted.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese

Delegation, dated Nanking, Oct. 9, 1931. No. 47.

Later report states fifty or sixty bombs were dropped; several locomotives destroyed; railway station crowded with passengers when bombs dropped; total casualties not yet ascertained. Japanese provoking beyond endurance deliberately.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese

Delegation, dated Nanking, Oct. 9, 1931. No. 48.

Japanese are busily arming Mongols in several places. Wire from Chengchiatung says "Mongols concentrated at Talingchen are starting independence movement under inspiration Japanese. Chief of Young Mongol Party been approached by Japanese to declare independence. Commander Mongol army been coerced to assume command of Mongol forces in district under title of Commander-in-chief of Autonomous Mongol Army. They are marching on Chengchiatung within few days. First instalment arms supplied by Japanese consists 3000 rifles, one million rounds ammunition, four trench mortars, four mountain guns with ammunition, two aeroplanes - all from Mukden arsenal.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.682.M.288.1931.VII.

Geneva,

October 10th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Representative of China the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following cable messages, in addition to the previous forty-eight, copies of which have already been circulated.

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No.49.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation  
dated Nanking, October 8th, 1931.

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Marshall Chang Hsueh-liang telegraphically reported that on October 6th two Japanese aeroplanes flew over Peih sien, circled for a while and then flew away westward. On the morning of the same day a Japanese aeroplane flew along the railway line to Tungliao where it was accompanied by another one and both flew together to Mukden.

On the evening of the 6th of October, around ten o'clock sounds of rifle and shelling were unceasingly heard in the north-western direction of Masanchiatse railway station. At the same time one Japanese train loaded with three hundred soldiers was dispatched to Chuliuho.

No.50.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 8th, 1931.

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It is reported that on October 7th at 5 a.m. one Japanese armoured train carrying over thousand soldiers arrived at Sinmin, where it stayed for more than twenty minutes before returning to Chuliuho. When the train was moving between the stations of Chuliuho and Sinmin the soldiers on the train fired their guns several times.

At the same time five Japanese aeroplanes flew over District Eight of the city and dropped bombs, killing several Chinese residents.

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No. 51.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 9th, 1931.

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Regarding attack on Chinchow by twelve Japanese aeroplanes General Chang Hsueh-ling reported more than fifty bombs dropped and machine guns also used killing one Russian professor, one soldier, fourteen citizens, wounding more than twenty people. Considerable damage to railway station, including destruction of three locomotives, other damage under investigation. Since occupation of Mukden by Japanese the Provincial capital has been moved to Chinchow.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

C.684.M.290.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 10th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communications by the President of the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to forward to the Council copies of the telegrams which were despatched to them on October 9th by the President of the Council.

I.

President Council requests me forward to Members Council following communication:

In view of information received I have addressed the following appeal to Chinese and Japanese Governments: Information received tends to shew that incidents are taking place in Manchuria and elsewhere which cannot but embitter feeling and thus render settlement more difficult. In these circumstances, and pending the Meeting of the Council, I feel it is my duty as President of the Council to remind the two parties of the engagements taken before the Council to refrain from any action which would aggravate the situation and to express the confident hope that steps are being taken on both sides to execute fully the assurances given to the Council and embodied in its resolution of thirtieth September.

Lerroux. Drummond.

II.

By letter of today's date which is being distributed to Members Council Chinese representative on Council has asked by reason of serious information received that a meeting of Council be forthwith summoned. In view this request I have decided that the meeting of Council convoked for Wednesday October fourteenth should now be held at midday on Tuesday October thirteenth at Geneva. Considering early date of meeting would suggest that any information as to development of situation obtained by Members of Council in accordance with paragraph nine of resolution of September thirtieth should be forwarded as soon as possible to Secretary General for transmission to Council.

Lerroux  
Acting President.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

C.686.M.292.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 10th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER  
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China  
on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

October 10th, 1931.

Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

Sir,

I beg to inform you that I am instructed by my Government to convey to you the following message, dated Kanking, October 9th:

A.4. "Japanese aeroplanes bombarded yesterday Chinchow city, outside South Manchurian Railway Zone to which Provincial Government was transferred from Mukden, causing many casualties and considerable damage to property, including University where Provincial Headquarters temporarily established. Chinchow strongly garrisoned by Chinese troops, situation exceedingly grave. Chinese Government request Council take urgent measures conservation peace, invite immediate arrival Chinchow League Commission to whom every facility will be given to investigate and report to the Council."

Pending a decision of the Council on this request I trust that the Members of the Council will arrange for immediate information to be obtained at Chinchow in accordance with paragraph 9 of the Council Resolution.

(Signed) Sao-Ke Alfred SZE.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

C.687.M.293.1931.VII.

Geneva,

October 12th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER  
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the American Consul in Geneva.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication from the American Consul in Geneva.

Geneva,

October 11th, 1931.

My dear Sir Eric,

I have the honor to inform you that on October 6th the Under-Secretary of State informed the press that Mr. Salisbury, Secretary of the American Embassy at Tokio, and Mr. Hanson, Consul General of the United States at Harbin, had been directed by the Secretary of State to proceed to South Manchuria and to undertake there a tour of observation. It should be understood in this connection that these officers were sent with the knowledge and approval of the Japanese and Chinese Governments, and that it is their function to travel, to observe, and to report to their Government. They have been given no other capacity.

(Signed) Prentiss B. GILBERT.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and the members  
of the League.

C.688.M.294.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 10th 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE

11 OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Chinese Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General

At the request of the Chinese representative, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following telegram dated October 9th.

"Chinese Minister in Tokio notified Japanese Government on October 6th that Chang Tso Hsiang and Wang Shu Chang have been appointed representatives to take over places to be evacuated by Japanese military forces and asked for telegraphic instructions to be sent to Japanese military commanders to begin handing over. No reply received up to date. Chinese Minister is instructed to deliver second note as follows: "Fulfilment of Council resolution September thirtieth requires immediate transfer to Chinese authorities of localities occupied by Japanese troops since September eighteenth. Chinese Government having pledged itself to assume responsibility for safety of lives and property of Japanese nationals during process of withdrawal of Japanese troops and reestablishment local Chinese authorities and police forces notified Japanese Government October sixth of appointment of its representatives and asked it to make immediate arrangements to enable Chinese troops effectively to take possession evacuated localities and thus to protect lives and property of residents in conformity with its undertaking given at Council. As no reply received and matter extremely urgent I am instructed to request: firstly, that Japanese Government indicate immediate localities to be taken over this week; secondly, that in the course of the day instructions to be telegraphed to military commanders so that reoccupation can begin tomorrow".

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

C. 689. M. 295. 1931 VII

Geneva, October 10th 1931

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER  
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the British Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the British Government the  
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the  
Council the following information, dated October 9th,  
which has been telegraphed to the Council.

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"Report dated October sixth from Mukden states  
that points outside railway zone still occupied  
by Japanese forces are:

- 1) Mukden - No material change since September  
nineteenth except that two gates only of  
walled city are now occupied.
- 2) Kirin - One or two battalions.
- 3) Turhwa - No definite information.
- 4) Chulinho - twenty-nine miles west of Mukden  
and Sinkin between three hundred and fifty  
and four hundred men.
- 5) Tienchuantai - twelve miles north of  
Newchwang one company. Taona - thirtysix  
men.

In addition Japanese armoured trains  
operating along Southern, fortyone miles from  
Mukden, Hailun, and along line west from  
Ssuningkai to Tungliac. This is not definitely  
confirmed."

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
Council and the members  
of the League.

C.690.M.296.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 10th 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE

11 OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Japanese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Government the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following memorandum which the Japanese Government instructed its Representative in China to hand to the Nankin Government.

MEMORANDUM

October 9th.

Firstly Japanese Government has already made it clear that Manchurian affair is nothing but outcome of deeprooted anti-Japanese feeling in China, which has taken specially provocative form in recent challenge to Japanese troops, compelling latter to resort to measures of selfdefence. Responsibility for present situation naturally lies with Chinese Government. Japanese Government has time and again requested Chinese Government to take proper steps to check anti-Japanese movement, so systematically carried out in various places in China. Being desirous of maintaining cordial relations between two countries, this Government has exercised greatest patience and forbearance in hope that this deplorable state of affairs may yet improve. Unfortunately however this anti-Japanese agitation seems now to be assuming alarming proportions. It is learned that anti-Japanese societies at Shanghai and elsewhere have passed resolutions not only to enforce prohibition of trading in and transportation of Japanese goods, but to order cancellation of existing contracts, and otherwise to prohibit all business transactions and to cancel contracts of employment between Chinese and Japanese, in order thus to effect so-called 'severance of economic relations with Japan'. For that purpose examination and detention of goods and persons, intimidation and violence, and various other means are being employed to give effect to such resolutions, and severe penalties are meted out to any who may fail to comply with these orders. Some societies even going so far as to threaten capital punishment. Moreover cases of expropriation and detention of goods owned by Japanese people, and of threats and violence against their lives and property have become so numerous and insistent throughout China, that

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
Council and the members  
of the League.

C.690.M.296.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 10th 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE

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- 2 -

they have been forced to withdraw totally or partially from various localities. Secondly it is to be noted that anti-Japanese movement in China is conducted as instrument of national policy under direction of nationalist party, which in view of peculiar political organization of China is inseparable in function from Government. That movement must therefore be clearly distinguished from one which originates spontaneously amongst people. It is therefore evident that present anti-Japanese movement in China is not only in contravention of letter and spirit of treaties existing between two countries, but constitutes form of hostile act without use of arms contrary to all standards of justice and friendship. Chinese Government will be assuming very serious responsibility, if it should fail to take prompt and effective measures to quell that agitation. Moreover in meting out penal sentences to individual citizens, anti-Japanese societies, which are purely private organizations, are clearly usurping authority of national government. Thirdly, it will be remembered that at recent meeting of Council of League of Nations at Geneva Chinese representative as well as Japanese gave assurance that their respective governments would endeavour to prevent aggravation of situation. Chinese Government, obviously against that pledge, is actually aggravating situation by making no honest or effective effort to restrain activities of anti-Japanese societies, which are jeopardizing lives and property as well as liberty of trade of Japanese subjects in different parts of China. Fourthly, Japanese Government desires to call once more serious attention of Chinese Government to those actions on part of anti-Japanese societies, and to declare at same time that Chinese Government will be held responsible for whatever may be consequences of its failure to suppress anti-Japanese movement, and to afford adequate protection to lives and property of Japanese subjects in China.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.691.M.297.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 11th 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE

11 OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Japanese Government.  
Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Representative of Japan the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following reply from the Japanese Government dated October 9th to the Chinese note of October 5th.

Reply from the Japanese Government.

First part of Chinese Government's note states that "Japanese representative on League of Nations has formally declared for withdrawal of all Japanese troops in different districts and reestablishment of situation existing before September eighteenth, and adds that Council's resolution ordered total withdrawal of Japanese troops before meeting of October fourteenth". As appears from Japanese representative's repeated statement to Council the withdrawal of Japanese troops in railway zone is conditional on security of our railways and protection of life and property of our nationals in Manchuria. Moreover Council's resolution of September thirtieth contains no provision ordering total withdrawal of our troops before Council meeting of October fourteenth. Regarding points raised in second part of Chinese note Japanese Government is prepared to define its attitude as follows. (1) Military operations undertaken by Japanese army along South Manchurian railway line since incident of night of September eighteenth between Chinese and Japanese troops near Mukden were designed solely to avert by preventative action the potential menace constituted by presence in these districts of Chinese armies in crushingly superior numbers. Japanese troops have in fact suffered considerable losses of men in spite of proclamation of non resistance of Chinese troops. (2) Chinese Government proposes appoint Generals Chang Tso Hsing and Wan Shu Chang to arrange with Japanese military authorities for suitable means of maintaining order in certain localities in railway zone after withdrawal of Japanese troops. The present concentration in these localities of armed Chinese soldiers to cope with any eventuality, although maintenance of order is sole object in view, would very probably under present circumstances as at time of incident have regrettable effect of reviving troops' feeling of serious impending menace. In view of extreme tension of national feeling on both sides danger of conflict between troops of both parties is probably greater than at any moment hitherto. (3) Japanese Government considers most urgent task of moment is collaboration of our two Governments, with a view to calming excited national feelings by rapidly establishing through direct negotiation fundamental points capable of constituting a basis allowing of resumption of normal relations. Once national feelings are allayed by direct negotiation, Japanese troops might without overmuch apprehension return entirely to railway zone, thus facilitating assertion of authority and maintenance of order in localities in question. (4) Japanese Government is ready to negotiate immediately with responsible representatives of Chinese Government in order to establish fundamental points referred to.

SAWADA



LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

C.693.M.298.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 11th 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the British Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the British Government the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following information, dated Peking October 9th, which has been telegraphed to the Council.

TELEGRAM.

Peking, October 9th.

Consul General Tientsin has been informed by Mr. Thompson (?) of Peking Mukden Railway that University Buildings at Chinchow, which is present seat of Provincial Government were bombed by twelve Japanese aeroplanes at one-thirty p.m. yesterday. Between thirty and forty bombs are reported to have been dropped. Foreign engineer states that locomotive shed at Chinchow was hit and five men killed and fifteen wounded.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

C.694.M.299.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 11th 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Chinese Representative.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Representative the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the two following cablegrams dated October 9th.

No. 56.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation  
dated Nanking, October 9th, 1931.

The following is a translation of the full text of the handbills dropped at Chinchow from Japanese aeroplanes yesterday (Oct. 8th) afternoon as published in the Japanese press of October 9th.

"Chang Hsueh-liang, the most rapacious and wanton, stinking youth, is still failing to realize his odiousness and has established a Provisional Mukden Government at Chinchow to plot intrigues in the territories which are safely under the rule of the troops of the Great Japanese Empire, when the heart of the Manchurian mass is no longer with him, his ground is lost and the four provinces of the North East are going to revolt against him. The Imperial army, which, in accordance with the principles of justice, is endeavouring to safeguard its interests and to protect the masses, will never recognize the Provisional Government of Chang Hsueh-liang at Chinchow, and therefore it is obliged to take drastic measures to suppress such a government. The people of Chinchow should submit to the kindness and power of the army of the Great Japanese Empire and should oppose and prevent the establishment of Chang Hsueh-liang's government, otherwise they will be considered as decidedly opposing the army of the Great Japanese Empire, in which case the army will ruthlessly destroy Chinchow. The people of Chinchow are hereby enjoined to carefully consider their situation and to take such decisions as they will deem wise."

No. 57.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation  
dated Nanking, October 9th, 1931.

The following is a translation of the appeal issued by the National Government on Oct. 7th.

"In view of the situation created by the recent inundation which has rendered millions of citizens homeless and destitute, and of the external aggression which stirred our people with indignation, the present appeal is made to every Chinese: The Government, having the responsibility of dealing with the foreign Powers, is of course acting for the welfare of the nation in conformity with public opinion. However, during the time limit fixed by the Council of the League of Nations for the withdrawal of Japanese troops, every Chinese national should all the more remain calm and strictly observe public order so as to deprive foreigners of any kind of possible excuse. The local authorities are held responsible for the protection of the lives and property of all foreign residents and, for the maintenance of order, they must also exert special caution to prevent rebellious elements from using the opportunity for starting disturbances and indulging in lawlessness. The flood relief work must be continued with increased energy and not in the least neglected."

In execution of this appeal, further instructions along the same line were sent again by the Executive Yuan on Oct. 8th to all the central and local authorities.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.695:M.300.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 11th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of Japan.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Representative of Japan the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following telegram which has been telegraphed to the Council.

TELEGRAM.

"Following on anti-Japanese movement several Japanese consulates in China, particularly those situated along River Yangtse, been obliged evacuate towns, in which established, to seek refuge in safer localities. Present position as regards evacuations as follows: 1) Japanese consulate at Chengchow. Five members including their families, ten Japanese residents. Anti-Japanese movements becoming very serious, all members of consulate their families and Japanese residents left town September twentyeighth, in order to avoid their way to refuge being cut off. They arrived at Hankow September thirtieth. 2) Japanese consulate at Yunnan. Three members including their families twentyfive Japanese residents.

Since beginning of incident Chinese authorities at Yunnan have seized all telegrams addressed to Japanese Consul thus causing much anxiety. In view of increasingly serious situation, the Consul caused the twentyfive Japanese residents to evacuate the town about October fifth. They arrived at Hanoi October seventh. Minister for Foreign Affairs ordered Consul on October seventh to leave his post if necessary, in order to assist the residents in refuge Hanoi, after having taken necessary steps to safeguard consulate and property left by the Japanese residents. 3) Japanese consulate at Chungking. Fifteen members including their families, eighty residents. One gunboat and a steamer are placed at disposal of Japanese refugees. Anti-Japanese movement so strong in this town that Japanese concession is in danger of being attacked by over-excited individuals. In these circumstances Minister for Foreign Affairs has ordered consul to send residents out of town down Yangtse. Consul also been authorised withdraw if necessary to Hankow with members of consulate, after collecting members of consulate and Japanese residents at Chengtou. 4) Consulate General at Chengtou. Five members including their families, five residents. The situation at Chengtou does not at present seem sufficiently serious to warrant immediate evacuation. If these residents remained in Chengtou the consulate and Japanese residents at Chungking would be in such a position that they could not withdraw in case of necessity. In these circumstances Minister for Foreign Affairs issued on October seventh instructions to Consul General that whole Japanese colony of Chengtou should be brought to Chungking as soon as possible, so that thence the Japanese residents might take refuge down the Yangtse.

SAWADA

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.696.M.301.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 11th 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Representative.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following telegram which he received from the Japanese Representative on October 11th.

TELEGRAM.

Have honour communicate statement of Japanese Government's attitude on China question telegraphed me by Japanese Delegation:

"(1) Since beginning of present incident Japanese Government has spared no effort to circumscribe events and settle matter by direct negotiations. It has further drawn up plan for withdrawing Japanese troops outside railway zone to within zone progressively as protection of railway and security of life and property of Japanese nationals are assured. In this spirit Japanese Government responded to appeal of President of Council and joined in Council resolution of September thirtieth last. (2) Japanese Government is firmly resolved to follow up line of conduct above indicated. With this object Japanese Government has not complied with urgent requests of Japanese nationals residing in Northern Manchuria and Tientao district for despatch of troops for their protection but on the contrary has not hesitated where necessary to take extreme measures in shape of orders not only to Japanese nationals but also to consular staff to evacuate Manchuria and China properly speaking. Japanese Government cannot under Chinese Government's unperturbed aggravation of situation by failure to take any effective measures to arrest anti-Japanese movement which increases daily throughout the country especially in districts under Nankin Government's direct control. Japanese Government continues to put forward idea of calming by direct negotiation atmosphere of extreme tension between the two peoples and not only settling present incident but also eradicating deeper causes of present incident with a view to preventing regrettable eventualities in future. Chinese Government is informed directly and indirectly of Japanese Government's intention in this respect. In pursuance of programme above indicated Japanese Government is withdrawing to within railway zone troops sent outside zone so far as situation permits. Withdrawal has made real progress since Japanese declaration of September twentyfourth last. (3) Chinese Government has withdrawn its unofficial proposal for direct negotiations which Japanese Government accepted on ground that Council of League was dealing with matter. Japanese Government continues to believe in direct negotiations as effective means of relieving situation and is glad to think that Council of League took same view when it called upon both parties by resolution of September thirtieth last to leave no stone unturned in order to hasten reestablishment of normal relations between two parties. Since above

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
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C.696.M.301.1931.VII.

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unofficial proposal Chinese Government has taken no step calculated to show its sincere desire to ease situation as you desire and has rendered practically impossible all efforts to clear up disagreeable atmosphere prevailing between the two countries and especially to relieve the tension between the two armies in Manchuria thus depriving of all practical value the assurance given by Chinese representatives to Council that China assumed responsibility for security of Japanese nationals with progressive withdrawal of Japanese troops within railway zone. Under these circumstances military authorities are compelled to forego decision to withdraw troops except from localities in Manchuria where organisations exist capable of maintaining order. Growing insecurity of Japanese nationals in localities without Japanese troops as shown by communications made to Council renders particularly difficult the efforts to restore normal situation. (4) Chinese Government might explain its inactivity in connection with protection of Japanese nationals by flight of its local officials and dispersion of its troops as result of Japanese troops' operations. These operations are only a consequence of provocation of Japanese railway guards by Chinese soldiers which is natural outlet of animosity displayed by China towards Japan for years past. This anti-Japanese attitude has led Japanese troops to take measures of protection in a somewhat wide area to safeguard their own existence as well as the railway and Japanese nationals. For these reasons Japanese Government is firmly convinced that only constructive way of solving difficulties is to arrest anti-Japanese movement throughout China and to negotiate directly as soon as possible with a view to calming and limiting dangerous situation now prevailing between the two countries. (5) Chinese Government through its Minister in Tokio has presented to Japanese Government a note dated October fifth regarding possibility of withdrawal of troops and maintenance of order in Manchuria. Japanese Government replied to this note October ninth repeating once more its intentions and urging necessity of immediate negotiations with representative of Chinese Government on points raised by Chinese note as well as fundamental points indispensable for reestablishment of normal relations. Improvement of present situation therefore depends solely on sincerity displayed by Chinese Government in considering Japanese Government's reply.

SAWADA. "

SOCIETE DES NATIONS.

C.692.M.297.1931.VII.)Erra-  
C.692.M.302.1931.VII.( tum.

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS EN VERTU DE  
L'ARTICLE 11 DU PACTE.

NOTE.

Le document suivant:

Appel du Gouvernement chinois en vertu de l'article 11 du Pacte.  
Communication du Représentant de la Chine au Conseil, numéroté par  
erreur C.692.M.297.1931.VII devrait porter le No. C.692.M.302.1931.  
VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER  
ART. 11 OF THE COVENANT.

NOTE.

The following document:

Appeal of the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant.  
Communication from the Representative of China on the Council,  
numbered by error C.692.M.297.1931.VII, should bear the number  
C.692.M.302.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.692.M.297.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 11th 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT

COMMUNICATION from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Representative of China the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following cable messages, in addition to the previous fifty-one, copies of which have already been circulated.

No. 52.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 8th, 1931.

The Special Commissioner of Foreign Affairs at Kirin reported that Mr. Sze Lieu-pen, chief of the office for Foreign Affairs at Chientao, and his staff were expelled from their office by Japanese soldiers on September 29th. The clerk in charge of the archives was threatened with bayonets by Japanese soldiers who examined all the documents and carried them away. The documents were returned later, but the work of the office could not be resumed because the Japanese military police have sealed up all the archives.

No. 53.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 9th, 1931.

Reliable information indicates that the Japanese military is materially assisting the Mongols in their independence movement by sending large supplies of firearms to Mongol radicals by the Szepingkai Liaoyuan railways, which are under Japanese control. Reports have also been received showing that the same thing has happened in Polishan station on the evening of October 3rd. The arrival of a Japanese munition train at Tamen on October 4th is also reported. Anxiety is growing in northwestern Lianing, as the radicals of the Mongolian Youth Party, who have been well supplied with Japanese firearms, are threatening to attack the Chinese population.

No. 54.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 9th, 1931.

According to a telegram from Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang dated October 8th., it is reported that New Chwang, Tashihchiao, Mukden, Kirin and Tiehling are still under the control of Japanese forces. All the telegraphic and postal services in these places are still being occupied by them.

A refugee from Mukden reported that sometimes most of the Japanese troops in Mukden withdrew to the Southern Manchurian Railway Station but they returned again afterwards. Usually they withdraw in the daytime and return at night; their movements, withdrawal or re-occupation, occurred constantly. The city is, therefore, still in their hands.

The same conditions prevail at Kirin and Changchun.

Another report of October 9th stated that there are still more than three hundred Japanese soldiers with six field guns four trench mortars and eight machine guns at Liaoyuan; that Japanese have compelled Chinese labourers to construct an aerodrome in a locality east of Liaoyuan and west of Liaochao; and that a company of Japanese soldiers is guarding the Liaochao Bridge.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.692.M.297.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 11th 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
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No. 55.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 10th. 1931.

Information from the Peking-Mukden Railway Administration states that on October 9th. at 10 a.m. Japanese arriving Tungliao in an armoured train damaged the railway lines between the Southern and Northern Stations. Simultaneously an aeroplane appeared, dropping handbills, which warned the residents not to go near the Tungliao Southern Station where mines had been laid. With the railway lines between Huangkutun and Mukden cut off by Japanese troops on September 18th. and the connecting lines between the two stations of Tungliao damaged, the connection between the eastern and western Chinese railways is completely interrupted.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to  
the Council and  
the Members of the League.

C.697.M.303.1931.VII.

Geneva,

October 12th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Representative of China,  
the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate  
to the Council, two further cable messages received  
in addition to the previous fifty-seven, copies of  
which have already been circulated.

No.58.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 11th, 1931.

Peking-Mukden Railway report two armour and one passenger  
cars from Chengchiatun arrived Tungliao and three cases of ammunition  
moved towards city. North-South Station damaged in twenty-six  
places. Goods Depot, South Station destroyed. One Japanese plane  
dropped handbills; since ninth passenger train go only as far as  
Tungliao South Station.

No.59.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 11th, 1931.

Japanese aircraft cruised October 10th over the  
industrial city Tongshan, and other Chinese territories inside  
the Great Wall, thus aggravating situation continuously and  
extending area of military operation.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

C.700.M.306.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 12th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the text of a message from the Secretary of State of the United States of America presented to him by the American Consul-General at Geneva.

Message

It is my belief that our co-operation in the future handling of this difficult matter should proceed along the lines which have been followed ever since the trouble first commenced and which fortunately found in session both the Assembly and the Council. The latter has deliberated long and earnestly on this question and the Covenant of the League provides well tried machinery for the handling of such questions. The Governments of China and Japan have presented and argued their cases before the Council and through published accounts regarding proceedings there the world has been informed. The League Council has formulated and outlined a course of action to be followed by the two countries; as both Governments have made commitments to the Council it is highly desirable that the League in no way relax its vigilance and in no way fail to assert all the pressure and authority in its competence with a view to regulating the action of Japan and China in the premises. The American Government on its part, acting independently through its diplomatic channels, will try to reinforce League action and will make it evident that it has not lost interest in the question and is not oblivious to the obligations which Japan and China have assumed to other signatories of the Pact of Paris as well as the Nine Power Pact, if a time should come when it would seem advisable that those obligations be brought forward.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

C.701.M.307.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 12th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Representative of China, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council, three further cable messages received in addition to the previous fifty-nine, copies of which have already been circulated.

No. 60. Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation, dated Nanking, October 11th, 1931.

Reports have been received that on the morning of October 9th, at 10 o'clock, one passenger car and two Japanese armoured cars carrying many Japanese soldiers arrived at Tungliao from Chenchiatung. After their arrival a number of Japanese nationals descended from the train and entered the city. Later, more than forty Japanese soldiers laid mines between the Southern and Northern Stations and did much damage to the railway.

The Japanese soldiers carried with them three cases of rifles and ammunition, which were sent to the South Manchurian Guild inside the city.

No. 61. Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation, dated Nanking, October 12th, 1931.

The allegation that the bombing of Chinchow by Japanese aeroplanes was provoked by Chinese soldiers who shot at the aeroplanes is absolutely groundless. As Chinchow is over five hundred li (about two hundred miles) distant from Mukden and Newchang, the sudden raid of that city by Japanese aeroplanes loaded with bombs, is no doubt a premeditated action. Besides our troops at Chinchow have no anti-aircraft guns and did not shoot at the aeroplanes with rifles.

No. 62. Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation from the Peking-Mukden Railway Administration, at Tientsin, dated October 12th, 1931.

Ninth: Japanese dynamited Tungliao track, cutting Peking-Mukden Railway Ssupinghai-Tsounan Railway connection. Peking-Mukden Railway Mukden-Hailong Railway connection cut September 18th, Yingkow occupied on 19th, thus bottling up Peking-Mukden Railway benefitting South Manchurian Railway. Tenth: Japanese at Chuliuh, east of Sinmin, occupied railway engineer's residence, bringing materials and workmen to complete barracks in twenty days.

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

C.702.M.308.1931.VII,

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Geneva, October 12th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the British Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the British Government, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following information, dated Pekin, October 10th.

TELEGRAM.

Consul-General at TienTsin has been informed that Japanese armoured train arrived Tung Liao 10 a.m. yesterday and remained for few hours. Part of track between north and south stations was removed and goods yard mined. Leaflets were dropped from Japanese aeroplanes informing population that Japanese troops had come to protect them against brigands.

2. Consul-General at Mukden stated that Japanese informed his United States colleague on October 8th, that Japanese troops at Mukden outside railway zone numbered two thousand. It is believed that no further withdrawals from zone have taken place at Mukden or elsewhere during last 48 hours.

: Communiqué au Conseil et  
aux Membres de la Société.

C.703. M.309.1931.VII

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

Genève, le 12 octobre 1931.

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS EN VERTU DE L'ARTICLE 11 DU PACTE.

Communication de la Délégation japonaise.

Note du Secrétaire général.

Conformément à la demande du Directeur du Bureau du Japon à la Société des Nations, le Secrétaire général a l'honneur de communiquer au Conseil le texte d'un télégramme officiel reçu par la Délégation japonaise

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Tokio, le 11 octobre 1931.

Le mouvement antijaponais se poursuit dans toute la Chine. Ci-dessous les derniers renseignements concernant les principales villes chinoises:

Shanghai.— Les mesures de coercition violente se poursuivent: le refus des banques et des changeurs chinois de faire des affaires avec les Japonais s'étend de plus en plus et avec la démission forcée des agents chinois des banques japonaises, le volume des transactions en effets et en monnaies a considérablement diminué, au point que les firmes et usines japonaises éprouvent de grandes difficultés à recevoir des lettres de change ou à changer l'argent des salaires. La pression de l'Association antijaponaise s'exerce sur tout le commerce et de nombreux contrats sont annulés. Les bateliers et transbordeurs obéissant aux injonctions de l'Association anti-japonaise refusent de transporter nos marchandises et les dockers au service des maisons japonaises ont également été obligés de se soumettre à ces mesures d'intimidation à partir du 5 octobre. Depuis le 6, aucune marchandise n'a pu être manutentionnée. Dans les usines, les produits s'accumulent et beaucoup d'entre elles vont être obligées de fermer. Les résidents japonais n'obtiennent qu'avec la plus grande peine les objets usuels (riz, charbon, lait, journaux, etc.). L'Association anti-japonaise a infligé des amendes de plusieurs milliers de taels à des commerçants chinois ayant vendu des marchandises japonaises, celles-ci ont été saisies, les délinquants ont été photographiés revêtus d'habits spéciaux de "traîtres au pays" et les photographies insérées dans les journaux.

: Communiqué au Conseil et  
aux Membres de la Société.

C.703. M.309.1931.VII

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

Genève, le 12 octobre 1931.

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Le 7 octobre, des rouleaux de papier journal, appartenant à une firme japonaise, ont été saisis en pleine rue; une centaine de journaux japonais vendus par des Chinois ont été détruits; un magasin de jouets japonais, établi dans la ville chinoise, a été complètement pillé.

Nos ressortissants sont journellement insultés, on leur lance des pierres. Par exemple, le 4 octobre, deux surveillants d'une filature ont été battus et grièvement blessés dans la rue.

Nankin.- Les manifestations d'étudiants se calment peu à peu, mais la rupture des relations économiques devient de jour en jour plus efficace. Les agents et employés de la Compagnie de navigation Nisshin ont été obligés de donner leur démission; l'Association anti-japonaise a traîné dans les rues de la ville, à titre d'exemple, trois marchands chinois ayant vendu des marchandises japonaises.

Wuhu.- Le transport des passagers et des marchandises de la Compagnie Nisshin a été interdit; depuis la fin du mois de septembre, les marins et les résidents japonais éprouvent les plus grandes difficultés à se ravitailler.

Hankow.- Le 5 octobre, l'Association anti-japonaise a obligé les commerçants à payer une taxe d'enregistrement de 15 % ad valorem sur les marchandises japonaises en stock; ces marchandises doivent être vendues dans les vingt jours; passé cette date, elles seront saisies. A partir du 6 octobre, l'Association anti-japonaise a envoyé un délégué au Bureau de poste pour opérer une censure sur tous les colis venant du Japon. De nombreuses marchandises japonaises appartenant à des Chinois ont été saisies.

Les agents chinois des Compagnies japonaises ont dû abandonner leurs fonctions le 5 octobre; le nombre des employés venant au travail diminue de jour en jour; les banques et chargeurs chinois ont

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annoncé le 6 octobre leur refus de poursuivre des relations commerciales avec les banques et les firmes japonaises. Les agents et caissiers chinois des banques et firmes anglaises, américaines et françaises, ayant également refusé d'accepter les chèques japonais, toutes les transactions en monnaie japonaise ont été arrêtées. C'est la première fois que les organisations bancaires chinoises ont unanimement refusé d'avoir des relations d'affaires avec les Japonais. Si cette situation se poursuivait, les relations économiques entre Chinois et Japonais deviendraient absolument impossibles.

Chungking.- Les approvisionnements de nos navires de guerre et des résidents japonais ont été saisis. L'Association anti-japonaise exerce une pression violente sur les agents de la Compagnie Nisshin, sur les pilotes, les interprètes du Consulat et autres employés chinois pour qu'ils abandonnent leurs fonctions. Certains employés d'usines japonaises ont été enlevés et traînés dans les rues de la ville par l'Association anti-japonaise.

Fuchow.- Obéissant aux injonctions de l'Association anti-japonaise, les changeurs, etc... refusent de travailler avec les Japonais; 500.000 silver dollars de dépôts ont été retirés de la Banque de Formose; les marchandises même chinoises ne peuvent être débarquées des bateaux japonais. Les relations d'affaires des Japonais et des maisons de Formose avec les maisons chinoises sont interrompues.

Swatow.- Le débarquement des marchandises sur bateaux japonais est interdit. De nombreux Chinois ont vu saisir leurs marchandises d'origine japonaise; de lourdes amendes leur ont été infligées. Des groupes d'étudiants sont passés dans les magasins chinois et ont apposé des scellés sur les marchandises japonaises.

Canton.- Les autorités ont pris des mesures relativement efficaces pour réprimer la violence des mouvements anti-japonais, mais

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|| les manifestations d'étudiants et les menaces contre les employés  
; chinois des firmes japonaises se poursuivent. Depuis le 3 octobre,  
les navires chinois à destination de Hongkong refusent d'embarquer  
les marchandises devant être transbordées dans ce port sur les navi-  
res japonais, et nos grandes compagnies de navigation (Yûsen,  
Shôsen) voient leur fret diminuer considérablement. Les compagnies  
de navigation côtière japonaises n'obtiennent plus aucun fret chinois.  
Les coolies employés par les Japonais ont été l'objet de mesures  
d'intimidation et se sont mis en grève empêchant l'emmagasinement  
et le transport des marchandises.

Communiqué au Conseil  
et aux Membres de la  
Société.

C./704. M.310.1931.VII

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS.

Genève, le 12 octobre 1931.

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS EN VERTU DE L'ARTICLE 11 DU PACTE.

Communication de la Délégation japonaise.

Note du Secrétaire général.

Le Secrétaire général a l'honneur de transmettre au Conseil la communication suivante du Directeur du Bureau du Japon à la Société des Nations.

Genève, le 12 octobre 1931.

Monsieur le Secrétaire général,

J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer ci-joint le résumé des informations reçues jusqu'à aujourd'hui concernant l'incident de Chinchow. Je vous saurais gré de bien vouloir le communiquer aux honorables membres du Conseil.

(s.): SAWADA.

L'atmosphère de tension qui, à la suite des événements récents de Moukden avait prévalu entre l'armée japonaise en Mandchourie et l'armée du général Chang-Hsue-Liang ne s'est malheureusement pas encore dissipée. Du côté chinois, loin de prendre des mesures efficaces pour améliorer l'atmosphère, les autorités laissent se développer partout le mouvement antijaponais. Par ailleurs, les formations de Peitaying, refoulées par nos troupes, s'étaient regroupées et étaient en marche dans la direction de Chinchow, où se trouve le quartier général des généraux Chang-Hsue-Liang et Chang-Tso-Hsiang. Des informations sérieuses nous avaient fait savoir que les troupes chinoises se concentraient à l'est et à l'ouest de la voie ferrée et se préparaient, en profitant du nombre restreint des gardes japonais, à

Communiqué au Conseil  
et aux Membres de la  
Société.

C./704. M.310.1931.VII

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à les attaquer des deux côtés. En présence de ces informations alarmantes, le commandant japonais, désireux d'avoir des renseignements exacts sur ces mouvements de troupes, afin de ne pas être attaqué par surprise, envoya en reconnaissance onze avions dans la direction de Chinchow où ils furent accueillis par une vive fusillade. Pour se défendre, ils ripostèrent par des bombes, ayant pris pour objectif uniquement le quartier général et le gouvernement provincial, avec le souci de ne causer aucun dommage aux autres édifices.

Il importe d'autre part de ne pas perdre de vue que cette reconnaissance et les actions qui s'en sont suivies ont été effectuées à la discrétion de l'armée de Kwantung et qu'elles n'ont jamais constitué, dans l'esprit du commandant japonais en cause, qu'une mesure de légitime et indispensable précaution pour veiller à la sécurité des troupes dans les circonstances présentes en Mandchourie.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.705.M.311.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 13th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to  
the Council the following communication from the Director of the  
Japanese Bureau accredited to the League of Nations.

Translation.

Japanese Delegation  
accredited to the  
League of Nations.

Geneva, October 13th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

Further to Annexes 2 and 3 of the telegram dated Paris,  
October 6th (C.675), I have the honour to ask you to be good  
enough to communicate to the Members of the Council the following  
telegram which I have received from the Japanese Minister for  
Foreign Affairs:

1. The number of Koreans massacred by the Chinese  
in Manchuria since the beginning of the incident up to  
October 9th is:

|                      |    |
|----------------------|----|
| Province of Tiehling | 50 |
| " " Fushun           | 5  |
| " " Kaiyuan          | 7  |
| " " Shen-yuang       | 1  |
| " " Tsing-yuan       | 25 |
| Total                | 88 |

2. The number of Koreans who have fled to the localities  
mentioned hereunder is as follows:

|            |     |
|------------|-----|
| Fushun     | 500 |
| Tiehling   | 268 |
| Kaiyuan    | 90  |
| Shintaitsu | 35  |
| Kirin      | 300 |

As these Korean refugees are in a state of great  
destitution, the Japanese authorities have done their best to help  
them but intend to send these refugees back to their homes as  
soon as order is re-established there.

(Signed) S. Sawada.

Director of the Japanese Bureau  
accredited to the League of Nations.

Communiqué au Conseil  
et aux  
Membres de la Société

C.706.M.812.1931.VII.

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

Genève, le 12 octobre 1931.

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS EN VERTU DE L'ARTICLE 11 DU PACTE.

Communication du Gouvernement japonais.

Note du Secrétaire général

Le Secrétaire général a l'honneur de communiquer au Conseil la réponse du Gouvernement du Japon au télégramme du Président du Conseil, en date du 9 octobre, que le Représentant du Japon au Conseil vient de lui transmettre.

1. Le Gouvernement japonais, tout en poursuivant dès le début des incidents actuels la ligne de conduite qu'il s'était tracé d'empêcher toute aggravation de la situation et de ramener ses troupes dans la Zone du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien au fur et à mesure que la sécurité du Chemin de fer et la protection des ressortissants japonais et des biens leur appartenant seraient effectivement assurées, a toujours été convaincu qu'une solution amicale de cet incident ne pouvait être obtenue que par des négociations directes entre le Japon et la Chine. C'est dans cet esprit que le Japon a répondu au message du Président du Conseil de la Société des Nations et qu'il a adhéré à la résolution votée à la dernière séance du Conseil.

2. Les opérations militaires en Mandchourie sont arrivées à un point stationnaire et le Gouvernement japonais ne constate actuellement aucun développement particulier de la situation. Divers faits pouvaient être considérés comme créant un nouvel état de choses. Par exemple, les troupes japonaises ont parfois été obligées de se porter au secours des nombreux Coréens qui ont été



Communiqué au Conseil  
et aux  
Membres de la Société

C.706.M.312.1931.VII.

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

Genève, le 12 octobre 1931.

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS EN VERTU DE L'ARTICLE 11 DU PACTE.

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- 2 -

été victimes d'attaques violentes de la part des soldats chinois et des brigands dans les environs de la ligne du Chemin de fer. Ces troupes, après avoir assuré la protection des Coréens et les avoir placés en sécurité, sont immédiatement retournés dans la Zone. Ou encore des avions, partis en reconnaissance à la nouvelle que les troupes chinoises fugitives se rassemblaient dans les environs de Chinchow et se préparaient à troubler l'ordre le long du Chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien, ayant été assaillis par les troupes chinoises, ont riposté en lançant des bombes.

Cependant, il est superflu de faire remarquer que les troupes japonaises ne pouvaient humainement laisser nos ressortissants coréens exposés sans défense à de telles violences. L'incident de Chinchow est facilement explicable lorsqu'on connaît les circonstances actuelles de la situation. L'atmosphère de surexcitation créée par les mesures de défense que les forces japonaises ont dû prendre devant l'action provocante des troupes chinoises de Mandchourie ne s'est aucunement détendue. Il est clair qu'il n'existe point un état de guerre, mais les troupes japonaises se trouvent dans la nécessité d'observer attentivement les mouvements des troupes chinoises et de prendre de minutieuses mesures de sécurité. C'est dans ces conditions que l'incident de Chinchow s'est produit. Considérer un tel événement, conséquence de la situation de fait, comme ayant un caractère d'aggravation de la situation, est, de l'avis du Gouvernement japonais, une appréciation inexacte de l'ensemble de la situation.

3. On a dit également que la situation s'aggravait du fait que les unités navales japonaises se dirigeaient vers le Yantsé. La réalité est toute différente. Devant les mouvements antijaponais par lesquels la Chine elle-même aggrave la situation, le Japon a constamment adopté une attitude de

patience et de calme. Il a évacué ses consulats et ses ressortissants des zones dangereuses du Haut-Yangtsé. Des vaisseaux de guerre ont été dirigés sur Changhaï vers l'époque où une protestation concernant les mouvements antijaponais était présentée au Gouvernement chinois. Cet envoi n'a eu pour but que de dissiper l'inquiétude causée par les menaces dirigées contre la vie et les biens de nos ressortissants et afin d'assurer, le cas échéant, leur protection et ne dépasse pas les mesures usuelles prises par les Puissances dans les cas analogues.

4. Il se dégage des discussions du Conseil, ainsi que de la résolution adoptée, que l'on paraît croire qu'avec le retrait des troupes actuellement en dehors de la Zone du Chemin de fer, les autorités chinoises pourront à leur place assurer le maintien de l'ordre. Malheureusement, la situation est telle qu'elle vient d'être expliquée ci-dessus et le maintien de l'ordre local non seulement ne peut être assuré d'une façon aussi simple, mais le fait que dans certains points du territoire chinois éloignés du théâtre des événements actuels, les menaces contre la vie et les biens de nos ressortissants croissent chaque jour nécessitent même l'envoi de renforts navals, permet de se rendre aisément compte des difficultés que rencontre l'exécution du plan de retrait intégral des troupes japonaises dans la Zone du Chemin de fer.

5. Le Gouvernement japonais estime que dans les circonstances actuelles, la nécessité la plus urgente est de ramener une détente des sentiments des peuples japonais et chinois par une coopération mutuelle. Dans ce but, il est essentiel de s'entendre sur quelques grands principes devant servir de base au maintien des relations normales entre les deux pays. Lorsque ces principes auront été établis, il ne manquera pas de s'ensuivre une détente des sentiments nationaux et les troupes japonaises pourront se retirer sans appréhension dans la Zone du Chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien. Le

Gouvernement japonais se déclare prêt à entrer en pourparlers avec les représentants responsables de la Chine pour s'entendre sur ces points fondamentaux.

Genève, le 12 octobre 1931.

C./65th Session/P.V.I(1).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

FIRST MEETING (PRIVATE, THEN PUBLIC).

*Held on Saturday, September 19th, 1931, at 5 p.m.*

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Deputy Secretary-General. France was represented by M. FLANDIN, and the Irish Free State by Mr. LESTER. M. STRASBURGER replaced M. Zaleski during part of the meeting.

2894. Welcome to New Members of the Council.

The PRESIDENT was sure that all the members would wish him to offer their sincere congratulations and a cordial welcome to the new Members of the Council, China, represented by M. Sze, and Panama, represented by M. Garay.

2895. Adoption of the Agenda.

*The agenda was adopted.*

2896. Administrative Tribunal: Renewal of the Terms of Office of Two Judges.

M. MATOS presented the following report and draft resolution:<sup>1</sup>

"Under the provisions which govern this question, the terms of office of M. MONTAGNA and M. VAN RYCKEVORSEL, judge and deputy judge on the Administrative Tribunal of the League of Nations, expire at the end of this year.

"I would propose that the Council should re-elect these persons for a period of three years and accordingly adopt the following resolution:

"The terms of office of M. MONTAGNA and M. VAN RYCKEVORSEL, respectively judge and deputy judge on the Administrative Tribunal of the League of Nations, are renewed for a period of three years as from 1932."

*The draft resolution was adopted.*

2897. Appointment of Rapporteurs.

The PRESIDENT requested the Secretary-General to submit a provisional list of Rapporteurs for questions appearing regularly on the agenda.  
(The Council went into public session.)

2898. Communications by the Representatives of Japan and China.

M. YOSHIKAWA said that, according to information which had appeared that day in the Press, an incident had occurred on the previous evening in the neighbourhood of the town of Mukden. He was anxious immediately to communicate to the Council—in accordance, moreover, with a desire expressed by the President—the first information he had received that morning. Unfortunately, it contained very few details. A collision had occurred between the Japanese and Chinese troops in the neighbourhood of Mukden, near the South Manchuria Railway. Immediately on

<sup>1</sup> Document C.574.1931.V.

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hearing the news, the Japanese Government had taken all the measures possible to prevent this local incident from leading to undesirable complications. M. Yoshizawa had asked his Government for additional information, and was sure it would do everything possible to relieve the situation.

M. SZE would not conceal from the Council that he had been greatly disturbed by the news from Manchuria regarding the incident mentioned by the Japanese representative. The information he had received so far seemed to indicate that the incident had not been occasioned by any act on the part of the Chinese. He would not fail to keep the Council informed of any authentic news he might receive regarding this highly regrettable incident.

The PRESIDENT was sure the Council had heard with satisfaction that the Japanese Government would take the necessary measures to deal with the situation. His colleagues would certainly desire to join him in expressing the most sincere hopes for a prompt settlement of the question.

**2899. Claim brought by the Finnish Government against the Government of the United Kingdom in connection with Finnish Ships used during the War by the Government of the United Kingdom: Appointment of a Rapporteur.**

Baron Yrjö-Koskinen, representative of Finland, came to the Council table.

The PRESIDENT thought the time had come for the Council to appoint a Rapporteur for this question.

On the proposal of M. YOSHIZAWA, supported by M. GRANDI, the representative of Spain was appointed Rapporteur.

The PRESIDENT said that, in view of the statements which had been made at the previous meeting, he naturally felt some hesitation in accepting the task entrusted to him. The numerous arguments which had been put forward on both sides proved that it would be a difficult one.

In his opinion, there was an important preliminary question to be examined: one of the parties had questioned whether it was desirable that the Council should deal with such matters. That point was of great importance and should, it appeared, be studied without delay. With a view to the examination of this preliminary question, he asked the Council to authorise him to obtain the help of the Italian and Norwegian representatives, so that he might be able to place the matter before the Council at its next session.

Baron YRJÖ-KOSKINEN, representative of Finland, interpreted the proposal to mean that the Rapporteur's mandate covered all the preliminary questions raised before the Council—in particular, those relating to the Council's duties in virtue of the Covenant. On that understanding he accepted the decision.

The PRESIDENT replied that that was the meaning of his proposal.

Baron Yrjö-Koskinen withdrew.

**2900. Saar Basin: Proposed Governing Commission Loan.**

The DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL said that the Chairman of the Saar Governing Commission had been obliged to leave Geneva for Saarbruck and had asked the Secretary-General to make his excuses to the Council and express his regret that he was unable to attend the meeting.

M. GRANDI presented the following report and draft resolution:<sup>1</sup>

"By a letter dated August 22nd, 1931, the Saar Territory Governing Commission submitted to the Council of the League of Nations a proposal it had formulated for the issue of a long-term loan of a nominal amount of 150 million French francs. The Governing Commission stated that the exclusive object of the loan was to enable the countries and communes of the Saar Territory, with the exception of the town of Saarbruck, to consolidate their short-term debts and to convert part of their long-term debts with the Saar savings banks.

"On September 14th, the Council requested the Financial Committee to examine this question in conjunction with the Saar Governing Commission.

"The report submitted by the Financial Committee to the Council states that the financial situation of the Saar Government is sound, and that the service of a long-term loan of 150 million French francs should place no undue strain upon the finances of the Governing Commission. Moreover, the Financial Committee added, the loan will be employed for the conversion of existing credits to local bodies, the service of which is already borne by the inhabitants of the Saar territory. With regard to the position after 1935, the Financial Committee suggests that, in order to assist the Governing Commission in its negotiations, the Council should make the following declaration:

"The Council undertakes to include in the decisions which will have to be taken in conformity with paragraph 39 of the Annex "Saar" to the Treaty of Versailles, the necessary measures to protect the interests of the lenders."

<sup>1</sup> Document C.571.1931.I.

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" In view of the Financial Committee's report, I take the liberty to submit to the Council the following draft resolution:

" ' The Council,

" ' Recognises the desirability of the financial operation contemplated by the Governing Commission and the advantages which would accrue to the Saar Territory from its success;

" ' Notes that the Financial Committee is of opinion that the financial situation of the Saar Government is sound and that the service of the loan for the amount mentioned will not place any undue strain upon the finances of the Governing Commission;

" ' Undertakes to include in the decisions which will have to be taken in conformity with paragraph 39 of the Annex " Saar " to the Treaty of Versailles <sup>1</sup> the necessary measures to protect the interests of the lenders. "

*The draft resolution was adopted.*

**2901. Work of the Fiscal Committee during its Third Session.**

M. BRAADLAND presented the following report: <sup>2</sup>

" The variety and scope of the subjects treated in the Fiscal Committee's report to the Council, on the work of its third session, is evidence of the importance of the work carried out by the Committee during the last two years.

" The progress of the campaign against double taxation and the practical effects of the work on this subject carried out under the auspices of the League can be seen from the list of the principal international agreements concluded during the last year and of laws recently enacted in various countries. Not only are the principles laid down by the Conference of Government experts for the exemption of shipping companies in countries other than those in which they are registered now applied by most countries with a fleet of any importance, but several bilateral conventions very wide in scope (particularly those between France and Italy, between Finland and Sweden, and between Belgium and France) have been concluded on the lines of the model conventions drawn up by the Government experts in 1928.

" In the hope of hastening the progress already achieved in this direction, the Fiscal Committee endeavoured, during its second session, to lay down the bases of a plurilateral convention, with the object of avoiding double taxation on certain kinds of income.

Two model drafts, corresponding to the two main tendencies of national legislation, have been prepared, which the Committee suggests should be communicated to Governments for consideration, without calling upon them to express an opinion at once. I propose that these drafts should be forwarded to the Governments, and that, in accordance with the Financial Committee's recommendations, their attention should be directed to the importance of the problem to be solved.

" The conclusion of a plurilateral convention on double taxation would tend greatly to improve international commercial relations.

" The work undertaken last year with the help of the grant from the Rockefeller Foundation on the subject of the apportionment of profits in the case of commercial undertakings operating in several countries has been continued. A thorough study has been made of the legislation of five important States, and the enquiry is to be pursued in several other countries. The Committee hopes that, within a year or eighteen months, it will be in a position to lay down general rules on the subject. The solution of this problem, which would provide fiscal security for business concerns with branches in several countries, and would considerably promote the resumption of free circulation of capital and goods, is of great importance for the improvement of international economic relations.

" I should add that the Financial Committee in its last report to the Council laid particular stress on the importance of the work accomplished by the Fiscal Committee. "

*The conclusions of the report were adopted.*

**2902. Work of the Financial Committee during its Forty-second Session, including the Report on the Settlement of Bulgarian Refugees.**

M. Guirguinoff, representative of Bulgaria, came to the Council table.

M. BRAADLAND presented the following report and draft resolution: <sup>3</sup>

" I. The Financial Committee has so far forwarded to the Council two reports on the first part of its work; these, I think, can be considered together. The Committee is still in session and will submit a further report to us later, on the questions relating to Austria and Hungary, which it is at present examining very carefully.

<sup>1</sup> Paragraph 39. — " The Council of the League of Nations shall take such provisions as may be necessary for the establishment of the regime which is to take effect after the decisions of the League of Nations mentioned in paragraph 35 have become operative, including an equitable apportionment of any obligations of the Government of the territory of the Saar Basin arising from loans raised by the Commission or from other causes.

" From the coming into force of the new regime, the powers of the Governing Commission will terminate, except in the case provided for in paragraph 35 (a). "

<sup>2</sup> Document C.575.1931.II.A.

<sup>3</sup> Document C.572.1931.II.A.

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" 2. In the two reports now before us, the Financial Committee deals with the situation of certain countries which previously had recourse to its assistance and with various questions, among which I might mention the work of the Gold Delegation, the problem of the recurrence of periods of economic depression, and the budgetary estimates relating to the work of the Financial Section. Other questions dealt with in the two reports of the Financial Committee have already formed, or will form, the subject of special reports to the Council. These are the transfer of the functions of the Greco-Bulgarian Mixed Emigration Commission, the report of the Fiscal Committee and the proposed loan of the Governing Commission of the Saar Territory.

" 3. The Financial Committee has noted the twentieth report—which has also been submitted to us—of the League Commissioner, dealing with the establishment of Bulgarian refugees. It notes that the work is almost completed.

" 4. The Financial Committee has devoted special consideration to the financial position of Bulgaria. The deficit at the close of the last financial year created a very difficult situation for the Treasury. In addition, the falling off in the estimated revenue for the first months of the current year will probably result in a new deficit. The Committee examined, with the Bulgarian Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance, the measures which should be urgently taken to deal with the situation. The financial plan submitted by the Bulgarian Government, which consists in reducing expenditure and increasing revenue, appeared likely, if carried out at once and energetically, to ensure the accounts for the current year being balanced. The Bulgarian Government has also undertaken to make the necessary modifications in the existing laws on pensions and the operation of the Cereals Buying and Export Department to ensure that the budgetary equilibrium is not adversely affected by their application. It has further undertaken to carry out various measures which are likely to bring in additional revenue later and to lead to a marked improvement in the position of the Treasury.

" The Committee concludes its report on this question by expressing its conviction that, if this programme is put into effect, Bulgaria will be able to overcome her present difficulties.

" 5. The Financial Committee states that the Gold Delegation expects to complete its work at its next session by drafting its final report.

" 6. The eleventh Assembly, when requesting that an enquiry should be made into the course and the phases of the present economic depression, at the same time decided that it was desirable to consider, in conjunction with 'national organisations, whether consultative or planning councils or research institutions . . . by what means the work now being conducted on the problem of the recurrence of periods of economic depression may be co-ordinated'. In the words of the report of the Second Committee of the Assembly, 'this is a problem the study of which calls imperatively for co-ordinated and concerted action'. The economic councils and research institutions, to which the question was submitted, recommended the summoning at suitable intervals of the representatives of the organisations dealing with the question, and of experts on the subject. They added that 'a competent economist and an adequate auxiliary staff should be attached permanently to the Secretariat'. The Financial Committee supports this recommendation, and I would ask the Council to approve it subject to the decision of the Assembly regarding the provision of the necessary budgetary credits.

" 7. The Financial Committee draws attention to the necessity of special credits being made available for this year and for 1932, in order that it may fulfil tasks already entrusted to it by the Council and in view of the possibility of unforeseen calls being made, in the present crisis, upon the Council for technical assistance.

" As regards 1931, the Secretary-General should be requested to make every effort to find funds to carry out this essential work this year from other items of the budget and to make proposals to the Council in this connection.

" As regards 1932, the matter lies in the hands of the Assembly, to whom this report and the forthcoming reports of the Financial Committee should be referred. It is obvious that, if the Council is to be in a position to use the services of the Financial Committee and otherwise seek treasure to alleviate the present crisis, additional and special budgetary provision must be made.

" 8. Accordingly, I propose to my colleagues the following draft resolution:

" 'The Council adopts the present report on the work of the Financial Committee and decides to transmit it to the Assembly, together with the Financial Committee's reports.' "

M. GUIRGUINOFF, representative of Bulgaria, accepted the report submitted by the Norwegian representative, and took the opportunity of thanking the Financial Committee, on behalf of the Bulgarian Government, for its continuous efforts to improve Bulgarian finances.

*The draft resolution was adopted.*

The PRESIDENT said that the Secretary-General would forward the reports to the Assembly and make the necessary arrangements to give effect to the Financial Committee's proposals.

M. Guirguinoff withdrew.

**2903. Greco-Bulgarian Intermigration Commission: Transfer of the Functions of the Mixed Commission.**

M. Molloff, representative of Bulgaria; M. Politis, representative of Greece and Colonel Corfe, Chairman of the Mixed Commission, came to the Council table.

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M. FLANDIN presented the following report and draft resolution:<sup>1</sup>

"At its meeting on September 4th, 1931, the Council requested the Financial Committee to give its opinion on the proposal made by the neutral members of the Greco-Bulgarian Intermigration Commission in their letter of July 7th, 1931. This proposal was that the functions conferred upon the Mixed Commission by the Moloff-Caphandaris Agreement of December 9th, 1927, should be transferred to such other person or body as might be selected for the purpose by the Council of the League of Nations in application of Article 7 of this agreement.

"In its report to the Council on this subject, the Financial Committee expresses the opinion that, as the neutral members have stated that the Mixed Commission has almost completed its work and will shortly be wound up, it would be desirable for the Council to come to a decision regarding this transfer. In order to avoid setting up any fresh organisation, the Financial Committee suggests that it might itself undertake the functions in question, on the understanding that it may appoint certain of its members to act in its name during the intervals between its sessions.

"I therefore propose the adoption of the following draft resolution:

"The Council decides to transfer the functions conferred upon the Mixed Commission until now by the Agreement of December 9th, 1927, to the Financial Committee as from to-day, on the understanding that the Financial Committee may appoint certain of its members to act in its name during the intervals between its sessions."

M. MOLLOFF, representative of Bulgaria, said that he had nothing to add to the report, which he accepted.

*The draft resolution was adopted.*

Colonel CORFE said that, on behalf of the Greco-Bulgarian Intermigration Commission, he desired to thank the Council for the decision it had just taken. Article 7 of the Moloff-Caphandaris Agreement being applied from that date, and the Mixed Commission being relieved of its functions under that agreement, the neutral members, who had been nominated by the Council on the Mixed Commission, believed that it would be possible to notify the Council at its next session of the complete liquidation of all the Commission's work, and lay before it a full report of the Mixed Commission's activities.

M. Molloff, M. Politis and Colonel Corfe withdrew.

#### 2904. Free City of Danzig: Amendment to the Constitution.

M. Ziehm, President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig, and Count Gravina, High Commissioner of the League of Nations at Danzig, came to the Council table.

Viscount CECIL OF CHELWOOD presented the following report and draft resolution:<sup>2</sup>

"On September 5th, 1931, the High Commissioner of the League of Nations at Danzig transmitted to the Council a letter dated August 29th, 1931, from the Senate of the Free City, communicating the text of a law amending the Constitution of the Free City.

"Under Article 49 of the Constitution of Danzig, an amendment to the Constitution proposed by the Popular Assembly cannot be adopted unless it passes its second reading by a two-thirds majority, at least two-thirds of the elected deputies being present; at least one month must elapse between the first and second readings. Amendments to the Constitution can only come into force after they have been communicated to the League of Nations and after the League has stated that it has no objection to these amendments.

"The purpose of the draft law submitted to us is the reduction of the salaries and pensions of officials and employees on the active list and retired officials and employees on the active list and retired officials and their survivors.

"It was necessary that this law, since it involves interference with the established rights of officials and the modification of Articles 92 and 110 of the Danzig Constitution, should take the form prescribed by Article 49 of the Danzig Constitution for laws amending the Constitution.

"The Bill, as submitted to us, passed the first reading in the Popular Assembly of the Free City by a two-thirds majority on August 28th, 1931, at least two-thirds of the elected deputies being present. The Senate has no doubt that the same majority will be forthcoming at the second reading, which, under the Constitution, cannot take place until September 28th, 1931.

"As the restoration of the Free City's financial position brooks no delay, the Senate requests the League Council to state at once that it has no objection to the amendments made in the Constitution by the new law as submitted to us, subject always to the Bill's receiving at the second reading the majority of the votes of the Assembly required by the Constitution.

"In his covering letter, the High Commissioner says that the measure contemplated by this draft law being in accordance with the recommendations made to the Council by the Financial Committee in 1926, when the Council approved a loan to Danzig, he can only recommend the procedure contemplated by the Senate of the Free City.

"I have examined the bill in the light of the Council's earlier resolutions relative to the

<sup>1</sup> Document C.569.1931.I.

<sup>2</sup> Document C.563.1931.I.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Constitution of Danzig, and I have no observations to make on this point. I venture to submit the following draft resolution to the Council:

" ' The Council authorises the President, in the event of the law amending the Constitution of the Free City, the draft of which passed its first reading on August 28th, 1931, and the text of which is reproduced in the annex to the letter of August 29th, 1931, from the President of the Danzig Senate to the High Commissioner of the League of Nations, passing its second reading without amendment, in accordance with the Constitution, to inform the Senate of the Free City, through the High Commissioner, that the Council has no objection to this amendment to the Constitution.' "

M. ZIEHM, President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig, had no comments to make on the report.

*The draft resolution was adopted.*

2905. Free City of Danzig: Danzig-Polish Relations: Special Report by the High Commissioner.

Viscount CECIL OF CHELWOOD presented the following report and draft resolution:<sup>1</sup>

" At its meeting of May 22nd last, the Council, after examining the situation of Danzig-Polish relations, requested the High Commissioner to submit a further report for its session in September. In compliance with this request, the High Commissioner forwarded to the Council on August 15th a report on the situation, followed by a supplementary report dated August 20th, 1931.

" I attach to my present report the High Commissioner's report, of which I desire to express my high appreciation.

" I am convinced that all the members of the Council will wish to thank him for all the efforts he has made to ensure normal relations between the Free City of Danzig and Poland.

" In his report, the High Commissioner submitted to the Council certain questions relating to the matter of the *port d'attache*, or, as it has latterly been termed, the question of access to and anchorage in the port of Danzig for Polish war vessels. The position of this question is as follows:

" This matter was submitted to the Council on several occasions—in particular, in September and December 1927. In August 1928, letters were exchanged between the parties, as the result of which the provisional Agreement of October 8th, 1921, was extended, and it was stipulated that it could not be denounced before July 1st, 1931. The Free City denounced it for that date. However, in order to facilitate negotiations, the Danzig Government of its own accord stated that it would maintain in force the provisions of the agreement until August 15th, 1931. As the negotiations did not succeed, the Senate again extended the time-limit up to September 15th. It added, however, that, if no result was reached by that date, it would consider any use of the port of Danzig by Polish warships, which was not in strict conformity with the international regulations in force for the admission of foreign war vessels, as ' direct action ' within the meaning of the Council's resolution of March 13th, 1925.

" The High Commissioner requests the Council to signify, in the very likely case of the Danzig-Polish negotiations breaking down, and of the Senate of the Free City requesting him to declare that ' direct action ' has been taken, whether the Council considers that such ' direct action ' has been taken or not. The High Commissioner is of opinion that, by its resolution of March 13th, 1925, the Council, in principle, reserved the competence to judge of ' direct action ', and that this competence is conferred upon the High Commissioner only provisionally and in cases of urgency, subject to the final approval of the Council. Moreover, from a study of the files relating to the question of the *port d'attache*, the High Commissioner concludes that the Council desired to reserve to itself the definition of the question of principle, which the High Commissioner might perhaps implicitly prejudge if he had to take a decision on the question of ' direct action '.

" I can only congratulate the High Commissioner on his foresight in this matter. According to the information at my disposal, I am obliged to state that there is no probability of a practical agreement being reached. In order to reply to the question raised by the High Commissioner in regard to ' direct action ', the Council will be obliged to go into the juridical aspect of the substance of the question, in regard to which the two parties disagree. As they wish to have this aspect of the question cleared up, I would suggest that the Council should ask the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion on the matter, requesting it to give this, if possible, in time for the Council to deal with it at its next session.

" Should the Council be prepared to adopt this procedure, the parties agree to the High Commissioner's drawing up provisional regulations on the matter, to remain in force until the Council reaches a final decision. It is understood that this arrangement will not in any way prejudice the definitive settlement of the question.

" If the Council agrees to this suggestion, I propose at a later date to formulate the question to be submitted to the Court."

<sup>1</sup> Document C.567.1931.I.

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" Annex.

" REPORT BY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER. "

[Translation.]

" Danzig, August 15th, 1931.

" At its meeting on May 22nd, 1931, the Council of the League of Nations invited me 'to submit a further report on the situation for the next session of the Council'. I accordingly have the honour to follow up my report of April 25th, 1931, by submitting the present report to the Council.

" On my return to Danzig at the end of May, I soon noted that the agitation caused by the deplorable incidents between Danzig citizens and Poles which occurred during April and to which I considered it my duty to draw the Council's attention in a special report had subsided to some extent. Unfortunately, I found that the general situation at Danzig was not so satisfactory; disturbances owing to party strife were still continuing. During the month of June, particularly violent clashes occurred between the organisations of the extremist parties even in the centre of the town, and, if they had spread, they would have constituted a very serious menace to public security.

" Since June 4th, I have made further representations to the Senate of the Free City, as suggested by the Council in Point II of its resolution of May 22nd, and have drawn the Senate's special attention to the regrettable consequences which might have resulted from the circumstances to which I have just referred, and to the necessity of taking without delay appropriate measures to check further developments of this kind.

" On June 30th, 1931, after a lively discussion in the Volkstag, the Senate obtained the necessary powers to enact a series of measures designed to ensure the maintenance of public order in the Free City (*Ermächtigungsgesetz*); this law is to remain in force until January 1st, 1932. On the same day, another law was passed introducing certain restrictions in regard to the Press (*Gesetz zur Sicherung der öffentlichen Ordnung*) (Appendix I).

" In a letter dated July 3rd (Appendix II), the Senate of the Free City communicated to me the decrees which it had just promulgated under the authority of the above-mentioned law conferring upon it full powers (Appendix III).

" I think there is no need for me to analyse the laws and decrees in question; it will be sufficient if I refer to the summary of them given by the Senate itself; this summary appears as a sub-appendix to Appendix II.

" In my reply of the same date to the President of the Senate, I emphasised that, although more general restrictions relating to the abuse of uniforms at Danzig would have been desirable from several points of view, I could only take note of the Senate's communication in the hope that these measures would have practical results. In my special report of April 25th last, I had brought this abuse to the notice of the Council and, on May 22nd, the latter had requested me to make further representations to the Senate on the subject, which I did on June 4th.

" It should be noted that, while the Senate felt that it must take into account the opinion expressed both by the representatives of the parties and by the police authorities in favour of the wearing of uniforms inasmuch as they facilitate the supervision and control of the members of the parties themselves, the new measures adopted by the Senate in this connection impose considerable restrictions on citizens wearing uniform as compared with the rights enjoyed by other citizens.

" It must also be admitted—and I have great satisfaction in informing the Council of this fact—that the measures adopted by the Danzig Government have so far proved effective in maintaining an adequate degree of safety and public order in the territory of the Free City.

" I am also happy to be able to inform the Council that the improvement in the relations between Danzig and Poland, which I noted on my return from the Council session held in May, has continued—a fact which the Press of both parties has commented on with satisfaction. Unfortunately, the personal relations between M. Ziehm, President of the Senate of the Free City, and M. Strasburger, the representative of the Republic of Poland, have not yet been satisfactorily defined, but there is reason to hope that they will not affect the treatment of matters of public interest and that it will be possible to examine in a calm atmosphere, and consequently in a more conciliatory spirit on both sides, the problems inherent in the special situation of Danzig, which inevitably give rise at times to considerable divergences in the initial views of the parties.

" I need not draw the special attention of the Council to certain incidents which have occurred between Polish citizens and Danzig nationals and which have been reported to me, because, in my opinion, they are incidents which, though deplorable, are inevitable in all large towns, and also because they are not sufficiently important to have any general consequences.

" On the other hand, somewhat grave consequences might have arisen as a result of an unfortunate dispute between the authorities of the Free City and the Polish authorities with regard

<sup>1</sup> For the Appendices to the High Commissioner's report, see Documents C.502 and C.548.

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to the despatch to Danzig territory of detachments of Polish sailors belonging to the crews of Polish warships in the port of Danzig. While the Polish naval authorities maintained that it was not necessary to obtain the consent of the Danzig authorities to the sending of detachments ashore, the latter contended that Polish naval authorities, like other foreign naval authorities, should comply with the Senate's recent decree to the effect that, by analogy with similar provisions in force in all other ports, the landing of detachments should be subject to the previous consent of the territorial authorities responsible for the maintenance of public order. I was asked to intervene and it was thus possible for me to bring the dispute within the framework laid down by the procedure in force for disputes between Poland and Danzig (Article 39 of the Paris Treaty of November 9th, 1920). An attempt has been made to establish a certain connection between this question and the more general question of the *port d'attache*, the complications of which are well known to the Council and which has been outstanding since the Free City denounced its agreement of 1928 with Poland. The parties are continuing their negotiations, but it seems hardly likely that a direct agreement will be reached.

"I would mention, as undoubtedly harmful to friendly relations between Danzig and Poland, certain demonstrations organised in the territory of the Free City by the parties of the Right, both Germans and Danzig nationals, during which nationalist aspirations for the return of Danzig to the Reich have been expressed more or less forcibly. On the Polish side, these demonstrations are regarded as evidence of the tendency to direct the general policy of the Free City towards Germany rather than towards Poland, while at the same time economic privileges are demanded from Poland and its hinterland.

"Before terminating this rapid survey, I would draw the Council's attention to the financial and economic situation of the Free City, which is such as to give rise to serious anxiety in the near future. I wish to mention this important aspect of the situation in Danzig, which has a direct influence on relations between Poland and Danzig, because, on the Danzig side, the tendency is to throw a large part of the responsibility on Poland.

"Without going into the details of the statement which the Senate of the Free City has asked me to attach to the present report (Appendix IV), because the majority of the Danzig complaints are to form the subject of an exchange of notes between the two Governments and because account must also be taken of any arguments that may be advanced by the Polish Government (which has not sent me a similar statement on the situation at Danzig), I will confine myself to the problem of unemployment, which, with the approach of winter, is already assuming a very serious aspect. It is likely to constitute a grave menace to public order and, in any case, to disturb relations between Danzig and Poland.

"I have already had the honour to draw the Council's attention to this problem in my annual reports for 1930 and 1931, in which I mentioned the negotiations which took place under my chairmanship at Warsaw in January 1930, but which unfortunately did not result in a definitive agreement, although the two Governments reached an agreement on principle. I attach as an appendix a copy of two notes which I have recently received in this connection from the two Governments concerned (Appendices V and VI). I consider it highly desirable that an agreement should be reached before the winter on the bases laid down at Warsaw, in accordance with which the Polish Government, having regard to the particularly difficult situation of the Free City, agreed provisionally to limit the influx of Polish labour into Danzig, where it has very serious effects on the Danzig labour market.

"I have great satisfaction in informing the Council of the conciliatory spirit displayed in the last Polish note (Appendix VI); there is therefore reason to hope that the goodwill thus shown by the Government at Warsaw will lead to practical results in the near future, especially as the Senate of the Free City for its part is prepared to guarantee that the restrictions imposed in regard to the influx of Polish labour into Danzig will also be strictly applied to any other labour of non-Danzig origin."

(Signed) M. GRAVINA.

"SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT BY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER.

[Translation.]

"Danzig, August 20th, 1931.

"In continuation of my report of the 15th instant, I have the honour to inform the Council that, as anticipated in that report, the direct negotiations entered into between the representatives of the Governments of the Polish Republic and of the Free City of Danzig regarding the question of the *port d'attache*—the agreement concerning which lapsed on July 1st and was denounced by the Free City—have not led to an agreement within the prescribed time-limit ending on August 15th.

"In a note dated August 14th, a copy of which was forwarded to me, the Senate of the Free City proposed to Poland to extend the time-limit laid down for the negotiations by one month—i.e., up to September 15th, 1931. It added, however, that, if the negotiations did not reach any result within that period, it would consider any use of the Port of Danzig by Polish warships which was not in strict conformity with the international regulations in force for the admission of foreign men-of-war, as 'direct action' within the meaning of the Council's resolution of March 13th, 1925. I think it is my duty to inform the Council that it is unfortunately highly improbable that any agreement will be reached between the two parties regarding this thorny

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question, with which the Council itself has so often had to deal and which from the legal point of view must still be considered as open.

"I feel I must draw the Council's attention to the unfortunate consequences which are likely to arise for Danzig-Polish relations out of this new dispute, which will doubtless be further embittered by the animosity of public opinion and of the Press of both countries, and will in all probability break out as soon as the time-limit expires on September 15th, if, as is to be feared, the parties have not reached an agreement by that date. In drawing the Council's attention to these unfortunate consequences, I believe I am rightly interpreting the duties of my office which I consider to be to do everything in my power to forestall and prevent such consequences.

"If, on the expiration of the time-limit (September 15th) Poland, relying on the right claimed by her to a *port d'attache* at Danzig (a right which is denied by the Free City), continues to use the Port of Danzig without complying with international regulations, it is clear from the Senate's note of August 14th that the Free City will apply to the High Commissioner for a decision that Poland is thus taking direct action.

"There are two considerations which raise serious doubts in my mind in this connection. The first is that, from a thorough study of the voluminous files relating to the question of the *port d'attache*, I conclude that the Council desires to reserve to itself the definition of the question of principle which I might perhaps implicitly prejudge if I had to take a decision on the question of direct action.

"The second is that, in my opinion, the resolution of March 13th, 1925, implies that the Council has in principle reserved the competence to judge of direct action, and that this competence is conferred upon the High Commissioner only provisionally and in cases of urgency subject to the final approval of the Council.

"I feel therefore that I must request the Council to signify, in the very likely case of the Danzig-Polish negotiations breaking down and of the Senate of the Free City requesting me to declare that direct action has been taken, whether the Council considers that such direct action has been taken or not."

(Signed) M. GRAVINA.

"The Council,

"Thanks the High Commissioner for his report of August 15th and supplementary report of August 20th;

"Takes note of the measures adopted by the Senate for the maintenance of public order at Danzig;

"Recalls its decision of May 22nd, 1931, by which it expressed its disapproval of all demonstrations or acts directed against the Statute of the Free City, from whatever quarter they may come;

"Expresses the hope that the measures contemplated both by Poland and by Danzig with a view to checking the influx of non-Danzig labour into the territory of the Free City will be such as to assist the Senate in its efforts to reduce unemployment at Danzig;

"Will welcome any measures which Poland and Danzig, in view of the close ties established between them by the treaties, may take to ensure more effective co-operation in the economic field;

"Decides to ask the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion on the question of access to and anchorage in the Port of Danzig for Polish war vessels. Pending the Council's final decision on this matter, the High Commissioner is requested to draw up provisional regulations. This arrangement shall in no wise prejudice the final settlement of the question."

Count GRAVINA thanked the Rapporteur for the way in which he had referred to himself and for the very careful examination he had made of the various questions submitted to the Council by the High Commissioner—in particular, that of access to and anchorage in the port of Danzig for Polish war vessels.

M. STRASBURGER, representative of Poland, observed that the High Commissioner, who had, as usual, been anxious to facilitate Danzig-Polish relations and to depict the present situation in Danzig as fully and accurately as possible, had submitted on August 15th a report which had been annexed to the British representative's report as an integral part of it. The High Commissioner's report gave a very detailed account of the measures which had been recommended by the Council at its May session, and which had in part been adopted by the Senate.

M. Strasburger fully appreciated the objective manner in which the account contained in the report was presented, and he thanked the High Commissioner for his report. He had, however, already informed the High Commissioner and the Rapporteur that he did not fully agree with the opinion expressed on one point. The High Commissioner had observed that the measures taken by the Senate had improved the situation—M. Strasburger entirely agreed with that statement—and had said that the state of public security in Danzig was entirely satisfactory. The majority of the public in Danzig and he himself did not entirely share that view.

M. Strasburger agreed that the measures proposed by the Council had helped to improve the position. He accepted Lord Cecil's formula that the Council should merely take note of the measures adopted by the Senate.

He would have been glad if the prohibition against the wearing of uniforms recommended by the Council had been passed by the Senate; the result would have been to restore to Danzig the appearance of a commercial city under the protection of the League.

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The High Commissioner had made the following observations in his report:

"I would mention, as undoubtedly harmful to friendly relations between Danzig and Poland, certain demonstrations organised in the territory of the Free City by the parties of the Right, both Germans and Danzig nationals, during which nationalist aspirations for the return of Danzig to the Reich have been expressed more or less forcibly. On the Polish side, these demonstrations are regarded as evidence of the tendency to direct the general policy of the Free City towards Germany rather than towards Poland, while at the same time economic privileges are demanded from Poland and its hinterland."

This passage in the High Commissioner's report had been rather severely criticised in some of the German and Danzig newspapers. At the same time, it had been announced that M. Hugenberg would arrive in Danzig on the following Tuesday, two days after the present meeting of the Council, to deliver an address on political problems.

M. Strasburger did not wish to discuss the expediency or the undesirability of demonstrations and manifestations against European peace and stability. He would merely point out the effects of such demonstrations on Danzig-Polish economic relations. The activities of organisations whose members wore uniforms and paraded the streets of Danzig in hundreds or thousands, although of no special military importance, kept up a constant agitation in the public mind. Again, the meetings organised against the Statute of the Free City, usually by persons from outside the city but often in conjunction with the official representatives of Danzig, had also created a feeling of unrest and excitement.

In these circumstances, Polish traders, and foreign traders as well, were refraining from transacting new business. Furthermore, the existing atmosphere sometimes made it difficult for official representatives to solve the present economic problems.

M. Strasburger therefore fully supported the resolution proposed by the British representative on the Council, in the following terms:

"The Council,

"Recalls its decision of May 22nd, 1931, by which it expressed its disapproval of all demonstrations or acts directed against the Statute of the Free City, from whatever quarter they may come."

He thanked the Rapporteur, the High Commissioner and the Secretariat for their efforts to ensure the security and economic development of the Free City.

M. ZIEHM asked permission, in view of what the High Commissioner and the Polish representative had said, to submit a few explanatory remarks concerning the resolution proposed by the British representative.

He was glad to note that the Council, and also the Polish representative, had approved the measures taken by the Danzig Government to maintain public order in the Free City. The Council would have seen from the High Commissioner's report that the measures taken by the Free City had proved effective and that, even in the gravest economic and political circumstances, the Government of the Free City was able to safeguard public safety, peace and good order in its territory. The police were prompt and energetic in putting a stop to any disturbance of good order. All breaches of the public peace were punished impartially by the courts, where the proceedings were specially expedited.

The Rapporteur's draft resolution expressed disapproval of all acts or manifestations directed against the Statute of the Free City, from whatever quarter they might come. The Government had always loyally observed the treaties by which the Free City had been established. Its administration had invariably been in conformity with those treaties and with the Constitution guaranteed by the League.

The resolution drew a distinction between demonstrations and acts. With regard to demonstrations, M. Ziehm felt sure that the Council would agree that there must be no interference with free speech, a right that had been granted to every citizen of the Free City by the Constitution guaranteed by the League of Nations. Political convictions and ideas could not be altered by force.

It must be borne in mind that, if the demonstrations referred to embodied a profession of faith in German civilisation, Danzig, with a population of which 97 per cent was German, had the closest ties with everything German. Those ties had been created throughout the centuries. Danzig would always maintain cultural, intellectual and historical relations with the German community. All demonstrations, regardless of those organising them, must plainly comply with the laws in force and respect the constitutional forms of the Free City.

With regard to acts directed against the legal Statute of Danzig, the Free City firmly believed that the League, under whose protection it was placed, would safeguard its political independence and territorial integrity.

M. Ziehm was particularly glad to observe that the Rapporteur had drawn the Council's attention to the economic position of the Free City. He hoped that the Council's recommendations would be of real assistance in bringing about an effective improvement in economic conditions.

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He entirely agreed with the High Commissioner's statement that the Free City's economic and financial situation was such as to give rise in the near future to anxieties that might have a dangerous effect on Danzig-Polish relations. While it was true that the universal depression affected Danzig as well, it should be pointed out that economic circles in Danzig and the authoritative representatives of her economic life—in particular, the Chamber of Commerce—had long urged that the economic relationships established by the treaties were not in accordance with the actual facts of the position and that serious injury was done to the Free City's economic position by a whole series of measures taken by the Polish Government and its authorities.

The memorandum by the Danzig Government, annexed to the High Commissioner's report, explained in detail the injurious effects of these Polish measures on Danzig. Economic co-operation in the form laid down in the treaties was the primary and fundamental condition for the existence of normal relations between Danzig and Poland. In order to be useful, all collaboration, as the French delegate to the Assembly had said a few days previously, must not consist only of words, but must have practical and effective results for both parties.

M. Ziehm trusted that, in accordance with the resolution before the Council, it would be possible to achieve some form of economic co-operation that would be more effective and more advantageous to the two countries. He could say, on behalf of his Government, that the latter desired the removal of all existing difficulties and that it would do everything in its power to ensure that end.

One question closely bound up with the economic situation was that of unemployment. As in many other countries, that was a very difficult problem for Danzig to solve. In Danzig, it was aggravated by quite exceptional circumstances.

The State and the communes were no longer able to defray the financial charges entailed by unemployment relief. The expenses incurred for the unemployed constantly nullified the great efforts made by the Government to balance the budget. In his report to the Council, the High Commissioner had brought out the great gravity of this question, and had stated that it was likely to constitute a serious menace to public order and to Danzig-Polish relations.

The connection between unemployment and Danzig-Polish relations was due to the inundation of the Free City by workers from Polish territory. In July 1931, there had been twenty-one thousand Polish workers in Danzig. Since January 1st, 1931, two thousand Polish workers had settled there. Polish workers poured into the Free City because the wage-level was higher there than in Poland. Employers with whom Polish orders had been placed were often compelled to engage Polish workers. The consequence of this intolerable position was that Danzig nationals in the territory of the Free City were deprived of their work and their livelihood by Polish immigrants, and that citizens of the Free City were often thrown into unemployment and distress. Every State was obliged to claim the natural right to protect its own nationals in circumstances such as these.

Poland regarded the question of her nationals' rights from a point of view other than that of Danzig. This dispute had been brought before the Council at its May session and had been referred, in conjunction with the problem as a whole, to the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion. The approach of winter, however, made it essential to find an immediate solution, without prejudice to the question of law.

The High Commissioner therefore had proposed in his report that the influx of foreign labour should provisionally be suspended, without prejudice to the legal point involved. The competent authorities of the Danzig Government, the representatives of the Danzig workers, and M. Ziehm himself, were of opinion that the measures proposed by the Polish Government in pursuance of the High Commissioner's suggestion, were insufficient to produce the necessary effects and so achieve the object in view. M. Ziehm, however, thought that he could infer from the Polish representative's declaration of principle that the Polish Government itself had seriously decided to take really effective measures to ease the congestion on the Danzig labour market.

The Danzig Government took note of that declaration with satisfaction. It would, it thought, be acting in the same spirit as that animating the Polish Government if it seconded that Government's efforts by taking suitable measures. In that way, the Danzig Government would be complying likewise with the Rapporteur's draft resolution, which proposed the limitation of the influx of non-Danzig labour with a view to reducing unemployment at Danzig.

Finally, with reference to the Rapporteur's proposal concerning the dispute between Danzig and Poland in regard to access to and anchorage in the port of Danzig for Polish war vessels, M. Ziehm's Government was anxious that this question, which had been outstanding for years, should be settled once and for all. His Government agreed that the Council should ask the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion on the legal question of principle, and that, subject to the question of law, the High Commissioner should draw up provisional regulations pending a final settlement of the matter by the Council.

In conclusion, M. Ziehm expressed the hope that the statements made in the Council and the decisions it had taken would help to remove, or at least to mitigate, the obstacles that had for so long impeded and still impeded co-operation between the Free City and the Polish Republic, more especially in the economic sphere. On behalf of his Government, he would thank the High Commissioner for what he had done to remove these difficulties. He wished also to thank the Secretariat.

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M. Ziehm pointed out that the existence of the Free City and its statute had been established by the desire of the Allies and of the League of Nations, which had stated, at the time, that the Free City could not be a naval base. Nevertheless, in 1921, the Free City had agreed to allow Polish warships to enter its port; it had then acted freely, and had concluded an agreement with Poland which could be denounced in 1931. The term mentioned in the agreement having expired, the latter had been denounced, not, he would repeat, with any unfriendly intention towards Poland, and, above all, not with the intention of creating economic difficulties in connection with the repairing and victualling of the warships. That was a question which, in principle, should be definitely cleared up, and he would note that the Council's decision was likely to lead to a solution of the dispute which was at the basis of the whole matter. In those circumstances, as the Council had decided to give its attention to the settlement of this dispute, the Government of Danzig was prepared to prolong the convention between Poland and the Free City.

M. Ziehm, replying to the Polish representative's observations in regard to the minorities, said that M. Strasburger had spoken of the equivalence of Polish diplomas and certificates, which the Free City was asked to accept for the purpose of the practice of the liberal professions. M. Ziehm had not referred to this matter because it was not mentioned in the High Commissioner's report. It did, indeed, form part of a whole group of questions at issue between Poland and the Free City, which would be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion and then to the Council. In any case, he had stated in private conversations that he was prepared to discuss a provisional settlement of the question of diplomas, pending a final solution.

In conclusion, M. Ziehm did not consider it advisable or expedient to associate this last question with the important question of unemployment, which was much more urgent, and in regard to which Danzig could not wait far long for a solution.

With regard to the Polish representative's other observations, M. Ziehm said that he had already explained his attitude in his first speech.

Viscount CECIL OF CHELWOOD did not propose to go into the special questions which had been debated between M. Ziehm and M. Strasburger. He thanked them both for having accepted the resolution attached to his report, and he trusted that that acceptance was a symbol and a symptom of closer co-operation between Poland and Danzig in the future.

There was, he thought, a misunderstanding with regard to the question of demonstrations. At its May session, the Council had expressed disapproval of all demonstrations directed against the Statute of the Free City, but he did not understand the Council to have said that all such demonstrations were necessarily illegal. That was obviously a matter to be settled by the courts. What the Council had meant was that, in the very special circumstances of Danzig, it was desirable that such expressions of opinion on burning political subjects should be as moderate and unprovocative in character as possible. Everyone who had the interests of Danzig and of Poland at heart would agree on that point.

The Council's duty in the matter was perfectly clear. The high appreciation of the High Commissioner's report expressed in Lord Cecil's report would, undoubtedly, be shared by every member of the Council. So long as the High Commissioner occupied his present responsible and difficult position, the Council's duty was to give to him its full support and sympathy backed by all the authority which the Council necessarily possessed.

*The draft resolution proposed by the Rapporteur in his report was adopted.*

Viscount CECIL OF CHELWOOD, then presented the following draft resolution: <sup>1</sup>

" The Council,

" Requests the Permanent Court of International Justice to give an advisory opinion under Article 14 of the Covenant on the following question:

" ' Do the Treaty of Peace of Versailles, Part III, Section XI, the Danzig-Polish Treaty concluded at Paris on November 9th, 1920, and the relevant decisions of the Council of the League of Nations and of the High Commissioner, confer upon Poland rights or attributions as regards the access to, or anchorage in, the port and waterways of Danzig of Polish war vessels? If so, what are these rights or attributions? '

" Requests the Permanent Court of International Justice to be so good as to give this opinion in time to enable the Council to take a decision on the matter at its session of January 1932;

" Invites the Governments of Poland and Danzig to hold themselves at the disposal of the Court for the purpose of furnishing any relevant documents or explanations.

" The Secretary-General is authorised to submit this request to the Court, to give any assistance necessary for the examination of the question, and, if necessary, to take steps to be represented before the court. "

*The draft resolution was adopted.*

M. Ziehm and Count Gravina withdrew.

<sup>1</sup> Document C.568.1931.I.



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2906. **Greco-Bulgarian Emigration: Request of the Bulgarian Government, dated August 7th, 1931, concerning the Execution of the Molloff-Caphandaris Agreement.**

M. Molloff, representative of Bulgaria, and M. Michalakopoulos, representative of Greece, came to the Council table.

M. FLANDIN, Rapporteur, reminded the Council that, at its third meeting, of the sixty-fourth session the French Representative had asked for time to consider the question connected with the execution of the Molloff-Caphandaris Agreement. The Rapporteur had hoped that the two parties would, in the interval, have been able to re-examine the matter and arrive at the necessary understanding. Unfortunately, the attempts which had been made had not been altogether successful. M. Flandin therefore proposed the following draft resolution:<sup>1</sup>

"The Council,

"Having noted the points of view stated by the representatives of Bulgaria and Greece;

"Considering that the Bulgarian Government has raised the question whether the Greek Government was entitled to establish a connection between, and set off one against the other, its debt to the Bulgarian refugees under the Molloff-Caphandaris Agreement and the Bulgarian Government's reparation debt;

"Considering that the Bulgarian Government maintains that these two debts are totally different in nature;

"Considering that, in the Greek Government's opinion, no dispute as to the interpretation of the Molloff-Caphandaris Agreement is involved;

"Noting that the respective financial obligations of the two Governments, in regard to which the difficulties thus submitted to the Council have arisen, were incurred in virtue of international instruments which are equally binding on both Governments and the execution of which can in no case be suspended except by agreement between all the signatory parties;

"Being convinced that such an agreement must be sought with extreme urgency on a practical basis in respect of the payments of the current year, all questions of law being reserved:

"Invites the two Governments to confer together in order to attain this result as soon as possible, the service of their above-mentioned debts being carried on in the interval;

"Subject to the foregoing, decides to request the Permanent Court of International Justice to consider, from the legal point of view, whether there is, in fact, a dispute between Greece and Bulgaria under Article 8 of the Molloff-Caphandaris Agreement, and, if so, to give an advisory opinion on the nature of the obligations arising out of the said agreement;

"Notes with great satisfaction the declarations of the two Governments with regard to their mutual desire to effect a general settlement of the other difficulties subsisting between them;

"Makes an urgent appeal to their spirit of conciliation and invites them to open negotiations as soon as possible with a view to achieving this result."

M. MOLLOFF said that the Bulgarian delegation took note of the Rapporteur's draft resolution. It thanked the French representative and the various organs of the Secretariat for the efforts they had made. It wished to observe that the agreement to be concluded between Bulgaria and Greece as to the payment for the year July 1931—July 1932 must in no case be taken as a precedent or as prejudicing in any way the solution to the various outstanding questions of law.

In the course of the afternoon, the Bulgarian delegation had received from the Greek delegation two notes to which a reply would be sent. It would therefore request the Council to include the notes and the replies among the papers to be sent to the Permanent Court at The Hague.

M. MICHALAKOPOULOS, on behalf of the Greek delegation, took note of the draft resolution. He adhered, however, at all points to the statement made by M. Vénisélós before the Council.

On behalf of his Government, he thanked the Rapporteur and the organs of the Secretariat for their efforts to obtain an effective agreement between the two parties, and hoped that their efforts would not be in vain.

Needless to say, the Bulgarian delegation was entitled to reply to the notes which it had received from the Greek delegation, and which were merely the necessary reply to a Bulgarian note recently received by the Greek delegation.

*The draft resolution was adopted.*

M. MARINKOVITCH had wished to wait until the resolution had been adopted before asking permission to speak. In order, however, to avoid any misunderstanding and to make sure that the resolution would not create a precedent, he was obliged to make the following declaration: In its request, the Bulgarian Government seems to assume that there was something obligatory about the Hoover proposal. That proposal, however, could only be binding on the countries which had accepted it. An attempt to reach an arrangement must be made in the case of those which had not accepted it.

M. MICHALAKOPOULOS pointed out that the matter raised by the representative of Yugoslavia was apparently cleared up in the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the resolution, which read:

"The respective financial obligations of the two Governments . . . were incurred in virtue of international instruments which are equally binding on both Governments and the

<sup>1</sup> Document C.578.1931.I.



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execution of which can in no case be suspended except by agreement between all the signatory parties."

M. FLANDIN then proposed the following draft resolution:<sup>1</sup>

"The Council,

"In view of the statements made at its meeting on September 7th, 1931, by the representatives of Bulgaria and of Greece;

"In view of the notes submitted by the Bulgarian Government on August 7th and on September 3rd, 14th and 17th, 1931, and the notes submitted by the Greek Government on September 2nd, 5th, 8th, 11th, 15th, 18th and 19th, 1931;

"Requests the Permanent Court of International Justice to give an advisory opinion on the following points:

"In the case at issue, is there a dispute between Greece and Bulgaria within the meaning of Article 8 of the Molloff-Caphandaris Agreement concluded at Geneva on December 9th, 1927?

"If so, what is the nature of the pecuniary obligations arising out of this agreement?

"Invites the Governments of Bulgaria and Greece to hold themselves at the disposal of the Court for the purpose of supplying any relevant documentation and explanations.

"The Secretary-General is authorised to submit this request to the Court, to give any assistance necessary for the examination of the question, and, should need arise, to take steps to be represented before the Court."

He added that the notes to which M. Molloff had referred as having been sent in reply to those forwarded by the Greek Government would be added to the list of notes submitted.

*The draft resolution was adopted.*

M. Molloff and M. Michalakopoulos withdrew.

2907. **Protection of Minorities in Poland: Situation of the German Minority in the Voivodies of Silesia, Poznan and Pomorze:**

(a) Notes from the German Government, dated November 27th and December 9th, 1930.

(b) Petitions from the "Deutscher Volksbund", dated January 7th and August 14th, 1931.

(c) Note from the German Government, dated December 17th, 1930.

M. YOSHIZAWA presented the following report<sup>2</sup>:

"The Council has already dealt twice with this question, at its sessions in January and in May 1931. Since its last session, it has received a new petition from the "Deutscher Volksbund" (see document C.582.1931.I).

"After carefully studying the whole of the documentation, to the details of which I need not here refer, I have come to the conclusion that the Council's principal task in this matter should be to ensure a regime of normal relations in the future between the Polish authorities and the German minority, both in the voivodie of Silesia and in the voivodies of Poznan and Pomorze. Such a regime would have a tranquillising effect in these voivodies and would thus bring about peaceful conditions.

"In this connection, I am happy to inform the Council that, during the conversations I have had with the Polish representative, he has assured me, after explaining the measures taken by his Government, that the latter will make every effort to give the minority the feeling of confidence without which it will be impossible to establish that co-operation between the minority and the States which, according to the treaties and the resolutions of the League of Nations Assembly and Council, is a duty equally urgent for the State and the minority concerned. This is the method which must be adopted in order to achieve the result contemplated by Mr. Henderson, President of the Council when, in his speech at the Council's meeting on January 24th last, he appealed first to the majority population to realise that the suppression of the rights of the minority is not in accordance with its real interests, and, secondly, to the minority to realise that it is in its true interest to co-operate loyally with the Government of the country in which it lives.

"I think the Council will agree with these considerations and in that case I would propose that it should declare the examination of this question closed."

*The conclusions of the report were adopted.*

2908. **Protection of Minorities in Upper Silesia: Appeal addressed to the Council under Articles 149 and following of the Geneva Convention of May 15th, 1922, relating to Upper Silesia: Appeal by the "Deutscher Volksbund" of June 5th, 1930, concerning the Non-admission to Minority Schools of the Voivodie of Silesia for the year 1929-30 of sixty Children formerly examined by M. Maurer, Educational Expert.**

M. YOSHIZAWA reminded the Council that, at its meeting on May 23rd, 1931, it had decided to postpone this item to the present session. He proposed that the report he had submitted at the meeting to which he had referred should be adopted.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Document C.583.1931.I.

<sup>2</sup> Document C.584.1931.I.

<sup>3</sup> Document C.391.1931.I.

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M. ZALESKI accepted the Rapporteur's conclusions, which were based on the advisory opinion from the Permanent Court of International Justice. He desired to state that the Polish Government had complied with that opinion and had informed the parents of the children mentioned in the petition that they would be admitted to the minority school without further formality.

As regards what might follow from the admission to the minority schools of children who did not speak the minority language, he would refer to his remarks before the Council on previous occasions, more especially on June 9th, 1928. He reserved his right to revert to that point, if necessary.

Dr. CURTIUS accepted the report and expressed his keen satisfaction that a final settlement had at last been found for a dispute which had for years been engaging the attention of the international authorities concerned—in particular, the President of the Mixed Commission—and which was very important to the many members of the German minority in Polish Upper Silesia. He was glad to think that the Courts' opinion, according to which the children in question could not be refused admission to the minority schools, would lead to the cancellation of all the penal measures taken against those responsible for their education, for not having sent to a Polish school, children who, according to the opinion of the Court, should have been admitted to the minority school.

M. ZALESKI said that he could make no definite statement on Dr. Curtius' suggestion.

*The report submitted by the Rapporteur at the May session of the Council was adopted.*

2909. **Protection of Minorities in Upper Silesia: Petition addressed to the Council under Article 147 of the Convention of May 15th, 1922, relating to Upper Silesia, from Dr. Prince of Pless, dated January 7th, 1931, concerning the Situation of his Father's Property in the Voivodie of Silesia (Poland).**

M. YOSHIZAWA presented the following report: <sup>1</sup>

"The Council first dealt with this question at its session in January 1931, and, at its meeting on May 23rd, 1931, it decided to adjourn the consideration of the matter to its present session. It took note of a communication from the Polish Government, dated May 19th, stating that the points regarding the taxes levied on the property of the Prince of Pless which were the subject of the petition addressed to the Council had been examined by the Polish authorities with every consideration for the petitioner.

"In a communication dated September 4th, 1931 (document C.538.1931.I), the Polish Government informed the Council that 'all the time-limits for the payment of his (the Prince of Pless's) taxes had been extended', and that, in accordance with the report of a special commission established by the Ministry of Finance for examining the petitioner's complaints, the said Ministry, 'under Article 31 of the Income Tax Law, had annulled the decisions of the Commission of Enquiry appointed to examine the question of the Prince of Pless's income tax for the years 1925 to 1929'. In the same communication, the Government informed the Council that 'the Ministry of Finance had ordered a further enquiry with a view to modifying certain figures which had previously been included in the list of taxable income'. Lastly, the Government stated that the Prince of Pless had 'expressed his personal thanks to the Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance for the considerate attitude of the Polish Government', and in this connection it enclosed the French translation of a letter addressed on September 3rd, 1931, to M. Zawadzki, Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance.

"I have been informed by the Secretary-General that a new communication from the petitioner dated September 12th, 1931, concerning this last stage in the affair has just been communicated to the Polish Government for any observations it may wish to make in accordance with the procedure in force, and that the Polish Government, in reply to this communication, has informed the Secretary-General of its intention to submit those observations in due course—i.e., within the time-limit fixed by the Council's resolution of September 8th, 1928. In these circumstances, the information at our disposal cannot yet be considered complete, and, for the moment, I can only propose to the Council that the consideration of the matter should be adjourned till its next session."

*The conclusions of the report were adopted.*

2910. **Protection of Minorities in Poland: Petitions concerning the Situation of the Ukrainian Minority in Poland.**

M. YOSHIZAWA, speaking as Rapporteur, observed that, in consequence of a proposal by the British, Italian and Norwegian representatives, members of the Minorities Committee which had examined these petitions and the Polish Government's comments in accordance with the Council's resolution of October 25th, 1920, the item relating to this question had been placed on the Council's agenda on the previous day. Before making any recommendation, he would like time to reflect

<sup>1</sup> Document C.580.1931.I.

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and to go in detail through the large number of papers on the subject. He would therefore request the Council to take no action for the moment, but merely to adjourn this matter to its next session in January 1932.

*The Rapporteur's proposal was adopted.*

2911. **Air Transport Co-operation: Relations between the Organisation for Communications and Transit and the Universal Postal Union.**

M. ZALESKI presented the following report and draft resolution<sup>1</sup>:

"The Council has taken cognisance of the letter from the Chairman of the Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit concerning the relations between the Communications and Transit Organisation and the Universal Postal Union in connection with the work undertaken by the Communications and Transit Organisation in the sphere of air transport co-operation.

"The Council has always attached the greatest importance to this work relating to the international organisation of air transport. It has not forgotten that the efforts of the Transit Organisation were undertaken in consequence of a recommendation unanimously voted by the Sub-Committee of Experts on Civil Aviation of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. The Council is further aware that it is impossible to study the organisation and operation of air transport without giving due prominence to postal traffic. The Air Transport Co-operation Committee of the Transit Organisation must not, and does not, intend to take the place of the postal administrations or of the Universal Postal Union in questions within their province; but, in order to carry out its task, it must obtain from the postal organisations particulars as to their requirements and the necessary information with regard to their traffic, etc. On the other hand, it is clear that the postal organisations are alone responsible for decisions in questions such as postal charges. Co-operation in some form or other between the postal administrations and the Air Transport Co-operation Committee of the League of Nations appears indispensable.

"The Council will also approve the intention of the Air Transport Co-operation Committee to avoid any overlapping with the work of other existing organisations, such as the Universal Postal Union. Co-operation between the Universal Postal Union and the Transit Organisation on the same lines as the present co-operation between the Transit Organisation and all the other unions seems to be the only means of preventing the Transit Organisation from being compelled to obtain for itself the opinion of the postal administrations or the advice of experts in postal questions.

"The Council therefore trusts that direct contact will be established without delay between the Universal Postal Union and the Communications and Transit Organisation in order that the important work undertaken may be carried out as satisfactory and speedily as possible, through mutual goodwill and combined efforts.

"I have the honour to submit the following resolution for the adoption of the Council:

"The Council,

"Attaching the greatest importance to the work undertaken by the Communications and Transit Organisation with regard to the international organisation of air transport;

"Noting that the Communications and Transit Organisation has never proposed in this connection to deal with exclusively postal problems within the province of the Universal Postal Union, but that, on the other hand, it cannot effectively carry out its work without knowing the requirements of the postal administrations interested in air traffic;

"Trusts that direct contact will be established for this purpose without delay between the Universal Postal Union and the Communications and Transit Organisation, and that the methods of co-operation for the purpose of avoiding all duplication which exist between the Communications and Transit Organisation and all the other unions dealing with questions of communications will be applied between the Communications and Transit Organisation and the Universal Postal Union;

"Requests the Secretary-General of the League to communicate the Council's views on this subject to the Universal Postal Union through the bureau of the Union;

"Requests the Chairman of the Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit to take all suitable measures for carrying on the work of the Organisation and to report to the Council, in time for its next session, with regard to the action taken on this resolution."

*The draft resolution was adopted.*

<sup>1</sup> Document C.579.1931.VIII.

C./65th Session/P.V.2(1).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

SECOND MEETING (PUBLIC).

*Held on Tuesday, September 22nd, 1931, at 10.30 a.m.*

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General. France was represented by M. MASSIGLI and Poland by M. SOKAL.

2912. Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant.

M. SZE. — I will not take up the time of the Council by reading the note<sup>1</sup> which I had the honour, on behalf of my Government, to communicate to you through the Secretary-General yesterday.

I wish first of all to thank you for convening this special meeting to-day and, with your permission, I will read two cable messages I received from Nanking last night. The first telegram, dated September 21st, 1931, is as follows:

"Kirin Changchun Railway seized: Japanese announced it will be managed by South Manchuria Railway which latter has sent 130 employees to Kirin to take over Chinese line. Yingkow, Antung, Changchun, Fushun and many other towns have been seized by Japanese who have cut all telegraph, telephone and wireless, hence difficult for Government to get complete news. Japanese Stock Exchange in Tokio has closed. Japanese troops also seized Huangkutun, Santungchiao and seized railway quarters Peiping-Mukden railway there, driving out all employees. Also seized many locomotives, cars belonging railway. On entering Mukden, Japanese have seized besides chief of staff, eleven important members of Fengtien provincial government. They have entered Marshal Chang Hsuehliang's private residence and have systematically looted all contents. Leinshanwan occupied by Japanese marines. Japanese military administration of Kwantung has moved into Mukden. Two more divisions being sent into Manchuria from Korea. United Press report to-day from Mukden, *inter alia*: 'With Japanese in complete control of communications throughout South Manchuria to-day disquieting reports were current regarding disturbances and possibility of conflict. With difficulty are propaganda, unfounded rumour being sifted from welter of Japanese reports, official and unofficial. At present virtually all news from this area of crisis emanates from Japanese sources.'"

The second telegram, dated also September 21st, 1931, reads as follows:

"Special to China Press from Peiping 20th:

"Various reports received here from different centres in Manchuria indicate that by far greatest destruction of Chinese property and lives took place at Changchun which city it is feared now half in ruins. Following bombardment of city by Japanese troops last evening fire broke out in several sections and a later despatch received here this afternoon states that while Japanese are in complete control of situation there conflagration continues unchecked. Magistrates' office, bureau of foreign affairs, bureau public safety and several other public buildings have gone up in flames while numerous other small private buildings have likewise been razed to the ground. Death-roll includes Brigadier Commander Fu whose unit was garrisoning Changchun and vicinity at time of Japanese invasion. Approximate

<sup>1</sup> Document C.585.M.232.1931.VII.

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casualties among Chinese soldiers and civilians estimated 600 while over 1,000 now under detention by Japanese military. Entire region Wanpaoshan has been occupied by Japanese troops. How Yung-teh who leased his holdings to Korean farmers and who was for some time storm centre of Wanpaoshan controversy has been liberated by Japanese authorities now in control of Changchun. Changchun Commissioner Public Safety, Special Border Guards Commander, Chairman Preparatory Municipal Committee and several officials reported killed."

I would add that the places mentioned in the cable despatches which have been occupied by Japanese troops, and are still in their occupation, are located in an area as extensive as the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State together.

The messages I have read undoubtedly give a very gloomy picture of the situation. Gloomy as it is, I am afraid it is only an incomplete picture, because, as I stated in my communication of yesterday to the Secretary-General, the Japanese troops have seized, in places under their occupation, Chinese means of communication. It therefore becomes increasingly difficult, if not impossible to obtain accurate, prompt and full information.

A further point I wish to emphasise is that the situation is much graver than at the time I wrote my note to the Secretary-General yesterday.

It must appear from the facts mentioned in the cables which I have read to you that it has become a serious question whether the application of other articles than Article 11 of the Covenant may not be required. It is to be hoped, however, that, owing to prompt and effective action on the part of the Government of Japan, this will not become necessary.

In conclusion, I would recall the steps which, in my letter to the Secretary-General, I requested the Council to take—viz.:

"To prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations; to re-establish the *status quo ante*, and to determine the amounts and character of such reparations as may be found due to the Republic of China."

It is, of course, with reference to the first and second steps that immediate action is imperatively required.

M. YOSHIZAWA. — I am the first to deplore the unfortunate incidents that have occurred in Manchuria. I intend to reply to the Chinese representative's statement after I have received instructions from my Government. Meanwhile, I should like to offer a few observations which will, I think, clear up the position and help to determine the scope of the problem before us.

To form a clear idea of the situation we must look at the area where that incident has occurred. Manchuria is, as you are aware, a vast territory where we have enormous interests and rights guaranteed by numerous treaties. Our nationals there number some hundreds of thousands. That is a fact which calls for note.

In this vast region, the Chinese authorities have an armed force of nearly 220,000 men, whereas we, in virtue of the treaties, have garrisons aggregating about 10,000 men. At Mukden alone, China has an army of 24,000 men, whereas we have a garrison of only one battalion. The incident mentioned occurred in the neighbourhood of Mukden where the comparative strength of the forces is 500 to 24,000 men.

The Chinese representative has alleged that the incident took place without provocation on the part of the Chinese troops. That is a mere affirmation and we cannot accept it without clear proof. According to official information in our possession, the incident was caused by the destruction by Chinese troops of part of the Japanese railway near Mukden. Hence it was as a result of this act of destruction—such acts are unhappily frequent in those parts—that the small Japanese garrison force was obliged to take up arms. It was necessary to occupy important points in certain towns in order to prevent further incidents and to protect the South Manchuria Railway and the life and property of our nationals resident in the district. I should like to point out in this connection that the contention that the Chinese troops offered no resistance is not in accordance with the facts. The dead and wounded among our troops in one city alone, Changchun, number over 150. The position has, however, become calmer.

It should be observed that this regrettable incident is not an isolated event. We must go back to earlier occurrences which led to the creation of the atmosphere which gave rise to the present incident. As I have already said, we have vast interests and rights recognised by international treaties in Manchuria. For years we have unfortunately been faced on the part of the Chinese with activities that are calculated to imperil our interests and endanger our rights, which are based on international undertakings. Further, deplorable incidents like the murder of Staff-Captain Nakamura by Chinese soldiers have occurred since the beginning of the year and thus created a feeling of tension and given rise to circumstances which are likely to disturb the good understanding between our two peoples. The recent incident may be regarded as an explosion due to this tense situation, which has been becoming worse for some time past.

In its letter to the Secretary-General, the Chinese delegation refers to the possibility of a demand for reparation for losses caused in consequence of these incidents; any such claim is

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unintelligible to us, since in our view the Chinese troops are responsible for the incident. It is, to my mind, unjust to make any such claim until the Council has finished discussing the merits of the case which have been brought before it under Article 11 of the Covenant.

As regards the demand in the Chinese Government's letter for the re-establishment of the *status quo ante*, that is a question which, in my opinion, cannot be properly settled except on the spot, and by taking into consideration the various factors existing in each locality. I cannot therefore express any opinion on this point until I have obtained my Government's views.

The unfortunate occurrence which is the cause of the present discussion is an eminently local one. Immediately after the incident, the Japanese Government sent a formal order to the commander of our forces in Manchuria to take the necessary steps to prevent the troubles from spreading. My Government has no intention of aggravating the position or of provoking further collisions. It is far from our idea to make war on the Chinese Republic.

According to the information in my possession, my Government and the Chinese Government are unanimous concerning the need for preventing everything that might aggravate the situation, so that a settlement may be found more easily. According to the particulars I have just received, a proposal has been made from the Chinese side that the solution should be sought by direct negotiation between the two Governments. The Japanese Government, I am told, has welcomed this proposal. Premature intervention in these circumstances would only have the deplorable result of needlessly exciting Japanese public opinion, which is already over-excited, and thus impede the pacific settlement of the situation. I am firmly convinced that a pacific settlement can be achieved by direct negotiations between the two Governments.

In conclusion, I wish to say that I will acquaint the Council with my Government's views as soon as I have received the instructions I am expecting at any moment. In the circumstances, I must ask the Council to adjourn the matter to its next meeting.

M. SZE. — The representative of Japan, in the statement which he has just read to you, said that he had not yet received instructions from his Government to make a definite reply, and that the views which he expressed were his own.

While I do not wish to take up too much of your time, I feel it is my duty to make a preliminary reply, reserving my answer in detail.

The first point touched on by the representative of Japan referred to the accuracy of my statements. As far as accuracy in regard to facts is concerned, I am prepared, on behalf of my Government, to agree to an enquiry being carried out by a Commission appointed by the League, and I am willing to leave the matter in the hands of an impartial Commission.

The Japanese delegate referred to certain cases, the case of Nakamura and other cases, as being responsible for the present incident. There is no need for me to tell the Council that such references are quite irrelevant. If there are other controversies besides the one before us now, there are means provided in the Covenant itself to which we can resort—diplomatic means, or, failing them, judicial means, or, finally, an appeal to the Council. This is all specified clearly in the document before us, the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Reference has been made to defensive measures, but such measures cannot be pleaded in justification, because the Council has itself on previous occasions clearly specified that no nation may plead defensive measures, and on those occasions the representative of Japan endorsed the declarations of the President of the Council, M. Briand, of the Rapporteur, Sir Austen Chamberlain, and others. I will not take up your time by quoting the relevant passages, but I may perhaps be permitted to state that they may be found in the Minutes of the thirty-sixth extraordinary session of the Council, held in Paris from Monday, October 26th, to Friday, October 30th, 1925.

The Japanese representative alleged that the Chinese had proposed direct negotiations. But how can we enter into diplomatic negotiations when a large portion of our territory is under military occupation by that country and, further, when that very country has resorted to means other than diplomatic negotiations? I do not think that any self-respecting State can agree to open diplomatic negotiations for the solution of a situation so long as a considerable portion of its territory is under forcible military occupation by the party which requests a diplomatic settlement. The representative of Japan, in taking up that position, practically questioned whether the matter was within the competence of the Council or not. I will not deal with that point now, because there is not the least doubt that the matter is within the competence of the League. Cases of a far less serious nature than this have been taken up, examined and adjusted by the Council.

I do not wish to occupy more of your time, but I would like to express my appreciation of the assurance given by the Japanese representative that his Government has no idea of war. I cannot, however, disguise my impression that we are very close to war and that immediate steps are imperatively necessary and must be taken by the Council. I may also add that the *status quo ante* must be restored before negotiations are possible.

In any case, as I stated in my communication to the Secretary-General yesterday, the Government of China is fully prepared to act in conformity with whatever recommendations it may receive from the Council, and to abide by whatever decisions the League of Nations may, in the circumstances, adopt.

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M. YOSHIKAWA. — I wish to refer to certain points in the Chinese representative's observations. In the first place M. Sze has said that, in my opening speech, I stated that I had received no instructions from my Government, and that the information which I had furnished to the Council was my own. What I meant was that I had not yet received instructions from my Government as to the line of policy which it proposed for the settlement of this incident. I did not intend to imply that the information I submitted had not been furnished by my Government. All the information I have given the Council this morning is official in character, and has been communicated to me by my Government.

Secondly, the Chinese representative said that communications had been cut off and that reports from Manchuria were very meagre. In reply to that, I would say that the first news regarding this incident came from Peiping, and I presume that the telegram from Peiping was based upon information transmitted from Manchuria. Subsequently, telegrams appeared day after day in the Press, and all this information was presumably supplied by Chinese reporters in Manchuria. I cannot, of course, say definitely whether all communications in Manchuria are intact, but I do not think it can be said that information from Manchuria in regard to the incident is meagre.

Thirdly, M. Sze said that I had implied that the consideration of the question did not come within the competence of the Council. That is not the case. What I did say was that the incident was one which might be settled by direct negotiation between the two Governments. As I pointed out in my earlier statement, not only the Japanese Government, but the Chinese Government as well is inclined to settle the question in this way. I have received official information by telegram from my Government to the effect that one of the highest officials in the National Government at Nanking spoke to the Japanese Minister to this effect. He proposed to our Minister that the incident should be settled by certain means, which I hope to be able to communicate to the Council in due course. I trust, however, that I may be permitted not to refer to them for the time being. According to the latest telegram received, my Government would seem ready to accept this proposal, though I have not yet been informed whether an answer has so far been communicated to the Chinese National Government in that sense. I am, however, able to report to the Council that my Government is ready to accept the suggestion. The remark I made in my earlier speech was therefore based upon facts.

My own view is that we must make every effort to settle this unhappy incident by direct negotiation between the two Governments. I never said that the question did not fall within the competence of the Council; I only asked the Council to adjourn the matter until its next meeting, when I hope to be in receipt of definite instructions from my Government.

M. SZE. — I think I have understood the Japanese representative's meaning correctly. I understood from the first that he was not in a position to reply to my letter because he had not yet received instructions from his Government. I further understood that he intended to make certain observations. I did not say that these were personal observations, but perhaps we can let the matter rest there. I may have been misunderstood owing to the fact that we are not using our own language.

With reference to the Japanese representative's remark regarding statements made by a Chinese official, I should point out that, at the present moment, there are no direct negotiations in progress. Moreover, I doubt whether a person can make statements in the name of his Government when he is not authorised to do so. In this connection, I may say that, during the last few days, I have again and again heard statements attributed to the Chinese delegation; but, on enquiry, it has been found that neither I nor any other of the Chinese delegates has made them. I do not accuse anyone of purposely fabricating statements. I simply mention the fact that, in the course of conversation, things may be alleged which have never actually been said.

I do not wish to take up more of the Council's time beyond saying that, as I stated in the letter submitted to you on behalf of my Government through the Secretary-General, the case is left with the Council.

M. YOSHIKAWA. — Although I am not in receipt of instructions indicating a line of policy for the settlement of this incident, I am nevertheless in a position to reply to the remarks made by M. Sze. I am speaking in my official capacity, and all that I have said has been based upon official information supplied by my Government. I may add that I will acquaint the Council at its next meeting, which I will ask the President to convene at a very early date, with such information as I may receive.

The Chinese representative said that he doubted whether a person who was not authorised to do so could make statements such as those to which I have referred. On this point I would inform the members of the Council that the official in question is a man holding one of the most important portfolios in the National Government of China, and there is no reason why the Japanese Minister should regard his statement of policy as of no official importance. After mature consideration, the Japanese Government is inclined to express its agreement with the suggestions made by this very responsible person.

Viscount CECIL OF CHELWOOD. — I shall have the assent of all my colleagues in saying that this is undoubtedly a matter of considerable seriousness and gravity, and it is not made less so

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by reason of the present condition of the world, when it is of vital interest to every country to avoid anything in the nature of political disturbance in any part of the world.

I therefore venture, at the very outset, to present that view of the case to my colleagues from Japan and China and to beg them to do their very utmost to avoid anything which can seriously disturb the peace of the world.

Though the matter is serious, it has some aspects which are encouraging.

In the first place, if I may be allowed to say so, it is a fortunate matter that the dispute should have arisen between the two countries in question. Japan has always been one of the great pillars of the League. From the very outset she has been a Member. She has taken the greatest interest in all its proceedings. She has, I believe, although this is a smaller matter, the largest society in support of the League of Nations of any Member of the League, except possibly the country which I have the honour to represent. China also has taken great interest in the League, and it is only a few days ago that she was unanimously elected as one of the non-permanent Members of the Council. We can therefore feel perfectly certain that both Governments will act fully and unreservedly in the spirit of the Covenant and will recognise their obligations, both direct and indirect, which arise from that instrument.

I am quite sure I shall have the warmest assent from my Japanese colleague in that statement, because Japan has always been pre-eminent amongst the nations of the world in her strict and rigid adherence to all international obligations.

Having said this, I do not think there is any question arising at this moment of any settlement of the merits of the dispute between the two parties. We are not in possession of the facts necessary to form an opinion. There is a very natural difference between the accounts given to us by the representatives of the two countries as to both the origin and the extent of the incident. It would obviously be quite impossible for us to decide exactly what the facts may be, since the two of our colleagues most interested are not agreed upon them, and we shall have to consider what other steps it may be necessary or possible for us to take in order to elucidate to the full what has happened.

In the meantime, there are, I think, certain preliminary steps which we may hope to take. This is not the first international dispute of this nature. There have been several in which clashes of arms have taken place and where there has been, I hope, no question of a resort to war, as we are assured by our Japanese colleague and our Chinese colleague is the case at this moment. The Council has now established what I think may be regarded as a settled procedure in these matters.

The first thing that has always been done has been for the Council, through its President, to issue an earnest appeal to both sides not to do anything to aggravate the position and to avoid further fighting of all kinds. Our Japanese colleague has already given an assurance that his country will do everything it can to avoid this, and, although I am not sure that I heard any specific assurance from our Chinese colleague to the same effect, the whole tenor of what he has said goes to show that he is ready to give the same assurance.

Another step has been taken, I think, in every case. Where it has been established that the troops of either party have entered the territory of the other, it has been customary for the President to issue an earnest appeal to the troops of both sides to withdraw from the territory of the other party and to avoid anything which might lead to a clash.

Subject to anything which may be said, I hope that our President may feel it possible to issue an appeal in that sense. Obviously, each case differs, and it may be necessary to word that appeal in one form in one case and in another form in another case; it may be necessary to take some precautions in one case which would be unnecessary in another. On all those details of form I am quite content to trust to the discretion and judgment of our President, in communication with the two parties.

I do feel, however, rather strongly that any troops which are on the territory belonging to the other party ought to be withdrawn without delay. That is the course which has been taken in previous cases, and I hope we shall not make any difference in our dealings with one country rather than another.

There are two other matters I would like to mention. In the first place, our Chinese colleague has referred to certain statements which have been made in the Council, indicating the general principles which the Council thinks ought to be adopted in cases of this kind. I have before me the statement made by the then President, M. Briand, at the session of the Council held in Paris in October 1925.<sup>1</sup> The statement reads:

"... He had understood the representative of Greece to indicate that all these incidents would not have arisen if his country had not been called upon to take rapid steps for its legitimate defence and protection. It was essential that such ideas should not take root in the minds of nations which were Members of the League and become a kind of jurisprudence, for it would be extremely dangerous. Under the pretext of legitimate defence, disputes might arise which, though limited in extent, were extremely unfortunate owing to the damage they entailed. These disputes, once they had broken out, might assume such proportions that the Government which started them, under a feeling of legitimate defence, would be no longer able to control them.

"The League of Nations, through its Council, and through all the methods of conciliation which were at its disposal, offered the nations a means of avoiding such deplorable events. The nations had only to appeal to the Council. It had been shown that the criticisms which

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Journal*, November 1925, thirty-sixth (extraordinary) session of the Council, page 1709.



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had been brought against the League of Nations to the effect that its machinery was cumbersome and that it found it difficult to take action in circumstances which required an urgent solution, were unjustified. It had been proved that a nation which appealed to the League when it felt that its existence was threatened, could be sure that the Council would be at its post ready to undertake its work of conciliation."

This statement was approved by my predecessor, Sir (then Mr.) Austen Chamberlain, on behalf of the British Empire, by Viscount Ishii, speaking for Japan, by M. Scialoja, speaking for Italy, and by a number of other members of the Council. I think it may be regarded now as the *locus classicus* as to the policy and procedure of the Council in cases of this kind.

One other matter I ought to mention. We are all aware that there are certain treaty obligations—or international instruments, let me call them—beyond the League of Nations, which affect this dispute; for instance, the Pact of Paris and the Treaty regarding Principles and Policies to be followed in Matters concerning China, signed by the United States and other Powers. In both these instruments the United States of America are very closely interested—in the first place, as one of the promoters of the Pact of Paris, and, in the second, as one of the signatories of the latter treaty. It seems to me that we should do well in these circumstances to communicate to the United States a statement of all the proceedings of this Council, and of all the discussions which have taken place within it. The United States Government will then be fully informed of what we are doing and will be able to take any action it may think right in connection with this matter.

The PRESIDENT observed that it was hardly possible for the Council to adopt a resolution on the question before it at once and he would therefore ask for time to prepare a draft resolution.

*The President's proposal was adopted.*

C./65th Session/P.V.3(r).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

THIRD MEETING (PUBLIC).

*Held on Tuesday, September 22nd, 1931, at 3.30 p.m.*

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General. France was represented by M. MASSIGLI and Poland by M. SOKAL.

2913. Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant (continuation).

M. YOSHIKAWA fully endorsed the noble sentiments to which Viscount Cecil had given expression at the previous meeting and which had prompted the conclusion of various important international agreements, among them the League Covenant and the Briand-Kellogg Pact. The Japanese Government adhered loyally to the terms of those international agreements and conventions. Not only had it respected them in the past, but it would continue in the future to observe in all respects the stipulations contained in them.

At the same time, M. Yoshizawa wished to explain as briefly as possible the conditions in Manchuria, where Japan had enormous interests. Apart from the South Manchuria Railway, there were, in Manchuria, more than a million Japanese nationals, and Japanese investments there were estimated at 2,000 million yen. Unfortunately, there were hundreds of outstanding questions which had not yet been settled between the two Governments, and, since the beginning of the present year, the situation had been aggravated by the tension existing between the Japanese residents and the local authorities and people. The relations between the two peoples had become so acute that it was difficult for those who lived in Europe to appreciate them.

Notwithstanding a series of unfortunate incidents, the Japanese Government was doing its utmost to settle all these various questions in the friendliest possible manner. M. Yoshizawa would not enumerate the incidents in question; but, if need be, he would explain them more fully to his colleagues on the Council. The unfortunate incident now engaging the Council's attention might be viewed from that angle, and that was a point which he desired to lay before the Council for its consideration.

M. SZE, referring to Lord Cecil's suggestion concerning assurances as to the withdrawal of troops, drew attention to the following paragraph in his note to the Secretary-General: <sup>1</sup>

"To these acts of violence the Chinese soldiers and populace, acting under instructions from the Chinese Government, have made no resistance, and have refrained from conduct which might in any way aggravate the situation."

The language of that paragraph was quite clear and explicit; but M. Sze was sure that when the members of the Council had seen the telegrams which he had received since the previous meeting they would have no hesitation in agreeing with him that the situation in Manchuria was becoming worse and worse every minute, and that it required their immediate attention. Time was the essential element in the situation; not a minute must be wasted.

M. Sze would repeat again the request he had made that morning that the Council should order the immediate withdrawal of the Japanese troops, which had now gone beyond the limits at which they had been stationed previously. Many Chinese, among them innocent women and children, had been killed. Some of the details contained in the telegrams he had received were, without any exaggeration, of the most revolting character.

<sup>1</sup> Document C.585.M.232.1931.VII.

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Council might find itself in an infinitely more delicate position, which would add to its difficulties in accomplishing its fundamental mission.

M. BRAADLAND supported the President's proposal. The facts in the question before the Council were not yet sufficiently well established to warrant him in holding any opinion as to the actual merits of the dispute. He desired, however, to express the keen anxiety he felt at the occurrence of such an incident between two Members of the League. He was firmly convinced that a complete solution would speedily be found for the problem, in accordance with the spirit of the Covenant and the Council's past decisions.

The responsibilities of the League and of all its Members must remain unimpaired. He trusted that, when the Council met again, it would receive communications which would enable it to congratulate the two Governments concerned and the League of Nations itself on the fact of real progress having been made towards a final settlement.

M. GRANDI said the representatives of Germany, France and Norway had so perfectly expressed his own views that he could do no more than repeat what had already been said. He desired, however, to associate himself, on behalf of his Government, with the remarks of the previous speakers, and to support the President's proposal.

At the same time, he would earnestly appeal to the two parties in the hope that, thanks to their goodwill, a solution might be found, a solution which would not merely satisfy both parties, but would be of the highest importance to the whole world.

M. SOKAL said that a great responsibility rested on the Council in the matter which had been laid before it; but it was to be hoped that, with the goodwill that the Governments directly concerned had already shown, the Council would find a solution.

He likewise accepted the President's proposal and trusted that the Council would be able to settle this dispute with all possible speed.

M. SZE understood that all the members who had spoken since the President had submitted his proposal agreed that time was an essential element in the situation, and that the resolution was only the first of a series of steps to be taken. He also understood—he hoped correctly—that, in the consultations which would take place between the present and the next meeting, the work would be within the Council—that was to say, there was no question of direct negotiation between the Chinese Government and the representative of Japan. Subject to these remarks, M. Sze approved the proposal.

He wished, however, to explain that he did so because he thought the proposal a good one so far as it went, even though it did not expressly and definitely provide for steps to be taken immediately by the Japanese Government for the purpose of fully re-establishing the *status quo ante*. Thus, not only would further loss of life and destruction of property be prevented, but the way would be paved for an impartial examination of all the events since September 18th, under the auspices and control of the League, and with a view to determining and apportioning the blame and the reparation to be made. He hoped and expected that the action authorised by the resolution would be promptly followed by such other acts on the part of the Council as the circumstances demanded. Finally, he trusted that the Council would be in a position to resume its discussion on the following day.

M. YOSHIKAWA said he also highly appreciated the sentiments by which his colleagues were animated in the interests of the settlement of the dispute. He expressed his sincere thanks for the attention with which the Council had examined the matter before it.

Various speakers had referred to the date on which the Council should meet again to consider the question. For his part, M. Yoshizawa might say that he was making every effort to supply the Council with fuller information so as to enable it to discuss the matter in greater detail; but he could not, at the moment, say whether he would be in a position to ask the President to convene another meeting on the following day. He would, of course, make the necessary request to the President as soon as he was in receipt of definite instructions from his Government.

Viscount CECIL OF CHELWOOD accepted the President's proposal as a first step, as Dr. Curtius had so properly termed it. With regard to the date of the next meeting, it was, of course, useless for the Council to meet unless it could take some action; but, if the information given by the Chinese representative was correct, very grave incidents were still taking place in Manchuria, and obviously there must be no avoidable delay.

He thought, therefore, that the decision as to the next meeting must be left to the President, and he ventured very respectfully to appeal to his Japanese colleague to hasten as much as he possibly could the necessary instructions he was awaiting from his Government.

M. YOSHIKAWA, in reply to Lord Cecil, repeated that he was making every possible effort to obtain further information from his Government, and he would not fail to submit a more comprehensive report at the earliest possible moment.

He understood Lord Cecil to have said that, if the statement made by the Chinese representative was correct, that statement included a report of the slaughter of hundreds of men, women and children, the Council could not hesitate to meet as soon as possible and even earlier than M. Yoshizawa might ask. He hoped, however, that this interpretation was not correct.

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Viscount CECIL OF CHELWOOD said his meaning was that, in view of what the Chinese representative had said, the matter was extremely urgent, as M. Yoshizawa would undoubtedly agree, and that he hoped that the instructions which the Japanese representative was awaiting from his Government would arrive at the earliest possible moment.

The PRESIDENT, speaking also as representative of Spain, associated himself with his colleagues, remarks. He could assure the Council that the question would be investigated with the utmost diligence, and the French representative's suggestion regarding the necessity of obtaining information would be borne in mind.

M. GARAY said that the American countries represented on the Council could not view without concern a question which affected the peace of the world. In view of the regrettable events that had taken place in the Far East, they felt that it was the Council's duty, in a spirit of world co-operation, to take all necessary steps, in conformity with the League Covenant and the other treaties, to secure the immediate cessation of hostilities, to prevent any resumption of the offensive by either party, and to bring about a restoration of peace in all those countries which at the moment deserved every sympathy on account of the deplorable calamities they had recently suffered. He trusted that the situation would again become normal as soon as possible.

*The Council authorised the President to take the action which he had proposed.*

C./65th Session/P.V.4(1).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

FOURTH MEETING (PUBLIC).

*Held on Friday, September 25th, 1931, at 5.15 p.m.*

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General. Germany was represented by Count BERNSTORFF, France by M. PETSCHÉ and, later, by M. MASSIGLI, the Irish Free State by Mr. LESTER, Japan by M. SAWADA and, later, by M. YOSHIZAWA, Peru by M. BARRETO, Poland by M. SOKAL and Yugoslavia by M. CHOUMENKOVITCH.

2914. **Report by the Financial Committee on the General Financial Situation.**

M. Suvich, Chairman of the Financial Committee, came to the Council table.

M. BRAADLAND presented the following report:<sup>1</sup>

"At the close of its forty-second session, which was of unusual importance owing to both the number and the gravity of the questions dealt with, the Financial Committee made a short report to the Council on the general situation (see document A.55(b)). The Committee explains that the situation is now totally different from that which existed at the time when various financial reconstruction schemes were launched under the auspices of the League. In each of the countries in question, a period of local inflation and rising prices had preceded the financial reconstruction; we now witness a fall in prices in all parts of the world, with a consequent increase in financial obligations of the State at a moment when economic life has great difficulty in bearing additional burdens.

"The Financial Committee declares that 'it cannot hide from itself and does not wish to hide from the Council that, necessary as undoubtedly are the individual methods of reconstruction which they have discussed in particular cases, their success is closely dependent on the early solution of a general world price problem which did not exist in the earlier cases'. The Financial Committee repeats the warnings recently given by the Committee appointed by the London Conference to deal with the German situation and by the Committee on Credit Problems and urges the pressing necessity in the interest of all countries of immediate action.

"As the general financial situation has during these last days formed the object of a discussion in the Second Commission of the Assembly, I propose that the Council should simply take note of this part of the Financial Committee's report."

*The Council noted the report of the Financial Committee.*

2915. **Request of the Austrian Government for an Examination by the League of its Economic and Financial Difficulties: Report of the Financial Committee.**

M. Pflügl, Representative of Austria, came to the Council table.

M. BRAADLAND presented the following report and draft resolution:<sup>2</sup>

"On September 3rd, the Council referred to the Financial Committee a letter received from the Austrian Government in which the Council was requested to proceed to an examination of Austria's economic and financial difficulties with a view to finding means of remedying them.

"The Financial Committee immediately took up the study of this question and put itself into touch with the representatives of the Austrian Government. As the Financial Committee remarks, the budgetary situation to-day is far better than it was in 1922, when the financial reconstruction scheme was undertaken. The situation is one, however, which demanded and demands prompt and energetic action. The report of the Financial Committee is before you and

<sup>1</sup> Document C.598.1931.II.A.

<sup>2</sup> Document C.600.1931.II.A.

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I need not recapitulate its contents. The Committee is to be congratulated on the rapidity with which it has accomplished the first part of its work, in which it was greatly facilitated by the fact that the Deputy Secretary-General had visited Vienna immediately after the letter referred to above was received.

"Owing to a falling-off in revenue and the financing of investments by short-term borrowing, the Austrian Government is faced with a deficit and with the repayment of short-term debt obligations which cannot be paid from the Treasury reserves. The difficulties of the Creditanstalt, which I need not recall here in detail, led the Government to undertake obligations in order to save the situation of that bank, the extent of which cannot be determined until the value of the bank's assets can be more closely ascertained. Finally, the difficulties of the Creditanstalt and the general world crisis weakened the situation of the National Bank, which, fortunately, at the beginning of the crisis, was in an exceptionally strong position and was therefore able to meet the storm.

"The Austrian Government is squarely facing the situation. The Chancellor of the Confederation has made a declaration given in full in the Financial Committee's report, which shows the firm decision of the Government to take the necessary measures. The Financial Committee, which has studied in detail the plan of reforms proposed by the Government, states that, in its opinion, this plan should, if energetically carried out, put the Austrian budget on a sound basis, in better relation to the actual conditions in Austria, and materially assist in strengthening Austria's economic situation'.

"The Council will no doubt desire to wish all success to the Austrian Government in the task it has undertaken. The difficulties of this task should not be minimised, but they are clearly not insuperable, and I have no doubt that the Government will face them with courage and determination and win the support from all sides that such determination deserves.

"The Austrian Government desires to establish collaboration with the Financial Committee and to receive in Vienna a representative or representatives of the Committee, in agreement with whom the detailed execution of the plan will be elaborated. The Committee is therefore asking the Council to authorise it to send a representative or representatives to Vienna and to give to the Austrian Government such assistance as may be within its power.

"The Council will no doubt desire to agree to this request. I propose, therefore, that it should adopt the following resolution:

"The Council,

"Approves the report of the Financial Committee on the request of the Austrian Government contained in its letter of August 7th, 1931;

"Takes note of the declaration of the Austrian Chancellor and of the plan of reforms contained therein and congratulates the Austrian Government on the determination it is showing to cope with the situation;

"Authorises the Financial Committee to co-operate with the Austrian Government with regard to the execution of the plan of reforms, to send a representative or representatives to Vienna, in agreement with whom the detailed execution of the plan of reforms will be elaborated, and to give to the Austrian Government such assistance as may be within its power."

M. Braadland added that he felt sure that all the members of the Council would agree that the Deputy Secretary-General should continue to give his personal assistance in the work undertaken on behalf of Austria.

M. GRANDI had pleasure in associating himself with the Rapporteur's observations. He congratulated the Austrian Chancellor on the position he had taken up in the matter of the restoration of his country's finances.

M. Grandi shared the feeling of confidence expressed by the Financial Committee with regard to the plan of reforms proposed by the Austrian Government. He hoped that the Financial Committee's co-operation with the Austrian Government would lead to valuable results.

He could not place too much stress on the importance of speedy improvement in the Austrian financial situation, both in the interest of Austria herself and in the general interest.

M. PETSCHÉ concurred in what the Rapporteur had said. On behalf of the French Government he congratulated the Austrian Government on the attitude it had adopted in the difficult circumstances through which Austria was passing.

The measures explained by the Chancellor, M. Buresch, in the Financial Committee for improving the financial position were drastic. They would, however, enable Austria to overcome difficulties which, while they affected all countries, were particularly serious in Austria.

The Austrian people could rely on the fullest sympathy in its efforts to improve the financial and economic situation of the country, and to restore prosperity.

Viscount CECIL associated himself, on behalf of the British Government, with the Italian and French representatives. The collaboration between the League and Austria at an earlier stage of the League's career had been one of the most satisfactory and successful incidents in its whole history. He was proud to recollect that his predecessor and relative, Lord Balfour, had taken a large share in those efforts. The Austrian Government had no need of the assurance that it had the warmest wishes of the British Government for its future prosperity and welfare.

Count BERNSTORFF joined in the wishes expressed by previous speakers. He trusted that the co-operation between the League and Austria would prove entirely successful.

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M. SOKAL, speaking on behalf of the Polish Government, endorsed the hopes expressed by the previous speakers.

M. CHOUMENKOVITCH associated himself, on behalf of the Yugoslav Government, with the statements of the Italian, French, British, German and Polish representatives.

M. MATOS joined very cordially in the views of those who had spoken before him.

M. PFLÜGL, representative of Austria, said that his Government's decision to appeal to the League with a request to examine the economic and financial difficulties by which Austria was at present beset and to seek the means of dealing with the situation had been due to its firm determination to maintain a balanced budget in all circumstances and to the situation which the Financial Committee had just examined.

The League had responded promptly to Austria's appeal. The happy decision taken by M. Avenol, then Acting Secretary-General, to go immediately to Vienna in person, accompanied by his assistants, had made it possible, with the Council's sanction, to draw up in the course of the same month, in close co-operation between the Government and the Financial Committee, a plan for the financial restoration of Austria. The main lines of that plan were set forth in the Federal Chancellor's statements to the Financial Committee, and were reproduced in the report before the Council.

The task which the Austrian Government had undertaken and to which M. Pflügl hoped the Council would give its support was an arduous one. It had been begun at a time when international economic and financial relations were in an exceptionally disturbed state, and, as a result, had become considerably more difficult. The Austrian people, however, were conscious of the needs of a particularly critical moment in Europe. They were actuated by an indomitable resolution to survive the crisis and would not grudge any sacrifices they were asked to make. The success of their efforts would be their salvation; in this time of general discouragement, it would be an example to all, and, M. Pflügl ventured to say, a matter for satisfaction on the part of those who had helped them.

The encouraging words pronounced by the Italian, French, British, German, Polish, Yugoslav and Guatemalan representatives would be warmly appreciated in Austria. It was at times like the present that the peoples drew near to one another.

On behalf of his Government, M. Pflügl expressed his deepest thanks to the Council, to the Rapporteur, to M. Avenol, to the Financial Committee, and to all the organs of the Secretariat which had taken part in this work, as well as to the Adviser of the National Bank, for the prompt and effective investigations which, with their high competence, they had immediately carried out.

M. Pflügl could not omit to refer to the special economic situation in which Austria was placed and which was at the root of the financial difficulties with which she was faced at present. That situation had been dealt with by the League long before the present European crisis had arisen, and since then it had constantly become more acute. The Austrian people placed their hopes in the early solution of this problem, for such a solution would greatly assist them in their efforts.

It only remained for him to inform the Council, on behalf of the Austrian Government, of the constitutional guarantees which had already been obtained for the execution of the programme of measures contained in the Federal Chancellor's statement which was before the Council.

The Council of Ministers had approved the programme unanimously. The Chamber (Nationalrat) being adjourned, the Federal Chancellor had submitted his report on this statement to the principal Commission of the Chamber (Hauptausschuss) at a meeting on Tuesday, September 22nd. The report had been adopted by all the members of the Government majority.

As regards the main figures in the programme, M. Pflügl had been instructed to say that they had been approved unanimously by the principal Commission. He referred, in particular, to the reduction of 35 million schillings in the difference between receipts and expenditure for the current year; the reduction, in the 1932 budget, of a maximum of 1,900 million schillings on the Government expenditure by economies on salaries and pensions, and on material expenditure; the repayment of short-term debts to the amount of 100 million schillings by drawing on the 1932 budget receipts, a similar withdrawal for a similar purpose from the 1933 budget receipts, and, lastly, the fixing of the 1932 budget receipts at a sum of at least 2,000 million schillings.

The draft laws for giving effect to these decisions would be submitted to the Chamber as soon as it met again; this meeting would take place very shortly.

M. SUVICH said that the Financial Committee would certainly be gratified to learn that the reconstruction plan had been approved by the Austrian Government and by the principal Commission of the Chamber by a large majority, and in part unanimously.

It was, of course, understood that the plan was an organic whole and was to be carried out in every particular.

M. BRAADLAND was sure that all the members would agree in thanking the Austrian representative for the information he had given to the Council, and in congratulating the Austrian Government on its endeavours to put on foot its programme of financial reforms and reconstruction.

*The draft resolution was adopted.*

M. Pflügl withdrew.

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2916. Request of the Hungarian Government for an Examination by the League of the Financial Situation of Hungary: Report of the Financial Committee.

M. Pelényi, representative of Hungary, came to the Council table.

M. BRAADLAND presented the following report and draft resolution: <sup>1</sup>

"On September 7th, the Council referred to the Financial Committee the request of the Hungarian Government for an examination to be made into the financial situation of the country by means of an expert enquiry. The Financial Committee has made a preliminary study of the situation with the assistance of representatives of the Hungarian Government and of the Hungarian National Bank. The Committee gives in its report certain figures concerning the budget situation, and shows that the Government is taking energetic measures to restore budgetary equilibrium.

"There are, the Committee adds, however, other aspects of the question that demand a more thorough enquiry than it is possible to make in Geneva. As the Hungarian Government's request was only received while the Committee was sitting, it was impossible to make any investigation on the spot, as was done in the case of Austria. The Committee therefore proposes to send a delegation to Budapest to make an enquiry as requested by the Hungarian Government. As it may be necessary to take prompt action to deal with the situation before the next session of the Council, the Committee asks the Council to give it permission to take such action, of which the Council would, of course, be kept informed. The Committee contemplates, in particular, the elaboration with the Hungarian Government of a definite plan for the amelioration of the financial situation in Hungary, and also perhaps the publication of a report on the Hungarian financial position.

"For the reasons explained in the Committee's report, I consider that we should grant to the Financial Committee the authorisation it asks for and propose the following resolution:

"The Council,

"Approves the report of the Financial Committee on the request of the Hungarian Government for an examination to be made into the financial situation of that country;

"Authorises the Financial Committee, while keeping the members of the Council informed, to take such action as may be required to deal with the situation, and to publish, should such a course prove opportune, its report on the question before the next meeting of the Council."

M. GRANDI announced the Italian Government's agreement to the proposal, made by the Financial Committee and the Rapporteur, to accept the request formulated by the Hungarian Government for a fuller enquiry into the financial position of Hungary. He also accepted the draft resolution submitted for the approval of the Council.

In the interests of Hungary and in the general interest, it was most important to consider without delay measures to bring about an improvement in the financial situation of that country. The measures which the Hungarian Government and Parliament had already taken were a good beginning and the best augury for the success of the proposed work of co-operation. The Italian Government took that opportunity of reaffirming its friendly sentiments towards Hungary.

M. PETSCHÉ, associating the French Government with the Rapporteur's statements, expressed the hope that measures would shortly be adopted which would result in an improvement in the financial situation of Hungary. The Hungarian people could rest assured that their efforts were regarded with the fullest sympathy.

Viscount CECIL said he was in entire agreement with the statements of the Rapporteur and the representatives of Italy and France.

Count BERNSTORFF associated himself with the good wishes and hopes expressed by the previous speakers.

M. SOKAL also supported the draft resolution submitted by the Rapporteur, and, while associating himself on behalf of Poland with the statements that had been made, he reserved such observations as his Government might desire to make until the time when the question came up before the Council at its next session.

M. PELÉNYI, representative of Hungary, thanked the Council for its decision, and the Rapporteur, the Financial Committee and the Secretariat for their work. He also desired particularly to thank the representatives of Italy, France, the British Empire, Germany and Poland for their friendly observations.

He assured the Council that the Committee of Enquiry which was to go to Hungary would receive the warmest welcome from the Government and the people of Hungary.

*The draft resolution was adopted.*

M. Pelényi and M. Suvich withdrew.

<sup>1</sup> Document C.599.1931.II.A.



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2917. Report of the Organisation Committee of the International Agricultural Mortgage Credit Company.

M. Regard, Chairman of the Organisation Committee, came to the Council table.

M. BRAADLAND presented the following report and draft resolutions:<sup>1</sup>

"The Council has before it the report of the Organisation Committee of the International Agricultural Mortgage Credit Company (document C.560.1931).

"1. As the Organisation Committee states in its report, the Convention for the creation of that company has been signed up to date by eighteen Governments, the nominal contributions of which to the special reserve amply cover the sum of 25 million Swiss francs fixed by the Convention. Nevertheless, it is desirable that Governments which intend to sign the Convention should do so before the period of signature comes to an end on September 30th. The Council will doubtless agree with the proposal of the Organisation Committee to make a special appeal to those Governments.

"Amongst the signatory Governments, two have so far obtained preliminary ratification. In most other countries it has been impossible on account of the parliamentary recess.

"As it would be desirable for the company to be created without delay, the Organisation Committee proposes that the Council should ask the signatory Governments to accelerate the ratification procedure in order that the Convention may in any case come into force before the end of this year. The Organisation Committee also proposes that the Council should draw the attention of the Governments to the provisions in the Convention for fiscal exemptions in favour of the company. The Council will no doubt desire to adopt these proposals.

"2. In May, the Council asked the Organisation Committee to consider in what form it would be possible to contemplate the accession of States not members of the League to the Convention establishing the International Agricultural Mortgage Credit Company.

"In its report, the Organisation Committee points out that the accession of such States is not possible under the present text of the Convention, and that, in order to make such accession possible, the Convention would have to be modified. The Convention itself contains a procedure for its modification; it can be revised by a Conference of the contracting Governments convened by the Council of the League, with the agreement of the company. Practically, such a revision can only take place once the Convention is definitely in force. Theoretically, it would not be impossible to modify the Convention before that time; but, in the present circumstances, such a procedure would inevitably entail considerable delay in its ratification and coming into force. I accordingly propose that the Council should adopt the Organisation Committee's conclusions and, while again urging the putting into force of the Convention in its present form at as early a date as possible, should transmit the Organisation Committee's conclusions to the Committee of Enquiry for European Union with a request to examine the conditions under which the necessary procedure to make the subsequent accession of Governments not Members of the League possible might be put into operation.

"3. Under Article 23 of the Convention, the Council of the League has to appoint the President and the Vice-President of the company. The Organisation Committee asks that the Council should make those nominations during the September session, as it is difficult for the Organisation Committee to appoint the other members of the Board of Directors as long as the President and Vice-President have not been appointed.

"I see no objection to this request of the Organisation Committee, and, if the Council agrees, I shall submit proposals as to these nominations at a private meeting.

"I have the honour to propose the following resolutions:

"1. The Council draws the attention of the European Members of the League to the appeal made by M. Briand last May, in the Commission of Enquiry for European Union, to unite their efforts to ensure the success of the International Agricultural Mortgage Credit Company'.

"2. The Council urges the signatory Governments to accelerate as much as possible the procedure of ratification in order that the Convention may come into force before the end of this year'.

"3. The Council draws the attention of the signatory Governments to the possibility offered by Article 9 of the Convention, of making, at the moment of ratification, special declarations concerning fiscal exemptions which the Governments may be willing to concede to the company'.

"4. The Council transmits to the Committee of Enquiry for European Union the Organisation Committee's report with the request to examine the conditions under which the necessary procedure for the subsequent accession of Governments not members of the League might be put into operation'."

<sup>1</sup> Document C.566(1).1931.II.A.

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M. REGARD desired first of all to thank the Council for the very great honour it had done him by inviting him to come to the Council table.

He thought he should supplement, in one particular, the report submitted by the Organisation Committee of the International Agricultural Mortgage Credit Company. Since the report had been submitted to the Council, three new signatures had been affixed to the Convention, those of Sweden, Lithuania and Denmark, which brought the number of signatory States up to twenty-one.

As the result of twenty-one signatures, the contributions to the special reserve now amounted to 31 million Swiss francs, whereas under the Convention the special reserve was fixed at only 25 millions. A proportionate reduction in the contribution of each of the signatory States would therefore have to be made.

The PRESIDENT, speaking as Spanish representative, was glad to announce that, in his capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, he would shortly sign the Convention.

*The draft resolutions were adopted.*

M. REGARD withdrew.

2918. **Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant** (continuation).

The PRESIDENT said that the members of the Council had received copies of the communications which the Chinese and Japanese Governments had addressed to him in answer to the telegrams he had the honour of sending to them on behalf of the Council. The Chinese Government's reply had reached him on the previous day and the reply of the Japanese Government that day.

He was sure that he was expressing the feelings of all his colleagues when he asked the representatives of China and Japan to transmit to their Governments the Council's thanks for the promptness with which they had replied to its appeal.

He proposed that the Council should note the two replies. He felt that the Council had every reason to be satisfied with the Japanese Government's statement that it "had withdrawn the greater part of its forces to the railway zone and that they were concentrated there". That improvement in the situation should be emphasised.

M. YOSHIZAWA said that the night before he had had the honour to communicate to the Council the Japanese Government's reply to the message which the President had forwarded to that Government. That morning he had received and transmitted to the members of the Council his Government's statement concerning the incidents in Manchuria. In view of the importance of these documents, he asked the President to be good enough to have them read.

(a) **LETTER FROM M. YOSHIZAWA TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, DATED SEPTEMBER 24TH, 1931.**<sup>1</sup>

Acting on instructions received from my Government, I have the honour to acquaint Your Excellency with the reply of my Government to the telegram of September 22nd which Your Excellency was good enough to forward to it.

1. As regards the first point mentioned in the message, the Japanese troops, since the beginning of the present events, have been careful to act only within the limits necessary to ensure their own safety, the protection of the railway and the safety of Japanese nationals. The Japanese Government has firmly pursued the object of preventing an extension of the incident and the aggravation of the situation; it is profoundly desirous of ensuring the peaceful settlement of this problem as rapidly as possible by negotiations between the two countries, and it has the firm intention not to depart from this line of conduct.

2. As regards the second point in the message, the Japanese Government desires to state that it has withdrawn the greater part of its forces to the railway zone and that they are concentrated there. Outside that zone, only a few troops are, as a precautionary measure, quartered in the town of Mukden and at Kirin, and a small number of soldiers have been placed at certain points, these measures not constituting any military occupation.

The Japanese forces are being withdrawn to the fullest extent which is at present allowed by the maintenance of the safety of Japanese nationals and the protection of the railway. The Japanese Government, which intends to withdraw its troops to the railway zone in proportion as the situation improves, feels confident that the Council will, in this matter, trust the sincerity of its attitude.

(Signed) YOSHIZAWA.

(b) **LETTER FROM M. YOSHIZAWA TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DATED SEPTEMBER 25TH, 1931.**<sup>2</sup>

I have the honour to communicate a declaration made by the Japanese Government on September 24th 1931, regarding the incidents in Manchuria. I would ask you to be good enough to forward this declaration to the President and Members of the Council.

(Signed) YOSHIZAWA.

<sup>1</sup> Document C.607.M.245.1931.VII.

<sup>2</sup> Document C.609.M.246.1931.VII.

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*Statement issued by the Japanese Government on September 24th 1931, in regard to the Recent Incident in Manchuria.*

"(1) The Japanese Government has constantly been exercising honest endeavours in pursuance of its settled policy to foster friendly relations between Japan and China, and to promote a common prosperity and well-being of the two countries. Unfortunately, the conduct of officials and individuals in China for some years past has been such that our national sentiment has frequently been irritated. In particular, unpleasant incidents have taken place one after another in the regions of Manchuria and Mongolia, in which Japan is interested in especial degree, until impression has gained strength in the minds of Japanese people that Japan's fair and friendly attitude is not being reciprocated by China in a like spirit. Amidst the atmosphere of perturbation and anxiety thus created, a detachment of Chinese troops destroyed tracks of South Manchuria Railway in the vicinity of Mukden, and attacked our railway guards in the midnight of September 18th. The clash between the Japanese and Chinese troops then took place.

"(2) The situation became critical, as the number of Japanese guards stationed along the entire railway did not then exceed 10,400 while there were in juxtaposition some 220,000 Chinese soldiers. Moreover, hundreds of thousands of Japanese residents were placed in jeopardy. In order to forestall an imminent disaster, the Japanese army had to act promptly. The Chinese soldiers garrisoned in neighbouring localities were disarmed, and the duty of maintaining peace and order was left in the hands of local Chinese organisations under the supervision of Japanese troops.

"(3) These measures having been taken, our soldiers were mostly withdrawn within the railway zone. There still remains some attachments in Mukden and Kirin, and a small number of men in a few other places, but nowhere does a state of military occupation as such exist. The report that the Japanese authorities have seized Customs or Saltgabelle Office in Yingkou, or that they have taken control of Chinese railways between Ssuningka and Chenchiatun or between Mukden and Sinmintun are entirely untrue; nor has the story of our troops having ever been sent north of Changchun or into Chientao any foundation in fact.

"(4) The Japanese Government, at a special Cabinet meeting of September 19th, took the decision that all possible efforts should be made to prevent an aggravation of the situation, and instructions to that effect were given to the commander of the Manchurian garrison. It is true that a detachment was despatched from Changchun to Kirin on September 21st, but it was not with a view to military occupation. It was sent only for the purpose of removing menace to the South Manchuria Railway on the flank. As soon as that object has been attained, our detachment will be entirely withdrawn. It may be added that, while a mixed brigade of four thousand men was sent from Korea to join the Manchurian garrison, the total number of men in garrison at present still remains within the limit set by treaty, and that fact cannot therefore be regarded as having in any way added to the seriousness of the international situation.

"(5) It may be superfluous to repeat that the Japanese Government harbours no territorial design in Manchuria. What we desire is that the Japanese subjects shall be enabled to engage safely in various peaceful pursuits, and be given an opportunity of participating in the development of that land by means of capital and labour. It is the proper duty of a Government to protect the rights and interests legitimately enjoyed by the nation or individuals. The endeavours of the Japanese Government to guard the South Manchuria Railway against wanton attacks should be viewed in no other light. The Japanese Government, true to its established policy, is prepared to co-operate with the Chinese Government in order to prevent the present incident from developing into a disastrous situation between the two countries, and to work out such constructive plans as will once for all eradicate causes for future friction. The Japanese Government would be more than gratified if the present difficulty could be brought to a solution which will give a new turn to the mutual relations between the two countries."

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M. YOSHIKAWA then read the following statement:

"I am glad to see that these documents and particulars which I have already communicated to the Council confirm in every respect the statements I made on my own responsibility at its meeting on September 22nd. I feel certain that they have cleared the atmosphere, which up to now has been obscured by alarming and exaggerated reports. In this connection I wish to make an indignant protest against the abominable accusations made against the Japanese troops. Those accusations are radically opposed to the noble traditions of our army and the strict discipline which prevails.

"The official information which I have communicated to you reduces the incidents in Manchuria to their proper proportions and will make it possible to examine the question in the atmosphere of calm and deliberation which its importance merits.

"The origin of the present incident—namely, the destruction of a part of the South Manchuria Railway line on the night of September 18th by a troop of Chinese soldiers—must necessarily call attention to the position of the Japanese forces in that region. Under the treaties, Japan possesses the important railway line which crosses regions frequently disturbed by political strife and attacks by bands of plunderers. For the purpose of protecting this line, around which is grouped

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a large Chinese and Japanese population, and safeguarding the native and foreign undertakings which have sprung up since the railway was built, the treaties provided for a zone on either side of the railway to be guarded by 15 soldiers per kilometre—that is to say, rather more than 15,000 men for the defence of 1,200 kilometres of track and several hundred thousand Japanese nationals scattered along the zone, while near them are stationed Chinese forces overwhelmingly superior in number.

"When the incident of September 18th occurred, the Japanese command, having regard to the dangerous atmosphere which I have mentioned, immediately took the protective measures incumbent upon it, and to do this it was obliged to check the movement of superior forces and to prevent the outbreak of popular demonstrations. An operation of this kind must necessarily be fairly far-reaching in scope and must be carried to a certain point if it is to be effective. It is none the less a protective measure and does not constitute aggression or occupation, as alleged in the first reports which have now proved to be incorrect.

"From the very first, the Japanese Government instructed the general in command of the troops at all costs to prevent the incident from spreading. Although 4,000 men had to be brought to the railway zone immediately, the total number of troops protecting it did not reach the number provided for in the treaties. They only went outside the railway zone in cases of urgent necessity, and, as soon as circumstances permitted, were brought back. The situation has now improved sufficiently to enable the greater part of our forces to be withdrawn, and the desires of the Council have thus been anticipated.

"To-day, the only troops outside the zone are detachments at Kirin and in the town of Mukden, and at a few small observation posts. The Japanese Government has stated, and repeats, that it is its intention to continue withdrawing the troops as soon as tranquillity has been sufficiently restored to enable it to do so without danger to its nationals. Moreover, I am in a position to state that it is absolutely incorrect that Japanese forces have been landed at Chefou, Tsingtao or other places actually in China. No troops—not even marines—have been landed, and our consular authorities are relying on the Chinese local authorities to protect our nationals.

"The Japanese Government repeats its earnest desire for a peaceful settlement of the incident by direct negotiation. As you are aware, a member of the Nanking Government at the very outset advocated a means of direct negotiation, and my Government accepted this proposal, which was then withdrawn by its author. The reason given on the Chinese side was that the course of events had changed the situation. In my opinion, the improvement in the situation to which I have just referred militates in favour of the reconsideration of the idea underlying the Chinese proposal.

"I need not dwell on the Council's mission nor on the action which the League should take in the event of difficulties between its Members. Its essential mission is to bring about a pacific settlement of the dispute. The method may vary according to the circumstances, but one point is clear—namely, that it is necessary to respect the wishes of the parties. If the latter, or one of them, clearly express their views as to the choice of procedure, it seems to me that it is the duty of the Council—which is, moreover, confirmed by practice—to respect their desires and to allow the parties in conflict the time necessary to achieve the proposed object, which is the settlement of the problem. In the present case it seems to me that the Council, in view of its nature, would do well not to intervene prematurely, as by so doing it might run the risk of adversely affecting the situation which already shows signs of improvement. I would repeat that my Government is prepared immediately to enter into negotiations with the Chinese Government with a view to a satisfactory settlement of the incident."

M. SZE asked that the reply from the Chinese Government should be read.

(c) TELEGRAM FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 23RD, 1931.<sup>1</sup>

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram conveying to me the decision reached by the Council of the League of Nations at its yesterday's meeting regarding the appeal of the Chinese Government to deal with the situation in China created by the action of Japanese troops. In accordance with the Covenant of the League, while expressing the appreciation of the Chinese Government of the prompt response thus made by the Council, I am confident that the decision you have communicated to me is only the first and preliminary step leading to the definite settlement of the question and that no time will be lost in the adoption of measures for giving complete satisfaction to the aggrieved party. In regard to first point, the Chinese Government declares that it welcomes and fully accepts the recommendations of the Council to abstain from any action liable to aggravate the situation or prejudice the pacific settlement of the question. In the face of every provocation the Government has taken all possible precautions to this end. It will suffice to quote a passage from the proclamation issued to the Chinese nation by the President of National Government:

"As we have entrusted our case to the League, the National Army has received the strictest orders to avoid all possibility of clash with the invaders. We exhort the entire nation to maintain dignified calm."

<sup>1</sup> Document C.596.M.238.1931.

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As regards the second point, the Chinese Government specially welcomes the decision of the Council to the effect that the troops on both sides should return immediately to their original positions. No measures contrary to the letter or spirit of this decision have been taken by China, nor have any movements of troops taken place save those necessitated by the firm decision of the Government to offer no resistance to the aggressive movements of the Japanese troops. The Chinese Government is gratified to learn that Your Excellency is, on behalf of the Council, guiding the search for the most effective means of ensuring the immediate withdrawal of the Japanese troops. I earnestly request most prompt action in this regard, as the situation is growing in gravity with every hour and the effective application of the Council's decision brooks absolutely no delay.

The Chinese Government will assume full responsibility for the protection of life and property as soon as we regain control of the areas evacuated by the Japanese troops.

The Chinese Government notes with satisfaction the third and last paragraph of the Council's decision, which authorises you to forward the Minutes of the meetings of the Council and all documents concerning this affair to the United States of America.—Chengting WANG, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the National Government of the Republic of China, September 23rd 1931.

\* \* \*

M. SZE spoke as follows:

China has placed herself unreservedly in the hands of the League and has agreed to accept any recommendations or directions which the Council may make. Relying with confidence on the League, China has made every effort to prevent an aggravation of the situation, and to that end has issued orders to its military forces and civilian population not to resist, with the result that Japanese military forces are now in occupation of important places in Manchuria, many of them at considerable distances from the scene of the original outbreak of violence. China heartily approves the action of the Council in sending, through the President, the letter of September 22nd, to the Governments of China and Japan, urging them to take no steps that might aggravate the situation and declaring that the Council would, by consultation with the Chinese and Japanese representatives on the Council, endeavour to find adequate means of enabling the two countries forthwith to withdraw their troops without the safety of their nationals and their property being endangered.

In reply to that letter, my Government has said that it is fully prepared to follow these recommendations, and has declared that the Chinese Government would assume full responsibility for the protection of life and property as soon as it regained control of the areas evacuated by the Japanese troops. In its reply, my Government expressed itself as confident that the action of the Council, as evidenced by the letter, was but a first and preliminary step leading to the definite settlement of the question, and that no time would be lost by the Council in adopting measures for giving complete satisfaction to the aggrieved party. My Government is strongly of the opinion that, if the matter is to be kept within the operation of Article 11 of the Covenant, the next and immediate step which the Council should take is to secure the complete withdrawal of troops to the positions or stations occupied by them prior to September 18th, the *status quo ante* thus being re-established.

In conformity with earlier precedents established by the Council, my Government has thought it desirable that a Commission of neutral members should be appointed by the Council and empowered to observe the modes in which, and the times at which, the troops are withdrawn, and to report thereon to the Council.

It appears to my Government that, in conformity with precedent, the next and immediate step on the part of the Council should be to point out to the Government of Japan that, unless there is an immediate withdrawal, Japan will place herself in opposition to the categorical obligation assumed by her under the first paragraph of Article 15 of the Covenant, to submit to the Council disputes which are likely to lead to a rupture and which are not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement, and it need hardly be observed that, if Article 15 is brought into operation, the procedure to be taken by the parties to the dispute and by the Council or the Assembly, if the question is referred to it, is no longer a matter of discretion, but is stated definitely and with particularity.

If it should be claimed by the Government of Japan that the local conditions are such that the troops cannot be withdrawn without leaving her resident nationals and their property in a perilous situation, it may be pointed out—as already stated—that the Government of China has given an assurance that lives and property will be protected. As to the ability of the Government of China to do this, it may be pointed out that, although indignation against the Japanese because of the acts of the Japanese troops is intense throughout China, there have been no reports that Japanese living in China, in regions where there are no Japanese troops, have been molested. The general obedience rendered by both the military and civilians to the proclamation of the Chinese Government urging them to do nothing to aggravate the situation is itself strong evidence of the control possessed by the Government over its people.

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I ask your permission to make a preliminary reply to certain observations made by the Japanese representative. He has been good enough to place before us letters and statements which deserve careful study: but, after a first glance at these documents, I should like to give my first impressions, reserving the right to give a fuller reply at a subsequent meeting.

Before proceeding, I wish to have it clearly understood that any remarks I make should not be taken as meaning that I am discussing the merits of the dispute between us. That is not the question which is before the Council at the present moment.

The statement read to us by the Japanese representative conceded that there is now a considerable occupation of Chinese territory in Manchuria by Japanese troops. He also conceded that there had been bloodshed, and that places in Manchuria where there is not even the claim of a treaty right by the Japanese Government are still occupied.

The Japanese representative questions the accuracy of some of the statements I had the honour to submit to you. As I stated a day or two ago, the fact that the accuracy of some of my statements is contested, and that I, too, have contested the accuracy of some of the Japanese representative's statements, is the very reason why a neutral impartial commission should be sent to enquire into them.

Since the military occupation of important parts of Manchuria by the Japanese, it has been very difficult for the Chinese Government to collect news. The last sentence but one of despatch No. 18,<sup>1</sup> which I have circulated, reads as follows:

"Only foreign members Sino-Foreign Press delegation allowed enter Mukden but must obtain permission from military before proceeding places and forbidden take photos".

Despatch No. 22<sup>1</sup> contains the following passage:

"At Chingwangtao Japanese soldiers searching all passengers on Peking-Mukden trains special attention being paid those travelling eastwards. Press representatives being closely scrutinised".

Chingwangtao is a seaport on the Peking-Mukden railway inside the Great Wall.

The Japanese representative has not questioned the accuracy of those two telegrams. All the information which the Chinese Government has received from Manchuria, meagre as it is, has thus passed through a sort of censorship.

At a time such as this, there are bound to be exaggerated statements on both sides, but I am quite prepared to give weight to Press news, because at times like the present Press news, especially from sources other than Chinese or Japanese, can be regarded with considerable reliance.

The Japanese representative has again mentioned defensive measures. Lord Cecil has already read to you an extract regarding defensive measures, and I have also dealt with this question briefly. I will not, therefore, deal with it further at the moment.

The Japanese representative has said that Japanese are now occupying Mukden and Kirin. These are two very important cities, as they are both capitals of provinces of Manchuria. He has stated in connection with the withdrawal of troops, "There still remain some detachments in Mukden and Kirin, and a small number of men in a few other places . . . ."

This is a very interesting statement and I wonder whether the Japanese representative would tell us what he considers "a small number of men" and what are the "few other places".

He has said that the measures taken were necessary for the protection of Japanese lives and property. If you will permit me to say so, it is a dangerous principle to assert that, in order to protect nationals and their property in a foreign country, a large number of troops may occupy so many places, destroy so much property and kill so many innocent people. In every country in the world there are nationals of other countries. Is this principle going to be the new principle for the world? This question deserves the closest attention, not only of the Members of the Council, but of the other nations.

There are several points which I could answer immediately, but I prefer to leave them to a subsequent meeting. I wish at present to reiterate the request made the other day that, as the situation is so grave, a Commission of neutral observers should be sent by the Council immediately.

I should like to add another point which I think is necessary in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding. The Japanese representative offered to China direct negotiations, and he also mentioned direct negotiations at our last meeting in connection with conversations held with a

<sup>1</sup> Document C.604.M.242.1931.VII.

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member of the Cabinet of Nanking. You will probably recall that one of the cabled despatches I submitted to you, cable No. 19, dealt with that subject<sup>1</sup>. With your permission I will read it:

*Telegram received by the Chinese delegation from Nanking, and dated September 23rd 1931.*

"Government's statement.

"M. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Minister to China, called on M. B. S. Soong, Vice-Chairman of the Executive Yuan, on Saturday morning, September 19th, at Shanghai, and in the course of a private discussion when through the seizure by Japanese troops of wireless, telegraph and telephone lines in Manchuria information available was mainly from Japanese sources which seemed to point to a purely local clash and envisaged the feasibility of setting up without delay a mixed 'Sino-Japanese Commission' to investigate the facts of an isolated incident in order to prevent it from embittering friendly relations between the two nations.

"Meanwhile the warlike character of the Japanese military operations became known, the invasion continued and the National Government appealed to the League of the Council, which fixed the debate for Tuesday, September 22nd, at 10 a.m. Geneva time, and 5 p.m. Nanking time.

"On the same day, Tuesday, September 22nd, at noon Nanking time, 5 a.m. Geneva time, the Japanese Consul-General in Nanking called officially on M. T. B. Soong to declare that the Japanese Government would be glad to constitute Commission referred to in the private conversations between M. Shigemitsu and M. T. B. Soong on the morning of Saturday, September 19th. M. T. B. Soong informed the Japanese Consul-General on behalf of the National Government that the invasion of Chinese territory by the Japanese troops made any direct negotiations absolutely impossible."

That last sentence still holds good.

M. YOSHIKAWA said that he had already replied in a previous statement to the accusations brought by the Chinese representative against Japan.

Viscount CECIL said that he would like to indicate briefly how he understood the actual position in which the Council was placed.

As he understood it, the matter had been brought before the Council under Article 11 of the Covenant, and therefore he did not understand the reference of the Chinese representative to Article 15, which could be invoked, as the Chinese representative was aware, by the procedure indicated therein, but which had not been invoked in the present case. The duty of the Council, as Lord Cecil had always understood it and as was expressed clearly in Article 11, was to "take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations". That was the Council's duty. It had not to settle the dispute or pass any judgment on the action of parties, or, indeed, to do anything but safeguard the peace of nations. It was only when peace had been safeguarded, for that was primarily the duty of the Council, that any question as to the settlement of the actual dispute could arise.

Lord Cecil agreed with his Japanese colleague that, primarily, the question of the dispute was a matter for the parties and not for the Council to deal with, unless it came before the latter under Article 15, or unless the parties had signed some general arbitration treaty, or what was called the General Act; in that case they were bound by their contractual agreement. But at the present stage the business of the Council, acting under Article 11, was to safeguard the peace of nations. That, at any rate, was his reason for accepting the proceedings at the previous Council meeting, when it urged both parties to refrain from action which would aggravate the dispute and to withdraw, as soon as possible, any troops that had penetrated into the territory of the other, apart from their treaty rights. Such seemed to him to be the duty of the Council, which would have failed in its duty if it had not taken that course.

It was with the greatest pleasure that he had recognised from the statement made by his Japanese colleague that, in point of fact, even before receiving the Council's communication, the Japanese troops were being withdrawn. The Japanese representative would contradict him if he said anything inaccurate, but Lord Cecil understood that that was his statement, and, so far as he knew, the Chinese representative did not dispute the fact. The Chinese representative said that there were still troops occupying the territory of China which the Japanese Government was not entitled to under treaty obligations, and it was clear that the Council would desire — and the Japanese Government too, he hoped — that those troops should be withdrawn as rapidly as possible. That was the obvious precaution which the Council ought to take to preserve the peace of nations.

Both sides admitted that the process of withdrawal was in progress, and there was every reason to hope that the duty of the Council to safeguard the peace of nations might in a short time be regarded as having been fully accomplished. If the Council entertained any doubts on the question, it would have to consider what its duty was under those circumstances.

He had submitted these observations merely to make quite clear what he took to be the duty of the Council in the matter, and what he had always believed to be the general understanding on that point.

<sup>1</sup> Document C.604.M.242.1931.VII.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The PRESIDENT said he would confine himself to making a brief statement.

The Japanese forces in the railway zone were being withdrawn, and, if on both sides efforts were made to alleviate the situation, the Council might hope for a satisfactory settlement of the problem. It must rely first and foremost on the firm determination of the two parties concerned, on the loyalty of their conduct, and on their sincere desire not to aggravate the situation. On the one hand, it would certainly wish to appeal to the Japanese Government to withdraw its troops as rapidly as possible within the railway zone. On the other hand, it would note the Chinese representative's statement that, in accordance with the pledge given in his Government's telegram of September 23rd, the latter would assume responsibility, as and when the Japanese troops withdrew, for the safety of Japanese subjects and the protection of their property outside the said zone.

The Council would no doubt desire to be kept informed of the measures taken by the two parties in response to the appeal which the President had just made to them.

Under the circumstances, he proposed to postpone the discussion of the question; furthermore, in view of the importance of the statements the Council had just heard, he thought his colleagues would like to have time to study them. The Council would meet as soon as the President had had time to consult his colleagues.



C./65th Session/P.V.5 (I).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

FIFTH MEETING (PRIVATE, THEN PUBLIC)

*Held on Monday, September 28th, 1931, at 5 p.m.*

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General. France was represented by M. PETSCHÉ, then by M. MASSIGLI, Germany by COUNT BERNSTORFF, the Irish Free State by Mr. LESTER, Italy by M. SCIALOJA, Peru by M. BARRETO, Poland by M. SOKAL and Yugoslavia by M. FOTITCH.

2919. Appointment of Rapporteurs.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL submitted the following draft list of Rapporteurs for 1931-32:<sup>1</sup>

|   |                  |
|---|------------------|
| 1. Financial Questions . . . . .              | Norway           |
| 2. Economic Questions . . . . .               | Germany          |
| 3. Transit Questions . . . . .                | Poland           |
| 4. Health . . . . .                           | Irish Free State |
| 5. International Law . . . . .                | Italy            |
| 6. Finances of the League of Nations. . . . . | Guatemala        |
| 7. International Bureaux . . . . .            | China            |
| 8. Mandates . . . . .                         | Yugoslavia       |
| 9. Minorities . . . . .                       | Japan            |
| 10. Armaments . . . . .                       | Spain            |
| 11. Saar . . . . .                            | Italy            |
| 12. Danzig . . . . .                          | Great Britain    |
| 13. Intellectual Co-operation . . . . .       | France           |
| 14. Opium . . . . .                           | Yugoslavia       |
| 15. Traffic in Women and Children . . . . .   | Panama           |
| 16. Humanitarian Questions. . . . .           | Peru             |
| 17. Child Welfare . . . . .                   | Irish Free State |
| 18. Refugees Questions . . . . .              | Peru             |

*The draft list was approved.*

2920. Appointment of the President and Vice-President of the International Agricultural Mortgage Credit Company.

M. BRAADLAND presented the following report:<sup>2</sup>

"In my report on the work of the Organisation Committee of the International Agricultural Mortgage Credit Company (document C.566.1931.II.A (1)), I informed the Council that, in accordance with the wish of the Organisation Committee, I should submit to a private meeting my suggestions regarding the selection of a President and Vice-President for the prospective Company.

"The holders of these positions must be able to meet two requirements. Their administrative duties make it necessary that they should possess a wide technical knowledge of mortgage credit business; and, further, the fact that the Company will have to seek capital in the money market makes it essential that their financial authority and general reputation should be such as to inspire

<sup>1</sup> Document C.626.1931.

<sup>2</sup> Document C.601.1931.II.A.

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confidence in possible lenders. In these circumstances I venture to suggest to my colleagues the names of the two following persons, who seem to me to meet the requirements of the situation in every way:

" *As President:*

" M. REGARD, Deputy-Governor of the *Crédit foncier de France*. Chairman of the Organisation Committee of the International Agricultural Mortgage Credit Company.

" *As Vice-President:*

" M. DI NOLA, Director-General of the *Istituto Italiano di Credito Fondiario*; honorary Director-General at the Department of National Economy; President of the Economic Committee of the League of Nations.

" I may add that M. REGARD and M. di NOLA have both taken a very active share in the work of the delegation of the Financial Committee for Agricultural Credit, and in that of the Organisation Committee of the International Company."

*The Council approved the nominations proposed by the Rapporteur.*

**2921. Resignation of the League Commissioner in Bulgaria.**

M. BRAADLAND presented the following report:<sup>1</sup>

" In the report which my predecessor submitted to the Council on January 23rd, 1931, on the resignation of the League Commissioner in Bulgaria, I stated that I was not in a position to make a definite proposal regarding the successor of M. Charron as Commissioner for Refugee Settlement and Technical Adviser to the National Bank. The Council then authorised its President to make the necessary appointment on the advice of the Rapporteur and a Sub-Committee of the Financial Committee.

" In his report (document C.241.M.107.1931.II.A), the President of the Council informed you that, on the Financial Committee's recommendation, he had approved the appointment of M. Jean Watteau to be adviser to the National Bank. The Financial Committee did not feel called upon to propose the appointment of a new Commissioner for the Settlement of Refugees as the work contemplated by the Protocols of September 8th, 1926, and March 10th, 1928, was almost completed. On its advice, M. Charron was requested to continue to act as honorary Commissioner. It was understood that the Financial Committee should reconsider the question at its September session.

" The Financial Committee at its recent session came to the conclusion that the best solution was to ask M. Charron to continue to perform the duties which he has discharged since March 31st as honorary Commissioner. M. Charron has kindly accepted this responsibility, and I am asking the Council to approve his maintenance in office and to tender him its warmest thanks."

*The conclusions of the report were adopted.*

**2922. Agricultural Credits: Advance of Funds by the League to the Organisation Committee of the International Agricultural Mortgage Credit Company.**

M. MATOS presented the following report and draft resolution:<sup>2</sup>

" My colleagues have before them the Secretary-General's note. They will see that it is not proposed to incur expenditure beyond the amount voted by the Council in May last but to enable the Secretary-General, in 1932, to advance funds to the Organisation Committee of the International Agricultural Mortgage Credit Company in case these should be required before the next session of the Council.

" I would therefore propose the adoption of the following resolution:

" The Council:

" Recalling the resolution which it adopted on May 22nd, 1931, authorising the Secretary-General to advance sums up to a maximum of 50,000 francs to the Organisation Committee of the International Agricultural Mortgage Credit Company;

" Empowers the Secretary-General, in accordance with Article 33 of the Financial Regulations, to advance in 1932 from the Working Capital Fund an amount not exceeding the balance which will remain unspent at the end of this year out of the 50,000 francs already voted by the Council."

*The draft resolution was adopted.*

**2923. Date of the Next Session of the Economic Consultative Committee.**

M. MATOS presented the following report:<sup>3</sup>

" My colleagues have seen the resolution adopted by the Assembly on September 26th, 1931, on the motion of the Fourth Committee, which reads as follows:

" The Assembly:

" Impressed by the difficult situation through which most of the States Members of the League are passing, and by the possible effects of that situation on the finances of the League; and

<sup>1</sup> Document C.620.1931.II.A.

<sup>2</sup> Document C.587.1931.X.

<sup>3</sup> Document C.628.1931.X.

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" ' Convinced that in the present circumstances it is important that the whole of the funds provided in the budget for the present financial year should not be expended:

" ' Requests the competent officials of the three organisations of the League to limit to the utmost possible extent the expenditure incurred between now and the end of the year; and

" ' Makes a strong appeal to the Council and the Governing Body of the International Labour Office to endeavour to postpone or cancel the sessions of conferences and committees convened or contemplated for the last quarter of this year, provided always that such postponements or cancellations do not interfere with the essential work of the League.'

" Certain meetings, which could be suspended without Council authority, have already been suspended, but the suspension of the following meeting, which has been proposed, would seem to require the assent of the Council—Session of the Economic Consultative Committee.

" In agreement with the Rapporteur for Economic Questions, the German representative, and with the Chairman of the Consultative Committee, I venture to propose to the Council the cancellation of this meeting, which will result in a saving estimated at 79,500 francs."

M. PETSCHÉ, while appreciating the soundness of the reasons advanced against convening the Economic Consultative Committee at the present stage, pointed out that since its formation the Committee had held only one session, that its members had then put forward very valuable suggestions and that it might perhaps be advantageous not to regard as final the decision which the Council was about to take. The Council perhaps might study the position again next January, for it might be thought paradoxical that, at a time of grave economic depression throughout the world, independent experts should not be convened to examine the crisis.

*The conclusions of the report were adopted.*

2924. **Request for Assistance submitted by the Liberian Government: Composition of the Council Committee.**

M. SOKAL presented the following report:<sup>1</sup>

" The Council decided, at its sixty-second session, to appoint a small Committee from among its members to study the problem raised by the Liberian Government's request for assistance.

" This Committee was composed of the representatives of the British Empire, France, Germany, Italy, Liberia, Poland, Spain and Venezuela.

" As our colleague M. Zumeta has left the Council, we must appoint a new member to replace the representative of Venezuela on the Council Committee, and, if my colleagues agree, I am prepared to make a proposal."

He proposed that M. Zumeta should be replaced by the representative of Panama on the Council Committee.

*The proposal of the Rapporteur was adopted.*

2925. **Invitation to be addressed to States non-Members of the League of Nations to take Part in the General Disarmament Conference.**

The PRESIDENT presented the following report and draft resolution:<sup>2</sup>

" On May 22nd, 1931, the Council adopted a resolution specifying which States non-Members<sup>3</sup> of the League of Nations were to be invited to the General Disarmament Conference.

" In consequence of the letter of September 14th from H.E. the Minister of the Hejaz and Nejd in London, which has been communicated to you (document C.608.1931.IX), I have the honour to propose to you the adoption of the following resolution:

" ' The Council requests the Secretary-General to invite the Government of the Hejaz to the Disarmament Conference convened at Geneva for February 2nd, 1932.' "

*The draft resolution was adopted.*

(The Council went into public session.)

2926. **Assault on Dr. C. T. Wang, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs: Communication by the President.**

The PRESIDENT said that his colleagues on the Council would have learnt with deep emotion of the attack made on the distinguished Foreign Minister of China, Dr. C. T. Wang, by Chinese

<sup>1</sup> Document C.618.1931.VII.

<sup>2</sup> Document C.611.1931.IX.

<sup>3</sup> These States were as follows: Afghanistan, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Turkey, United States of America, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Mexico. The latter country has meanwhile become a Member of the League of Nations.

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students, who, to judge by the telegram containing the news, had been misinformed as to the efforts being made to find a successful issue for the incident which the Chinese Government had brought before the Council.

The President felt certain that he would be expressing the unanimous wish of his colleagues if he asked the Chinese representative to transmit the Council's warmest sympathies to Dr. C. T. Wang.

Speaking in his personal capacity, he would venture to call to mind a resolution submitted by the Spanish delegation at that year's Assembly concerning the grave disturbance to international relations that might be caused by the circulation of false news. He had no definite particulars as to the Press telegrams which, without any justification at all, had given rise to such deep resentment on the part of the students in Nanking. He would, however, say that at various times during the week his attention had been drawn to inaccurate reports that had reached distant capitals as to the conciliatory measures being pursued by the Council in wholehearted co-operation with the representatives of two great nations which had always been devoted to the ideals of the League.

He would venture to make an appeal to the Press attending the present discussion. He was certain that the members of the Press would appreciate the fraternal spirit in which that appeal was addressed to them.

The question upon which the Council was engaged was a particularly delicate one, for which it was seeking a solution in close agreement with the two parties. He would therefore exhort journalists of all countries to co-operate with the Council by giving world public opinion accurate information. In a situation of such difficulty everyone must keep calm and work for peace.

Misinterpretation of the action taken by the Council, which was working first and foremost for the pacification of men's minds, should be avoided. The Council would not abandon the efforts it was making with the representatives of the two parties until it had assured itself that all danger to peace could be regarded as at an end, and that the way was open to a satisfactory settlement in a calmer atmosphere than that of the last few days.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL suggested that the Council should authorise him to send to the League offices in Tokio and Nanking a short résumé of its meetings on this particular question for publication.

M. YOSHIZAWA expressed his deep emotion at the news of the assault made on Dr. C. T. Wang. He greatly admired both the ability and the amiable personal character of Dr. Wang, who had been his personal friend for many years. His sympathy was particularly deep in that he was at the moment engaged with M. Sze in a debate on a serious matter. He heartily approved the statement made by the President and also the Secretary-General's suggestion.

M. SZE would not fail to convey the President's message to Dr. Wang immediately. He greatly appreciated, and he was sure Dr. Wang would greatly appreciate, the sentiments which the President had expressed both on his own behalf and on that of the members of the Council. He would add that, since the report of the attack on Dr. Wang, he had received official information that the Government was making every effort to calm popular feeling.

With reference to the Secretary-General's suggestion, it was hardly necessary to say that the Chinese Government always welcomed, and would continue to welcome, accurate, complete and prompt news regarding, not only the present question, but other activities of the League as well.

On behalf of Dr. Wang he would express his sincere thanks to the Japanese representative for his kind words. He could assure M. Yoshizawa that the admiration and respect which he had expressed for Dr. Wang were mutual. Dr. Wang had the same admiration and respect for him.

2927. **Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant** (continuation).

M. YOSHIZAWA made the following declaration:

The unfortunate situation to which the Council has given its attention for several days past is happily improving. I wish to say that I have very much appreciated the efforts made by the Council to ensure peace.

At previous meetings of the Council I have clearly explained the line of conduct followed by the Japanese Government, and have given to my colleagues, on its behalf, an assurance of its determination to continue withdrawing its forces, as and when the return to peaceful conditions makes such withdrawal possible without danger to its nationals.

The Chinese Government, through its representative on the Council, has been good enough to declare that it assumes responsibility for the safety of Japanese nationals and for the protection of their property. I am very glad to take note of the Chinese Government's readiness to assume that responsibility. Unfortunate experiences compel us, however, to recognise that the goodwill of the Chinese Government has not always been able to make its voice heard in the provinces, and that numerous regrettable incidents have occurred. The Powers have thus often found themselves compelled to land and maintain troops or war vessels in China. In this respect the situation in Manchuria is particularly serious. It must, moreover, be borne in mind that the Chinese and Japanese populations in and around the railway zone are closely mixed. The situation cannot be compared in any way with that existing between two neighbouring countries with separate populations divided by a well-defined frontier. It is therefore essential before cancelling the measures taken to assure the protection of our nationals, to make certain that the local authorities are in

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fact in a position to maintain order, and that the departure of our protecting forces would not involve any danger for our nationals.

I desire particularly to bring to the knowledge of the Council the fact that pressing appeals for protection by our troops are being received by the Japanese Government from its nationals in North Manchuria and in Chientao, near the Korean frontier. In spite of the anxiety which it feels on their behalf, the Japanese Government, being anxious, in accordance with the assurance that it has given to the Council, to do nothing which might aggravate the situation, has felt obliged to take no action on those appeals.

I am furthermore happy to be able to inform you that the withdrawal of our troops continues, and that the number of our effectives at Kirin has been still further reduced since my communication of Friday last. Apart from Kirin and Mukden there are now, outside the zone, only small posts at Hsinmingtung and at Chengshiatung, for the protection of our nationals against attack by Chinese soldiers and brigands who are at the moment plundering those districts.

There is no need for me to emphasise the fact that my Government has made every effort to supply the Council with the most reliable and accurate information regarding the present situation. It has indeed no object in concealing the facts, and at present every facility is being given in Manchuria for foreign officers, as for instance Colonel Thornhill, British Military Attaché at Peiping, and for newspaper correspondents, etc., to ascertain the true state of affairs.

My Government will not fail to keep the Council very closely in touch with the situation and with all steps taken to bring about a rapid solution. In the present circumstances any further measures of this nature appear to be unnecessary.

In conclusion, I desire to declare once more that the Japanese Government has no territorial designs on Manchuria, and that it maintains its determination, of which practical proof has been given during the last few days, to withdraw its forces within the railway zone in so far as effective provision is made for the safety of its nationals and their property. It is my earnest hope that it will be able to carry out this intention to the full within the shortest possible time.

M. SZE: I have listened with great interest to the Japanese representative's statement, and am glad to learn that Japan is continuing to withdraw her troops from the positions occupied since September 18th, 1931. I should, of course, have been much happier had the Japanese representative been able to tell us that all the troops had been withdrawn, or at least to have given a date when the last soldier would be withdrawn.

Before going any further, may I request the Japanese representative to give the Council information with reference to the attacks made by aeroplanes armed by Japanese officers on trains on the Peking-Mukden Railway? There seem to have been at least four attacks, which took place last Thursday and Friday. Those attacks were made on trains carrying ordinary passengers—Chinese and foreign—and according to the information I received, at the points where the attacks were made, the aeroplanes came down fairly low and used their machine-guns. There were no Chinese soldiers in the neighbourhood and none on the trains.

Another point on which I would beg M. Yoshizawa to enlighten the Council is this. The troops being withdrawn from the places which they have been occupying since the night of September 18th, I presume the *status quo ante* in those places has been completely restored; that is to say, the persons whom the Japanese military authorities arrested or detained have been released and the property, etc., seized from the people, returned or begun to be returned to its owners.

As regards Japanese nationals in China, so far, I think, neither the Japanese representative nor myself has received any report that any Japanese nationals have been attacked. There is no doubt a great deal of feeling, but that we can well appreciate. In fact, some people have expressed their admiration for the wonderful restraint of the Chinese nation under present conditions.

The Japanese representative mentioned at a previous meeting the desire of his country to maintain the most friendly relations with China. I can assure him that China desires to live on the most friendly terms, not only with Japan, but with all the nations of the world, and the fact that China has in recent years commenced a very active collaboration with the League is a testimony of that desire, since the League stands for those ideals of peace, justice and right for which China has always stood. The Chinese desire to maintain the most friendly relations with Japan is the same as the Japanese desire to maintain friendly relations with China, but the most important element in relations between nations, as between individuals, is good-will and mutual appreciation. I do not wish to be misunderstood; the President and members of the Council will bear me out when I say that, throughout this debate before the Council, I have never uttered a single harsh word to the Japanese representative.

M. Yoshizawa mentioned in his statement that the number of troops in occupation of positions since the night of September 18th, 1931, has now been reduced, and that only certain limited posts are now occupied. If I understood his statement correctly, he mentioned two posts, Hsinmingtung and Chengshiatung. Are there no other places at present occupied by Japanese troops?

M. YOSHIZAWA said his statement referred to Kirin, Mukden, Hsinmingtung and Chengshiatung.

M. SZE asked the intentions of the Japanese Government with reference to those posts, and how soon the troops would be withdrawn.

One very important point on which everyone was agreed was that there was a desire on the part of the Japanese Government for the speedy completion of the withdrawal of the troops; that was also the desire of the Council and of China. But there remained the question as to how

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the withdrawal was to be carried out, because, as the representative of Japan had stated, some posts still remained occupied. The Chinese point of view was well known to the Council. It was that a neutral commission of enquiry should be sent, and that Japan should accept that, as she had now accepted the Chinese assurance to protect Japanese life and property. But as he was anxious to be conciliatory and to meet the representative from Japan more than halfway, he proposed that the Council should help the parties to reach an agreement as to arrangements on the spot, which would make it possible to fix an early date for the completion of the withdrawal of troops, and render it unnecessary for the Council to send a commission of enquiry from Geneva.

The reports that had been communicated to him stated that in some of the stations Japanese troops had disarmed the Chinese railway guards on the Pekin-Mukden Railway, which had rendered the task of those guards—whose duty it was to protect the railway, the stations and passengers as well as Japanese nationals and property in the neighbourhood—extremely difficult. He hoped therefore that in his reply the Japanese representative would refer to that point also.

M. YOSHIKAWA replied that the most important points raised by the Chinese representative seemed to be the immediate withdrawal of the troops within the railway zone, and the commission of observers. He was convinced that he had fully explained, not only in his statement that day, but also last Friday, the reason for which the Japanese Government was unable to agree to those two suggestions.

The Chinese representative had alleged, *inter alia*, that Chinese women and children had been massacred by the Japanese army. That statement he had denied in the most formal manner at the Council table on Friday. The whole of his information was based on telegrams received from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs at Tokio.

The Chinese representative had also made other accusations against the Japanese army, but M. Yoshikawa was sure that the Japanese army had never done anything of the sort. As soon as he received any information of that kind, he would not fail to inform, not only the Chinese representative, but the other members of the Council.

M. SZE said that, if he understood the Japanese representative correctly, the Japanese Government could not agree to the Chinese demand for immediate evacuation. M. Sze was not quite sure that he did say so in so many words, but he protested in the strongest possible terms against the continued occupation of Chinese territory by Japanese troops.

With regard to observers, he had said that he would prefer that a commission of neutral observers should be sent to the spot, but, in order to be conciliatory, he had suggested that the Council should help the parties to come to an agreement as to arrangements on the spot which would make it possible to fix an early date for the completion of the withdrawal, thereby rendering unnecessary the sending of a commission of enquiry.

With reference to the telegrams which he had circulated and to which the representative of Japan had taken exception, M. Sze had said at an earlier meeting that there were bound to be inaccuracies in the telegrams he circulated, just as he contested some of the statements the Japanese representative had circulated; for instance, one circulated that day as to the cause of the existing situation in Mukden. But the fact that there was a difference in the statements issued by the two representatives or their respective Governments proved conclusively the necessity for the early despatch of a neutral mission to ascertain the true facts. China was perfectly willing to accept and welcome such a commission.

M. YOSHIKAWA observed that he had already replied to M. Sze's suggestion that a date for the completion of the evacuation might well be fixed.

M. Yoshikawa was prepared to telegraph at once to Tokio M. Sze's second suggestion for the organisation of a Sino-Japanese commission on the spot with a view to facilitating the evacuation.

M. SZE said that the Council, having received the appeal from China and China having entrusted her case to the Council, he expected that the commission would report to the Council in order that the latter might be informed of the speedy and complete withdrawal of the troops.

He would venture to ask whether the Japanese representative was in a position to answer his other questions with reference to the release of the Chinese officials and civilians who had been arrested and detained by the Japanese troops and whether their property had been restored.

With regard to M. Yoshikawa's statement concerning the reason for which Japanese troops had been retained in certain places, M. Sze observed that Japanese citizens in China far from Japanese soldiers had suffered no molestation. It was the presence of Japanese soldiers that created the tension against which the Government of Japan alleged it to be necessary to provide military protection. A vicious circle was thus created.

M. YOSHIKAWA said that, owing to the lack of details, he would have to ask for information with regard to the questions just asked by the Chinese representative.

He desired, however, to ask whether M. Sze had in mind a commission composed only of Japanese and Chinese or a commission including members of other nationalities as well.

M. SZE replied that, in view of the fact that the Japanese representative had on previous occasions and again at the present meeting questioned the accuracy of reports, and that there were matters on which the representatives of the two countries did not agree, it was possible

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that the same thing might happen—although M. Sze hoped it would not—in arranging for the withdrawal of the troops. In those circumstances and as the Council was assisting the two parties, M. Sze considered that it should appoint a neutral representative or representatives who might be able to help in settling any differences and also in removing any possibility of a misunderstanding.

With regard to the question of a complete withdrawal, the Japanese representative had said that, while his Government had withdrawn the troops from Chientao in the province of Kirin, it had left several hundreds of Japanese police there. The presence of uniformed policemen was liable to aggravate the situation and thus the Council might find it necessary to take steps to safeguard peace and to preserve friendly relations between the two countries. M. Sze therefore considered that this point too should be examined and arrangements made for Chinese police to take the place of the Japanese.

M. YOSHIKAWA replied that in his first statement he had fully explained his Government's position with regard to evacuation and the commission of observers. He had said at the end of his statement: "In these circumstances all measures other than those mentioned above are unnecessary". He was therefore unable to agree to the Chinese representative's suggestion with reference to the sending of the commission to Manchuria, if that commission was to be composed on the lines indicated by M. Sze in his last remarks.

M. SZE pointed out that he had never used the words "a Commission of Observers". He had said that the Council would help the parties to arrange a conciliation. He had not suggested a commission to proceed from Geneva, because there were neutrals on the spot who would help the two parties to arrive at an amicable settlement. As the Japanese representative had said that Japan was anxious to live in the most friendly relations with China, he would most certainly welcome someone to help in the removal of any possible misunderstanding that might have arisen.

Viscount CECIL thought the suggestion made by the Chinese representative an interesting one, and hoped that his Japanese colleague would be able to give it further consideration.

If he understood the Chinese suggestion rightly, it was that there should be some kind of committee or meeting formed in Manchuria, consisting essentially of Chinese and Japanese representatives. The Chinese representative had also suggested that the League might do something to help the two parties to come to an agreement. If M. Yoshizawa thought that suggestion of use, the Council might begin by bringing the Chinese and Japanese together, to see if they could arrive at an agreement.

As Lord Cecil had said at the last meeting, the chief business of the League was to promote an agreement between the parties after they had succeeded—if they did succeed—in avoiding all danger of the dispute degenerating into a war. In saying that, Lord Cecil had not meant to suggest that the League was not interested in seeing such an agreement being made. On the contrary. Since the League's business was to bring about peace and agreement, it was intensely interested in an agreement being reached between the parties, but according to all the previous practice of the League, it had always been left to the parties to come to an agreement if they could do so. He hoped that his Japanese colleague would consider carefully whether a meeting of Chinese and Japanese might not be of service in arranging at least evacuation and other matters of that kind. If that meeting should prove fruitless, the Council would then have to consider if anything else could be done by it to bring about an agreement.

In conclusion, Lord Cecil suggested that, in order to avoid misunderstanding, the Chinese representative might put his proposal in writing.

M. SZE would gladly conform to the request to put his suggestion in writing. He would, however, point out that he had said that the Council could help the parties to come to an agreement by arrangements on the spot. He had not said that China or Japan alone could arrange matters, but that the Council could arrange them and that the Council might see fit to select its representative on the spot.

Viscount CECIL thought that in that case the Council would be unable to carry the matter further at the present stage.

M. YOSHIKAWA repeated that he was quite ready to submit Lord Cecil's suggestion for consideration by his Government, but, if that suggestion was to be supplemented by the further suggestion made by the Chinese representative, he would be unable to do so. He appreciated the motives with which Lord Cecil had made his suggestion. Japan had no intention of making war upon China.

M. Yoshizawa added that the Japanese Government was endeavouring to bring about a happy solution of the affair at the earliest possible date and for that reason he welcomed any suggestion which would pave the way to it.

He interpreted Lord Cecil's suggestion to mean that the Chinese and Japanese would endeavour to come to an agreement without help from outsiders. If that interpretation were correct, he would not fail to transmit the suggestion to his Government.

M. SZE said that there seemed to be some misapprehension on the part of the representative of Japan. He, M. Sze, had made a proposal which Lord Cecil had sought to restate in his own words, and this version by Lord Cecil M. Sze had corrected.

Viscount CECIL regretted that there should be any possible misunderstanding in the matter. He had thought in the first place that his Chinese colleague's suggestion applied to the questions of the method, time, etc., of the evacuation, and nothing else.

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It was true that M. Sze had added that he thought the League could help the parties to come to an agreement. The only difference was that it was now suggested that the Chinese and Japanese should meet and try to come to an agreement. If they did not do so, the Council would be no worse off than it was at present, and it could then say what further steps could be taken. Lord Cecil merely wished to make it quite clear that he was referring solely to the question of evacuation, and that he was not dealing with other questions at the moment. It would, however, be difficult to carry the matter farther at the present meeting.

The PRESIDENT did not think that there was any advantage in discussing the matter further at that meeting. The statements which had been made would need to be carefully studied by the members of the Council. He would summon another meeting shortly, but, as the Assembly was closing on the following day, the Council would no doubt agree that he should explain the situation to it. He therefore proposed to ask permission of the President of the Assembly to speak on the following day in order to give an impartial report on the question, and on the manner in which the Council had so far carried out its duties under Article 11 of the Covenant.

2928. **Tribute to the Memory of Count Skrzynski.**

The PRESIDENT felt sure that he would be interpreting the unanimous feelings of his colleagues in expressing to the representative of Poland the Council's deep sympathy in the loss which Poland and the League had suffered in the death of Count Skrzynski.

Count Skrzynski, who was a former President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and had been three times first delegate to the Assembly, was one of the hopes of Poland and a devoted labourer for peace.

M. SOKAL said he was much touched by the sympathetic words of the President concerning the tragic death of Count Alexander Skrzynski, a Polish statesman whose name was closely bound up with the important work done by the League for the consolidation of peace. He sincerely thanked the President and all the members of the Council for that tribute, which he would not fail to bring to the knowledge of his Government.



C./65th Session/P.-V.6(I).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

SIXTH MEETING (PUBLIC, THEN PRIVATE).

*Held on Tuesday, September 29th, 1931, at 4 p.m.*

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General. France was represented by M. MASSIGLI, Germany by Count BERNSTORFF, the Irish Free State by Mr. LESTER, Italy by M. ROSSO, Peru by M. BARRETO, Poland by M. SOKAL, and Yugoslavia by M. FOTITCH.

2929. Claim brought by the Finnish Government against the Government of the United Kingdom, in Connection with Finnish Ships used during the War by the Government of the United Kingdom.

M. Holsti, representative of Finland, came to the Council table.

At the request of the Rapporteur, *this item was postponed to the next session.*

M. Holsti withdrew.

2930. Co-operation of Women in the Work of the League of Nations: Resolution adopted by the Assembly on September 24th, 1931.

The PRESIDENT presented the following report:<sup>1</sup>

"The Assembly, at its meeting of September 24th, adopted the following resolution:

"The Assembly:

"Convinced of the great value of the contribution of women to the work of peace and friendly relations between the peoples, which is the principal aim of the League of Nations:

"Requests the Council to examine the possibility of increasing the collaboration of women in the work of the League of Nations."

"I am sure that the members of the Council are aware that the big organisations of women have for years been working to spread a knowledge of the activities of the League."

"The women of every country have given their support to the efforts to introduce instruction on the activities and organisation of the League of Nations into the schools. They have done their best to promote mutual understanding between peoples; they are already taking an active part in the League's work in several of its committees, and a number of countries have sent them as delegates to the Assembly."

"I think, however, that the members of the Council will agree with me that the Assembly wishes to extend this collaboration still further, and that it is desirable in such an important matter to leave sufficient time to allow of a careful examination of the various possibilities which may arise."

"The first step seems to me to be to obtain from various organisations of women suggestions as to how effect can best be given to the Assembly's desire, and I therefore propose that the Secretary-General should be authorised to consult these organisations and prepare a report on the subject for the next Assembly."

Viscount CECIL approved the report. He felt, however, that a report to be submitted to the next Assembly on what the women's organisations could do to help the cause of disarmament would be rather late, and he would therefore ask whether the Secretary-General could prepare a report with regard to that part of the co-operation by women in time for the next Council session in January.

<sup>1</sup> Document C.632.1931.

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Count BERNSTORFF supported Lord Cecil's proposal. He, too, had been approached by several women's organisations in connection with the disarmament question.

M. SZE associated himself very warmly with Lord Cecil's proposal.

M. SOKAL noted that, according to Lord Cecil's proposal, the first report should be presented to the Council in January. As the Disarmament Conference would begin on February 2nd, it would be difficult to do anything before that date, even if action were taken at the end of January.

M. Sokal drew attention to the fact that there was one way of making it possible for the women's organisations to take part in the Disarmament Conference. The Polish delegation had submitted a proposal to the Third Committee whereby the Governments were invited to appoint representatives of women's associations on their delegations. As this proposal had not been adopted, M. Sokal supported the Rapporteur's proposal, but thought that the women's organisations might be informed that the Disarmament Conference desired to avail itself of their co-operation from the beginning.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL thought that the question of women's co-operation might be divided into two parts: first, co-operation in connection with the Disarmament Conference, and secondly, by general collaboration in the work of the League. The Secretariat could ask for observations on the first aspect of the question so as to be in a position to present a report to the Council in January, while on the second it would be able to present a report to the next Assembly.

*The conclusions of the report and the suggestions made during the discussion were adopted.*

2931. Co-operation of the Press in the Organisation of Peace: Resolution adopted by the Assembly on September 24th, 1931.

The PRESIDENT presented the following report and draft resolution:<sup>1</sup>

"My colleagues will remember that on September 24th, 1931, the Assembly adopted a resolution concerning the spreading of false news through the Press, the text of which is as follows:

" 'The Assembly:

" 'Considering that the organisation of peace demands an international spirit freed from all prejudices and misconceptions;

" 'Convinced of the necessity of ensuring that Press information shall be as impartial and complete as possible:

" 'Requests the Council to consider the possibility of studying, with the help of the Press, the difficult problem of the spread of false information which may threaten to disturb the peace or the good understanding between nations.'

"I need not draw my colleagues' attention to the importance of this problem, which is urgent in the interests of international relations, and at the same time extremely delicate from the point of view of the maintenance of the liberty of the Press and the independence of journalists.

"The Third Committee unanimously considered that this question should be studied by the Government Press Bureaux, in close co-operation with Press circles.

"The Conference of Representatives of Government Press Bureaux, which the Danish Government intends shortly to convene at Copenhagen, might in this respect make a valuable contribution towards the solution of the problem which is before the Council to-day.

"The Danish Government is to be congratulated on this highly opportune step. At the same time the Committee also realises that it is essential to approach the principal Press associations, some of which, indeed, have already devoted attention to this question. Without their advice and cordial co-operation, success in this matter is quite impossible.

"I would therefore suggest that we ask the Secretary-General to consult, through the Secretariat, the Press associations which took part in the Press Conference of 1927 and any other Press organisations which may regard themselves as interested.

"I am sure that, once in possession of the results of the Copenhagen Conference and the enquiry organised by the Secretariat, the Council will be in a position to submit to the next Assembly a useful report on this question, which is of great importance to international relations.

"I have the honour to move the following resolution:

" 'The Council:

" 'Being convinced that the dissemination of inaccurate news is capable of disturbing international relations;

" 'And holding that false reports cannot be suppressed without the assistance of Governments, on whom it is incumbent to correct them without delay, and of the Press, whose co-operation is essential:

" 'Takes note of the happily inspired action taken by the Danish Government in summoning a Conference of Representatives of Government Press Bureaux at Copenhagen

<sup>1</sup> Document C.637.1931.IX.

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this winter, and welcomes the opportunity that this meeting will afford for an exchange of views on the question of the dissemination of false news;

" ' Further, requests the Secretary-General to consult on this delicate question the Press associations previously approached when preparations were being made for the 1927 Conference, and to receive any suggestions made by such Press organisations as may regard themselves as interested;

" ' And expects to be able to lay before the next Assembly a report on the results of the Copenhagen Conference and of the Secretary-General's enquiry.' "

*The draft resolution was adopted.*

2932. **Slavery: Appointment of a Committee of Experts: Resolution adopted by the Assembly on September 25th, 1931.**

Viscount CECIL presented the following report and draft resolution: <sup>1</sup>

" On September 25th, 1931, the Assembly adopted the following resolution:

" ' The Assembly:

" ' Requests the Council to appoint for one year a small Committee of Experts to examine the material upon Slavery which has been supplied or transmitted by Governments since the signature of the Convention of 1926. This Committee will submit to the Council suggestions with a view to recommending to the next Assembly the measures of assistance which the League of Nations could render to those countries which have agreed to abolish slavery and which request such assistance. '

" Further, on the proposal of its Fourth Committee, the Assembly included in the budget for the financial year 1932 an appropriation of 10,000 francs for the execution of this resolution.

" I imagine the Council will wish to comply with the Assembly's request and proceed to appoint the Committee of Experts referred to in the resolution.

" As regards the Committee's terms of reference, these require further definition on certain points. In the first place it should enquire to what extent the Slavery Convention has been successful in putting an end to slavery and what obstacles exist to further progress in this direction. Next it should consider and report, on the basis of the documents submitted to it, by what methods assistance can be rendered to States desirous of receiving it with the object of putting an end to slavery within their territory, and whether any modifications of the existing machinery of the League would be desirable with this object. The method of work of the Committee must be left to be determined by that body. They will no doubt give full consideration to the precedents of 1924. It will be unnecessary for the Committee to enquire into the question of public or private compulsory labour, which has been entirely separated from the problem of slavery.

" Referring to the financial aspect of the question, you are aware that the total sum of 11,500 francs appropriated for slavery in the budget for the financial year 1932 is not sufficient to cover the expenditure involved by the appointment of the Committee of Experts which we are asked to set up. You have, however, been informed that contributions from private sources, to an amount not yet stated, are to be offered to the League to make up this sum. I am now able to announce that promises of contributions to the amount of 10,000 francs have already been received. Other contributions may follow, so that it cannot yet be stated what will be the total funds at the Council's disposal, if the offers of private funds are accepted. It is of course understood that the receipt of funds from private sources will confer on the donors no right to influence in any way the deliberations of the Committee.

" I am sure the Council will agree that we have no time to nominate the members of the Committee of Experts at this session. But in view of the financial difficulties their number should be kept as small as possible. Your Rapporteur might be asked to submit any suggestions that may be of use in this matter at the Council's session in January 1932.

" If the Council shares my view, it might to-day adopt the following resolution:

" ' The Council:

" ' Takes note of the Assembly's resolution of September 25th, 1931, and decides to appoint the small Committee of Experts referred to in that resolution at its session in January 1932. It requests its Rapporteur, the representative of Great Britain, to submit at its January session a report containing any suggestions that may be of use in this matter.

" ' The Committee should examine the documents submitted to it and report to what extent in the light of these documents the Slavery Convention has been successful in putting an end to slavery and what obstacles, if any, exist to further progress in this direction. The Committee should further consider and report by what methods assistance can be rendered

<sup>1</sup> Document C.631(1).1931.VI.

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to those States which have expressed a desire to receive it for the purpose of suppressing slavery within their territory and whether any modifications of the existing machinery of the League would be desirable with this object."

The SECRETARY-GENERAL said that the experts of the Secretariat estimated the total cost of the Committee at 25,000 francs. He therefore very much hoped that the other contributions mentioned in the report would amount to 3,500 francs so as to enable the Committee to carry out its work fully and adequately.

Viscount CECIL agreed that it was most desirable to obtain the additional sum. At the same time some of those with whom he had been in contact thought that the expense might not be quite so high as the experts of the Secretariat believed.

*The draft resolution was adopted.*

2933. **Work of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union.**

The PRESIDENT thought the Council would wish to note the communication from the Vice-President of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union,<sup>1</sup> approve the Commission's resolutions and authorise the Secretary-General and the technical organisations to carry them into effect. The Council would also wish to authorise the Secretary-General to give effect to the Assembly's request that an invitation should be addressed to the Government of the United States of America to be represented, if it should deem it expedient, on the special Committee to consider a pact of economic non-aggression.

The President also asked the Council to approve the two resolutions mentioned in the communication in question concerning:

1. The invitation to the Governing Body of the International Labour Office to take the necessary steps to convene a technical conference on international placing upon the terms specified;
2. The invitation to the organisations of the League of Nations to get into touch, upon the terms specified, with the Commission of Enquiry for European Union.

The President further pointed out that the Vice-President of the Commission of Enquiry, availing himself of his discretionary powers, had added Yugoslavia to the two Committees and Hungary to the special Committee to study the extension of preference to agricultural products other than cereals. It had seemed desirable to add these States, which were interested in the questions that were to be studied.

*The proposals of the President were adopted.*

2934. **Russian, Armenian, Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean and Turkish Refugees: Resolution adopted by the Assembly on September 25th, 1931.**

M. Max Huber, President of the Governing Body of the Nansen International Office for Refugees, came to the Council table.

M. BARRETO presented the following report:<sup>2</sup>

"At its meeting on September 1st, 1931, the Council decided to refer the report of the Inter-Governmental Advisory Commission for Refugees to the Assembly, and not to consider certain problems mentioned therein which fell within the Council's jurisdiction until the Assembly had given a decision.

"On September 25th, the Assembly, on the proposal of its Sixth Committee, passed a number of resolutions relating to the refugee problem, the last two of which are as follows:

"The Assembly:

"Recommends that the Belgian Government be invited to nominate a delegate to the Inter-Governmental Advisory Commission for Refugees.

"And requests the Council to communicate to the Governments the recommendations adopted by the Inter-Governmental Advisory Commission for Refugees at its fourth session concerning certain facilities for the refugees."

"I am sure you will agree that the Council should endorse these resolutions and instruct the Secretary-General to carry them into effect.

"The Council will also doubtless wish to ask M. Max Huber, President of the Governing Body of the Nansen International Office for Refugees, to take part in the work of the Inter-Governmental Advisory Commission in an advisory capacity, as suggested by the Commission."

*The conclusions of the report were adopted.*

<sup>1</sup> Document C.622.M.250.1931.VII.

<sup>2</sup> Document C.619.1931.

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2935. Refugees in China: Communication from the Delegate of Paraguay to the League of Nations.

M. BARRETO read the following letter from the delegate of Paraguay to the League of Nations:<sup>1</sup>

"I have the honour to refer to the moving appeal made by the delegate of China to the League of Nations, through the Sixth Committee, concerning the desperate situation of the Russian refugees at Harbin. In consequence of this appeal, the Twelfth Assembly at its plenary meeting on the 25th instant decided to invite the Nansen International Office for Refugees to devote particular attention to the precarious situation of more than 100,000 Russian refugees living in China, in order to find employment for them in other countries.

"In response to this humanitarian appeal, the Government of the Republic of Paraguay has instructed me to inform your Excellency that it is prepared to receive on its territory a thousand of these refugees of German origin (Mennonites and Lutherans), who would appear to be particularly well adapted for colonisation; provided, however, that the cost of transport and establishment of these refugees is met out of special funds. The refugees might then establish themselves in the Chaco, where there already exist flourishing Mennonite settlements.

"The cost of transport from China to the Paraguayan Chaco would amount to £47,250 sterling, taking normal prices as a basis. The Nansen Office has already obtained the promise of a substantial reduction in the fares from the shipping company which would have to undertake the transport. In addition to cost of transport there would be the cost of settlement which would amount roughly to £11,250. Numerous private charitable organisations and several religious communities are prepared to contribute towards these expenses, but their contributions by themselves would not be sufficient; they are not in a position to cover the total costs.

"I have the honour therefore urgently to appeal to the League of Nations to take steps to consider the most appropriate means to this end. Consequently, I request your Excellency on behalf of my Government to be so good as to lay this matter before the Council at its next session. The situation of the Harbin refugees is so serious that any such assistance, prompted by the highest methods of humanity, cannot any longer be delayed.

"(Signed) R. CABALLERO DE BEDOYA,

"*Delegate of Paraguay to the League of Nations.*"

M. SZE observed that in recent years there had been a large number of foreign refugees in China. While China welcomed all those who sought her hospitality, she found that on account of language difficulties and differences in customs, some of the refugees had difficulty in earning their livelihood. The Government did its utmost to help those who deserved help, but the means at its disposal were rather limited. The Chinese Government believed in the right of all people to move from place to place in accordance with their legitimate desires, and therefore M. Sze supported, on behalf of his country, the request contained in the communication from the delegate of Paraguay.

Count BERNSTORFF pointed out that, as the letter stated, some thousand refugees of German origin (Mennonites and Lutherans) were affected. He therefore desired to express his sincerest thanks to the Rapporteur for bringing this question before the Council, and to Paraguay, which had given proof of its humanitarian spirit and of the generous hospitality which had always been a characteristic of that country. He also expressed his gratitude to China, whose representative had supported the proposal and whose Government had given temporary hospitality to these unfortunate refugees in spite of the present position of that country. Count Bernstorff also thanked the Nansen Office and its officials.

M. BARRETO said that the Council would certainly wish to thank the delegate of Paraguay for the generous offer he had made on behalf of his Government to receive a thousand refugees of German origin at present at Harbin.

The Assembly had requested the Nansen International Office for Refugees to give specially careful consideration to the precarious condition of over 100,000 Russian refugees in China, with the object of finding work for them in other countries.

The communication from the delegate of Paraguay appeared to suggest that, thanks to the help of certain Governments, private organisations and a number of religious communities, the Office's efforts might be entirely successful.

The Council might accordingly ask the Secretary-General to forward the Paraguayan delegate's communication to the Nansen Office with a request that it be considered as soon as possible.

Speaking on behalf of his colleagues on the Council, he expressed the hope that the Office would meet with the necessary understanding and support in all circles for the successful achievement of its noble humanitarian task.

*The proposal of the Rapporteur was adopted.*

M. Max Huber withdrew.

<sup>1</sup> Document C.629.1931.

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2936. Nationality of Women: Resolution adopted by the Assembly on September 26th, 1931.

M. Rosso presented the following report: <sup>1</sup>

" On September 26th, 1931, the Assembly adopted the following resolution:

" ' The Assembly:

" ' Having examined with the greatest interest the report of the Secretary-General on the question of the nationality of women, presented in accordance with the resolution of the Council of January 24th, 1931, and the report and proposals of the Committee of Representatives of Women's International Organisations which are annexed thereto:

" ' Notes the desire of the said Committee that steps should be taken to bring about the reconsideration of the Hague Nationality Convention, bearing in mind the principle of equality between men and women;

" ' Thanks the Committee of Representatives of Women's International Organisations for its report; and

" ' Requests the Council, in harmony with the recommendation No. VI of the Conference for the Codification of International Law held at The Hague, March-April 1930, to transmit to all Governments the report of the Secretary-General on the question of the nationality of women, including the report of the Committee of Representatives of Women's International Organisations, and the letter of the International Union of Leagues of Catholic Women of August 19th, 1931, together with the Minutes of the First Committee of the Assembly on this subject, and to request Governments to submit their observations on this subject (including their views regarding the Hague Nationality Convention) for reconsideration of the matter by the thirteenth Assembly, to which any observations which the above-mentioned Committee thinks fit to present will be communicated. '

" In accordance with the Assembly's resolution, I propose that the Council should instruct the Secretary-General to transmit the documents mentioned in that resolution to the Governments of all the Members of the League and of the non-member States which were invited to the Hague Conference for the Progressive Codification of International Law, requesting them to submit, before July 1st next, their observations on the general question of the Nationality of Women, including their views regarding the Hague Nationality Convention. In view of the decisions which the Assembly has taken as regards avoiding, during the present economic crisis, any expenditure on printing which is not indispensable, I propose that the Secretariat should not print a special document containing the discussions of the First Committee on the Nationality of Women, since these discussions will appear in the Minutes of the Committee, which will be sent to the Governments as soon as possible. "

Viscount CECIL understood that the Committee of Representatives of Women's International Organisations, mentioned in the Assembly resolution, was a private committee which was not paid for by the League, but had been working in connection with the League. Was it proposed to keep this Committee in being? In his opinion, it was very desirable that this should be done.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL thought that in its report on this matter to the Assembly the Council had expressed the hope that the Committee would continue in being in order that it could keep the Members of the League informed on any points on which it wished to express its views. The Committee was a private organisation.

*The conclusions of the report were adopted.*

2937. Economic Work of the League: Action to be taken on the Resolutions adopted by the Commission of Enquiry for European Union and by the Assembly.

Count BERNSTORFF presented the following report: <sup>2</sup>

" The Commission of Enquiry for European Union adopted, at its fourth session, a series of proposals relating to economic matters, which provide for action by the Secretary-General and the League of Nations Economic Organisation.

" The Assembly approved these resolutions, and invited the Council to take action upon them.

" I will briefly indicate the resolutions which call for an immediate decision by the Council:

" (a) The Commission of Enquiry asked the Council to instruct the Economic Committee to study, on the basis of the preparatory work carried out by the Secretariat, and with due regard to the Governments' observations, the whole of the problems that arise out of the idea of ' economic rapprochement in Europe ' as defined in the report of the Sub-Committee of Economic Experts set up by the Commission of Enquiry.

" (b) The Commission of Enquiry asked the Council to invite the Economic Committee to resume and continue its consultations concerning the most important branches of production. The nature of such consultations, and a number of commodities which might be considered, are

<sup>1</sup> Document C.615.1931.V.

<sup>2</sup> Document C.623.1931.II.B.

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specified both in the report of the Economic experts and in that of the Second Committee of the Assembly.

"(c) The Commission of Enquiry has stressed the advantage of a careful enquiry into the possible effects of the various schemes for 'economic *rapprochement* in Europe' on the interests of *extra-European States*.

"Bearing in mind the apprehensions voiced on this subject at the Second Committee of the Assembly, the Council will doubtless desire to refer this matter forthwith to the Economic Committee for study.

"(d) The Commission of Enquiry has set up a Special Committee to consider whether, and if so under what conditions, the *extension of special facilities* to agricultural products other than cereals may be contemplated. The products to be considered in the first place are tobacco and raisins.

"The Assembly, considering that such extension raises delicate questions of principle in regard to the most-favoured-nation clause, felt that it would be expedient that the conclusions of this Special Committee should be examined by the Economic Committee before submission to the Commission of Enquiry.

"(e) The Commission of Enquiry requests the Council to invite the Economic Committee to examine the expediency of preparing a preliminary draft *international convention concerning the import and export of animals, meat, and other products of animal origin*.

"(f) The Assembly, holding it desirable to associate *national Economic Councils*, wherever they may exist, with the work of economic *rapprochement*, requests the Council to devise the most appropriate means of securing the co-operation of such Councils in the work of the League. I would add that, at the Second Committee of the Assembly, it was suggested that this object might be achieved by a suitable modification of the Economic Consultative Committee whose mandate expires at the end of the current year.

"It would, in my opinion, be necessary for the Secretary-General to examine in detail both aspects of the problem arising out of this resolution. Such an examination will enable me to make definite proposals on the subject at one of the next sessions of the Council.

"In conclusion, I propose that the Council authorise the Secretary-General and the League of Nations Economic Organisation to take action on the various proposals enumerated in this report."

*The conclusions of the report were adopted.*

2938. Financial Work of the League: Resolutions adopted by the Assembly on September 26th, 1931.

M. BRADLAND presented the following report and draft resolutions:<sup>1</sup>

"I. My colleagues have seen the resolutions proposed by the Second Committee and adopted by the Assembly with regard to the financial work of the League of Nations (document A.88.1931.II.A). Two of these resolutions call for special action by the Council.

"II. The second resolution passed by the Assembly reads as follows:

"(2) It welcomes the decision of the Council laying down the conditions on which the Financial Committee should be prepared to consider applications from States which are desirous to obtain the assistance of the League;

"And requests the Council to follow closely the evolution of events and to take all measures necessary to assure that, at any moment, the decisions demanded by the situation may be taken without delay, and that the League of Nations may be in a position to render such service as may be demanded of it; and, in particular, to provide that the Financial Organisation of the League of Nations obtains the funds and the technical assistance necessary to permit it to afford to all States Members prompt and effective assistance whenever such assistance be sought, whether by means of delegations or advice or by any other means."

"This resolution emphasises a point which the events of the last few weeks have brought into the foreground—namely, the urgency with which certain action may be called for and the necessity of a procedure by which essential measures may be taken immediately without waiting for the Council to be convened or for the Financial Committee to meet.

"In order that such decisions as the situation may demand may be reached without delay, it seems to me that the most suitable arrangement would be that your President, in agreement with your Rapporteur (and after consultation with the Chairman of the Financial Committee) should be empowered to propose to you—by telegram if necessary—any steps which he may think necessary.

"I therefore move the following resolution:

"The Council:

"In order to allow such urgent decisions as the situation may demand to be taken, authorises its President, in agreement with its Rapporteur on financial questions (and after

<sup>1</sup> Document C.630.1931.II.A.

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consulting the Chairman of the Financial Committee) to propose to the individual members of the Council the adoption of such measures as he may think appropriate.'

" III. The third resolution passed by the Assembly is worded as follows:

" (3) In view of the fact that the Commission of Enquiry for European Union and its Sub-Committee of Economic Experts have given favourable consideration to M. Francqui's proposal to establish an institution for long- and medium-term credits.

" It requests the Council of the League of Nations to instruct the competent organs of the League to examine, as soon as possible, with the assistance especially of M. Francqui, the proposal submitted by the latter to the Sub-Committee of Economic Experts, and, in the event of any practical scheme being recommended under the auspices of the League, to ensure that it will be open for all countries to participate on an equal footing.'

" The proper procedure to carry out this resolution seems to me to be to refer M. Francqui's proposal to the appropriate body—namely, the Financial Committee.

" I therefore move the following resolution:

" ' The Council:

" ' Having considered the Assembly's resolution regarding the proposal submitted by M. Francqui to the Sub-Committee of Economic Experts, decides to request the Financial Committee to examine that proposal and asks it to secure the assistance of M. Francqui and of any other experts whose co-operation it may think necessary.' "

M. MASSIGLI, while approving the conclusions of the report, wished to emphasise the very great importance attaching, in his opinion, not only to the resolution concerning the Francqui Committee, but also to that under which the Council would invest the President with special powers to deal with urgent questions arising in the international financial sphere. That was an example of very flexible machinery set up by the Council, which might be found extremely useful in difficult circumstances.

Count BERNSTORFF, with reference to the second resolution, recalled the observations which the German representatives had put forward on several occasions, demonstrating the great importance attached by Germany to a study of this problem. He hoped that the Financial Committee, which had now been instructed to consider the whole question, would start work soon and submit to the Council definite proposals which would make it possible for the distinguished Belgian financier's scheme to be carried out promptly and effectively.

*The draft resolutions were adopted.*

**2939. Relief Measures and Epidemic Disease Control in the Flooded Areas of China.**

Mr. LESTER presented the following report and draft resolutions:<sup>1</sup>

" The Assembly has called our attention to the grave problems of relief and epidemic disease control resulting from the serious floods in the valley of the Yangtes River and elsewhere in China.

" The Assembly proposes that all States be asked to respond so far as is in their power, and in co-operation with the League of Nations, to the request for assistance in the flooded areas. The need for anti-epidemic measures is emphasised, in view of the international danger resulting from the prevalence of malaria, dysentery, cholera and typhus fever. We are asked to take the steps necessary to render international co-operation in these matters as effective as possible.

" There are two distinct problems facing the Government and people of China as a result of the disastrous floods.

" The first is the problem of relief.

" China has taken measures to cope with this problem by setting up a National Flood Relief Commission, by setting aside large sums for the purpose of relief, and by providing foodstuffs in large quantities for the people deprived of their livelihood.

" The Government of China has asked the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to recommend a League expert in relief work, preferably with experience in the Near East, to act as general director of the Headquarters of the National Flood Relief Commission. (The Secretary-General has addressed a note to the Council on this subject.)

" I am sure I am interpreting the views of my colleagues in expressing to the Government and people of China our sincere sympathy and our real admiration for the heroic manner in which they have set about to mitigate the sufferings of the flood victims.

" A number of countries have sent supplies, stores and other timely gifts to assist the sufferers.

<sup>1</sup> Document C.624.1931.III.



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My colleagues will join me in the hope that the resolutions of the Assembly and of the Council will result in a greater flow of the supplies necessary to relieve the victims of this disaster.

"The second important problem is that of epidemic disease control. While the desire to assist in the relief of the flood victims must be shared by all, the prevention of epidemics is an international obligation, in view of the danger to all countries in the Far East and possibly elsewhere which would result from the prevalence of the diseases I have mentioned above.

"It will be recalled that under similar circumstances the Health Organisation was able to co-ordinate the action of National Health Administrations in their campaigns against typhus fever in the eastern part of Europe in 1921. Governments were asked to make contributions to a fund to finance this co-ordinated campaign, and many responded generously.

"We may well follow this precedent in the present situation. Fortunately, representatives of our Health Organisation are in China, and at the request of the National Health Administration they have already taken steps to co-ordinate the assistance proposed by various countries which desire to share in the anti-epidemic campaign. These representatives, in touch with the National Health Administration, are in a position to appreciate the requirements for anti-epidemic measures, and we are informed that these include epidemiologists, sanitary engineers, medical staff and equipment, mobile bacteriological laboratories, quinine, oral dysentery and cholera vaccines, cyanide fumigation apparatus, etc.

"In these circumstances I would propose to my colleagues the adoption of the following resolutions:

I.

"The Council;

"Expresses its sympathy to the Government and people of China in view of the suffering and loss of life which have resulted from the floods in the Yangtze Valley;

"Views with admiration the efforts being put forth by the Government and people of China to cope with this disaster;

"Notes the request of China that the Secretary-General should recommend an expert with League experience to act as the General Director of the Headquarters of the National Flood Relief Commission and authorises the Secretary-General to comply with it;

"And invites all States to take every possible measure for the relief of the victims of the flood.

II.

"The Council;

"In view of the international danger resulting from the prevalence of epidemic diseases in the flooded area of China:

"Recalls the assistance rendered in similar circumstances by the League's Health Organisation in Poland and Greece in 1921 and 1923;

"Requests the Health Organisation to act on the request of the National Health Administration of China by co-ordinating the campaign against epidemic diseases, urges all Governments to give effect as far as possible to all requests received through the Secretariat for assistance in combating these epidemics;

"Draws the attention of Governments and the public to the particular need for contributions in money as well as for medical and health staff and supplies;

"Authorises the Secretary-General to receive and to transmit to the co-ordinating authorities such money contributions;

"And instructs the Secretary-General to communicate these resolutions to all States, and to take such action as may be necessary to give effect to their provisions."

Mr. Lester added that the Council would be glad to learn that a number of Governments and Health Administrations had already offered their assistance and co-operation in the campaign against epidemics in the flooded areas of China. The Government of the Netherlands had informed the Secretary-General that, thanks to a generous offer on the part of the *Kinabureau* at Amsterdam, it was in a position to send one thousand kilogrammes of quinine to relieve the victims of malaria in the flooded areas. Large amounts of vaccines had been despatched by Denmark and Poland and would be extremely useful in protecting the flood victims against cholera and dysentery. The Spanish Government was sending a medical officer who was an expert in cyanide fumigation and would be invaluable in the campaign against typhus fever.

The Council would undoubtedly wish to request the Secretary-General to express its grateful appreciation to these Governments for their prompt and generous offers.

M. SZE expressed his deep emotion at the draft resolutions. On behalf of his Government and the Chinese people he tendered his sincere thanks to the Council and likewise to all the Governments and peoples who had shown in numerous ways their sympathy for China in this hour of trial.

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Fortunately, the waters of the Yangtse had subsided during the last two weeks, but M. Sze was informed that sixteen provinces had been affected by the floods. The Chinese Government was taking every measure and making every effort to relieve the sufferings of those in distress, with the assistance lent from abroad both by experts and in the form of material and money. The problem was, not only that of relieving the sufferers from the floods, but also that of preventing the possible spread of disease.

*The draft resolutions were adopted.*

The SECRETARY-GENERAL submitted the following note<sup>1</sup> giving information with regard to the Chinese Government's request asking him to recommend an expert with League experience to direct relief operations:

"The Secretary-General has the honour to bring to the notice of the Council the following telegram which he has just received from the Government of China:

" 'Can you recommend League expert to assist flood relief China if possible one who has relief experience Near East — T. V. Soong.' "

"It will be observed that by this telegram the League is not invited itself to appoint a representative to assist in the work of flood relief, or to incur any expenses in connection therewith. On the other hand, as mention is made of a 'League expert', the Secretary-General does not feel authorised to make recommendations to the Chinese Government in accordance with the request contained in the telegram without the consent of the Council.

"Having in view the resolution adopted by the Assembly proposing certain action by the Members of the League in regard to flood relief in China, on which a report will be submitted to the Council at a later meeting, the Secretary-General trusts that the Council will have no difficulty in authorising him to reply to the request.

"It will be observed that the Chinese Government asks for an expert who 'has relief experience in the Near East'. It would also seem obvious that the person or persons recommended should have an adequate knowledge of the English language.

"From information received by the Secretary-General, it would appear that the following two persons fulfil the conditions laid down, and, if the Council agrees, the Secretary-General proposes to recommend them to the Chinese Government, in order that it may make its final choice:

"Sir John Hope SIMPSON, Assistant Commissioner of the League in Greece, in connection with the Greek Refugee Settlement plan; twenty years' experience as an Indian District Officer, including the handling of problems in India similar to those existing in China.

"M. Raymond SCHLEMMER, delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross for a number of years; has been connected with League work concerning Russian refugees in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece, and has organised relief work in Albania at the time of the Albanian famine."

The Secretary-General asked the Council's authorisation to take action in accordance with the above proposal.

*The Secretary-General's proposal was adopted.*

2940. **Public Works Programmes: Resolution adopted by the Assembly on September 24th, 1931.**

M. SOKAL presented the following report and draft resolution:<sup>2</sup>

"The Council has noted the following resolution adopted by the Assembly on September 24th, 1931:

" 'The Assembly:

" 'Seeing that, among the measures of international solidarity calculated to mitigate the effects of the economic depression and to assist the resumption of activity which would benefit the workers of all countries, consideration should be given to the execution of important public works jointly undertaken by public or private groups on European or extra-European territory;

" 'Seeing, further, that the problem has already been approached by the Commission of Enquiry for European Union and has been laid before the competent organs of the League of Nations;

" 'In order to expedite the examination of these programmes, to co-ordinate them on an international scale, to hasten their putting into effect and to follow their execution:

" 'Invites the Council of the League of Nations to instruct the Committee of Enquiry set up by the Communications and Transit Organisation, to which should be added

<sup>1</sup> Document C.613.1931.III.

<sup>2</sup> Document C.617.1931.VIII.

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representatives of the International Labour Office and possibly of the economic and financial organs of the League, to undertake these various tasks.

" ' This Committee will examine the concrete proposals of the various Governments, particularly from the point of view of the utility and productivity of the works proposed.

" ' It will report to the Council of the League of Nations. The Commission of Enquiry for European Union will be called on to give its opinion on the proposals relating to Europe.

" The Council will no doubt wish to give effect to this resolution.

" I have accordingly the honour to propose to the Council the adoption of the following resolution:

" ' The Council;

" ' Having noted the resolution adopted by the Assembly on September 24th, 1931, concerning public works programmes;

" ' Requests the Chairman of the Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit to invite the Committee of Enquiry into Questions of Public Works and National Equipment set up by that Committee to carry out the tasks indicated in that resolution under the conditions mentioned therein. ' "

*The draft resolution was adopted.*

(The Council went into private session.)

2941. **Proposed Gift for Malaria Research in Greece.**

M. MATOS presented the following report and draft resolution: <sup>1</sup>

" The Secretary-General has informed us that the gift offered by Mrs. David Simmons will not involve the League in any financial liability, and is therefore acceptable by the Council in accordance with the terms of Article 23 of the Financial Regulations.

" I would venture, therefore, to propose the following resolution:

" ' The Council:

" ' Accepts the gift offered by Mrs. David Simmons for financing malaria research in Greece on the conditions set out in the Secretary-General's note;

" ' Requests the Secretary-General to convey to the donor the warm appreciation of the Council for this generous gesture. ' "

*The draft resolution was adopted.*

<sup>1</sup> Document C.633.1931.X.

C./65th Session/P.V.7(1).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

SEVENTH MEETING (PUBLIC).

*Held on Wednesday, September 30th, 1931, at 4 p.m.*

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General.  
During the first part of the meeting, China was represented by M. WANG CHIA CHENG and Japan by M. SATO. France was represented by M. MASSIGLI, Germany by Count BERNSTORFF, Irish Free State by Mr. LESTER, Italy by M. Rosso, Peru by M. BARRETO, Poland by M. SOKAL, and Yugoslavia by M. FOTITCH.

2942. **Armaments Truce: Resolution adopted by the Assembly on September 29th, 1931.**

The PRESIDENT presented the following report:<sup>1</sup>

"At its sitting of September 29th, the Assembly adopted the report and the resolution presented to it by M. de Madariaga, Rapporteur of the Third Committee. The text of this resolution is as follows:

" 'Convinced that the crisis which at the present time is creating such profound disturbance among the nations of the world is due to a number of economic and political causes originating principally in the lack of mutual confidence between the nations; and

" 'Convinced that a renewal of the competition in armaments would necessarily lead to an international and social catastrophe:

" 'The Assembly addresses a solemn appeal to all those who are desirous that practical effect should be given to the principles of peace and justice upon which the Covenant is based and urges them to devote all their efforts towards creating a world opinion strong enough to enable the General Disarmament Conference to achieve positive results, including, in particular, a gradual reduction of armaments to be continued until such time as the object laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant is attained.

" 'In view of the fact that an undertaking on the part of all States not to increase their armaments would help to create an atmosphere of confidence, to prevent competition in armaments and to prepare the ground for the success of the forthcoming Conference:

" 'The Assembly requests the Governments invited to the Disarmament Conference to prepare for this event by means of an armaments truce; and, accordingly,

" 'Requests the Council to urge the Governments convened to the said Conference to give proof of their earnest desire for the successful issue of the efforts to ensure and organise peace and, without prejudging the decisions of the Conference or the programmes or proposals submitted to it by each Government, to refrain from any measure involving an increase in their armaments;

" 'Likewise requests the Council to ask the Governments to state, before November 1st, 1931, whether they are prepared for a period of one year as from that date to accept this truce in armaments.'

"If my colleagues agree with me, I will suggest that the Council should request the Secretary-General to communicate the text of this resolution to the Governments invited to the Disarmament Conference and to ask them whether, in accordance with the terms of the last paragraph of the said resolution, they are prepared to accept the armaments truce proposed by the Assembly.

<sup>1</sup> Document C.639.1931.IX.

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"I would further suggest to the Council to authorise the Secretary-General to take, in consultation with the President, such measures as may be necessary for the distribution to the States invited to the Conference of the replies of the various Governments so as to enable them to consider the said replies."

Viscount CECIL thought the words "and to take a final decision thereon" should be added to the last paragraph of the report. No Government would be able to say definitely how far it could participate in the truce until it knew what other Governments were going to do. Some *locus paenitentiae* must therefore be reserved to the Governments concerned.

M. SATO supported Lord Cecil's proposal.

*The conclusions of the report were adopted, together with the amendment proposed by the British representative.*

**2943. Information on the Position of Armaments: Resolution adopted by the Assembly on September 29th, 1931.**

The PRESIDENT presented the following report:<sup>1</sup>

"At its meeting on September 29th, the Assembly adopted the following resolution with regard to information concerning the position of armaments in the various countries:

"The Assembly,

"Noting that, of the sixty-three Governments invited to participate in the Disarmament Conference, twenty-five have up to the present communicated information on the position of their armaments in conformity with the recommendation made by the Council at its January and May sessions:

"Requests the Council to invite the Governments which have not yet transmitted their replies to the circular letters from the Secretary-General dated February 17th and June 13th, 1931, on the position of their armaments, to do so as soon as possible, and in any case before November 1st, 1931, in order to enable the Secretariat to provide the Disarmament Conference with adequate documentation."

"In view of the great importance of the proper preparation of the documents for the Disarmament Conference, I have accordingly the honour to propose to the Council that it should ask the Secretary-General to communicate with those Governments invited to the Conference which have not yet sent their replies with regard to the position of their armaments, urging them to despatch those replies so that they may reach the League Secretariat not later than November 1st next."

*The conclusions of the report were adopted.*

**2944. General Convention to improve the Means of preventing War: Resolution adopted by the Assembly on September 26th, 1931.**

The PRESIDENT presented the following report:<sup>2</sup>

"At its meeting on Saturday, September 26th, after examining the text of the General Convention to improve the Means of preventing War and the report relating thereto by M. de Madariaga, Rapporteur of the Third Committee, which were circulated to the Council, the Assembly adopted the following resolution:

"The Assembly,

"1. Taking note of the report submitted to it on behalf of the Third Committee;

"2. Thanking the Special Committee for the admirable work it has done towards the framing of the draft General Convention to improve the Means of preventing War:

"3. Approves the text of the said Convention which has been drawn up by the Third Committee;

"4. Decides to open the Convention for signature by the States Members of the League and by those non-member States to which the Council of the League shall have communicated a copy of the Convention for that purpose;

"5. Earnestly trusts that a large number of States will sign the Convention before the opening of the forthcoming General Disarmament Conference; and

"6. Requests the Council to make the necessary arrangements in good time for the preparation of the rules referred to in the last paragraph of Article 4, in order that, should circumstances so dictate, the Convention may be put into effect immediately upon its entry into force."

"Paragraphs 4 and 6 of this resolution entrust certain duties to the Council in regard to the communication of the Convention to non-member States and the preparation of the rules to be followed in regard to the composition and working of the commissions of control referred to in the last paragraph of Article 4 of that Convention.

<sup>1</sup> Document C.640.1931.IX.

<sup>2</sup> Document C.625(1).1931.IX.

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"As regards the first question, I would suggest that the Council authorise the Secretary-General to communicate a copy of the Convention to the non-member States invited to the General Disarmament Conference and request them to sign that Convention.

"As regards the question of the rules referred to in the last paragraph of Article 4 of the Convention, the Council might decide that these regulations should be drawn up by its Permanent Advisory Commission for Military, Naval and Air Questions. To this Commission would be added the Legal Adviser of the League of Nations and the Secretary-General of the Transit Organisation. If necessary, the Commission could also call in the assistance of other experts.

"As the members of the Commission will all be at Geneva for the Disarmament Conference, the Commission might meet at the beginning of the Conference.

"Once the regulations have been drawn up by the Commission and approved by the Council, they can be forwarded by the Secretary-General to the Governments of the States invited to the Disarmament Conference."

Viscount CECIL believed that the Permanent Advisory Commission had not met for two or three years. He did not know whether it had always been successful in reaching conclusions. Furthermore, it consisted of forty-two persons, which made it rather an expensive body.

M. MASSIGLI appreciated Lord Cecil's point of view. It seemed to him, however, that, in this particular case, the body in question was the most competent. In the first place, Article 9 of the Covenant was very clear in this respect. Further, though it was true that the Permanent Advisory Commission had not met for a long time, it nevertheless existed. Its President was appointed in rotation for three months, and the Secretariat informed the members of the Commission of the composition of the Bureau.

With regard to the number of members, M. Massigli pointed out that regulations would have to be drawn up for military, naval and air questions. Consequently, the body to which the Council had recourse must include persons competent to deal with the question from the military, naval and air aspects.

Finally, the question of expenditure did not arise, since it was proposed to convene the Commission during the Disarmament Conference. Everyone would therefore be on the spot. As the members of the Commission would doubtless have some spare time during the Conference, they might very well meet to draw up the regulations in question.

No serious difficulty, therefore, would arise. Moreover, this question was one of those covered by Article 9 of the Covenant, and the provisions of that article should be complied with.

With regard to the question itself, M. Massigli added that he had every reason to suppose that his Government would be in a position to sign the Convention before February 2nd, 1932, the date fixed in the Convention itself.

Viscount CECIL said he would not persist in his opposition, in view of what his French colleague had said. He merely hoped that the future deliberations of the Permanent Advisory Commission would be more fortunate than those which had taken place in the past.

Count BERNSTORFF was glad that the Convention to improve the Means of preventing War had been achieved, seeing that it was the German delegate who had proposed such a Convention in the Committee on Arbitration and Security in 1928. He noted with satisfaction that it had been possible to obtain unanimity, after efforts which had lasted for several years, with regard to the text which had been adopted. He was convinced that the Convention would greatly contribute to the maintenance and organisation of peace and hoped that, should circumstances arise, it would prove a practical and effective instrument for safeguarding peace. He noted with the greatest satisfaction that several States had already signed the Convention, and he was sure that the German Government would affix its signature with the least possible delay.

*The conclusions of the report were adopted.*

(The meeting was adjourned at 5 p.m. and resumed at 5.45 p.m.)

2945. **Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant** (continuation).

The PRESIDENT read the following statement:

My colleagues will remember that on Monday, September 28th, the Council adjourned its discussion of this question in order to give to its members the opportunity of studying carefully the statements which had then been made. It was also agreed that the President of the Council should ask the permission of the Assembly to give an impartial report on the question and on the manner in which the Council had so far carried out its duties under Article 11 of the Covenant. This statement, as is known, I had the honour to make before the Assembly at its meeting yesterday.

I do not know if my colleagues will agree with me, but, after examining the most recent statements made before the Council on this subject, I have the impression that it may be of advantage to emphasise the essential point of the problem. Under that article of the Covenant under which an appeal has been made to the Council, the duty of the League is "to take such action as may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations", and the Council, in viewing the actual situation before it in the light of this injunction, has singled out one object as being of immediate and paramount importance—namely, the withdrawal of troops to the railway zone. Nevertheless, it could not but admit that, in the special circumstances, a certain time had to be allowed for the withdrawal, particularly in order to ensure the safety of life and property.

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Both the parties have concurred with other Members of the Council in recognising, without prejudice to their views as to the method of settlement of questions outstanding between them, the essential importance of the withdrawal of the troops in accordance with the above conditions, and the parties have each taken steps to that end.

In these circumstances, I am inclined to think that no useful purpose would be served by continuing our discussions at the present moment. A certain amount of time, which the Council, together with the parties, will desire to be as short as possible, is still required for the complete withdrawal of troops to the railway zone.

In my opinion, the Council, which must watch closely the development of the situation, will in present circumstances best serve the interests of peace and good understanding by adjourning for a short time, and I therefore beg to propose the resolution which is before you.

I should add that suggestions have been made, verbally or in writing, for obtaining information on the spot. The discussion of the resolution will give the authors of these proposals the opportunity of explaining them, if they so desire.

It is understood that the Council, which, as I have said, will follow the further developments of this affair with deep interest, will be ready at all times to render any assistance that may be useful.

The President then read the following draft resolution:<sup>1</sup>

"The Council,

"1. Notes the replies of the Chinese and Japanese Governments to the urgent appeal addressed to them by its President and the steps that have already been taken in response to that appeal;

"2. Recognises the importance of the Japanese Government's statement that it has no territorial designs in Manchuria;

"3. Notes the Japanese representative's statement that his Government will continue, as rapidly as possible, the withdrawal of its troops, which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be;

"4. Notes the Chinese representative's statement that his Government will assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police forces are re-established;

"5. Being convinced that both Governments are anxious to avoid taking any action which might disturb the peace and good understanding between the two nations, notes that the Chinese and Japanese representatives have given assurances that their respective Governments will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation;

"6. Requests both parties to do all in their power to hasten the restoration of normal relations between them and for that purpose to continue and speedily complete the execution of the above-mentioned undertakings;

"7. Requests both parties to furnish the Council at frequent intervals with full information as to the development of the situation;

"8. Decides, in the absence of any unforeseen occurrence which might render an immediate meeting essential, to meet again at Geneva on Wednesday, October 14th, 1931, to consider the situation as it then stands;

"9. Authorises its President to cancel the meeting of the Council fixed for October 14th should he decide, after consulting his colleagues, and more particularly the representatives of the two parties, that, in view of such information as he may have received from the parties or from other members of the Council as to the development of the situation, the meeting is no longer necessary."

M. YOSHIKAWA accepted the draft resolution submitted by the President. With regard to the information to be obtained on the spot, a question to which several of his colleagues apparently attached great importance, he drew attention again to what he had already said. In his view, and in the view of his Government, it would be quite useless to take special measures in this respect, particularly as there were a great many persons on the spot from whom the Council could obtain information. However, in order to facilitate the task of his colleagues, some of whom might not be able easily to obtain information from sources of their own, M. Yoshikawa suggested that each member of the Council should send to the Secretary-General any information which his Government might have received on the spot and which he thought it desirable and useful to communicate to the other Members of the Council.

M. SZE noted that the Japanese representative now recognised that neutral information was required by the Council in order that its task might be facilitated.

He noted further the Council's request that it should be given complete and frequent information as to the progress of events, and he assured the Council that the Chinese Government would be glad to comply with that request.

By these means, and in the light of the Japanese representative's statement, M. Sze hoped that, as a first step towards the restoration of normal relations between the two countries, the

<sup>1</sup> Document C.648.1931.VII.

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unfortunate situation with which the Council was now dealing would speedily come to an end. In this connection, he noted with satisfaction that, by the terms of the proposed resolution, the Council was conscious of its responsibility for helping both parties to secure the complete and prompt withdrawal of the armed forces of Japan and the full re-establishment of the *status quo ante*, and would remain in session until that responsibility was fully discharged. That, indeed, was made clear in the appeal which the Council had addressed to the parties on September 22nd, when it had authorised its President, in consultation with the parties, to endeavour to find adequate means of enabling the withdrawal of troops to take place forthwith without endangering the safety of life or property.

The Chinese representative recognised that, if by October 14th the complete withdrawal and the re-establishment of the *status quo ante* had been effected, the measures at present being employed would have proved adequate; but if, contrary to the strongly expressed hope of his Japanese colleague—a hope that was shared by the Council and the Chinese Government—this happy result was not achieved by that date, the Council would, of course, have to examine what other measures might be required in the circumstances.

Upon that head, M. Sze had made two proposals: first, a committee of enquiry; and, secondly, local arrangements. The Council would no doubt give them due consideration on October 14th in the course of its general survey of the situation, but he must repeat that he fervently hoped and believed—as did all his colleagues on the Council—that by that date no such action would prove necessary.

With reference to the President's statement, the Chinese representative had not failed to recognise that the complete withdrawal of the armed forces of Japan and the full re-establishment of the *status quo ante*, while a distinct and separate matter, constituted but a single and preliminary step in the adjustment of the controversy which the Government of China had submitted to the Council. He therefore deemed it proper to say that, when the complete and full re-establishment of the *status quo ante* had been effected, the Government of China reserved all its rights under the Covenant and would continue to look to the Council for aid in determining the several responsibilities of the two parties for the events which had occurred since the night of September 18th, and the fixing of the reparation justly due. It was with the foregoing understanding that the Chinese representative accepted the resolution.

M. YOSHIZAWA was unable to accept the interpretation placed by the Chinese representative on the resolution before the Council. He only accepted the draft resolution as it stood.

*The draft resolution was adopted.*

The PRESIDENT was glad to note that the Council approved the resolution unanimously. There was, he thought, no need to go into matters of interpretation at the present stage. The rights of both parties obviously remained intact. Either would be entitled, if necessary, to submit his point of view to the Council later.

Before the members of the Council separated, the President wished, on behalf of his colleagues, to tender to the Chinese and Japanese representatives his deepest thanks for the highmindedness and courtesy they had shown.

M. SZE begged to express to the President his sincere thanks for the very able and impartial manner in which he had presided over the discussions.

M. YOSHIZAWA associated himself entirely with the sentiments expressed by the Chinese representative.

In conformity with the resolution just adopted, the PRESIDENT adjourned the session to October 14th.




DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quintanilla NARS, Date 12-18-75




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RECD  
EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Lima, October 18, 1931.



OCT 24 31



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
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To the

Ind. S. 21

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.



S i r:

I have the honor to refer to my despatches  
793.94/1980  
No. 1057 of September 26th, No. 1111 of October  
9th and No. 1114 of October 12th, concerning the  
Manchurian imbroglio and to inform the Department  
that at a dinner last night to the Under Secretary  
of the Foreign Office, Señor Enrique Carrillo, who  
is going to Bogotá as Peruvian Minister to Colombia,  
the Japanese Minister, Mr. Kurusu, approached me and  
remarked with a shade of complaint in his voice and

apropos

793.94/2335

-2-

apropos of nothing that Japan seemed to have no friends. He then immediately launched into a conversation regarding the Manchurian situation, which he kept up for the next half hour.

He complained bitterly of the League, remarking that none of the smaller nations in Europe knew a blessed thing about Manchuria and that it was fantastic for them to be meddling in Manchurian affairs. He said that the only nations that understood the Manchurian situation were Great Britain and the United States and that Great Britain at the present moment had such serious difficulties of her own to deal with that she could not give the Far Eastern situation adequate attention. This, he said, left the United States alone, and he said that as far as he was personally concerned he would welcome the friendly intervention of the United States in contributing to a peaceful solution of the conflict, as he felt sure of the impartiality of our country. He thought the League, however, was taking far too much upon itself and was concerned not nearly so much with Manchurian affairs as with enhancing its own prestige.

He wanted to know where Mr. Gibson was and where Mr. Wilson could be and seemed puzzled that the discussions in Geneva should have been entrusted to our Consul General there, Mr. Gilbert. I remarked to the Minister that Mr. Gilbert had long been associated with our Western European Division and League

questions

-3-

questions and that in sending him to Geneva, it was expected that he would have other duties than those of a merely consular character and would act as a sort of observer of League activities. The Minister acted as if he could not quite understand why Mr. Gilbert had been selected to speak for us, but expressed his satisfaction that Mr. Gilbert was not to vote and was not, as he put it, to concern himself with the merits of the question.

Mr. Kurusu said that of course Japan wanted to observe the Kellogg Pact. I told him that as far as I was concerned there was no unfriendliness whatsoever to Japan, but that I merely wished to keep a perfectly open mind, and that I thought our Government desired to act as a disinterested friend and for the purpose of having the difficulties solved, if possible, by peaceful processes and in the spirit of the Kellogg Pact, which condemned the use of war as an instrument of public policy. The Minister remarked that he, the Foreign Office and the more enlightened people in Japan quite understood our interest in the Manchurian situation and in maintaining the spirit of the Kellogg Pact. He remarked, however, that the Japanese had not forgotten Secretary Knox's attempts to neutralize the Chinese Eastern Railway or Mr. Straight's activities in Mukden a number of years ago, and said that therefore the more uninformed Japanese were concerned as

to

-4-

to our activity now and were wondering just what it all meant and why Mr. Gilbert should be taking part in the League conversations.

Mr. Kurusu said that he could perfectly understand the Chinese situation, that of course Chang Kai Shek and the Foreign Minister had to make the declarations they had made, since otherwise they might suffer personal violence and the Canton hot-heads might get busy again and upset the Chinese situation even more than it is at present. He gave it as his opinion that Chang Kai Shek and the Foreign Minister did not, however, really wish to go to war and said that he thought the difficulty could be settled by direct negotiation between the two Governments. I could only guess as to how far the Minister was giving me his own opinion or reflecting instructions from his Government.


Mr. Kurusu and Mr. Ouei, the Chinese Minister, have been very good friends. Mr. Kurusu told me he had spoken to his Chinese Colleague and told him that in the present confusion somebody would have to keep cool and keep a level head, that Ouei agreed with him and that the two of them had decided they would not publish anything in the papers except what they were ordered to publish by their Governments and that they would discourage any hostile activity on the part of their respective colonies. Mr. Kurusu

said

-5-

said that clashes between the two colonies would not only be disastrous to the colonies themselves, but would make a very bad impression in Peru and be embarrassing to the Peruvian Government. He seemed to think that he and the Chinese Minister could keep the situation here quiet.

Respectfully yours,

  
Fred Morris Dearing.

FMD-hkl

P.S. Please see my telegram No. 341 of October 17th, 3 p.m.. This information was confirmed to me last night by the Official Mayor of the Foreign Office, Señor Carrillo.

F.M.D.



*re Chaco +  
Memorandum*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*EE*

THE UNDER SECRETARY  
OCT <sup>19</sup> 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON.

October 19th, 1931.

PERSONAL.

793.94  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 23 1931  
Department of State

RECEIVED  
OCT 24 1931  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

My dear Mr. Secretary,

I telegraphed to Lord Reading  
in the sense of our conversation on Friday  
evening the 16th and I have now received a  
reply from him.

He hopes that his telegram to the  
Foreign Office, copy of which I enclose for  
your information, will show you that their  
chief preoccupation at Geneva has been to  
do everything possible to fall in with your  
wishes and as far as possible to remove any  
difficulty you might have to meet, in taking  
the very important step of allowing an  
American representative to sit at the Council  
table. In giving you the above message I am

The Honourable

Henry L. Stimson,

Secretary of State of the United States,  
Washington, D. C.

to/

MAR 24 1932

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793.94/2336

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON.

to add that there never was any intention of  
leaving you to take the sole initiative in  
invoking the Pact of Paris, that any impression  
you may have gained to that effect is due to a  
misunderstanding, and <sup>that</sup> you can rely on him to  
maintain the closest possible cooperation with  
you and with your representative in Geneva.

Believe me,

My dear Mr. Secretary,

Very sincerely yours,

D. G. Owen.

Copy of telegram from Lord Reading, Geneva,  
to Foreign Office, London, repeated  
to British Embassy, Washington.

October 17th.

"United States Representative this afternoon (October 17th), told me that Mr. Stimson attached great importance to immediate invocation of Pact of Paris and that he would be satisfied if four Ministers for Foreign Affairs here present would act at once from Geneva without waiting for other members of Council.

Draft telegram was submitted to private meeting of Council this evening and I and French and Italian and Norwegian Ministers for Foreign Affairs agreed to telegraph at once in those terms to Chinese and Japanese Governments through our respective representatives in Nanking and Tokio. German delegate stated that he had just received authorization from his Government to take similar action. I am therefore sending to Nanking and Tokio telegram which is repeated in my en clair telegram of today and French, Italian, German and Norwegian delegates

are/



are sending identic telegrams to their representatives. Other members of Council are recommending their Governments to take similar action immediately.

United States representative had asked that those who took this action should immediately notify all other signatories of Pact of Paris including U. S. Government, who wished for no special or separate notification. It was agreed that it would be unnecessary for all five delegates who were taking action to notify separately all other signatories and Monsieur Briand undertook to make this notification indicating to all signatory Governments which were taking action.

Press is being informed tonight that in the course of Council deliberations this afternoon it was agreed that Pact of Paris to which reference had already been made in earlier proceedings should now formally be invoked and that certain Government has already taken necessary steps.


As regards general situation little progress can be reported. Monsieur Briand informed Council that Japanese delegate had told him that his Government  
could/

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

could not accept proposal regarding neutral officers but it seemed to him that Japanese delegate had not represented matter clearly to his Government who were under the impression that League Commission was still contemplated.

First draft resolution embodying Council's conclusions was circulated to members of Council at close of meeting this evening and will come up for discussion at private meeting at 11 o'clock tomorrow morning. "

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



The Secretary:

I attach a letter handed me by Mr. Osborne.  
During my talk with Mr. Osborne I gave him a full  
statement as to our attitude toward Gilbert's further  
participation in the meetings of the League of  
Nations. Mr. Osborne seemed thoroughly to understand  
and I believe you have since discussed the matter with  
the Ambassador himself and this makes it doubly  
safe.

WLC

F.W.-792.94/2336

U WRC:GMH

OCT 24 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

V  
October 22, 1931.

Digest of  
Newspaper Items.

NEW YORK TIMES

The following summary of developments in Manchuria is given:

"Postponement of League action in the Manchurian dispute is forecast in Geneva, where the committee of five principal powers has drafted a resolution to adjourn and await events. Belief that the United States has weakened in its attitude is given as the chief reason for this development, although Mr. Gilbert, our delegate, denies there has been any change in our attitude.

"Fighting between Japanese and disbanded Chinese troops has been renewed at Hiehling, forty-five miles north of Mukden.

"Japan is willing to change the last of her five demands, the one for railroad cooperation, but in answer to the League insists China shall suppress boycotts and safeguard her treaty rights and her nationals.

"Washington denies any weakening in its attitude and believes the growing reasonableness of Japan and China will bring about a settlement. Mr. Stimson is permitting the League to work out its policy without interference.

"Nanking

733.94/2237

- 2 -

"Nanking denies reports from Geneva that it has accepted the Japanese demand on railways. Canton delegates have arrived there for a peace conference and demand the retirement of Chiang Kai-shek."

Geneva despatch, October 21 (Lansing Warren), states that "the Council has been exhausted by its effort to break down the strong position of the Japanese, and today is determined to resort to the less difficult alternative of overriding the objections of appealing China". The Chinese delegation said that they will not agree.

Shanghai despatch, October 21 (Hallett Abend), reported that Canton delegates had arrived to negotiate peace with Nanking, with the understanding that Chiang Kai-shek should retire. This was denied by Nanking.

Tokyo despatch, October 21 (Hugh Byas), states as follows:

"If China decides to recognize all her treaty commitments, ---an amicable settlement will result quickly, but if China refuses---the League of Nations and the signers of the Briand-Kellogg anti-war pact can---wash their hands of the affair".

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

Tokyo despatch, October 22 (A. P.), states that the Japanese garrison at Tiehling, 45 miles north of Mukden, is fighting with 2,000 Chinese troops. Japanese reinforcements are being sent from Mukden.

Tokyo

- 3 -

Tokyo despatch, October 21 (Wilfred Fleisher), quotes the text of Japan's reply to the members of the League Council and the United States, attacking the Chinese position and pleading self-defense.

Peiping despatch, October 21 (A. P.), states that Japanese military authorities have notified the "Young Marshal", Chung Hsueh-liang "that his presence was not desired in Mukden".

*CRB*

CBC/REK

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated **FROM**  
to anyone.

NANKING

Dated October 26, 1931

Rec'd 12:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

URGENT

October 26, 7 p.m.

One. Following telegram in identic words ~~being~~  
despatched this evening by my British and French  
colleagues:

Two. "The President summoned me and my French  
and British colleagues (the German Minister having left  
for Shanghai) to meet him this evening October 26th.

He opened the discussion by expressing his warm  
appreciation of the proceedings at Geneva. Turning  
to the Council's draft resolution of October 24th  
he said that regardless of what Japan might do  
regarding it, China was determined to carry out its  
terms. He therefore invited us to nominate representatives  
to observe transfer of evacuated areas as provided for  
in paragraph four of draft resolution and to communicate  
the names of our respective representatives. He  
said we could immediately report to our respective  
governments and with their approval consider whom we  
should send. The President expressed the desire that  
we should



Telegram drafted  
to Nanking Oct. 27,  
1931

OCT 27 1931

793.94/2338

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OCT 29 1931  
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AM

2-from Nanking, October 26, 1931  
7 p.m. .

we should each of us nominate at least two representatives, civil and military, but the more the better and hold them in readiness until required"

Three. I explained that I would seek your instructions and inform him at once of our response to this invitation. He wants us to give him names of our representatives for publication along with Chinese appointees.

Four. I told the President that I would go to Shanghai to remain until about the 16th but that I would be available at any time should he desire my presence here.

JOHNSON

WSB



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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or  
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\$

Department of State

Washington,

October 27, 1931.

793.94/2338  
AMERICAN CONSUL,  
NANKING (CHINA).

OCT 27 31

*Spur*

For the Minister.

103

Your October 26, 7 p.m.

The Department feels that any action which may be proposed in connection with paragraph four of the resolution voted upon by the Council on October 24 should be taken in the first instance by the Council or Governments members of the League. Throughout this dispute the position of the American Government has been and continues to be that, as China referred the dispute to the League and as the League is dealing with the matter, this Government does not desire to create confusion by itself assuming an independent initiative, and this Government has been and is prepared to <sup>reinforce</sup> ~~support~~ in so far as is practicable efforts made by the League toward adjusting the present dispute by peaceful means. Until this Government is informed specifically with regard to action taken by League members in relation to paragraph four of the resolution

793.94/2338

*SKH*

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

of

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Washington,

-2-

of October 24, it prefers to refrain from commitment  
in regard to the request under reference.

*Stinson*  
*W/*

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CR  
*kuu*  
27.19.1.1

*W/*  
FE:MMH:EMF  
*W.H.*


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Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY



Mr. McBride:

Far Eastern Division is  
preparing telegram to Geneva  
conveying most of this for  
communication to Drummond.  
Will you so inform the Secretary?

*8/14*

*This is most important -  
I want Mr. Castle et al to  
consider whether & when we should  
give a résumé of it, & S.'s reports  
to Shudshane 1/21*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

THE UNDER SECRETARY

OCT 14 1931

October 14, 1931.

Mr. Castle: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

743-ay  
The Far Eastern Division feels strongly that, unless we choose to assume position of a mediator (which in international relations is a step not to be taken without some deliberation and, usually, after being invited to do so) or that of a prosecutor, we should go very slow about telling any official of the Japanese Government very much about what is being reported to us by our observers.

We assume that the Japanese know that we have been told what the observers have been able to see with their own eyes; that they know on whom the observers called and substantially what the observers were told. In other words, they know that we know the essential facts with regard to what has occurred and what is occurring.

In addition, we have little doubt but that they know the actual contents of the incoming communications to us in Gray code by radio. We feel that we should not go on record to the Japanese with statements of what we know. We perceive no particular advantage to be derived from so doing and we feel that there would be at least two possible disadvantages: (a) we would appear to be/convicting Japan of something, and (b) we would be impairing the usefulness of our observers.

In

790.94/2339

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1-22-1931

- 2 -

In this connection, I think we should take full cognizance of the fact that the Japanese Foreign Office and its representatives are not at this moment directing the policy of the Japanese State: they are acting as Japan's attorneys in international relations; they are not determining Japan's policy and action; they are conducting Japan's case in the court of world opinion and foreign relations. What we have said or may say to Baron Shidehara may affect our relations with Japan but will not sweeten the milk which has gone sour in Manchuria.

*I concur*  
*Wiley*

*SKH*

SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 20, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

OCT 20 1931

Since the memorandum here-  
under was drafted, last evening,  
there has come in Geneva's 224  
(attached).

The contents of this telegram  
reenforces my impression of the  
situation as expressed in the  
memorandum.

*SKH*

SKH/ZMF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 20, 1931

793.94  
OCT 22 1931  
DIVISION OF  
THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE AND ITS  
INTENDED NEW RESOLUTION.

OCT 20 1931

The Council is working on a new resolution to deal with the Sino-Japanese dispute. The text they first formulated contains provisions which, in our opinion, would be unacceptable to the Japanese. That, however, I think we need not let worry us.

Lord Reading has stated that they will confer with the Chinese and the Japanese about the provisions before adopting the resolution. We have noted that they have dropped (for the time being only, I surmise) the provision about negotiation in presence of observers. It is probable, I feel, that they are keeping that in reserve. It is also quite conceivable that they are deliberately drafting some impossible-of-acceptance provisions in the expectation of submitting them and then, when they are objected to, substituting others, such as the "observers" scheme -- thereby enhancing the chance of acceptance of the latter.

Notwithstanding my view that they have blundered in having so rushed the consideration of the Kellogg Pact and Gilbert's reception as to have brushed aside Japan's demand for consideration of the constitutional point -- thereby giving the Japanese the opportunity, in objecting, to base their

793.94/2340

- 2 -

their objection on technical grounds --, I am of the impression that M. Briand and Lord Reading are experts in negotiation; and, although they may not know a great deal about Manchuria and the Chinese and the Japanese, I am sure that they have sufficient knowledge of the art, the methods and all the finesses of European diplomacy (on which in large measure Japanese diplomacy is modelled). I therefore have the feeling that, although they may not possess or acquire full and accurate knowledge of the facts in the Manchuria situation or of the underlying causes of the controversy, they will not be excelled in alertness and resourcefulness as to ways and means for achieving their objective by either China's or Japan's diplomats.

Their objective in this matter is, fortunately, the same as ours: to keep the Far East "out of war". With the support that we have given them, they are in a very strong position.

They did pretty well, at the time and under the circumstances, in formulating and getting adopted the Resolution of September 30. It is my feeling that we may rely on them to do as well as can be done in the efforts which they are making currently on their forthcoming Resolution, and that, unless and until they consult us about its possible contents, we should entertain no misgivings with regard to the progress of those efforts and should avoid any semblance of participation -- whether by expression of doubt or by constructive

suggestion\* --



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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suggestion\* -- in the making of it.

\*(NOTE: Our suggestion with regard to direct negotiations in the presence of observers has already been planted in the minds of Sir Eric Drummond and Mr. Debuchi. It will be all "to the good" if it be put forward as emanating from a Japanese, <sup>a</sup> Council or a Chinese source.)

SKH

SKH/ZMF

MICROCOPY

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ROLL

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END

